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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/78218-0.txt b/78218-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ea11ef --- /dev/null +++ b/78218-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5939 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78218 *** + + The Great Betrayal + + (La Trahison des Clercs) + + + By + Julien Benda + + + Translated by + Richard Aldington + + + London + George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. + Broadway House, Carter Lane, E.C. + 1928. + + + PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY + STEPHEN AUSTIN AND SONS, LTD., HERTFORD. + + + + + _Contents_ + + Translator’s Note + Author’s Foreword + I - The Modern Perfecting of Political Passions + II - Significance of this Movement--Nature of Political Passions + III - The ‘Clerks’--The Great Betrayal + IV - Summary--Predictions + Notes + [Footnotes] + [Transcriber’s Notes] + + + + +_Translator’s Note_ + + +The title of M. Benda’s book is _La Trahison des Clercs_. The word +‘Clercs’, which occurs throughout the book, is defined by M. Benda’s +as ‘all those who speak to the world in a transcendental manner’. I +do not know the English word for ‘all those who speak to the world +in a transcendental manner’. But in Chaucer’s time the word ‘clerk’ +(‘a clerke of Oxenforde’) meant anyone who was not a ‘layman’, a word +employed by M. Benda as the antithesis to ‘clerk’. We still use the +word in this sense when we speak of a ‘clerk in holy orders’ and retain +its root in ‘cleric’. A ‘cleric’ is the person described by M. Benda as +‘pre-eminently a clerk’. If the words ‘in holy orders’ are subtracted +from ‘a clerk in holy orders’, the remaining ‘clerk’ is roughly what M. +Benda means, though he also uses ‘clerk’ to include ‘a clerk in holy +orders’. Nowadays a clerk is a person who performs sedentary labour in +an office, and the word in England is pronounced ‘clark’. In America a +clerk (pronounced ‘clurrk’) is what the English call a shop-assistant. +In order to avoid a misleading title I have called this translation +_The Great Betrayal_, giving M. Benda’s title in brackets afterwards. +Where the word ‘clerk’ first occurs in the book, I have added the words +‘in the medieval sense’, and throughout the text I have invariably +written the word in inverted commas, ‘clerk’, to avoid any possible +misunderstanding. + +I should add that the words ‘real’ and ‘realism’ are nearly always +used in this book as the antithesis to ‘ideal’ and ‘idealism’. Other +abstract words are used in a rather special sense which I hope will be +plain from the context. + + R. A. + + + + + ‘The world is suffering from lack of faith + in a transcendental truth.’ + + _Renouvier._ + + + + +_Author’s Foreword_ + + +Tolstoi relates that when he was in the Army he saw one of his brother +officers strike a man who fell out from the ranks during a march. +Tolstoi said to him:-- + +‘Are you not ashamed to treat a fellow human being in this way? Have +you not read the Gospels?’ + +The other officer replied:-- + +‘And have you not read Army Orders?’ + +This retort will always be thrown back at the spiritual man who tries +to take the direction of the material. To me it seems a very wise one. +Those who lead men to the conquest of material things have no need of +justice and charity. + +Nevertheless I think it important that there should be men--even if +they are scorned--who urge their fellow beings to other religions than +the religion of the material. Now, those who should play this part +(to whom I have given the name of ‘clerks’ in the medieval sense of +the word) have not only ceased to do so, but are playing an exactly +contrary part. Most of the influential moralists of the past fifty +years in Europe, particularly the men of letters in France, call upon +mankind to sneer at the Gospel and to read Army Orders. + +This new teaching seems to me all the more deserving of serious +attention because it is addressed to a humanity which of its own +volition is now established in materialism with a decisiveness hitherto +unknown. And I shall begin by showing this to be true. + + + + +I + +_The Modern Perfecting of Political Passions_ + + +We are to consider those passions termed political, owing to which men +rise up against other men, the chief of which are racial passions, +class passions and national passions. Those persons who are most +determined to believe in the inevitable progress of the human species, +especially in its indispensable movement towards more peace and +love, cannot deny that during the past century these passions have +attained--and day by day increasingly so--in several most important +directions, a degree of perfection hitherto unknown in history. + +In the first place they affect a large number of men they never before +affected. When, for example, we study the civil wars which convulsed +France in the sixteenth century, and even those at the end of the +eighteenth century, we are struck by the small number of persons +whose minds were really disturbed by these events. While history, up +to the nineteenth century, is filled with long European wars which +left the great majority of people completely indifferent, apart from +the material losses they themselves suffered,[1] it may be said that +to-day there is scarcely a mind in Europe which is not affected--or +thinks itself affected--by a racial or class or national passion, and +most often by all three. The same progress seems to have taken place +in the New World, while immense bodies of men in the Far East, who +seemed to be free from these impulses, are awakening to social hatred, +the party system, and the national spirit insofar as it implies the +will to humiliate other men. To-day political passions have attained a +_universality_ never before known. + +They have also attained _coherence_. Thanks to the progress of +communication and, still more, to the group spirit, it is clear +that the holders of the same political hatred now form a compact +impassioned mass, every individual of which feels himself in touch +with the infinite numbers of others, whereas a century ago such +people were comparatively out of touch with each other and hated in +a ‘scattered’ way. This is singularly striking with respect to the +working classes who, even in the middle of the nineteenth century, +felt only a scattered hostility for the opposing class, attempted only +dispersed efforts at war (such as striking in one town, or one union), +whereas to-day they form a closely-woven fabric of hatred from one +end of Europe to the other. It may be asserted that these coherences +will tend to develop still further, for the will to group is one of +the most profound characteristics of the modern world, which even in +the most unexpected domains (for instance, the domain of thought) +is more and more becoming the world of leagues, of ‘unions’ and of +‘groups’. Is it necessary to say that the passion of the individual +is strengthened by feeling itself in proximity to these thousands +of similar passions? Let me add that the individual bestows a mystic +personality on the association of which he feels himself a member, and +gives it a religious adoration, which is simply the deification of his +own passion, and no small stimulus to its intensity. + +The coherence just described might be called a surface coherence, +but there is added to it a coherence of essence. For the very reason +that the holders of the same political passion form a more compact, +impassioned group, they also form a more _homogeneous_, impassioned +group, in which individual ways of feeling disappear and the zeal of +each member more and more takes on the colour of the others. In France, +for instance, one cannot but be struck by the fact that the enemies +of the democratic system (I am speaking of the mass, not the highest +points) display a passion which has little variety, shows very slight +differences in different persons. How little this mass of hatred is +weakened by personal and original manners of hating--one might almost +say that this passion itself is obedient to ‘democratic levelling +down’! How much more uniformity is shown now than a hundred years ago +by the emotions known as anti-Semitism, anti-Clericalism and Socialism, +in spite of the immense number of varieties in the last-named! And do +not those who are subject to these emotions now all tend _to say the +same thing_? Political passions, as passions, seem to have attained the +habit of discipline; they seem to obey a word of command even in the +manner they are felt. It is easy to see what increase of strength they +acquire thereby. + +With some of these passions the increase in homogeneousness is +accompanied by an increased _precision_. For instance, we all know that +a hundred years ago Socialism was a strong but vague passion with the +great mass of its supporters. But to-day Socialism has more closely +defined the object it wishes to attain, has determined the exact point +where it means to strike its adversary and the movement it intends to +create in order to succeed. The same progress may be observed in the +anti-democratic movement. And we all know that hatred becomes stronger +by becoming more precise. + +There is another sort of perfecting of political passions. Throughout +history until our own days I see these passions acting intermittently, +blazing up and then subsiding. I see that the undoubtedly terrible and +numerous explosions of class and race hatred were followed by long +periods of calm, or at least of somnolence. Wars between nations lasted +for years, but not hatred--even if we may say that it existed. To-day +we have only to look every morning at any daily paper and we shall see +that political hatreds do not cease for a single day. At best some +of them are silent a moment for the benefit of one among them which +suddenly claims all the subject’s strength. This is the period of +‘national unions’, which do not in the very least herald in the reign +of love, but merely of a general hatred which for the moment dominates +partial hatreds. To-day political passions have acquired _continuity_, +which is so rare a quality in all feelings. + +Let us consider a moment the impulse which causes partial hatreds to +abdicate in favour of another, more general hatred, which derives a +new religion of itself and hence a new strength, from the feeling of +its generality. Perhaps it has not been sufficiently observed that +this sort of impulse is one of the essential characteristics of the +nineteenth century. Twice during the nineteenth century, in Germany and +in Italy, the age-old hatreds of petty States disappeared in favour +of a great national passion. In the same period (more precisely, +at the end of the eighteenth century) in France, the mutual hatred +of the Court nobles and the country nobles was extinguished in the +greater hatred of both parties for all who were not nobles; the hatred +between the military and legal nobles disappeared in the same impulse; +the hatred between the upper and lower ranks of the clergy vanished +in their common hatred of laicality; the hatred between clergy and +nobility expired to the profit of their mutual hatred for the commons. +And in our times the hatred between the three orders has melted into +one hatred, that of the possessing classes for the working class. The +condensation of political passions into a small number of very simple +hatreds, springing from the deepest roots of the human heart, is a +conquest of modern times.[2] + +I also believe that I see a great progress in political passions to-day +in their relation to other passions in the same person. Political +passions undoubtedly occupied more of the attention of a bourgeois +of ancient France than is usually supposed, but less than the love +of money and pleasure, family feeling and the calls of vanity; while +the least we can say of his modern equivalent is that when political +passions take possession of him, they do so to the same extent as +the other passions. Compare, for instance, the tiny place occupied +by political passions in the French bourgeois as he appears in the +Fabliaux, in medieval drama, the novels of Scarron, Furetière and +Charles Sorel,[3] with the same bourgeois as drawn by Balzac, Stendhal, +Anatole France, Abel Hermant and Paul Bourget. (Of course, I am not +speaking of times of crisis, like the Ligue and the Fronde, when +political passions occupied the whole individual as soon as they +touched him at all.) The truth is that to-day political passions are +invading most of the other passions in the bourgeoisie, and weakening +the latter to their own profit. Everyone knows that in our own days +family rivalries, commercial enmities, ambitions and the competition +for public honours are all tainted with political passion. An apostle +of the modern mind clamours for ‘politics first’. He might have +observed that nowadays it is politics everywhere, politics always and +nothing but politics.[4] We have only to open our eyes to see when an +increase of power is acquired by political passion when combined with +other passions, so numerous, so constant and so strong themselves. +Coming to the man of the people, we can measure the increase of his +political passions in relation to his other passions in modern times +by considering, as Stendhal puts it, how long his whole passion was +limited to wishing (_a_) Not to be killed, (_b_) For a good warm coat. +And then we may recollect that when a little less misery permitted him +a few general ideas, how long it was before his vague desire for social +changes were transformed into a passion, i.e. showing the two essential +characteristics of passion: The fixed idea, and the need to put it +into action.[5] I think it may be said that political passions in all +classes to-day have attained a degree of _preponderance over all other +passions_ in those affected such as hitherto had been unknown. + +The reader will already have perceived an all-important factor in +the impulses I have been describing. Political passions rendered +universal, coherent, homogeneous, permanent, preponderant--everyone can +recognize there to a great extent the work of the cheap daily political +newspaper. One cannot help reflecting and wondering whether it may not +be that inter-human wars are only just beginning, when one thinks of +this instrument for developing their own passions which men have just +invented, or at least brought to a degree of power never seen before, +to which they abandon themselves with all the expansion of their hearts +every morning as soon as they are awake. + +I have now showed what might be called the perfecting of political +passions on the surface, in their more or less exterior aspects. But +they have also become strangely perfected in depth and inner strength. + +In the first place they have made an immense advance in consciousness +of themselves. Here again, largely owing to the influence of the +newspaper, it is clear that the mind affected by political hatred +to-day becomes conscious of its own passion, formulates it, sees it, +with an accuracy unknown to the same sort of mind fifty years ago. +There is no need to say how much the passion is intensified by this. +And while I am on this subject I should like to point to two passions, +which have certainly not come to birth in our times but have attained +consciousness of themselves, self-assertion, a pride in themselves. + +The first is what I shall call a certain _Jewish nationalism_. In the +past, when the Jews were accused in various countries of forming an +inferior race, or at any rate a peculiar people not to be assimilated, +they replied by denying their peculiarity, by trying to get rid of all +appearance of peculiarity, and by refusing to admit the reality of +race. But in the last few years we see some of them labouring to assert +this peculiarity, to define its characteristics--or what they think +such--taking a pride in it, and condemning every effort at assimilation +with their opponents (see the works of Israel Zangwill, of André Spire, +and the _Revue Juive_). Here I am not trying to discover whether the +impulse of these Jews is or is not nobler than the efforts of so many +others to have their origin pardoned them; I am simply pointing out to +those interested in the progress of peace in the world that our age has +added one more arrogance to those which set men against each other, at +least to the extent that it is conscious and proud of itself.[6] + +The other impulse I am thinking of is ‘_bourgeoisism_’, by which I +mean the passion of the bourgeois class in asserting itself against +the class by which it is threatened. It may be said that until our +own times, ‘class hatred’, as a conscious hatred proud of itself, was +chiefly the hatred of the labourer for the bourgeois. The reciprocal +hatred was much less clearly confessed. Ashamed of an egotism they +thought peculiar to their own caste, the bourgeois temporized with this +egotism, would not admit even to themselves that it existed, tried to +convince themselves and others that it was a form of interest in the +common good.[7] The bourgeois replied to the dogma of the class war by +denying that there really are any classes, thereby showing that while +they felt an inalterable opposition to the adverse party, they were +unwilling to admit that they felt it. To-day we have only to think of +Italian ‘Fascism’, of a certain ‘Eloge du Bourgeois Français’, and +numerous other manifestations of the same kind,[8] and we shall see +that the bourgeoisie are becoming fully conscious of their specific +egotisms, are proclaiming and venerating them as such and as though +these egotisms were bound up with the supreme interests of the human +race, that they are proud of this veneration and of setting up these +egotisms against those which are trying to destroy the bourgeoisie. In +our time there has been created the ‘mysticism’ of bourgeois passion in +its opposition to the passions of the other class.[9] Here again our +age enters in the balance-sheet of humanity the arrival of yet one more +passion at full possession of itself. + +The progress of political passions in depth during the past century +seems to me most remarkable in the case of national passions. + +First of all, owing to the fact that they are experienced to-day by +large masses of men, these passions have become _far more purely +passionate_. When the national feeling was practically confined to +Kings or their Ministers, it consisted chiefly in attachment to some +_interest_ (desire for territorial expansion, search for commercial +advantages and profitable alliances), whereas to-day when this national +feeling is continually experienced by common minds, it consists chiefly +in the exercise of _pride_. Everyone will agree that nationalist +passion in the modern citizen is far less founded on a comprehensive +knowledge of the national interests (he has an imperfect perception +of these interests, he lacks the information necessary and does not +try to acquire it, for he is indifferent to questions of foreign +policy) than on the pride he feels in his nation, on his will to feel +himself one with the nation, to react to the honours and insults he +thinks are bestowed on it. No doubt he wants his nation to acquire +territories, to be prosperous and to have powerful allies; but he wants +all this far less on account of the material results which will accrue +to the nation (how much is he conscious of these results?) than on +account of the glory, the prestige which the nation will acquire. By +becoming popular, national feeling has become national pride, national +susceptibility.[10] To measure how much more purely passionate it has +become, how much more perfectly irrational (and therefore stronger) +one has only to think of Jingoism, the form of patriotism specially +invented by democracies. If, in accordance with current opinion, you +think that pride is a weaker passion than self-interest, you may be +convinced to the contrary by observing how commonly men let themselves +be killed on account of a wound to their pride, and how infrequently +for some infraction of their interests. + +The susceptibility developed by national sentiment as it has become +popular makes the possibility of wars far greater to-day than in the +past. Obviously, with the peoples and with the aptitude of these new +‘sovereigns’ to rise up in a rage as soon as they think they are +insulted, peace runs an additional danger which did not exist when it +depended only upon Kings and their Ministers, who were far more purely +practical persons, fully self-controlled, and quite willing to put up +with insults when they did not think themselves the stronger party.[11] +And, in fact, how many times during the last hundred years has the +world almost flamed up in war solely because some nation thought its +honour had been wounded?[12] To this must be added the fact that this +national susceptibility provides the leaders of nations with a new and +most effective method of starting the wars they need, whether it is +employed at home or abroad. They have not failed to see this, which +is amply proved by the example of Bismarck and the means by which he +provoked war with Austria and with France. From this point of view +it seems to me quite correct to say with the French monarchists that +‘democracy is war’, provided that by democracy is meant the attainment +of national susceptibility by the masses, and provided that it is +recognized that no change in the system of government would destroy +this phenomenon.[13] + +Another considerable deepening of national passions comes from the fact +that the nations are now conscious of themselves not only as regards +their material existence, their military power, their territorial +possessions, and their economic wealth, but as regards their _moral_ +existence. With a hitherto unknown consciousness (prodigiously fanned +by authors) every nation now hugs itself and sets itself up against all +other nations as superior in language, art, literature, philosophy, +civilization, ‘culture’. Patriotism to-day is the assertion of one +form of mind against other forms of mind.[14] We know how much this +passion increases its inner strength in this way and that the wars +it determines are fiercer than those waged by the Kings, who merely +desired the same piece of territory. The prophecy of the old Saxon bard +is completely fulfilled: ‘In those days countries will be something +they have not yet become--they will be persons. They will feel hatred, +and these hatreds will cause wars more terrible than any that have yet +been seen.’[15] + +It is impossible to over-stress the novelty of this form of patriotism +in history. It is obviously bound up with the adoption of this passion +by the masses of the populace, and seems to have been inaugurated +in 1813 by Germany, who is apparently the real teacher of humanity +in the matter of democratic patriotism, if by this word is meant the +determination of a nation to oppose others in the name of its most +fundamental characteristics.[16] (The France of the Revolution and the +Empire never dreamed of setting itself up against other nations in the +name of its language or of its literature.) This form of patriotism was +so little known to preceding ages that there are countless examples +of nations adopting the cultures of other nations, even of those with +whom they were at war, and in addition reverencing the culture adopted. +Shall I refer to the profound respect of Rome for the genius of Greece, +though Rome had felt it necessary to crush Greece politically? To the +respect of the conquerors of Rome, such as Ataulf and Theodoric, for +Roman genius? And, nearer to ourselves, shall I mention Louis XIV +annexing Alsace and not for one moment thinking of forbidding the +German language?[17] In the past, nations displayed their sympathy for +the culture of other nations with whom they were at war, or invited +them to adopt their own. The Duke of Alba took measures to protect the +learned men in the towns of Holland, against which he was directing his +army; in the eighteenth century, the small German States, allied with +Frederick the Great against the French, adopted more freely than ever +French ideas, French fashions, French[18] literature; in the midst of +the struggle with England, the Convention sent a deputation there to +urge the English to adopt the French metric system.[19] The notion that +political warfare involves a war of cultures is entirely an invention +of modern times, and confers upon them a conspicuous place in the moral +history of humanity. + +Another strengthening of national passions comes from the determination +of the peoples to be conscious of _their past_, more precisely to +be conscious of their ambitions as going back to their ancestors, +and to vibrate with ‘centuries-old’ aspirations, with attachments to +‘historical’ rights. This Romantic patriotism is also a characteristic +of patriotism as practised by popular minds (by ‘popular’ I here mean +all minds governed by the imagination, that is, in the first place, +society people and men of letters). I have an idea that when Hugues de +Lionne desired for the nation the conquest of Flanders or when Sieyès +wanted the Low Countries, they did not think they felt the soul of +ancient Gauls reviving in them, any more than Bismarck thought (I am +not talking of what he said) of reviving the Teutonic Knights when he +coveted the Danish Duchies.[20] + +Those who wish to estimate the increase of violence given to national +passion by this solemnizing of its desires have only to observe what +has happened to this feeling among the Germans, with their claim to +be carrying on the spirit of the Holy Roman Empire, and among the +Italians since they have set up their aspirations as the revival of +those of the Roman Empire.[21] There once again the leaders of the +State find in popular sentimentality a new and excellent instrument for +carrying out their practical designs, an instrument they well know how +to use. To mention only one recent example--think of the result the +Italian government was able to obtain from the amazing aptitude of its +compatriots to wake up one fine morning and discover that the claim to +Fiume was a ‘centuries-old’ claim. + +Speaking generally, it may be said that national passions, owing to +the fact that they are now exerted by plebeian minds, assume the +character of _mysticism_, of a religious adoration almost unknown +in these passions in the practical minds of the great nobles. It is +unnecessary to add that this makes these passions deeper and stronger. +Here once more this plebeian form of patriotism is adopted by all who +practise this passion, even when they are the noisiest champions of +the aristocracy of the mind. M. Maurras talks of the ‘goddess France’, +just as Victor Hugo does. Let me add that this mystical adoration +of the nation is not only to be explained by the nature of those who +adore, but also by the changes which have taken place in the adored +object. There is first of all the spectacle of the military force and +organization of modern States, which is something far more imposing +than of old. And when these States are seen to make war for an +indefinite period after they have no more men, and go on subsisting +for long years after they have no more money, it is easy to understand +why a man who has some tincture of religion in his mind may be led to +believe that these States are of an essence different from that of +ordinary natural beings. + +I shall point out another great increase of power in national sentiment +which has occurred in the last half-century. I mean that several +very powerful political passions, which were originally independent +of nationalist feeling, have now become incorporated with it. These +passions are: (_a_) The movement against the Jews; (_b_) the movement +of the possessing classes against the proletariat; (_c_) the movement +of the champions of authority against the democrats. To-day each one of +these passions is identified with national feeling and declares that +its adversary implies the negation of nationalism. I may add that when +a person is affected by one of these passions he is generally affected +by all three; consequently nationalist passion is usually swelled by +the addition of all three. Moreover this increase is reciprocal, and +it may be said that to-day capitalism, anti-semitism and the party +of authority have all received new strength from their union with +nationalism. (For additional proof of the strength of these unions, see +Note C at the end of this book.) + +I cannot drop the subject of the modern perfecting of political +passions without mentioning one more characteristic: In all nations the +number of persons who feel a direct interest in belonging to a powerful +nation is incomparably greater now than in the past. In all the great +States to-day I observe that not only the world of industry and big +business but a considerable number of small tradesmen, small bourgeois, +doctors, lawyers, and even writers and artists, and working men too, +feel that for the sake of the prosperity of their own occupations it +is essential for them to belong to a powerful group which can make +itself feared. Those who are in a position to give an opinion on +this sort of change agree that the feeling did not exist, at least +in the same clearly defined way as to-day, thirty years ago among +the small tradesmen of France, for instance. It seems an even newer +thing among the men who belong to the so-called liberal professions; +it is certainly something new to hear artists constantly girding at +the government of their country because it ‘does not give the nation +enough prestige to impose their art on foreigners’. The feeling that +from a professional point of view they have an interest in belonging +to a powerful nation is also very recent among the working classes. +The party of ‘Nationalist Socialists’, which seems to exist everywhere +except in France, is a quite modern political development. Among the +masters of industry the new development is, not that they feel how +much it is to their interest that their nation should be powerful, +but that the feeling is to-day transformed into action, into formal +pressure on their governments.[22] This extension of patriotism based +on interest certainly does not prevent this sort of patriotism (as I +said above) from being much less wide-spread than the patriotism[23] +based on pride; nevertheless it brings another increase of strength to +nationalist passions. + +I shall now point out a last important perfecting of all political +passions to-day, whether of race, class, party or nation. When I +observe these passions in the past, I see them consisting in purely +passionate impulses, natural explosions of instinct, devoid of all +extension of themselves in ideas and systems--at least among the +majority. The revolt of the workers in the fifteenth century against +the possessing classes was apparently not accompanied by any sort +of teaching about the origin of property or the nature of capital. +Those who massacred the Ghettos seem to have had no views on the +philosophical values of their action. And when the troops of Charles V +attacked the defenders of Mezières, it does not appear that the assault +was enlivened by a theory about the predestination of the Germanic race +and the moral baseness of the Latin world. To-day I notice that every +political passion is furnished with a whole network of strongly woven +doctrines, the sole object of which is to show the supreme value of +its action from every point of view, while the result is a redoubling +of its strength as a passion. We must look at the system of ideology +of German nationalism known as ‘Pangermanism’ and at the similar +ideology of the French Monarchists, if we wish to realize the point +of perfection to which our age has carried these systems, with what +tenacity each passion has built up in every direction the theories apt +to satisfy it, with what precision these theories have been adapted to +this satisfaction, with what opulence of research, what labour, what +profound investigation they have been carried on in all directions. Our +age is indeed the age of the _intellectual organization of political +hatreds_. It will be one of its chief claims to notice in the moral +history of humanity. + +Ever since these systems have been in existence, they have consisted +in establishing for each passion that it is the agent of good in the +world and that its enemy is the genius of evil. But to-day these +passions desire to establish this not only politically, but morally, +intellectually and aesthetically. Anti-semitism, Pangermanism, French +Monarchism, Socialism are not only political manifestations; they +defend a particular form of morality, of intelligence, of sensibility, +of literature, of philosophy and of artistic conceptions. Our age has +introduced two novelties into the theorizing of political passions, by +which they have been remarkably intensified. The first is that everyone +to-day claims that his movement is in line with ‘the development of +evolution’ and ‘the profound unrolling of history’. All these passions +of to-day, whether they derive from Marx, from M. Maurras or from +Houston Chamberlain, have discovered a ‘historical law’, according to +which their movement is merely carrying out the spirit of history and +must therefore necessarily triumph, while the opposing party is running +counter to this spirit and can enjoy only a transitory triumph. That +is merely the old desire to have Fate on one’s side, but it is put +forth in a scientific shape. And this brings us to the second novelty: +To-day all political ideologies claim to be founded on science, to +be the result of a ‘precise observation of facts’. We all know what +self-assurance, what rigidity, what inhumanity (comparatively new +traits in the history of political passions, of which modern French +monarchism is a good example) are given to these passions to-day by +this claim. + +To summarize: To-day political passions show a degree of universality, +of coherence, of homogeneousness, of precision, of continuity, of +preponderance, in relation to other passions, unknown until our +times. They have become conscious of themselves to an extent never +seen before. Some of them, hitherto scarcely avowed, have awakened to +consciousness and have joined the old passions. Others have become more +purely passionate than ever, possess men’s hearts in moral regions +they never before reached, and have acquired a mystic character which +had disappeared for centuries. All are furnished with an apparatus of +ideology whereby, in the name of science, they proclaim the supreme +value of their action and its historical necessity. On the surface +and in the depths, in spatial values and in inner strength, political +passions have to-day reached a point of perfection never before known +in history. The present age is essentially the age of politics. + + + + +II + +_Significance of this Movement--Nature of Political Passions_ + + +What is the significance of this movement? Of what simple and profound +human tendency does it show the progress and triumph? The question +comes down to inquiring what is the nature of political passions, +of what more general and more essential state of mind are they the +expression, what--as the schools say--is their psychological foundation? + +It seems to me that these passions can be reduced to two fundamental +desires: (_a_) The will of a group of men to get hold of (or to retain +a hold on) some _material_ advantage, such as territories, comfort, +political power and all its material advantages; and (_b_) the will +of a group of men to become conscious of themselves as _individuals_, +insofar as they are _distinct_ in relation to other men. It may also +be said that these passions can be reduced to two desires, one of +which seeks the satisfaction of an _interest_, the other of a _pride_ +or self-esteem. These two desires enter into political passions in +very different proportions, according to which passion is involved. It +appears that racial passion, insofar as it is not one with national +passion, is chiefly based on the will of a group of men to set +themselves up as distinct from others; the same thing may be said of +religious passion, if we consider it in its pure state. On the other +hand, class passion, at least as we see it in the working classes, +apparently consists solely in the will to obtain possession of material +advantages. The desire to feel himself distinct, which George Sand and +the apostles of 1848 had begun to inculcate in the working man, now +seems to be abandoned by him, at least in his utterances. National +passion contains both factors. The patriot wants to obtain material +advantages and he wants to set himself up as distinct from others. This +is the secret of the evident superiority in strength of this passion +(when it is really a passion) over all other passions, especially over +Socialism. A passion whose sole motive is interest is too weak to +contend with another which combines interest and pride. This too is one +of the weaknesses of Socialism when opposed to class passion as exerted +by the bourgeoisie, for the bourgeois wants both to possess material +advantages and to feel himself distinct from others. I shall add to +this that in my opinion the relative strengths of these two passions +(one based on interest and the other on pride or self-esteem) are very +unequal, and that the more powerful of the two is not that which tries +to satisfy interest. + +Now, when I come to ask what is signified in their turn by these +fundamental desires of political passions, I find they appear to me +as the two essential composites of man’s will to situate himself _in +real life_. To want real life is to want (_a_) To possess some material +advantages, and (_b_) to be conscious of oneself as an individual. +Every life which despises these two desires, every life which pursues +only spiritual advantage or sincerely asserts itself in the universal, +situates itself _outside the real_. Political passions, especially +national passions insofar as they unite the two desires mentioned, seem +to me essentially _realist_ passions. + +Here many persons will protest: ‘Yes,’ they will say, ‘the desires +which make up political passions are realist desires, but the +individual shifts these desires from himself to the group of which +he is a part. The working man wants to obtain possession of material +advantages for his class, not for his own limited person. The patriot +wants to possess territories for his nation, not for his own narrow +ego; he wants to be distinct from other men through his nation. Do you +apply the term “realist” to passions which imply such a transfer from +the individual to the collective body?’ Is it necessary to reply that +when the individual transfers these desires to the body of which he is +a part, he does not thereby alter their nature? And that all he does is +simply to increase their dimensions immeasureably? To wish to possess +material advantages _in one’s nation_, to want to feel distinct from +other men _in one’s nation_, is still the desire to possess material +advantages, still the desire to feel distinct from other men. It only +means that, if you are a Frenchman, you want to possess Brittany, +Provence, Guyenne, Algeria, Indo-China; and you want to feel yourself +distinct from other men in Jeanne d’Arc, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Racine, +Voltaire, Victor Hugo, Pasteur. Add to this that at the same time +you attach these desires, not to a transitory and precarious single +existence, but to an ‘eternal’ existence, and feel them in that way. +Not only does national egotism not cease to be egotism because it +is national, but it becomes ‘sacred’ egotism.[24] Let me complete +my definition by saying that political passions are realism of a +particular quality, which is an important element of strength in them: +They are _divinized_ realism.[25] + +If, therefore, we desire to express this perfecting of political +passions which I have described, in terms of a more profound and +essential order of things, we may say that men to-day are displaying, +with a hitherto unknown knowledge and consciousness, the desire to +situate themselves in the _real_ or practical manner of existence, in +opposition to the _disinterested_ or _metaphysical_ manner. Moreover, +it is remarkable to see how political passions to-day more and more +expressly assert their derivation from this realism and from it alone. +On the one hand we have a Socialism which constantly declares that it +has no interest in universal man, no interest in procuring justice for +him or any other ‘metaphysical phantom’, but solely desires to obtain +possession of material advantages for the benefit of its class. On the +other hand we have the nationalist mind which everywhere takes a pride +in being purely realistic. The French people who fought in the past to +carry to other nations a doctrine they believed would bring happiness +(I say the people, for its rulers never shared in that simple-minded +belief) would now blush to have it even suspected that they would fight +‘for principles’.[26] Is it not suggestive to observe that the only +wars of the past which, to some extent, brought into play passions +that were a little disinterested--the wars of religion--are the only +wars from which humanity has freed itself?[27] And that immense +idealistic upheavals like the crusades (idealistic at least with humble +people) should now be something which makes the modern man smile, like +the spectacle of children at play? Is it not also significant that the +national passions (which I have shown are the most perfectly realist of +all political passions) should be those which I have been able to point +out have most absorbed all other passions?[28] Let me add to this, +that these passions, insofar as they are the will of a group of men to +set themselves up as distinct from others, have attained a hitherto +unknown degree of consciousness.[29] Finally, the supreme attribute we +have discovered in political passions, i.e. the divinization of their +realism, is now openly admitted, with a plainness never seen before. +The State, Country, Class, are now frankly God; we may even say that +for many people (and some are proud of it) they alone are God.[30] +Humanity, by its present practice of political passions, thereby +declares that it has become more realist, more exclusively and more +religiously realist than it has ever been. + + + + +III + +_The ‘Clerks’--The Great Betrayal_ + +_‘I created him to be spiritual in his flesh; and now he has become +carnal even in the spirit.’_--(Bossuet, _Élévations_, VII, 3.) + + +In all that I have said hitherto I have been considering only masses, +whether bourgeois or proletarian, kings, ministers, political leaders, +all that portion of the human species which I shall call ‘the laymen’, +whose whole function consists essentially in the pursuit of material +interests, and who, by becoming more and more solely and systematically +realist, have in fact only done what might be expected of them. + +Side by side with this humanity whom the poet has described in a +phrase--‘O curvae in terram animae et celestium inanes’--there existed +until the last half century another, essentially distinct humanity, +which to a certain extent acted as a check upon the former. I mean +that class of men whom I shall designate ‘_the clerks_’, by which term +I mean all those whose activity essentially is _not_ the pursuit of +practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art +or a science or metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession +of non-material advantages, and hence in a certain manner say: ‘My +kingdom is not of this world.’ Indeed, throughout history, for more +than two thousand years until modern times, I see an uninterrupted +series of philosophers, men of religion, men of literature, artists, +men of learning (one might say almost all during this period), whose +influence, whose life, were in direct opposition to the realism of the +multitudes. To come down specifically to the political passions--the +‘clerks’ were in opposition to them in two ways. They were either +entirely indifferent to these passions, and, like Leonardo da Vinci, +Malebranche, Goethe, set an example of attachment to the purely +disinterested activity of the mind and created a belief in the +supreme value of this form of existence; or, gazing as moralists +upon the conflict of human egotisms, like Erasmus, Kant, Renan, they +preached, in the name of humanity or justice, the adoption of an +abstract principle superior to and directly opposed to these passions. +Although these ‘clerks’ founded the modern State to the extent that it +dominates individual egotisms, their activity undoubtedly was chiefly +theoretical, and they were unable to prevent the laymen from filling +all history with the noise of their hatreds and their slaughters; _but +the ‘clerks’ did prevent the laymen from setting up their actions as a +religion, they did prevent them from thinking themselves great men as +they carried out these activities_. It may be said that, thanks to the +‘clerks’, humanity did evil for two thousand years, but honoured good. +This contradiction was an honour to the human species, and formed the +rift whereby civilization slipped into the world. + +Now, at the end of the nineteenth century a fundamental change +occurred: _the ‘clerks’ began to play the game of political passions_. +The men who had acted as a check on the realism of the people began +to act as its stimulators. This upheaval in the moral behaviour of +humanity operated in several ways. + + +_First: The ‘clerks’ have adopted political passions_ + +First of all the ‘clerks’ have adopted political passions. No one will +deny that throughout Europe to-day the immense majority of men of +letters and artists, a considerable number of scholars, philosophers, +and ‘ministers’ of the divine, share in the chorus of hatreds among +races and political factions. Still less will it be denied that they +adopt national passions. Doubtless, the names of Dante, Petrarch, +d’Aubigné, certain apologists of Caboche or preachers of the Ligue +will suffice to show that certain ‘clerks’ did not wait for our era +to indulge in these passions with all the strength of their souls. +But, upon the whole, these ‘clerks’ of the forum were exceptions, at +least among the great ones. If, in addition to the great masters named +above, I evoke the phalanx of Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Galilei, +Rabelais, Montaigne, Descartes, Racine, Pascal, Leibniz, Kepler, +Huyghens, Newton, and even Voltaire, Buffon and Montesquieu (to mention +only a few) I think I may repeat that until our own days the men of +thought or the honest men remained strangers to political passions, +and said with Goethe: ‘Let us leave politics to the diplomats and the +soldiers.’ Or if, like Voltaire, they took these passions into account, +they adopted a critical attitude towards them, did not espouse them +as passions. Or if, like Rousseau, Maistre, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, +even Michelet, they did take these passions to heart, they did so with +a generalizing of feeling, a disdain for immediate results, which in +fact make the word ‘passions’ incorrect. To-day, if we mention Mommsen, +Treitschke, Ostwald, Brunetière, Barrès, Lemaître, Péguy, Maurras, +d’Annunzio, Kipling, we have to admit that the ‘clerks’ now exercise +political passions with all the characteristics of passion--the +tendency to action, the thirst for immediate results, the exclusive +preoccupation with the desired end, the scorn for argument, the excess, +the hatred, the fixed ideas. The modern ‘clerk’ has entirely ceased +to let the layman alone descend to the market place. The modern clerk +is determined to have the soul of a citizen and to make vigorous use +of it; he is proud of that soul; his literature is filled with his +contempt for the man who shuts himself up with art or science and +takes no interest in the passions of the State.[31] He is violently +on the side of Michaelangelo crying shame upon Leonardo da Vinci for +his indifference to the misfortunes of Florence, and against the +master of the Last Supper when he replied that indeed the study of +beauty occupied his whole heart. The time has long past by since Plato +demanded that the philosopher should be bound in chains in order to +compel him to take an interest in the State. To have as his function +the pursuit of eternal things and yet to believe that he becomes +greater by concerning himself with the State--that is the view of the +modern ‘clerk’. It is as natural as it is evident that this adhesion +of the ‘clerks’ to the passions of the laymen fortifies these passions +in the hearts of the latter. In the first place, it abolishes the +suggestive spectacle (which I mentioned above) of a race of men whose +interests are set outside the practical world. And then especially, +the ‘clerk’ by adopting political passions, brings them the tremendous +influence of his sensibility if he is an artist, of his persuasive +power if he is a thinker, and in either case his moral prestige.[32] + +Before proceeding any further, I feel I ought to make myself clear on +certain points:-- + +(_a_) I have been talking of the _whole_ of the men of thought anterior +to our own age. When I say that the ‘clerks’ in the past opposed +the realism of the laymen and that the ‘clerks’ of to-day are in +its service, I am considering each of these groups as a whole; I am +contrasting one general characteristic with another. This means that +I shall not feel myself contradicted by a reader who takes pains to +point out to me that so-and-so in the former group was a realist, +and that so-and-so in the second is not, so long as this reader is +obliged to admit that as a whole each of these groups does manifest the +characteristic I have indicated. And also, when I speak of a single +‘clerk’, I am thinking of his work in its chief characteristic, i.e. +in that part of his teaching which dominates all the rest, even if the +remainder sometimes contradicts this dominant teaching. This means that +I do not consider that I ought to refrain from looking upon Malebranche +as a master of liberal thought because a few lines of his ‘Morale’ seem +to be a justification of slavery, or upon Nietzsche as a moralist of +war because the end of ‘Zarathustra’ is a manifesto of fraternity which +outdoes the Gospels. And I see the less reason for doing so, since +Malebranche as a defender of slavery and Nietzsche as a humanitarian +have had no influence at all, and my subject is the influence which the +‘clerks’ have had in the world, and not what they were in themselves. + +(_b_) Some will object to me: ‘How can you treat men like Barrès +and Péguy as “clerks” and blame them for lacking the true spirit of +“clerks” when they are so openly men of action, with whom political +thought is obviously occupied solely with the needs of the present +hour, solely spurred on by the events of the day, while the former +scarcely ever gave expression to his political thought except in +newspaper articles?’ I reply, that this thought, which in truth is +practically nothing but a form of immediate action, is given out by its +authors as the fruits of the highest speculative intellectual activity, +the result of the most truly philosophical meditation. Barrès and +Péguy would never have consented to be looked upon as mere polemical +writers, even in their polemical works.[33] These men, who indeed are +not ‘clerks’, gave themselves out to be ‘clerks’ and were considered +as such, (Barrès gave himself out to be a thinker who condescended to +the arena), and it is precisely as such that they enjoy a particular +prestige among men of action. In this study my subject is not the +‘clerk’ such as he is, but the ‘clerk’ such as he is considered to be +and as he acts upon the world in that capacity. + +I shall make the same answer with regard to M. Maurras and the other +instructors of the _Action Française_, of whom it will be said even +more truly that they are men of action and that it is indefensible to +cite them as ‘clerks’. These men claim to carry out their action by +virtue of a doctrine derived from a wholly objective study of history, +from the exercise of the most purely scientific spirit. And they owe +the special attention with which they are listened to by men of action +entirely to this claim that they are _men of learning_, men who are +fighting for a truth discovered in the austerity of the laboratory. +They owe it to their pose as combative ‘clerks’, but essentially _as +‘clerks’_. + +(_c_) Finally I should like to define my views on another point and +to say that when the ‘clerk’ descends to the market place I only +consider that he is failing to perform his functions when he does so, +like those I have mentioned, for the purpose of securing the triumph +of a realist passion, whether of class, race or nation. When Gerson +entered the pulpit of Notre Dame to denounce the murderers of Louis +d’Orléans; when Spinoza, at the peril of his life, went and wrote the +words ‘Ultimi barbarorum’ on the gate of those who had murdered the de +Witts; when Voltaire fought for the Calas family; when Zola and Duclaux +came forward to take part in a celebrated lawsuit (Dreyfus affair); +all these ‘clerks’ were carrying out their functions as ‘clerks’ in +the fullest and noblest manner. They were the officiants of abstract +justice and were sullied with no passion for a worldly object.[34] +Moreover, there exists a certain criterion by which we may know whether +the ‘clerk’ who takes public action does so in conformity with his true +functions; and that is, that he is immediately reviled by the laymen, +whose interests he thwarts (Socrates, Jesus). We may say beforehand +that the ‘clerk’ who is praised by the laymen is a traitor to his +office. + +But let us return to the modern ‘clerk’s’ adhesion to political +passions. + +It is concerning national passions that this adhesion seems to me +particularly novel and big with results. Once again, of course humanity +did not have to wait for the present age to see the ‘clerks’ indulge +in this passion. Without mentioning the poets, whose tender hearts +have always sighed ‘Nescio qua natale dulcedine solum cunctos Ducit’; +and, as regards the philosophers, without going back to antiquity when +all, previous to the Stoics, were ardent patriots; we may yet observe +in history (since the coming of Christianity and long before our own +days) writers, men of learning, artists, moralists, even ministers +of the ‘Universal’ Church, who more or less explicitly displayed a +special attachment for the group to which they belonged. But this +affection among these men was based on reason; it showed itself +capable of judging its object, of denouncing its errors when they +believed such errors had been committed. Need I recall how Fénelon and +Massillon denounced certain wars of Louis XIV? How Voltaire condemned +the destruction of the Palatinate? How Renan denounced the violences +of Napoleon? Buckle, the intolerance of England towards the French +Revolution? And, in our own times, Nietzsche, the brutalities of +Germany towards France?[35] It was reserved for our own time to see men +of thought, or men giving themselves out as such, professing openly +that they would not submit their patriotism to any check on the part of +their judgment, proclaiming (like Barrès) that ‘even if the country is +wrong, we must think it in the right’, denouncing as ‘traitors to the +nation’ those of their compatriots who retain their liberty of mind, or +at least of speech, in regard to their country. In France we have not +forgotten how, during the last war, so many ‘thinkers’ attacked Renan +for the liberty of his judgments on the history of his country.[36] Nor +have we forgotten how, a little before that, a whole set of young men +(who claimed to share in the life of the spirit) bristled up against +one of their masters (Jacob) who tried to teach them a patriotism which +did not exclude all right of criticism. After the violation of Belgium +and other excesses of the Germans, in October, 1914, a German teacher +said: ‘There is nothing for which we need make excuses.’[37] Now, if +their own countries had been in a similar position, the same thing +would have been said by most of the spiritual leaders of that time; +by Barrès in France, by d’Annunzio in Italy, by Kipling in England, +if we may judge by his conduct during the attack of his nation upon +the Boers, and by William James in the United States, if we recall +his attitude when his compatriots seized the island of Cuba.[38] I am +quite ready to agree that this sort of blind patriotism makes powerful +nations, and that the patriotism of Fénelon or of Renan is not the sort +which secures empires. It remains to determine whether the function of +‘clerks’ is to secure empires. + +This adhesion of the ‘clerks’ to national passion is particularly +remarkable among those whom I shall call ‘pre-eminently clerks’; I mean +the Churchmen. In all European countries during the past fifty years, +the immense majority of these men have not only given their adhesion to +the national feeling[39] and therefore have ceased to provide the world +with the spectacle of hearts solely occupied with God--but they seem to +have adopted this feeling with the same passion as that I have pointed +out as existing among men of letters, and they too appear to be ready +to support their own countries in the most flagrant injustices. During +the last war this could be most clearly seen in the German clergy, from +whom no one could drag the shadow of a protest against the excesses +committed by their nation, and whose silence does not appear to have +been caused solely by prudence.[40] In contrast to this attitude I +refer the reader to that of the Spanish theologians of the sixteenth +century, to men like Bartholomew de las Casas and Vittoria, earnestly +denouncing the cruelties committed by their compatriots in the conquest +of America. I do not claim that similar behaviour was then the rule +among Churchmen, but I should like to ask whether there is a single +country to-day where they would do likewise, or where they would even +wish to be permitted to do so?[41] + +I shall point out another characteristic of patriotism in the modern +‘clerk’: xenophobia. The hatred of man for ‘the man from outside’ (the +_horsain_), his rejection of and scorn for everything which is not +‘from his own home’, all these impulses, so constant among peoples and +apparently necessary to their existence, have been adopted in our days +by the so-called men of thought, and adopted with a seriousness of +application, _an absence of simple-mindedness_, which go far towards +making this adoption worthy of notice. We know how systematically the +mass of German teachers in the past fifty years have announced the +decline of every civilization but that of their own race, and how in +France the admirers of Nietzsche or Wagner, even of Kant or Goethe, +were treated by Frenchmen who claimed to share in the life of the +spirit.[42] You may estimate how curiously new this form of patriotism +is among the men of thought in France by thinking of Lamartine, Victor +Hugo, Michelet, Proudhon, Renan, to name only patriotic ‘clerks’ in the +age immediately preceding that we are considering. Is it necessary to +say once again how much the ‘clerks’ have stimulated the passion of the +laymen by adopting this xenophobia? + +I shall be told that during the past fifty years, and especially +during the twenty years before the war, the attitude of foreigners to +France was such that the most violent national partiality was forced +upon all Frenchmen who wished to safeguard the nation, and that the +only true patriots were those who consented to this fanaticism. I say +nothing to the contrary; I only say that the ‘clerks’ who indulged +in this fanaticism betrayed their duty, which is precisely to set +up a corporation whose sole cult is that of justice and of truth, +in opposition to the peoples and the injustice to which they are +condemned by their religions of this earth. It is true indeed that +these new ‘clerks’ declare that they do not know what is meant by +justice, truth, and other ‘metaphysical fogs’, that for them the true +is determined by the useful, the just by circumstances. All these +things were taught by Callicles, but with this difference; he revolted +all the important thinkers of his time. + +It must be admitted that the German ‘clerks’ led the way in this +adhesion of the modern ‘clerk’ to patriotic fanaticism. The French +‘clerks’ were, and long remained, animated with the most perfect spirit +of justice towards foreign cultures (think of the cosmopolitanism +of the Romantics!), when already Lessing, Schlegel, Fichte, Goerres +were organizing in their hearts a violent adoration for ‘everything +German’, and a scorn for everything not German. The nationalist ‘clerk’ +is essentially a German invention. This, moreover, is a theme which +will frequently recur in this book, i.e. that most of the moral and +political attitudes adopted by the ‘clerks’ of Europe in the past fifty +years are of German origin, and that in the world of spiritual things +the victory of Germany is now complete. + +It may be said that Germany, by creating for herself the nationalist +‘clerk’ and thereby acquiring the additional strength we know she +has acquired, made this species of ‘clerk’ necessary to all other +countries. It is undeniable that from the moment when Germany had a +Mommsen, France especially was bound to have a Barrès, under penalty +of finding herself in a position of great inferiority in nationalist +fanaticism, and of seeing her existence seriously menaced. Every +Frenchman attached to the continuance of his nation must rejoice that +in the last half century France has possessed a fanatically nationalist +literature. Yet one would like this Frenchman to rise for a moment +superior to his interest, and, faithful in this to the honour of his +race, to think it sad that the course of events in the world should +force him to rejoice in such a thing. + +More generally, it may be admitted that a realist attitude has been +imposed on the modern ‘clerks’, chiefly the French ‘clerks’, by +exterior and interior political conditions which have arisen in their +nations. However serious this may be, it would be much less serious +if we found that the ‘clerks’ deplored it while they submitted to +it, if they felt how much their own value is diminished by it, how +greatly civilization is menaced by it, to what an extent the universe +is rendered ugly by it. But this is exactly what we do not see. On the +contrary, we see them joyfully carrying out this realism; we see them +believing that they are rendered greater by their nationalist fury, +that it is a service to civilization, an embellishment to humanity. +Then one feels that one is confronted by something different from +a function thwarted by the events of the moment, and faced with a +cataclysm of moral notions in those who educate the world. + +I should like to point out two other characteristics in the patriotism +of the modern ‘clerks’ which seem new to me, the second of which has +not failed to stimulate this passion greatly among the peoples. + +The first can best be brought out by contrast with the lines written by +an author of the fifteenth century, lines which are the more remarkable +since he who wrote them proved by his deeds how deep was his love for +his native country. ‘All cities,’ says Guicciardini, ‘all States, all +Kingdoms, are mortal; everything comes to an end, either by accident or +by the course of nature. That is why a citizen who witnesses the end of +his country cannot feel so distressed at her misfortune with so much +reason as he would lament his own ruin. His country has met the fate +which in every way she was bound to meet; the misfortune is wholly for +him whose unhappy lot has caused him to be born in a time when such a +disaster had to occur.’ One wonders whether there is a single modern +thinker, attached to his country as the author of that passage was to +his, who would dare to form, still less to express, a judgment of her +so extraordinarily free in its melancholy. And here we come upon one +of the great impieties of the moderns: The refusal to believe that +above their nations there exists a development of a superior kind, by +which they will be swept away like all other things. The ancients, +so completely the adorers of their States, nevertheless placed them +beneath Fate. The ancient City was under divine protection, but in no +wise believed that she herself was divine and necessarily eternal. All +the literature of the ancients shows us that, in their opinion, the +duration of their institutions was a precarious thing, solely due to +the favour of the Gods, who at any time might withdraw that favour.[43] +We have Thucydides contemplating the image of a world in which Athens +should have ceased to exist; we have Polybius showing us the conqueror +of Carthage meditating over the burning town: ‘And Rome too shall meet +her fatal hour.’ We have Virgil praising the peasant of the fields for +whom ‘res romanae et peritura regna’ are of no value. + +It was reserved for the moderns to make of their City a tower which +defies the heavens, and to do it with the aid of their ‘clerks’. + +The second characteristic of the patriotism of the modern ‘clerks’ +is a desire to relate the form of their own minds to a form of the +_national_ mind, which they naturally brandish against other national +forms of mind. We all know how, during the last fifty years, so many +men of learning on both banks of the Rhine have asserted their views in +the name of _French_ science, of _German_ science. We know how acridly +so many of our writers in the same period have vibrated with _French_ +sensibility, _French_ intelligence, _French_ philosophy. Some declare +that they are the incarnation of Aryan thought, Aryan painting, Aryan +music, to which others reply by discovering that a certain master had +a Jewish grandmother, and so venerate Semitic genius in him. Here it +is not a question of inquiring whether the form of mind of a scholar +or an artist is the signature of his nationality or his race and to +what extent, but of noting the desire of the modern ‘clerks’ that it +should be so, and noting how new a thing this is. Racine and La Bruyère +never dreamed of setting up their works before themselves and before +the world as manifestation of the French mind, nor did Goethe and +Wincklemann relate theirs to the genius of Germany.[44] Here, chiefly +among the artists, is a very remarkable fact. It is very remarkable to +see men whose activity consists, one might say professionally, in the +assertion of individuality, men who became so violently conscious of +this truth a century ago with the Romantic movement, now (as it were) +abdicating this sort of consciousness and trying to feel themselves +as the expression of some general existence, a manifestation of a +collective mind. It is true that this abdication of the individual in +favour of ‘a great impersonal and eternal Whole’ satisfies another +sort of Romanticism. It is true that this impulse of the artist may +also be explained by the desire (which Barrès does not conceal) to +increase the enjoyment of himself by himself, since the consciousness +of the individual ego is doubled in profundity by consciousness of +the national ego, while at the same time the artist finds new lyrical +themes in this second consciousness. It may also be admitted that +the artist is not blind to his own interest in calling himself the +expression of the genius of his nation, thereby inviting the whole race +to applaud itself in the work he put before it.[45] Whatever their +motives may have been, the great minds or the minds reputed such, by +relating the whole of their value so noisily to their nation, have +laboured in a direction contrary to that expected of them; they have +flattered the vanity of nations, they have fed full the arrogance +with which each nation flings its superiority in the face of its +neighbours.[46] + +I cannot better bring out all the novelty of this attitude of the +‘clerk’ than by quoting the remark of Renan, which would be signed +by all men of thought from Socrates onwards: ‘Man belongs neither to +his language nor to his race; he belongs only to himself, for he is +a free being, that is, a moral being.’ To this Barrès replies, amid +the applause of his compeers: ‘To be moral is _not to wish to be free +from one’s race_.’ Here, obviously, is an exaltation of the gregarious +spirit which the nations had heard little of before from the priests of +the spirit. + +The modern ‘clerks’ do better still. They declare that their thought +cannot be good, that it cannot bear good fruit, unless they remain on +their native soil, unless they are not ‘uprooted’ (‘_déracinés_’). They +congratulate A on working in _his_ Bearn, B in _his_ Berry, C in _his_ +Brittany. And they not only proclaim this law for the poets, but for +critics, moralists, philosophers, the servants of purely intellectual +activity. To declare the mind good to the extent of its refusal to +liberate itself from the earth is something which will make the modern +‘clerks’ certain of a conspicuous place in the annals of the spiritual +life. Obviously, the feelings of this class of men has changed since +Plutarch taught: ‘Man is not a plant created to be immobile and to have +his roots fixed in the soil where he was born,’ and since Antisthenes +replied to his colleagues who boasted that they were native to the +soil, that ‘they shared this honour with the slugs and grasshoppers’. + +Need I say that I am only denouncing this desire of the ‘clerk’ to +feel himself determined by his race and to remain fixed to his native +soil to the extent that it becomes in him a political attitude, a +nationalist provocation. The best way for me to define this is by +quoting this hymn of a modern ‘clerk’ to ‘his soil and his dead’, a +hymn completely void of political passion: + +‘And the old oak under which I am sitting speaks in its turn, and says +to me: + +‘“Read, read in my shadow those Gothic songs whose refrains I heard +in the past mingle with the rustling of my leaves. The souls of your +ancestors are in these songs that are older than I am. Learn to know +those humble ancestors, share their past joys and sorrows. Thus, O +transitory creature, shalt thou live long ages in a few years. Be +pious, venerate the soil of your country. Never take up a handful in +your hand without remembering that it is sacred. Love all those far-off +relatives whose dust mingled with earth has fed me for centuries, +whose minds have passed into you, their Benjamin, the child of better +days. Reproach not your ancestors with their ignorance, nor with the +feebleness of their thought, nor even with the illusions of fear which +sometimes rendered them cruel. As well reproach yourself for having +been a child. Remember that they laboured, that they suffered, that +they hoped for you, and that you owe everything to them!”’[47] + + +_Second: They bring their political passions into their activities as +‘clerks’._ + +The ‘clerks’ have not been content simply to adopt political passions, +if by this one means that they have made a place for these passions +side by side with the activities they are bound to carry on as +‘clerks’. They have introduced these passions into those activities. +They permit, they desire them to be mingled with their work as artists, +as men of learning, as philosophers, to colour the essence of their +work and to mark all its productions. And indeed never were there so +many political works among those which ought to be the mirror of the +disinterested intelligence. + +You may refuse to be surprised by this in the case of poetry. We must +not ask the poets to separate their works from their passions. The +latter are the substance of the former, and the only question to ask +is whether they write poems to express their passions or whether they +hunt for passions in order to write poems. In either case one does +not see why they should exclude national passion or the spirit of +party from their vibrant material. Our political poets, who are not +numerous however, have only followed the example of Virgil, Claudian, +Lucan, Dante, d’Aubigné, Ronsard, and Hugo. Yet we cannot deny that +political passion, as it is expressed by Claudel or d’Annunzio, a +conscious and organized passion _lacking all simplicity_, coldly +scornful of its adversary, a passion which in the second of these +poets displays itself as so precisely political, so cunningly adapted +to the profound cupidity of his compatriots and the exact point of +weakness in the foreigner--we cannot deny, I say, that this political +passion is something different from the eloquent generalities of the +‘Tragiques of the Année Terrible.’ A work like _La Nave_, with its +national plan as exact and practical as that of a Bismarck, wherein +the lyric gift is used to extol this practical character, seems to me +something new in the history of poetry, even of political poetry. The +result of this new departure on the minds of laymen may be judged by +the present state of mind of the Italian people.[48] But in our day +the most remarkable example of the poets’ applying their art to the +service of political passions is that literary form which may be called +‘lyrical philosophy’, the most brilliant symbol of which is the work of +Barrès. It begins by taking as its centres of vibration certain truly +philosophical states of mind (such as pantheism, a loftily sceptical +intellectualism) and then entirely devotes itself to serving racial +passion and national feeling. Here the action of the lyric spirit is +doubled by the prestige of the spirit of abstract thought (Barrès +admirably caught the appearance of that spirit--he stole the tool, a +philosopher has said of him), and in France as elsewhere the ‘clerks’ +have thereby stimulated political passions among the laymen, at least +in that very important section of them who read and believe they think. +Moreover, in regard to poets and especially the poet I have just named, +it is difficult to know whether the lyrical impulse lends its aid to a +genuine and pre-existing political passion, or whether on the contrary +this passion puts itself at the service of a lyrical impulse which is +seeking inspiration. Alius judex erit. + +But there are other ‘clerks’ who introduce political passion into +their works with a remarkable consciousness of what they are doing, in +whom this derogation seems more worthy of notice than in the poets. I +mean the novelists and dramatists, i.e. ‘clerks’ whose function is to +portray in as objective a manner as possible the emotions of the human +soul and their conflicts--a function which, as Shakespeare, Molière, +and Balzac have proved, may be carried out with all the purity I have +here assigned to it. One may show how this function has been more than +ever perverted by its subjection to political ends by the example of +many contemporary novelists, not because they scatter ‘tendencious’ +reflections throughout their narratives (Balzac constantly does so), +but because instead of making their heroes feel and act in conformity +with a true observation of human nature, they make them do so as the +passion of the authors requires. Shall I cite those novels where the +traditionalist, whatever his errors, always finally displays a noble +soul, whereas the character without religion inevitably, and in spite +of all his efforts, is capable of none but vile actions?[49] Or the +other novels where the man of the people possesses every virtue and +vileness is the exclusive portion of the bourgeois?[50] Or the novels +where the author displays his compatriots in contact with foreigners +and, more or less frankly, gives all moral superiority to his own +people?[51] There is a two-fold evil in this proceeding; not only does +it considerably inflame political passion in the breast of the reader, +but it deprives him of one of the most eminently civilizing effects of +all works of art, i.e. that self-examination to which every spectator +is impelled by a representation of human beings which he feels to be +true and solely pre-occupied with truth.[52] From the point of view +of the artist and of the value of his activity alone, this partiality +indicates a great degradation. The value of the artist, the thing +which makes him the world’s high ornament, is that he _plays_ human +passions instead of living them, and that he discovers in this ‘play’ +emotion the same source of desires, joys and sufferings as ordinary +men find in the pursuit of real things. Now, if this accomplished type +of exuberant activity places itself at the service of the nation or of +a class, if this fine flower of disinterestedness becomes utilitarian, +then I say with the poet of the ‘Vierge aux Rochers’ when the author of +_Siegfried_ exhales his last sigh: ‘The world has lost its import.’ + +I have pointed out that certain ‘clerks’ have put their activities as +‘clerks’ at the service of political passions. These are the poets, +the novelists, the dramatists, the artists, i.e. they are men who may +be permitted to give passion, even wilful passion, a predominant place +in their works. But there are other ‘clerks’ in whom this derogation +from the disinterested activity of the mind is far more shocking, +‘clerks’ whose influence on the laymen is much more profound by reason +of the prestige attached to their functions. I mean the historians. +Here, as with the poets, the phenomenon is a new one on account of +the point of perfection it has reached. Assuredly, humanity did not +await our age to see History putting itself at the service of the +spirit of party or of national passion. But I think I may assert that +it has never seen this done with the same methodical spirit, the same +intensity of consciousness which may be observed in German historians +of the past half century and in the French Monarchists of the past +twenty years. The case of the latter is the more remarkable since they +belong to a nation which has acquired eternal honour in the history +of human intelligence by explicitly condemning pragmatic history +and formulating, as it were, the charter of disinterested history, +through the works of Beaufort, Fréret, Voltaire, Thierry, Renan, +Fustel de Coulanges.[53] Yet the true novelty here is the admission of +this spirit of partiality, the expressed intention to employ it as a +legitimate method. ‘A true German historian,’ declares a German master, +‘should especially tell those facts which conduce to the grandeur of +Germany.’ The same scholar praises Mommsen (who himself boasted of it) +for having written a Roman history ‘which becomes a history of Germany +with Roman names’. Another (Treitschke) prided himself on his lack of +‘that anemic objectivity which is contrary to the historical sense’. +Another (Guisebrecht) teaches that ‘Science must not soar beyond the +frontiers, but be national, be German’. Our Monarchists do not lag +behind. Recently one of them, the author of a _History of France_, +which tried to show that the French Kings since Clovis were occupied in +trying to prevent the war of 1914, defended the historian who presents +the past from the point of view of the passions of his own time.[54] By +his determination in bringing this partiality to historical narrative +the modern ‘clerk’ most seriously derogates from his true function, +if I am right in saying that his function is to restrain the passions +of the laymen. Not only does he inflame the laymen’s passions more +cunningly than ever, not only does he deprive them of the suggestive +spectacle of a man solely occupied by the thirst for truth, but he +prevents the laymen from hearing speech different from that of the +market place, speech (Renan’s is perhaps the finest example) which, +coming from the heights, shows that the most opposite passions are +equally justified, equally necessary to the earthly State, and thereby +incites every reader who has any capacity for getting outside himself +to relax the severity of his passions, at least for a moment. + +Let me say, however, that indeed men like Treitschke and his French +equivalents are not historians; they are men of politics who make use +of history to support a cause whose triumph they desire. Hence, it +is natural that the master of their method should not be Lenain de +Tillemont but Louis XIV, who threatened to withdraw Mezeray’s pension +if the historian persisted in pointing out the abuses of the old +monarchy; or Napoleon, who ordered the chief of police to take measures +for the history of France to be written in a manner favourable to his +own throne. Nevertheless, the really cunning ones assume the mask of +disinterestedness.[55] + +I believe that many of those whom I am here accusing of betraying their +spiritual ministry, that disinterested activity which should be theirs +by the mere fact of their being historians, psychologists, moralists, +would reply to me as follows, if such a confession did not destroy +their influence: ‘We are not in the least the servants of spiritual +things; we are the servants of material things, of a political party, +of a nation. Only, instead of serving it with the sword, we serve it +with the pen. We are _the spiritual militia of the material_.’ + +Among those who ought to show the world an example of disinterested +intellectual activity and who nevertheless turn their function to +practical ends, I shall also mention the critics. Everyone knows that +innumerable critics to-day consider that a book is only good insofar +as it serves the party which is dear to them, or as it manifests ‘the +genius of the nation’, or as it illustrates a political doctrine in +harmony with their own political system, or for other reasons of the +like purity. The modern ‘clerks’, I said before, insist that the +just shall be determined by the useful. They also want the useful to +determine the beautiful, which is not one of their least originalities +in history. Nevertheless, here again those who adopt such a form +of criticism are not truly critics, but men of politics, who make +criticism serve their practical designs. Here is a perfecting of +political passion, the whole honour of which must be given to the +moderns. Neither Pius XIV nor Napoleon apparently thought of using +literary criticism in support of the social system in which they +believed.[56] This new departure has brought forth its fruits. For +instance, if you assert with the French Monarchists that the democratic +ideal is inevitably bound up with bad literature, you are dealing that +ideal a real blow in a country like France, which has a real devotion +to literature, at least among those who will consent to believe that +Victor Hugo and Lamartine were mere scribblers.[57] + +But the most remarkable thing about the modern ‘clerk’ in his desire +to bring political passion into his work, is that he has done so in +philosophy, more precisely, in metaphysics. It may be said that until +the nineteenth century metaphysics remained the inviolate citadel +of disinterested speculation. Among all forms of spiritual labour +metaphysics best deserved the admirable tribute which a mathematician +rendered the theory of numbers above all branches of mathematics, when +he said: ‘This is the really pure branch of our science, by which I +mean that it is unsullied by any contact with practical application.’ +In fact thinkers free from any sort of earthly preference, like +Plotinus, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, and even thinkers strongly +imbued with the superiority of their class or nation (like Plato +and Aristotle), never thought of directing their transcendental +speculations towards a demonstration of this superiority or the +necessity of this adoption by the whole world. It has been said +that the morality of the Greeks was national, but their metaphysics +were universal. The Church itself, so often favourable to class or +national interests in its morality, thinks only of God and Man in its +metaphysics. It was reserved for our own age to see metaphysicians of +the greatest eminence turning their speculations to the exaltation +of their own countries and to the depreciation of other countries, +fortifying the will to power of their compatriots with all the power +of abstractive genius. Fichte and Hegel made the triumph of the German +world the supreme and necessary end of the development of Being, +and history has showed whether the action of these ‘clerks’ had an +effect on the hearts of their laymen. Let me hasten to add that this +spectacle of patriotic metaphysics is provided by Germany alone. In +France, even in this age of nationalist ‘clerks’, we have not yet +seen any philosopher (at least one who is taken seriously) build up +a metaphysical system to the glory of France. Neither Auguste Comte +nor Renouvier nor Bergson ever thought of making a French hegemony +the necessary result of the world’s development. Need I add what a +degradation this has been for metaphysics, as it has been for art? +It will be the eternal shame of the German philosophers to have +transformed the patrician virgin who honoured the Gods into a harpy +engaged in shrieking the glory of her children. + + +_Third: The ‘clerks’ have played the game of political passions by +their doctrines_ + +But where the ‘clerks’ have most violently broken with their tradition +and resolutely played the game of the laymen in their eagerness to +place themselves in the real, is by their doctrines, by the scale +of values they have set up for the world. Those whose preaching for +twenty centuries had been to humiliate the realist passions in favour +of something transcendental, have set themselves (with a science and a +consciousness which will stupify history) to the task of making these +passions, and the impulses which ensure them, the highest of virtues, +while they cannot show too much scorn for the existence which in any +respect raises itself beyond the material. I shall now describe the +principal aspects of this phenomenon. + + +_A. The ‘clerks’ praise attachment to the particular and denounce the +feeling of the universal_ + +In the first place, the ‘clerks’ have set out to exalt the will of +men to feel conscious of themselves as distinct from others, and +to proclaim as contemptible every tendency to establish oneself in +a universal. With the exception of certain authors like Tolstoi +and Anatole France, whose teaching moreover is now looked on with +contempt by most of their colleagues, all the influential moralists of +Europe during the past fifty years, Bourget, Barrès, Maurras, Péguy, +d’Annunzio, Kipling, the immense majority of German thinkers, have +praised the efforts of men to feel conscious of themselves in their +nation and race, to the extent that this distinguishes them from +others and opposes them to others, and have made them ashamed of every +aspiration to feel conscious of themselves as men in the general +sense and in the sense of rising above ethnical aims. Those whose +activity since the time of the Stoics had been devoted to preaching +the extinction of national egotism in the interest of an abstract and +eternal entity, set out to denounce every feeling of this kind and to +proclaim the lofty morality of that egotism. In our age the descendants +of Erasmus, Montaigne, Voltaire, have denounced humanitarianism as a +moral degeneration, nay, as an intellectual degeneration, in that it +implies ‘a total absence of practical common sense’; for practical +common sense has become the measure of intellectual values with these +strange ‘clerks’. + +I should like to draw a distinction between humanitarianism as I mean +it here--a sensitiveness to the abstract quality of what is human, to +Montaigne’s ‘whole form of human condition’--and the feeling which is +usually called humanitarianism, by which is meant the love for human +beings existing in the concrete. The former impulse (which would more +accurately be called humanism) is the attachment to a concept. It is a +pure passion of the intelligence, implying no terrestrial love. It is +quite easy to conceive of a person plunging into the concept of what +is human without having the least desire even to see a man. This is +the form assumed by love of humanity in the great patricians of the +mind like Erasmus, Malebranche, Spinoza, Goethe, who all were men, it +appears, not very anxious to throw themselves into the arms of their +neighbours. The second humanitarianism is a state of the heart and +therefore the portion of plebeian souls. It occurs among moralists +in periods when lofty intellectual discipline disappears among them +and gives way to sentimental exaltation, I mean in the eighteenth +century (chiefly with Diderot) and above all in the nineteenth century, +with Michelet, Quinet, Proudhon, Romain Rolland, Georges Duhamel. +This sentimental form of humanitarianism and forgetfulness of its +conceptual form explain the unpopularity of this doctrine with so many +distinguished minds, who discover two equally repulsive commonplaces in +the arsenal of political ideology. One of them is ‘the patriotic bore’ +and the other ‘the universal embrace’.[58] + +The humanitarianism which holds in honour the abstract quality of what +is human, is the only one which allows us to love _all_ men. Obviously, +as soon as we look at men in the concrete, we inevitably find that this +quality is distributed in different quantities, and we have to say with +Renan: ‘In reality one is _more or less_ a man, _more or less_ the son +of God ... I see no reason why a Papuan should be immortal.’ Modern +equalitarians, by failing to understand that there can be no equality +except in the abstract and that inequality is the essence of the +concrete, have merely displayed the extraordinary vulgarity of their +minds as well as their amazing political clumsiness.[59] + +Humanism, as I have defined it, has nothing to do with +internationalism. Internationalism is a protest against national +egotism, not on behalf of a spiritual passion, but on behalf of another +egotism, another earthly passion. It is the impulse of a certain +category of men--labourers, bankers, industrialists--who unite across +frontiers in the name of private and practical interests, and who only +oppose the national spirit because it thwarts them in satisfying those +interests.[60] + +In comparison with such impulses, national passion appears an +idealistic and disinterested impulse. In short, humanism is also +something entirely different from cosmopolitanism, which is the simple +desire to enjoy the advantages of all nations and all their cultures, +and is generally exempt from all moral dogmatism.[61] But let us come +back to this movement of the ‘clerks’ exhorting the peoples to feel +conscious of themselves in what makes them distinct from others. + +What will especially amaze history in this movement of the ‘clerks’ +is the perfection with which they have carried it out. They have +exhorted the peoples to feel conscious of themselves in what makes them +_the most distinct_ from others, in their poets rather than in their +scientists, in their legends rather than in their philosophies, since +poetry (as they perfectly well perceived) is infinitely more national, +more separating than the products of pure intelligence.[62] They have +exhorted the peoples to honour their poets’ characteristics insofar +as they are peculiar to them and are not universal. Recently a young +Italian writer praised his language because it is only used in Italy, +and poured scorn on French because it is employed universally.[63] +They have exhorted the peoples to feel conscious of themselves in +_everything_ which makes them distinct from others, not only in their +language, art, and literature, but in their dress, houses, furniture, +and food. During the past half century it has been a common experience +to see serious writers (to go no further than France) exhorting +their compatriots to remain faithful to French fashions, French +hair-dressing, French dining rooms, French cooking, French cars. They +have exhorted the peoples to feel themselves distinct even in their +vices. The German historians, says Fustel de Coulanges, urge their +nation to be intoxicated with its personality, even to its barbarity. +The French moralist does not lag behind and desires his compatriots +to accept their ‘national determinism’ in its ‘indivisible totality’, +with its injustices as well as its wisdom, with its fanaticism as +well as its enlightenment, its pettiness as well as its grandeur. +Another, (Maurras) declares: ‘Good or bad, our tastes are ours and +it is always permissible to take ourselves as the sole judges and +models of our lives’. Once again, the remarkable thing here is not +that such things should be said, but that they should be said by the +‘clerks’, by a class of men whose purpose hitherto has been to urge +their fellow-citizens to feel conscious of themselves in what is common +to all men, that they should be said in France by the descendants of +Montaigne, Pascal, Voltaire, and Renan. + +This glorifying of national particularism, so unexpected among +all ‘clerks’ is especially so among those whom I described as +‘pre-eminently clerks’--the Churchmen. Those who for centuries have +exhorted men, at least theoretically, to deaden the feeling of their +differences in order to take cognizance of each other in the divine +essence which brings all men together, have now come to praise them, +according to where the sermon is given, for their ‘fidelity to the +French soul’, for ‘the immutability of their German consciousness’, +for the ‘fervour of their Italian hearts’.[64] The sight is indeed +surprising and remarkable! What would be thought by him who, by the +mouth of his apostle, declared: ‘There is neither Greek nor Jew nor +barbarian, but Christ is in all things,’ if to-day he entered one of +his churches and saw offered to the veneration of his faithful, a +national heroine with a sword on her thigh and a flag in her hand?[65] + +This glorification of national particularisms, at least with the +precision observable to-day, is undoubtedly something new in the +history of the Church. It is not necessary to go back as far as +Saint Augustine, who preached the extinction of all patriotisms in +the embrace of ‘the City of God’; nor even to Bossuet, who shows us +the indignation of Jesus at observing ‘that because we are separated +by a few rivers or mountains, we seem to have forgotten that we are +all of one nature’. So recently as 1849 a lofty assembly of prelates +asserted that ‘this movement of nationalities is a relic of paganism, +differences of language are a consequence of sin and the fall of man’. +Certainly this declaration was an interested one, since it was provoked +by the Most Catholic Francis Joseph to check the separatist tendencies +among the peoples of his Empire; but I dare to assert that the Church +would no longer make such a declaration, even for motives of interest. +I shall be told that even if the Church wished to do so, she could +only do it under penalty of delivering up her ministers to a terrible +unpopularity among their respective peoples. As if the ‘clerk’s’ +function were not to tell the laymen truths which are displeasing to +them, and to pay the price at the expense of his own peace! + +I do not ask so much. Is there a single prelate in any pulpit of Europe +who would now dare to pronounce: ‘The Christian is both a cosmopolitan +and a patriot. These two qualities are not incompatible. The world +indeed is one common fatherland, or, to speak in more Christian terms, +one common exile.’ (Pastoral letter ‘On the pretended philosophy of +modern infidels,’ by Le Franc de Pompignon, Bishop of Puy, 1763. +The ‘infidels’ here are those who refuse the Church the right to be +cosmopolitan.) + +Some ‘clerks’ do better, and assert that by extolling national +particularisms they are in complete harmony with the fundamental spirit +of the Church, especially with the teaching of the great Doctors of +the Middle Ages. (This is the thesis which opposes Catholicism to +Christianity.) Need I recall the fact that the most national of these +Doctors limited themselves to considering national particularisms as an +inevitable condition of an earthly and inferior world, which must be +respected like everything else which is the will of God? Or that they +never exhorted men to intensify this feeling in their hearts, still +less did they ever think of putting this intensification before them as +an exercise in moral self-perfection? + +When the Church in past times did approve of something in patriotism, +it was fraternity among fellow-citizens, like love of man for other +men, but not his opposition to other men. She approved of patriotism as +an extension of human love, and not as a limitation of it.[66] + +But the most remarkable thing in all this is that recently--precisely +since the time when Benedict XV was reproached during the last war for +not having denounced the arrogance of German nationalism--there has +arisen a school in the bosom of the Church which tries to prove that +by acting in this way the Holy Father had simply obeyed the teaching +of his Divine Master, who is supposed to have preached explicitly the +love of a man for his own nation. Could anything better symbolize the +determination of the modern ‘clerks’ to place their credit and their +activities at the service of lay passions than these Churchmen making +Jesus an apostle of nationalism? + +These strange Christians express themselves thus: + +‘Jesus does not look beyond the frontiers of his own country with the +idea of bestowing his benefactions upon other nations. He declares to +the Canaanitish woman, whose daughter he heals against his own wish, +that “his mission is only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel” +(Matt. xv, 24). He sent his first disciples among the Israelites. And +notice how he insists that they shall not go elsewhere. “Go not on the +paths of the Gentiles, and enter not the cities of the Samaritans, but +go first to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.” (Matt. x, 6.) Later +on, it will be time enough to announce the good news to foreigners, +but first of all we must bring it to our own people. This is what he +means by the words, so full of patriotic meaning and love: “the house +of Israel.” A group of human beings possessing the same blood, the same +language, the same religion, the same tradition, form “a house”. These +particularities are so many dividing walls.’[67] + +They also say: + +‘The most striking thing about Jesus when he consents to pay tribute +to Caesar and refuses the crown which the people offer him in the +desert, is not so much his prudence and his disinterestedness, as his +patriotism ... One of the most important characteristics of Jesus’s +teaching is its absolutely national character....’[68] + +If the reader desires, he will himself go and find out the solidity +of the proofs on which these teachers base their thesis (one of these +proofs is that Jesus was strongly attached to the institutions of his +nation, which he showed by accepting circumcision eight days after he +was born). The point I wish to insist on is the eagerness of these +Christians to make their Master a supporter of national egotism, at +least at one period of his life. + +These views on the attitude of the Church towards nationalism seem to +me to remain unmodified by the recent declarations of the Holy See +concerning a certain type of French nationalism, for these declarations +only condemn an openly anti-Christian nationalism (hence a very +exceptional form of nationalism) and do not utter a word of blame for +the desire of the peoples to set themselves up as distinct from others +and to reject universalism. Moreover, this is how a universalist is +answered by a publication which is to some extent the official organ of +Pontifical views: + +‘Yes, all men are sons of one Father; but they were divided in the +beginning and have never been brought together again. The family was +broken up and never joined up again. On the contrary. Certainly, I am +glad to recognize the fraternity of all living beings; but are all +the dead our fathers? Have they all loved us? Have they all suffered +and laboured for us? Some lived on the other side of the globe, and, +so to speak, in another world. Some laboured against us, or, if +they supported our ancestors, it was in the hope of safeguarding or +enriching their own bequest to others, not to us. Where is the debt? +If the home is open to all comers, it is no longer a home but an +inn.’[69] + +It appears that we must look among those who have left the Church, +to find Christian ministers who proclaim the true teaching of their +Master, and who declare with no beating about the bush: ‘The Gospel of +Jesus does not imply any country, but obliterates the fatherland.’[70] + +The modern ‘clerk’ denounces the feeling of universalism, not only +for the profit of the nation, but for that of a class. Our age has +beheld moralists who have declared to the bourgeois world (or to the +working classes) that, far from trying to check the feeling of their +differences from others and to feel conscious of their common human +nature, they should on the contrary try to feel conscious of this +difference in all its profundity and irreducibleness, and that this +effort is fine and noble, whereas every desire for union is here a +sign of baseness and cowardice, and also of weakness of mind. This, +as everyone knows, is the thesis of the ‘Reflections on Violence’, +which has been praised by a whole galaxy of apostles of the modern +soul. There is certainly something more novel in this attitude of +the ‘clerks’ to class differences than in their attitude towards +national differences. To discover the results of this teaching and the +additional hatred (hitherto unknown) which it has given to either class +in doing violence to its adversary, you have only to look at Italian +Fascism for the bourgeois class, and at Russian Bolshevism for the +working class.[71] + +Here again we see realism trying to shelter under cover of the Church. +We see certain Catholic teachers striving to prove that, by encouraging +the bourgeois class, _in the name of morality_, to feel conscious of +themselves as distinct from the opposing class, to plunge religiously +into consciousness of the characteristics which are proper to their +own class, and especially (Johannet) to _intensify their feeling of +property_, these teachers are merely acting in conformity with the +teaching of the Church.[72] + +It is easy to point out the equivocation upon which this claim is +based. The Church does indeed admit class distinctions. She exhorts the +faithful to recognize and even to respect them, as something imposed +by God upon a fallen world. She also exhorts the privileged to accept +their situation, to carry out the activities it implies, and to +perform ‘the duties of their state of life’. She even tells them that +by performing these duties they are pleasing God and ‘making an act of +prayer’. But the Church never exhorted them to glorify in themselves +the feeling of this distinction, still less did she ever do so in the +name of morality. On the contrary, she exhorted them in the name of +morality to extinguish (beneath this privileged life) all belief in +a particularity of essence in their persons, and told them to feel +conscious of themselves in that humanity which is common to all men +beneath the inequality of ranks and states of life.[73] Jesus Christ, +the Church states explicitly and constantly, _only accepts the man who +is reconciled_, i.e. the man who has obliterated from his heart every +feeling of difference between himself and other men. (See Bossuet’s +_Sermon on Reconciliation_.) It seems unnecessary to insist further on +the unimpeachable character of this Christian teaching--I am speaking +of teaching, not of practice. But one cannot meditate too much on the +eagerness of so many modern Church teachers to try to find some means +of sanctifying bourgeois egotism through the words of the Gospels.[74] + +Let me point out another and remarkable form of this extolling of +particularism by the ‘clerks’: the extolling of particular systems +of morality and the scorn for universal morality. During the past +half century a whole school, not only of men of action but of serious +philosophers, has taught that a people should form a conception of its +rights and duties from a study of its particular genius, its history, +its geographical position, the particular circumstances in which it +happens to be, and not from the commands of a so-called conscience of +man in all times and places. Moreover, this same school teaches that +a class should construct a scale of good and evil, determined by an +inquiry into its particular needs, its particular aims, the particular +conditions surrounding it, and should cease to encumber itself with +such sensibilities as ‘justice in itself’, ‘humanity in itself’ and +other ‘rags and tatters’ of general morality. To-day with Barrès, +Maurras, Sorel, even Durckheim[75] we are witnessing the complete +bankruptcy among the ‘clerks’ of that form of soul which, from Plato +to Kant, looked for the notion of good in the heart of eternal and +disinterested man. The example of Germany in 1914 shows the results of +this teaching which exhorts a group of men to set themselves up as the +sole judges of the morality of their actions, shows what deification of +their appetites it leads to, what codification of their violence, what +tranquillity in carrying out their plans. One day perhaps we shall see +the same thing throughout Europe exemplified by the bourgeois class, +unless the doctrines of that class are turned against itself and we see +it exemplified by the working classes.[76] + +I dare to say that the indignation of certain French moralists at +the action of Germany in 1914 surprises me, when I reflect that some +sixteen years earlier, during the famous ‘affair’ which I have already +mentioned, these moralists preached to their compatriots exactly the +same doctrines, urging them to reject the concept of absolute justice, +and to desire only a form of justice ‘adapted to France’, to its +particular genius, its particular history, its particular, eternal, and +present needs.[77] For the honour of these thinkers--I mean for the +honour of their consistency--one likes to think that their indignation +in 1914 was not the result of any moral conviction, but only of the +desire to place the enemy of their nation in the wrong with a naïve +universe. + +This last-named activity of the ‘clerks’ seems to me one of those +which best display their determination and skill in serving the +passions of the laymen. If a man exhorts his compatriots to recognize +only a personal morality and to reject all universal morality, he is +showing himself a master of the art of encouraging them to want to be +distinct from all other men, i.e. of the art of perfecting national +passion in them, at least in one of its aspects. The desire to take +none but oneself as a judge of one’s actions and to scorn every opinion +of other people is undoubtedly a source of strength to a nation, as +every exertion of pride is a source of strength to an institution, +whose fundamental principle--whatever may be said to the contrary--is +the assertion of an ego against a non-ego. What ruined Germany in the +last war was not its ‘irritating arrogance’, as is asserted by certain +visionaries who have made up their minds that malevolence of soul +must be an element of weakness in practical life, but the fact that +its material strength was not equal to its arrogance. When arrogance +finds an equivalent material power at its disposal, it is very far from +ruining nations; witness Rome and the Prussia of Bismarck. The ‘clerks’ +who, thirty years ago, exhorted France to make herself the sole judge +of her own actions and to despise eternal morality, showed that +they possessed in the highest degree the perception of the national +interest, insofar as that interest is wholly realist and has nothing +to do with disinterested passion. It remains to be seen, once more, +whether the function of the ‘clerks’ is to serve this sort of interests. + +But the modern ‘clerks’ have held up universal truth to the scorn +of mankind, as well as universal morality. Here the ‘clerks’ have +positively shown genius in their effort to serve the passions of the +laymen. It is obvious that truth is a great impediment to those who +wish to set themselves up as distinct; from the very moment when they +accept truth, it condemns them to be conscious of themselves in a +universal. What a joy for them to learn that this universal is a mere +phantom, that there exist only particular truths, ‘Lorrain truths, +Provençal truths, Britanny truths, the harmony of which in the course +of centuries constitutes what is beneficial, respectable, _true in +France_’[78] (the neighbour similarly speaks of what is _true in +Germany_), that in other words Pascal had the mind of a clown, and that +what is true on one side of the Pyrenees may perfectly well be error +on the other side! Humanity hears the same teaching about the classes +and learns that there is a bourgeois truth and a working-class truth; +better still, that the functioning of our minds should be different +according to whether we are working men or bourgeois. The source of +your troubles (Sorel teaches the working classes) is that you do not +think in the mental way suited to your class. His disciple, Johannet, +says the same thing to the capitalist class. Perhaps we shall soon see +the results of this truly supreme art of the ‘clerks’ in exasperating +the feeling in their differences among the classes. + +The cult for the particular and the scorn for the universal is a +reversal of values quite generally characteristic of the teaching +of the modern ‘clerks’, who proclaim them in a far higher sphere of +thought than politics. The metaphysics adopted in the last twenty +years by almost all those who think or pretend to think, set up as the +supreme state of human consciousness that state--‘duration’--where we +succeed in taking cognizance of ourselves in what is most individual, +most distinct from everything not ourselves, and in freeing ourselves +from those forms of thought (concept, reason, habits of speech) through +which we can only become conscious of ourselves in what is common to +us and others. These metaphysics put forward as a superior form of +cognizance of the world that which grasps each thing by what is unique +in it, distinct from every other, and is full of scorn for the mind +which seeks to discover general states of being. Our age has seen a +fact hitherto unknown, at least from my point of view; and this in +metaphysics preaching adoration for the contingent, and scorn for the +eternal.[79] Nothing could show better how profound is the modern +‘clerk’s’ desire to exalt the real, the practical side of existence, +and to degrade the ideal, the truly metaphysical side. In the history +of philosophy this veneration for the individual comes from the German +thinkers (Schlegel, Nietzsche, Lotze), while the metaphysical cult of +the universal (added to a certain contempt for the experimental) is +pre-eminently a legacy of Greece to the human mind. So here again, and +moreover in its profoundest part, the teaching of the modern ‘clerks’ +shows the triumph of Germanic values and the bankruptcy of Hellenism. + +I should like to point out another form, not the least remarkable, +which this preaching of particularism assumes among the ‘clerks’. I +mean their exhortations to consider everything only as it exists _in +time_, that is as it constitutes a succession of particular states, a +‘becoming’, a ‘history’, and never as it presents a state of permanence +beyond time under this succession of distinct cases. I mean especially +their assertion that this view of things in their historical aspect is +the only serious and philosophical view, and that the need to look at +them in their eternal aspect is a form of the child’s taste for ghosts, +and should be merely smiled at. Need I point out that this conception +inspires the whole of modern thought? It exists among a whole group +of literary critics, who, on their own showing, inquire far less +whether a work is beautiful than whether it expresses ‘the present’ +aspirations of ‘the contemporary soul’.[80] It may be seen in a whole +school of moralist-historians who admire a doctrine, not because it +is just or good, but because it embodies the morality _of its time_, +the scientific spirit _of its time_. (This is the principal reason why +Sorel admires Bergsonism and why Nietzsche admires the philosophy of +Nicolas de Cuse.) It may be seen especially in all our metaphysicians. +Whether they put forward _Entwickelung_ or _Duration_ or _Creative +Evolution_ or _Pluralism_ or _Integral Experience_ or the _Concrete +Universal_, they all teach that the absolute is developed _in time_, +in the circumstantial, and proclaim the decadence of that form of +mind which, from Plato to Kant, hallows existence as conceived beyond +change.[81] If, with Pythagoras, we assume that the Cosmos is the place +of regulated and uniform existence, and the Ouranos the place of the +becoming and the moving, we may say that all modern metaphysics place +the Ouranos at the top of their scale of values and hold the Cosmos in +very slight esteem. Is it not remarkable to see the ‘clerks’, even in +the lofty function of metaphysicians, teaching the laymen that the real +alone is worthy of consideration, and that the supersensible is only +worthy of derisive laughter?[82] + + +(_B_) _The ‘clerks’ praise attachment to the practical, and denounce +love of the spiritual_ + +But the ‘clerks’ with their doctrines have inflamed the realism of the +laymen in other ways besides praising the particular and denouncing the +universal. At the very top of the scale of moral values they place the +possession of concrete advantages, of material power and the means by +which they are procured; and they hold up to scorn the pursuit of truly +spiritual advantages, of non-practical or disinterested values. + +This they have done, first of all, as regards the State. For twenty +centuries the ‘clerks’ preached to the world that the State should be +just; now they proclaim that the State should be strong and should +care nothing about being just. (Remember the attitude of the chief +French teachers during the Dreyfus affair.) Convinced that the strength +of the State depends upon authority, they defend autocratic systems, +arbitrary government, the reason of State, the religions which teach +blind submission to authority, and they cannot sufficiently denounce +all institutions based on liberty and discussion.[83] This denunciation +of liberalism, notably by the vast majority of contemporary men of +letters, will be one of the things in this age most astonishing to +History, especially on the part of the French. With their eyes fixed +on the powerful State, they have praised the State disciplined in the +Prussian manner, where everyone has his post, and under orders from +above, labours for the greatness of the nation, without there being +any place left for particular wills.[84] Owing to their cult of the +powerful State (and also for other reasons I shall mention later), +they want the military element to preponderate in the State, they want +it to have a right to privileges and they want the civil element to +agree to this right. (See _L’Appel au Soldat_, and the declarations of +numerous writers during the Dreyfus affair.) It is certainly something +new to see men of thought preaching the abasement of the toga before +the sword, especially in the country of Montesquieu and Renan. And +then they preach that the State should be strong and contemptuous of +justice, above all in its relations with other States. To this end +they praise in the head of the State the will to aggrandisement, the +desire for ‘strong frontiers’, the effort to keep his neighbours under +his domination. And they glorify those means which to them seem likely +to attain these ends, i.e. sudden aggression, trickery, bad faith, +contempt for treaties. This apology for Machiavellianism has inspired +all the German historians for the past fifty years, and in France it is +professed by very influential teachers, who exhort France to venerate +her Kings because they are supposed to have been models of the purely +practical spirit, exempt from all respect for any silly justice in +their relations with their neighbours. + +The novelty of this attitude among the ‘clerks’ can best be displayed +by quoting the famous answer of Socrates to the realist in the +_Georgias_: + +‘In the persons of Themistocles, Cimon and Pericles, you praise men who +made their fellow citizens good cheer, by serving them with everything +they desired without caring to teach them what is good and right in +food. They have enlarged the State, cry the Athenians, but they do not +see that this enlargement is nothing but a swelling, a tumour filled +with corruption. This is all that has been achieved by these former +politicians by filling the city with ports, arsenals, walls, tributes, +and the like follies, and by not adding Temperance and Justice.’ + +Up to our own times, in theory at least (but it is with theories I +am dealing here) the supremacy of the spiritual proclaimed in those +words has been adopted by all those who, explicitly or otherwise, +have proposed a scale of values to the world, whether through the +Church, or the Renaissance, or the eighteenth century. One can guess +the derisive laughter of a Barrès or any Italian moralist (to speak +only of the Latin races) at this disdain of power for the benefit of +justice, and their severity for the manner in which this son of Athens +judges those who made his city materially powerful. For Socrates, in +this respect the perfect model of the ‘clerk’ who is faithful to his +essential function, ports, arsenals, walls are ‘follies’, and the +serious things are justice and temperance. Those who to-day should +perform the duties of a Socrates consider that it is justice which is a +folly--‘a cloud’--and the serious things are the arsenals, the walls. +To-day the ‘clerk’ has made himself Minister of War. Moreover, one of +the most revered modern moralists definitely approves of the judges who +condemned Socrates, as good guardians of worldly interests.[85] And +that is something which has not been seen among the educators of the +human soul since the evening when Crito closed his master’s eyelids. + +I say that the modern ‘clerks’ have _preached_ that the State should be +strong and care nothing about being just; and in fact the ‘clerks’ do +give this assertion the characteristic of preaching, of moral teaching. +I cannot insist too often that in this lies their great originality. +When Machiavelli advises the Prince to carry out the Machiavellian +scheme of action, he invests those actions with no sort of morality +or beauty. For him morality remains what it is for everyone else, +and does not cease to remain so because he observes (not without +melancholy) that it is incompatible with politics. ‘The Prince,’ says +Machiavelli, ‘must have an understanding always ready to do good, +but he must be able to enter into evil when he is forced to do so’; +thereby showing that for him evil, even if it aids politics, still +remains evil. The modern realists are the _moralists_ of realism. For +them, the act which makes the State strong is invested with a moral +character by the fact that it does so, and this whatever the act may +be. The evil which serves politics ceases to be evil and becomes +good. This position is evident in Hegel, in the Pangermanists and in +Barrès; it is no less evident among realists like M. Maurras and his +disciples, in spite of their insistence in declaring that they profess +no morality. Perhaps these teachers do not profess any morality, at +least expressly, in what concerns private life, but they very clearly +profess a morality in the political order of things, if by morality is +meant everything which puts forward a scale of good and evil. For them +as for Hegel, the practical in politics _is the moral_, and if what +the rest of the world calls moral is in opposition to the practical, +then _it is the immoral_. Such precisely is the perfectly moralist +meaning of the famous campaign of ‘false patriotism’. It seems as if +we might say that for M. Maurras the practical is the divine, and that +his ‘atheism’ consists less in denying God than in shifting Him to man +and his political work. I think I can describe the work of this writer +accurately by saying that it is the _divinizing of politics_.[86] This +displacement of morality is undoubtedly the most important achievement +of the modern ‘clerks’, and the most deserving of the historian’s +attention. It is a great turning-point in the history of man when those +who speak in the name of pondered thought come and tell him that his +political egotisms are divine, and that everything which labours to +relax them is degrading. The results of this teaching were shown by the +example of Germany a decade ago.[87] + +The extent to which the modern ‘clerks’ have made innovations may be +judged by the fact that up till our own times men had only received two +sorts of teaching in what concerns the relations between politics and +morality. One was Plato’s, and it said: ‘Morality decides politics’; +the other was Machiavelli’s, and it said: ‘Politics have nothing to +do with morality.’ To-day they receive a third. M. Maurras teaches: +‘Politics decide morality.’[88] However, the real departure is not +that this doctrine should be put before them, but that they should +accept it. Callicles asserted that force is the only morality; but the +thinking world despised him. Let me also mention that Machiavelli was +covered with insults by most of the moralists of his time, at least in +France. + +The modern world also hearkens to other moralists of realism, who are +not lacking in influence as such; I mean the statesmen. Here I shall +point to the same sort of change as above. Formerly, leaders of States +practised realism, but did not honour it; Louis XI, Charles the Fifth +of Spain, Richelieu, Louis XIV, did not claim that their actions were +moral. They saw morality where the Gospel had showed it to them, and +they did not attempt to displace it because they did not apply it.[89] +With them morality was violated, but moral notions remain intact; _and +that is why, in spite of all their violence, they did not disturb +civilization_. Signor Mussolini proclaims the morality of his politics +of force and the immorality of everything which opposes it. Like the +writer, the man of government, who formerly was merely a realist, is +now the _apostle_ of realism; and the majesty of his function--if not +of his person--gives weight to his apostleship. + +The modern governor, owing to the fact that he addresses crowds, is +compelled to be a moralist, and to present his acts as bound up with +a system of morality, a metaphysics, a mysticism. Richelieu, who need +account only to his King, is able to talk only of the practical, and +leaves visions of the eternal to others. Mussolini, Bethmann-Hollweg, +Herriot, are condemned to these heights.[90] Moreover, this shows how +great to-day is the number of those whom I can call ‘clerks’, since by +that word I mean all those who speak to the world in a transcendental +manner. Consequently, I have a right to demand that they give an +account of their acts _as ‘clerks’_. + +The preachers of political realism often claim to base themselves +on the teaching of the Church, and call her a hypocrite when she +condemns their theses. This claim has little foundation as regards the +teaching of the Church before the nineteenth century, but has much more +foundation if we consider the present age. I doubt whether one could +now find from the pen of a modern theologian any passage so brutally +denunciatory of a war of aggression as the following:-- + +‘Glaringly unjust is the war of him who declares war only from ambition +and from the desire to extend his dominions beyond their legitimate +boundaries, from the desire to possess a more commodious country +in which to establish himself, from the fear of the great power of +a neighbouring prince with whom he is at peace, or from the desire +to despoil a rival solely because he is thought unworthy of the +possessions or States he holds or of a right which legitimately belongs +to him, because a ruler is inconvenienced by him and wants to get rid +of this inconvenience by force of arms.’[91] On the other hand, there +are an immense number of works to-day which need only a little twisting +to make them justify every attempt at conquest. For instance, the view +that a war is just ‘if it can invoke the necessity of safeguarding +the common good and public tranquillity, the recapture of things +unjustly carried off, the repression of rebels, the defence of the +innocent’.[92] And the view which asserts that ‘war is just when it +is necessary to a nation either to defend itself against invasion, or +_to overthrow the obstacles thwarting the exercise of its rights_.’[93] +At the beginning of the last century the Church still taught that war +could only be just for one of the two belligerents.[94] It is heavy +with consequences that she has now abandoned this position and to-day +asserts that war may be just on both sides at once, ‘from the moment +when each of the two adversaries, without being certain of its right, +considers it as simply probable after having taken the opinion of its +counsellors’.[95] Here is another serious thing: In the past, war +would only be declared just when it was against an adversary who had +committed an injury _accompanied by a moral intention_, whereas to-day +it may be declared just if it is directed against a material injury +caused without any malice,[96] for instance, an accidental violation of +frontier. It is certain that to-day Napoleon and Bismarck could find +in the teaching of the Church more justification than ever for their +incursions.[97] + +The modern ‘clerks’ have preached this realism to the classes as well +as to the nations. They say to the working class as well as to the +bourgeois class: ‘Organize yourselves, become the stronger, seize +on power or exert yourself to retain it if you already possess it; +laugh at all efforts to bring more charity, more justice or any other +“rot”[98] into your relations with the other class, you have been +cheated long enough by that sort of thing.’ And here again they do not +say: ‘Become so, because necessity demands it,’ they say, and that is +the novelty of it: ‘Become so, because morality, aesthetics demand it; +to wish to be powerful is the sign of an elevated soul, to wish to be +just the sign of a base soul.’ This is the teaching of Nietzsche,[99] +of Sorel, applauded by a whole thinking (so-called) Europe; this is +the enthusiasm of Europe, when it is attracted by Socialism, for the +doctrines of Marx, its scorn for the doctrines of Proudhon.[100] The +‘clerks’ have said the same thing to the parties contending within the +same nation. ‘Make yourself the stronger,’ they say to one or other, +according to their own passion, ‘and do away with everything which +obstructs you; free yourself from the foolish prejudice which exhorts +you to make allowances for your adversary, to establish with him a +system of justice and harmony.’ We all know the admiration professed by +a whole army of ‘thinkers’ in all countries for the Italian government, +which simply outlaws all citizens who do not approve of it. Until our +own times the educators of the human soul, disciples of Aristotle, +urged mankind to denounce as infamous any State which was an organized +faction. The pupils of Signor Mussolini and M. Maurras learn to +reverence such a State.[101] + +This extolling of the ‘strong State’ by the modern ‘clerks’ appears +also in certain teachings which, it may be asserted, would greatly have +amazed their ancestors, at least the great ones:-- + +(_a_) _The affirmation of the rights of custom, history, the past_ (to +the extent, be it understood, that they support the systems of force) +in opposition to the rights of reason. I say the affirmation of the +_rights_ of custom. The modern traditionalists do not simply teach, +like Descartes or Malebranche, that custom is upon the whole quite a +good thing, and that there is more wisdom in submitting to it than +opposing it. They teach that custom has a right, _the_ right, and +consequently that custom should be respected not only from the point +of view of interest, but of justice. The arguments in favour of the +‘historical right’ of Germany to Alsace, the ‘historical right’ of the +French monarchy, are not purely political positions, they are moral +positions. They claim to be accepted in the name of ‘true justice’, +of which (they say) their adversaries have a false conception.[102] +To determine what is just by the ‘accomplished fact’ is certainly a +new sort of teaching, especially among the peoples who for twenty +centuries derived their conception of what is just from the companions +of Socrates. Here again, the soul of Greece has given place to the soul +of Prussia among the educators of mankind. The spirit which speaks +here--and from all the teachers of Europe, Mediterranean as well as +Germanic--is the spirit of Hegel: ‘The history of the world is the +justice of the world.’ (_Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht._) + +(_b_) The extolling of _policy founded on experience_--by which is +meant that a society should be governed on principles which have proved +that they can make it strong, and by ‘illusions’ which would tend to +make it just. It is in this narrowly practical sense that the cult +of experimental politics is a new thing among the ‘clerks’. For if +we mean by the phrase the respect for principles which have showed +that they are fitted to make a society not only strong but just, the +recommendation of such a policy in opposition to a purely rational +policy appeared in the thinking world long before the disciples of +Taine or Auguste Comte.[103] Long before our ‘organizing empiricists’ +Spinoza wanted political science to be an experimental science, and +desired that the conditions under which States endure should be sought +from observation at least as much as from reason. (See his attack +on the Utopians, _Treatise_, I, i.) But he believed he learned from +observation that these conditions do not solely consist in States +possessing good armies and obedient peoples, but in their respecting +the rights of citizens and even of neighbouring peoples.[104] The +cult of experimental politics to-day is accompanied in those who +adopt it by a posture which they evidently mean to be striking, and +which in fact is so. We all know with what fatalistic visages, what +scornful inflexibility, what dark certainty of grasping the absolute, +they declare that in matters of politics ‘they consider only the +facts’. Here, especially among the French thinkers, is a new kind of +Romanticism, which I shall call the _Romanticism of Positivism_, the +chief representatives of which will rise up in the imagination of my +readers without its being necessary for me to name them. Moreover, +this cult brings out a silliness of mind which to me seems wholly an +acquisition of the nineteenth century,[105] i.e. the belief that the +teachings to be drawn from the past (supposing that they exist) will +come straight out of an examination of the _facts_, viz. desires which +have been realized. As if the desires which have not been realized were +not as important, and perhaps more important, if you reflect that they +may quite well come to fill the world’s stage now.[106] Let me add that +this cult of fact also claims to be the sole discoverer of ‘the meaning +of history’ and ‘the philosophy of history’, which there again shows +a weakness of mind from which the preceding ages seem to have been +free. When Bossuet and Hegel built up philosophies of history they were +certainly no more metaphysicians than Taine or Comte or any of their +noisy disciples, but at least they knew that they were so, that they +could not be otherwise, and were not so naïve as to think themselves +‘pure scientists’. + +(_c_) The assertion that political forms should be adapted to ‘man +as he is and always will be’ (viz. unsocial and bloody, therefore +eternally needing systems of coercion and military institutions). +This effort of so many modern teachers to assert the imperfectability +of human nature appears as one of their strangest attitudes, if you +realize that it tends towards nothing less than asserting the complete +uselessness of their function, and proving that they have completely +ceased to realize its very essence. When we see moralists, educators, +professional providers of spiritual guidance, assert at the spectacle +of human barbarism that ‘man is thus’, that ‘he must be taken thus’, +that ‘you will never change him’, we are tempted to ask them what is +their reason for existing. And when we hear them reply that ‘they are +positive minds and not Utopians’, ‘that they are concerned with what +is, not with what might be’, we are staggered to see that they do not +know that the moralist is essentially a Utopian, and that the nature +of moral action is precisely that it creates its object by affirming +it. But we recover when we notice that they are in no wise ignorant +of this, and know perfectly well that by affirming it they will +create that eternity of barbarism necessary to the maintenance of the +institutions which are dear to them.[107] + +The dogma of the incurable wickedness of man has another root among +some who profess it. This is a Romantic pleasure in picturing the human +race as walled in by an inevitable and eternal woe. From this point +of view we may say that there has grown up among certain political +writers of our time a real _Romanticism of Pessimism_, as false in its +absoluteness as the Optimism of Rousseau and Michelet, in hatred of +whom it has arisen, while its haughty and so-called scientific attitude +is most impressive to simple souls.[108] This doctrine has undoubtedly +borne fruits outside the world of literature, and at its voice there +has arisen a humanity which believes in nothing but its egotisms and +merely laughs at the naïve persons who still think that it might become +better. The modern ‘clerk’ has accomplished a truly new work--he has +taught man to deny his divinity. The import of such a work is obvious. +The Stoics claimed that pain is abolished if it is denied; the thing +is disputable in the matter of pain, but it is absolutely true in the +matter of moral perfectability. + +I shall point out two more teachings inspired in the modern ‘clerks’, +by their preaching of the ‘strong State’, and it will not be necessary +to add that they are new in the ministers of the spiritual:-- + +The first is the teaching whereby they declare to Man that he is great +to the extent that he strives to act and to think as his ancestors, +his race, his environment thought, and ignores ‘individualism’. Thirty +years ago many of the French teachers hurled anathemas against the man +who ‘claimed to seek truth for himself’, to arrive at his own opinion, +instead of adopting the opinion of his nation which had been told what +it ought to think by its vigilant leaders. Our age has seen priests +of the mind teaching that the gregarious is the praiseworthy form of +thought, and that independent thought is contemptible. It is moreover +certain that a group which desires to be strong has no use for the man +who claims to think for himself.[109] + +The second is the teaching whereby they declare to men that the fact +that a group is numerous constitutes a right. This is the morality +which the over-populated nations hear from many of their thinkers, +while the other nations hear from many of theirs that if their low +birth-rate continues they will become the objects of a ‘legitimate’ +extermination. The rights of numerousness admitted by men who claim to +belong to the life of the mind--that is what modern humanity sees. But +it is certain that if a nation is to be strong, it must be numerous. + +This cult of the strong State and the moral methods which ensure it +have been preached to mankind by the ‘clerks’ far beyond the domain +of politics, and on a wholly general plane. This is the preaching of +_Pragmatism_ whose teaching during the past fifty years by nearly +all the influential moralists of Europe is one of the most remarkable +turning points in the moral history of the human species. It is +impossible to exaggerate the importance of a movement whereby those who +for twenty centuries taught Man that the criterion of the morality of +an act is its disinterestedness, that good is a decree of his reason +insofar as it is universal, that his will is only moral if it seeks +its law outside its objects, should begin to teach him that the moral +act is the act whereby he secures his existence against an environment +which disputes it, that his will is moral insofar as it is a will ‘to +power’, that the part of his soul which determines what is good is +its ‘will to live’ wherein it is most ‘hostile to all reason’, that +the morality of an act is measured by its adaptation to its end, and +that the only morality is the morality of circumstances. The educators +of the human mind now take sides with Callicles against Socrates, a +revolution which I dare to say seems to me more important than all +political upheavals.[110] + +I should like to point out certain particularly remarkable aspects of +this preaching, which are probably not sufficiently realized. + +I said that the modern ‘clerks’ teach man that his desires are moral +insofar as they tend to secure his existence at the expense of an +environment which disputes it. In particular they teach him that his +species is sacred insofar as it is able to assert its existence at the +expense of the surrounding world.[111] In other words, the old morality +told Man that he is divine to the extent that he becomes one with the +universe; the new morality tells him that he is divine to the extent +that he is in opposition to it. The former exhorted him not to set +himself in Nature ‘like an empire within an empire’; the latter exhorts +him to say with the fallen angels of Holy Writ, ‘We desire now to feel +conscious of ourselves in ourselves, and not in God.’ The former, +like the master of the _Contemplations_, said: ‘Believe, but not in +ourselves’; the latter replies with Nietzsche and Maurras: ‘Believe, +and believe in ourselves, only ourselves.’ + +Nevertheless, the real originality of Pragmatism is not in that. +Christianity exhorted man to set himself up against Nature, but did so +in the name of his spiritual and disinterested attributes: Pragmatism +exhorts him to do so in the name of his practical attributes. Formerly +man was divine because he had been able to acquire the concept of +justice, the idea of law, the sense of God; to-day he is divine because +he has been able to create an equipment which makes him the master of +matter. (See the glorifications of the _homo faber_ by Nietzsche, +Sorel, Bergson.) + +Moreover, the modern ‘clerks’ extol Christianity insofar as it is +supposed to have been pre-eminently a school of practical, creative +virtues, adjusted to the support of the great human institutions. This +amazing deformation of a doctrine which in its precepts is so obviously +devoted to the love of the spiritual alone, is not only taught by +laymen, who are quite within their rights in trying to place their +practical desires under the patronage of the highest moral authorities; +it is also professed by the ministers of Jesus themselves. Pragmatist +Christianity, as I mean it here, is preached to-day from all Christian +pulpits.[112] + +This exhortation to concrete advantages and to that form of soul which +procures them, is expressed by the modern ‘clerk’ in another very +remarkable teaching: By praise of the military life and the feelings +which go with it, and by contempt for civil life and the morality it +implies. We know the doctrine preached in Europe during the past fifty +years by its most esteemed moralists, their apology for war ‘which +purifies’, their veneration for the man of arms ‘the archtype of moral +beauty’, their proclamation of the supreme morality of ‘violence’ or +of those who settle their differences by duels and not before a jury, +while they declare that respect for contracts is the ‘weapon of the +weak’, the need for justice the ‘characteristic of slaves’. It is +not betraying the disciples of Nietzsche or Sorel--that is, the great +majority of contemporary men of letters who attempt to set up a scale +of moral values for the world--to say that according to them Colleoni +is a far superior specimen of humanity to l’Hôpital. The estimates of +the _Voyage du Condottiere_ are not peculiar to the author of that +work. Here is an idealization of practical activity, which humanity had +never before heard from its educators, at least from those who speak +dogmatically. + +I shall be told that Nietzsche and his school do not extol the military +life because it procures material advantages, but on the contrary, +because it is the type of disinterested realism, and in opposition to +the realism which in their opinion is the characteristic of civilian +life. Yet it is none the less true that the way of life praised by +these moralists is in fact that which pre-eminently brings material +advantages. Whatever may be said by the author of _Reflections on +Violence_ and his disciples, war is more profitable than the counting +house; to take is more advantageous than to exchange; Colleoni +possesses more than Franklin. (Naturally, I am speaking of the +successful military man, since Nietzsche and Sorel never speak of the +merchant who goes bankrupt.) + +Moreover, no one will deny that the irrational activities, of which +the military instinct is only one aspect, are extolled by their great +modern apostles for their practical value. Their historian has put +it admirably: The Romanticism of Nietzsche, Sorel, and Bergson is a +_utilitarian_ Romanticism. + +Let me insist that what I am pointing to here, is not the modern +‘clerk’s’ extolling of the military spirit, but of the warlike +instinct. It is the cult of the warlike instinct, outside all social +spirit of discipline or sacrifice which is meant by the following +assertions of Nietzsche, glorified by a French moralist whom himself +has numerous followers:-- + +‘The values of the warrior aristocracy are founded on a powerful +bodily constitution, excellent health, without forgetting all that is +necessary to the upkeep of that overflowing vigour--war, adventure, +hunting, dancing, physical games and exercises, and in general +everything which implies a robust, free and joyous activity.’ + +‘That audacity of noble races, a mad, absurd, spontaneous audacity ... +their indifference and scorn for all safety of body, for life, comfort +...’ + +‘The superb blond beast wandering in search of prey and carnage ...’ + +‘The terrible gaiety and profound joy felt by heroes in all +destruction, in all the pleasures of victory and cruelty.’ + +The moralist who quotes those remarks (Sorel, _Reflexions sur la +Violence_, p. 360) adds, in order to leave no doubt about his +recommendation of them to his fellow human beings: ‘It is quite evident +that liberty would be seriously compromised if men came to look upon +the Homeric values’ (which, for him, are the values just praised by +Nietzsche) ‘as being characteristic of the barbarous peoples only.’ + +Is it necessary to observe how, here again, the moral presentation +dominant among the world’s educators is essentially Germanic, and +shows the bankruptcy of Graeco-Roman thought? Before our times you do +not find in France a single serious moralist (including de Maistre) +or even a poet (if you consider only the great ones) who praises the +‘pleasures of victory and cruelty’.[113] And it is the same for ancient +Rome, among the nations to whom war had given world supremacy. I do +not find a single passage which puts forward the instincts of prey +as the supreme form of human morality in Cicero, Seneca, or Tacitus, +or even in Virgil, Ovid, Lucan, and Claudian. On the other hand, I +find a great many which attribute this rank to the instincts on which +civil life is based.[114] Moreover, in primitive Greece, long before +the philosophers, the myths very soon give an important place to +civil morality. In a poem of Hesiod the tomb of Cycnus is engulfed +in the waters by Apollo’s command, because Cycnus was a brigand. The +defence of warlike instincts by Mediterranean moralists will be one +of the amazements of history. Some of them, moreover, seem uneasy +about it, and feel they ought to claim that the Homeric values (we +have seen what they mean by that) ‘are very close to the values of +Corneille’[115]--as if the French poet’s heroes, with all their sense +of devotion to duty and the State, had anything in common with lovers +of adventure, prey, and carnage! + +It will be observed that these passages from Nietzsche praise the +military life apart from any political aim.[116] And, in fact, the +modern ‘clerks’ teach men that war implies a morality _in itself_ +and should be exercised even apart from any utility. This thesis, so +familiar in Barrès, has been defended in its full splendour by a young +hero who is an educator of the soul for a whole French generation: + +‘In my country we love war and secretly desire it. We have always made +war. Not to conquer a province, not to exterminate a nation, not to +settle a conflict of interests.... We make war for the sake of making +war, with no other purpose.’[117] + +The old French moralists, even the soldiers (Vauvenargues, Vigny), +looked upon war as a sad necessity; their descendants recommend it as +a noble inutility. Yet, here again, the cult preached as apart from +the practical and as an art happens to be eminently favourable to the +practical--useless war is the best preparation for useful war. + +This teaching leads the modern ‘clerk’ (we have just seen it in +Nietzsche) to confer a _moral_ value upon physical exercise and to +proclaim _the morality of sport_--a most remarkable thing indeed among +those who for twenty centuries have exhorted man to situate good in +states of the mind. The moralists of sport, moreover, do not all +shuffle over the practical essence of their doctrine. Young people, +Barrès clearly teaches, should be trained in physical strength, for the +greatness of the country. The modern educator goes for his inspiration, +not to those who strolled in the Lyceum or to the solitaries of +Clairvaux, but to the founder of a little town in the Peloponnesus. +Moreover, our age has seen this new thing: Men who claim to belong +to the spiritual life teaching that the Greece to venerate is Sparta +with her gymnasiums, not the city of Plato or Praxiteles, while others +maintain that in antiquity we should honour Rome and not Greece. All +these things are perfectly consistent in those who desire to preach to +humanity nothing but strong constitutions and solid ramparts.[118] + +The preaching of realism leads the modern ‘Clerk’ to certain teachings, +whose novelty in his history is not sufficiently noticed, nor what a +break they form with the teaching which his class has given to men for +the past two thousand years. + +(_a_) _The extolling of courage_, or more precisely the exhortation to +make the supreme virtue Man’s aptitude to face death, while all other +virtues, however lofty, are placed below it. This teaching, openly the +teaching of Nietzsche, Sorel, Péguy, Barrès, was always the teaching +of poets and generals, but is entirely new among the ‘clerks’, I mean +among men who put before the world a scale of values in the name of +philosophical reflection, or who are willing to be considered as such. +From Socrates to Renan they had considered courage as a virtue, but +on a lower plane. All, more or less openly, teach with Plato: ‘In the +first rank of virtue are wisdom and temperance; courage only comes +afterwards.’[119] The impulses they exhort man to venerate are not +those whereby he strives to quench his thirst for placing himself in +the real, but those whereby he moderates it. It was reserved for our +time to see the priests of the spiritual placing in the first rank of +forms of soul that which is indispensable to man if he is to conquer +and to lay foundations.[120] However, this practical value of courage, +plainly expressed by Nietzsche and Sorel, is not equally so expressed +by all the modern moralists who praise this virtue. This brings another +of their teachings before us:-- + +(_b_) _The extolling of honour_, by which is meant all those impulses +which cause a man to risk his life for no practical interest--to be +precise, from desire of glory--_but which are an excellent school of +practical courage_, and were always extolled by those who lead men to +the conquest of material things. In this connection, let the reader +think of the respect in which the institution of the duel has always +been held in armies, in spite of certain repressions inspired solely by +practical considerations.[121] + +Here again, the position attributed to these impulses by so many modern +moralists is something new among them, especially in the country of +Montaigne, Pascal, La Bruyère, Montesquieu, Voltaire and Renan, who, +when they extol honour, mean something very different from man’s +cult of his own glory.[122] Nevertheless, the most remarkable thing +about all this is that the cult of man for his own glory is currently +preached by the Churchmen as a virtue which leads Man to God. Is it +not amazing to hear words like the following from a Christian pulpit? +‘The love of grandeurs is the path to God, and the heroic impulse which +fully coincides with the search for glories in their cause, permits +him who had forgotten God or who thought he knew not God to re-invent +Him, to discover this last summit after temporary ascents have rendered +him accustomed to the dizziness and air of altitudes.’[123] One cannot +forebear quoting the lesson given by a true disciple of Jesus to a +Christian teacher who had also strangely forgotten his Master’s word:-- + +‘Have you noticed that the eight Beatitudes, the Sermon on the Mount, +the Gospels, the whole of primitive Christian literature, contain not +one word which sets military virtues among those which lead to the +Kingdom of Heaven?’ (Renan, _First Letter to Strauss_.)[124] + +Let me observe that I am not reproaching the Christian preacher for +giving their due to glory and other earthly passions, I am only +reproaching him for trying to pretend that he is in harmony with his +institution when he does so. We do not ask that the Christian shall not +violate the Christian law; we only ask him to know that he is breaking +it when he does break it. This seems to me admirably brought out by +the remark of Cardinal Lavigerie who was asked: ‘What would you do, +Eminence, if someone slapped your right cheek?’ and who replied, ‘I +know what I ought to do, but I do not know what I should do.’ _I know +what I ought to do_, and therefore what I ought to teach. A man who +speaks in that way may give way to every species of violence, and yet +maintain Christian morality. Here actions are nothing; the judgment on +the actions is everything. + +Must I repeat that I am not deploring the fact that the cults of honour +and courage should be preached to human beings; I am deploring the fact +that they are preached _by the ‘clerks’_. Civilization, I repeat, seems +to me possible only if humanity consents to a division of functions, if +side by side with those who carry out the lay passions and extol the +virtues serviceable to them there exists a class of men who depreciate +these passions and glorify the advantages which are beyond the +material. What I think serious is that this class of men should cease +to perform their office, and that those whose duty was to quench human +pride should extol the same impulses of soul as the leaders of armies. + +I shall be told that this preaching is imposed on the ‘clerks’, at +least in war-time, by the laymen, by the States, who to-day intend to +mobilize all the moral resources of the nation for their ends.[125] +But what amazes me is not so much that I see the ‘clerks’ preaching in +this manner, as to see them do it with such docility, such absence of +disgust, such enthusiasm, such joy.... The truth is that the ‘clerks’ +have become as much laymen as the laymen themselves. + +(_c_) _The extolling of harshness_ and the scorn for human love--pity, +charity, benevolence. Here again, the modern ‘clerks’ are the +_moralists_ of realism. They are not content to remind the world +that harshness is necessary in order ‘to succeed’ and that charity +is an encumbrance, nor have they limited themselves to preaching to +their nation or party what Zarathustra preached to his disciples: ‘Be +hard, be pitiless, and in this way dominate.’ They proclaim the moral +nobility of harshness and the ignominy of charity. This teaching, +which is the foundation of Nietzsche’s work, need not surprise one +in a country which has not provided the world with a single great +apostle,[126] but it is very remarkable in the land of Vincent de Paul +and the defender of the Calas. Lines like the following, which might be +an extract from the _Genealogy of Morals_, seem to me something wholly +new coming from the pen of a French moralist: ‘This perverted pity has +degraded love.[127] It has been given the name of charity, and the weak +have received its dew. Night after night the seed of this calamity has +been scattered. It conquers the earth. It fills the solitary places. In +whatever country you go, you cannot go about for a single day without +meeting this withered face with its commonplace gestures, inspired by +the sole desire of prolonging its shameful life.’[128] There again +we can observe how the modern realists have advanced beyond their +predecessors. When Machiavelli declares that ‘a Prince in order to +maintain his power is forced to govern in a manner contrary to charity +and humanity’, he is simply saying that to act contrary to charity +may be a practical necessity, but he does not in the least vouch that +charity is a degradation of the soul. This teaching is the contribution +of the nineteenth century to the moral education of mankind. + +Sometimes the modern ‘clerks’ claim that in preaching inhumanity +they are only continuing the teaching of their great ancestors, +particularly of Spinoza on account of his famous proposition: ‘Pity in +itself is bad and useless in a soul which lives according to reason.’ +Is it necessary to point out that here pity is depreciated, not to +the benefit of inhumanity, but to the benefit of humanity _guided by +reason_, because reason alone ‘enables us to give aid to others with +certainty’. And Spinoza, determined to stress the fact that for him +pity is only inferior to reasoned kindness, adds: ‘It must be fully +understood that I am here speaking of the man who lives by reason. For +if a man is never led by reason or by pity to go to the assistance +of others, then assuredly he deserves the name of inhuman, since he +retains no resemblance to a man.’ Let me add that the apostles of +harshness cannot claim either that they are supported by the fanatics +of justice (Michelet, Proudhon, Renouvier) who, by sacrificing love to +justice, do perhaps end up in harshness, but not in a joyous harshness +which is precisely the harshness preached by the modern realists, who +say--perhaps rightly--that it is the only fertile kind.[129] + +This extolling of harshness seems to me to have borne more fruit than +any other preaching by the modern ‘clerks’. It is a commonplace that +among the great majority of the (so-called) thinking young men, in +France for instance, harshness is to-day an object of respect, while +human love in all its forms is considered a rather laughable thing. +These young men have a cult for doctrines which respect nothing but +force, pay no attention to the lamentations of suffering and proclaim +the inevitability of war and slavery, while they despise those who are +revolted by such prospects and desire to alter them. I should like +these cults to be compared with the literary aesthetics of these young +men, their veneration for certain contemporary novelists and poets in +whom the absence of human sympathy reaches a rare pitch of perfection, +and whom they plainly venerate, especially for that characteristic. +And I should like you to observe the gloomy gravity and arrogance with +which these young men subscribe to these ‘iron’ doctrines. It seems +to me that the modern ‘clerks’ have created in so-called cultivated +society a positive _Romanticism of harshness_. + +They have also created a _Romanticism of contempt_, at least in France, +and notably with Barrès, and indeed since Flaubert and Baudelaire. +Nevertheless, it seems to me that in recent times contempt has been +practised in France for reasons quite other than aesthetic. These +peoples have come to see that by feeling contempt for others they are +not only obtaining the pleasure of a lofty attitude, but that when +they are really expert in expressing contempt they harm what they +despise, do it a real damage. And in fact the kind of contempt which +Barrès expresses for the Jews and which certain royalist teachers have +displayed for democratic institutions every morning for the past twenty +years, do really harm their victims, at least among those very numerous +artistic minds for whom a superbly executory gesture is as good as +an argument. The modern ‘clerks’ deserve a place of honour in the +history of realism; they have come to understand the practical value of +contempt. + +It may also be said that they have created a _cult for cruelty_. +Nietzsche proclaims that ‘every superior culture is built up on +cruelty’, a doctrine which is explicitly proclaimed in many places +by Barrès, author of _Du sang, de la volupté et de la mort_. +Nevertheless, the cult of cruelty, which may also be thought necessary +‘to succeed’[130] has remained limited to a few particularly artistic +sensibilities, at least in France. It is very far from becoming the +cult of a school, like harshness and contempt. Here again we may +notice how new this cult is in the land of those who said ‘Cowardice, +the mother of cruelty’ (Montaigne), or, to quote a military moralist, +‘a hero does not feel proud of carrying hunger and misery among +foreigners, but of enduring them for the State; nor of giving death, +but of risking it.’ (Vauvenargues).[131] + +(_d_) _The cult of success_, I mean the teaching which says that when a +will is successful that fact alone gives it a moral value, whereas the +will which fails is for that reason alone deserving of contempt. This +philosophy which is professed by many a modern teacher in political +life (it may be said, by all in Germany since Hegel, and by a large +number in France since de Maistre) is also professed in private life, +and has borne its fruits there. In the so-called thinking world to-day +there are innumerable people who think they are demonstrating their +aristocratic morality by declaring their systematic esteem for all +who ‘succeed’ and their scorn for all who fail. One moralist places +to the credit of Napoleon’s greatness of soul his contempt for ‘the +unlucky’; others do the same thing in regard to Mazarin, Vauban, +Mussolini. It cannot be denied that the ‘clerks’ are thereby keeping +an excellent school of realism, since the cult of success and the +contempt for misfortune are obviously admirable moral conditions for +obtaining material advantages. Nor can it be denied that this teaching +is entirely new among them, especially among the ‘clerks’ of the Latin +races, I mean those whose ancestors had taught mankind to honour merit +apart from its achievements, to honour Hector as much as Achilles, the +Curiatii more than their successful rivals.[132] + +We have just seen that the modern moralists extol the warrior at the +expense of the man of justice. They also extol him at the expense of +the man of learning and, there again, they preach to the world the +cult of practical activity in defiance of the disinterested life. We +all know Nietzsche’s hue and cry against the man of the study, the man +of erudition, ‘the mirror man,’ whose only passion is to understand. +And also Nietzsche’s esteem for the life of the mind solely insofar +as it is emotion, lyricism, action, partiality; his derisive laughter +at ‘objective’ methodical research devoted to ‘the horrible old woman +known as truth’. And we know Sorel’s denunciations of societies which +‘give a privileged place to the amateurs of _purely intellectual +things_’;[133] those of Barrès, Lemaître, Brunetière, thirty years ago, +intimating to the ‘intellectuals’ that they are a type of humanity +‘inferior to the soldier’; those of Péguy, who admires philosophies to +the extent that ‘they are good fighters’, and admires Descartes because +he was in the army, and the dialecticians of French monarchism solely +because they are ready to be killed for the sake of their views.[134] +I shall be told that most often this is the mere wild talk of men of +letters, the posturing of lyricists, to which it is unjust to attribute +a dogmatic meaning; that Nietzsche, Barrès and Péguy denounce the life +of study on account of their poetic temperaments, their aversion from +everything lacking in picturesqueness and the spirit of adventure, and +not their resolution to abase disinterestedness. To which I reply that +these poets give themselves out as serious thinkers (notice their tone, +_quite free from_ naiveté); that the immense majority of their readers +accept them as such; that, even if it were true that in depreciating +the man of study their motive is not to abase disinterestedness, it +is none the less true in fact that the manner of living they hold +up to the laughter of mankind happens to be the very type of the +disinterested life, while the life they extol at its expense is the +very type of practical activity (at least more practical than that +of the man of study, for it will be admitted that the activity of du +Guesclin and Napoleon is more likely to acquire material advantages +than the activity of Spinoza and Mabillon); that, moreover, what these +thinkers despise in the man of study is precisely the man who lays no +foundations, who does not conquer, who does not predicate the capture +of its environment by the species, or who, if he does predicate it, +as the scientist does by his discoveries, retains for himself only +the joy of knowledge and abandons the practical exploitation of his +discoveries to others. In Nietzsche, the scorn for the man of study to +the benefit of the warrior is only an episode in a desire which nobody +will deny inspires the whole of his work as well as the work of Sorel, +Barrès and Péguy: _The desire to abase the values of knowledge before +the values of action._[135] + +To-day this desire inspires not only the moralist, but another kind +of ‘clerk’ who speaks from much higher ground. I am referring to that +teaching of modern metaphysics which exhorts man to feel comparatively +little esteem for the truly thinking portion of himself and to honour +the active and _willing_ part of himself with all his devotion. The +theory of knowledge from which humanity has taken its values during +the past half century assigns a secondary rank to the mind which +proceeds by clear and distinct ideas, by categories, by words, and +places in the highest rank the mind which succeeds in liberating itself +from these intellectual habits and in becoming conscious of itself +insofar as it is a ‘pure tendency’, a ‘pure will’, a ‘pure activity’. +Philosophy which formerly raised man to feel conscious of himself +because he was a thinking being and to say, ‘I think, therefore I am’, +now raises him to say, ‘I am, therefore I think’, ‘I think, therefore +I am not’ (unless he takes thought into consideration only in that +humble region where it is confused with action). Formerly philosophy +taught him that his soul is divine insofar as it resembles the soul of +Pythagoras linking up concepts; now she informs him that his soul is +divine insofar as it resembles that of the small chicken breaking its +eggshell.[136] From his loftiest pulpit the modern ‘clerk’ assures man +that he is great in proportion as he is practical. + +During fifty years, especially in France (see Barrès and Bourget) +a whole literature has assiduously proclaimed the superiority of +instinct, the unconscious, intuition, the will (in the German sense, +i.e. as opposed to the intelligence) and has proclaimed it in the name +of the practical spirit, because the instinct and not the intelligence +knows what we ought to do--as individuals, as a nation, as a class--to +secure our own advantage. These writers have eagerly expatiated on +the example of the insect whose ‘instinct’ (it appears) teaches it +to strike its prey precisely in the spot which will paralyse it +without killing it, so that its offspring may feed on the living prey +and develop better.[137] Other teachers denounce this ‘barbarous’ +extolling of instinct in the name of ‘the French tradition’ and preach +‘the superiority of the intelligence’; but they preach it because +in their opinion it is the intelligence which shows us the actions +required by our interests, i.e. from exactly the same passion for the +practical. This brings us to one of the most remarkable and certainly +the most novel forms of this preaching of the practical by the modern +‘clerks’. + +I mean that teaching according to which _intellectual activity is +worthy of esteem to the extent that it is practical and to that extent +alone_. It may be said that since the Greeks the predominant attitude +of thinkers towards intellectual activity was to glorify it insofar as +(like aesthetic activity) it finds its satisfaction in itself, apart +from any attention to the advantages it may procure. Most thinkers +would have agreed with Plato’s famous hymn to geometry, where that +discipline is venerated more than all others because for him it +represents the type of speculative thought which brings in nothing +material; and with Renan’s verdict which declares that the man who +loves science for its fruits commits the worst of blasphemies against +that divinity.[138] By this standard of values the ‘clerks’ put before +the laymen the spectacle of a class of men for whom the value of life +lies in its disinterestedness, and they acted as a check on--or at +least shamed--the laymen’s practical passions. The modern ‘clerks’ +have violently torn up this charter. They proclaim that intellectual +functions are only respectable to the extent that they are bound up +with the pursuit of a concrete advantage, and that the intelligence +which takes no interest in its objects is a contemptible activity. +They teach that the superior form of the intelligence is that which +thrusts its roots into ‘the vital urge’, occupied in discovering +what is most valuable in securing our existence. In historical[139] +science especially, they honour the intelligence which labours under +the guidance of political interests,[140] and they are completely +disdainful of all efforts towards ‘objectivity’. Elsewhere they +assert that the intelligence to be venerated is that which limits its +activities within the bounds of national interests and social order, +while the intelligence which allows itself to be guided by the desire +for truth alone, apart from any concern with the demands of society, is +merely a ‘savage and brutal’ activity, which ‘dishonours the highest +of human faculties.’[141] Let me also point out their devotion to +the doctrine (Bergson, Sorel) which says that science has a purely +utilitarian origin--the necessity of man to dominate matter, ‘knowledge +is adaptation’; and their scorn for the beautiful Greek conception +which made science bloom from the desire to play, the perfect type of +disinterested activity. And then they teach men that to accept an error +which is of service to them (the ‘myth’) is an undertaking which does +them honour, while it is shameful to admit a truth which harms them. In +other words, as Nietzsche, Barrès and Sorel plainly put it, sensibility +to truth in itself apart from any practical aim is a somewhat +contemptible form of mind.[142] Here the modern ‘clerk’ positively +displays genius in his defence of the material, since the material has +nothing to do with the truth, or rather to speak more truly--has no +worse enemy. The genius of Callicles in all its profundity lives again +in the great masters of the modern soul.[143] + +Then the modern ‘clerks’ have preached to men the religion of the +practical _by means of their theology_, through the image of God they +have set before them. First, they determined that God, who since the +Stoics has been infinite, should once more become finite, distinct, +endowed with a personality, that He should be the affirmation of a +_physical_ and not a _metaphysical_ existence. Anthropomorphism, which +in the poets from Prudentius to Victor Hugo existed mingled with +pantheism without troubling to define the frontiers between them, +since God was personal or indeterminate according to the direction of +the emotion and the needs of the lyric impulse, rose up in Péguy and +Claudel with the most violent consciousness of itself, the clearest +desire to be distinguished from its acolyte and to express contempt +for him. At the same time the political teachers attacked the religion +of the Infinite with a precision of hatred, a skill in depreciation, +unparalleled even in the Church, which consisted in denouncing this +religion precisely because it is not practical, because it saps away +the feelings which found the great earthly realities: the City and the +State.[144] But the modern ‘clerks’ have above all endowed God with +the attributes which secure practical advantages. It may be said that, +since the Old Testament, God was far more just than strong, or rather +that, as Plato thought, His strength was only a form of His justice; +and His power, as Malebranche and Spinoza put it, had nothing in common +with the power of kings and Empire-builders. The desire to increase was +implicitly excluded from His nature, as well as the moral attributes +necessary to the satisfaction of that desire--energy, will, the love +of effort, the attraction of triumph. This was an inevitable result +of His perfect and infinite state of being, which at once constituted +the whole of possible reality. Even in creation, the idea of which is +essentially inseparable from the ideas of power and increase, these +ideas were avoided--the world was far less a result of God’s power than +of His love; it came out of God as a ray comes out of the sun, without +God feeling any increase of Himself at the expense of anything else. +God, to speak in terms of the schools, was far less the transcendent +cause of the world than its immanent cause.[145] On the other hand, +for the modern teachers (Hegel, Schelling, Bergson, Péguy), God is +essentially something which increases; His law is ‘incessant change’, +‘incessant novelty’, ‘incessant[146] creation’; His principle is +essentially a principle of growth--Will, Tension, Vital Urge. If He is +Intelligence, as with Hegel, He is an intelligence which ‘develops’, +which ‘realizes itself’ more and more. The Being situated immediately +in all His perfection and knowing nothing of conquest is an object of +contempt; He represents (Bergson) an ‘eternity of death’.[147] So the +believers in an initial and single creation to-day strive to present +this act in its purely practical aspect. The Church condemns with a +hitherto unknown clearness every doctrine of immanence and preaches +transcendence in all its strictness.[148] God, in creating the world, +no longer witnesses an inevitable expansion of His nature; through +His power (some, to diminish the arbitrariness, say ‘through His +benevolence’) he sees the arising of something clearly distinct from +Himself, something on which He sets His hand. His act, whatever may be +said to the contrary, is the perfect model of material aggrandisement. +Like the prophet of Israel of old, the modern ‘clerk’ says to mankind: +‘Display your zeal for the Eternal, the God of battles.’ + +For half a century, such has been the attitude of men whose function is +to thwart the realism of nations, and who have laboured to excite it +with all their power and with complete decision of purpose. For this +reason I dare to call this attitude ‘The Great Betrayal’. If I look +for its causes, I see profound causes which forbid me to look upon +this movement as a mere fashion, to which the contrary movement might +succeed to-morrow. + +One of the principal causes is that the modern world has made the +‘clerk’ into a citizen, subject to all the responsibilities of a +citizen, and consequently to despise lay passions is far more difficult +for him than for his predecessors. If he is reproached for not looking +upon national quarrels with the noble serenity of Descartes and Goethe, +the ‘clerk’ may well retort that his nation claps a soldier’s pack +on his back if she is insulted, and crushes him with taxes even if +she is victorious. If shame is cried upon him because he does not +rise superior to social hatreds, he will point out that the day of +enlightened patronage is over, that to-day he has to earn his living, +and that it is not his fault if he is eager to support the class which +takes a pleasure in his productions. No doubt this explanation is +not valid for the true ‘clerk’, who submits to the laws of his State +without allowing them to injure his soul. He renders unto Caesar the +things that are Caesar’s, i.e. his life perhaps, but nothing more. +The true ‘clerk’ is Vauvenargues, Lamarck, Fresnel, who never imbibed +national patriotism although they perfectly performed their patriotic +duty; he is Spinoza, Schiller, Baudelaire, César Franck, who were never +diverted from single-hearted adoration of the Beautiful and the Divine +by the necessity of earning their daily bread. But such ‘clerks’ are +inevitably rare. So much contempt for suffering is not the law of human +nature even among the ‘clerks’; the law is that the living creature +condemned to struggle for life turns to practical passions, and +thence to the sanctifying of those passions. The ‘clerk’s’ new faith +is to a great extent a result of the social conditions imposed upon +him, and the real evil to deplore is perhaps not so much the ‘great +betrayal’ of the ‘clerks’ as the disappearance of the ‘clerks’, the +impossibility of leading the life of a ‘clerk’ in the world of to-day. +One of the gravest responsibilities of the modern State is that it has +not maintained (but could it do so?) a class of men exempt from civic +duties, men whose sole function is to maintain non-practical values. +Renan’s prophecy is verified; he foretold the inevitable degradation +of a society where every member was forced to discharge worldly tasks, +although Renan himself was the very type of those whom such servitude +would never have prevented--in the phrase of one of his peers--‘from +breathing only in the direction of Heaven’. + +It would be very unjust to explain the existence of national passion +in the modern ‘clerk’ by self-interest alone. This is also to be +explained, and in a more simple manner, by the love, the impulse which +naturally inspires every man to love the group from which he derives, +more than the other groups which share the earth. There again, it may +be argued that the ‘clerk’s’ new faith is caused by the changes of +the nineteenth century, which by giving national groups a consistency +hitherto unknown furnishes food to a passion which in many countries +before that period could have been little more than potential. +Obviously, attachment to the world of the spirit alone was easier for +those who were capable of it when there were no nations to love. And, +in fact, it is most suggestive to notice that the true appearance of +the ‘clerk’ coincides with the fall of the Roman Empire, i.e. with the +time when the great nation collapsed and the little nations had not yet +come into existence. It is equally suggestive to notice that the age of +the great lovers of spiritual things, the age of Thomas Aquinas, Roger +Bacon, Galilei, Erasmus, was the age when most of Europe was in a state +of chaos and the nations were unknown; that the regions where pure +speculation endured longest seem to be Germany and Italy,[149] i.e. +the regions which were the last to be nationalized; and practically +ceased to produce pure speculation from the moment when they became +nations. Of course, here again the vicissitudes of the world of sense +do not affect the true ‘clerk’. The misfortunes of their country, and +even its triumphs, did not prevent Einstein and Nietzsche from feeling +no passion but the passion for thought. When Jules Lemaître exclaimed +that the wound of Sedan made him lose his reason, Renan replied that he +perfectly retained his, and that a true priest of the mind could only +be wounded in other than earthly interests.[150] + +In the cases I have just mentioned, the ‘clerk’s’ devotion to his +nation or class is sincere, whether it is from interest or from love. +I admit I think this sincerity is infrequent. The practice of the life +of the spirit seems to me to lead inevitably to universalism, to the +feeling of the eternal, to a lack of vigour in the belief in worldly +conventions. The sincerity of national passion especially, in men of +letters particularly, seems to me to assume the virtue of naiveté, +which everyone will admit is not characteristic of this body of men, +apart from their own self-esteem. It will also be hard to convince +me that the motives of their public attitudes in artists are such +simple things as the desire to live and to eat. I therefore seek--and +find--other reasons for the realism of the modern ‘clerk’, and these, +although less natural, are none the less profound. They seem to me +particularly valid for men of letters, especially in France, the +country where the attitude of writers in the past half century differs +most from that of their fathers. + +First of all, I see the interests of their careers. It is an obvious +fact that during the past two centuries most of the men of letters who +have attained wide fame in France assumed a political attitude--for +instance, Voltaire, Diderot, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Victor Hugo, +Anatole France, Barrès. With some of them, real fame dates from the +moment when they assumed that attitude. This law has not escaped the +attention of their descendants, and it may be said to-day that every +French writer who desires wide fame (which means every writer endowed +with the real temperament of a man of letters) also desires inevitably +to play a political part. This desire may arise from other motives. For +instance, in Barrès and d’Annunzio, from the desire ‘to act’, to be +something more than ‘men at a desk’, to lead a life like that of the +‘heroes’ and not like that of ‘scribes’; or, more ingenuously, as no +doubt happened with Renan when he stood as a Parliamentary candidate, +from the idea that he could perform a public service. Let me add that +the modern writer’s desire to be a political man is excused by the fact +that the position is to some extent offered him by public opinion, +whereas the compatriots of Racine and La Bruyère would have laughed +in their faces if they had thought of publishing their views on the +advisability of the war with Holland or the legality of Chambres de +réunion. There again, it was easier to be a true ‘clerk’ in the past +than to-day. + +These observations explain why the contemporary French writer so +frequently desires to assume a political attitude, but they do not +explain why this attitude is so inevitably in support of arbitrary +authority. Liberalism is also a political attitude; and the least +which can be said is that the modern French ‘clerk’ has very seldom +adopted it in the past twenty years. Another factor comes in here. That +is the practical writer’s desire to please the bourgeoisie, who are the +creators of fame and the source of honours. It may even be argued that +for this sort of writer the necessity to treat the passions of this +class with deference is greater than ever, if I may judge by the fate +of those who in recent times have dared to defy them, i.e. Zola, Romain +Rolland. Now, the bourgeoisie of to-day, terrified by the progress +of the opposing class, solely anxious to retain the privileges which +are left them, feel nothing but aversion from liberal dogmas; and the +man of letters who displays any political flag is bound to wave the +flag of ‘Order’ if he wishes to obtain favours. The case of Barrès +is particularly instructive from this point of view. He began as a +great intellectual sceptic, and his material star waxed a hundredfold +greater, at least in his own country, on the day when he made himself +the apostle of ‘necessary prejudices’. This sort of thing makes me +believe that the present political fashion of French writers is going +to last a long time. A phenomenon which is caused by the uneasiness of +the French bourgeoisie does not seem likely to disappear quickly.[151] + +I have mentioned the lot of those writers who in quite recent times +have dared to thwart the passions of the bourgeoisie. This is only one +aspect of a very general novelty, of supreme interest to the subject +I am discussing. I mean the consciousness of their sovereignty felt +by the herd of laymen, and the resolution they display to bring to +his senses any writer who dares to say anything but what they wish to +hear. This propensity of the layman appears not only in his relations +with his writers (and with his press--a newspaper which does not +supply its readers with the exact errors they cherish is immediately +dropped), but, which is far more remarkable, in his relations with +his truly ‘clerical’ teachers, whose voice speaks to him in the name +of the Divine. The pulpit-orator who really presumed to censure +nationalist passion, who really mortified bourgeois arrogance, would +soon (particularly in France) see his flock disperse. He can no +longer terrify such a gathering with the fear of punishment, and they +no longer believe in anything but the real; consequently they feel +stronger and more important than he, and only consent to listen to +his preaching on condition that he treats with deference--not to say +sanctifies--the egotisms they venerate.[152] Modern humanity is fully +determined that those who call themselves its teachers, shall be its +servants and not its guides. And most of the teachers understand this +admirably.[153] + +To come back to the modern writer and the causes for his political +attitude--I shall add that he is not only in the service of a +bourgeoisie which is in a state of anxiety, but that he himself has +become more and more of a bourgeois, endowed with all the social +position and respect which belong to that caste. The Bohemian man of +letters has practically disappeared, at least among those who engage +public interest. Consequently, he has more and more come to possess the +bourgeois form of soul, one of those most conspicuous characteristics +is an affectation of the political feelings of the aristocracy--an +attachment to systems of arbitrary authority, to military and priestly +institutions, a scorn for societies founded upon justice, upon civic +equality, a cult for the past, etc.... How many writers in France +during the past fifty years, men whose names are on everyone’s lips, +obviously think they are ennobling themselves by expressing disgust for +democratic institutions![154] In the same way I explain the adoption +by many of them of harshness and cruelty, which they think are also +attributes of the souls of the nobility. + +The reasons I have just mentioned for the new political attitude of +men of letters arise from the changes in their social status. Those I +am about to mention arise from changes in the structure of their minds, +in their literary desires, in their aesthetic cults, in their morality. +These reasons seem to me even more worthy of the historian’s attention +than those which have gone before. + +First of all, we have their Romanticism, taking that word to mean the +desire which arose in the writers of the nineteenth century (but which +has become greatly perfected in the last thirty years) to treat themes +which lend themselves in a literary manner to striking attitudes. About +1890 the men of letters, especially in France and Italy, realized with +astonishing astuteness that the doctrines of arbitrary authority, +discipline, tradition, contempt for the spirit of liberty, assertion +of the morality of war and slavery, were opportunities for haughty and +rigid poses infinitely more likely to strike the imagination of simple +souls than the sentimentalities of Liberalism and Humanitarianism. +And as a matter of fact, the so-called reactionary doctrines do lend +themselves to a pessimistic and contemptuous Romanticism which makes +a far deeper impression on the common herd than enthusiastic and +optimistic Romanticism. The pose of a Barrès or a d’Annunzio strikes +naïve persons far more than that of a Michelet or a Proudhon. Moreover, +these doctrines are to-day given forth as founded upon science, upon +‘pure experience’, and thereby permit a tone of calm inhumanity (the +Romanticism of Positivism) whose effect on the herd has not escaped +the sagacious eye of the man of letters. (Of course, I am only speaking +of the elegant herd; Romantic pessimism has no value whatsoever for the +people.) + +There is another transformation of the literary soul in men of letters, +wherein I think I see a cause of their new political creed. This is, +that recently the only one of their faculties they venerate is their +artistic sensibility, on which to some extent they base all their +judgments. Until the last thirty years it may be said that men of +letters, at least in Latin Europe, disciples in this of the Greeks, +were determined in their judgments--even their literary judgments--far +more by their sensibility to reason than by their artistic sensibility, +whereof moreover they were scarcely conscious as something distinct +from the former. This remark is true for the men of the Renaissance +and their direct descendants (the French writers of the seventeenth +and succeeding century) and, despite appearances, it is also true +of those who lived at the beginning of the nineteenth century. If +the weakening of sensibility to reason and, more generally, of lofty +intellectual discipline, is indisputably one of the characteristics of +the Romanticism of 1830, the contempt for this sensibility makes no +appearance. Victor Hugo, Lamartine, Michelet never prided themselves +on despising the values of reason in things in order to esteem only +their art values. Now, towards 1890, there occurred a revolution whose +influence cannot be exaggerated. Enlightened by philosophical analysis +(Bergsonism), the men of letters became conscious of the fundamental +difference between intellectual sensibility and artistic sensibility; +and ardently chose the latter. This is the epoch when they were heard +to assert that a book is great as soon as it achieves a literary and +artistic success, that its intellectual content is of no interest, +that all arguments are equally defensible, that error is no more false +than truth, etc.[155] This great change affected their political +attitudes. Obviously, as soon as we think things are good only +insofar as they content our artistic needs, the only good political +systems are those of arbitrary authority. Artistic sensibility is far +more gratified by a system which tends to the realization of force +and grandeur than by a system which tends to the establishment of +justice, for the characteristic of artistic sensibility is the love +of concrete realities and the repugnance for abstract conceptions and +conceptions of pure reason, the model of which is the idea of justice. +Artistic sensibility is especially flattered by the spectacle of a +mass of units which are subordinated to each other up to the final +head who dominates them all, whereas the spectacle of a democracy, +which is a mass of units _where no one is first_, deprives this +sensibility of one of its fundamental needs.[156] Add to this that +every doctrine which honours Man in the universal, in what is common +to all men, is a personal injury to the artist, whose characteristic +(at least since Romanticism)[157] is precisely to set himself up as an +exceptional being. Add also the sovereignty the artist now attributes +to his desires and their satisfaction (the ‘rights of genius’) and, +consequently, his natural hatred for systems which limit each person’s +liberty of action by that of others. And finally add the artist’s +aversion from everything which is general, everything which is only +the object of conception, not of sensation.[158] The determination of +men of letters to pass judgment only in accordance with their artistic +sensibility is only one aspect of their desire (since Romanticism) to +exalt feeling at the expense of thought, a desire which itself is one +among the thousand results of the decline of intellectual discipline +among them. The new political attitude of the ‘clerks’ seems to me to +be here the result of a serious modification of their state of mind. + +This attitude also seems to me to result from the decline of the +study of classical literature in the formation of their minds. The +humanities, as the word implies, have always taught the cult of +humanity in its universal aspect, at least since the time of the +Portico.[159] The decline of Graeco-Roman culture in Barrès and his +literary generation, in comparison with that of Taine, Renan, Hugo, +Michelet, even Anatole France and Bourget, is undeniable. Still less +will it be denied that this decline is considerably more noticeable +in Barrès’s successors. However, this decline does not prevent these +writers from extolling classical studies, but they do not do this +with the idea of reviving the cult for what is human in its universal +aspect, but on the contrary to strengthen the ‘French’ mind, or at +least the ‘Latin’ mind, in the grasp of its own roots, in consciousness +of itself as distinct from other minds. Notice that this decline of +classical culture in the French writers coincides with the discovery of +the great German realists, Hegel and especially Nietzsche, whose genius +had the more effect on these Frenchmen because their lack of classical +discipline deprived them of the one real barrier which can be opposed +to that genius.[160] + +Among the causes of this new attitude among men of letters I must point +to their thirst for sensations, their need to experience things, which +in recent times have grown stronger and have caused them to adopt a +political attitude which gave them emotions and sensations. Belphegor +is not the only star in the literary heavens. A French writer, who +was taken seriously as a thinker as early as 1890, was reproached for +having joined a party whose inconsistency will long be an amazement to +History; and he replied, ‘I followed Boulangism, as a man follows a +fanfare of trumpets.’ The same thinker gives us to understand that his +chief motive in ‘seeking contact with national minds’ was to ‘throw +more fuel under his sensibility, which was beginning to run down’.[161] +I do not think I am mistaken when I say that numbers of our moralists +who sneer at pacific civilization and extol a warlike life, do so +because the former seems a dull sort of a life to them and the latter +an opportunity for sensations.[162] You will recollect the remark of a +young thinker, quoted by Agathon in 1913: ‘Why not a war? It will be +amusing.’ I shall be told that this is the mere extravagant saying of +a young man. But what of this remark from a man of fifty, and what is +more, a scientist (R. Quinton), who saw the tragedy of 1914 coming, +and exclaimed: ‘We shall picnic on the grass!’? This scientist was +certainly a good soldier, but no more so than Fresnel and Lamarck, of +whom I dare to say that they may have approved of war, but not because +it satisfied their taste for the picturesque. All who frequented the +author of _Reflexions sur la Violence_ know that one of the greatest +attractions of any idea for him was that it was ‘amusing’ and likely +to exasperate so-called reasonable people. There are many thinkers of +the past fifty years whose ‘philosophy’ has one fundamental motive--the +pleasure of throwing off irritating paradoxes; while they are only +too happy if their rockets fall like swords and satisfy that need for +cruelty which they profess as the sign of noble minds. This prodigious +decline of morality, this sort of (very Germanic) intellectual sadism, +is usually and quite openly accompanied by a huge contempt for the true +‘clerk’, whose joy comes from the exercise of thought and who disdains +sensation, particularly the sensations of action. Here again the new +political cult of the men of letters is the result of a modification +in the most intimate part of their mind, the very same modification we +have been discussing, i.e. a decline of intellectual discipline, which +does not mean a decline in intelligence.[163] + +On their own showing, many modern ‘clerks’ have adopted these realist +doctrines because they want to have done with the moral disarray into +which they are thrown by the spectacle of philosophies, ‘none of which +bring certainty,’ and which all collapse upon each other as they cry +to heaven their contradictory absolutes. There again the ‘clerk’s’ +political attitude is the result of a great decline in his intellectual +discipline, whether we consider that this decline is shown by his +belief that any philosophy can bring certainty, or whether we think +that it lies in his inability to stand upright on the ruins of the +schools, devoting himself to reason, which is above all the schools, +and is their judge. + +I shall also admit as one other cause of realism in the modern ‘clerks’ +the irritation produced in them by the teaching of some of their +predecessors--I mean certain masters of the year 1848, with their +visionary idealism, their belief that justice and love were suddenly +about to become the essence of the soul of nations, an irritation +greatly increased by seeing the dreadful contrast between these idyllic +prophecies and the events which followed them. Nevertheless, the point +to remember is that the modern ‘clerks’ replied to these errors by +hurling anathemas at every sort of idealism, whether visionary or not, +thereby showing incapacity to distinguish between species, inability +to rise above passion to judgment. And this is but one other aspect of +their loss of the good manners of the mind. + +Let me recapitulate the causes for this change in the ‘clerks’: The +imposition of political interests on all men without any exception; +the growth of consistency in matters apt to feed realist passions; +the desire and the possibility for men of letters to play a political +part; the need in the interests of their own fame for them to play +the game of a class which is daily becoming more anxious; the +increasing tendency of the ‘clerks’ to become bourgeois and to take +on the vanities of that class; the perfecting of their Romanticism; +the decline of their knowledge of antiquity and of their intellectual +discipline. It will be seen that these causes arise from certain +phenomena which are most profoundly and generally characteristic of +the present age. The political realism of the ‘clerks’, far from being +a superficial fact due to the caprice of an order of men, seems to me +bound up with the very essence of the modern world. + + + + +IV + +_Summary--Predictions_ + + +To sum up: If I look at contemporary humanity from the point of +view of its moral state as revealed by its political life, I see +(_a_) A mass in whom realist passions in its two chief forms--class +passion, national passion--has attained a degree of consciousness and +organization hitherto unknown; (_b_) A body of men who used to be in +opposition to the realism of the masses, but who now, not only do not +oppose it, but adopt it, proclaim its grandeur and morality; in short, +a humanity which has abandoned itself to realism with a unanimity, +an absence of reserve, a sanctification of its passion unexampled in +history. + +This remark may be put in another form. Imagine an observer of the +twelfth century taking a bird’s-eye view of the Europe of his time. He +would see men groping in the obscurity of their minds and striving to +form themselves into nations (to mention only the most striking aspect +of the realist will); he would see them beginning to succeed; he would +see groups of men attaining consistency, determined to seize a portion +of the earth and tending to feel conscious of themselves as distinct +from the groups surrounding them. But at the same time he would see a +whole class of men, regarded with the greatest reverence, labouring +to thwart this movement. He would see men of learning, artists and +philosophers, displaying to the world a spirit which cared nothing for +nations, using a universal language among themselves. He would see +those who gave Europe its moral values preaching the cult of the human, +or at least of the Christian, and not of the national, he would see +them striving to found, in opposition to the nations, a great universal +empire on spiritual foundations. And so he might say to himself: +‘Which of these two currents will triumph? Will humanity be national +or spiritual? Will it depend on the will of the laymen or of the +“clerks”?’ And for long ages the realist cause will not be completely +victorious; the spiritual body will remain faithful to itself long +enough to our observer to be uncertain of the result. To-day the game +is over. Humanity is national. The layman has won. But his triumph +has gone beyond anything he could have expected. The ‘clerk’ is not +only conquered, he is assimilated. The man of science, the artist, the +philosopher are attached to their nations as much as the day-labourer +and the merchant. Those who make the world’s values, make them for +a nation; the Ministers of Jesus defend the national. All humanity +including the ‘clerks’, have become laymen. All Europe, including +Erasmus, has followed Luther. + +I said above that the humanity of the past, more precisely the humanity +of Europe in the Middle Ages, with the values imposed upon it by the +‘clerks’, acted ill but honoured the good. It may be said that modern +Europe with teachers who inform it that its realist instincts are +beautiful, acts ill and honours what is ill. Modern Europe is like +the brigand in one of Tolstoi’s stories, who made his confession to a +hermit, and the hermit said in amazement: ‘Others were at least ashamed +of being brigands; but what is to be done with this man, who is proud +of it?’ + +Indeed, if we ask ourselves what will happen to a humanity where +every group is striving more eagerly than ever to feel conscious of +its own particular interests, and makes its moralists tell it that it +is sublime to the extent that it knows no law but this interest--a +child can give the answer. This humanity is heading for the greatest +and most perfect war ever seen in the world, whether it is a war of +nations, or a war of classes. A race of which one group exalts one of +its masters (Barrès) to the skies because he teaches: ‘We must defend +the essential part of ourselves as sectarians,’ while a neighbouring +group acclaims a leader because, when he attacks a defenceless small +nation, he says, ‘Necessity knows no law’--such a race is ripe for the +zoological wars Renan talks about, which, he said, would be like the +life and death wars which occur among rodents and among the carnivora. +As regards the nation, think of Italy; as regards class, think of +Russia; and you will see the hitherto unknown point of perfection +attained by the spirit of hatred against what is ‘different’ among +a group of men, consciously realist and at last liberated from all +non-practical morality. And my predictions are not rendered less +probable by the fact that these two nations are hailed as models +throughout the world by those who desire either the grandeur of their +nation or the triumph of their class. + +These dark predictions do not seem to me to need as much modification +as some people think, on account of certain actions resolutely directed +against war, such as the setting up of a supernational institution +and the agreements recently made by the rival nations. Imposed upon +the nations by their Ministers rather than desired by them, dictated +solely by interest (the fear of war and its ravages) and not at all +by a change in public morality, these new institutions may perhaps +be opposed to war but leave intact the _spirit of war_, and nothing +leads us to suppose that a nation which only respects a contract for +practical reasons, will not break it as soon as breaking it appears +more profitable. Peace, if it ever exists, will not be based on the +fear of war but on the love of peace. It will not be the abstaining +from an act, but the coming of a state of mind.[164] In this sense +the most insignificant writer can serve peace where the most powerful +tribunals can do nothing. And moreover these tribunals leave untouched +the economic war between the nations and the class wars. + +Peace, it must be repeated after so many others have said this, is +only possible if men cease to place their happiness in the possession +of things ‘which cannot be shared’, and if they raise themselves to +a point where they adopt an abstract principle superior to their +egotisms. In other words, it can only be obtained by a betterment of +human morality. But, as I have pointed out above, not only do men +to-day steel themselves entirely against this, but the very first +condition of peace, which is to recognize the necessity for this +progress of the soul, is seriously menaced. A school arose in the +nineteenth century which told men to expect peace from enlightened +self-interest, from the belief that a war, even when victorious, is +disastrous, especially to economic transformations, to ‘the evolution +of production’, in a phrase, to factors totally foreign to their moral +improvement, from which, these thinkers say, it would be frivolous to +expect anything. So that humanity, even if it had any desire for peace, +is exhorted to neglect the one effort which might procure it, an effort +it is delighted not to make. The cause of peace, which is always +surrounded with adverse factors, in our days has one more against +it--the pacifism which pretends to be scientific.[165] + +I can point to other sorts of pacifism, whose chief result I dare to +say is to weaken the cause of peace, at least among serious-minded +persons:-- + +(_a_) First, there is the pacifism I shall call ‘vulgar’, meaning +thereby the pacifism which does nothing but denounce ‘the man who +kills’, and sneer at the prejudices of patriotism. When I see certain +teachers, even if they are Montaigne, Voltaire, and Anatole France, +whose whole case against war consists in saying that highwaymen are no +more criminal than leaders of armies, and in laughing at people who +kill each other because one party is dressed in yellow and the other in +blue, I feel inclined to desert a cause whose champions over-simplify +things to this extent, and I begin to feel some sympathy for the +impulses of profound humanity which created the nations and which are +thereby so grossly insulted.[166] + +(_b_) _Mystic pacifism_, by which I mean the pacifism which is solely +animated by a blind hatred of war and refuses to inquire whether +a war is just or not, whether those fighting are the attackers or +the defenders, whether they wanted war or only submit to it. This +pacifism is essentially the pacifism of the people (and that of all the +so-called pacifist newspapers) and was strikingly embodied in 1914 by +a French writer who, having to judge between two fighting nations one +of which had attacked the other contrary to all its pledges while the +other was only defending itself, could do nothing but intone ‘I have +a horror of war’ and condemned them both equally. It is impossible to +exaggerate the consequences of this behaviour, which showed mankind +that mystic pacifism, just like mystic militarism, may entirely +obliterate the feeling of justice in those who are smitten with it. + +I think I see another motive in the French writers who in 1914 adopted +the attitude of M. Romain Rolland--the fear that they would fall into +national partiality if they admitted that their nation was in the +right. It may be asserted that these writers would have warmly taken up +the cause of France, if France had not been their own country. Whereas +Barrès said, ‘I always maintain my country is right even if it is in +the wrong,’ these strange friends of justice are not unwilling to say: +‘I always maintain my country is in the wrong, even if it is right.’ +There again we see that the frenzy of impartiality, like any other +frenzy, leads to injustice. + +I have also a word to say about the severities of these ‘justiciaries’ +towards France’s attitude immediately after her victory, towards her +desire to force the enemy to make good the damage done to her, and to +seize on pledges if he refused. The motive which here animated these +moralists without their perceiving it, seems to me very remarkable; +it was the thought that the just person must inevitably be weak and +suffer, that he must be a victim. If the just man becomes strong and +comes to possess the means of enforcing justice towards himself, then +he ceases to be just to these thinkers. If Socrates and Jesus make +their persecutors disgorge, then they cease to embody justice; one step +more and the persecutors, having become victims, would embody right. +In this the cult of justice is replaced by the cult of misfortune, +a Christian Romanticism which is somewhat unexpected in a man like +Anatole France. No doubt the events of 1918 upset all the habits of the +advocates of right. Outraged right became the stronger, the assailed +toga triumphed over the sword, the Curiatii were victorious. Perhaps +some coolness of mind was needed to recognize that right remained +right, even when thus invested with force. The French pacifists failed +to remain cool. In short, their attitude in the past ten years has been +inspired by sentiment alone, and nothing could show better the degree +of weakness to which intellectual discipline has now fallen among our +‘princes of the mind’.[167] + +(_c_) _Pacifism claiming to be patriotic_, by which I mean the pacifism +which claims to exalt humanitarianism, to preach the abatement of the +militarist spirit and of national passion, and yet not to harm the +interests of the nation nor to compromise its power of resistance to +foreign nations. This attitude--which is that of all Parliamentary +pacifists--is the more antipathetic to upright minds in that it is +inevitably accompanied by the assertion (which is also nearly always +contrary to the truth) that the nation is not in the least threatened +and that the malevolence of neighbouring nations is a pure invention +of people who want war. But that is merely an aspect of a very general +fact, which is of supreme importance to the matter under discussion. + +By this I mean the ‘clerk’s’ determination to put forth his principles +as valid in the practical order of things, as reconcilable with the +safeguarding of the sword’s conquests. This determination, which has +affected the Church for twenty centuries and almost all the idealists +(give me the names of those since Jesus who have declared themselves +incompetent in the practical order of things), is the source of all the +‘clerk’s failures’. It may be said that the ‘clerk’s’ defeat begins +from the very moment when he claims to be practical. As soon as the +‘clerk’ claims that he does not disregard the interests of the nation +or of the established classes, he is inevitably beaten, for the very +good reason that it is impossible to preach the spiritual and the +universal without undermining the institutions whose foundations are +the possession of the material and the desire to feel distinct from +others. A true ‘clerk’ (Renan) says excellently: ‘The mother-country +is a worldly thing; the man who wants to play the angel will always +be a bad patriot.’ Thus we see that the ‘clerk’ who claims to secure +the works of the world has a choice between two consequences. Either +he secures them and transgresses all his principles, which is the case +with the Church supporting the nation and property; or he maintains +his principles and causes the ruin of the institutions he claimed he +was supporting, which is the case with the humanitarian who claims to +safeguard what is national. In the first case the ‘clerk’ is despised +by the just man, who denounces him as cunning and strikes him out of +the rank of ‘clerk’; and in the second case he collapses under the +hooting of the nations who call him inefficient, while he provokes a +violent and loudly acclaimed reaction on the part of the realist, which +is what is now happening in Italy. From all this it follows that the +‘clerk’ is only strong if he is clearly conscious of his essential +qualities and his true function, and shows mankind that he is clearly +conscious of them. In other words he declares to them that his kingdom +is not of this world, that _the grandeur of his teaching lies precisely +in this absence of practical value, and that the right morality for +the prosperity of the kingdoms which are of this world, is not his, but +Caesar’s_. When he takes up this position, the ‘clerk’ is crucified, +but he is respected, and his words haunt the memory of mankind.[168] +The need to remind the modern ‘clerks’ of these truths (for everyone of +them is angry at being called Utopian) is one of the most suggestive +observations in connection with our subject. It shows that the desire +to be practical has become general, that the claim to be so has now +become necessary in order to obtain an audience, and that the very +notion of ‘clerkdom’ has become obscured even in those who still tend +to exercise that function. + +It will be seen that I entirely dissociate myself from those who want +the ‘clerk’ to govern the world, and who wish with Renan for the ‘reign +of the philosophers’; for it seems to me that human affairs can only +adopt the religions of the true ‘clerk’ under penalty of becoming +divine, i.e. of perishing as human. This has been clearly seen by all +lovers of the divine who did not desire the destruction of what is +human. This is marvellously expressed by one of them when he makes +Jesus say so profoundly to His disciple: ‘My son, I must not give you a +clear idea of your substance ... for if you saw clearly what you are, +you could no longer remain so closely united to your body. You would +no longer watch over the preservation of your life.’[169] But though +I think it a bad thing that the ‘clerk’s’ religion should possess the +lay world, I think it still more to be dreaded that it should not be +preached to the layman at all, and that he should thus be allowed to +yield to his practical passions without the least shame or the least, +even hypocritical, desire to raise himself however slightly above them. +‘There are a few just men who prevent me from sleeping’--that was what +the realist said of the teachers of old. Nietzsche, Barrès, and Sorel +do not prevent any realist from sleeping; on the contrary. This is the +novelty I want to point out, which to me seems so serious. It seems to +me serious that a humanity, which is more than ever obsessed by the +passions of the world, should receive from its spiritual leaders the +command: ‘remain faithful to the earth.’ + +Is this adoption of ‘integral realism’ by the human species permanent, +or merely temporary? Are we, as some people think, witnessing the +beginning of a new Middle Ages (and one far more barbarous than the +former, for though it practised realism, it did not extol realism), +from which, however, will arise a new Renaissance, a new return to +the religion of disinterestedness? The elements we have discovered +as forming the new realism scarcely allow us to hope so. It is hard +to imagine the nations sincerely striving not to feel conscious of +themselves as distinct from others, or, if they do so, having any +other motive than that of concentrating inter-human hatred into that +of class. It is hard to imagine the clergy regaining a real moral sway +over the faithful and being able (supposing they desired to do so) to +tell them with impunity unpleasant truths. It is hard to imagine a +body of men of letters (for corporative action becomes more and more +important) attempting to withstand the bourgeois classes instead of +flattering them. It is still harder to imagine them turning against the +tide of their intellectual decadence and ceasing to think that they +display a lofty culture when they sneer at rational morality and fall +on their knees before history. Nevertheless one thinks of a humanity +of the future, weary of its ‘sacred egotisms’ and the slaughterings to +which they inevitably lead, coming as humanity came two thousand years +ago, to the acceptance of a good situated beyond itself, accepting it +even more ardently than before, with the knowledge of all the tears and +blood that have been shed through departing from that doctrine. Once +more Vauvenargues’ admirable saying would be verified. ‘The passions +have taught men reason.’ But such a thing only seems to me possible +after a long lapse of time, when war has caused far more woes than +have yet been endured. Men will not revise their values for wars which +only last fifty months and only kill a couple of million men in each +nation. One may even doubt whether war will ever become so terrible as +to discourage those who love it, the more so since they are not always +the men who have to fight. + +When I set this limit to my pessimistic outlook and admit that such +a Renaissance is possible, I mean no more than that it is just +possible. I cannot agree with those who say it is certain, either +because it happened once before, or because ‘civilization is due to +the human race’. Civilization as I understand it here--moral supremacy +conferred on the cult of the spiritual and on the feeling of the +universal--appears to me as a lucky accident in man’s development. It +blossomed three thousand years ago under a set of circumstances whose +contingent character was perfectly perceived by the historian who +called it ‘the Greek miracle’. It does not appear to me in the least to +be a thing due to the human race by virtue of the data of its nature. +It seems to me so little such a thing that I observe large portions +of the species (the Asiatic world in antiquity, the Germanic world in +modern times) who showed themselves incapable of it and quite likely +to remain so. And this means that if humanity loses this jewel, there +is not much chance of finding it again. On the contrary there is every +chance that humanity will not find it again, just as a man who should +find a precious stone in the sea and then drop it back in the water +would have little chance of ever seeing it again. Nothing seems to me +more doubtful than Aristotle’s remark that it is probable the arts +and philosophy have several times been discovered and several times +lost. The other position which maintains that civilization, despite +partial eclipses, is something which humanity cannot lose, seems to +me quite worthless except as an act of faith--though it is valuable +as a means of preserving the good we wish to keep. I should not think +it a serious objection to what I have said if someone should point +out that civilization, lost once with the fall of the ancient world, +nevertheless had its Renaissance. Everyone knows that the Graeco-Roman +form of mind was far from being wholly extinguished during the Middle +Ages and that the sixteenth century only brought to life what was not +dead; to which I add that even if that form of mind had been ‘reborn’ +_ex nihilo_, the fact that this is the only instance would make it +insufficient to reassure me, although the fact that it had occurred +would disturb me. + +Let me point out in this respect that insufficient attention is perhaps +paid to the fact that there are always only a very tiny number of +instances in history on which are built up a ‘law’, which claims to be +valid for the whole past and future evolution of humanity. Vico says +that history is a series of alternations between periods of progress +and periods of retrogression; and he gives _two_ examples. Saint-Simon +says history is a series of oscillations between organic epochs and +critical epochs; and he gives _two_ examples. Marx says history is a +series of economic systems, each of which casts out its predecessor by +means of violence; and he gives _one_ example! I shall be told that +these examples could not be more numerous, owing to the fact that +history, at least known history, is so short. The truth, implied by +this very reply, is that history has lasted too short a time for us +to be able to deduce laws from it to enable us to infer the future +from the past. Those who do so are like a mathematician who should +decide the nature of a curve from the form he finds it has at its +very beginning. True, a somewhat uncommon turn of mind is required to +confess that human history, after several thousands of years, is only +beginning. I cannot sufficiently admire the rare mental value displayed +by La Bruyère (in my opinion) when he wrote the following lines in a +century which was strongly inclined to think it was the topmost summit +of human development: ‘If the world lasts only a hundred million years, +it will still be in all its freshness and only beginning; we ourselves +are almost contemporary with the first men and the patriarchs, and who, +in those far-off ages, will be able to avoid confusing us with them? +But if we judge of the future from the past, what new things are we +ignorant of in the arts, in the sciences, in Nature, and, I dare say, +in history? What discoveries will be made! What different revolutions +will occur in our Empires all over the world! How ignorant we are! And +how slight is an experience of six or seven thousand years!’ + +I shall go further and say that even if an examination of the past +could lead to any valid prediction concerning man’s future, that +prediction would be the contrary of reassuring. People forget that +Hellenic rationalism only really enlightened the world during seven +hundred years, that it was then hidden (this _a minima_ verdict will +be granted me) for twelve centuries, and has begun to shine again for +barely four centuries; so that _the longest period of consecutive time +in human history on which we can found inductions is, upon the whole, +a period of intellectual and moral darkness_. Looking at history, we +may say in a more synthetic manner that, with the exception of two or +three very short, luminous epochs whose light, like that of certain +stars, lightens the world long after they are extinct, humanity lives +generally in darkness; while literatures live generally in a state of +decadence and the organism in disorder. And the disturbing thing is +that humanity does not seem to mind these long periods of cave-dwelling. + +To come back to the realism of my contemporaries and their contempt +for a disinterested existence, I must add that my mind is sometimes +haunted by a dreadful question. I wonder whether humanity, by adopting +this system to-day, has not discovered its true law of existence and +adopted the true scale of values demanded by its essence? The religion +of the spiritual, I said just now, seems to me a lucky accident in +man’s history. I shall go further, and say it seems to me a paradox. +The obvious law of human substance is the conquest of things and the +exaltation of the impulses which secure this conquest. Only through an +amazing abuse were a handful of men at desks able to succeed in making +humanity believe that the supreme values are the good things of the +spirit. To-day humanity has awakened from this dream, knows its true +nature and its real desires, and utters its war-cry against those who +for centuries have robbed it of itself. Instead of waxing indignant at +the ruin of their domination, would it not be more reasonable for these +usurpers (if there are any left) to wonder that it lasted so long? +Orpheus could not aspire to charm the wild beasts with his music until +the end of time. However, one could have hoped that Orpheus himself +would not become a wild beast. + +It is scarcely necessary to say my remarks on realist desires and +their violent perfecting do not blind me to the immense growth of +gentleness, justice, and love written to-day in our customs and laws, +which would certainly have amazed our most optimistic ancestors. +There is an immense improvement in the relations between man and man +within the groups which fight each other--especially within the nation +where security is the rule and injustice is a scandal. But to keep +more closely to our subject, perhaps we do not sufficiently realize +the incredible degree of civilization implied by the good treatment +of prisoners, and the care of enemy wounded in wars between nations, +and by the institution of public and private charity in the relations +between the classes. The denial of progress, the assertion that +barbarity of heart has never been worse, are natural themes for poets +and those who are discontented, and perhaps they are even necessary +to progress. But the historian, whether he looks at national or class +warfare, is amazed at the transformation of a species which only four +centuries ago roasted prisoners of war in baker’s ovens, and, only two +centuries ago forbade the workers to establish a pension fund for their +aged members. Nevertheless I must point out that these improvements +cannot be credited to the present age. They are the results of the +teaching of the eighteenth century, against which the ‘masters of +modern thought’ are in complete revolt. The establishment of war +ambulances, the wide development of State charities are the work of the +Second Empire, are connected with the ‘humanitarian clichés’ of Victor +Hugo and Michelet, which are immeasureably despised by the moralists +of the past half century. They exist to some extent _despite of_ these +moralists, not one of whom has conducted a truly humane campaign, while +the chief of them--Nietzsche, Barrès, Sorel--would blush to be able +to say like Voltaire: ‘I have done a little good, ’tis my best work.’ +I must add that these good works are now merely customs, i.e. actions +performed from habit, without the will taking any part in them, without +the mind reflecting on their meaning. And if the mind of our realists +ever came to think of them, I think there is every possibility that +it might prohibit them. I can well imagine a future war when a nation +would decide not to look after the enemy wounded, a strike where the +bourgeoisie would make up its mind not to support hospitals for the +benefit of a class which was ruining it and anxious to destroy it. I +can imagine both priding themselves on getting free from a ‘stupid +humanitarianism’, and finding disciples of Nietzsche and Sorel to +praise them for it. The attitude of the Italian Fascists and the +Russian Bolshevists towards their enemies is not calculated to give me +the lie here. The modern world still displays certain failures in pure +practicality, a few stains of idealism from which it might well cleanse +itself. + +I said above that the logical end of the ‘integral realism’ professed +by humanity to-day is the organized slaughter of nations or classes. +It is possible to conceive of a third, which would be their +reconciliation. The thing to possess would be the whole earth, and they +would finally come to realize that the only way to exploit it properly +is by union, while the desire to set themselves up as distinct from +others would be transferred from the nation to the species, arrogantly +drawn up against everything which is not itself. And, as a matter of +fact, such a movement does exist. Above classes and nations there +does exist a desire of the species to become the master of things, +and, when a human being flies from one end of the world to the other +in a few hours, the whole human race quivers with pride and adores +itself as distinct from all the rest of creation. At bottom, this +imperialism of the species is preached by all the great directors of +the modern conscience. It is Man, and not the nation or the class, +whom Nietzsche, Sorel, Bergson extoll in his genius for making himself +master of the world. It is humanity, and not any one section of it, +whom Auguste Comte exhorts to plunge into consciousness of itself +and to make itself the object of its adoration. Sometimes one may +feel that such an impulse will grow ever stronger, and that in this +way inter-human wars will come to an end. In this way humanity would +attain ‘universal fraternity’. But, far from being the abolition of the +national spirit with its appetites and its arrogance, this would simply +be its supreme form, the nation being called Man and the enemy God. +Thereafter, humanity would be unified in one immense army, one immense +factory, would be aware only of heroisms, disciplines, inventions, +would denounce all free and disinterested activity, would long cease +to situate the good outside the real world, would have no God but +itself and its desires, and would achieve great things; by which I mean +that it would attain to a really grandiose control over the matter +surrounding it, to a really joyous consciousness of its power and its +grandeur. And History will smile to think that this is the species for +which Socrates and Jesus Christ died. + +1924-1927. + + + + +_Notes_ + + +Note A (Page 1) + +_That political passions affect a large number of men they never before +affected ..._ + +It is very difficult to know to what extent crowds are moved by the +political events of their time (of course, I am leaving on one side all +truly popular movements). Crowds do not write their memoirs, and those +who write memoirs scarcely ever speak of the crowds. However, I do not +think my proposition will be seriously disputed. To limit ourselves to +France and the two examples I quoted--suppose we had another upheaval +like the Religious Wars, I do not think we should see the immense +majority of country districts possessed by no other passion than a +hatred for soldiers, whatever party they belonged to.[170] Nor should +we see cultivated bourgeois who keep diaries giving a couple of lines +to such events as Luther’s preaching, along with the thousand little +facts they relate.[171] Nor do I think that a month after an event like +the taking of the Bastille we should find a foreigner on his travels +in France, writing: ‘13th August, 1789. Before I leave Clermont I must +remark that I have dined or supped five times at the table d’hôte with +some twenty to thirty merchants and tradesmen, officers, etc.; and it +is not easy for me to express the insignificance--the inanity of the +conversation. Scarcely any politics, at a moment when every bosom ought +to beat with none but political sensations.’ (Arthur Young.)[172] + +The attitude of populations towards wars between States long seems to +have been that described by Voltaire in the following lines: ‘It is +indeed a deplorable evil that this multitude of soldiers should always +be kept up by all Princes. But, as we have pointed out, this evil +produces a good. The peoples take no part in the wars carried on by +their masters; the citizens of besieged towns often pass from the power +of one to another without having cost the life of a single inhabitant; +they are simply the prize of the King who possesses most soldiers, +cannons and money.’ (_Essai sur les Moeurs_, towards the end.) Again, +in 1870, a Prussian servant girl said to a French prisoner employed +on the farm where she was working: ‘When the war is over I will marry +you. Don’t be surprised at what I say, patriotism doesn’t mean much to +us, you know.’ I imagine that in 1914, many servant girls, Prussian or +otherwise, felt in their hearts and put into practice, this absence of +patriotism; but I dare to assert that very few would have formulated +it, even to themselves. The really new fact to-day is not perhaps that +the peoples feel political passions, but that they claim the right to +feel them. This claim is sufficient to make them act and therefore +furnishes a magnificent opportunity for their leaders to exploit them. + + +Note B (Page 15) + +_Louis XIV annexing Alsace and not for one moment thinking of +forbidding the German language ..._ + +It was not until 1768 that the Monarchy thought of setting up schools +in Alsace, ‘where French is to be taught’. Vidal de la Blanche, who +relates this (_La France de l’Est_, 1, vi) adds: ‘This indifference +(to the language question) must not shock us too much. Let us rather +learn a lesson from it. It raises us above the narrowly jealous +conceptions which since then have set nation against nation, under this +language pretext. It takes us into an age when another spirit presided +over human relations. There was then no language question. Fortunate +eighteenth century, when war bred no lasting hatred, when the poison of +national animosities was not inoculated and fostered by all the means +now at the disposal of the State, including the schools.’ The eminent +historian forgets that the State has these means at its disposal, _with +the consent of the peoples_. The peoples, or at least the cultivated +classes among them, at the bidding of their men of letters, during the +past century have set themselves up arrogantly against one another in +their languages and cultures, even though they one day come face to +face with the unexpected results of this attitude, as is happening +to-day to France in its difficulties with Alsace. + + +Note C (Page 19) + +_The Union of capitalism, anti-semitism, anti-democracy with +nationalism._ + +I am under no illusion concerning the solidity of certain among these +unions. Although the conservative passions fully comprehend their +immense interest in identifying themselves with national passion and +thereby benefiting by its popularity, although one may even admit +that they have been caught in their own net and have become sincere +in this feeling, yet it is none the less true that conservatism +(chiefly capitalism) is essentially something entirely different +from patriotism, and that this difference, whose manifestations in +the course of history have been innumerable (how many times have the +bourgeoisie treated with foreigners when they thought it was to their +interests!) may once again display itself. It is easy to imagine that +the French bourgeoisie would turn against France if they thought their +patrimony was being too seriously threatened by the legislation of +the Republic. This may already be seen in the case of families who, +in recent years, have exported their capital abroad. I may say the +same thing of monarchist passion. It is easy to imagine that certain +followers of that passion might one day decide to work against a nation +which decisively and finally rejects the system they propose. I think +I observe this when I see monarchist writers publishing that ‘from the +Spree to the Mekong, the whole world knows that France is in a state of +weakness bordering upon disintegration’. However, such things are still +exceptional, and those who are responsible for them would refuse to +admit--perhaps sincerely--that they meant to harm their nation. + +Moreover, the bourgeoisie have another interest in keeping up +nationalism and the fear of war. These feelings create a sort of +permanent military spirit in a nation. More precisely, they create in +the people a disposition to accept the existing hierarchy, to obey +orders, to recognize superiors, i.e. the very things required of +them by those who wish them to continue in a state of service. The +confused perception of this truth inspires the bourgeoisie with that +curious ill-humour they display towards every attempt at international +agreement, in whatever form this may be presented by the governments. +This ill-humour (they declare) arises from the fact that they consider +it simple-minded and imprudent to believe in the extinction of national +hatreds. At bottom, it arises from the fact that _they do not want this +extinction to occur_. They know that the maintenance of these hatreds +will cost the lives of their children, but they do not hesitate to +make the sacrifice, if by doing so they retain possession of their +property[173] and their power over their servants. Here is a grandeur +of egotism which is perhaps insufficiently appreciated. + + +Note D (Page 28) + +_On the attitude of the modern Catholics towards Catholicism when it is +in opposition to their nationalism._ + +A good example is the attitude of the German Catholics in the past +twenty years. It has been described with all desirable detail by +M. Edmond Bloud in his great study: _Le nouveau Centre et le +catholicisme_.[174] It will be seen that it strangely resembles the +attitude of many a non-German Catholic. + +The ‘Centre’ began by declaring itself ‘a political party which has +assumed as its duty the representation of the interests of the whole +nation in all domains of public life, in accordance with the principles +of Christian doctrine.’ (_Katholische Weltanschauung_: Catholic +conception of the world.) Soon they announced political action founded +on ‘a Christian basis’ (christliche Basis), the spirit of which is thus +defined by one of its apostles (Doctor Brauweiler, April, 1913): ‘In +the domain of practical action, _concepts are determined by the end +in view_. The formation of political concepts is comparable with the +formation of juridical concepts. The jurist forms his concepts _with +no other consideration than that of what is needed, in relation solely +to the required end_. But no one can say that the juridical concept +thus formed is a false one. In the same way, one may speak in politics +of Christianity or Christian doctrine.’ In 1914, Doctor Karl Bachem of +Cologne, published a pamphlet entitled: _Centre, Catholic Doctrine, +Practical Politics_, where he declares that the doctrine of ‘universal +Christianity’ is only a political formula intended to render possible +the collaboration of Catholics and Protestants, chiefly in Parliament; +that from the religious point of view this formula has only a negative +meaning, and only means the determination to struggle against +materialism, atheism and nihilism; that its positive content is defined +by the Prussian Constitution which in paragraphs 14 and 18 lays down +that ‘the Christian religion’ is the ‘foundation of the institutions of +the State’. + +Thus, as M. Edmond Bloud justly remarks, Doctor Bachem makes the +Prussian Constitution the Rule of Faith. Put ‘national interest’ in +place of ‘Prussian Constitution’ and you will have the state of mind of +many a modern French Catholic. + +The attitude of the German Catholics seems to me also representative of +a certain Catholicism common to-day to other nations, in declarations +of this sort: + +‘The Catholic members of the “Centre” remain Catholics individually, +_but the party, as a party, does not necessarily accept the Catholic +conception of the world_.’ + +And again: + +‘The Pope and the Bishops have authority in matters of religion, but +wherever political matters are concerned we shall not allow ourselves +to be influenced by the authority of the Pope or by that of the +Bishops.’ (M. Edmond Bloud alludes to a conversation reported in the +_Frankfurter Zeitung_, April, 1914, where one of the chief of the +‘syndicats mixtes’ declared that, ‘The German Catholics have had enough +of the Pope.’) + +What M. Bloud calls the ‘declericalization of the Centre’ is not a +thing peculiar to our neighbours, nor is the joy of the great German +nationalist organ (the Prussian Annals) when it observes that ‘the +Catholic idea of the State is ceasing to be ultramontain and is +becoming nationalist’.[175] + +The attitude common to German Catholics and to certain Catholics of +other nations seems to me well brought out by two protests which M. +Bloud quotes. + +The first is from Father Weiss: + +‘There exist,’ says the eminent theologian, ‘several kinds of political +Catholicism.... The worst of all consists in looking upon pure +politics, social politics, national politics, not only as something +wholly independent of religion, but _as being the standard by which we +should determine the degree to which Catholicism or Christianity may be +utilized in public life_.’ + +The other is from Cardinal Kopp (then Bishop of Fulda) in a letter +written in 1887: + +‘Unhappily a gust of madness is blowing over us. Formerly we held +to the principle: Faith first, politics afterwards. Now they say: +_Politics first!_ The Church and the Faith afterwards.’ + +Our Catholics of the _Action Française_ have not invented much. + + +Note E (Page 33) + +_The ‘clerk’, by adopting political passions, brings them the +tremendous influence of his sensibility if he is an artist, of his +persuasive power if he is a thinker, and in either case his moral +prestige._ + +This prestige itself is something new in history, at least from my +point of view. The results produced in France by the intervention +of the ‘intellectuals’ in the Dreyfus affair, and those produced by +the manifesto of the German Intellectuals in 1914, not only in their +own country but throughout the world, are things to which I find no +equivalent in the past. One cannot imagine the Roman Republic feeling +that the moral support of Terence and Varro was of value to it during +the war with Carthage, or the government of Louis XIV finding that +the approbation of Racine and Fermat, gave it additional strength in +the war with Holland. This increase of strength which a cause to-day +receives from the approbation of the men of thought (or those who are +considered such) does great honour to the modern world. It is an homage +to the mind hitherto unexampled in humanity. + +Naturally, this prestige has a double result. Though the modern ‘clerk’ +fortifies a cause by giving it his approbation he can also seriously +harm it by refusing his approbation. If in 1915 men like Ostwald and +Mach had refused to approve the acts of their nation, they would have +seriously harmed it. The ‘clerk’ who to-day condemns the realism of +the State to which he belongs does really harm that State.[176] Hence +it follows that the State, in the name of its practical interests, to +defend which is its function, has a right--perhaps a duty--to punish +them. This appears to me to be the true order of things: The ‘clerk’, +faithful to his essential duty, denounces the realism of States; +whereupon, the States, no less faithful to their duty, made him drink +the hemlock. The serious disorganization in the modern world is that +the ‘clerks’ do not denounce the realism of States, but on the contrary +approve of it; they no longer drink the hemlock.[177] + +Let me point to another disorganization. That is when the State does +not punish the ‘clerk’ for denouncing its realism. This occurred +in France during the Dreyfus affair. The order of things demanded +that the ‘clerks’ should demand abstract justice, as they did; but +perhaps it also demanded that the State, weakened in strength by their +idealism, should throw them into prison. When the ‘clerk’ performs the +layman’s task, the result is anarchy; but there is also anarchy when +the layman acts and speaks as a ‘clerk’, when those whose duty is to +defend the nation display their cult for the abolition of frontiers, +universal love, or other spiritual things.[178] When I see philosophers +concerning themselves with the safety of the State and Ministers +striving to bring about love among mankind, I think of what Dante says: +‘You turn to religion him who was born to wear the sword, you make a +King of one who was born to preach. Thus all your steps are out of the +true way.’ However, this second disorganization of orders has been +denounced by others, and it is not my function to combat it. + + +Note F (Page 37) + +_Think how willingly the ecclesiastics now accept military service._ + +I think this willingness is worthy of the historian’s attention. +Obviously, it implies some sincere attachment to their country in those +who display this willingness, although their law is to be dead to all +worldly attachments. Moreover, it appears that in the last war most of +the ministers of Jesus Christ able to bear arms were glad to defend +their country, whatever that country was, and whatever notion they +may have had of the justice of its cause. Here is a most suggestive +fact: Certain Belgian monastic orders (and others as well, I am told) +established abroad at the declaration of war, and authorized by the +government to remain abroad, insisted upon returning to the capital to +perform their military duties. True, the behaviour of these monks may +be explained, not on grounds of patriotism, but from the fear that they +would be severely criticized by their fellow-citizens if they acted +otherwise; for the modern ‘clerks’ have ceased to understand that the +sign of an attitude truly in harmony with their function is that it +should be unpopular with the laymen. + +But the most remarkable thing here for the historian, is that the +imposition of military service on ecclesiastics does not appear to +arouse any protest from the Church. Certain Church teachers even assert +(Mgr Battifol, _L’Eglise et le Droit de la guerre_): ‘There is no +further doubt about the legality of military service.’[179] It is also +curious to see in the _Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique_ +(Art. ‘Paix et Guerre’) the strenuous efforts of the author (Father de +la Brière) to prove that bearing arms, even by ‘clerks’ in holy orders, +is in no sense contrary to Christian law. However, the opinion of these +theologians does not seem to be shared, at least publicly, by the +higher ecclesiastical authorities; for every ‘clerk’ who bears arms is +laid under an interdict, as he was in the past--only the interdict is +taken off a few minutes after it has been declared. + +The modern laymen (Barrès for example) praise this patriotism of the +ecclesiastic and his willingness to fight. The laymen of the past tried +to make him ashamed of it, and liked to exhort him to sentiments which +they considered more in harmony with his sacred ministry. The warlike +ardours of John XII and Julius II were severely condemned by their +contemporaries. Apart from Erasmus--the type of the man of letters +fully aware of the ‘clerk’s’ high function, who was continually saying: +‘Their tonsure does not warn them that they ought to be free from all +the passions of this world and think only of the things of Heaven’--the +Italian Tizio wrote: ‘It is astonishing that the Pontiffs, whose part +is to be pacific and independent, should take part in the shedding of +Christian blood.’ The French poet Jean Bouchet shows the weeping Church +imploring Julius II to end the war (though it is true that Julius II +was fighting France): + + ‘Your patron is my Lord Saint Peter, + Who never warred for worldly goods.’ + +In _Le Songe du Verger_, a kind of summary of moral doctrines current +in France in the fourteenth century, there is a dialogue between a +Knight and a Clerk, when the Clerk claims for his caste the right to +make war, and the Knight tells him that ‘the arms of the “clerks” are +prayers and tears’. It is suggestive to see a soldier urging a minister +of the spiritual to perform his true function and seeming to think that +the performance of this function is necessary to the good order of the +world. Here is a feeling for ‘clerkdom’ and its social value which is +very seldom to be found among the modern laymen, even the non-military +ones--I nearly said, especially the non-military ones.[180] + + +Note G (Page 53) + +_That self-examination to which every spectator is impelled by a +representation of human beings which he feels to be true and solely +pre-occupied with truth._ + +Let me quote the following passage concerning the civilizing effects of +such representation:-- + +‘This spectacle of man offered to man has considerable moral effects. +First, a valuable exercise of the intelligence, an increase of +reflection, a widening of the view in every direction, result from the +habit thus set up of getting out of oneself and entering into others, +to understand their actions, to share in their passions, sympathize +with their sufferings, appreciate their motives. This faculty of the +artist communicated to the spectator or the listener, this faculty of +participation and assimilation, is something set up in opposition to +egotism and is a condition of tolerance and benevolence, frequently +even of justice. Then, lessons of virtue, frequently not the least +effective, are given to the spectator, from the very fact that he +is placed in a position to praise or condemn acts or thoughts which +are set before him relative to cases where his own interests are not +involved. He recognizes his own image in the actor of the epic, a man +like himself, a voluntary and impassioned agent, whose dangers though +perhaps magnified are not foreign to his own experience. Then the +essential phenomena which characterize conscious humanity and morality +occur in him who thus witnesses himself in the person of another, +i.e. disinterested objectivity of himself to himself, generalization +of passion, motive and maxim, judgment founded on the universal, +self-examination to arrive at what is duty, clear and defined sentiment +of the direction of the will. + +‘_But this must not lead us to think that the poet’s object is utility +or morality. If it were, he would be lacking in the true feeling of +art._ Teaching, moralizing--this object of the artist is indirect, i.e. +does not exist systematically for him. He must only attain it without +having sought it, and sometimes he attains it when he seems to have +departed from it. What he desires to do, is to touch the feelings, +to arouse emotions. But it happens that by doing so he elevates, +purifies, moralizes. The poet (I am especially speaking of him) does +indeed address himself to everyone. _That means he can only sing the +universal_, however curious such an assembly of words may appear. He +may indeed sing it under the form of the particular, without which +his fictions would be lacking in life, he none the less excludes the +pure, incomprehensible, inexplicable individual, shorn of all truth +if he does not express a relationship.[181] He generalizes passion, +therefore ennobles it and renders it at once the object of observation, +reflection and disinterested emotion. The listener, carried away from +his own relatively base private preoccupations and transported without +hope or fear (at least, too personal and too present hope and fear) +into the superior sphere of humanity’s common passion, feels the +benefit of an elevation of soul; his consciousness is temporarily freed +from egotism.’ (Renouvier, _Introduction à la philosophie analytique de +l’Histoire_, p. 354.) + + +Note H (Page 56) + +_... Napoleon, who ordered the chief of police to take measures for +the history of France to be written in a manner favourable to his own +throne._ + +Here are some portions of a note on this subject dictated by Napoleon +at Bordeaux in 1808. It promulgates the conception of history as +practised, mutatis mutandis, by many of our historians of the past:-- + +‘I do not approve the principles laid down in his note by the Minister +of the Interior. They were true twenty years ago, they will be true +sixty years hence, but they are not true to-day. Velly is the one +fairly detailed author who has written on the history of France. The +abridged chronology of the President Hénault is a good classical book. +It is useful to have them both continued. _It is of the greatest +importance to make certain of the spirit in which these continuations +are written._ I ordered the Minister of Police to look after the +continuation of Millot, and I desire the two Ministers will consult +over the continuation of Velly and the President Hénault.... + +‘They are to be just to Henri IV, Louis XIII, Louis XIV and Louis XV, +but without adulation. The September Massacres and the horrors of the +Revolution must be painted in the same colours as the Inquisition +and the massacres of the Sixteen. They must take care to avoid all +reaction in speaking of the Revolution, no man could have opposed it +successfully. No blame attaches either to those who perished or to +those who survived. There was no individual power capable of changing +the elements and foreseeing the events which arose from the nature of +things and circumstances. + +‘They are to point out the perpetual disorganization of the national +finances, the chaos of the provincial assemblies, the claims of the +Parlements, the lack of regulation and resort in the administration. +This checkered France, without unity of laws and administration, was +rather a union of twenty Kingdoms than a single State, so that one +breathes freely on coming to the period when the benefits of unity +of laws, administration and territory are enjoyed.... The opinion +expressed by the Minister, which, if followed, would result in +abandoning this task to private enterprise and the speculation of some +publisher, is wrong and could only produce regrettable results.’ + +Of course, the champions of authority are not the only persons who make +history serve their own interests. Condorcet (_Tableau historique_, +10^e Epoque) says that history should serve ‘to maintain an active +vigilance in recognizing and crushing under the weight of Reason the +first germs of superstition and tyranny, if they ever dare to appear +again.’ + + +Note I (Page 62) + +_Humanitarianism and Humanism._ + +Here, on this subject, is a curious passage from one of the ancients:-- + +‘Those who created the Latin language and those who spoke it well +do not give the word _humanitas_ the vulgar meaning which is +synonymous with the Greek word _philanthropia_, which means an +active kindness, a tender benevolence for all men. But they give +the word the meaning which the Greeks attach to _paideia_, which we +call education, knowledge of the fine arts. Those who show the most +taste and disposition for these studies are the most worthy to be +called _humanissimi_. For man alone among all living beings is able +to devote himself to cultivating a study which for that reason has +been called _humanitas_. Such is the meaning given to this by the +ancients, particularly by Varro and Cicero. Almost all their works +show examples, so I shall content myself with quoting one only. I +have chosen the opening of the first book of Varro “Concerning human +things”: “Praxiteles, qui propter artificium egregium nemini est paulum +modo humaniori ignotus (Praxiteles, whose excellent talent as an +artist has made him known to every man at all skilled in the arts)”. +Here _humanior_ does not bear the vulgar meaning of easy, tractable, +benevolent even though lacking in knowledge of letters. That meaning +would not express the author’s thought. It means an educated, a learned +man, one who is acquainted with Praxiteles through books and history.’ +(Aulus Gellius, _Noctes Atticae_, Book XIII, XVI.) + + +Note J (Page 82) + +_... they cannot sufficiently denounce all institutions based on +liberty and discussion._ + +Note that the novelty here lies in the passion, the fury with which +they condemn liberty of discussion. Otherwise, we see most of the +so-called liberal thinkers in history themselves recognize the +necessity for submission to the sovereign’s judgment. Spinoza declares +that ‘there is no possible government if every man makes himself the +defender of his own rights and the rights of others.’ The _Letters of +Descartes_ contain passages in favour of the ‘reason of State.’ + +It is perhaps not sufficiently noticed how frequently the old French +absolute monarchists say that justice is the chief function of the +sovereign. ‘The most important of the King’s rights,’ says one of +these theorists (Guy Coquille, _Institution du droit des Français_, +1608) ‘is to make _the laws and general statutes for the good order of +his Kingdom_.’ Another (Loyseau, _Des Seigneuries_, 1608) says: ‘The +usage of public _lordship must be regulated by justice_ ...’ Bossuet +(_Instruction à Louis XIV_) says: ‘When the King administers justice or +has it exactly administered in accordance with the laws, _which is his +principal function_ ...’ The modern absolute monarchists, even French, +seem to be inspired by the German theorist, who says: ‘The State has +two functions to perform: the administration of justice and the waging +of war. _But war is by far the principal._’ (Treitschke.) + +Note this famous passage from Bossuet (_Pol._, Book VIII, art. II, par. +I): + +‘It is one thing for it (the government) to be absolute, another for +it to be arbitrary. It is absolute in relation to constraint, there +being no power which is capable of compelling the sovereign, who in +this sense is independent of all human authority. But it does not +follow that government is arbitrary; because, apart from the fact that +all things are subject to God’s judgment (which applies also to the +government we have called arbitrary), there are laws in empires, and +everything which is done contrary to them is void of right.’ + +It will be seen that the defence of arbitrary government is a new thing +among French teachers, even in regard to Bossuet. (I am speaking of +Bossuet’s _doctrines_, not of his practical advice.) + + +Note K (Page 91) + +_This is the teaching of Nietzsche._ + +I must repeat that throughout this work I am considering the teaching +of Nietzsche (and Hegel’s too) insofar as it has become the pretext +for a great moral preaching, though I know perfectly well that in +reality this teaching is something far more complex. I shall quote +the following judicious observation, in connection with the fact +that certain philosophers have only themselves to blame for ‘the +misunderstanding of their true thought’: + +‘Nietzscheism has been subjected to the same test as Hegelianism. And +no doubt here and there philosophical themes have served especially as +pretexts to cover up a new offensive on the part of barbarism. _But +the fact that they have been utilized, the manner in which they have +been utilized, have a significance which must not be overlooked._ Is +it not the criterion of a philosophy which may be called rational +without reserve and equivocation, that it should remain incorruptibly +faithful to itself? On the other hand, _the systems which begin by +accepting contradictions, reserving the right to add that they are +capable of surmounting them or of “living” them, lodge their enemy in +their midst_. Their punishment is that their antithesis still resembles +them; and that is what has happened to Nietzsche.’ (L. Brunschvicg, _Le +Progrès de la Conscience dans la philosophie occidentale_, p. 431.) +This book contains an excellent exposition of ‘Hegelian themes’ and +‘Nietzschean themes’, precisely insofar as they have become political +breviaries. + + +Note L (Page 94) + +_Long before the disciples of Taine and Auguste Comte._ + +When this book appeared in a periodical, certain persons declared +that the whole of my attack on the modern ‘clerk’ went astray because +I did not give more space to the author of _Origines de la France +Contemporaine_. He, they said, was the ‘great realist “clerk” of the +past fifty years, while those I attacked were only his small change.’ +(This sudden contempt for the thought of Barrès and Maurras of the part +of certain people is certainly surprising.) + +There is here a manifest abuse of the word _realism_. Taine threw +light on the true nature of the real, or rather the political real, +and reminded the universalist that this domain is not under his +jurisdiction. He never _exalted_ this real at the expense of the +universal, which is the realism I am denouncing here. He plainly +taught, on the contrary, that the universalist who stays in his own +domain (see his admiration for Spinoza and Goethe) is the great human +model. Compare this with Maurras for whom the universalist, even +when non-political (the infinitist, the pantheist) is profoundly +contemptible. It is also difficult for me to see Taine as the godfather +of those who glorify the soldier at the expense of the man of justice +and the man of study,[182] who exhort the nations to cultivate their +prejudices where they are ‘totally foreign to reason’ (Barrès) and who +declare that the intelligence which cares nothing about what is social +is the activity of a savage. I think Taine would cheerfully say of +those who claim to derive from him the same thing that M. Bergson is +reported to have said of some of his ‘disciples’: ‘These gentlemen are +most original.’ + +Nevertheless, Taine seems to me to be the initiator of the modern +realists in two points. The first is his condemnation of individualism, +more exactly, of the moral liberty of the citizen (for this, at +bottom, is the meaning of his regret for the old corporations, and, +more generally, of his exhortation to form groups, which shape the +individual’s soul, instead of allowing it to be autonomous as against +the State); and the second, which is far more novel than the first +among French teachers, is his condemnation of idealist education. The +peroration of the ‘_Régime moderne_’ obviously establishes the whole +educational argument of the _Déracines_ and _L’Étape_:-- + +‘Sometimes when he is with his intimates, as bitter and as overfatigued +as he is, the young man is tempted to say to us: “By your education +you induced us to believe that the world is made in a certain way. +You deceived us. It is much uglier, stupider, dirtier, gloomier and +harsher, at least to our sensibility and our imagination. You think +they are over-excited and out of gear; well, if they are, it is your +fault. That is why we curse and despise the whole of your world, and +reject your pretended truths, which for us are lies, including those +elementary and primary truths which you say are evident to common +sense, and upon which you build your laws, your institutions, your +society, your philosophy, your sciences and your arts.” That is what +contemporary youth have been telling us aloud for fifteen years by +their tastes, their opinions, their inclinations in literature, the +arts and life.’ + +Against this manifesto in favour of a practical education, let me set +this protest of a true descendant of Montaigne, Pascal and Montesquieu: + +‘In his diatribe for the classical spirit and the primary truths of +reason and philosophy which direct literary education of all kinds, +Taine comes to use words similar to those of the adversaries of ancient +literature,[183] of the general ideas which are inseparable from them, +and of disinterested culture even. The only object would then be to +prepare persons for an empirical world,[184] people taught to know the +world as it is, and trained to make it continue as it now is. However, +the school laws are too recent for one to be able decently to blame +them for the evils of the age, and make them the cause of the hatred +and scorn poured on society by those who are bored, enervate and out of +their class. However, even if it were true that the comparison between +the general principles of reason, morality and beauty, and empirical +life engendered more disgust with the realities than it has done in +the past, it would be a sad paradox to ask that this danger should +be averted by banishing from education all elevated views and all +idealism.’ (Renouvier, _Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire_, tome iv, +p. 541.) + + +Note M (Page 95) + +_This cult brings out a silliness of mind which to me seems wholly an +acquisition of the nineteenth century._ + +This silliness of mind assumes another form, i.e. the belief (rigidly +formulated by Maurras) that in politics you can find laws of cause +and effect as certainly valid as those of weight or electricity. +(‘Politics are a _science_.’) This is the superstition of science, +held to be competent in all domains, including that of morality; a +superstition which, I repeat, is an acquisition of the nineteenth +century. It remains to discover whether those who brandish this +doctrine believe in it or whether they simply want to give the prestige +of a scientific appearance to the passions of their hearts, which they +perfectly well know are nothing but passions. It is to be noted that +the dogma that history is obedient to scientific laws is preached +especially by partisans of arbitrary authority. This is quite natural, +since it eliminates the two realities they most hate, i.e. human +liberty and the historical action of the individual. + + +Note N (Page 98) + +_Our age has seen priests of the mind teaching that the gregarious +is the praiseworthy form of thought, and that independent thought is +contemptible._ + +Note that what is new in this crusade against individualism (the great +apostle of which is M. Maurras) is not the recognition that ‘the +individual is only an abstraction’, that to a great extent, he is +formed by his race, his surroundings, his nation, a thousand things +which are not himself. The novelty is the cult for this servitude, the +order given to mankind to submit entirely to it, the contempt shown +for any attempt to get free from it. Once again this is the cult (so +strange in French thinkers) for the _inevitable_ part of the human +being, the hatred for its free part. + +Note that those who to-day preach obedience of the mind, not only +demand it from the uncultured masses but from the men of thought, +_especially_ from the men of thought. The anti-individualists of the +Dreyfus affair particularly opposed the independence of scientists, +writers, and philosophers--‘the mad vanity of a few intellectuals’. +Nevertheless, the most curious thing is not that they require this +obedience, but that they obtain it. When M. Maritain declares that +‘everyone cannot philosophize and that, for men, the essential thing +is to choose a master’, and when M. Maurras asserts that the function +of most minds is to be ‘servants’ and to reflect the thought of some +leader, these teachers find a number of men of thought to applaud and +abdicate their liberty of mind in their favour. The thinkers of the +eighteenth century said: ‘A religion is needed for the people.’ Those +of our age say: ‘A religion is needed for ourselves.’ What Barrès +wrote: ‘The part of the masters is to justify the habits and prejudices +of France, so as best to prepare our children to take their place in +the national procession,’ he certainly meant that he and his colleagues +were to walk in this procession. Here we again come upon that thirst +for discipline which I spoke of above and which seemed to me so worthy +of remark in the descendants of Montaigne and Renan. The cause, I said, +was their desire to belong to a ‘strong group’. In them it also arises +from a feeling for the artistic value of regimenting a collection of +men in a beautiful ‘procession’, and also from the joy felt by so many +souls in being governed, if not having to make the effort to think for +themselves--a most curious joy in so-called men of thought. + +The cult for the collective soul, with all its violation of human +consciousness, seems to me admirably denounced by a passage of Maine +de Biran, quoted by M. L. Brunschvicg (op. cit., _La Sociologie de +l’ordre_, p. 526):-- + +‘... According to M. Bonald, it is not the human mind, it is not +the individual understanding which is the seat, the true subject of +inherence of the nations or (universal) truths under discussion; but +it is society, which, gifted with a kind of collective understanding +different from that of individuals, was from its origin imbued with +them through the gift of speech and by virtue of a miraculous influence +exerted on the mass alone, independent of its parts. The individual, +the man, is nothing; society alone exists; society is the soul of +the moral world, it alone exists, while individual persons are only +phenomena. Let those who can, understand this social metaphysics. If +the author himself understands it clearly, then I am in the wrong. +Then we must cease to talk of philosophy and recognize the nothingness +of the science of intellectual and moral man, we must admit that all +psychology based on the primitive fact of consciousness is simply +false, and we must consider science itself as an illusion which +perpetually deceives and misleads us by showing us everything, even our +own existence, in a false and fantastic light.’ + +M. Brunschvicg very rightly adds: ‘The antithesis could not be stated +more clearly. Either the primary fact of consciousness, or the primary +fact of language; either Socrates or Bonald.’ + +Either Socrates or Bonald. Barrès and Maurras made their choice. + + +Note O (Page 118) + +_... Péguy who admires philosophies to the extent that ‘they are good +fighters.’_[185] + +This determination to praise philosophers for their virtues of action +rather than for their intellectual virtues is very frequent among +men of thought to-day. In his _Souvenirs concernant Lagneau_, Alain, +wishing to give as favourable a picture of his master as possible, +praises his energy and his resolution at least as much as his +intelligence. It is also very remarkable--although here literature +only is in question--to see a professor of moral science (M. Jacques +Bardoux) setting a special value on those French literary men who were +soldiers, i.e. Vauvenargues, Vigny, Péguy. As to the men of letters +themselves, I shall content myself with pointing out that one of +them who is most applauded by his own colleagues recently declared +that he chiefly admired d’Annunzio for his attitude as an officer, +and expressed regret that he had returned to literature.[186] The +Emperor Julian praised Aristotle for having said that he felt prouder +of being the author of his _Treatise on Theology_ than he would have +felt if he had destroyed the power of the Persians. One might still +find soldiers in France who would agree with this judgment, but very +few men of letters. Elsewhere (_Les Sentiments de Critias_, p. 206) +I have attempted to give the history and the explanation of this +desire (so curious in men of the pen) to exalt a warlike life and to +scorn a sedentary life. Note that this characteristic is to be seen in +contemporary writers long before the war of 1914, and that those who +talk most about a warlike life are not always those who lead it. + +The new thing, I repeat, is not that we see men of letters praising +an active life and scorning a sedentary life; it is _the absence of +naiveté, the dogmatic tone_. When Ronsard exclaims: ‘Good Gods, who +would praise those who let life go by bent over books’;[187] when +Bertrand de Born wishes that ‘no man of high lineage should have any +thought but cutting off heads and arms’; when Froissart sings the +glories of chivalry and casts his scorn in the faces of the bourgeois, +no one will take these candid lyre-players, who like noble poses and +do not even know that the word doctrine exists, for the ancestors of +our grave professors of belligerent aesthetics. Moreover, I doubt +whether the author of _Scenes and Doctrines of Nationalism_ would have +condescended to be a descendant of these simple-minded persons. + +I find scorn for the life of the mind clearly professed in a dogmatic +tone, in a writer of the seventeenth century who frequently reminds one +of certain modern authors by his efforts to humiliate the toga before +the sword. (It is true that this writer was a gentleman of the very +minor nobility.) + +‘Certainly, there is no better way of relaxing the vigour of men’s +courage than to occupy their minds with peaceful and sedentary +exercises, and idleness cannot enter civilized States in a more subtle +or dangerous disguise than that of literature. Lazy and idle persons +have in part ruined commerce and agriculture, which are the cause +of the weakness of our condition and the cowardice of our age.’ (J. +L. de Balzac, _Le Prince_, 1631. He then admits literature and the +sciences to the State insofar as ‘they strengthen and embellish the +Mother-country’.) + +On the other hand, a master from the great period of French literature +writes a eulogy of the life of the mind at the expense of the active +mind, which I hardly think would be accepted by many of the moderns who +venerate that period (I am especially thinking of those who admire the +thought of Georges Sorel). + +‘In France great strength of character and width of mind are needed if +a man is to reject offices and employments and thus consent to remain +at home and do nothing. Scarcely anyone possesses sufficient merit to +play this part with dignity, nor sufficient resources to fill up the +void of time without what the vulgar call “business”. But the wise +man’s idleness needs only a better name, and we ought to say that one +who meditates, talks, reads and is calm, is working.’ (La Bruyère, _Du +Mérite personnel_.) + + +Note P (Page 122) + +_The ‘Manifesto of the Party of Intelligence’ (Figaro, 19th July, +1919)._ + +This manifesto, signed by fifty-four French writers, several of whom +are among the teachers most respected by their fellow-citizens, is +of the greatest importance to the present inquiry. In addition to +the strange passage on the Church’s mission which I quoted above, it +contains things like this:-- + +‘Nationalism, which the conceptions of the intelligence impose +on political conduct as well as on the order of the world, is a +reasonable, humane system, and French in addition.’ + +And further on:-- + +‘When a literature becomes national does it not acquire a more +universal significance, a more humanly general interest?’ + +And again:-- + +‘We believe--and the world believes with us--that it is part of the +destiny of our race to defend the spiritual interests of humanity.... +We are solicitous for Europe and all the humanity remaining in the +world. French humanity is the sovereign protector of this.’ + +And above all:-- + +‘Victorious France means to take her place again in the order of the +mind, the only order whereby a legitimate domination may be exercised.’ + +Hence the desire to found (the manifesto itself underlines the words): +‘_The intellectual Federation of Europe and the world under the aegis +of victorious France, the guardian of civilization._’ + +Victory under arms conferring the right to command in the intellectual +order--that is professed to-day by French thinkers! One remembers the +Roman writers, from whom these thinkers claim descent, who took as the +leader of their minds Greece, which had been conquered by force of +arms; one also remembers the German teachers of 1871 who also claimed +intellectual hegemony for their ‘victorious’ nation, which they too +claimed as ‘the guardian of civilization’.[188] + +When this manifesto was published, somewhat similar reflections seem +to have occurred to the mind of one of our great writers. In a letter +concerning this document,[189] Marcel Proust deplores the proclamation +of ‘a kind of “Frankreich ueber alles”, the policeman of the literature +of all nations.’ As a true priest of the mind, he goes on: ‘Why take +this peremptory attitude towards other countries in such matters as +literature, where a man only reigns by persuasion?’ I am happy to take +this opportunity to do homage to this true ‘clerk’, and to say that I +know that there are still other writers in France beside those who only +believe in the virtue of cold steel. + + +Note Q (Page 138) + +_Those who base their judgments on their artistic sensibilities._ + +This artistic origin of the political attitudes of so many men of +letters has been pointed out with great ability by M. Daniel Halévy in +the case of M. Maurras. In an old article (_La Grande France_, 1902) M. +Halévy quotes this beautiful passage from M. Maurras’s _Anthinéa_ on +the walk of women carrying a clay pot balanced on their heads:-- + +‘The bosom swells and is modelled like a vase, it opens like a flower. +The neck settles, the loins strain nervously. Their walk becomes +graver and more supple, is measured with an inestimable sobriety; it +unrolls in the mind like a piece of music. This living pillar moves, +glides, advances, without being interrupted by any sudden jerk or any +break. It follows the undulations of the ground, adapts itself to the +slightest rises, and thus resembles the stem of a beautiful young tree +set free from its roots, moving over the ground without leaving it for +a fraction of an inch. An infinite multitude of half-pauses make the +jerks imperceptible, or one is only conscious of their succession, a +continual harmony which leaves its curves in the air....’ + +M. Daniel Halévy adds:-- + +‘I quote the whole passage because it gives the very idea of Charles +Maurras. For his classical way of thought, things are beautiful, not +from the shocks of feeling and passion, but from the form and rhythm +which give them continuity, or rather existence in the human sense of +the word. M. Charles Maurras applies this taste for form to the study +of history, and that is the whole of his “sociology”.’ + +There could be no better definition of the type of man for whom things +are good insofar as they satisfy his artistic sensibility. Let me place +in opposition to him the exactly contrary type, leaving the reader to +judge which of the two may claim to belong to ‘the intelligence’:-- + +‘... For the perfection of things should be measured by their nature +alone, and things are not more or less perfect because they flatter or +wound our senses.’ (Spinoza.) + + + + +_Footnotes_ + + +[1] See Note A at the end of this book. + +[2] It is to be noted that a little more than a century ago French +working-men from different provinces frequently engaged in desperate +fights among themselves. (See Martin Nadaud, _Mémoires de Léonard_, p. +93.) + +[3] See Petit de Julleville, _La Comédie et les Moeurs en France au +moyen age_, and André Le Breton, _Le Roman au XVIIe Siècle_. + +[4] The great novelty is that to-day people accept the position that +everything should be political, that they should proclaim it and take a +pride in it. Otherwise it is perfectly obvious that men, shopkeepers, +or poets, have not waited for the present time to try to get rid of a +rival by political means. Remember how La Fontaine’s rivals kept him +out of the Académie for ten years. + +[5] As de Tocqueville profoundly remarks, these only occurred when a +first improvement in his condition encouraged the man of the people to +want more; i.e. towards the end of the eighteenth century. + +[6] I am here speaking of Western Jews of the bourgeois class. The +Jewish proletariat did not await our time to plunge into the feeling of +its racial peculiarity. However, it does so without giving provocation. + +[7] This was the notion expressed by Benedict XV when he told the poor +‘to take delight in the prosperity of elevated persons and to expect +confidently their assistance’. + +[8] For example, M. Paul Bourget’s _La Barricade_, where the author, a +disciple of Georges Sorel, exhorts the bourgeoise not to leave to the +proletariat the monopoly of class passion and violence. See also André +Beaunier, _Les Devoirs de la Violence_ (quoted by Halperine-Kaminski +in the preface to Tolstoi’s book, _The Law of Love and the Law of +Violence_). + +[9] ‘The phrase, _the sublime bourgeois_, which would have caused +so much laughter twenty years ago, has now acquired for the French +bourgeoisie a mystic plenitude owing to its fusion with the highest +social and national values.’ (_Eloge du Bourgeois Français_, p. 284.) + +[10] Let me define more precisely what is new here. In the seventeenth +century the citizen already had the notion of national honour; Racine’s +Letters would be sufficient to prove it (see a significant page in +the _Mémoires_ of de Pontis, Book XIV); but he left it to the King to +decide what this honour demanded; indignation like Vauban’s against the +peace of Ryswick ‘which dishonours the King and the whole nation’, is +a very exceptional emotion under the old _régime_. The modern citizen +claims to feel for himself what is demanded by the national honour, and +he is ready to rise up against his leaders if they have a different +conception of it. This new development is not peculiar to the nations +living under democratic systems; in 1911 the citizens of the German +monarchy thought that the concessions made to their country by France +in exchange for German abstention in Morocco were insufficient, and +they were extremely angry with their Sovereign who had accepted these +conditions which, in their opinion, were an insult to German honour. It +may be asserted that the same thing would be true of France if she ever +became a monarchy again and if the King took it upon himself to feel +the interest of national honour in a different manner to his subjects. +Moreover, this actually happened throughout the reign of Louis-Philippe. + +[11] For example, the humiliation of Olmüts in 1805. It may be asserted +that no democracy would have endured it, at least with the philosophy +displayed by the King of Prussia and his government. On the other hand, +is it necessary to stress the other dangers to peace which existed +under the Kings? It is sufficient to quote Montesquieu’s remark: ‘The +spirit of the Monarchy is war and aggrandisement.’ + +[12] In 1886, the Schnaebele affair; in 1890, the incident in Paris +where the King of Spain in the uniform of a Colonel of Uhlans was +hooted; in 1891, the incident of the Empress of Germany passing through +Paris; in 1897, Fashoda; in 1904, the incident of the British trawlers +sunk by the Russian Fleet, etc. Of course, I do not claim that the +Kings only waged practical wars, although with them the allegation of +‘wounded honour’ was very often a mere pretext. Louis XIV obviously +did not make war on Holland because the Dutch struck a medal insulting +him. Moreover, I shall grant that from time to time the Kings indulged +in military invasions, a type of elegance which appears to be less and +less tempting to the democracies; one cannot now imagine the peace of +the world disturbed by excursions like those of Charles VIII into Italy +or Charles XII into the Ukraine. + +[13] Is it necessary to point out that wars started by public +passion against the will of the government have often occurred under +monarchies? And not only under constitutional monarchies, like the +war of France with Spain in 1823 and with Turkey in 1826, but under +absolute monarchies. For instance, the War of the Austrian Succession +imposed on Fleury by an uprising of public opinion; the War of American +Independence under Louis XVI; in 1806 the war of Prussia against +Napoleon. In 1813 the war of Saxony. It seems probable that in 1914 war +was imposed on absolute sovereigns like Nicholas II and Wilhelm II by +popular passions which they had been exciting for years and then found +themselves unable to restrain. + +[14] ‘But what is much more important than material facts is the soul +of nations. Among all races a kind of effervescence it to be noticed; +some defend certain principles, others the opposing principles. By +becoming members of the League of Nations, the different peoples do +not abandon their _national morality_.’ (Speech of the German Minister +for Foreign Affairs at Geneva, on the occasion of the entry of Germany +into the League of Nations, 10th September, 1926.) The orator went on: +‘Yet this should not result in raising up nation against nation.’ One +is surprised that he did not add: ‘On the contrary.’ How much nobler, +and at the same time more respectful of the truth, is the language +of Treitschke: ‘This consciousness of themselves which the nations +are acquiring and which can only be strengthened by culture, this +consciousness means that war will never disappear from the earth, in +spite of the closer linking up of interests, in spite of the growing +uniformity of customs and the exterior forms of life.’ (Quoted by +Charles Andler in _Les Origines du Pangermanisme_, p. 223.) + +[15] This is what Mirabeau seems to have foreseen when he announced +to the Constituent Assembly that the wars of the ‘free nations’ would +cause the wars of the Kings to be regretted. + +[16] The religion of the ‘national soul’ is obviously and logically +an emanation of the popular soul. Moreover, it has been sung by an +eminently democratic literature: Romanticism. It is to be observed that +the worst enemies of Romanticism and of Democracy have adopted it; it +is constantly to be found in the Action Française. To such an extent +is it now impossible to be a patriot without flattering democratic +passions. + +[17] See Note B at the end of the book. + +[18] See Brunot, _Histoire de la Langue Française_, t. v, liv. iii. + +[19] On this topic see some excellent remarks of Auguste Comte, _Cours +de Philosophie Positive_, 57^e leçon. + +[20] As a matter of fact, the peoples do not believe either that their +ambitions go back to their ancestors; they are ignorant of history and +do not believe it to be so even when it is true; they believe they +believe, or, more exactly, they want to believe that they believe. +However, that is enough to make them ferocious, perhaps more so than if +they really believed it. + +[21] France is here in a position of manifest inferiority in regard +to her neighbours. The modern French feel very slight inclinations to +claim that they reincarnate the ambitions of Charlemagne or even of +Louis XIV, despite the proclamations of certain men of letters. + +[22] For instance, the address of the ‘six great industrial and +agricultural associations of Germany’ to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg in +May, 1914, which was not very different from that drawn up in 1815 +by the Prussian metallurgists to point out to their government what +annexations should be made in the interests of their industry. (See +Vidal de La Blache, _La France de l’Est_, chap. xix.) Moreover, some +Germans are urgent in boldly proclaiming the economic character of +their nationalism. ‘Let us not forget,’ says a well-known Pangermanist, +‘that the German Empire, which is generally considered abroad as a +purely military State, is in its origin (Zollverein) chiefly economic.’ +And again: ‘For us war is only the continuation of our commercial +activity in times of peace, with other means but the same methods.’ +(Naumann, _L’Europe Centrale_, pp. 112, 247; see the whole book.) +Germany seems to be not indeed the only country to practise commercial +patriotism (England has done so just as much and for a much longer +time) but the only country to boast of it. + +[23] And to build up a much less passionate patriotism. Think, for +instance, of the agreements with foreigners accepted by patriotism +based on interest (such as the Franco-German iron cartel), against +which the patriotism based on pride rises up in revolt. + +[24] ‘Love of country is a real love of oneself.’ (Saint-Evremond.) + +[25] The divinizing of realism, of which patriotism specially consists, +is expressed with all desirable candour in the ‘Addresses to the German +People’ (Eighth Address); Fichte attacks religion for its claim to +situate the superior life outside all interest in earthly matters: ‘It +is an abuse of religion to force it, as Christianity has so often done, +to extol complete indifference to the business of the State and the +nation as the true religious spirit. Men,’ he declares, ‘are determined +to find heaven on earth and to impregnate their earthly labours with +something durable.’ He then shows, with great warmth, that this desire +is the essence of patriotism, and it is evident that for him earthly +labours become divine by becoming durable. This, indeed, is the only +means men have discovered for divinizing their institutions. + +[26] It is necessary to recall that the United States did not enter the +last war ‘in defence of principles’, but with the very practical object +of safeguarding their prestige, which had been lowered by the facts +that the Germans had torpedoed three of their ships? Nevertheless, +their desire to pose as having been purely idealistic in this affair is +noteworthy. + +[27] It may be said that religious passions, at least in the West, only +exist as a reinforcement to national passions; in France, a man sets up +as a Catholic in order to pose as being ‘more French’; in Germany as a +Protestant in order to declare himself ‘more German’. + +[28] Here are two remarkable cases of idealistic passions which in the +past successfully opposed national passion and are now submissive to +it: (_a_) In France, the monarchic passion, which in 1792 was stronger +than national feeling in many people, whereas in 1914 it was completely +effaced by national feeling. (Everyone will agree that attachment to a +certain form of government, i.e. at bottom, the attachment to a certain +metaphysical conception, is an infinitely more idealistic passion than +nationalist passion; however, I do not claim that all the Emigrés were +inspired by this idealism.) (_b_) In Germany, the religious passion, +which only fifty years ago was stronger than national feeling in more +than fifty per cent of Germans, and to-day is entirely subject to +national feeling (in 1866 the German Catholics desired the defeat of +Germany; in 1914 they ardently desired it to be victorious). The Europe +of to-day, compared with the Europe of the past, seems to contain many +less chances of civil wars and many more chances of national wars; +nothing could show better how much Europe has lost in idealism. (See +Note D at the end of this book for additional matter on the attitude of +the modern Catholics towards Catholicism when it is in opposition to +their nationalism.) + +[29] For example, in words like the following, uttered at Venice on +the 11th December, 1926, by the Italian Minister of Education and +Fine Arts: ‘Artists must prepare themselves for the new imperialist +function which must be carried out by our art. Above everything, we +must categorically impose a principle of _Italianita_. Whoever copies +a foreigner is guilty of _lèse-nation_ (an insult to the nation) like +a spy who admits an enemy by a secret doorway.’ These words have to be +approved by every adept of ‘_integral_ nationalism’. Moreover, we hear +much the same thing in France from certain adversaries of Romanticism. + +[30] ‘Discipline from the lowest to the highest must be essential and +of a religious type.’ (Mussolini, 25th October, 1925.) This is new +language in the mouth of a statesman, even of the most realist kind; +it may be asserted that neither Richelieu nor Bismarck would have +applied the word ‘religious’ to an activity whose object is exclusively +materialistic. + +[31] Notably for Renan and ‘speculative a-moralism’. (H. Massis, +_Judgments_, i.) + +[32] See Note E at the end of this book for further information on this +prestige, and what is new about it in history. + +[33] In 1891 Barrès wrote to the editor of _La Plume_: ‘If these +books have any value, it is from the logic, the continuity of thought +I have put into them during five years.’ (‘These books’ included +his Boulangiste campaign.) And, in the preface to his collection of +articles entitled ‘Scènes et Documents du nationalisme’, he says: ‘I +think that if Doumic will examine it from a greater distance he will +find a development, and not contradictions, in my work.’ + +[34] I shall be told of ‘clerks’ who, apparently without degradation, +have at some time or other taken the part of a race or a nation, even +of their own race or nation. That is because they believed that the +cause of that race or nation coincided at that time with the cause of +abstract justice. + +[35] Similar occurrences may be observed among the ancients. For +instance, Cicero denounced his fellow-citizens for having destroyed +Corinth merely to avenge an insult to their ambassador (De off., I, xi). + +[36] Already in 1911, when a writer quoted this sentence: ‘It is +impossible to accept the situation that humanity should be bound +for indefinite centuries by the marriages, battles, treaties of the +narrow-minded, ignorant, egotistic creatures who during the middle +ages were at the head of affairs in this world,’ he felt it necessary +to add: ‘Fortunately these lines were written by Renan; one could not +write them to-day without being called an unpatriotic Frenchman.’ (G. +Guy-Grand, _La Philosophie Nationaliste_, p. 165.) Without being called +so _by the men of thought_--that is the curious part of it. + +[37] Quoted by Mgr. Chapon in his admirable study, ‘La France et +l’Allemagne devant la doctrine chrétienne.’ (_Correspondant_, of 15th +August, 1915.) + +[38] See his _Letters_, ii, p. 31. + +[39] Consider how willingly they now accept military service. See Note +F at the end of this book. + +[40] Here are the reasons given by a German Catholic for this attitude +among those of his religion: ‘(_a_) Their incomplete knowledge of the +facts and opinions in the belligerent and neutral countries; (_b_) +_Their patriotism, which could not be allowed to separate itself from +the union binding together the German people_; (_c_) The fear of a +second Kulturkampf, which would be doubly dangerous if the German +Catholics had even appeared to agree with the campaign carried on in +France against German methods of waging war.’ The second reason will +be noted, i.e. the desire to be at unity with the nation, whatever the +moral aspect of its cause. Here, at least, is one reason which Bossuet +did not allege when he screened the violences of Louis XIV. + +Let me recall that when, in 1914, the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in +the Reichstag hinted at a sort of apology for the violation of Belgian +neutrality, he was sharply reproved by the Christian minister von +Harnack ‘for having tried to excuse what did not need excusing’. (See +A. Loisy, _Guerre et Religion_, p. 14.) + +[41] The clergy of the allied nations are eager to throw in the faces +of the German clergy their union with injustice in 1914. They abuse +their own good fortune in belonging to nations whose cause happened +to be just. When Italy, in 1923, at the time of the Corfu incident, +adopted towards Greece an attitude as unjust as that of Austria towards +Serbia in 1914, I am not aware that the Italian clergy expressed +indignation. Nor do I remember that in 1900, when a European army +intervened in Chinese affairs (the Boxer affair) and excesses were +committed by the soldiers, any strong protests were uttered by the +clergies of the respective nations. + +[42] A particularly remarkable attitude was that of the philosopher +Boutroux. You will find an admirable denunciation of it from the pen of +Charles Andler, _Les Origines du Pangermanisme_, p. viii. + +[43] This may be seen especially in the chorus of the Seven against +Thebes: ‘Gods of our City, let it not be destroyed with our houses and +our hearths.... O ye who have dwelt therein so long, will ye betray +this land?’ Six centuries later this may be seen in the ‘Aeneid’, where +the preservation of the Trojan City across the seas is plainly due +solely to the protection of Juno, and in no wise to any inward notion +of Trojan blood giving it an assurance of eternal duration. + +[44] Although the Germans appear to have been the inventors of the +passion I am denouncing, Lessing and Schlegel seem to have been the +first to brandish their poets as the expression of the national +soul, from a feeling of exasperation with the universalism of French +literature. The men of the French Pléiade (who will certainly be +brought up against me) wished to give their sensibility a national +mode of expression, a national language; they never claimed to give +a national character to that sensibility, to oppose it to other +national sensibilities. The systematic nationalization of the mind +is undoubtedly an invention of modern times. As regards the men of +learning, this nationalizing has undoubtedly been favoured by the +disappearance of Latin as the scientific language; and no one will ever +be able to say to what an extent this disappearance was an element of +arrest in civilisation. + +[45] In Nietzsche’s opinion, this was the case with Wagner, who, when +he gave himself out to his compatriots as the Messiah of German art, +saw that there was ‘a good vacant place to take’, while the whole +of his artistic formation as well as his profound philosophy, was +essentially universalist. (See _Ecce Homo_, p. 58. ‘What I have never +forgiven Wagner is his condescending to Germany.’) One wonders whether +the same might not be said of a certain apostle of ‘Lorrain genius’ or +of ‘Provençal genius’. + +[46] The nationalization of the mind sometimes has results whose savour +is not sufficiently enjoyed. In 1904, during the centenary celebrations +of Petrarch, the nations of Goethe and Shakespeare were not invited, +because they are not Latins; but the Roumanians were invited. We do not +know whether Uruguay was invited. + +[47] Anatole France, _La Vie Littéraire_, tome ii, p. 274. The +nationalist desires in French writers which I have been pointing out +have had other than political results; no one will ever be able to +say how many among them in the past fifty years have falsified their +talents, mistaken their true gifts in their endeavours to ‘feel in the +French manner’. A good example is the _Voyage de Sparte_, where so +many pages show what a beautiful piece of work it might have been if +the author had not _forced_ himself to feel his Lorrain soul under a +Greek sky. Here we come upon one of the most curious characteristics +in the writers of this age; the rejection of freedom of mind _for +themselves_, the thirst for ‘a discipline’ (the whole fortune of MM. +Maurras and Maritain comes from this), a thirst which in most of them +is the result of a fundamental intellectual nihilism. (On this nihilism +in Barrès, see Curtius, ‘Barrès and the intellectual foundations of +French nationalism,’ extracts in _Union pour la Vérité_, May, 1925; +in Maurras, see Guy-Grand, op. cit., p. 19; and L. Dimier, _Vingt Ans +d’Action Française_, p. 330: ‘I have never seen a more unhappy soul +than his.’) But the psychology of contemporary writers in itself and +apart from its political action is not my subject here. + +[48] I think it novel that a poet should give rise to a demonstration +so essentially practical as the address of the Naval League of Venice +to d’Annunzio after the publication of _La Nave_. ‘On the day when your +genius radiates with new splendour over the ancient ruler of “our sea”, +over Venice, to-day disarmed against Pola, the Naval League of Venice +thanks you with emotion, hoping that the third Italy may at last arm +the prow and set sail towards the world.’ (_Translator’s Note._--I have +rendered the French version as quoted; its meaning or lack of meaning +is no doubt inherent in the genius of the original, which I have not +before me.) + +[49] Compare with Balzac, who, though a Conservative, never hesitates +to show his Conservatives and particularly his Catholics in an +unfavourable light, if he thinks that the true light. See the examples +quoted by E. Seillière (_Balzac et la morale romantique_, pp. 27 +onwards, and 84 onwards), who sharply reproaches Balzac. + +[50] ‘_Resurrection_,’ ‘_Jean-Christophe_’ (derived in this respect +from the procedure of George Sand). On the other hand, I seem to find a +great deal of justice done the bourgeois in _Les Miserables_, which is +nevertheless a most ‘tendencious’ novel. + +[51] For instance, pre-war French novels showing the French in +Alsace-Lorraine. We may be quite certain that since 1918 the Germans +have written novels which are the exact counterpart to these. + +[52] See Note G at the end of this book. + +[53] See, for instance, Fustel de Coulanges’s study _De la manière +d’écrire l’histoire en France et en Allemagne_. It will be observed +that this author’s denunciation of the German historians exactly +applies to certain French historians of recent years, with this +difference: That the German alters history to exalt his nation and the +Frenchman to exalt a political system. In general it may be said that +the ‘tendencious’ philosophies of the Germans lead to national war, and +those of the French to civil war. Is it necessary to repeat, after so +many others, how much this proves the moral superiority of the latter? + +[54] _Revue Universelle_, 15th April, 1924. Here is that very curious +desire of the moderns to yield to subjectivism, whereas their elders +made every effort to combat it. + +[55] See Note H at the end of this book. + +[56] Yet the Jesuits thought of doing so to combat the Jansenists. (See +Racine, _Port-Royal_, pt. i.) + +[57] On the matter of the lack of literary sensibility which +accompanies this political criticism among its adepts, see a paragraph +of L. Dimier, _Vingt Ans d’Action Française_, p. 334. + +[58] The distinction between these two humanitarianisms is well +expressed by Goethe when he relates (Dichtung und Wahrheit) the +indifference of himself and his friends to the events of 1789. ‘In our +little circle, we took no notice of news and newspapers; our object +was to know Man; as for men, we left them to do as they chose.’ Need +I recall that the ‘humanities’, as instituted by the Jesuits in the +seventeenth century, the ‘studia humanitatis’, are ‘the study of what +is most essentially human’, in no sense altruistic exercises. See +further Note I at the end of this book for a curious quotation from one +of the ancients. + +[59] This the Church has understood so well, and the corollary to +this truth: That love between men can only be created by developing +in them the sensibility for abstract man, and by combatting in them +the interest for concrete man; by turning them towards metaphysical +meditation and away from the study of history (see Malebranche). This +is exactly the contrary direction to that of the modern ‘clerks’ but, +once again, these ‘clerks’ have not the slightest desire to create love +among men. + +[60] Thus they adopt the national spirit if it seems to serve their +interests; for instance, the party of ‘nationalist-socialists’. + +[61] Certain nationalists, desirous of honouring cosmopolitanism, +whose full value their intelligence perceives, and yet not wishing +to sacrifice nationalism, declare that cosmopolitanism represents +‘enlightened nationalism’. M. Paul Bourget, who gives this definition +(_Paris-Times_, June, 1924), quotes Goethe and Stendhal as examples, +‘the former of whom remained so profoundly German while striving +to understand the whole movement of French thought, and the +latter remained so profoundly French while he devoted himself to +understanding Italy.’ One wonders how these two masters showed the +least, even enlightened, ‘nationalism’ by remaining profoundly German +and profoundly French. Obviously M. Bourget confuses national and +nationalist. + +[62] Almost all works of national propaganda among the small nations +of Eastern Europe are anthologies of poetry. Very few are works of +thought. See the words uttered by E. Boutroux in August, 1915, to the +Committee of the Entente Cordiale, against the peoples who attach too +much importance to the intelligence, which ‘of itself tends to be one +and common to all beings capable of knowledge’. + +[63] _Les Nouvelles Littéraires_, 25th September, 1926. + +[64] Here is a specimen of the acrobatics which these teachers are +compelled to perform in order to conciliate Christian doctrine with +the preaching of national particularisms: ‘We wish to set the ideal of +universalism in positive relation to the contemporary reality of the +national form, which is that of all life, even the Christian life.’ +(Pastor Witte, quoted by A. Loisy, _Guerre et Religion_, p. 18.) Here +are minds for whom the squaring of the circle is obviously mere child’s +play. + +[65] Is it not suggestive to note that the Church in the last twenty +years has replaced the commandment ‘Homicide shalt thou not be, in fact +or by assent’ with ‘Homicide shalt thou not be, without right, nor +voluntarily’? + +[66] For example in this passage of Bossuet: ‘Since we are obliged to +love all men and since in truth no man is a foreigner to a Christian, +there is all the more reason for loving our fellow citizens. All the +love a man feels for himself, for his family, and for his friends is +united in the love he feels for his country....’ (_Politique tirée de +l’Ecriture Sainte_, I, vi. Notice the phrase ‘All the love a man feels +for himself....’ It wholly justifies Saint Evremond’s phrase: ‘Love +of country is really love of oneself.’) It appears that the Church +would prefer to go on presenting patriotism under this one aspect of +love (see the inquiry of ‘les Lettres’ on the Church and Nationalism, +1922-3), which would allow her to exalt this passion (as its +popularity requires) without violating the principles of Christianity. +Unfortunately for the Church, positive men come along and remind her +that patriotism is something more than love, and includes ‘hatred for +the foreigner’. (Maurras, _Dilemme de Marc Sangnier_.) Who will deliver +us from the truth-tellers? + +[67] A. Lugan, _La grande loi sociale de l’amour des hommes_, liv. ii, +chap. iii. + +[68] Père Ollivier, _Les Amitiés de Jesus_, p. 142. + +[69] _Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique_ (1919), in +the article headed ‘Patrie’. The reader will note the extraordinary +practical spirit of this article, and the desire to love only those who +have done something for us. + +[70] Loisy’s _Guerre et Religion_, p. 60. Nevertheless, a certain +number of practising clergy speak in the same way; see Guillot de +Givry, _Le Christ et la Patrie_, towards the end. + +[71] It is current knowledge that Italian Fascism and Russian +Bolshevism both derive from the author of _Reflections on Violence_. +He did, indeed, preach class egotism to some extent in a universal +manner, but without any explicit preference for the interest of one +class rather than that of another. In his preaching of egotism there +is a kind of impartiality which does not lack grandeur, a quality not +inherited by his disciples. + +[72] And even the teaching of Jesus Christ. R. Johannet says (op. cit., +p. 153), ‘I have tried to show what a vast amount of Christianity +is contained in the bourgeois type, when it is pure. To condemn the +bourgeois, because he is a bourgeois, in the name of Christ, seems to +me a somewhat daring paradox.’ But this author does not quote a single +text of the Gospels. He only quotes a few interpreters of Saint Thomas +Aquinas, whom he praises for their ‘extra-realist sense of affairs’, +and who apparently for him incarnate the thinking of Jesus Christ. This +work is one of the most perfect examples of the modern ‘clerk’s’ desire +to idealize the practical spirit. (On the subject of Christian doctrine +in the matter of property, see Father Thomassin, _Traité de l’aumône_.) + +[73] It might be said that in Christian theology the bourgeois state is +a _function_, and not a rank. + +[74] The essential position of the Church on this point (I say +essential; for, by close search, one can find texts supporting the +opposite thesis, but once more the curious thing is the fact that +this search should be made) seems to me defined in these lines: +‘Malebranche inclines, like Bossuet, to look upon social inequalities +and injustices as the results of sin, which must be endured as such, +and to which exterior conduct must conform.... We must not even attempt +to remedy these injustices except by charity, for we should simply +disturb the peace of the world, probably without any result. Only, _we +should not in our own souls attach any sort of importance to these +circumstances and conditions, for the true life is not there_’ (H. +Joly, _Malebranche_, p. 262). + +[75] On the relation between Durckheim’s theses and those of the French +traditionalists, see D. Parodi, _La Philosophie contemporaine en +France_, p. 148. + +[76] ‘Germany is the sole judge of her methods.’ (Major von Disfurth, +November, 1914.) The philosophy of national moralities seems +essentially German. Is it not very remarkable to see Hegel and Zeller +desiring at all costs to prove that Plato in his _Republic_ defined +a state of good which was only valid for the Greeks, and not for all +peoples? (See P. Janet, _Histoire des idées politiques_, tome 1, p. +140.) + +[77] Barrès wrote in 1898: ‘The professors are still arguing about +justice and truth, when every self-respecting man knows that he must +limit himself to inquiring if there is justice in the relations between +two given men, at a given time, under specified circumstances.’ That is +exactly what the Germany of 1914 said in answer to those who brought +accusations against her. Not a single moralist in France before +Barrès--not even de Maistre or Bonald--would have asserted that ‘every +self-respecting man’ can conceive of no justice but one specially +arranged for the circumstances. + +[78] _L’Appel au Soldat._ Compare this with the traditional French +teaching, of which Barrès claims to be the heir: ‘Whatever your country +may be, you should only believe what you would be disposed to believe +if you were in another country.’ (_Logique de Port-Royal_, iii, xx.) +It must not be thought that dogma of national truths aims only at +moral truth. Recently certain French thinkers waxed indignant that the +doctrines of Einstein were accepted by their compatriots without more +resistance. + +[79] The adoration of the contingent _for its own sake_; otherwise, +and as a step towards the eternal, the knowledge of ‘strange things’ +is highly recommended by Leibniz, and even by Spinoza. Renouvier, so +hostile to a certain kind of universalism, never bestows philosophical +value on a knowledge of what is ‘unique and inexpressible’ in the +object. (See G. Séailles, ‘Le Pluralisme de Renouvier,’ _Revue de +Métaphysique et de Morale_, 1925.) He would never have signed this +charter of modern metaphysics: ‘That the philosophers since Socrates +should have contended as to which should most scorn the knowledge of +the particular and should most adore knowledge of the general, is +something which passes understanding. For, after all, must not the most +honourable knowledge be the knowledge of the most valuable realities! +And is there a valuable reality which is not concrete and individual?’ +(William James.) + +[80] An important literary review recently reproached a critic +(M. Pierre Lasserre) for his supposed inaptitude to understand +‘contemporary literature’. + +[81] Curiously enough, these metaphysics of the historic may also be +found among the poets. We all know Claudel’s cult of ‘the present +minute’ (because it differs from all other minutes in that it is not +the extremity of the same quantity of the past); Rimbaud before this +said: ‘One must be absolutely modern.’ Moreover, for certain Christians +dogma is only valid _relative to a time_. There again particularism +seems to have been started by the Germans: ‘No exposition of morality +can be the same for all periods of the Christian Church; each possesses +full and complete value for a certain period only.’ (Scheiermacher.) On +the Germanism in this desire to see everything in its ‘becoming’, see +Parodi, _le Problème moral et la Pensée contemporaine_, p. 255. + +[82] These views on the modern cult of the particular do not seem to +me to be invalidated by the arrival of a recent school (Neo-Thomism) +which opposes the cult of Being to that of Becoming. According to the +leaders of this school, it is clear that, despite certain universalist +declarations, human Being really belongs only to them and their group, +although in this case the group is wider than the nation. One of them +would quite willingly say with a Christian of the second century: ‘We +are men; the rest are pigs and dogs.’ Nor do I think I need take into +account those particularisms which claim that by working for themselves +they are working for the universal, seeing that for them their own +group represents the universal. ‘I am Roman, I am human’ (Maurras). ‘I +am German, I am human’ (Fichte) and so on.... However, these claims +show the prestige of the universal in despite of doctrines. + +[83] See Note J at the end of this book. + +[84] On the cult of the ‘Prussian model’ even among the English +‘clerks’, see Elie Halévy, _Histoire du Peuple anglais_, Epilogue, +livre ii, ch. i. + +[85] Sorel, _Le procès de Socrate_. + +[86] This has been perfectly obvious to all those guardians of the +spiritual who have condemned it, whatever their motives may have been. +More precisely, Maurras’s work makes the passion of man to found the +State (or to strengthen it) an object of religious adoration; it +is really the worldly made transcendental. This displacing of the +transcendental is the secret of the great influence exerted by Maurras +on his contemporaries. These persons, especially in irreligious +France, were plainly eager for such a doctrine, if one may judge by +the outburst of gratitude with which they greeted it, and which seems +to say: ‘At last we are delivered from God; at last we are allowed to +adore ourselves in our will to be great, not in our will to be good; we +are shown the ideal in the real, on earth and not in heaven.’ In this +sense, Maurras’s work is the same as Nietzsche’s (‘be faithful to the +earth’), with this difference, that the German thinker deifies man in +his anarchic passions, and the Frenchman in his organising passions. +It is also the same as the work of Bergson and James, inasmuch as it +says like them: the real is the only ideal. This _secularizing of the +divine_ may be compared with the work of Luther. + +[87] Machiavellian morality is plainly proclaimed in the following +lines, where every open-minded person will recognize, except for the +tone, the teaching of _all_ the present teachers of realism, whatever +their nationality: ‘In his relations with other States, the Prince +should know neither law nor right, except the right of the strongest. +These relations place in his hands, under his responsibility, the +divine rights of the Destiny and government of the world, and raise +him above the precepts of individual morality into a higher moral +order, whose content is enshrined in the words: Salus populi suprema +lex esto.’ (Fichte, quoted by Andler, op. cit., p. 33.) The advance on +Machiavelli is obvious. + +[88] The teaching of this writer may be put in this form: ‘All that +is good from the point of view of politics is good; _and I know no +other criterion of good_.’ This enables him to say that he makes no +pronouncement in matters of private morality. + +[89] In Richelieu’s _Testament politique_ and the _Mémoires de Louis +XIV pour l’Instruction du Dauphin_, the catalogue of good and ill might +be signed by Saint Vincent de Paul. We read in them: ‘Kings should +take care in making treaties, but once the treaties are made, _they +must observe them religiously_. I know that many politicians teach the +contrary; but, without taking into consideration all that the Christian +Faith provides us with against these maxims, I maintain that since +the loss of honour is greater than the loss of life itself, a great +Prince should hazard his person and _even the interest of his State +rather than break his word_, which he cannot violate without losing his +reputation, and consequently _the greatest strength_ of a Sovereign.’ +(_Testament Politique_, part 2, ch. vi.) + +[90] Similarly with the writer--Machiavelli, who writes for his +peers, can allow himself the luxury of not being a moralist; Maurras +who writes for crowds cannot do so. No one writes with impunity in a +democracy. Moreover, a political activity which is supported by moral +activity proves that it understands the true conditions of its success. +A master in these matters says: ‘There can be no profound political +reform unless religion and morality are also reformed.’ (Hegel.) +Clearly the particular influence of the _Action Française_ among +all other conservative organs is due to the fact that its political +movement is supported by a moral teaching, although other interests +oblige it to deny this. + +[91] _Dictionnaire des Cas de Conscience_ (ed. 1712), article ‘Guerre’. +With such a morality the territorial formation of any European State +would become impossible. This is the type of non-practical teaching, +i.e. of what I mean by the true ‘clerk’. (See Note F at the end of +this book on the subject of the welcome given to this teaching by the +material world.) In the opinion of Vittoria as well, the extension of +empire is not a just cause. + +[92] This is the thesis of Alfonso Liguori which to-day prevails in the +Church’s teaching over that of Vittoria. + +[93] Cardinal Gousset (_Théologie morale_, 1845). + +[94] This is the Scholastic doctrine of war, formulated in all its +rigidity by Thomas Aquinas. According to this doctrine, the Prince +(or the people) who declares war, acts as a magistrate (minister Dei) +under whose jurisdiction a foreign nation falls, owing to an injustice +it has committed and which it refuses to repair. From this it follows, +in particular, that the Prince who has declared war ought solely +to punish the guilty, if he is victorious, and not to acquire any +personal benefit from his victory. This high moral doctrine is entirely +abandoned by the Church to-day. (See Vanderpol, _La Guerre devant le +Christianisme_, titre ix.) + +[95] Apparently this was the view adopted by the Holy See in 1914 +towards the Franco-German war, Germany benefiting by what theology +calls ‘invincible’ ignorance, i.e. implying that one has used all +the diligence of which a man is capable in trying to understand the +explanations of an adversary. Obviously, one may feel that some +goodwill was needed to think that Germany had a right to this benefit. + +[96] Like the thesis of war being just on both sides, this is the +doctrine of Molina, which in matters of law in war has entirely +replaced Scholastic doctrine in ecclesiastic teaching. + +[97] In the _Dictionnaire théologique_ of Vacant-Mangenot (1922, +article ‘Guerre’), I find the following passage, which I recommend to +all aggressors desirous of sheltering under a high moral authority: ‘It +is not only the right but the duty of the leader of a nation to adopt +this method (i.e. war) to safeguard the general interests committed to +his care. This right and duty apply not only to a strictly defensive +war, but also to an offensive war rendered necessary by the actions +of a neighbouring State whose ambitious intrigues constitute a real +danger.’ In the same article will be found a theory of colonial wars +identical to Kipling’s when he calls them: _the white man’s burden_. + +[98] This expression (i.e. ‘la blague’) is Sorel’s (see Julien Benda, +_Les Sentiments de Critias_, p. 258); and again (_Reflexions sur la +Violence_, ch. ii): ‘You cannot sufficiently execrate those who teach +the people that they should carry out some alleged superlatively +idealistic injunction of a justice moving towards the future.’ +Moreover, Sorel professes a similar hatred for those who preach this +injunction to the bourgeoisie. + +[99] See Note K at the end of the book. + +[100] See _Reflexions sur la Violence_, ch. vi: ‘The morality of +Violence.’ We shall be told that the justice denounced by Sorel is the +justice of tribunals, which according to him is a false justice, a +‘violence with a judicial mask’. There is no indication that a justice +which was a true justice would receive any more respect from him. + +[101] In this respect one cannot stress too much in certain political +teachers a defence of intolerance, carried out with a consciousness and +arrogance which hitherto had only appeared sometimes in the mandatories +of a revealed religion. A specimen is quoted by G. Guy-Grand (_La +Philosophie nationaliste_, p. 47). See also one of these defences in L. +Romier, _Nation et Civilisation_, p. 180. + +[102] ‘Modern science has established as the measure of truth, not the +deductive demands of its understanding, but the observed existence +of the fact.’ (Paul Bourget.) The ‘truth’ here is evidently moral +truth; for scientific truth the phrase would be a tautology. Once +more, here the ‘fact’ is solely the fact which happens to suit the +author’s passions. When M. d’Haussonville points out to M. Bourget that +democracy is a fact, and an unavoidable fact, he is told that this +belief is a ‘prejudice’ and one suddenly learns that ‘boats are made to +row against the stream’. This is exactly what revolutionaries say. + +[103] See Note L at the end of this book. + +[104] Another thinker to whom our empiricists are strangely ungrateful +is the author of these words: ‘Consider the danger of one stirring up +the enormous masses which form the French nation. Who could restrain +the disturbance set up, or foresee all the results it might produce? +Even if all the advantages of the new scheme should be indisputable, +what man of good sense would dare to undertake to abolish old customs, +to change old maxims, and to give a new form to a State other than that +it has reached after an existence of 1,300 years?’ (J. J. Rousseau.) + +[105] See Note M at the end of this book. + +[106] ‘A truly scientific mind,’ says one of these devotees of fact, +‘feels no need to justify a privilege which appears as an elementary +and irreducible datum of the social world.’ (Paul Bourget.) But this +same ‘truly scientific’ mind is scandalised at an _insurrection_ +against this privilege, which is also an ‘elementary and irreducible +datum of the social world’. I shall be told this that insurrection is +not a datum of the social world, but of the world of passion where it +is most anti-social. And that indeed is the position of this dogmatism: +It considers the social _independent of the passionate_, whether the +latter has been made social (by Catholic education), or has been +reduced to silence by force (school of Maurras) or by skill (school +of Bainville). The strangest part of it all is that those who argue +in this way about the social _in itself_ accuse their adversaries of +dealing in abstractions. + +[107] The position I am here denouncing has nothing in common with that +of a recent school of moralists (Rauh, Lévy-Bruhl) who also desire ‘to +take man as he is’, but in order to discover how he may be made better. + +[108] This pessimism, whatever some of its heralds may say, has nothing +in common with the pessimism of the masters of the seventeenth century. +La Fontaine and La Bruyère attribute nothing inevitable or eternal to +the ills they portray. Let me also point out that in their efforts +to discourage hope, the Romantics of Pessimism cannot claim (as M. +Georges Goyau has pointed out to them) that they are based on Catholic +tradition. + +[109] Such a group logically comes to declarations like the following, +which every supporter of ‘integral nationalism’ is bound to admire: +‘From to-night onwards let there be an end to the silly Utopia where +everyone thinks with his own head.’ (Impero, 4th November, 1926.) See +Note N at the end of this volume. + +[110] On Pragmatism, especially Nietzschean pragmatism, and the place +it holds (whether they confess it or not) in almost all the moral +and political teachings really characteristic of this time, see R. +Berthelot, _Un Romantisme Utilitaire_, tome i, page 28 onwards. I can +best show the novelty of the pragmatist attitude, especially among the +French moralists, by quoting a remark of Montaigne which they all, +before Barrès, would have ratified: ‘The honour and beauty of an action +cannot be argued from its utility.’ Let us not forget, however, that +Nietzsche, always unfaithful to his disciples, declares that ‘in the +long run, utility, like everything else, is simply a figment of our +imagination, and may well be the _fatal stupidity by which we shall one +day perish_’. + +[111] That it why Pragmatism is also called Humanism. (See F. Schiller, +_Protagoras or Plato_.) + +[112] We know how the two are reconciled. Jesus, they say, preached +the spirit of sacrifice, which is the basis of all human institutions. +As if Jesus preached the spirit of sacrifice which wins battles and +secures empires! + +[113] ‘The true warrior remains human in the midst of the blood he +sheds.’ (De Maistre.) + +[114] For example, when they make a soldier say in heaven: ‘You must +know, my friends, that among all things done upon earth, nothing +is more agreeable to the eyes of those who rule the universe than +societies of men founded upon respect for laws, which we call cities.’ +(Cicero, _Scipio’s Dream_.) + +[115] Sorel, loc. cit. + +[116] And from any patriotism. Nietzsche and Sorel prove that love of +war is something totally distinct from love of country, although most +often they coincide. + +[117] Ernest Psichari, _Terres de Soleil et de Sommeil_. And, in +_L’Appel des armes_, through the mouth of a character who obviously has +all the author’s sympathies; ‘I think it necessary that there should be +in the world a certain number of the men who are called soldiers and +who place their ideal in fighting, who have a taste for battle, not for +victory but for the contest, as hunters have a taste for hunting, not +for game!... The part we have to play, or otherwise we lose our reason +for existing and have no more meaning, is to maintain a military ideal, +not a nationally military ideal, but a militarily military ideal, if +I may so express it.’ The religion of this moralist is, according +to his own expression, _integral militarism_. ‘Big guns,’ he says, +‘are the most real realities which exist, the sole realities of the +modern world.’ And obviously these realities are divinities for this +‘spiritual’ person and his followers. + +[118] This depreciation of Greece, to be seen in many French +traditionalists since de Maistre, is constant among the Pangermanists. +(See notably Houston Chamberlain, _Genesis of the Nineteenth Century_, +tome i, page 57.) In a periodical with dogmatic claims (_Notre Temps_, +August, 1927), under the suggestive title ‘Towards a Practical +Idealism’, I read: ‘A young generation trained in this way, _more +sporting than ideological_, supports those who ask whether we are +not at the dawn of a great age.’ Here again the Churchmen do not +lag behind. In _La Vie Catholique_ (24th September, 1927) I find a +warm eulogy of a champion boxer. It is true that this eulogy ends up +with the words: ‘Finally, let us add that Tunney is a convinced and +practising Catholic, and that two of his sisters are nuns.’ + +[119] Laws, Book I. The exact text of Plato is: ‘In the order of +virtues, wisdom is first, temperance comes next, courage occupies the +last place.’ Plato here means by courage (see the context, notably the +passage about those soldiers who ‘though insolent, unjust, immoral, +know how to fight’) Man’s aptitude for facing death. It seems that he +would not have given the first place to the courage which is strength +of mind, a resistance to misfortune, as the Stoics afterwards did. +With him strength of mind always comes after justice--according to his +doctrine, it is a consequence of justice. Moreover, the courage placed +in the supreme rank by Barrès is not Stoic patience but the active +defiance of death. For Nietzsche and Sorel it is essential audacity, +where audacity is irrational--a form of courage depreciated by all +ancient moralists and their disciples. (See Plato, Laches; Aristotle, +Ethics, VIII; Spinoza, Ethics, IV, 69; even the poets--‘Our reason +which commands our fire,’ Ronsard.) + +It seems that facing death, even on behalf of justice, was not so much +the object of praise among the ancient philosophers as it is among the +moderns. In the Phaedo, Socrates is praised for his justice; he is not +very loudly praised because he died for justice. Moreover, the views +of the ancients on this point seem to me well expressed by Spinoza: +‘Death is a thing of which the free man thinks least of all,’ a thought +which does not imply much admiration for those who face death bravely. +One wonders whether the veneration of courage, at least among the +moralists, has not been created by Christianity, with the importance it +attaches to death, and the subsequent appearance before God. + +I cannot leave this point without recalling a passage where Saint-Simon +speaks of a nobility ‘accustomed to be good for nothing except to get +itself killed’, _Mémoires_, t. xi, page 427, ed. Cheruel. It may be +asserted that there is not one modern writer, even a Duke of France, +who would speak of courage in such a tone. + +[120] And to hold. + +[121] There will be found in Barrès (_Une Enquête aux pays du Levant_, +chap. vii: ‘Les derniers fidèles du Vieux de la Montagne’) a striking +example of admiration for the cult of honour inasmuch as this cult, +when ably exploited by an intelligent leader, gives practical results. + +[122] This is especially the case with Montaigne who, as everyone +knows, extols honour insofar as it is man’s sensitiveness to the +judgment of his conscience, but very little insofar as it is a desire +for glory--‘put off with other pleasures that which comes from the +approbation of others.’ Barrès believes he sees in that ‘a foreigner +who does not share our prejudices’. Barrès confuses the moralists and +the poets. Before him I do not know one French author with dogmatic +claims who has attributed a high moral value to the love of glory; the +French moralists before 1890 are very unmilitary, even the soldiers +like Vauvenargues and Vigny. (See the excellent study of G. Le Bidois, +_L’Honneur au miroir de nos lettres_, especially on Montesquieu.) + +[123] The Abbé Sertillanges, _L’Héroisme et la Gloire_. Compare this +with Bossuet’s two sermons on ‘The Honour of the World’. You can +measure the advance made by the Church during three centuries in its +concessions to lay passions. See also Nicole: ‘On the true idea of +valour.’ The sermons of the Abbé Sertillanges (‘la Vie Héroïque’) +should be read entire, as a monument of a Churchman’s enthusiasm for +warlike instincts. It is positively the manifesto of a helmed ‘clerk’. +You can find in them such emotions as the following which, mutatis +mutandis, might be an extract from the Regimental Orders of a Colonel +of the Death’s Head Hussars: ‘Behold Guynemer, the young hero, the +simple soul with the eagle glance, the slim Hercules, the Achilles who +does not retire to his tent, the Roland of the clouds and the Cid of +the French sky: was there ever a wilder and more furious paladin, more +careless of death, whether his own or that of an enemy? This “kid”, as +his comrades called him, only enjoyed the savage pleasure of attack, of +the hard fight, of the clear victory, and in him the arrogance of the +conqueror was at once charming and terrible.’ + +[124] Let me recall Thomas Aquinas’s definition of honour, which is not +exactly the definition of the honour extolled by the Abbé Sertillanges: +‘Honour is good (like the love of human glory) on condition that +charity is its principle, and the love of God or the good of one’s +neighbour as its object.’ + +[125] See the recent Bill to amend Martial Law, known as the Paul +Boncour Bill. + +[126] This suggestive remark is Lavisse’s, _Etudes d’Histoire de +Prusse_, page 30. See the whole passage. + +[127] Love here is obviously love for the superior species--to which +the preacher naturally belongs. Doubtless it is this love also which +permits of a pity which is not ‘perverted.’ + +[128] Charles Maurras, _Action Française_, tome iv, page 596. One +thinks of Nietzsche’s exclamation: ‘Humanity! Was there ever a more +horrible old woman among all horrible old women!’ and the German master +adds, always in agreement with many a French master as we shall see +later, ‘unless perhaps it is truth.’ + +[129] Their harshness has obviously nothing in common with the +harshness implied by these fine words: ‘The man of justice subordinates +passion to reason, which seems regrettable if his heart is cold, but +will appear sublime if he is capable of love’ (Renouvier). + +[130] This is the opinion of Machiavelli (chap. xviii) who, there +again, does not therefore consider cruelty as a proof of a high state +of culture. + +[131] I find this from the pen of a hero of the First Empire: ‘I was +afraid of feeling _pleasure_’ (the author himself underlines the word) +‘in killing with my own hand some of these scoundrels’ (he is speaking +of some Germans who murdered French prisoners after the battle of +Leipzic). ‘I therefore sheathed my sabre and left the extermination +of these assassins to the troopers.’ (_Memoirs of General Marbot_, +tome iii, page 344.) There is a condemnation of the joy of killing +which would be scorned by many a contemporary writer. In France the +glorification of warlike instincts is much less common among the +soldiers than among the authors. Marbot is far less bloody-minded than +Barrès. + +[132] ‘And the honour of virtue consists in contending, not in winning’ +(Montaigne). + +[133] _La Ruine du monde antique_, page 76. See also in _Les Illusions +du progrès_ (page 259) Sorel’s derisive amusement at a thinker who +said that the preponderance of intellectual emotions is the sign of +superior societies. We may take up Sainte-Beuve’s famous distinction +and say that modern thinkers extol _sword-intelligence_ at the expense +of _mirror-intelligence_. On their own showing it is the former they +admire in Nietzsche, Sorel, Péguy, and Maurras. (See R. Gillouin, +_Esquisses littéraires et morales_, page 52.) Let me observe that +contempt for ‘mirror-intelligence’ implies contempt for Aristotle, +Spinoza, Bacon, Goethe, and Renan. Nor does it seem to me that M. Paul +Valéry is exactly a ‘sword-intelligence’. + +[134] _Victor Marie, Comte Hugo_, towards the end. See Note O at the +end of this volume. + +[135] This it the only reason why Nietzsche extols art, and declares +(along with all modern moralism) the supremacy of the artist over the +philosopher, because art seems to him to possess the value of action. +Apart from this point of view, it seems just to say with one of his +critics: ‘At bottom Nietzsche despised art and artists.... In art he +condemns a feminine principle, the mimicry of the actor, the love of +dress and all that glitters.... Remember the eloquent page where he +praises Shakespeare, the greatest of poets, for having abased the +figure of the poet, whom he treats as a stage-player, before Caesar, +_that divine man_.’ (C. Schuwer, _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_, +April, 1926.) For Sorel art is great because it is an anticipation of +intense production, as it tends to manifest itself more and more in our +society. + +[136] _Evolution Créatrice_, page 216. The true formula of Bergsonism +should be, ‘I grow, therefore I am.’ Notice also the tendency of modern +philosophy to make the practical character of thought its essential +characteristic and to make its consciousness of itself a secondary +characteristic: ‘Perhaps thought must be defined as the faculty of +combining means towards certain ends rather than by the sole property +of being clear to itself.’ (D. Roustan, _Leçons de Psychologie_, page +73.) + +[137] The Sphex. The example is given in _L’Evolution Créatrice_, and +has had an immense success in the literary world. (It is, moreover, +imaginary. See Marie Goldsmith, _Psychologie Comparée_, page 211.) The +defence of the practical value of instinct, with the same Romantic +contempt of the rationalist as in Barrès, existed with J. J. Rousseau: +‘Conscience never deceives us; it is to the soul what instinct is +to the body.... Modern philosophy, which only admits what can be +explained, takes care not to admit the obscure faculty called instinct +which, without acquired knowledge, seems to guide animals towards some +end.’ (_Confession de foi du vicaire savoyard._) + +[138] ‘If the utility which results from a man’s occupations determined +our praise, the inventor of the plough would deserve the praise of +being a great mind far more than Aristotle, Galilei, and M. Descartes.’ +(Bayle.) Fontenelle and Voltaire have pointed out the utility of +certain studies which were considered useless; they never meant that +those who cultivated these studies while they thought them useless were +therefore contemptible. + +[139] See above, page 54. + +[140] Or moral. Barrès denounces the ‘immorality’ of the scholar who +shows the part played by chance in history. Compare Michelet’s remark, +‘respect kills history.’ + +[141] As is well known, this is the argument of the ‘Avenir +de l’intelligence’. It allows followers to say (‘Manifeste de +l’Intelligence,’ _Figaro_, 19th July, 1919; on this manifesto, see Note +P at the end of this volume) that ‘one of the most obvious missions +of the Church during the ages has been to protect the intelligence +against its own errors’--an irrefutable saying from the moment that the +errors of the intelligence are everything it says without reference to +social order (whose basis is to be the teaching of the Church). This +practical conception of the intelligence leads to definitions of this +sort: ‘True logic is to be defined as the normal union of feelings, +images and signs, to inspire in us the conceptions suited to our moral, +intellectual and physical needs.’ (Maurras.) Compare this with the +tradition teaching of the French masters: ‘Logic is the art of guiding +reason properly in the knowledge of things.’ (_Logique de Port-Royal._) + +The wish to esteem intelligence according to its practical results +appears again in this astounding formula: ‘A critical mind is of value +_through the influence it exerts_ by means of the enlightenment it +bestows.’ (Maurras.) See also how severe is M. Massis (_Jugements_, i, +87) for Renan when he says: ‘The useful is what I abhor.’ Elsewhere +(_Jugements_, 107) the same thinker speaks of a spiritual freedom +‘whose disinterestedness is merely a refusal of the conditions of life, +of action, _and of thought_!’ + +[142] They add ‘and unscientific’, which is irrefutable as soon as +science means ‘practical’. ‘Bringing up children religiously,’ says M. +Paul Bourget, ‘is bringing them up scientifically’--a very defensible +saying as soon as ‘scientifically’ means (as the author here wants it +to mean) ‘in conformity with the national interest’. + +[143] The French traditionalists condemn the truth in itself in the +name of ‘social’ truth. This is the _glorification of prejudices_, +a new thing indeed in the descendants of Montaigne and Voltaire. It +may be said that certain contemporary French masters show a zeal in +defending the interests of society never seen before in those whose +business was to defend the interests of the mind. + +The condemnation of disinterested intellectual activity is plainly +laid down in this command of Barrès: ‘All questions must be solved in +relation to France,’ to which a German thinker replies in 1920, ‘All +the conquests of ancient and modern culture and of science are looked +at by us from the German point of view before everything.’ (Quoted by +C. Chabot, Preface to the French translation of _Speeches to the German +Nation_, page xix). For the cult of the ‘useful error’, see an amazing +page in the _Jardin de Bérénice_, quoted and commented on by Parodi. +(_Traditionalisme et Democratie_, page 136.) + +[144] Here M. Maurras separates from his Master, de Maistre, who speaks +of ‘the ocean which will one day welcome everything and everyone to +its bosom’. However, the author of the _Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg_ +quickly adds: ‘But I refrain from touching on personality, without +which immortality is nothing.’ + +[145] On the existence of this doctrine of immanence among almost all +Christian teachers until our own times, see Renouvier: ‘l’Idée de Dieu’ +(_Année Philosophique_, 1897), and also _Essai d’une Classification des +doctrines_, 3: _l’évolution_; _la création_. + +[146] According to Hegel, God constantly grows at the expense of His +opposite; His activity is essentially that of war and victory. + +[147] Let me note a keen protest against this conception in +‘Neo-Thomism’. + +[148] Compare, for instance, the condemnation of Rosmini with that of +Maître Eckart, where such propositions as ‘Nulla in Deo distinctio +esse aut intelligi potest’ and ‘Omnes creaturae sunt purum nihil’ +are declared to be, not heretical, but only ‘ill-sounding, rash and +suspected of heresy’. + +[149] Remember that in 1806, immediately after Jena, Hegel’s one +thought was to find a corner in which to philosophize. In 1813 +Schopenhauer was completely indifferent to the up-rising of Germany +against Napoleon. + +[150] ‘No one has the right to be indifferent to the disasters of his +country; but the philosopher, like the Christian, always has reasons +for living. The Kingdom of God knows neither conquerors nor conquered; +that Kingdom resides in the joys of the heart, the mind, and the +imagination, which the conquered enjoys more than the conqueror if he +is morally on a higher plane and has more mind. Your great Goethe, your +admirable Fichte have taught us, have they not, how to lead a noble and +consequently happy life, when our country is humiliated abroad.’ (First +Letter to Strauss.) + +Need I say that Nietzsche, who seems to me a bad ‘clerk’ from the +nature of his teaching, seems to me one of the finest from his entire +devotion to the passions of the spirit alone? + +[151] Of course, I am not doubting the sincerity of all the +‘right-thinking’ men of letters. Some persons are so fortunate that +the most profitable attitudes are precisely those which they adopt +sincerely. + +[152] This may be clearly seen by the ill-will displayed by the French +bourgeoisie towards the order of their ‘spiritual leader’ forbidding +them to read a publication whose doctrines they like. The change may be +estimated if you remember that when, a century ago, the Pope ordered +the French Catholics to accept the law against the Jesuits voted by the +government of Charles X, they all bowed to his will. + +[153] At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession when the north of +France was invaded, Fénelon delivered several sermons in which he told +the invaded population that their sufferings were the just punishment +for their sins. Imagine the reception of anyone who dared to preach +such a sermon to the French in August, 1914! For the manner in which +the ‘taught’ Church to-day treats the ‘teaching’ Church if the latter +does not say what it wants to hear, think of the reception thirty years +ago of Father Ollivier’s sermon on the victims of the fire at the +charity bazaar. + +[154] Similar observations may be made about the philosophers, most of +whom--and not the least famous--do not live to-day like Descartes and +Spinoza, but are married, have children, occupy posts, are ‘in daily +life’. All of which seems to me to have a relation with the ‘pragmatic’ +character of their teaching. (On this point, see my book: _Sur le +Succès du Bergsonisme_, page 207.) + +[155] This is the reign (which seems eternal in France) of the ‘wit’, +with his attribute so admirably denounced by Malebranche in this +delicious phrase: ‘The stupid person and the wit are equally blind to +truth; with this difference, that the stupid person respects truth +while the wit despises it.’ + +[156] The spectacle of democracies may satisfy another sort of artistic +sensibility, i.e. the sort which is moved, not by the spectacle of +order, but by the spectacle of an equilibrium between forces which +are naturally in opposition. (On this distinction, see the great book +by M. Hauriou, _Principes de droit public_, chap. i.) Nevertheless, +a sensibility to equilibrium is far more intellectual than truly +artistic. See Note Q at the end of this book. + +[157] More precisely, since the haughty Romanticism I mentioned above. +The artist’s desire to set himself up as an exceptional being dates +from Flaubert. Hugo and Lamartine never expressed it. + +[158] This aversion is particularly strong in Nietzsche. (See _Le +Gai sçavoir_, loc. cit., where generalization becomes a synonym for +platitude, superficiality, stupidity.) Like a true artist, Nietzsche +is incapable of understanding that the apperception of a common +characteristic may be an act of genius--for instance, the apperception +of the common characteristic between the movement of the planets and +the fall of an apple. + +[159] So much so that the true champions of ‘sacred egoism’ definitely +condemn them. Bismarck, Wilhelm II, Naumann, Houston Chamberlain, all +argue against classical teaching. + +[160] Remember that Nietzsche only truly esteems the thought of the +ancients up to Socrates, i.e. up to the time when it begins to teach +the universal. + +[161] This same Barrès is quoted as having said to a ‘Dreyfusist’ in +1898: ‘Why do you talk of justice and humanity to me! What do I care +for? A few pictures in Europe and a few cemeteries!’ Another of our +great political realists confessed one day to his fundamental necessity +to ‘enjoy’. Socrates long ago told Protagoras that the basis of his +doctrine was a thirst for sensation. + +[162] It seems to me difficult to deny that pacifism, humanitarianism, +and altruism are _boring_. No doubt, art, science, and philosophy offer +sufficient opportunities for ‘amusement’ without one asking of it +doctrines which set the world on fire. But that is the view of a man +who is not wildly eager for sensation. + +[163] The realists are not the only people to-day who find +opportunities for sensation in their political attitudes. It is certain +that the humanitarianism of Victor Hugo and Michelet is far from having +the pure intellectual resonance it had in Spinoza and Malebranche. (See +above, my distinction between humanitarianism and humanism.) + +[164] ‘Peace it not the absence of war, but a virtue born from strength +of soul.’ (Spinoza.) + +[165] Here is an example: ‘Universal peace will come about one day, not +because men will become better (one cannot hope for that) but because +a new order of things, new science, new economic needs, will impose a +state of peace on them, just as the very conditions of their existence +formerly placed and maintained them in a state of war.’ (Anatole +France, _Sur la Pierre blanche_.) Note the refusal, mentioned above, to +believe in any possible betterment of the human soul. + +[166] This observation applied to nearly all anti-militarist literature +up to our own times. We have to come to Renan and Renouvier (at least +among writers not of the Church) to find authors who speak of war and +national passions with the seriousness and respect due to such dramas. + +[167] I am not to say whether the claims of France after her victory +might have been _impolitic_, for the thinkers I am discussing here +only speak of what they consider their _immorality_. Notice that the +pacifism of the Church, at least among the great teachers, is not +at all inspired by sentimental considerations, but by pure moral +education. ‘What do we condemn in war?’ says Saint Augustin. ‘Is it +the fact that they kill men who have all one day to die? Only cowards, +not religious men, would bring this accusation against war. What we +condemn in war is the desire to do harm, an implacable soul, the fury +of reprisals, the passion for dominion.’ (This is taken up by Thomas +Aquinas in the _Summum_, 2, 2, xl, art. 1.) + +[168] I consider that ‘My kingdom is not of this world’ may be said by +all whose activity is not directed to practical ends: the artist, the +metaphysician, the scientist _insofar as he finds satisfaction in the +practice of science and not in its results_. Many will tell me that +they and not the Christians are the true ‘clerks’, for the Christian +accepts the ideas of justice and charity only for the sake of his +salvation. No one will deny, however, that men, even Christians, exist, +who accept this idea with no practical end in view. + +[169] Malebranche, _Méditations chrétiennes_ (ix, 19). + +[170] See Babeau, _Le village sous l’ancien régime_, iv, iii; L. +Gregoire, _La Ligue en Bretagne_, chap, vi; Roupnel, _La Ville et +la Campagne au xvii siècle_, i, 1. ‘The peasants,’ says M. Roumier, +‘were only really converted where it was to their interests to be +so, and especially where the local landlords put their influence at +the service of the new religion, and where the Catholic clergy had +completely deserted the parishes. We must be careful not to consider as +Protestants all the “rustics” who took part in pillaging the abbeys and +castles during the civil war’ (_La Royaume de Catherine de Médicis_, +tome ii, page 294). M. Romier quotes the remark of a contemporary: ‘The +whole of the Low Countries scarcely knows what this new doctrine is.’ + +[171] ‘Le livre de raison de M. Nicolas Versoris’ (_Mémoires de la +Société de l’Histoire de Paris_, tome xii). The author, avocat au +Parlement de Paris, similarly gives two lines to events like the +Connétable de Bourbon’s treachery, and the signing of the treaty of +Madrid. The same attitude exists in the _Journal d’un Bourgeois de +Paris_, 1515-1536; the public misfortunes sketched by the author leave +him completely indifferent. He makes no comment on the disaster of +Pavia. Apropos the treaty of Madrid, ‘it is to be noted,’ writes a +contemporary, ‘that there were no bonfires or rejoicings when the news +of the peace was published, because no one understood anything about +it.’ (Lavisse, _Histoire de France_, v, 49.) Contemporaries mention the +indifference of the people of Paris to the Peace of Westphalia, the +battle of Rossbach, even the battles of Valmy and Navarino. ‘The affair +at Valmy made very little stir at first.’ (Kellerman.) + +[172] Michelet relates that in his youth he questioned an old man on +the impressions left upon him by 1793, and the only answer he got was: +‘It was the bad paper year.’ + +[173] Admire the profundity of Machiavelli, when he advises his Prince: +‘Above everything, avoid taking your subjects’ property; _for men will +more easily forget the deaths of their fathers than the loss of their +patrimony_.’ + +[174] Inserted in the collection of studies entitled ‘L’Allemagne et +les Alliés devant la conscience chrétienne’. (Bloud et Gay, 1915.) + +[175] M. Edmond Bloud quotes this remark of a German nationalist, +which might have been made on the French side of the Rhine: ‘The +Catholic world must be nationalized to re-Catholicize it.’ He adds +that in Germany it is common to hear ‘German Catholicism’ spoken of in +opposition to Roman Catholicism. + +[176] And therefore it requires much more courage to do so now than in +the past. + +[177] Nevertheless, Zola, Romain Rolland, and Einstein have drunk the +hemlock. + +[178] When they allow themselves to be told, as Louis XVI was told by +Turgot: ‘Sire, your kingdom _is of this world_.’ There also exists ‘_a +betrayal of the laymen_’. + +[179] Mgr Battifol’s writings support my argument so beautifully that I +hesitate to quote an author who plays so perfectly into my hands. For +example, he spends much time in proving that the spirit of Christianity +‘has resulted, without contradicting itself, in a doctrine of the +morality of war’. + +[180] Here is a passage which, except for its violence, seems to me +to express the feelings of most modern laymen on the subject of the +patriotic loyalty of the priests: ‘The clergy of France is ardently +patriotic; it serves gallantly under fire; it absolves and glorifies +every action of the soldier; it regards the accusation of having +deserted military duty as infamous, and does it justice. It is not +for me to say whether it is in accord with the Gospels. We are simply +Frenchmen and patriots; we can only approve and admire the French +patriotic monks and priests. The French priest has no pardon for a +German, the German priest and pastor have no pardon for a Frenchman. +Mother-country first! Kill! Kill! In the name of the God of the +Christians, we absolve you, we glorify you for killing Christians!’ +(Urbain Gohier, ‘La Vieille France,’ quoted by Grillot de Givry, _Le +Christ et la Patrie_, page 12.) + +[181] This clearly shows in what sense Renouvier is an ‘individualist’. + +[182] See his hymn to the mathematician Franz Woepfke. + +[183] Jules Lemaître was explicitly this adversary. + +[184] ‘For an empirical France,’ say Barrès and Bourget. + +[185] ‘Note sur M. Bergson et la philosophie bergsonienne,’ Cahiers de +la Quinzaine. See my book, _Sur le Succès du Bergsonisme_, page 158. + +[186] The same thing is to be found in Lamartine when he says of Byron: +‘There is more true, imperishable poetry in the tent at Missolonghi +where he lies prostrate with fever, under arms, than in all his works.’ +(_Commentaire de la 2e Meditation._) This is precisely the teaching +adopted by Barrès, Suarès, Péguy (the last preached it by his example, +however), which comes down to saying: ‘There is more poetry in a heroic +death than in all the activities of the mind.’ Note that this position +is by no means common to all the Romantics. Hugo, Vigny, Michelet, felt +all the poetry of action, but they never appear to think it superior to +the poetry of the lofty forms of intellectual life. Hugo never thought +of sacrificing Homer or Galilei to Napoleon, or even to Hoche--to take +a disinterested hero such as Lamartine praises in Byron. + +[187] Note that Ronsard is the very type of the man ‘bent over books’. + +[188] ‘Germany is the protector and the support of European +civilization’ (Lamprecht.) ‘After the war Germany will again take up +her historic task, which is to be the heart of Europe and to prepare +European humanity.’ (Wilhelm II, _Temps_, 14th September, 1915.) + +[189] See Robert Dreyfus, _Souvenirs sur Marcel Proust_, page 336. + + + + +_Transcriber’s Notes_ + + +This transcription is based on the English edition of Aldington’s +translation. Some corrections have been applied in consultation with +both the French original (‘La trahison des clercs’, B. Grasset, 1927) +and the American edition of the same translation (‘The treason of the +intellectuals’, William Morrow & Company, 1928). Here are the main +revisions. + + • A text comparison with the American edition incorporated these + changes from that edition: + • page 28, footnote 28: ‘more idealistic passion than national[+ist] + passion’; + • page 44: ‘One wonders whether [+there is] a single modern + thinker’ (grammatically necessary); + • the fourth section, ‘Summary--Predictions’, is now correctly + numbered ‘IV’, not a duplicated ‘III’; + • The following changes were made with reference to the original + French: + • numerous instances of unbalanced quotation marks have been fixed; + • page 117: removed an unclosed parenthesis beginning ‘(those of’ + in favor of parallel phrases with semi-colons, as in the original + French; + • page 173: added balanced em-dashes after ‘Apart from Erasmus’ as + in the original, to clarify sentence structure; + • page 176: ‘the chaos of the provincial assembles → assemblies’ + (original: ‘le chaos des assemblées provinciales’); + • page 181, note 179: ‘with contradicting → without contradicting’ + (‘a abouti sans se déjuger à une doctrine de la moralité de la + guerre’); + • A simple table of contents has been added. + • The book cover image accompanying some versions of this text is + original and placed in the public domain. +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78218 *** diff --git a/78218-h/78218-h.htm b/78218-h/78218-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a11fd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/78218-h/78218-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,6786 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> +<head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> + <meta name="format-detection" content="telephone=no,date=no,address=no,email=no,url=no"> + <title> + The Great Betrayal | Project Gutenberg + </title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + +h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; + clear: both; +} + +p { + text-indent: 1.5em; + margin-top: .5em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .5em; +} + + +hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: 33.5%; + margin-right: 33.5%; + clear: both; + border: 0; + background: #bbb; + height: 1px; +} + +hr.chap {width: 30%; margin-left: 35%; margin-right: 35%;} +hr.front {width: 10%; margin-left: 45%; margin-right: 45%;} + +hr.chap {width: 50%; margin-left: 25%; margin-right: 25%;} +@media print {hr.chap {display: none; visibility: hidden;} } + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} +h2.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid;} + +.pagenum { + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: small; + text-align: right; + font-style: normal; + font-weight: normal; + font-variant: normal; + text-indent: 0; +} + +blockquote { + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + margin-left: 5%; + margin-right: 5%; +} + +.center {text-align: center; text-indent: 0;} + +.right {text-align: right;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + +/* Footnotes */ + +.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + +.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + +a {text-decoration: none;} +a:hover {text-decoration: underline;} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; +} + +/* Poetry */ + +/* uncomment the next line for centered poetry */ +.poetry-container {display: flex; justify-content: center;} +.poetry-container {text-align: center;} +.poetry {text-align: left; margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 5%;} +.poetry .stanza {margin: 1em auto;} +.poetry .verse {text-indent: -3em; padding-left: 3em;} + +figcaption {font-weight: bold;} +figcaption p {margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: .2em; text-align: inherit;} + +.transnote {background-color: #EEE; font-size: 0.9em; padding: 1em 2em 1em 2em; margin: 2em 0 2em 0;} + +/* Poetry indents */ +.poetry .indent0 {text-indent: -3.0em;} +.poetry .indent4 {text-indent: -1.0em;} + + </style> +</head> +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78218 ***</div> + +<div class="chapter center"> + +<h1> +<i>The Great Betrayal</i> +</h1> +<i>(La Trahison des Clercs)</i><br> +<br> +<br> +<i>By</i><br> +<span style="font-size:x-large;">Julien Benda</span><br> +<br> +<br> +<i>Translated by</i><br> +<span style="font-size:larger;">Richard Aldington</span> +<br> +<br> +London<br> +George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.<br> +Broadway House, Carter Lane, E.C.<br> +1928. + +<hr class="front x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<p class="center" style="font-size:smaller;"> +PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY<br> +STEPHEN AUSTIN AND SONS, LTD., HERTFORD. +</p> +</div> + +<hr class="front x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter center"> +<h2><i>Contents</i></h2> + +<a href="#Translators_Note">Translator’s Note</a><br> +<a href="#Authors_Foreword">Author’s Foreword</a><br> +<a href="#I">I – The Modern Perfecting of Political Passions</a><br> +<a href="#II">II – Significance of this Movement—Nature of Political Passions</a><br> +<a href="#III">III – The ‘Clerks’—The Great Betrayal</a><br> +<a href="#IV">IV – Summary—Predictions</a><br> +<a href="#NOTES">Notes</a><br> +[<a href="#FOOTNOTES">Footnotes</a>]<br> +[<a href="#tn">Transcriber’s Notes</a>] +</div> + +<hr class="front x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_v">[v]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Translators_Note"> + <i>Translator’s Note</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>The title of M. Benda’s book is <i>La Trahison des +Clercs</i>. The word ‘Clercs’, which occurs throughout +the book, is defined by M. Benda’s as ‘all those +who speak to the world in a transcendental manner’. +I do not know the English word for ‘all those who +speak to the world in a transcendental manner’. But +in Chaucer’s time the word ‘clerk’ (‘a clerke of +Oxenforde’) meant anyone who was not a ‘layman’, +a word employed by M. Benda as the antithesis to +‘clerk’. We still use the word in this sense when we +speak of a ‘clerk in holy orders’ and retain its root in +‘cleric’. A ‘cleric’ is the person described by M. Benda +as ‘pre-eminently a clerk’. If the words ‘in holy +orders’ are subtracted from ‘a clerk in holy orders’, the +remaining ‘clerk’ is roughly what M. Benda means, +though he also uses ‘clerk’ to include ‘a clerk in holy +orders’. Nowadays a clerk is a person who performs +sedentary labour in an office, and the word in England +is pronounced ‘clark’. In America a clerk (pronounced +‘clurrk’) is what the English call a shop-assistant. +In order to avoid a misleading title I have called this +translation <i>The Great Betrayal</i>, giving M. Benda’s title +in brackets afterwards. Where the word ‘clerk’ first +occurs in the book, I have added the words ‘in the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_vi">[vi]</span>medieval sense’, and throughout the text I have invariably +written the word in inverted commas, ‘clerk’, to avoid +any possible misunderstanding.</p> + +<p>I should add that the words ‘real’ and ‘realism’ +are nearly always used in this book as the antithesis to +‘ideal’ and ‘idealism’. Other abstract words are +used in a rather special sense which I hope will be plain +from the context.</p> + +<p class="right"> + R. A. +</p> + +<hr class="front x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_vii">[vii]</span></p> + + +<div class="poetry-container center" style="font-size:larger; margin:4em 0 4em 0;"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">‘The world is suffering from lack of faith</div> + <div class="verse indent4">in a transcendental truth.’</div> + </div> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0 right"><i>Renouvier.</i></div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + + +<hr class="front x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="p_viii"></a><a id="p_ix"></a>[ix]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Authors_Foreword"> + <i>Author’s Foreword</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Tolstoi relates that when he was in the Army he +saw one of his brother officers strike a man who +fell out from the ranks during a march. Tolstoi said +to him:—</p> + +<p>‘Are you not ashamed to treat a fellow human being +in this way? Have you not read the Gospels?’</p> + +<p>The other officer replied:—</p> + +<p>‘And have you not read Army Orders?’</p> + +<p>This retort will always be thrown back at the spiritual +man who tries to take the direction of the material. +To me it seems a very wise one. Those who lead men +to the conquest of material things have no need of +justice and charity.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless I think it important that there should +be men—even if they are scorned—who urge their +fellow beings to other religions than the religion of the +material. Now, those who should play this part (to whom +I have given the name of ‘clerks’ in the medieval sense +of the word) have not only ceased to do so, but are playing +an exactly contrary part. Most of the influential +moralists of the past fifty years in Europe, particularly +the men of letters in France, call upon mankind to sneer +at the Gospel and to read Army Orders.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_x">[x]</span></p> + +<p>This new teaching seems to me all the more deserving +of serious attention because it is addressed to a humanity +which of its own volition is now established in materialism +with a decisiveness hitherto unknown. And I shall begin +by showing this to be true.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_1">[1]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="I"> + I + <br> + <i>The Modern Perfecting of Political Passions</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>We are to consider those passions termed political, +owing to which men rise up against other men, the chief +of which are racial passions, class passions and national +passions. Those persons who are most determined to +believe in the inevitable progress of the human species, +especially in its indispensable movement towards more +peace and love, cannot deny that during the past century +these passions have attained—and day by day increasingly +so—in several most important directions, a degree of +perfection hitherto unknown in history.</p> + +<p>In the first place they affect a large number of men +they never before affected. When, for example, we +study the civil wars which convulsed France in the +sixteenth century, and even those at the end of the +eighteenth century, we are struck by the small number +of persons whose minds were really disturbed by these +events. While history, up to the nineteenth century, +is filled with long European wars which left the great +majority of people completely indifferent, apart from the +material losses they themselves suffered,⁠<a id="FNanchor_1_1" href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> it may be said +that to-day there is scarcely a mind in Europe which is +not affected—or thinks itself affected—by a racial or +<span class="pagenum" id="p_2">[2]</span>class or national passion, and most often by all three. +The same progress seems to have taken place in the New +World, while immense bodies of men in the Far East, +who seemed to be free from these impulses, are awakening +to social hatred, the party system, and the national spirit +insofar as it implies the will to humiliate other men. +To-day political passions have attained a <i>universality</i> +never before known.</p> + +<p>They have also attained <i>coherence</i>. Thanks to the +progress of communication and, still more, to the group +spirit, it is clear that the holders of the same political +hatred now form a compact impassioned mass, every +individual of which feels himself in touch with the +infinite numbers of others, whereas a century ago such +people were comparatively out of touch with each other +and hated in a ‘scattered’ way. This is singularly +striking with respect to the working classes who, even +in the middle of the nineteenth century, felt only a +scattered hostility for the opposing class, attempted +only dispersed efforts at war (such as striking in one town, +or one union), whereas to-day they form a closely-woven +fabric of hatred from one end of Europe to the other. +It may be asserted that these coherences will tend to +develop still further, for the will to group is one of the +most profound characteristics of the modern world, +which even in the most unexpected domains (for instance, +the domain of thought) is more and more becoming +the world of leagues, of ‘unions’ and of ‘groups’. +Is it necessary to say that the passion of the individual +<span class="pagenum" id="p_3">[3]</span>is strengthened by feeling itself in proximity to these +thousands of similar passions? Let me add that the +individual bestows a mystic personality on the association +of which he feels himself a member, and gives it a religious +adoration, which is simply the deification of his own +passion, and no small stimulus to its intensity.</p> + +<p>The coherence just described might be called a surface +coherence, but there is added to it a coherence of essence. +For the very reason that the holders of the same political +passion form a more compact, impassioned group, +they also form a more <i>homogeneous</i>, impassioned group, +in which individual ways of feeling disappear and the +zeal of each member more and more takes on the colour +of the others. In France, for instance, one cannot but +be struck by the fact that the enemies of the democratic +system (I am speaking of the mass, not the highest +points) display a passion which has little variety, shows +very slight differences in different persons. How little +this mass of hatred is weakened by personal and original +manners of hating—one might almost say that this passion +itself is obedient to ‘democratic levelling down’! How +much more uniformity is shown now than a hundred +years ago by the emotions known as anti-Semitism, anti-Clericalism +and Socialism, in spite of the immense +number of varieties in the last-named! And do not those +who are subject to these emotions now all tend <i>to say +the same thing</i>? Political passions, as passions, seem +to have attained the habit of discipline; they seem to +obey a word of command even in the manner they are +<span class="pagenum" id="p_4">[4]</span>felt. It is easy to see what increase of strength they +acquire thereby.</p> + +<p>With some of these passions the increase in homogeneousness +is accompanied by an increased <i>precision</i>. +For instance, we all know that a hundred years ago +Socialism was a strong but vague passion with the great +mass of its supporters. But to-day Socialism has more +closely defined the object it wishes to attain, has determined +the exact point where it means to strike its +adversary and the movement it intends to create in +order to succeed. The same progress may be observed +in the anti-democratic movement. And we all know +that hatred becomes stronger by becoming more precise.</p> + +<p>There is another sort of perfecting of political passions. +Throughout history until our own days I see these +passions acting intermittently, blazing up and then +subsiding. I see that the undoubtedly terrible and +numerous explosions of class and race hatred were +followed by long periods of calm, or at least of somnolence. +Wars between nations lasted for years, but not hatred—even +if we may say that it existed. To-day we have only +to look every morning at any daily paper and we shall see +that political hatreds do not cease for a single day. At +best some of them are silent a moment for the benefit +of one among them which suddenly claims all the subject’s +strength. This is the period of ‘national unions’, +which do not in the very least herald in the reign of +love, but merely of a general hatred which for the moment +dominates partial hatreds. To-day political passions +<span class="pagenum" id="p_5">[5]</span>have acquired <i>continuity</i>, which is so rare a quality in +all feelings.</p> + +<p>Let us consider a moment the impulse which causes +partial hatreds to abdicate in favour of another, more +general hatred, which derives a new religion of itself +and hence a new strength, from the feeling of its +generality. Perhaps it has not been sufficiently observed +that this sort of impulse is one of the essential characteristics +of the nineteenth century. Twice during the +nineteenth century, in Germany and in Italy, the age-old +hatreds of petty States disappeared in favour of a great +national passion. In the same period (more precisely, +at the end of the eighteenth century) in France, the +mutual hatred of the Court nobles and the country +nobles was extinguished in the greater hatred of both +parties for all who were not nobles; the hatred between +the military and legal nobles disappeared in the same +impulse; the hatred between the upper and lower +ranks of the clergy vanished in their common hatred of +laicality; the hatred between clergy and nobility expired +to the profit of their mutual hatred for the commons. +And in our times the hatred between the three orders +has melted into one hatred, that of the possessing +classes for the working class. The condensation of +political passions into a small number of very simple +hatreds, springing from the deepest roots of the human +heart, is a conquest of modern times.⁠<a id="FNanchor_2_2" href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_6">[6]</span></p> + +<p>I also believe that I see a great progress in political +passions to-day in their relation to other passions in +the same person. Political passions undoubtedly occupied +more of the attention of a bourgeois of ancient France +than is usually supposed, but less than the love of money +and pleasure, family feeling and the calls of vanity; +while the least we can say of his modern equivalent +is that when political passions take possession of him, +they do so to the same extent as the other passions. +Compare, for instance, the tiny place occupied by political +passions in the French bourgeois as he appears in the +Fabliaux, in medieval drama, the novels of Scarron, +Furetière and Charles Sorel,⁠<a id="FNanchor_3_3" href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> with the same bourgeois +as drawn by Balzac, Stendhal, Anatole France, Abel +Hermant and Paul Bourget. (Of course, I am not speaking +of times of crisis, like the Ligue and the Fronde, when +political passions occupied the whole individual as soon +as they touched him at all.) The truth is that to-day +political passions are invading most of the other passions +in the bourgeoisie, and weakening the latter to their +own profit. Everyone knows that in our own days +family rivalries, commercial enmities, ambitions and the +competition for public honours are all tainted with +political passion. An apostle of the modern mind +clamours for ‘politics first’. He might have observed +that nowadays it is politics everywhere, politics always +and nothing but politics.⁠<a id="FNanchor_4_4" href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> We have only to open our +<span class="pagenum" id="p_7">[7]</span>eyes to see when an increase of power is acquired by +political passion when combined with other passions, +so numerous, so constant and so strong themselves. +Coming to the man of the people, we can measure the +increase of his political passions in relation to his other +passions in modern times by considering, as Stendhal +puts it, how long his whole passion was limited to +wishing (<i>a</i>) Not to be killed, (<i>b</i>) For a good warm coat. +And then we may recollect that when a little less misery +permitted him a few general ideas, how long it was before +his vague desire for social changes were transformed +into a passion, i.e. showing the two essential characteristics +of passion: The fixed idea, and the need to put +it into action.⁠<a id="FNanchor_5_5" href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> I think it may be said that political +passions in all classes to-day have attained a degree +of <i>preponderance over all other passions</i> in those affected +such as hitherto had been unknown.</p> + +<p>The reader will already have perceived an all-important +factor in the impulses I have been describing. +Political passions rendered universal, coherent, homogeneous, +permanent, preponderant—everyone can +recognize there to a great extent the work of the cheap +daily political newspaper. One cannot help reflecting +and wondering whether it may not be that inter-human +wars are only just beginning, when one thinks of this +<span class="pagenum" id="p_8">[8]</span>instrument for developing their own passions which +men have just invented, or at least brought to a degree +of power never seen before, to which they abandon +themselves with all the expansion of their hearts every +morning as soon as they are awake.</p> + +<p>I have now showed what might be called the perfecting +of political passions on the surface, in their more or less +exterior aspects. But they have also become strangely +perfected in depth and inner strength.</p> + +<p>In the first place they have made an immense advance +in consciousness of themselves. Here again, largely +owing to the influence of the newspaper, it is clear that +the mind affected by political hatred to-day becomes +conscious of its own passion, formulates it, sees it, with +an accuracy unknown to the same sort of mind fifty +years ago. There is no need to say how much the passion +is intensified by this. And while I am on this subject +I should like to point to two passions, which have +certainly not come to birth in our times but have attained +consciousness of themselves, self-assertion, a pride in +themselves.</p> + +<p>The first is what I shall call a certain <i>Jewish nationalism</i>. +In the past, when the Jews were accused in various +countries of forming an inferior race, or at any rate a +peculiar people not to be assimilated, they replied by +denying their peculiarity, by trying to get rid of all +appearance of peculiarity, and by refusing to admit the +reality of race. But in the last few years we see some of +them labouring to assert this peculiarity, to define its +<span class="pagenum" id="p_9">[9]</span>characteristics—or what they think such—taking a +pride in it, and condemning every effort at assimilation +with their opponents (see the works of Israel Zangwill, +of André Spire, and the <i>Revue Juive</i>). Here I am not +trying to discover whether the impulse of these Jews +is or is not nobler than the efforts of so many others +to have their origin pardoned them; I am simply pointing +out to those interested in the progress of peace in the +world that our age has added one more arrogance +to those which set men against each other, at least to the +extent that it is conscious and proud of itself.⁠<a id="FNanchor_6_6" href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> + +<p>The other impulse I am thinking of is ‘<i>bourgeoisism</i>’, +by which I mean the passion of the bourgeois class in +asserting itself against the class by which it is threatened. +It may be said that until our own times, ‘class hatred’, +as a conscious hatred proud of itself, was chiefly the +hatred of the labourer for the bourgeois. The reciprocal +hatred was much less clearly confessed. Ashamed of +an egotism they thought peculiar to their own caste, +the bourgeois temporized with this egotism, would +not admit even to themselves that it existed, tried to +convince themselves and others that it was a form of +interest in the common good.⁠<a id="FNanchor_7_7" href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> The bourgeois replied +to the dogma of the class war by denying that there +really are any classes, thereby showing that while they +<span class="pagenum" id="p_10">[10]</span>felt an inalterable opposition to the adverse party, they +were unwilling to admit that they felt it. To-day we +have only to think of Italian ‘Fascism’, of a certain +‘Eloge du Bourgeois Français’, and numerous other +manifestations of the same kind,⁠<a id="FNanchor_8_8" href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> and we shall see that +the bourgeoisie are becoming fully conscious of their +specific egotisms, are proclaiming and venerating them +as such and as though these egotisms were bound +up with the supreme interests of the human race, that +they are proud of this veneration and of setting up +these egotisms against those which are trying to destroy +the bourgeoisie. In our time there has been created +the ‘mysticism’ of bourgeois passion in its opposition +to the passions of the other class.⁠<a id="FNanchor_9_9" href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Here again our age +enters in the balance-sheet of humanity the arrival of +yet one more passion at full possession of itself.</p> + +<p>The progress of political passions in depth during +the past century seems to me most remarkable in the +case of national passions.</p> + +<p>First of all, owing to the fact that they are experienced +to-day by large masses of men, these passions have become +<i>far more purely passionate</i>. When the national feeling +was practically confined to Kings or their Ministers, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_11">[11]</span>it consisted chiefly in attachment to some <i>interest</i> (desire +for territorial expansion, search for commercial advantages +and profitable alliances), whereas to-day when this +national feeling is continually experienced by common +minds, it consists chiefly in the exercise of <i>pride</i>. Everyone +will agree that nationalist passion in the modern +citizen is far less founded on a comprehensive knowledge +of the national interests (he has an imperfect perception +of these interests, he lacks the information necessary +and does not try to acquire it, for he is indifferent to +questions of foreign policy) than on the pride he feels +in his nation, on his will to feel himself one with the +nation, to react to the honours and insults he thinks +are bestowed on it. No doubt he wants his nation to +acquire territories, to be prosperous and to have powerful +allies; but he wants all this far less on account of the +material results which will accrue to the nation (how +much is he conscious of these results?) than on account +of the glory, the prestige which the nation will acquire. +By becoming popular, national feeling has become +national pride, national susceptibility.⁠<a id="FNanchor_10_10" href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> To measure +<span class="pagenum" id="p_12">[12]</span>how much more purely passionate it has become, how +much more perfectly irrational (and therefore stronger) +one has only to think of Jingoism, the form of patriotism +specially invented by democracies. If, in accordance +with current opinion, you think that pride is a weaker +passion than self-interest, you may be convinced to +the contrary by observing how commonly men let +themselves be killed on account of a wound to their +pride, and how infrequently for some infraction of their +interests.</p> + +<p>The susceptibility developed by national sentiment +as it has become popular makes the possibility of wars +far greater to-day than in the past. Obviously, with the +peoples and with the aptitude of these new ‘sovereigns’ +to rise up in a rage as soon as they think they are insulted, +peace runs an additional danger which did not exist +when it depended only upon Kings and their Ministers, +who were far more purely practical persons, fully self-controlled, +and quite willing to put up with insults +when they did not think themselves the stronger party.⁠<a id="FNanchor_11_11" href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> +And, in fact, how many times during the last hundred +years has the world almost flamed up in war solely +because some nation thought its honour had been +<span class="pagenum" id="p_13">[13]</span>wounded?⁠<a id="FNanchor_12_12" href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> To this must be added the fact that this +national susceptibility provides the leaders of nations +with a new and most effective method of starting the +wars they need, whether it is employed at home or +abroad. They have not failed to see this, which is +amply proved by the example of Bismarck and the means +by which he provoked war with Austria and with France. +From this point of view it seems to me quite correct +to say with the French monarchists that ‘democracy +is war’, provided that by democracy is meant the +attainment of national susceptibility by the masses, +and provided that it is recognized that no change in the +system of government would destroy this phenomenon.⁠<a id="FNanchor_13_13" href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> + +<p>Another considerable deepening of national passions +comes from the fact that the nations are now conscious +of themselves not only as regards their material existence, +their military power, their territorial possessions, and +<span class="pagenum" id="p_14">[14]</span>their economic wealth, but as regards their <i>moral</i> +existence. With a hitherto unknown consciousness +(prodigiously fanned by authors) every nation now +hugs itself and sets itself up against all other nations +as superior in language, art, literature, philosophy, +civilization, ‘culture’. Patriotism to-day is the assertion +of one form of mind against other forms of mind.⁠<a id="FNanchor_14_14" href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> +We know how much this passion increases its inner +strength in this way and that the wars it determines are +fiercer than those waged by the Kings, who merely +desired the same piece of territory. The prophecy +of the old Saxon bard is completely fulfilled: ‘In those +days countries will be something they have not yet +become—they will be persons. They will feel hatred, +and these hatreds will cause wars more terrible than any +that have yet been seen.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_15_15" href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> + +<p>It is impossible to over-stress the novelty of this +form of patriotism in history. It is obviously bound up +with the adoption of this passion by the masses of the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_15">[15]</span>populace, and seems to have been inaugurated in 1813 +by Germany, who is apparently the real teacher of +humanity in the matter of democratic patriotism, if +by this word is meant the determination of a nation +to oppose others in the name of its most fundamental +characteristics.⁠<a id="FNanchor_16_16" href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> (The France of the Revolution and the +Empire never dreamed of setting itself up against other +nations in the name of its language or of its literature.) +This form of patriotism was so little known to preceding +ages that there are countless examples of nations adopting +the cultures of other nations, even of those with whom +they were at war, and in addition reverencing the culture +adopted. Shall I refer to the profound respect of Rome +for the genius of Greece, though Rome had felt it necessary +to crush Greece politically? To the respect of the +conquerors of Rome, such as Ataulf and Theodoric, +for Roman genius? And, nearer to ourselves, shall +I mention Louis XIV annexing Alsace and not for one +moment thinking of forbidding the German language?⁠<a id="FNanchor_17_17" href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> +In the past, nations displayed their sympathy for the +culture of other nations with whom they were at war, +or invited them to adopt their own. The Duke of Alba +took measures to protect the learned men in the towns of +Holland, against which he was directing his army; +in the eighteenth century, the small German States, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_16">[16]</span>allied with Frederick the Great against the French, +adopted more freely than ever French ideas, French +fashions, French⁠<a id="FNanchor_18_18" href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> literature; in the midst of the struggle +with England, the Convention sent a deputation there +to urge the English to adopt the French metric system.⁠<a id="FNanchor_19_19" href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> +The notion that political warfare involves a war of +cultures is entirely an invention of modern times, and +confers upon them a conspicuous place in the moral +history of humanity.</p> + +<p>Another strengthening of national passions comes +from the determination of the peoples to be conscious +of <i>their past</i>, more precisely to be conscious of their +ambitions as going back to their ancestors, and to vibrate +with ‘centuries-old’ aspirations, with attachments to +‘historical’ rights. This Romantic patriotism is also +a characteristic of patriotism as practised by popular +minds (by ‘popular’ I here mean all minds governed +by the imagination, that is, in the first place, society +people and men of letters). I have an idea that when +Hugues de Lionne desired for the nation the conquest +of Flanders or when Sieyès wanted the Low Countries, +they did not think they felt the soul of ancient Gauls +reviving in them, any more than Bismarck thought +(I am not talking of what he said) of reviving the Teutonic +Knights when he coveted the Danish Duchies.⁠<a id="FNanchor_20_20" href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_17">[17]</span></p> + +<p>Those who wish to estimate the increase of violence +given to national passion by this solemnizing of its +desires have only to observe what has happened to this +feeling among the Germans, with their claim to be carrying +on the spirit of the Holy Roman Empire, and among +the Italians since they have set up their aspirations as the +revival of those of the Roman Empire.⁠<a id="FNanchor_21_21" href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> There once +again the leaders of the State find in popular sentimentality +a new and excellent instrument for carrying out their +practical designs, an instrument they well know how to +use. To mention only one recent example—think of +the result the Italian government was able to obtain +from the amazing aptitude of its compatriots to wake +up one fine morning and discover that the claim to Fiume +was a ‘centuries-old’ claim.</p> + +<p>Speaking generally, it may be said that national passions, +owing to the fact that they are now exerted by plebeian +minds, assume the character of <i>mysticism</i>, of a religious +adoration almost unknown in these passions in the +practical minds of the great nobles. It is unnecessary +to add that this makes these passions deeper and stronger. +Here once more this plebeian form of patriotism is +adopted by all who practise this passion, even when they +are the noisiest champions of the aristocracy of the mind. +M. Maurras talks of the ‘goddess France’, just as +Victor Hugo does. Let me add that this mystical +<span class="pagenum" id="p_18">[18]</span>adoration of the nation is not only to be explained by the +nature of those who adore, but also by the changes which +have taken place in the adored object. There is first +of all the spectacle of the military force and organization +of modern States, which is something far more imposing +than of old. And when these States are seen to make +war for an indefinite period after they have no more +men, and go on subsisting for long years after they +have no more money, it is easy to understand why a man +who has some tincture of religion in his mind may be +led to believe that these States are of an essence different +from that of ordinary natural beings.</p> + +<p>I shall point out another great increase of power in +national sentiment which has occurred in the last half-century. +I mean that several very powerful political +passions, which were originally independent of nationalist +feeling, have now become incorporated with it. These +passions are: (<i>a</i>) The movement against the Jews; +(<i>b</i>) the movement of the possessing classes against the +proletariat; (<i>c</i>) the movement of the champions of +authority against the democrats. To-day each one of +these passions is identified with national feeling and +declares that its adversary implies the negation of +nationalism. I may add that when a person is affected +by one of these passions he is generally affected by all +three; consequently nationalist passion is usually +swelled by the addition of all three. Moreover this +increase is reciprocal, and it may be said that to-day +capitalism, anti-semitism and the party of authority +<span class="pagenum" id="p_19">[19]</span>have all received new strength from their union with +nationalism. (For additional proof of the strength of +these unions, see <a href="#Note_C">Note C</a> at the end of this book.)</p> + +<p>I cannot drop the subject of the modern perfecting +of political passions without mentioning one more +characteristic: In all nations the number of persons +who feel a direct interest in belonging to a powerful +nation is incomparably greater now than in the past. +In all the great States to-day I observe that not only +the world of industry and big business but a considerable +number of small tradesmen, small bourgeois, doctors, +lawyers, and even writers and artists, and working men +too, feel that for the sake of the prosperity of their own +occupations it is essential for them to belong to a powerful +group which can make itself feared. Those who are in +a position to give an opinion on this sort of change agree +that the feeling did not exist, at least in the same clearly +defined way as to-day, thirty years ago among the small +tradesmen of France, for instance. It seems an even +newer thing among the men who belong to the so-called +liberal professions; it is certainly something new to +hear artists constantly girding at the government of their +country because it ‘does not give the nation enough +prestige to impose their art on foreigners’. The feeling +that from a professional point of view they have an +interest in belonging to a powerful nation is also very +recent among the working classes. The party of +‘Nationalist Socialists’, which seems to exist everywhere +except in France, is a quite modern political +<span class="pagenum" id="p_20">[20]</span>development. Among the masters of industry the new +development is, not that they feel how much it is to +their interest that their nation should be powerful, but +that the feeling is to-day transformed into action, into +formal pressure on their governments.⁠<a id="FNanchor_22_22" href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> This extension +of patriotism based on interest certainly does not prevent +this sort of patriotism (as I said above) from being much +less wide-spread than the patriotism⁠<a id="FNanchor_23_23" href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> based on pride; +nevertheless it brings another increase of strength to +nationalist passions.</p> + +<p>I shall now point out a last important perfecting of +all political passions to-day, whether of race, class, party +or nation. When I observe these passions in the past, +I see them consisting in purely passionate impulses, +natural explosions of instinct, devoid of all extension +of themselves in ideas and systems—at least among +the majority. The revolt of the workers in the fifteenth +century against the possessing classes was apparently +not accompanied by any sort of teaching about the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_21">[21]</span>origin of property or the nature of capital. Those who +massacred the Ghettos seem to have had no views on the +philosophical values of their action. And when the +troops of Charles V attacked the defenders of Mezières, +it does not appear that the assault was enlivened by a +theory about the predestination of the Germanic race +and the moral baseness of the Latin world. To-day I +notice that every political passion is furnished with a +whole network of strongly woven doctrines, the sole +object of which is to show the supreme value of its +action from every point of view, while the result is a +redoubling of its strength as a passion. We must look +at the system of ideology of German nationalism known +as ‘Pangermanism’ and at the similar ideology of the +French Monarchists, if we wish to realize the point of +perfection to which our age has carried these systems, +with what tenacity each passion has built up in every +direction the theories apt to satisfy it, with what precision +these theories have been adapted to this satisfaction, +with what opulence of research, what labour, what +profound investigation they have been carried on in all +directions. Our age is indeed the age of the <i>intellectual +organization of political hatreds</i>. It will be one of its +chief claims to notice in the moral history of humanity.</p> + +<p>Ever since these systems have been in existence, +they have consisted in establishing for each passion +that it is the agent of good in the world and that its +enemy is the genius of evil. But to-day these passions +desire to establish this not only politically, but morally, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_22">[22]</span>intellectually and aesthetically. Anti-semitism, Pangermanism, +French Monarchism, Socialism are not only +political manifestations; they defend a particular form +of morality, of intelligence, of sensibility, of literature, +of philosophy and of artistic conceptions. Our age has +introduced two novelties into the theorizing of political +passions, by which they have been remarkably intensified. +The first is that everyone to-day claims that his movement +is in line with ‘the development of evolution’ +and ‘the profound unrolling of history’. All these +passions of to-day, whether they derive from Marx, +from M. Maurras or from Houston Chamberlain, have +discovered a ‘historical law’, according to which their +movement is merely carrying out the spirit of history +and must therefore necessarily triumph, while the +opposing party is running counter to this spirit and can +enjoy only a transitory triumph. That is merely the +old desire to have Fate on one’s side, but it is put forth +in a scientific shape. And this brings us to the second +novelty: To-day all political ideologies claim to be +founded on science, to be the result of a ‘precise observation +of facts’. We all know what self-assurance, what +rigidity, what inhumanity (comparatively new traits +in the history of political passions, of which modern +French monarchism is a good example) are given to +these passions to-day by this claim.</p> + +<p>To summarize: To-day political passions show a +degree of universality, of coherence, of homogeneousness, +of precision, of continuity, of preponderance, in +<span class="pagenum" id="p_23">[23]</span>relation to other passions, unknown until our times. +They have become conscious of themselves to an extent +never seen before. Some of them, hitherto scarcely +avowed, have awakened to consciousness and have +joined the old passions. Others have become more +purely passionate than ever, possess men’s hearts in +moral regions they never before reached, and have +acquired a mystic character which had disappeared for +centuries. All are furnished with an apparatus of +ideology whereby, in the name of science, they proclaim +the supreme value of their action and its historical +necessity. On the surface and in the depths, in spatial +values and in inner strength, political passions have +to-day reached a point of perfection never before known +in history. The present age is essentially the age of +politics.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="II"> + II + <br> + <i>Significance of this Movement—Nature of Political Passions</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>What is the significance of this movement? Of what +simple and profound human tendency does it show the +progress and triumph? The question comes down to +inquiring what is the nature of political passions, of +what more general and more essential state of mind are +they the expression, what—as the schools say—is their +psychological foundation?</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_24">[24]</span></p> + +<p>It seems to me that these passions can be reduced to +two fundamental desires: (<i>a</i>) The will of a group of +men to get hold of (or to retain a hold on) some <i>material</i> +advantage, such as territories, comfort, political power +and all its material advantages; and (<i>b</i>) the will of a +group of men to become conscious of themselves as +<i>individuals</i>, insofar as they are <i>distinct</i> in relation to +other men. It may also be said that these passions can +be reduced to two desires, one of which seeks the satisfaction +of an <i>interest</i>, the other of a <i>pride</i> or self-esteem. +These two desires enter into political passions in very +different proportions, according to which passion is +involved. It appears that racial passion, insofar as it +is not one with national passion, is chiefly based on the +will of a group of men to set themselves up as distinct +from others; the same thing may be said of religious +passion, if we consider it in its pure state. On the +other hand, class passion, at least as we see it in the +working classes, apparently consists solely in the will +to obtain possession of material advantages. The desire +to feel himself distinct, which George Sand and the +apostles of 1848 had begun to inculcate in the working +man, now seems to be abandoned by him, at least in his +utterances. National passion contains both factors. +The patriot wants to obtain material advantages and he +wants to set himself up as distinct from others. This +is the secret of the evident superiority in strength of +this passion (when it is really a passion) over all other +passions, especially over Socialism. A passion whose +<span class="pagenum" id="p_25">[25]</span>sole motive is interest is too weak to contend with another +which combines interest and pride. This too is one of +the weaknesses of Socialism when opposed to class +passion as exerted by the bourgeoisie, for the bourgeois +wants both to possess material advantages and to feel +himself distinct from others. I shall add to this that +in my opinion the relative strengths of these two passions +(one based on interest and the other on pride or self-esteem) +are very unequal, and that the more powerful +of the two is not that which tries to satisfy interest.</p> + +<p>Now, when I come to ask what is signified in their +turn by these fundamental desires of political passions, +I find they appear to me as the two essential composites +of man’s will to situate himself <i>in real life</i>. To want +real life is to want (<i>a</i>) To possess some material advantages, +and (<i>b</i>) to be conscious of oneself as an individual. +Every life which despises these two desires, every life +which pursues only spiritual advantage or sincerely +asserts itself in the universal, situates itself <i>outside the +real</i>. Political passions, especially national passions +insofar as they unite the two desires mentioned, seem to +me essentially <i>realist</i> passions.</p> + +<p>Here many persons will protest: ‘Yes,’ they will +say, ‘the desires which make up political passions are +realist desires, but the individual shifts these desires +from himself to the group of which he is a part. The +working man wants to obtain possession of material +advantages for his class, not for his own limited person. +The patriot wants to possess territories for his nation, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_26">[26]</span>not for his own narrow ego; he wants to be distinct +from other men through his nation. Do you apply the term +“realist” to passions which imply such a transfer from +the individual to the collective body?’ Is it necessary +to reply that when the individual transfers these desires +to the body of which he is a part, he does not thereby +alter their nature? And that all he does is simply to +increase their dimensions immeasureably? To wish +to possess material advantages <i>in one’s nation</i>, to want to +feel distinct from other men <i>in one’s nation</i>, is still the +desire to possess material advantages, still the desire +to feel distinct from other men. It only means that, +if you are a Frenchman, you want to possess Brittany, +Provence, Guyenne, Algeria, Indo-China; and you want +to feel yourself distinct from other men in Jeanne d’Arc, +Louis XIV, Napoleon, Racine, Voltaire, Victor Hugo, +Pasteur. Add to this that at the same time you attach +these desires, not to a transitory and precarious single +existence, but to an ‘eternal’ existence, and feel them +in that way. Not only does national egotism not cease +to be egotism because it is national, but it becomes +‘sacred’ egotism.⁠<a id="FNanchor_24_24" href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> Let me complete my definition by +saying that political passions are realism of a particular +quality, which is an important element of strength +in them: They are <i>divinized</i> realism.⁠<a id="FNanchor_25_25" href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_27">[27]</span></p> + +<p>If, therefore, we desire to express this perfecting of +political passions which I have described, in terms of a +more profound and essential order of things, we may +say that men to-day are displaying, with a hitherto +unknown knowledge and consciousness, the desire to +situate themselves in the <i>real</i> or practical manner of +existence, in opposition to the <i>disinterested</i> or <i>metaphysical</i> +manner. Moreover, it is remarkable to see how political +passions to-day more and more expressly assert their +derivation from this realism and from it alone. On the +one hand we have a Socialism which constantly declares +that it has no interest in universal man, no interest in +procuring justice for him or any other ‘metaphysical +phantom’, but solely desires to obtain possession of +material advantages for the benefit of its class. On +the other hand we have the nationalist mind which +everywhere takes a pride in being purely realistic. The +French people who fought in the past to carry to other +nations a doctrine they believed would bring happiness +(I say the people, for its rulers never shared in that +simple-minded belief) would now blush to have it even +suspected that they would fight ‘for principles’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_26_26" href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> Is +it not suggestive to observe that the only wars of the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_28">[28]</span>past which, to some extent, brought into play passions +that were a little disinterested—the wars of religion—are +the only wars from which humanity has freed itself?⁠<a id="FNanchor_27_27" href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> +And that immense idealistic upheavals like the crusades +(idealistic at least with humble people) should now be +something which makes the modern man smile, like +the spectacle of children at play? Is it not also significant +that the national passions (which I have shown are +the most perfectly realist of all political passions) should +be those which I have been able to point out have most +absorbed all other passions?⁠<a id="FNanchor_28_28" href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Let me add to this, that +these passions, insofar as they are the will of a group +of men to set themselves up as distinct from others, +have attained a hitherto unknown degree of consciousness.⁠<a id="FNanchor_29_29" href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> +Finally, the supreme attribute we have discovered +<span class="pagenum" id="p_29">[29]</span>in political passions, i.e. the divinization of their realism, +is now openly admitted, with a plainness never seen +before. The State, Country, Class, are now frankly +God; we may even say that for many people (and some +are proud of it) they alone are God.⁠<a id="FNanchor_30_30" href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> Humanity, by +its present practice of political passions, thereby declares +that it has become more realist, more exclusively and +more religiously realist than it has ever been.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="III"> + III + <br> + <i>The ‘Clerks’—The Great Betrayal</i> </h2> + + <p class="center"><i>‘I created him to be spiritual in his flesh; and now he has become + carnal even in the spirit.’</i>—(Bossuet, <i>Élévations</i>, VII, 3.)</p> +</div> + + +<p>In all that I have said hitherto I have been considering +only masses, whether bourgeois or proletarian, kings, +ministers, political leaders, all that portion of the human +species which I shall call ‘the laymen’, whose whole +function consists essentially in the pursuit of material +interests, and who, by becoming more and more solely +and systematically realist, have in fact only done what +might be expected of them.</p> + +<p>Side by side with this humanity whom the poet has +described in a phrase—‘O curvae in terram animae et +celestium inanes’—there existed until the last half +<span class="pagenum" id="p_30">[30]</span>century another, essentially distinct humanity, which to +a certain extent acted as a check upon the former. I mean +that class of men whom I shall designate ‘<i>the clerks</i>’, +by which term I mean all those whose activity essentially +is <i>not</i> the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek +their joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical +speculation, in short in the possession of non-material +advantages, and hence in a certain manner say: +‘My kingdom is not of this world.’ Indeed, throughout +history, for more than two thousand years until modern +times, I see an uninterrupted series of philosophers, +men of religion, men of literature, artists, men of learning +(one might say almost all during this period), whose +influence, whose life, were in direct opposition to the +realism of the multitudes. To come down specifically +to the political passions—the ‘clerks’ were in opposition +to them in two ways. They were either entirely +indifferent to these passions, and, like Leonardo da +Vinci, Malebranche, Goethe, set an example of attachment +to the purely disinterested activity of the mind +and created a belief in the supreme value of this form +of existence; or, gazing as moralists upon the conflict +of human egotisms, like Erasmus, Kant, Renan, they +preached, in the name of humanity or justice, the +adoption of an abstract principle superior to and directly +opposed to these passions. Although these ‘clerks’ +founded the modern State to the extent that it dominates +individual egotisms, their activity undoubtedly was +chiefly theoretical, and they were unable to prevent the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_31">[31]</span>laymen from filling all history with the noise of their +hatreds and their slaughters; <i>but the ‘clerks’ did prevent +the laymen from setting up their actions as a religion, they +did prevent them from thinking themselves great men as +they carried out these activities</i>. It may be said that, +thanks to the ‘clerks’, humanity did evil for two thousand +years, but honoured good. This contradiction was an +honour to the human species, and formed the rift +whereby civilization slipped into the world.</p> + +<p>Now, at the end of the nineteenth century a fundamental +change occurred: <i>the ‘clerks’ began to play the +game of political passions</i>. The men who had acted +as a check on the realism of the people began to act +as its stimulators. This upheaval in the moral behaviour +of humanity operated in several ways.</p> + + +<h3 id="First_The_clerks_have_adopted_political_passions"> + <i>First: The ‘clerks’ have adopted political passions</i> +</h3> + +<p>First of all the ‘clerks’ have adopted political passions. +No one will deny that throughout Europe to-day the +immense majority of men of letters and artists, a considerable +number of scholars, philosophers, and +‘ministers’ of the divine, share in the chorus of hatreds +among races and political factions. Still less will it be +denied that they adopt national passions. Doubtless, +the names of Dante, Petrarch, d’Aubigné, certain +apologists of Caboche or preachers of the Ligue will +suffice to show that certain ‘clerks’ did not wait for +our era to indulge in these passions with all the strength +of their souls. But, upon the whole, these ‘clerks’ +<span class="pagenum" id="p_32">[32]</span>of the forum were exceptions, at least among the +great ones. If, in addition to the great masters named +above, I evoke the phalanx of Thomas Aquinas, Roger +Bacon, Galilei, Rabelais, Montaigne, Descartes, Racine, +Pascal, Leibniz, Kepler, Huyghens, Newton, and even +Voltaire, Buffon and Montesquieu (to mention only +a few) I think I may repeat that until our own days the +men of thought or the honest men remained strangers +to political passions, and said with Goethe: ‘Let us +leave politics to the diplomats and the soldiers.’ Or if, +like Voltaire, they took these passions into account, +they adopted a critical attitude towards them, did not +espouse them as passions. Or if, like Rousseau, Maistre, +Chateaubriand, Lamartine, even Michelet, they did +take these passions to heart, they did so with a generalizing +of feeling, a disdain for immediate results, which in fact +make the word ‘passions’ incorrect. To-day, if we +mention Mommsen, Treitschke, Ostwald, Brunetière, +Barrès, Lemaître, Péguy, Maurras, d’Annunzio, +Kipling, we have to admit that the ‘clerks’ now +exercise political passions with all the characteristics of +passion—the tendency to action, the thirst for immediate +results, the exclusive preoccupation with the desired +end, the scorn for argument, the excess, the hatred, the +fixed ideas. The modern ‘clerk’ has entirely ceased +to let the layman alone descend to the market place. +The modern clerk is determined to have the soul of a +citizen and to make vigorous use of it; he is proud of +that soul; his literature is filled with his contempt for +<span class="pagenum" id="p_33">[33]</span>the man who shuts himself up with art or science and +takes no interest in the passions of the State.⁠<a id="FNanchor_31_31" href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> He is +violently on the side of Michaelangelo crying shame +upon Leonardo da Vinci for his indifference to the +misfortunes of Florence, and against the master of the +Last Supper when he replied that indeed the study of +beauty occupied his whole heart. The time has long past +by since Plato demanded that the philosopher should +be bound in chains in order to compel him to take +an interest in the State. To have as his function the +pursuit of eternal things and yet to believe that he +becomes greater by concerning himself with the State—that +is the view of the modern ‘clerk’. It is as natural +as it is evident that this adhesion of the ‘clerks’ to the +passions of the laymen fortifies these passions in the +hearts of the latter. In the first place, it abolishes the +suggestive spectacle (which I mentioned above) of a +race of men whose interests are set outside the practical +world. And then especially, the ‘clerk’ by adopting +political passions, brings them the tremendous influence +of his sensibility if he is an artist, of his persuasive power +if he is a thinker, and in either case his moral prestige.⁠<a id="FNanchor_32_32" href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> + +<p>Before proceeding any further, I feel I ought to make +myself clear on certain points:—</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) I have been talking of the <i>whole</i> of the men of +thought anterior to our own age. When I say that +the ‘clerks’ in the past opposed the realism of the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_34">[34]</span>laymen and that the ‘clerks’ of to-day are in its service, +I am considering each of these groups as a whole; I am +contrasting one general characteristic with another. +This means that I shall not feel myself contradicted by +a reader who takes pains to point out to me that so-and-so +in the former group was a realist, and that so-and-so +in the second is not, so long as this reader is obliged to +admit that as a whole each of these groups does manifest +the characteristic I have indicated. And also, when I +speak of a single ‘clerk’, I am thinking of his work +in its chief characteristic, i.e. in that part of his teaching +which dominates all the rest, even if the remainder +sometimes contradicts this dominant teaching. This +means that I do not consider that I ought to refrain from +looking upon Malebranche as a master of liberal thought +because a few lines of his ‘Morale’ seem to be a justification +of slavery, or upon Nietzsche as a moralist of war +because the end of ‘Zarathustra’ is a manifesto of +fraternity which outdoes the Gospels. And I see the +less reason for doing so, since Malebranche as a defender +of slavery and Nietzsche as a humanitarian have had no +influence at all, and my subject is the influence which +the ‘clerks’ have had in the world, and not what +they were in themselves.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) Some will object to me: ‘How can you treat +men like Barrès and Péguy as “clerks” and blame them +for lacking the true spirit of “clerks” when they are +so openly men of action, with whom political thought +is obviously occupied solely with the needs of the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_35">[35]</span>present hour, solely spurred on by the events of the +day, while the former scarcely ever gave expression to +his political thought except in newspaper articles?’ +I reply, that this thought, which in truth is practically +nothing but a form of immediate action, is given out +by its authors as the fruits of the highest speculative +intellectual activity, the result of the most truly philosophical +meditation. Barrès and Péguy would never +have consented to be looked upon as mere polemical +writers, even in their polemical works.⁠<a id="FNanchor_33_33" href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> These men, +who indeed are not ‘clerks’, gave themselves out to +be ‘clerks’ and were considered as such, (Barrès +gave himself out to be a thinker who condescended to +the arena), and it is precisely as such that they enjoy a +particular prestige among men of action. In this study +my subject is not the ‘clerk’ such as he is, but the +‘clerk’ such as he is considered to be and as he acts +upon the world in that capacity.</p> + +<p>I shall make the same answer with regard to +M. Maurras and the other instructors of the <i>Action +Française</i>, of whom it will be said even more truly +that they are men of action and that it is indefensible to +cite them as ‘clerks’. These men claim to carry out +their action by virtue of a doctrine derived from a wholly +objective study of history, from the exercise of the most +<span class="pagenum" id="p_36">[36]</span>purely scientific spirit. And they owe the special attention +with which they are listened to by men of action +entirely to this claim that they are <i>men of learning</i>, men +who are fighting for a truth discovered in the austerity +of the laboratory. They owe it to their pose as combative +‘clerks’, but essentially <i>as ‘clerks’</i>.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) Finally I should like to define my views on another +point and to say that when the ‘clerk’ descends to the +market place I only consider that he is failing to perform +his functions when he does so, like those I have +mentioned, for the purpose of securing the triumph of +a realist passion, whether of class, race or nation. When +Gerson entered the pulpit of Notre Dame to denounce +the murderers of Louis d’Orléans; when Spinoza, at +the peril of his life, went and wrote the words ‘Ultimi +barbarorum’ on the gate of those who had murdered the +de Witts; when Voltaire fought for the Calas family; +when Zola and Duclaux came forward to take part in a +celebrated lawsuit (Dreyfus affair); all these ‘clerks’ +were carrying out their functions as ‘clerks’ in the fullest +and noblest manner. They were the officiants of abstract +justice and were sullied with no passion for a worldly +object.⁠<a id="FNanchor_34_34" href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> Moreover, there exists a certain criterion by +which we may know whether the ‘clerk’ who takes +public action does so in conformity with his true functions; +<span class="pagenum" id="p_37">[37]</span>and that is, that he is immediately reviled by the laymen, +whose interests he thwarts (Socrates, Jesus). We may +say beforehand that the ‘clerk’ who is praised by the +laymen is a traitor to his office.</p> + +<p>But let us return to the modern ‘clerk’s’ adhesion +to political passions.</p> + +<p>It is concerning national passions that this adhesion +seems to me particularly novel and big with results. +Once again, of course humanity did not have to wait +for the present age to see the ‘clerks’ indulge in this +passion. Without mentioning the poets, whose tender +hearts have always sighed ‘Nescio qua natale dulcedine +solum cunctos Ducit’; and, as regards the philosophers, +without going back to antiquity when all, previous to +the Stoics, were ardent patriots; we may yet observe +in history (since the coming of Christianity and long +before our own days) writers, men of learning, artists, +moralists, even ministers of the ‘Universal’ Church, +who more or less explicitly displayed a special attachment +for the group to which they belonged. But this +affection among these men was based on reason; it +showed itself capable of judging its object, of denouncing +its errors when they believed such errors had been committed. +Need I recall how Fénelon and Massillon +denounced certain wars of Louis XIV? How Voltaire +condemned the destruction of the Palatinate? How +Renan denounced the violences of Napoleon? Buckle, +the intolerance of England towards the French Revolution? +And, in our own times, Nietzsche, the brutalities +<span class="pagenum" id="p_38">[38]</span>of Germany towards France?⁠<a id="FNanchor_35_35" href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> It was reserved for +our own time to see men of thought, or men giving themselves +out as such, professing openly that they would +not submit their patriotism to any check on the part +of their judgment, proclaiming (like Barrès) that ‘even +if the country is wrong, we must think it in the right’, +denouncing as ‘traitors to the nation’ those of their +compatriots who retain their liberty of mind, or at least +of speech, in regard to their country. In France we have +not forgotten how, during the last war, so many ‘thinkers’ +attacked Renan for the liberty of his judgments on the +history of his country.⁠<a id="FNanchor_36_36" href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> Nor have we forgotten how, a +little before that, a whole set of young men (who claimed +to share in the life of the spirit) bristled up against one +of their masters (Jacob) who tried to teach them a +patriotism which did not exclude all right of criticism. +After the violation of Belgium and other excesses of the +Germans, in October, 1914, a German teacher said: +‘There is nothing for which we need make excuses.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_37_37" href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> +Now, if their own countries had been in a similar position, +the same thing would have been said by most of the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_39">[39]</span>spiritual leaders of that time; by Barrès in France, by +d’Annunzio in Italy, by Kipling in England, if we may +judge by his conduct during the attack of his nation +upon the Boers, and by William James in the United +States, if we recall his attitude when his compatriots +seized the island of Cuba.⁠<a id="FNanchor_38_38" href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> I am quite ready to agree +that this sort of blind patriotism makes powerful nations, +and that the patriotism of Fénelon or of Renan is not the +sort which secures empires. It remains to determine +whether the function of ‘clerks’ is to secure +empires.</p> + +<p>This adhesion of the ‘clerks’ to national passion is +particularly remarkable among those whom I shall call +‘pre-eminently clerks’; I mean the Churchmen. In all +European countries during the past fifty years, the +immense majority of these men have not only given +their adhesion to the national feeling⁠<a id="FNanchor_39_39" href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> and therefore +have ceased to provide the world with the spectacle of +hearts solely occupied with God—but they seem to +have adopted this feeling with the same passion as that +I have pointed out as existing among men of letters, +and they too appear to be ready to support their own +countries in the most flagrant injustices. During the +last war this could be most clearly seen in the German +clergy, from whom no one could drag the shadow of a +protest against the excesses committed by their nation, +and whose silence does not appear to have been caused +<span class="pagenum" id="p_40">[40]</span>solely by prudence.⁠<a id="FNanchor_40_40" href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> In contrast to this attitude I refer +the reader to that of the Spanish theologians of the +sixteenth century, to men like Bartholomew de las Casas +and Vittoria, earnestly denouncing the cruelties committed +by their compatriots in the conquest of America. +I do not claim that similar behaviour was then the rule +among Churchmen, but I should like to ask whether +there is a single country to-day where they would do +likewise, or where they would even wish to be permitted +to do so?⁠<a id="FNanchor_41_41" href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a></p> + +<p>I shall point out another characteristic of patriotism +in the modern ‘clerk’: xenophobia. The hatred of man +for ‘the man from outside’ (the <i>horsain</i>), his rejection +of and scorn for everything which is not ‘from his own +home’, all these impulses, so constant among peoples +and apparently necessary to their existence, have been +<span class="pagenum" id="p_41">[41]</span>adopted in our days by the so-called men of thought, +and adopted with a seriousness of application, <i>an absence +of simple-mindedness</i>, which go far towards making this +adoption worthy of notice. We know how systematically +the mass of German teachers in the past fifty years have +announced the decline of every civilization but that of +their own race, and how in France the admirers of +Nietzsche or Wagner, even of Kant or Goethe, were +treated by Frenchmen who claimed to share in the life +of the spirit.⁠<a id="FNanchor_42_42" href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> You may estimate how curiously new +this form of patriotism is among the men of thought in +France by thinking of Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Michelet, +Proudhon, Renan, to name only patriotic ‘clerks’ in +the age immediately preceding that we are considering. +Is it necessary to say once again how much the ‘clerks’ +have stimulated the passion of the laymen by adopting +this xenophobia?</p> + +<p>I shall be told that during the past fifty years, and +especially during the twenty years before the war, the +attitude of foreigners to France was such that the most +violent national partiality was forced upon all Frenchmen +who wished to safeguard the nation, and that the +only true patriots were those who consented to this +fanaticism. I say nothing to the contrary; I only +say that the ‘clerks’ who indulged in this fanaticism +betrayed their duty, which is precisely to set up a corporation +whose sole cult is that of justice and of truth, in +<span class="pagenum" id="p_42">[42]</span>opposition to the peoples and the injustice to which +they are condemned by their religions of this earth. +It is true indeed that these new ‘clerks’ declare that +they do not know what is meant by justice, truth, and +other ‘metaphysical fogs’, that for them the true is +determined by the useful, the just by circumstances. +All these things were taught by Callicles, but with this +difference; he revolted all the important thinkers +of his time.</p> + +<p>It must be admitted that the German ‘clerks’ led +the way in this adhesion of the modern ‘clerk’ to patriotic +fanaticism. The French ‘clerks’ were, and long +remained, animated with the most perfect spirit of justice +towards foreign cultures (think of the cosmopolitanism +of the Romantics!), when already Lessing, Schlegel, +Fichte, Goerres were organizing in their hearts a violent +adoration for ‘everything German’, and a scorn for +everything not German. The nationalist ‘clerk’ is +essentially a German invention. This, moreover, is a +theme which will frequently recur in this book, i.e. that +most of the moral and political attitudes adopted by the +‘clerks’ of Europe in the past fifty years are of German +origin, and that in the world of spiritual things the +victory of Germany is now complete.</p> + +<p>It may be said that Germany, by creating for herself +the nationalist ‘clerk’ and thereby acquiring the +additional strength we know she has acquired, made +this species of ‘clerk’ necessary to all other countries. +It is undeniable that from the moment when Germany +<span class="pagenum" id="p_43">[43]</span>had a Mommsen, France especially was bound to have a +Barrès, under penalty of finding herself in a position of +great inferiority in nationalist fanaticism, and of seeing +her existence seriously menaced. Every Frenchman +attached to the continuance of his nation must rejoice +that in the last half century France has possessed a +fanatically nationalist literature. Yet one would like +this Frenchman to rise for a moment superior to his +interest, and, faithful in this to the honour of his race, +to think it sad that the course of events in the world should +force him to rejoice in such a thing.</p> + +<p>More generally, it may be admitted that a realist +attitude has been imposed on the modern ‘clerks’, +chiefly the French ‘clerks’, by exterior and interior +political conditions which have arisen in their nations. +However serious this may be, it would be much less +serious if we found that the ‘clerks’ deplored it while +they submitted to it, if they felt how much their own +value is diminished by it, how greatly civilization is +menaced by it, to what an extent the universe is rendered +ugly by it. But this is exactly what we do not see. On +the contrary, we see them joyfully carrying out this +realism; we see them believing that they are rendered +greater by their nationalist fury, that it is a service to +civilization, an embellishment to humanity. Then one +feels that one is confronted by something different from +a function thwarted by the events of the moment, and +faced with a cataclysm of moral notions in those who +educate the world.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_44">[44]</span></p> + +<p>I should like to point out two other characteristics +in the patriotism of the modern ‘clerks’ which seem +new to me, the second of which has not failed to stimulate +this passion greatly among the peoples.</p> + +<p>The first can best be brought out by contrast with +the lines written by an author of the fifteenth century, +lines which are the more remarkable since he who wrote +them proved by his deeds how deep was his love for his +native country. ‘All cities,’ says Guicciardini, ‘all +States, all Kingdoms, are mortal; everything comes to +an end, either by accident or by the course of nature. +That is why a citizen who witnesses the end of his +country cannot feel so distressed at her misfortune with +so much reason as he would lament his own ruin. His +country has met the fate which in every way she was +bound to meet; the misfortune is wholly for him whose +unhappy lot has caused him to be born in a time when +such a disaster had to occur.’ One wonders whether there is +a single modern thinker, attached to his country as the +author of that passage was to his, who would dare to +form, still less to express, a judgment of her so extraordinarily +free in its melancholy. And here we come +upon one of the great impieties of the moderns: The +refusal to believe that above their nations there exists +a development of a superior kind, by which they will +be swept away like all other things. The ancients, so +completely the adorers of their States, nevertheless +placed them beneath Fate. The ancient City was under +divine protection, but in no wise believed that she herself +<span class="pagenum" id="p_45">[45]</span>was divine and necessarily eternal. All the literature +of the ancients shows us that, in their opinion, the +duration of their institutions was a precarious thing, solely +due to the favour of the Gods, who at any time might +withdraw that favour.⁠<a id="FNanchor_43_43" href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> We have Thucydides contemplating +the image of a world in which Athens should +have ceased to exist; we have Polybius showing us the +conqueror of Carthage meditating over the burning town: +‘And Rome too shall meet her fatal hour.’ We have +Virgil praising the peasant of the fields for whom ‘res +romanae et peritura regna’ are of no value.</p> + +<p>It was reserved for the moderns to make of their City +a tower which defies the heavens, and to do it with the +aid of their ‘clerks’.</p> + +<p>The second characteristic of the patriotism of the +modern ‘clerks’ is a desire to relate the form of their +own minds to a form of the <i>national</i> mind, which they +naturally brandish against other national forms of mind. +We all know how, during the last fifty years, so many +men of learning on both banks of the Rhine have asserted +their views in the name of <i>French</i> science, of <i>German</i> +science. We know how acridly so many of our writers +in the same period have vibrated with <i>French</i> sensibility, +<i>French</i> intelligence, <i>French</i> philosophy. Some declare +that they are the incarnation of Aryan thought, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_46">[46]</span>Aryan painting, Aryan music, to which others reply by +discovering that a certain master had a Jewish grandmother, +and so venerate Semitic genius in him. Here it +is not a question of inquiring whether the form of mind +of a scholar or an artist is the signature of his nationality +or his race and to what extent, but of noting the desire +of the modern ‘clerks’ that it should be so, and noting +how new a thing this is. Racine and La Bruyère never +dreamed of setting up their works before themselves and +before the world as manifestation of the French mind, nor +did Goethe and Wincklemann relate theirs to the genius +of Germany.⁠<a id="FNanchor_44_44" href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> Here, chiefly among the artists, is a very +remarkable fact. It is very remarkable to see men whose +activity consists, one might say professionally, in the +assertion of individuality, men who became so violently +conscious of this truth a century ago with the Romantic +movement, now (as it were) abdicating this sort of +consciousness and trying to feel themselves as the +expression of some general existence, a manifestation +of a collective mind. It is true that this abdication of +the individual in favour of ‘a great impersonal and +eternal Whole’ satisfies another sort of Romanticism. +<span class="pagenum" id="p_47">[47]</span>It is true that this impulse of the artist may also be +explained by the desire (which Barrès does not conceal) +to increase the enjoyment of himself by himself, since +the consciousness of the individual ego is doubled in +profundity by consciousness of the national ego, while at +the same time the artist finds new lyrical themes in this +second consciousness. It may also be admitted that the +artist is not blind to his own interest in calling himself the +expression of the genius of his nation, thereby inviting +the whole race to applaud itself in the work he put before +it.⁠<a id="FNanchor_45_45" href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> Whatever their motives may have been, the great +minds or the minds reputed such, by relating the whole +of their value so noisily to their nation, have laboured +in a direction contrary to that expected of them; they +have flattered the vanity of nations, they have fed full +the arrogance with which each nation flings its superiority +in the face of its neighbours.⁠<a id="FNanchor_46_46" href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></p> + +<p>I cannot better bring out all the novelty of this attitude +of the ‘clerk’ than by quoting the remark of Renan, +which would be signed by all men of thought from +Socrates onwards: ‘Man belongs neither to his +language nor to his race; he belongs only to himself, +for he is a free being, that is, a moral being.’ To this +<span class="pagenum" id="p_48">[48]</span>Barrès replies, amid the applause of his compeers: ‘To +be moral is <i>not to wish to be free from one’s race</i>.’ Here, +obviously, is an exaltation of the gregarious spirit which +the nations had heard little of before from the priests +of the spirit.</p> + +<p>The modern ‘clerks’ do better still. They declare +that their thought cannot be good, that it cannot bear +good fruit, unless they remain on their native soil, unless +they are not ‘uprooted’ (‘<i>déracinés</i>’). They congratulate +A on working in <i>his</i> Bearn, B in <i>his</i> Berry, +C in <i>his</i> Brittany. And they not only proclaim this +law for the poets, but for critics, moralists, philosophers, +the servants of purely intellectual activity. To declare +the mind good to the extent of its refusal to liberate +itself from the earth is something which will make the +modern ‘clerks’ certain of a conspicuous place in the +annals of the spiritual life. Obviously, the feelings of +this class of men has changed since Plutarch taught: +‘Man is not a plant created to be immobile and to have +his roots fixed in the soil where he was born,’ and since +Antisthenes replied to his colleagues who boasted that +they were native to the soil, that ‘they shared this +honour with the slugs and grasshoppers’.</p> + +<p>Need I say that I am only denouncing this desire +of the ‘clerk’ to feel himself determined by his race +and to remain fixed to his native soil to the extent that +it becomes in him a political attitude, a nationalist +provocation. The best way for me to define this is by +quoting this hymn of a modern ‘clerk’ to ‘his soil +<span class="pagenum" id="p_49">[49]</span>and his dead’, a hymn completely void of political +passion:</p> + +<p>‘And the old oak under which I am sitting speaks +in its turn, and says to me:</p> + +<p>‘“Read, read in my shadow those Gothic songs whose +refrains I heard in the past mingle with the rustling of +my leaves. The souls of your ancestors are in these +songs that are older than I am. Learn to know those +humble ancestors, share their past joys and sorrows. +Thus, O transitory creature, shalt thou live long ages +in a few years. Be pious, venerate the soil of your +country. Never take up a handful in your hand without +remembering that it is sacred. Love all those far-off +relatives whose dust mingled with earth has fed me for +centuries, whose minds have passed into you, their +Benjamin, the child of better days. Reproach not your +ancestors with their ignorance, nor with the feebleness +of their thought, nor even with the illusions of fear which +sometimes rendered them cruel. As well reproach yourself +for having been a child. Remember that they +laboured, that they suffered, that they hoped for you, +and that you owe everything to them!”’⁠<a id="FNanchor_47_47" href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_50">[50]</span></p> + + +<h3 id="Second_They_bring_their_political_passions_into_their_activities_as_clerks"> + <i>Second: They bring their political passions into their activities as ‘clerks’.</i> +</h3> + +<p>The ‘clerks’ have not been content simply to adopt +political passions, if by this one means that they have +made a place for these passions side by side with the +activities they are bound to carry on as ‘clerks’. They +have introduced these passions into those activities. +They permit, they desire them to be mingled with their +work as artists, as men of learning, as philosophers, to +colour the essence of their work and to mark all its +productions. And indeed never were there so many +political works among those which ought to be the +mirror of the disinterested intelligence.</p> + +<p>You may refuse to be surprised by this in the case +of poetry. We must not ask the poets to separate their +works from their passions. The latter are the substance +of the former, and the only question to ask is whether +they write poems to express their passions or whether +they hunt for passions in order to write poems. In either +case one does not see why they should exclude national +passion or the spirit of party from their vibrant material. +Our political poets, who are not numerous however, +have only followed the example of Virgil, Claudian, +Lucan, Dante, d’Aubigné, Ronsard, and Hugo. Yet +we cannot deny that political passion, as it is expressed +<span class="pagenum" id="p_51">[51]</span>by Claudel or d’Annunzio, a conscious and organized +passion <i>lacking all simplicity</i>, coldly scornful of its +adversary, a passion which in the second of these poets +displays itself as so precisely political, so cunningly +adapted to the profound cupidity of his compatriots and +the exact point of weakness in the foreigner—we cannot +deny, I say, that this political passion is something +different from the eloquent generalities of the ‘Tragiques +of the Année Terrible.’ A work like <i>La Nave</i>, with its +national plan as exact and practical as that of a Bismarck, +wherein the lyric gift is used to extol this practical +character, seems to me something new in the history +of poetry, even of political poetry. The result of this +new departure on the minds of laymen may be judged +by the present state of mind of the Italian people.⁠<a id="FNanchor_48_48" href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> +But in our day the most remarkable example of the poets’ +applying their art to the service of political passions +is that literary form which may be called ‘lyrical +philosophy’, the most brilliant symbol of which is the +work of Barrès. It begins by taking as its centres of +vibration certain truly philosophical states of mind (such +as pantheism, a loftily sceptical intellectualism) and then +entirely devotes itself to serving racial passion and +national feeling. Here the action of the lyric spirit is +<span class="pagenum" id="p_52">[52]</span>doubled by the prestige of the spirit of abstract thought +(Barrès admirably caught the appearance of that spirit—he +stole the tool, a philosopher has said of him), and in +France as elsewhere the ‘clerks’ have thereby stimulated +political passions among the laymen, at least in that +very important section of them who read and believe +they think. Moreover, in regard to poets and especially +the poet I have just named, it is difficult to know whether +the lyrical impulse lends its aid to a genuine and pre-existing +political passion, or whether on the contrary +this passion puts itself at the service of a lyrical impulse +which is seeking inspiration. Alius judex erit.</p> + +<p>But there are other ‘clerks’ who introduce political +passion into their works with a remarkable consciousness +of what they are doing, in whom this derogation +seems more worthy of notice than in the poets. I mean +the novelists and dramatists, i.e. ‘clerks’ whose function +is to portray in as objective a manner as possible the +emotions of the human soul and their conflicts—a +function which, as Shakespeare, Molière, and Balzac +have proved, may be carried out with all the purity I +have here assigned to it. One may show how this +function has been more than ever perverted by its subjection +to political ends by the example of many contemporary +novelists, not because they scatter +‘tendencious’ reflections throughout their narratives +(Balzac constantly does so), but because instead of making +their heroes feel and act in conformity with a true observation +of human nature, they make them do so as the passion +<span class="pagenum" id="p_53">[53]</span>of the authors requires. Shall I cite those novels where +the traditionalist, whatever his errors, always finally +displays a noble soul, whereas the character without +religion inevitably, and in spite of all his efforts, is +capable of none but vile actions?⁠<a id="FNanchor_49_49" href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Or the other novels +where the man of the people possesses every virtue and +vileness is the exclusive portion of the bourgeois?⁠<a id="FNanchor_50_50" href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> +Or the novels where the author displays his compatriots +in contact with foreigners and, more or less +frankly, gives all moral superiority to his own people?⁠<a id="FNanchor_51_51" href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> +There is a two-fold evil in this proceeding; not only +does it considerably inflame political passion in the +breast of the reader, but it deprives him of one of the +most eminently civilizing effects of all works of art, i.e. +that self-examination to which every spectator is impelled +by a representation of human beings which he feels to +be true and solely pre-occupied with truth.⁠<a id="FNanchor_52_52" href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> From the +point of view of the artist and of the value of his activity +alone, this partiality indicates a great degradation. The +value of the artist, the thing which makes him the world’s +high ornament, is that he <i>plays</i> human passions instead +of living them, and that he discovers in this ‘play’ +<span class="pagenum" id="p_54">[54]</span>emotion the same source of desires, joys and sufferings +as ordinary men find in the pursuit of real things. Now, +if this accomplished type of exuberant activity places +itself at the service of the nation or of a class, if this fine +flower of disinterestedness becomes utilitarian, then I +say with the poet of the ‘Vierge aux Rochers’ when the +author of <i>Siegfried</i> exhales his last sigh: ‘The world +has lost its import.’</p> + +<p>I have pointed out that certain ‘clerks’ have put their +activities as ‘clerks’ at the service of political passions. +These are the poets, the novelists, the dramatists, the +artists, i.e. they are men who may be permitted to give +passion, even wilful passion, a predominant place in +their works. But there are other ‘clerks’ in whom this +derogation from the disinterested activity of the mind +is far more shocking, ‘clerks’ whose influence on the +laymen is much more profound by reason of the prestige +attached to their functions. I mean the historians. Here, +as with the poets, the phenomenon is a new one on +account of the point of perfection it has reached. +Assuredly, humanity did not await our age to see History +putting itself at the service of the spirit of party or of +national passion. But I think I may assert that it has +never seen this done with the same methodical spirit, +the same intensity of consciousness which may be +observed in German historians of the past half century +and in the French Monarchists of the past twenty +years. The case of the latter is the more remarkable +since they belong to a nation which has acquired eternal +<span class="pagenum" id="p_55">[55]</span>honour in the history of human intelligence by explicitly +condemning pragmatic history and formulating, as it +were, the charter of disinterested history, through the +works of Beaufort, Fréret, Voltaire, Thierry, Renan, +Fustel de Coulanges.⁠<a id="FNanchor_53_53" href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> Yet the true novelty here is the +admission of this spirit of partiality, the expressed +intention to employ it as a legitimate method. ‘A true +German historian,’ declares a German master, ‘should +especially tell those facts which conduce to the grandeur +of Germany.’ The same scholar praises Mommsen +(who himself boasted of it) for having written a Roman +history ‘which becomes a history of Germany with +Roman names’. Another (Treitschke) prided himself +on his lack of ‘that anemic objectivity which is contrary +to the historical sense’. Another (Guisebrecht) teaches +that ‘Science must not soar beyond the frontiers, but +be national, be German’. Our Monarchists do not +lag behind. Recently one of them, the author of a +<i>History of France</i>, which tried to show that the French +Kings since Clovis were occupied in trying to prevent +the war of 1914, defended the historian who presents +the past from the point of view of the passions of his +own time.⁠<a id="FNanchor_54_54" href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> By his determination in bringing this +<span class="pagenum" id="p_56">[56]</span>partiality to historical narrative the modern ‘clerk’ most +seriously derogates from his true function, if I am right +in saying that his function is to restrain the passions of +the laymen. Not only does he inflame the laymen’s +passions more cunningly than ever, not only does he +deprive them of the suggestive spectacle of a man solely +occupied by the thirst for truth, but he prevents the +laymen from hearing speech different from that of the +market place, speech (Renan’s is perhaps the finest +example) which, coming from the heights, shows that +the most opposite passions are equally justified, equally +necessary to the earthly State, and thereby incites every +reader who has any capacity for getting outside himself +to relax the severity of his passions, at least for a moment.</p> + +<p>Let me say, however, that indeed men like Treitschke +and his French equivalents are not historians; they +are men of politics who make use of history to support +a cause whose triumph they desire. Hence, it is natural +that the master of their method should not be Lenain de +Tillemont but Louis XIV, who threatened to withdraw +Mezeray’s pension if the historian persisted in pointing +out the abuses of the old monarchy; or Napoleon, who +ordered the chief of police to take measures for the history +of France to be written in a manner favourable to his +own throne. Nevertheless, the really cunning ones +assume the mask of disinterestedness.⁠<a id="FNanchor_55_55" href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a></p> + +<p>I believe that many of those whom I am here accusing +of betraying their spiritual ministry, that disinterested +<span class="pagenum" id="p_57">[57]</span>activity which should be theirs by the mere fact of their +being historians, psychologists, moralists, would reply +to me as follows, if such a confession did not destroy +their influence: ‘We are not in the least the servants +of spiritual things; we are the servants of material +things, of a political party, of a nation. Only, instead +of serving it with the sword, we serve it with the pen. +We are <i>the spiritual militia of the material</i>.’</p> + +<p>Among those who ought to show the world an example +of disinterested intellectual activity and who nevertheless +turn their function to practical ends, I shall also mention +the critics. Everyone knows that innumerable critics +to-day consider that a book is only good insofar as it +serves the party which is dear to them, or as it manifests +‘the genius of the nation’, or as it illustrates a political +doctrine in harmony with their own political system, +or for other reasons of the like purity. The modern +‘clerks’, I said before, insist that the just shall be +determined by the useful. They also want the useful +to determine the beautiful, which is not one of their +least originalities in history. Nevertheless, here again +those who adopt such a form of criticism are not truly +critics, but men of politics, who make criticism serve +their practical designs. Here is a perfecting of political +passion, the whole honour of which must be given to +the moderns. Neither Pius XIV nor Napoleon apparently +thought of using literary criticism in support of the +social system in which they believed.⁠<a id="FNanchor_56_56" href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> This new +<span class="pagenum" id="p_58">[58]</span>departure has brought forth its fruits. For instance, +if you assert with the French Monarchists that the +democratic ideal is inevitably bound up with bad literature, +you are dealing that ideal a real blow in a country +like France, which has a real devotion to literature, at +least among those who will consent to believe that Victor +Hugo and Lamartine were mere scribblers.⁠<a id="FNanchor_57_57" href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p> + +<p>But the most remarkable thing about the modern +‘clerk’ in his desire to bring political passion into his +work, is that he has done so in philosophy, more precisely, +in metaphysics. It may be said that until the nineteenth +century metaphysics remained the inviolate citadel of +disinterested speculation. Among all forms of spiritual +labour metaphysics best deserved the admirable tribute +which a mathematician rendered the theory of numbers +above all branches of mathematics, when he said: +‘This is the really pure branch of our science, by which +I mean that it is unsullied by any contact with practical +application.’ In fact thinkers free from any sort of +earthly preference, like Plotinus, Thomas Aquinas, +Descartes, Kant, and even thinkers strongly imbued +with the superiority of their class or nation (like Plato +and Aristotle), never thought of directing their transcendental +speculations towards a demonstration of this +superiority or the necessity of this adoption by the +whole world. It has been said that the morality of the +Greeks was national, but their metaphysics were universal. +<span class="pagenum" id="p_59">[59]</span>The Church itself, so often favourable to class or national +interests in its morality, thinks only of God and Man in +its metaphysics. It was reserved for our own age to see +metaphysicians of the greatest eminence turning their +speculations to the exaltation of their own countries +and to the depreciation of other countries, fortifying the +will to power of their compatriots with all the power of +abstractive genius. Fichte and Hegel made the triumph +of the German world the supreme and necessary end of +the development of Being, and history has showed whether +the action of these ‘clerks’ had an effect on the hearts +of their laymen. Let me hasten to add that this spectacle +of patriotic metaphysics is provided by Germany alone. +In France, even in this age of nationalist ‘clerks’, we +have not yet seen any philosopher (at least one who is +taken seriously) build up a metaphysical system to the +glory of France. Neither Auguste Comte nor Renouvier +nor Bergson ever thought of making a French hegemony +the necessary result of the world’s development. Need +I add what a degradation this has been for metaphysics, +as it has been for art? It will be the eternal shame of +the German philosophers to have transformed the patrician +virgin who honoured the Gods into a harpy engaged +in shrieking the glory of her children.</p> + + +<p><i>Third: The ‘clerks’ have played the game of political +passions by their doctrines</i></p> + +<p>But where the ‘clerks’ have most violently broken +with their tradition and resolutely played the game of +<span class="pagenum" id="p_60">[60]</span>the laymen in their eagerness to place themselves in the +real, is by their doctrines, by the scale of values they +have set up for the world. Those whose preaching for +twenty centuries had been to humiliate the realist +passions in favour of something transcendental, have +set themselves (with a science and a consciousness +which will stupify history) to the task of making these +passions, and the impulses which ensure them, the highest +of virtues, while they cannot show too much scorn for +the existence which in any respect raises itself beyond +the material. I shall now describe the principal aspects +of this phenomenon.</p> + + +<p><i>A. The ‘clerks’ praise attachment to the particular and +denounce the feeling of the universal</i></p> + +<p>In the first place, the ‘clerks’ have set out to exalt +the will of men to feel conscious of themselves as distinct +from others, and to proclaim as contemptible every +tendency to establish oneself in a universal. With the +exception of certain authors like Tolstoi and Anatole +France, whose teaching moreover is now looked on +with contempt by most of their colleagues, all the +influential moralists of Europe during the past fifty +years, Bourget, Barrès, Maurras, Péguy, d’Annunzio, +Kipling, the immense majority of German thinkers, +have praised the efforts of men to feel conscious of themselves +in their nation and race, to the extent that this +distinguishes them from others and opposes them to +others, and have made them ashamed of every aspiration +<span class="pagenum" id="p_61">[61]</span>to feel conscious of themselves as men in the general +sense and in the sense of rising above ethnical aims. +Those whose activity since the time of the Stoics had been +devoted to preaching the extinction of national egotism +in the interest of an abstract and eternal entity, set out +to denounce every feeling of this kind and to proclaim +the lofty morality of that egotism. In our age the +descendants of Erasmus, Montaigne, Voltaire, have +denounced humanitarianism as a moral degeneration, +nay, as an intellectual degeneration, in that it implies +‘a total absence of practical common sense’; for +practical common sense has become the measure of +intellectual values with these strange ‘clerks’.</p> + +<p>I should like to draw a distinction between +humanitarianism as I mean it here—a sensitiveness to +the abstract quality of what is human, to Montaigne’s +‘whole form of human condition’—and the feeling which +is usually called humanitarianism, by which is meant the +love for human beings existing in the concrete. The +former impulse (which would more accurately be called +humanism) is the attachment to a concept. It is a pure +passion of the intelligence, implying no terrestrial love. +It is quite easy to conceive of a person plunging into +the concept of what is human without having the least +desire even to see a man. This is the form assumed by +love of humanity in the great patricians of the mind +like Erasmus, Malebranche, Spinoza, Goethe, who all +were men, it appears, not very anxious to throw themselves +into the arms of their neighbours. The second +<span class="pagenum" id="p_62">[62]</span>humanitarianism is a state of the heart and therefore the +portion of plebeian souls. It occurs among moralists +in periods when lofty intellectual discipline disappears +among them and gives way to sentimental exaltation, +I mean in the eighteenth century (chiefly with Diderot) +and above all in the nineteenth century, with Michelet, +Quinet, Proudhon, Romain Rolland, Georges Duhamel. +This sentimental form of humanitarianism and forgetfulness +of its conceptual form explain the unpopularity +of this doctrine with so many distinguished minds, who +discover two equally repulsive commonplaces in the +arsenal of political ideology. One of them is ‘the +patriotic bore’ and the other ‘the universal embrace’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_58_58" href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p> + +<p>The humanitarianism which holds in honour the +abstract quality of what is human, is the only one which +allows us to love <i>all</i> men. Obviously, as soon as we +look at men in the concrete, we inevitably find that +this quality is distributed in different quantities, and +we have to say with Renan: ‘In reality one is <i>more or +less</i> a man, <i>more or less</i> the son of God ... I see no +reason why a Papuan should be immortal.’ Modern +equalitarians, by failing to understand that there can +be no equality except in the abstract and that inequality +<span class="pagenum" id="p_63">[63]</span>is the essence of the concrete, have merely displayed the +extraordinary vulgarity of their minds as well as their +amazing political clumsiness.⁠<a id="FNanchor_59_59" href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p> + +<p>Humanism, as I have defined it, has nothing to do +with internationalism. Internationalism is a protest +against national egotism, not on behalf of a spiritual +passion, but on behalf of another egotism, another +earthly passion. It is the impulse of a certain category +of men—labourers, bankers, industrialists—who unite +across frontiers in the name of private and practical +interests, and who only oppose the national spirit because +it thwarts them in satisfying those interests.⁠<a id="FNanchor_60_60" href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a></p> + +<p>In comparison with such impulses, national passion +appears an idealistic and disinterested impulse. In short, +humanism is also something entirely different from +cosmopolitanism, which is the simple desire to enjoy the +advantages of all nations and all their cultures, and is +generally exempt from all moral dogmatism.⁠<a id="FNanchor_61_61" href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> But let +<span class="pagenum" id="p_64">[64]</span>us come back to this movement of the ‘clerks’ exhorting +the peoples to feel conscious of themselves in what +makes them distinct from others.</p> + +<p>What will especially amaze history in this movement +of the ‘clerks’ is the perfection with which they +have carried it out. They have exhorted the peoples +to feel conscious of themselves in what makes them <i>the +most distinct</i> from others, in their poets rather than in +their scientists, in their legends rather than in their +philosophies, since poetry (as they perfectly well perceived) +is infinitely more national, more separating than the +products of pure intelligence.⁠<a id="FNanchor_62_62" href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> They have exhorted the +peoples to honour their poets’ characteristics insofar as +they are peculiar to them and are not universal. Recently +a young Italian writer praised his language because it is +only used in Italy, and poured scorn on French because +it is employed universally.⁠<a id="FNanchor_63_63" href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> They have exhorted the +peoples to feel conscious of themselves in <i>everything</i> +which makes them distinct from others, not only in their +language, art, and literature, but in their dress, houses, +furniture, and food. During the past half century it +has been a common experience to see serious writers +(to go no further than France) exhorting their compatriots +to remain faithful to French fashions, French +hair-dressing, French dining rooms, French cooking, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_65">[65]</span>French cars. They have exhorted the peoples to feel +themselves distinct even in their vices. The German +historians, says Fustel de Coulanges, urge their nation +to be intoxicated with its personality, even to its barbarity. +The French moralist does not lag behind and desires +his compatriots to accept their ‘national determinism’ +in its ‘indivisible totality’, with its injustices as well as +its wisdom, with its fanaticism as well as its enlightenment, +its pettiness as well as its grandeur. Another, +(Maurras) declares: ‘Good or bad, our tastes are ours +and it is always permissible to take ourselves as the sole +judges and models of our lives’. Once again, the +remarkable thing here is not that such things should +be said, but that they should be said by the ‘clerks’, by +a class of men whose purpose hitherto has been to urge +their fellow-citizens to feel conscious of themselves in +what is common to all men, that they should be said in +France by the descendants of Montaigne, Pascal, +Voltaire, and Renan.</p> + +<p>This glorifying of national particularism, so unexpected +among all ‘clerks’ is especially so among those whom +I described as ‘pre-eminently clerks’—the Churchmen. +Those who for centuries have exhorted men, at least +theoretically, to deaden the feeling of their differences +in order to take cognizance of each other in the divine +essence which brings all men together, have now come +to praise them, according to where the sermon is given, +for their ‘fidelity to the French soul’, for ‘the immutability +of their German consciousness’, for the ‘fervour +<span class="pagenum" id="p_66">[66]</span>of their Italian hearts’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_64_64" href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> The sight is indeed surprising +and remarkable! What would be thought by him who, +by the mouth of his apostle, declared: ‘There is neither +Greek nor Jew nor barbarian, but Christ is in all things,’ +if to-day he entered one of his churches and saw offered +to the veneration of his faithful, a national heroine with +a sword on her thigh and a flag in her hand?⁠<a id="FNanchor_65_65" href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a></p> + +<p>This glorification of national particularisms, at least +with the precision observable to-day, is undoubtedly +something new in the history of the Church. It is not +necessary to go back as far as Saint Augustine, who +preached the extinction of all patriotisms in the embrace +of ‘the City of God’; nor even to Bossuet, who shows +us the indignation of Jesus at observing ‘that because +we are separated by a few rivers or mountains, we seem +to have forgotten that we are all of one nature’. So +recently as 1849 a lofty assembly of prelates asserted +that ‘this movement of nationalities is a relic of paganism, +differences of language are a consequence of sin and the +fall of man’. Certainly this declaration was an interested +one, since it was provoked by the Most Catholic Francis +Joseph to check the separatist tendencies among the +peoples of his Empire; but I dare to assert that the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_67">[67]</span>Church would no longer make such a declaration, even +for motives of interest. I shall be told that even if the +Church wished to do so, she could only do it under +penalty of delivering up her ministers to a terrible +unpopularity among their respective peoples. As if the +‘clerk’s’ function were not to tell the laymen truths +which are displeasing to them, and to pay the price at +the expense of his own peace!</p> + +<p>I do not ask so much. Is there a single prelate in any +pulpit of Europe who would now dare to pronounce: +‘The Christian is both a cosmopolitan and a patriot. +These two qualities are not incompatible. The world +indeed is one common fatherland, or, to speak in more +Christian terms, one common exile.’ (Pastoral letter +‘On the pretended philosophy of modern infidels,’ by +Le Franc de Pompignon, Bishop of Puy, 1763. The +‘infidels’ here are those who refuse the Church the +right to be cosmopolitan.)</p> + +<p>Some ‘clerks’ do better, and assert that by extolling +national particularisms they are in complete harmony +with the fundamental spirit of the Church, especially +with the teaching of the great Doctors of the Middle +Ages. (This is the thesis which opposes Catholicism +to Christianity.) Need I recall the fact that the most +national of these Doctors limited themselves to considering +national particularisms as an inevitable condition +of an earthly and inferior world, which must be respected +like everything else which is the will of God? Or that +they never exhorted men to intensify this feeling in their +<span class="pagenum" id="p_68">[68]</span>hearts, still less did they ever think of putting this +intensification before them as an exercise in moral +self-perfection?</p> + +<p>When the Church in past times did approve of something +in patriotism, it was fraternity among fellow-citizens, +like love of man for other men, but not his +opposition to other men. She approved of patriotism +as an extension of human love, and not as a limitation +of it.⁠<a id="FNanchor_66_66" href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> + +<p>But the most remarkable thing in all this is that +recently—precisely since the time when Benedict XV +was reproached during the last war for not having +denounced the arrogance of German nationalism—there +has arisen a school in the bosom of the Church which +tries to prove that by acting in this way the Holy Father +had simply obeyed the teaching of his Divine Master, +who is supposed to have preached explicitly the love of a +man for his own nation. Could anything better symbolize +the determination of the modern ‘clerks’ to place their +credit and their activities at the service of lay passions +than these Churchmen making Jesus an apostle of +nationalism?</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_69">[69]</span></p> + +<p>These strange Christians express themselves thus:</p> + +<p>‘Jesus does not look beyond the frontiers of his own +country with the idea of bestowing his benefactions +upon other nations. He declares to the Canaanitish +woman, whose daughter he heals against his own wish, +that “his mission is only to the lost sheep of the house +of Israel” (Matt. xv, 24). He sent his first disciples +among the Israelites. And notice how he insists that +they shall not go elsewhere. “Go not on the paths of +the Gentiles, and enter not the cities of the Samaritans, +but go first to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.” +(Matt. x, 6.) Later on, it will be time enough to announce +the good news to foreigners, but first of all we must +bring it to our own people. This is what he means +by the words, so full of patriotic meaning and love: +“the house of Israel.” A group of human beings +possessing the same blood, the same language, the same +religion, the same tradition, form “a house”. These +particularities are so many dividing walls.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_67_67" href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a></p> + +<p>They also say:</p> + +<p>‘The most striking thing about Jesus when he consents +to pay tribute to Caesar and refuses the crown which +the people offer him in the desert, is not so much his +prudence and his disinterestedness, as his patriotism ... +One of the most important characteristics of Jesus’s +teaching is its absolutely national character....’⁠<a id="FNanchor_68_68" href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a></p> + +<p>If the reader desires, he will himself go and find out +<span class="pagenum" id="p_70">[70]</span>the solidity of the proofs on which these teachers base +their thesis (one of these proofs is that Jesus was strongly +attached to the institutions of his nation, which he +showed by accepting circumcision eight days after +he was born). The point I wish to insist on is the eagerness +of these Christians to make their Master a supporter +of national egotism, at least at one period of his life.</p> + +<p>These views on the attitude of the Church towards +nationalism seem to me to remain unmodified by the +recent declarations of the Holy See concerning a certain +type of French nationalism, for these declarations only +condemn an openly anti-Christian nationalism (hence a +very exceptional form of nationalism) and do not utter +a word of blame for the desire of the peoples to set +themselves up as distinct from others and to reject +universalism. Moreover, this is how a universalist is +answered by a publication which is to some extent the +official organ of Pontifical views:</p> + +<p>‘Yes, all men are sons of one Father; but they +were divided in the beginning and have never been +brought together again. The family was broken up +and never joined up again. On the contrary. Certainly, +I am glad to recognize the fraternity of all living beings; +but are all the dead our fathers? Have they all loved +us? Have they all suffered and laboured for us? Some +lived on the other side of the globe, and, so to speak, in +another world. Some laboured against us, or, if they +supported our ancestors, it was in the hope of safeguarding +or enriching their own bequest to others, not to us. +<span class="pagenum" id="p_71">[71]</span>Where is the debt? If the home is open to all comers, +it is no longer a home but an inn.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_69_69" href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a></p> + +<p>It appears that we must look among those who have +left the Church, to find Christian ministers who proclaim +the true teaching of their Master, and who declare with +no beating about the bush: ‘The Gospel of Jesus +does not imply any country, but obliterates the fatherland.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_70_70" href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a></p> + +<p>The modern ‘clerk’ denounces the feeling of +universalism, not only for the profit of the nation, but +for that of a class. Our age has beheld moralists who +have declared to the bourgeois world (or to the working +classes) that, far from trying to check the feeling of their +differences from others and to feel conscious of their +common human nature, they should on the contrary try +to feel conscious of this difference in all its profundity +and irreducibleness, and that this effort is fine and noble, +whereas every desire for union is here a sign of baseness +and cowardice, and also of weakness of mind. This, +as everyone knows, is the thesis of the ‘Reflections +on Violence’, which has been praised by a whole galaxy +of apostles of the modern soul. There is certainly something +more novel in this attitude of the ‘clerks’ to +class differences than in their attitude towards national +differences. To discover the results of this teaching +<span class="pagenum" id="p_72">[72]</span>and the additional hatred (hitherto unknown) which +it has given to either class in doing violence to its +adversary, you have only to look at Italian Fascism for +the bourgeois class, and at Russian Bolshevism for the +working class.⁠<a id="FNanchor_71_71" href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a></p> + +<p>Here again we see realism trying to shelter under +cover of the Church. We see certain Catholic teachers +striving to prove that, by encouraging the bourgeois +class, <i>in the name of morality</i>, to feel conscious of themselves +as distinct from the opposing class, to plunge +religiously into consciousness of the characteristics which +are proper to their own class, and especially (Johannet) +to <i>intensify their feeling of property</i>, these teachers are +merely acting in conformity with the teaching of the +Church.⁠<a id="FNanchor_72_72" href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> + +<p>It is easy to point out the equivocation upon which +this claim is based. The Church does indeed admit class +distinctions. She exhorts the faithful to recognize and +even to respect them, as something imposed by God upon +a fallen world. She also exhorts the privileged to accept +<span class="pagenum" id="p_73">[73]</span>their situation, to carry out the activities it implies, and +to perform ‘the duties of their state of life’. She even +tells them that by performing these duties they are +pleasing God and ‘making an act of prayer’. But the +Church never exhorted them to glorify in themselves +the feeling of this distinction, still less did she ever do so +in the name of morality. On the contrary, she exhorted +them in the name of morality to extinguish (beneath this +privileged life) all belief in a particularity of essence in +their persons, and told them to feel conscious of themselves +in that humanity which is common to all men beneath +the inequality of ranks and states of life.⁠<a id="FNanchor_73_73" href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> Jesus Christ, +the Church states explicitly and constantly, <i>only accepts +the man who is reconciled</i>, i.e. the man who has obliterated +from his heart every feeling of difference between +himself and other men. (See Bossuet’s <i>Sermon on +Reconciliation</i>.) It seems unnecessary to insist further +on the unimpeachable character of this Christian +teaching—I am speaking of teaching, not of practice. +But one cannot meditate too much on the eagerness of +so many modern Church teachers to try to find some +means of sanctifying bourgeois egotism through the +words of the Gospels.⁠<a id="FNanchor_74_74" href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_74">[74]</span></p> + +<p>Let me point out another and remarkable form of this +extolling of particularism by the ‘clerks’: the extolling +of particular systems of morality and the scorn for +universal morality. During the past half century a whole +school, not only of men of action but of serious philosophers, +has taught that a people should form a conception +of its rights and duties from a study of its particular +genius, its history, its geographical position, the particular +circumstances in which it happens to be, and not from +the commands of a so-called conscience of man in all +times and places. Moreover, this same school teaches +that a class should construct a scale of good and evil, +determined by an inquiry into its particular needs, its +particular aims, the particular conditions surrounding +it, and should cease to encumber itself with such sensibilities +as ‘justice in itself’, ‘humanity in itself’ and +other ‘rags and tatters’ of general morality. To-day +with Barrès, Maurras, Sorel, even Durckheim⁠<a id="FNanchor_75_75" href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> we are +witnessing the complete bankruptcy among the ‘clerks’ +of that form of soul which, from Plato to Kant, looked +for the notion of good in the heart of eternal and disinterested +man. The example of Germany in 1914 shows +the results of this teaching which exhorts a group of +men to set themselves up as the sole judges of the +morality of their actions, shows what deification of their +appetites it leads to, what codification of their violence, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_75">[75]</span>what tranquillity in carrying out their plans. One day +perhaps we shall see the same thing throughout Europe +exemplified by the bourgeois class, unless the doctrines +of that class are turned against itself and we see it +exemplified by the working classes.⁠<a id="FNanchor_76_76" href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p> + +<p>I dare to say that the indignation of certain French +moralists at the action of Germany in 1914 surprises +me, when I reflect that some sixteen years earlier, during +the famous ‘affair’ which I have already mentioned, +these moralists preached to their compatriots exactly +the same doctrines, urging them to reject the concept +of absolute justice, and to desire only a form of justice +‘adapted to France’, to its particular genius, its particular +history, its particular, eternal, and present needs.⁠<a id="FNanchor_77_77" href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> +For the honour of these thinkers—I mean for the +honour of their consistency—one likes to think that +their indignation in 1914 was not the result of any moral +conviction, but only of the desire to place the enemy of +their nation in the wrong with a naïve universe.</p> + +<p>This last-named activity of the ‘clerks’ seems to +me one of those which best display their determination +<span class="pagenum" id="p_76">[76]</span>and skill in serving the passions of the laymen. If a +man exhorts his compatriots to recognize only a personal +morality and to reject all universal morality, he is showing +himself a master of the art of encouraging them to want +to be distinct from all other men, i.e. of the art of perfecting +national passion in them, at least in one of its aspects. +The desire to take none but oneself as a judge of one’s +actions and to scorn every opinion of other people is +undoubtedly a source of strength to a nation, as every +exertion of pride is a source of strength to an institution, +whose fundamental principle—whatever may be said +to the contrary—is the assertion of an ego against a +non-ego. What ruined Germany in the last war was +not its ‘irritating arrogance’, as is asserted by certain +visionaries who have made up their minds that +malevolence of soul must be an element of weakness +in practical life, but the fact that its material strength +was not equal to its arrogance. When arrogance finds +an equivalent material power at its disposal, it is very +far from ruining nations; witness Rome and the Prussia +of Bismarck. The ‘clerks’ who, thirty years ago, +exhorted France to make herself the sole judge of her +own actions and to despise eternal morality, showed +that they possessed in the highest degree the perception +of the national interest, insofar as that interest is wholly +realist and has nothing to do with disinterested passion. +It remains to be seen, once more, whether the function +of the ‘clerks’ is to serve this sort of interests.</p> + +<p>But the modern ‘clerks’ have held up universal +<span class="pagenum" id="p_77">[77]</span>truth to the scorn of mankind, as well as universal +morality. Here the ‘clerks’ have positively shown +genius in their effort to serve the passions of the laymen. +It is obvious that truth is a great impediment to those +who wish to set themselves up as distinct; from the +very moment when they accept truth, it condemns them +to be conscious of themselves in a universal. What a +joy for them to learn that this universal is a mere phantom, +that there exist only particular truths, ‘Lorrain truths, +Provençal truths, Britanny truths, the harmony of +which in the course of centuries constitutes what is +beneficial, respectable, <i>true in France</i>’⁠<a id="FNanchor_78_78" href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> (the neighbour +similarly speaks of what is <i>true in Germany</i>), that in +other words Pascal had the mind of a clown, and that +what is true on one side of the Pyrenees may perfectly +well be error on the other side! Humanity hears the +same teaching about the classes and learns that there +is a bourgeois truth and a working-class truth; better +still, that the functioning of our minds should be different +according to whether we are working men or bourgeois. +The source of your troubles (Sorel teaches the working +classes) is that you do not think in the mental way +suited to your class. His disciple, Johannet, says the +same thing to the capitalist class. Perhaps we shall +soon see the results of this truly supreme art of the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_78">[78]</span>‘clerks’ in exasperating the feeling in their differences +among the classes.</p> + +<p>The cult for the particular and the scorn for the +universal is a reversal of values quite generally characteristic +of the teaching of the modern ‘clerks’, who proclaim +them in a far higher sphere of thought than politics. +The metaphysics adopted in the last twenty years by +almost all those who think or pretend to think, set up +as the supreme state of human consciousness that state—‘duration’—where +we succeed in taking cognizance +of ourselves in what is most individual, most distinct +from everything not ourselves, and in freeing ourselves +from those forms of thought (concept, reason, habits of +speech) through which we can only become conscious +of ourselves in what is common to us and others. These +metaphysics put forward as a superior form of cognizance +of the world that which grasps each thing by what is +unique in it, distinct from every other, and is full of +scorn for the mind which seeks to discover general +states of being. Our age has seen a fact hitherto unknown, +at least from my point of view; and this in metaphysics +preaching adoration for the contingent, and scorn for +the eternal.⁠<a id="FNanchor_79_79" href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> Nothing could show better how profound +<span class="pagenum" id="p_79">[79]</span>is the modern ‘clerk’s’ desire to exalt the real, the +practical side of existence, and to degrade the ideal, +the truly metaphysical side. In the history of philosophy +this veneration for the individual comes from the German +thinkers (Schlegel, Nietzsche, Lotze), while the metaphysical +cult of the universal (added to a certain contempt +for the experimental) is pre-eminently a legacy of Greece +to the human mind. So here again, and moreover in +its profoundest part, the teaching of the modern ‘clerks’ +shows the triumph of Germanic values and the bankruptcy +of Hellenism.</p> + +<p>I should like to point out another form, not the least +remarkable, which this preaching of particularism +assumes among the ‘clerks’. I mean their exhortations +to consider everything only as it exists <i>in time</i>, that is +as it constitutes a succession of particular states, a +‘becoming’, a ‘history’, and never as it presents a +state of permanence beyond time under this succession +of distinct cases. I mean especially their assertion that +this view of things in their historical aspect is the only +serious and philosophical view, and that the need to +look at them in their eternal aspect is a form of the child’s +taste for ghosts, and should be merely smiled at. Need +I point out that this conception inspires the whole of +modern thought? It exists among a whole group of +literary critics, who, on their own showing, inquire far +less whether a work is beautiful than whether it expresses +<span class="pagenum" id="p_80">[80]</span>‘the present’ aspirations of ‘the contemporary soul’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_80_80" href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> +It may be seen in a whole school of moralist-historians +who admire a doctrine, not because it is just or good, but +because it embodies the morality <i>of its time</i>, the scientific +spirit <i>of its time</i>. (This is the principal reason why Sorel +admires Bergsonism and why Nietzsche admires the +philosophy of Nicolas de Cuse.) It may be seen especially +in all our metaphysicians. Whether they put forward +<i>Entwickelung</i> or <i>Duration</i> or <i>Creative Evolution</i> or +<i>Pluralism</i> or <i>Integral Experience</i> or the <i>Concrete Universal</i>, +they all teach that the absolute is developed <i>in time</i>, +in the circumstantial, and proclaim the decadence of +that form of mind which, from Plato to Kant, hallows +existence as conceived beyond change.⁠<a id="FNanchor_81_81" href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> If, with +Pythagoras, we assume that the Cosmos is the place of +regulated and uniform existence, and the Ouranos the +place of the becoming and the moving, we may say that +all modern metaphysics place the Ouranos at the top +of their scale of values and hold the Cosmos in very +slight esteem. Is it not remarkable to see the ‘clerks’, +even in the lofty function of metaphysicians, teaching +the laymen that the real alone is worthy of consideration, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_81">[81]</span>and that the supersensible is only worthy of derisive +laughter?⁠<a id="FNanchor_82_82" href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p> + + +<p>(<i>B</i>) <i>The ‘clerks’ praise attachment to the practical, and +denounce love of the spiritual</i></p> + +<p>But the ‘clerks’ with their doctrines have inflamed +the realism of the laymen in other ways besides praising +the particular and denouncing the universal. At the +very top of the scale of moral values they place the +possession of concrete advantages, of material power +and the means by which they are procured; and they +hold up to scorn the pursuit of truly spiritual advantages, +of non-practical or disinterested values.</p> + +<p>This they have done, first of all, as regards the State. +For twenty centuries the ‘clerks’ preached to the +world that the State should be just; now they proclaim +that the State should be strong and should care nothing +about being just. (Remember the attitude of the chief +French teachers during the Dreyfus affair.) Convinced +that the strength of the State depends upon authority, +they defend autocratic systems, arbitrary government, +the reason of State, the religions which teach blind +<span class="pagenum" id="p_82">[82]</span>submission to authority, and they cannot sufficiently +denounce all institutions based on liberty and discussion.⁠<a id="FNanchor_83_83" href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> +This denunciation of liberalism, notably by the vast +majority of contemporary men of letters, will be one +of the things in this age most astonishing to History, +especially on the part of the French. With their eyes +fixed on the powerful State, they have praised the State +disciplined in the Prussian manner, where everyone has +his post, and under orders from above, labours for the +greatness of the nation, without there being any place +left for particular wills.⁠<a id="FNanchor_84_84" href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> Owing to their cult of the +powerful State (and also for other reasons I shall mention +later), they want the military element to preponderate +in the State, they want it to have a right to privileges +and they want the civil element to agree to this right. +(See <i>L’Appel au Soldat</i>, and the declarations of numerous +writers during the Dreyfus affair.) It is certainly something +new to see men of thought preaching the abasement +of the toga before the sword, especially in the country +of Montesquieu and Renan. And then they preach +that the State should be strong and contemptuous of +justice, above all in its relations with other States. To +this end they praise in the head of the State the will to +aggrandisement, the desire for ‘strong frontiers’, the +effort to keep his neighbours under his domination. +And they glorify those means which to them seem likely +<span class="pagenum" id="p_83">[83]</span>to attain these ends, i.e. sudden aggression, trickery, +bad faith, contempt for treaties. This apology for +Machiavellianism has inspired all the German historians +for the past fifty years, and in France it is professed by +very influential teachers, who exhort France to venerate +her Kings because they are supposed to have been models +of the purely practical spirit, exempt from all respect +for any silly justice in their relations with their neighbours.</p> + +<p>The novelty of this attitude among the ‘clerks’ +can best be displayed by quoting the famous answer of +Socrates to the realist in the <i>Georgias</i>:</p> + +<p>‘In the persons of Themistocles, Cimon and Pericles, +you praise men who made their fellow citizens good +cheer, by serving them with everything they desired +without caring to teach them what is good and right +in food. They have enlarged the State, cry the Athenians, +but they do not see that this enlargement is nothing but +a swelling, a tumour filled with corruption. This is all +that has been achieved by these former politicians by +filling the city with ports, arsenals, walls, tributes, and +the like follies, and by not adding Temperance and +Justice.’</p> + +<p>Up to our own times, in theory at least (but it is +with theories I am dealing here) the supremacy of the +spiritual proclaimed in those words has been adopted by +all those who, explicitly or otherwise, have proposed a +scale of values to the world, whether through the Church, +or the Renaissance, or the eighteenth century. One can +<span class="pagenum" id="p_84">[84]</span>guess the derisive laughter of a Barrès or any Italian +moralist (to speak only of the Latin races) at this disdain +of power for the benefit of justice, and their severity for +the manner in which this son of Athens judges those +who made his city materially powerful. For Socrates, +in this respect the perfect model of the ‘clerk’ who is +faithful to his essential function, ports, arsenals, walls +are ‘follies’, and the serious things are justice and +temperance. Those who to-day should perform the +duties of a Socrates consider that it is justice which is a +folly—‘a cloud’—and the serious things are the +arsenals, the walls. To-day the ‘clerk’ has made himself +Minister of War. Moreover, one of the most revered +modern moralists definitely approves of the judges who +condemned Socrates, as good guardians of worldly +interests.⁠<a id="FNanchor_85_85" href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> And that is something which has not +been seen among the educators of the human soul +since the evening when Crito closed his master’s +eyelids.</p> + +<p>I say that the modern ‘clerks’ have <i>preached</i> that the +State should be strong and care nothing about being +just; and in fact the ‘clerks’ do give this assertion +the characteristic of preaching, of moral teaching. +I cannot insist too often that in this lies their great +originality. When Machiavelli advises the Prince to +carry out the Machiavellian scheme of action, he invests +those actions with no sort of morality or beauty. For +him morality remains what it is for everyone else, and +<span class="pagenum" id="p_85">[85]</span>does not cease to remain so because he observes (not +without melancholy) that it is incompatible with politics. +‘The Prince,’ says Machiavelli, ‘must have an understanding +always ready to do good, but he must be able +to enter into evil when he is forced to do so’; thereby +showing that for him evil, even if it aids politics, still +remains evil. The modern realists are the <i>moralists</i> of +realism. For them, the act which makes the State strong +is invested with a moral character by the fact that it +does so, and this whatever the act may be. The evil +which serves politics ceases to be evil and becomes good. +This position is evident in Hegel, in the Pangermanists +and in Barrès; it is no less evident among realists like +M. Maurras and his disciples, in spite of their insistence +in declaring that they profess no morality. Perhaps +these teachers do not profess any morality, at least +expressly, in what concerns private life, but they very +clearly profess a morality in the political order of things, +if by morality is meant everything which puts forward +a scale of good and evil. For them as for Hegel, the +practical in politics <i>is the moral</i>, and if what the rest of +the world calls moral is in opposition to the practical, +then <i>it is the immoral</i>. Such precisely is the perfectly +moralist meaning of the famous campaign of ‘false +patriotism’. It seems as if we might say that for +M. Maurras the practical is the divine, and that his +‘atheism’ consists less in denying God than in shifting +Him to man and his political work. I think I can +describe the work of this writer accurately by saying +<span class="pagenum" id="p_86">[86]</span>that it is the <i>divinizing of politics</i>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_86_86" href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> This displacement +of morality is undoubtedly the most important achievement +of the modern ‘clerks’, and the most deserving +of the historian’s attention. It is a great turning-point +in the history of man when those who speak in the name +of pondered thought come and tell him that his political +egotisms are divine, and that everything which labours +to relax them is degrading. The results of this teaching +were shown by the example of Germany a decade ago.⁠<a id="FNanchor_87_87" href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a></p> + +<p>The extent to which the modern ‘clerks’ have made +innovations may be judged by the fact that up till our +own times men had only received two sorts of teaching +in what concerns the relations between politics and +morality. One was Plato’s, and it said: ‘Morality +<span class="pagenum" id="p_87">[87]</span>decides politics’; the other was Machiavelli’s, and it +said: ‘Politics have nothing to do with morality.’ +To-day they receive a third. M. Maurras teaches: +‘Politics decide morality.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_88_88" href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> However, the real departure +is not that this doctrine should be put before them, but +that they should accept it. Callicles asserted that force +is the only morality; but the thinking world despised +him. Let me also mention that Machiavelli was covered +with insults by most of the moralists of his time, at least +in France.</p> + +<p>The modern world also hearkens to other moralists +of realism, who are not lacking in influence as such; +I mean the statesmen. Here I shall point to the same +sort of change as above. Formerly, leaders of States +practised realism, but did not honour it; Louis XI, +Charles the Fifth of Spain, Richelieu, Louis XIV, did +not claim that their actions were moral. They saw +morality where the Gospel had showed it to them, and +they did not attempt to displace it because they did +not apply it.⁠<a id="FNanchor_89_89" href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> With them morality was violated, but +moral notions remain intact; <i>and that is why, in spite of +<span class="pagenum" id="p_88">[88]</span>all their violence, they did not disturb civilization</i>. Signor +Mussolini proclaims the morality of his politics of force +and the immorality of everything which opposes it. +Like the writer, the man of government, who formerly +was merely a realist, is now the <i>apostle</i> of realism; and +the majesty of his function—if not of his person—gives +weight to his apostleship.</p> + +<p>The modern governor, owing to the fact that he +addresses crowds, is compelled to be a moralist, and to +present his acts as bound up with a system of morality, +a metaphysics, a mysticism. Richelieu, who need +account only to his King, is able to talk only of the +practical, and leaves visions of the eternal to others. +Mussolini, Bethmann-Hollweg, Herriot, are condemned +to these heights.⁠<a id="FNanchor_90_90" href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> Moreover, this shows how great +to-day is the number of those whom I can call ‘clerks’, +since by that word I mean all those who speak to the +world in a transcendental manner. Consequently, I +have a right to demand that they give an account of their +acts <i>as ‘clerks’</i>.</p> + +<p>The preachers of political realism often claim to base +themselves on the teaching of the Church, and call +her a hypocrite when she condemns their theses. This +<span class="pagenum" id="p_89">[89]</span>claim has little foundation as regards the teaching of +the Church before the nineteenth century, but has +much more foundation if we consider the present age. +I doubt whether one could now find from the pen of +a modern theologian any passage so brutally denunciatory +of a war of aggression as the following:—</p> + +<p>‘Glaringly unjust is the war of him who declares +war only from ambition and from the desire to extend +his dominions beyond their legitimate boundaries, from +the desire to possess a more commodious country in +which to establish himself, from the fear of the great +power of a neighbouring prince with whom he is at peace, +or from the desire to despoil a rival solely because he +is thought unworthy of the possessions or States he holds +or of a right which legitimately belongs to him, because +a ruler is inconvenienced by him and wants to get rid +of this inconvenience by force of arms.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_91_91" href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> On the other +hand, there are an immense number of works to-day +which need only a little twisting to make them justify +every attempt at conquest. For instance, the view that +a war is just ‘if it can invoke the necessity of safeguarding +the common good and public tranquillity, the recapture +of things unjustly carried off, the repression of rebels, +the defence of the innocent’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_92_92" href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> And the view which +<span class="pagenum" id="p_90">[90]</span>asserts that ‘war is just when it is necessary to a nation +either to defend itself against invasion, or <i>to overthrow +the obstacles thwarting the exercise of its rights</i>.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_93_93" href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> At the +beginning of the last century the Church still taught +that war could only be just for one of the two belligerents.⁠<a id="FNanchor_94_94" href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> +It is heavy with consequences that she has now abandoned +this position and to-day asserts that war may be just on +both sides at once, ‘from the moment when each of +the two adversaries, without being certain of its right, +considers it as simply probable after having taken the +opinion of its counsellors’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_95_95" href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> Here is another serious +thing: In the past, war would only be declared just +when it was against an adversary who had committed +an injury <i>accompanied by a moral intention</i>, whereas +to-day it may be declared just if it is directed against +a material injury caused without any malice,⁠<a id="FNanchor_96_96" href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> for +instance, an accidental violation of frontier. It is +certain that to-day Napoleon and Bismarck could find +<span class="pagenum" id="p_91">[91]</span>in the teaching of the Church more justification than +ever for their incursions.⁠<a id="FNanchor_97_97" href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a></p> + +<p>The modern ‘clerks’ have preached this realism +to the classes as well as to the nations. They say to the +working class as well as to the bourgeois class: ‘Organize +yourselves, become the stronger, seize on power or exert +yourself to retain it if you already possess it; laugh at +all efforts to bring more charity, more justice or any other +“rot”⁠<a id="FNanchor_98_98" href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> into your relations with the other class, you +have been cheated long enough by that sort of thing.’ +And here again they do not say: ‘Become so, because +necessity demands it,’ they say, and that is the novelty +of it: ‘Become so, because morality, aesthetics demand +it; to wish to be powerful is the sign of an elevated soul, +to wish to be just the sign of a base soul.’ This is the +teaching of Nietzsche,⁠<a id="FNanchor_99_99" href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> of Sorel, applauded by a whole +thinking (so-called) Europe; this is the enthusiasm of +Europe, when it is attracted by Socialism, for the doctrines +of Marx, its scorn for the doctrines of Proudhon.⁠<a id="FNanchor_100_100" href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> The +<span class="pagenum" id="p_92">[92]</span>‘clerks’ have said the same thing to the parties contending +within the same nation. ‘Make yourself the +stronger,’ they say to one or other, according to their +own passion, ‘and do away with everything which +obstructs you; free yourself from the foolish prejudice +which exhorts you to make allowances for your adversary, +to establish with him a system of justice and harmony.’ +We all know the admiration professed by a whole army +of ‘thinkers’ in all countries for the Italian government, +which simply outlaws all citizens who do not approve +of it. Until our own times the educators of the human +soul, disciples of Aristotle, urged mankind to denounce +as infamous any State which was an organized faction. +The pupils of Signor Mussolini and M. Maurras learn +to reverence such a State.⁠<a id="FNanchor_101_101" href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a></p> + +<p>This extolling of the ‘strong State’ by the modern +‘clerks’ appears also in certain teachings which, it +may be asserted, would greatly have amazed their +ancestors, at least the great ones:—</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>The affirmation of the rights of custom, history, the +past</i> (to the extent, be it understood, that they support +the systems of force) in opposition to the rights of reason. +I say the affirmation of the <i>rights</i> of custom. The modern +traditionalists do not simply teach, like Descartes or +Malebranche, that custom is upon the whole quite a +good thing, and that there is more wisdom in submitting +<span class="pagenum" id="p_93">[93]</span>to it than opposing it. They teach that custom has a +right, <i>the</i> right, and consequently that custom should +be respected not only from the point of view of interest, +but of justice. The arguments in favour of the ‘historical +right’ of Germany to Alsace, the ‘historical right’ +of the French monarchy, are not purely political positions, +they are moral positions. They claim to be accepted +in the name of ‘true justice’, of which (they say) their +adversaries have a false conception.⁠<a id="FNanchor_102_102" href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> To determine +what is just by the ‘accomplished fact’ is certainly a +new sort of teaching, especially among the peoples who +for twenty centuries derived their conception of what is +just from the companions of Socrates. Here again, the +soul of Greece has given place to the soul of Prussia +among the educators of mankind. The spirit which +speaks here—and from all the teachers of Europe, +Mediterranean as well as Germanic—is the spirit of +Hegel: ‘The history of the world is the justice of the +world.’ (<i>Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht.</i>)</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) The extolling of <i>policy founded on experience</i>—by +which is meant that a society should be governed on +principles which have proved that they can make it +strong, and by ‘illusions’ which would tend to make it +just. It is in this narrowly practical sense that the cult +<span class="pagenum" id="p_94">[94]</span>of experimental politics is a new thing among the +‘clerks’. For if we mean by the phrase the respect +for principles which have showed that they are fitted +to make a society not only strong but just, the recommendation +of such a policy in opposition to a purely +rational policy appeared in the thinking world long +before the disciples of Taine or Auguste Comte.⁠<a id="FNanchor_103_103" href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> Long +before our ‘organizing empiricists’ Spinoza wanted +political science to be an experimental science, and desired +that the conditions under which States endure should +be sought from observation at least as much as from +reason. (See his attack on the Utopians, <i>Treatise</i>, I, i.) +But he believed he learned from observation that these +conditions do not solely consist in States possessing +good armies and obedient peoples, but in their respecting +the rights of citizens and even of neighbouring peoples.⁠<a id="FNanchor_104_104" href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> +The cult of experimental politics to-day is accompanied +in those who adopt it by a posture which they evidently +mean to be striking, and which in fact is so. We all +know with what fatalistic visages, what scornful inflexibility, +what dark certainty of grasping the absolute, they +declare that in matters of politics ‘they consider only +the facts’. Here, especially among the French thinkers, +is a new kind of Romanticism, which I shall call the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_95">[95]</span><i>Romanticism of Positivism</i>, the chief representatives of +which will rise up in the imagination of my readers without +its being necessary for me to name them. Moreover, +this cult brings out a silliness of mind which to me seems +wholly an acquisition of the nineteenth century,⁠<a id="FNanchor_105_105" href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> i.e. the +belief that the teachings to be drawn from the past +(supposing that they exist) will come straight out of an +examination of the <i>facts</i>, viz. desires which have been +realized. As if the desires which have not been realized +were not as important, and perhaps more important, if +you reflect that they may quite well come to fill the +world’s stage now.⁠<a id="FNanchor_106_106" href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a> Let me add that this cult of fact +also claims to be the sole discoverer of ‘the meaning +of history’ and ‘the philosophy of history’, which +there again shows a weakness of mind from which the +preceding ages seem to have been free. When Bossuet +and Hegel built up philosophies of history they were +certainly no more metaphysicians than Taine or Comte +or any of their noisy disciples, but at least they knew +that they were so, that they could not be otherwise, and +were not so naïve as to think themselves ‘pure scientists’.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_96">[96]</span></p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) The assertion that political forms should be +adapted to ‘man as he is and always will be’ (viz. +unsocial and bloody, therefore eternally needing +systems of coercion and military institutions). This +effort of so many modern teachers to assert the imperfectability +of human nature appears as one of their strangest +attitudes, if you realize that it tends towards nothing +less than asserting the complete uselessness of their +function, and proving that they have completely ceased +to realize its very essence. When we see moralists, +educators, professional providers of spiritual guidance, +assert at the spectacle of human barbarism that ‘man +is thus’, that ‘he must be taken thus’, that ‘you will +never change him’, we are tempted to ask them what +is their reason for existing. And when we hear them +reply that ‘they are positive minds and not Utopians’, +‘that they are concerned with what is, not with what +might be’, we are staggered to see that they do not +know that the moralist is essentially a Utopian, and that +the nature of moral action is precisely that it creates its +object by affirming it. But we recover when we notice +that they are in no wise ignorant of this, and know +perfectly well that by affirming it they will create that +eternity of barbarism necessary to the maintenance of +the institutions which are dear to them.⁠<a id="FNanchor_107_107" href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a></p> + +<p>The dogma of the incurable wickedness of man has +<span class="pagenum" id="p_97">[97]</span>another root among some who profess it. This is a +Romantic pleasure in picturing the human race as walled +in by an inevitable and eternal woe. From this point +of view we may say that there has grown up among +certain political writers of our time a real <i>Romanticism of +Pessimism</i>, as false in its absoluteness as the Optimism +of Rousseau and Michelet, in hatred of whom it has +arisen, while its haughty and so-called scientific attitude +is most impressive to simple souls.⁠<a id="FNanchor_108_108" href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> This doctrine has +undoubtedly borne fruits outside the world of literature, +and at its voice there has arisen a humanity which +believes in nothing but its egotisms and merely laughs +at the naïve persons who still think that it might become +better. The modern ‘clerk’ has accomplished a truly +new work—he has taught man to deny his divinity. +The import of such a work is obvious. The Stoics +claimed that pain is abolished if it is denied; the thing +is disputable in the matter of pain, but it is absolutely +true in the matter of moral perfectability.</p> + +<p>I shall point out two more teachings inspired in the +modern ‘clerks’, by their preaching of the ‘strong +State’, and it will not be necessary to add that they +are new in the ministers of the spiritual:—</p> + +<p>The first is the teaching whereby they declare to Man +that he is great to the extent that he strives to act and +<span class="pagenum" id="p_98">[98]</span>to think as his ancestors, his race, his environment +thought, and ignores ‘individualism’. Thirty years +ago many of the French teachers hurled anathemas +against the man who ‘claimed to seek truth for himself’, +to arrive at his own opinion, instead of adopting the +opinion of his nation which had been told what it ought +to think by its vigilant leaders. Our age has seen priests +of the mind teaching that the gregarious is the praiseworthy +form of thought, and that independent thought +is contemptible. It is moreover certain that a group +which desires to be strong has no use for the man who +claims to think for himself.⁠<a id="FNanchor_109_109" href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a></p> + +<p>The second is the teaching whereby they declare to +men that the fact that a group is numerous constitutes +a right. This is the morality which the over-populated +nations hear from many of their thinkers, while the +other nations hear from many of theirs that if their low +birth-rate continues they will become the objects of a +‘legitimate’ extermination. The rights of numerousness +admitted by men who claim to belong to the life of the +mind—that is what modern humanity sees. But it is +certain that if a nation is to be strong, it must be numerous.</p> + +<p>This cult of the strong State and the moral methods +which ensure it have been preached to mankind by the +‘clerks’ far beyond the domain of politics, and on a +wholly general plane. This is the preaching of <i>Pragmatism</i> +<span class="pagenum" id="p_99">[99]</span>whose teaching during the past fifty years by +nearly all the influential moralists of Europe is one of the +most remarkable turning points in the moral history +of the human species. It is impossible to exaggerate +the importance of a movement whereby those who for +twenty centuries taught Man that the criterion of the +morality of an act is its disinterestedness, that good is a +decree of his reason insofar as it is universal, that his +will is only moral if it seeks its law outside its objects, +should begin to teach him that the moral act is the act +whereby he secures his existence against an environment +which disputes it, that his will is moral insofar as it is a will +‘to power’, that the part of his soul which determines +what is good is its ‘will to live’ wherein it is most +‘hostile to all reason’, that the morality of an act is +measured by its adaptation to its end, and that the only +morality is the morality of circumstances. The +educators of the human mind now take sides with +Callicles against Socrates, a revolution which I dare +to say seems to me more important than all political +upheavals.⁠<a id="FNanchor_110_110" href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a></p> + +<p>I should like to point out certain particularly remarkable +aspects of this preaching, which are probably not +sufficiently realized.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_100">[100]</span></p> + +<p>I said that the modern ‘clerks’ teach man that his +desires are moral insofar as they tend to secure his +existence at the expense of an environment which +disputes it. In particular they teach him that his species +is sacred insofar as it is able to assert its existence at the +expense of the surrounding world.⁠<a id="FNanchor_111_111" href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> In other words, +the old morality told Man that he is divine to the extent +that he becomes one with the universe; the new morality +tells him that he is divine to the extent that he is in +opposition to it. The former exhorted him not to set +himself in Nature ‘like an empire within an empire’; +the latter exhorts him to say with the fallen angels of +Holy Writ, ‘We desire now to feel conscious of ourselves +in ourselves, and not in God.’ The former, like +the master of the <i>Contemplations</i>, said: ‘Believe, but +not in ourselves’; the latter replies with Nietzsche +and Maurras: ‘Believe, and believe in ourselves, only +ourselves.’</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the real originality of Pragmatism is not +in that. Christianity exhorted man to set himself up +against Nature, but did so in the name of his spiritual +and disinterested attributes: Pragmatism exhorts him +to do so in the name of his practical attributes. Formerly +man was divine because he had been able to acquire +the concept of justice, the idea of law, the sense of God; +to-day he is divine because he has been able to create an +equipment which makes him the master of matter. (See +<span class="pagenum" id="p_101">[101]</span>the glorifications of the <i>homo faber</i> by Nietzsche, Sorel, +Bergson.)</p> + +<p>Moreover, the modern ‘clerks’ extol Christianity +insofar as it is supposed to have been pre-eminently a +school of practical, creative virtues, adjusted to the +support of the great human institutions. This amazing +deformation of a doctrine which in its precepts is so +obviously devoted to the love of the spiritual alone, +is not only taught by laymen, who are quite within their +rights in trying to place their practical desires under +the patronage of the highest moral authorities; it is +also professed by the ministers of Jesus themselves. +Pragmatist Christianity, as I mean it here, is preached +to-day from all Christian pulpits.⁠<a id="FNanchor_112_112" href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a></p> + +<p>This exhortation to concrete advantages and to that +form of soul which procures them, is expressed by the +modern ‘clerk’ in another very remarkable teaching: +By praise of the military life and the feelings which go +with it, and by contempt for civil life and the morality +it implies. We know the doctrine preached in Europe +during the past fifty years by its most esteemed moralists, +their apology for war ‘which purifies’, their veneration +for the man of arms ‘the archtype of moral beauty’, +their proclamation of the supreme morality of ‘violence’ +or of those who settle their differences by duels and +not before a jury, while they declare that respect for +contracts is the ‘weapon of the weak’, the need for +<span class="pagenum" id="p_102">[102]</span>justice the ‘characteristic of slaves’. It is not betraying +the disciples of Nietzsche or Sorel—that is, the great +majority of contemporary men of letters who attempt to +set up a scale of moral values for the world—to say that +according to them Colleoni is a far superior specimen +of humanity to l’Hôpital. The estimates of the <i>Voyage +du Condottiere</i> are not peculiar to the author of that +work. Here is an idealization of practical activity, +which humanity had never before heard from its educators, +at least from those who speak dogmatically.</p> + +<p>I shall be told that Nietzsche and his school do not +extol the military life because it procures material +advantages, but on the contrary, because it is the type +of disinterested realism, and in opposition to the realism +which in their opinion is the characteristic of civilian +life. Yet it is none the less true that the way of life +praised by these moralists is in fact that which pre-eminently +brings material advantages. Whatever may +be said by the author of <i>Reflections on Violence</i> and his +disciples, war is more profitable than the counting house; +to take is more advantageous than to exchange; Colleoni +possesses more than Franklin. (Naturally, I am speaking +of the successful military man, since Nietzsche and +Sorel never speak of the merchant who goes bankrupt.)</p> + +<p>Moreover, no one will deny that the irrational activities, +of which the military instinct is only one aspect, are +extolled by their great modern apostles for their practical +value. Their historian has put it admirably: The +<span class="pagenum" id="p_103">[103]</span>Romanticism of Nietzsche, Sorel, and Bergson is a +<i>utilitarian</i> Romanticism.</p> + +<p>Let me insist that what I am pointing to here, is not +the modern ‘clerk’s’ extolling of the military spirit, +but of the warlike instinct. It is the cult of the warlike +instinct, outside all social spirit of discipline or sacrifice +which is meant by the following assertions of Nietzsche, +glorified by a French moralist whom himself has numerous +followers:—</p> + +<p>‘The values of the warrior aristocracy are founded +on a powerful bodily constitution, excellent health, +without forgetting all that is necessary to the upkeep +of that overflowing vigour—war, adventure, hunting, +dancing, physical games and exercises, and in general +everything which implies a robust, free and joyous +activity.’</p> + +<p>‘That audacity of noble races, a mad, absurd, spontaneous +audacity ... their indifference and scorn for +all safety of body, for life, comfort ...’</p> + +<p>‘The superb blond beast wandering in search of +prey and carnage ...’</p> + +<p>‘The terrible gaiety and profound joy felt by heroes +in all destruction, in all the pleasures of victory and +cruelty.’</p> + +<p>The moralist who quotes those remarks (Sorel, +<i>Reflexions sur la Violence</i>, p. 360) adds, in order to leave +no doubt about his recommendation of them to his fellow +human beings: ‘It is quite evident that liberty would +be seriously compromised if men came to look upon the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_104">[104]</span>Homeric values’ (which, for him, are the values just +praised by Nietzsche) ‘as being characteristic of the +barbarous peoples only.’</p> + +<p>Is it necessary to observe how, here again, the moral +presentation dominant among the world’s educators is +essentially Germanic, and shows the bankruptcy of Graeco-Roman +thought? Before our times you do not find in +France a single serious moralist (including de Maistre) +or even a poet (if you consider only the great ones) who +praises the ‘pleasures of victory and cruelty’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_113_113" href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> And it +is the same for ancient Rome, among the nations to whom +war had given world supremacy. I do not find a single +passage which puts forward the instincts of prey as the +supreme form of human morality in Cicero, Seneca, or +Tacitus, or even in Virgil, Ovid, Lucan, and Claudian. +On the other hand, I find a great many which attribute +this rank to the instincts on which civil life is based.⁠<a id="FNanchor_114_114" href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> +Moreover, in primitive Greece, long before the +philosophers, the myths very soon give an important +place to civil morality. In a poem of Hesiod the tomb +of Cycnus is engulfed in the waters by Apollo’s command, +because Cycnus was a brigand. The defence of warlike +instincts by Mediterranean moralists will be one of +the amazements of history. Some of them, moreover, +seem uneasy about it, and feel they ought to claim that +<span class="pagenum" id="p_105">[105]</span>the Homeric values (we have seen what they mean by +that) ‘are very close to the values of Corneille’⁠<a id="FNanchor_115_115" href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a>—as +if the French poet’s heroes, with all their sense of +devotion to duty and the State, had anything in common +with lovers of adventure, prey, and carnage!</p> + +<p>It will be observed that these passages from Nietzsche +praise the military life apart from any political aim.⁠<a id="FNanchor_116_116" href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> +And, in fact, the modern ‘clerks’ teach men that war +implies a morality <i>in itself</i> and should be exercised even +apart from any utility. This thesis, so familiar in Barrès, +has been defended in its full splendour by a young hero +who is an educator of the soul for a whole French +generation:</p> + +<p>‘In my country we love war and secretly desire it. +We have always made war. Not to conquer a province, +not to exterminate a nation, not to settle a conflict of +interests.... We make war for the sake of making +war, with no other purpose.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_117_117" href="#Footnote_117_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a></p> + +<p>The old French moralists, even the soldiers (Vauvenargues, +Vigny), looked upon war as a sad necessity; +<span class="pagenum" id="p_106">[106]</span>their descendants recommend it as a noble inutility. +Yet, here again, the cult preached as apart from the +practical and as an art happens to be eminently favourable +to the practical—useless war is the best preparation for +useful war.</p> + +<p>This teaching leads the modern ‘clerk’ (we have +just seen it in Nietzsche) to confer a <i>moral</i> value upon +physical exercise and to proclaim <i>the morality of sport</i>—a +most remarkable thing indeed among those who for +twenty centuries have exhorted man to situate good in +states of the mind. The moralists of sport, moreover, +do not all shuffle over the practical essence of their +doctrine. Young people, Barrès clearly teaches, should +be trained in physical strength, for the greatness of the +country. The modern educator goes for his inspiration, +not to those who strolled in the Lyceum or to the solitaries +of Clairvaux, but to the founder of a little town in the +Peloponnesus. Moreover, our age has seen this new thing: +Men who claim to belong to the spiritual life teaching +that the Greece to venerate is Sparta with her gymnasiums, +not the city of Plato or Praxiteles, while others maintain +that in antiquity we should honour Rome and not Greece. +All these things are perfectly consistent in those who +desire to preach to humanity nothing but strong constitutions +and solid ramparts.⁠<a id="FNanchor_118_118" href="#Footnote_118_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_107">[107]</span></p> + +<p>The preaching of realism leads the modern ‘Clerk’ +to certain teachings, whose novelty in his history is not +sufficiently noticed, nor what a break they form with the +teaching which his class has given to men for the past +two thousand years.</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>The extolling of courage</i>, or more precisely the +exhortation to make the supreme virtue Man’s aptitude +to face death, while all other virtues, however lofty, are +placed below it. This teaching, openly the teaching of +Nietzsche, Sorel, Péguy, Barrès, was always the teaching +of poets and generals, but is entirely new among the +‘clerks’, I mean among men who put before the world +a scale of values in the name of philosophical reflection, +or who are willing to be considered as such. From +Socrates to Renan they had considered courage as a +virtue, but on a lower plane. All, more or less openly, +teach with Plato: ‘In the first rank of virtue are wisdom +and temperance; courage only comes afterwards.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_119_119" href="#Footnote_119_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> +<span class="pagenum" id="p_108">[108]</span>The impulses they exhort man to venerate are not those +whereby he strives to quench his thirst for placing himself +in the real, but those whereby he moderates it. It was +reserved for our time to see the priests of the spiritual +placing in the first rank of forms of soul that which is +indispensable to man if he is to conquer and to lay +foundations.⁠<a id="FNanchor_120_120" href="#Footnote_120_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> However, this practical value of courage, +plainly expressed by Nietzsche and Sorel, is not equally +so expressed by all the modern moralists who praise +this virtue. This brings another of their teachings +before us:—</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>The extolling of honour</i>, by which is meant all +those impulses which cause a man to risk his life for no +practical interest—to be precise, from desire of glory—<i>but +which are an excellent school of practical courage</i>, and +were always extolled by those who lead men to the +conquest of material things. In this connection, let the +reader think of the respect in which the institution of +the duel has always been held in armies, in spite of +certain repressions inspired solely by practical +considerations.⁠<a id="FNanchor_121_121" href="#Footnote_121_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_109">[109]</span></p> + +<p>Here again, the position attributed to these impulses +by so many modern moralists is something new among +them, especially in the country of Montaigne, Pascal, +La Bruyère, Montesquieu, Voltaire and Renan, who, +when they extol honour, mean something very different +from man’s cult of his own glory.⁠<a id="FNanchor_122_122" href="#Footnote_122_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> Nevertheless, the +most remarkable thing about all this is that the cult +of man for his own glory is currently preached by the +Churchmen as a virtue which leads Man to God. Is it +not amazing to hear words like the following from a +Christian pulpit? ‘The love of grandeurs is the path +to God, and the heroic impulse which fully coincides +with the search for glories in their cause, permits him +who had forgotten God or who thought he knew not +God to re-invent Him, to discover this last summit +after temporary ascents have rendered him accustomed +to the dizziness and air of altitudes.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_123_123" href="#Footnote_123_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> One cannot +<span class="pagenum" id="p_110">[110]</span>forebear quoting the lesson given by a true disciple of +Jesus to a Christian teacher who had also strangely +forgotten his Master’s word:—</p> + +<p>‘Have you noticed that the eight Beatitudes, the +Sermon on the Mount, the Gospels, the whole of +primitive Christian literature, contain not one word +which sets military virtues among those which lead to +the Kingdom of Heaven?’ (Renan, <i>First Letter to +Strauss</i>.)⁠<a id="FNanchor_124_124" href="#Footnote_124_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a></p> + +<p>Let me observe that I am not reproaching the Christian +preacher for giving their due to glory and other earthly +passions, I am only reproaching him for trying to pretend +that he is in harmony with his institution when he does +so. We do not ask that the Christian shall not violate +the Christian law; we only ask him to know that he is +breaking it when he does break it. This seems to me +admirably brought out by the remark of Cardinal +Lavigerie who was asked: ‘What would you do, +Eminence, if someone slapped your right cheek?’ and +who replied, ‘I know what I ought to do, but I do +not know what I should do.’ <i>I know what I ought to do</i>, +and therefore what I ought to teach. A man who speaks +in that way may give way to every species of violence, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_111">[111]</span>and yet maintain Christian morality. Here actions +are nothing; the judgment on the actions is everything.</p> + +<p>Must I repeat that I am not deploring the fact that +the cults of honour and courage should be preached to +human beings; I am deploring the fact that they are +preached <i>by the ‘clerks’</i>. Civilization, I repeat, seems +to me possible only if humanity consents to a division +of functions, if side by side with those who carry out the +lay passions and extol the virtues serviceable to them +there exists a class of men who depreciate these passions +and glorify the advantages which are beyond the material. +What I think serious is that this class of men should +cease to perform their office, and that those whose duty +was to quench human pride should extol the same +impulses of soul as the leaders of armies.</p> + +<p>I shall be told that this preaching is imposed on the +‘clerks’, at least in war-time, by the laymen, by the +States, who to-day intend to mobilize all the moral +resources of the nation for their ends.⁠<a id="FNanchor_125_125" href="#Footnote_125_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> But what amazes +me is not so much that I see the ‘clerks’ preaching in +this manner, as to see them do it with such docility, +such absence of disgust, such enthusiasm, such joy.... +The truth is that the ‘clerks’ have become as much +laymen as the laymen themselves.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) <i>The extolling of harshness</i> and the scorn for human +love—pity, charity, benevolence. Here again, the +modern ‘clerks’ are the <i>moralists</i> of realism. They are +not content to remind the world that harshness is +<span class="pagenum" id="p_112">[112]</span>necessary in order ‘to succeed’ and that charity is an +encumbrance, nor have they limited themselves to +preaching to their nation or party what Zarathustra +preached to his disciples: ‘Be hard, be pitiless, and in +this way dominate.’ They proclaim the moral nobility +of harshness and the ignominy of charity. This teaching, +which is the foundation of Nietzsche’s work, need not +surprise one in a country which has not provided the +world with a single great apostle,⁠<a id="FNanchor_126_126" href="#Footnote_126_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> but it is very remarkable +in the land of Vincent de Paul and the defender of +the Calas. Lines like the following, which might be an +extract from the <i>Genealogy of Morals</i>, seem to me something +wholly new coming from the pen of a French +moralist: ‘This perverted pity has degraded love.⁠<a id="FNanchor_127_127" href="#Footnote_127_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> +It has been given the name of charity, and the weak +have received its dew. Night after night the seed of +this calamity has been scattered. It conquers the earth. +It fills the solitary places. In whatever country you go, +you cannot go about for a single day without meeting +this withered face with its commonplace gestures, inspired +by the sole desire of prolonging its shameful life.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_128_128" href="#Footnote_128_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> There +again we can observe how the modern realists have +advanced beyond their predecessors. When Machiavelli +declares that ‘a Prince in order to maintain his power +<span class="pagenum" id="p_113">[113]</span>is forced to govern in a manner contrary to charity and +humanity’, he is simply saying that to act contrary +to charity may be a practical necessity, but he does not +in the least vouch that charity is a degradation of the +soul. This teaching is the contribution of the nineteenth +century to the moral education of mankind.</p> + +<p>Sometimes the modern ‘clerks’ claim that in preaching +inhumanity they are only continuing the teaching of +their great ancestors, particularly of Spinoza on account +of his famous proposition: ‘Pity in itself is bad and +useless in a soul which lives according to reason.’ Is it +necessary to point out that here pity is depreciated, not +to the benefit of inhumanity, but to the benefit of +humanity <i>guided by reason</i>, because reason alone ‘enables +us to give aid to others with certainty’. And Spinoza, +determined to stress the fact that for him pity is only +inferior to reasoned kindness, adds: ‘It must be fully +understood that I am here speaking of the man who +lives by reason. For if a man is never led by reason +or by pity to go to the assistance of others, then assuredly +he deserves the name of inhuman, since he retains no +resemblance to a man.’ Let me add that the apostles of +harshness cannot claim either that they are supported +by the fanatics of justice (Michelet, Proudhon, Renouvier) +who, by sacrificing love to justice, do perhaps end up +in harshness, but not in a joyous harshness which is +precisely the harshness preached by the modern realists, +who say—perhaps rightly—that it is the only fertile kind.⁠<a id="FNanchor_129_129" href="#Footnote_129_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_114">[114]</span></p> + +<p>This extolling of harshness seems to me to have borne +more fruit than any other preaching by the modern +‘clerks’. It is a commonplace that among the great +majority of the (so-called) thinking young men, in +France for instance, harshness is to-day an object of +respect, while human love in all its forms is considered +a rather laughable thing. These young men have a cult +for doctrines which respect nothing but force, pay no +attention to the lamentations of suffering and proclaim +the inevitability of war and slavery, while they despise +those who are revolted by such prospects and desire to +alter them. I should like these cults to be compared with +the literary aesthetics of these young men, their veneration +for certain contemporary novelists and poets in +whom the absence of human sympathy reaches a rare +pitch of perfection, and whom they plainly venerate, +especially for that characteristic. And I should like +you to observe the gloomy gravity and arrogance with +which these young men subscribe to these ‘iron’ +doctrines. It seems to me that the modern ‘clerks’ +have created in so-called cultivated society a positive +<i>Romanticism of harshness</i>.</p> + +<p>They have also created a <i>Romanticism of contempt</i>, at +least in France, and notably with Barrès, and indeed +since Flaubert and Baudelaire. Nevertheless, it seems +to me that in recent times contempt has been practised +in France for reasons quite other than aesthetic. These +peoples have come to see that by feeling contempt for +others they are not only obtaining the pleasure of a lofty +<span class="pagenum" id="p_115">[115]</span>attitude, but that when they are really expert in expressing +contempt they harm what they despise, do it a real +damage. And in fact the kind of contempt which +Barrès expresses for the Jews and which certain royalist +teachers have displayed for democratic institutions every +morning for the past twenty years, do really harm their +victims, at least among those very numerous artistic +minds for whom a superbly executory gesture is as good +as an argument. The modern ‘clerks’ deserve a place +of honour in the history of realism; they have come to +understand the practical value of contempt.</p> + +<p>It may also be said that they have created a <i>cult for +cruelty</i>. Nietzsche proclaims that ‘every superior +culture is built up on cruelty’, a doctrine which is +explicitly proclaimed in many places by Barrès, author +of <i>Du sang, de la volupté et de la mort</i>. Nevertheless, +the cult of cruelty, which may also be thought necessary +‘to succeed’⁠<a id="FNanchor_130_130" href="#Footnote_130_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> has remained limited to a few particularly +artistic sensibilities, at least in France. It is very far +from becoming the cult of a school, like harshness and +contempt. Here again we may notice how new this +cult is in the land of those who said ‘Cowardice, the +mother of cruelty’ (Montaigne), or, to quote a military +moralist, ‘a hero does not feel proud of carrying hunger +and misery among foreigners, but of enduring them for +the State; nor of giving death, but of risking it.’ +(Vauvenargues).⁠<a id="FNanchor_131_131" href="#Footnote_131_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_116">[116]</span></p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) <i>The cult of success</i>, I mean the teaching which says +that when a will is successful that fact alone gives it a +moral value, whereas the will which fails is for that reason +alone deserving of contempt. This philosophy which +is professed by many a modern teacher in political life +(it may be said, by all in Germany since Hegel, and by a +large number in France since de Maistre) is also professed +in private life, and has borne its fruits there. In the +so-called thinking world to-day there are innumerable +people who think they are demonstrating their aristocratic +morality by declaring their systematic esteem for all +who ‘succeed’ and their scorn for all who fail. One +moralist places to the credit of Napoleon’s greatness of +soul his contempt for ‘the unlucky’; others do the +same thing in regard to Mazarin, Vauban, Mussolini. +It cannot be denied that the ‘clerks’ are thereby keeping +an excellent school of realism, since the cult of success +and the contempt for misfortune are obviously admirable +moral conditions for obtaining material advantages. +Nor can it be denied that this teaching is entirely new +among them, especially among the ‘clerks’ of the Latin +races, I mean those whose ancestors had taught mankind +to honour merit apart from its achievements, to honour +<span class="pagenum" id="p_117">[117]</span>Hector as much as Achilles, the Curiatii more than +their successful rivals.⁠<a id="FNanchor_132_132" href="#Footnote_132_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a></p> + +<p>We have just seen that the modern moralists extol +the warrior at the expense of the man of justice. They +also extol him at the expense of the man of learning and, +there again, they preach to the world the cult of practical +activity in defiance of the disinterested life. We all +know Nietzsche’s hue and cry against the man of the +study, the man of erudition, ‘the mirror man,’ whose +only passion is to understand. And also Nietzsche’s +esteem for the life of the mind solely insofar as it is +emotion, lyricism, action, partiality; his derisive laughter +at ‘objective’ methodical research devoted to ‘the +horrible old woman known as truth’. And we know +Sorel’s denunciations of societies which ‘give a privileged +place to the amateurs of <i>purely intellectual things</i>’;⁠<a id="FNanchor_133_133" href="#Footnote_133_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> those of +Barrès, Lemaître, Brunetière, thirty years ago, intimating +to the ‘intellectuals’ that they are a type of humanity +‘inferior to the soldier’; those of Péguy, who admires +philosophies to the extent that ‘they are good fighters’, +and admires Descartes because he was in the army, and +the dialecticians of French monarchism solely because +<span class="pagenum" id="p_118">[118]</span>they are ready to be killed for the sake of their views.⁠<a id="FNanchor_134_134" href="#Footnote_134_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> +I shall be told that most often this is the mere wild talk +of men of letters, the posturing of lyricists, to which it +is unjust to attribute a dogmatic meaning; that Nietzsche, +Barrès and Péguy denounce the life of study on account +of their poetic temperaments, their aversion from +everything lacking in picturesqueness and the spirit +of adventure, and not their resolution to abase disinterestedness. +To which I reply that these poets +give themselves out as serious thinkers (notice their +tone, <i>quite free from</i> naiveté); that the immense majority +of their readers accept them as such; that, even if it +were true that in depreciating the man of study their +motive is not to abase disinterestedness, it is none the +less true in fact that the manner of living they hold up +to the laughter of mankind happens to be the very type +of the disinterested life, while the life they extol at its +expense is the very type of practical activity (at least +more practical than that of the man of study, for it will +be admitted that the activity of du Guesclin and Napoleon +is more likely to acquire material advantages than the +activity of Spinoza and Mabillon); that, moreover, +what these thinkers despise in the man of study is +precisely the man who lays no foundations, who does +not conquer, who does not predicate the capture of its +environment by the species, or who, if he does predicate +it, as the scientist does by his discoveries, retains for +<span class="pagenum" id="p_119">[119]</span>himself only the joy of knowledge and abandons the +practical exploitation of his discoveries to others. In +Nietzsche, the scorn for the man of study to the benefit +of the warrior is only an episode in a desire which +nobody will deny inspires the whole of his work as well +as the work of Sorel, Barrès and Péguy: <i>The desire to +abase the values of knowledge before the values of action.</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_135_135" href="#Footnote_135_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a></p> + +<p>To-day this desire inspires not only the moralist, +but another kind of ‘clerk’ who speaks from much +higher ground. I am referring to that teaching of +modern metaphysics which exhorts man to feel comparatively +little esteem for the truly thinking portion +of himself and to honour the active and <i>willing</i> part of +himself with all his devotion. The theory of knowledge +from which humanity has taken its values during the +past half century assigns a secondary rank to the mind +which proceeds by clear and distinct ideas, by categories, +by words, and places in the highest rank the mind which +succeeds in liberating itself from these intellectual habits +and in becoming conscious of itself insofar as it is a +‘pure tendency’, a ‘pure will’, a ‘pure activity’. +Philosophy which formerly raised man to feel conscious +of himself because he was a thinking being and to say, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_120">[120]</span>‘I think, therefore I am’, now raises him to say, ‘I am, +therefore I think’, ‘I think, therefore I am not’ (unless +he takes thought into consideration only in that humble +region where it is confused with action). Formerly +philosophy taught him that his soul is divine insofar as +it resembles the soul of Pythagoras linking up concepts; +now she informs him that his soul is divine insofar as it +resembles that of the small chicken breaking its eggshell.⁠<a id="FNanchor_136_136" href="#Footnote_136_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a> +From his loftiest pulpit the modern ‘clerk’ +assures man that he is great in proportion as he is practical.</p> + +<p>During fifty years, especially in France (see Barrès +and Bourget) a whole literature has assiduously proclaimed +the superiority of instinct, the unconscious, +intuition, the will (in the German sense, i.e. as opposed +to the intelligence) and has proclaimed it in the name +of the practical spirit, because the instinct and not the +intelligence knows what we ought to do—as individuals, +as a nation, as a class—to secure our own advantage. +These writers have eagerly expatiated on the example +of the insect whose ‘instinct’ (it appears) teaches it to +strike its prey precisely in the spot which will paralyse +it without killing it, so that its offspring may feed on the +living prey and develop better.⁠<a id="FNanchor_137_137" href="#Footnote_137_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> Other teachers denounce +<span class="pagenum" id="p_121">[121]</span>this ‘barbarous’ extolling of instinct in the name of +‘the French tradition’ and preach ‘the superiority +of the intelligence’; but they preach it because in their +opinion it is the intelligence which shows us the actions +required by our interests, i.e. from exactly the same +passion for the practical. This brings us to one of the +most remarkable and certainly the most novel forms +of this preaching of the practical by the modern ‘clerks’.</p> + +<p>I mean that teaching according to which <i>intellectual +activity is worthy of esteem to the extent that it is practical +and to that extent alone</i>. It may be said that since the +Greeks the predominant attitude of thinkers towards +intellectual activity was to glorify it insofar as (like +aesthetic activity) it finds its satisfaction in itself, apart +from any attention to the advantages it may procure. +Most thinkers would have agreed with Plato’s famous +hymn to geometry, where that discipline is venerated +more than all others because for him it represents the +type of speculative thought which brings in nothing +material; and with Renan’s verdict which declares that +the man who loves science for its fruits commits the +worst of blasphemies against that divinity.⁠<a id="FNanchor_138_138" href="#Footnote_138_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> By this +<span class="pagenum" id="p_122">[122]</span>standard of values the ‘clerks’ put before the laymen +the spectacle of a class of men for whom the value of +life lies in its disinterestedness, and they acted as a check +on—or at least shamed—the laymen’s practical passions. +The modern ‘clerks’ have violently torn up this charter. +They proclaim that intellectual functions are only +respectable to the extent that they are bound up with +the pursuit of a concrete advantage, and that the +intelligence which takes no interest in its objects is a +contemptible activity. They teach that the superior +form of the intelligence is that which thrusts its roots +into ‘the vital urge’, occupied in discovering what is +most valuable in securing our existence. In historical⁠<a id="FNanchor_139_139" href="#Footnote_139_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> +science especially, they honour the intelligence which +labours under the guidance of political interests,⁠<a id="FNanchor_140_140" href="#Footnote_140_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> and +they are completely disdainful of all efforts towards +‘objectivity’. Elsewhere they assert that the intelligence +to be venerated is that which limits its activities within +the bounds of national interests and social order, while +the intelligence which allows itself to be guided by +the desire for truth alone, apart from any concern with +the demands of society, is merely a ‘savage and brutal’ +activity, which ‘dishonours the highest of human +faculties.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_141_141" href="#Footnote_141_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> Let me also point out their devotion to the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_123">[123]</span>doctrine (Bergson, Sorel) which says that science has +a purely utilitarian origin—the necessity of man to +dominate matter, ‘knowledge is adaptation’; and their +scorn for the beautiful Greek conception which made +science bloom from the desire to play, the perfect type +of disinterested activity. And then they teach men that +to accept an error which is of service to them (the ‘myth’) +is an undertaking which does them honour, while it is +shameful to admit a truth which harms them. In other +words, as Nietzsche, Barrès and Sorel plainly put it, +sensibility to truth in itself apart from any practical +aim is a somewhat contemptible form of mind.⁠<a id="FNanchor_142_142" href="#Footnote_142_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a> Here +the modern ‘clerk’ positively displays genius in his +defence of the material, since the material has nothing +to do with the truth, or rather to speak more truly—has +no worse enemy. The genius of Callicles in all its +profundity lives again in the great masters of the modern +soul.⁠<a id="FNanchor_143_143" href="#Footnote_143_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_124">[124]</span></p> + +<p>Then the modern ‘clerks’ have preached to men the +religion of the practical <i>by means of their theology</i>, through +the image of God they have set before them. First, +they determined that God, who since the Stoics has been +infinite, should once more become finite, distinct, +endowed with a personality, that He should be the +affirmation of a <i>physical</i> and not a <i>metaphysical</i> existence. +Anthropomorphism, which in the poets from Prudentius +to Victor Hugo existed mingled with pantheism without +troubling to define the frontiers between them, since +God was personal or indeterminate according to the +direction of the emotion and the needs of the lyric +impulse, rose up in Péguy and Claudel with the most +violent consciousness of itself, the clearest desire to be +distinguished from its acolyte and to express contempt +for him. At the same time the political teachers attacked +the religion of the Infinite with a precision of hatred, +a skill in depreciation, unparalleled even in the Church, +which consisted in denouncing this religion precisely +because it is not practical, because it saps away the +feelings which found the great earthly realities: the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_125">[125]</span>City and the State.⁠<a id="FNanchor_144_144" href="#Footnote_144_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a> But the modern ‘clerks’ have +above all endowed God with the attributes which secure +practical advantages. It may be said that, since the +Old Testament, God was far more just than strong, +or rather that, as Plato thought, His strength was only +a form of His justice; and His power, as Malebranche +and Spinoza put it, had nothing in common with the +power of kings and Empire-builders. The desire to +increase was implicitly excluded from His nature, as +well as the moral attributes necessary to the satisfaction +of that desire—energy, will, the love of effort, the +attraction of triumph. This was an inevitable result +of His perfect and infinite state of being, which at once +constituted the whole of possible reality. Even in creation, +the idea of which is essentially inseparable from the ideas +of power and increase, these ideas were avoided—the +world was far less a result of God’s power than of His +love; it came out of God as a ray comes out of the sun, +without God feeling any increase of Himself at the expense +of anything else. God, to speak in terms of the schools, +was far less the transcendent cause of the world than +its immanent cause.⁠<a id="FNanchor_145_145" href="#Footnote_145_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> On the other hand, for the modern +teachers (Hegel, Schelling, Bergson, Péguy), God is +essentially something which increases; His law is +<span class="pagenum" id="p_126">[126]</span>‘incessant change’, ‘incessant novelty’, ‘incessant⁠<a id="FNanchor_146_146" href="#Footnote_146_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> +creation’; His principle is essentially a principle of +growth—Will, Tension, Vital Urge. If He is Intelligence, +as with Hegel, He is an intelligence which +‘develops’, which ‘realizes itself’ more and more. +The Being situated immediately in all His perfection +and knowing nothing of conquest is an object of contempt; +He represents (Bergson) an ‘eternity of death’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_147_147" href="#Footnote_147_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> So +the believers in an initial and single creation to-day +strive to present this act in its purely practical aspect. +The Church condemns with a hitherto unknown clearness +every doctrine of immanence and preaches transcendence +in all its strictness.⁠<a id="FNanchor_148_148" href="#Footnote_148_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> God, in creating the world, no +longer witnesses an inevitable expansion of His nature; +through His power (some, to diminish the arbitrariness, +say ‘through His benevolence’) he sees the arising of +something clearly distinct from Himself, something on +which He sets His hand. His act, whatever may be +said to the contrary, is the perfect model of material +aggrandisement. Like the prophet of Israel of old, +the modern ‘clerk’ says to mankind: ‘Display your +zeal for the Eternal, the God of battles.’</p> + +<p>For half a century, such has been the attitude of +men whose function is to thwart the realism of nations, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_127">[127]</span>and who have laboured to excite it with all their power +and with complete decision of purpose. For this reason +I dare to call this attitude ‘The Great Betrayal’. If +I look for its causes, I see profound causes which forbid +me to look upon this movement as a mere fashion, to +which the contrary movement might succeed to-morrow.</p> + +<p>One of the principal causes is that the modern world +has made the ‘clerk’ into a citizen, subject to all the +responsibilities of a citizen, and consequently to despise +lay passions is far more difficult for him than for his +predecessors. If he is reproached for not looking upon +national quarrels with the noble serenity of Descartes +and Goethe, the ‘clerk’ may well retort that his nation +claps a soldier’s pack on his back if she is insulted, and +crushes him with taxes even if she is victorious. If +shame is cried upon him because he does not rise superior +to social hatreds, he will point out that the day of +enlightened patronage is over, that to-day he has to earn +his living, and that it is not his fault if he is eager to +support the class which takes a pleasure in his productions. +No doubt this explanation is not valid for the true ‘clerk’, +who submits to the laws of his State without allowing them +to injure his soul. He renders unto Caesar the things +that are Caesar’s, i.e. his life perhaps, but nothing more. +The true ‘clerk’ is Vauvenargues, Lamarck, Fresnel, +who never imbibed national patriotism although they +perfectly performed their patriotic duty; he is Spinoza, +Schiller, Baudelaire, César Franck, who were never +diverted from single-hearted adoration of the Beautiful +<span class="pagenum" id="p_128">[128]</span>and the Divine by the necessity of earning their daily +bread. But such ‘clerks’ are inevitably rare. So much +contempt for suffering is not the law of human nature +even among the ‘clerks’; the law is that the living +creature condemned to struggle for life turns to practical +passions, and thence to the sanctifying of those passions. +The ‘clerk’s’ new faith is to a great extent a result of +the social conditions imposed upon him, and the real evil +to deplore is perhaps not so much the ‘great betrayal’ +of the ‘clerks’ as the disappearance of the ‘clerks’, +the impossibility of leading the life of a ‘clerk’ in the +world of to-day. One of the gravest responsibilities +of the modern State is that it has not maintained (but +could it do so?) a class of men exempt from civic duties, +men whose sole function is to maintain non-practical +values. Renan’s prophecy is verified; he foretold +the inevitable degradation of a society where every +member was forced to discharge worldly tasks, although +Renan himself was the very type of those whom such +servitude would never have prevented—in the phrase +of one of his peers—‘from breathing only in the +direction of Heaven’.</p> + +<p>It would be very unjust to explain the existence of +national passion in the modern ‘clerk’ by self-interest +alone. This is also to be explained, and in a more +simple manner, by the love, the impulse which naturally +inspires every man to love the group from which he +derives, more than the other groups which share the +earth. There again, it may be argued that the ‘clerk’s’ +<span class="pagenum" id="p_129">[129]</span>new faith is caused by the changes of the nineteenth +century, which by giving national groups a consistency +hitherto unknown furnishes food to a passion which in +many countries before that period could have been little +more than potential. Obviously, attachment to the +world of the spirit alone was easier for those who were +capable of it when there were no nations to love. And, +in fact, it is most suggestive to notice that the true appearance +of the ‘clerk’ coincides with the fall of the Roman +Empire, i.e. with the time when the great nation collapsed +and the little nations had not yet come into existence. +It is equally suggestive to notice that the age of the great +lovers of spiritual things, the age of Thomas Aquinas, +Roger Bacon, Galilei, Erasmus, was the age when most +of Europe was in a state of chaos and the nations were +unknown; that the regions where pure speculation +endured longest seem to be Germany and Italy,⁠<a id="FNanchor_149_149" href="#Footnote_149_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a> i.e. +the regions which were the last to be nationalized; +and practically ceased to produce pure speculation from +the moment when they became nations. Of course, +here again the vicissitudes of the world of sense do not +affect the true ‘clerk’. The misfortunes of their +country, and even its triumphs, did not prevent Einstein +and Nietzsche from feeling no passion but the passion +for thought. When Jules Lemaître exclaimed that the +wound of Sedan made him lose his reason, Renan replied +that he perfectly retained his, and that a true priest of +<span class="pagenum" id="p_130">[130]</span>the mind could only be wounded in other than earthly +interests.⁠<a id="FNanchor_150_150" href="#Footnote_150_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a></p> + +<p>In the cases I have just mentioned, the ‘clerk’s’ +devotion to his nation or class is sincere, whether it is +from interest or from love. I admit I think this sincerity +is infrequent. The practice of the life of the spirit seems +to me to lead inevitably to universalism, to the feeling +of the eternal, to a lack of vigour in the belief in worldly +conventions. The sincerity of national passion especially, +in men of letters particularly, seems to me to assume the +virtue of naiveté, which everyone will admit is not +characteristic of this body of men, apart from their own +self-esteem. It will also be hard to convince me that the +motives of their public attitudes in artists are such simple +things as the desire to live and to eat. I therefore seek—and +find—other reasons for the realism of the modern +‘clerk’, and these, although less natural, are none the +less profound. They seem to me particularly valid +for men of letters, especially in France, the country +where the attitude of writers in the past half century +differs most from that of their fathers.</p> + +<p>First of all, I see the interests of their careers. It is +an obvious fact that during the past two centuries most +<span class="pagenum" id="p_131">[131]</span>of the men of letters who have attained wide fame in +France assumed a political attitude—for instance, +Voltaire, Diderot, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Victor +Hugo, Anatole France, Barrès. With some of them, +real fame dates from the moment when they assumed +that attitude. This law has not escaped the attention +of their descendants, and it may be said to-day that every +French writer who desires wide fame (which means +every writer endowed with the real temperament of a +man of letters) also desires inevitably to play a political +part. This desire may arise from other motives. For +instance, in Barrès and d’Annunzio, from the desire +‘to act’, to be something more than ‘men at a desk’, +to lead a life like that of the ‘heroes’ and not like that +of ‘scribes’; or, more ingenuously, as no doubt happened +with Renan when he stood as a Parliamentary candidate, +from the idea that he could perform a public service. +Let me add that the modern writer’s desire to be a +political man is excused by the fact that the position +is to some extent offered him by public opinion, whereas +the compatriots of Racine and La Bruyère would have +laughed in their faces if they had thought of publishing +their views on the advisability of the war with Holland +or the legality of Chambres de réunion. There again, +it was easier to be a true ‘clerk’ in the past than to-day.</p> + +<p>These observations explain why the contemporary +French writer so frequently desires to assume a political +attitude, but they do not explain why this attitude is +so inevitably in support of arbitrary authority. +<span class="pagenum" id="p_132">[132]</span>Liberalism is also a political attitude; and the least which +can be said is that the modern French ‘clerk’ has very +seldom adopted it in the past twenty years. Another +factor comes in here. That is the practical writer’s +desire to please the bourgeoisie, who are the creators +of fame and the source of honours. It may even be +argued that for this sort of writer the necessity to treat +the passions of this class with deference is greater than +ever, if I may judge by the fate of those who in recent +times have dared to defy them, i.e. Zola, Romain Rolland. +Now, the bourgeoisie of to-day, terrified by the progress +of the opposing class, solely anxious to retain the privileges +which are left them, feel nothing but aversion from +liberal dogmas; and the man of letters who displays +any political flag is bound to wave the flag of ‘Order’ +if he wishes to obtain favours. The case of Barrès +is particularly instructive from this point of view. He +began as a great intellectual sceptic, and his material +star waxed a hundredfold greater, at least in his own +country, on the day when he made himself the apostle +of ‘necessary prejudices’. This sort of thing makes me +believe that the present political fashion of French +writers is going to last a long time. A phenomenon +which is caused by the uneasiness of the French +bourgeoisie does not seem likely to disappear quickly.⁠<a id="FNanchor_151_151" href="#Footnote_151_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a></p> + +<p>I have mentioned the lot of those writers who in +quite recent times have dared to thwart the passions of +<span class="pagenum" id="p_133">[133]</span>the bourgeoisie. This is only one aspect of a very +general novelty, of supreme interest to the subject I am +discussing. I mean the consciousness of their sovereignty +felt by the herd of laymen, and the resolution they +display to bring to his senses any writer who dares to +say anything but what they wish to hear. This propensity +of the layman appears not only in his relations +with his writers (and with his press—a newspaper which +does not supply its readers with the exact errors they +cherish is immediately dropped), but, which is far more +remarkable, in his relations with his truly ‘clerical’ +teachers, whose voice speaks to him in the name of the +Divine. The pulpit-orator who really presumed to +censure nationalist passion, who really mortified bourgeois +arrogance, would soon (particularly in France) see his +flock disperse. He can no longer terrify such a gathering +with the fear of punishment, and they no longer believe +in anything but the real; consequently they feel stronger +and more important than he, and only consent to listen +to his preaching on condition that he treats with deference—not +to say sanctifies—the egotisms they venerate.⁠<a id="FNanchor_152_152" href="#Footnote_152_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> +Modern humanity is fully determined that those who +call themselves its teachers, shall be its servants and not +its guides. And most of the teachers understand this +admirably.⁠<a id="FNanchor_153_153" href="#Footnote_153_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_134">[134]</span></p> + +<p>To come back to the modern writer and the causes +for his political attitude—I shall add that he is not only +in the service of a bourgeoisie which is in a state of +anxiety, but that he himself has become more and more +of a bourgeois, endowed with all the social position and +respect which belong to that caste. The Bohemian +man of letters has practically disappeared, at least among +those who engage public interest. Consequently, he +has more and more come to possess the bourgeois form +of soul, one of those most conspicuous characteristics +is an affectation of the political feelings of the aristocracy—an +attachment to systems of arbitrary authority, to +military and priestly institutions, a scorn for societies +founded upon justice, upon civic equality, a cult for the +past, etc.... How many writers in France during +the past fifty years, men whose names are on everyone’s +lips, obviously think they are ennobling themselves +by expressing disgust for democratic institutions!⁠<a id="FNanchor_154_154" href="#Footnote_154_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a> In +the same way I explain the adoption by many of them +of harshness and cruelty, which they think are also +attributes of the souls of the nobility.</p> + +<p>The reasons I have just mentioned for the new +<span class="pagenum" id="p_135">[135]</span>political attitude of men of letters arise from the changes +in their social status. Those I am about to mention arise +from changes in the structure of their minds, in their +literary desires, in their aesthetic cults, in their morality. +These reasons seem to me even more worthy of the +historian’s attention than those which have gone before.</p> + +<p>First of all, we have their Romanticism, taking that +word to mean the desire which arose in the writers of +the nineteenth century (but which has become greatly +perfected in the last thirty years) to treat themes which +lend themselves in a literary manner to striking attitudes. +About 1890 the men of letters, especially in France and +Italy, realized with astonishing astuteness that the +doctrines of arbitrary authority, discipline, tradition, +contempt for the spirit of liberty, assertion of the +morality of war and slavery, were opportunities for +haughty and rigid poses infinitely more likely to strike +the imagination of simple souls than the sentimentalities +of Liberalism and Humanitarianism. And as a matter +of fact, the so-called reactionary doctrines do lend +themselves to a pessimistic and contemptuous Romanticism +which makes a far deeper impression on the +common herd than enthusiastic and optimistic Romanticism. +The pose of a Barrès or a d’Annunzio strikes +naïve persons far more than that of a Michelet or a +Proudhon. Moreover, these doctrines are to-day given +forth as founded upon science, upon ‘pure experience’, +and thereby permit a tone of calm inhumanity (the +Romanticism of Positivism) whose effect on the herd +<span class="pagenum" id="p_136">[136]</span>has not escaped the sagacious eye of the man of letters. +(Of course, I am only speaking of the elegant herd; +Romantic pessimism has no value whatsoever for the +people.)</p> + +<p>There is another transformation of the literary soul +in men of letters, wherein I think I see a cause of their +new political creed. This is, that recently the only one +of their faculties they venerate is their artistic sensibility, +on which to some extent they base all their judgments. +Until the last thirty years it may be said that men of +letters, at least in Latin Europe, disciples in this of +the Greeks, were determined in their judgments—even +their literary judgments—far more by their sensibility +to reason than by their artistic sensibility, whereof +moreover they were scarcely conscious as something +distinct from the former. This remark is true for the +men of the Renaissance and their direct descendants +(the French writers of the seventeenth and succeeding +century) and, despite appearances, it is also true of those +who lived at the beginning of the nineteenth century. +If the weakening of sensibility to reason and, more +generally, of lofty intellectual discipline, is indisputably +one of the characteristics of the Romanticism of 1830, +the contempt for this sensibility makes no appearance. +Victor Hugo, Lamartine, Michelet never prided themselves +on despising the values of reason in things in +order to esteem only their art values. Now, towards +1890, there occurred a revolution whose influence cannot +be exaggerated. Enlightened by philosophical analysis +<span class="pagenum" id="p_137">[137]</span>(Bergsonism), the men of letters became conscious of +the fundamental difference between intellectual sensibility +and artistic sensibility; and ardently chose the +latter. This is the epoch when they were heard to assert +that a book is great as soon as it achieves a literary and +artistic success, that its intellectual content is of no +interest, that all arguments are equally defensible, that +error is no more false than truth, etc.⁠<a id="FNanchor_155_155" href="#Footnote_155_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> This great change +affected their political attitudes. Obviously, as soon as +we think things are good only insofar as they content +our artistic needs, the only good political systems are +those of arbitrary authority. Artistic sensibility is far +more gratified by a system which tends to the realization +of force and grandeur than by a system which tends to +the establishment of justice, for the characteristic of +artistic sensibility is the love of concrete realities and the +repugnance for abstract conceptions and conceptions of +pure reason, the model of which is the idea of justice. +Artistic sensibility is especially flattered by the spectacle +of a mass of units which are subordinated to each other +up to the final head who dominates them all, whereas +the spectacle of a democracy, which is a mass of units +<i>where no one is first</i>, deprives this sensibility of one of its +fundamental needs.⁠<a id="FNanchor_156_156" href="#Footnote_156_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a> Add to this that every doctrine +<span class="pagenum" id="p_138">[138]</span>which honours Man in the universal, in what is common +to all men, is a personal injury to the artist, whose +characteristic (at least since Romanticism)⁠<a id="FNanchor_157_157" href="#Footnote_157_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> is precisely +to set himself up as an exceptional being. Add also the +sovereignty the artist now attributes to his desires and +their satisfaction (the ‘rights of genius’) and, consequently, +his natural hatred for systems which limit each +person’s liberty of action by that of others. And finally +add the artist’s aversion from everything which is general, +everything which is only the object of conception, not +of sensation.⁠<a id="FNanchor_158_158" href="#Footnote_158_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> The determination of men of letters to +pass judgment only in accordance with their artistic +sensibility is only one aspect of their desire (since +Romanticism) to exalt feeling at the expense of thought, +a desire which itself is one among the thousand results +of the decline of intellectual discipline among them. +The new political attitude of the ‘clerks’ seems to me +to be here the result of a serious modification of their +state of mind.</p> + +<p>This attitude also seems to me to result from the +decline of the study of classical literature in the formation +of their minds. The humanities, as the word implies, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_139">[139]</span>have always taught the cult of humanity in its universal +aspect, at least since the time of the Portico.⁠<a id="FNanchor_159_159" href="#Footnote_159_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> The decline +of Graeco-Roman culture in Barrès and his literary +generation, in comparison with that of Taine, Renan, +Hugo, Michelet, even Anatole France and Bourget, +is undeniable. Still less will it be denied that this +decline is considerably more noticeable in Barrès’s +successors. However, this decline does not prevent +these writers from extolling classical studies, but they +do not do this with the idea of reviving the cult for what +is human in its universal aspect, but on the contrary +to strengthen the ‘French’ mind, or at least the ‘Latin’ +mind, in the grasp of its own roots, in consciousness +of itself as distinct from other minds. Notice that this +decline of classical culture in the French writers coincides +with the discovery of the great German realists, Hegel +and especially Nietzsche, whose genius had the more +effect on these Frenchmen because their lack of classical +discipline deprived them of the one real barrier which +can be opposed to that genius.⁠<a id="FNanchor_160_160" href="#Footnote_160_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a></p> + +<p>Among the causes of this new attitude among men +of letters I must point to their thirst for sensations, their +need to experience things, which in recent times have +grown stronger and have caused them to adopt a political +attitude which gave them emotions and sensations. +<span class="pagenum" id="p_140">[140]</span>Belphegor is not the only star in the literary heavens. +A French writer, who was taken seriously as a thinker +as early as 1890, was reproached for having joined a +party whose inconsistency will long be an amazement +to History; and he replied, ‘I followed Boulangism, +as a man follows a fanfare of trumpets.’ The same +thinker gives us to understand that his chief motive in +‘seeking contact with national minds’ was to ‘throw +more fuel under his sensibility, which was beginning +to run down’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_161_161" href="#Footnote_161_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a> I do not think I am mistaken when I say +that numbers of our moralists who sneer at pacific +civilization and extol a warlike life, do so because the +former seems a dull sort of a life to them and the latter +an opportunity for sensations.⁠<a id="FNanchor_162_162" href="#Footnote_162_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> You will recollect the +remark of a young thinker, quoted by Agathon in 1913: +‘Why not a war? It will be amusing.’ I shall be told +that this is the mere extravagant saying of a young man. +But what of this remark from a man of fifty, and what +is more, a scientist (R. Quinton), who saw the tragedy +of 1914 coming, and exclaimed: ‘We shall picnic +on the grass!’? This scientist was certainly a good +soldier, but no more so than Fresnel and Lamarck, +of whom I dare to say that they may have approved of +<span class="pagenum" id="p_141">[141]</span>war, but not because it satisfied their taste for the +picturesque. All who frequented the author of <i>Reflexions +sur la Violence</i> know that one of the greatest attractions +of any idea for him was that it was ‘amusing’ and likely +to exasperate so-called reasonable people. There are +many thinkers of the past fifty years whose ‘philosophy’ +has one fundamental motive—the pleasure of throwing +off irritating paradoxes; while they are only too happy +if their rockets fall like swords and satisfy that need for +cruelty which they profess as the sign of noble minds. +This prodigious decline of morality, this sort of (very +Germanic) intellectual sadism, is usually and quite openly +accompanied by a huge contempt for the true ‘clerk’, +whose joy comes from the exercise of thought and who +disdains sensation, particularly the sensations of action. +Here again the new political cult of the men of letters +is the result of a modification in the most intimate part +of their mind, the very same modification we have been +discussing, i.e. a decline of intellectual discipline, which +does not mean a decline in intelligence.⁠<a id="FNanchor_163_163" href="#Footnote_163_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a></p> + +<p>On their own showing, many modern ‘clerks’ have +adopted these realist doctrines because they want to have +done with the moral disarray into which they are thrown +by the spectacle of philosophies, ‘none of which bring +certainty,’ and which all collapse upon each other as +they cry to heaven their contradictory absolutes. There +<span class="pagenum" id="p_142">[142]</span>again the ‘clerk’s’ political attitude is the result of a +great decline in his intellectual discipline, whether we +consider that this decline is shown by his belief that any +philosophy can bring certainty, or whether we think that +it lies in his inability to stand upright on the ruins of the +schools, devoting himself to reason, which is above all +the schools, and is their judge.</p> + +<p>I shall also admit as one other cause of realism in +the modern ‘clerks’ the irritation produced in them by +the teaching of some of their predecessors—I mean +certain masters of the year 1848, with their visionary +idealism, their belief that justice and love were suddenly +about to become the essence of the soul of nations, an +irritation greatly increased by seeing the dreadful +contrast between these idyllic prophecies and the events +which followed them. Nevertheless, the point to +remember is that the modern ‘clerks’ replied to these +errors by hurling anathemas at every sort of idealism, +whether visionary or not, thereby showing incapacity +to distinguish between species, inability to rise above +passion to judgment. And this is but one other aspect +of their loss of the good manners of the mind.</p> + +<p>Let me recapitulate the causes for this change in the +‘clerks’: The imposition of political interests on all +men without any exception; the growth of consistency +in matters apt to feed realist passions; the desire and the +possibility for men of letters to play a political part; the +need in the interests of their own fame for them to play +the game of a class which is daily becoming more +<span class="pagenum" id="p_143">[143]</span>anxious; the increasing tendency of the ‘clerks’ to +become bourgeois and to take on the vanities of that +class; the perfecting of their Romanticism; the decline +of their knowledge of antiquity and of their intellectual +discipline. It will be seen that these causes arise from +certain phenomena which are most profoundly and +generally characteristic of the present age. The political +realism of the ‘clerks’, far from being a superficial +fact due to the caprice of an order of men, seems to me +bound up with the very essence of the modern world.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="IV"> + IV + <br> + <i>Summary—Predictions</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>To sum up: If I look at contemporary humanity +from the point of view of its moral state as revealed by +its political life, I see (<i>a</i>) A mass in whom realist passions +in its two chief forms—class passion, national passion—has +attained a degree of consciousness and organization +hitherto unknown; (<i>b</i>) A body of men who used +to be in opposition to the realism of the masses, but +who now, not only do not oppose it, but adopt it, proclaim +its grandeur and morality; in short, a humanity which +has abandoned itself to realism with a unanimity, an +absence of reserve, a sanctification of its passion +unexampled in history.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_144">[144]</span></p> + +<p>This remark may be put in another form. Imagine +an observer of the twelfth century taking a bird’s-eye +view of the Europe of his time. He would see men +groping in the obscurity of their minds and striving +to form themselves into nations (to mention only the +most striking aspect of the realist will); he would see +them beginning to succeed; he would see groups of +men attaining consistency, determined to seize a portion +of the earth and tending to feel conscious of themselves +as distinct from the groups surrounding them. But at +the same time he would see a whole class of men, +regarded with the greatest reverence, labouring to +thwart this movement. He would see men of learning, +artists and philosophers, displaying to the world a +spirit which cared nothing for nations, using a universal +language among themselves. He would see those who +gave Europe its moral values preaching the cult of the +human, or at least of the Christian, and not of the +national, he would see them striving to found, in opposition +to the nations, a great universal empire on spiritual +foundations. And so he might say to himself: ‘Which +of these two currents will triumph? Will humanity be +national or spiritual? Will it depend on the will of the +laymen or of the “clerks”?’ And for long ages the +realist cause will not be completely victorious; the +spiritual body will remain faithful to itself long enough +to our observer to be uncertain of the result. To-day +the game is over. Humanity is national. The layman +has won. But his triumph has gone beyond anything +<span class="pagenum" id="p_145">[145]</span>he could have expected. The ‘clerk’ is not only +conquered, he is assimilated. The man of science, the +artist, the philosopher are attached to their nations as +much as the day-labourer and the merchant. Those +who make the world’s values, make them for a nation; +the Ministers of Jesus defend the national. All humanity +including the ‘clerks’, have become laymen. All +Europe, including Erasmus, has followed Luther.</p> + +<p>I said above that the humanity of the past, more +precisely the humanity of Europe in the Middle Ages, +with the values imposed upon it by the ‘clerks’, acted +ill but honoured the good. It may be said that modern +Europe with teachers who inform it that its realist +instincts are beautiful, acts ill and honours what is ill. +Modern Europe is like the brigand in one of Tolstoi’s +stories, who made his confession to a hermit, and the +hermit said in amazement: ‘Others were at least +ashamed of being brigands; but what is to be done +with this man, who is proud of it?’</p> + +<p>Indeed, if we ask ourselves what will happen to a +humanity where every group is striving more eagerly +than ever to feel conscious of its own particular interests, +and makes its moralists tell it that it is sublime to the +extent that it knows no law but this interest—a child +can give the answer. This humanity is heading for the +greatest and most perfect war ever seen in the world, +whether it is a war of nations, or a war of classes. A race +of which one group exalts one of its masters (Barrès) +to the skies because he teaches: ‘We must defend the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_146">[146]</span>essential part of ourselves as sectarians,’ while a neighbouring +group acclaims a leader because, when he attacks a +defenceless small nation, he says, ‘Necessity knows no +law’—such a race is ripe for the zoological wars Renan +talks about, which, he said, would be like the life and +death wars which occur among rodents and among the +carnivora. As regards the nation, think of Italy; as +regards class, think of Russia; and you will see the +hitherto unknown point of perfection attained by the +spirit of hatred against what is ‘different’ among a +group of men, consciously realist and at last liberated +from all non-practical morality. And my predictions +are not rendered less probable by the fact that these +two nations are hailed as models throughout the world +by those who desire either the grandeur of their nation +or the triumph of their class.</p> + +<p>These dark predictions do not seem to me to need +as much modification as some people think, on account +of certain actions resolutely directed against war, such +as the setting up of a supernational institution and the +agreements recently made by the rival nations. Imposed +upon the nations by their Ministers rather than desired +by them, dictated solely by interest (the fear of war +and its ravages) and not at all by a change in public +morality, these new institutions may perhaps be opposed +to war but leave intact the <i>spirit of war</i>, and nothing +leads us to suppose that a nation which only respects +a contract for practical reasons, will not break it as soon +as breaking it appears more profitable. Peace, if it ever +<span class="pagenum" id="p_147">[147]</span>exists, will not be based on the fear of war but on the +love of peace. It will not be the abstaining from an act, +but the coming of a state of mind.⁠<a id="FNanchor_164_164" href="#Footnote_164_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> In this sense the +most insignificant writer can serve peace where the most +powerful tribunals can do nothing. And moreover +these tribunals leave untouched the economic war +between the nations and the class wars.</p> + +<p>Peace, it must be repeated after so many others have +said this, is only possible if men cease to place their +happiness in the possession of things ‘which cannot +be shared’, and if they raise themselves to a point where +they adopt an abstract principle superior to their +egotisms. In other words, it can only be obtained by a +betterment of human morality. But, as I have pointed +out above, not only do men to-day steel themselves +entirely against this, but the very first condition of peace, +which is to recognize the necessity for this progress of +the soul, is seriously menaced. A school arose in the +nineteenth century which told men to expect peace from +enlightened self-interest, from the belief that a war, +even when victorious, is disastrous, especially to economic +transformations, to ‘the evolution of production’, in a +phrase, to factors totally foreign to their moral improvement, +from which, these thinkers say, it would be +frivolous to expect anything. So that humanity, even +if it had any desire for peace, is exhorted to neglect the +one effort which might procure it, an effort it is delighted +<span class="pagenum" id="p_148">[148]</span>not to make. The cause of peace, which is always +surrounded with adverse factors, in our days has one +more against it—the pacifism which pretends to be +scientific.⁠<a id="FNanchor_165_165" href="#Footnote_165_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a></p> + +<p>I can point to other sorts of pacifism, whose chief +result I dare to say is to weaken the cause of peace, at +least among serious-minded persons:—</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) First, there is the pacifism I shall call ‘vulgar’, +meaning thereby the pacifism which does nothing but +denounce ‘the man who kills’, and sneer at the prejudices +of patriotism. When I see certain teachers, even if +they are Montaigne, Voltaire, and Anatole France, +whose whole case against war consists in saying that +highwaymen are no more criminal than leaders of armies, +and in laughing at people who kill each other because +one party is dressed in yellow and the other in blue, I +feel inclined to desert a cause whose champions over-simplify +things to this extent, and I begin to feel some +sympathy for the impulses of profound humanity which +created the nations and which are thereby so grossly +insulted.⁠<a id="FNanchor_166_166" href="#Footnote_166_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a></p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Mystic pacifism</i>, by which I mean the pacifism +which is solely animated by a blind hatred of war and +<span class="pagenum" id="p_149">[149]</span>refuses to inquire whether a war is just or not, whether +those fighting are the attackers or the defenders, whether +they wanted war or only submit to it. This pacifism is +essentially the pacifism of the people (and that of all +the so-called pacifist newspapers) and was strikingly +embodied in 1914 by a French writer who, having to +judge between two fighting nations one of which had +attacked the other contrary to all its pledges while the +other was only defending itself, could do nothing but +intone ‘I have a horror of war’ and condemned them +both equally. It is impossible to exaggerate the consequences +of this behaviour, which showed mankind that +mystic pacifism, just like mystic militarism, may entirely +obliterate the feeling of justice in those who are smitten +with it.</p> + +<p>I think I see another motive in the French writers +who in 1914 adopted the attitude of M. Romain Rolland—the +fear that they would fall into national partiality +if they admitted that their nation was in the right. It +may be asserted that these writers would have warmly +taken up the cause of France, if France had not been +their own country. Whereas Barrès said, ‘I always +maintain my country is right even if it is in the wrong,’ +these strange friends of justice are not unwilling to say: +‘I always maintain my country is in the wrong, even +if it is right.’ There again we see that the frenzy of +impartiality, like any other frenzy, leads to injustice.</p> + +<p>I have also a word to say about the severities of these +‘justiciaries’ towards France’s attitude immediately +<span class="pagenum" id="p_150">[150]</span>after her victory, towards her desire to force the enemy to +make good the damage done to her, and to seize on pledges +if he refused. The motive which here animated these +moralists without their perceiving it, seems to me very +remarkable; it was the thought that the just person +must inevitably be weak and suffer, that he must be a +victim. If the just man becomes strong and comes to +possess the means of enforcing justice towards himself, +then he ceases to be just to these thinkers. If Socrates +and Jesus make their persecutors disgorge, then they +cease to embody justice; one step more and the persecutors, +having become victims, would embody right. +In this the cult of justice is replaced by the cult of +misfortune, a Christian Romanticism which is somewhat +unexpected in a man like Anatole France. No +doubt the events of 1918 upset all the habits of the +advocates of right. Outraged right became the stronger, +the assailed toga triumphed over the sword, the Curiatii +were victorious. Perhaps some coolness of mind was +needed to recognize that right remained right, even +when thus invested with force. The French pacifists +failed to remain cool. In short, their attitude in the +past ten years has been inspired by sentiment alone, +and nothing could show better the degree of weakness +to which intellectual discipline has now fallen among +our ‘princes of the mind’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_167_167" href="#Footnote_167_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_151">[151]</span></p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) <i>Pacifism claiming to be patriotic</i>, by which I mean +the pacifism which claims to exalt humanitarianism, to +preach the abatement of the militarist spirit and of national +passion, and yet not to harm the interests of the nation +nor to compromise its power of resistance to foreign +nations. This attitude—which is that of all Parliamentary +pacifists—is the more antipathetic to upright +minds in that it is inevitably accompanied by the assertion +(which is also nearly always contrary to the truth) that +the nation is not in the least threatened and that the +malevolence of neighbouring nations is a pure invention +of people who want war. But that is merely an aspect +of a very general fact, which is of supreme importance +to the matter under discussion.</p> + +<p>By this I mean the ‘clerk’s’ determination to put +forth his principles as valid in the practical order of +things, as reconcilable with the safeguarding of the +sword’s conquests. This determination, which has +affected the Church for twenty centuries and almost +all the idealists (give me the names of those since Jesus +who have declared themselves incompetent in the practical +order of things), is the source of all the ‘clerk’s failures’. +It may be said that the ‘clerk’s’ defeat begins from the +very moment when he claims to be practical. As soon +as the ‘clerk’ claims that he does not disregard the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_152">[152]</span>interests of the nation or of the established classes, he +is inevitably beaten, for the very good reason that it +is impossible to preach the spiritual and the universal +without undermining the institutions whose foundations +are the possession of the material and the desire to feel +distinct from others. A true ‘clerk’ (Renan) says +excellently: ‘The mother-country is a worldly thing; +the man who wants to play the angel will always be a +bad patriot.’ Thus we see that the ‘clerk’ who claims +to secure the works of the world has a choice between +two consequences. Either he secures them and transgresses +all his principles, which is the case with the +Church supporting the nation and property; or he +maintains his principles and causes the ruin of the +institutions he claimed he was supporting, which is the +case with the humanitarian who claims to safeguard +what is national. In the first case the ‘clerk’ is despised +by the just man, who denounces him as cunning and +strikes him out of the rank of ‘clerk’; and in the +second case he collapses under the hooting of the nations +who call him inefficient, while he provokes a violent and +loudly acclaimed reaction on the part of the realist, +which is what is now happening in Italy. From all +this it follows that the ‘clerk’ is only strong if he is +clearly conscious of his essential qualities and his true +function, and shows mankind that he is clearly conscious +of them. In other words he declares to them that his +kingdom is not of this world, that <i>the grandeur of his +teaching lies precisely in this absence of practical value, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_153">[153]</span>and that the right morality for the prosperity of the kingdoms +which are of this world, is not his, but Caesar’s</i>. When +he takes up this position, the ‘clerk’ is crucified, but he is +respected, and his words haunt the memory of mankind.⁠<a id="FNanchor_168_168" href="#Footnote_168_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> +The need to remind the modern ‘clerks’ of these +truths (for everyone of them is angry at being called +Utopian) is one of the most suggestive observations in +connection with our subject. It shows that the desire +to be practical has become general, that the claim to be +so has now become necessary in order to obtain an +audience, and that the very notion of ‘clerkdom’ has +become obscured even in those who still tend to exercise +that function.</p> + +<p>It will be seen that I entirely dissociate myself from +those who want the ‘clerk’ to govern the world, and +who wish with Renan for the ‘reign of the philosophers’; +for it seems to me that human affairs can only adopt the +religions of the true ‘clerk’ under penalty of becoming +divine, i.e. of perishing as human. This has been clearly +seen by all lovers of the divine who did not desire the +destruction of what is human. This is marvellously +expressed by one of them when he makes Jesus say so +profoundly to His disciple: ‘My son, I must not give +you a clear idea of your substance ... for if you saw +clearly what you are, you could no longer remain so +<span class="pagenum" id="p_154">[154]</span>closely united to your body. You would no longer +watch over the preservation of your life.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_169_169" href="#Footnote_169_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> But though +I think it a bad thing that the ‘clerk’s’ religion should +possess the lay world, I think it still more to be dreaded +that it should not be preached to the layman at all, and +that he should thus be allowed to yield to his practical +passions without the least shame or the least, even +hypocritical, desire to raise himself however slightly +above them. ‘There are a few just men who prevent +me from sleeping’—that was what the realist said of +the teachers of old. Nietzsche, Barrès, and Sorel do not +prevent any realist from sleeping; on the contrary. +This is the novelty I want to point out, which to me +seems so serious. It seems to me serious that a +humanity, which is more than ever obsessed by the +passions of the world, should receive from its +spiritual leaders the command: ‘remain faithful to +the earth.’</p> + +<p>Is this adoption of ‘integral realism’ by the human +species permanent, or merely temporary? Are we, +as some people think, witnessing the beginning of a +new Middle Ages (and one far more barbarous than the +former, for though it practised realism, it did not extol +realism), from which, however, will arise a new +Renaissance, a new return to the religion of disinterestedness? +The elements we have discovered as forming +the new realism scarcely allow us to hope so. It is hard +to imagine the nations sincerely striving not to feel +<span class="pagenum" id="p_155">[155]</span>conscious of themselves as distinct from others, or, if +they do so, having any other motive than that of concentrating +inter-human hatred into that of class. It is +hard to imagine the clergy regaining a real moral sway +over the faithful and being able (supposing they desired +to do so) to tell them with impunity unpleasant truths. +It is hard to imagine a body of men of letters (for +corporative action becomes more and more important) +attempting to withstand the bourgeois classes instead +of flattering them. It is still harder to imagine them +turning against the tide of their intellectual decadence +and ceasing to think that they display a lofty culture +when they sneer at rational morality and fall on their +knees before history. Nevertheless one thinks of a +humanity of the future, weary of its ‘sacred egotisms’ +and the slaughterings to which they inevitably lead, +coming as humanity came two thousand years ago, to +the acceptance of a good situated beyond itself, accepting +it even more ardently than before, with the knowledge +of all the tears and blood that have been shed through +departing from that doctrine. Once more Vauvenargues’ +admirable saying would be verified. ‘The passions +have taught men reason.’ But such a thing only seems +to me possible after a long lapse of time, when war has +caused far more woes than have yet been endured. +Men will not revise their values for wars which only last +fifty months and only kill a couple of million men in +each nation. One may even doubt whether war will +ever become so terrible as to discourage those who +<span class="pagenum" id="p_156">[156]</span>love it, the more so since they are not always the men +who have to fight.</p> + +<p>When I set this limit to my pessimistic outlook and +admit that such a Renaissance is possible, I mean no +more than that it is just possible. I cannot agree with +those who say it is certain, either because it happened +once before, or because ‘civilization is due to the +human race’. Civilization as I understand it here—moral +supremacy conferred on the cult of the spiritual +and on the feeling of the universal—appears to me as a +lucky accident in man’s development. It blossomed +three thousand years ago under a set of circumstances +whose contingent character was perfectly perceived by +the historian who called it ‘the Greek miracle’. It does +not appear to me in the least to be a thing due to the +human race by virtue of the data of its nature. It seems +to me so little such a thing that I observe large portions +of the species (the Asiatic world in antiquity, the +Germanic world in modern times) who showed themselves +incapable of it and quite likely to remain so. +And this means that if humanity loses this jewel, there +is not much chance of finding it again. On the contrary +there is every chance that humanity will not find it again, +just as a man who should find a precious stone in the +sea and then drop it back in the water would have little +chance of ever seeing it again. Nothing seems to me +more doubtful than Aristotle’s remark that it is probable +the arts and philosophy have several times been discovered +and several times lost. The other position which +<span class="pagenum" id="p_157">[157]</span>maintains that civilization, despite partial eclipses, is +something which humanity cannot lose, seems to me +quite worthless except as an act of faith—though it is +valuable as a means of preserving the good we wish to +keep. I should not think it a serious objection to what +I have said if someone should point out that civilization, +lost once with the fall of the ancient world, nevertheless +had its Renaissance. Everyone knows that the Graeco-Roman +form of mind was far from being wholly extinguished +during the Middle Ages and that the sixteenth +century only brought to life what was not dead; to which +I add that even if that form of mind had been ‘reborn’ +<i>ex nihilo</i>, the fact that this is the only instance would +make it insufficient to reassure me, although the fact +that it had occurred would disturb me.</p> + +<p>Let me point out in this respect that insufficient +attention is perhaps paid to the fact that there are always +only a very tiny number of instances in history on which +are built up a ‘law’, which claims to be valid for the +whole past and future evolution of humanity. Vico +says that history is a series of alternations between periods +of progress and periods of retrogression; and he gives +<i>two</i> examples. Saint-Simon says history is a series of +oscillations between organic epochs and critical epochs; +and he gives <i>two</i> examples. Marx says history is a +series of economic systems, each of which casts out its +predecessor by means of violence; and he gives <i>one</i> +example! I shall be told that these examples could +not be more numerous, owing to the fact that history, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_158">[158]</span>at least known history, is so short. The truth, implied +by this very reply, is that history has lasted too short a +time for us to be able to deduce laws from it to enable +us to infer the future from the past. Those who do so +are like a mathematician who should decide the nature +of a curve from the form he finds it has at its very +beginning. True, a somewhat uncommon turn of +mind is required to confess that human history, after +several thousands of years, is only beginning. I cannot +sufficiently admire the rare mental value displayed by +La Bruyère (in my opinion) when he wrote the following +lines in a century which was strongly inclined to think +it was the topmost summit of human development: +‘If the world lasts only a hundred million years, it will +still be in all its freshness and only beginning; we +ourselves are almost contemporary with the first men +and the patriarchs, and who, in those far-off ages, will +be able to avoid confusing us with them? But if we +judge of the future from the past, what new things are +we ignorant of in the arts, in the sciences, in Nature, and, +I dare say, in history? What discoveries will be made! +What different revolutions will occur in our Empires +all over the world! How ignorant we are! And how +slight is an experience of six or seven thousand years!’</p> + +<p>I shall go further and say that even if an examination +of the past could lead to any valid prediction concerning +man’s future, that prediction would be the contrary of +reassuring. People forget that Hellenic rationalism +only really enlightened the world during seven hundred +<span class="pagenum" id="p_159">[159]</span>years, that it was then hidden (this <i>a minima</i> verdict +will be granted me) for twelve centuries, and has begun +to shine again for barely four centuries; so that <i>the +longest period of consecutive time in human history on which +we can found inductions is, upon the whole, a period of +intellectual and moral darkness</i>. Looking at history, we +may say in a more synthetic manner that, with the +exception of two or three very short, luminous epochs +whose light, like that of certain stars, lightens the world +long after they are extinct, humanity lives generally in +darkness; while literatures live generally in a state of +decadence and the organism in disorder. And the +disturbing thing is that humanity does not seem to +mind these long periods of cave-dwelling.</p> + +<p>To come back to the realism of my contemporaries +and their contempt for a disinterested existence, I must +add that my mind is sometimes haunted by a dreadful +question. I wonder whether humanity, by adopting +this system to-day, has not discovered its true law of +existence and adopted the true scale of values demanded +by its essence? The religion of the spiritual, I said +just now, seems to me a lucky accident in man’s history. +I shall go further, and say it seems to me a paradox. +The obvious law of human substance is the conquest +of things and the exaltation of the impulses which +secure this conquest. Only through an amazing abuse +were a handful of men at desks able to succeed in making +humanity believe that the supreme values are the good +things of the spirit. To-day humanity has awakened +<span class="pagenum" id="p_160">[160]</span>from this dream, knows its true nature and its real +desires, and utters its war-cry against those who for +centuries have robbed it of itself. Instead of waxing +indignant at the ruin of their domination, would it +not be more reasonable for these usurpers (if there are +any left) to wonder that it lasted so long? Orpheus +could not aspire to charm the wild beasts with his music +until the end of time. However, one could have hoped +that Orpheus himself would not become a wild beast.</p> + +<p>It is scarcely necessary to say my remarks on realist +desires and their violent perfecting do not blind me +to the immense growth of gentleness, justice, and love +written to-day in our customs and laws, which would +certainly have amazed our most optimistic ancestors. +There is an immense improvement in the relations +between man and man within the groups which fight +each other—especially within the nation where security +is the rule and injustice is a scandal. But to keep more +closely to our subject, perhaps we do not sufficiently +realize the incredible degree of civilization implied by +the good treatment of prisoners, and the care of enemy +wounded in wars between nations, and by the institution +of public and private charity in the relations between +the classes. The denial of progress, the assertion that +barbarity of heart has never been worse, are natural +themes for poets and those who are discontented, and +perhaps they are even necessary to progress. But the +historian, whether he looks at national or class warfare, +is amazed at the transformation of a species which only +<span class="pagenum" id="p_161">[161]</span>four centuries ago roasted prisoners of war in baker’s +ovens, and, only two centuries ago forbade the workers +to establish a pension fund for their aged members. +Nevertheless I must point out that these improvements +cannot be credited to the present age. They are the +results of the teaching of the eighteenth century, against +which the ‘masters of modern thought’ are in complete +revolt. The establishment of war ambulances, the wide +development of State charities are the work of the Second +Empire, are connected with the ‘humanitarian clichés’ +of Victor Hugo and Michelet, which are immeasureably +despised by the moralists of the past half century. They +exist to some extent <i>despite of</i> these moralists, not one of +whom has conducted a truly humane campaign, while +the chief of them—Nietzsche, Barrès, Sorel—would +blush to be able to say like Voltaire: ‘I have done a +little good, ’tis my best work.’ I must add that these +good works are now merely customs, i.e. actions performed +from habit, without the will taking any part in them, +without the mind reflecting on their meaning. And if +the mind of our realists ever came to think of them, +I think there is every possibility that it might prohibit +them. I can well imagine a future war when a nation +would decide not to look after the enemy wounded, a +strike where the bourgeoisie would make up its mind +not to support hospitals for the benefit of a class which +was ruining it and anxious to destroy it. I can imagine +both priding themselves on getting free from a ‘stupid +humanitarianism’, and finding disciples of Nietzsche +<span class="pagenum" id="p_162">[162]</span>and Sorel to praise them for it. The attitude of the +Italian Fascists and the Russian Bolshevists towards their +enemies is not calculated to give me the lie here. The +modern world still displays certain failures in pure +practicality, a few stains of idealism from which it might +well cleanse itself.</p> + +<p>I said above that the logical end of the ‘integral +realism’ professed by humanity to-day is the organized +slaughter of nations or classes. It is possible to conceive +of a third, which would be their reconciliation. The +thing to possess would be the whole earth, and they +would finally come to realize that the only way to +exploit it properly is by union, while the desire to set +themselves up as distinct from others would be transferred +from the nation to the species, arrogantly drawn +up against everything which is not itself. And, as a +matter of fact, such a movement does exist. Above +classes and nations there does exist a desire of the +species to become the master of things, and, when a +human being flies from one end of the world to the +other in a few hours, the whole human race quivers with +pride and adores itself as distinct from all the rest of +creation. At bottom, this imperialism of the species is +preached by all the great directors of the modern +conscience. It is Man, and not the nation or the class, +whom Nietzsche, Sorel, Bergson extoll in his genius +for making himself master of the world. It is humanity, +and not any one section of it, whom Auguste Comte +exhorts to plunge into consciousness of itself and to +<span class="pagenum" id="p_163">[163]</span>make itself the object of its adoration. Sometimes one +may feel that such an impulse will grow ever stronger, +and that in this way inter-human wars will come to an +end. In this way humanity would attain ‘universal +fraternity’. But, far from being the abolition of the +national spirit with its appetites and its arrogance, this +would simply be its supreme form, the nation being +called Man and the enemy God. Thereafter, humanity +would be unified in one immense army, one immense +factory, would be aware only of heroisms, disciplines, +inventions, would denounce all free and disinterested +activity, would long cease to situate the good outside +the real world, would have no God but itself and its +desires, and would achieve great things; by which I +mean that it would attain to a really grandiose control +over the matter surrounding it, to a really joyous +consciousness of its power and its grandeur. And +History will smile to think that this is the species for +which Socrates and Jesus Christ died.</p> + +<p>1924–1927.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="p_164"></a><a id="p_165"></a>[165]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="NOTES"> + <i>Notes</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<h3 id="Note_A"><span class="smcap">Note A</span> (<a href="#p_1">Page 1</a>)</h3> + +<p><i>That political passions affect a large number of men they never before +affected ...</i></p> + +<p>It is very difficult to know to what extent crowds are moved by the +political events of their time (of course, I am leaving on one side all truly +popular movements). Crowds do not write their memoirs, and those +who write memoirs scarcely ever speak of the crowds. However, I do +not think my proposition will be seriously disputed. To limit ourselves +to France and the two examples I quoted—suppose we had another +upheaval like the Religious Wars, I do not think we should see the +immense majority of country districts possessed by no other passion than +a hatred for soldiers, whatever party they belonged to.⁠<a id="FNanchor_170_170" href="#Footnote_170_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> Nor should +we see cultivated bourgeois who keep diaries giving a couple of lines to +such events as Luther’s preaching, along with the thousand little facts +they relate.⁠<a id="FNanchor_171_171" href="#Footnote_171_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> Nor do I think that a month after an event like the taking +<span class="pagenum" id="p_166">[166]</span>of the Bastille we should find a foreigner on his travels in France, writing: +‘13th August, 1789. Before I leave Clermont I must remark that I +have dined or supped five times at the table d’hôte with some twenty +to thirty merchants and tradesmen, officers, etc.; and it is not easy for +me to express the insignificance—the inanity of the conversation. Scarcely +any politics, at a moment when every bosom ought to beat with none +but political sensations.’ (Arthur Young.)⁠<a id="FNanchor_172_172" href="#Footnote_172_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p> + +<p>The attitude of populations towards wars between States long seems +to have been that described by Voltaire in the following lines: ‘It is +indeed a deplorable evil that this multitude of soldiers should always be +kept up by all Princes. But, as we have pointed out, this evil produces +a good. The peoples take no part in the wars carried on by their masters; +the citizens of besieged towns often pass from the power of one to another +without having cost the life of a single inhabitant; they are simply the +prize of the King who possesses most soldiers, cannons and money.’ +(<i>Essai sur les Moeurs</i>, towards the end.) Again, in 1870, a Prussian +servant girl said to a French prisoner employed on the farm where she +was working: ‘When the war is over I will marry you. Don’t be +surprised at what I say, patriotism doesn’t mean much to us, you know.’ +I imagine that in 1914, many servant girls, Prussian or otherwise, felt +in their hearts and put into practice, this absence of patriotism; but +I dare to assert that very few would have formulated it, even to themselves. +The really new fact to-day is not perhaps that the peoples feel +political passions, but that they claim the right to feel them. This claim +is sufficient to make them act and therefore furnishes a magnificent +opportunity for their leaders to exploit them.</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_B"> + <span class="smcap">Note B</span> (<a href="#p_15">Page 15</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>Louis XIV annexing Alsace and not for one moment thinking of forbidding +the German language ...</i></p> + +<p>It was not until 1768 that the Monarchy thought of setting up schools +in Alsace, ‘where French is to be taught’. Vidal de la Blanche, who +<span class="pagenum" id="p_167">[167]</span>relates this (<i>La France de l’Est</i>, 1, vi) adds: ‘This indifference (to the +language question) must not shock us too much. Let us rather learn a +lesson from it. It raises us above the narrowly jealous conceptions which +since then have set nation against nation, under this language pretext. +It takes us into an age when another spirit presided over human relations. +There was then no language question. Fortunate eighteenth century, +when war bred no lasting hatred, when the poison of national animosities +was not inoculated and fostered by all the means now at the disposal +of the State, including the schools.’ The eminent historian forgets that +the State has these means at its disposal, <i>with the consent of the peoples</i>. +The peoples, or at least the cultivated classes among them, at the bidding +of their men of letters, during the past century have set themselves up +arrogantly against one another in their languages and cultures, even +though they one day come face to face with the unexpected results of +this attitude, as is happening to-day to France in its difficulties with +Alsace.</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_C"> + <span class="smcap">Note C</span> (<a href="#p_19">Page 19</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>The Union of capitalism, anti-semitism, anti-democracy with nationalism.</i></p> + +<p>I am under no illusion concerning the solidity of certain among these +unions. Although the conservative passions fully comprehend their +immense interest in identifying themselves with national passion and +thereby benefiting by its popularity, although one may even admit that +they have been caught in their own net and have become sincere in this +feeling, yet it is none the less true that conservatism (chiefly capitalism) +is essentially something entirely different from patriotism, and that this +difference, whose manifestations in the course of history have been +innumerable (how many times have the bourgeoisie treated with foreigners +when they thought it was to their interests!) may once again display itself. +It is easy to imagine that the French bourgeoisie would turn against +France if they thought their patrimony was being too seriously threatened +by the legislation of the Republic. This may already be seen in the +case of families who, in recent years, have exported their capital abroad. +I may say the same thing of monarchist passion. It is easy to imagine +<span class="pagenum" id="p_168">[168]</span>that certain followers of that passion might one day decide to work against +a nation which decisively and finally rejects the system they propose. +I think I observe this when I see monarchist writers publishing that +‘from the Spree to the Mekong, the whole world knows that France is +in a state of weakness bordering upon disintegration’. However, such +things are still exceptional, and those who are responsible for them would +refuse to admit—perhaps sincerely—that they meant to harm their +nation.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the bourgeoisie have another interest in keeping up +nationalism and the fear of war. These feelings create a sort of permanent +military spirit in a nation. More precisely, they create in the people a +disposition to accept the existing hierarchy, to obey orders, to recognize +superiors, i.e. the very things required of them by those who wish them +to continue in a state of service. The confused perception of this truth +inspires the bourgeoisie with that curious ill-humour they display towards +every attempt at international agreement, in whatever form this may be +presented by the governments. This ill-humour (they declare) arises +from the fact that they consider it simple-minded and imprudent to +believe in the extinction of national hatreds. At bottom, it arises from the +fact that <i>they do not want this extinction to occur</i>. They know that the +maintenance of these hatreds will cost the lives of their children, but they +do not hesitate to make the sacrifice, if by doing so they retain possession +of their property⁠<a id="FNanchor_173_173" href="#Footnote_173_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> and their power over their servants. Here is a +grandeur of egotism which is perhaps insufficiently appreciated.</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_D"> + <span class="smcap">Note D</span> (<a href="#p_28">Page 28</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>On the attitude of the modern Catholics towards Catholicism when it +is in opposition to their nationalism.</i></p> + +<p>A good example is the attitude of the German Catholics in the past +twenty years. It has been described with all desirable detail by +<span class="pagenum" id="p_169">[169]</span>M. + Edmond Bloud in his great study: <i>Le nouveau Centre et le catholicisme</i>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_174_174" href="#Footnote_174_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> +It will be seen that it strangely resembles the attitude of many a non-German +Catholic.</p> + +<p>The ‘Centre’ began by declaring itself ‘a political party which has +assumed as its duty the representation of the interests of the whole nation +in all domains of public life, in accordance with the principles of Christian +doctrine.’ (<i>Katholische Weltanschauung</i>: Catholic conception of the +world.) Soon they announced political action founded on ‘a Christian +basis’ (christliche Basis), the spirit of which is thus defined by one of +its apostles (Doctor Brauweiler, April, 1913): ‘In the domain of practical +action, <i>concepts are determined by the end in view</i>. The formation of +political concepts is comparable with the formation of juridical concepts. +The jurist forms his concepts <i>with no other consideration than that of what +is needed, in relation solely to the required end</i>. But no one can say that +the juridical concept thus formed is a false one. In the same way, one +may speak in politics of Christianity or Christian doctrine.’ In 1914, +Doctor Karl Bachem of Cologne, published a pamphlet entitled: <i>Centre, +Catholic Doctrine, Practical Politics</i>, where he declares that the doctrine +of ‘universal Christianity’ is only a political formula intended to render +possible the collaboration of Catholics and Protestants, chiefly in Parliament; +that from the religious point of view this formula has only a +negative meaning, and only means the determination to struggle against +materialism, atheism and nihilism; that its positive content is defined by +the Prussian Constitution which in paragraphs 14 and 18 lays down +that ‘the Christian religion’ is the ‘foundation of the institutions of +the State’.</p> + +<p>Thus, as M. Edmond Bloud justly remarks, Doctor Bachem makes +the Prussian Constitution the Rule of Faith. Put ‘national interest’ +in place of ‘Prussian Constitution’ and you will have the state of mind +of many a modern French Catholic.</p> + +<p>The attitude of the German Catholics seems to me also representative +of a certain Catholicism common to-day to other nations, in declarations +of this sort:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_170">[170]</span></p> + +<p>‘The Catholic members of the “Centre” remain Catholics individually, +<i>but the party, as a party, does not necessarily accept the Catholic conception +of the world</i>.’</p> + +<p>And again:</p> + +<p>‘The Pope and the Bishops have authority in matters of religion, +but wherever political matters are concerned we shall not allow ourselves +to be influenced by the authority of the Pope or by that of the Bishops.’ +(M. Edmond Bloud alludes to a conversation reported in the <i>Frankfurter +Zeitung</i>, April, 1914, where one of the chief of the ‘syndicats mixtes’ +declared that, ‘The German Catholics have had enough of the Pope.’)</p> + +<p>What M. Bloud calls the ‘declericalization of the Centre’ is not a +thing peculiar to our neighbours, nor is the joy of the great German +nationalist organ (the Prussian Annals) when it observes that ‘the Catholic +idea of the State is ceasing to be ultramontain and is becoming nationalist’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_175_175" href="#Footnote_175_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a></p> + +<p>The attitude common to German Catholics and to certain Catholics +of other nations seems to me well brought out by two protests which +M. Bloud quotes.</p> + +<p>The first is from Father Weiss:</p> + +<p>‘There exist,’ says the eminent theologian, ‘several kinds of political +Catholicism.... The worst of all consists in looking upon pure +politics, social politics, national politics, not only as something wholly +independent of religion, but <i>as being the standard by which we should +determine the degree to which Catholicism or Christianity may be utilized +in public life</i>.’</p> + +<p>The other is from Cardinal Kopp (then Bishop of Fulda) in a letter +written in 1887:</p> + +<p>‘Unhappily a gust of madness is blowing over us. Formerly we held +to the principle: Faith first, politics afterwards. Now they say: <i>Politics +first!</i> The Church and the Faith afterwards.’</p> + +<p>Our Catholics of the <i>Action Française</i> have not invented much.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_171">[171]</span></p> + + +<h3 id="Note_E"> + <span class="smcap">Note E</span> (<a href="#p_33">Page 33</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>The ‘clerk’, by adopting political passions, brings them the tremendous +influence of his sensibility if he is an artist, of his persuasive power if he is a +thinker, and in either case his moral prestige.</i></p> + +<p>This prestige itself is something new in history, at least from my point +of view. The results produced in France by the intervention of the +‘intellectuals’ in the Dreyfus affair, and those produced by the manifesto +of the German Intellectuals in 1914, not only in their own country but +throughout the world, are things to which I find no equivalent in the past. +One cannot imagine the Roman Republic feeling that the moral support +of Terence and Varro was of value to it during the war with Carthage, +or the government of Louis XIV finding that the approbation of Racine +and Fermat, gave it additional strength in the war with Holland. This +increase of strength which a cause to-day receives from the approbation +of the men of thought (or those who are considered such) does great +honour to the modern world. It is an homage to the mind hitherto +unexampled in humanity.</p> + +<p>Naturally, this prestige has a double result. Though the modern +‘clerk’ fortifies a cause by giving it his approbation he can also seriously +harm it by refusing his approbation. If in 1915 men like Ostwald and +Mach had refused to approve the acts of their nation, they would have +seriously harmed it. The ‘clerk’ who to-day condemns the realism of +the State to which he belongs does really harm that State.⁠<a id="FNanchor_176_176" href="#Footnote_176_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a> Hence it +follows that the State, in the name of its practical interests, to defend which +is its function, has a right—perhaps a duty—to punish them. This +appears to me to be the true order of things: The ‘clerk’, faithful to +his essential duty, denounces the realism of States; whereupon, the +States, no less faithful to their duty, made him drink the hemlock. The +serious disorganization in the modern world is that the ‘clerks’ do not +denounce the realism of States, but on the contrary approve of it; they +no longer drink the hemlock.⁠<a id="FNanchor_177_177" href="#Footnote_177_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_172">[172]</span></p> + +<p>Let me point to another disorganization. That is when the State +does not punish the ‘clerk’ for denouncing its realism. This occurred +in France during the Dreyfus affair. The order of things demanded that +the ‘clerks’ should demand abstract justice, as they did; but perhaps it +also demanded that the State, weakened in strength by their idealism, +should throw them into prison. When the ‘clerk’ performs the layman’s +task, the result is anarchy; but there is also anarchy when the layman +acts and speaks as a ‘clerk’, when those whose duty is to defend the nation +display their cult for the abolition of frontiers, universal love, or other +spiritual things.⁠<a id="FNanchor_178_178" href="#Footnote_178_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a> When I see philosophers concerning themselves with +the safety of the State and Ministers striving to bring about love among +mankind, I think of what Dante says: ‘You turn to religion him who was +born to wear the sword, you make a King of one who was born to preach. +Thus all your steps are out of the true way.’ However, this second +disorganization of orders has been denounced by others, and it is not my +function to combat it.</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_F"> + <span class="smcap">Note F</span> (<a href="#p_37">Page 37</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>Think how willingly the ecclesiastics now accept military service.</i></p> + +<p>I think this willingness is worthy of the historian’s attention. Obviously, +it implies some sincere attachment to their country in those who display +this willingness, although their law is to be dead to all worldly attachments. +Moreover, it appears that in the last war most of the ministers of Jesus +Christ able to bear arms were glad to defend their country, whatever that +country was, and whatever notion they may have had of the justice of +its cause. Here is a most suggestive fact: Certain Belgian monastic +orders (and others as well, I am told) established abroad at the declaration +of war, and authorized by the government to remain abroad, insisted +upon returning to the capital to perform their military duties. True, +the behaviour of these monks may be explained, not on grounds of +patriotism, but from the fear that they would be severely criticized by +their fellow-citizens if they acted otherwise; for the modern ‘clerks’ +<span class="pagenum" id="p_173">[173]</span>have ceased to understand that the sign of an attitude truly in harmony +with their function is that it should be unpopular with the laymen.</p> + +<p>But the most remarkable thing here for the historian, is that the imposition +of military service on ecclesiastics does not appear to arouse any protest +from the Church. Certain Church teachers even assert (Mgr Battifol, +<i>L’Eglise et le Droit de la guerre</i>): ‘There is no further doubt about the +legality of military service.’⁠<a id="FNanchor_179_179" href="#Footnote_179_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a> It is also curious to see in the <i>Dictionnaire +apologétique de la foi catholique</i> (Art. ‘Paix et Guerre’) the strenuous +efforts of the author (Father de la Brière) to prove that bearing arms, even +by ‘clerks’ in holy orders, is in no sense contrary to Christian law. However, +the opinion of these theologians does not seem to be shared, at least +publicly, by the higher ecclesiastical authorities; for every ‘clerk’ who +bears arms is laid under an interdict, as he was in the past—only the interdict +is taken off a few minutes after it has been declared.</p> + +<p>The modern laymen (Barrès for example) praise this patriotism of the +ecclesiastic and his willingness to fight. The laymen of the past tried to +make him ashamed of it, and liked to exhort him to sentiments which they +considered more in harmony with his sacred ministry. The warlike +ardours of John XII and Julius II were severely condemned by their +contemporaries. Apart from Erasmus—the type of the man of letters +fully aware of the ‘clerk’s’ high function, who was continually saying: +‘Their tonsure does not warn them that they ought to be free from all +the passions of this world and think only of the things of Heaven’—the +Italian Tizio wrote: ‘It is astonishing that the Pontiffs, whose part is +to be pacific and independent, should take part in the shedding of Christian +blood.’ The French poet Jean Bouchet shows the weeping Church +imploring Julius II to end the war (though it is true that Julius II was +fighting France):</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">‘Your patron is my Lord Saint Peter,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Who never warred for worldly goods.’</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>In <i>Le Songe du Verger</i>, a kind of summary of moral doctrines current +in France in the fourteenth century, there is a dialogue between +<span class="pagenum" id="p_174">[174]</span>a Knight and a Clerk, when the Clerk claims for his caste the right to make +war, and the Knight tells him that ‘the arms of the “clerks” are prayers +and tears’. It is suggestive to see a soldier urging a minister of the spiritual +to perform his true function and seeming to think that the performance +of this function is necessary to the good order of the world. Here is a +feeling for ‘clerkdom’ and its social value which is very seldom to be +found among the modern laymen, even the non-military ones—I nearly +said, especially the non-military ones.⁠<a id="FNanchor_180_180" href="#Footnote_180_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a></p> + + +<h3 id="Note_G"> + <span class="smcap">Note G</span> (<a href="#p_53">Page 53</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>That self-examination to which every spectator is impelled by a representation +of human beings which he feels to be true and solely pre-occupied +with truth.</i></p> + +<p>Let me quote the following passage concerning the civilizing effects +of such representation:—</p> + +<p>‘This spectacle of man offered to man has considerable moral effects. +First, a valuable exercise of the intelligence, an increase of reflection, +a widening of the view in every direction, result from the habit thus set +up of getting out of oneself and entering into others, to understand their +actions, to share in their passions, sympathize with their sufferings, appreciate +their motives. This faculty of the artist communicated to the +spectator or the listener, this faculty of participation and assimilation, +is something set up in opposition to egotism and is a condition of tolerance +<span class="pagenum" id="p_175">[175]</span>and benevolence, frequently even of justice. Then, lessons of virtue, +frequently not the least effective, are given to the spectator, from the very +fact that he is placed in a position to praise or condemn acts or thoughts +which are set before him relative to cases where his own interests are not +involved. He recognizes his own image in the actor of the epic, a man +like himself, a voluntary and impassioned agent, whose dangers though +perhaps magnified are not foreign to his own experience. Then the +essential phenomena which characterize conscious humanity and morality +occur in him who thus witnesses himself in the person of another, i.e. +disinterested objectivity of himself to himself, generalization of passion, +motive and maxim, judgment founded on the universal, self-examination +to arrive at what is duty, clear and defined sentiment of the direction of +the will.</p> + +<p>‘<i>But this must not lead us to think that the poet’s object is utility or +morality. If it were, he would be lacking in the true feeling of art.</i> +Teaching, moralizing—this object of the artist is indirect, i.e. does not +exist systematically for him. He must only attain it without having sought +it, and sometimes he attains it when he seems to have departed from it. +What he desires to do, is to touch the feelings, to arouse emotions. But +it happens that by doing so he elevates, purifies, moralizes. The poet +(I am especially speaking of him) does indeed address himself to everyone. +<i>That means he can only sing the universal</i>, however curious such an assembly +of words may appear. He may indeed sing it under the form of the +particular, without which his fictions would be lacking in life, he none the +less excludes the pure, incomprehensible, inexplicable individual, shorn +of all truth if he does not express a relationship.⁠<a id="FNanchor_181_181" href="#Footnote_181_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a> He generalizes passion, +therefore ennobles it and renders it at once the object of observation, +reflection and disinterested emotion. The listener, carried away from his +own relatively base private preoccupations and transported without +hope or fear (at least, too personal and too present hope and fear) into +the superior sphere of humanity’s common passion, feels the benefit of an +elevation of soul; his consciousness is temporarily freed from egotism.’ +(Renouvier, <i>Introduction à la philosophie analytique de l’Histoire</i>, p. 354.)</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_176">[176]</span></p> + + +<h3 id="Note_H"> + <span class="smcap">Note H</span> (<a href="#p_56">Page 56</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>... Napoleon, who ordered the chief of police to take measures for the +history of France to be written in a manner favourable to his own throne.</i></p> + +<p>Here are some portions of a note on this subject dictated by Napoleon +at Bordeaux in 1808. It promulgates the conception of history as practised, +mutatis mutandis, by many of our historians of the past:—</p> + +<p>‘I do not approve the principles laid down in his note by the Minister +of the Interior. They were true twenty years ago, they will be true +sixty years hence, but they are not true to-day. Velly is the one fairly +detailed author who has written on the history of France. The abridged +chronology of the President Hénault is a good classical book. It is useful +to have them both continued. <i>It is of the greatest importance to make +certain of the spirit in which these continuations are written.</i> I ordered +the Minister of Police to look after the continuation of Millot, and I +desire the two Ministers will consult over the continuation of Velly and +the President Hénault....</p> + +<p>‘They are to be just to Henri IV, Louis XIII, Louis XIV and Louis +XV, but without adulation. The September Massacres and the horrors +of the Revolution must be painted in the same colours as the Inquisition +and the massacres of the Sixteen. They must take care to avoid all reaction +in speaking of the Revolution, no man could have opposed it successfully. +No blame attaches either to those who perished or to those who survived. +There was no individual power capable of changing the elements and +foreseeing the events which arose from the nature of things and circumstances.</p> + +<p>‘They are to point out the perpetual disorganization of the national +finances, the chaos of the provincial assemblies, the claims of the Parlements, +the lack of regulation and resort in the administration. This +checkered France, without unity of laws and administration, was rather +a union of twenty Kingdoms than a single State, so that one breathes +freely on coming to the period when the benefits of unity of laws, administration +and territory are enjoyed.... The opinion expressed by the +<span class="pagenum" id="p_177">[177]</span>Minister, which, if followed, would result in abandoning this task to +private enterprise and the speculation of some publisher, is wrong and +could only produce regrettable results.’</p> + +<p>Of course, the champions of authority are not the only persons who +make history serve their own interests. Condorcet (<i>Tableau historique</i>, +10<sup>e</sup> Epoque) says that history should serve ‘to maintain an active vigilance +in recognizing and crushing under the weight of Reason the first germs +of superstition and tyranny, if they ever dare to appear again.’</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_I"> + <span class="smcap">Note I</span> (<a href="#p_62">Page 62</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>Humanitarianism and Humanism.</i></p> + +<p>Here, on this subject, is a curious passage from one of the ancients:—</p> + +<p>‘Those who created the Latin language and those who spoke it well +do not give the word <i>humanitas</i> the vulgar meaning which is synonymous +with the Greek word <i>philanthropia</i>, which means an active kindness, a +tender benevolence for all men. But they give the word the meaning +which the Greeks attach to <i>paideia</i>, which we call education, knowledge +of the fine arts. Those who show the most taste and disposition for these +studies are the most worthy to be called <i>humanissimi</i>. For man alone +among all living beings is able to devote himself to cultivating a study +which for that reason has been called <i>humanitas</i>. Such is the meaning +given to this by the ancients, particularly by Varro and Cicero. Almost +all their works show examples, so I shall content myself with quoting +one only. I have chosen the opening of the first book of Varro “Concerning +human things”: “Praxiteles, qui propter artificium egregium +nemini est paulum modo humaniori ignotus (Praxiteles, whose excellent +talent as an artist has made him known to every man at all skilled in the +arts)”. Here <i>humanior</i> does not bear the vulgar meaning of easy, tractable, +benevolent even though lacking in knowledge of letters. That +meaning would not express the author’s thought. It means an educated, +a learned man, one who is acquainted with Praxiteles through books and +history.’ (Aulus Gellius, <i>Noctes Atticae</i>, Book XIII, XVI.)</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_178">[178]</span></p> + + +<h3 id="Note_J"> + <span class="smcap">Note J</span> (<a href="#p_82">Page 82</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>... they cannot sufficiently denounce all institutions based on liberty +and discussion.</i></p> + +<p>Note that the novelty here lies in the passion, the fury with which +they condemn liberty of discussion. Otherwise, we see most of the +so-called liberal thinkers in history themselves recognize the necessity +for submission to the sovereign’s judgment. Spinoza declares that ‘there +is no possible government if every man makes himself the defender of +his own rights and the rights of others.’ The <i>Letters of Descartes</i> contain +passages in favour of the ‘reason of State.’</p> + +<p>It is perhaps not sufficiently noticed how frequently the old French +absolute monarchists say that justice is the chief function of the sovereign. +‘The most important of the King’s rights,’ says one of these theorists +(Guy Coquille, <i>Institution du droit des Français</i>, 1608) ‘is to make <i>the +laws and general statutes for the good order of his Kingdom</i>.’ Another +(Loyseau, <i>Des Seigneuries</i>, 1608) says: ‘The usage of public <i>lordship +must be regulated by justice</i> ...’ Bossuet (<i>Instruction à Louis XIV</i>) +says: ‘When the King administers justice or has it exactly administered +in accordance with the laws, <i>which is his principal function</i> ...’ The +modern absolute monarchists, even French, seem to be inspired by the +German theorist, who says: ‘The State has two functions to perform: +the administration of justice and the waging of war. <i>But war is by far +the principal.</i>’ (Treitschke.)</p> + +<p>Note this famous passage from Bossuet (<i>Pol.</i>, Book VIII, art. II, par. I):</p> + +<p>‘It is one thing for it (the government) to be absolute, another for it +to be arbitrary. It is absolute in relation to constraint, there being no +power which is capable of compelling the sovereign, who in this sense is +independent of all human authority. But it does not follow that government +is arbitrary; because, apart from the fact that all things are subject +to God’s judgment (which applies also to the government we have called +arbitrary), there are laws in empires, and everything which is done +contrary to them is void of right.’</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_179">[179]</span></p> + +<p>It will be seen that the defence of arbitrary government is a new thing +among French teachers, even in regard to Bossuet. (I am speaking of +Bossuet’s <i>doctrines</i>, not of his practical advice.)</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_K"> + <span class="smcap">Note K</span> (<a href="#p_91">Page 91</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>This is the teaching of Nietzsche.</i></p> + +<p>I must repeat that throughout this work I am considering the teaching +of Nietzsche (and Hegel’s too) insofar as it has become the pretext for +a great moral preaching, though I know perfectly well that in reality this +teaching is something far more complex. I shall quote the following +judicious observation, in connection with the fact that certain philosophers +have only themselves to blame for ‘the misunderstanding of their true +thought’:</p> + +<p>‘Nietzscheism has been subjected to the same test as Hegelianism. +And no doubt here and there philosophical themes have served especially +as pretexts to cover up a new offensive on the part of barbarism. <i>But +the fact that they have been utilized, the manner in which they have been +utilized, have a significance which must not be overlooked.</i> Is it not the +criterion of a philosophy which may be called rational without reserve +and equivocation, that it should remain incorruptibly faithful to itself? +On the other hand, <i>the systems which begin by accepting contradictions, +reserving the right to add that they are capable of surmounting them or of +“living” them, lodge their enemy in their midst</i>. Their punishment is +that their antithesis still resembles them; and that is what has happened +to Nietzsche.’ (L. Brunschvicg, <i>Le Progrès de la Conscience dans la philosophie +occidentale</i>, p. 431.) This book contains an excellent exposition of +‘Hegelian themes’ and ‘Nietzschean themes’, precisely insofar as they +have become political breviaries.</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_L"> + <span class="smcap">Note L</span> (<a href="#p_94">Page 94</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>Long before the disciples of Taine and Auguste Comte.</i></p> + +<p>When this book appeared in a periodical, certain persons declared +that the whole of my attack on the modern ‘clerk’ went astray because +<span class="pagenum" id="p_180">[180]</span>I did not give more space to the author of <i>Origines de la France Contemporaine</i>. +He, they said, was the ‘great realist “clerk” of the past fifty +years, while those I attacked were only his small change.’ (This sudden +contempt for the thought of Barrès and Maurras of the part of certain +people is certainly surprising.)</p> + +<p>There is here a manifest abuse of the word <i>realism</i>. Taine threw light +on the true nature of the real, or rather the political real, and reminded +the universalist that this domain is not under his jurisdiction. He never +<i>exalted</i> this real at the expense of the universal, which is the realism I am +denouncing here. He plainly taught, on the contrary, that the universalist +who stays in his own domain (see his admiration for Spinoza and Goethe) +is the great human model. Compare this with Maurras for whom the +universalist, even when non-political (the infinitist, the pantheist) is +profoundly contemptible. It is also difficult for me to see Taine as the +godfather of those who glorify the soldier at the expense of the man of +justice and the man of study,⁠<a id="FNanchor_182_182" href="#Footnote_182_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a> who exhort the nations to cultivate their +prejudices where they are ‘totally foreign to reason’ (Barrès) and who +declare that the intelligence which cares nothing about what is social is +the activity of a savage. I think Taine would cheerfully say of those who +claim to derive from him the same thing that M. Bergson is reported to +have said of some of his ‘disciples’: ‘These gentlemen are most original.’</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, Taine seems to me to be the initiator of the modern +realists in two points. The first is his condemnation of individualism, +more exactly, of the moral liberty of the citizen (for this, at bottom, is the +meaning of his regret for the old corporations, and, more generally, +of his exhortation to form groups, which shape the individual’s soul, +instead of allowing it to be autonomous as against the State); and the +second, which is far more novel than the first among French teachers, +is his condemnation of idealist education. The peroration of the ‘<i>Régime +moderne</i>’ obviously establishes the whole educational argument of the +<i>Déracines</i> and <i>L’Étape</i>:—</p> + +<p>‘Sometimes when he is with his intimates, as bitter and as overfatigued +as he is, the young man is tempted to say to us: “By your education you +induced us to believe that the world is made in a certain way. You deceived +<span class="pagenum" id="p_181">[181]</span>us. It is much uglier, stupider, dirtier, gloomier and harsher, at least +to our sensibility and our imagination. You think they are over-excited +and out of gear; well, if they are, it is your fault. That is why we curse +and despise the whole of your world, and reject your pretended truths, +which for us are lies, including those elementary and primary truths +which you say are evident to common sense, and upon which you build +your laws, your institutions, your society, your philosophy, your sciences +and your arts.” That is what contemporary youth have been telling us +aloud for fifteen years by their tastes, their opinions, their inclinations +in literature, the arts and life.’</p> + +<p>Against this manifesto in favour of a practical education, let me set +this protest of a true descendant of Montaigne, Pascal and Montesquieu:</p> + +<p>‘In his diatribe for the classical spirit and the primary truths of reason +and philosophy which direct literary education of all kinds, Taine comes +to use words similar to those of the adversaries of ancient literature,⁠<a id="FNanchor_183_183" href="#Footnote_183_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> +of the general ideas which are inseparable from them, and of disinterested +culture even. The only object would then be to prepare persons for an +empirical world,⁠<a id="FNanchor_184_184" href="#Footnote_184_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> people taught to know the world as it is, and trained to +make it continue as it now is. However, the school laws are too recent +for one to be able decently to blame them for the evils of the age, and make +them the cause of the hatred and scorn poured on society by those who are +bored, enervate and out of their class. However, even if it were true that +the comparison between the general principles of reason, morality and +beauty, and empirical life engendered more disgust with the realities than +it has done in the past, it would be a sad paradox to ask that this danger +should be averted by banishing from education all elevated views and all +idealism.’ (Renouvier, <i>Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire</i>, tome iv, +p. 541.)</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_M"> + <span class="smcap">Note M</span> (<a href="#p_95">Page 95</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>This cult brings out a silliness of mind which to me seems wholly an +acquisition of the nineteenth century.</i></p> + +<p>This silliness of mind assumes another form, i.e. the belief (rigidly +formulated by Maurras) that in politics you can find laws of cause and +<span class="pagenum" id="p_182">[182]</span>effect as certainly valid as those of weight or electricity. (‘Politics are a +<i>science</i>.’) This is the superstition of science, held to be competent in +all domains, including that of morality; a superstition which, I repeat, +is an acquisition of the nineteenth century. It remains to discover whether +those who brandish this doctrine believe in it or whether they simply +want to give the prestige of a scientific appearance to the passions of their +hearts, which they perfectly well know are nothing but passions. It is +to be noted that the dogma that history is obedient to scientific laws is +preached especially by partisans of arbitrary authority. This is quite +natural, since it eliminates the two realities they most hate, i.e. human +liberty and the historical action of the individual.</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_N"> + <span class="smcap">Note N</span> (<a href="#p_98">Page 98</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>Our age has seen priests of the mind teaching that the gregarious is the +praiseworthy form of thought, and that independent thought is contemptible.</i></p> + +<p>Note that what is new in this crusade against individualism (the great +apostle of which is M. Maurras) is not the recognition that ‘the individual +is only an abstraction’, that to a great extent, he is formed by his race, +his surroundings, his nation, a thousand things which are not himself. +The novelty is the cult for this servitude, the order given to mankind to +submit entirely to it, the contempt shown for any attempt to get free +from it. Once again this is the cult (so strange in French thinkers) for +the <i>inevitable</i> part of the human being, the hatred for its free part.</p> + +<p>Note that those who to-day preach obedience of the mind, not only +demand it from the uncultured masses but from the men of thought, +<i>especially</i> from the men of thought. The anti-individualists of the +Dreyfus affair particularly opposed the independence of scientists, writers, +and philosophers—‘the mad vanity of a few intellectuals’. Nevertheless, +the most curious thing is not that they require this obedience, but that +they obtain it. When M. Maritain declares that ‘everyone cannot +philosophize and that, for men, the essential thing is to choose a master’, +and when M. Maurras asserts that the function of most minds is to be +‘servants’ and to reflect the thought of some leader, these teachers find +<span class="pagenum" id="p_183">[183]</span>a number of men of thought to applaud and abdicate their liberty of +mind in their favour. The thinkers of the eighteenth century said: +‘A religion is needed for the people.’ Those of our age say: ‘A religion +is needed for ourselves.’ What Barrès wrote: ‘The part of the masters +is to justify the habits and prejudices of France, so as best to prepare +our children to take their place in the national procession,’ he certainly +meant that he and his colleagues were to walk in this procession. Here +we again come upon that thirst for discipline which I spoke of above +and which seemed to me so worthy of remark in the descendants of +Montaigne and Renan. The cause, I said, was their desire to belong +to a ‘strong group’. In them it also arises from a feeling for the artistic +value of regimenting a collection of men in a beautiful ‘procession’, +and also from the joy felt by so many souls in being governed, if not +having to make the effort to think for themselves—a most curious joy +in so-called men of thought.</p> + +<p>The cult for the collective soul, with all its violation of human consciousness, +seems to me admirably denounced by a passage of Maine de +Biran, quoted by M. L. Brunschvicg (op. cit., <i>La Sociologie de l’ordre</i>, +p. 526):—</p> + +<p>‘... According to M. Bonald, it is not the human mind, it is not the +individual understanding which is the seat, the true subject of inherence +of the nations or (universal) truths under discussion; but it is society, +which, gifted with a kind of collective understanding different from +that of individuals, was from its origin imbued with them through the +gift of speech and by virtue of a miraculous influence exerted on the mass +alone, independent of its parts. The individual, the man, is nothing; +society alone exists; society is the soul of the moral world, it alone exists, +while individual persons are only phenomena. Let those who can, +understand this social metaphysics. If the author himself understands +it clearly, then I am in the wrong. Then we must cease to talk of +philosophy and recognize the nothingness of the science of intellectual +and moral man, we must admit that all psychology based on the primitive +fact of consciousness is simply false, and we must consider science itself +as an illusion which perpetually deceives and misleads us by showing us +everything, even our own existence, in a false and fantastic light.’</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_184">[184]</span></p> + +<p>M. Brunschvicg very rightly adds: ‘The antithesis could not be stated +more clearly. Either the primary fact of consciousness, or the primary +fact of language; either Socrates or Bonald.’</p> + +<p>Either Socrates or Bonald. Barrès and Maurras made their choice.</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_O"> + <span class="smcap">Note O</span> (<a href="#p_118">Page 118</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>... Péguy who admires philosophies to the extent that ‘they are good +fighters.’</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_185_185" href="#Footnote_185_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a></p> + +<p>This determination to praise philosophers for their virtues of action +rather than for their intellectual virtues is very frequent among men of +thought to-day. In his <i>Souvenirs concernant Lagneau</i>, Alain, wishing to +give as favourable a picture of his master as possible, praises his energy +and his resolution at least as much as his intelligence. It is also very +remarkable—although here literature only is in question—to see a professor +of moral science (M. Jacques Bardoux) setting a special value on those +French literary men who were soldiers, i.e. Vauvenargues, Vigny, Péguy. +As to the men of letters themselves, I shall content myself with pointing +out that one of them who is most applauded by his own colleagues recently +declared that he chiefly admired d’Annunzio for his attitude as an officer, +and expressed regret that he had returned to literature.⁠<a id="FNanchor_186_186" href="#Footnote_186_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> The Emperor +Julian praised Aristotle for having said that he felt prouder of being the +author of his <i>Treatise on Theology</i> than he would have felt if he had +destroyed the power of the Persians. One might still find soldiers in +France who would agree with this judgment, but very few men of letters. +<span class="pagenum" id="p_185">[185]</span>Elsewhere (<i>Les Sentiments de Critias</i>, p. 206) I have attempted to give +the history and the explanation of this desire (so curious in men of the +pen) to exalt a warlike life and to scorn a sedentary life. Note that this +characteristic is to be seen in contemporary writers long before the war +of 1914, and that those who talk most about a warlike life are not always +those who lead it.</p> + +<p>The new thing, I repeat, is not that we see men of letters praising +an active life and scorning a sedentary life; it is <i>the absence of naiveté, +the dogmatic tone</i>. When Ronsard exclaims: ‘Good Gods, who would +praise those who let life go by bent over books’;⁠<a id="FNanchor_187_187" href="#Footnote_187_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a> when Bertrand de +Born wishes that ‘no man of high lineage should have any thought but +cutting off heads and arms’; when Froissart sings the glories of chivalry +and casts his scorn in the faces of the bourgeois, no one will take these +candid lyre-players, who like noble poses and do not even know that the +word doctrine exists, for the ancestors of our grave professors of belligerent +aesthetics. Moreover, I doubt whether the author of <i>Scenes and Doctrines +of Nationalism</i> would have condescended to be a descendant of these +simple-minded persons.</p> + +<p>I find scorn for the life of the mind clearly professed in a dogmatic +tone, in a writer of the seventeenth century who frequently reminds one +of certain modern authors by his efforts to humiliate the toga before the +sword. (It is true that this writer was a gentleman of the very minor +nobility.)</p> + +<p>‘Certainly, there is no better way of relaxing the vigour of men’s +courage than to occupy their minds with peaceful and sedentary exercises, +and idleness cannot enter civilized States in a more subtle or dangerous +disguise than that of literature. Lazy and idle persons have in part ruined +commerce and agriculture, which are the cause of the weakness of our +condition and the cowardice of our age.’ (J. L. de Balzac, <i>Le Prince</i>, +1631. He then admits literature and the sciences to the State insofar +as ‘they strengthen and embellish the Mother-country’.)</p> + +<p>On the other hand, a master from the great period of French literature +writes a eulogy of the life of the mind at the expense of the active mind, +which I hardly think would be accepted by many of the moderns who +<span class="pagenum" id="p_186">[186]</span>venerate that period (I am especially thinking of those who admire the +thought of Georges Sorel).</p> + +<p>‘In France great strength of character and width of mind are needed +if a man is to reject offices and employments and thus consent to remain +at home and do nothing. Scarcely anyone possesses sufficient merit to +play this part with dignity, nor sufficient resources to fill up the void of +time without what the vulgar call “business”. But the wise man’s +idleness needs only a better name, and we ought to say that one who +meditates, talks, reads and is calm, is working.’ (La Bruyère, <i>Du Mérite +personnel</i>.)</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_P"> + <span class="smcap">Note P</span> (<a href="#p_122">Page 122</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>The ‘Manifesto of the Party of Intelligence’ (Figaro, 19th July, 1919).</i></p> + +<p>This manifesto, signed by fifty-four French writers, several of whom +are among the teachers most respected by their fellow-citizens, is of the +greatest importance to the present inquiry. In addition to the strange +passage on the Church’s mission which I quoted above, it contains things +like this:—</p> + +<p>‘Nationalism, which the conceptions of the intelligence impose on +political conduct as well as on the order of the world, is a reasonable, +humane system, and French in addition.’</p> + +<p>And further on:—</p> + +<p>‘When a literature becomes national does it not acquire a more +universal significance, a more humanly general interest?’</p> + +<p>And again:—</p> + +<p>‘We believe—and the world believes with us—that it is part of the +destiny of our race to defend the spiritual interests of humanity.... We +are solicitous for Europe and all the humanity remaining in the world. +French humanity is the sovereign protector of this.’</p> + +<p>And above all:—</p> + +<p>‘Victorious France means to take her place again in the order of the +mind, the only order whereby a legitimate domination may be exercised.’</p> + +<p>Hence the desire to found (the manifesto itself underlines the words): +‘<i>The intellectual Federation of Europe and the world under the aegis of +victorious France, the guardian of civilization.</i>’</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p_187">[187]</span></p> + +<p>Victory under arms conferring the right to command in the intellectual +order—that is professed to-day by French thinkers! One remembers +the Roman writers, from whom these thinkers claim descent, who took as +the leader of their minds Greece, which had been conquered by force of +arms; one also remembers the German teachers of 1871 who also +claimed intellectual hegemony for their ‘victorious’ nation, which they +too claimed as ‘the guardian of civilization’.⁠<a id="FNanchor_188_188" href="#Footnote_188_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a></p> + +<p>When this manifesto was published, somewhat similar reflections +seem to have occurred to the mind of one of our great writers. In a letter +concerning this document,⁠<a id="FNanchor_189_189" href="#Footnote_189_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> Marcel Proust deplores the proclamation +of ‘a kind of “Frankreich ueber alles”, the policeman of the literature +of all nations.’ As a true priest of the mind, he goes on: ‘Why take +this peremptory attitude towards other countries in such matters as +literature, where a man only reigns by persuasion?’ I am happy to +take this opportunity to do homage to this true ‘clerk’, and to say that +I know that there are still other writers in France beside those who only +believe in the virtue of cold steel.</p> + + +<h3 id="Note_Q"> + <span class="smcap">Note Q</span> (<a href="#p_138">Page 138</a>) +</h3> + +<p><i>Those who base their judgments on their artistic sensibilities.</i></p> + +<p>This artistic origin of the political attitudes of so many men of letters +has been pointed out with great ability by M. Daniel Halévy in the case +of M. Maurras. In an old article (<i>La Grande France</i>, 1902) M. Halévy +quotes this beautiful passage from M. Maurras’s <i>Anthinéa</i> on the walk +of women carrying a clay pot balanced on their heads:—</p> + +<p>‘The bosom swells and is modelled like a vase, it opens like a flower. +The neck settles, the loins strain nervously. Their walk becomes graver +and more supple, is measured with an inestimable sobriety; it unrolls +in the mind like a piece of music. This living pillar moves, glides, advances, +<span class="pagenum" id="p_188">[188]</span>without being interrupted by any sudden jerk or any break. It follows +the undulations of the ground, adapts itself to the slightest rises, and thus +resembles the stem of a beautiful young tree set free from its roots, moving +over the ground without leaving it for a fraction of an inch. An infinite +multitude of half-pauses make the jerks imperceptible, or one +is only conscious of their succession, a continual harmony which leaves +its curves in the air....’</p> + +<p>M. Daniel Halévy adds:—</p> + +<p>‘I quote the whole passage because it gives the very idea of Charles +Maurras. For his classical way of thought, things are beautiful, not +from the shocks of feeling and passion, but from the form and rhythm +which give them continuity, or rather existence in the human sense of the +word. M. Charles Maurras applies this taste for form to the study of +history, and that is the whole of his “sociology”.’</p> + +<p>There could be no better definition of the type of man for whom +things are good insofar as they satisfy his artistic sensibility. Let me place +in opposition to him the exactly contrary type, leaving the reader to judge +which of the two may claim to belong to ‘the intelligence’:—</p> + +<p>‘... For the perfection of things should be measured by their +nature alone, and things are not more or less perfect because they flatter +or wound our senses.’ (Spinoza.)</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="FOOTNOTES"> + <i>Footnotes</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_1_1" href="#FNanchor_1_1" class="label">[1]</a> See <a href="#Note_A">Note A</a> at the end of this book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_2_2" href="#FNanchor_2_2" class="label">[2]</a> It is to be noted that a little more than a century ago French working-men from +different provinces frequently engaged in desperate fights among themselves. (See +Martin Nadaud, <i>Mémoires de Léonard</i>, p. 93.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_3_3" href="#FNanchor_3_3" class="label">[3]</a> See Petit de Julleville, <i>La Comédie et les Moeurs en France au moyen age</i>, and André +Le Breton, <i>Le Roman au XVIIe Siècle</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_4_4" href="#FNanchor_4_4" class="label">[4]</a> The great novelty is that to-day people accept the position that everything should +be political, that they should proclaim it and take a pride in it. Otherwise it is perfectly +obvious that men, shopkeepers, or poets, have not waited for the present time to try +to get rid of a rival by political means. Remember how La Fontaine’s rivals kept him +out of the Académie for ten years.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_5_5" href="#FNanchor_5_5" class="label">[5]</a> As de Tocqueville profoundly remarks, these only occurred when a first improvement +in his condition encouraged the man of the people to want more; i.e. towards +the end of the eighteenth century.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_6_6" href="#FNanchor_6_6" class="label">[6]</a> I am here speaking of Western Jews of the bourgeois class. The Jewish proletariat +did not await our time to plunge into the feeling of its racial peculiarity. +However, it does so without giving provocation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_7_7" href="#FNanchor_7_7" class="label">[7]</a> This was the notion expressed by Benedict XV when he told the poor ‘to take +delight in the prosperity of elevated persons and to expect confidently their assistance’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_8_8" href="#FNanchor_8_8" class="label">[8]</a> For example, M. Paul Bourget’s <i>La Barricade</i>, where the author, a disciple of +Georges Sorel, exhorts the bourgeoise not to leave to the proletariat the monopoly of +class passion and violence. See also André Beaunier, <i>Les Devoirs de la Violence</i> (quoted +by Halperine-Kaminski in the preface to Tolstoi’s book, <i>The Law of Love and the +Law of Violence</i>).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_9_9" href="#FNanchor_9_9" class="label">[9]</a> ‘The phrase, <i>the sublime bourgeois</i>, which would have caused so much laughter +twenty years ago, has now acquired for the French bourgeoisie a mystic plenitude +owing to its fusion with the highest social and national values.’ (<i>Eloge du Bourgeois +Français</i>, p. 284.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_10_10" href="#FNanchor_10_10" class="label">[10]</a> Let me define more precisely what is new here. In the seventeenth century the +citizen already had the notion of national honour; Racine’s Letters would be sufficient +to prove it (see a significant page in the <i>Mémoires</i> of de Pontis, Book XIV); but he +left it to the King to decide what this honour demanded; indignation like Vauban’s +against the peace of Ryswick ‘which dishonours the King and the whole nation’, +is a very exceptional emotion under the old <i>régime</i>. The modern citizen claims to feel +for himself what is demanded by the national honour, and he is ready to rise up against +his leaders if they have a different conception of it. This new development is not +peculiar to the nations living under democratic systems; in 1911 the citizens of the +German monarchy thought that the concessions made to their country by France in +exchange for German abstention in Morocco were insufficient, and they were extremely +angry with their Sovereign who had accepted these conditions which, in their opinion, +were an insult to German honour. It may be asserted that the same thing would be +true of France if she ever became a monarchy again and if the King took it upon himself +to feel the interest of national honour in a different manner to his subjects. Moreover, +this actually happened throughout the reign of Louis-Philippe.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_11_11" href="#FNanchor_11_11" class="label">[11]</a> For example, the humiliation of Olmüts in 1805. It may be asserted that no +democracy would have endured it, at least with the philosophy displayed by the King +of Prussia and his government. On the other hand, is it necessary to stress the other +dangers to peace which existed under the Kings? It is sufficient to quote +Montesquieu’s remark: ‘The spirit of the Monarchy is war and aggrandisement.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_12_12" href="#FNanchor_12_12" class="label">[12]</a> In 1886, the Schnaebele affair; in 1890, the incident in Paris where the King of +Spain in the uniform of a Colonel of Uhlans was hooted; in 1891, the incident of +the Empress of Germany passing through Paris; in 1897, Fashoda; in 1904, the +incident of the British trawlers sunk by the Russian Fleet, etc. Of course, I do not +claim that the Kings only waged practical wars, although with them the allegation of +‘wounded honour’ was very often a mere pretext. Louis XIV obviously did not make +war on Holland because the Dutch struck a medal insulting him. Moreover, I shall +grant that from time to time the Kings indulged in military invasions, a type of +elegance which appears to be less and less tempting to the democracies; one cannot +now imagine the peace of the world disturbed by excursions like those of Charles VIII +into Italy or Charles XII into the Ukraine.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_13_13" href="#FNanchor_13_13" class="label">[13]</a> Is it necessary to point out that wars started by public passion against the will +of the government have often occurred under monarchies? And not only under +constitutional monarchies, like the war of France with Spain in 1823 and with Turkey +in 1826, but under absolute monarchies. For instance, the War of the Austrian +Succession imposed on Fleury by an uprising of public opinion; the War of +American Independence under Louis XVI; in 1806 the war of Prussia against Napoleon. +In 1813 the war of Saxony. It seems probable that in 1914 war was imposed on absolute +sovereigns like Nicholas II and Wilhelm II by popular passions which they had been +exciting for years and then found themselves unable to restrain.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_14_14" href="#FNanchor_14_14" class="label">[14]</a> ‘But what is much more important than material facts is the soul of nations. +Among all races a kind of effervescence it to be noticed; some defend certain principles, +others the opposing principles. By becoming members of the League of Nations, the +different peoples do not abandon their <i>national morality</i>.’ (Speech of the German +Minister for Foreign Affairs at Geneva, on the occasion of the entry of Germany into +the League of Nations, 10th September, 1926.) The orator went on: ‘Yet this should +not result in raising up nation against nation.’ One is surprised that he did not add: +‘On the contrary.’ How much nobler, and at the same time more respectful of the +truth, is the language of Treitschke: ‘This consciousness of themselves which the +nations are acquiring and which can only be strengthened by culture, this consciousness +means that war will never disappear from the earth, in spite of the closer linking up +of interests, in spite of the growing uniformity of customs and the exterior forms of +life.’ (Quoted by Charles Andler in <i>Les Origines du Pangermanisme</i>, p. 223.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_15_15" href="#FNanchor_15_15" class="label">[15]</a> This is what Mirabeau seems to have foreseen when he announced to the +Constituent Assembly that the wars of the ‘free nations’ would cause the wars of the +Kings to be regretted.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_16_16" href="#FNanchor_16_16" class="label">[16]</a> The religion of the ‘national soul’ is obviously and logically an emanation of the +popular soul. Moreover, it has been sung by an eminently democratic literature: +Romanticism. It is to be observed that the worst enemies of Romanticism and of +Democracy have adopted it; it is constantly to be found in the Action Française. To +such an extent is it now impossible to be a patriot without flattering democratic passions.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_17_17" href="#FNanchor_17_17" class="label">[17]</a> See <a href="#Note_B">Note B</a> at the end of the book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_18_18" href="#FNanchor_18_18" class="label">[18]</a> See Brunot, <i>Histoire de la Langue Française</i>, t. v, liv. iii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_19_19" href="#FNanchor_19_19" class="label">[19]</a> On this topic see some excellent remarks of Auguste Comte, <i>Cours de +Philosophie Positive</i>, 57<sup>e</sup> leçon.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_20_20" href="#FNanchor_20_20" class="label">[20]</a> As a matter of fact, the peoples do not believe either that their ambitions go back +to their ancestors; they are ignorant of history and do not believe it to be so even when +it is true; they believe they believe, or, more exactly, they want to believe that they +believe. However, that is enough to make them ferocious, perhaps more so than if +they really believed it.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_21_21" href="#FNanchor_21_21" class="label">[21]</a> France is here in a position of manifest inferiority in regard to her neighbours. +The modern French feel very slight inclinations to claim that they reincarnate the +ambitions of Charlemagne or even of Louis XIV, despite the proclamations of certain +men of letters.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_22_22" href="#FNanchor_22_22" class="label">[22]</a> For instance, the address of the ‘six great industrial and agricultural associations +of Germany’ to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg in May, 1914, which was not very +different from that drawn up in 1815 by the Prussian metallurgists to point out to +their government what annexations should be made in the interests of their industry. +(See Vidal de La Blache, <i>La France de l’Est</i>, chap. xix.) Moreover, some Germans +are urgent in boldly proclaiming the economic character of their nationalism. ‘Let +us not forget,’ says a well-known Pangermanist, ‘that the German Empire, which is +generally considered abroad as a purely military State, is in its origin (Zollverein) chiefly +economic.’ And again: ‘For us war is only the continuation of our commercial +activity in times of peace, with other means but the same methods.’ (Naumann, +<i>L’Europe Centrale</i>, pp. 112, 247; see the whole book.) Germany seems to be not +indeed the only country to practise commercial patriotism (England has done so just +as much and for a much longer time) but the only country to boast of it.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_23_23" href="#FNanchor_23_23" class="label">[23]</a> And to build up a much less passionate patriotism. Think, for instance, of the +agreements with foreigners accepted by patriotism based on interest (such as the +Franco-German iron cartel), against which the patriotism based on pride rises up in +revolt.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_24_24" href="#FNanchor_24_24" class="label">[24]</a> ‘Love of country is a real love of oneself.’ (Saint-Evremond.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_25_25" href="#FNanchor_25_25" class="label">[25]</a> The divinizing of realism, of which patriotism specially consists, is expressed +with all desirable candour in the ‘Addresses to the German People’ (Eighth Address); +Fichte attacks religion for its claim to situate the superior life outside all interest in +earthly matters: ‘It is an abuse of religion to force it, as Christianity has so often +done, to extol complete indifference to the business of the State and the nation as the +true religious spirit. Men,’ he declares, ‘are determined to find heaven on earth and +to impregnate their earthly labours with something durable.’ He then shows, with +great warmth, that this desire is the essence of patriotism, and it is evident that for +him earthly labours become divine by becoming durable. This, indeed, is the only means +men have discovered for divinizing their institutions.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_26_26" href="#FNanchor_26_26" class="label">[26]</a> It is necessary to recall that the United States did not enter the last war ‘in +defence of principles’, but with the very practical object of safeguarding their prestige, +which had been lowered by the facts that the Germans had torpedoed three of their +ships? Nevertheless, their desire to pose as having been purely idealistic in this affair +is noteworthy.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_27_27" href="#FNanchor_27_27" class="label">[27]</a> It may be said that religious passions, at least in the West, only exist as a reinforcement +to national passions; in France, a man sets up as a Catholic in order to +pose as being ‘more French’; in Germany as a Protestant in order to declare himself +‘more German’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_28_28" href="#FNanchor_28_28" class="label">[28]</a> Here are two remarkable cases of idealistic passions which in the past successfully +opposed national passion and are now submissive to it: (<i>a</i>) In France, the monarchic +passion, which in 1792 was stronger than national feeling in many people, whereas in +1914 it was completely effaced by national feeling. (Everyone will agree that attachment +to a certain form of government, i.e. at bottom, the attachment to a certain +metaphysical conception, is an infinitely more idealistic passion than nationalist passion; +however, I do not claim that all the Emigrés were inspired by this idealism.) (<i>b</i>) In +Germany, the religious passion, which only fifty years ago was stronger than national +feeling in more than fifty per cent of Germans, and to-day is entirely subject to +national feeling (in 1866 the German Catholics desired the defeat of Germany; in 1914 +they ardently desired it to be victorious). The Europe of to-day, compared with the +Europe of the past, seems to contain many less chances of civil wars and many more +chances of national wars; nothing could show better how much Europe has lost in +idealism. (See <a href="#Note_D">Note D</a> at the end of this book for additional matter on the attitude of +the modern Catholics towards Catholicism when it is in opposition to their nationalism.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_29_29" href="#FNanchor_29_29" class="label">[29]</a> For example, in words like the following, uttered at Venice on the 11th December, +1926, by the Italian Minister of Education and Fine Arts: ‘Artists must prepare +themselves for the new imperialist function which must be carried out by our art. +Above everything, we must categorically impose a principle of <i>Italianita</i>. Whoever +copies a foreigner is guilty of <i>lèse-nation</i> (an insult to the nation) like a spy who admits +an enemy by a secret doorway.’ These words have to be approved by every adept of +‘<i>integral</i> nationalism’. Moreover, we hear much the same thing in France from certain +adversaries of Romanticism.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_30_30" href="#FNanchor_30_30" class="label">[30]</a> ‘Discipline from the lowest to the highest must be essential and of a religious type.’ +(Mussolini, 25th October, 1925.) This is new language in the mouth of a statesman, +even of the most realist kind; it may be asserted that neither Richelieu nor Bismarck +would have applied the word ‘religious’ to an activity whose object is exclusively +materialistic.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_31_31" href="#FNanchor_31_31" class="label">[31]</a> Notably for Renan and ‘speculative a-moralism’. (H. Massis, <i>Judgments</i>, i.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_32_32" href="#FNanchor_32_32" class="label">[32]</a> See <a href="#Note_E">Note E</a> at the end of this book for further information on this prestige, and +what is new about it in history.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_33_33" href="#FNanchor_33_33" class="label">[33]</a> In 1891 Barrès wrote to the editor of <i>La Plume</i>: ‘If these books have any value, +it is from the logic, the continuity of thought I have put into them during five years.’ +(‘These books’ included his Boulangiste campaign.) And, in the preface to his collection +of articles entitled ‘Scènes et Documents du nationalisme’, he says: ‘I think that +if Doumic will examine it from a greater distance he will find a development, and not +contradictions, in my work.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_34_34" href="#FNanchor_34_34" class="label">[34]</a> I shall be told of ‘clerks’ who, apparently without degradation, have at some time +or other taken the part of a race or a nation, even of their own race or nation. That +is because they believed that the cause of that race or nation coincided at that time +with the cause of abstract justice.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_35_35" href="#FNanchor_35_35" class="label">[35]</a> Similar occurrences may be observed among the ancients. For instance, Cicero +denounced his fellow-citizens for having destroyed Corinth merely to avenge an insult +to their ambassador (De off., I, xi).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_36_36" href="#FNanchor_36_36" class="label">[36]</a> Already in 1911, when a writer quoted this sentence: ‘It is impossible to accept +the situation that humanity should be bound for indefinite centuries by the marriages, +battles, treaties of the narrow-minded, ignorant, egotistic creatures who during the +middle ages were at the head of affairs in this world,’ he felt it necessary to add: +‘Fortunately these lines were written by Renan; one could not write them to-day +without being called an unpatriotic Frenchman.’ (G. Guy-Grand, <i>La Philosophie +Nationaliste</i>, p. 165.) Without being called so <i>by the men of thought</i>—that is the curious +part of it.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_37_37" href="#FNanchor_37_37" class="label">[37]</a> Quoted by Mgr. Chapon in his admirable study, ‘La France et l’Allemagne devant +la doctrine chrétienne.’ (<i>Correspondant</i>, of 15th August, 1915.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_38_38" href="#FNanchor_38_38" class="label">[38]</a> See his <i>Letters</i>, ii, p. 31.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_39_39" href="#FNanchor_39_39" class="label">[39]</a> Consider how willingly they now accept military service. See <a href="#Note_F">Note F</a> at the +end of this book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_40_40" href="#FNanchor_40_40" class="label">[40]</a> Here are the reasons given by a German Catholic for this attitude among those +of his religion: ‘(<i>a</i>) Their incomplete knowledge of the facts and opinions in the +belligerent and neutral countries; (<i>b</i>) <i>Their patriotism, which could not be allowed to +separate itself from the union binding together the German people</i>; (<i>c</i>) The fear of a second +Kulturkampf, which would be doubly dangerous if the German Catholics had even +appeared to agree with the campaign carried on in France against German methods +of waging war.’ The second reason will be noted, i.e. the desire to be at unity with +the nation, whatever the moral aspect of its cause. Here, at least, is one reason which +Bossuet did not allege when he screened the violences of Louis XIV.</p> + +<p>Let me recall that when, in 1914, the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in the +Reichstag hinted at a sort of apology for the violation of Belgian neutrality, he was +sharply reproved by the Christian minister von Harnack ‘for having tried to excuse +what did not need excusing’. (See A. Loisy, <i>Guerre et Religion</i>, p. 14.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_41_41" href="#FNanchor_41_41" class="label">[41]</a> The clergy of the allied nations are eager to throw in the faces of the German +clergy their union with injustice in 1914. They abuse their own good fortune in +belonging to nations whose cause happened to be just. When Italy, in 1923, at the time +of the Corfu incident, adopted towards Greece an attitude as unjust as that of Austria +towards Serbia in 1914, I am not aware that the Italian clergy expressed indignation. +Nor do I remember that in 1900, when a European army intervened in Chinese affairs +(the Boxer affair) and excesses were committed by the soldiers, any strong protests were +uttered by the clergies of the respective nations.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_42_42" href="#FNanchor_42_42" class="label">[42]</a> A particularly remarkable attitude was that of the philosopher Boutroux. You +will find an admirable denunciation of it from the pen of Charles Andler, <i>Les Origines +du Pangermanisme</i>, p. viii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_43_43" href="#FNanchor_43_43" class="label">[43]</a> This may be seen especially in the chorus of the Seven against Thebes: ‘Gods of our +City, let it not be destroyed with our houses and our hearths.... O ye who have +dwelt therein so long, will ye betray this land?’ Six centuries later this may be seen +in the ‘Aeneid’, where the preservation of the Trojan City across the seas is plainly +due solely to the protection of Juno, and in no wise to any inward notion of Trojan +blood giving it an assurance of eternal duration.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_44_44" href="#FNanchor_44_44" class="label">[44]</a> Although the Germans appear to have been the inventors of the passion I am +denouncing, Lessing and Schlegel seem to have been the first to brandish their poets +as the expression of the national soul, from a feeling of exasperation with the universalism +of French literature. The men of the French Pléiade (who will certainly be brought +up against me) wished to give their sensibility a national mode of expression, a national +language; they never claimed to give a national character to that sensibility, to oppose +it to other national sensibilities. The systematic nationalization of the mind is +undoubtedly an invention of modern times. As regards the men of learning, this +nationalizing has undoubtedly been favoured by the disappearance of Latin as the scientific +language; and no one will ever be able to say to what an extent this disappearance was +an element of arrest in civilisation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_45_45" href="#FNanchor_45_45" class="label">[45]</a> In Nietzsche’s opinion, this was the case with Wagner, who, when he gave himself +out to his compatriots as the Messiah of German art, saw that there was ‘a good +vacant place to take’, while the whole of his artistic formation as well as his profound +philosophy, was essentially universalist. (See <i>Ecce Homo</i>, p. 58. ‘What I have never +forgiven Wagner is his condescending to Germany.’) One wonders whether the same +might not be said of a certain apostle of ‘Lorrain genius’ or of ‘Provençal genius’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_46_46" href="#FNanchor_46_46" class="label">[46]</a> The nationalization of the mind sometimes has results whose savour is not +sufficiently enjoyed. In 1904, during the centenary celebrations of Petrarch, the +nations of Goethe and Shakespeare were not invited, because they are not Latins; +but the Roumanians were invited. We do not know whether Uruguay was invited.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_47_47" href="#FNanchor_47_47" class="label">[47]</a> Anatole France, <i>La Vie Littéraire</i>, tome ii, p. 274. The nationalist desires in +French writers which I have been pointing out have had other than political results; +no one will ever be able to say how many among them in the past fifty years have +falsified their talents, mistaken their true gifts in their endeavours to ‘feel in the French +manner’. A good example is the <i>Voyage de Sparte</i>, where so many pages show what +a beautiful piece of work it might have been if the author had not <i>forced</i> himself to +feel his Lorrain soul under a Greek sky. Here we come upon one of the most curious +characteristics in the writers of this age; the rejection of freedom of mind <i>for themselves</i>, +the thirst for ‘a discipline’ (the whole fortune of MM. Maurras and Maritain +comes from this), a thirst which in most of them is the result of a fundamental intellectual +nihilism. (On this nihilism in Barrès, see Curtius, ‘Barrès and the intellectual foundations +of French nationalism,’ extracts in <i>Union pour la Vérité</i>, May, 1925; in Maurras, +see Guy-Grand, op. cit., p. 19; and L. Dimier, <i>Vingt Ans d’Action Française</i>, p. 330: +‘I have never seen a more unhappy soul than his.’) But the psychology of contemporary +writers in itself and apart from its political action is not my subject here.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_48_48" href="#FNanchor_48_48" class="label">[48]</a> I think it novel that a poet should give rise to a demonstration so essentially +practical as the address of the Naval League of Venice to d’Annunzio after the publication +of <i>La Nave</i>. ‘On the day when your genius radiates with new splendour over the +ancient ruler of “our sea”, over Venice, to-day disarmed against Pola, the Naval League +of Venice thanks you with emotion, hoping that the third Italy may at last arm the +prow and set sail towards the world.’ (<i>Translator’s Note.</i>—I have rendered the French +version as quoted; its meaning or lack of meaning is no doubt inherent in the genius +of the original, which I have not before me.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_49_49" href="#FNanchor_49_49" class="label">[49]</a> Compare with Balzac, who, though a Conservative, never hesitates to show his +Conservatives and particularly his Catholics in an unfavourable light, if he thinks that +the true light. See the examples quoted by E. Seillière (<i>Balzac et la morale romantique</i>, +pp. 27 onwards, and 84 onwards), who sharply reproaches Balzac.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_50_50" href="#FNanchor_50_50" class="label">[50]</a> ‘<i>Resurrection</i>,’ ‘<i>Jean-Christophe</i>’ (derived in this respect from the procedure of +George Sand). On the other hand, I seem to find a great deal of justice done the +bourgeois in <i>Les Miserables</i>, which is nevertheless a most ‘tendencious’ novel.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_51_51" href="#FNanchor_51_51" class="label">[51]</a> For instance, pre-war French novels showing the French in Alsace-Lorraine. +We may be quite certain that since 1918 the Germans have written novels which are +the exact counterpart to these.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_52_52" href="#FNanchor_52_52" class="label">[52]</a> See <a href="#Note_G">Note G</a> at the end of this book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_53_53" href="#FNanchor_53_53" class="label">[53]</a> See, for instance, Fustel de Coulanges’s study <i>De la manière d’écrire l’histoire en +France et en Allemagne</i>. It will be observed that this author’s denunciation of the +German historians exactly applies to certain French historians of recent years, with +this difference: That the German alters history to exalt his nation and the Frenchman +to exalt a political system. In general it may be said that the ‘tendencious’ philosophies +of the Germans lead to national war, and those of the French to civil war. Is it necessary +to repeat, after so many others, how much this proves the moral superiority of the +latter?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_54_54" href="#FNanchor_54_54" class="label">[54]</a> <i>Revue Universelle</i>, 15th April, 1924. Here is that very curious desire of the +moderns to yield to subjectivism, whereas their elders made every effort to combat it.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_55_55" href="#FNanchor_55_55" class="label">[55]</a> See <a href="#Note_H">Note H</a> at the end of this book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_56_56" href="#FNanchor_56_56" class="label">[56]</a> Yet the Jesuits thought of doing so to combat the Jansenists. (See Racine, +<i>Port-Royal</i>, pt. i.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_57_57" href="#FNanchor_57_57" class="label">[57]</a> On the matter of the lack of literary sensibility which accompanies this political +criticism among its adepts, see a paragraph of L. Dimier, <i>Vingt Ans d’Action Française</i>, +p. 334.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_58_58" href="#FNanchor_58_58" class="label">[58]</a> The distinction between these two humanitarianisms is well expressed by Goethe +when he relates (Dichtung und Wahrheit) the indifference of himself and his friends +to the events of 1789. ‘In our little circle, we took no notice of news and newspapers; +our object was to know Man; as for men, we left them to do as they chose.’ +Need I recall that the ‘humanities’, as instituted by the Jesuits in the seventeenth +century, the ‘studia humanitatis’, are ‘the study of what is most essentially human’, +in no sense altruistic exercises. See further <a href="#Note_I">Note I</a> at the end of this book for a curious +quotation from one of the ancients.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_59_59" href="#FNanchor_59_59" class="label">[59]</a> This the Church has understood so well, and the corollary to this truth: That +love between men can only be created by developing in them the sensibility for abstract +man, and by combatting in them the interest for concrete man; by turning them +towards metaphysical meditation and away from the study of history (see Malebranche). +This is exactly the contrary direction to that of the modern ‘clerks’ but, once again, +these ‘clerks’ have not the slightest desire to create love among men.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_60_60" href="#FNanchor_60_60" class="label">[60]</a> Thus they adopt the national spirit if it seems to serve their interests; for instance, +the party of ‘nationalist-socialists’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_61_61" href="#FNanchor_61_61" class="label">[61]</a> Certain nationalists, desirous of honouring cosmopolitanism, whose full value +their intelligence perceives, and yet not wishing to sacrifice nationalism, declare that +cosmopolitanism represents ‘enlightened nationalism’. M. Paul Bourget, who gives +this definition (<i>Paris-Times</i>, June, 1924), quotes Goethe and Stendhal as examples, +‘the former of whom remained so profoundly German while striving to understand +the whole movement of French thought, and the latter remained so profoundly French +while he devoted himself to understanding Italy.’ One wonders how these two masters +showed the least, even enlightened, ‘nationalism’ by remaining profoundly German +and profoundly French. Obviously M. Bourget confuses national and nationalist.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_62_62" href="#FNanchor_62_62" class="label">[62]</a> Almost all works of national propaganda among the small nations of Eastern Europe +are anthologies of poetry. Very few are works of thought. See the words uttered by +E. Boutroux in August, 1915, to the Committee of the Entente Cordiale, against the +peoples who attach too much importance to the intelligence, which ‘of itself tends to +be one and common to all beings capable of knowledge’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_63_63" href="#FNanchor_63_63" class="label">[63]</a> <i>Les Nouvelles Littéraires</i>, 25th September, 1926.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_64_64" href="#FNanchor_64_64" class="label">[64]</a> Here is a specimen of the acrobatics which these teachers are compelled to perform +in order to conciliate Christian doctrine with the preaching of national particularisms: +‘We wish to set the ideal of universalism in positive relation to the contemporary +reality of the national form, which is that of all life, even the Christian life.’ (Pastor +Witte, quoted by A. Loisy, <i>Guerre et Religion</i>, p. 18.) Here are minds for whom the +squaring of the circle is obviously mere child’s play.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_65_65" href="#FNanchor_65_65" class="label">[65]</a> Is it not suggestive to note that the Church in the last twenty years has replaced +the commandment ‘Homicide shalt thou not be, in fact or by assent’ with ‘Homicide +shalt thou not be, without right, nor voluntarily’?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_66_66" href="#FNanchor_66_66" class="label">[66]</a> For example in this passage of Bossuet: ‘Since we are obliged to love all men and +since in truth no man is a foreigner to a Christian, there is all the more reason for loving +our fellow citizens. All the love a man feels for himself, for his family, and for his +friends is united in the love he feels for his country....’ (<i>Politique tirée de l’Ecriture +Sainte</i>, I, vi. Notice the phrase ‘All the love a man feels for himself....’ It wholly +justifies Saint Evremond’s phrase: ‘Love of country is really love of oneself.’) It +appears that the Church would prefer to go on presenting patriotism under this one +aspect of love (see the inquiry of ‘les Lettres’ on the Church and Nationalism, 1922–3), +which would allow her to exalt this passion (as its popularity requires) without violating +the principles of Christianity. Unfortunately for the Church, positive men come along +and remind her that patriotism is something more than love, and includes ‘hatred for +the foreigner’. (Maurras, <i>Dilemme de Marc Sangnier</i>.) Who will deliver us from +the truth-tellers?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_67_67" href="#FNanchor_67_67" class="label">[67]</a> A. Lugan, <i>La grande loi sociale de l’amour des hommes</i>, liv. ii, chap. iii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_68_68" href="#FNanchor_68_68" class="label">[68]</a> Père Ollivier, <i>Les Amitiés de Jesus</i>, p. 142.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_69_69" href="#FNanchor_69_69" class="label">[69]</a> <i>Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique</i> (1919), in the article headed ‘Patrie’. +The reader will note the extraordinary practical spirit of this article, and the desire to +love only those who have done something for us.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_70_70" href="#FNanchor_70_70" class="label">[70]</a> Loisy’s <i>Guerre et Religion</i>, p. 60. Nevertheless, a certain number of practising +clergy speak in the same way; see Guillot de Givry, <i>Le Christ et la Patrie</i>, towards +the end.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_71_71" href="#FNanchor_71_71" class="label">[71]</a> It is current knowledge that Italian Fascism and Russian Bolshevism both derive +from the author of <i>Reflections on Violence</i>. He did, indeed, preach class egotism to some +extent in a universal manner, but without any explicit preference for the interest of +one class rather than that of another. In his preaching of egotism there is a kind +of impartiality which does not lack grandeur, a quality not inherited by his disciples.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_72_72" href="#FNanchor_72_72" class="label">[72]</a> And even the teaching of Jesus Christ. R. Johannet says (op. cit., p. 153), ‘I have +tried to show what a vast amount of Christianity is contained in the bourgeois type, +when it is pure. To condemn the bourgeois, because he is a bourgeois, in the name +of Christ, seems to me a somewhat daring paradox.’ But this author does not quote +a single text of the Gospels. He only quotes a few interpreters of Saint Thomas Aquinas, +whom he praises for their ‘extra-realist sense of affairs’, and who apparently for him +incarnate the thinking of Jesus Christ. This work is one of the most perfect examples +of the modern ‘clerk’s’ desire to idealize the practical spirit. (On the subject of Christian +doctrine in the matter of property, see Father Thomassin, <i>Traité de l’aumône</i>.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_73_73" href="#FNanchor_73_73" class="label">[73]</a> It might be said that in Christian theology the bourgeois state is a <i>function</i>, and +not a rank.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_74_74" href="#FNanchor_74_74" class="label">[74]</a> The essential position of the Church on this point (I say essential; for, by close +search, one can find texts supporting the opposite thesis, but once more the curious +thing is the fact that this search should be made) seems to me defined in these lines: +‘Malebranche inclines, like Bossuet, to look upon social inequalities and injustices +as the results of sin, which must be endured as such, and to which exterior conduct must +conform.... We must not even attempt to remedy these injustices except by charity, +for we should simply disturb the peace of the world, probably without any result. Only, +<i>we should not in our own souls attach any sort of importance to these circumstances and +conditions, for the true life is not there</i>’ (H. Joly, <i>Malebranche</i>, p. 262).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_75_75" href="#FNanchor_75_75" class="label">[75]</a> On the relation between Durckheim’s theses and those of the French traditionalists, +see D. Parodi, <i>La Philosophie contemporaine en France</i>, p. 148.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_76_76" href="#FNanchor_76_76" class="label">[76]</a> ‘Germany is the sole judge of her methods.’ (Major von Disfurth, November, +1914.) The philosophy of national moralities seems essentially German. Is it not +very remarkable to see Hegel and Zeller desiring at all costs to prove that Plato in his +<i>Republic</i> defined a state of good which was only valid for the Greeks, and not for all +peoples? (See P. Janet, <i>Histoire des idées politiques</i>, tome 1, p. 140.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_77_77" href="#FNanchor_77_77" class="label">[77]</a> Barrès wrote in 1898: ‘The professors are still arguing about justice and truth, +when every self-respecting man knows that he must limit himself to inquiring if there +is justice in the relations between two given men, at a given time, under specified circumstances.’ +That is exactly what the Germany of 1914 said in answer to those who brought +accusations against her. Not a single moralist in France before Barrès—not even de +Maistre or Bonald—would have asserted that ‘every self-respecting man’ can conceive +of no justice but one specially arranged for the circumstances.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_78_78" href="#FNanchor_78_78" class="label">[78]</a> <i>L’Appel au Soldat.</i> Compare this with the traditional French teaching, of which +Barrès claims to be the heir: ‘Whatever your country may be, you should only believe +what you would be disposed to believe if you were in another country.’ (<i>Logique de +Port-Royal</i>, iii, xx.) It must not be thought that dogma of national truths aims only +at moral truth. Recently certain French thinkers waxed indignant that the doctrines +of Einstein were accepted by their compatriots without more resistance.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_79_79" href="#FNanchor_79_79" class="label">[79]</a> The adoration of the contingent <i>for its own sake</i>; otherwise, and as a step towards +the eternal, the knowledge of ‘strange things’ is highly recommended by Leibniz, +and even by Spinoza. Renouvier, so hostile to a certain kind of universalism, never +bestows philosophical value on a knowledge of what is ‘unique and inexpressible’ in +the object. (See G. Séailles, ‘Le Pluralisme de Renouvier,’ <i>Revue de Métaphysique et +de Morale</i>, 1925.) He would never have signed this charter of modern metaphysics: +‘That the philosophers since Socrates should have contended as to which should most +scorn the knowledge of the particular and should most adore knowledge of the general, +is something which passes understanding. For, after all, must not the most honourable +knowledge be the knowledge of the most valuable realities! And is there a valuable +reality which is not concrete and individual?’ (William James.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_80_80" href="#FNanchor_80_80" class="label">[80]</a> An important literary review recently reproached a critic (M. Pierre Lasserre) +for his supposed inaptitude to understand ‘contemporary literature’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_81_81" href="#FNanchor_81_81" class="label">[81]</a> Curiously enough, these metaphysics of the historic may also be found among the +poets. We all know Claudel’s cult of ‘the present minute’ (because it differs from all +other minutes in that it is not the extremity of the same quantity of the past); Rimbaud +before this said: ‘One must be absolutely modern.’ Moreover, for certain Christians +dogma is only valid <i>relative to a time</i>. There again particularism seems to have been +started by the Germans: ‘No exposition of morality can be the same for all periods of +the Christian Church; each possesses full and complete value for a certain period only.’ +(Scheiermacher.) On the Germanism in this desire to see everything in its ‘becoming’, +see Parodi, <i>le Problème moral et la Pensée contemporaine</i>, p. 255.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_82_82" href="#FNanchor_82_82" class="label">[82]</a> These views on the modern cult of the particular do not seem to me to be invalidated +by the arrival of a recent school (Neo-Thomism) which opposes the cult of Being +to that of Becoming. According to the leaders of this school, it is clear that, despite +certain universalist declarations, human Being really belongs only to them and their +group, although in this case the group is wider than the nation. One of them would +quite willingly say with a Christian of the second century: ‘We are men; the rest +are pigs and dogs.’ Nor do I think I need take into account those particularisms which +claim that by working for themselves they are working for the universal, seeing that +for them their own group represents the universal. ‘I am Roman, I am human’ +(Maurras). ‘I am German, I am human’ (Fichte) and so on.... However, these +claims show the prestige of the universal in despite of doctrines.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_83_83" href="#FNanchor_83_83" class="label">[83]</a> See <a href="#Note_J">Note J</a> at the end of this book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_84_84" href="#FNanchor_84_84" class="label">[84]</a> On the cult of the ‘Prussian model’ even among the English ‘clerks’, see Elie +Halévy, <i>Histoire du Peuple anglais</i>, Epilogue, livre ii, ch. i.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_85_85" href="#FNanchor_85_85" class="label">[85]</a> Sorel, <i>Le procès de Socrate</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_86_86" href="#FNanchor_86_86" class="label">[86]</a> This has been perfectly obvious to all those guardians of the spiritual who have +condemned it, whatever their motives may have been. More precisely, Maurras’s +work makes the passion of man to found the State (or to strengthen it) an object of +religious adoration; it is really the worldly made transcendental. This displacing of +the transcendental is the secret of the great influence exerted by Maurras on his contemporaries. +These persons, especially in irreligious France, were plainly eager for +such a doctrine, if one may judge by the outburst of gratitude with which they greeted +it, and which seems to say: ‘At last we are delivered from God; at last we are allowed +to adore ourselves in our will to be great, not in our will to be good; we are shown the +ideal in the real, on earth and not in heaven.’ In this sense, Maurras’s work is the same +as Nietzsche’s (‘be faithful to the earth’), with this difference, that the German +thinker deifies man in his anarchic passions, and the Frenchman in his organising passions. +It is also the same as the work of Bergson and James, inasmuch as it says like them: +the real is the only ideal. This <i>secularizing of the divine</i> may be compared with the +work of Luther.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_87_87" href="#FNanchor_87_87" class="label">[87]</a> Machiavellian morality is plainly proclaimed in the following lines, where every +open-minded person will recognize, except for the tone, the teaching of <i>all</i> the present +teachers of realism, whatever their nationality: ‘In his relations with other States, +the Prince should know neither law nor right, except the right of the strongest. These +relations place in his hands, under his responsibility, the divine rights of the Destiny +and government of the world, and raise him above the precepts of individual morality +into a higher moral order, whose content is enshrined in the words: Salus populi +suprema lex esto.’ (Fichte, quoted by Andler, op. cit., p. 33.) The advance on Machiavelli +is obvious.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_88_88" href="#FNanchor_88_88" class="label">[88]</a> The teaching of this writer may be put in this form: ‘All that is good from the +point of view of politics is good; <i>and I know no other criterion of good</i>.’ This enables +him to say that he makes no pronouncement in matters of private morality.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_89_89" href="#FNanchor_89_89" class="label">[89]</a> In Richelieu’s <i>Testament politique</i> and the <i>Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l’Instruction +du Dauphin</i>, the catalogue of good and ill might be signed by Saint Vincent de Paul. +We read in them: ‘Kings should take care in making treaties, but once the treaties +are made, <i>they must observe them religiously</i>. I know that many politicians teach the +contrary; but, without taking into consideration all that the Christian Faith provides +us with against these maxims, I maintain that since the loss of honour is greater than +the loss of life itself, a great Prince should hazard his person and <i>even the interest of his +State rather than break his word</i>, which he cannot violate without losing his reputation, +and consequently <i>the greatest strength</i> of a Sovereign.’ (<i>Testament Politique</i>, part 2, ch. vi.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_90_90" href="#FNanchor_90_90" class="label">[90]</a> Similarly with the writer—Machiavelli, who writes for his peers, can allow himself +the luxury of not being a moralist; Maurras who writes for crowds cannot do so. No +one writes with impunity in a democracy. Moreover, a political activity which is +supported by moral activity proves that it understands the true conditions of its success. +A master in these matters says: ‘There can be no profound political reform unless +religion and morality are also reformed.’ (Hegel.) Clearly the particular influence +of the <i>Action Française</i> among all other conservative organs is due to the fact that its +political movement is supported by a moral teaching, although other interests oblige +it to deny this.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_91_91" href="#FNanchor_91_91" class="label">[91]</a> <i>Dictionnaire des Cas de Conscience</i> (ed. 1712), article ‘Guerre’. With such a morality +the territorial formation of any European State would become impossible. This is the +type of non-practical teaching, i.e. of what I mean by the true ‘clerk’. (See <a href="#Note_F">Note F</a> at +the end of this book on the subject of the welcome given to this teaching by the material +world.) In the opinion of Vittoria as well, the extension of empire is not a just cause.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_92_92" href="#FNanchor_92_92" class="label">[92]</a> This is the thesis of Alfonso Liguori which to-day prevails in the Church’s teaching +over that of Vittoria.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_93_93" href="#FNanchor_93_93" class="label">[93]</a> Cardinal Gousset (<i>Théologie morale</i>, 1845).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_94_94" href="#FNanchor_94_94" class="label">[94]</a> This is the Scholastic doctrine of war, formulated in all its rigidity by Thomas +Aquinas. According to this doctrine, the Prince (or the people) who declares war, +acts as a magistrate (minister Dei) under whose jurisdiction a foreign nation falls, owing +to an injustice it has committed and which it refuses to repair. From this it follows, +in particular, that the Prince who has declared war ought solely to punish the guilty, +if he is victorious, and not to acquire any personal benefit from his victory. This high +moral doctrine is entirely abandoned by the Church to-day. (See Vanderpol, <i>La +Guerre devant le Christianisme</i>, titre ix.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_95_95" href="#FNanchor_95_95" class="label">[95]</a> Apparently this was the view adopted by the Holy See in 1914 towards the Franco-German +war, Germany benefiting by what theology calls ‘invincible’ ignorance, i.e. +implying that one has used all the diligence of which a man is capable in trying to understand +the explanations of an adversary. Obviously, one may feel that some goodwill +was needed to think that Germany had a right to this benefit.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_96_96" href="#FNanchor_96_96" class="label">[96]</a> Like the thesis of war being just on both sides, this is the doctrine of Molina, which +in matters of law in war has entirely replaced Scholastic doctrine in ecclesiastic +teaching.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_97_97" href="#FNanchor_97_97" class="label">[97]</a> In the <i>Dictionnaire théologique</i> of Vacant-Mangenot (1922, article ‘Guerre’), I find +the following passage, which I recommend to all aggressors desirous of sheltering under +a high moral authority: ‘It is not only the right but the duty of the leader of a nation +to adopt this method (i.e. war) to safeguard the general interests committed to his +care. This right and duty apply not only to a strictly defensive war, but also to an +offensive war rendered necessary by the actions of a neighbouring State whose +ambitious intrigues constitute a real danger.’ In the same article will be found a theory +of colonial wars identical to Kipling’s when he calls them: <i>the white man’s burden</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_98_98" href="#FNanchor_98_98" class="label">[98]</a> This expression (i.e. ‘la blague’) is Sorel’s (see Julien Benda, <i>Les Sentiments de +Critias</i>, p. 258); and again (<i>Reflexions sur la Violence</i>, ch. ii): ‘You cannot sufficiently +execrate those who teach the people that they should carry out some alleged superlatively +idealistic injunction of a justice moving towards the future.’ Moreover, Sorel professes +a similar hatred for those who preach this injunction to the bourgeoisie.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_99_99" href="#FNanchor_99_99" class="label">[99]</a> See <a href="#Note_K">Note K</a> at the end of the book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_100_100" href="#FNanchor_100_100" class="label">[100]</a> See <i>Reflexions sur la Violence</i>, ch. vi: ‘The morality of Violence.’ We shall be +told that the justice denounced by Sorel is the justice of tribunals, which according to +him is a false justice, a ‘violence with a judicial mask’. There is no indication that a +justice which was a true justice would receive any more respect from him.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_101_101" href="#FNanchor_101_101" class="label">[101]</a> In this respect one cannot stress too much in certain political teachers a defence +of intolerance, carried out with a consciousness and arrogance which hitherto had +only appeared sometimes in the mandatories of a revealed religion. A specimen is +quoted by G. Guy-Grand (<i>La Philosophie nationaliste</i>, p. 47). See also one of these +defences in L. Romier, <i>Nation et Civilisation</i>, p. 180.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_102_102" href="#FNanchor_102_102" class="label">[102]</a> ‘Modern science has established as the measure of truth, not the deductive demands +of its understanding, but the observed existence of the fact.’ (Paul Bourget.) The ‘truth’ +here is evidently moral truth; for scientific truth the phrase would be a tautology. Once +more, here the ‘fact’ is solely the fact which happens to suit the author’s passions. +When M. d’Haussonville points out to M. Bourget that democracy is a fact, and an +unavoidable fact, he is told that this belief is a ‘prejudice’ and one suddenly learns +that ‘boats are made to row against the stream’. This is exactly what revolutionaries say.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_103_103" href="#FNanchor_103_103" class="label">[103]</a> See <a href="#Note_L">Note L</a> at the end of this book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_104_104" href="#FNanchor_104_104" class="label">[104]</a> Another thinker to whom our empiricists are strangely ungrateful is the author +of these words: ‘Consider the danger of one stirring up the enormous masses which +form the French nation. Who could restrain the disturbance set up, or foresee all the +results it might produce? Even if all the advantages of the new scheme should be +indisputable, what man of good sense would dare to undertake to abolish old customs, +to change old maxims, and to give a new form to a State other than that it has reached +after an existence of 1,300 years?’ (J. J. Rousseau.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_105_105" href="#FNanchor_105_105" class="label">[105]</a> See <a href="#Note_M">Note M</a> at the end of this book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_106_106" href="#FNanchor_106_106" class="label">[106]</a> ‘A truly scientific mind,’ says one of these devotees of fact, ‘feels no need to justify +a privilege which appears as an elementary and irreducible datum of the social world.’ +(Paul Bourget.) But this same ‘truly scientific’ mind is scandalised at an <i>insurrection</i> +against this privilege, which is also an ‘elementary and irreducible datum of the social +world’. I shall be told this that insurrection is not a datum of the social world, but +of the world of passion where it is most anti-social. And that indeed is the position +of this dogmatism: It considers the social <i>independent of the passionate</i>, whether the +latter has been made social (by Catholic education), or has been reduced to silence by +force (school of Maurras) or by skill (school of Bainville). The strangest part of it all +is that those who argue in this way about the social <i>in itself</i> accuse their adversaries of +dealing in abstractions.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_107_107" href="#FNanchor_107_107" class="label">[107]</a> The position I am here denouncing has nothing in common with that of a recent +school of moralists (Rauh, Lévy-Bruhl) who also desire ‘to take man as he is’, but in +order to discover how he may be made better.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_108_108" href="#FNanchor_108_108" class="label">[108]</a> This pessimism, whatever some of its heralds may say, has nothing in common +with the pessimism of the masters of the seventeenth century. La Fontaine and La +Bruyère attribute nothing inevitable or eternal to the ills they portray. Let me also +point out that in their efforts to discourage hope, the Romantics of Pessimism cannot +claim (as M. Georges Goyau has pointed out to them) that they are based on Catholic +tradition.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_109_109" href="#FNanchor_109_109" class="label">[109]</a> Such a group logically comes to declarations like the following, which every +supporter of ‘integral nationalism’ is bound to admire: ‘From to-night onwards let +there be an end to the silly Utopia where everyone thinks with his own head.’ (Impero, +4th November, 1926.) See <a href="#Note_N">Note N</a> at the end of this volume.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_110_110" href="#FNanchor_110_110" class="label">[110]</a> On Pragmatism, especially Nietzschean pragmatism, and the place it holds (whether +they confess it or not) in almost all the moral and political teachings really characteristic +of this time, see R. Berthelot, <i>Un Romantisme Utilitaire</i>, tome i, page 28 onwards. +I can best show the novelty of the pragmatist attitude, especially among the French +moralists, by quoting a remark of Montaigne which they all, before Barrès, would have +ratified: ‘The honour and beauty of an action cannot be argued from its utility.’ Let +us not forget, however, that Nietzsche, always unfaithful to his disciples, declares +that ‘in the long run, utility, like everything else, is simply a figment of our imagination, +and may well be the <i>fatal stupidity by which we shall one day perish</i>’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_111_111" href="#FNanchor_111_111" class="label">[111]</a> That it why Pragmatism is also called Humanism. (See F. Schiller, <i>Protagoras +or Plato</i>.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_112_112" href="#FNanchor_112_112" class="label">[112]</a> We know how the two are reconciled. Jesus, they say, preached the spirit of +sacrifice, which is the basis of all human institutions. As if Jesus preached the spirit +of sacrifice which wins battles and secures empires!</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_113_113" href="#FNanchor_113_113" class="label">[113]</a> ‘The true warrior remains human in the midst of the blood he sheds.’ (De +Maistre.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_114_114" href="#FNanchor_114_114" class="label">[114]</a> For example, when they make a soldier say in heaven: ‘You must know, my +friends, that among all things done upon earth, nothing is more agreeable to the eyes +of those who rule the universe than societies of men founded upon respect for laws, +which we call cities.’ (Cicero, <i>Scipio’s Dream</i>.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_115_115" href="#FNanchor_115_115" class="label">[115]</a> Sorel, loc. cit.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_116_116" href="#FNanchor_116_116" class="label">[116]</a> And from any patriotism. Nietzsche and Sorel prove that love of war is something +totally distinct from love of country, although most often they coincide.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_117_117" href="#FNanchor_117_117" class="label">[117]</a> Ernest Psichari, <i>Terres de Soleil et de Sommeil</i>. And, in <i>L’Appel des armes</i>, +through the mouth of a character who obviously has all the author’s sympathies; +‘I think it necessary that there should be in the world a certain number of the men +who are called soldiers and who place their ideal in fighting, who have a taste for battle, +not for victory but for the contest, as hunters have a taste for hunting, not for game!... +The part we have to play, or otherwise we lose our reason for existing and have no more +meaning, is to maintain a military ideal, not a nationally military ideal, but a militarily +military ideal, if I may so express it.’ The religion of this moralist is, according to +his own expression, <i>integral militarism</i>. ‘Big guns,’ he says, ‘are the most real realities +which exist, the sole realities of the modern world.’ And obviously these realities are +divinities for this ‘spiritual’ person and his followers.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_118_118" href="#FNanchor_118_118" class="label">[118]</a> This depreciation of Greece, to be seen in many French traditionalists since +de Maistre, is constant among the Pangermanists. (See notably Houston Chamberlain, +<i>Genesis of the Nineteenth Century</i>, tome i, page 57.) In a periodical with dogmatic +claims (<i>Notre Temps</i>, August, 1927), under the suggestive title ‘Towards a Practical +Idealism’, I read: ‘A young generation trained in this way, <i>more sporting than ideological</i>, +supports those who ask whether we are not at the dawn of a great age.’ Here +again the Churchmen do not lag behind. In <i>La Vie Catholique</i> (24th September, 1927) +I find a warm eulogy of a champion boxer. It is true that this eulogy ends up with the +words: ‘Finally, let us add that Tunney is a convinced and practising Catholic, and +that two of his sisters are nuns.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_119_119" href="#FNanchor_119_119" class="label">[119]</a> Laws, Book I. The exact text of Plato is: ‘In the order of virtues, wisdom is +first, temperance comes next, courage occupies the last place.’ Plato here means by +courage (see the context, notably the passage about those soldiers who ‘though +insolent, unjust, immoral, know how to fight’) Man’s aptitude for facing death. It +seems that he would not have given the first place to the courage which is strength +of mind, a resistance to misfortune, as the Stoics afterwards did. With him strength of +mind always comes after justice—according to his doctrine, it is a consequence of justice. +Moreover, the courage placed in the supreme rank by Barrès is not Stoic patience but +the active defiance of death. For Nietzsche and Sorel it is essential audacity, where +audacity is irrational—a form of courage depreciated by all ancient moralists and their +disciples. (See Plato, Laches; Aristotle, Ethics, VIII; Spinoza, Ethics, IV, 69; +even the poets—‘Our reason which commands our fire,’ Ronsard.)</p> + +<p>It seems that facing death, even on behalf of justice, was not so much the object of +praise among the ancient philosophers as it is among the moderns. In the Phaedo, +Socrates is praised for his justice; he is not very loudly praised because he died for +justice. Moreover, the views of the ancients on this point seem to me well expressed +by Spinoza: ‘Death is a thing of which the free man thinks least of all,’ a thought +which does not imply much admiration for those who face death bravely. One wonders +whether the veneration of courage, at least among the moralists, has not been created +by Christianity, with the importance it attaches to death, and the subsequent appearance +before God.</p> + +<p>I cannot leave this point without recalling a passage where Saint-Simon speaks of a +nobility ‘accustomed to be good for nothing except to get itself killed’, <i>Mémoires</i>, +t. xi, page 427, ed. Cheruel. It may be asserted that there is not one modern writer, +even a Duke of France, who would speak of courage in such a tone.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_120_120" href="#FNanchor_120_120" class="label">[120]</a> And to hold.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_121_121" href="#FNanchor_121_121" class="label">[121]</a> There will be found in Barrès (<i>Une Enquête aux pays du Levant</i>, chap. vii: ‘Les +derniers fidèles du Vieux de la Montagne’) a striking example of admiration for the +cult of honour inasmuch as this cult, when ably exploited by an intelligent leader, gives +practical results.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_122_122" href="#FNanchor_122_122" class="label">[122]</a> This is especially the case with Montaigne who, as everyone knows, extols honour +insofar as it is man’s sensitiveness to the judgment of his conscience, but very little +insofar as it is a desire for glory—‘put off with other pleasures that which comes from +the approbation of others.’ Barrès believes he sees in that ‘a foreigner who does not +share our prejudices’. Barrès confuses the moralists and the poets. Before him I +do not know one French author with dogmatic claims who has attributed a high moral +value to the love of glory; the French moralists before 1890 are very unmilitary, even +the soldiers like Vauvenargues and Vigny. (See the excellent study of G. Le Bidois, +<i>L’Honneur au miroir de nos lettres</i>, especially on Montesquieu.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_123_123" href="#FNanchor_123_123" class="label">[123]</a> The Abbé Sertillanges, <i>L’Héroisme et la Gloire</i>. Compare this with Bossuet’s +two sermons on ‘The Honour of the World’. You can measure the advance made +by the Church during three centuries in its concessions to lay passions. See also +Nicole: ‘On the true idea of valour.’ The sermons of the Abbé Sertillanges (‘la Vie +Héroïque’) should be read entire, as a monument of a Churchman’s enthusiasm for +warlike instincts. It is positively the manifesto of a helmed ‘clerk’. You can find +in them such emotions as the following which, mutatis mutandis, might be an extract +from the Regimental Orders of a Colonel of the Death’s Head Hussars: ‘Behold +Guynemer, the young hero, the simple soul with the eagle glance, the slim Hercules, +the Achilles who does not retire to his tent, the Roland of the clouds and the Cid of the +French sky: was there ever a wilder and more furious paladin, more careless of death, +whether his own or that of an enemy? This “kid”, as his comrades called him, only +enjoyed the savage pleasure of attack, of the hard fight, of the clear victory, and in him +the arrogance of the conqueror was at once charming and terrible.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_124_124" href="#FNanchor_124_124" class="label">[124]</a> Let me recall Thomas Aquinas’s definition of honour, which is not exactly the +definition of the honour extolled by the Abbé Sertillanges: ‘Honour is good (like the +love of human glory) on condition that charity is its principle, and the love of God +or the good of one’s neighbour as its object.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_125_125" href="#FNanchor_125_125" class="label">[125]</a> See the recent Bill to amend Martial Law, known as the Paul Boncour Bill.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_126_126" href="#FNanchor_126_126" class="label">[126]</a> This suggestive remark is Lavisse’s, <i>Etudes d’Histoire de Prusse</i>, page 30. See +the whole passage.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_127_127" href="#FNanchor_127_127" class="label">[127]</a> Love here is obviously love for the superior species—to which the preacher naturally +belongs. Doubtless it is this love also which permits of a pity which is not ‘perverted.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_128_128" href="#FNanchor_128_128" class="label">[128]</a> Charles Maurras, <i>Action Française</i>, tome iv, page 596. One thinks of Nietzsche’s +exclamation: ‘Humanity! Was there ever a more horrible old woman among all +horrible old women!’ and the German master adds, always in agreement with many +a French master as we shall see later, ‘unless perhaps it is truth.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_129_129" href="#FNanchor_129_129" class="label">[129]</a> Their harshness has obviously nothing in common with the harshness implied +by these fine words: ‘The man of justice subordinates passion to reason, which seems +regrettable if his heart is cold, but will appear sublime if he is capable of love’ (Renouvier).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_130_130" href="#FNanchor_130_130" class="label">[130]</a> This is the opinion of Machiavelli (chap. xviii) who, there again, does not therefore +consider cruelty as a proof of a high state of culture.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_131_131" href="#FNanchor_131_131" class="label">[131]</a> I find this from the pen of a hero of the First Empire: ‘I was afraid of feeling +<i>pleasure</i>’ (the author himself underlines the word) ‘in killing with my own hand some +of these scoundrels’ (he is speaking of some Germans who murdered French prisoners +after the battle of Leipzic). ‘I therefore sheathed my sabre and left the extermination +of these assassins to the troopers.’ (<i>Memoirs of General Marbot</i>, tome iii, page 344.) +There is a condemnation of the joy of killing which would be scorned by many a contemporary +writer. In France the glorification of warlike instincts is much less +common among the soldiers than among the authors. Marbot is far less bloody-minded +than Barrès.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_132_132" href="#FNanchor_132_132" class="label">[132]</a> ‘And the honour of virtue consists in contending, not in winning’ (Montaigne).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_133_133" href="#FNanchor_133_133" class="label">[133]</a> <i>La Ruine du monde antique</i>, page 76. See also in <i>Les Illusions du progrès</i> (page 259) +Sorel’s derisive amusement at a thinker who said that the preponderance of intellectual +emotions is the sign of superior societies. We may take up Sainte-Beuve’s famous +distinction and say that modern thinkers extol <i>sword-intelligence</i> at the expense of +<i>mirror-intelligence</i>. On their own showing it is the former they admire in Nietzsche, +Sorel, Péguy, and Maurras. (See R. Gillouin, <i>Esquisses littéraires et morales</i>, page 52.) +Let me observe that contempt for ‘mirror-intelligence’ implies contempt for Aristotle, +Spinoza, Bacon, Goethe, and Renan. Nor does it seem to me that M. Paul Valéry +is exactly a ‘sword-intelligence’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_134_134" href="#FNanchor_134_134" class="label">[134]</a> <i>Victor Marie, Comte Hugo</i>, towards the end. See <a href="#Note_O">Note O</a> at the end of this +volume.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_135_135" href="#FNanchor_135_135" class="label">[135]</a> This it the only reason why Nietzsche extols art, and declares (along with all +modern moralism) the supremacy of the artist over the philosopher, because art seems +to him to possess the value of action. Apart from this point of view, it seems just to +say with one of his critics: ‘At bottom Nietzsche despised art and artists.... In art +he condemns a feminine principle, the mimicry of the actor, the love of dress and all that +glitters.... Remember the eloquent page where he praises Shakespeare, the greatest +of poets, for having abased the figure of the poet, whom he treats as a stage-player, +before Caesar, <i>that divine man</i>.’ (C. Schuwer, <i>Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale</i>, +April, 1926.) For Sorel art is great because it is an anticipation of intense production, +as it tends to manifest itself more and more in our society.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_136_136" href="#FNanchor_136_136" class="label">[136]</a> <i>Evolution Créatrice</i>, page 216. The true formula of Bergsonism should be, ‘I grow, +therefore I am.’ Notice also the tendency of modern philosophy to make the practical +character of thought its essential characteristic and to make its consciousness of itself +a secondary characteristic: ‘Perhaps thought must be defined as the faculty of combining +means towards certain ends rather than by the sole property of being clear to itself.’ +(D. Roustan, <i>Leçons de Psychologie</i>, page 73.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_137_137" href="#FNanchor_137_137" class="label">[137]</a> The Sphex. The example is given in <i>L’Evolution Créatrice</i>, and has had an immense +success in the literary world. (It is, moreover, imaginary. See Marie Goldsmith, +<i>Psychologie Comparée</i>, page 211.) The defence of the practical value of instinct, with +the same Romantic contempt of the rationalist as in Barrès, existed with J. J. Rousseau: +‘Conscience never deceives us; it is to the soul what instinct is to the body.... Modern +philosophy, which only admits what can be explained, takes care not to admit the obscure +faculty called instinct which, without acquired knowledge, seems to guide animals +towards some end.’ (<i>Confession de foi du vicaire savoyard.</i>)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_138_138" href="#FNanchor_138_138" class="label">[138]</a> ‘If the utility which results from a man’s occupations determined our praise, +the inventor of the plough would deserve the praise of being a great mind far more +than Aristotle, Galilei, and M. Descartes.’ (Bayle.) Fontenelle and Voltaire have +pointed out the utility of certain studies which were considered useless; they never +meant that those who cultivated these studies while they thought them useless were +therefore contemptible.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_139_139" href="#FNanchor_139_139" class="label">[139]</a> See above, page 54.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_140_140" href="#FNanchor_140_140" class="label">[140]</a> Or moral. Barrès denounces the ‘immorality’ of the scholar who shows the part +played by chance in history. Compare Michelet’s remark, ‘respect kills history.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_141_141" href="#FNanchor_141_141" class="label">[141]</a> As is well known, this is the argument of the ‘Avenir de l’intelligence’. It +allows followers to say (‘Manifeste de l’Intelligence,’ <i>Figaro</i>, 19th July, 1919; on +this manifesto, see <a href="#Note_P">Note P</a> at the end of this volume) that ‘one of the most obvious +missions of the Church during the ages has been to protect the intelligence against its +own errors’—an irrefutable saying from the moment that the errors of the intelligence +are everything it says without reference to social order (whose basis is to be the teaching +of the Church). This practical conception of the intelligence leads to definitions of +this sort: ‘True logic is to be defined as the normal union of feelings, images and signs, +to inspire in us the conceptions suited to our moral, intellectual and physical needs.’ +(Maurras.) Compare this with the tradition teaching of the French masters: ‘Logic +is the art of guiding reason properly in the knowledge of things.’ (<i>Logique de Port-Royal.</i>)</p> + +<p>The wish to esteem intelligence according to its practical results appears again in this +astounding formula: ‘A critical mind is of value <i>through the influence it exerts</i> by means +of the enlightenment it bestows.’ (Maurras.) See also how severe is M. Massis +(<i>Jugements</i>, i, 87) for Renan when he says: ‘The useful is what I abhor.’ Elsewhere +(<i>Jugements</i>, 107) the same thinker speaks of a spiritual freedom ‘whose disinterestedness +is merely a refusal of the conditions of life, of action, <i>and of thought</i>!’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_142_142" href="#FNanchor_142_142" class="label">[142]</a> They add ‘and unscientific’, which is irrefutable as soon as science means +‘practical’. ‘Bringing up children religiously,’ says M. Paul Bourget, ‘is bringing +them up scientifically’—a very defensible saying as soon as ‘scientifically’ means +(as the author here wants it to mean) ‘in conformity with the national interest’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_143_143" href="#FNanchor_143_143" class="label">[143]</a> The French traditionalists condemn the truth in itself in the name of ‘social’ +truth. This is the <i>glorification of prejudices</i>, a new thing indeed in the descendants of +Montaigne and Voltaire. It may be said that certain contemporary French masters +show a zeal in defending the interests of society never seen before in those whose business +was to defend the interests of the mind.</p> + +<p>The condemnation of disinterested intellectual activity is plainly laid down in this +command of Barrès: ‘All questions must be solved in relation to France,’ to which +a German thinker replies in 1920, ‘All the conquests of ancient and modern culture +and of science are looked at by us from the German point of view before everything.’ +(Quoted by C. Chabot, Preface to the French translation of <i>Speeches to the German +Nation</i>, page xix). For the cult of the ‘useful error’, see an amazing page in the <i>Jardin +de Bérénice</i>, quoted and commented on by Parodi. (<i>Traditionalisme et Democratie</i>, +page 136.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_144_144" href="#FNanchor_144_144" class="label">[144]</a> Here M. Maurras separates from his Master, de Maistre, who speaks of ‘the +ocean which will one day welcome everything and everyone to its bosom’. However, +the author of the <i>Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg</i> quickly adds: ‘But I refrain from touching +on personality, without which immortality is nothing.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_145_145" href="#FNanchor_145_145" class="label">[145]</a> On the existence of this doctrine of immanence among almost all Christian teachers +until our own times, see Renouvier: ‘l’Idée de Dieu’ (<i>Année Philosophique</i>, 1897), +and also <i>Essai d’une Classification des doctrines</i>, 3: <i>l’évolution</i>; <i>la création</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_146_146" href="#FNanchor_146_146" class="label">[146]</a> According to Hegel, God constantly grows at the expense of His opposite; His +activity is essentially that of war and victory.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_147_147" href="#FNanchor_147_147" class="label">[147]</a> Let me note a keen protest against this conception in ‘Neo-Thomism’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_148_148" href="#FNanchor_148_148" class="label">[148]</a> Compare, for instance, the condemnation of Rosmini with that of Maître Eckart, +where such propositions as ‘Nulla in Deo distinctio esse aut intelligi potest’ and ‘Omnes +creaturae sunt purum nihil’ are declared to be, not heretical, but only ‘ill-sounding, +rash and suspected of heresy’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_149_149" href="#FNanchor_149_149" class="label">[149]</a> Remember that in 1806, immediately after Jena, Hegel’s one thought was to find +a corner in which to philosophize. In 1813 Schopenhauer was completely indifferent +to the up-rising of Germany against Napoleon.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_150_150" href="#FNanchor_150_150" class="label">[150]</a> ‘No one has the right to be indifferent to the disasters of his country; but the +philosopher, like the Christian, always has reasons for living. The Kingdom of God +knows neither conquerors nor conquered; that Kingdom resides in the joys of the heart, +the mind, and the imagination, which the conquered enjoys more than the conqueror +if he is morally on a higher plane and has more mind. Your great Goethe, your +admirable Fichte have taught us, have they not, how to lead a noble and consequently +happy life, when our country is humiliated abroad.’ (First Letter to Strauss.)</p> + +<p>Need I say that Nietzsche, who seems to me a bad ‘clerk’ from the nature of his +teaching, seems to me one of the finest from his entire devotion to the passions of the +spirit alone?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_151_151" href="#FNanchor_151_151" class="label">[151]</a> Of course, I am not doubting the sincerity of all the ‘right-thinking’ men of +letters. Some persons are so fortunate that the most profitable attitudes are precisely +those which they adopt sincerely.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_152_152" href="#FNanchor_152_152" class="label">[152]</a> This may be clearly seen by the ill-will displayed by the French bourgeoisie towards +the order of their ‘spiritual leader’ forbidding them to read a publication whose doctrines +they like. The change may be estimated if you remember that when, a century ago, +the Pope ordered the French Catholics to accept the law against the Jesuits voted by +the government of Charles X, they all bowed to his will.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_153_153" href="#FNanchor_153_153" class="label">[153]</a> At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession when the north of France was +invaded, Fénelon delivered several sermons in which he told the invaded population +that their sufferings were the just punishment for their sins. Imagine the reception of +anyone who dared to preach such a sermon to the French in August, 1914! For the +manner in which the ‘taught’ Church to-day treats the ‘teaching’ Church if the +latter does not say what it wants to hear, think of the reception thirty years ago of +Father Ollivier’s sermon on the victims of the fire at the charity bazaar.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_154_154" href="#FNanchor_154_154" class="label">[154]</a> Similar observations may be made about the philosophers, most of whom—and not +the least famous—do not live to-day like Descartes and Spinoza, but are married, have +children, occupy posts, are ‘in daily life’. All of which seems to me to have a relation +with the ‘pragmatic’ character of their teaching. (On this point, see my book: <i>Sur +le Succès du Bergsonisme</i>, page 207.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_155_155" href="#FNanchor_155_155" class="label">[155]</a> This is the reign (which seems eternal in France) of the ‘wit’, with his attribute +so admirably denounced by Malebranche in this delicious phrase: ‘The stupid person +and the wit are equally blind to truth; with this difference, that the stupid person +respects truth while the wit despises it.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_156_156" href="#FNanchor_156_156" class="label">[156]</a> The spectacle of democracies may satisfy another sort of artistic sensibility, i.e. +the sort which is moved, not by the spectacle of order, but by the spectacle of an equilibrium +between forces which are naturally in opposition. (On this distinction, see the +great book by M. Hauriou, <i>Principes de droit public</i>, chap. i.) Nevertheless, a sensibility +to equilibrium is far more intellectual than truly artistic. See <a href="#Note_Q">Note Q</a> at the end of +this book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_157_157" href="#FNanchor_157_157" class="label">[157]</a> More precisely, since the haughty Romanticism I mentioned above. The artist’s +desire to set himself up as an exceptional being dates from Flaubert. Hugo and +Lamartine never expressed it.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_158_158" href="#FNanchor_158_158" class="label">[158]</a> This aversion is particularly strong in Nietzsche. (See <i>Le Gai sçavoir</i>, loc. cit., +where generalization becomes a synonym for platitude, superficiality, stupidity.) Like +a true artist, Nietzsche is incapable of understanding that the apperception of a common +characteristic may be an act of genius—for instance, the apperception of the common +characteristic between the movement of the planets and the fall of an apple.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_159_159" href="#FNanchor_159_159" class="label">[159]</a> So much so that the true champions of ‘sacred egoism’ definitely condemn them. +Bismarck, Wilhelm II, Naumann, Houston Chamberlain, all argue against classical +teaching.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_160_160" href="#FNanchor_160_160" class="label">[160]</a> Remember that Nietzsche only truly esteems the thought of the ancients up to +Socrates, i.e. up to the time when it begins to teach the universal.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_161_161" href="#FNanchor_161_161" class="label">[161]</a> This same Barrès is quoted as having said to a ‘Dreyfusist’ in 1898: ‘Why do +you talk of justice and humanity to me! What do I care for? A few pictures in +Europe and a few cemeteries!’ Another of our great political realists confessed one +day to his fundamental necessity to ‘enjoy’. Socrates long ago told Protagoras that +the basis of his doctrine was a thirst for sensation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_162_162" href="#FNanchor_162_162" class="label">[162]</a> It seems to me difficult to deny that pacifism, humanitarianism, and altruism are +<i>boring</i>. No doubt, art, science, and philosophy offer sufficient opportunities for ‘amusement’ +without one asking of it doctrines which set the world on fire. But that is +the view of a man who is not wildly eager for sensation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_163_163" href="#FNanchor_163_163" class="label">[163]</a> The realists are not the only people to-day who find opportunities for sensation +in their political attitudes. It is certain that the humanitarianism of Victor Hugo and +Michelet is far from having the pure intellectual resonance it had in Spinoza and +Malebranche. (See above, my distinction between humanitarianism and humanism.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_164_164" href="#FNanchor_164_164" class="label">[164]</a> ‘Peace it not the absence of war, but a virtue born from strength of soul.’ +(Spinoza.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_165_165" href="#FNanchor_165_165" class="label">[165]</a> Here is an example: ‘Universal peace will come about one day, not because men +will become better (one cannot hope for that) but because a new order of things, new +science, new economic needs, will impose a state of peace on them, just as the very +conditions of their existence formerly placed and maintained them in a state of war.’ +(Anatole France, <i>Sur la Pierre blanche</i>.) Note the refusal, mentioned above, to believe +in any possible betterment of the human soul.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_166_166" href="#FNanchor_166_166" class="label">[166]</a> This observation applied to nearly all anti-militarist literature up to our own times. +We have to come to Renan and Renouvier (at least among writers not of the Church) +to find authors who speak of war and national passions with the seriousness and respect +due to such dramas.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_167_167" href="#FNanchor_167_167" class="label">[167]</a> I am not to say whether the claims of France after her victory might have been +<i>impolitic</i>, for the thinkers I am discussing here only speak of what they consider their +<i>immorality</i>. Notice that the pacifism of the Church, at least among the great teachers, +is not at all inspired by sentimental considerations, but by pure moral education. ‘What +do we condemn in war?’ says Saint Augustin. ‘Is it the fact that they kill men who +have all one day to die? Only cowards, not religious men, would bring this accusation +against war. What we condemn in war is the desire to do harm, an implacable soul, +the fury of reprisals, the passion for dominion.’ (This is taken up by Thomas Aquinas +in the <i>Summum</i>, 2, 2, xl, art. 1.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_168_168" href="#FNanchor_168_168" class="label">[168]</a> I consider that ‘My kingdom is not of this world’ may be said by all whose activity +is not directed to practical ends: the artist, the metaphysician, the scientist <i>insofar +as he finds satisfaction in the practice of science and not in its results</i>. Many will tell me +that they and not the Christians are the true ‘clerks’, for the Christian accepts the +ideas of justice and charity only for the sake of his salvation. No one will deny, however, +that men, even Christians, exist, who accept this idea with no practical end in view.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_169_169" href="#FNanchor_169_169" class="label">[169]</a> Malebranche, <i>Méditations chrétiennes</i> (ix, 19).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_170_170" href="#FNanchor_170_170" class="label">[170]</a> See Babeau, <i>Le village sous l’ancien régime</i>, iv, iii; L. Gregoire, <i>La Ligue en +Bretagne</i>, chap, vi; Roupnel, <i>La Ville et la Campagne au xvii siècle</i>, i, 1. ‘The peasants,’ +says M. Roumier, ‘were only really converted where it was to their interests to be so, +and especially where the local landlords put their influence at the service of the new +religion, and where the Catholic clergy had completely deserted the parishes. We +must be careful not to consider as Protestants all the “rustics” who took part in pillaging +the abbeys and castles during the civil war’ (<i>La Royaume de Catherine de Médicis</i>, tome +ii, page 294). M. Romier quotes the remark of a contemporary: ‘The whole of the +Low Countries scarcely knows what this new doctrine is.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_171_171" href="#FNanchor_171_171" class="label">[171]</a> ‘Le livre de raison de M. Nicolas Versoris’ (<i>Mémoires de la Société de l’Histoire de +Paris</i>, tome xii). The author, avocat au Parlement de Paris, similarly gives two +lines to events like the Connétable de Bourbon’s treachery, and the signing of the treaty +of Madrid. The same attitude exists in the <i>Journal d’un Bourgeois de Paris</i>, 1515–1536; +the public misfortunes sketched by the author leave him completely indifferent. He +makes no comment on the disaster of Pavia. Apropos the treaty of Madrid, ‘it is to be +noted,’ writes a contemporary, ‘that there were no bonfires or rejoicings when the +news of the peace was published, because no one understood anything about it.’ +(Lavisse, <i>Histoire de France</i>, v, 49.) Contemporaries mention the indifference of the +people of Paris to the Peace of Westphalia, the battle of Rossbach, even the battles of +Valmy and Navarino. ‘The affair at Valmy made very little stir at first.’ (Kellerman.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_172_172" href="#FNanchor_172_172" class="label">[172]</a> Michelet relates that in his youth he questioned an old man on the impressions +left upon him by 1793, and the only answer he got was: ‘It was the bad paper year.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_173_173" href="#FNanchor_173_173" class="label">[173]</a> Admire the profundity of Machiavelli, when he advises his Prince: ‘Above everything, +avoid taking your subjects’ property; <i>for men will more easily forget the deaths +of their fathers than the loss of their patrimony</i>.’</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_174_174" href="#FNanchor_174_174" class="label">[174]</a> Inserted in the collection of studies entitled ‘L’Allemagne et les Alliés devant la +conscience chrétienne’. (Bloud et Gay, 1915.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_175_175" href="#FNanchor_175_175" class="label">[175]</a> M. Edmond Bloud quotes this remark of a German nationalist, which might have +been made on the French side of the Rhine: ‘The Catholic world must be nationalized +to re-Catholicize it.’ He adds that in Germany it is common to hear ‘German +Catholicism’ spoken of in opposition to Roman Catholicism.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_176_176" href="#FNanchor_176_176" class="label">[176]</a> And therefore it requires much more courage to do so now than in the past.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_177_177" href="#FNanchor_177_177" class="label">[177]</a> Nevertheless, Zola, Romain Rolland, and Einstein have drunk the hemlock.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_178_178" href="#FNanchor_178_178" class="label">[178]</a> When they allow themselves to be told, as Louis XVI was told by Turgot: ‘Sire, +your kingdom <i>is of this world</i>.’ There also exists ‘<i>a betrayal of the laymen</i>’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_179_179" href="#FNanchor_179_179" class="label">[179]</a> Mgr Battifol’s writings support my argument so beautifully that I hesitate to quote +an author who plays so perfectly into my hands. For example, he spends much time +in proving that the spirit of Christianity ‘has resulted, without contradicting itself, in a +doctrine of the morality of war’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_180_180" href="#FNanchor_180_180" class="label">[180]</a> Here is a passage which, except for its violence, seems to me to express the feelings +of most modern laymen on the subject of the patriotic loyalty of the priests: ‘The clergy +of France is ardently patriotic; it serves gallantly under fire; it absolves and glorifies +every action of the soldier; it regards the accusation of having deserted military duty +as infamous, and does it justice. It is not for me to say whether it is in accord with +the Gospels. We are simply Frenchmen and patriots; we can only approve and admire +the French patriotic monks and priests. The French priest has no pardon for a German, +the German priest and pastor have no pardon for a Frenchman. Mother-country first! +Kill! Kill! In the name of the God of the Christians, we absolve you, we glorify +you for killing Christians!’ (Urbain Gohier, ‘La Vieille France,’ quoted by Grillot +de Givry, <i>Le Christ et la Patrie</i>, page 12.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_181_181" href="#FNanchor_181_181" class="label">[181]</a> This clearly shows in what sense Renouvier is an ‘individualist’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_182_182" href="#FNanchor_182_182" class="label">[182]</a> See his hymn to the mathematician Franz Woepfke.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_183_183" href="#FNanchor_183_183" class="label">[183]</a> Jules Lemaître was explicitly this adversary.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_184_184" href="#FNanchor_184_184" class="label">[184]</a> ‘For an empirical France,’ say Barrès and Bourget.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_185_185" href="#FNanchor_185_185" class="label">[185]</a> ‘Note sur M. Bergson et la philosophie bergsonienne,’ Cahiers de la Quinzaine. +See my book, <i>Sur le Succès du Bergsonisme</i>, page 158.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_186_186" href="#FNanchor_186_186" class="label">[186]</a> The same thing is to be found in Lamartine when he says of Byron: ‘There is more +true, imperishable poetry in the tent at Missolonghi where he lies prostrate with fever, +under arms, than in all his works.’ (<i>Commentaire de la 2e Meditation.</i>) This is precisely +the teaching adopted by Barrès, Suarès, Péguy (the last preached it by his example, +however), which comes down to saying: ‘There is more poetry in a heroic death than in +all the activities of the mind.’ Note that this position is by no means common to all +the Romantics. Hugo, Vigny, Michelet, felt all the poetry of action, but they never +appear to think it superior to the poetry of the lofty forms of intellectual life. Hugo +never thought of sacrificing Homer or Galilei to Napoleon, or even to Hoche—to take +a disinterested hero such as Lamartine praises in Byron.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_187_187" href="#FNanchor_187_187" class="label">[187]</a> Note that Ronsard is the very type of the man ‘bent over books’.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_188_188" href="#FNanchor_188_188" class="label">[188]</a> ‘Germany is the protector and the support of European civilization’ (Lamprecht.) +‘After the war Germany will again take up her historic task, which is to be the heart +of Europe and to prepare European humanity.’ (Wilhelm II, <i>Temps</i>, 14th September, +1915.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_189_189" href="#FNanchor_189_189" class="label">[189]</a> See Robert Dreyfus, <i>Souvenirs sur Marcel Proust</i>, page 336.</p></div> + +<div class="transnote chapter" id="tn"> +<h2><i>Transcriber’s Notes</i></h2> + +<p>This transcription is based on the English edition of Aldington’s translation. +Some corrections have been applied in consultation with +both the French original (<i>La trahison des clercs</i>, B. Grasset, 1927) and the American +edition of the same translation (<i>The treason of the intellectuals</i>, William Morrow & Company, 1928). +Here are the main revisions. +<ul> +<li>A text comparison with the American edition incorporated these changes from that edition:<ul> + +<li>page 28, footnote <a href="#Footnote_28_28">28</a>: ‘more idealistic passion than national[+ist] passion’;</li> +<li>page <a href="#p_44">44</a>: ‘One wonders whether [+there is] a single modern thinker’ (grammatically necessary);</li> +<li>the fourth section, ‘<a href="#IV">Summary—Predictions</a>’, is now correctly numbered ‘IV’, not a duplicated ‘III’;</li> +</ul> +</li> +<li> +The following changes were made with reference to the original French: +<ul> +<li>numerous instances of unbalanced quotation marks have been fixed;</li> +<li>page <a href="#p_117">117</a>: removed an unclosed parenthesis beginning ‘(those of’ in favor of +parallel phrases with semi-colons, as in the original French;</li> +<li>page <a href="#p_173">173</a>: added balanced em-dashes after ‘Apart from Erasmus’ as in the original, to clarify sentence structure;</li> +<li>page <a href="#p_176">176</a>: ‘the chaos of the provincial assembles → assemblies’ (original: ‘le chaos des assemblées provinciales’);</li> +<li>page 181, note <a href="#Footnote_179_179">179</a>: ‘with contradicting → without contradicting’ +(‘a abouti sans se déjuger à une doctrine de la moralité de la guerre’);</li></ul> +<li>A simple table of contents has been added.</li> +<li>The book cover image accompanying some versions of this text is original and placed in the public domain.</li> +</ul> +</div> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78218 ***</div> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/78218-h/images/cover.jpg b/78218-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2fa466 --- /dev/null +++ b/78218-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c72794 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This book, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. 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