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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/78800-0.txt b/78800-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a29afc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/78800-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,22587 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78800 *** + + + + + PROCLUS + + ON + + THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO. + + _Proc._ _Vol. II._ _a_ + + + + + THE + + SIX BOOKS OF PROCLUS + + The platonic Successor, + + ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO, + + TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK; + + TO WHICH + + A SEVENTH BOOK IS ADDED, + + IN ORDER TO SUPPLY THE DEFICIENCY OF ANOTHER BOOK ON THIS SUBJECT, + + WHICH WAS WRITTEN BY PROCLUS, BUT SINCE LOST. + + ALSO, A TRANSLATION FROM THE GREEK OF + + PROCLUS’ ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY. + + TO WHICH ARE ADDED + + A TRANSLATION OF THE TREATISE OF PROCLUS, + + On Providence and Fate; + + A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE, ENTITLED, + + TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE; + + AND + + A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE + + ON THE SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL; + + _As preserved in the Bibliotheca Gr. of Fabricius_. + + + BY THOMAS TAYLOR. + + + Αλλ’ εστιν, εστι, καν τις εγγελα λογῳ, + Zευς, xαι θεοι, βροτεια λευσσοντες παθη. + _Euripides._ + + There are, there are, though laugh the scoffer may, + Jove and the Gods, who mortal ills survey. + + ωσπερ εισι θεoι πολλοι, και κυριοι πολλοι. + Corinth, I, Cap. 8. v. 5. + + As there be GODS many, and LORDS many. + + + TWO VOLUMES. + VOL. II. + + LONDON: + PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR, + _By A. J. Valpy, Tooke’s Court, Chancery Lane_. + AND SOLD BY MESSRS. LAW AND Co.; LONGMAN AND Co.; BALDWIN AND Co.; + AND ALL OTHER BOOKSELLERS. + + 1816. + + + + + PROCLUS, + + THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR, + + ON + + The Theology of Plato. + + + + + BOOK VI. + + + + + CHAPTER I. + + +The hebdomatic _aion_ (eternity) therefore, of the intellectual +Gods has been through these things celebrated by us, following the +mystic conceptions of Plato. But after this, let us in the next place +contemplate the multiform progressions of the ruling orders, and refer +the one union of them to the intellectual theory of Parmenides. For +this order is woven together in continuity with the demiurgus and +father of wholes, proceeds from, is perfected by, and converted to +him, according to his perfective power. Hence also, it is necessary to +connect the narration about the governors of the universe, with the +discussion concerning the demiurgus, and to assimilate words to the +things of which they are the interpreters. For all the series of the +ruling Gods, are collected into the intellectual fabrication as into a +summit, and subsist about it. And as all the fountains are the progeny +of the intelligible father, and are filled from him with intelligible +union, thus likewise, all the orders of the principles or rulers, are +suspended according to nature from the demiurgus, and participate +from thence of an intellectual life. And let no one be offended with +me, on hearing in this place the names of fountain and principle, nor +accuse these names, as not at all pertaining to Plato. For, as we have +before observed, Plato does not leave unnoticed any one of these mystic +names. But in his discussions about souls, when he denominates them the +fountains and principles of motion, he at the same time indicates the +difference between the peculiarity of fountain, and the peculiarity of +principle, and the inferiority of principle with respect to the exempt +transcendency of fountain. + +He likewise manifests that the self-vital extends to all things as far +as to soul, from fountain; but the unbegotten from principle. And this +is because the fontal genus indeed of the Gods is self-begotten, and +first-effective, and produces other things from itself; but the ruling +genus of the Gods, and which has the relation of a principle, though +it proceeds from the fountains, and is allotted a more partial order +among beings, yet it is expanded above every thing which is generated, +and neither is in a certain respect connected with generated natures, +nor communicates with a sensible nature. For the mundane Gods, indeed, +are in a certain respect generated; whence also, they are denominated +generated by Timæus, and this whole world is likewise called by him +a generated god. But the ruling Gods, and who have the relation of +principles, are perfectly exempt from generated natures, and are not +co-arranged with them. Hence also, the unbegotten is most particularly +adapted to them. Those Gods, however, who preside over the liberated +dominion being the media between the unbegotten and generated Gods, +come into contact indeed with the latter, but do not give completion to +the choir of mundane Gods. Hence, they are in a certain respect both +generated and unbegotten. The Gods, therefore, who are the summits of +supermundane natures, and the rulers of wholes, are alone allotted an +unbegotten subsistence in the orders that proceed from the demiurgus. +Hence, likewise, this peculiarity is from thence derived to souls. +For, as Plato says, principle is unbegotten. For it is necessary that +every thing which is generated should be generated from a principle, +but that the principle should not be generated from any thing. + +At the same time, therefore, it is manifest through these things, +how the [ruling] principles proceed from the Gods prior to them. For +they are not allotted a progression from them according to motion, +nor in short, according to mutation; but the orders of the ruling +Gods subsist by their very being, according to their prolific power, +and unenvying and exuberant will; and the self-begotten power of the +intellectual Gods, gives to the principles also the first generation +from itself. Whether, therefore, some one is willing to adopt these, or +other names of the divine orders, we shall consider it as a thing of +no consequence. But receiving the peculiarity of them, whatever it may +be, according to the rumours of theologists, we shall transfer their +mystic tradition to the Platonic narration. For thus we shall make the +investigation of what follows conformable to what has been before said, +and what we assert will be adapted to the things themselves. + + + + + CHAPTER II. + + +Again therefore, let us assume the principles of the science concerning +these Gods, and demonstrate that the theory pertaining to them is +consequent to the first causes. The intelligible Gods therefore, +surpass wholes according to supreme transcendency, and primarily +participate the union and divine light, in which all the Gods perfectly +establish their hypostases. They likewise unically produce all things +from themselves, according to the paternal and exuberant will of the +communication of good, and pre-establish in themselves occultly the +first effective causes of secondary natures. For the whole and common +measures of forms presubsist in them, and they comprehend according to +one cause the uniform genera of being, and prior to these, bound and +infinity, from which the superessential orders of the Gods generate all +beings. + +But in the second rank after these, the intelligible and at the +same time intellectual Gods subsist, being divided indeed according +to the same number, and preserving the measure of the all-perfect +triad in a second order, but producing into multitude the unities of +intelligibles, and transferring the unical boundaries of those triads +into essential hypostases, and which participate of _the one_. +Instead of powers however, which are whole, without separation, and +occult, they are transferred into divided causes, and which proceed far +from _the one_. + +Again, in the third rank after the intelligible Gods, those that are +called intellectual are arranged at one and the same time indeed, +proceeding into an order diminished with respect to that which is +prior to it, and changing the number according to which they subsist. +For instead of the perfective triads, they are intellectually divided +according to hebdomads. And with respect to the hebdomads, the division +of them into two triads, is supernally derived from the first triads; +but the terminations of them into monads, express the ends of those +orders. For every thing which is the peculiarity of difference and +multitude, proceeds from thence to all the genera. + +Again therefore, from these, the multiform orders of the ruling +principles are generated, being divided indeed analogous to all the +intelligible Gods, and to those that are prior to these intellectual +Gods, viz. to those that are called intelligible and at the same +time intellectual. They have however, their proximate and peculiar +hypostasis from the one fabrication; but their united generation +together with intellectuals, from the third triad of intelligibles. For +that all-perfect cause produces also from itself, the whole orders of +the Gods. Hence likewise Parmenides denominates it infinite multitude, +as unfolding into light all the genera of being, and all the orders of +divine natures, and as being sufficient through one all-perfect power +to the generation of wholes. + +Farther still, we may also assert this of these leading and ruling +Gods, that the intellectual monads make their progression according +to imparticipable intellect, in the same manner as the Gods prior to +them illuminate imparticipable life, and prior to all things, the +intelligible Gods constitute about themselves truly existing and +intelligible essence. For every God is participated indeed by beings, +and on this account falls short of the unity which is imparticipable +and exempt from all things. But a different deity proceeds according +to a different peculiarity. And some of the Gods indeed, being +defined according to the ineffable good itself, comprehend the +intelligible causes of wholes. But others produce the vivific powers, +and connectedly contain the first genera of the Gods. Others again, +unfold into light all the intellectual involutions, and preside over +the participants of the unities that produce divided hypostases. +Since therefore, the intellectual Gods primarily subsist according +to imparticipable intellect, and on this account are denominated +intellectual, the orders that first proceed immediately after them, +illuminate the summit of participated intellect, and are intellectual +indeed, as with reference to the inferior orders, and which are now +divided according to providential energies about the world. But they +are secondary to the first intellectuals, and are allotted a more +partial government; just as the first of intellectuals, are indeed +intelligible with respect to the Gods produced from them, but fall +short of the union of first intelligibles. As therefore, they unfold +into light the first and imparticipable life, which the intelligible +monads pre-established in themselves according to cause only, and +occultly; (for all the causes of wholes are pre-assumed there according +to one ineffable union) after the same manner also, these Gods, shining +forth the first of the intellectuals, express the Gods from whom they +derive their subsistence, and are intellectual indeed, but produce the +pure, uniform, and total hyparxis of the fathers, into a secondary, +and multiplied progression, which is divided about themselves, and +into a diminution of essence. By first emissions also from the +first-effective, and self-subsistent fountains, they shine forth +similarly to the intellectual Gods. + +Hence also, they bind to themselves the ruling and generative causes +of all the partial orders, and which exist prior to these orders both +in dignity and power. And in short, they have the same transcendency +with respect to the other Gods [subordinate to them,] which the +intelligible Gods have to those that are produced from them. For the +intelligible Gods being expanded above all the intellectual genera,[63] +have pre-established the intelligible hyparxis, by itself, unmingled +and pure; and these ruling Gods have also established in themselves +the supermundane union, and this peculiarity perfectly exempt from +mundane natures. And as in the imparticipable and total hypostases, +there is indeed, the intelligible genus, itself by itself; there is +also the intellectual which is foreign from this; and there is that +which is collective of both, which is celebrated as subsisting in +the middle, and is denominated intelligible and at the same time +intellectual,--thus also, in these partial orders, the peculiarity +of the supermundane Gods, pre-exists by itself exempt from the parts +of the universe, unco-ordinated with this world, and on all sides +comprehending it according to cause. + +But the essence of all the mundane Gods is allotted the third +order, being proximately carried as in a vehicle in the parts of +the world, giving completion to this one and only begotten God, +and connectedly-containing the different progressions in it. The +government however of the liberated Gods is allotted the middle bond +of the extremes, possessing sovereign authority over all [mundane] +natures, and in a certain respect communicating with the divisions +about the world, but unitedly ascending at the same time into many of +its parts, and collecting the divided numbers of the mundane Gods into +unical bounds, and more simple causes. Every genus likewise, of the +mundane Gods is spread under this liberated order, being on all sides +connected, contained, and perfected by it, and filled with the first +of goods. If therefore, there is any thing supermundane in the Gods, +and if it imparts a certain definite hyparxis of essence to them, and +defines a certain peculiarity of powers and a transcendency of order by +itself, we must admit that it primarily subsists in the ruling Gods, +being derived to them from the intellectual fathers, unmingled with +a mundane nature. And this supermundane order indeed is universal, +as with reference to all the partible rivers of the Gods, but it is +partial, as with reference to the all-perfect, one and whole kingdom of +the intellectual Gods. For it is everywhere necessary that the leading +causes of secondary orders, should be in a certain respect assimilated +to the terminations of the orders established above them. + +And thus the progression of the Gods is one and continued, originating +supernally from the intelligible and occult unities, and ending in the +last division of a divine cause. For, as in sensibles the most gross +and solid bodies, are not immediately connascent with the etherial +expanse, but those which are simple and more immaterial than others, +are proximately spread under the celestial periods, and of containing +bodies, those which are primarily[2] contained, are allotted a greater +communion than those which are situated remotely, and are conjoined +to them through other media; thus also, in the divine essences prior +to the world, the second orders are in continuity with those prior +to them. The progressions of beings however, are completed through +similitude. But the terminations of the higher orders are united to the +beginnings of second orders. And one series and indissoluble order, +extends from on high, through the surpassing goodness of the first +cause, and his unical power. For because indeed, he is _one_, +he is the supplier of union; but because he is _the good_, he +constitutes things similar to him, prior to such as are dissimilar. +And thus all things are in continuity with each other. For if this +continuity were broken, there would not be union. And things dissimilar +to each other being placed in a consequent order, that which is more +similar to the principle, would not have a more ancient and honourable +progression into being. If therefore, we assert these things rightly, +it is necessary that the first hypostases of the partial orders should +be total, according to an intellectual transcendency which they are +allotted in the divided genera of the Gods, and thus that they should +causally comprehend all secondary natures, and conjoin them to the +Gods prior to themselves. The order of the ruling Gods therefore, is +in continuity with the kingdom of the intellectual Gods. Hence also, +Parmenides proximately constitutes it from the demiurgic monad. These +things however, will afterwards be apparent. + + + + + CHAPTER III. + + +For the present, however, let us survey the common peculiarity of the +whole of this order, that we may to the utmost of our power admire the +divinely-inspired intellection of Plato, which unfolds to us the most +mystic of dogmas. The progression, therefore, of these Gods is said to +be supermundane, as we have observed, and to have the second dominion +in wholes, after the intellectual Gods. But being defined according +to the hyparxis itself of this essence, it unfolds indeed the united +nature of the intellectual Gods; but produces into multitude the causes +comprehended in them. It also arranges and adorns the more partial +genera of beings, from total and first-effective monads, divides them +according to the best[3] order, and co-arranges them to each other. +But it collects and binds all secondary natures, and inserts in them +an admirable communion of essences and powers. Besides this, likewise, +it conjoins all the natures posterior to itself, to those prior to +itself, and calls forth the beneficent will of exempt causes, into the +providential care of secondary natures, but establishes the hyparxes of +subordinate in first essences, and imparts to all beings continuity, +and one series of hypostasis. Conferring also all these benefits, it +comprehends in itself the supply of them according to one peculiarity. +For it assimilates all things, subordinate natures, to those prior +to them, and co-ordinate natures, to each other. And through this +similitude, at one, and the same time, indeed, it unfolds the essences +and multiform powers of them, and is the collector of many things into +union, and of divided natures, into the divine communion of goods. + +From hence, therefore, the orders of different images primarily +subsist. For every image is produced according to a similitude to its +paradigm. But that which assimilates secondary to first natures, and +binds all things through similitude, especially pertains to these Gods. +For what else is able to assimilate the world itself, and every thing +in the world to their paradigms, but this supermundane genus of Gods? +For all intellectuals constitute the natures in the world according to +one union, and an all-perfect providence, and impartibly preside over +the essence of them. But the liberated genus of Gods, in a certain +respect now comes into contact with the world, and co-operates with +the mundane Gods. It is necessary, therefore, that the assimilating +nature should every where according to essence indeed be exempt from +the things assimilated, and which are impressed through similitude; +but that it should adorn secondary natures with separation, and a +division according to species. For how would it be possible for it to +assimilate some things to others, and appropriately conjoin all things +to their paradigms, unless it proceeded as far as to the last forms, +and separated all those things from each other, of which there are +immoveable pre-existing causes? For the demiurgus, indeed, appears +to assimilate all things to himself, as Timæus says, being good, he +produced all things similar to himself on account of his beneficent +will. He likewise imparts to the world the order of time, by this +mean rendering the world more similar to intelligible animal. And in +short, on account of the similitude of the universe to its paradigm, he +produces all things, and perfects his own fabrication. + +In the demiurgus, however, all things, and likewise the second genera +of Gods, are according to cause. And as he is the plenitude of all the +natures prior to himself, thus also, he comprehends the united causes +of the natures posterior to himself. Hence, he perfects the universe, +energizes assimilatively, vivifies wholes, is the father of souls, +the plastic framer of bodies, the supplier of harmony, the author of +bonds, the cause of the impartible and partible genera, and the maker +of all figures. And these things, indeed, he constitutes unically; but +the Gods posterior to him in a divided manner. Let not, however, any +one assert, that the assimilative nature is primarily in the demiurgus, +but [let him rather say] that existence is present to the demiurgus +according to sameness.[4] But if from him similitude subsists in all +things, and his very being is in sameness, as Parmenides teaches us, +we must indeed admit, that such a genus of Gods [as the assimilative] +is proximate to him, which also first unfolds his whole fabrication, +and inserts it in secondary natures, but is essentially different +from and posterior to him, and falls short of the first-effective +principle of all things which he contains. In short, the demiurgic +monad, and all the multitude co-arranged with it, presides over the +similitude of wholes, uniformly, originally, and impartibly; but the +order of the ruling Gods, divides indeed that which is united in the +demiurgic fabrication, expands that which is total in the energy of the +intellectual Gods, and produces into variety the simplicity of their +providence. Hence similitude extends from these to all the natures in +the world, and to the first, middle, and last forms of life. For that +which is assimilated presides over a second form of communion with +appropriate principles, on account of progression from causes. + +If, however, you are willing by investigating each particular to +survey the providence pervading to all things through similitude, you +will find that the whole world is the image of the perpetual Gods on +account of this, and also that all the wholenesses in it are in a +similar manner suspended from their paradigms, that whole souls always +dance about the intelligible, and that the more excellent genera that +follow the Gods, and such of our souls as are happy, are on account +of similitude extended from the wandering produced by generation, to +their proper fountain. In short, you will find, that all progressions +and conversions are effected and perfected on account of the cause of +similitude. For every thing which proceeds subsists through similitude +to its generator, and every thing which is converted, in consequence +of being assimilated to its proper principles, makes a conversion to +them. Moreover, similitude eternally guards the never-failing nature +of all the forms in the world, extending supernally from the Gods +themselves. And the stable similitude of forms, brings back again to +the circle of generation, the unstable mutation of particulars, not +only in immaterial, but also in material forms, which are conversant +with mutability. And it closes in a finite period, the infinite variety +of generated natures. But it refers the all-various division of reasons +[i.e. of productive principles] to their united and first-effective +cause. And on this account, the world being perpetually all-perfect, +is completely filled by total genera and species. Hence also, it is +similar to intelligible animal, possessing and comprehending all such +things after the manner of an image, as all-perfect animal possesses +paradigmatically. + +We must not, therefore, suppose that the genus of similitude is +something small, and extended only to a few things, since it is the +cause of perfection to the whole world, gives completion through +similitude to its first generation and self-sufficiency, and supplies +from itself, its entire comprehension of all things. But neither +must we admit that a production of this kind, is to be referred to +one certain intellectual form. For that which extends[5] to all the +superessential, essential, psychical, incorporeal, and corporeal +genera, exists prior to all forms and genera, and to incorporeal +and corporeal causes. For the Gods in the world, do not proceed +assimilated to their causes, on account of the intellectual form of +similitude. Nor on account of the paradigmatic idea of the dissimilar, +are the superessential unities of the Gods divided, the intellectual +nature separated from itself, and the psychical essences allotted +a progression in order; but, I think, that both similitude and +dissimilitude have their hypostasis analogous to intellectual sameness +and difference. And as they are primarily in the Gods themselves, +but secondarily in intellectual forms, being unfolded into light +together with the hyparxes of the Gods, thus also, this similitude and +dissimilitude, are allotted indeed a precedaneous hyparxis in the +superessential unities, but a successive hyparxis in the descending +progressions of beings. And on this account Parmenides, as he evinced +that _the one_ is moved and stands still, is same and different, +separate from being, thus also he demonstrates to us the similar and +the dissimilar in the uniform hyparxes themselves of the Gods. And +Socrates indeed presents to our view in the beginning of the dialogue, +the similar and the dissimilar, and defines each paradigm of these +to be separate, and exempt from the many similars and dissimilars. +But Parmenides recurring to the superessential hypostases of wholes, +produces beings from thence, according to the peculiarities of the +first causes. + +For as every thing in generation is adorned with forms from essences, +thus also the peculiarities of hyparxes extend to all essences from +superessential natures. For generation is the image of essence; but +essence has its progression according to superessential union. The +genus of similitude, therefore, is primarily in the Gods; but is +divided secondarily in intellectual forms. And on this account the +progressions of the whole of things are according to similitude; +but the conversions of all things to their principles are through +similitude, it being said that all things proceed, and receive the +power of conversion from divinity. The intelligible paradigm indeed +preassumes in itself the occult cause of the assimilative Gods. For +it is not sluggish from itself, and established unprolific. But it +produces all things essentially assimilated to itself, constitutes +them paternally, and is by its very being alone. It likewise imparts +by illumination hyparxis to secondary natures, and the power of +assimilation to itself. But again, that which is demiurgic of the +divine genera, being suspended from the precedaneous cause of the +intelligible paradigm, and adhering to, and energizing about it, +assimilates indeed all things both to itself and the paradigm, but +does not define its proper hyparxis in the genus of similitude. For it +comprehends intellectually and unitedly the causes of the similitude +of wholes, and employs such like genera of Gods as ministrant to +the generation of secondary natures. But the tribe of ruling Gods, +being wholly arranged in the partible orders, but first unfolding +the intellectual fabrication of the father, is suspended indeed from +him[6] through the similitude of the causes pre-existing in him, but +extends and expands all things to the demiurgic union. It converts, +however, the partible genera of the Gods to impartible intellectual +sameness. But it assimilates the proceeding orders to the intelligible +paradigms, and gives completion to the one series of all beings. Very +properly, therefore, do those who are wise in divine concerns assert, +that the last triad of intelligibles is the cause of the fontal and +ruling Gods, and that the whole series of rulers subsists about the +intellectual father. For the genus of assimilating natures pertains +to the perfect paradigm, just as the genus of things assimilated +pertains to the extremity of the intellectual order. For all things +are assimilated to the first paradigm, and the conversion of all +secondary natures to it is through similitude. And with the demiurgus +of wholes, the cause of intellectual sameness and difference is united, +being partibly unfolded into light through the power of similitude and +dissimilitude, and producing the one and whole form of that fabrication +in all beings through divided energies, and the separations of essence. +Through these things, therefore, we have reminded the reader, that the +first and most total of the partible divine genera, and which is united +to the intellectual orders, is allotted the assimilative peculiarity, +and being defined according to this, conjoins all things to the +demiurgic monad; and [we have also shown] how it proceeds from the +intelligible paradigm to all mundane natures, and is the primary origin +of their generation. + + + + + CHAPTER IV. + + +Again, it follows in addition to what has been said, that we should +separate all the assimilative powers, properly arrange them, and survey +them proceeding about the one essence of the Gods. Plato, therefore, +asserts that the first and most ruling of these powers, are those +that unfold the intellectual production of the father, and expand it +to all the divided orders of beings. But that the second, are those +which are connective of wholes, and which preserve one series and +indissoluble connexion of the divine progressions. And that the third, +are those which are the primary leaders of perfection to all secondary +natures, and produce through similitude self-perfect conversions to +principles. But next to these he arranges those powers that extend +all the proceeding genera of the Gods to impartible monads, and which +pre-exist as the collectors of partible natures. Farther still, he +likewise asserts that other assimilative powers give subsistence to +the divided genera, and are definitely the suppliers of existence and +essence to first and last natures. And besides all these, that other +powers are the causes of undefiled distribution, and of perpetually +stable perfection. + +Moreover, together with these, I should arrange the authors of prolific +production, and those that pour upon and distribute to all secondary +natures the partible rivers of life. And farther still, after these, +I should arrange the powers that elevate secondary beings, cut off +every thing material, confused, and inordinate, and are the suppliers +of all goods. For there is no one of all the beautiful things in the +world that does not proceed from this[7] order of Gods, which fills its +participants with divine goods. Or whence indeed is the world always +established in its proper principles, whence does its circulation +remain immutable, and whence is the universe connected by indissoluble +bonds? For the ends of its periods become the principles of the +subsequent revolutions. But the circle of generation imitates the +invariable supply of the celestial orbs, and all things are converted +to more divine natures. Matter, indeed, is assimilated to beings, +through the last representations of the production of form. But that +which is moved in a confused and disordered manner, is circularly led +to order and bound by demiurgic reasons, being assimilated to natures +which always subsist with invariable sameness and permanency. Things, +however, which are borne along in a diversified generation, and +multiform mutations, are assimilated to the celestial orbs, and being +moved in an all-various manner, follow the revolutions of the heavenly +bodies. But the convolutions of the heavens, represent as in images the +psychical periods; and the circulations of the spheres inscribe as it +were the intellections of the celestial souls. Time itself, likewise, +which proceeds according to number, and forms a circular dance, is +in a certain respect[8] assimilated to stable intellections, and to +[eternity] the measure of all intelligibles. For the whole of this time +was generated an image of eternity abiding in one, since it is evolved +after the same manner according to number. All things, therefore, +are allotted a progression into existence, and the distribution of +perfection according to measure, from the assimilative leaders, and +connect the essence of themselves through similitude. + +Moreover, this order of Gods in a particular manner, presides over +the sympathy of things in the world, and their communion with each +other. For all things concur with each other through similitude, and +communicate the powers which they possess. And first natures, indeed, +impart by illumination the gift of themselves to secondary natures, +in unenvying abundance. But effects are established in their causes. +An indissoluble connexion, likewise, and communion of wholes, and a +colligation of agents and patients, are surveyed in the world. For in +effects their generative causes subsist through similitude. And in +causes, the progeny that proceed from them are contained according to +comprehension. All things, likewise, are in each other, and similitude +is the collector of all things. On this account, also, celestial, +impart to sublunary natures, an exuberant and unenvying communication +of their own effluxions; but sublunary, being in a certain respect +assimilated to celestial natures, participate of an appropriate +perfection. A chain likewise extends from on high, as far as to the +last of things, secondary, always expressing the powers of the natures +prior to them, progression indeed diminishing the similitude, but all +things at the same time, and even such as most obscurely participate +of existence, bearing a similitude to the first causes, and being +co-passive with each other, and with their original causes. For there +is naturally a two-fold similitude in things which have proceeded from +their causes. For they are assimilated to each other, according to +their progression from _the one_, and their conversion again to +it, and they are also assimilated to their ruling and first-effective +causes. And through the former similitude, indeed, the elements +conspire, are connascent, and are mingled with each other. But through +the latter, they hasten to their proper principles, and are conjoined +with their paradigms. On this account, all things which participate of +the solar effluxion, are suspended from the circulation of the sun; I +mean, not only the genera that are more excellent than us, but likewise +the number of souls, animals, plants, and stones. But all things adhere +to the Mercurial circulation, which receive the peculiarity of this +God. And the like takes place in the other [mundane] Gods. For all of +them are leaders and rulers in the universe. And many orders indeed of +angels dance round them; many numbers of demons; many herds of heroes; +the copious multitude of partial souls; the multiform genera of mortal +animals; and the various powers of plants. And all things indeed +aspire after their leaders, and in all things there is an impression +of their proper monad; but in some this impression is more clear, and +in others more obscure; since similitude also subsists in a greater +degree, in the first progeny, but is obscured in the middle, and last +progeny, according to the ratio of progression. Images, therefore, +and paradigms, are allotted their hypostasis on account of collective +similitude. And every thing on account of similitude is familiar to +itself, and to co-ordinate natures. But there is an unshaken friendship +between the co-ordinate natures in the world through the presence of +similitude; since contraries, also, and things which are most distant +from each other, are irreprehensibly bound through it, and connected so +as to produce the perfection of the universe. + +In short, therefore, we may say, that the assimilative leaders +of wholes, produce and generate all things from themselves. For +progressions are through similitude; and every thing which is +constituted, is wont to be assimilated to its generative cause. The +assimilative rulers also convert all things to their principles; for +every conversion is through similitude. They likewise bind co-ordinate +natures to each other. For the communion of the one cause [of all] +produces similitude indeed in its participants, but from this, it +inserts in them an indissoluble connexion. They also cause all things +to sympathize, be friendly, and familiar with each other; exhibiting +indeed, through participation, more elevated in more abject natures; +but subordinate in more perfect essences, through causal comprehension. +They likewise extend series and periods from on high, as far as to +the last of things. And they produce monads indeed, into diminution, +through appropriate numbers; but collect multitudes into union, through +communion according to essence. They also adapt wholes to parts; but +comprehend parts in wholes. And things imperfect, indeed, they perfect, +through contact with ends; but they guard immutably perfect natures, +through a similar cause. They likewise lead into definite order, by +similar forms and reasons, the sea of dissimilitude; but they terminate +the very-mutable generation of sublunary natures, by stable paradigms. +Thus much, therefore, we have to say in common concerning the order +of divine natures, which we assert to be proximate indeed to the +intellectual Gods, but to be the leader, and cause of the assimilation +of all secondary natures to their proper principles. + + + + + CHAPTER V. + + +In the next place, I wish prior to the theory of Parmenides to teach, +what the Gods are, possessing this peculiarity, of whom Plato makes +mention in other dialogues. For perhaps thus the doctrine of Parmenides +will become more credible, and more manifest to reason. The ruling +Gods, therefore, are divided in a three-fold manner; and some of them +indeed are united to the intellectual kings, and extend the whole +series under themselves to a union with those kings; but others give +completion to the middle genera, and distribute the all-perfect +progression of these Gods; and others close the end of this order, +and unfold the powers of these divinities to secondary natures. This +being the case, those Gods that are arranged in the summits, do not +immediately participate of the similitude of the assimilative Gods; +but some of them are in a certain respect established above it, are +are essentially connected with the intellectual Gods; but others +proceed from it, and are mingled with the secondary genera. Hence, +those only who give completion to the middle breadth, genuinely define +in themselves the hyparxis of this order. We, therefore, likewise +beginning from these, shall embrace by a reasoning process the whole +theory of Plato. For we shall find in these, the perfect measures of +the ruling order, perfectly delivered to us by him. + +Again, therefore, let us refer the whole progression of these +middle orders to a triad, it being allotted a division of this kind +supernally, from the three intellectual fathers. Hence, indeed, this +whole order of Gods, is suspended from the demiurgic monad. But the +demiurgic intellect produces indeed some of them from itself and +the intellectual father; but others from itself,[9] and the whole +vivification; and others from appropriate rivers. Hence, also, of +the Gods that thus derive their subsistence, some are allotted a +paternal dignity, and are ruling fathers; but others are allotted a +generative; and others an elevating and convertive dignity. But since +a certain order of the unpolluted Gods is conjoined with each of the +intellectual kings, it is indeed necessary that in the ruling Gods +also, a second progression from them should shine forth to the view, +and that on this account the guardian order should be connascent with +the above-mentioned triple orders, being appropriately consubsistent +with each of them; viz. paternally indeed in the first; but vivifically +in the middle; and intellectually and convertively tn the third +order. And thus it is necessary that this whole order of Gods should +be divided by paternal powers, and prolific progressions, by powers +that lead upward all secondary natures, and by those that are of an +undefiled guardian characteristic. For being allotted their hypostasis +from the intellectual Gods, some indeed ascend totally into parts, but +others partibly pour on wholes, the exuberant powers of themselves. +They likewise distribute the providence of the demiurgus and father, +some indeed arranging and adorning the universe with the first, middle, +and last forms of production; others educing the rivers of life, and +pouring them on all things; others elevating the natures that have +proceeded, and recalling them to the father; and others presiding over +purity, and being the guardians of secondary natures. + + + + + CHAPTER VI. + + +Again, therefore, receiving the beginning of the theory of Plato from +the paternal cause, we assert as follows: The demiurgus and father of +this universe, being allotted this order in the intellectual kings, as +was before demonstrated, as he produced wholes totally, and referred +all things to the one form of the world, and the one perfection of the +universe, thus also he arranged and adorned the parts of the world, and +gave completion to the whole, contriving that all immortal and mortal +natures should be generated for the sake of the universe. And this is +what Plato introduces him saying in the Timæus to the junior Gods: +“That mortal natures therefore may exist, and that this universe may be +truly all, convert yourselves according to nature to the fabrication of +animals.” Since, however, after the monad, it is every where necessary +that a multitude should be generated proximate to the monad, and that +prior to an all-perfect division, united number should subsist (for +that which has proceeded to all things is not allied to that which +abides, nor is it possible that what is all-variously divided, should +be connascent with that which is impartible)--this being the case, the +demiurgus of wholes, produces indeed from himself, and his father a +number proximate to the monad of the fathers. But the three [fathers] +deriving their subsistence from one father, and first receiving the +power and dominion of fabrication, produce other second and third +fabricators from themselves, till through a diminution proceeding +according to [appropriate] measures, they evolve the whole demiurgic +number, the cause of which indeed, the demiurgic monad comprehends in +itself. + +The orderly progression, however, of multitude becomes at length +apparent. And thus the three ruling fathers of wholes, separate their +productions, by first, middle, and last boundaries of fabrication, +and are all of them total, but they are fabricators and fathers of +parts totally; through being in continuity indeed with the monad, +not changing the form of production; but on account of diminished +progression, not possessing an energy impartibly extended to all +things. And the one demiurgus indeed, being arranged prior to the +triad, comprehends in himself uniformly the productions of all [the +demiurgi]. But these three fathers multiply the unical dominion and +power of the first demiurgus, divide his impartible production, and +lead forth into secondary natures the stable energy of the father. And +the exempt monad indeed comprehends in itself the all-perfect measure +of the triad, according to supreme union; but the triad unfolds into +light from itself the undivided power of the monad. + +Plato, therefore, celebrates indeed, in other dialogues, these three +fabricators and fathers, but particularly in the Gorgias, adducing as +a witness of the theory concerning them, divinely-inspired poetry, +he refers the whole progression of them to Saturn the father of the +intellectual Gods, and from thence gives to them their first production +into light. He exempts, however, the demiurgic intellect from the +triadic division of them, co-arranges it with the father, and says, +that they have an intellectual dominion secondary to him. He likewise +calls them the sons of Saturn, but indicates that they are allotted +their progression from Jupiter. For there is a twofold Jupiter both +according to Plato, and all the theology, as I may say, of the Greeks; +the one indeed convolving the end of the intellectual triad to the +beginning; but the other being allotted the summit of the ruling triad. +And the one being the demiurgus of wholes totally; but the other being +allotted the first parts of divided fabrication. And the one indeed +being arranged prior to the three fathers; but the other being the +first of the three, and proximate to the remaining fathers. Whence, +also, I think that many who discuss these particulars are ignorant +that Jupiter the demiurgus of the universe, is not the first of the +three fathers, and that Saturn the leader and ruler of the intellectual +kings, is not the same with the demiurgic intellect. For of those who +immediately suspend the triad of the ruling fathers from the paternal +kingdom of Saturn, some indeed refer the whole fabrication of things +to Saturn himself; but others ascribe to the summit of the triad the +generation of wholes. Is not, however, each of these impossible? For +the one abiding in himself, and converting to himself every thing which +has proceeded, is exempt from demiurgic production; but the other +being divided oppositely to the total[10] fathers, will not be the +impartible fabricator of wholes. For it is necessary that the whole and +all-perfect demiurgus of the world, should neither be connumerated with +the many[11] demiurgi, nor be the same with the cause which is stable, +and perfectly established in itself. For he has a subsistence contrary +to the cause which recalls that which has proceeded, and again exhibits +it unemanent from itself. To be present likewise to all things by no +means accords with that nature which energizes separately, and takes +away its generative power. How, therefore, can he who converts his own +children to himself, and shuts his own progeny in himself, possess +the same power with the demiurgus who unfolds all things into light, +and produces them into multitude? And how can he who is allotted the +universe in conjunction with the remaining demiurgi, be uniformly the +cause of the universe? + +For, if you are willing, consider each of these three demiurgi, and +survey what will happen from this assertion. For we say that the first +of them is the cause of essence, and of existence to the fabrications +in the world; but that the second is the source of the motion, life, +and generation of sensibles; and that the third is the cause of the +divided production of form, of partible circumscription, and of the +circular conversion of wholes to their one principle. We likewise +definitely assert these things, admitting that the fabrication of each +of the three extends to the whole world. But surveying the peculiar +mode of fabrication in each, we say that the first is the effector of +essence, the second of life, and the third of intellect. And that the +first is the cause of hyparxis, the second of motion, and the third of +conversion. Hence, the whole world, so far as it participates of being, +is produced from the first father; but so far as it subsists through +motion, and is generation, it receives its progression from the second +father; and so far as it is perfectly divided, and after all-various +division, is converted to its proper principle, it is produced from the +third father. + + + + + CHAPTER VII. + + +These things, therefore, being thus determined, we may see how in the +Timæus, the demiurgus and father of this universe, at one and the +same time impartibly constitutes the world, gives to it essence, and +supplies it with existence, fashioning bodies, generating souls in +the middle of an impartible and partible essence, and constituting +intellects ingenerably [i.e. without generation] and indivisibly, +from the first genera. And farther still, besides these things, he +distributes different motions to souls and bodies, divides each of them +all-variously, according to harmonic reasons, binds them by analogies, +and converts them to himself, and his own will. How, therefore, can we +any longer rank such a demiurgus as this in the same order with one +of these three fathers. For those things which they are said to give +to the universe divisibly, he constitutes impartibly from himself. Nor +does he produce some things precedaneously, and others according to +accident, but by his very being he generates essence, supplies motions, +and extends the divisions of mundane forms, and after the progression +of other things, converts all things to himself, abiding in his own +accustomed manner. + +In the second place, therefore, we say that the three demiurgi differ +from each other, because the first paternally comprehends the rest, and +is the father of this whole triad. But the second is the power of the +triad, and participates of the extremes according to the peculiarity of +powers. And the third is the intellect of the triad, and contains the +paternal, and intellectual power [by participation]. And in short, the +first is the father of both; but the second is the power of both; and +the third is the intellect of both. How, therefore, can the demiurgus +of wholes be the same with one of the above mentioned fathers? For he, +as Timæus says, is the father of all the world, and is allotted in +himself a paternal power and divine intellect, converting all things to +the watch-tower of himself. Again, therefore, we find that the partible +peculiarities of the three demiurgi, pre-exist in him impartibly and +uniformly. And as the demiurgic triad participates of union with him, +on account of the uncircumscribed transcendency of the monad, thus +also the monad antecedently and occultly comprehends in itself the +triad, according to the power of cause. Nor is it proper to confound +these with each other, but it is requisite to exempt the monad from +the triad, and to suspend the triad from the monad. And neither ought +we to make the three fathers, the rulers of total fabrication, nor to +rank the first of them in the same order with the one demiurgus. For +a co-ordinated entirely differs from an exempt cause. And that which +produces all things according to comprehension perfectly differs from +that which is similarly present to all things, and is equally distant +from all things. Besides this also, multitude is every where suspended +from its proper monad. And as _the one_ precedes the total orders +of things, so likewise each order of the Gods has its progression from +a monad; since also each God is allotted a union which antecedes the +multitude he contains. But if the whole genus of the Gods, and each God +proceed after the same manner, it is also necessary that each of the +divided orders should have the same mode of subsistence. + +In the third place we say that both Plato and the ancient theology +of the Greeks assert, that these three demiurgi divide the uniform +kingdom of their father Saturn. And that one of these three every +where arranges and adorns the first of wholes, another the middles, +and another the extremities of wholes; and that each is allotted this +order, not in fabrication only, but also in the providence of partial +souls. For of these, some indeed are arranged and perfected under +the first, prior to generation; but others, that give completion to +generation, are arranged under the second; and others, that require +purification after generation, are perfected under the third. Moreover, +the first demiurgus, as it is written in the Timæus, produces the whole +world. For he constitutes the circulation of the _same_, and +arranges and adorns the circulation of the _different_, and all +sublunary natures as far as to the earth, which he fabricated to be the +guardian of night and day, being immoveably fixed about the axis which +is extended through the poles of the universe. He also fills the whole +parts of the world with their proper numbers, and gives generation to +all of them, both to those that revolve manifestly, and to those that +become manifest when they please. Again, he defines the whole period +to partial souls, the measures of their descent into generation, the +vicissitudes of the present life, and their restitutions to their +kindred star,[12] and he is also said to unfold to them all the laws +of Fate, and to point out to them the nature of the universe. Hence, +he is not one[13] of these three fathers, nor is he co-arranged with +them, but is perfectly exempt from the triad. According likewise to the +proper prerogative of his empire, he is expanded separately above each, +and in common above all of them. And the operations indeed, of these +fathers, are divided about him, and are distinguished by more partial +boundaries. But his fabrication is uncircumscribed, is one whole, and +is impartible. + + + + + CHAPTER VIII. + + +Let it therefore, from these things be manifest, that the demiurgic +monad, is exempt from the ruling fathers, and that according to one +undivided cause he generates beings eternally. But if Jupiter is +according to Plato, the one and whole fabricator of the only-begotten +world, as we have before demonstrated, and we grant these things +without being deceived, and if, as it is now said, and Socrates in +the Gorgias teaches us, the first of the demiurgi that divide the +kingdom of Saturn, is in a similar manner called Jupiter, there will +be according to this theory a twofold Jupiter, the one being an +intellectual God prior to the three fathers; but the other being of +a ruling, assimilative, and principal nature, and arranged at the +summit of the three. For Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, divide, says +Plato, the kingdom of their father, three leaders of wholes subsisting +from one great king as it were, and producing the one fountain of the +demiurgic series, into one all-perfect principal triad, which Plato +also indicating, denominates the providence divided in the three a +kingdom, attributing the first-effective, and the uniform to the Gods +prior to these. If these however, are not the only orders of Jupiter, +but there is also another Jovian multitude, how this proceeds will +be evident in what follows. For all these three fathers participate +of the same appellation, and are after the same manner celebrated by +poets inspired by Phœbus; but one is called simply Jupiter, another +marine Jupiter, and another subterranean Jupiter. The leader however +of the three, possesses primarily the paternal dignity in the triad, +and the appellation of the great Jupiter. For on account of the supreme +union which he is allotted with the fontal demiurgus, who is beyond +the three, he also participates of the same name as the total Jupiter, +without any distinction. And on this account, I think, Socrates in the +Cratylus, unfolding to us the arcane and mystic discipline concerning +the Gods, from names, and at one time co-arranging Jupiter with Saturn, +and at another with the remaining demiurgi, does not think it worth +while to speak twice about the same things, but in the intellectual +conceptions about the all-perfect demiurgus, he also thinks fit to +deliver the arcane discipline concerning the first of the three +demiurgi, through the truth of names. For in a certain respect, it +was not possible for him to do otherwise who shows that the theory in +things accords with names; since also, the father of this triad, is +inseparably united to the whole demiurgus. But of these things enough. + +If you are willing however, we will add the following observations to +what has been said. For perhaps some one may apprehend that the fable +in the Gorgias, gives to the three sons of Saturn, a progression from +Saturn proximately, but not, as we have said, through the demiurgic +monad as a medium. For again, the three are said to divide the kingdom +of Saturn, but not of the whole demiurgus and father. That we may not +however, ignorantly wander beyond measure from the conception of Plato, +and the truth of things, in consequence of following fabulous fictions, +we must affirm from the beginning, that both the whole demiurgus, +and this triad of the ruling fathers, proceed from the father of the +intellectual Gods. But the whole demiurgus proceeding from a whole, +impartibly participates of his father. For he abides in the allness +of his power, and imitates, if it be lawful so to speak, his uniform +and unmultiplied nature, by being monadic and whole, and the father of +things first, middle and last. But the three demiurgi, in a divided +manner participate of, and proceed from their generating cause, being +divided indeed from each other, but dividing his unical providence. And +Saturn indeed, is a God one and numerous, establishing multitude in +himself, and occultly comprehending it in appropriate boundaries. But +Jupiter expresses the paternal monad, and produces the unical nature +of it into the providence of wholes. And the three sons of Saturn +unfold into light the multitude which is there, in the all-perfect +boundary of the triad. Hence also they are said to divide the kingdom +of their father,[14] which Jupiter possessed indivisibly. Hence, if +it be requisite to speak boldly, he indeed is a proceeding father, +hastening to arrange and adorn, and being parturient in order to the +generation of wholes. But they distribute his providence. This however, +is the same thing as to say they distribute the providence of Jupiter. +For the progression to them was from each of these divinities, from +Saturn indeed, according to the _from which_ (αφ’ου), but from Jupiter +according to the _by which_, υφ’ου.[15] For Jupiter indeed, unfolds +them into light; but they proceed from the Saturnian adyta. + +If again, you are willing [to consider the affair] according to the +Parmenides of Plato, since in the Saturnian order there are both +wholeness and parts, if you assume the subsistence there of _that +which is in another_, according to whole, but of _that which is in +itself_, according to parts, Jupiter indeed, who is prior to the three, +proceeds from his father according to whole; but the three demiurgi, +according to parts. Hence, Jupiter reigns, possessing in himself, as +Socrates says in the Philebus, a royal intellect. But they reign in +a divided manner, and are allotted the universe according to parts. +Hence therefore, the Elean guest in the Politicus, celebrates these +two intellectual kings, one indeed, being the cause of the unapparent +life to wholes, and of the other circulation, but the other being the +source of the manifest order of things, and of the present period; and +he attributes to Jupiter the cause of both these periods. But at one +time indeed, he ascribes this cause to Jupiter, as leading all things +in the universe to the kingdom of Saturn; but at another, as binding +to himself the providence of secondary natures. For he is united to +his father by intellectual bonds, of which Socrates makes mention in +the Cratylus. He is likewise a whole extended to a whole, and as it +were adapts himself by his own light to the light of his father, and +possesses a second dominion. Hence also, he is said to define the +providence of his father. The Athenian guest however [in the Laws,] +extending us to the one demiurgic kingdom, to the law, and the total +justice which are there asserts, “that God, as it is said, possesses +the beginning, middle, and end of all beings, and bounds all things by +a circular progression according to nature, in a direct path.” For +because we do not think it right to consider Plato here as speaking +of the first God, or of any other of the intellectual or intelligible +fathers, but of the whole demiurgus, it is sufficient for those who +are moderately able to understand things of this kind, that he is +said to bound all things in a direct path, and to proceed circularly +according to nature. It is also sufficient, that Justice is said to be +the attendant of this God, being the avenger of those who transgress +the divine law. For the first God, and all the Gods who are established +above the perfective order, are exempt from this rectilinear, and also +from the circular progression, as Parmenides teaches us. They likewise +transcend all motion. But the first that proceeds after motion, is +the whole and all-perfect demiurgus. To this divinity therefore, it +pertains to bound wholes in a direct path, to proceed circularly, and +to be followed by Justice. For we say indeed, that the thing which +follows, follows that which is moved. + +Moreover, the Gods who are secondary to the demiurgus, have not a +unical dominion over wholes as he has, nor do they antecedently assume +the beginnings, middles and ends of all beings. But some of them +indeed, preside over partial natures totally, as these three fathers; +but others preside over wholes partibly, as those who pour upon all +things the rivers of life, in a divided manner; and others preside over +parts partibly, as the last of the demiurgi, and who are conversant +with the world. The one and impartible demiurgus of wholes therefore, +alone comprehends in himself, the beginning, middle, and end of all +beings, and equally rules over all secondary natures according to one +cause. But Justice follows him, bounding the desert of the whole of +things, and circumscribing each thing in its proper limits. And these +things the Athenian guest manifests in the above-mentioned words; but +Orpheus clearly refers them to the whole demiurgus. For he says that +total Justice follows him, now reigning over, and beginning to arrange +and adorn the universe. + + Justice th’ abundant punisher of crimes, + Aid and defence of all things, follows Jove. + +Moreover, that Jupiter comprehends the beginnings, middles and ends of +wholes, the theologist says, in addition to these things, + + Jove’s the beginning, and the middle’s Jove, + And all things flow from Jove’s prolific mind. + +And it appears to me that Plato looking to all the Grecian theology, +and particularly to the Orphic-mystic discipline says, that God, +according to the ancient assertion, possesses the beginning, middle, +and end of all things, bounding the whole of things in a direct path, +and proceeding circularly according to nature, and that he has Justice +for his attendant, through which every thing that departs from the +providential empire of Jupiter is converted to it, and obtains an +appropriate end. Through these things therefore, we have reminded the +reader, that the Athenian guest also looking to the whole demiurgus, +proclaims things of this kind to his pupils. If however, these things +are rightly determined, it is indeed entirely necessary to exempt the +one demiurgus, according to essence, from these three [demiurgi]. For +if one of them indeed, comprehends the beginnings of every thing in +the world, but another the middles, and another, every where convolves +the ends, is it not necessary that he who uniformly rules over the +universe, should be established above divided causes? But, the Athenian +guest gives to him a power generative of this triad [of demiurgi]. +For if he comprehends the beginnings, middles, and ends of the whole +of things, according to the primary cause indeed, he generates the +demiurgus, who arranges and adorns first natures; but according to +middle causes, the demiurgus who gives completion to the middle +boundaries of fabrication; and according to the end, the demiurgus who +adapts an appropriate production to the last of things. + + + + + CHAPTER IX. + + +The Athenian guest therefore, does all but clearly say, that the +distribution to the three sons of Saturn, the measures of providence, +and in short, progression, are suspended[16] from the great Jupiter, +and that it is he who supernally defines their allotments, and +uniformly comprehends all of them in himself. Moreover, with respect to +the assertions, that he bounds all things in a direct path, and that he +proceeds circularly according to nature, the former of these, manifests +the progression of wholes from him; for the direct is a symbol of +progression; but the latter manifests the conversion of wholes to him. +For he being intellectually converted in, and to himself, convolves +all things to the watch-tower of himself. But if the straight and +the circular first subsist in the perfective Gods, the demiurgus of +wholes is filled indeed from thence, but fills the natures posterior +to himself with the powers that proceed from him. And as according +to the triple cause of wholes, he constitutes the triad of demiurgi +in conjunction with his father, thus also according to these twofold +powers, he generates twofold [orders of] Gods; one indeed, which adorns +a sensible nature, according to the straight which is in him; but the +other which elevates all things to him, according to the circular. +Moreover, because he proceeds indeed from the whole fabrication, (i +e. from Rhea) but participates of the perfective triad, he connects +this straight and circular with motion. For to bound according to the +straight, and to proceed circularly, designate motion; the former +indeed, being significant of motion proceeding to all things, and +adorning all things with boundaries, forms and reasons; but the latter, +of motion convolving to itself, and calling upward all things to +itself. + +Again, therefore, Plato placing in the one demiurgus the cause of the +triad, exempts him, who abides as it were in himself, from production +according to parts; but attributes to the triad a division according +to the demiurgus. For Timæus also, by placing in him a paternal cause, +a generative power, and a royal intellect, theologizes the same things +about him as the Athenian guest. The paternal, indeed, is every where +principal; but power belongs to the middle; and intellect closes the +end of the triad. For power, according to the Oracle, is with them; +[i.e. with father and intellect], but intellect is from him, [i.e. +from the father]. Hence, of the natures which have proceeded, one +is the father of the whole triad, but another the intellect of it. +And one indeed is allotted the beginning of total fabrication; but +another, gives completion to the middle of the generation of wholes; +and another, bounds the end of it. Nor must we here omit to observe the +accuracy of Plato, but survey[17] how the Athenian guest magnificently +celebrates the extremities of the three demiurgi, by more singular +names, calling one the _beginning_, and the other the _end_, but that +which is between the extremes even in causes, he manifests through +multitude. For he denominates it _middles_; since power also, as being +co-ordinate with the infinite, or rather being a certain infinity, is +the cause of multitude and division to wholes. Hence also, of the three +demiurgi, one indeed, is the cause to mundane natures of a stable[18] +collocation; but another, of generation proceeding to all things; +and another, of the circulation of things to the principle of their +progression. + +Let us, however, return whence we digressed, to the discussion +concerning the first demiurgus, in which it was said, that Jupiter, +Neptune, and Pluto divide the kingdom of their father. For prior +to these, the demiurgus received the kingdom of his father in an +undivided and uniform manner. For both the demiurgic monad and the +triad, were thence allotted their progression from the beginning, and +their dominion over secondary natures; but the former impartibly, +and the latter partibly; and the former monadically, but the latter +triadically. That you may not, therefore, think that these three +proceed after the same manner from the father, as the one king who +is prior to the three, Socrates, [in the Gorgias] in the form of a +fable, says that they divide the kingdom of the father, and on this +account require secondary laws, and a subordinate order, and which is +adapted to parts. For the law under Saturn, and the law of Jupiter who +recently possesses the kingdom [of his father] appear to be by no means +adapted to the providence of those powers who produce a partial and +various form of life. And do you not see how Socrates gives to total +Jupiter and to Saturn an exempt transcendency, and connects one law +with both kingdoms; but to the three demiurgi that divide the kingdom, +he definitely assigns as it were another polity, and more various +laws commensurate to the subjects of their providential care? For he +says that Pluto, and the curators were present enquiring of Jupiter +respecting the second legislation; but that he placed over partible +lives, other judges, and laws adapted to these lives. Again, therefore, +Jupiter, who definitely assigns things of this kind, and who generates +the three judges, is not the same with the Jupiter who is prior to the +three [demiurgi]. For the latter was together with his father according +to a prior law, and the simplicity of a divine life; but the former +together with Pluto, leads into order and bound the variety of partial +natures, and is the leader of secondary laws. + +The divine law, therefore, is with the intellectual kings, Saturn and +Jupiter; and also Justice the avenger of those who transgress the +divine law, as the Athenian guest says. But other more various laws are +with the three sons of Saturn, and also judges co-ordinate to such like +laws, as it is written in the Gorgias. And there indeed, [i.e. with the +intellectual kings,] all things are impartibly, and unitedly; but here, +[i.e. with the three sons of Saturn], all things subsist in a divided +and partible manner. And the things which are there being primary, the +law indeed is more Saturnian. But Justice follows the great Jupiter. +And the laws indeed pertaining to secondary natures, confer perfection +under the first of the sons of Saturn. But the judges give completion +to the empire of the third of these sons. And Pluto participates from +the second Jupiter of the separation of the laws; in the same manner as +the total Jupiter receives from Saturn the one law which is to be the +co-administrator with him in the total fabrication of things. In short, +the Jupiter who is co-arranged with Neptune and Pluto, is the summit of +the ruling triad; but the Jupiter who is co-arranged with Saturn and +the mistress Rhea, is the third of the intellectual[19] triad. Hence +also, Socrates, in the Cratylus, at one time ascends from Jupiter to +Saturn, and conjoins the two kingdoms; but at another time he proceeds +from Jupiter to Neptune and Pluto, and unfolds this one ruling triad; +just as in the Gorgias, he weaves together the Saturnian and Jovian +order, when he says that there is one and the same law in both. He +co-arranges therefore, the second and more partial Jupiter with +Pluto, according to the apparent correction of the prior law, and the +distribution of the second laws. And thus much may suffice concerning +these particulars. + + + + + CHAPTER X.[20] + + +It now remains that we should begin to speak about these three fathers, +following the mystic narrations of Plato, since all of them are +suspended from the demiurgic monad, and present themselves to our view +as the second [in rank] after it. These three leaders, therefore, of +wholes, and rulers, are emitted indeed from the intellectual fathers, +and are divided according to them; but they are unfolded into light +in all the partible orders of the Gods. For among the rulers they are +allotted the first order, and are analogous to the intelligible and +intellectual fathers, in the whole assimilative series, and having +made a second progression in the liberated Gods, they rule over the +universe. Together also with the mundane Gods, they give completion +to the apparent order of things, being allotted in one way an essence +in the heavens, but in another way distributing the total parts in +the sublunary region, but every where energizing paternally and +demiurgically, expanding the one fabrication, and adapting it to parts. + +With respect, however, to the allotment and distribution of them, +in the first place, if you please, it is according to the whole +universe, the first of them producing essences, the second lives +and generations, and the third administering formal divisions. And +the first indeed establishing in the one demiurgus all things that +thence proceed; but the second calling all things into progression; +and the third converting all things to itself. In the second place, +the allotment and division of them are according to the parts of the +universe. For the first of them adorns the inerratic sphere, and the +circulation of it; but the second governs the planetary region, and +perfects the multiform, efficacious, and prolific motions in it; and +the last administers the sublunary region, and intellectually perfects +the terrestrial world. Again, in the third place, we may survey in +that which is generated, these three demiurgic progressions; since +Timæus also here makes mention of the offspring of Saturn. Jupiter, +therefore, administers the summit of generated natures, and governs the +spheres of fire and air. But Neptune all-variously moves the middle and +very-mutable elements, and is the inspective guardian of every moist +essence, which is beheld in air and water. And Pluto providentially +attends to the earth, and to every thing in the earth. Hence also he is +called terrestrial Jupiter. + +In the fourth place, therefore, in the whole of generation, Jupiter +indeed is allotted the summits, and the parts which are raised above +others, in which also are the allotments of happy souls, as Socrates +says in the Phædrus, because they then live under Jupiter, beyond +generation. But Neptune is allotted cavities, and cavernous places, +with which generation, motion, and the incursion of concussions are +conversant. Hence, they call this God, the earth-shaker. And Pluto is +allotted the places under the earth, various streams, Tartarus itself, +and in short, the places in which souls are judged and punished. Whence +also, of souls themselves, they say that such of them as have not yet +proceeded into generation, but abide in the intelligible, are Jovian; +but that such as are conversant with generation, are arranged under +Neptune; and that such as are purified and punished after generation, +and wander under the earth, according to a journey of a thousand years, +or which are again converted and led back to their principle, are +perfected under Pluto. + +In the fifth place, therefore, we must say that the allotments of these +divinities, are divided according to the centres of the universe. And +Jupiter, indeed, has the eastern centre, as being allotted an order +analogous to fire; but Neptune, the middle centre, which pertains to +vivification, and according to which especially generation enjoys +celestial natures; and Pluto the western centre, since we say that the +west is co-ordinate to earth, as being nocturnal, and the cause of the +unapparent. For shadow is from earth, and earth is the privation of +light from west to east. In short, according to every division of the +world, we admit that the first and most leading parts are Jovian; but +we say that the middle parts pertain to the kingdom of Neptune; and we +consider the last parts as belonging to the empire of Pluto. + + + + + CHAPTER XI. + + +Through these things, therefore, the triad of the ruling fathers +has been celebrated by us. Let us, however, survey another order in +this progression, prolific, and vivific, and which is delivered by +Plato in a divinely-inspired manner. For the proximate decrements +and generations from all the intellectual fathers, are unfolded into +light in the assimilative Gods. For here the partible progressions +exist of things which there subsist uniformly, since it is lawful for +progeny which every where are allotted an order inferior to their +causes, to give multitude to the monads, and to multiply the stable +hypostases of them, and to render the energies of the simplicity, +which is in first natures, more composite. As, therefore, from the +paternal monad [Saturn] a triad subsists of ruling demiurgi, thus also +from the vivific fountain [Rhea] which is allotted the middle centre +in the intellectual Gods, the vivific order of the assimilative Gods +is emitted. And here also there is a triad connectedly contained by +one monad; since the paternal triad also subsists according to one +perfect intellect, and was, as we have said, monadic. After the same +manner, therefore, the triad which is the supplier of life is monadic, +being indeed full of prolific power, and full of undefiled perfection. +It likewise participates of the whole vivification, and through the +rivers of life, fills all secondary natures with generative goods, +and produces the vivific light, into the unenvying and exuberant +participation of subordinate essences. And it converts indeed all +things to itself, but is present to all things, and imparts to them +its own appropriate powers. It likewise pervades from on high, as far +as to the last parts of the world, but every where preserves the union +of itself unmingled with its participants. And it embosoms indeed the +generative, perfect, and beneficent light of the demiurgic monad; but +weaves together with the third father [Pluto] the order of life; and +co-arranges the boundaries of wholes in a becoming manner.[22] In +short, it extends itself from the middle to all the genera of rulers, +both the first and the last. And together with them indeed, it perfects +all secondary natures, and co-arranges that which is generative, +with the demiurgus. In addition to these things also, it illuminates +all things with an analogous power, and connects the undefiled with +the convertive peculiarity. For stable power pertains indeed to the +demiurgic genera, but undefiled purity to the elevating genera. + +Plato, therefore, in the same manner as Orpheus, calls this triad by +one name; but in a certain respect he also indicates the multitude of +the powers it contains. For all the theology of the Greeks denominates +the second vivification _Coric_, (i.e. _Virginal_) and conjoins it +with the whole vivific fountain. Plato also says, that it has its +hypostasis from this fountain, and energizes together with it. For +effects are never divulsed from the providence of their causes. But +wanderings indeed, and investigations, [belong to the powers that +energize providentially, just as[23]] participations according to +periods pertain to the subjects of providential energy. The divine +cause, however, of a partible life [i.e. Proserpine] conjoins herself +from eternity, with the whole vivific fountain [i.e. with Ceres] which +theologists call the mother of the ruling Goddess. And Plato every +where conjoins Proserpine with Ceres. And he pre-establishes indeed, +the latter as a generative cause; but he celebrates the former as +being filled from the latter, and filling secondary natures. Since, +however, the Coric order is twofold, one indeed shining forth above +the world, where it is also co-arranged with Jupiter, and constitutes +with him the one demiurgus of partible natures [i.e. Bacchus], but the +other, and which is secondary, shining forth in the world, where also +it is said to be ravished by Pluto, and to animate the extremities +of the universe, which are under the administration of Pluto,--this +being the case, Plato perfectly unfolds to us both these, at one time +indeed conjoining Proserpine with Ceres, but at another with Pluto, +and evincing that she is the wife of this God. For the rumour of +theologists who delivered to us the most holy mysteries in Eleusis, +says, that above indeed, Proserpine abides in the dwellings of her +mother, which her mother had fabricated in inaccessible places, exempt +from the universe, but that beneath she governs terrestrial concerns in +conjunction with Pluto, rules over the recesses of the earth, extends +life to the extremities of the universe, and imparts soul to things +which are of themselves inanimate, and dead. Where also you may wonder +that Proserpine associates with Jupiter indeed and Pluto, the former, +as fables say violating, but the latter ravishing the Goddess, but +is not connected with Neptune. For he alone of the sons of Saturn, +is not conjoined with Proserpine. [The reason, however, of this is,] +that Neptune possessing the middle centre in the triad, is allotted +a vivific dignity and power, and is characterized according to this. +From himself, therefore, he has the vivific cause, animates the whole +of his proper allotment, and fills it with middle life from his own +peculiarity. For Pluto indeed is the supplier of wisdom and intellect +to souls according to Socrates in the Cratylus. But Jupiter is the +cause of existence to beings, as the father of the triad. Proserpine, +therefore, being co-arranged with the extremes, and prior to the world, +with Jupiter indeed paternally, but in the world with Pluto, according +to the beneficent will of the father, in the former case she is said +to be violated by Jupiter, but in the latter, to be ravished by Pluto, +in order that the first and last of fabrications may participate of +vivification. For as the whole fountain of life [Rhea] being conjoined +with the whole, according to one impartible cause, illuminates all +things with life, thus also Proserpine, weaving in conjunction with the +leaders of the universe, things first, middle, and last, illuminates +them with the vivification of herself. + +Moreover, we may know from Plato, through these signs, the union of +the whole triad, since denominating it _Core_ (i.e. a virgin or +Proserpine) he celebrates it with Ceres. But again, we must survey +where it is that he indicates the division of the triad. For there +are three monads in it, and one of them is arranged, as being the +highest, according to hyparxis, but another is arranged according to +the power which is definitive of life, and another according to vivific +intellect. And theologists indeed are accustomed to call the first of +these Coric, (i.e. virginal) Diana, but the second Proserpine, and the +third, Coric Minerva. I speak, however, of the authors of the Grecian +theology, since among the Barbarians [i.e. the Chaldeans] the same +things are manifested through other names. For they indeed call the +first monad, Hecate, but the middle monad, Soul, and the third, Virtue. +Since, therefore, these things are made known to us after this manner +by the names of the Greeks, Plato indeed indicates the order of Coric +Minerva, by denominating Minerva Mistress, celebrating her as Core, +asserting that she is the cause of the whole of virtue, and calling +her the lover of wisdom, and the lover of war, and also Ethonoe, +as being intelligence in manners. For all these names sufficiently +represent to us her intellectual and ruling nature, and that power +of her which promptly supplies the whole of virtue. But in the same +dialogue, he indicates the order of Proserpine, celebrating her as +Pherephatta, and employing this name, which is likewise used by all +other theologists. These things he manifests in the Cratylus, where he +unfolds the truth concealed in the name of Pherephatta. And in the same +dialogue he indicates the order of Diana, by calling her skilful in +virtue. For it is evident that the whole triad being united to itself, +the first [monad] of the triad,[24] unically comprehends the third, the +third is converted to the first, and the middle has a power extending +to both. There are, therefore, these three vivific monads, viz. Diana, +Proserpine, and our mistress Minerva. And the first of these indeed is +the summit of the whole triad, and which also converts to herself the +third. But the second is a power vivific of wholes. And the third is +a divine and undefiled intellect, comprehending in one, in a ruling +manner, total virtues. Timæus, therefore, manifests this, calling +the third monad (Minerva) philosophic, as being full of intellectual +knowledge, and true wisdom; but philopolemic, as the cause of undefiled +power, and the inspective guardian of the whole of fortitude. And +again, the Athenian guest, calls her Core, as being a virgin, and as +purifying from all conversion to externals. + +If, however, you are willing, we will survey the triad of Core, from +what is said in the Cratylus concerning Pherephatta. She is called, +therefore, wisdom, and is said to come into contact with that which +is generated and borne along; she also produces fear in those that +hear her name, and excites astonishment in the multitude. With respect +to the appellation of wisdom, therefore, it is evident that it is a +sign [of the characteristic property] of Minerva, and the summit of +virtue. For if in us, all the sciences are the first of the virtues, +how is it possible that wisdom should not be rightly denominated, the +first-effective cause of all the virtues? And if philosophy pertains +to her, so far as she is wisdom, and immaterial intelligence, but +not because she is indigent of wisdom, (for no one of the Gods, says +Diotima, philosophizes), on this account, therefore, she is not +indigent of wisdom; and the intellectual good of the ruling order +entirely pertains to her. But to come into contact with that which +is borne along, and with generation, will in a particular manner +be adapted to soul. For it is soul that knows every thing which is +generated, and continually communicates with it. She, likewise, in a +certain respect comes entirely into contact with that which is borne +along. Moreover, the incommensurability of Pherephatta with multitude, +and the terrour and astonishment which she excites, are indicative of +the power in her which is exempt from all things, which is unapparent +to the many and unknown. For the Barbarians also [i.e. the Chaldeans,] +call the Goddess who is the leader of this triad, dire and terrible. +Hence Plato does not more clearly indicate these things to us about +this mighty Goddess [than the Barbarians;] but he announces names +adapted to the theology concerning her. + +To the Core, therefore, that is beneath, and that associates with +Pluto, all the above-mentioned particulars are inherent according to +participation, and, as some one might say, according to similitude to +the total Core; but they are inherent in the ruling Core, according +to the first hypostasis. And in reality these three Goddesses are +consubsistent. As, likewise, the whole vivific deity comprehends in +herself the fountains of virtue and soul, which the demiurgus also +imparts to the world, causing it to subsist perfectly, thus too, this +deity [Core] possessing the primary cause of all the partible forms of +life, possesses likewise the principle of souls, and of the virtues, +and on this account, the ascent to partial souls [such as ours], is +through similitude, and virtue is a similitude to the Gods. Hence also, +the form of each of these, I mean of virtue and soul, presubsist in +the assimilative Gods; since, likewise, the immortality of souls is +inferred by Socrates, from their similitude to divinity. If, therefore, +they are allotted immortality essentially, it is indeed necessary +that the cause which assimilates them [to divinity] should primarily +be in the Gods. For they are assimilated to their fountain. But they +participate of similitude from the assimilative causes. Hence in these, +the cause of such an immortality of souls as this, shines forth. On +this account also, Socrates arguing from similitude says, it is fit +that souls should govern and despotically rule over bodies, since they +are allotted the power of governing and despotically ruling, from the +same cause from which they derive their similitude [to divinity.] +The one cause itself, therefore, of all the partible forms of life, +pre-exists in the assimilative rulers. But one, whole, and impartible +virtue exists prior to all the virtues which afford a similitude [to a +divine nature.] And neither is the essential similitude of souls, nor +the similitude of virtue, derived from any other source than that of +these rulers and principles. + +Since, however, there are, as we have said, triple monads in Core; +and one, indeed, establishes all things in itself; but another leads +all things into generation; (for it belongs to soul to generate) and +another converts all things to itself; (for this is the illustrious +work of virtue) and since all things are perfectly pre-arranged in +Core,--this being the case, the monad which associates with Pluto, +participates, indeed, in a certain respect of the extremes, but is +particularly allotted its progression according to the middle. Hence +also, it is called Proserpine, because it comes into contact, as we +have observed, with generation and things which are borne along. +For the unmingled and the virginal were adapted to the extremes. +But mixture, and a contact with generated natures, are adapted to +the middle, which rejoices in progressions and multiplications. +This ravishment therefore, of Core, is indeed perfectly established +in Proserpine. But she also imparts herself, and the vivification +proceeding from herself to the last of things. Hence likewise, Socrates +in the Cratylus co-arranges Proserpine with Pluto, but every where +ranks total Core with Ceres, and comprehends her in the name of Core. +The power however, which proceeds from her to the realms beneath, he +comprehends in the name of Proserpine. For the psychical nature is in +this power essentially; but the remaining things are in it, as we have +said, according to representation, and not primarily. And thus much +concerning the vivific triad, since Plato has delivered to us but few +auxiliaries about it, from which as from firestones rubbed against each +other, it is possible to enkindle the light of truth. + + + + + CHAPTER XII. + + +In the third place, let us discuss the elevating, among the ruling +Gods, and the triad which converts all things to their principle. For +since there are three intellectual monads, as we have said, which are +pre-arranged in the Gods prior to these, three triads of the ruling +Gods proceed conformably to those monads; the paternal triad indeed, +conformably to the first intellectual monad; (whence also they are +called the sons of Saturn, and are said to have divided the kingdom of +their father) but the vivific triad conformably to the middle monad; +(whence also we are accustomed to co-arrange Core with Ceres as with +a precedaneous cause) and the convertive triad, conformably to the +third monad. Hence likewise we establish the peculiar cause of this +triad in the demiurgus. For all the triads of the ruling Gods, are +suspended from the demiurgic monad, and the progression to all of +them is from this. One of them however, he constitutes in conjunction +with his father; another in conjunction with the vivific Goddess; and +another from the fountain in himself. For in the all-perfect demiurgus +there are many fountains, which exist prior to all the second and +third generations. For there the fountain of ideas subsists, according +to which he adorns the universe, fashions the several particulars in +it with forms and reasons, and arranges, and leads them into bound +and morphe. For the fountain of souls likewise, and the fountain of +all the intellectual Gods which proceed from him, are there. For he +possesses a royal soul, and a royal intellect, according to the power +of cause, as Socrates says in the Philebus. For there also the fontal +sun subsists. Hence Timæus, after the generation of the seven bodies, +and their position into total circulations, says, that the demiurgus +enkindled that light which we now call the sun in the second of the +revolutions from the earth, as affording an hypostasis to the sun from +his own essence. For that which enkindles the whole sun, produces it, +and constitutes that which is enkindled. + +The demiurgus therefore, possessing, and comprehending in himself +the solar fountain, generates likewise in conjunction with the +principles and rulers of wholes, solar powers, and the triad of solar +Gods, through which all things are elevated, perfected, and filled +with intellectual goods; from one[25] monad indeed, participating +unpolluted light, and intelligible harmony, but from the remaining two, +efficacious power, acme, and demiurgic perfection. How therefore, does +Plato deliver to us these divine orders, and where does he indicate +concerning them? Here then, he comprehends the whole triad through +one name, in the same manner as he does the triad prior to it. And as +there he manifests the whole genus of the vivific principles by the +name of Core, so likewise in these, he denominates the whole triad +Apolloniacal. But he indicates the multitude in this triad by the many +powers of this God. + +In the first place therefore, let us survey how Plato, in the same +manner as Orpheus, considers the sun to be in a certain respect the +same as Apollo, and how he venerates the communion of these Gods. +For Orpheus clearly says that the sun is the same with Apollo, and +asserts this (as I may say) through the whole of his poetry. But the +Athenian guest indicates this through the union of these divinities, +constructing a common temple to Apollo and the sun, and at one time +making mention of both, but at another, of one only, in consequence +of their subsisting according to one union. But he says as follows: +“Every year after the conversions of the sun from summer to winter, +it is requisite that the whole city should assemble in the temple +common to the sun and Apollo, consecrating three of the citizens to the +God.” In these words therefore, speaking in common about both these +divinities, that it is fit there should be a temple of Apollo and the +sun, into which it is necessary the whole city should assemble, after +the summer solstice, he discourses in what follows about both, as if +they were one, adding, that three of the citizens should be consecrated +to the God; thus recurring from the division to the union of both. +But elsewhere, he latently indicates the communion of them with each +other. And again, in what follows, at one time he says that the +citizens [consecrated to the God] should offer common first fruits to +the sun and Apollo, but at another to the sun alone, in consequence +of Apollo being in the sun. According to Plato therefore, there is a +kindred conjunction of these divinities, a communion of powers, and an +ineffable union. + +Socrates also in the Cratylus, proposing to discover the essence of +Apollo from his appellation, ascends to the simplicity of his hyparxis, +to his power of unfolding truth into light, and to his intellect +which is the cause of knowledge, thus sufficiently indicating to +us the unmultiplied, simple, and uniform nature of the God. But in +the [6th book of the] Republic, arranging the sun analogous to _the +good_, and sensible light, to the light proceeding from _the good_ +to the intelligible, and calling the light which is present to the +intelligible from _the good_, truth, connecting likewise intellect and +the intelligible with each other, he evidently collects together these +two series, I mean the Apolloniacal and the solar. For each of these +is analogous to _the good_.[26] But sensible light, and intellectual +truth, are analogous to superessential light. And these three lights +are successive to each other, viz. the divine, the intellectual, and +sensible light; the last indeed pervading to sensibles from the visible +sun; but the second extending from Apollo to intellectuals; and the +first, from _the good_ to intelligibles. + +Again therefore, these Gods are demonstrated to be connascent with +each other, according to their analogy to _the good_. But together +with union, they have also a separation adapted to them. Hence +by poets inspired by Phœbus, the different generative causes and +fountains of them are celebrated, from which being allotted their +hypostasis, they are separated from each other. But they are likewise +celebrated by these poets, as mutually connascent and united, and are +praised by the appellations of each other. For the sun vehemently +rejoices, to be celebrated in hymns as Apollo. And Apollo when he is +invoked as the sun, benevolently causes the light of truth to shine +forth. If therefore, the hyparxes of these divinities are united to, +and subsist together with each other, but many powers of Apollo +are delivered to us by Plato himself, and are happily allotted an +appropriate theory, it is certainly proper to collect from these by +a reasoning process, the solar progressions. But I say these things, +looking to Socrates in the Cratylus, and his conceptions through +images, which are there delivered, of the Apolloniacal powers. For +the name of this God being one, unfolds all his powers, to the lovers +of the contemplation of truth. This therefore is a very illustrious +indication of the Apolloniacal peculiarity, viz. to collect multitude +into one, to comprehend number in unity, to produce many things from +one, and through intellectual simplicity to convolve to himself all +the variety of secondary natures, and by one hyparxis to unite in +one, multiform essences and powers. This Socrates says happens to the +name Apollo, it being sufficient to signify in one, the various and +different powers of the God, so that receiving his last image, and the +most obscure representation from him, it is assimilated to his unific, +and collective hyparxis, and contributes to our recollection of the +Apolloniacal peculiarity. This one name therefore, possesses occultly +many indications of the powers of the God. And by this simplicity +indeed, which is exempt from multitude, the truth which the God through +prophesy unfolds to secondary natures, is presented to our view. For +the simple is the same with the true. But by the representation [in +his name] of dissolution and liberation, the purifying and undefiled +nature of the God is signified, and also his power which is the saviour +of wholes. By his emission of arrows, his power is indicated which is +subversive of every thing inordinate, confused, and incommensurate, +through a cause which is the source of the jaculation of arrows. And by +his revolution, the harmonious motion of wholes, and the symphony which +coalesces in itself, and binds all things, are indicated. Referring +therefore, these four powers of the God to forms adapted to the powers, +we may thus accommodate them to the solar monads. Hence the first of +these monads is enunciative of truth and the intellectual light which +subsists occultly in the Gods themselves. But the second is subversive +of every thing confused, and exterminative of all disorder. And the +third renders all things commensurate and friendly to each other, +through harmonic reasons. An undefiled however, and most pure cause +presides over these monads, illuminating all things with perfection, +and a subsistence according to nature, and expelling the contraries to +these. + +Of the solar triad, therefore, the first monad, indeed, unfolds +intellectual light, and announces it to all secondary natures, fills +all things with total truth, and elevates them to the intellect of +the Gods. And this we say is the employment of the prophetic power of +Apollo, viz. to lead forth into light the truth comprehended in divine +natures, and to perfect that which is unknown to secondary natures. +But the second and third monads, emit efficacious and demiurgic acme, +in order to the production of wholes, and perfect energy, according +to which they adorn indeed every thing sensible, but exterminate +the inordinate and indefinite from the universe. And one of these +monads is analogous to the production in wholes through music, and to +the harmonious providence of things that are moved. But another is +analogous to the power which is subversive of all disorder, and of the +confusion and tumult which are contrary to form, and to the arrangement +of wholes. And the remaining monad which supplies all things with an +unenvying and exuberant communication of what is beautiful, which +extends the beneficial, and imparts true blessedness, closes indeed +the solar principles, but guards its triple progression. In a similar +manner also, it illuminates ascending natures, with the perfect and +intellectual measure of a happy life, presiding in the sun analogous to +the purifying and Pœonian powers of the king Apollo. + +From what is written likewise in the Republic concerning the sun, we +may be able to collect the same things by a reasoning process. For +Socrates there gives to it a transcendency exempt from every thing +generated, and says that it is established above things which are +borne along in a sensible nature; just as _the good_ is perfectly +exempt from intelligibles. He likewise says that the sun generates +sense, that which is sensible, and generated natures, just as _the +good_ produces essence and true being, and is antecedently the +cause of intellect and intelligibles. If, therefore, this sensible +world is generated and generation, as Timæus says, and a divine +generated[27] nature, as it is asserted in the Republic, but the sun is +beyond generation, as Socrates affirms, and in short, is allotted an +essence different from sensibles, it is perfectly evident that it is +allotted a supermundane order in the world, and exhibits an unbegotten +transcendency in generated[28] natures, and an intellectual dignity in +sensibles. Hence, Timæus also delivers a twofold progression of the +sun from the demiurgus, one indeed being co-arranged with the other +planets, but the other exempt, supernatural, and unknown. For the +demiurgus, when producing the seven bodies of the planets, and placing +them in their proper circulations, at the same time constitutes the sun +with the other planets arranging the moon the first from the earth, +but the sun in the second circulation; and after these, he enkindles a +light in the solar sphere, similar to none of the others; nor does he +receive this light from the subject matter, but himself produces and +generates it from himself, and extends as it were from certain adyta +to mundane natures, a symbol of intellectual essences, and unfolds to +the universe that which is arcane in the Gods that are above the world. +Hence also the sun when he [first] appeared, astonished the [mundane] +Gods, and all of them were desirous to dance round him, and to be +filled with his light. This world likewise is beautiful and solar-form. + +As we have said, therefore, from the fabrication [of the universe,] +in the Timæus, the sun is demonstrated to possess this order beyond +sensibles, and to be allotted an essence above every thing which is +generated, but every thing in the world receives from him, perfection +and essence. Hence also, Socrates in the Republic calls the sun the +offspring of _the good_, the demiurgus of a generated nature, +and the author of all mundane light. These things, therefore, we must +likewise understand analogously about the ruling order of the God; for +they are thence communicated to this visible sun. And on this account, +here also, the sun is allotted an exempt transcendency with respect to +the Gods in the world, because he possesses a precedaneous hypostasis +among the leaders and rulers of wholes. + +Farther still, in those Gods likewise, the first effective cause of +light subsists, generating those supermundane and intellectual rays, +through which souls, and all the more excellent genera obtain an +elevating progression. With these Gods also, there is the demiurgic +duad which produces both simple and composite natures, those that are +of a more ruling, and those that are of an inferior order. And in +short, this demiurgic duad governs the twofold co-ordinations of the +world. Hence those who are wise in divine concerns call this primary +cause of light, and the demiurgic duad hands, as being efficacious, +motive, and fabricative of wholes. But they establish them to be +twofold, the one indeed being dexter, but the other sinister; which +things also Timæus admits to be primarily in the celestial periods, +and says that this division is derived from the first demiurgus. If, +therefore, the demiurgic monad constituted the solar order prior to the +world, why is it wonderful that in that order he should establish this +division according to the right and left? For Socrates also calls the +motive powers of the Parcæ hands, and says that the eldest of the three +moves the universe with both her hands; so that we must not refuse +to transfer the name of hands to divine concerns. Moreover, will not +likewise the last of the solar principles according to Plato be that +from which the interpreters of divine concerns say, a happy life, and +unpolluted fruits are derived to wholes? Since he calls the sun the +offspring of _the good_, and this essentially pertains to it. For +it is evident that as the good extends felicity to all beings, thus +also the sun extends to mundane natures measures of felicity adapted to +each, and gives completion to this through similitudes, and a tendency +to the whole demiurgus. Hence also I think, felicity is said to consist +in an assimilation to divinity. And felicity pertains to all the Gods +in the world, according to the one ruling cause of them. For thence +perfection and blessedness flow upon all things. + + + + + CHAPTER XIII. + + +And thus much, following Plato, we have collected by a reasoning +process, concerning these particulars. We shall add, however, to what +has been said, the theory pertaining to the unpolluted Gods, among the +ruling divinities. For Plato also gives us an opportunity of mentioning +these, since it is necessary that the rulers and leaders of wholes +should subsist analogous to the intellectual kings, though they make +their progression in conjunction with division and a separation into +parts. For as they imitate the paternal, generative, and convertive +powers of the intellectual kings, thus also it is necessary that they +should receive the immutable monads in themselves, according to the +ruling peculiarity, and establish over their own progressions secondary +causes of a guardian characteristic. And the mystic tradition indeed +of Orpheus, makes mention of these more clearly. But Plato being +persuaded by the mysteries, and by what is performed in them, indicates +concerning these unpolluted Gods. And in the Laws indeed he reminds +us of the inflation of the pipe by the Corybantes, which represses +every inordinate and tumultuous motion. But in the Euthydemus, he +makes mention of the collocation on a throne, which is performed in +the Corybantic mysteries; just as in other dialogues he makes mention +of the Curetic order, speaking of the armed sports of the Curetes. For +they are said to surround and to dance round the demiurgus of wholes, +when he was unfolded into light from Rhea. In the intellectual Gods, +therefore, the first Curetic order is allotted its hypostasis. But the +order of the Corybantes which precedes Core, (i.e. Proserpine) and +guards her on all sides, as the theology says, is analogous to the +Curetes in the intellectual order. If, however, you are willing to +speak according to Platonic custom, because these divinities preside +over purity, and preserve the Curetic order undefiled, and also +preserve immutability in their generations, and stability in their +progressions[29] into the worlds, on this account they were called +Corybantes. For το κορον, _to koron_, is every where significant +of purity, as Socrates says in the Cratylus; since also you may say, +that our mistress Core was no otherwise denominated than from purity, +and an unpolluted life. But in consequence of her alliance to this +order, she produces twofold guardian triads, one indeed in conjunction +with her father, but the other herself, by and from herself, imitating +in this respect the whole vivific Goddess. For she constitutes the +first Curetes. + +Every where, therefore, the guardian and undefiled order is thus +denominated by the Grecian theology. Above, however, it is more simple +and impartible; but beneath, among the ruling Gods, it presents itself +to the view with division and variety. Hence the Corybantes require +the Minerval monad, and in a particular manner they are in want of the +third Minerval monad, which unites their progression, sustains their +armed motion, and in short, converts them to their proper principles. +Moreover, this number the triad, is adapted to these guardian powers, +as being perfect, and uniformly comprehending the beginning, middle, +and end of secondary natures; for every thing which guards, hastens +on all sides to comprehend that which is guarded. The triad also, +preserves the essences, powers, and energies of secondary natures, firm +and unmoved. In the intellectual Gods indeed the three [unpolluted] +monads, were divided about the three fathers; but here the triad is +said to guard Core on all sides, since she also has pre-established +triple monads in herself, as we before observed. All these monads, +therefore, are preserved immutable through the guardianship of the +unpolluted Gods, both in abiding and proceeding. And what else besides +this guardian genus of Gods is fit to be co-arranged with prolific +powers? For this co-arrangement is necessary, in order that these +guardian deities may sustain all the progressions of these powers, +and the multiplications in their generations, and may manifestly +render their motions immutably established in themselves. And on this +account indeed the Gods fill all things with themselves, and generate +all things, and do not depart from any thing either of first or last +natures. But by being in themselves, they are present to all things, +and filling themselves, they fill all secondary natures. And neither +does their inflexibility remain unprolific, nor does their fecundity, +receive any thing from subordinate natures, but prolific abundance, +and immutable power, are in them connascently conjoined. These things +have been briefly asserted concerning the undefiled deity, who is +co-arranged with the ruling Gods, both by Plato, and the Grecian +theologists. + + + + + CHAPTER XIV. + + +Again, resuming [the same subject,] let us discuss in common such +things as Parmenides delivers to us concerning the whole order of +Gods that are called assimilative rulers and leaders. For it is +necessary, as we have before observed, to refer the whole divided +theory [respecting the Gods] to the common and one mystic doctrine of +Parmenides. For there we shall find the connexion of the divine orders, +and their common powers delivered to us by Plato in a continued series. +The same and the different, therefore, define for us the peculiarity of +the demiurgic order. And according to these, we have unfolded in what +has been before said, the paternal and prolific cause of the demiurgus, +his unpolluted fountain, and the separative power in him, conformably +to which he divides his own kingdom from that of Saturn. Since, +however, the whole order of the assimilative Gods, is suspended from +the demiurgic monad, subsists about, is converted to, and perfected +by it, it is indeed necessary to refer the signs of this order to the +demiurgic signs, and to give to the former a well-ordered generation +proceeding in measures from the latter. For thus the coherence of the +divine genera with each other, will become more apparent, and the +evolution into light of secondary from more ancient natures, will +through these very things become perfectly known to us. + +What, therefore, are the peculiarities of this order, which is +celebrated as of a ruling and leading nature by others,[30] but is +demonstrated by arguments to be of an assimilative nature? Every thing +then which is assimilative, imparts the communication of similitude, +and of communion with paradigms to all[31] the beings that are +assimilated by it. Together with the similar, however, it produces and +commingles the dissimilar; since in the images [of the similar] the +genus of similitude is not naturally adapted to be present, separate +from its contrary. If, therefore, this order of Gods assimilates +sensibles to intellectuals, and produces all things posterior to itself +according to an imitation of causes, it is indeed the first-effective +cause of similitude to natures posterior to itself. But if it is the +cause of this, it is also of the dissimilitude which is co-ordinate +with similitude. For it is necessary that all things which participate +of the similar, should also participate of the dissimilar. And this +order of Gods indeed imparts the similar in a greater degree than the +dissimilar to the progeny that are more proximate to their principles; +but it constitutes the essence of things that proceed farther from +their principles, according to dissimilitude rather than similitude. + +For, in short, similitude will have in itself an hypostasis analogous +to the paternal causes, and to the causes which convert to principles. +But the hypostasis of dissimilitude is analogous to prolific causes, +and to those that preside over multitude and division. For similitude +indeed proceeds analogous to intelligible bound,[32] but dissimilitude +to intelligible infinity. Hence the former is collective, but the +latter separative of progressions. Since, however, every divine nature +begins its own energy from itself, and though its energy is directed +to secondary natures, and it imparts its own peculiarity to things +subordinate, yet it establishes and defines itself according to that +energy, prior to other things;--this being the case, that which +supplies other things with the participation of the similar[33] and +the dissimilar, from itself, will entirely possess in itself this +similitude and dissimilitude. It is also mingled from both these, +though here similitude is emitted in a greater degree, and there +dissimilitude. For generative are united to paternal causes, and +unpolluted causes to those that hasten to proceed to every thing. +Twofold co-ordinations likewise of the divine genera, are connected +with each other, energize together with, and subsist in each other. +For the genus of the ruling Gods, is similar and dissimilar to itself, +and to other things. But being similar and dissimilar to itself, it +conjoins itself[34] to, and separates itself from its principles, +preserving the proper boundaries of progression. That, however, which +is similar and dissimilar to other things, converts and congregates +other things to itself, and separates them from itself. Such, +therefore, are the peculiarities of these Gods. + +But that the similar and the dissimilar proceed from the demiurgic +monad, and the signs which there pre-exist, into this order, Parmenides +sufficiently demonstrates to us. For the demiurgic same and different, +are the antecedently-existing causes, as he says, of the similitude +and dissimilitude in this order. Since, however, though this order of +Gods is the summit of the partible genera, and of genera which energize +partibly, yet it has a total transcendency with respect to them, in +order that being in continuity with the total orders of the Gods, its +progression may not be separately allotted its generation from divided +causes, but that each of the opposites, as it were, may proceed from +the whole demiurgus. For the similar is from same and different, and +the dissimilar receives its hypostasis from both these; and thus each +participates of the whole demiurgic monad. And this is an indication +of total[35] hyparxis, viz. to refer each of the parts that are, as +it were different, to the whole. Sameness, therefore, and difference +generate similitude; but the one indeed paternally, and the other +in an unpolluted manner; and the one generatively, but the other +separatively. And again, each constitutes dissimilitude in a manner +appropriate to itself. And thus the genera of the assimilative Gods are +varied, subsisting as paternal, generative, and collective of wholes. +For they are allotted their evolution into light, doubled according to +pre-existent causes. And the demiurgic duad energizing through each +of the causes that are pre-established in him, makes a progression +from each into secondary natures. The whole conclusions, likewise, are +dyadic, (or pertaining to the duad) but they are comprehended by the +demiurgic tetrad in pre-arranged boundaries. And the multitude of the +assimilative progressions is convolved to union, by the simplicity of +the intellectual genera. + +Each also of the progressions, has indeed one progression supernatural +and unknown to the multitude, but the other apparent and known to all. +I mean, for instance, that the similar, so far as it is constituted +by difference, has a progression from thence difficult to be known; +but that so far as it proceeds from sameness, it exhibits a manifest +reason of cause. After the same manner, dissimilitude has difference +for the manifest principle of its proper hyparxis; but sameness, for +its principle difficult to be known. Hence also Parmenides beginning +from things unknown to the multitude, and which are alone apparent to +science and intellect, ends in things which are known to all men, and +are effable. For in the Gods themselves, the ineffable precedes the +effable. And the latent and unknown mode of their hypostasis, precedes +that which is known according to progression. And thus much concerning +these Gods from the Parmenides of Plato. + + + + + CHAPTER XV. + + +Making, however, another beginning, let us discuss the orders +that follow successively. Since the partial orders of the Gods, +therefore, are divided in a three-fold manner, according to the +all-perfect measure of the triad, proceeding supernally from the +first intelligibles, as far as to the last of things, measuring and +defining all things as the Oracles say,--the ruling Gods, indeed, are +allotted the first and highest rank [among the partial orders,] making +their progression proximately after the intellectual order, elevating +secondary natures and conjoining them with the demiurgus of wholes, +unfolding all impartible and united intellectual goods to things +subordinate, and connecting and containing exemptly, their essence and +perfection. But the Gods who give completion to the sensible world are +allotted the last order, and close the end of the divine progression. +These divide the universe, and obtain perpetual allotments and +receptacles in it, and through these weave one and the best polity of +the world. Between these mundane Gods, however, who are our rulers and +saviours, and the supermundane leaders, those Gods subsist who preside +over the separable and at the same time inseparable order of sensibles, +and define according to this their proper progression, being at one and +the same time exempt from the Gods in the universe, and co-arranged +with them. And they are expanded, indeed, above the allotment which +is adequate to the divided parts of the world, and supernally ascend +into many numbers of the mundane Gods; but they make a progression +subordinate to the government which extends to all things and to wholes. + +For in short, being the media between the supermundane and mundane +Gods, they in a certain respect communicate with both, and have an +indissoluble communion with both, being mundane, and at the same time +supermundane according to order. And above indeed, they are united by +the ruling leaders, but beneath, they are produced into multitude by +the junior Gods, as Timæus says. For they ride on the mundane Gods, +and are in an undefiled manner established on their summits; but they +are suspended from the supermundane Gods, and subsist about them. They +are also more united than the former; but are more multiplied than the +latter. And they divide indeed, the whole monads of the supermundane +Gods, into perfect numbers; but they collect the multitudes and the +numbers of the mundane Gods into united bounds, converting these +Gods to their exempt principles, but calling forth the Gods that are +above the world into the generation and providential care of sensible +natures, and immutably preserving in themselves the middle form of +empire. For the middle bonds give completion to all the genera of the +Gods. Thus in intelligibles, between the intelligible and occult order, +and the paradigmatic triad, and all-perfect multitude, the intelligible +centre subsists, being parturient indeed, with multitude and the first +(forms,) but vanquished by the uniform comprehension of the first +order. Again, in intelligibles and intellectuals, the connective genus +extending from the middle to all the extremes, conjoins and binds all +their essences, powers and providential energies. + +After the same manner therefore, in these orders also, viz. in the +kings exempt from, and in those that are co-arranged with the universe, +those Gods that emit in themselves uniformly the peculiarities of +both these kings, afford a communication to them with each other. +Whence also it belongs to them to transport first to second natures, +to convert second to first natures, to unite both by an indissoluble +connexion, and to guard the whole order in the world. The immutable, +therefore, the inflexible, the indissoluble in providential energies, +dominion over wholes, the administration of many partible allotments +of the Gods at once, and the elevating to supermundane perfection +many of their progressions and orders, pertain to these Gods. Hence, +we are accustomed to celebrate this genus of Gods as _liberated_, in +consequence of being freed from all division according to parts;[36] +as _supercelestial_, in consequence of proximately establishing +itself above the Gods in the heavens; as _undefiled_, in consequence +of not verging to subordinate natures, nor dissolving its exempt +transcendency by a providential attention to the world; as _elevating_, +in consequence of extending the mundane Gods to the intellectual and +intelligible place of survey; and as _perfect_, in consequence of +illuminating all the celestials with the measures of perfection. Since +therefore, this order is in continuity with the assimilative rulers, +but is arranged prior to the mundane Gods, it is indeed proper to +evince that the theology pertaining to it[37] is suspended from the +doctrine concerning the ruling Gods, and at the same time affords from +itself the principles of the conceptions about the sensible Gods. + + + + + CHAPTER XVI. + + +The intelligible king[38] therefore, of all intellectuals, luminously +emitting from himself the first causes, and which measure wholes, +according to the all-perfect triad in himself, defines all wholes as +far as to the last of things, and triples the progressions of the +Gods from himself, so as to generate indeed three orders, but refer +each of them to one monad, and an intelligible transcendency. On +this account he constitutes three collective, three connective, and +three perfective causes of all intellectuals; extending the triadic +light to all things, and imparting by illumination the perfect in the +progressions of its proper offspring, to the beginnings, middles, and +ends of all separated natures. But again, the demiurgus and father, +imitating his father and grandfather,[39] to the latter of whom he +extends his total intelligence, being the same in intellectuals, as +he is in intelligibles, and terminating the genus of the intellectual +fathers, in the same manner as his grandfather closes the paternal +profundity of intelligibles, produces from himself three orders of +Gods. And as the total progressions were divided from his grandfather +triadically, so the partial progressions are perfected on account of +him, according to the triad. Hence, there are also three orders from +the demiurgus; but they proceed according to the end adapted to each. +And one of them indeed, is supermundane alone; another is mundane; and +another is in a certain respect the middle of both. They are likewise +allotted the triple proximately from the paternal cause; but each +derives the peculiarity of hyparxis from definite principles, and a +diminution proceeding according to measures. For they have neither an +hypostasis of equal dignity, as mathematical monads have in the triad, +nor a disorderly difference of dignity, but they receive the difference +of a subordinate essence, and arrangement in their generation from +the first causes. And thus, the ruling Gods indeed, are allotted +the highest order in the partial progressions, and the exempt cause +of the proceeding natures. But the liberated Gods are allotted the +second order, being arranged indeed under the ruling, but riding on +the mundane Gods. And the mundane Gods are allotted the third order, +being elevated through the liberated, but united by the ruling, to the +intellectual Gods. In what manner however, the Gods in the world and +all the mundane genera participate of the ruling Gods, we have already +shown. + +But each of the mundane genera enjoy the energy of the liberated +governors of the universe, according to a measure adapted to each, and +especially such as are able to follow the powers of these Gods. For in +the Gods themselves, we may perceive a twofold energy, the one indeed, +being co-arranged with the subjects of their providential care, but the +other being exempt and separate. According therefore, to the first of +these energies, the mundane Gods govern sensibles, and convolve, and +convert them to themselves; but according to the other, they follow the +liberated Gods, and together with them are elevated to an intelligible +nature. And on this account, the Elean guest, makes the periods of the +whole world, and of each of the Gods in it to be twofold. For, he says, +that the sun, and each of the heavenly bodies, subsist according to +both these circulations, viz. the intellectual and the mundane; or, if +you are willing so to speak, according to the power which is motive of +secondary natures, and the power which ascends in conjunction with the +liberated Gods. + +Moreover, he says, that our souls, and all the natures that have a life +separate from bodies, at one time live according to that elevating +progression, and at another according to the mundane; and now indeed +we proceed from youth to old age, since we have departed from a +flourishing and undefiled life, and are borne to earth, and generation; +but then on the contrary, we proceeded from old age to youth. On +which account, we were led round to a flourishing, intellectual, and +liberated form of energy. Hence also, the corporeal-formed nature [with +which we are connected,] was gradually obliterated, and whatever causes +us to tend downward, and renders us inseparable from the universe. But +an incorporeal, and immaterial nature shone forth, and was filled with +the Gods who are the leaders of a life of this kind. + +If also, you are willing, we may collect the same thing by a reasoning +process, from what is written in the Phædrus. Socrates, therefore, +says in that dialogue, that the soul which is perfect and winged, +revolves on high, and governs the whole world; and that this will be +the case with our soul, when it arrives at the summit of a happy life. +But this is in a much greater degree present with the genera superior +to us, and with the Gods themselves. For our souls obtain this end, +and this true blessedness, through the Gods. For whence do you think, +and from what other causes, is a disencumbered energy, and which has +dominion over wholes, imparted to us, and to the genera in the world +more excellent than us, but from the liberated Gods? For each of the +mundane Gods obtains the administration of its allotment, and of the +proper series over which it rules; and which it constitutes about +itself, according to the will of the father. For the demiurgus arranges +under the several mundane Gods, the herds of dæmons, and partial +souls, as Timæus says. But to energize through the whole world, is a +supernatural good, and the peculiarity of the exempt government of the +supercelestial Gods. Hence, from these this good is imparted to the +mundane Gods, and to our souls. Or how can that which is partial extend +its proper energy to the whole? And how departing from its own divided +peculiarity, can it change its life? For that which directs its energy +to the universe, withdraws itself from an energy which is arranged in a +part. We must not therefore say, that this divine good is by any means +present to mundane natures from any other source than these Gods, who +establish their kingdom proximately above the world. As, therefore, +the progression to all things through similitude, and the conversion +according to similitude to causes, are imparted from the assimilative +rulers to the celestial Gods, to the more excellent genera, and to +us, thus also, that which is liberated from partial natures, which is +disencumbered and which tends spontaneously to many energies, is an +impression derived from the liberated rulers. And thus much concerning +the providence of these rulers which pervades to all things, and the +goods which they impart to subordinate natures. But we shall add to +what has been before said, the peculiarity of their essence, according +to which they are allotted this order. + + + + + CHAPTER XVII. + + +From the intellectual[40] Gods, therefore, [i.e. from the assimilative +rulers] an immaterial and divine intellect is suspended. But a separate +and total intellect is an intellect of this kind. Hence also these Gods +are called intellectual. For according to their hyparxes, they are +beyond essence and multitude; but according to the participations of +them which receive the illumination of a progression of this kind, they +are called assimilative. For because they have intellectual hypostases, +and perfect powers, since intellect is the last of their participants, +and the intellectual peculiarity defines their whole essence,--hence +they are allotted this appellation. Of the mundane Gods, indeed, +an intellectual nature participates primarily, an undefiled soul +also participates of them, and that portion of the world together +with which they render the whole world, an intellectual and divine +animal, emitting the splendour of themselves as far as to bodies, and +imparting to these a vestige of their own peculiarity. It is necessary, +therefore, that the orders which are between both these, should +rejoice in certain additions, by which they are more multitudinous +than the intellectual Gods, and in progressions into participants; but +that they should be more singular and simple than the mundane Gods. +For the diminutions of the divine essences multiply the receptacles +that are suspended from them. Hence, together with the intellectual +peculiarity, these Gods assume the psychical power, in order that by +the incorporeal nature, they may have the supermundane [property,] but +by the psychical, they may be more manifold than the intellectual Gods. + +For again, considering the affair in another way, since soul presents +itself to the view, and the one fountain of whole souls, in pure +[intellectuals,] and constitutes all things in conjunction with the +demiurgus, is it not necessary that the supermundane Gods should +participate of the psychical peculiarity? For the Gods that are divided +about the world, are not filled with the unical soul without a medium, +but through other more total media, which do not proceed out of the +monad, [i.e. out of Juno, or the crater,] and possess an eternal +life. From thence, therefore, that is, from the crater of souls, the +presence of soul is derived to the ruling and liberated Gods. For the +demiurgus Jupiter also, as Socrates says in the Philebus, possessing in +himself a royal soul, and a royal intellect, according to the reason +of cause, and generating according to the whole of himself those +Gods that are of a ruling characteristic among the supermundane and +mundane divinities, entirely likewise imparts the intellectual and +the psychical peculiarity. But the supermundane Gods indeed, being +primarily unfolded into light, participate more of an intellectual +essence. Hence also, the psychical peculiarity is in them occultly. +But the Gods who are allotted the middle order, cause the psychical +peculiarity, indeed, to shine forth, yet subsisting with a more +abundant separation (than in the supermundane Gods.) The mundane Gods, +however, perfectly unfold the psychical peculiarity into light; since +intellect also, was indeed occultly in the first intellectuals, but +exhibits a fore-running light in the middle, and shines forth in the +last intellectuals. And the supermundane Gods, indeed, being perfectly +[supermundane] derive the power of soul from the intellectual[41] +crater, or the royal soul in the demiurgus; but they pre-establish in +themselves another monad of the divided psychical genera. The liberated +however, now communicating in essence with the mundane Gods, have the +psychical peculiarity from a twofold source, i.e. from the fountain of +total animations, and from the assimilative principle. And in the last +place, the mundane Gods receive the illuminations of all the divinities +prior to them. Hence also, they rule over the universe, imitating the +liberated Gods, adorn sublunary natures with forms, and assimilate them +to intellectual paradigms, imitating the ruling Gods. They likewise +pour forth the whole of the life which is inseparable [from body,] from +the one fountain of souls, establishing it as an image [of the life +which is separate from a corporeal nature] and conjoin themselves to +this fountain. + +In short, all the genera[42] being mingled by the demiurgus in the +fountain of souls, in order to the generation of the different ranks +of souls, some of these ranks have one thing, but others a different +thing at hand. And in some indeed, the essential has dominion over +the remaining genera; in others sameness; and in others difference. +But those souls that are connascent with the assimilative Gods, +have[43] their whole hypostasis according to essence. Hence they are +near to an intellectual hyparxis, and are allotted in the genera of +souls, an intelligible and occult transcendency. But those[44] that +are co-arranged with the liberated Gods, characterize their proper +progression, according to sameness. Hence also, they are consubsistent +with the Gods that bind together and congregate the supermundane and +mundane Gods. And those souls that are co-divided with the mundane +Gods, define the essence of themselves according to difference: and +on this account also, the demiurgus, in constituting the soul of the +universe, is said to co-adapt difference to other souls by force. + +Moreover, the separation into parts in these, the union through +harmony, and the energy according to time are effected through the +illuminations of difference. But [in the souls] above these essence and +sameness subsist, with which there are eternal life, and a union of +powers. And thus much concerning these particulars. + +From what has been said, however, we may collect by a reasoning +process, that intellect, essence, and intellectual life, are suspended +from the liberated Gods. In them also soul, and the nature of the +supercelestial souls shine with a fore-running light. For they are +established above the celestial Gods who ride in bodies, just as the +celestial Gods are exempt from the sublunary divinities, and from those +who are allotted the government of matter. If, however, the genus of +the liberated Gods is of this kind, they are very properly said to +belong to the partial orders, in the same manner as the Gods prior to +them. But they indeed are more total, because the psychical peculiarity +was in them occultly. But the liberated Gods have that which is partial +in providential energies more apparent because the psychical power also +in these is more manifest, just as the mundane Gods who now preside +over partial allotments, perfectly unfold into light the psychical +essence. The whole, however, and impartible genera of the Gods shine +forth as far as to the intellectual hypostasis. For intellect according +to its own nature is impartible. + +The liberated leaders, therefore, being such as we have shown them to +be, let us survey the multiform orders of them adapted to this order. +Some of them, therefore, we call _transporters_, and these are such +as unfold to secondary natures, the progressions of the assimilative +genera. But others are _elevators_, who draw upward the mundane orders, +to a separate energy. Others are _colligators_, who administer equally +the communion of the extremes. Others are _undefiled_, and these are +such as entirely obliterate matter, and impart by illumination the +disencumbered to the providential energies of secondary natures. +Others are _perfective_, and these are such as are the suppliers of +perfection to mundane natures. And others are _prolific_, who multiply +the progressions of subordinate essences. For according to these, and +far more numerous powers, incomprehensible by our conceptions, they +preside over the Gods in the world, and give completion to the divine +genera which subsist between the Gods that are exempt, and those that +are co-arranged with the parts of the universe. + +Moreover, we must assign to them energies in symphony with their +powers, viz. such energies as are disencumbered, every where apparent, +amputating every thing material, and corporeal-formed, emitting an +idea undefiled, without contact, and incorporeal, and converting all +secondary natures to themselves, and extending them to intellectual +light. And farther still, we must ascribe to them energies that unfold +the exempt principles of the universe, and also energies more excellent +than these, which draw upward to the intellectual Gods, and others +still more elevated which conjoin themselves with the intellectual +Gods, and exhibit an essence uncoloured, unfigured, and without +contact. Again, according to another mode, [we must admit] that some of +their energies operate about the secondary Gods, and are collectors of +their divine unities to a union prior to the world. But others operate +about the mundane intellects, and extend the intellections of them from +co-ordinate intelligibles to such as are first, and exempt from the +universe. Others again, are elevators of souls to the one fountain of +them. And some of their energies, indeed, are the leaders of divine +souls themselves; but others preside over the genera that are more +excellent than us. And others convolve the multitude of intelligible +[souls[45]] to an undefiled life. For being as it were certain leaders +of herds, they ascend supernally into all the natures in the world, and +as dæmon Gods, they proximately rule over Gods, and are the leaders of +the progression to the intelligible, to some in one, and to others in a +different way, according to the order which is adapted to the elevated +natures. For every thing [mundane] participates of the liberated Gods. +But the participation is different. For it is either according to +the divine, dæmoniacal, and partible, or according to the uniform, +intellectual, and psychical. For all things, as I may say, are +allotted a separate[46] life, a disencumbered energy, a supernatural +providence, and a common prefecture, from this order of Gods. Let the +common definition, therefore, of the liberated Gods, be such as this. + + + + + CHAPTER XVIII. + + +In the next place it follows that we should unfold the theory of +Plato, first, that which may be obtained in other dialogues, and +afterwards, the all-perfect doctrine concerning these Gods, which is +to be found in the Parmenides. In the Phædrus therefore, Socrates +energizing enthusiastically, and expanding his intellect to the whole +connexion of the divine orders, and not only mystically surveying the +mundane progressions of them, but also their indescribable and blessed +visions, and discursive energies above[47] the world, divides indeed, +in a three-fold manner, all the separate hypostases in the world, from +the subjects of their government. And he calls the first of these +hypostases divine; but the middle dæmoniacal; and he gives completion +to the last from our souls. He also suspends partial souls [such as +ours] from dæmons. Hence he denominates them co-attendants, and extends +them through dæmons as media, to the divine empire. But he suspends the +dæmoniacal orders from the mundane Gods. For dæmons are the attendants +of these. He refers however, these whole divine principalities, the +dæmoniacal herds, and choirs of partial souls, to the liberated order; +and he says that the triadic army of mundane souls is elevated under +this order, to the intellectual and intelligible Gods, together at the +same time with their first causes. + +Here therefore, he defines according to the measure of the dodecad +(i.e. the number twelve) all the liberated Gods, though the multitude +of them is incomprehensible, and not to be numbered by human +conceptions; and though none of those theologists that have written +any thing concerning them, have been able to define their whole +number, in the same manner as they have the ruling multitude (i.e. the +multitude of supermundane Gods,) or the multitude of the intellectual, +or intelligible Gods. Plato however, apprehended that the number of +the dodecad is adapted to the liberated Gods, as being all-perfect, +composed from the first numbers, and completed from things perfect; and +he comprehends in this measure all the progressions[48] of these Gods. +For he refers all the genera and peculiarities of them to this dodecad, +and defines them according to it. But again dividing the dodecad into +two monads and one decad; he suspends all [mundane natures] from the +two monads, but delivers to us each of these energizing on the monad +posterior to itself, according to its own hyparxis. And one of these +monads indeed, he calls Jovian, but he denominates the other Vesta. He +likewise makes mention of other more partial principalities, and which +give completion to the aforesaid decad, such as those of Apollo, Mars, +and Venus. And he suspends indeed, the prophetic form of life from the +Apolloniacal principality; but the amatory from the principality of +Venus; and the divisive, from that of Mars; for hence the most total +and first genera of lives are derived; just as when he introduces into +the world souls recently fashioned, he says that some preside over one, +and others over another form of life. And it appears to me, that as +Timæus makes the division of souls, at one time supermundane, but at +another mundane, for he distributes souls equal in number to the stars, +and disseminates one into the moon, another into the earth, and others +into the other instruments of time; after the same manner also Socrates +prearranges twofold rulers and leaders of them; proximately indeed the +mundane Gods, but in a still higher rank than these, the liberated Gods. + +As we have said however, the twelve Gods convolve every mundane genus, +whether it be divine, or dæmoniacal, to the vision of intelligibles, +and perfect their separate energy. They likewise comprehend in +themselves all the supercelestial genera, so that whether there be a +paternal genus of the liberated Gods, or a vivific, or an undefiled +and guardian genus, they are comprehended in this number. For this +number must not be surveyed as if it was such as twelve is in units; +for number in the Gods is not of this kind; but it must be beheld in +the peculiarity of hyparxis. For as the duad in the Gods presides over +prolific power,[49] and the triad, over the first perfection, thus also +the dodecad [in the Gods,] is a symbol of all-perfect progression. For +since these Gods close the end of the powers that are unapparent and +exempt from the world, and ride on the celestial Gods, according to +each of these, the dodecad pertains to them, viz. it belongs to them +as terminating the all-perfect in the progression of the supermundane, +and as presiding over the celestial Gods. For they impart to the latter +a distribution from themselves into the dodecad, and especially guard +them in this number. The ruling dodecad therefore, was all-perfectly +supermundane; but the celestial, is evidently mundane only; and the +dodecad of the liberated rulers contains the communion of the extremes, +and binds the order posterior, to that which is prior to itself. And on +this account indeed, the liberated Gods are perfective of the mundane +Gods, and lead them upward. But they are proximately suspended from the +ruling Gods, are emitted from them, and administer the indissoluble +connexion of both. [i.e. of the supermundane and mundane Gods.] + + + + + CHAPTER XIX. + + +That we may not however present the reader with our conceptions, but +may unfold to the utmost of our power the theory of Plato, to the +lovers of the contemplation of truth, let us consider by ourselves, +where those leaders must be arranged, which Socrates celebrates in the +Phædrus, and with whom it is fit to connumerate, and with what orders +of Gods, it is proper to co-arrange the great ruler of those leaders, +who drives a winged chariot. For it is necessary either to give to +him an intellectual, or an assimilative, or a liberated, or a mundane +order. For these are the decrements accompanying the progression of the +great God Jupiter. If however, he is the intellectual Jupiter, whom we +have denominated the demiurgus of the universe, and have made Plato +bear testimony to our assertion, how is he the leader of the above +mentioned dodecad? And how is he divided oppositely to the principality +of Vesta? For the demiurgic monad closes indeed, the intellectual +breadth, but is exempt from all other numbers, and unco-ordinated +with all [the monads of other numbers.] For it neither was, nor is +lawful for effects to have an hypostasis opposed in division to their +causes. It is not therefore proper to make twelve leaders of wholes, +but to make the number of causes to be one, as Timæus says. Moreover, +Jupiter the demiurgus is exempt[50] from the universe, as being himself +the author of the apparent order of things. But the first of the +twelve leaders, is said by Socrates to drive a winged chariot in the +heavens. How therefore, can he who is connected with the world, and who +approximates to the Gods in the heavens, be considered as the same with +him who is exempt from all [mundane natures,] and who abides, as Timæus +says, in his own accustomed manner? + +Farther still, this Jupiter indeed, presides over a philosophic life, +and souls [that follow him] perpetually lead this life. But another God +presides over the prophetic, amatory, and poetic life. The demiurgus +of wholes, however, contains in himself the paradigms of all lives; +and as he uniformly comprehends the essence of souls, after the same +manner also, he comprehends all the different mutations of their +lives. He is not, therefore, divisibly the cause of the lives in the +soul, but pre-establishes according to one demiurgic cause, all the +periods of souls, all the variety, and all the measures of life. And +as the mundane sun is not the cause of some things, but the demiurgus +of others, but of whatever the sun is the author, the demiurgus is in +a greater degree the fabricator, and precedaneous cause,--thus also +in the lives of souls, it is not proper to refer the cause to the +demiurgus in a divided manner. For the demiurgic monad, presides as +the impartible, common, and one cause of all lives; but the divisions +according to lives, and the different paradigms of mundane natures, +pertain to the Gods posterior to him. + +If, however, some one should think that we ought to abandon this +hypothesis, but that we should assert this Jupiter, and the other +leaders to be mundane, where must we arrange the Gods that follow him? +For Socrates says, “that the army of Gods and dæmons divided into +eleven parts, follows Jupiter.” For there are more comprehensive and +partial orders of Gods in the universe than these, and some of them +have the relation of leaders, but others of followers. The magnitude, +however, of the principality celebrated by Socrates, does not manifest +to us a transcendency co-arranged with, but exempt from mundane +natures. For in incorporeal causes, _the great_, imparts a peculiarity +of this kind to those to whom it is present. And as Love being not +simply called a dæmon by Diotima, but a _great_ dæmon, is demonstrated +to be expanded above all dæmons, and is a god, but is not arranged in +the genus of dæmons, thus also Jupiter, being celebrated as the _great_ +leader, not as the mundane leader of mundane natures, but as exempt +from, and transcending the mundane order, is allotted this appellation. +But if Jupiter is exempt from the Gods in the world, it is necessary +that the other leaders also should have an essence antecedent to those +that follow Jupiter. For all of them are allotted a ruling dignity. +But if the other leaders are arranged as mundane, and Jupiter alone is +a leader beyond these, again we must transfer the whole principality +from the dodecad, to the Jovian monad. It is necessary, however, to +attribute a ruling power to all of them, and to preserve to Jupiter the +principal authority among them. + +It remains, therefore, that a principality such as this of the Gods, +must either be that of the assimilative Gods, or of those that are +allotted a liberated dominion in the universe, as we say it must. +If, however, we should admit it to belong to the assimilative orders, +it will be the leader of a demiurgic triad, but not of the dodecad +which is now celebrated. The Jupiter, therefore, who is among the +assimilative Gods, and whom we have before unfolded, is the first of +the sons of Saturn. For these sons, as Socrates says in the Gorgias, +divide the whole kingdom of Saturn. And the first of them indeed is the +author of first, the second of middle, and the third of last natures. +The division, therefore, of mundane natures being three-fold, the first +of the sons of Saturn may be called the leader of the triadic division, +and the multitude proximately suspended from him will be the first of +the triadic division in the universe. But the leader of the twelve +Gods, presides over an army distributed into eleven parts. Hence[51] +the one defines his proper dominion in the thirds of wholes, but the +other in the twelfths. And according to the power of comprehension, +one of them defines his principality conformably to the triad, but the +other according to the endecad [or the number eleven.] By no means, +therefore, is each of these allotted the same order. The demiurgus, +therefore, and saviour Jupiter is uncoarranged with all these. But +the assimilative Jupiter is the leader of the division of wholes into +a triad. And the mundane Jupiter is among the number of leaders that +follow, and not of those that are exempt. The Jupiter, however, who is +celebrated by Socrates in the Phædrus, is co-arranged with the other +leaders, and presides over those that are disposed in an orderly manner +according to eleven parts, and not over those that receive a tripartite +division; and he is also exempt from all mundane natures on account of +the magnitude of his ruling transcendency. Hence he is different from +all the above-mentioned orders, and exhibits in no one of them the +peculiarity which is now presented to our view. + +It remains, therefore, that we should connumerate him with the +liberated Gods, in order that he may be proximate to the mundane +Gods; and on this account he is said to be in the heavens, and to be +exempt from the mundane divinities. On this account, likewise, he is +celebrated as _great_. For frequently media present themselves to +our view, from the extremes being surveyed according to mixture. Since +therefore, Jupiter is said to drive a winged chariot in the heavens, +and is denominated great, he is in a certain respect co-arranged with +the celestial Gods, and is exempt from them. But he who is at one and +the same time co-arranged with the Gods in the universe, among whom the +celestial Jupiter is allotted the highest dignity, and is exempt from +them, ranks among the liberated Gods, if in what has been before said, +we have rightly determined. Hence, of the Gods, some are exempt from +the universe; but others give completion to it; and others are at one +and the same time allotted a co-arranged, and an exempt transcendency. +This great leader in the heavens therefore Jupiter, is liberated and +supercelestial, and the whole dodecad shines forth in this order of +Gods. For there is one all-perfect and divine number, to which the +twelve leaders give completion. So that it is necessary the whole +number should be placed in this order of Gods, but we must not call +in a divided manner some of the leading and ruling Gods mundane, and +others supermundane. But if the first of them is supermundane, the rest +also will after the same manner establish themselves above the Gods in +the world. Each also is the leader of an appropriate multitude, and +is surrounded with a great number[52] of Gods and dæmons. But partial +souls rank among the last of their followers. For they are co-divided +with dæmons, and divine natures, and participate of the liberated +principality of the Gods, as far as they are able. For, as Socrates +says, “that which is willing and able always follows the Gods.” Through +these things therefore, we have reminded the reader, that the twelve +leaders of wholes celebrated by Socrates in the Phædrus, belong to the +liberated Gods. + + + + + CHAPTER XX. + + +In the next place, let us show whence they derive the whole of this +number. It is necessary therefore, that they should have their +hypostasis from the Gods prior to them; since the progression to +the assimilative Gods was from the intellectual fathers, and to the +intellectual fathers supernally from the intelligible and at the same +time intellectual Gods, just as to these the progression was from +the first intelligibles. For since the order of the assimilative +rulers is prior to that of the liberated Gods; as is also the triad +of the intellectual kings; or rather the demiurgic monad establishing +in itself the all-perfect measure of the division of wholes into +the triad,--this being the case we must survey the causes of the +generation[53] of the liberated Gods according to both these, viz. +according to the demiurgic measure, and the genera of the assimilative +Gods. For the different orders of them are imparted from these two. + +Moreover, if we remember what has been before observed, we gave a +fourfold division to the middle progressions of the assimilative Gods. +And we said, that some of them are paternal, others prolific, others +of an elevating, and others of a guardian nature. Since therefore, the +demiurgic monad divides progressions into first, middle, and last, in +the same manner as the intelligible father prior to it, but the Gods +posterior to this monad, emit the rivers of themselves tetradically +to secondary natures,--this being the case, the dodecad of liberated +Gods presents itself to our view, above indeed proceeding according +to the triad, but beneath being quadruply multiplied. Hence, of the +genera which give completion to it; some indeed, are allotted the +demiurgic and paternal triadically; others, the generative and vivific +triadically; others, the elevating peculiarity triadically; and others +after the same manner the undefiled and guardian characteristic. +For all their peculiarities are derived from the multitude of the +assimilative Gods. But the division of them into first, middle and +last, proceeds from the demiurgic cause. And thus much concerning the +number of the liberated Gods, whence, and how it is generated. + + + + + CHAPTER XXI. + + +Since therefore, as we have before observed, there are twelve leaders +of all the mundane Gods, of all dæmons, and farther still, of such +partial souls as are able to be extended to the intelligible, again +in this dodecad, the mighty Jupiter and Vesta are allotted the more +ruling order. But the principality of the rest is co-arranged with +these, and has a secondary dignity. And Jupiter indeed, being neither +the intellect of the universe, as some say he is, nor the intellect +in the sun, nor in short, any one of mundane intellects or souls, but +being expanded above all these, and pre-existing among the liberated +Gods, elevates the choir of Gods, and of the genera superior to us that +follow him, and imparts paternal goodness to the multitude converted to +him. But he is the leader of all the other numbers that terminate under +the twelve Gods. Again however, Vesta indeed governs an appropriate +multitude, but she neither has the order of the first soul, nor is that +which is called the earth in the universe. But prior to these, she is +allotted a ruling power among the supercelestial Gods. She imparts +however, her own peculiarity to the numbers of the other leaders, in +the same manner as Jupiter. For the leaders that are suspended from the +decad, participate also of these two monads. + +Jupiter however, being indeed the cause of motion is the leader to all +things of a progression to the intelligible. But Vesta illuminates +all things with stable[54] and inflexible power; though Jupiter also +abiding in himself, is thus elevated to the intelligible place of +survey; and Vesta on account of an inflexible and undefiled permanency +in herself, is conjoined to the first causes. The emission however of +a different peculiarity, affords the difference of dominion. For since +there are twofold conversions in the Gods (for all things are converted +to themselves and to their principles) each form of conversion indeed, +was impartibly in king Saturn. For according to Parmenides he is +demonstrated to be in himself, and in another. And the latter indeed, +pertains to a conversion to a more excellent nature, but the former +implies a conversion to himself. In the secondary however, and more +partial Gods, both these forms shine forth in a divided manner. And +Vesta indeed, imparts to the mundane Gods an undefiled establishment +in themselves; but Jupiter imparts to them an elevating motion to +first natures. For Vesta belongs to the undefiled, but Jupiter to +the paternal series; but they are divided by a subsistence in self, +and a subsistence in another, as we have before observed. It must +be said therefore, that every thing stable and immutable, and which +possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, arrives to all mundane +natures from the supercelestial Vesta, and that on this account all +the poles are immoveable, and the axes about which the circulations +of the spheres convolve themselves. It must also be said, that the +wholenesses of the circulations are firmly established, that the earth +abides immoveably in the middle, and that the centres have an unshaken +permanency [from this supercelestial Vesta.] + +Again therefore, it must be admitted that all motions, separate +energies, and the conversions of secondary to first natures, are +derived to wholes from Jupiter. For the intellectual orders are not +only united to co-ordinate intelligibles, but also to such as are +exempt, on account of the elevating progression of Jupiter. And divine +souls following the mighty Jupiter are extended as far as to the first +causes. The attendants of these also are collected together with the +Gods, in consequence of being suspended from the paternal government +of Jupiter. But again, with respect to all the remaining leaders, +each presides over his proper series and imparts from himself his +peculiarity to the whole multitude [suspended from him.] And one of +them indeed, imparts as far as to the last of things an unfolding, +another, a prolific, and another, an immutable peculiarity, being +themselves allotted a supercelestial order, and drawing upward a +numerous army of partible Gods. Hence Socrates also at one and the same +time denominates them rulers, says that they have an arrangement, and +that their energy is directed to secondary natures, according to the +order in which they are placed. Each, however, of the other ruling Gods +who are ranked in the number of the twelve, is a leader according to +the order in which he is arranged. The ruling and leading peculiarity, +therefore, alone, pertains to the supermundane Gods. But to be +arranged, and that which is arranged itself by itself, pertain to the +mundane Gods. For these are they who participate of order, and who are +allotted order according to participation. Both these peculiarities, +however, pertain to the liberated Gods. For they are rulers and +leaders, as being in continuity with the ruling [supermundane] Gods, +and they are arranged and participate of order, as being proximate +to the mundane Gods. But being the middle of both, they connect the +whole progressions of them according to one intellectual bond. Farther +still, as presiding indeed over the ruling order in the heavens, they +come into contact with the mundane Gods, and as being in themselves, +and extended to the intelligible, they are allotted a transcendency +separate from the universe, and exempt from their participants. Thus +much, therefore, may suffice concerning the first division of these +Gods. Since, however, we have before observed that their progression is +tetradic and triadic, we shall concisely define[55] the peculiarities +of the arranged triads. + + + + + CHAPTER XXII. + + +These, therefore, being arranged according to triads, as we have +said, of the demiurgic triad, indeed, Jupiter is allotted the highest +order, supernally from intellect governing souls and bodies, and as +Socrates says, taking care of all things. But Neptune here also gives +completion to the middle of the demiurgic [triad], and especially +governs the psychical order. For this God is the cause of motion, and +of all generation. But soul is the first of generated natures, and +is essentially motion. And Vulcan inspires the nature of bodies, and +fabricates all the mundane seats of the Gods. Again, of the guardian +and immutable triad, the first indeed is Vesta, because she preserves +the very being of things, and an undefiled essence. For Socrates in +the Cratylus gives to her the highest order, as connectedly containing +the summits of wholes. But Minerva preserves middle lives inflexible, +through intellection, and a self-energizing life, sustaining them from +[the incursions of] matter. And Mars illuminates corporeal-formed +natures with power, and an infrangible[56] strength, as Socrates says +in the Cratylus. Hence he is perfected by Minerva, and participates of +a more intellectual inspiration, as the poetry [of Orpheus] says, and +of a life separate from generated natures. + +Moreover, of the vivific triad, Ceres is the chief, entirely generating +all mundane life, viz. the intellectual, the psychical, and that which +is inseparable from body. But Juno contains the middle of the triad, +and imparts the generation of soul. For the intellectual goddess emits +from herself all the progressions of the other psychical genera. And +Diana is allotted the end of the triad, moving all natural reasons +into energy, and perfecting the imperfection[57] of matter. Hence +theologists, and Socrates in the Theætetus, call her _Lochia_, (or +the power that presides over births) as being the inspective guardian +of psychical progression and generation. Of the remaining triad, +therefore, the anagogic, or elevating, Hermes indeed is the supplier +of philosophy, and through this elevates souls, and by the dialectic +powers, sends upward both total and partial souls to the good itself. +But Venus is the first-effective cause of the amatory inspiration which +pervades through wholes, and familiarizes to the beautiful the lives +that are elevated by her. And Apollo perfects and converts all things +through music, convolving, as Socrates says [in the Cratylus], and +through harmony and rhythm attracting to intellectual truth, and the +light which is there. + +We say, however, in common respecting all of them, that establishing +themselves above the mundane Gods, they contain all the choir of +the liberated Gods. And souls indeed are suspended from them, but +intellectual souls, and such as are as it were powers generative of +souls. Hence Socrates also gives to them chariots. For Jupiter is said +to drive a winged chariot, and the other Gods after the same manner +as Jupiter use secondary vehicles. But what else can we say these are +than supermundane souls, on which they ride, and which are intellectual +indeed, but the sources of partibility and division, from which mundane +souls are allotted their hypostasis; a more abundant separation, and +a greater number of parts appearing in them, in consequence of their +being adapted to be bound through analogy? In the liberated Gods, +therefore, the psychical peculiarity unites itself to intellect. Hence +also, Jupiter is said to drive a winged chariot, without division, +in consequence of this chariot being intellectual, and not departing +from an immaterial and divine intellect. But in the mundane Gods, +divisions of horses and charioteers are delivered. [For Socrates says +in the Phædrus], “All the horses, therefore, and chariots of the Gods +are good, and consist of such things as are good.” Hence an energy +according to time first shines forth in the mundane Gods, where there +is a more abundant separation of powers. But in the liberated Gods, +time is always with eternity, and partibility with union. For they are +the principles of souls, and the causes of mundane natures, and are as +it were intellectual seeds abiding in the intellectual comprehensions +of themselves. And thus much concerning these things. + + + + + CHAPTER XXIII. + + +I wish, however, to show from other writings of Plato what the +peculiarity is which he exhibits to us of the liberated order. In +the Republic, therefore, teaching us the order of the universe which +pervades through the mundane wholes, supernally from the inerratic +sphere, and which governs the elections of human life that are +different at different times, this life also varying the measure of +justice adapted to it, he refers the first-effective cause of this +order to a monad and triad exempt from [the mundane] wholes. And to the +monad indeed, he gives the power of dominion, extending the authority +of it to all heaven, its empire being at one and the same time +impartibly present to all things, governing all things indivisibly, +and according to one energy, and moving wholes by the lowest powers +of itself. Giving also to the triad a progression from the monad, he +distributes from it into the universe a partible energy and production. +For that which is simple and united in exempt providence, is educed +into multitude through secondary inspection. Thus, therefore, the one +cause of multitude possesses a greater authority, but the distributed +cause appears to be more proximate to its effects. For all the variety +of powers in the world, the infinity of motions, and the multiform +difference of reasons, [i.e. of productive principles] are convolved +under the triad of the Fates. But again this triad is extended to +the one monad which is prior to the three Fates, and which Socrates +denominates Necessity, not as ruling over wholes by violence, nor as +obliterating the self-motive nature of our life, nor as deprived of +intellect and the most excellent knowledge, but as comprehending all +things intellectually, and introducing bound to things indefinite, and +order to things inordinate. And farther still, he thus denominates it, +as causing all things to be obedient to itself, and extending them +to good, as subjecting them to demiurgic sacred laws, as guarding +all things within the world, and as comprehending all things in the +universe in a circle, and leaving nothing deprived of the justice +pertaining to it, nor suffering it, besides this, to fly from the +divine law. + +Since, therefore, we give a twofold division to the causes of the order +of the world, and we admit one of the causes to be monadic, but the +other triadic, and we acknowledge that the monad is productive of the +triad, being persuaded by Plato, and since we have shown that the triad +is the offspring of the monad, let us see in what order it is possible +to arrange each of these. For wishing to learn this, we have undertaken +the present discussion concerning them. The monad, therefore, which, +as we have said, Socrates calls Necessity, is perfectly exempt from +mundane natures, and by the last of her powers imparts motion to all +heaven, neither being converted to it, nor energizing about it, but +imparting an orderly circulation to the world, by her very essence, and +by being firmly established. For [Socrates says] that the spindle is +moved on the knees of Necessity; but that she herself having royally +established herself on a throne near to the universe, governs the +heavens in a silent path. But the triad is now in a certain respect +co-arranged with the circulations of the heavens, convolves them with +hands, and energizes about them, and no longer causes them to revolve +by its very being alone [in the same manner as the monad]. For the +triad is the cause of the order and circulations of the universe, by +producing and performing a certain thing; though in this also there is +a different energy. For Lachesis indeed moves with both her hands; but +each of the remaining Parcæ, with one hand only. This however we shall +again discuss. But it is obvious to every one, that of this production +which subsists according to the monad, and the triad proceeding from +it, it must be granted that the monad is established in a more ancient +order of Gods, but the triad in an inferior order. + +We say, therefore, that Necessity who is called the mother of the +Parcæ, first subsists in the intellectual Gods, analogous to the +intelligible and intellectual monad of Adrastia; and that thence +being unfolded into light in the ruling orders, she generates this +triad of the Parcæ. For that which is total in providence, energy, +and the convolution of wholes by the very being itself of that which +convolves them, are indications of intellectual transcendency. To +extend, likewise, impartibly production to all things, is coequalized +with demiurgic dominion. And this Goddess appears to me to illuminate +all the progeny of the demiurgus with an ineffable guard. As likewise +he is the generator of wholes impartibly, thus too Necessity guards +inflexibly all things in herself, and comprehends them monadically, +preserving indissoluble the order which proceeds from the demiurgus +into the world. Necessity, therefore, being allotted such an authority +and kingdom in wholes, the triad of the Parcæ rules over the universe +in a liberated manner. For it comes into contact with the heavens, and +for a time relinquishes the contact, as Socrates says. And through +contact indeed, it is co-arranged with the bodies that are moved, and +is connascent with them; but through a retention of energies, it is +without contact, is separate from the things governed, and is exempt +from them. Being, however, at one and the same time allotted both these +peculiarities, it exists in the liberated Gods. For to touch, and +not to touch, to move and not to move, as the fable relates, are not +according to a part in the Gods, but are coexistent, and subsist with +each other at once. For divine natures do not change their energies +according to time, nor like partial souls, do they at one time energize +separately, and at another providentially attend to secondary natures; +but abiding in them selves they are every where present, and being +present to all things, they do not depart from the watch-tower of +themselves. At one and the same time, therefore, the being without +contact, and the coming into contact with the celestial periods, are +present with the Parcæ, and they also comprehend that which is exempt +and liberated from sensibles, according to one peculiarity, and that +which is co-arranged with, and allied to them. And on this account, +they possess a liberated order with reference to the whole heaven. + +If, however, there is also a mundane triad of the Parcæ, and a +providence proximate to the subjects of their government, it is not +wonderful. For of Jupiter, and Juno, Apollo and Minerva, there are +common progressions and co-arrangements, after the supercelestial +allotment, and together with the mundane Gods. For powers which give +completion to the last order of the Gods, approximate to the universe +from all the liberated Gods. But Socrates, celebrating the liberated +and supermundane kingdoms of the Parcæ, has represented them to us +as touching and not touching the whole circulations, dividing the +limitation[58] of their peculiarities, by mutation according to time. +For to relinquish [the contact] for a time, affords a representation +of a temporal mutation of energies. This, however, pertains to the +concealment which is adapted to divine fables. For fables introducing +generations of things unbegotten, compositions of things simple, and +distributions of things impartible, obumbrate under many veils the +truth of things. If, however, as fables call the transition from +cause to existence, generation, denominate the causal comprehension +of composite in simple natures, composition itself, and say that the +division of secondary about first natures, is the distribution of the +latter into parts,--thus also, if we do not apprehend according to +time, the alternately coming into contact with, and being separated +from things that are moved, conformably to the apparent meaning of the +fable, but according to the different peculiarities of the Parcæ,[59] +and an hypostasis mingled from the extremes, we shall be most near to +the conception of Plato. Here, therefore, let us terminate this, which +does not require much discussion at present. + +But let us consider the order of the Parcæ by itself. For of these, +some think that Lachesis should be arranged as the first, but others +as the last of the three. And of the remaining two, some give a prior +arrangement to Atropos, and place her in the order of a monad, but +others to Clotho. Since, however, Plato in the Laws clearly says, +that Lachesis is the first, Clotho the second, and Atropos the third, +I think that what is said in the Republic should be referred to this +definite order in them, and that we should not make any innovation by +following the mutable opinions of interpreters. Socrates, therefore, +says, that Lachesis sings the past, but Clotho the present, and +Atropos the future; here also in a similar manner using an order of +division conformably to their energies. And to Lachesis indeed he +gives predominance, and a uniform dominion over the rest. But he +gives to Clotho a dominion subordinate to that of Lachesis, but +more comprehensive than the kingdom of Atropos. And to Atropos he +attributes the third kingdom, which is comprehended by both the others, +and is arranged under them. The multitude, therefore, are ignorant +that Socrates uses the parts of time as symbols of the comprehension +according to cause. For the past was once the future, and the present, +but the future[60] is not yet the past, but has the whole of its +essence in existing in some after time. We must assume, therefore, +the triple causes analogous to these three parts of time; and say +that the cause which is the most perfect, and the most comprehensive +of the others, sings the past, as the cause of the others, and the +source of their energy. For the past is comprehensive of the future +and the present. But the second cause is the present,[61] which +partly comprehends, and is partly comprehended. For this prior to its +being the present was the future. And the third cause, and which is +comprehended by both the others, is the future. For this requires the +present and the past, the one unfolding it, but the other bounding +its progression. Lachesis, therefore, is the first-effective cause, +comprehending the other causes in herself; but each of the remaining +Parcæ is comprehended by her. And Clotho indeed is allotted a superior, +but Atropos an inferior order. And on this account, Lachesis indeed +moves with both her hands, as giving completion in a greater and more +total manner to those things which are effected by them more partially. +But Clotho turns the spindle with her right, and Atropos with her +left hand, so far as the former indeed is the primary leader of the +energies, but the latter follows, and governs all things in conjunction +with the former. For in mortal animals, the right hand is the principle +of motion; and in wholes, the motion to the right is comprehensive of +the motion to the left hand. On this account, therefore, the triad +of the Fates, in the Laws and in the Republic, is divided by Plato +according to the same order, into first, middle, and last. + +And not only in the before mentioned passages, but also at the end +of the fable, in which he leads the soul to the mortal place, and to +a polity the work of generation under the dæmon allotted to it as a +ruler, supernally from the heavens, and the summit of the universe, +he arranges souls under Lachesis as the first, under Clotho as the +second, and under Atropos as the third. And after these, when they +become perfectly situated under the throne of Necessity, he leads them +to the plain of Oblivion, and the river of Negligence. It is necessary, +therefore, either to disturb the descent of souls, and subvert the +continuity of remission, which the prefecture of the governing dæmon +affords to souls, or to assign to Lachesis a rank more elevated than +that of the other Parcæ; but to give to Clotho the second, and to +Atropos after the same manner the third rank. For the progression into +generation beginning from more perfect natures, and subsiding according +to a tendency to an earthly nature, originates indeed from Lachesis, +but ends in Atropos. + +Farther still, the lots, and the paradigms of lives, are extended to +souls from the knees of Lachesis, through the prophet as a medium. And +as the fable before said that the whole spindle is turned on the knees +of Necessity, thus also it suspends the providence about partial souls +from the knees of Lachesis, who moves the universe perpetually with +her hands, as with more elevated powers, but in her knees possesses +subordinately the causes of the psychical periods. Hence the prophet +in a remarkable manner celebrates this daughter of the Goddess: “This +is the speech of the virgin Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity.” But +again, Clotho is said to weave things consequent to the elections made +by souls, and to distribute to each of them an appropriate destiny. And +after her, Atropos imparts to the webs the immutable and the definite, +giving completion to the end of the canons of the Fates, and to the +order which extends from the universe to us. If, therefore, Lachesis +energizes in souls prior to their election, and after their choice is +made, defines all the periods of them in the realms of generation, by +the most beautiful boundaries; but the other Parcæ after the election +made by souls, allot them what is convenient, and connect their lives +with the order of the universe, does it not appear that Lachesis +precedes Clotho and Atropos, and that they follow her, and together +with her give completion to their appropriate providence? Lachesis, +therefore, appears to possess the second dignity of a mother with +respect to the other Parcæ, and to be a certain monad co-arranged with +them, just as Necessity in an exempt manner comprehends the powers of +all of them. But the other Parcæ are proximately indeed perfected under +Lachesis, but still higher than her, under Necessity. Such, therefore, +is the order of them according to the narration of Plato. + +The symbols, however, which the fable attributes to them, magnificently +celebrate their kingdoms. For their walking on the [celestial] +circles, signifies their exempt and separate dominion. But their +sitting on thrones, and not on the circles themselves, as the Sirens +do, indicates that the receptacles which are primarily illuminated +by them, are established above the celestial bodies. For a throne is +the vehicle and receptacle of those that are seated on it. And all +the participants of the participable Gods, are placed under them like +vehicles, and the [participable] Gods are eternally established in, +ride on, and energize through them. But the Fates being seated at equal +distances from each other, manifest the orderly separation of them, +their remission proceeding according to analogy, and the distribution +supernally derived to them from their mother. For from thence, that +which is arranged in progression, and that which is according to desert +in energies, are imparted to the Fates. + +Moreover, the having a crown on their heads, signifies that their +summits are surrounded with a divine light, and that they are adorned +by prolific and undefiled causes, through which also they fill the +heavens with generative power, and immutable purity. But their being +invested with white garments evinces that all their externally +emitted reasons, and the lives which they propose to themselves, are +intellectual and luciform, and full of divine splendour. And the +garments indeed appear to indicate the essences which participate of +the Fates; but the thrones, the receptacles in the first firmaments. +For with us also, garments are proximately connected with our bodies; +but vehicles are apprehended to be more remote from us. This, however, +is assumed from another theology, from which we are instructed in the +orders that are above the inerratic sphere. But the assertion that +one of the Fates sings the past, another the present, and the third +the future, evinces that all their externally proceeding energies are +elegant and intellectual, and full of harmony. For the Fates perfect +the songs of the Sirens, and the very orderly and elegant motions of +the heavens, and fill all things with their hymns; calling forth indeed +the production of their mother into the universe, through intellectual +hymns, but converting all things to themselves through the harmonious +motion of wholes. All these particulars, however, sufficiently +demonstrate to us the perfect, undefiled, and supercelestial order of +the Fates. + + + + + CHAPTER XXIV. + + +It remains, therefore, for us to adduce the Parmenides as a witness of +the doctrine concerning these gods. For Plato in that dialogue most +clearly delivers the one peculiarity of them. For after the progression +of the assimilative orders, in which the similar and dissimilar +shine forth to the view from intellectual sameness and difference, +at one time indeed according to analogy, but at another according to +a generation which is different [from that of the other orders], and +difficult to be surveyed, he demonstrates that _the one_ touches +and does not touch,[62] both itself and other things. For all the +divine genera after the demiurgic monad double their energies or +they are naturally adapted to energize both towards themselves, and +other things, posterior to themselves, rejoicing in progressions, +being subservient to the providence of secondary natures, through the +will of their father, and calling forth his supernatural, impartible, +and all-perfect production, and communicating the streams of it to +secondary natures. Does not, therefore, this contact and division +with things subordinate, represent to us the liberated peculiarity? +For to touch, is an indication of alliance with us, and of a +co-arranged providence. But again, not to touch, is an indication of +a transcendency exempt and separate from mundane natures. In what has +been before said, therefore, we have demonstrated that a thing of this +kind pertains to the genus of the liberated Gods, who at one and the +same time come into contact with celestial natures, and are expanded +above them, and proceed to all things with an unrestrained energy, +and free from all habitude. On this account also, we have placed the +Fates in the supercelestial order. For Socrates says that they touch +the [celestial] circulations; and in the Cratylus he asserts that the +mundane Core (or Proserpine) who associates with Pluto, and administers +the whole of generation, comes into contact with a mutable essence, and +that through this contact she is called Pherephatta. + +Farther still, in the Phædo, teaching us what the mode of the cathartic +life of souls is, he says “that the soul when it does not associate +with the body, comes into contact with [true] being.” Through all these +particulars, therefore, he indicates that contact is the work of an +inseparable providence, and of a co-arranged administration; but that +the negation of contact is the business of a prefecture, separate, +unrestrained, and exempt from the subjects of government. _The +one_, therefore, which touches and does not touch other things, is +conjoined with other things, and established above them. Hence, at one +and the same time it is allotted the power of things established above +the world, and of mundane natures. For being in the middle of both, +it comprehends in one the divided peculiarities of the extremes. And +moreover, it touches, and does not touch itself prior to other things; +because there are in it multitude, a separation of wholeness, and the +parts of wholeness, and a union collective of all the multitude. For +if it has proceeded from its principles, and if it energizes partibly, +it is various and multiform. For every progression diminishes indeed, +the powers of the proceeding natures, but increases the multitude +which is in them, and if it has not entirely proceeded, the uniform +nature of its essence shines forth to the view, at one and the same +time, with the multitude it contains. This genus of Gods, therefore, is +co-arranged with the mundane Gods, and transcends the subjects of its +government. It is also liberated, being separated from things which are +perfectly divided. Hence, if it is one and multitude, producing indeed +into secondary natures the many rivers of the fountains, but surpassing +partible allotments, it will at one and the same time touch and not +touch itself. On account of its separate union indeed, it is not in +want of contact; but on account of its progression into multitude, it +touches itself. “For it comprehends many things in itself, and touches +itself, so far as it is in itself,” says Parmenides.[1] In short, so +far as it is without contact, it is separate; but so far as it proceeds +from itself, and is again established in itself, it touches itself. +And so far indeed, as it is in other things, it comes into contact +with other things; but so far as it is uncoarranged with others, and +so far as it has not a co-ordinate number in them, it is separated +from them. At one and the same time therefore, this genus of Gods +is uniform and multiplied, and is uniformly varied. It also abides +and proceeds, and is participated by more imperfect natures, and is +imparticipable, existing prior to them. All these particulars, however, +are the elements of the supercelestial order, presenting to our view an +hypostasis mingled from perfectly divided peculiarities. And thus much +concerning the essence and hyparxis of these Gods, which Parmenides +exhibits to us in the above citation. + +It is necessary, however, to assume from the things placed before us, +the causes of the generation of these Gods. Since it is demonstrated, +therefore, that these divinities are according to union itself +beyond all partible separation, and contact, they will have their +progression from _the one_. For union is thence derived to all things, +from the first unity, which is exempt from all multitude, and all +division. But in consequence of their having pre-assumed the power +of touching themselves, according to a subsistence in self they +derive their existence from the unpolluted Gods. For the subsistence +in self in the first of the intellectual fathers, was the symbol +of a cause inflexible, and which immutably sustains multitude from +secondary natures. If, therefore, this one touches itself, on account +of a subsistence in self, it establishes multitude in _the one_, +and contains parts in wholeness, on account of undefiled power in +progression. And in the intellectual fathers, indeed, a subsistence +in self primarily shines forth to the view, and comprehends contact +causally, as was demonstrated to us through the first hypothesis. +But in the liberated Gods, a subsistence in self is according to +participation. Contact, however, is in this one according to essence, +and is consubsistent with the multitude it contains. + +Farther still, [_the one_] being in other things touches other things; +but not being co-arranged with them according to any common number, it +is separated from them. By this, therefore, Parmenides appears indeed +to form his reasoning from a subsistence in another; since that _the +one_ touches itself, was before demonstrated, through a subsistence in +itself. It is, however, wonderful that a subsistence in another is, in +the first progression,[64] superior to a subsistence in self, but in +the participation of the liberated Gods is subordinate to a subsistence +in self. For we say, that for a thing to come into contact, and be +co-arranged with other things, is in every respect more imperfect +than for it to convert multitude to itself. We must, therefore, say +that the liberated Gods have their progression from the demiurgic +and the assimilative order. Hence Parmenides does not say that _the +one_ is in another thing, but in other things. But other things are +primarily suspended from the [demiurgic] monad; but secondarily from +the assimilative Gods. The liberated Gods, therefore, from thence +receive their subsistence in others. For the demiurgic one being same +and different, imparts to them sameness and union exemptly. But the +assimilative one illuminates them with a separate similitude. But _the +one_ of the liberated Gods subsists now with others, so far as it is +co-arranged with them, and proximately presides over them. Again, +however, because it differs from the mundane unities, it is allotted +the whole of its appropriate number exempt from others. And thus other +things participating of no number which is common with this one, cannot +proximately participate of it. Hence the progression to the liberated +Gods, is from the first causes, and from causes that are arranged near +to them. For their progression is from _the one_; since as _the one_ +is exempt from intelligibles, thus also the liberated Gods are exempt +from sensibles. And their progression is likewise from the undefiled +order. For they have not the disencumbered from any other source than +that of immutable power, and the demiurgic cause. Being likewise +generated from the assimilative Gods, they receive a communion with +other things, and from themselves they are established above others. +For they establish their appropriate number above the subsistence of +other things. And thus much concerning these Gods may be assumed from +the Parmenides. But we have elsewhere accurately explained the several +particulars relating to them, and there is no occasion to write the +same things in the present treatise [as we have there written]. + + + + + BOOK VII. + + + + + CHAPTER I. + + +The mundane Gods, or those divinities who give completion to the +sensible world, are assigned the last order of deific progression, as +we are informed by Proclus in the preceding book. They also divide +the universe, and obtain perpetual allotments and receptacles in it, +and through these weave one and the best polity of the universe. Each +of the mundane genera likewise enjoy the energy of the liberated +governors of the universe, according to a measure adapted to each, +and especially such as are able to follow the powers of these Gods. +For in the Gods themselves we may perceive a twofold energy, the one +indeed being co-arranged with the subjects of their providential care, +but the other being exempt and separate. According, therefore, to +the first of these energies, the mundane Gods govern sensibles, and +convolve and convert them to themselves; but according to the other, +they follow the liberated Gods, and together with them are elevated +to an intelligible nature. The mundane Gods also perfectly unfold the +psychical peculiarity into light; and receive the illuminations of all +the divinities prior to them. Hence too, they rule over the universe +imitating the liberated Gods, adorn sublunary natures with forms, and +assimilate them to intellectual paradigms, imitating the ruling Gods. +They likewise pour forth the whole of the life which is inseparable +from body, from the one fountain of souls, establishing it as an image +of the life which is separate from a corporeal nature, and unite +themselves to this fountain. + +Again, the world is said by Plato in the Timæus to be the image of the +eternal, i.e. of the intelligible Gods. For it is filled from them +with deity, and the progressions into it of the mundane Gods, are as +it were certain rivers and illuminations of the intelligible Gods. +These progressions also the world receives, not only according to the +celestial part of it, but according to the whole of itself. For in the +air, the earth and sea, there are advents of terrestrial, aquatic, +and aerial Gods. Hence the world is throughout filled with deity; and +on this account is according to the whole of itself the image of the +intelligible Gods. Not that it receives indeed these Gods themselves; +for images do not receive the exempt essences of the total Gods; but +illuminations poured from thence on the secondary orders, to the +reception of which they are commensurate. + +Farther still, of the mundane Gods, some are the causes of the +existence of the world; others animate it; others again harmonize +it thus composed of different natures; and others, lastly, guard +and preserve it when harmonically arranged. And since these orders +are four, and each consists of things first, middle and last, it is +necessary that the disposers of these should be twelve. Hence Jupiter, +Neptune, and Vulcan, fabricate the world; Ceres, Juno and Diana animate +it; Mercury, Venus, and Apollo harmonize it; and lastly, Vesta, +Minerva, and Mars, preside over it with a guardian power. But the truth +of this may be seen in statues as in enigmas. For Apollo harmonizes the +lyre; Pallas is invested with arms; and Venus is naked; since harmony +generates beauty, and beauty is not concealed in objects of sensible +inspection. Since, however, these Gods primarily possess the world, it +is necessary to consider the other mundane Gods as subsisting in these; +as Bacchus in Jupiter, Esculapius in Apollo, and the Graces in Venus. +We may likewise, behold the spheres with which they are connected; viz. +Vesta with earth, Neptune with water, Juno with air, and Vulcan with +fire. But the six superior Gods we denominate from general custom. For +Apollo and Diana are assumed for the sun and moon; but the orb of +Saturn is attributed to Ceres; æther to Pallas; and heaven is common +to them all. And thus much concerning the mundane Gods in general, the +sources of their progression, their orders, powers, and spheres.[65] + + + + + CHAPTER II. + + +The division, however, of the mundane Gods is into the celestial and +sublunary. And of the celestial, the divinity of the inerratic sphere +has the relation of a monad to the divinities of the planets. But +the triad under this monad consists of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars; of +which the first is the cause of connected comprehension, the second of +symmetry, and the third of division and separation. And again, with +respect to the sublunary deities, the moon ranks as a monad, being +the cause of all generation and corruption. But the triad under it, +consists of the divinities who preside over the elements of air, water +and earth. Between these are the planets that revolve with an equal +velocity. And of these, the sun indeed unfolds truth into light, Venus +beauty, and Mercury the symmetry of reasons or productive principles, +conformably to the analogy of the three monads mentioned by Plato in +the Philebus, as subsisting in the vestibule of _the good_. It may +also be said that the moon is the cause of nature to the mortal genera, +being the visible image of the fontal nature existing in the goddess +Rhea. But the sun is the fabricator of all the senses, because he is +the author of seeing and of being seen. Mercury is the cause of the +motions of the phantasy; for the sun gives subsistence to the essence +of the phantasy, so far as it is the same with sense. But Venus is +the cause of the appetites of that irrational part of the soul which +is called desire; and Mars, of those irascible motions which are +conformable to nature. Jupiter also, is the common cause of all vital, +and Saturn of all gnostic powers. For all the irrational forms may be +divided into these. The causes, therefore, of these, are antecedently +comprehended in the celestial Gods, and in the spheres with which they +are connected. + +The allotments also of the mundane Gods are conformable to the +divisions of the universe. But the universe is divided by demiurgic +numbers, viz. by the duad, triad, tetrad, pentad, hebdomad, and +dodecad. For after the one fabrication of things by the demiurgus, +the division of the universe into two parts, heaven and generation +(or the sublunary region), gives subsistence to twofold allotments, +the celestial and the sublunary. After this, the triad divides +the universe, to which Homer alludes when he says that Neptune is +allotted the hoary deep, Jupiter, the extended heavens, and Pluto, the +subterranean darkness. But after the triple distribution, the tetradic +follows, which gives a fourfold arrangement to the elements in the +universe, as the Pythagoreans say, viz. the celestial and the ethereal, +above the earth and under the earth. The universe also receives a +division into five parts. For the world is one and quintuple, and +is appropriately divided by celestial, empyreal, aerial, aquatic +and terrestrial figures and presiding Gods. After this follows its +division into seven parts. For the heptad beginning supernally from the +inerratic sphere, pervades through all the elements. And in the last +place is the division of the universe by the dodecad, viz. into the +sphere of the fixed stars, the spheres of the seven planets, and the +spheres of the four elements. + +Moreover, the allotment of angels and dæmons is co-suspended from +the divine allotments, but has a more various distribution. For one +divine allotment comprehends in itself many angelic, and a still +greater number of dæmoniacal allotments; since every angel rules over +many dæmons, and every angelic allotment is surrounded with numerous +dæmoniacal allotments. For what a monad is in the Gods, that a tribe +is among dæmons. Here, therefore, instead of the triad we must assume +three compositions, and instead of the tetrad or dodecad, four or +twelve choirs following their respective leaders. And thus we shall +always preserve the higher allotments. For as in essences, powers and +energies, progressions generate multitude; thus also in allotments, +such as are first, have a precedency in power, but are diminished in +multitude, as being nearer to the one father of the universe, and the +whole and one providence which extends to all things. But secondary +allotments, have a diminution of power, but an increase of multitude. +And thus much concerning allotments in general. + +Since, however, according to a division of the universe into two parts, +we have distributed allotments into the celestial and sublunary, +there can be no doubt what the former are, and whether they possess +an invariable sameness of subsistence. But the sublunary allotments +are deservedly a subject of admiration, whether they are said to be +perpetual or not. For since all things in generation are continually +changing and flowing, how can the allotments of the providential +rulers of them be said to be perpetual? For things in generation are +not perpetual. But if their allotments are not perpetual, how is it +possible to suppose that divine government can subsist differently at +different times? For an allotment is neither a certain separate energy +of the Gods, so that sublunary natures changing, we might say that +it is exempt and remains immutable, nor is it that which is governed +alone, so that no absurdity would follow from admitting that an +allotment is in a flowing condition, and is conversant with all-various +mutations; but it is a providential inspection, and unrestrained +government of divinity over sublunary concerns. Such being the doubts +with which this subject is attended, the following appears to be the +only solution of the difficulty. + +We must say then, that it is not proper to consider all the natures +that are in generation and generation itself, as alone consisting of +things mutable and flowing, but that there is also something immutable +in these, and which is naturally adapted to remain perpetually the +same. For the interval which receives and comprehends in itself all the +parts of the world, and which has an arrangement through all bodies, +is immoveable, lest being moved it should require another place, and +thus should proceed from one receptacle to another ad infinitum. The +etherial vehicles also of divine souls with which they are circularly +invested, and which imitate the lives in the heavens, have a +perpetual essence, and are eternally suspended from these divine souls +themselves, being full of prolific powers, and performing a circular +motion, according to a certain secondary revolution of the celestial +orbs. And in the third place the wholeness (ολοτης) of the elements +has a permanent subsistence, though the parts are all-variously +corrupted. For it is necessary that every form in the universe should +be never failing, in order that the universe may be perfect, and that +being generated from an immoveable cause, it may be immoveable in its +essence. But every wholeness is a form; or rather it is that which it +is said to be through the participation of one all-perfect form. + +And here we may see the orderly progression of the nature of bodies. +For the interval of the universe is immoveable according to every kind +of motion. But the vehicles of divine souls alone receive a mutation +according to place; for such a motion as this, is most remote from +essential mutation. And the wholeness of the elements admits in its +parts the other motions of bodies, but the whole remains perfectly +immutable. The celestial allotments also which proximately divide +the interval of the universe, co-distribute likewise the heavens +themselves. But those in the sublunary region, are primarily indeed +allotted the parts which are in the interval of the universe, but +afterwards they make a distribution according to the definite vehicles +of souls. And in the third place, they remain perpetually the same +according to the total parts of generation. The allotments of the Gods +therefore do not change, nor do they subsist differently at different +times; for they have not their subsistence proximately in that which +may be changed. + +How therefore do the illuminations of the Gods accede to these? How +are the dissolutions of sacred rites effected? And how is the same +place at different times under the influence of different spirits? +May it not be said, that since the Gods have perpetual allotments, +and divide the earth according to divine numbers, similarly to the +sections of the heavens, the parts of the earth also are illuminated, +so far as they participate of aptitude. But the circulation of the +heavenly bodies, through the figures which they possess produce this +aptitude; divine illumination at the same time imparting a power more +excellent than the nature which is present to these parts of the earth. +This aptitude is also effected by nature herself as a whole inserting +divine impressions in each of the illuminated parts, through which they +spontaneously participate of the Gods. For as these parts depend on +the Gods, nature inserts in such of them as are different, different +images of the divinities. Times too co-operate in producing this +aptitude, according to which other things also are governed; the proper +temperature of the air; and in short, every thing by which we are +surrounded contributes to the increase and diminution of this aptitude. +When therefore conformably to a concurrence of these many causes, an +aptitude to the participation of the Gods is ingenerated in some one of +the natures which are disposed to be changed, then a certain divinity +is unfolded into light, which prior to this was concealed through +the inaptitude of the recipients; possessing indeed his appropriate +allotment eternally, and always extending the participation of +himself, similarly to illuminations from the sun, but not being always +participated by sublunary natures, in consequence of their inaptitude +to such participation. For as with respect to partial souls such as +ours, which at different times embrace different lives, some of them +indeed, choose lives accommodated to their appropriate Gods, but others +foreign lives, through oblivion of the divinities to whom they belong; +thus also with respect to sacred places, some are adapted to the power +which there receives its allotment, but others are suspended from a +different order. And on this account, as the Athenian guest in Plato +says, some places are more fortunate, but others more unfortunate. + +The divine Iamblichus however, doubts how the Gods are said to be +allotted certain places according to definite times, as by Plato in the +Timæus, Minerva is said to have been first allotted the guardianship of +Athens, and afterwards of Sais. For if their allotment commenced from +a certain time, it will also at a certain time cease. For every thing +which is measured by time is of this kind. And farther still was the +place which at a certain time they are allotted, without a presiding +deity prior to this allotment, or was it under the government of other +Gods? For if it was without a presiding deity, how is it to be admitted +that a certain part of the universe was once entirely destitute of +divinity? How can any place remain without the guardianship of superior +beings? And, if any place is sufficient to the preservation of itself, +how does it afterwards become the allotment of some one of the Gods? +But if it should be said that it is afterwards under the government of +another God, of whom it becomes the allotment, this also is absurd. +For the second God does not divulse the government and allotment of +the former, nor do the Gods alternately occupy the places of each +other, nor dæmons change their allotments. Such being the doubts on +this subject, he solves them by saying that the allotments of the Gods +remain perpetually unchanged, but that the participants of them, at one +time indeed enjoy the beneficent influence of the presiding powers, but +at another are deprived of it. He adds that these are the mutations +measured by time, which sacred institutes frequently call the birth-day +of the Gods.[66] + + + + + CHAPTER III. + + +In the next place, it is necessary to observe of the mundane Gods +that they do not obtain the rank which they hold in the universe from +any habitude or arrangement towards bodies; for they are all of them +essentially liberated from body, unrestrained in their energies, and +have no proximity or alliance to a corporeal nature. For bodies are +ministrant to them, and are subservient to the generation of mutable +essences. Hence they are not in bodies, but rule over them externally; +so that they are not changed together with them. Farther still, they +impart from themselves to bodies, every good which they are capable +of receiving, but do not in return receive any thing from bodies; and +consequently they do not receive certain peculiarities from them. +For if indeed they had a subsistence like the habits of bodies, or +like material forms, or were corporeal after any other manner, it +might perhaps be possible for them to be transmuted together with +the differences of bodies. But if they antecedently subsist separate +from bodies, and are essentially unmingled with them, what reasonable +distinction can they derive from a corporeal nature? To which may be +added, that such an hypothesis makes bodies to be better than the +divine genera, if they afford a seat to more excellent causes, and +essentially insert in them characteristic peculiarities. He therefore, +who co-arranges the allotments and distributions of the governors with +the governed, will evidently ascribe authority and dominion to better +natures. For because the presiding powers possess such peculiarities, +on this account they chuse such an allotment, and give it essentially +a specific distinction; but the allotment itself is not assimilated to +the nature of the recipient. + +With respect indeed to partial souls such as ours it is requisite to +admit that such as is the life which it emitted before it was inserted +in a human body, such also will be the organic body with which it is +connected, and such will be the nature consequent to it, and which +receives from the soul a more perfect life. But with respect to the +natures superior to man, and which have dominion as wholes, it must be +admitted, that inferior are produced in more excellent natures, bodies +in incorporeal essences, and fabrications in the fabricators of them, +and that being circularly comprehended in them, they are governed +according to invariable rectitude. The circulations therefore of the +celestial orbs are primarily inserted in the celestial circulations +of the etherial soul, in which they are perpetually inherent. And +the souls of the spheres being extended to the intellect which they +participate, are perfectly comprehended by, and are primarily generated +in it. Intellect also, both that which is partial, and that which +is universal, are comprehended in the more excellent genera. Since +therefore secondary natures are always converted to such as are first, +and superior natures as paradigms are the leaders of those that are +subordinate, both essence and form are derived from more excellent +beings to those of an inferior rank, and the latter are primarily +produced in the former, so as to derive from them order and measure, +and the properties by which they are characterized; while on the +contrary such properties do not flow from subordinate natures to such +as have a precedency and a greater dignity of essence. + +In short, neither are the Gods held in subjection by certain parts +of the world, nor are terrestrial natures destitute of their +all-preserving influence; but superior powers at the same time that +they comprehend all things in themselves, are not comprehended +by any thing. And terrestrial natures having their very being in +the plenitudes of the Gods, when they become adapted to divine +participation, immediately prior to their own proper essence manifestly +possess the Gods which latently pre-subsisted in it.[67] + +Farther still, divinity whether it is allotted certain portions of +the universe, such as the heavens or the earth, or sacred cities and +regions, or certain groves and sacred statues, illuminates all these +externally, viz. without any alliance to the things themselves, in +the same manner as the sun externally enlightens all things with its +rays; except that in the latter instance, the illuminating cause is +locally, but in the former is impassively, unextendedly, and in short +incorporeally external. As therefore, the solar light comprehends +in itself the illuminated objects, thus also the power of the Gods, +externally comprehends its participants. And as light is present with +the air, without being essentially mingled with it; which is evident +from no light remaining in the air, when once the illuminating source +has departed, though heat is present with it when that which heated +is entirely withdrawn; thus also the light of the Gods illuminates in +a separate manner, and being firmly established in itself, pervades +totally through all things. Indeed, this visible light of the sun, is +one, continued, and is every where the same whole, so that it is not +possible for any part of it to be separated and cut off from the rest, +nor to inclose it on all sides, nor divulge it from its source. After +the same manner therefore, the whole world being partible, is divided +about the one impartible light of the Gods. But this light is one +and every where the same whole, and is impartibly present to all the +natures that are able to partake of it. It likewise fills all things +through an all-perfect power, and bounds in itself wholes, by a certain +infinite causal transcendency; is every where united to itself, and +conjoins the terminations with the beginnings of things. But all heaven +and the world imitating this light, is circularly convolved, is united +to itself, conducts the elements in their circular motion, causes all +things to be in, and tend to each other, and ends to have juxtaposition +with their principles, and produces one connexion and consent of wholes +with wholes. + +He therefore who surveys this visible image of the Gods (the world) +thus united in itself, will be ashamed to have a different opinion +of the Gods the causes of it, and to introduce in them divisions, +obstructions, and corporeal circumscriptions. For if there is no ratio, +no habitude of symmetry, no communion of essence, no connexion either +according to power or energy, between the adorning cause and adorned +effect; if this be the case, in the former there is neither a certain +extension according to interval, nor any local comprehension, or any +partible interception, nor any other similar innate equalization in +the manner in which the Gods are present. For in things which are of +a kindred nature either according to essence or power, or which are +in a certain respect similar in species, or homogeneous, a certain +mutual comprehension or retention may be perceived; but what coercion, +or transition through the universe, or partible circumscription, or +local comprehension, or any thing else of the like kind can there be in +natures perfectly exempt from the whole of things? For the participants +indeed of the divinities are such, that some of them participate +etherially, others aerially, and others aquatically of a divine +nature. And this the ancients perceiving, employed in their divine +operations, adaptations and invocations, conformably to a division of +this kind. And thus much concerning the distribution of the Gods in the +world.[68] + + + + + CHAPTER IV. + + +If, however, the mundane as well as the supermundane Gods are +incorporeal, it may be asked how the visible celestial orbs can be +Gods? To this we reply, that the celestial Gods are not comprehended +by bodies, but that they contain bodies in their divine lives and +energies; that they are not converted to body, but that the body +which is suspended from their essence is converted to a divine cause; +and that body is no impediment to their intellectual and incorporeal +perfection, and is not the cause of any molestation to them by its +intervention. Hence it does not require an abundant care and attention, +but spontaneously and after a certain manner self-motively follows +the divinities with which it is connected, not being in want of any +manuduction, but by its elevation to the one of the Gods, is also +itself uniformly raised by itself. + +Indeed, a celestial body is allied in the most eminent degree to the +incorporeal essence of the Gods. For as the latter is characterized +by unity, so the former is simple. As that is impartible, this is +indivisible. And as that is immutable, this after a similar manner is +unchanged in quality. If also it is admitted that the energies of the +Gods are uniform, this body likewise has one circulation. Besides this, +it imitates the sameness of the Gods, by its perpetual and invariable +motion according to, and towards the same things, conformably to one +reason and order. It likewise imitates the divine life of the Gods by +the life which is connascent with the ethereal bodies. Hence, neither +is a celestial body so constituted as if composed of contrary and +different natures, as is the case with our bodies; nor does the soul +of the celestial Gods so coalesce with the body suspended from it, as +to form one animal from the two; but the animals of these divinities +are perfectly similar and united to the Gods from whom they depend; +and are throughout whole, uniform, and free from all composition. For +more excellent natures always subsisting with invariable sameness in +themselves, but inferior being suspended from the dominion of superior +beings, yet so as never to draw down this dominion to themselves, +wholes likewise being collected into one order and one perfection, +and after a certain manner all things in the celestial Gods being +incorporeal and throughout divine, because the divine form universally +predominates in them,--this being the case, one total essence in the +nature of these divinities every where prevails. And thus the visible +celestial orbs are all of them Gods, and are after a certain manner +incorporeal.[69] + +If, therefore, these divinities as being incorporeal, intellectual, +and united, ride as it were in the celestial spheres, they have their +origin in the intelligible world, and there intellectually perceiving +the divine forms of themselves, they govern the whole of heaven +according to one infinite energy. And if being present to the heavens +in a separate manner, they lead its perpetual circulations by their +will alone, they are themselves unmingled with a sensible nature, and +are consubsistent with the intelligible Gods. Indeed, the celestial +orbs, those visible statues as it were of the Gods, are generated from, +and subsist about, the intelligible Gods, and being thus generated +are established in them, and have the image elevated to them which +from them also receives its perfection. The divine intellectual forms +also which are present to the visible bodies of the Gods, have a +subsistence prior to them in a separate manner; but the unmingled and +supercelestial intelligible paradigms of them, abide in themselves, +containing all things simultaneously in one, according to the eternal +transcendency of their nature. + +Hence there is one common indivisible bond of them according to +intellectual energies. There is also the same bond between them +according to the common participations of forms, since there is +nothing to intercept them, nor any intervening medium. Indeed, an +immaterial and incorporeal essence, being neither separated by places +nor subjects, nor defined by any divisible circumscriptions of parts, +immediately coalesces in sameness; and the elevation of wholes to _the +one_, and the universal dominion of _the one_, collects the communion +of the mundane Gods with the divinities that presubsist in the +intelligible world. + +Farther still, the intellectual conversion of secondary to first +natures, and the gift of the same essence and power from the primary to +the secondary Gods connects their congress into an indissoluble one. +In things of different essences indeed, such as soul and body, and in +things of different species, such as material forms, and those natures +which in any other way are separated from each other, the connascent +union is adventitious, being derived from supernal causes, and lost +in certain definite periods of time. But the higher we ascend, to the +sameness of first causes, both according to form and according to +essence, and the more we raise ourselves from parts to wholes, by so +much the more shall we discover and survey that union which is eternal, +precedaneous and more principal, and which contains about and in itself +difference and multitude. + +Since, however, the order of all the Gods consists in union, and the +first and second genera of them, and the multitude which germinates +about them coexist in unity; since also every thing in them is +characterized by _the one_; hence the beginning, middle, and end +of their essence consubsists according to _the one_. It is not +proper, therefore, to enquire whence unity extends to all things in +them; for their very being, whatever it may be, consists in _the +one_. And secondary genera indeed remain with invariable sameness +in _the one_ of the first genera. But the latter impart from +themselves union to the former; while all of them possess in each other +the communion of an indissoluble connexion. + +From this cause, therefore, the perfectly incorporeal Gods, are united +to the sensible Gods who are connected with bodies. For the visible +Gods themselves are external to bodies, and on this account are in +the intelligible world. And the intelligible Gods on account of their +infinite union comprehend in themselves the apparent divinities; while +in the mean time both these are established according to a common union +and one energy. In a similar manner, this likewise is the illustrious +prerogative of a deific cause and orderly distribution, that the same +union of all things pervades from on high as far as to the end of the +divine order. And thus much concerning the contact of the sensible with +the intelligible Gods.[70] + + + + + CHAPTER V. + + +What has been above delivered concerning the mundane Gods is perfectly +conformable to the doctrine of Plato, as delivered by him in the +Timæus, in the speech[71] of the demiurgus to the junior Gods. For it +is there said, “When, therefore, all such Gods as visibly revolve, +and all such as become apparent when they please, were generated, he +who fabricated this universe thus addressed them: Gods of Gods, of +whom I am the demiurgus and father, whatever is generated by me is +indissoluble, such being my will in its fabrication. Indeed every thing +which is bound is dissoluble; but to be willing to dissolve that which +is beautifully harmonized and well composed is the property of an evil +nature. Hence, so far as you are generated, you are not immortal, nor +in every respect indissoluble, yet you shall never be dissolved, nor +become subject to the fatality of death; my will being a much greater +and more excellent bond than the vital connectives with which you were +bound at the commencement of your generation. Learn now, therefore, +what I say to you indicating my desire. Three genera of mortals yet +remain to be produced. Without the generation of these, therefore, +the universe will be imperfect; for it will not contain every kind of +animal in its spacious extent. But it ought to contain them, that it +may be sufficiently perfect. Yet if these are generated and participate +of life through me they will become equal to the Gods. That mortal +natures, therefore, may subsist, and that the universe may be truly +all, convert yourselves according to your nature to the fabrication +of animals, imitating the power which I employed in your generation. +And whatever among these is of such a nature as to deserve the same +appellation with immortals, which is called divine, obtains sovereignty +in them, and willingly pursues justice and reverences you,--of this +I myself will deliver the seed and beginning. It is your business +to accomplish the rest; to weave together the mortal and immortal +nature; by this mean fabricating and generating animals, causing them +to increase by supplying them with nutriment, and receiving them back +again when dissolved by corruption.” + +As the commentary of Proclus on this speech most admirably unfolds +its recondite meaning, and is at the same time replete with the most +interesting information respecting the mundane Gods, I shall give the +following extracts from it, in which the most magnificent exuberance of +diction is combined with the greatest fecundity and scientific accuracy +of conception. + +“The scope of this speech (says Proclus) is to insert demiurgic power +and providence in the mundane genera of Gods, to lead them forth to +the generation of the remaining kinds of animals, and to place them +over mortals, analogously to the father of wholes over the one orderly +distribution of the universe. For it is necessary that some things +should be primarily generated by the demiurgic monad, and others +through other media; the Demiurgus, indeed, producing all things from +himself, at once and eternally, but the things produced in order, and +first proceeding from him, producing together with him the natures +posterior to themselves. Thus, for instance, the celestial produce +sublunary Gods, and these generate mortal animals; the Demiurgus at +the same time fabricating these in conjunction with the celestial and +sublunary divinities. For in speaking he understands all things, and by +understanding all things he also makes the mortal genera of animals; +these requiring another proximate generating cause, so far as they +are mortal, and through this receiving a progression into being. But +the character of the words is enthusiastic, shining with intellectual +intuitions, pure and venerable as being perfected by the father of the +Gods, differing from and transcending human conceptions, delicate and +at the same time terrific, full of grace and beauty--at once concise +and perfectly accurate. Plato, therefore, particularly studies these +things in the imitations of divine speeches; as he also evinces in the +Republic, when he represents the Muses speaking sublimely, and the +prophet ascending to a lofty seat. He also adorns both these speeches +with conciseness and venerableness, employing the accurate powers of +colons, directly shadowing forth divine intellections through such a +form of words. But in the words before us he omits no transcendency +either of the grand and robust in the sentences and the names +adapted to these devices, or of magnitude in the conceptions and the +figures which give completion to this idea. Besides this, also, much +distinction and purity, the unfolding of truth, and the illustrious +prerogatives of beauty, are mingled with the idea of magnitude, this +being especially adapted to the subject things, to the speaker, and to +the hearers. For the objects of this speech are, the perfection of the +universe, an assimilation to all-perfect animal [i.e. to its paradigm], +and the generation of all mortal animals; the maker of all things, at +the same time, presubsisting and adorning all things through exempt +transcendency; but the secondary fabricators adding what was wanting +to the formation of the universe. All, therefore, being great and +divine, as well the persons as the things, and shining with beauty and +a distinction from each other, Plato has employed words adapted to the +form of the speech. + +“Homer, also, when energizing enthusiastically, represents Jupiter +speaking, converting to himself the two-fold co-ordinations of Gods; +becoming himself, as it were, the centre of all the divine genera in +the world, and making all things obedient to his intellection. But +at one time he conjoins the multitude of Gods with himself without a +medium, and at another through Themis as the medium. + + But Jove to Themis gives command to call + The Gods to council. + +“This Goddess pervading everywhere collects the divine number, and +converts it to the demiurgic monad. For the Gods are both separate +from mundane affairs, and eternally provide for all things, being at +the same time exempt from them through the highest transcendency, and +extending their providence everywhere. For their unmingled nature +is not without providential energy, nor is their providence mingled +with matter. Through transcendency of power they are not filled +with the subjects of their government, and through beneficent will, +they make all things similar to themselves; in permanently abiding, +proceeding, and in being separated from all things, being similarly +present to all things. Since, therefore, the Gods that govern the +world, and the dæmons the attendants of these, receive after this +manner unmingled purity, and providential administration from their +father; at one time he converts them to himself without a medium, and +illuminates them with a separate, unmingled, and pure form of life. +Whence also I think he orders them to be separated from all things, +to remain exempt in Olympus, and neither convert themselves to Greeks +nor Barbarians; which is just the same as to say, that they must +transcend the two-fold orders of mundane natures, and abide immutably +in undefiled intellection. But at another time he converts them to a +providential attention to secondary natures, through Themis, and calls +upon them to direct the mundane battle, and excites different Gods +to different works. These divinities, therefore, especially require +the assistance of Themis, who contains in herself the divine laws, +according to which providence is intimately connected with wholes. +Homer, therefore, divinely delivers two-fold speeches, accompanying +the two-fold energies of Jupiter; but Plato, through this one speech, +comprehends those two-fold modes of discourse. For the Demiurgus +renders the Gods unmingled with secondary natures, and causes them to +provide for, and give existence to, mortals. But he orders them to +fabricate in imitation of himself: and in an injunction of this kind, +both these are comprehended, viz. the unmingled through the imitation +of the father, for he is separate, being exempt from mundane wholes; +but providential energy, through the command to fabricate, nourish, and +increase mortal natures. Or rather, we may survey both in each; for +in imitating the demiurgus, they provide for secondary natures, as he +does for the immortals; and in fabricating they are separate from the +things fabricated. For every demiurgic cause is exempt from the things +generated by it; but that which is mingled with and filled from them is +imbecil and inefficacious, and is unable to adorn and fabricate them. +And thus much in common respecting the whole of the speech. + +“Let us then, in the first place, consider what we are to understand by +“Gods of Gods,” and what power it possesses: for that this invocation +is collective and convertive of multitude to its monad, that it calls +upwards the natures which have proceeded to the one fabrication of +them, and inserts a boundary and divine measure in them, is clear to +those who are not entirely unacquainted with such-like discourses. But +how those that are allotted the world by their father are called Gods +of Gods, and according to what conception, cannot easily be indicated +to the many; for there is an unfolding of one divine intelligence in +these names.” Proclus then proceeds to relate the explanations given +by others of these words; which having rejected as erroneous, he very +properly, in my opinion, adopts the following, which is that of his +preceptor, the great Syrianus. “All the mundane Gods are not simply +Gods, but they are wholly Gods which participate: for there is in them +that which is separate, unapparent, and supermundane, and also that +which is the apparent image of them, and has an orderly establishment +in the world. And that, indeed, which is unapparent in them is +primarily a God, this being undistributed and one: but this vehicle +which is suspended from their unapparent essence is secondarily a God. +For if, with respect to us, man is two-fold, one inward, according to +the soul, the other apparent, which we see, much more must both these +be asserted of the mundane Gods; since divinity also is two-fold, one +unapparent and the other apparent. This being the case, we must say, +that “Gods of Gods” is addressed to all the mundane divinities, in whom +there is a connection of unapparent with apparent Gods: for they are +Gods that participate. In short, since two-fold orders are produced +by the Demiurgus, some being supermundane, and others mundane, and +some being without, and others with participation [of body], if the +Demiurgus now addressed the supermundane orders, he would have alone +said to them, “Gods:” for they are without participation [i.e. without +the participation of body], are separate and unapparent:--but since the +speech is to the mundane Gods, he calls them Gods of Gods, as being +participated by other apparent divinities. In these also dæmons are +comprehended; for they also are Gods, as to their order with respect +to the Gods, whose peculiarity they indivisibly participate. Thus also +Plato, in the Phædrus, when he calls the twelve Gods the leaders +of dæmons, at the same time denominates all the attendants of the +divinities Gods, adding, ‘and this is the life of the Gods.’ All these, +therefore, are Gods of Gods, as possessing the apparent connected with +the unapparent, and the mundane with the supermundane. + + + + + CHAPTER VI. + + +And thus much concerning the whole conception of the speech. It is +necessary, however, since we have said the words are demiurgic or +fabricative, that they should be received in a manner adapted to +demiurgic providence. But if these words are intellectual conceptions, +and the intellectual conceptions themselves are productions, what shall +we say the demiurgus effects in the multitude of mundane Gods by the +first words of his speech? Is it not evident we must say that this +energy of his is deific? For this one divine intellectual conception +which is the first and most simple proceeding from the demiurgus, +deifies all the recipients of it, and makes them demiurgic Gods, +participated Gods, and Gods unapparent, and at the same time apparent. +For this, as has been said, is the meaning of “Gods of Gods.” For +the term Gods is not alone adapted to them; since they are not alone +unapparent; nor the word Gods twice enunciated, as if some one should +say Gods and Gods; for every bond of this kind is artificial, and +foreign from divine union. + +It is also necessary to observe that every mundane God has an animal +suspended from him, according to which he is denominated mundane. He +has likewise a divine soul, which rules over its depending vehicle; and +an immaterial and separate intellect, according to which he is united +to the intelligible, in order that he may imitate the world in which +all these are contained. And by the animal suspended from him, he is +indeed a part of the sensible universe; but by intellect he belongs to +an intelligible essence; and by soul he conjoins the impartible life +which is in him, with the life that is divisible about body. Such a +composition, however, being triple in each mundane God, neither does +Plato here deliver the demiurgus speaking to intellects; for intellects +subsist in unproceeding union with the divine intellect, and are +entirely unbegotten; but soul is the first of generated natures, and +a little after the demiurgus addresses these when he says, “since ye +are generated.” Nor does he represent the demiurgus as speaking only +to the animals which are suspended from the souls of these Gods; for +they pertain to corporeal natures, and are not adapted to enjoy the one +demiurgic intelligence, without a medium. Nor yet does he represent him +as speaking to souls by themselves; for they are entirely immortal; +but the Gods whom he now addresses are said by him not[72] to be in +every respect immortal. If therefore it be requisite for me to say +what appears to me to be the truth, the words of the demiurgus are +addressed to the composite from soul and animal, viz. to the animal +which is divine, and partakes of a soul. For intellect does not know +the demiurgic will through reason, but through intelligence, or in +other words, through intellectual vision; nor through conversion, but +through a union with that intellect which ranks as a whole, as being +itself intellect, and as it were of the same colour with it. But soul +as being reason, and not intellect itself, requires appropriately +to its essence the energy of reason, and a rational conversion to +the intelligible.[73] To these, therefore, as being essentially +rational, and as being essentialized in reasons, the demiurgic speech +proceeds. And it is adapted to them in a twofold respect; first, as +being participated by bodies; for they are Gods of those Gods; and +secondly, as participating of intellects; for they are Gods of [viz. +derived from] intellects which are also Gods. And they participate of +intellects, and are participable by bodies. Hence the assertions that +they are generated, and that they are not entirely immortal, and every +thing else in the speech, are appropriately adapted to them, so far as +they have a certain co-ordination and connexion with mundane natures, +and so far as they are participated by them. But the mandates “learn +and generate,” and every thing else of this kind which is more divine +than generated natures, are adapted to them as intellectual essences. + +Let us in the next place attend to the meaning of the words, “Of +whom I am the demiurgus and father, whatever is generated by me is +indissoluble, such being my will in its fabrication.” Plato then +appears to give a triple division to the energy of the one demiurgus +in his production of the junior Gods, viz. a division into the deific, +into that which imparts connexion and into that which supplies a +similitude to animal itself. For the address of the demiurgus evinces +those to be Gods that proceed from him. But the assertions respecting +the indissoluble and dissoluble, by defining the measure of a medium +between these, impart a distribution and connexion commensurate to +the order of the mundane Gods. And the words calling on them to +the fabrication of mortal natures, cause them to be the sources of +perfection to the universe, and the fabricators of secondary animals, +conformably to the imitation of the paradigm. But through these three +energies the demiurgus elevates his offspring to all the intelligible +Gods, and establishes them in the intelligible triads. In the one being +indeed, [or the summit of these triads] through the first of these +energies; for that is primarily deified, in which _the one_ is deity, +but _being_ is the first participant of it. For _the one itself_ is +alone deity, without habitude to any thing, and is not participable; +but _the one being_ in which there is the first participation is God +of God. And being is deity as the summit of all things; but _the +one_ of it is deity as proceeding from _the one_ itself, which is +primarily God. But through the second of these energies the demiurgus +establishes his offspring in the second of the intelligible triads, +i.e. in eternity itself. For eternity is the cause of this indissoluble +permanency to every thing which continues perpetually undissolved. +Hence all mundane natures are bound according to the demiurgic will, +and have something of the indissoluble through the participation of +him; the natures which are primarily indissoluble being different from +these, and those that are truly immortal subsisting for his sake. +And he establishes them in all-perfect animal [or the third of the +intelligible triads] through the third of these energies. For to this +the vivific assimilates the mundane Gods, and inserts in them the +paradigms of animals which they generate. And this, indeed, will be +one scope of generation, the converting and perfecting the proceeding +multitude of the Gods. But after the one there will be a triple design, +which establishes them in the three intelligible orders. + +This second demiurgic intelligence, therefore, after the first which +is deific, illuminates the mundane Gods with a firm establishment, an +immutable power, and an eternal essence, through which the whole world, +and all the divine allotments subsist always the same, participating +through the father of an immutable nature and undecaying power. +For every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, is +indissoluble and immutable; but all the progeny of a moveable cause +are moveable. Hence among mundane natures, such as proceed from the +demiurgic cause alone, in consequence of being generated according to +an invariable sameness are permanent, and are exempt from every mutable +and variable essence. But such as proceed both from this cause, and +from other moveable principles, are indeed immutable so far as they +proceed from the demiurgus, but mutable so far as they proceed from +the latter. For those natures which the demiurgus alone generates, +these he fabricates immutable and indissoluble, both according to their +own nature, and according to his power and will. For he imparts to +them a guardian and preserving power, and he connects their essence +in a manner transcendent and exempt. For all things are preserved in +a twofold respect, from the power which he contains, and from his +providential goodness, which is truly able and willing to preserve +every thing which may be lawfully perpetually saved. The most divine of +visible natures therefore, are, as we have said, from their own nature +indissoluble; but they are likewise so from the demiurgic power which +pervades through all things, and eternally connects them. For this +power is the guard and the divine law which connectedly contains all +things. But a still greater and more principal cause than these is the +demiurgic will which employs this power in its productions. For what +is superior to goodness, or what bond is more perfect than this, which +imparts by illumination union, connects an eternal essence, and is +the bound and measure of all things; to which also the demiurgus now +refers the cause of immutable power, saying, “such being my will in its +fabrication.” For he established his own will as a guard over his own +proper works, as that which gives union, connexion and measure to the +whole of things. + +Who the demiurgus, however, is, and who father is, has been unfolded by +us before, and will be now also concisely shown. There are then these +four; father alone; maker alone; father and maker; maker and father. +And father indeed is æther [or bound] being the first procession from +_the one_. Father and maker is the divinity who subsists according +to the intelligible paradigm [at the extremity of the intelligible +order,] and whom Orpheus says, the blessed Gods call Phanes Protogonus. +But maker and father is Jupiter, who is now called by himself the +demiurgus, but whom the Orphic writers would call the father of works. +And maker alone, is the cause of partible fabrication,[74] as the +same writers would say. To father alone, therefore, all intelligible, +intellectual, supermundane and mundane natures are in subjection. To +father and maker, all intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures +are subordinate. To maker and father who is an intellectual deity, +supermundane and mundane natures are subservient. But to maker alone, +mundane natures alone are in subjection. And all these particulars we +learn from the narration of Orpheus; for according to each peculiarity +of the four there is a subject multitude of Gods. + + + + + CHAPTER VII. + + +In the next place, the demiurgus says: “Every thing, therefore, which +is bound is dissoluble, but to be willing to dissolve that which is +beautifully harmonized and well composed, is the province of an evil +nature.” It is requisite then to consider how the dissoluble and +indissoluble are asserted of the Gods, and to conjoin proper modes of +solution with appropriate bonds. For every thing is not bound after +a similar manner, nor is that which is bound in one way, dissolved +in different ways. But that which is in a certain respect bound, has +also its dissolution according to this mode. That which is in every +respect bound, is likewise in every respect dissolved. And that which +is bound by itself is also by itself dissolved. But that which is bound +by something different from itself, has also on that its dissolution +depending. That likewise which is bound in time, is also dissolved +according to time. But that which is allotted a perpetual bond, must +also be said to be perpetually dissolved. For in short, dissolution +is conjoined with every bond. For a bond is not union without +multitude; since _the one_ does not require a bond. Nor is it an +assemblage of many and different things, no longer preserving their +characteristic peculiarities. For a thing of this kind is confusion; +and that which results from them is one thing, consisting of things +corrupted together, but does not become bound. For it is necessary +that things that are bound should remain as they are, but not be bound +when corrupted. Hence a bond then alone takes place, when there are +many things, and which are preserved, having one power connective and +collective of them, whether this power be corporeal or incorporeal. If +this, however, be the case, things that are bound are united through +the bond, and separated, because each preserves its own proper nature. + +Every where, therefore, as we have said, a bond has also dissolution +connected with it. Bonds, however, and their dissolutions differ in +subsisting in a certain respect, and simply, from themselves, and +from others, according to time, and perpetually. For in these their +differences consist. We must not, therefore, wonder if the same thing +is both dissoluble and indissoluble; and if it is in a certain respect +indissoluble, and in a certain respect dissoluble. So that the works +of the father, if they are indeed indissoluble, are so, as not to +be dissolved according to time. But they are dissoluble, as having +together with a bond, a separation of the simple things of which they +consist, according to the definite causes of things that are bound, +existing in him that binds. For as that which is self-subsistent is +said to be so in a twofold respect, one, as supplying all things from +itself alone, but another, as subsisting indeed from itself, and also +from another which is the cause of it, thus also the indissoluble is +so, from another,[75] and from itself; just as that which is moved is +twofold, and subsists in a similar manner. + +To these two modes, however, two modes of dissolution are also opposed; +viz. that which is dissoluble from another and from itself is opposed +to that which is indissoluble from another and from itself. And this, +indeed, is dissoluble in itself, as consisting of things that are +separate. But in consequence of having in something else prior to +itself the causes of its subsistence, by this cause, and according to +this mode alone it becomes dissoluble. Again, that which is simply +dissoluble in a twofold respect, and which contains in itself the cause +of its dissolution, and also receives it from another, is opposed to +that which is simply indissoluble in a twofold respect, from itself and +from another. These, therefore, are four in number, viz. that which +is simply indissoluble from another and from itself. And again, that +which is indissoluble after a certain manner in a twofold respect; that +which is dissoluble after a certain manner in a twofold respect; and +that which is dissoluble simply from itself, and from another.[76] Of +these four, however, the first pertains to intelligibles; for they are +indissoluble, as being entirely simple, and receiving no composition +or dissolution whatever. But the fourth belongs to mortal natures, +which are dissoluble from themselves and from others, as consisting of +many things, and being composed by their causes in such a way, as to +be at a certain time dissolved. And the middles pertain to the mundane +Gods; for the second and the third of these four concur with them. +For after a certain manner, these as being the works of the father +are indissoluble; and they are saved from themselves and through his +will. And again, they are in a certain respect dissoluble, because they +are bound by him; and he contains the productive principle of those +simple natures from which they are composed. Every thing, therefore, +which is bound is dissoluble; and this is also the case with the works +of the father. For these are, all bodies, the composition of animals, +and the number of participated souls. But intellects which ride as +it were in souls as in a vehicle, cannot be called the works of the +father; for they were not generated, but were unfolded into light in +an unbegotten manner, as if fashioned within the adyta of his essence, +and not proceeding out of them. For there are no paradigms of these, +but of middle and last natures; since soul is the first of images. But +the wholes such as animals, the participants of soul and intellect, +and generated natures, derive their subsistence from intellectual +paradigms, of which animal itself is the comprehending cause. + +Bodies, therefore, are bound through analogy; for this is the most +beautiful bond of them. But animals are bound with animated bonds. +And souls which contain something of a partible nature are bound by +media, [viz. by geometrical, arithmetical and harmonical ratios;] for +Plato calls these and all the productive principles of which the soul +consists, bonds. Hence the indissoluble in the mundane Gods subsists +according to nature; for each of them is generated indissoluble; such +being the works of the father through the power, which he contains. +They are also indissoluble from the demiurgic will, since they are of a +composite nature, and possess the indissoluble with a bond. But there +is likewise in a certain respect a dissolution of them, so far as they +consist of things of a simple nature, of which the father contains in +himself the definite causes. At one and the same time, therefore, they +are indissoluble and dissoluble. They are not, however, so indissoluble +as the intelligible; for that is indissoluble through transcendency +of simplicity. But these are at the same time indissoluble and +dissoluble, as consisting of simple natures, and as being perpetually +bound. For all the natures that are bound being dissoluble, such as +are perpetual, possessing through the whole of time, beauty from the +intelligible, divine union, and demiurgic harmony, are indissoluble. +But mortal natures are dissoluble alone, because they are connected +with the deformity and inaptitude of matter. And the former indeed are +beautifully harmonized through the union inserted in them by their +harmonizing cause; but this is not the case with the latter, on account +of the multitude of causes which no longer insert in them a similar +union;[77] for their union is dissipated through the multitude which is +mingled in their composition: so that they are very properly allotted a +remitted[78] harmony. + +Hence, every thing which is bound is dissoluble. But one thing is +thus dissoluble and indissoluble, and another is dissoluble only, +just as the intelligible is alone indissoluble. Why, therefore, is +that which is primarily bound at one and the same time dissoluble +and indissoluble? Because it is _beautifully_ harmonized, and is +_well_ composed. For from being _well_ composed it obtains union; +since _goodness_ is unific. But from the intelligible it obtains the +_beautifully_; for from thence beauty is derived. And from fabricating +power it obtains _harmony_; for this is the cause of the Muses, and +is the source of harmonical arrangement to mundane natures. Hence +we again have the three causes, the final through the _well_, the +paradigmatic through the _beautifully_; and the demiurgic through the +_harmonized_.[79] But it is necessary that a composition of this kind, +harmonized by the one fabricating power, filled with divine beauty, and +obtaining a boniform union, should be indissoluble; for the demiurgus +says, that to dissolve it is the province of an evil nature. + +Moreover, prior to this Plato had said, that the universe is +indissoluble except by him by whom it was bound. If, however, it is +entirely impossible for the universe to be dissolved by any other, +but the father alone is able to dissolve it, and it is impossible for +him to effect this, for it is the province of an evil nature,--it +is impossible for the universe to be dissolved. For either he must +dissolve it, or some other. But if some other, who is it that is +able to offer violence to the demiurgus? For it is impossible that +a dissolution of it should be effected, except by him that bound it. +But if he dissolves it, how being good, can he dissolve that which is +beautifully harmonized and well composed. For that which is subversive +of these, is productive of evil; just as that which is subversive +of evil is allotted a beneficent nature. Hence, there is an equal +necessity that the demiurgus should be depraved, if it be lawful so +to speak, or that this world should be dissolved, [viz. each of these +is equally impossible.] Such, therefore, is the necessity which Plato +assigns to the incorruptibility of the universe. Hence, that Plato +gives the indissoluble to the composition of the mundane Gods, he +clearly manifests when he orders them to bind mortal natures, not with +those indissoluble bonds with which they are connected. For if the +connective bonds of these Gods are indissoluble, they themselves must +be essentially indissoluble. Here, however, he says that they are not +in every respect indissoluble. It is evident, therefore, from both +these assertions, that they are indissoluble, and at the same time +dissoluble,[80] and that they are not in every respect indissoluble, +in consequence of their being appropriately bound. But if these things +are true, there is every necessity that the dissolution of them +should be very different from that which we call corruption. For that +which is dissoluble after such a manner as the corruptible, not being +indissoluble, is so far from being not in every respect indissoluble, +that it is in every respect dissoluble. Hence it is not proper to +say that the mundane Gods are of themselves corruptible, but remain +incorruptible through the will of the father; but we ought to say that +they are in their own nature[81] incorruptible. + + + + + CHAPTER VIII. + + +In the next place let us attend to the meaning of the following part +of the speech of the demiurgus to the mundane Gods, as beautifully +unfolded by Proclus: “Hence so far as you are generated, you are not +immortal, nor in every respect indissoluble, yet you shall never be +dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality of death; my will being +a much greater and more excellent bond than the vital connectives +with which you were bound at the commencement of your generation.” +Since all the mundane Gods to whom these words are addressed consist +of divine souls, and animals suspended from them, or in other words, +since they are participated souls, and since the demiurgus denominates +them indissoluble and at the same time dissoluble, in the way above +explained, he now wishes to collect in one point of view, and into one +truth, all that he had said separately about them. For at one and the +same time he takes away from them the immortal and the indissoluble, +and again confers these on them through a subversion of their +opposites. For media are allotted this nature, not receiving the nature +of the extremes, and appearing to comprehend the whole of both. Just +as if some one should call the soul impartible and at the same time +partible, as consisting of both, and neither impartible, nor partible, +as being different from the extremes. For see how a middle of this kind +may be surveyed in the mundane Gods. + +That is principally and primarily called immortal, which supplies +itself with immortality; since that also is primarily being which +is being from itself; intellect which is intellect from itself; and +one which is from itself one. For every where that which primarily +possesses any thing is such from itself; since if it were not so +from itself but from another, that other would be primarily, either +intellect, or life, or _the one_, or something else; and either +this would be primarily so, or if there is nothing primarily, the +ascent will be to infinity. Thus therefore, that is truly immortal, +which is immortal from itself, and which imparts to itself immortality. +But that which is neither vital according to the whole of itself, +nor self-subsistent, nor possesses immortality from itself, is not +primarily immortal. Hence as that which is secondarily being is not +being, so that which is secondarily immortal is not immortal, yet it +is not mortal; for this is entirely a defection or departure from the +immortal, neither possessing a connascent life, nor infinite power. For +these three are in a successive order: That which possesses from itself +infinite life; that which receives infinite life from another; and that +which neither from itself nor another exhibits the infinity of life. +And the first indeed, is immortal; the second is not immortal; the +third is mortal; and the mean is adapted to the mundane Gods. For they +neither have the immortal from themselves, so far as they derive it +from that which is truly and primarily immortal, and so far as bodies +are suspended from them; nor have they a finite life; but they are +filled indeed from the eternal Gods, and produce mortal natures. For +the second fabrication is connected with the first, proceeds about it, +is governed by it, and refers to it the production of the mortal genera. + +Again, with respect to the indissoluble, that which is principally and +primarily so is simple and free from all composition. For where there +is no composition what representation can there be of dissolution? But +that is secondarily indissoluble, which is indissoluble with a bond; +which is at the same time dissoluble in consequence of proceeding +from divided causes. For it is not simply dissoluble, but dissoluble +by its cause. For that which is bound prior to all time, is alone +bound according to cause; but that which is alone causally bound, is +alone causally dissolved. And the third from that which is properly +indissoluble, is that which was indissoluble for a certain time; +because the first indeed, is properly indissoluble in conjunction +with simplicity; but the second is subordinately so, together with +composition: and the third, falling off from both, is in its own nature +dissoluble. + +Neither therefore, are the mundane Gods entirely indissoluble; for this +pertains to the most simple natures. Nor are they dissoluble according +to time; for the composition of them proceeds from the demiurgic +union. As therefore in the cause union precedes things of a simple +nature, after the same manner here also, a bond precedes dissolution; +for it is more excellent, and the resemblance of a more divine power. +And this is seen in souls; for there were bonds and media in them, +as has been before observed in the generation of the soul. It is +also seen in bodies; for analogy is a bond. And likewise in animals; +for being bound with animated bonds they became animals. Hence, the +immortal and the indissoluble, do not entirely pertain to the mundane +Gods; yet at the same time they do pertain to them. And because they +are not in every respect present with them nor in such a manner as +in intelligibles, immortality must be taken from them. For in the +Banquet also, Plato does not think fit to call Love immortal, yet he +does not denominate it mortal; but asserts it to be something between +both these. For there is a great extent of the mortal and immortal, +and they are bound together by many media. It appears likewise, with +respect to the immortal, that one kind of it is common to all the +beings that differ from a mortal nature,[82] and which consists in not +being deprived of the life which it possesses. According to this sense +of the word, Plato says that the demiurgus is the cause of immortal +natures, but the junior Gods, of such as are mortal. But another kind +of the immortal is the peculiarity of intelligibles, being eternally +so. And another belongs to the mundane Gods, which is an immortality +perpetually rising into existence, and having its subsistence in always +becoming to be. Hence, it may be said that the immortal and mortal are +oppositely divided without a medium, if the common signification of +the immortal is assumed; and that they are not opposed to each other +without a medium, if that which is primarily immortal is considered; +and this is that which _is_ always immortal. For the medium between +this and the mortal, is that which is always _becoming to be_ immortal. +But that which is properly immortal possesses the whole of its life in +eternity. That however which has its life evolved through the whole +of time, and has not always one and the same indivisible life, this +possesses an immortality co-extended with the flux of generation, but +is not immortal according to the stability of being. And again, the +medium between the immortality of the mundane Gods and that of partial +souls, is that which has a life always rising into existence, and +which ascends and descends in intellectual energy, so as to be nearer +to mortal natures, leaving indeed a more excellent intellection, but +transferring itself into one that is subordinate, and again recurring +to its pristine condition without oblivion. And of these, the former +indeed, is the peculiarity of the mundane Gods; but the latter, of +dæmons the attendants on these Gods. But if the nature which remains +is filled with oblivion in descending, becomes most proximate to +mortals, entirely destroys the true life which it contains, and alone +possesses the essential life,--such an immortality as this belongs to +partial souls. Hence, the demiurgus in his speech calls the immortality +in these homonymous to that of the immortals. If however, there is +any nature after these which casts aside its essential life, this is +alone[83] mortal. Hence, the primarily immortal and the mortal are the +extremes. But the immortality of the mundane Gods, and that of partial +souls, are the sub-extremes. And the immortality which is truly the +medium between these, is that of dæmons. Hence too, dæmons are in +reality entirely of a middle nature. + + + + + CHAPTER IX. + + +After this, the demiurgus sublimely addresses the mundane Gods in the +following words: “Learn now therefore what I say to you indicating +my desire.” The first address to the mundane Gods, says Proclus, was +deific of or deified the auditors; for it evinced all of them to be +Gods, and to be participated by the bodies in which they ride. For +these very bodies also are Gods, as being the statues [as it were] +of Gods; since Plato likewise calls the earth the first and most +ancient of the Gods within the heavens. But these deified bodies +are participants of the Gods truly so called, from which they are +suspended, and which are prior to generation. For these bodies have, +as we have observed, generation. But the second address to the mundane +Gods, inserted in them an eternal power, through the participation of +an indissoluble connexion. And the present words fill them with divine, +and demiurgic conceptions, proceeding supernally from intelligible +animal [the paradigm of the universe.] For the being instructed in +the fabrication of animals, so far as it is mathesis or learning, +is adapted to soul. But these words fill the multitude of Gods with +the demiurgic intelligence of all the forms that are contained in +intelligible animal. And through the word _now_ indeed, the _eternal_ +is after a manner indicated; through the word _what_ the united, and +convolved; through _I say_, that which proceeds into multitude, and is +disseminated about the many Gods; and through _indication_ a plenitude +derived from intelligible and unapparent causes is signified. For we +only _indicate_ in things unapparent to the multitude. But through all +the words together it is evident that the demiurgus establishes himself +analogous to intelligible intellect, and fills the mundane number +of Gods with intellectual conceptions. Farther still, these words +convert this multitude to the one demiurgic intelligence, and prior +to a providential attention to secondary natures, illuminate it with +unmingled purity, and stable intellection. For as the demiurgus makes +by energizing intellectually, and generates from inward, externally +proceeding energy, thus also he wishes the mundane Gods first to learn +and understand the will of their father, and thus afterwards to imitate +his power. + +In the next place, the demiurgus says, “Three genera of mortals yet +remain to be produced. Without the generation of these therefore, the +universe will be imperfect; for it will not contain every kind of +animal in its spacious extent. But it ought to contain them that it may +be sufficiently perfect. Yet if these are generated and participate of +life through me they will become equal to the Gods.” On these words +Proclus observes: The most total, first, and most divine of ideas, +not only give subsistence to such mundane natures as are perpetual, +in an exempt manner, but likewise to all mortal natures, according to +one united cause. For the idea of winged natures which is there is the +paradigm of all winged animals whatever; the idea of the aquatic, of +all aquatic; and the idea of the pedestrial, of all pedestrial animals. +But the progressions of intelligibles into the intellectual orders, +become the sources of division to united ideas, produce into multitude +total causes, and unfold the definite principles of multiform natures. +For there is no longer in intelligibles one intellectual cause of all +aerial animals; since there is not a separate intellection of perpetual +animals of this kind; nor one intellectual cause of aquatic, nor in +a similar manner of terrestrial animals; but the power of difference +[in the intellectual order] minutely distributes the whole into parts, +and monads into numbers. Hence the causes of divine animals, according +to which the demiurgus gives subsistence to the orders of Gods and +dæmons that produce generation, exist in him separate from the causes +of mortal natures, according to which he calls on the junior Gods to +generate mortal animals. For the demiurgus precedes the generative +energy of these Gods, and makes by merely saying that a thing is to +be made. For the words of the father are demiurgic intellections, and +his intellections are creations; but a proximate making is adapted to +the multitude of Gods. And again you see how the order of effective +and generative causes is unfolded into light. For the choir of mundane +Gods produces indeed mortal animals, but in conjunction with motion and +mutation.[84] And the demiurgus also produces them but by speaking, +viz. by intellection. For he speaks indeed, intellectually perceiving, +and immoveably and intellectually. Animal itself also produces them; +for it contains the one cause of all winged, of all aquatic, and of all +terrestrial animals. But it produces them with silence, by its very +essence and intelligibly. For the demiurgic speech receives indeed the +paternal silence, but the intellectual production, the intelligible +cause, and the generation which subsists according to energizing, the +providence according to existence. Motion also receives the demiurgic +words, but the orderly distribution which is mingled with a sensible +nature, receives the intellectual energy. For the fabrications which +exist at the extremity of things require a producing cause of this +kind. Every thing therefore which is mutable, which is changed in +quality, which is generated and corruptible, is generated from a cause, +immoveable indeed according to essence, but moved according to energy. +For the motion which is there separated from essence, here produces an +essence which is moved. Hence, because that which makes, makes both +according to essence and according to energy, both which are as it were +woven together, mutation of essence thence derives its progression. +Mortal natures therefore require moveable causes, and those that +are very mutable, many such causes. For it is impossible that they +should remain only begotten; since the mortal genera would not have an +existence. + +It is necessary however, that the mortal nature should exist, in the +first place, in order that every thing may have a subsistence which +is capable of being generated, viz. both perpetual beings, and those +which at a certain time cease to exist. For beyond these is that which +in no respect whatever is. In the next place this is necessary, in +order that divine natures and being may not be the last of things; +since that which is generative of any thing is more excellent and +more divine than the thing which it generates. And in the third place +it is necessary in order that the world may not be imperfect, not +comprehending every thing the causes of which are contained in animal +itself. For the ideas which are there, are the causes of every thing +whether divine or mortal. Hence Orpheus says that the vivific cause[85] +of partible natures, while she remained on high weaving the order of +celestials, was a nymph, as being undefiled, and in consequence of +this connected with Jupiter, and abiding in her appropriate manners; +but that proceeding from her proper habitation, she left her webs +unfinished, was ravished, having been ravished was married, and being +married generated, in order that she might animate things which have +an adventitious life. For the unfinished state of her webs indicates, +I think, that the universe is imperfect or unfinished as far as to +perpetual animals. Hence Plato says, that the one demiurgus calls on +the many demiurgi to weave together the mortal and immortal natures, +after a manner reminding us that the addition of the mortal genera +is the perfection of the textorial life of the universe, and also +exciting our recollection of the divine Orphic fable, and affording us +interpretative causes of the unfinished webs [of Proserpine]. + +The divine number therefore, has its proper boundary and end, and is +perfect. But it is also necessary that the mortal nature should exist, +and have an appropriate limit; and this triply, aerially, aquatically +and terrestrially. For celestially, is impossible, because the summit, +and the first genus of every order is undefiled and perpetual, in +consequence of being assimilated to the cause which is prior to it. As +therefore, the first of intellectuals is intelligible, and the first +of angels is a God, thus also the first of sensibles is perpetual and +divine. + +When however the demiurgus says, “Yet if these are generated and +participate of life through me they will become equal to the Gods,” +he confirms what has been before asserted, that every thing which +is produced by an immoveable cause is unbegotten and immutable; but +that every thing which is produced indeed by an immoveable cause, yet +through the medium of a cause that is moved, is partly unbegotten, and +partly mutable. For from the immoveable cause indeed it receives unity, +but from the moveable cause multitude. And from the former it derives +being and form, but from the latter individuality, and a flowing +existence; through which the form or species is preserved, but the +individual is destroyed. + + + + + CHAPTER X. + + +After this, the demiurgus says, “That mortal natures therefore may +subsist, and that the universe may be truly all, convert yourselves +according to nature to the fabrication of animals, imitating the power +which I employed in your generation.” A twofold scope of fabrication, +says Proclus, is here delivered, one indeed providential, but the +other assimilative; the one being more proximate, but the other more +total. For to fabricate for the sake of giving subsistence to mortal +natures, indicates providence, and the perfection[86] of power. For +all super-plenitude of power is prolific of other things subordinate +to itself. But to fabricate for the sake of giving completion to the +universe, indicates an energy according to assimilative power, in order +that this universe may be rendered similar to all-perfect animal, +in consequence of being adorned with all the numbers of divine and +mortal animals. For if all things were immortal, the most divine[87] +of sensible natures would be unprolific. And if the universe was +not filled with all the forms of life, it would not be perfect, nor +sufficiently similar to all-perfect animal. That neither of these +defects therefore might happen, the first demiurgus excites the second +fabrication supernally from his own exalted place of survey. He also +pours on the mundane Gods vivific and demiurgic power, through which +they generate from themselves secondary essences, fill them with life, +and give them a specific distinction. For the peculiarity of vivific +deity is to vivify, but of demiurgic deity to be productive of form. +The expression therefore “_convert yourselves_” is of an exciting +nature, and is similar to the mandate of Jupiter to the Gods in Homer, + + Haste, to the Greek and Trojan hosts descend.[88] + +For as that calls them to the war of generation, so this in Plato +excites them to the fabrication of mortals, which they effect through +motion. And this indeed is accomplished by all the mundane Gods, but +especially by the governors of the world [or the planets], and in the +most eminent degree by the sovereign sun. For the demiurgus gave him +dominion over wholes, fabricated him as a guardian, and ordered him, as +Orpheus says, + + ----O’er all to rule. + +The words likewise, “according to nature,” bound their fabrication +according to measure and the good: and besides this, spread under +them all physical production as an instrument to their energies. This +therefore which is subservient to their will they move and govern. And +in the third place, these words define their subsistence as media; +for it pertains to the middle to fabricate the extremes according to +nature. For things which sometimes have an existence are suspended +from those that are perpetual according to time; and the latter are +suspended from eternal entities. And primary natures indeed are +generative of media; but these are productive of such beings as are +last in the series of things. The word “_yourselves_” also which +denotes manual operation, excites the divine lives themselves to +fabrication. Nor ought we to wonder whence demiurgic power is derived +to divine souls, this being the peculiarity of the superessential +Gods. For as Orpheus, placing an intellectual essence in Jupiter, +renders it demiurgic, thus also Plato producing words from the father, +evinces that the souls which rank as wholes are divine and demiurgic. +Nor must we doubt why of mundane natures[89] some are immortal, +but others mortal, since all of them are generated according to +intelligible causes; for some of them proceed from one, but others +from another proximate producing cause. And it is necessary to look +to these, and not to paradigms alone. Nor must we investigate ideas +of Socrates, Plato, or of any thing that ranks as a particular. For +the demiurgus divides mortal animals according to genera, and stops +at total intellections; and through these comprehends every thing of +a partial nature. For as the demiurgus makes that which is material +immaterially, and that which is generated ingenerably, thus also he +produces mortal natures immortally.[90] For he makes these indeed, +but through the junior Gods; since prior to their making, he made by +intellection alone. Nor must we deny that mortal natures subsist also +divinely, and not mortally only. For the things which the demiurgus +now extends in his speech are hypostases or subsisting natures about +the junior or mundane Gods, which the heavens primarily receive; and +according to which the Gods fabricate the mortal genera. For the +monads of every mortal-formed life proceed into the heavens from the +intelligible forms. But from these monads which are divine, all the +multitude of material animals is generated. For if we adopt these +conceptions, we shall accord with Plato, and shall not wander from the +nature of things. + +Again, when the demiurgus says, “_Imitating the power which I +employed about your generation_,” we must understand by this that an +assimilation to the one exempt fabrication of things, and a conversion +to it, is the highest end of the second fabrication. For it is +necessary that self-motive should follow immoveable natures, and such +as are very mutable, such as are always moved, and that there should +be perpetually a series of secondary beings assimilated to those that +are prior to them. Since however there was a divine will and a divine +power in the demiurgus, he unfolds his will to the mundane Gods through +_learning_; and through this perfects their demiurgic will. But he +unfolds his power to them through this _imitation_, according to which +he orders them to imitate the power of the one demiurgus, conformably +to which they were generated by him. For by saying that which he wills, +he imparts to them will; and by saying that which he is able to effect, +he supplies them with power. And in the last place he demonstrates +them to be secondary fabricators imitators of their father. Whether, +therefore, there is a mundane power, or an efficacious energy of +dæmons, or a fortitude and supernatural strength of heroes, to all +this the demiurgus gives subsistence, and imparts it to those that +give completion to the whole of the second fabrication. For the first +power is in him, and the monad of demiurgic powers. Since, however, he +is also intellect and father, all things will be in him, viz. father, +the power of the father, and the paternal intellect. Hence Plato was +not ignorant of this division; and on this account the demiurgus as +being father, calls power his power. This also he manifests by adding, +“_which I employed about your generation_.” For the father is the cause +of this in conjunction with power; just as father here in conjunction +with the female is the cause of the propagation of the human species. +[For power is of a feminine characteristic.] + + + + + CHAPTER XI. + + +And thus much for the developement of such particulars in the speech of +the demiurgus as relate to the junior or mundane Gods. Others, however, +no less important respecting the fabrication of these Gods remain to +be collected from another part of the Timæus; and which accompanied +with the admirable elucidations of Proclus are as follow: After the +demiurgus had instructed souls in all that was necessary to their well +being, and had disseminated some of them into the earth, others into +the moon, and others into the remaining different instruments of time, +Plato adds: “But after this semination he delivered to the junior Gods +the province of fabricating mortal bodies, and generating whatever +else remained necessary to the human soul; and gave them dominion +over every thing consequent to their fabrications.” Who the junior +Gods are, says Proclus, must now be shown; for that the mundane Gods +are thus denominated is evident. But it seems they are thus called +by Plato, either from a comparison with the more ancient dignity of +the unapparent [i.e. the intellectual] fabrication, and with the +transcendency of the power in it, and the perfection of intellectual +vision. For that which is more intellectual is with the Gods more +ancient. + +“But Jove was born the first, and more he knows,” says Homer. Or they +are thus denominated, because they always make generation to be new; +and when it becomes old and imbecil through its subject nature, again +recall it to a subsistence according to nature by their motions, +sending into it effluxions of all-various productive principles +and powers, and thus render it perpetually new. Or, they are thus +called, because having intellectual essences suspended from them, +they eternally energize with the acme of intellectual vigor. For as +the poets say, Hebe pours out their wine, and they drink nectar, and +survey the whole sensible world. Employing, therefore, immutable and +undeviating intellections, they fill all things with their demiurgic +providence. Or they have this appellation, because Curetic deity is +present with them, [or deity belonging to the order of the Curetes,] +illuminating their intellectual conceptions with purity, their motion +with inflexibility, and supplying the whole of them with rigid power, +through which they govern all things without departing from the +characteristics of their nature. Or, which is the truest reason of all +the preceding, they are thus denominated, because the monad of them +is called the _recent_ God. For theologists give this appellation to +Bacchus, who is the monad of all the second fabrication. For Jupiter +established him the king of all the mundane Gods, and distributed to +him the first honours. On this account also, theologists are accustomed +to call the sun _a recent God_, and Heraclitus says, that the sun is _a +diurnal youth_, as participating of Dionysiacal power. Or, for a reason +most appropriate to Platonic principles, they are thus denominated, +because bodies which have generation are suspended from them; and the +essence of these is not allotted a subsistence in eternity, but in the +whole of time. They are junior, therefore, not as once beginning to +exist, but as being always generated, and as we have before observed, +subsisting in becoming to be, or perpetually rising into existence. For +every thing which is generated has not the whole of what it possesses +present at once, nor a simultaneous infinity, but an infinity which is +perpetually supplying. Thus, therefore, they are called junior, as +having a subsistence co-extended with time, and always advancing into +existence, and as possessing a renovated immortality. + +Again, the delivery of the first fabrication is a communication and +generation of demiurgic powers, exempt from every thing which the +second fabrication produces proximately, a progression of production +from the unapparent into the apparent, and a division of uniform power +into the multiplied government of the world. But the formation of +bodies assimilates the junior Gods to the unapparent fabrication. For +that was the cause of bodies that rank as wholes, just as they are the +causes of partial bodies, at the same time exhibiting a diminution +of power. For of the body of which they are the makers and formers, +the demiurgus also is the cause; but they are the formers of partial +bodies, which are bodies endued with certain qualities. Hence body +indeed is simply unbegotten as from time, and incorruptible as was also +the opinion of Aristotle. “For,” says he, “there would be a vacuum if +body could be generated, external[91] to the body of the universe. +But this _particular_ body is corruptible, as being of a partial +nature; for the _wholes_ of the elements derived their subsistence +from _total_ fabrication. The accession, however, of the human soul +which remained[92] to be generated, assimilates the mundane Gods to the +paternal power. For it is the province of a father to generate life; +since the first father, and every father is the cause of life; the +intelligible father, indeed, of intelligible, but the intellectual of +intellectual, and the supermundane of supermundane life. And hence, the +mundane Gods who generate corporeal life are fathers. The fabrication, +however, adapted to these Gods, produces the nature of partial animals. +For this partial animal which is suspended from the immortal soul, +consists of soul and body. But the _dominion_ which the demiurgus +gave the junior Gods, excites their providential inspection, their +connective power, and their guardian comprehensions. For without these, +the bodies that are fashioned, and the mortal form of life, would +rapidly vanish into non-entity. Prior, therefore, to the generation +of these, the demiurgus made their ruling Gods to be the guardians and +saviours of them. In the junior Gods, therefore, there are demiurgic +powers, according to which they invest generated natures with forms; +vivific powers, according to which they give subsistence to a secondary +life; and perfective powers, through which they give completion to what +is deficient in generation. There are also many other powers in them +besides these, which are inexplicable by our conceptions. + + + + + CHAPTER XII. + + +After this, Plato adds, “He likewise commanded them to govern as much +as possible in the best and most beautiful manner the mortal animal, +that it might not become the cause of evil to itself.” On these words +Proclus observes: Of all that the one demiurgus delivers to the +junior Gods, it must be admitted that there are three most beautiful +boundaries, the boniform will of him that delivers, the perfect power +of the recipients, and the symmetry of both these with each other. Of +the demiurgic production, however, of the junior Gods themselves, three +elements and these the greatest must be again surveyed, a reduction to +the good, a conversion to intelligible beauty, and a liberated power +sufficient to rule over all the subjects of its government. For as +Phanes,[93] himself the demiurgus of wholes, rendered the whole world +as much as possible the most beautiful and the best, thus also he was +willing that the second fabricators should govern the mortal animal +in a way the most beautiful and the best; pouring on them indeed from +intelligibles, beauty, but filling them with that boniform power and +will, which he himself possessing fabricated the whole world. For thus +generation also will participate of beauty and goodness, as far as it +is naturally adapted to such participation, if the Gods by whom it is +connected and contained, adorn it, who are themselves transcendently +decorated with beauty and good. + +If, however, the second demiurgi have such a nature as this, nothing +evil or preternatural is generated from the celestial Gods; nor is +it proper to divide the Gods in the heavens after this manner, as +many do, viz. into the beneficent and malignant; for being Gods this +is impossible. But the mortal animal is the cause of evil to itself. +For neither disease, nor poverty,[94] nor any thing else of this kind +is evil; but the depravity of the soul, intemperance, timidity, and +every vice. Of these things, however, we are the causes to ourselves. +For though being impelled by others to these vices we are badly +affected, yet again it is through ourselves; since we have the power +of associating with the good, and separating ourselves from the bad. +According to Plato, therefore, we must not think that of the Gods some +are malignant and others beneficent, but we must admit that all of +them are the sources to mortals of all the good which they are able to +receive; and that things which are truly evils are not produced, but +are only signified by them, as we have before observed. For they extend +terrific appearances and signs to those who are able to see and read +the letters in the universe, which the framers of mortal natures during +their revolutions write by their configurations. And though some one +should derive a certain evil from the motions of the celestial Gods, +so as to become timid or intemperate, yet they operate in one way, and +their influences are participated by souls in another. For the efflux +of intellect, says Plotinus, becomes craft in him who receives the +efflux badly; the gift of an elegant life becomes intemperance through +a similar cause; and in short, while they produce beneficently, their +gifts are participated by terrestrial natures, after a contrary manner. +Hence the givers who bestow beneficently are not to be accused as the +authors of evil, but the recipients who pervert their gifts by their +own inaptitudes. Thus also Jupiter in Homer blames souls as in vain +accusing the Gods, while they themselves are the causes of evils. For +the Gods are the sources of good, and the suppliers of intellect and +life, but are not the causes of any evil; since even a partial nature +is not the cause of evil to its offspring. What, therefore, ought we +to think concerning the Gods themselves? Is it not, that they are much +more the causes of good to their productions; since with them there +is power, with them there is a self-perfect nature, with them there +is universal goodness, to all which evil is contrary. For in its own +nature it is powerless, imperfect, and without measure. + +In the next place Plato says, “At the same time he who orderly disposed +all these particulars, remained in his own accustomed manner.” And +Proclus observes, that Plato every where after having employed many +words, summarily comprehends the multitude of them in the conclusion. +For he knew that in the Demiurgus, one intellectual perception +comprehends the multitude of intellectual conceptions; that one power +connects many powers; and that a uniform cause collects into one union +divided causes. Hence the words [prior to these], “Having, therefore, +instructed souls in all these particulars,” and the words before us, +“He who orderly disposed all these particulars,” lead the distinct +energy of the Demiurgus to an united cause. Farther still, the word +_all_ manifests that which is consummated from all its appropriate +boundaries. But the words _orderly disposed_, indicate the order +pervading through all beings, which the Demiurgus introduced to the +mundane Gods, and to partial souls; demonstrating the former to be +demiurgi, but inscribing in the latter the laws of Fate. Moreover, +the word _remained_, does not manifest station, and inflexible +intellection, but an _establishment[95] in the one_. For according to +this, he is exempt from wholes, and is separated from the beings that +intellectually perceive him. But this establishment itself is eternal, +and always invariably permanent. These things, therefore, are also +indicated by the words _accustomed_ and _manner_; the one exhibiting +sameness of permanency; but the other the peculiarity of the demiurgic +stability. For _manner_ is indicative of peculiarity; since connective +is different from immutable, and both these from demiurgic permanency. + + + + + CHAPTER XIII. + + +“But in consequence of his abiding, says Plato, as soon as his children +understood the order of their father, they became obedient to it.” +When the Demiurgus speaks, says Proclus, then the junior Gods have the +order of hearers. When he intellectually perceives, then they learn; +for learning is dianoetic. When he abides according to union itself, +then his children intellectually perceive. For they always receive from +him an inferior order. And as filled indeed from him, they preserve +the analogy of hearers with reference to him; but as evolving his one +power, they are analogous to learners. For he who learns evolves the +intellect of his preceptor. As being deified, however, by him, they +have the analogy of those that perceive intellectually. For intellect +becomes deific, by its contact[96] with _the one_. The father, +therefore, abiding, his children very properly intellectually perceive. +For they are intellects participated by divine souls, that ride in +the vehicles of undefiled bodies. But they intellectually perceive +the order of the father presubsisting in him prior to the arranged +effects, according to which order he became all things. Mortal natures, +therefore, were fashioned and animated by the demiurgic intellection +alone. But the junior Gods unfold his total production, through their +own manifest fabrication; being filled from the demiurgic monad. + +In the last place, Plato adds, “And receiving the immortal principle +of mortal animal, in imitation of their artificer, they borrowed from +the world the parts of fire and earth, water and air, as things which +they should restore back again; and conglutinated the received parts +together, but not with the same indissoluble bonds by which they were +connected.” On-these words Proclus admirably comments as follows: +Plato indicates to us, the separation of the second from the first +fabrication, through many words and steps.[97] For if the Demiurgus +orderly disposes, but the junior Gods are obedient to his mandates, +the former by merely commanding is the cause of generated natures, but +the latter being excited by the Demiurgus, receive from thence the +boundary of the whole of their fabrication. And if, indeed, he abides +in himself, but they are moved about him, it is evident that he is +eternally the cause of things which subsist in time, but that they +being filled from him energize according to the whole of time. And if +he perfectly establishes himself in his own accustomed manner, but +they proceeding from him, unfold into light this united and ineffable +disposition of himself, they derive from him secondary measures of +fabrication. + +Moreover, he is said to have a paternal dignity, but they are +denominated his children, as expressing his prolific power, and his +single goodness. And he indeed, is celebrated as delivering from his +exalted abode the principles of fabrication; but they are celebrated +as receiving the immortal principle contributing to the orderly +distribution of mortals. He is said to have the fountain of the +vivification of perpetual natures; but they are the causes of the +subsistence of mortal-formed animals. And he indeed extends himself as +a paradigm to the many Gods; but they are said to imitate the demiurgic +intellect. He is said to produce the whole world, and the plenitudes +of it; but they are said to borrow parts from the fabrications of +their father, in order to the completion of their proper works. And he +indeed employs all incorporeal powers; but they also employ such as +are corporeal. He gives subsistence to indissoluble bonds; but they +to such as are dissoluble. And he, indeed, is said to insert a union +more ancient than the natures which it unites; but they are said to +introduce an adventitious union, and which is of an origin posterior +to this, to the beings that consist of many contrary natures. And he +is said to produce all things impartibly; but they with division, +minutely distributing the subsistence of mortal natures into small and +invisible nails. From these things, therefore the separation of the two +fabrications may be assumed; but the union and contact of them may be +surveyed from the words before us. For here a contact is effected of +the second with the first fabrication; of apparent with unapparent, and +of divided with monadic production. + +Hence it is necessary that the lowest part of the first and unapparent +fabrication, should coalesce with the summit of the second. For thus +also the heavens are conjoined with generation [or the sublunary +region] the lowest of the celestial bodies exhibiting the principle +of mutation; but the summit of the essence of sublunary natures, +being moved in conjunction with the heavens. Hence too, here also the +rational soul is conjoined with the mortal form of life; viz. the +lowest and most partial of the productions of the father, with the +highest of the natures generated by the junior Gods. For they, indeed, +as being certain fathers produce lives; but as fabricators, bodies. And +they imitate indeed Vulcan by the fabrication of bodies; but Juno by +vivification. But through both these they imitate the whole Demiurgus. +For he is maker and father; but they fashion bodies by borrowing +parts from wholes. For every where parts derive their composition +from wholes. When, however, the wholes are incorporeal, they remain +undiminished by the subsistence of the parts; but when they are +corporeal, the parts that are generated from them diminish the wholes. +Hence an ablation always taking place, but the parts always remaining, +the wholes perish. And thus generation will no longer exist, and the +works of the first fabrication will all vanish through the second, +which it is not lawful to assert. That nothing of this kind, therefore, +may take place in the universe, the composite parts are again +dissolved, in order to fill up their wholes. And the generation of one +thing is the corruption of another; but the corruption of one thing +is the generation of another; in order that generation and corruption +may always remain. For if generation existed only once, it would at a +certain time stop, in consequence of consisting of finite things, and +these being consumed. But these perishing corruption also would stop, +all things being destroyed. Hence if it is necessary that one of these +should exist, the other also will exist. Every thing, therefore, which +is generated from the second fabrication is a composite and dissoluble, +and deriving its composition from time, will also in time be again +dissolved. The junior Gods, therefore, are very properly said to +borrow parts which are again to be restored to their wholes. But they +borrow them from the universe.[98] For that which they borrow is fire, +earth, water and air; and they again restore them to the universe.[99] +The father, therefore, wishes the wholes to remain which he generated +and arranged. And thus much concerning all the fabrication of the +junior Gods. + + + + + CHAPTER XIV. + + +Having, therefore, thus largely presented to the reader what pertains +to the mundane Gods in general, it is now requisite to descend to +particulars, and to discuss separately the peculiarities of the +celestial, and those of the sublunary Gods. The order of the celestial +Gods then consisting of the fixed stars and the planets, the sphere in +which the former are placed has the relation of a monad, as we have +before observed, to the starry deities which that sphere contains. +For the first of the four ideas in the paradigm of the universe being +an exempt monad, the multitude of the stars proceeding from it is +comprehended by a co-ordinate monad, which is the inerratic sphere. +This sphere is called by Plato in the Timæus a true world, because +it is more properly a world than the sublunary region, which always +requires a foreign arrangement, and is conversant with unceasing +mutation. It is also a world thus variegated with stars, as expressing +intellectual variety, and receiving from thence as it were in the whole +of itself the uniform flowers with which the intellectual world is +surrounded, and which imitate the beauty of the celestial paradigms. +But Plato very accurately says, that the Demiurgus gave this sphere +a circular _distribution_ about the whole of the heavens. For to +_distribute_ and _to distribute in a circle_, is adapted to this +sphere; since the former signifies intellectual distribution, but the +latter demiurgic order. Hence theologists[100] establish Eunomia in +the inerratic sphere, who separates the multitude it contains, and +always preserves each of the stars in its proper order. Hence also +celebrating Vulcan as the maker of the heavens, they conjoin with him +Aglaia, as causing all heaven to be splendid through the variety of the +stars. And again, of the Seasons, they place Dice or Justice over the +planetary region, as bringing in a circular order the inequability of +the motions of the planets to an equability according to reason; but of +the Graces, Thalia, as causing their lives to be ever-flourishing. And +in the sublunary region, they establish Irene or peace, as conciliating +the war of the elements; but of the Graces Euphrosune, as conferring on +every thing a facility of natural energy. + +But the planets are called the Governors of the world, (κοσμοκρατορες) +and are allotted a total power. As the inerratic sphere too, has a +number of starry animals, so each of the planets is the leader of +a multitude of animals, or of certain other things of this kind. +Hence the doubt may be solved, why the one sphere of the fixed stars +comprehends a multitude of stars, but each of the planetary spheres +convolves only one star. For it must be said, that in the former case +the sphere indeed is a monad, comprehending in itself an appropriate +multitude, and is sufficient to the comprehension of a mundane +multitude which ranks as the first. But in the latter case, the +governing power is twofold, viz. the sphere, and each of the governors +of the world, who is a monad co-arranged with multitude. The sphere +itself, however, is a leader, a co-arranged monad and a wholeness; +(ολοτης) but each of the governors of the world is a leader and a +monad, but is not a wholeness. Indeed, subordinate natures require +a greater number of leaders, and a multitude in each of the spheres +unapparent on account of diminution. But in the sublunary region, the +orders which are the leaders of the genera in each of the elements are +still more numerous than those of the planets, as we learn from the +Grecian theogony. + +In each of the planetary spheres, therefore, there is a number of +satellites analogous to the choir of the fixed stars, subsisting +with proper circulations of their own. The revolution also of these +satellites is similar to that of the planets which they follow; +and this according to Plato is a spiral revolution. With respect, +likewise, to these satellites, the first in order about every planet +are Gods; after these dæmons revolve in lucid orbicular bodies; and +these are followed by partial souls such as ours. That in each of +the planetary spheres, however, there is a multitude co-ordinate to +each may be inferred from the extremes. For if the inerratic sphere +has a multitude co-ordinate to itself, and earth is with respect +to terrestrial animals what the inerratic sphere is to such as are +celestial, it is necessary that every _wholeness_ should entirely +possess certain partial animals co-ordinate to itself, through which +also the spheres derive the appellation of _wholenesses_.[101] But the +natures situated in the middle are concealed from our sense, while in +the mean time those contained in the extremes are apparent,---one kind +through their transcendently luminous essence, and the other through +their alliance to ourselves. If also partial souls are disseminated +about these spheres, some indeed about the sun, but others about the +moon, and others about each of the remaining spheres; and if prior to +souls, there are dæmons giving completion to the herds of which they +are the leaders; it is evident that it is beautifully said, that _each +of the spheres is a world_. And this is conformable to the doctrines +of theologists,[102] when they teach us that there are Gods in every +sphere prior to dæmons, the government of some receiving its perfection +under that of others. As for instance, with respect to our queen the +moon, that she contains the Goddess Hecate, and Diana; and with respect +to the sovereign sun, and the Gods which he contains, theologists +celebrate Bacchus as subsisting there. + + The sun’s assessor, who with watchful eye + Inspects the sacred pole. + +They also celebrate Jupiter as seated there, Osiris, and a solar Pan, +as likewise other divinities, of which the books of theologists and +theurgists are full. From all which it is evident how true it is that +each of the planets is the prefect of many Gods, who give completion to +its proper circulation.[103] + + + + + CHAPTER XV. + + +Owing to the loss of a seventh book On the Theology of Plato, written +by Proclus, copious information respecting the peculiarities of all +the celestial Gods is unfortunately not to be obtained. All that can +be procured, however, on this subject, and which I have diligently +collected from Platonic writings, I shall now present to the +philosophic reader, beginning in the first place with the moon. This +divinity then has the relation of nature and of a mother with respect +to generation, or the sublunary region. For all things are convolved +and co-increased by her when she increases; but are diminished when +she diminishes. This Goddess, too, benevolently leads into light +the unapparent productive principles of nature. She likewise gives +perfection to souls through a life according to virtue; but imparts to +mortal animals a restitution to form. + +Next to the moon is Mercury, who is the cause of symmetry to +all mundane natures, having the relation of reason to things in +generation. For all symmetry proceeds according to one ratio, and +according to number of which this God is the giver. This deity, +too, is the inspective guardian of _gymnastic_ exercises; and hence +_hermæ_, or carved statues of Mercury were placed in the Palæstræ; of +_music_, and hence he is honoured as the lyrist (λυραιος) among the +celestial constellations; and of _disciplines_, because the invention +of geometry, reasoning and discourse is referred to this God. He +presides, therefore, over every species of discipline, leading us to an +intelligible essence from this mortal abode, governing the different +herds of souls, and dispersing the sleep and oblivion with which they +are oppressed. He is likewise the supplier of recollection, the end of +which is a genuine intellectual apprehension of divine natures. Hence, +among the Athenians, certain images of these things were preserved; +grammar having a reference to dialectic discipline; playing on the harp +pertaining to music; and wrestling to gymnastic, in which those youths +that were well born were instructed. + +In the next place follows Venus, who is the cause of beauty to +generated natures, which is an imitation of intelligible beauty. This +goddess also is the source of the union of form with matter; connecting +and comprehending the powers of all the elements; and her principal +employment consists in beautifully illuminating the order, harmony, +and communion of all mundane concerns. She likewise governs all the +co-ordinations in the celestial world and the earth, binds them to each +other, and perfects their generative progressions through a kindred +conjunction. And she unites and leads into communion the Hermaic +production which has a remitted subsistence, and is in subjection to +the solar fabrication. + +The next celestial divinity in order after Venus is the sovereign Sun, +whose essence and dignity are so great, according to the theology of +Plato, as to possess a supermundane prerogative among mundane natures. +This Plato indicates in the Timæus, when speaking of the sun he says: +“In order that these circles might possess a certain manifest measure +of slowness and swiftness with reference to each other, and that the +motion of the eight circulations might be conspicuous, the divinity +enkindled a light which we now denominate the sun, in the second +revolution from the earth; that the heavens might become eminently +apparent to all things, and that such animals might participate of +number as are adapted to its participation, receiving numerical +information from the revolution of a nature similar and the same.” +On these words Proclus admirably comments as follows:[104] Plato +here delivers the one ruling cause of the generation of apparent +time. For as the Demiurgus gives subsistence to unapparent time, thus +also the sun to the time which is apparent, and which measures the +motion of bodies. For through light he leads into visibility every +temporal interval, gives bound to all periods, and exhibits measures +of restoration to a pristine state. Deservedly, therefore, is the sun +a manifest measure, as especially unfolding the progression[105] of +time according to number, into the universe. For it has a more accurate +period than that of the five planets, its motions being less anomalous +than theirs; and also than that of the moon, by always terminating at +the same point, its progressions to the north and the south. But if it +has a more accurate period, it is deservedly a measure of measures, and +from itself bounds[106] the periodic measures of the other planets, +and the swiftness of their motions with reference to each other. It +also in a greater degree imitates the perpetual permanency of eternity, +by always revolving after the same manner. In this way, therefore, it +differs from the planets. + +After another manner, likewise, the sun is a more manifest measure +than the measure of the inerratic sphere. For though this sphere has +a certain appropriate measure, a proper interval, and one immutable +number of its peculiar motion, yet the solar light causes this measure +and all the evolution of apparent time to be manifest and known. Hence +Plato says, “In order that there might be a certain manifest measure.” +For though there is a certain measure in the other planets, yet it +is not clear and manifest. But the sun unfolds into light both other +intelligibles and time. You must not however on this account say that +the solar light was generated for the sake of measurement. For how is +it possible that wholes should subsist for the sake of parts; governing +natures for the sake of the governed; and perpetual for the sake of +corruptible natures? But we should rather say that light possessing an +evolving power unfolds total time, and calls forth its supermundane +monad, and one measure into the measurement of the periods of bodies. +And this makes time to be, as it were, sensible. Hence, it is the +light of the sun which causes every thing that is moved to have a +clear and manifest measure. And this indeed is its whole good. After +wholes, however, it likewise benefits parts in a secondary degree. For +it imparts the generation of number, and measure to the natures which +are adapted to participate of these. For irrational beings indeed are +destitute of these; but the genera of dæmons who follow the periods +of the Gods, and men become partakers of them. The supply of good, +therefore, through the solar light, beginning supernally from wholes, +descends as far as to parts. And if beginning from visible natures, +you are willing to speak of such as are invisible, the light of the +sun gives splendor to the whole world, causes a corporeal-formed +nature to be divine, and wholly filled through the whole of itself +with life. But it leads souls through undefiled light, imparts to them +a pure and elevating power, and governs the world by its rays. And it +likewise fills souls with empyrean fruits. For the order of the sun is +supernally derived from supermundane natures. Hence Plato does not here +fabricate the solar light, but says that the Demiurgus enkindled it, as +giving subsistence from his own essence to this sphere, and emitting +from the solar fountain a life extended into interval and continually +renewed. _And this also is asserted by theologists concerning the +supermundane firmaments._ + +On this account, it appears to me that Plato delivers a two-fold +generation of the sun; one indeed in conjunction with the seven +governors of the world, when he fashions the bodies of them, and +inserts them in their circulations; but the other according to the +enkindling of light, through which he imparts to the sun supermundane +power. For it is one thing to generate the bulk of the sun itself +by itself, and another in conjunction with a ruling characteristic, +through which the sun is called the king of every visible nature, and +is established analogous to the one fountain of good. For as this +fountain being better than the intelligible essence, illuminates +both intellect and the intelligible, thus also the sun being better +than a visible nature, illuminates both that which is visible and +sight. But if the sun is beyond a visible essence, it will have a +supermundane nature. For the world is visible and tangible, and has a +body. Hence, we must survey the sun in a twofold respect; viz. as one +of the sever planets, and as the leader of wholes; and as mundane and +supermundane, according to the latter of which he splendidly emits a +divine light. For in the same manner as _the good_ luminously +emits truth which deifies the intelligible and intellectual orders; +as Phanes in Orpheus sends forth intelligible light which fills with +intelligence all the intellectual Gods; and as Jupiter enkindles an +intellectual and demiurgic light in all the supermundane Gods; thus +also the sun illuminates every thing visible through this undefiled +light. The illuminating cause too is always in an order superior to the +illuminated natures. For neither is _the good_ intelligible, nor +Phanes intellectual, nor Jupiter supermundane. In consequence of this +reasoning, therefore, the sun being supermundane emits the fountains of +light. And according to the most mystic doctrines, the wholeness of the +sun is in the supermundane orders; for in them there is a solar world, +and a total light, as the Chaldæan oracles[107] assert, and which I am +persuaded is true. + +That the stars, however, and the whole of the heavens receive their +light from the sun may easily be perceived. For that which is common +in many things derives its subsistence from one cause; and in one way +indeed from an exempt, but in another from a co-arranged cause. But +this cause is that which primarily participates of that form. The +primary participant, however, is that in which either primarily or +especially this form exists. If, therefore, light especially subsists +in the sun, this will be the first light; and from this that which is +in other things will be derived. + + + + + CHAPTER XVI. + + +Conformably, also, to this doctrine of Plato concerning the sun, the +emperor Julian sublimely theologizes about this divinity in his very +elegant oration to him, from which the following is an extract. The +apparent and splendid orbicular sun is the cause of well-being to +sensible natures. And whatever we have asserted as flowing from the +mighty intellectual sun among the intellectual Gods,[108] the same +perfections the apparent sun communicates to apparent forms; the +truth of which will be clearly evinced by contemplating invisible +natures from the objects of sensible inspection. And in the first +place, is not light the incorporeal and divine form of that which +is diaphanous in energy? But whatever that which is diaphanous may +be, which is subjected to all the elements, and is their proximate +form, it is certain that it is neither corporeal nor mixed, nor does +it display any of the peculiar qualities of body. Hence, you cannot +affirm that heat is one of its properties, nor its contrary cold; +you can neither ascribe to it hardness nor softness, nor any other +tangible difference; nor attribute taste or smell as peculiarities of +its essence. For a nature of this kind, which is called forth into +energy by the interposition of light, is alone subject to the power of +sight. But light is the form of a diaphanous essence which resembles +that common matter the subject of bodies, through which it is every +where diffused; and rays are the summit, and as it were flower of +light, which is an incorporeal nature. According to the opinion of the +Phœnicians, however, who are skilled in divine science and wisdom, the +universally-diffused splendour of light is the unmingled energy of an +intellect perfectly pure. And this doctrine will be found agreeable to +reason, when we consider that since light is incorporeal, its fountain +cannot be body, but the pure energy of intellect, illuminating in its +proper habitation the middle region of the heavens: and from this +exalted situation scattering its light, it fills all the celestial orbs +with powerful vigour, and illuminates the universe with divine and +incorruptible light. + +Whatever, likewise, we first perceive by the sight, is nothing but +a mere name of honourable labour, unless it receives the ruling +assistance of light. For how can any thing be visible, unless, +like matter, it is moved to the artificer that it may receive the +supervening investments of form? Just as gold in a state of simple +fusion is indeed gold, but is not a statue or an image till the +artificer invests it with form. In a similar manner all naturally +visible objects cease to be apparent, unless light is present with +the perceiver. Hence, since it confers vision on the perceiver, and +visibility on the objects of perception, it perfects two natures in +energy, sight and that which is visible. Perfections, however, are form +and essence; though perhaps an assertion of this kind is more subtle +than is suited to our present purpose. + +Of this, however, all men are persuaded, both the scientific and the +illiterate, philosophers and the learned, that day and night are +fabricated by the power of this rising and setting divinity; and that +he manifestly changes and convolves the world. But to which of the +other stars does a province of this kind belong? Do we not, therefore, +derive conviction from hence, that the unapparent and divine race of +intellectual Gods,[109] above the heavens, are replenished from the sun +with boniform powers; to whose authority the whole choir of the stars +submits; and whose nod generation, which he governs by his providence, +attentively obeys? For the planets, indeed, dancing round him as their +king, harmoniously revolve in a circle, with definite intervals, about +his orb; producing certain stable energies, and advancing backwards and +forwards; terms by which the skilful in the spheric theory signify such +like phænomena of the stars. To which we may add, as manifest to every +one, that the light of the moon is augmented or diminished according to +her distance from the sun. + +Is it not then highly probable that the orderly disposition of the +intellectual Gods, which is more ancient than that of bodies, is +analogous to the mundane arrangement? Hence we infer his _perfective_ +power from the whole phænomena, because he gives vision to visive +natures; for he perfects these by his light. But we collect his +_demiurgic_ and _prolific_ power from the mutation of the universe; +and his _capacity of collecting all things into one_, from the +properties of motion conspiring into union and consent; and _middle +position_, from his own central situation. Lastly, we infer his _royal +establishment among the intellectual Gods_, from his middle order +between the planets. For if we perceived these, or as many other +properties, belonging to any other of the apparent Gods, we should not +ascribe the principality among them to the sun. + +Again, that we may consider this affair in a different mode, since +there is one demiurgus of the universe, but many demiurgic Gods, who +revolve round the heavens, it is proper to place in the midst of these +the mundane administration of the sun. Besides, the fertile power of +life is copious and redundant in intelligibles, and the world is full +of the same prolific life. Hence it is evident that the fertile life of +the sovereign sun is a medium between the two, as the mundane phænomena +perpetually evince. For with respect to forms, some he perfects, and +others he fabricates; some he adorns, and others he excites; nor is +any thing capable of advancing into light and generation without +the demiurgic power of the sun. Add too, that if we attend to the +unmingled, pure and immaterial essence of intelligibles, to which +nothing extrinsical flows, and nothing foreign adheres, but which is +full of its own appropriate simplicity, and afterwards consider the +defecated nature of that pure and divine body which is conversant +with mundane bodies revolving in an orb, and which is free from all +elementary mixture, we shall find that the splendid and incorruptible +essence of the royal sun, is a medium between the immaterial purity of +intelligibles and that which in sensibles is unmingled and remote from +generation and corruption. + +The greatest argument, however, for the truth of this is derived from +hence, that the light which flows from the sun upon the earth will not +suffer itself to be mingled with any thing; nor is it polluted by any +sordid nature, or by any contagion; but it abides every where pure, +undefiled, and impassive. Again, if we consider not only immaterial and +intelligible forms, but such as are sensible, subsisting in matter, +the middle intellectual situation of forms about the mighty sun will +be no less certain and clear. For these afford continual assistance to +forms merged in matter: so that they could neither exist, nor preserve +themselves in existence, unless this beneficent deity co-operated with +their essence. In short, is he not the cause of the separation of forms +and the concretion of matter? From whom we not only possess the power +of understanding his nature, but from whom our eyes are endued with the +faculty of sight? For the distribution of rays throughout the world, +and union of light, exhibit the demiurgic separation of the artificer. + +Again, the solar orb is moved in the starless, which is far higher than +the inerratic sphere. Hence, he is not the middle of the planets, but +of the three worlds, according to the mystic hypotheses;[110] if it +be proper to call them hypotheses, and not rather dogmas; confining +the appellation of hypotheses to the doctrine of the sphere. For the +truth of the former is testified by men who audibly received this +information from Gods, or mighty dæmons; but the latter is founded +on the probability arising from the agreement of the phænomena. But +besides those which I have mentioned, there is an innumerable multitude +of celestial Gods, perceived by such as do not contemplate the heavens +indolently and after the manner of brutes. As the sun quadruply divides +these three worlds, on account of the communion of the zodiac with +each, so he again divides the zodiac into twelve powers of Gods, and +each of these into three others, so that thirty-six are produced in +the whole. Hence, as it appears to me, a triple benefit of the Graces +proceeds to us from the heavens, I mean from those circles which the +God quadruply dividing produces in consequence of this, a quadripartite +beauty and elegance of seasons and times. But the Graces also imitate +a circle in their resemblances on the earth. Add too, that Bacchus +is the source of joy, who is said to obtain a common kingdom with +the sun. But why should I here mention the epithet Horus, or other +names of the Gods, all of which correspond with the divinity of the +sun? Mankind, indeed, may conceive the excellence of the God from his +operations; since he perfects the heavens with intellectual goods, and +renders them partakers of intelligible beauty. For as he originates +from this beauty, he applies himself both wholly and by parts, to the +distribution of good. + +In the last place, as the sun is the source of our existence, so +likewise of the aliment by which that existence is supported. And, +indeed, he confers on us more divine advantages peculiar to souls; for +he loosens these from the bands of a corporeal nature, reduces them +to the kindred essence of divinity, and assigns them the subtile and +firm texture of divine splendor, as a vehicle in which they may safely +descend to the realms of generation. And these benefits of the God have +been celebrated by others according to their desert, and require the +assistance of faith more than the evidence of demonstration. + + + + + CHAPTER XVII. + + +From the MS. Scholia likewise of Proclus on the Cratylus of Plato, we +derive the following very important information concerning Apollo; in +which the principal powers of the God are unfolded by him with his +usual magnificence of diction, and divine fecundity of conception. +Socrates, therefore, in the Cratylus says, “that there is no other name +[than that of Apollo] which can more harmonize with the four powers of +this God, because it touches upon them all, and evinces in a certain +respect his _harmonic_, _prophetic_, _medicinal_, and _arrow-darting +skill_.” And shortly after he adds, “that the name is so composed that +it touches upon all the powers of the God, viz. his _simplicity_, +_perpetual jaculation_, _purifying_, and _joint-revolving nature_.” On +these words Proclus observes, that very rationally after Proserpine, +Plato analyzes Apollo. For there is a great communion between the Coric +and the Apolloniacal series; since the former is the unity of the +middle triad of the supermundane Gods, and emits from herself vivific +powers; but the latter converts the solar principles to one union; +and the solar principles are allotted a subsistence immediately after +the vivific. Hence, according to Orpheus, when Ceres delivered up the +government to Proserpine, she thus admonished her: + + Αυταρ Απολλωνος θαλερον λεχος εισαναβασα, + Τεξεται αγλαα τεκνα πυριφλεγεθοντα προσωποις.[111] + +That is, + + But next Apollo’s florid bed ascend; + For thus the God fam’d offspring shall beget, + Refulgent with the beams of glowing fire. + +But how could this be the case, unless there was a considerable degree +of communion between these divinities? + +It is necessary however, to know thus much concerning Apollo, that +according to the first and most natural conception, his name signifies +the cause of union, and that power which collects multitude into one; +and this mode of speculation concerning his name harmonizes with all +the orders of the God. But Socrates alone considers his more partial +powers: for the multitude of the powers of Apollo are not to be +comprehended, nor described by us. For when will man who is merely +rational, be able to comprehend not only all the peculiarities of +Apollo, but all those of any other God? Theologists indeed deliver +to us a great multitude of Apolloniacal peculiarities; but Socrates +now only mentions four of them. For the world is as it were a decad, +being filled from all productive principles, receiving all things in +itself, and being converted to the proper principle of the decad, +of which the tetrad proximately contains the cause, but in an exempt +manner the monad. And the former without separation and occultly, but +the latter with separation; just as Apollo proximately unites the +multitude of mundane natures, but the demiurgic intellect exemptly. Why +then does Socrates use an order of this kind? For beginning from the +_medicinal_ power of the god, and proceeding through his _prophetic_ +and _arrow-darting_ powers, he ends in his _harmonic_ power. We +reply, that all the energies of this god, are in all the orders of +beings, beginning from on high and proceeding as far as to the last of +things; but different energies appear to have more or less dominion in +different orders. Thus for instance the _medicinal_ power of Apollo is +most apparent in the sublunary region, for + + There slaughter, rage, and countless ills beside, + Disease, decay, and rottenness reside.[112] + +And as these are moved in an inordinate manner, they require to be +restored from a condition contrary, into one agreeable to nature, and +from incommensuration and manifold division, into symmetry and union. + +But the _prophetic_ energy of the god is most apparent in the +heavens; for there his enunciative power shines forth, unfolding +intelligible good to celestial natures, and on this account he revolves +together with the sun, with whom he participates the same intellect +in common; since the sun also illuminates whatever the heavens +contain, and extends a unifying power to all their parts. But his +_arrow-darting_ energy mostly prevails among the _liberated_ +gods; for there ruling over the wholes which the universe contains, +he excites their motions by his rays, which are always assimilated to +arrows, extirpates every thing inordinate, and fills all things with +demiurgic gifts. And though he has a separate and exempt subsistence, +he reaches all things by his energies. + +Again, his _harmonic_ power is more predominant in the _ruling +supermundane_ order; for it is this divinity who harmonizing the +universe, establishes about himself according to one union the choir +of the Muses, and produces by this mean as a certain Theurgist says +“_the harmony of exulting light_.” Apollo therefore as we have shown +is _harmonic_, and this is likewise the case with the other Apollos +which are contained in the earth and the other spheres; but this +power appears in some places more, and in others less. These powers +too subsist in the god himself in an united manner, and exempt from +other natures, but in those attendants of the Gods who are superior to +us, divisibly, and according to participation; for there is a great +multitude of medicinal, prophetic, harmonic, and arrow-darting angels, +dæmons, and heroes, suspended from Apollo, who distribute in a partial +manner the uniform powers of the god. + +But it is necessary to consider each of these powers according to +one definite characteristic; as for instance, his _harmonic_ power, +according to its binding together separated multitude; his _prophetic_ +power according to the enunciative; his _arrow-darting_ power, +according to its being subvertive of an inordinate nature; and his +_medicinal_ power, according to its perfective energy. We should +likewise speculate these characteristics differently in Gods, angels, +dæmons, heroes, men, animals, and plants; for the powers of the Gods +extend from on high to the last of things, and at the same time appear +in an accommodated manner in each; and the telestic (i.e. mystic) art +endeavours through sympathy to conjoin these ultimate participants with +the Gods. But in all these orders we must carefully observe, that this +God is the cause of union to multiplied natures: for his _medicinal_ +power, which takes away the _multiform_ nature of disease, imparts +_uniform_ health; since health is symmetry and a subsistence according +to nature, but that which is contrary to nature is multifarious. Thus +too, his _prophetic_ power, which unfolds the simplicity of truth, +takes away the variety of that which is false; but his _arrow-darting_ +power, which exterminates every thing furious and wild, but prepares +that which is orderly and gentle to exercise dominion, vindicates +to itself unity, and exterminates a disordered nature tending to +multitude; and his _musical_ power, through rhythm and harmony, places +a bond, friendship and union in _wholes_, and subdues the contraries to +these. + +And all these powers indeed, subsist primarily, in an exempt manner, +and uniformly in Jupiter the demiurgus of wholes, but secondarily +and separately in Apollo. Hence Apollo is not the same with the +demiurgic intellect; for this comprehends these powers totally and +paternally, but Apollo with subjection, imitating his father; since +all the energies and powers of secondary Gods, are comprehended in the +demiurgus according to cause. And the demiurgus fabricates and adorns +the universe according to all these powers, and in a collected manner; +but the other deities which proceed from him, co-operate with their +father according to different powers. + +Purification however being seen not only in the medicinal, but also +in the prophetic art evinces, that the cathartic power of Apollo +comprehends the two powers: for it illustrates the world with the +glittering splendors of light, and purifies all material immoderation +by Pæonian energies; which physicians and prophets among us imitating, +the former purify bodies, and the latter through sulphureous +preparations render themselves and their associates pure. For, as +Timæus says, the Gods purify the universe, either by fire or water; +and prophets also in this respect imitate the Gods. In the most sacred +of the mysteries too, purifications are employed prior to initiation +into them, in order to take away every thing foreign from the proposed +sacred mystery. We may likewise add, that the referring multiform +purifications to the one cathartic power of the Gods, is adapted to +him. For Apollo every where unites and elevates multitude to _the +one_, and uniformly comprehends all the modes of purification; +purifying all heaven, generation, and all mundane lives, and separating +partial souls from the grossness of matter. Hence the theurgist who is +the leader of the mysteries of this God begins from purifications and +sprinklings: + + Αυτος δ’ εν πρωτοις ιερευς πυρος εργα κυβερνων, + Κυματι ραινεσθω παγερῳ βαρυηχετος αλμης. + +i.e. “The priest in the first place governing the works of fire, +must sprinkle with the cold water of the loud-sounding sea,” as the +Oracle says concerning him. But the assertion that the God presides +over simplicity according to knowledge, and unfolds truth into +light, presents him to our view as analogous to _the good_, which +Socrates celebrates in the Republic; in which place he calls the sun +the progeny of _the good_, and says that the former is analogous to +the latter. Apollo therefore being the source of union, and this to +the mundane Gods, is arranged analogous to _the good_; and through +_truth_, he unfolds to us his similitude to it, if it be lawful so to +speak. For _the simple_ is a manifestation of _the one_, and the truth +which subsists according to knowledge is a luminous representation of +superessential truth, which first proceeds from _the good_. But _the +perpetually prevailing might of the God in the jaculation of arrows_, +evinces his dominion which vanquishes every thing in the world. For on +high from the supercelestial order, he scatters the rivers of Jupiter, +and pours his rays on the whole world: for his arrows obscurely signify +his rays. Again, the assertion that he presides over music, represents +to us that this God is the cause of all harmony, both unapparent and +apparent, through his ruling supermundane powers, according to which +he generates together with Mnemosyne and Jupiter, the Muses. But he +orderly disposes every thing sensible by his _demiurgic powers_, which +the sons of _theurgists_ denominate _hands_; since the energy of +the harmony of sounds is suspended from the motion of the hands. He +likewise orderly disposes souls and bodies through harmonic reasons, +using their different powers as if they were sounds; and he moves all +things harmoniously and rythmically by his demiurgic motions. The +whole of the celestial order too, and motion, exhibit the harmonious +work of the God; on which account also, partial souls are no otherwise +perfected than through an harmonic similitude to the universe, and +abandoning the dissonance arising from generation; for then they obtain +the most excellent life, which is proposed to them by the God. + + + + + CHAPTER XVIII. + + +As the Muses derive their subsistence from Apollo, and are perpetually +united to him, it is necessary to consider the nature of these +divinities in the next place, and the good which they confer on the +universe in conjunction with their leader Apollo. Plato therefore in +the Cratylus says “That the name of the Muses, and universally that of +music, was derived, as it seems, from μωσθαι, _to inquire_, and from +investigation and philosophy.” On which Proclus in his MS. Scholia on +that dialogue observes as follows: + +“From discoursing about king Apollo, Plato proceeds to the Muses, and +the name of music; for Apollo is celebrated as Musagetes, or the leader +of the Muses. And he indeed is a monad with respect to the harmony +in the world; but the choir of the Muses is the monad of all the +number of the ennead (i.e. nine): From both likewise the whole world +is bound in indissoluble bonds, and is one and all-perfect, through +the communications of these divinities; possessing the former through +the Apolloniacal monad, but its all-perfect subsistence through the +number of the Muses. For the number nine which is generated from the +first perfect number (that is 3) is, through similitude and sameness, +accommodated to the multiform causes of the mundane order and harmony; +all these causes at the same time being collected into one summit for +the purpose of producing one consummate perfection. For the Muses +generate the variety of reasons with which the world is replete; but +Apollo comprehends in union all the multitude of these. And the Muses +give subsistence to the harmony of soul; but Apollo is the leader of +intellectual and impartible harmony. The Muses distribute the phænomena +according to harmonical reasons; but Apollo comprehends unapparent and +separate harmony. And though both give subsistence to the same things, +yet the Muses effect this according to number, but Apollo according +to union. And the Muses indeed distribute the unity of Apollo; +but Apollo unites harmonic multitude, which he also converts and +comprehends. For the multitude of the Muses proceeds from the essence +of _Musagetes_, which is both separate, and subsists according +to the nature of _the one_; and their number evolves the one and +primary cause of the harmony of the universe. + +That such being the etymology of the name of the Muses, since Plato +calls philosophy the greatest music, as causing our psychical powers +to be moved harmoniously, in symphony with real beings, and in +conformity to the orderly motions of the celestial orbs; and since the +investigation of our own essence and that of the universe leads us to +this harmony, through a conversion to ourselves and more excellent +natures,--hence also we denominate the Muses from investigation. For +Musagetes himself unfolds truth to souls, according to one intellectual +simplicity; but the Muses perfect our various energies elevating them +to an intellectual unity. For investigations have the relation of +matter, with reference to the end from invention; just as multitude +with respect to _the one_, and variety with respect to simplicity. +We know therefore, that the Muses impart to souls the investigation of +truth, to bodies the multitude of powers, and that they are every where +the sources of the variety of harmonies. + +In the fable likewise in the Phædrus about the grasshoppers Plato +speaks of the four Muses, Terpsichore, Erato, Calliope, and Urania, +as follows: “It is said the race of the grasshoppers received this +gift from the Muses, that they should never want nutriment, but should +continue singing without meat or drink till they died; and that after +death they should depart to the Muses, and inform them what Muse was +honoured by some particular person among us. Hence that by acquainting +Terpsichore with those who reverence her in the dance, they render her +propitious to such. By informing Erato of her votaries, they render +her favourable in amatory concerns; and the rest in a similar manner, +according to the species of veneration belonging to each. But that +they announce to the most ancient Calliope, and after her to Urania, +those who have lived in the exercise of philosophy, and have cultivated +the music over which they preside; these Muses more than all the rest +being conversant with the heavens, and with both divine and human +discourse; and sending forth the most beautiful voice.” + +On what Plato here says of these Muses, Hermeas in his MS. Commentary +On the Phædrus, makes the following beautiful remarks: “Dancing here +must not be understood literally, as if Terpsichore was propitious +to those who engage in that kind of dancing which is the object of +sense; for this would be ridiculous. We must say therefore, that there +are divine dances; in the first place, the dance of the Gods; and +in the second place, that of divine souls. In the third place, the +revolution of the celestial divinities, viz. of the seven planets, and +the inerratic sphere, is called a dance. In the fourth place, those +who are initiated in the mysteries perform a certain dance. And in the +last place, the whole life of a philosopher is a dance. Who then are +those that honour the Goddess in the dance? Not those who dance well, +but those who live well through the whole of the present existence, +elegantly arranging their life, and dancing in symphony with the +universe. Again, Erato is denominated from Love, and from making the +works of Love, lovely; for she co-operates with Love. But Calliope +is denominated from the eye; and Urania presides over astronomy. +Through these two Goddesses we preserve our rational part from being +in subjection to the irrational nature. For through sight surveying +the order of the celestial Gods, we properly arrange our irrational +part. And farther still, through rythms, philosophy, and hearing, we +elegantly dispose that which we contain of the disorderly and void of +rythm.” + + + + + CHAPTER XIX. + + +The triad of celestial Gods immediately above the sun consists of +Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, of which the first who is the source of +division and motion, perpetually separates, nourishes and excites the +contrarieties of the universe, that the world may exist perfect and +entire from all its parts. He requires, however, the assistance of +Venus, that he may insert order and harmony into things contrary and +discordant. But Jupiter is the cause of a royal and political life, +and is the supplier of a ruling prudence and a practical and adorning +intellect. And Saturn is the source of intellect, in consequence of +being an intellectual deity, and ascending as far as to the first +cause. Hence, as there is nothing disordered and novel in intellect, +Saturn is represented as an old man, and as slow in his motion: and on +this account, astrologers say, that such as have Saturn well situated +in their nativity are endued with intellect. + +Plato in the Timæus delivers to us the manner in which each of these +seven divinities becomes an animal, and is suspended from a more +divine soul, and what kind of perfection it affords to the universe. +For he says, “When therefore, each of the natures necessary to a +joint fabrication of time had arrived at a local motion adapted to +its condition, and their bodies became animals through the connecting +power of vital bonds, they then learned their prescribed order.” For +each of them, says Proclus, is allotted an appropriate life and motion. +For since the demiurgic sacred law distributes to every mortal nature +that which is adapted to it, and co-arranges every thing with a view +to the blessedness of the universe, what ought we to say concerning +the governors of the world? Ought we not to assert that they have +received from their father, every thing appropriate and every good; +and that shining with the splendors of beauty, they not only fabricate +the generation of time in conjunction with the father, but also lead +and govern the whole world? For by thus speaking of them we shall +speak rightly. In addition to these things likewise, we ought to +assert, that they not only receive the beautiful and the good from the +demiurgic monad, but also that being self-motive, they impart these to +themselves; and that from themselves the giving of good originates. +Plato indeed, indicating this says, “that each of them _arrives_ +(αφικεσθαι) at a local motion, adapted to its condition,” as defining +from itself the measure of the life, the order, and the motion which it +is allotted in the universe. + +Since, however, each of the seven bodies has a twofold life, the one +inseparable, but the other separable; and the one indeed intellectual, +and in a ruling manner established in itself, but the other divided +about body, which it connects and moves; according to the latter +indeed, it is an animal, but according to the former a God. Plato, +therefore, distinguishing both these, and rightly conceiving that +a divine and intellectual soul, and which does not depart from +intelligibles, is one thing, but another, the animal which is suspended +from it, possesses life from, and is the image of it says, “that their +bodies became animals through the connecting power of vital bonds, +and that they then learned their prescribed order.” For a divine +soul learns indeed the demiurgic will, understands the works of the +father, and fabricates in conjunction with him mundane natures; and +this, through intellectually perceiving him, and being filled from +him with divine powers. For it is not possible for either intellect +or soul to provide for wholes in an exempt manner, in any other way +than by the participation of deity, and through a deific life. The +words, therefore, “a joint fabrication of time,” manifest that they +are allotted a secondary power in the generation of it; in consequence +of their father possessing a primary power. For he, indeed, generated +the wholeness of time; but these divinities co-operate with him in +the production of the parts of which time consists. For the periods +of these are the parts of the whole of time; just as they also were +generated parts of the world. + +But the animated body is an animal bound with vital bonds, possessing +life from the soul which it receives according to the demiurgic +allotments. For if with us also, the animal is different from the man, +and the visible Socrates is one thing, but the true another, much more +are the true sun and the true Jupiter different from the visible orbs +of these divinities, and not composites of body and soul. Conformably +to this Socrates in the Phædrus says, “that we do not sufficiently +understand that a God is an immortal animal, possessing indeed a +soul and a body, connascent through the whole of time.” Indeed the +unity in each of these divinities, and the ineffable participation +of the fountain of all the numbers characterized by unity, form that +which is primarily a God. But the intellect which connects each of +these deities stably, uniformly, and invariably, is secondarily a +God. And the soul which is filled from intellect, and evolves the +one comprehension of it, is a God in the third place. And the first +indeed of these is truly a God; the second is most divine; and the +third is itself also divine, but illuminates the animal with which it +is connected with the peculiarity of deity; according to which this +likewise is divine, being bound with animated bonds, which may be said +to be vivific, demiurgic and indissoluble bonds, as Plato himself +afterwards asserts. For the whole of the divine bodies, are bound +in souls, are comprehended by and established in them; the _being +bound_ indeed indicating the stable and immutable comprehension +of bodies in souls, and their undisjoined communion with them. Such +therefore being the nature of divine bodies, they fabricate time in +conjunction with the demiurgus, call forth its one and unapparent +power, and impart a progression to it into the world, which unfolds +many temporal measures. + + + + + CHAPTER XX. + + +The celestial Gods therefore, according to Plato subsisting after this +manner, and the unity in each of them ineffably proceeding from the +fountain of good, it is evident that they are all of them beneficent, +and after a similar manner the causes of good. The bodies also which +are suspended from their divine souls possess indescribable powers, +some indeed being firmly established in the divine bodies themselves, +but others proceeding from them into the nature of the world and into +the world itself, descending in an orderly manner through the whole of +generation, and without impediment extending as far as to particulars. +With respect to the powers therefore, which remain in the divine +celestial bodies themselves, there can be no doubt but that they are +all similar; hence those powers remain to be considered which are sent +to this terrestrial region, and are mingled with generation. + +These then descend after the same manner for the safety of the +universe, and connect with invariable sameness the whole of generation. +They are likewise impassive and immutable, though they arrive at that +which is mutable and passive. Generation indeed, being multiform, and +consisting of things of a different nature, it receives the unity +and simplicity of these Gods through its appropriate contrariety and +division, in a hostile and partible manner. It likewise receives that +which is impassive passively: and in short it participates of these +Gods according to its own nature, and not according to their power. +Hence, as that which is generated participates of being according to +a flux of existence; and body participates of an incorporeal nature +corporeally; thus also the natural and material substances which are +in generation, participate of the immaterial and etherial bodies which +are above nature and generation, in a confused and disorderly manner. +Those therefore are absurd who attribute colour, figure and contact +to intelligible forms, because the participants of them are coloured, +figured and tangible; and they are no less absurd who ascribe evil to +the celestial bodies, because the participants of them are sometimes +evil. For there could be no participation, if the participant was +not different from that which it participates. But if that which is +participated is received in something different from itself, this +something different, is in terrestrial places that which is evil and +disorderly. + +This participation therefore, becomes the cause of the abundant +difference in secondary natures, and also the mixture of material with +immaterial influences. To which may be added likewise, as another +cause, that what is imparted in one way, is received after another in +these inferior realms. Thus for instance, the influence of Saturn is +connective, but that of Mars motive. In these material realms however, +the passive receptacle of generation, receives the former according to +congelation and frigidity; but the latter according to immoderate heat. +Hence, corruption and the privation of symmetry are to be ascribed to +the alterant, material and passive nature of the recipients. + +Farther still, the imbecility of material and terrestrial places, not +being able to receive the genuine power and most pure life of the +etherial natures, ascribes its own defects to first causes. Just as if +some one being weak in his body, and not able to bear the vivifying +heat of the sun, should falsely dare to say, influenced by his own +infirmities, that the sun is not advantageous to health and life. +A thing of this kind likewise, may take place in the harmony and +temperament of the universe, I mean, that the same things which are +salutary to the whole, through the perfection of the recipients and +things received, may be noxious to the parts though their partible +privation of symmetry. In the motion of the universe therefore, all the +circulations preserve the whole world after a similar manner, though +frequently one certain part is injured by another; just as in a dance, +where the order of the whole choir is still preserved, though a foot +or a finger may happen to be hurt. Again, to be corrupted, and to be +changed, are affections connascent with particulars. But it is not +proper to accuse on this account wholes and first causes, either as +containing these in themselves, or as if these proceeded from them into +these inferior realms. And thus it appears, that neither the celestial +Gods themselves, nor their gifts are productive of evil.[113] + + + + + CHAPTER XXI. + + +And thus much concerning the planetary deities, who were called by the +ancients, the governors of the world. In the next place therefore, +let us direct our attention to what Plato and his best interpreter +Proclus have transmitted to us concerning Minerva, who as a mundane +divinity is connected with ether, and has also an allotment in the +celestial regions. Plato then in the Timæus describes this Goddess as +both a lover of war, and a lover of wisdom; for he says that she is +philopolemic and philosophic. As she every where however exerts this +twofold power, according to her intellectual, supermundane, and mundane +subsistence, I shall present the reader with the whole of what Proclus +says[114] respecting these two powers of the goddess, in his commentary +on that part of the Timæus where she is celebrated by Plato. + +In the demiurgus and father, says he, of the whole world, many orders +of Gods that have the form of _the one_ present themselves to +the view. And these are of a guardian, or demiurgic, or elevating, +or connective, or perfective characteristic. But the undefiled and +untamed deity Minerva, is one of the first intellectual unities +subsisting in the demiurgus, according to which he himself remains +firm and immutable, and all things proceeding from him participate +of inflexible power; and through which he intellectually perceives +every thing, and is separate in an exempt manner from all beings. +All theologists therefore, call this divinity Minerva, as being +brought forth indeed from the summit of her father, and abiding in +him, being a demiurgic, separate, and immaterial intelligence. Hence +Socrates in the Cratylus, celebrates her as _theonoe_ (θεονοη) +or _deific intellection_. But as, in conjunction with other +divinities sustaining all things in the one demiurgus, and arranging +wholes, together with her father;--through the first of these, they +denominate her philosophic, but through the second philopolemic. For +she who according to the form of one connectedly contains all the +paternal wisdom is a philosopher. And she who invariably rules over +all contrariety, may be properly called a lover of war. Hence Orpheus +speaking of her birth says, that Jupiter generated her from his head, + + With armour shining like a brazen flower. + +Since however, it was necessary that she should proceed into second and +third orders, she appears in the order to which Proserpine belongs, +according to the undefiled heptad; but she generates every virtue +from herself, and elevating powers, and illuminates secondary natures +with intellect, and an undefiled life. Hence she is called _Core +Tritogenes_. She likewise appears among the liberated Gods, uniting +the lunar order with intellectual and demiurgic light, causing the +productions of those divinities to be undefiled, and demonstrating the +one unity of them to be unmingled with their depending powers. She also +appears in the heavens and the sublunary region; and according to the +united gift of herself, imparts the cause both of the philosophic and +the philopolemic power. For her inflexibility is intellectual, and her +separate wisdom is pure and unmingled with secondary natures; and the +one characteristic peculiarity of Minerval providence, extends as far +as to the last orders. For since wherever there are partial souls that +resemble her divinity, they exert an admirable prudence, and exhibit +an unconquerable strength, what ought we to say of her attendant +choirs[115] of dæmons or divine, mundane, liberated, and ruling orders? +For all these receive as from a fountain the twofold peculiarity of +this Goddess. Hence also the divine poet [Homer] indicating both these +powers of Minerva, in conjunction with fabulous devices says, + + The radiant veil her sacred fingers wove, + Floats in rich waves, and spreads the court of Jove. + Her father’s warlike robe her limbs invest.[116] + +In which verses by the veil which she wove, and to which she gave +subsistence by her intellections, her intellectual wisdom is signified. +But by the warlike robe of Jupiter we must understand her demiurgic +providence, which immutably takes care of mundane natures, and prepares +more divine beings always to have dominion in the world. Hence also, I +think Homer represents her as an associate in battle with the Greeks +against the Barbarians; just as Plato here relates that she was an +associate with the Greeks against the inhabitants of the Atlantic +island; in order that every where more intellectual and divine natures +may rule over such as are more irrational and vile. For Mars also is +a friend to war and contrarieties, but with a separation and division +more adapted to the things themselves. Minerva however, connects +contrariety, and illuminates the subjects of her government with union. +Hence likewise she is said to be philopolemic. For, + + Strife, fighting, war, she always loves. + +And she is a friend to war indeed, because she is allotted the summit +of separation; but she is a lover of contrarieties, because these are +in a certain respect congregated through this goddess, in consequence +of better natures having dominion. On this account likewise, the +ancients co-arranged Victory with Minerva. + +If therefore, these things are rightly asserted, she is philosophic +indeed, as being demiurgic intelligence, and as separate and immaterial +wisdom. Hence also, she is called Metis by the Gods. But she is +philopolemic, as connecting the contrarieties in wholes, and as an +untamed and inflexible deity. On this account likewise, she preserves +Bacchus undefiled, but vanquishes the giants in conjunction with her +father. She too alone shakes the ægis, without waiting for the mandate +of Jupiter. She also hurls the javelin, + + Shook by her arm, the massy javelin bends, + Huge, ponderous, strong! that when her fury burns + Whole ranks of heroes tames and overturns.[117] + +Again, she is _Phosphoros_, as every way extending intellectual light; +the _Saviour_, as establishing every partial intellect in the total +intellections of her father; _Ergane_, or the artificer, as presiding +over demiurgic works. Hence the theologist Orpheus says, that the +father produced her, + + That she the queen might be of mighty works. + +But she is _Calliergos_, or the beautiful fabricator, as connecting +by beauty all the works of the father; a _Virgin_, as exerting an +undefiled and unmingled purity; and _Aigiochos_, or ægis-bearing, as +moving the whole of fate, and being the leader of its productions. + +With respect to the spear and shield with which this Goddess, in +the statues of her, is represented as armed, Jamblichus, as we are +informed by Proclus,[118] explains these in a most divinely-inspired +manner as follows: Since every divine nature ought to act and not to +suffer; in order that by operating it may not have the inefficacious +which is similar to matter, but by not suffering, it may not have that +efficacy which resembles material natures, that produce accompanied +with passion,--that it may have neither of these, he asserts that +shields are powers, through which a divine nature remains impassive +and pure, surrounding itself with an infrangible guard. But spears +are powers, according to which it proceeds without contact through +all things, operates in all things, amputating a material nature, and +giving assistance to every generation-producing form. These powers, +however, are first seen about Minerva. Hence also in the statues of her +she is armed with a spear and shield. For she vanquishes every thing, +and according to theologists, remains inflexibly, and uncontaminated +in her father. But these things are seen in a secondary degree in the +Minerval powers, both in such as are whole, and such as are partial. +For as the Jovian and demiurgic multitudes imitate their monads; +and as the prophetic and Apolloniacal multitudes participate of the +characteristic peculiarity of Apollo; thus also the Minerval number +adumbrates the uncontaminated and unmingled nature of Minerva. And they +are seen ultimately in Minerval souls. For in these also the shield is +the untamed and inflexible power of reason; but the spear is that which +is incisive of matter, and which liberates souls from the perturbations +arising from dæmons or destiny. + +With respect to the mundane allotment also of this Goddess who +proceeds supernally from intellectual causes to the earth, Proclus +observes, (in Tim. p. 43.) that she primarily subsists in her father; +but secondarily in the supermundane Gods; that her third progression +is in the twelve liberated rulers; and that after this, she unfolds +into light a liberated authority in the heavens. In one way indeed +in the inerratic sphere; for there also, a certain allotment of this +Goddess is expanded; whether it be the place about the ram, or that +about the virgin, or whether it be some one of the northern stars, as +the Electra which is there is by certain persons asserted to be. But +she unfolds this power in another way in the sun. For there also an +admirable power, and a Minerval order, fabricates wholes, according to +theologists, in conjunction with the sun. And again, in another way +in the moon, being the monad of the triad[119] which is there. But in +another way in the earth, according to the similitude of the allotments +of the earth to the celestial distributions. And lastly, she unfolds +this liberated authority differently in different parts of the earth, +according to the peculiarities of providential energy. This being the +case, it is by no means wonderful that one deity, Minerva, is said by +Plato to have been allotted Athens, and Saïs in Egypt. For it must +not be supposed, that because partial souls are not naturally adapted +to inhabit two bodies at once, this is also impossible to the Gods. +But there is a participation of the same divine power according to +different places, yet in the one power there is also multitude. And by +this place, indeed, it is participated in one way; but by other places +in a different way. And in some sameness is more abundant, but in +others difference. + +In another part, likewise, of the same admirable work (p. 30) Proclus +observes of this Goddess, that it is manifest from the Greeks, that +her dominion extends from on high as far as to the last of things; +for they say she was generated from the summit or head of Jupiter. +But the Egyptians relate that this inscription was written in the +adytum of the Goddess. _I am the things that are, that will be, and +that have been. No one has ever laid open the garment by which I am +concealed. The fruit which I brought forth was the sun._[120] The +Goddess, therefore, being demiurgic, and at the same time apparent +and unapparent, has an allotment in the heavens, and illuminates +generation with forms. For of the signs of the zodiack, the ram is +ascribed to the Goddess, and the equinoctial circle itself, where +especially a power motive of the universe is established. And thus much +concerning the philopolemic and philosophic Goddess Minerva. + + + + + CHAPTER XXII. + + +Let us in the next place direct our attention to that great mundane +divinity the earth, and consider what it is, whence it proceeds, +and how it is said by Plato in the Timæus to be our nurse, and the +most ancient and first of the Gods within the heavens, deriving our +information about this Goddess also from Proclus, (in Tim. p. 280). +Earth then proceeds primarily from the intelligible earth which +comprehends all the intelligible orders of the Gods, and is eternally +established in the father.[121] It also proceeds from the intellectual +Earth which is co-arranged with Heaven, and all the productions of +which it receives. For being analogous to these, it also abides +perpetually as in the centre of the heavens, and being contained, +on all sides by them, is full of generative power, and demiurgic +perfection. The true earth, therefore, is neither this corporeal-formed +and gross bulk; for it will not be the most ancient of the Gods from +its bulk, nor the first of the Gods that are arranged within the +heavens; nor is it the soul of this body; for it would not be, as +Plato says it is, extended about the pole of the universe, since not +the soul, but the body of the earth is a thing of this kind; but if +it be necessary to speak what is most true concerning it, it is an +animal consisting of a divine soul, and a living body. Hence the whole +is, as Plato says, an animal. For there are in it an immaterial and +separate intellect; a divine soul dancing round this intellect; an +etherial body proximately suspended from its informing soul; and in +the last place, this visible bulk, which is on all sides inspired with +life by the vehicle[122] of this soul, with which also being filled, +it generates and nourishes all-various animals. For some animals[123] +are rooted in it, but others about it. And this likewise, Aristotle +perceiving, was ashamed not to give to the earth a natural life. For +whence is it that plants while they remain in the earth live, but when +divulsed from it die, unless this earthly mass was full of life? It +is necessary, also, to assume universally, that wholes are animated +prior to parts. For it would be ridiculous that man indeed should +participate of a rational soul and of intellect, but that no soul +should be assigned to the earth and the air, supernally riding in [as +it were] and governing the elements, and preserving them in their +proper boundaries. For wholes, as Theophrastus says, would have less +authority than parts, and perpetual than corruptible natures, if they +were destitute of soul. Hence, it is necessary to grant that a soul and +an intellect are in the earth; the former causing it to be prolific, +but the latter connectedly-containing it in the middle of the universe. + +Earth herself, therefore, being a divine animal, is also a plenitude +of intellectual and psychical essences, and of immaterial powers. For +if a partial soul has besides a material body an immaterial vehicle, +what ought we to think of a soul so divine as that of the earth? Is +it not, that by a much greater priority visible bodies are suspended +from this soul through other vehicles as media, and that through these, +the visible bodies are able to receive the illuminations of soul? +Such then being the nature of earth herself, she is said to be our +nurse; in the first place, indeed, as possessing a power in a certain +respect equivalent to Heaven. For as that comprehends in itself divine +animals, thus also earth is seen to contain terrestrial animals. But +in the second place, she is our nurse, as inspiring our lives from +her own proper life. For she not only produces fruits, and nourishes +our bodies through these, but she also fills our souls with the +illuminations of herself. For being a divine animal, and generating +us who are partial animals, through her own body indeed she nourishes +and connectedly-contains our bulk; but from her own soul perfects +ours. By her own intellect, likewise, she excites the intellect +which is in us; and thus according to the whole of herself becomes +the nurse of our whole composition. On this account it appears to me +that Plato calls her our nurse, indicating by this her intellectual +nutritive energy. For if she is our nurse, but we are truly souls and +intellects, according to these especially, she will be the perfector +of our essence, moving and exciting our intellectual part. But being +a divine animal, and comprehending in herself many partial animals, +she is said by Plato to be conglobed about the pole which is extended +through the universe; because she is contained and compressed about +its axis. For the axis also is the pole. And the pole is thus now +denominated, because the universe revolves about it. Because, however, +the pole [properly so called] is impartible, but the axis is a pole +with interval, just as if some one should say that a line is a flowing +point,--on this account, the pole is said by Plato to be extended +through the universe, as entirely pervading through the centre of the +earth. + +But we must survey the poles as powers that give stability to the +universe, exciting indeed the whole bulk of it to intelligible love, +and impartibly connecting that which is partible, and unitedly and +without interval that which is extended by interval. Hence, also, Plato +in the Republic, makes the spindle of Lachesis of adamant, indicating, +as we have said, their inflexible and untamed power. And we must +consider the axis, as that one divinity which collects the centres +of the universe, which is connective of the whole world, and motive +of the divine circulations; and as that about which wholes dance and +are convolved, and as sustaining all heaven, being on this account +denominated Atlas, as possessing an immutable and unwearied energy. The +word τεταμενον also, or _extended_, used here by Plato, indicates that +this one power is Titannic guarding the circulations of wholes. But +if, as the divine Jamblichus says, we understand by the pole extended +through the universe, the heavens, neither thus shall we wander from +the conception of Plato. For, as Plato says in the Cratylus, those who +are skilled in astronomy call the heavens the pole, as harmoniously +revolving. According to this conception, therefore, you may call heaven +the pole extended through the universe, as being incurvated through +the whole of itself, in consequence of being without an angle. For +after this manner the superficies of a circle is extended. About this, +however, earth is conglobed, not locally, but through a desire of +becoming assimilated to it, converging to the middle, in order that as +heaven is moved about the centre, so she by tending to the centre, may +become similar to that which is essentially spherical, being herself as +much as possible conglobed. Hence she is compressed about the heaven in +such a way as to be wholly extended about it. + +According to each of these conceptions, therefore, Plato delivers the +cause through which earth is contained in the middle. For the axis +is a power connective of the earth; and the earth is on all sides +compressed by the circulation of the heaven, and is collected together +into the centre of the universe. Earth, therefore, being such, Timæus +afterwards clearly shows what utility she affords to the universe; for +he calls her the guardian and artificer of day and night. And indeed +that she is the maker of night, is evident. For she produces a conical +shadow; and her magnitude and figure, are the causes of the dimension +and quality of the figure of this shadow. But after what manner is she +likewise the fabricator of day? Or does she not produce this day which +is conjoined with night? For about her the risings and settings of the +sun are surveyed. And that Plato assumes this day which is convolved +with night, is evident from his arranging the former under the latter; +as also prior to this, when he says, night therefore and day were thus +generated. Earth, therefore, is the fabricator of both these, producing +both in conjunction with the sun; the sun indeed being in a greater +degree the cause of day, but the earth of night. + +Being, however, the fabricator, she is also the guardian of them, +preserving their boundaries and contrariety with reference to each +other, and also their augmentations and diminutions, according to a +certain analogy. Hence, some denominate her Isis, as equalizing the +inequality, and bringing to an analogy the increase and decrease of +both day and night. But others looking to her prolific power call her +Ceres, as Plotinus, who denominates the intellect of the earth Vesta, +but the soul of it Ceres. We, however, say that the first causes of +these divinities are intellectual, ruling[124] and liberated; but that +from these causes illuminations and powers extend to the earth. Hence +there is a terrestrial Ceres and Vesta, and a terrestrial Isis, in +the same manner as there is a terrestrial Jupiter, and a terrestrial +Hermes; these terrene deities being arranged about the one divinity of +the earth; just as a multitude of celestial Gods proceeds about the one +divinity of the heavens. For there are progressions and terminations +of all the celestial Gods into the earth; and all things are in her +terrestrially, which are contained in the heavens celestially. For +the intellectual earth receives the paternal powers of heaven, and +contains all things after a generative manner. Thus, therefore, we say +that there is a terrestrial Bacchus, and a terrestrial Apollo, who is +the source of prophetic[125] waters in many parts of the earth, and of +openings which predict future events. But the Pæonian[126] and judicial +powers which proceed into it, render other places of it of a purifying +or medicinal nature. All the other powers of the earth, however, it is +impossible to enumerate. For divine powers are indeed inexplicable. But +the orders of angels and demons that follow these powers are still more +numerous, and are circularly allotted the whole earth, and dance round +its one divinity, its one intellect, and one soul. + + + + + CHAPTER XXIII. + + +It remains in the next place, that we should survey how the earth is +said to be the most ancient, and the first of the Gods within the +heavens. For this will be taken literally by those who are accustomed +to look only to its material, gross and dark bulk. But we indeed grant +them that there is something of such a kind in the bulk of the earth +as they say there is; but we think it proper that they should likewise +look to the other goods of the earth, through which it surpasses the +prerogatives of the other elements, viz. its stability, its generative +power, its concord with the heavens, and its position in the centre of +the universe. For the centre has great power in the universe, as being +connective of every circulation. Hence also the Pythagoreans call the +centre the tower of Jupiter, in consequence of containing in itself a +demiurgic guard. We shall likewise remind our opponents of the Platonic +hypothesis concerning the earth, mentioned by Socrates in the Phædo, +where he says that the place of our abode is hollow and dark, and +bound by the sea; but that there is another true earth, containing the +receptacles of the Gods, and possessing a beauty resembling that of the +heavens. We ought not, therefore, to wonder if now the earth is said to +be the most ancient and the first of the Gods within the heavens, since +she possesses so great an altitude, and such a surpassing beauty, and +as Socrates afterwards says, was fashioned by the Demiurgus resembling +a sphere covered with twelve skins, just as the heaven is similar to a +dodecahedron. We must likewise understand that the Demiurgus gave to +the earth alone among the elements to have all the elements separately, +causing her to be wholly a world, variegated analogous to the heavens. +For she contains a river of fire, of air, and of water, and of another +earth, which has the same relation to her which she has to the +universe, as Socrates says in the Phædo. But if this be the case, she +very much transcends the other elements as imitating the heavens, and +possessing every thing in herself terrestrially, which is celestially +contained in the heavens. + +To this also we may add, that the Demiurgus produced these two elements +the first, earth and fire; but the others for the sake of these, in +order that they might have the ratio of bonds with respect to them. And +that the four elements are both in the heavens, and in the sublunary +region; but in the former, indeed, according to a fiery characteristic, +since fire there predominates, as Plato says, but in the latter +according to a terrestrial peculiarity. For the profundity of air, and +the bulk of water are spread round the earth, and possess much of an +earthly property, on which account they are in their own nature dark. +In the heavens, therefore, there is a predominance of fire, but in the +sublunary region of earth. Since, however, generation is connascently +conjoined with the heavens, the end of the latter is earth, so far +as earth is in the heavens, but the beginning of generation is fire, +considered as subsisting in generation. For it is usual to call the +moon earth, as having the same ratio to the sun, which earth has to +fire. “But [the Demiurgus] says Orpheus, fabricated another infinite +earth, which the immortals call _Selene_, but terrestrials +_Mene_.” And it is usual to denominate the summit of generation +fire, which Aristotle also does, when he calls ether fire. In another +place, however, he does not think it proper to call ether fire, but +fiery-formed. Hence, the end of the heavens is not entirely destitute +of mutation, in consequence of its propinquity to generation; but the +beginning of generation is moved in a circle imitating the heavens. + +Farther still, this likewise must be considered, that we ought not +to judge of the dignity of things from places, but from powers and +essence. By what peculiarities, therefore, are we to form a judgment +of transcendencies? By what others than those which the divine orders +exhibit? For transcendency truly so called is with the Gods. From +the divine orders, therefore, we must assume _the monadic_, _the +stable_, _the all-perfect_, _the prolific_, _the connective_, _the +perfective_, _the every-way extended_, _the vivific_, _the adorning_, +_the assimilative_, and _the comprehending_ power. For these are the +peculiarities of all the divine orders. According to all these however, +the earth surpasses the other elements, so that she may justly be +called the most ancient, and the first of the Gods. + +Again, a two-fold nature of things may be surveyed, the one indeed +according to progression, which always makes things that have a +secondary arrangement subordinate to those that are prior to them; but +the other according to conversion, which conjoins extremes to primary +natures through similitude, and produces one circle of the whole +generation. Since also the world is spherical, but a figure of this +kind is the peculiarity of things that subsist according to conversion, +earth likewise must be conjoined in it to the heavens, through one. +circle, and one similitude. For thus also the centre is most similar +to the poles. For the heavens indeed entirely comprehend wholes, being +moved about the poles; but the earth is allotted permanency in the +centre. For it is appropriate to generation that the immoveable should +be more ancient than that which is moved. Hence, according to all these +conceptions it may be said, that earth as co-ordinate with heaven, is +the most ancient of the Gods within the heavens. For she is within +them, as being on all sides comprehended by them. For as the demiurgus +fashioned the whole of a corporeal nature within the soul of the world, +thus also he fabricated earth within the heavens, as compressed and +contained by them, and in conjunction with them fabricating wholes. + +She has, however, so far as she is _the first_ of the Gods, an +indication of transcendency according to essence; but so far as she +is _the most ancient_, she exhibits to our view the dignity which she +is allotted. For how is it possible not to admit that she is allotted +a great portion in the world, and is very honourable, in whom there +are the tower of Jupiter, and the progression of Saturn? For not +only Tartarus, which is the extremity of the earth, is on all sides +comprehended by Saturn, and the Saturnian power, but also whatever +else may be conceived subordinate to this. For Homer says that this +is connectedly contained through the sub-tartarean Gods. Not that he +arranges Gods beyond Tartarus, as the words indicate; but that Tartarus +itself is on all sides comprehended by them. + +Farther still, we may survey the analogy which earth has to the +intellectual earth. For as the latter comprehends and gives subsistence +to perfective, guardian, and Titannic orders of Gods, of which the +Orphic theologies are full, so likewise the former possesses various +powers. And as a nurse indeed she imitates the perfective order, +according to which the Athenians also are accustomed to call her +κουροτροφος, or _the nourisher of youth_, and ανησιδωρα, or _scattering +gifts_, as producing and nourishing plants and animals. But as a guard +she imitates the guardian, and as conglobed about the pole which is +extended (τεταμενη) through the universe, the _Titannic_ order. Since, +however, the intellectual earth prior to other divinities generated +Aigle and the Hesperian Erithya, thus also our earth is the fabricator +of day and night. And the analogy of the latter to the former is +evident. + +In the last place, Proclus adds, if also you are willing after another +manner to understand that she is the first and most ancient of the +Gods, as deriving her subsistence from the first and most ancient +causes, this reason also will be attended with probability, since first +causes proceed by their energies to the utmost extent of things; and +besides this, the last of things frequently preserve the analogy of +such as are first, as possessing their order from them alone. Hence, +every way the assertion of Plato is true, whether you are willing to +look to the bulk of the earth, or to the powers which she contains. And +thus much from Proclus, concerning that great mundane divinity, the +earth, who in the language of Theophrastus[127] is the common Vesta +of Gods and men; and on whose fertile surface reclining, says he, as +on the soft bosom of a mother or a nurse, we ought to celebrate her +divinity with hymns, and incline to her with filial affection, as to +the source of our existence. + + + + + CHAPTER XXIV. + + +Having thus amply discussed the theory pertaining to the celestial +Gods, it is necessary in the next place, that we should direct our +attention to the sublunary deities, who are denominated γενεσιουργοι, +or _the fabricators of generation_. Plato in the Timæus calls +these Gods dæmons, because they are so with reference to the celestial +Gods. For they are suspended from them, and together with them +providentially attend to their appropriate allotments. Conformably +to this, also, in the Banquet he calls Love a dæmon, as being the +attendant of Venus, and as proceeding from the God Porus, who is truly +the source of abundance; though in the Phædrus he admits Love to be +a God, as with reference to the life of which he is the leader. What +Plato, therefore, says of these Gods in the Timæus is as follows: “But +to speak concerning the other dæmons, and to know their generation, +is a task beyond our ability to perform. It is, therefore, necessary +in this case to believe in ancient men; who being the progeny of the +Gods, as they themselves assert, must have a clear knowledge of their +parents. It is impossible, therefore, not to believe in the children +of the Gods, though they should speak without probable and necessary +arguments: but as they declare that their narrations are about affairs +to which they are naturally allied, it is proper that complying with +the law, we should assent to their tradition. In this manner then, +according to them, the generation of these Gods is to be described. +That Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of Heaven and Earth. That from +hence Phorcys, Saturn, and Rhea, and such as subsist together with +these, were produced. That from Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter, Juno, and all +such as we know are called the brethren of these descended. And lastly +others, which are reported to be the progeny of these.” + +Proclus, in his usual admirable manner, copiously elucidates these +words of Plato, and in his comment fully unfolds the theory of the +sublunary Gods. But unfortunately there are many chasms in some of the +most important parts of his elucidations, which no critical acumen, nor +sagacious conjecture, can fully supply. I shall endeavour, however, +to extract from his commentary, in the best manner I am able, all the +information on this subject which can at present be derived from this +invaluable work, occasionally attempting to restore the sense, where +from the mutilated state of the original it is wanting. + +Plato then, intending now to speak of the sublunary Gods, says, +that the discourse about them is admirable, and beyond our ability +to perform, if we intend to discover the generation of them, and +promulgate it to others. For what he before said of the demiurgus, +that it is difficult to discover him, and impossible to speak of him +to all men, this he now says of the sublunary Gods, that to know and +to speak of the generation of them, surpasses our ability. What, +therefore, does Plato mean by this mode of indication? For as he has +delivered so many and such admirable things concerning all heaven, and +the intelligible paradigm, how is it that he says, that to speak of +the Gods who are the fabricators of generation, is a task beyond our +ability to perform? Perhaps it is because many physiologists considered +these sublunary elements to be inanimate natures casually borne along, +and destitute of providential care. For they acknowledged that the +celestial bodies, on account of their orderly motions, participate +of intellect and the Gods; but they left generation, as being very +mutable and indefinite, deprived of providential inspection. In order, +therefore, that we might not be affected in the same manner as they +were, he antecedently celebrates and proclaims the generation of the +sublunary Gods to be divine and intellectual, requiring no such mode +of indication in speaking of the celestial Gods. Perhaps also it may +be said, that souls more swiftly forget things nearer to themselves, +but have a greater remembrance of superior principles. For they in a +greater degree operate upon them through transcendency of power, and +appear through energy to be present with them. The same thing also +happens with respect to our sight. For though we do not see many things +that are situated on the earth, yet at the same time we appear to see +the inerratic sphere, and the stars themselves, because they illuminate +our sight with their light. The eye of the soul, therefore, becomes +in a greater degree oblivious of, and blind to, more proximate than +to higher and more divine principles. Thus, all religions and sects +acknowledge that there is a first principle of things, and all men +invoke God as their helper; but all do not believe that there are Gods +posterior to this principle, and that a providential energy proceeds +from them into the universe. For _the one_ is seen by them in a +clearer manner than multitude. Others, again, believe indeed that there +are Gods, but after the Gads, admitting the dæmoniacal genus, they are +ignorant of the heroic order. And in short, this is the greatest work +of science, subtilly to distinguish the media and the progressions of +beings. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, Plato, when +speaking of the celestial Gods, very properly indicates nothing of the +difficulty of the subject; but when speaking of the sublunary Gods, +says that it surpasses our ability. For the discussion of these is +more difficult, because we cannot collect any thing about them from +apparent objects, but it alone requires a divinely-inspired energy, and +intellectual projection. And thus much concerning this doubt. + +Again, though we have assigned a reason why Plato calls the sublunary +Gods dæmons, we may likewise say according to another conception, +that in the celestial regions there are dæmons, and in the sublunary, +Gods; but that in the former the genus is indeed divine,[128] though +dæmons also are generated according to it;[129] and that in the +latter the whole multitude are dæmons. For there indeed, the divine +peculiarity, but here the dæmoniacal predominates, to which some alone +looking, have divided the divine and the dæmoniacal, according to the +heavens and generation. They ought however, to have arranged both in +both; but in the former indeed the divine nature, and in the latter +the dæmoniacal predominates; though in the former there is also the +divine peculiarity. For if the whole world is a blessed God, no one of +the parts which give completion to it is destitute of divinity, and +providential inspection. But if all things participate of deity and +providence, the world is allotted a divine nature. And if this be the +case, appropriate orders of Gods preside over its different parts. For +if the heavens through souls and intellects as media participate of +one soul, and one intellect, what ought we to think of these sublunary +elements? How is it possible, that these should not in a much greater +degree participate through certain middle divine orders, of the one +deity of the world? + +Farther still, it would also be absurd that the telestic art (or the +art pertaining to mystic ceremonies) should establish on the earth +places fitted for oracles, and statues of the Gods, and through certain +symbols should cause things generated from a partial and corruptible +matter, to become adapted to the participation of deity, to be moved by +him, and to predict future events; but that the demiurgus of wholes, +should not place over the whole elements which are the incorruptible +plenitudes of the world, divine souls, intellects and Gods. For +whether was he unwilling? But how could he be unwilling, since he +wished to make all things similar to himself? Was he then unable? But +what could hinder him? For we see that this is possible from telestic +works. But if he was both willing and able, it is evident that he gave +subsistence to Gods, who have allotments in, and are the inspective +guardians of generation. Since however the genus of dæmons is every +where an attendant on the Gods, there are also dæmons who are the +fabricators of generation; some of whom indeed rule over the whole +elements, but others are the guardians of climates, others are the +rulers of nations, others of cities, others of certain families, and +others are the guardians of individuals. For the guardianship of dæmons +extends as far as to the most extreme division. + + + + + CHAPTER XXV. + + +Having therefore solved the problem pertaining to the essence, let us +in the next place consider the order of the sublunary Gods, and the +meaning of the subsequent words of Plato. For let them be Gods, and +let them be called dæmons for the cause above assigned, where must we +arrange them? Must it be, as we have before said, under the moon, or +prior to the celestial[130] Gods? For this may appear to be proper +for these two reasons; one indeed, because Plato indicates that he +ascends to a greater order, by saying that it exceeds our ability to +speak concerning them, having already spoken concerning the celestial +Gods; but the other, because he follows in what he says, those who +have delivered to us Theogonies. For they prior to the world and the +demiurgus, delivered these generations of Gods proceeding from Heaven +and Earth. In answer to this query however, we must say, that he +produces them after the celestial Gods, and through this from Heaven +and Earth. For on this account he said that Earth was the most ancient +of the Gods within the Heaven, because from this and Heaven, he was +about to produce the other Gods which the heavens contain. This we +demonstrate from the demiurgus addressing his speech to these Gods, +and to all the rest, as being produced by him within the universe. +Why, however, Plato says that he follows the Theogony, and why he +shall omit to speak concerning the sublunary deities, we must refer to +his having no clear indications of the subsistence of these from the +phænomena, as he had of the celestial divinities, from the order of +their periods, which is adapted to the government of Gods. It exceeds +the province therefore of physiology to speak of beings, concerning +whom natural effects afford us no stable belief. Hence Plato says, as a +physiologist, that it surpasses his ability to speak of these. + +If, however, he says that he follows those who are divinely inspired, +but they speaking concerning the supercelestial Gods, he adopts a +similar Theogony, though discoursing of the sub-celestial divinities, +we must not consider this as wonderful. For he knew that all the +orders of the Gods, proceed as far as to the last of things, from the +arrangement which is the principle of their progression, every where +generating series from themselves analogous to the superior deities +from which they proceed. Hence, though the orders of these Gods which +are celebrated by theologists, are above the world, yet they subsist +also in the sensible universe. And as this visible heaven is allied +to that which is supermundane, so likewise our earth is allied to the +earth which is there, and the orders subsisting from the one to the +orders proceeding from the other. From these things too, this also +may be assumed, that according to Plato as well as according to other +theologists, first natures as they proceed, produce things subordinate +in conjunction with the causes of themselves. For these sublunary Gods +proceeding from the demiurgus, are also said to be generated from +Heaven and Earth that first proceed from him. The demiurgus therefore +says to all of them that they ought to fabricate mortal natures, +imitating his[131] power about their generation. Hence all of them +proceed from one producing cause, though those of a secondary order +proceed likewise from the Gods that are prior to them. It follows +therefore from this, that not every thing which is produced by the +junior Gods is mortal, since some of these proceed from other junior +Gods; but the contrary alone is true, that every thing mortal is +generated by these divinities. And again, it follows from this, that +the junior Gods produce some things according to the immoveable, but +others according to the moveable hyparxes of themselves. For they would +not be the causes of immortals, if they produced all things according +to moveable hyparxes; if it be true that every thing which subsists +from a moveable cause, is essentially mutable. + +Again, when Plato says, “It is therefore necessary to believe in +ancient men, who being the progeny of the Gods as they themselves +assert, must have a clear knowledge of their parents; for it is +impossible not to believe in the children of the Gods, though they +should speak without probable and necessary arguments,” we may collect +from this, that he who simply believes in things which seem difficult +to be known, and which are of a dubious nature, runs in the paths of +abundance, recurring to divine knowledge, and deific intelligence, +through which all things become apparent and known. For all things +are contained in the Gods. But that which antecedently comprehends +all things, is likewise able to fill other things with the knowledge +of itself. Hence, Timæus here sends us to theologists, and to the +generation of the Gods celebrated by them. Who therefore are they, and +what is their knowledge? They indeed are the progeny of the Gods, and +clearly know their progenitors; being the progeny and children of the +Gods, as preserving the form of their presiding deity according to +the present life. For Apolloniacal souls, in consequence of chusing a +prophetic, or telestic life, are called the children and progeny of +Apollo; children indeed, so far as they are souls pertaining to this +God, and adapted to this series; but progeny because they demonstrate +their present life to be conformable to these characteristics of the +God. All souls therefore, are the children of the Gods; but all do not +know their presiding God. Such however, as have this knowledge and +chuse a similar life, are called the children and progeny[132] of the +Gods. Hence Plato adds, “as they say,” for they unfold the order from +which they came. Thus the Sibyl[133] as soon as she was born, uttered +oracles; and Hercules appeared at his birth with demiurgic symbols. But +souls of this kind convert themselves to their progenitors, and are +filled from them with deific knowledge. Their knowledge however, is +enthusiastic, being conjoined to deity through divine light, and exempt +from all other knowledge, both that which is probable, and that which +is demonstrative. For the former is conversant with nature, and the +universal in particulars; but the latter with an incorporeal essence, +and the objects of science. Divinely-inspired knowledge however, alone, +is conjoined with the Gods themselves. + +Timæus, or in other words Plato, afterwards adds: “But as they declare +that their narrations are about affairs, to which they are naturally +allied, it is proper that complying with the law, we should assent to +their tradition.” From these words, he who considers them accurately +may assume many things, such as that divinely-inspired knowledge is +perfected through familiarity with and alliance to the Gods. For the +sun is seen through solar-form light, and divinity becomes apparent +through divine illumination. It may likewise be inferred that the +divine law defines the orders of the Gods which the divinely-inspired +conceptions of the ancients unfold, according to which also souls +energizing, though not enthusiastically, are persuaded by those +that enthusiastically energize. Complying with this law, Timæus in +the beginning of this dialogue says that he shall invoke the Gods +and Goddesses. From these words also we may infer, that all the +kingdoms both in the heavens and the sublunary region, are adorned +and distributed in order, according to the first and intellectual +principles; and that all of them are every where according to the +analogous. Likewise that the order of things precedes our conceptions. +But it is Pythagoric to follow the Orphic genealogies. For the science +concerning the Gods proceeded from the Orphic tradition through +Pythagoras, to the Greeks, as Pythagoras himself says in the _Sacred +Discourse_. + + + + + CHAPTER XXVI. + + +Again then, following Proclus, we say that the theory of the sublunary +is immediately connected with that of the celestial Gods; and in +consequence of being suspended from it, possesses the perfect and +the scientific: For the generation-producing choir of Gods, follows +the Gods in the heavens, and in imitation of the celestial circle, +convolves also the circle in generation. For secondary follow the +natures prior to them, according to an indivisible and united +progression. Because however, the divinities that govern generation, +subsist immediately from the celestial Gods, on this account also they +are converted to them according to one undisjoined union; just as the +celestial are converted to the supercelestial deities, from whom they +were proximately generated; but the supercelestial to the intellectual, +by whom they were adorned and distributed; and again the intellectual +to the intelligible Gods, from whom they were ineffably unfolded into +light, and who indescribably and occultly comprehend all things. + +Of the whole of this truly golden chain therefore, the summit is +indeed the genus of the intelligible Gods, but the end is that of the +sublunary deities, who govern[134] generation in an unbegotten, and +nature in a supernatural manner, to which the demiurgic intellect +now gives subsistence; the dominion of the Gods extending supernally +from the heavens, as far as to the last of things. Of these sublunary +deities however, it is necessary to observe in the first place, that +all of them preserve the generative and perfective energy of their +generating cause, and also his demiurgic and stable productive power. +They likewise receive measures, boundaries, and order from their +father. And such things as he governs exemptly and totally, they being +divided according to allotments, fabricate, generate, and perfect. Some +of them also are proximate to the celestial Gods; but others proceed +to a greater distance from them. Hence, some preserve the idea of +these Gods, so far as it can be preserved in the sublunary order; but +others are established according to their appropriate power. For of +every order, the summit is analogous to the order prior to it. Thus the +summit of intelligibles is unity; of intellectuals is intelligible; +of the supermundane order, is intellectual; and of the mundane order, +supermundane. And some of the sublunary Gods indeed, are in a greater +degree united to the demiurgic monad; but others are more distant +from it. Hence, some being analogous to it, are the leaders of the +whole of this series; but others have a more partial similitude to +it. For the father established in every order powers analogous to him +in their arrangement; since in all the divine orders a certain cause +pre-subsists analogous to _the good_. + +Conformably to these causes which are thus analogous to the ineffable +principle of things, and which with reference to it are called monads, +the sublunary Gods proceed, and adorn and distribute generation in a +becoming manner. And some indeed, give completion to this, but others +to some other will of their father. For some complete his connective, +others his prolific, others his motive, others his guardian will, and +others, some other will of the demiurgus pertaining to the wholes in +the sublunary region. And some of them have dominion over souls, others +over dæmons, and others over Gods. All of them however are intellectual +according to essence, but mundane according to allotment. They are also +perfective, and powerful, governing generation in an unbegotten manner, +beings deprived of intellect, intellectually, and inanimate natures, +vitally. For they adorn all things according to their own essence, +and not according to the imbecility of the recipients. But Plato is +evidently of opinion that these Gods use certain other bodies more +simple and perpetual than these elements by saying, that they appear +when they please and become visible to us. That he likewise gives them +souls is manifest from his saying that every mundane God is conjoined +to bodies through soul. For he then first called the world itself a +God, when he had established a soul in it. And again that he suspends +intellects from them, through which their souls are intellectual, and +are immediately converted to the demiurgus, is evident from the speech +of the demiurgus to them. + +If likewise it is requisite that the whole world should be perfect, it +is necessary that together with the divine genera we should conceive +that the dæmoniacal order was generated prior to our souls, and which +receives a triple division, viz. into angels, dæmons properly so +called, and heroes. For the whole of this order fills up the middle +space between Gods and men; because there is an all-perfect separation +or interval between our concerns, and those of the Gods. For the latter +are eternal, but the former are frail and mortal. And the former indeed +are satisfied with the enjoyment of intellect in energy partially; but +the latter ascend into total intellects themselves. On this account, +there is a triad which conjoins our concerns with the Gods, and which +proceeds analogous to the three principal causes of things; though +Plato is accustomed to call the whole of this triad dæmoniacal. For +the angelic is analogous to being, or the intelligible which is first +unfolded into light from the ineffable and occult fountain of beings. +Hence also, it unfolds the Gods themselves, and announces that which is +occult in their essence. But the dæmoniacal is analogous to infinite +life. On which account it proceeds every where according to many +orders, and is of a multiform nature. And the heroic is analogous to +intellect and conversion. Hence also, it is the inspective guardian +of purification, and is the supplier of a magnificent and elevated +life. Farther still, the angelic indeed proceeds according to the +intellectual life of the demiurgus. Hence it also is essentially +intellectual, and interprets, and transmits a divine intellect to +secondary natures. But the dæmoniacal proceeds according to the +demiurgic providence of wholes, governs nature, and rightly gives +completion to the order of the whole world. And the heroic again, +proceeds according to the convertive providence of all these. Hence, +this genus likewise is elevated, raises souls on high, and is the cause +of a grand and vigorous energy. + +Such therefore being the nature of these triple genera, they are +suspended from the Gods; some indeed from the celestial Gods, but +others from the divinities who are the inspective guardians of +generation. And about every God there is an appropriate number of +angels, heroes and dæmons. For, every God is the leader of a multitude +which receives his characteristic form. Hence of the celestial Gods, +the angels, dæmons aid heroes are celestial; but of the fabricators of +generation, they have a generation-producing characteristic. Of the +elevating Gods, they have an elevating property: but of the demiurgic, +a demiurgic; of the vivific, a vivific property. And so of the rest. +And again, among the elevating Gods, of those that are of a Saturnian +characteristic, the angels, dæmons, and heroes are Saturnian; but of +those that are Solar, they are Solar. Among the vivific Gods likewise +of those that are Lunar, the ministrant powers are Lunar; but of the +Aphrodisiacal, or those that have the characteristic of Venus, they +are Aphrodisiacal. For they bear the names of the Gods from whom +they are suspended, as being in connected continuity with them, and +receiving one and the same idea with an appropriate subjection. Nor is +this wonderful, since partial souls also, when they know their patron +and leading Gods, call themselves by their names. Or whence were the +Esculapiuses, the Bacchuses, and the Dioscuri denominated, who being +men of an heroic character, took the names of the deities from whom +they descended?[135] As therefore, of the celestial, so likewise of +the Gods who are the fabricators of generation, it is necessary to +survey about each of them, a co-ordinate angelical, dæmoniacal, and +heroical multitude; and that the number suspended from them retains +the appellation of its producing monad. Hence, there is a celestial +God, angel and hero; and the like is also true of the earth.[136] In a +similar manner we must say that Ocean and Tethys proceed into all the +orders; and conformably to this the other Gods. For there is likewise a +Jovian, a Junonian, and a Saturnian multitude, which is called by the +same appellation of life. Nor is there any absurdity, in calling man +both the intelligible and the sensible man; though in these, there is +a much greater separation and interval.[137] And thus much in common +concerning the Gods and dæmons who are the fabricators of generation. + + + + + CHAPTER XXVII. + + +It now remains to show what conceptions we ought to have of the Gods +mentioned by Plato in the passage before cited from the Timæus. For +of the ancients, some referred what is said about them to fables, +others to the fathers of cities, others to guardian powers, others +to ethical explanations, and others to souls. These, however, are +sufficiently confuted by the divine Jamblichus, who demonstrates +that they wander from the meaning of Plato, and from the truth of +things. After this manner, therefore, we must say, that Timæus being +a Pythagorean, follows the Pythagorean principles. But these are the +Orphic traditions. For what Orpheus delivered mystically through arcane +narrations, these Pythagoras learned, being initiated by Aglaophemus in +the mystic wisdom which Orpheus derived from his mother Calliope. For +these things Pythagoras says in the _Sacred Discourse_. What then +are the Orphic traditions, since we are of opinion that the doctrine of +Timæus about the Gods should be referred to these? They are as follow: +Orpheus delivered the kingdoms of the Gods who preside over wholes, +according to a perfect number, viz. Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, +Jupiter, Bacchus. For Phanes is the first that bears a sceptre, and the +first king is the celebrated Ericapæus. But the second is Night, who +receives the sceptre from her father [Phanes.] The third is Heaven, +who receives it from Night. The fourth is Saturn, who, as they say, +offered violence to his father. The fifth is Jupiter, who subdued +his father. And after him, the sixth is Bacchus. All these kings, +therefore, beginning supernally from the intelligible and intellectual +Gods, proceed through the middle orders, and into the world, that they +may adorn mundane affairs. For Phanes is not only in intelligibles, +but also in intellectuals, in the demiurgic, and in the supermundane +order; and in a similar manner, Heaven and Night. For the peculiarities +of them proceed through all the middle orders. And with respect to the +mighty Saturn, is he not arranged prior to Jupiter, and does he not +after the Jovian kingdom, divide the Bacchic fabrication in conjunction +with the other Titans? And this indeed, he effects in one way in the +heavens, and in another in the sublunary region; in one way in the +inerratic sphere, and in another among the planets. And in a similar +manner Jupiter and Bacchus. _These things, therefore, are clearly +asserted by the ancients._ + +If, however we are right in these assertions, these divinities have +every where an analogous subsistence; and he who wishes to survey +the progressions of them into the heavens, or the sublunary region, +should look to the first and principal causes of their kingdoms. For +from thence, and according to them, their generation is derived. Some, +therefore, say, that Plato omits to investigate the Gods who are +analogous to the two kings in the heavens, I mean Phanes and Night. +For it is necessary to place them in a superior order, and not among +the mundane Gods; because prior to the world, they are the leaders of +the intellectual Gods, being eternally established in the adytum, as +Orpheus says of Phanes, who by the word adytum signifies their occult +and immanifest order. Whether, therefore, we refer the circulation of +same and different, mentioned by Plato in this dialogue, to the analogy +of these, as male and female, or paternal and generative, we shall +not wander from the truth. Or whether we refer the sun and moon, as +opposed to each other among the planets, to the same analogy, we shall +not err. For the sun indeed through his light preserves a similitude +to Phanes, but the moon to Night. Jupiter, or the demiurgus, in the +intellectual, is analogous to Phanes in the intelligible order. And +the vivific crater Juno is analogous to Night, who produces all life +in conjunction with Phanes from unapparent causes; just as Juno is +parturient with, and emits into light, all the soul contained in the +world. For it is better to conceive both these as prior to the world; +and to arrange the demiurgus himself as analogous to Phanes; since he +is said to be assimilated to him according to the production of wholes; +but to arrange the power conjoined with Jupiter, (i.e. Juno) and which +is generative of wholes, to Night, who produces all things from the +father Phanes. After these, however, we must consider the remaining, as +analogous to the intellectual kingdoms. + +If, likewise, it should be asked why Plato does not mention the +kingdoms of Phanes and Night, to whom we have said Jupiter and Juno are +analogous? It may be readily answered, that the tradition of Orpheus +contains these; on which account Plato celebrates the kingdom of Heaven +and Earth as the first, the Greeks being more accustomed to this than +to the Orphic traditions; as he himself says in the Cratylus, where he +particularly mentions the Theogony of Hesiod, and recurs as far as to +this kingdom according to that poet. Beginning, therefore, from this +Theogony as more known, and assuming Heaven and Earth as the first +kingdoms above the world, he produces the visible Heaven and Earth +analogous to those in the intellectual order, and celebrates the latter +as the most ancient of the Gods within the former. From these also, he +begins the Theogony of the sublunary Gods. These things, however, if +divinity pleases, will be manifest from what follows. At present we +shall only add, that it is requisite to survey all these names divinely +or dæmoniacally, and according to the allotments of these divinities in +the four elements. For this ennead is in ether and water, in earth and +in air, all-variously, according to the divine, and also according to +the dæmoniacal peculiarity. And again, these names are to be surveyed +aquatically and aerially, and likewise in the earth terrestrially, in +order that all of them may be every where, according to an all-various +mode of subsistence. For there are many modes of providence divine +and dæmoniacal, and many allotments according to the division of the +elements. + + + + + CHAPTER XXVIII. + + +Let us, therefore, now return to the words of Plato. In the first place +then he says that Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of Heaven and +Earth. And here we may observe, that as this whole world is ample and +various, as adumbrating the intellectual order of forms, it contains +these two extremities in itself, Earth and Heaven; the latter having +the relation of a father, but the former of a mother. On this account +Plato calls Earth the most ancient of the Gods within the heavens, in +order that conformably to this he might say, that Earth is the mother +of all that Heaven is the father; at the same time evincing that +partial causes are not only subordinate to their progeny, as Poverty, +in the Banquet of Plato to Love, but are likewise superior to them, as +alone receiving the offspring proceeding from the fathers. These two +extremities, therefore, must be conceived in the world, Heaven as the +father, and Earth as the mother of her common progeny. For all the rest +terminate in these, some giving completion to the celestial number, +but others to the wholeness of Earth. After the same manner, likewise, +in each of the elements of the world, these two principles, Heaven +and Earth, must be admitted, subsisting aerially indeed in air, but +aquatically in water, and terrestrially in earth; and according to all +the above-mentioned modes; in order that each may be a perfect world, +adorned and distributed from analogous[138] principles. For if man is +said to be a microcosm, is it not necessary that each of the elements +by a much greater priority should contain in itself appropriately all +that the world contains totally? Hence, it appears to me that Plato +immediately after speaking about Heaven and Earth, delivers the theory +of these Gods, beginning from those two divinities; for the other +divinities proceed analogous to Heaven and Earth. These two divinities, +however, are totally the causes of all the Gods that are now produced. +And these divinities that are the progeny of Heaven and Earth, are +analogous to the whole of each. These two, likewise, as we have before +observed, are in each of the elements, aerially, or aquatically, or +terrestrially. For Heaven is in Earth, and Earth in Heaven.[139] +And here, indeed, Heaven subsists terrestrially, but there Earth +celestially. For Orpheus calls the moon celestial earth.[140] Nor is it +proper to wonder that this should be the case. For we may survey the +same things every where, according to the analogous, in intelligibles, +in intellectuals, in the supermundane order, in the heavens, and in +generation, conformably to the proper order of each. + +With respect, however, to each of these divinities, some of the +interpreters of Plato understand by Earth, this solid bulk which is the +object of sensible inspection; others as that which has an arrangement +analogous to matter, and is supposed to exist prior to generated +natures; others, as intelligible matter; others, as the power of +intellect; others, as life; others, as an incorporeal form inseparable +from earth; others conceive it to be soul; and others intellect. In +a similar manner with respect to Heaven, some suppose it to be the +visible heavens; others, the motion about the middle of the universe; +others, power aptly proceeding in conjunction with motion; others, +that which possesses intellect; others, a pure and separate intellect; +others, the nature of circulation; others, soul; and others, intellect. +I know, likewise, that the divine Jamblichus understands by Earth, +every thing stable and firm, according to the essence of the mundane +Gods, and which according to energy and a perpetual circulation, +comprehends more excellent powers and total lives. But by Heaven, he +understands the total and perfect energy proceeding from the demiurgus, +which is full of appropriate power, and subsists about the demiurgus, +as being the boundary of itself and of wholes. I know, likewise, that +the admirable Theodorus establishes both these powers in the life which +subsists according to habitude. + +In order, however, that we may avoid erroneous opinions, and may +adhere to the most pure conceptions of Jamblichus, and the traditions +of Syrianus, if is necessary in the first place to recollect, that +Plato is now speaking of the sublunary Gods, that all of them are +every where, and that they proceed according to the analogy of the +intelligible and intellectual kings. And in the second place we must +say, that as the first Heaven is the boundary of and connectedly +contains the intellectual Gods, containing the measure which proceeds +from _the good_[141] and the intelligible Gods, into the intellectual +orders, after the same manner the Heaven which is now mentioned +by Plato, is the boundary and container of the Gods that are the +fabricators of generation, comprehending in one bound the demiurgic +measure, and also that which proceeds from the celestial Gods to those +divinities that are allotted the realms of generation, and connecting +them with the celestial government of the Gods. For as the demiurgus +is to _the good itself_, so is the one divinity of this Heaven, to the +intellectual Heaven. Hence, as there, measure and bound proceeds from +_the good_ through Heaven to all the intellectual Gods, so likewise +here a bound arrives to the Gods the fabricators of generation and to +the more excellent genera [viz. to angels, dæmons and heroes] from +the demiurgus, and the summit of the mundane Gods; viz. through the +connectedly-containing medium of this Heaven.[142] For the everywhere +proceeding Heaven is allotted this order; in one procession of +things indeed, unitedly and occultly; but in another manifestly and +separately. For in one order, it introduces bound to souls; in another +to the works of nature; and in another in a different manner to other +things. And in air indeed, it effects this primarily; but in the +aquatic orders secondarily; and in earth, and terrestrial works, in +an ultimate degree. But there are also complications of these. For +the divine mode of subsistence, and also the dæmoniacal are different +in the air, and in the earth. For in one place, the mode is the same +in different orders; but in another the mode is different in one +allotment. And thus much concerning the power of Heaven. + + + + + CHAPTER XXIX. + + +In the next place, directing our attention to Earth, we shall derive +the whole of the theory concerning her from her first evolution into +light. She first becomes manifest, therefore, in the middle triads[143] +of the intellectual Gods, together with Heaven who connectedly +contains the whole intellectual order. She likewise proceeds analogous +to the intelligible Earth, which we find to be the first of the +intelligible[144] triads. And as ranking in the vivific orders, she is +assimilated to the first infinity. But she is the receiving bosom of +the generative deity of Heaven, and the middle centre of his paternal +goodness. She also reigns together with him, and is the power of him +who ranks as a father. The Earth, however, which is analogous to her, +and presides in the sublunary regions, is as it were the prolific power +of the Heaven pertaining to the realms of generation, unfolding into +light his paternal, definitive, measuring and containing providence, +which prolifically extends to all things. She likewise generates +all the sublunary infinity;[145] just as Heaven who belongs to the +co-ordination of bound, introduces termination and end to secondary +natures. Bound, therefore, and end define the hyparxis of every thing +according to which Gods and dæmons, souls and bodies are connected and +made to be one, imitating the one unity of wholes, or in other words, +the ineffable principle of things; but infinity multiplies the powers +of every being. For there is much bound in all sublunary natures, and +likewise much infinity, which through divinity, and after the Gods +extends to all things. We have, therefore, these two orders, which +are generative of the divine or dæmoniacal progressions, in all the +sublunary genera and elements; and one kingdom of them in the same +manner as in the intellectual orders. + +From these, however, a second duad proceeds, Ocean and Tethys, this +generation not being effected by copulation, nor by any conjunction +of things separated, nor by division, nor according to a certain +abscission, for all these are foreign from the Gods; but they are +accomplished according to one union and indivisible conjunction of +powers. And this union theologists are accustomed to call marriage. +For marriage, as the theologist Orpheus says, is appropriate to this +order. For he calls Earth the first Nymph, and the union of her +with Heaven the first marriage; since there is no marriage in the +divinities that are in the most eminent degree united. Hence there +is no marriage between Phanes and Night, who are intelligibly united +to each other. And marriage appears on this account to be adapted to +the Heaven and Earth which we are at present considering, so far as +they adumbrate the intellectual Heaven and Earth; which the sacred +laws of the Athenians likewise knowing, ordered that the marriages of +Heaven and Earth should be celebrated, as preparatory to initiation +into the mysteries. Directing their attention to these also, in the +Eleusinian mysteries looking upward to the heavens, they exclaimed, O +son! but looking downward to the earth, O parent! According to this +union, therefore, in conjunction with separation, Heaven and Earth +produce through their goodness Ocean and Tethys. Or rather, they do not +immediately produce these, but prior to these two monads, two triads, +and duple hebdomads, among which are Ocean and Tethys. And the monads +indeed, together with the triads, remain with the father. But of the +hebdomads, Ocean, together with Tethys, abide, and at the same time +proceed. All the rest, however, proceed into another order of Gods. And +this indeed is the mode of their subsistence in the intellectual order. +But here, Plato entirely omits the causes that abide in the father, +but delivers to us those that proceed and at the same time abide, +because his intention is to speak of the Gods that are the fabricators +of generation. To these, however, progression, motion, and difference, +are adapted, and a co-arrangement of the male with the female; in +order that there may be generation, that matter may be adorned with +forms, and that difference may be combined with sameness. Hence Plato +commences from the duad, proceeds through it, and again returns to it. +For the duad is adapted to material natures, as well as difference, on +account of the division of forms about matter. Having mentioned a duad, +likewise, he begins from Earth; for this is more adapted to things +pertaining to generation. + +With respect to these two divinities, however, Ocean and Tethys, who +abide in their causes and at the same time proceed from them, some +say that Ocean is a corporeal essence; others, that it is a swiftly +pervading nature; others, that it is the motion of a humid essence; +others, that it is ether, through the velocity of its motion; and +others, that it is the intelligible profundity itself of life. The +divine Jamblichus, however, defines it to be the middle motive divine +cause, which middle souls, lives, and intellections, efficacious +natures, and those elements that are pneumatic, such as air and fire, +first participate. And with respect to Tethys, some say that it is a +humid essence; others, that it is a very-mutable nature; and others, +that it is the hilarity of the universe. But the divine Jamblichus +asserts it to be a productive power, possessing in energizing an +efficacious establishment, the stable intellections of which, souls, +natures, and powers participate, and which is likewise participated by +certain solid receptacles, either of earth or water, which prepare a +seat for the elements. + +We, however, again assuming our principles, say, that the causes of +these are indeed in the intellectual Gods, and that they are likewise +in the sensible universe. For Ocean every where distinguishes first +from second orders, in consequence of which poets do not improperly +call it the boundary of the earth. But the Ocean which is now the +subject of discussion, is the cause of motion, progression, and power; +inserting in intellectual lives indeed, acme, and prolific abundance; +but in souls, celerity and vigour, in their energies, and purity in +their generations; and in bodies facility of motion. And in the Gods +indeed it imparts a motive and providential cause; but in angels an +unfolding and intellectual celerity and vigour. Again, in dæmons it +is the supplier of efficacious power; but in heroes, of a magnificent +and flourishing life. It likewise subsists in each of the elements, +according to its characteristic peculiarity. Hence, the aerial Ocean +is the cause of all the mutation of aerial natures, and of the circle +of the meteors, as also Aristotle says. But the aquatic Ocean gives +subsistence to fertility, facility of motion, and all-various powers. +For according to the poets, + + From this all seas, and every river flow. + +And the terrestrial ocean is the producing cause of generative +perfection, of the separation of forms, and of generation and +corruption. Whether also there are certain terrestrial orders, vivific +and demiurgic, it is the source of their distinction; or whether there +are powers connective of the productive principles of the earth, and +the inspective guardians of generation,--these also it excites and +multiplies, and calls into motion. + +With respect to Tethys, as the name indeed evinces, she is the most +ancient, and the progenitor, of the Gods, in the same manner as it +is fit to acknowledge of the mother Rhea. For theologists denominate +another Goddess prior to her, Maia. Thus, Orpheus, + + Maia, of Gods supreme, immortal Night, + What mean you, say? + +But according to the etymology of Plato, she is a certain fontal +deity. For the undefiled and pure, and that which percolates are +signified through her name. For since Ocean produces all things, and +is the source of all motions, whence also it is called the generation +of the Gods, Tethys separates the unical cause of his motions into +primary and secondary motions. Hence Plato says, that she derives her +appellation from _leaping_ and _percolating_. For these are separative +names, in the same manner, as he says in the Sophista, (το ξαινειν και +κερκιζειν) to card, and to separate threads in weaving with a shuttle. +Ocean, therefore, generating all motion collectively, whether divine, +or intellectual, or psychical, Tethys separating both internal and +external motions, is so called from causing material motions to leap +and be percolated from such as are immaterial. Hence, the separating +characteristic is adapted to the female, and the unical[146] to the +male, Plato, therefore, would assert such peculiarities as these, of +Ocean and Tethys, and does assert them in the Cratylus. But according +to the divine Jamblichus, Tethys must be defined to be the supplier of +position and firm establishment. From all that has been said, however, +it may be summarily asserted that Tethys is the cause of permanency, +and a firm establishment of things in herself, separating them from the +motions that proceed externally. + +In short, Ocean is the cause of all motion, intellectual, psychical, +and physical to all secondary natures; but Tethys is the cause of all +the separation of the streams proceeding from Ocean, imparting to each +a proper purity in the motion adapted to it by nature; through which +each, though it may move itself, or though it may move other things, +yet moves in a transcendent manner. But theologists manifest that Ocean +is the supplier of all motion, when they say that he sends forth ten +streams, nine of which proceed into the sea; because it is necessary, +that of motions nine should be corporeal, but that there should be one +alone of the essence which is separate from bodies, as we are informed +by Plato in the Laws.[147] Such divine natures, therefore, as the +mighty Ocean generates, these he excites to motion, and renders them +efficacious. But Tethys distinguishes these, preserving generative +causes pure from their progeny, and establishing them in energies more +ancient than those that proceed into the external world. And thus much +concerning each of these divinities, Ocean and Tethys. + +Since, however, as we have said, the generation of these, is from +the prior divinities, Heaven and Earth, but is not effected either +by a copulation such as that which is in sensibles, nor according to +such a union as that of Night and Phanes in intelligibles, it very +properly follows that their progeny are separated from each other, +analogously to their parents, and that each receives a similitude to +both. For Ocean indeed, as being the male, is assimilated to the +paternal cause, Heaven; but as the supplier of motion to the maternal +cause, Earth, who is the cause of progressions. And Tethys indeed, as +the female, is assimilated to the prolific cause; but as producing a +firm establishment[148] of her progeny in their proper lives, she is +assimilated to the fabricating cause. For the male is analogous to the +monadic; but the female to the dyadic. And the stable is adapted to the +former; but the motive to the latter. A duad, therefore, proceeding +from a duad, and being assimilated according to the whole of itself +to the duad which is generative of it, defines and distinguishes the +causes of itself, and all the number posterior to itself; in order that +every where we may ascribe that which defines and separates, to the +order of Ocean and Tethys. + + + + + CHAPTER XXX. + + +In the next place Plato says, “that from Ocean and Tethys, Phorcys, +Saturn, and Rhea, and such as subsist together with these were +produced;” the theory of which divinities is as follows. In the former +progeny, a duad generative and motive, was produced from a terminating +and definitive duad; viz. Ocean and Tethys, from Heaven and Earth; but +in the second progeny, a multitude converted to its causes through the +triad, ts generated from the duad; indicating likewise an all-perfect +progression. For this multitude also is divided, into the analogous +to bound, and the co-ordinate to infinity. For the triad is the bound +in this multitude; but the nameless number is the infinity in it. And +of the triad itself, likewise, one thing is analogous to the monad +and bound, but another to the duad and infinity. And in the former +progression, indeed, the progeny alone proceeded according to bound +and the intellectual; but in this there is also a mixture of the +indefinite. But after the boundary from the triad, Plato adds, “And +such as subsist together with these,” indicating the entire progression +and separation of these triple orders; so that the progeny of this +progression is triadic through the peculiarity of conversion, and +dyadic through the intervention of the infinite and indefinite. + +Since, however, these differ according to their intellectual causes, in +the same manner as the before-mentioned orders; but in them Ocean and +Tethys were said to be the brethren, and not the fathers[149] of Saturn +and Rhea; for the progression to these was from Heaven and Earth, and +all the Titannic order is thence derived; let us see on what account +Plato here gives subsistence to Phorcys, Saturn and Rhea, from Ocean +and Tethys. For he may appear to say this not conformably to the Orphic +principles. For “Earth latently bore from Heaven, as the theologist +says, seven pure beautiful virgins with rolling eyes, and seven sons +that were kings, with fine long hair. And the daughters indeed were +Themis, and the joyful Tethys, Mnemosyne with thick-curled hair, and +the blessed Thea. She likewise bore Dione having a very-graceful form, +and Phœbe, and Rhea the mother of king Jupiter. But the venerable +Earth brought forth those celestial youths, who are called by the +appellation of Titans, because they revenged the mighty starry Heaven. +And she also bore Cæus, the great Cræus, and the strong Phorcys, and +likewise Saturn, and Ocean, Hyperion and Japetus.” These things then +having been written by the theologist prior to Plato, how is it that +Timæus produces Saturn and Rhea, from Ocean and Tethys? In answer to +this, as we have before arranged Ocean and Tethys above Saturn and +Rhea, as being the media between these and the fathers, and guardians +of the boundaries of both, as it is usual to celebrate them; we must +say in the first place, indeed, that it is not wonderful that the same +divinities should be brothers, and yet through transcendency of dignity +should be called the fathers of certain Gods. For such things as are +first, when they proceed from their causes, produce in conjunction +with those causes, the natures posterior to themselves. Thus all souls +indeed are sisters, according to one demiurgic cause, and according to +the vivific principle and fountain from which they proceed; at the same +time divine souls produce partial souls together with the demiurgus +and vivific causes, in consequence of first proceeding into light, +and abiding in their wholeness, receiving the power of fabricating +natures similar to themselves. Besides, in the Gods themselves, all the +offspring of Saturn are brethren, according to the one generative monad +by which they were produced; yet at the same time Jupiter is called +father, in the divine poet Homer, both by Juno and Neptune. So that it +is not at all wonderful, if Ocean and Tethys are called both brethren +and fathers of Saturn and Rhea; in consequence of preserving as among +brethren the paternal peculiarity. In the first place, therefore, the +doubt may after this manner be solved. + +In the next place, it may be said, that of the divine Titannic +hebdomads, Ocean indeed both abides and proceeds, uniting himself +to his father, and not departing from his kingdom. But all the rest +rejoicing in progression, are said to have given completion to the +will of Earth, but to have assaulted their father, dividing themselves +from his kingdom, and proceeding into another order. Or rather, of +all the celestial genera, some alone abide in their principles, as +the two first triads. For, as soon as Heaven understood that they +had an implacable heart, and a lawless nature, he hurled them into +Tartarus, the profundity of the earth, [says Orpheus]. He concealed +them, therefore, in the unapparent, through transcendency of power. But +others both abide in, and proceed from, their principles, as Ocean and +Tethys. For when the other Titans proceeded to assault their father +Heaven, Ocean prohibited them from obeying the mandates of their +mother, being dubious of their rectitude. He, therefore, abides, and +at the same time proceeds, together with Tethys; for she is conjoined +with him according to the first progeny. But the other Titans are +induced to separation and progression. And the leader of these is the +mighty Saturn, as the theologist says; though he evinces that Saturn +is superior to Ocean, by saying, that Saturn himself received the +celestial Olympus, and that there being throned he reigns over the +Titans; but that Ocean obtained all the middle allotment. For he says, +that he dwells in the divine streams which are posterior to Olympus, +and that he environs the Heaven which is there, and not the highest +Heaven, but as the fable says, that which fell from Olympus, and was +there arranged.[150] + + +Ocean and Tethys, therefore, so far as they abide, and are united to +Heaven, produce in conjunction with him the kingdom of Saturn and +Rhea; and so far as they are established in the first power of their +mother, so far they produce Phorcys in conjunction with her.[151] For +she produces him together with Nereus and Thaumas,[152] from being +mingled through love with the sea. For Phorcys is not celestial, but +Ocean, as is evident from the Theogony.[153] And so far as Tethys is +full of Earth, so far being as it were a certain Earth, she may be said +to produce this Phorcys in conjunction with Ocean; so far as Ocean +also comprehends the intelligible in himself. Hence Tethys, so far as +she is Earth according to participation, and Ocean so far as he is +causally the sea, give subsistence in conjunction with Saturn and Rhea +to this God. If, however, any arguments should demonstrate that in the +intellectual order Saturn is above Ocean, or Rhea above Tethys, it must +be said that this arrangement is indeed there; for in that order the +causes of intellection are superior to those of motion; but that here +on the contrary, all things are in mutation and a flowing condition, +so that here Ocean is very properly prior to Saturn, since it is the +fountain of motion, and Tethys is prior to Rhea. Hence, after another +manner, the doubt may be thus solved. + +That we may speak, however, about each of these Gods, Theodorus refers +souls that subsist in habitude to these divinities, and arranges +them as presiding over the three divisions of the world. And Phorcys +indeed, he arranges in the starless sphere, as moving the lation of the +universe. He ought, however, to persuade us that Plato was acquainted +with a certain starless sphere, and afterwards, that he thus arranged +Phorcys in this sphere. But he places Saturn over the motions of +the stars, because time[154] is from these, and the generations and +corruptions of things. And he places Rhea over the material part of +the world, because by materiality she has a redundancy with respect to +the divinities prior to herself. But the divine Jamblichus arranges +them in the three spheres between the heavens and the earth. For some +of the sublunary deities give a two-fold division to the sublunary +region, but these divide it in a three-fold manner. And Phorcys indeed, +according to him, presides over the whole[155] of a humid essence, +containing all of it impartibly. But Rhea is a divinity connective of +flowing and aerial-formed spirits. And Saturn governs the highest and +most attenuated sphere of ether, having a middle arrangement according +to Plato; because the middle and the centre in incorporeal essences, +have a greater authority than the powers situated about the middle. +We, indeed, admire this intellectual explanation of Jamblichus; but +we think it proper to survey these Gods every where, both in all the +elements, and all orders. For thus we shall behold that which is common +in them, and which extends to all things. And we say, indeed, that +Phorcys is the inspective guardian of every spermatic essence, and of +physical, and as it were spermatic productive principles, as being +pregnant with, and the cause of generation. For there are spermatic +productive principles in each of the elements; and different orders of +Gods and dæmons preside over them, all which Plato comprehends through +Phorcys. But king Saturn divides forms and productive principles, and +produces more total into more partial powers. Hence he is not only +an animal but pedestrious, aquatic and a bird. And he is not only +pedestrious, but likewise man and horse. For the productive principles +in him are more partial than in the celestial deities. Among the +intellectual Gods, therefore, he is allotted this power, viz. to +multiply and divide intelligibles. Hence, he is the leader of the +Titans, as being especially characterized by the dividing peculiarity. + +Again, we say that Rhea receives the unapparent powers of king Saturn, +leads them forth to secondary natures, and excites the paternal powers +to the fabrication of visible objects. For thus also, her first order +is moved, is filled with power and life, and produces into that which +is apparent, the causes that abide in Saturn. Hence Saturn is every +where the supplier of intellectual forms; Rhea is the cause of all +souls, and of every kind of life; and Phorcys is prolific with physical +productive principles. Since however another number of Gods pertains +to the kingdom of these, and which Saturn and Rhea comprehend, on this +account Plato adds, “and such as subsist together with these.” For he +not only through this comprehends dæmons, as some say, but both the +angelic and the dæmoniacal Saturn have with themselves a multitude, +the one angelic, but the other dæmoniacal. And the multitude which is +in the Gods is divine; that which is in the air is aerial; and in a +similar manner in the other elements, and in the other more excellent +genera arranged under these Gods. + +By the words also “such as subsist together with these,” Plato appears +to signify the remaining Titans, viz. Cæus and Hyperion, Creus, +Japetus, and likewise the remaining Titanidæ, viz. Phœbe, Theia, +Mnemosyne, Themis, and Dione, with whom Saturn and Rhea proceeded into +light. Also, those that proceeded together with Phorcys, viz. Nereus +and Thaumas, the most motive Eurybia, and those who especially contain +and connect the whole of generation. Moreover, it is worth while to +observe that it is not proper to discuss accurately the arrangement in +these divinities, and whether Saturn or Phorcys is the superior deity; +for they are united and similar to each other. But if it be requisite +to make a division, it is better to adopt the arrangement of the divine +Jamblichus, viz. that Saturn is a monad; but Rhea a certain duad +calling forth the powers that are in Saturn; and that Phorcys gives +perfection to their progression. + + + + + CHAPTER XXXI. + + +It now remains that we direct our attention to the other kings, who +produce the apparent sublunary order of things; for such is the +arrangement which they are allotted. Plato adds therefore, “That from +Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter, Juno, and all such as we know are called +the brethren of these descended.” This is the third progression of +the Gods who are the fabricators of generation, but the fourth order, +closing as a tetrad the nomination of the leading Gods. For the tetrad +is comprehensive of the divine orders. But as a duad this progression +is assimilated to the first kingdom; because that as well as this is +dyadic. There are, however, present with it, the all-perfect according +to progression, and the uncircumscribed according to number. But +Plato here not only adds the words “_such as_,” as in the progression +prior to it, but likewise the word “_all_,” that he may indicate +the progression of them to every thing. For we use the term το οσον +_such as_ in speaking of things united, but the term το παντας _all_, +in speaking of things now divided and multiplied. The total (το +ολικον) likewise pertains to this progression. For the Gods which are +denominated in it, and those that proceed every where together with +them, are characterized according to this form of fabrication. For all +demiurgi are total. Who therefore are they, and what kind of order do +they possess? + +The divine Jamblichus then asserts that Jupiter is the perfector of all +generation; but that Juno is the cause of power, connexion, plenitude +and life to all things; and that the brethren of them are those that +communicate with them in the fabrication of generation, being also +themselves intellects, and receiving a completion according to a +perfection and power similar to them. But Theodorus, again dividing +the life which animates the total in habitude, and forming it as he is +accustomed to do into triads, calls Jupiter the power that governs the +upper region as far as to the air; but Juno the power who is allotted +the aerial part of the world; and the brethren of them those that give +completion to the remaining parts. For Jupiter is the essential of +the soul that subsists in a material habit, because there is nothing +more vital than essence. But Juno is the intellectual part of such a +soul, because the natures on the earth are governed by the productive +principles proceeding from the air. And the other number is the +psychical distributed into particulars. + +We, however, consequently[156] to what has been before asserted, say, +that according to Plato there are many orders of Jupiter. For one is +the demiurgus, as it is written in the Cratylus; another, is the first +of the Saturnian triad, as it is asserted in the Gorgias; another is +the liberated, as it is delivered in the Phædrus; and another is the +celestial, whether in the inerratic sphere, or among the planets. +Moreover, as the first Jupiter produced into the visible fabrication +the power of his father, which was concealed in the unapparent, being +excited[157] to this by his mother Rhea; after the same manner the +Jupiter delivered here, who is the fabricator of generation, causes the +unapparent divisions and separations of forms made by Saturn to become +apparent; but Rhea calls them forth, into motion and generation; and +Phorcys inserts them in matter, produces sensible natures, and adorns +the visible essence, in order that there may not only be divisions of +productive principles in natures and in souls, and in intellectual +essences prior to these, but likewise in sensibles. For this is the +peculiarity of fabrication. And if it be requisite to speak what +appears to me to be the truth, Saturn indeed produces intellectual +sections, but Rhea such as are psychical, and Phorcys such as are +physical. For all spermatic productive principles are under nature. +But Jupiter adorning sensible and visible sections, gives a specific +distinction to such beings in the sublunary region as are totally +vital, and causes them to be moved. Since, however, these sensible +forms which are generated and perfected, are multiformly evolved, +being moved and changed according to all-various evolutions, on this +account, the queen Juno is conjoined with Jupiter, giving perfection to +this motion of visible natures, and to the evolution of forms. Hence +fables represent her as at one time sending mania to certain persons, +but ordering others to undergo severe labours, in order that through +intellect being present with all things, and partial souls energizing +divinely both theoretically and practically, every progression, and all +the generation of the sublunary region may obtain complete perfection. + +Such, therefore, being the nature of this duad, there are also other +demiurgic powers which triply divide the apparent[158] world of +generation; one of these being allotted the government of air; another, +that of water; and another that of earth, conformably to demiurgic +allotments. Hence they are said to be the brothers of these, because +they also preside over the visible fabrication. And farther still, +there are others the progeny of these; which is the last progression +of the divinities mentioned in this place by Plato. Hence, they are +delivered anonymously; Plato by this indicating the diminution of it +as far as to the last division: For as in the Gods that are above the +world, the partible proceeds from the total fabrication, and the series +of kings terminates in this; after the same manner also among the +sublunary Gods, the progeny of Jupiter proceed from the Jovian order; +among which progeny, likewise, is the choir of partible fabrication. +For the before-mentioned demiurgi producing sensibles totally, it is +necessary that those deities should have a subsistence who distribute +different powers and peculiarities to different natures, and divide the +sublunary generation into multitude. Hence Plato alone denominates them +_others_, and does not employ the expressions _such as_, and +_all_, because they associate with all-various diversity. + +With respect, therefore, to this ennead of Gods, Heaven terminates, +Earth corroborates, and Ocean moves all generation. But Tethys +establishes every thing in its proper motion; intellectual essences in +intellectual; middle essences in psychical; and such as are corporeal +in physical, motion; Ocean at the same time collectively moving all +things. Saturn alone divides intellectually; Rhea vivifies; Phorcys +distributes spermatic productive principles; Jupiter perfects things +apparent from such as are unapparent; and Juno evolves according +to the all-various mutations of visible natures. And thus through +this ennead all the sublunary world derives its completion, and is +fitly arranged; divinely indeed from the Gods, but angelically, as +we say, from angels, and dæmoniacally from dæmons; the Gods indeed +subsisting about bodies, souls and intellects; but angels exhibiting +their providence about souls and bodies; and dæmons being distributed +about the fabrication of nature, and the providential care of bodies. +But again, the number of the ennead is adapted to generation. For +it proceeds from the monad as far as to the extremities without +retrogression;[159] which is the peculiarity of generation. For reasons +(i.e. productive principles) fall into matter, and are unable to +convert themselves to the principles of their existence. Moreover, the +duad is triadic; for three dyadic orders were assumed; viz. Heaven and +Earth; Ocean and Tethys; Jupiter and Juno. And this last duad ranks +as the fourth progression, because prior to it, is the triad Phorcys, +Saturn, and Rhea; which manifests the complication here, of the perfect +and the imperfect, and of bound with infinity. For all celestial +natures are definite, and as Aristotle says, are always in the end. But +things in generation proceed[160] from the imperfect to the perfect, +and receive the same boundary indefinitely. Besides this, the tetrad +arising from the generation of these divinities is adapted to the +orders of the fabricators of the sublunary region; in order that they +may contain multitude unitedly, and the partible impartibly; and also +to the natures that exist in generation. For the sublunary elements are +four; the seasons according to which generation is evolved are four; +and the centres are four. And in short, there is an abundant dominion +of the tetrad in generation. + +Why, however, it may be said, does Plato comprehend all the multitude +of the Gods that fabricate generation, in this ennead? I answer, +because this ennead gives completion to all the fabrication of +generation. For in the sublunary realms there are bodies and natures, +souls, and intellects, and this both totally and partially. And all +these are in both respects in each of the elements. This ennead in each +of the elements, is as follows, viz. total and partial bodies, total +and partial natures, total and partial souls, and total and partial +intellects, and the monad which contains these, viz. the elementary +sphere itself; because wholes and parts are consubsistent with each +other. Heaven and Earth, however, generate the unapparent essences +of these, i.e. of wholes and parts, the former indeed according to +union, but the latter according to multiplication. And the former +according to bound, but the latter according to infinity; being the +leaders of essence to all things. But Ocean and Tethys give perfection +to both the common and divided motion of them. There is, however, a +different motion of different things, viz. of total intellect, of +total soul, and of total nature; and in a similar manner in such of +these as are partial. The sublunary wholes, therefore, being thus +adorned and distributed, Saturn, indeed, divides partial from total +natures, but intellectually; Rhea, calls forth this division from +intellectuals, into all-various progressions,[161] as far as to the +last forms of life, being a vivific deity; but Phorcys produces the +Titannic separation, to physical productive principles. After these +three, are the fathers of composite natures. And Jupiter indeed, +adorns sensibles totally, according to an imitation of Heaven. For +the Jupiter in the intellectual order, proceeds analogous to the +intellectual Heaven, in the royal series. But Juno moves wholes, fills +them with powers, and evolves, according to every progression. And the +Gods posterior to these fabricate the partial works of sensibles, some +according to one, but others according to another peculiarity, either +demiurgic, or vivific, or perfective, or connective, being evolved and +dividing themselves, as far as to the last of things, analogously to +the Saturnian order. For the dividing peculiarity originates from the +Saturnian dominion. + + + + + CHAPTER XXXII. + + +In the last place, let us consider why Plato denominates the sublunary +deities, “such as become apparent when they please.” Shall we say +it is because these material elements are hurled forth before them +as veils[162] of the splendour of the etherial vehicles which are +proximately suspended from them? For it is evident that being mundane +they must also necessarily have a mundane starry vehicle. The light of +them, however, shines forth to the view, when they are about to benefit +the places that receive their illumination. But if Plato says that they +become visible when they please, it is necessary that this appearance +of them should either be an evolution into light of the incorporeal +powers which they contain, or of the bodies which are entirely spread +under them. But if it is an evolution of their incorporeal powers, this +is also common to the visible Gods. For they are not always apparent +by their incorporeal powers, but only sometimes, and when they please. +It is not proper, therefore, to divide the sublunary oppositely to the +visible Gods, according to that which is common to both, but so far as +they have entirely something peculiar. But if they produce a luminous +evolution of certain bodies when they please, they must necessarily use +other bodies prior to these material elements; and which then become +visible to us, when it seems fit to the powers that use them. Hence, +other bodies more divine than such as are apparent, are spread under +the invisible Gods; and according to these, they are said to be, and +are mundane. Through these also as media, they ride in and govern these +elements. For they impart to them as much of themselves as they are +able to receive, and contain the forms and the natures of them in their +powers. For since no one of these is an object of sense, and it is +necessary that the vehicles of rational souls should be things of this +kind, it is evident that they must use other vehicles prior to these +visible bodies. + +With respect, however, to all the Gods that govern generation, we +must not say, that they have an essence mingled with matter, as the +Stoics assert they have. For nothing which verges to matter is able +to govern with intellect and wisdom, nor is properly a producing +cause, but an organ of something else. Nor must we say that they have +an essence unmingled with matter, but powers and energies mingled +with it, as Numenius and his followers assert. For the energies of +the Gods concur with their essences, and their inward subsist prior +to their externally proceeding energies; since a partial soul also +prior to the life which is inserted in the animal suspended from it, +contains a more principal life in itself; and prior to the externally +proceeding motion, through which it moves other things, it is moved +with a motion converted to itself. The sublunary Gods, therefore, are +entirely unmingled with matter; adorning indeed things mingled in an +unmingled, and things generated, in an unbegotten manner. They likewise +contain partibles impartibly, are the causes of life, the suppliers of +intellect, the replenishers of power, the givers of soul, the primary +leaders of all good, and the sources of order, providence, and the best +administration. They also give subsistence to more excellent animals +about themselves, are the leaders of angels, the rulers of dæmons, and +the prefects of heroes; governing through this triple army the whole +of generation. If, therefore, we assert that the appropriate order +of these divinities about generation, is the basis and seat of the +total Gods, we shall speak rightly. And we shall likewise not err in +asserting that they convolve the end of the divine decrement to the +beginning. Such then being the nature of these divinities, Plato indeed +looking to the Gods that are both intelligible and intellectual, and to +those that are properly called intellectual, surveyed four progressions +of them in common. But they also contain powers derived from the +supermundane Gods; whether they proceed from the twelve leaders, or +from certain other deities. + +From the celestial choir of Gods likewise, a certain order proceeds +into generation, which, as the divine Jamblichus says, is doubled in +its progression. For from the twenty-one leaders, forty-two governments +of Gods who are the fabricators of generation, are derived, according +to each elementary allotment. But from the thirty-six decadarchs,[163] +seventy-two sublunary rulers proceed; and in a similar manner other +Gods; being the double of the celestial Gods in multitude, but falling +short of them in power. It is likewise necessary to survey their triple +progressions, their quintuple divisions, and their divine generation +according to the hebdomad. For they receive an orderly distribution in +a three-fold, five-fold, and sevenfold manner analogous to the whole +world; in order that each of the elements may be a world, and may be +truly an imitation of the universe. Such, therefore, is the concise +doctrine concerning the sublunary Gods, according to twofold essences, +lives, and allotments; just as Plato also makes the ruling progeny of +them to be dyadic. + + + + + CHAPTER XXXIII. + + +Having therefore discussed the theory pertaining to the celestial and +sublunary Gods, it now remains that we ascend to the summit or monad +of all the mundane Gods, Bacchus, in whose divinity they all subsist +and are rooted, similarly to the fixed stars in the inerratic sphere. +For after this manner, every monad analogously contains its co-ordinate +multitude. + +Bacchus therefore, is the mundane intellect, from which the soul and +body of the world are suspended. With respect however, to intellect +it is necessary to observe that one kind is imparticipable and total; +another is participable indeed but essentially so; and a third is +participable, and subsists as a habit. All intellects unconnected +with soul belong to the first kind. The mundane intellect, and the +intellects of all the mundane Gods and beneficent dæmons, rank in the +second division. And to the third class such intellects as ours belong. +This deity also is the monad of the Titans, or ultimate fabricators +of things, by whom he is said in divine fables to have been torn in +pieces; because the mundane soul which participates of this divinity, +and is on this account intellectual, is participated by the Titans, +and through them distributed into every part of the universe. Plato +in the Cratylus says of this divinity “that he is the giver of wine; +and that οινος _wine_ may most justly be denominated οιονους because +it is accustomed to deprive those of intellect who possessed it +before.” On which words Proclus in his MS Scholia on that dialogue +observes as follows: “The young man Cratylus appears to inquire about +our sovereign master Bacchus, as if it were about things of small +importance, and on this account he is silenced by Socrates.[164] And +he does not indeed pay attention to the occult, but only to the last +and mundane progressions of the Gods.” These indeed, the wise man +venerates, though as he says, they are sports, through these Gods +[Bacchus and Venus] being lovers of sport. For as he says of the +terminations of the other Gods, that they are terrible, and that they +avenge and punish, and thus give perfection to souls; as for instance, +that Justice follows Jupiter, the avenger of the divine law, and that +this divinity is benevolent to those whose manners are orderly, and +who live according to intellect, but that she is baneful to those who +mingle their life with insolence and ignorance, till she has entirely +subverted them, their houses and cities;--in like manner, he venerates +the terminations of Bacchus and Venus, which produce γλυκυθυμια +_sweetness of sensation_; every where purifying our conceptions +concerning the Gods, and preparing us to understand that all things +look to the best end, whatever it may be. For because the terminations +of these divinities strengthen the infirmity of the mortal nature, and +alleviate corporeal molestation, on this account the Gods the causes +of these things, are φιλοπαιγμονες lovers of sport. Hence, of statues, +they make some of them laughing and dancing, and exhibiting relaxation, +but others austere, astonishing, and terrible to the view, analogously +to the mundane allotments of the Gods. + +But theologists frequently call Bacchus _wine_, from the last of his +gifts, as for instance, Orpheus, + + Οινου παντα μελη κοσμῳ λαβε, και μοι ενεικε. + +i.e. “Take all the members of _Wine_ [that are distributed] in the +world, and bring them to me.” If however the God is thus denominated, +certainly his first and middle energies will be thus called, as well +as his last; so that Socrates now looking to this calls the God +διδοινυσος, beginning from wine, which as we have said manifests all +the powers of Bacchus. Thus also in the Phædrus, Socrates calls Love in +common _great_, both that which is divine, and that which is a lover +of body. By this epithet _wine_ therefore, we must understand that the +peculiarity of a partial intellect, is in common presented to our view. +For the word οιουν _such as_, is nothing else than intellectual form +separated from a total intellect, and in consequence of this becoming +participated, particular and _alone_. For an all-perfect intellect +is all things, and energizes according to all things with invariable +sameness: but a partial and participated intellect, is indeed all +things, but this according to one form, such as a solar, lunar, or +mercurial form. This therefore, the peculiarity of which is to be +separated from the rest, wine indicates, signifying an intellect _such +as_, and _particular_. (σημαινων τον οιον και τινα νουν) + +Since, therefore, every partial fabrication is suspended from the +Dionysiacal or Bacchic monad, which distributes participated mundane +intellects from total intellect, (or that intellect which ranks as a +whole) many souls from one soul, and all sensible forms from their +proper wholenesses; on this account theologists call both this God +and all his fabrications _wine_. For all these are the progeny of +intellect. And some things participate of the partial distribution +of intellect in a more distant, but others in a nearer degree. Wine +therefore energizes in things analogous to its subsistence in them; +in body indeed, after the manner of an image, according to a false +opinion and imagination; but in intellectual natures, according to an +intellectual energy and fabrication. For in the laceration of Bacchus +by the Titans, the _heart_ of the God is said to have alone remained +undistributed, i.e. _the indivisible_ or impartible _essence of +intellect_. + +With respect to the mundane soul which is the immediate participant +of this Bacchic intellect, the composition of it is most accurately +delivered by Plato in the Timæus, and admirably unfolded by Proclus +in his Commentaries on that dialogue. For full information therefore +on this subject I refer the reader to those works; and shall only +summarily observe at present that there are five genera of being, from +which all things after the first being are composed; viz. _essence_, +_permanency_, _motion_, _sameness_, and _difference_. For every thing +must possess _essence_; must _abide_ in its cause, from which also +it must _proceed_, and to which it must be _converted_; must be the +_same_ with itself and certain other natures, and at the same time +different from others, and distinguished in itself. But Plato for the +sake of brevity, assumes only three of these in the composition of +the mundane soul, viz. _essence, sameness, and difference_; for the +other two must necessarily subsist in conjunction with these. When +therefore Plato says, “that from an essence impartible, and always +subsisting according to sameness of being, and from a nature divisible +about bodies, the demiurgus mingled from both a third form of essence, +having a middle subsistence between the two,”--by the impartible +essence he means intellect, and by the nature which is divisible about +bodies, a corporeal life. Hence the mundane soul is a medium between +the mundane intellect, and the whole of that corporeal life which the +world participates. We must not however suppose that when the soul +is said to be mingled from these two, the indivisible and divisible +natures are consumed in the mixture, as is the case when corporeal +substances are mingled together; but we must understand that the soul +is of a middle nature between these, so as to be different from each, +and yet a participant of each. In short, the intellect participated by +soul, is called by Plato impartible; but the nature which is divisible +about bodies is the corporeal-formed life proceeding from the mundane +soul, and which has the relation of splendour to it. For intellect is +analogous to the sun; soul, to the light proceeding from the sun; and a +divisible life to the splendour proceeding from light. + +Proclus observes on the above cited words of Plato, that they are +conformable to the Orphic traditions. “For, says he,[165] Orpheus does +not predicate the impartible of every intelligible or intellectual +order, but according to him there are certain natures superior to this +appellation, in the same manner as others are superior to other names. +For king and father are not adapted to all the divine orders. Where, +therefore, according to Orpheus, shall we first survey the impartible, +in order that we may understand the divine conception of Plato? Orpheus +therefore establishes one demiurgus of every divisible fabrication, +analogous to the one father who generates the total fabrication, and +from him produces the whole intellectual mundane multitude, the number +of souls, and corporeal compositions. And this one demiurgus indeed +(i.e. Bacchus) generates all these unitedly; but the Gods that surround +him, divide and separate his fabrications. Orpheus however says, that +all his other fabrications were distributed into parts by the Gods +whose characteristic is of a dividing nature; but that his heart alone +was preserved impartible, through the providence of Minerva. For +since he gives subsistence to intellects, souls and bodies; but souls +and bodies indeed, receive in themselves an abundant division and +distribution into parts, intellect remaining united and indivisible, +being all things in one, and comprehending total intelligibles in one +intellection;--this being the case, he says that the intellectual +essence alone, and the intellectual number was saved entire by Minerva. +For says he, + + The intellectual heart alone was left, + +directly calling it intellectual. + +If therefore the impartible heart is intellectual, it will evidently +be intellect and an intellectual number; not indeed every intellect, +but the mundane; for this is the impartible heart, since the divided +God was also the fabricator of this. Orpheus therefore calls the +impartible essence of Bacchus intellect. But he denominates the life +which is divisible about body, which is physical, and pregnant with +seeds, the genitals of the God. And he says that Diana who presides +over all the generation in nature, and is the midwife of physical +productive principles, extends these genitals, distributing as far as +to subterranean natures, the prolific power of the God. But all the +remaining body of Bacchus was, he says, the psychical essence, this +also being divided into seven parts. For they divided all the seven +parts of the boy, says the theologist, speaking of the Titans; just as +Timæus divides the soul into seven parts. And perhaps Timæus, when he +says that soul is extended through the whole world, will remind the +followers of Orpheus of the Titannic division, through which soul is +not only spread round the universe like a veil, but is also extended +through it. Very properly therefore, does Plato call the essence which +is proximately above soul, an impartible essence. And in short, he thus +denominates the intellect which is participated by soul, following the +Orphic fables, and wishing to be as it were an interpreter of what is +said in the mysteries.” And thus much concerning Bacchus, or the monad +of the mundane Gods. + + + + + CHAPTER XXXIV. + + +In the next place let us direct our attention to the Parmenides of +Plato, and see how in that most theological dialogue the mundane +Gods are characterized. In the first hypothesis therefore of that +dialogue, in which all the divine orders are denied of _the one_, +Parmenides characterizes the mundane Gods by the equal and the unequal +as follows: “But since _the one_ is such, it will neither be equal +nor unequal either to itself or to another. How so? If it were equal, +indeed, it would be of the same measures with that to which it is +equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or less than the things +with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the +less quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But to those +to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will +consist of less; and with respect to the other of greater measures. How +should it not? Is it not therefore impossible that a thing which does +not participate of same should either be of the same measures, or admit +any thing in any respect the same? It is impossible. It will therefore +neither be equal to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of +the same measures. It does not appear that it will. But if it consists +of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are +measures; and so again, it will no longer be _the one_, but as many as +there are measures. Right. But if it should be of one measure, it would +become equal to that measure. It has, however, appeared that _the one_ +cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared so. _The one_, therefore, +neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nor of a few; nor +(since it in no respect participates of _same_) can it ever, as it +appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or less +either than itself or another. It is in every respect so.” + +As the commentary of Proclus on the second hypothesis of the +Parmenides, in which the equal and the unequal are affirmed of _the +one_, is lost, and in which I have no doubt, the properties of the +mundane Gods were most fully unfolded, I shall present the reader with +the following extract from his commentary on the above passage in the +Parmenides of Plato. The peculiarity of the mundane Gods is the equal +and the unequal, the former of these indicating their fulness, and +their receiving neither any addition nor ablation; (for such is that +which is equal to itself, always preserving the same boundary;) but the +latter, the multitude of their powers, and the excess and defect which +they contain. For in these, divisions, variety of powers, differences +of progressions, analogies, and bonds through these, are, according to +ancient theologists, especially allotted a place. Hence, Timæus also +constitutes souls through analogy, the causes of which must necessarily +presubsist in the Gods that proximately preside over souls. And as all +analogies subsist from equality, Plato very properly indicates the +peculiarity of these divinities by the equal and the unequal. But he +now rightly frames the demonstrations of the negations of the equal +and the unequal from _sameness and the many_, and not from _the +similar and the dissimilar_, though immediately before he spoke of +these. For every mundane deity proceeds from the demiurgic monad, and +the first multitude which he denies of _the one_. + +Of this then we must be entirely persuaded, that the things of which +demonstrations consist are the preceding causes of the particulars +about which Parmenides discourses; so that _the equal_ and _the +unequal_, so far as they proceed from _the one_, and subsist through +_sameness_ and _the many_, so far through these they are denied of +_the one_. Hence, Plato thus begins his discussion of them:--“But +since it (viz. _the one_) is such,” i.e. not as we have just now +demonstrated, but as was formerly shown, that it neither receives +_same_ nor _different_, and is _without multitude_,--being such, it is +neither equal nor unequal, neither to itself, nor to others. For again, +there are here twofold conclusions, in the same manner as concerning +the similar and the dissimilar, and the same and the different. But +that _the equal_ and _the unequal_ are suspended from the twofold +co-ordinations of divine natures is not immanifest. For _the equal_ is +arranged under _the similar_, and _the same, subsistence in another, +the round, and the whole_; but _the unequal_, under _the dissimilar_, +_the different_, _subsistence in itself_, _the straight_, and _the +possession of parts_. And again, of these the former are suspended from +_bound_, but the latter from infinity. Plato also appears to produce +the discourse through certain oppositions, as it were, that he may show +that _the one_ is above all opposition. For _the one_ cannot be the +worse of the two opposites, since this would be absurd; nor can it be +the better of the two, since in this case it would not be the cause +of all things. For the better opposite is not the cause of the worse, +but in a certain respect communicates with it, without being properly +its cause. For neither does sameness give subsistence to difference, +nor permanency to motion; but comprehension and union pervade from the +better to the worse. + +It is, however, by no means wonderful that the demonstrations of +_the equal_ and _the unequal_, which are here assumed as symbols of +mundane deity, should be adapted to physical and mathematical equals, +to the equals in the reasons of soul, and to those in intellectual +forms. For it is necessary that demonstrations in all these negations +should begin supernally, and should extend through all secondary +natures, that they may show that _the one_ of the Gods is exempt from +intellectual, psychical, mathematical, and physical forms. All such +axioms, therefore, as are now assumed concerning things equal and +unequal, must be adapted to this order of Gods. Hence, as it contains +many powers, some of which are co-ordinate with each other, and extend +themselves to the self-perfect and _the good_, but others differ +according to transcendency and subjection--the former must be said to +be characterized by _equality_, but the latter by _inequality_. For +_the good_ is the measure of every thing: and hence such things as are +united by the same good are measured by the same measure, and are equal +to each other. But things which are unco-ordinated with each other make +their progression according to the unequal. + +Since, however, of things unequal, some are commensurate and others +incommensurate, it is evident that these also must be adapted to +divine natures. Hence commensuration must be referred to those Gods, +through whom secondary natures are mingled with those prior to them, +and participate of the whole of more excellent beings. For thus, in +things commensurate, the less is willing to have a common measure +with the greater, the same thing measuring the whole of each. But +incommensuration must be ascribed to those divinities from whom things +subordinate, through the exempt transcendency of more excellent +natures, participate of them in a certain respect, but are incapable +through their subjection of being conjoined with the whole of them. +For the communion proceeding from first to partial and multifarious +natures is incommensurate to the latter. If, indeed, _the equal_ and +_the unequal_ are symbols of the mundane Gods, _the commensurate_ +and _the incommensurate_ are here very properly introduced. For in +things incorporeal and immaterial this opposition has no place, all +things being there effable; but where there is a material subject, +and a mixture of form and something formless, there an opposition of +commensuration very properly subsists. Hence, as the mundane Gods are +proximately connective of souls and bodies, form and matter, a division +appears in them, according to _the equal_ and _the unequal_. + + + + + CHAPTER XXXV. + + +After the mundane Gods, the scientific order of discussion requires +that we should consider divine souls, and the triple genera of natures +more excellent than man, viz. angels, dæmons, and heroes. Previous, +however, to this, that I may as much as possible unfold to the reader +the whole of the Platonic theory about the Gods, I shall present him +with a development of the nature of certain other divinities mentioned +by Plato; and which, owing to the loss of the seventh book of Proclus, +and of other theological works of the most genuine Platonists, cannot +at this remote and barren period be scientifically classed. + +In the first place, then, I shall present the reader with what Plato +says in the Phædrus of Boreas and Orithya, the Centaurs, Chimæras, +Gorgons, Pegasuses, Typhons, Achelous, and the Nymphs, accompanied +with the elucidations of Ammonius Hermeas. “Phædr. Inform me, Socrates, +whether this is not the place in which Boreas is reported to have +ravished Orithya from Ilissus. Soc. It is reported so indeed. Phædr. +Was it not just here then? for the brooks hereabouts appear to be +grateful to the view, pure and transparent, and very well adapted to +the sports of virgins. Soc. It was not, but two or three stadia lower +down, where we meet with the temple of Diana, and in that very place +there is a certain altar sacred to Boreas. Phædr. I did not perfectly +know this. But tell me by Jupiter, Socrates, are you persuaded that +this fabulous narration is true? Soc. If I should not believe in it, +as is the case with the wise, I should not be absurd: and afterwards, +speaking sophistically, I should say that the wind Boreas hurled from +the neighbouring rocks Orithya, sporting with Pharmacia; and that she +dying in consequence of this, was said to have been ravished by Boreas, +or from the hill of Mars. There is also another report, that she was +not ravished from this place, but from that. But for my own part, +Phædrus, I consider interpretations of this kind as pleasant enough, +but at the same time, as the province of a man vehemently curious +and laborious, and not entirely happy; and this for no other reason, +than because after such an explanation, it is necessary for him to +correct the shape of the Centaurs, and Chimæra. And besides this, a +crowd of Gorgons and Pegasuses will pour upon him for an exposition +of this kind, and of certain other prodigious natures, immense both +in multitude and novelty. All which, if any one, not believing in +their literal meaning, should draw to a probable sense, employing for +this purpose a certain rustic wisdom, he will stand in need of most +abundant leisure. With respect to myself, indeed, I have not leisure +for such an undertaking; and this because I am not yet able, according +to the Delphic precept, to know myself. But it appears to me to be +ridiculous, while I am yet ignorant of this, to speculate things +foreign from the knowledge of myself. Hence, bidding farewell to these, +and being persuaded in the opinion which I have just now mentioned +respecting them, I do not contemplate these, but myself, considering +whether I am not a wild beast, possessing more folds than Typhon, +and far more raging and fierce; or whether I am a more mild and +simple animal, naturally participating of a certain divine and modest +condition. But are we not, my friend, in the midst of our discourse +arrived at our destined seat? And is not yonder the oak to which you +were to lead us? Phædr. That indeed is it. Soc. By Juno, a beautiful +retreat. For the plane-tree very widely spreads its shady branches, +and is remarkably tall; and the height and opacity of the willow, are +perfectly beautiful, being now in the vigour of its vegetation, and, on +this account, filling all the place with the most agreeable odour. Add +too, that a most pleasant fountain of extreme cool water flows under +the plane-tree, as may be inferred from its effect on our feet, and +which appears to be sacred to certain Nymphs, and to Achelous, from the +virgins and statues with which it is adorned.” + +On this very beautiful passage, Hermes comments as follows: The +Athenians established a temple of Rural Diana, because this Goddess is +the inspective guardian of every thing rural, and represses every thing +rustic and uncultivated. But the altars and temples of the Gods signify +their allotments; as you may also call this mundane body, or apparent +solar orb, the altar and temple of the sun, and of the soul of the sun. + +With respect to the fable, a two-fold solution may be given of it; one +from history, more ethical, but the other transferring us to wholes. +And the former of these is as follows: Orithya was the daughter of +Erectheus, and the priestess of Boreas; for each of the winds has a +presiding deity, which the telestic art, or the art pertaining to +sacred mysteries, religiously cultivates. To this Orithya, then, +the God was so very propitious, that he sent the north wind for the +safety of the country; and besides this, he is said to have assisted +the Athenians in their naval battles. Orithya, therefore, becoming +enthusiastic, being possessed by her proper God Boreas, and no longer +energizing as a human being (for animals cease to energize according to +their own peculiarities when possessed by superior causes) died under +the inspiring influence, and thus was said to have been ravished by +Boreas. And this is the more ethical explanation of the fable. + +But the second, which transfers the narration to wholes, is as follows, +and does not entirely subvert the former: for divine fables often +employ transactions and histories in subserviency to the discipline +of wholes. They say, then, that Erectheus is the God that rules +over the three elements, air, water, and earth. Sometimes, however, +he is considered as alone the ruler of the earth, and sometimes +as the presiding deity of Attica alone. Of this deity, Orithya is +the daughter. And she is the prolific power of the earth, which is +indeed co-extended with the word _Erectheus_, as the unfolding +of the name signifies. For it is _the prolific power of the earth +flourishing and restored according to the seasons_. But Boreas is +the providence of the Gods supernally illuminating secondary natures; +for the providence of the Gods in the world is signified by Boreas, +because this divinity blows from lofty places. But the elevating power +of the Gods is signified by the south wind, because this wind blows +from low to lofty places; and besides this, things situated towards the +south are more divine. The providence of the Gods, therefore, causes +the prolific power of the earth, or of the Attic land, to ascend, and +proceed into the apparent. + +Orithya, also, may be said to be a soul[166] aspiring after things +above, from ορουω and θειω, according to the Attic custom of adding a +letter at the end of a word, which letter is here an ω. Such a soul, +therefore, is ravished by Boreas supernally blowing. But if Orithya +was hurled from a precipice, this also is appropriate. For such a +soul dies a philosophic, not receiving a physical death, and abandons +a _proairetic_,[167] at the same time that she lives a physical +life. And philosophy, according to Socrates in the Phædo, is nothing +else than a meditation of death. + +According to some, however, Socrates in what he here says about Orithya +and Boreas does not admit the explanation of fables. But it is evident +that he frequently does admit and employ fables. Now, indeed, he blames +those explanations which make fables to be nothing more than certain +histories, and unfold them into material causes, airs, and earth, and +winds, which do not revert to true beings, nor harmonize with divine +concerns. Hence, Socrates now says, If unfolding this fable I should +recur to physical causes, and should assert that the wind Boreas, +blowing vehemently, hurled Orithya as she was playing from the rock, +and thus dying she was said to have been ravished by Boreas,--should +I not speak absurdly? For this explanation which is adopted by the +_wise_, viz. by those who are employed in physical speculations, +is meagre and conjectural; since it does not recur to true beings, +but to natures, and winds, airs and vortices, as he also says in the +Phædo. He rejects, therefore, these naturalists, and those who thus +explain this fable, as falling into the indefinite and infinite, and +not recurring to soul, intellect, and the Gods. But when Socrates says +that he considers such interpretations as the province of a man _very +curious and laborious, and not entirely happy_, these words indicate +the being conversant with things sensible and material. And the +Centaurs, Chimæras, Gorgons, and Pegasuses, are powers which preside +over a material nature, and the region about the earth.[168] + +When Socrates also says, that he is not yet able to know himself, his +meaning may be, either that he does not yet know himself as pure soul +itself, but that as being in body he knows himself; or that he does not +yet know himself, as he is known by divinity. For if ever any man knew +himself, this was certainly the case with Socrates. + +When likewise he says, “I do not contemplate these, but myself;” this +is because he who knows himself knows all things. For in consequence +of the soul being παμμορφον αγαλμα an omniform image, he beholds all +things in himself. But by Typhon here we must understand that power +which presides over the confused and disordered in the universe, +or in other words over the last procession of things. The term +_manifold_, therefore, in this place, must not be applied to the +God Typhon, but to that over which he presides, as being in its own +nature moved in a confused, disordered, and manifold manner. For +it is usual with fables to refer the properties of the objects of +providential care to the providing powers themselves. + +Farther still, Socrates mentions Juno, as generating and adorning +the beauty of the mundane fabrication; and hence she is said to have +received the Cestus from Venus. But Achelous is the deity who presides +over the much-honoured power of water. For by this mighty river, the +God who is the inspective guardian of potable water is manifested. And +Nymphs are Goddesses who preside over regeneration, and are ministrant +to Bacchus the offspring of Semele. But this Bacchus supplies the +regeneration of the whole sensible world. + +I shall only add, that Nymphs according to Servius on the first Æneid +are distributed into three classes. But Nymphs belonging to mountains +are called Oreades; to woods, Dryades; those that are born with woods, +Hamadryades; those that belong to fountains, Napæ, or Naiades; and +those that belong to the sea, Nereides. + + + + + CHAPTER XXXVI. + + +Again, the following divinities are also mentioned by Plato in +different parts of his works. In the first place, Pan, at the end +of the Phædrus; to which divinity Socrates addresses the following +admirable prayer: “O beloved Pan, and all ye other Gods, who are +residents of this place, grant that I may become beautiful within, +and that whatever I possess externally may be friendly to my inward +attainments! Grant also, that I may consider the wise man as one who +abounds in wealth; and that I may enjoy that portion of gold, which no +other than a prudent man is able either to bear, or properly manage!” +In this prayer, by Pan and the other Gods, we must understand local +deities under the moon. But Pan is denominated as it were _all_, +because he possesses the most ample sway in the order of local Gods. +For as the supermundane Gods are referred to Jupiter, and the celestial +to Bacchus, so all the sublunary local Gods and dæmons are referred to +Pan. + +In the next place, Tartarus is mentioned by Plato in the Phædo, as one +of the greatest chasms of the earth; and of which, says he, Homer[169] +thus speaks: + + Far, very far, where under earth is found + A gulf, of every depth, the most profound. + +But Tartarus, says Olympiodorus, is the extremity of the universe, and +subsists oppositely to Olympus. It is also a deity, the inspective +guardian of that which is last in every order. Hence, there is a +celestial Tartarus, in which Heaven concealed his offspring; a +Saturnian Tartarus, in which likewise Saturn concealed his offspring; +and also a Jovian of this kind, which is demiurgic. + +Again, the characteristic peculiarity of Prometheus, as mentioned by +Plato in the Gorgias, is thus unfolded by Olympiodorus in his MS. +Scholia on that dialogue: Prometheus is the inspective guardian of the +descent of rational souls. For to exert a _providential energy_ +is the employment of the rational soul, and, prior to any thing else, +to know itself. Irrational natures indeed perceive through percussion, +and prior to impulsion know nothing; but the rational nature is able, +prior to information from another, to know what is useful. Hence, +_Epimetheus_ is the inspective guardian of the irrational soul, +because it knows through percussion, and not prior to it. Prometheus, +therefore, is that power which presides over the descent of rational +souls. But _fire_ signifies the rational soul itself; because, as +fire tends upwards, so the rational soul pursues things on high. But +you will say, why is this fire said to have been stolen? Because that +which is stolen is transferred from its proper place to one that is +foreign. Hence, since the rational soul is sent from its proper place +of abode on high, to earth, as to a foreign region, on this account +the fire is said to be stolen. But why was it concealed in a reed? +Because a reed is full of cavities, and therefore signifies the flowing +body in which the soul is carried. But why was the fire stolen contrary +to the will of Jupiter? Again, the fable speaks as a fable. For both +Prometheus and Jupiter are willing that the soul should abide on high; +but as it is requisite that she should descend, the fable fabricates +particulars accommodated to the persons. And it represents indeed the +superior character, which is Jupiter, as unwilling; for he wishes the +soul always to abide on high. But the inferior character, Prometheus, +obliges her to descend: Jupiter, therefore, ordered Pandora to be made. +And what else is this than the irrational soul, which is of a feminine +characteristic? For as it was necessary that the soul should descend +to these lower regions, but being incorporeal and divine, it was +impossible for her to be conjoined with body without a medium, hence +she becomes united with it through _the irrational soul_. But this +irrational soul was called Pandora, because each of the Gods bestowed +on it some particular gift. And this signifies that the illuminations +which terrestrial natures receive take place through the celestial +bodies.[170] + +Again, in the Phædo, mention is made by Plato of Cadmus, who, according +to Olympiodorus, is the sublunary world, as being Dionysiacal, on which +account Harmonia or Harmony is united to the God, and also as being the +father of the four Bacchuses. The four elements likewise he informs +us are said to be Dionysiacal, viz. _fire_ to be _Semele_; _earth_, +_Agave_, tearing in pieces her own offspring; _water_, _Ino_; and +lastly, _air_, _Autonoe_. There is great beauty in conjoining Harmony, +the daughter of Venus and Mars, with Cadmus. For Venus, as we have +before observed, is the cause of all the harmony and analogy in the +universe, and beautifully illuminates the order and communion of all +mundane concerns. But Mars excites the contrarieties of the universe, +that the world may exist perfect and entire from all its parts. The +progeny, therefore, of these two divinities must be the _concordant +discord_, or _harmony_ of the sublunary world. + +Farther still, the Syrens are mentioned by Plato, both in the 10th book +of the Republic, and in the Cratylus. And Proclus, in the 6th book of +this work, has explained the meaning of what Plato says of them in +the former of those dialogues. But in his MS. Scholia on the Cratylus +he says, “The divine Plato knew that there are three kinds of Sirens; +the _celestial_, which is under the government of Jupiter; _that which +produces generation_, and is under the government of Neptune; and that +which is _cathartic_, and is under the government of Pluto. It is +common to all these, to incline all things through an harmonic motion +to their ruling Gods. Hence, when the soul is in the heavens, the +Sirens are desirous of uniting it to the divine life which flourishes +there. But it is proper that souls living in generation should sail +beyond them, like the Homeric Ulysses, that they may not be allured +by generation, of which the sea is an image. And when souls are in +Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through intellectual +conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the kingdom of Hades +there are Gods, dæmons, and souls, who dance as it were round Pluto, +allured by the Sirens that dwell there.” + + + + + CHAPTER XXXVII. + + +In the next place, let us direct our attention to Plato’s theological +conceptions of Nature, Fate, and Fortune. From the Timæus, therefore, +it appears that Plato does not consider either matter, or material +form, or body, or natural powers, as worthy to be called Nature, though +it has been thus denominated by others. Nor does he think proper +to call Nature soul; but establishing its essence between soul and +corporeal powers, he considers it as inferior to the former through +its being divided about bodies, and its incapacity of conversion to +itself, but as surpassing the latter through containing the productive +principles, and generating and vivifying every part of the visible +world. For Nature verges towards bodies, and is inseparable from their +fluctuating empire. But soul is separate from body, is established in +herself, and subsists both from herself and another; from another, that +is, from intellect through participation; and from herself, on account +of not verging to body, but abiding in her own essence, and at the +same time illuminating the obscure nature of matter with a secondary +life. Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this +corporeal and sensible world; bounds the progressions of incorporeal +essences; and is full of reasons and powers through which she governs +mundane affairs. And she is a Goddess indeed considered as deified, +and not according to the primary signification of the word; for divine +bodies also are called Gods, as being the statues or images of the +Gods. But she governs the whole world by her powers; by her summit +comprehending the heavens; but through heaven governing generation. And +she every where weaves partial natures in amicable conjunction with +wholes. + +Nature, however, thus subsisting, she proceeds from the vivific Goddess +Rhea; (for “immense Nature, says the Chaldean oracle, is suspended from +the shoulders of the Goddess;”) from whom all life is derived, both +that which is intellectual, and that which is inseparable from the +subjects of its government. But Nature being from thence suspended, +she pervades through and inspires all things without impediment. +Hence, the most inanimate beings participate of a certain soul, and +corruptible natures remain perpetually in the world, being connected +and comprehended by the causes of forms which she contains. And those +indeed who call Nature demiurgic art, if they mean by this the Nature +which abides in the demiurgus himself, they do not speak rightly; +but if they mean that which proceeds from him, their conception +is accurate. For art must be considered as having a three-fold +subsistence; one, that which does not proceed out of the artist; the +second, that which proceeds indeed, but is converted to him; and +the third, that which has now proceeded, and has its subsistence in +something else. The art, therefore, which is in the demiurgus, abides +indeed in him; but the intellectual soul is art, yet at the same time +both abiding and proceeding. And Nature is art, alone proceeding into +something different from herself. Hence, she is said to be the organ of +the Gods, not deprived of life, nor alter-motive alone, but having in a +certain respect, a self-motive power, in consequence of energizing from +herself. For the organs of the Gods are essentialized in efficacious +powers, are vital, and concur with their energies. And thus much +concerning Nature according to the conceptions of Plato, as unfolded by +Proclus. + +In the next place with respect to Fate, in the fable in the Politicus, +Plato says, that “Fate and connate desire convolve the world, when it +is considered by itself as a corporeal nature, without the intellectual +Gods.” And in the Timæus he represents the demiurgus exhibiting to +souls the nature of the universe, and announcing to them the laws of +Fate. On which Proclus admirably comments as follows: It must not be +said, that Fate is a partial nature, as some of the Peripatetics assert +it is; as for instance, Alexander; for such a nature is imbecil and not +perpetual. For from common conceptions, we pre-assume that the power of +Fate is something very great and stable. Nor must it be said, that it +is the order of the mundane periods, as Aristotle asserts it to be, who +denominates the increase which is contrary to order _preterfatal_, +as if order and Fate were the same. For the cause of order is one +thing, but order itself is another. Nor is it soul subsisting in +habitude, as Theodorus says; for such a form of life in wholes is not +a principle. Nor is it simply Nature, as Porphyry says it is. For many +things which are supernatural, and out of the dominion of Nature are +produced by Fate, such as nobility, renown, and wealth. For where is +it seen that physical motions become the cause of these? Nor is it the +intellect of the universe, as again Aristotle says in a certain place, +if the treatise On the World was written by him. For intellect produces +every thing which it produces at once, and is not at all in want of +an administration which proceeds according to a certain period, and a +continued and well-ordered series of things. But the chain, the order, +the periodic production of many causes constitute the peculiarity of +Fate. + +If, however, it be requisite to comprehend the whole form of it +concisely, we must say, that the subject matter as it were of it is +Nature herself, but considered as deified, and filled with divine, +intellectual, and psychical illuminations. For the order of Gods called +the presidents of destiny, (των μοιρηγετων καλουμενων) and the genera +that are more excellent than man terminate in Nature. For these impart +powers from themselves to the one life of Nature; and the demiurgus of +wholes collects and unites all these gifts, and demonstrates them to +be one power. For if visible bodies [i.e. the celestial bodies], are +filled with divine[171] powers, Nature, is by a much greater priority +divine. And if the whole visible world is one, much more is the whole +essence of Fate one, and derives from many causes the completion of +its composition. For being suspended from the providence of the Gods, +and from demiurgic goodness, it is united and governed by it, being +a productive principle subsisting from productive principles, one +multiform power, a divine life, and an order of things that have a +prior arrangement. Hence, the ancients looking to this its various +and multiform nature, were led to form different opinions concerning +it. And some indeed said that it is a Goddess, on account of that +which is divine in it; others, that it is a dæmon, on account of the +efficacious and at the same time multiform nature of its production; +others, that it is intellect, because a certain participation of +intellect reaches it; but others, that it is order, so that every +thing which has an arrangement is invisibly comprehended by it. Plato, +however, alone surveyed the essence of it, asserting indeed that it +is Nature, but Nature suspended from the demiurgus. For how could the +demiurgus exhibit Nature to souls, otherwise than by containing the +principle of it in himself? And how could he announce to them the laws +of Fate, after exhibiting to them the Nature of the universe, except by +constituting Nature as the one power that comprehends these laws? + +Farther still, in the Politicus, Plato more clearly suspends the second +life of the universe from Fate, after the departure of the one dæmon +that governed it, and the many dæmons that were the followers of that +one. Hence, he separates all the providential care of these powers +from the universe, and alone leaves it the government according to +Fate; the world, indeed, always possessing both these, but the fable +separating the first from the second. For he says, “that Fate and +connate desire convolve the world,” just as the Chaldæan oracles say, +“that unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws +downward in order that the heavens may run an eternal course; and +that the other periods of the sun, the moon, the seasons, night and +day may be accomplished.” Thus, therefore, Plato also says, that the +second period of the world is convolved by Fate, and not the first and +intellectual period, all but clearly asserting that Fate is the power +which proximately moves the sensible world, and is suspended from +the invisible providence of the Gods. For establishing Necessity the +mother of the Fates prior to these, he represents her in the Republic +convolving[172] the world on her knees. And if it be requisite to give +my opinion, Plato arranges these three causes of order successive +to each other, viz. Adrastia, Necessity, and Fate; the first being +intellectual, the second supermundane, and the third mundane. For +the demiurgus as Orpheus says, was nourished indeed by Adrastia, +but associated with Necessity, and generated Fate. And as Adrastia +was comprehensive of divine institutions,[173] and the collector of +all-various laws, thus also Fate is comprehensive of all the mundane +laws, which the demiurgus now inscribes in souls, that he may lead +them in conjunction with wholes, and may define what is adapted to +them according to the different elections of lives. Hence, a vicious +life tends to that which is dark and atheistical, but a pious life +leads the soul to the heavens to which she is also conducted by wholes; +because each of these lives is full of the laws of Fate; and souls +lead themselves, as Plotinus says, thither where the law that is in +them announces. For this is the peculiarity of the providence of the +Gods, to conduct inwardly the subjects for which it provides. And +why is it wonderful that this should be the case, since Nature also +inserting material and corporeal-formed powers in bodies, moves them +through these powers; earth indeed through gravity, but fire through +levity. In a much greater degree, therefore, do the Gods move souls +through the powers which they disseminate in them. Hence, if they +lead souls according to the laws of Fate, these laws also subsist in +souls. And they pre-exist indeed intellectually in the demiurgus; +for the divine law is established with him. But they exist in divine +souls; for according to these laws they govern the universe. And they +are participated by partial souls; for through these they conduct +themselves to an appropriate place, themselves moving themselves. +And through deliberate choice, indeed, they act erroneously and with +rectitude; but through law they distribute to themselves an order +adapted to their former conduct. + +in the last place with respect to Fortune, it is necessary to observe +that Plato does not assert as the Stoics do, that the worthy man has +no need of the assistance of this divinity; but he is of opinion that +the energies of our reasoning power, since according to their external +progression they are complicated with corporeal energies, require the +inspiration of good Fortune, in order that they may be prosperous and +benefit others. Hence in the Timæus and the Parmenides, the persons of +the dialogues are represented as meeting together through a certain +good Fortune. And in the Laws he says, that God, and after God, +Fortune and Time govern all human affairs. “Fortune, therefore,” says +Proclus,[174] “and her gifts, are not things destitute of design and +indefinite; but she is a power collective of many dispersed causes, and +which adorns things disordered, and gives completion to the allotments +assigned to every thing from the universe.” According to Sallust in his +elegant treatise On the Gods and the World, “Fortune must be considered +as a power of the Gods, disposing things differing from each other, and +happening contrary to expectation, to beneficent purposes.” He adds, +“On this account it is proper that cities should celebrate this Goddess +in common; since every city is composed of different particulars. But +this Goddess holds her dominion in sublunary concerns, since every +thing fortuitous is excluded from the regions above the moon.” + +In conformity to this, Simplicius also, in his Commentary On the +Physics of Aristotle,[175] admirably observes concerning Fortune as +follows: “The power of Fortune particularly disposes in an orderly +manner the sublunary part of the universe, in which contingencies +subsist, and which being essentially disordered, Fortune, in +conjunction with other primary causes, directs, places in order, and +governs. Hence she is represented guiding a rudder, because she governs +things sailing on the sea of generation. Her rudder too is fixed on +a globe, because she directs that which is unstable in generation. +In her other hand, she holds the horn of Amalthea, which is full of +fruits, because she is the cause of obtaining all divine fruits. And +on this account, we venerate the fortunes of cities and houses, and +of each individual; because being very remote from divine union, we +are in danger of being deprived of its participation, and require in +order to obtain it the assistance of the Goddess Fortune, and of those +natures[176] superior to the human who possess the characteristic of +this divinity. Indeed, every fortune is good; for every attainment +respects something good, nor does any thing evil subsist from divinity. +But of things that are good, some are precedaneous, and others are of a +punishing or revenging characteristic, which we are accustomed to call +evils. Hence we speak of two Fortunes, one of which we denominate GOOD, +and which is the cause of our obtaining precedaneous goods, but the +other EVIL, which prepares us to receive punishment or revenge.” And +thus much concerning Fortune. + + + + + CHAPTER XXXVIII. + + +It remains that we should consider in the next place, what Time, Day +and Night, Month and Year are, so far as they are deities, according +to the theology of Plato; the Commentaries of Proclus on the Timæus +fortunately presenting us with much valuable information respecting +the nature of these divinities. The speculation also of Time in this +place will be very appropriate, as immediately after, the discussion +of divine souls, angels, dæmons and heroes will naturally follow, with +whose essence Time is intimately and inseparably connected. Plato +therefore in the Timæus says, “that while the demiurgus was adorning +and distributing the universe, he at the same time formed an eternal +image flowing according to number, of eternity abiding in one; and +which receives from us the appellation of time. But besides this he +fabricated the generation of days and nights, and months and years, +which had no subsistence prior to the universe, but which together with +it rose into existence. And all these indeed, are the proper parts of +Time.” Proclus[177] in commenting on what Plato here says about Time, +after having shown that it is neither any thing belonging to motion, +nor an attendant on the energy of soul, nor, in short, the offspring of +soul, investigates what it is in the following admirable manner: + +“Perhaps, says he, it is not sufficient to say that it is the measure +of mundane natures, nor to enumerate the goods of which it is the +cause, but to the utmost of our power we should endeavour to apprehend +its peculiarity. May we not therefore say, since its essence is most +excellent, perfective of soul, and present to all things, that it is +an intellect not only abiding but also subsisting in motion? Abiding +indeed according to its inward energy, and by which it is truly +eternal, but being moved according to its externally proceeding energy, +by which it becomes the boundary of all transition. For eternity +possessing permanency, both according to its inward energy, and that +which it exerts to things eternal, Time being assimilated to it, +according to the former of these energies, becomes separated from it +according to the latter, abiding and being moved. And as with respect +to the essence of the soul, we say that it is intelligible and at +the same time generated, partible, and at the same time impartible, +and are no otherwise able to apprehend its middle nature than by +employing after a manner opposites, what wonder is there if, perceiving +the nature of Time to be partly immoveable, and partly subsisting +in motion, we, or rather not we, but prior to us, the philosopher, +through _the eternal_, should indicate its intellectual monad abiding +in sameness, and through _the moveable_ its externally proceeding +energy, which is participated by soul and the whole world? For we must +not think that the expression _the eternal_ simply indicates that Time +is the image of eternity; for if this were the case, what would have +hindered Plato from directly saying that it is the _image_, and not +the _eternal image_ of eternity? But he was willing to indicate this +very thing, that time has an eternal nature, but not in such a manner +as animal itself [the paradigm of the universe] is said to be eternal. +For that is eternal both in essence and energy; but Time is partly +eternal, and partly, by its external gift, moveable. Hence theurgists +call it eternal; and Plato very properly denominates it not _only_ so. +For one thing is _alone_ moveable, both essentially and according to +the participants of it, being _alone_ the cause of motion, as soul, and +hence it _alone_ moves itself and other things; but another thing is +_alone_ immoveable, preserving itself without transition, and being the +cause to other things of a perpetual subsistence after the same manner, +and to moveable natures through soul. It is necessary therefore, that +the medium between these two extremes should be that which, both +according to its own nature, and the gifts which it imparts to others, +is immoveable and at the same time moveable, essentially immoveable +indeed, but moved in its participants. A thing however of this kind is +Time. + +Hence Time is truly, so far as it is considered in itself, immoveable; +but so far as it is in its participants, it is moveable, and subsists +together with them, unfolding itself into them. It is therefore, +eternal, and a monad and center essentially, and according to its own +abiding energy; but it is at the same time, continuous, and number, and +a circle, according to its proceeding and being participated. Hence, +it is a certain proceeding intellect, established indeed in eternity, +and on this account is said to be eternal. For it would not otherwise +contribute to the assimilation of mundane natures to more perfect +paradigms, unless it were itself previously suspended from them. But +it proceeds and abundantly flows into the things which are guarded +by it. Whence I think the chief of theurgists celebrate Time as a +God, as Julian in the seventh of the Zones, and venerate it by those +names, through which it is unfolded in its participants, causing some +things to be older, and others to be younger, and leading all things +in a circle. Time therefore, possessing a certain intellectual nature, +circularly leads according to number, both its other participants +and souls. For Time is eternal, not in essence only, but also in its +inward energy; but so far as it is participated by externals, it is +alone moveable, coextending and harmonizing with them the gift which it +imparts. But every soul is transitively moved, both according to its +inward and external energies, by the latter of which it moves bodies. +And it appears to me that those who thus denominated Time χρονος had +this conception of its nature, and were therefore willing to call it as +it were χορευοντος νους, an intellect moving in measure; but dividing +the words, perhaps for the sake of concealment, they called it χρονος. +Perhaps too, they gave it this appellation because it abides and is at +the same time moved in measure; by one part of itself abiding, and by +the other proceeding with measured motion. By the conjunction therefore +of both these, they signify the wonderful and demiurgic nature of +this God. And it appears, that as the demiurgus being intellectual +began from intellect to adorn the universe, so Time being itself +supermundane, began from soul to impart perfection. For that Time is +not only mundane, but by a much greater priority supermundane, is +evident; since as eternity is to animal itself, the paradigm of the +universe, so is Time to the world, which is animated and illuminated +by intellect, and wholly an image of animal itself, in the same manner +as Time of eternity. And thus much concerning Time, according to its +first subsistence, and considered as a God. + +With respect to Day and Night, according to their more principal +subsistence, they are demiurgic measures of Time, exciting and +convolving all the apparent and unapparent life and motion, and orderly +distribution of the inerratic sphere. For these are the true parts of +Time, are present after the same manner to all things, and comprehend +the primary cause of apparent day and night, each of these having a +different subsistence in apparent time; to which also Timæus looking +reminds us how time was generated together with the world. Hence he +says in the plural number _nights_ and _days_, and also _months_ and +_years_. But these are obvious to all men. For the unapparent causes of +these have a uniform subsistence prior to things multiplied, and which +circulate infinitely. Things immoveable also subsist prior to such +as are moved, and intellectual natures are prior to sensibles. Such +therefore, must be our conceptions of Night and Day according to their +first subsistence. + +By Month we must understand that truly divine temporal measure which +convolves the lunar sphere, and every termination of the circulation +about the zodiac. But Year is that which perfects and connects +the whole of middle fabrication, according to which the Sun is +seen possessing the greatest strength, and measuring all things in +conjunction with Time. For neither Day nor Night, nor Month is without +the Sun, nor much more Year, nor any other mundane nature. I do not +here speak according to the apparent fabrication of things alone; for +the apparent Sun is the cause of these measures; but also according to +that fabrication which is unapparent. For, ascending higher, we shall +find that the more true Sun[178] measures all things in conjunction +with Time, being itself in reality Time of Time, according to the +Chaldæan oracle concerning it. For that Plato not only knew these +apparent parts of Time, but also those divine parts to which these are +homonymous, is evident from the 10th book of his Laws. For he there +asserts that we call Hours and Months divine, as having the same divine +lives, and divine intellects presiding over them, as the universe. Let +these therefore be the parts of Time, of which some are accommodated +to the inerratic Gods, others to the Gods that revolve about the poles +of the oblique circle, and others to other Gods, or attendants of the +Gods, or to mortal animals, or the more sublime or more abject parts of +the universe. + +Farther still, concerning Night and Day, Plato afterwards says, “that +through these, the period of one most wise circulation [i.e. the +circulation of the inerratic sphere,] was produced;” on which Proclus +observes as follows: “It may be doubted how Plato calls Night and Day +the measure of the circulation of this sphere. For this measure is +every where, originating supernally from the one intelligible cause +of the universe, and the first paradigm; but in the sublunary region +it is the space of day and night. In answer to this, it must be said +that the temporal interval which first subsists in the circulation +of the inerratic sphere, and the solar light are productive of the +_nycthemeron_ or space of day and night. From the last of things +therefore, and which are known to us, the whole measure is defined. For +this _nycthemeron_ is one thing, but another that which subsists in +unapparent time. And the former is the image and ultimate termination +of the latter. For there are many orders of Night and Day, intelligible +and intellectual, supermundane, celestial and sublunary, as we are +taught by the Orphic theology. And some of these indeed, are prior to +fabrication; but others are comprehended in it; and others proceed from +it. Some also are unapparent, but others are apparent. For with respect +likewise to Month and Year, one order of these is unapparent, measures, +connectedly contains, and gives perfection to the intellectual and +corporeal periods of the sun and moon; but another is apparent, which +terminates and is the measure of the solar revolution. Thus too in +the other Gods, the unapparent Saturnian number is one thing, and the +apparent another. And in a similar manner the unapparent and apparent +Martial, Jovian and Mercurial numbers differ from each other. For with +respect to Month and Year, each of these being one according to each +period, and always the same, is a certain God, immoveably bounding the +measure of motion. For whence have the periods always an invariable +sameness, except from a certain immoveable cause? And whence do they +derive the difference of their restitutions to their pristine state, +except from different immoveable causes? Whence also the unceasing, and +the again and again to infinity, except from the infinite powers they +contain? But Plato considering all this series as temporal, arranges +it under one and that the first Time, which defines the periodic time +of a perpetually circulating body, and is, as we have before observed, +true number. From these invisible causes however, we must conceive the +visible periodic times are derived, proceeding from them according to +that which is numbered, since they are able both to number and generate +them. And in all these astronomy beautifully instructs us, doxastically +apprehending the number of the periodic restitutions of each; and +making comparisons of the ratios of the periods to each other; such +as that the Saturnian period, is the double and a half of the period +of Jupiter, and in a similar manner of the rest. For though their +restitutions differ, yet they have a ratio to each other. Sacred rumour +also venerates the unapparent causes of these, proclaiming the divine +names of Night and Day, and also the causes that constitute, and the +invocations, and self-manifestations of Month and Year. Hence, they are +not to be surveyed superficially, but as having a subsistence in divine +hyparxes. And these the laws of sacred institutions, and the oracles of +Apollo ordered to be worshiped and honoured by statues and sacrifices, +as histories inform us. When these also are reverenced, mankind are +supplied with the benefits arising from the periods of the Seasons, +and of the other divinities in a similar manner; but a preternatural +disposition of every thing about the earth, is the consequence of the +worship of these being neglected.”[179] Plato likewise in the Laws +proclaims that all these are Gods, viz. the Seasons, Years and Months, +in the same manner as the stars and the sun; and we do not introduce +any thing new by thinking it proper to direct our attention to the +unapparent powers of these prior to those that are apparent.” And +thus much concerning Time, Day and Night, Month and Year, considered +according to their first subsistence, by which they are Gods. + + + + + CHAPTER XXXIX. + + +After the Gods, it is necessary in the next place to consider the order +of divine souls, who are deified by always participating of the Gods. +This order, Plato in the Parmenides denies of _the one_ as follows: +“Does it appear that _the one_ can be either older or younger, or be +of the same age? What should hinder? If it had in any respect the same +age, either with itself, or with another, it would participate equally +of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless asserted _the one_ +does not participate. We have asserted so. And this also we have said, +that it neither participates of dissimilitude nor inequality. Entirely +so. How therefore being such, can it either be older or younger than +any thing, or possess the same age with any thing? It can in no +respect. _The one_ therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor +will it be of the same age, either with itself or with another. It +does not appear that it will. Will it not therefore, be impossible +that _the one_ should be at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not +necessary that, if any thing is in time, it should always become older +than itself? It is necessary. But is not that which is older, always +older than the younger? What then? Hence that which is becoming to be +older than itself, is at the same time becoming to be younger than +itself, if it is about to have that through which it may become older. +How do you say? Thus: It is requisite that nothing should subsist +in _becoming_ to be different from another, when it _is_ already +different, but that it should _be_ now different from that which _is_ +different, _have been_ from that which _was_, and _will be_ from that +which _is to be hereafter_. But from that which is _becoming to be_ +different, it ought neither to _have been_, nor to _be hereafter_, +nor _to be_, but to subsist in _becoming to be_ different, and no +otherwise. It is necessary. But the older differs from the younger, +and no other. Certainly. Hence, that which is _becoming to be_ older +than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in _becoming +to be_ younger than itself. It seems so. But likewise it ought not to +subsist in _becoming to be_ in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a +shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in _becoming +to be_, should _be_, _have been_, and _be hereafter_. For these are +necessary. It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things +as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each +one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming +to be both older and younger than itself. It seems so. But no one of +these passions belongs to _the one_. None. Neither, therefore, is time +present with it, nor does it subsist in any time. It does not indeed +according to the decisions of reason.” + +Plato having proceeded, says Proclus, as far as to the mundane Gods, +always taking away things in a consequent order from _the one_, through +the middle genera, or, to speak more clearly, the negations always +producing things secondary, through such as are proximate to _the one_, +from the exempt cause of wholes, he is now about to separate from +_the one_ the divine essence itself, which first participates of the +Gods, and receives their progression into the world; or, to speak more +accurately, he is now about to produce this essence from the ineffable +fountain of all beings. For, as every thing which has being derives its +subsistence from the monad of beings, both _true being_, and that which +is assimilated to it, which of itself indeed is not, but through its +communion with true being receives an obscure representation of being; +in like manner from the one unity of every deity, the peculiarity of +which, if it be lawful so to speak, is to deify all things according +to a certain exempt and ineffable transcendency, every divine number +subsists, or rather proceeds, and every deified order of things. The +design, therefore, as we have before observed, of what is now said, +is to show that _the one_ is exempt from, and therefore produces this +essence. + +And here we may see how Parmenides subverts their hypothesis who +contend that the first cause is soul, or any thing else of this kind, +and this by showing that _the one_ does not participate of time. For +it is impossible that a nature which is exempt from time should be +soul; since every soul participates of time, and uses periods which +are measured by time. _The one_ also is better than, and is beyond +intellect, because every intellect is both moved and permanent; +but it is demonstrated that _the one_ neither stands still, nor is +moved. Hence through these things, the three hypostases which rank +as principles, viz. _the one_, _intellect_, and _soul_, become known +to us. But that _the one_ is perfectly exempt from time, Parmenides +demonstrates by showing in the first place, that it is neither older +nor younger, nor of the same age with itself, nor with any other. For +every thing which participates of time necessarily participates of +these; so that by showing that _the one_ is exempt from these which +happen to every thing that participates of time, he also shows that +_the one_ has no connexion with time. This, however, is incredible to +the many, and appeared so to the physiologists prior to Plato, who +thought that all things were comprehended in time, and that, if there +is any thing perpetual, it is infinite time, but that there is not any +thing which time does not measure. For, as they were of opinion that +all things are in place, in consequence of thinking that all things +are bodies, and that nothing is incorporeal, so they thought that +all things subsist in time, and are in motion, and that nothing is +immoveable; for the conception of bodies introduces with itself place, +but motion time. As, therefore, it was demonstrated that _the one_ is +not in place, because it is not in another, and on this account is +incorporeal,--in like manner through these arguments it is also shown +that neither is it in time, and on this account that it is not soul, +nor any thing else which requires and participates of time, either +according to essence or according to energy. + +And here it is well worthy our observation that Parmenides no longer +stops at the dyad as in the former conclusions, but triadically +enumerates the peculiarities of this order, viz. _the older_, _the +younger_, and _the possession of the same age_, though he might have +said dyadically, _of an equal age_, and _of an unequal age_, as there +_the equal_ and _the unequal_. But there indeed having previously +introduced the dyad, he passes from the division of the unequal to the +triadic distribution; but here he begins from the triad. For there +union precedes multitude, and the whole the parts; but in this order of +things multitude is most apparent, and a division into parts, as Timæus +says, whom Parmenides, in what is now said imitating, begins indeed +from the triad, but proceeds as far as to the hexad. For, _the older_ +and _the younger_, and _the possession of the same age_, are doubled, +being divided into _itself_ and _relation to another_. That the triad, +indeed, and the hexad are adapted to this order is not immanifest. +For the triple nature of soul, consisting of _essence_, _same_ and +_different_, and its triple power, which receives its completion from +the charioteer and the two horses, as we learn from the Phædrus,[180] +evince its alliance with the triad; and its essence being combined from +both these shows its natural alliance with the hexad. + +It is likewise necessary to observe, that as the discourse is about +divine souls who are deified by always participating of the Gods, Time +according to its first subsistence pertains to these souls,--not that +which proceeds into the apparent, but that which is liberated, and +without habitude; and this is the Time which is now denied of _the +one_. All the periods of souls, their harmonious motions about the +intelligible, and their circulations, are measured by this Time. For +it has a supernal origin, imitates eternity, and connects, evolves, +and perfects every motion, whether vital, or pertaining to soul, or +in whatever other manner it may be said to subsist. This Time also is +indeed essentially an intellect, as we have before observed; but it is +the cause to divine souls, of their harmonic and infinite motion about +the intelligible, through which these likewise are led to _the older_ +and to _the same age_: and this in a twofold respect. For _the older_ +in these _with respect to themselves_ takes place, so far as with their +more excellent powers they enjoy in a greater degree the infinity of +Time, and participate it more abundantly. For they are not filled with +similar perfection from more divine natures, according to all their +powers, but with some more, and with others less. But that is said to +be older which participates more of time. That which is older in these +divine souls _with respect to other things_ is effected, so far as +some of these receive the whole measure of Time, and the whole of its +extension proceeding to souls, but others are measured by more partial +periods. Those therefore are older, whose period is more total, and is +extended to a longer time. They may also be said to be _older and at +the same time younger with respect to themselves_, by becoming _hoary_ +as it were above, through extending themselves to the whole power of +Time, but juvenile _beneath_, by enjoying Time more partially. But, _as +with respect to others_, they may be said to be _older and at the same +time younger_ according to a diminution of energy. For that which has +its circulation measured by a less period is younger than that whose +circulation is measured by a more extended period. + +Again, among things co-ordinate, that which has the same participation +and the same measure of perfection with others may be said to be of +_the same age with itself and others_. But every divine soul, though +its own period is measured according to one Time, and that of the body +which is suspended from it according to another, yet it has an equal +restitution to the same condition; itself always according to its own +Time, and its body also according to its time. Hence, again, it is of +the same age with itself and its body, according to the analogous. By +thus interpreting what is now said of _the one_, we shall accord with +Plato in the Timæus, who there evinces that Time is the measure of +every transitive life, and who says that soul is the origin of a divine +and wise life through the whole of time. And we shall also accord with +his assertion in the Phædrus, that souls see true being through Time, +because they perceive temporally and not eternally. + +Farther still, Plato here demonstrates that _the one_ is neither older +nor younger than itself, or another. For it was necessary to show +that _the one_ is beyond every divine soul, prior to other souls, in +the same manner as it is demonstrated to be prior to true beings, and +to be the cause of all things. Hence, since it is the cause of every +divine soul, so far as these derive their subsistence as well as all +beings from the divine unities, with great propriety is it necessary +to show that _the one_ is beyond the order of deified souls. For these +souls so far as they are intellectual have intellect for their cause; +so far as they are essences they originate from being; and so far as +they have the form of unity, they are derived from _the one_; receiving +their subsistence from this, so far as each is a multitude consisting +of certain unities, and of these as elements. + +Again, that which participates of time is twofold, the one proceeding, +as it were, in a right line, and beginning from one thing, and ending +in another; but the other proceeding circularly, and having its motion +from the same to the same, to which both the beginning and the end +are the same, and the motion is unceasing, every thing in it being +both beginning and end. That, therefore, which energizes circularly, +participates of time periodically: and so far as it departs from the +beginning it becomes older, but so far as it approaches to the end it +becomes younger. For becoming nearer the end, it becomes nearer to +its proper beginning. But that which becomes nearer to its beginning +becomes younger. Hence, that which circularly approaches to the end +becomes younger, the same also according to the same becoming older; +for that which approximates to its end proceeds to that which is +older. That to which the beginning therefore is one thing, and the end +another, to this the younger is different from the older; but that to +which the beginning and the end are the same, is in no respect older +than younger, but as Plato says, at the same time becomes younger and +older than itself. Every thing, therefore, which participates of time, +if it becomes both older and younger than itself, is circularly moved. +But divine souls are of this kind: for they participate of time, and +the time of their proper motion is periodical. + + + + + CHAPTER XL. + + +Having in the preceding chapters presented the reader from the most +genuine sources, with all the information that can at present be +obtained concerning the mundane Gods, the order of scientific theology +requires that those perpetual attendants of the Gods, denominated +angels, dæmons and heroes, should be in the next place considered. +As all these ministrant powers however, are frequently called by one +name dæmons; and as Love is denominated by Plato a great dæmon, and +contains in himself the paradigm of the whole dæmoniacal series, it is +necessary that the developement of the nature of Love should precede +the discussion of the peculiarities of dæmons. The following admirable +account therefore of this mighty divinity, by Proclus the Coryphæus +of all true philosophers, is extracted from his MS. Commentary on the +First Alcibiades of Plato. + +There are different properties of different Gods. For some are the +fabricators of wholes, of the form of beings, and of their essential +ornament. But others are the suppliers of life, and are the sources of +its various genera. Others again preserve the unchangeable order, and +guard the indissoluble connexion of things. And others lastly, who are +allotted a different power, preserve all things by their beneficent +energies. In like manner every amatory order is the cause to all +things of conversion to divine beauty, leading back, conjoining, and +establishing all secondary natures in the beautiful, replenishing them +from thence, and irradiating all things with the gifts of its light. +On this account it is asserted in the Banquet of Plato that Love is a +great dæmon, because Love first demonstrates in itself a power of this +kind, and is the medium between the object of desire and the desiring +nature, and is the cause of the conversion of subsequent to prior +natures. The whole amatory series therefore, being established in the +vestibule of the cause of beauty, calls upwards all things to this +cause, and forms a middle progression between the object of Love and +the natures which are recalled by Love. Hence it pre-establishes in +itself the paradigm of the whole dæmoniacal order, obtaining the same +middle situation among the Gods as dæmons between divine and mortal +natures. Since therefore, every amatory series possesses this property +among the Gods, we must consider its uniform and occult summit as +ineffably established in the first orders of the Gods, and conjoined +with the first and intelligible beauty; its middle process as shining +forth among the supermundane Gods, with an intellectual condition; its +third progression as possessing an exempt power among the liberated +Gods; and its fourth as multifariously distributed about the world, +producing many orders and powers from itself, and distributing gifts of +this kind to the different parts of the world. + +But after the unific and first principle of Love, and after the +tripartite essence perfected from thence, a various multitude of Loves +shines forth with divine light, from whence the choirs of angels are +filled with Love; and the herds of dæmons full of this God attend on +the Gods who are recalled to intelligible beauty. Add too, that the +army of heroes, together with dæmons and angels, are agitated about +the participation of the beautiful with divine bacchanalian fury. +Lastly, all things are excited, revive and flourish through the influx +of the beautiful. But the souls of such men as receive an inspiration +of this kind, and are naturally allied to the God, assiduously move +about beauty, and fall into the realms of generation, for the purpose +of benefiting more imperfect souls, and providing for those natures +which require to be saved. The Gods indeed, and the attendants on the +Gods, abiding in their proper habits, benefit all following natures, +and convert them to themselves; but the souls of men descending, and +touching on the coasts of generation, imitate the beneficent providence +of the Gods. As, therefore, souls established according to some other +God descend with purity into the regions of mortality, and benefit +souls that revolve in it; and some indeed benefit more imperfect +souls by prophecy, others by mystic ceremonies, and others by divine +medicinal skill;--thus also souls that chose an amatory life, are moved +about the deity who presides over beautiful natures, for the purpose +of taking care of well-born souls. But from apparent beauty they are +led back to divine beauty, and together with themselves elevate those +who are the objects of their love. And this also divine Love primarily +effects in intelligibles. For he unites himself to the object of +love, extends to it the participants of his power, and inserts in all +things one bond, and one indissoluble friendship with each other, and +with the beautiful itself. Souls therefore possessed with Love, and +participating the inspiration thence derived, in consequence of using +an undefiled vehicle, are led from apparent to intelligible beauty, and +make this the end of their energy. Likewise enkindling a light in more +imperfect souls, they also lead these back to a divine nature, and are +divinely agitated together with them about the fountain of all-perfect +beauty. + +But such souls as from a perverse education fall from the gift which +is thence derived, yet are allotted an amatory nature, these, through +their ignorance of true beauty, are busily employed about that which +is material and divisible, at which also they are astonished in +consequence of not knowing the passion which they suffer. Hence, they +abandon every thing divine, and gradually decline into impiety and the +darkness of matter. They appear indeed to hasten to a union with the +beautiful, in the same manner as perfectly amatory souls; but they are +ignorant of the union, and tend to a dissipated condition of life, and +to matter, which Plato calls the sea of dissimilitude. They are also +conjoined with the base itself, and material privation of form. For +where are material natures able to pervade through each other? Or where +is apparent beauty, pure and genuine, being thus mingled with matter, +and replete with the deformity of its subject? Some souls therefore +genuinely participate the gifts of Love, and by others these gifts are +perverted. For as according to Plotinus the defluxion of intellect +produces craft, and an erroneous participation of wisdom sophistry, +so likewise the illumination of Love when it meets with a depraved +recipient, produces a tyrannic and intemperate life. + + + + + CHAPTER XLI. + + +In another part, likewise, of the same admirable Commentary, Proclus +presents us, as he says, with some of the more arcane assertions +concerning Love; and these are as follow: + +Love is neither to be placed in the first, nor among the last of +beings. Not in the first, because the object of Love is superior to +Love: nor yet among the last, because the lover participates of Love. +It is requisite, therefore, that love should be established between the +object of Love and the lover, and that it should be posterior to the +beautiful, but prior to every nature endued with love. Where then does +it first subsist? How does it extend itself through the universe, and +with what monads does it leap forth? + +There are three hypostases, therefore, among the intelligible and +occult Gods. And the first, indeed, is characterized by _the good_, +understanding _the good itself_, and residing in that place where +according to the oracle the paternal monad abides. But the second is +characterized by wisdom, where the first intelligence flourishes. +And the third by the beautiful, where, as Timæus says, the most +beautiful of intelligibles abides. There are, however, three monads +according to these intelligible causes, subsisting uniformly and +causally in intelligibles, but first unfolding themselves into light +in the ineffable order of the Gods,[181] I mean Faith, Truth, and +Love. And Faith indeed establishes all things in good; but Truth +unfolds all the knowledge in beings; and lastly, Love converts all +things, and congregates them into the nature of the beautiful. This +triad, indeed, thence proceeds through all the orders of the Gods, +and imparts to all things, by its light, a union with intelligible +itself. It also unfolds itself differently in different orders, every +where combining its powers with the peculiarities of the Gods. And +among some it subsists ineffably, incomprehensibly, and unifically; +but among others, as the cause of connecting and binding; and among +others, as endued with a perfective and forming power. Here again, it +subsists intellectually and paternally; but there in a manner entirely +motive, vivific, and effective. Here, as governing and assimilating; +there in a liberated and undefiled manner; and elsewhere according to +a multiplied and dividing mode. Love, therefore, supernally descends +from intelligibles to mundane natures, calling all things upwards to +divine beauty. Truth also proceeds through all things, illuminating all +things with knowledge. And lastly, Faith proceeds through the universe, +establishing all things unically in good. Hence the Chaldæan oracles +assert that all things are governed by, and abide in, these. And on +this account they order Theurgists to conjoin themselves to divinity +through this triad. Intelligibles themselves, indeed, do not require +the amatory medium, on account of their ineffable union. But where +there is a union and separation of beings, there also Love abides. For +it is the binder and conciliator of natures posterior and prior to +itself; but the converter of subsequent into prior, and the elevating +and perfecting case of imperfect natures. + +The Chaldæan oracles, therefore, speak of Love as binding, and residing +in all things: and hence, if it connects all things, it also copulates +us with the governments of dæmons. But Diotima in the Banquet, calls +Love a great dæmon, because it every where fills up the medium between +desiring and desirable natures. And indeed that which is the object of +Love vindicates to itself the first order; but that which loves is in +the third order from the beloved object. Lastly, Love usurps a middle +situation between each, congregating and collecting together that +which desires and that which is desired, and filling subordinate from +better natures. But among the intelligible and occult Gods, it unites +intelligible intellect to the first and secret beauty by a certain +life better than intelligence. Hence, the theologist of the Greeks +[Orpheus], calls this Love, blind; for he says, + + In his breast feeding, eyless, rapid Love.[182] + +But in natures posterior to intelligibles, it imparts by illumination +an indissoluble bond to all things perfected by itself; for a bond is +a certain union, but accompanied with much separation. On this account +the Chaldæan oracles are accustomed to call the fire of this Love a +copulator. For proceeding from intelligible intellect, it binds all +following natures to each other, and to itself. Hence, it conjoins +all the Gods with intelligible beauty, and dæmons with Gods; but it +conjoins us both with Gods and dæmons. In the Gods indeed it has a +primary subsistence; in dæmons a secondary one; and in partial souls +a subsistence through a certain third procession from principles. +Again, in the Gods it subsists above essence; for every genus of Gods +is superessential. But in dæmons it subsists according to essence; +and in souls according to illumination. And this triple order appears +similar to the triple power of intellect. For one intellect subsists as +imparticipable, being exempt from all partial genera; but another as +participated, of which also the souls of the Gods participate as of a +better nature; and another is from this ingenerated in souls, and which +is indeed their perfection. And these three distinctions of intellect +Tamæus himself indicates. Hence, that Love which subsists in the Gods +must be considered as analogous to imparticipable intellect; for this +is exempt from all the beings which receive and are illuminated by its +nature. But dæmoniacal Love is analogous to participated intellect; +for this is essential and is perfected from itself, in the same manner +as participated intellect is proximately resident in souls. And the +third Love is analogous to intellect which subsists as a habit, and +which inserts an illumination in souls. Nor is it unjustly that we +consider Love as co-ordinate with this intellectual difference; for in +intelligible intellect it possesses its first and occult subsistence. +And if it thence leaps forth, it is also established there according to +cause. It likewise appears to me that Plato finding that intelligible +intellect was called by Orpheus both Love and a great dæmon, was +himself pleased to celebrate Love in a similar manner. Very properly, +therefore, does Diotima call it a great demon. And Socrates conjoins +the discourse about Love with that concerning dæmons. For as every +thing dæmoniacal is suspended from the amatory medium, so likewise +the discourse concerning a dæmoniacal nature is conjoined with that +concerning Love, and is allied to it. For Love is a medium between the +object of Love and the lover; and a dæmon is a medium between man and +divinity. + + + + + CHAPTER XLII. + + +The nature of dæmons, therefore, remains in the next place to be +more fully disclosed; for the reader has been already presented with +some very important information concerning them, in the discussion +of the sublunary Gods. As there is no vacuum then in corporeal, so +neither in incorporeal natures. Hence, between divine essences which +are the first of things, and partial essences such as ours, which +are nothing more than the dregs of the rational nature, there must +necessarily be a middle rank of beings, in order that divinity may +be connected with man, and that the progression of things may form +an entire whole, suspended like the golden chain of Homer from the +summit of Olympus. This middle rank of beings, considered according +to a two-fold division, consists of dæmons and heroes, the latter of +which is proximate to partial souls such as ours, and the former to, +divine natures, just as air and water subsist between fire and earth. +Hence, whatever is ineffable and occult in the Gods, dæmons and heroes +express and unfold. They likewise conciliate all things, and are the +sources of the harmonic consent and sympathy of all things with each +other. They transmit divine gifts to us, and equally carry back ours +to the divinities. But the characteristics of divine natures are +unity, permanency in themselves, a subsistence as an immoveable cause +of motion, transcendent providence, and which possesses nothing in +common with the subjects of their providential energies. And these +characteristics are preserved in them according to essence, power +and energy. On the other hand, the characteristics of partial souls +are, a declination to multitude and motion, a conjunction with the +Gods, an aptitude to receive something from other natures, and to +mingle together all things in itself, and through itself. And these +characteristics they also possess according to essence, power and +energy. Such then being the peculiarities of the two extremes, we +shall find that those of dæmons are to contain in themselves the gifts +of divine natures, in a more inferior manner indeed than the Gods, +but yet so as to comprehend the conditions of subordinate natures, +under the idea of a divine essence. In other words, the prerogatives +of deity characterize and absorb as it were by their powerful light, +whatever dæmons possess peculiar to inferior beings. Hence, they are +multiplied indeed but unitedly; mingled, but yet so that the unmingled +predominates; and are moved, but with stability. On the contrary, +heroes possess unity, identity, permanency, and every excellence, under +the condition of multitude, motion, and mixture; viz. the prerogatives +of subordinate predominate in these over the characteristics of +superior natures, yet so as never to induce a cessation of energy +about, or oblivion of, divinity. In short, dæmons and heroes are +composed of the properties of the two extremes--Gods and partial souls; +but in dæmons there is more of the divine, and in heroes more of the +human nature. + +Having premised thus much, I shall next present the reader with all +the information I have been able to collect from the most genuine +Platonists, and especially from Proclus, on the nature of this middle +order of beings. In the first place, therefore, what follows on this +subject is derived from the MS. Commentary of Proclus On the First +Alcibiades, in which extract also the nature of the dæmon of Socrates +is unfolded, about which modern wit has been so much puzzled, and so +egregiously mistaken. + +Let us now speak first, concerning dæmons in general; secondly, +concerning those that are allotted us in common; and thirdly, +concerning the dæmon of Socrates. For it is always requisite that +demonstrations should begin from things more universal, and proceed +from these as far as to individuals. For this mode of proceeding is +natural, and is more adapted to science. Dæmons, therefore, deriving +their first subsistence from the vivific Goddess [Juno], and flowing +from thence as from a certain fountain, are allotted an essence +characterized by soul. This essence in those of a superior order is +more intellectual, and more perfect according to hyparxis; in those +of a middle order it is more rational; and in those which rank in the +third degree, and which subsist at the extremity of the dæmoniacal +order, it is various, more irrational, and more material. Possessing, +therefore, an essence of this kind, they are distributed in conjunction +with the Gods, as being allotted a power ministrant to deity. Hence, +they are in one way subservient to the liberated Gods, who are the +leaders of wholes prior to the world; and in another to the mundane +Gods, who proximately preside over the parts of the universe. For there +is one division of dæmons according to the twelve supercelestial Gods, +and another according to all the peculiarities of the mundane Gods. +For every mundane God is the leader of a certain dæmoniacal order, +to which he proximately imparts his power; viz. if he is a demiurgic +God, he imparts a demiurgic power; if immutable, an undefiled power; +if telesiurgic, a perfective power. And about each of the divinities, +there is an innumerable multitude of dæmons, and which are dignified +with the same appellations as their leading Gods. Hence, they rejoice +when they are called by the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hermes, &c. +as expressing the peculiarity of their proper deities. And from these, +mortal natures also participate of divine influxions. And thus animals +and plants are fabricated, bearing the images of different Gods; dæmons +proximately imparting to these the representations of their leaders. +But the Gods in an exempt manner supernally preside over dæmons; and +through this last natures sympathize with such as are first. For the +representations of first are seen in last natures; and the causes of +things that are last are comprehended in primary beings. The middle +genera, too, of dæmons give completion to wholes, the communion of +which they bind and connect; participating indeed of the Gods, but +participated by mortal natures. He, therefore, will not err who asserts +that the mundane artificer established the centres of the order of +the universe in dæmons; since Diotima also assigns them this order, +viz. that of binding together divine and mortal natures, of deducing +supernal streams, elevating all secondary natures to the Gods, and +giving completion to wholes through the connexion of a medium. + +Hence, we must not assent to their doctrine, who say that dæmons are +the souls of men that have changed the present life. For it is not +proper to consider a dæmoniacal nature _according to habitude_, as +the same with a nature essentially dæmoniacal; nor to assert that the +perpetual medium of all mundane natures consists from a life conversant +with multiform mutations. For a dæmoniacal guard subsists always the +same, connecting the mundane wholes. But soul does not always thus +retain its own order, as Socrates says in the Republic; since at +different times it chooses different lives. Nor do we praise those who +make certain of the Gods to be dæmons, such as the erratic Gods, [i.e. +the planets] according to Amelius. But we are persuaded by Plato, who +calls the Gods the rulers of the universe, but subjects to them the +herds of dæmons. And we shall every where preserve the doctrine of +Diotima, who assigns the middle order, between all divine and mortal +natures, to a dæmoniacal essence. Let this then be the conception +respecting the whole of the dæmoniacal order in common. + + + + + CHAPTER XLIII. + + +In the next place, let us speak concerning the dæmons, who are allotted +the superintendence of mankind. For of these dæmons, which, as we +have said, rank in the middle order, the first and highest are divine +dæmons, and who often appear as Gods, through their transcendent +similitude to the divinities. For, in short, that which is first +in every order preserves the form of the nature prior to itself. +Thus, the first intellect is a God, and the most ancient of souls is +intellectual. Hence, the highest genus of dæmons, as being proximate to +the Gods, is uniform and divine. The next to these in order are those +dæmons who participate of an intellectual peculiarity, and preside +over the ascent and descent of souls, and who unfold into light and +deliver to all things the productions of the Gods. The third are those +who distribute the productions of divine souls to secondary natures, +and complete the bond of those that receive effluxions from thence. The +fourth are those that transmit the efficacious powers of whole natures +to things generated and corrupted, and who inspire partial natures +with life, order, reasons, and the all-various perfect operations +which things mortal are able to effect. The fifth are corporeal, and +bind together the extremes in bodies. For, how can perpetual accord +with corruptible bodies, and efficients with effects, except through +this medium? For it is this ultimate nature which has dominion over +corporeal goods, and provides for all natural prerogatives. The sixth +in order are those that revolve about matter, connect the powers +which descend from celestial to sublunary matter, perpetually guard +this matter, and defend the shadowy representation of forms which it +contains. + +Dæmons, therefore, as Diotima also says, being many and all-various, +the highest of them conjoin souls proceeding from their father to +their leading Gods. For every God, as we have said, is the leader in +the first place of dæmons, and in the next of partial souls. For the +demiurgus disseminated these, as Timæus says, into the sun and moon, +and the other instruments of time. These divine dæmons, therefore, +are those which are essentially allotted to souls, and conjoin them +to their proper leaders. And every soul, though it revolves together +with its leading deity, requires a dæmon of this kind. But dæmons of +the second rank preside over the ascensions and descensions of souls; +and from these the souls of the multitude derive their elections. +For the most perfect souls, who are conversant with generation in an +undefiled manner, as they choose a life conformable to their presiding +God, so they live according to a divine dæmon, who conjoined them +to their proper deity when they dwelt on high. Hence, the Egyptian +priest admired Plotinus, as being governed by a divine dæmon. To +souls, therefore, who live as those that will shortly return to the +intelligible world whence they came, the supernal is the same with the +dæmon which attends them here. But to imperfect souls the essential is +different from the dæmon that attends them at their birth. + +If these things then are rightly asserted, we must not assent to those +who make our rational soul a dæmon. For a dæmon is different from +man, as Diotima says, who places dæmons between Gods and men, and as +Socrates also evinces, when he divides a dæmoniacal oppositely to the +human nature. “For,” says he, “not a human but a dæmoniacal obstacle +detains me.” But man is a soul using the body as an instrument. A +dæmon, therefore, is not the same with the rational soul. + +This also is evident from Plato in the Timæus, where he says that +intellect has in us the relation of a dæmon. But this is only true +as far as pertains to analogy. For a dæmon according to essence is +different from a dæmon according to analogy. For in many instances, +that which proximately presides, subsisting in the order of a dæmon +with respect to that which is inferior, is called a dæmon. Thus Jupiter +in Orpheus calls his father Saturn an illustrious dæmon; and Plato in +the Timæus calls those Gods who proximately preside over, and orderly +distribute the realms of generation, dæmons. “For,” says he, “to speak +concerning other dæmons, and to know their generation, exceeds the +ability of human nature.” But a dæmon according to analogy is that +which proximately presides over any thing, though it should be a God, +or though it should be some one of the natures posterior to the Gods. +And the soul that through similitude to the dæmoniacal genus produces +energies more wonderful than those which belong to human nature, and +which suspends the whole of its life from dæmons, is a dæmon κατα +σχεσιν, according to habitude, i.e. proximity or alliance. Thus, as it +appears to me, Socrates in the Republic calls those dæmons, who have +lived well, and who in consequence of this are transferred to a better +condition of being, and to more holy places. But an essential dæmon +is neither called a dæmon through habitude to secondary natures, nor +through an assimilation to something different from itself; but is +allotted this peculiarity from himself, and is defined by a certain +hyparxis, by appropriate powers, and by different modes of energies. +In short, the rational soul is called in the Timæus the dæmon of the +animal; but we investigate the dæmon of man, and not of the animal; +that which governs the rational soul itself, and not its instrument; +and that which leads the soul to its judges, after the dissolution of +the animal, as Socrates says in the Phædo. For when the animal is no +more, the dæmon which the soul was allotted while connected with the +body, conducts it to its judge. For, if the soul possesses that dæmon +while living in the body, which is said to lead it to judgment after +death, this dæmon must be the dæmon of the man, and not of the animal +alone. To which we may add, that beginning from on high, it governs the +whole of our composition. + +Nor again, dismissing the rational soul, must it be said that a dæmon +is that which energizes in the soul: as for instance, that in those +who live according to reason, reason is the dæmon; in those that +live according to anger, the irascible part; and in those that live +according to desire, the epithymetic or desiring part. Nor must it +be said that the nature which proximately presides over that which +energizes in our life, is a dæmon: as for instance, that reason is +the dæmon of the irascible, and anger of those that live according to +desire. For, in the first place, to assert that dæmons are parts of +our soul, is to admire human life in an improper degree, and oppose +the division of Socrates in the Republic, who after Gods and dæmons +places the heroic and human race, and blames the poets for introducing +in their poems heroes in no respect better than men, but subject to +similar passions. By this accusation, therefore, it is plain that +Socrates was very far from thinking that dæmons, who are of a sublimer +order than heroes, are to be ranked among the parts and powers of the +soul. For from this doctrine it will follow that things essentially +more excellent give completion to such as are subordinate. And in the +second place, from this hypothesis, mutations of lives would also +introduce multiform mutations of dæmons. For the avaricious character +is frequently changed into an ambitious life, this again into a life +which is formed by right opinion, and this last into a scientific life. +The dæmon, therefore, will vary according to these changes; for the +energizing part will be different at different times. If, therefore, +either this energizing part itself is a dæmon, or that part which has +an arrangement prior to it, dæmons will be changed together with the +mutation of human life, and the same person will have many dæmons in +one life; which is of all things the most impossible. For the soul +never changes in one life the government of its dæmon; but it is the +same dæmon which presides over us till we are brought before the judges +of our conduct, as also Socrates asserts in the Phædo. + +Again, those who consider a partial intellect, or that intellect which +subsists at the extremity of the intellectual order, as the same with +the dæmon which is assigned to man, appear to me to confound the +intellectual peculiarity with the dæmoniacal essence. For all dæmons +subsist in the extent of souls, and rank as the next in order to divine +souls. But the intellectual order is different from that of soul, and +is neither allotted the same essence, nor power, nor energy. + +Further still, this also may be said, that souls enjoy intellect then +only when they convert themselves to it, receive its light, and conjoin +their own with intellectual energy; but they experience the presiding +care of a dæmoniacal nature through the whole of life, and in every +thing which proceeds from fate and providence. For it is the dæmon that +governs the whole of our life, and that fulfils the elections which we +made prior to generation, together with the gifts of fate, and of those +Gods that preside over fate. It is likewise the dæmon that supplies and +measures the illuminations from providence. And as souls indeed, we +are suspended from intellect, but as souls using the body we require +the aid of a dæmon. Hence, Plato in the Phædrus calls intellect the +governor of the soul; but he every where calls a dæmon the inspector +and guardian of mankind. And no one who considers the affair rightly, +will find any other one and proximate providence of every thing +pertaining to us, besides that of a dæmon. For intellect, as we have +said, is participated by the rational soul, but not by the body; and +nature is participated by the body, but not by the dianoëtic part. +And further still, the rational soul rules over anger and desire, but +it has no dominion over fortuitous events. But the dæmon alone moves, +governs, and orderly disposes all our affairs. For he gives perfection +to reason, measures the passions, inspires nature, connects the body, +supplies things fortuitous, accomplishes the decrees of fate, and +imparts the gifts of providence. In short, he is the king of every +thing in and about us, and is the pilot of the whole of our life. And +thus much concerning our allotted dæmons. + + + + + CHAPTER XLIV. + + +In the next place, with respect to the dæmon of Socrates, these three +things are to be particularly considered. First, that he not only ranks +as a dæmon, but also as a God. For in the First Alcibiades Socrates +clearly says, “I have long been of opinion that the God did not as +yet direct me to hold any conversation with you.” He calls the same +power therefore a dæmon and a God. And in the Apology he more clearly +evinces that this dæmon is allotted a divine transcendency, considered +as ranking in a dæmoniacal order. And this is what we before said, that +the dæmons of divine souls, and who make choice of an intellectual and +elevating life, are divine, transcending the whole of a dæmoniacal +genus, and being the first participants of the Gods. For, as is a dæmon +among Gods, such also is a God among dæmons. Among the divinities +however the hyparxis is divine; but in dæmons on the contrary, the +peculiarity of their essence is dæmoniacal, but the analogy which they +bear to divinity evinces their essence to be godlike. For on account +of their transcendency with respect to other dæmons they frequently +appear as Gods. With great propriety therefore, does Socrates call his +dæmon a God; for he belonged to the first and highest dæmons. Hence +Socrates was most perfect, being governed by such a presiding power, +and conducting himself by the will of such a leader and guardian of his +life. This then was one of the illustrious prerogatives of the dæmon of +Socrates. The second was this: that Socrates perceived a certain voice +proceeding from his dæmon. For this is asserted by him in the Theætetus +and in the Phædrus. This voice also is the signal from the dæmon, +which he speaks of in the Theages. And again in the Phædrus, when he +was about to pass over the river, he experienced the accustomed signal +from the dæmon. What then, does Socrates indicate by these assertions, +and what was the voice through which he says the dæmon signified to him +his will? + +In the first place, we must say that Socrates, through his dianoëtic +power, and his science of things, enjoyed the inspiration of his dæmon, +who continually recalled him to divine love. In the second place, in +the affairs of life, Socrates supernally directed his providential +attention to more imperfect souls. And according to the energy of +his dæmon, he received the light proceeding from thence, neither in +his dianoëtic part alone, nor in his doxastic powers, but also in +his spirit, the illumination of the dæmon suddenly diffusing itself +through the whole of his life, and now moving sense itself. For it is +evident that reason, imagination, and sense, enjoy the same energy +differently; and that each of our inward parts is passive to, and is +moved by the dæmon in a peculiar manner. The voice therefore, did +not act upon Socrates externally with passivity; but the dæmoniacal +inspiration, proceeding inwardly through his whole soul, and diffusing +itself as far as to the organs of sense, became at last a voice, which +was rather recognized by consciousness than by sense. For such are the +illuminations of good dæmons and the Gods. + +In the third place, let us consider the peculiarity of the dæmon of +Socrates; for it never exhorted, bet perpetually recalled him. This +also must be again referred to the Socratic life. For it is not a +property common to our allotted dæmons, but was the characteristic of +the guardian of Socrates. We must say therefore, that the beneficent +and philanthropic disposition of Socrates, and his great promptitude +with respect to the communication of good, did not require the +exhortation of the dæmon. For he was impelled from himself, and was +ready at all times to impart to all men the most excellent life. But +since many of those that came to him were unadapted to the pursuit +of virtue and the science of wholes, his governing good dæmon +restrained him from a providential care of such as these. Just as a +good charioteer alone restrains the impetus of a horse naturally +well adapted for the race, but does not stimulate him, in consequence +of his being excited to motion from himself, and not requiring the +spur, but the bridle. And hence Socrates, from his great readiness +to benefit those with whom he conversed, rather required a recalling +than an exciting dæmon. For the inaptitude of auditors, which is for +the most part concealed from human sagacity, requires a dæmoniacal +discrimination; and the knowledge of favourable opportunities can by +this alone be accurately announced to us. Socrates therefore being +naturally impelled to good, alone required to be recalled in his +unseasonable impulses. + +But farther still, it may be said, that of dæmons, some are allotted +a purifying and undefiled power; others a perfective; and others a +demiurgic power. And in short, they are divided according to the +characteristic peculiarities of the Gods, and the powers under which +they are arranged. Each likewise, according to his hyparxis, incites +the object of his providential care to a blessed life; some of them +moving us to an attention to inferior concerns; and others restraining +us from action, and an energy verging to externals. It appears +therefore, that the dæmon of Socrates being allotted this peculiarity, +viz. cathartic, and the source of an undefiled life, and being arranged +under this power of Apollo, and uniformly presiding over the whole of +purification, separated also Socrates from too much commerce with the +vulgar, and a life extending itself into multitude. But it led him into +the depths of his soul, and an energy undefiled by subordinate natures. +And hence it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. For, what +else is to recall, than to withdraw him from the multitude to inward +energy? And of what is this the peculiarity except of purification? +Indeed, it appears to me, that as Orpheus places the Apolloniacal monad +over king Bacchus, which recalls him from a progression into Titannic +multitude, and a desertion of his royal throne, in like manner the +dæmon of Socrates conducted him to an intellectual place of survey, +and restrained his association with the multitude. For the dæmon is +analogous to Apollo, being his attendant, but the intellect of Socrates +to Bacchus; for our intellect is the progeny of the power of this +divinity. + + + + + CHAPTER XLV. + + +From the MS. Scholia also of Proclus on the Cratylus, we derive the +following important information concerning this order of beings who +connect the divine and human nature together. Of the genera posterior +to the Gods, and which are indeed their perpetual attendants, but +produce in conjunction with them mundane fabrications from on high, as +far as to the last of things,--of these genera, some unfold generation +into light; others are transporters of union; others of power; and +others call forth the knowledge of the Gods, and an intellectual +essence. But of these, some are called angelic, by those that are +skilful in divine concerns, in consequence of being established +according to the hyparxis itself of the Gods, and making that which +is uniform in their nature commensurate with things of a secondary +rank. Hence, the angelic tribe is _boniform_, as unfolding into light +the occult _goodness_ of the Gods. Others among these are called by +theologists dæmoniacal, as binding the middle of all things, and as +distributing divine power, and producing it as far as to the last of +things. For δαισαι is το μερισαι. But this genus possesses abundance +of power, and is multifarious, as giving subsistence to those last +dæmons who are material, who draw down souls, and proceed to the most +partial and material form of energy. Others again, are denominated +by them heroic, who lead human souls on high through love, and who +are the suppliers of an intellectual life, of magnitude of operation, +and transcendency of wisdom. In short, they are allotted a convertive +order and providence, and an alliance to a divine intellect, to which +they also convert secondary natures. Hence, they are allotted this +appellation, as being able to _raise_ and _extend_ souls to the Gods. +(ως αιρειν και ανατεινειν τας ψυχας επι θεους δυναμενα) + +These triple genera posterior to, are indeed, always suspended from +the Gods, but they are divided from each other. And some of them are +essentially intellectual; others are essentialized in rational souls; +and others subsist in irrational and phantastic lives, i.e. in lives +characterized by imagination. It is also evident that such of them as +are intellectual, are allotted a prudence or wisdom transcending that +of human nature, and which is eternally conjoined with the objects +of their intellection. But such of them as are rational, energize +discursively according to prudence. And the irrational kind are +destitute of prudence. For they dwell in matter, and the darkest parts +of the universe. They also bind souls to image-producing bosoms, (και +συνδει τας ψυχας τοις ειδωλοποιοις κολποις) and strangle such as are +brought into that region, until they have suffered the punishment which +is their due. These three genera therefore, which are more excellent +than us, Socrates now calls dæmons. And thus much concerning these +triple genera, according to Proclus. + +Again, with respect to dæmons properly so called, there are three +species of them according to the Platonic theology; the first of +which is rational only, and the last is irrational only; but the +middle species is partly rational and partly irrational. And again, of +these the first is perfectly beneficent, but many among the other two +species are malevolent and noxious to mankind: not indeed essentially +malevolent (for there is nothing in the universe, the ample abode of +all-bountiful Jove, essentially evil), but only so from the office +which they are destined to perform. For nothing which operates +naturally, operates as to itself evilly. But the Platonic Hermeas in +his MS. Commentary on the Phædrus, and on that part of it in which +Plato says, “There are indeed, other evils besides these, but a certain +dæmon immediately mingles pleasure with most of them,” admirably +observes respecting dæmons as follows: “The distribution of good and +evil originates from the dæmoniacal genus. For every genus transcending +that of dæmons, uniformly possesses good. There are therefore, certain +genera of dæmons, some of which adorn and administer certain parts of +the world; but others certain species of animals. Hence, the dæmon who +is the inspective guardian of life, hastens souls into that condition +which he himself is allotted; as for instance, into injustice or +intemperance, and continually mingles pleasure in them as a snare. But +there are other dæmons transcending these, who are the punishers of +souls, converting them to a more perfect and elevated life. And the +first of these it is necessary to avoid; but the second sort we should +render propitious. There are other dæmons however, more excellent than +these, who distribute good in an uniform manner.” + +Farther still, Plato in the Phædo, says, “that the dæmon of each +person, which was allotted to him while living, endeavours to lead +each to a certain place, where it is necessary that all of them being +collected together, after they have been judged, should proceed to +Hades, together with their leader, who is ordered to conduct them from +hence thither. But there receiving the allotments proper to their +condition, and abiding for a necessary time, another leader brings them +back hither again, in many and long periods of time.” Olympiodorus +in his MS. Commentary on that dialogue, observes on this passage as +follows: + +“Since there are in the universe, things which subsist differently at +different times, and since there are also natures which are conjoined +with the superessential unities, it is necessary that there should be +a certain middle genus, which is neither immediately suspended from +deity, nor subsists differently at different times according to better +and worse, but which is always perfect, and does not depart from its +proper virtue; and is immutable indeed but is not conjoined with the +superessential. The whole of this genus is dæmoniacal. There are also +different genera of dæmons; for they are arranged under the mundane +Gods. The highest of these subsists according to _the one_ of the +Gods, which is called an unific and divine genus of dæmons. The next +according to the intellect which is suspended from Deity, and is called +intellectual. The third subsists according to soul, and is called +rational. The fourth according to nature, and is denominated physical. +The fifth according to body, and is called corporeal-formed. And the +sixth according to matter, and this is denominated material. Or after +another manner it may be said, that some of these are celestial, others +ethereal, others aerial, others aquatic, others terrestrial, and others +subterranean. With respect also to this division, it is evident that +it is derived from the parts of the universe. But irrational dæmons +originate from the serial governors, whence also the [Chaldean] Oracle +says, + + ηεριων ελατηρα κυνων χθονιων τε και υγρων. + +i.e. “being the charioteer of the aerial, terrestrial and aquatic +dogs.” Our guardian dæmons, however, belong to that order of dæmons, +which is arranged under the Gods that preside over the ascent and +descent of souls.” + +Olympiodorus further observes, “that the dæmon endeavours to lead +the soul as exciting its conceptions and imaginations, at the same +time, however, yielding to the self-motive power of the soul. But +in consequence of the dæmon exciting, one soul follows voluntarily, +another violently, and another according to a mode subsisting between +these. There is also one dæmon who leads the soul to its judges from +the present life; another who is ministrant to the judges, giving +completion, as it were, to the sentence which is passed; and a third +who is allotted the guardianship of life.” + +In the next place, with respect to irrational dæmons, it remains to +investigate how they subsist. For if they derive their subsistence +from the junior Gods, how, since these are the fathers of mortal +natures, are these dæmons immortal? But if from the demiurgus how are +they irrational? For he is the father of things in conjunction with +intellect. This doubt is beautifully solved by Proclus as follows: +irrational dæmons derive their subsistence from the junior Gods, yet +are not on this account mortal, since of these Gods some generate +others. And perhaps the generated Gods are called by Plato, in the +Timæus, dæmons, because those that are truly dæmons are produced by the +junior Gods. But they likewise proceed from the one demiurgus. For as +Timæus says, he is the cause of all immortal natures. If, however, the +demiurgus imparts intellect to all things, there is also in irrational +dæmons an ultimate vestige of the intellectual peculiarity, so far as +they have a facility of imagination; for this is the last echo as it +were of intellect. And on this account the phantasy is not improperly +called by others passive intellect. + +Lastly, after essential heroes, an order of souls follows, who +proximately govern the affairs of men, and are dæmoniacal according to +habitude or alliance, but not essentially. These souls likewise are +the perpetual attendants of the Gods, but they have not an essence +_wholly_ superior to man. Of this kind, as we are informed by +Proclus in his MS. Scholia on the Cratylus, are the Nymphs that +sympathize with waters, Pans with the feet of goats and the like. They +also differ from those powers that are essentially of a dæmoniacal +characteristic in this, that they assume a variety of shapes (each +of the others immutably preserving one form) are subject to various +passions, and are the causes of every kind of deception to mankind. +Proclus likewise observes, that the Minerva which so often appeared to +Ulysses and Telemachus belonged to this order of souls. + + + + + CHAPTER XLVI. + + +After the triple genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, +those human souls follow that are of an heroic characteristic, are +undefiled, associating with generation, and abandoning their proper +order but for a little time. For the souls that descend and are +defiled with vice, are very remote from those that abide on high with +immaculate purity. The media, therefore, between these, are the souls +that descend indeed, but without defilement; since it is not lawful +for the contrary to take place, viz. to be defiled with vice, and yet +to abide on high. For evil is not in the Gods, but in the regions of +mortality, and material affairs. The first genus of souls, therefore, +is divine. For every where, that which is the recipient of deity has a +ruling and leading order, in essences, in intellects, in souls and in +bodies. But the second genus of souls is always conjoined to the Gods, +in order that through this those that sometimes depart from, may again +be recalled to them. The third genus is that which descends indeed into +generation, but descends with purity, exchanges a more divine life for +one of a subordinate nature, but is exempt from vice, and liberated +from the dominion of the passions. For this genus exists in continuity +with that which always abides on high, and is always undefiled. And +the fourth and last genus is that of the souls of the bulk of mankind, +which wanders abundantly, descends as far as to Tartarus, and is +again excited from thence. It likewise evolves all-various forms of +life, uses a variety of manners, is under the influence of different +passions at different times, and assumes the forms of dæmons, men, and +irrational animals. At the same time, however, it is corrected and +amended by Justice, recurs from earth to heaven, and is led round from +matter to intellect, but according to certain orderly periods of wholes. + +Plotinus beautifully alludes to this undefiled genus of human souls +in the 9th book of his 5th Ennead, On Intellect, Ideas, and Being, +as follows: “Since all men from their birth employ sense prior to +intellect, and are necessarily first conversant with sensibles, some +proceeding no farther pass through life, considering these as the +first and last of things, and apprehending that whatever is painful +among these is evil, and whatever is pleasant is good; thus thinking +it sufficient to pursue the one and avoid the other. Those too, among +them, who pretend to a greater share of reason than others, esteem +this to be wisdom, being affected in a manner similar to more heavy +birds, who, collecting many things from the earth, and being oppressed +with the weight, are unable to fly on high, though they have received +wings for this purpose from nature. But others are in a small degree +elevated from things subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul +recalling them from pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, +however, unable to look on high, and as not possessing any thing else +which can afford them rest, they betake themselves together with the +name of virtue to actions and the election of things inferior, from +which they at first endeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain. +_In the third class is the race of divine men_, who through a more +excellent power, and with piercing eyes, acutely perceive supernal +light, to the vision of which they raise themselves above the clouds +and darkness as it were of this lower world, and there abiding despise +every thing in these regions of sense; being no otherwise delighted +with the place which is truly and properly their own, than he who after +many wanderings is at length restored to his lawful country.” + +These undefiled souls are called by the author of the Golden Verses, +“terrestrial dæmons,” because, as Hierocles observes, they are by +nature men, but by habitude dæmons, and possess a scientific knowledge +of divinity. For since all men are terrestrial, as ranking in the third +degree of rational beings, but all are not skilful (δαημονων) and wise, +the author of the verses very properly calls wise men both terrestrial +and dæmons conjointly. For neither are all men wise, nor are all the +beings that are wise, men. But the illustrious heroes[183] and the +immortal Gods, being naturally more excellent than men, are wise and +good. The verses therefore exhort us to reverence those men who are +co-arranged with the divine genera, and who (according to habitude) are +equal to angels and dæmons, and are similar to the illustrious heroes. + +Plato, in the Cratylus, calls these undefiled souls both dæmons and +heroes, and speaks of them as follows: “Soc. Do you not know who those +dæmons are which Hesiod speaks of? Herm. I do not. Soc. And are you +ignorant that he says the golden race of men was first generated? +Herm. This I know. Soc. He says, therefore, that after this race was +concealed by Fate, it produced dæmons denominated holy, terrestrial, +good, expellers of evil, and guardians of mortal men. Herm. But what +then? Soc. I think, indeed, that he calls it a golden race, not as +naturally consisting of gold, but as being beautiful and good. I infer +this, however, from his denominating our race an iron one. Herm. You +speak the truth. Soc. Do you not therefore think, that if any one +of the present times should appear to be good, Hesiod would say he +belonged to the golden race? Herm. It is probable he would. Soc. But +are the good any other than such as are [intellectually] prudent? Herm. +They are not. Soc. On this account, therefore, as it appears to me, +more than any other he calls them dæmons, because they were _prudent_ +and _learned_ (δαημονες). And in our ancient tongue this very name is +to be found. Hence both he and many other poets, speak in a becoming +manner, when they say that a good man after death will receive a +mighty destiny and renown, and will become a _dæmon_, according to the +surname of prudence. I therefore assert the same, that every good man +is _learned_ and _skilful_; that he is dæmoniacal both while living +and when dead; and that he is properly denominated a dæmon. Herm. And +I also, Socrates, seem to myself to agree with you perfectly in this +particular. But what does the name hero signify? Soc. This is by no +means difficult to understand. For this name is very little different +from its original, evincing that its generation is derived from love. +Herm. How is this? Soc. Do you not know that heroes are demigods? Herm. +What then? Soc. All of them were doubtless generated either from the +love of a God towards a mortal maid, or from the love of a man towards +a Goddess. If, therefore, you consider this matter according to the +ancient Attic tongue, you will more clearly understand the truth of +this derivation. For it will be evident to you that the word hero is +derived from love, with a trifling mutation for the sake of the name.” + +The meaning of Plato in this passage, and also the characteristic +properties of terrestrial heroes are beautifully unfolded by Proclus as +follows, in his very rare and invaluable MS. Scholia on the Cratylus. +“Every where the extremities of a prior, are conjoined with the +summits of a secondary order. Thus for instance, our master Hermes +(ο δεσποτης ημων Ερμης) being an archangelic monad, is celebrated as +a God. But Plato calls the whole extent between Gods and men dæmons. +And they indeed, are dæmons by nature. Those dæmons, however, that are +now mentioned, together with the demigods heroes, are not dæmons and +heroes by nature, for they do not always follow the Gods; but they are +only so from habitude, being souls who naturally deliver themselves +to generation, such as was the great Hercules, and others of the like +kind. But the peculiarity of heroic souls is magnitude of operation, +elevation and magnificence. Such heroes also it is necessary to +honour, and to perform funeral rites to their memory, conformably to +the exhortation of the Athenian guest in the Laws. This heroic genus +of souls, therefore, does not always follow the Gods, but is undefiled, +and more intellectual than other souls. And it descends indeed for +the benefit of the life of men, as partaking of a destiny inclining +downwards; but it has much of an elevated nature, and which is properly +liberated from matter. Hence souls of this kind are easily led back to +the intelligible world, in which they live for many periods; while on +the contrary, the more irrational kind of souls, are either never led +back, or this is accomplished with great difficulty, or continues for a +very inconsiderable period of time.” + +Each of the Gods indeed is perfectly exempt from secondary natures, +and the first and more total of dæmons are likewise established above +a habitude of this kind. They employ, however, terrestrial and partial +spirits in the generations of some of the human race, not physically +mingling with mortals, but moving nature, perfecting its power, +expanding the path of generation, and removing all impediments. Fables, +therefore, through the similitude of appellation conceal the things +themselves. For spirits of this kind are similarly denominated with the +Gods, the leading causes of their series. Hence they say, either that +Gods have connexion with women, or men with Goddesses. But if they were +willing to speak plainly and clearly, they would say that Venus, Mars, +Thetis, and the other divinities, produce their respective series, +beginning from on high, as far as to the last of things; each of which +series comprehends in itself many essences differing from each other; +such as the angelical, dæmoniacal, heroical, nymphical, and the like. +The lowest powers, therefore, of these orders, have much communion with +the human race; for the extremities of first are connascent with the +summits of secondary natures. And they contribute to our other natural +operations, and to the production of our species. On this account it is +frequently seen that from the mixture of these powers with men heroes +are generated, who appear to possess a certain prerogative above human +nature. Not only a dæmoniacal genus, however, of this kind, physically +sympathizes with men, but a different genus sympathizes with other +animals, as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with +stags, or serpents. + +But how is it that at one time the Gods are said to have connexion with +mortal females, and at another time mortal females with the Gods? We +reply, that the communion of Gods with Goddesses gives subsistence to +Gods or dæmons eternally; but heroic souls having a two-fold form of +life, viz. _doxastic_ and _dianoëtic_, the former of which is called by +Plato in the Timæus _the circle of difference_, and the latter, _the +circle of sameness_, and which are characterized by the properties of +_male_ and _female_;--hence these souls at one time exhibit a deiform +power, by energizing according to the masculine prerogative of their +nature, or _the circle of sameness_, and at another time according to +their feminine prerogative, or _the circle of difference_; yet so as +that according to both these energies they act with rectitude, and +without merging themselves in the darkness of body. They likewise know +the natures prior to their own, and exercise a providential care over +inferior concerns, without at the same time having that propensity to +such concerns which is found in the bulk of mankind. But the souls +which act erroneously according to the energies of both these circles, +or which, in other words, neither exhibit accurate specimens of +practical, nor of intellectual virtue--these differ in no respect from +_gregarious_ souls, or the herd of mankind, with whom the circle of +sameness is fettered, and the circle of difference sustains all-various +fractions and distortions. + +As it is impossible therefore, that these heroic souls can act with +equal vigour and perfection, according to both these circles at once, +since this is the province of natures more divine than the human, it is +necessary that they should sometimes descend and energize principally +according to their doxastic part, and sometimes according to their +more intellectual part. Hence, one of these circles must energize +naturally, and the other be hindered from its proper energy. On this +account heroes are called _demigods_, as having only one of their +circles illuminated by the Gods. Such of these therefore, as have the +circle of sameness unfettered, as are excited to an intellectual life, +and are moved about it according to a deific energy,--these are said +to have a God for their father, and a mortal for their mother, through +a defect with respect to the doxastic form of life. But such, on the +contrary, as energize without impediment according to the circle of +difference, who act with becoming rectitude in practical affairs, and +at the same time _enthusiastically_, or in other words, under the +inspiring influence of divinity,--these are said to have a mortal for +their father, and a Goddess for their mother. In short, rectitude +of energy in each of these circles is to be ascribed to a divine +cause.[184] Hence when the circle of sameness has dominion, the divine +cause of illumination is said to be masculine and paternal; but when +the circle of difference predominates, it is said to be maternal. Hence +too, Achilles in Homer acts with rectitude in practical affairs,[185] +and at the same time exhibits specimens of magnificent, vehement, and +divinely-inspired energy, as being the son of a Goddess. And such +is his attachment to practical virtue, that even when in Hades, he +desires a union with body, that he may assist his father. While on +the contrary, Minos and Rhadamanthus, who were heroes illuminated by +Jupiter, raised themselves from generation to true being, and meddled +with mortal concerns no further than absolute necessity required. + +In the last place Proclus adds, that heroes are very properly +denominated from Love, since Love is a great dæmon: and from the +co-operation of dæmons heroes are produced. To which may also be +added, that Love originated from Plenty as the more excellent cause, +and from Poverty as the recipient and the worse cause; and heroes are +analogously produced from different genera. + +Plato who was one of these heroes or demigods, was the offspring of +Apollo in the way above explained by Proclus, as we are informed by +Olympiodorus in his life of him. For he says, “It is reported that +an Apolloniacal spectre had connection with Perictione the mother of +Plato, and that appearing in the night to Aristo the father of Plato, +it commanded him not to sleep with Perictione during the time of her +pregnancy--which mandate Aristo obeyed.” The like account of the divine +origin of Plato is also given by Apuleius in his treatise on the dogmas +of Plato, and by Plutarch in the 8th book of his Symposiacs. Epimenides +likewise, Eudoxus and Xenocrates asserted that Apollo becoming +connected with Parthenis the mother of Pythagoras, and causing her to +be pregnant, had in consequence of this predicted concerning Pythagoras +by his priest.[186] And thus much concerning those undefiled souls who +were called by the ancients terrestrial dæmons, heroes and demigods, +and who descended into the regions of mortality for the benevolent +purpose of benefiting those apostate souls, who are elegantly called by +Empedocles, + + Heaven’s exiles straying from the orb of light. + + + + + CHAPTER XLVII. + + +The triple genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, and +which have been unfolded in the preceding chapters, are indicated +by the following division of time, in the first hypothesis of the +Parmenides; from which division _the one_ is shown to be exempt: +“Do not the terms _it was_, _it has been_, _it did become_, seem to +signify the participation of the time past? Certainly. And do not +the terms _it will be_, _it may become_, and _it will be generated_, +signify that which is about to be hereafter? Certainly. But are not +the terms _it is_, and _it is becoming to be_, marks of the present +time? Entirely so. If then _the one_ participates in no respect of any +time, it neither ever _was_, nor _has been_, nor _did become_. Nor is +it _now generated_, nor is _becoming to be_, nor _is_, nor _may become_ +hereafter, nor _will be generated_, nor _will be_. It is most true.” + +The commentary of Proclus on this passage is as follows: “This division +of time accords with the multitude of the divine genera, which are +suspended from divine souls, viz. with angels, dæmons, and heroes. +And in the first place, this division proceeds to them supernally, +according to a triadic distribution into the _present_, _past_, and +_future_; and in the next place, according to a distribution into nine, +each of these three being again subdivided into three. For the monad +of souls is united to the one whole of time, but this is participated +secondarily by the multitude of souls. And of this multitude, those +participate of this whole _totally_, that subsist according to _the +past_, or _the present_, or _the future_; but those participate of +it _partially_, that are essentialized according to the differences +of these. For to each of the wholes a multitude is co-ordinated, +divided into things first, middle, and last. For a certain multitude +subsists in conjunction with that which is established conformably to +_the past_, the _summit_ of which is according to _the was_, but the +_middle_ according to _it has been_, and the _end_ according to _it +did become_. With that also which is established according to _the +present_, there is another multitude, the _principal_ part of which is +characterized by _the is_, the _middle_ by _it is generated_, and the +_end_ by _it is becoming to be_. And there is another triad with that +which subsists according to _the future_, the _most elevated_ part +of which is characterized by _the will be_, that which ranks in the +_middle_ by _it may become_, and the _end_ by _it will be generated_. +And thus there will be three triads proximately suspended from these +three totalities, but all these are suspended from their monad. + +All these orders, likewise, which are distributed according to the +parts of time, energize according to the whole of time; this whole +containing in itself triple powers, one of which is _perfective_ of all +motion, the second _connects_ and _guards_ things which are governed by +it, and the third _unfolds_ divine natures into light. For, as all such +things as are not eternal, are led round in a circle, the wholeness or +the monad of time, perfects and connects their essence, and discloses +to them the united infinity of eternity, evolving the contracted +multitude which subsists in eternal natures; whence also this apparent +time, as Timæus says, unfolds to us the measures of divine periods, +perfects sensibles, and guards things which are generated in their +proper numbers. Time, therefore, possesses triple powers prior to +souls, viz. _the perfective_, _the connective_, and _the unfolding_, +according to a similitude to eternity. For eternity, possessing a +middle order in intelligibles, _perfects_ the order posterior to +itself, supplying it with union, but _unfolds into light_ that which +is prior to itself, producing into multitude its ineffable union, and +_connects_ the middle bond of intelligibles, and guards all things +intransitively through its power. Time, therefore, receiving supernally +the triple powers of eternity, imparts them to souls. Eternity, +however, possesses this triad unitedly; but time both unitedly and +distributively; and souls distributively alone. Hence, of souls, some +are characterized according to one, and others according to another +power of time; some imitating its _unfolding_, others its _perfective_, +and others its _connective_ power. Thus also with respect to the Fates, +some of these being adapted to give completion and perfection to +things, are said to sing the past, always indeed energizing, and always +singing, their songs being intellections, and fabricative energies +about the world: for _the past_ is the source of _completion_. Others +again of these are adapted to _connect_ things _present_; for they +guard the essence and the generation of these. And others are adapted +to _unfold the future_; for they lead into essence and to an end that +which as yet is not. + +We may also say, since there is an order of souls more excellent than +ours divided into such as are first, such as are middle, and such +as are last, the most total of these are adapted to _the past_. For +as this comprehends in itself the present and the future, so these +souls comprehend in themselves the rest. But souls of a middle rank +are adapted to _the present_; for this was once _future_, but is not +yet _the past_. As, therefore, _the present_ contains in itself _the +future_, so these middle souls comprehend those posterior, but are +comprehended in those prior to themselves. And souls of the third order +correspond to _the future_. For this does not proceed through _the +present_, nor has become _the past_, but is _the future_ alone; just as +these third souls are of themselves alone, but through falling into +a more partial subsistence, are by no means comprehensive of others. +For they convolve the boundary according to a triadic division of the +genera posterior to the Gods. + +The whole of the first triad, therefore, has _the once_, for this is +the peculiarity of _the past_, and of completion; but it is divided +into _the was_, _it was generated_, and _it did become_. Again, +therefore, of these three, _the was_ signifies the summit of the triad, +bounded according to hyparxis itself; but _it was generated_, signifies +an at-once-collected perfection; and _it did become_, an extension +in being perfected; these things being imitations of intelligibles. +For _the was_ is an imitation of _being_, _it was generated_, of +_eternity_, and _it did become_, of that which is _primarily eternal_. +For _being_ is derived to all things from the first of these; a +subsistence at once as _all_, and a _whole_ from the second; and an +_extension into multitude_ from the third. + + + + + CHAPTER XLVIII. + + +Having, therefore, unfolded to the readers the orders and +characteristic properties of the mundane Gods, and of the triple genera +that are perpetually suspended from them, I shall in the next place +present him with what Plato says, in celebration of the divinity of +the World, the great monad which comprehends all these, so far as the +whole of it is a God, consisting of a superessential unity derived from +the ineffable principle of all things, a divine intellect, a divine +soul, and a deified body. In the Timæus then, Plato celebrates the +world as a deity in the following manner; “When, therefore, that God +who is an eternally reasoning divinity cogitated about the God who at +a certain time would exist, he fabricated his body smooth and equable, +and every way from the middle equal and whole, and perfect from the +composition of perfect bodies. But placing soul in the middle of the +world, he extended it through the whole; and besides this, externally +surrounded the body of the universe with soul. And causing circle to +revolve in a circle, he established heaven (i.e. the world) one, only, +solitary nature, able through virtue to converse with itself, indigent +of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself. And +on all these accounts the world was generated by him, a blessed God.” +The first part of this extract, as far as to the word “perfect bodies,” +is admirably elucidated by Proclus as follows: + +What is here said, imitating the one intellect which comprehends the +intellection of wholes in one, collects all things into sameness, +and refers to one summit all the fabrication of the corporeal +system. It is necessary, therefore, that we should recall to our +memory what has been already asserted. It has been said then, that +the elements through analogy rendered all things in concord with +each other. That the universe was generated a whole consisting of +wholes. That it is spherical and smooth, and has itself a knowledge +of itself, and a motion in itself. Hence, it is evident that the +whole world is assimilated to [its paradigm] all-perfect animal. But +the orderly distribution according to the wholes which it contains +proceeds analogous to its second and third causes. And the number of +its elements indeed, and the unifying bond of them through analogy, +corresponds to the essence which is without colour, without figure, and +without contact;[187] for number is there. The first wholeness of the +world which adorns all things, and which consists of the wholes of the +elements, proceeds analogous to the intellectual wholeness.[188] Its +sphericity is analogous to intellectual figure.[189] Its sufficiency, +intellectual motion, and sameness of convolution, are analogous to +the God who absorbs all his offspring in himself.[190] Its animation +corresponds to its vivific cause [Rhea]. And its possession of +intellect is analogous to the demiurgic intellect; though from this all +things proceed, and from the natures prior to it, different things +being analogous to different causes. And the more excellent natures +indeed are the causes of all that proceeds from secondary principles; +but secondary principles are the causes of less numerous and less +excellent effects. For with respect to the demiurgus himself, so far as +he is _intellectual_, he produces all things intellectual; but so +far as he is _being_, he is the father of all bodies and of every +thing incorporeal; and so far as he is a God, he also gives subsistence +to matter itself. In what is now said, therefore, Plato makes a +summary repetition of every thing which the universe derives from the +intellectual Gods. And thus much concerning the whole theory. + +Let us survey, however, more particularly the truth of what is now +said. When, therefore, Plato calls the demiurgus, “an eternally +reasoning being,” he makes the essence and at the same time the +intellection of him through which the world is perpetual, to be +eternal. It is requisite, likewise, to observe how he arranges the +demiurgus among beings that always exist, assigning to him an eternal +order; so that he will not be soul. For in the Laws Plato says that +soul is immortal indeed, and indestructible, but is not eternal. +Hence, it appears that every one who fancies soul is the demiurgus, is +ignorant of the difference between the eternal and the indestructible. +But _reasoning_ is significant of distributed or divided fabrication. +And the words, “who at a certain time would exist,” do not indicate +a temporal beginning, as Atticus imagined they did, but an essence +conjoined with time. For Plato says in this dialogue, “that time was +generated together with the universe,” and the world is temporal, +and time is mundane. For time and the world are consubsistent with +each other, and co-produced from the one fabrication of things. And a +_temporal ever_, may be said to be _at a certain time_, when compared +with that which is eternal, just as that which is _generatively being_, +is _non-being_, when compared with that which is _intelligibly being_. +Though the world, therefore, exists through the whole of time, yet +its being consists in _becoming to be_, and is in a part of time. But +this is the ποτε or the _at a certain time_, mentioned by Plato, and +is not a simultaneous subsistence in all time, but is always _at a +certain time_. For the eternal is always in the whole of eternity; but +the temporal in a certain time, is always differently in a different +time. Hence, the world, as with reference to an _eternally_ existing +God, is very properly called a God, who at _a certain time_ would +exist. For the former is sensible with reference to the latter, who is +intellectual. That which is sensible, therefore, is _always generated_, +but _is_ at a certain time. For it possesses existence partibly, and is +perpetually advancing into being from that which always is. For since, +as we have before observed, it derives from something else an infinite +power of existing, and that which it possesses is finite, but it is +perpetual by always receiving, the ability of existing infinitely, +being numbered in that which is finite, it is evident that it is at a +certain time; from _a certain time_ always possessing existence; and +in consequence of that which is imparted to it never ceasing, always +becoming to be;[191] but in its own nature existing at a certain time, +and having, as Plato says in the Politicus, a renovated immortality. +For subsisting in rising into existence, the whole of it does not +at once participate of the whole of being, but again and again, not +existing without an extension of being. Unless, perhaps, the expression +_at a certain time_, signifies the _whole_ of time. For the evolution +of time, as with reference to an _eternal infinity_ is ποτε _a certain +time_. And the whole of time has the same ratio to eternity, that a +part of time the ποτε has to the whole. + +If, also, you are willing, it may be said after another manner, that +Plato denominates the world “a God that at a certain time would exist,” +since he has now fashioned a corporeal nature, and given subsistence +to intellect, but not yet to soul, because the world also as a God +will have a subsistence in the course of his narration. For divinity +produces at once both parts and the whole, but language divides things +that are consubsistent, generates things that are unbegotten, and +distributes eternal natures according to time. The God, therefore, +that at a certain time would exist, is that which is fashioned in the +narration of Plato, and according to which there are division and +composition. For this, also, the Pythagoric Timæus himself indicates to +those who are able to understand him, when he says in his treatise [On +the soul of the world], “Before heaven (i.e. the world) was generated +in words, there were idea and matter, and God the demiurgus.” For he +clearly manifests that he fashions in words the generation of the world. + +When Plato, likewise, says that the demiurgus fabricated the body of +the world smooth and equable, this manifests the one comprehension +in the world, and its supreme aptitude to the participation of a +divine soul. But the words, “every way from the middle equal,” +exhibit the peculiarity of a spherical figure; for this is every way +equally distant according to all intervals. And the words “whole and +perfect from the composition of perfect bodies,” give to the world +a consummate similitude to all-perfect animal; for that was in all +things perfect; and also to the demiurgus himself. For as he is the +father of fathers, and the supreme of rulers, so the world is the most +perfect of perfect natures, and the most total of wholes. You may also +say, that Plato calls the world smooth, as not being in want of any +motive, or nutritive, or sensitive organs; for this had just before +been demonstrated by him. But that it is every way equal from the +middle, as having a spherical figure. And that it is whole and perfect, +as being all-perfect, and leaving nothing external to itself; for +this is properly a whole and perfect. It likewise consists of perfect +bodies, as being composed of the four elements. But Plato calls it in +the singular number a body, as being only-begotten. And thus beginning +from the only-begotten, and proceeding as far as to perfection, he +again returns to it through the above-mentioned words, imitating the +progression of the world from its paradigm, and its perfect conversion +to it. + + + + + CHAPTER XLIX. + + +In the next place, let us direct our attention to the words, “But +placing soul in the middle of the world, he extended it through the +whole; and besides this, externally surrounded the body of the universe +with soul.” Divinity, says Proclus, at once and eternally produces +all things. For according to his very being, and according to the +eternal intellection of wholes, he generates all things from himself, +supermundane and mundane beings, intellects, souls, natures, bodies, +and matter itself. And indeed, an at-once-collected subsistence in a +greater degree belongs to the demiurgic progeny, than to the solar +illumination; though in this the whole light proceeds simultaneously +with the sun. But it is evident that the sun imitating the father of +the universe through visible fabrication is inferior to eternal and +invisible production. All things, therefore, as we have said, being +produced from the invisible fabrication at once and eternally, at the +same time, the order of the effects is likewise preserved. For all +things proceed collectively together with their own proper order. +For in the producing cause, there was also an eternal intellection, +and order prior to the things that were arranged. Hence, though all +things proceed at once from one cause, yet some have a first, and +others a diminished dignity. For some things proceed in a greater, but +others in a less degree. And some are co-arranged with the demiurgus +according to union, others according to contact, and others according +to participation. For intellect is able to be connascent with intellect +through union; but soul is naturally adapted to be conjoined with +intellect; and bodies participate of it only, just as things in the +profundity of the earth participate of the splendour of the sun. All +these, therefore, subsisting in the world, viz. intellect, soul, and +body, and all these being produced at once, and at the same time, there +being an order in these proceeding from the demiurgus, language at +one time beginning supernally according to progression, ends at the +boundaries of fabrication, but at another time being incited[192] from +things last, according to conversion, recurs to the summits of the +universe, conformably to things themselves. For all things proceed, and +are converted to the cause and principle from which they proceeded; in +so doing exhibiting a certain demiurgic circle. + +Plato, however, delivered to us the order of the plenitudes +(πληρωματων)[193] of the world, according to progression, in what he +before said, when the demiurgus placing intellect in soul, and soul +in body fabricated[194] the universe, but in the present passage, he +unfolds to us the order according to conversion. And in the first +place, he assumes two contraries in the universe, adds two media to +these, and unites them through analogy. Afterwards giving completion +to the world, by rendering it a whole of wholes, he surrounds it with +an intellectual [i.e. with a spherical] figure, gives it the power of +participating a divine life, and a motion imitating intellect.[195] +Always, likewise, causing the world to be more perfect by the +additions, he introduces soul into it as her proper place of abode, and +fills all things with life, but different things with a different life. +He also inserts intellect in soul, and through this conjoins her with +her fountain. For the soul of the universe participating of intellect, +is connected with intelligibles themselves. And thus he ends at the +principle from which the mundane intellect, soul and the body of the +world proceed. For giving a three-fold division to the universe, viz. +into intellect, soul, and body, he discusses in the first place the +two latter which are subordinate. For such is the mode according to +conversion. And he terminates indeed the discussion of the body of the +world, having unfolded its essence, its figure, and its motion. But the +theory of soul is connected with this, just as the body itself of the +world is suspended from a divine soul. + +With respect, however, to the position of soul in the middle of the +universe, it is differently explained by the different interpreters of +Plato. For some call the centre of the earth the middle, but others +the moon, as being the isthmus of generated and divine natures. Others +again say that the sun is the middle, as being established in the place +of a heart [in the world], others the inerratic sphere, others the +equinoctial, as bounding the breadth of the universe, and others the +zodiac. And some indeed place the governing principle in the centre +of the universe, others in the moon, others in the sun, others in the +equinoctial, and others in the zodiac. And the power of the centre +testifies in favour of the first of these, since it is connective of +every circulation; the motion of the moon, in favour of the second, +since it variously changes generation; the vivific heat of the sun, +in favour of the third; the facility of the motion of the equinoctial +circle, of the fourth; and in favour of the fifth, the circulation of +the stars about the zodiac. Porphyry, however, and Jamblichus, oppose +all these interpretations, and reprobate them as understanding the +middle in a way accompanied with interval, and enclosing in a certain +part the soul of the whole world, which is every where similarly +present, which rules over all things, and leads all things by its own +motions. Of these divine men, however, Porphyry assuming the soul to +be the soul of the universe, interprets the _middle_ according +to the psychical essence; for soul is the middle of intelligibles and +sensibles. This interpretation, however, does not appear to say any +thing as with reference to the words of Plato. But if we assume this, +that the universe derives its completion from intellect, soul and +body, and that it is a psychical and intellectual animal, we shall +find in this system that soul is the middle. This, therefore, Plato +had before asserted; and now he will appear to say nothing else, than +that the soul of the world is extended through the universe, being +allotted a middle order in it. But the philosopher Jamblichus thinks +that by _soul_ we should understand the exempt, supermundane, and +liberated soul, and which has dominion over all things. For according +to him, Plato does not here speak of the mundane soul, but of the +soul which is not participated by body, and which is arranged as a +monad above all mundane souls. For the first soul is of this kind, +and the _middle_ is asserted of this, as being similarly present +to all things, because it does not belong to any body, has no manner +of habitude whatever, similarly animates all things, and is equally +distant from all things. For it is not distant from some things in +a less, and from others in a greater degree, since it is without +habitude; but it is alike distant from all things; though all things +are not after the same manner distant from it. For in its participants +there is the more and the less. + +Our leader, however, [Syrianus] more aptly interprets the words of +Plato. For the soul of the world has indeed that which is supermundane +and exempt from the universe, according to which it is conjoined with +intellect, which Plato in the Phædrus, and Orpheus in his verses +concerning _Ippa_[196] denominate the head or summit of the soul. +It has also another multitude of powers proceeding from this monad, +divided about the world, and appropriately present to all the parts of +the universe. And these subsist in one way indeed about the middle, in +another way about the earth, in another about the sun, and in another +about each of the spheres. Our leader, therefore, says that all these +are comprehended in the present words of Plato, who indicates by them, +that the soul of the world in one way animates the middle, in another +the whole bulk, and that it leaves something else prior to these exempt +from the universe. + +That we may not, however, carelessly attend to what is here said by +Plato, but may offer something demonstrative about the psychical +powers, it must be said, that soul by a much greater priority than body +is a vital world, and is both one and number. And by the one indeed, it +is better than every form of habitude; but by the multitude it rules +over the different parts of the universe. For in its guardian powers it +contains the centre; since from thence the whole sphere is governed, to +which also it converges. Farther still, every thing turbulent in the +world is impelled to the middle, and requires a divine guard, which +is able to arrange it, and detain it in its proper boundaries. Hence +also, theologists terminate the progressions of the highest Gods in +that place; and the Pythagoreans call the middle either the tower or +the prison of Jupiter. But in its stable and at the same time vivific +powers, it contains the sphere of the earth. In its perfective and +generative powers, the sphere of water. In its connective and motive +powers it comprehends the air. In its undefiled powers, fire. And in +its intellectual powers, the whole heaven. In these powers, likewise, +it in one way contains the lunar, in another the solar, and in another +the inerratic sphere. + +Such therefore, being the animation of the world, or its participation +of soul, Plato, as it is usual with him, beginning according to +conversion from things that are last, first imparts soul to the middle, +afterwards to the universe, and in the third place leaves something +of soul external to the universe. For as he gave subsistence to body +prior to soul, and to parts prior to wholes, thus also he imparts soul +to the world, beginning from things that have an ultimate existence. +When Plato therefore delivered the order of the plenitudes of the world +according to progression, beginning supernally, he placed intellect in +soul, and soul in body. But here where he delivers the order according +to conversion, he first animates the middle, and afterwards the +universe itself. For the river of vivification proceeds as far as to +the centre; as the Chaldean oracles also assert, when speaking about +the middle of the five centres, which from on high passes entirely to +the opposite part, through the centre of the earth. For they say: “And +another fifth middle fiery centre, where a life-bearing fire descends +as far as to the material rivers.” Hence Plato beginning from those +things in which animation ends, recurs to the whole vivification, +and prior to this surveys the exempt power of the soul. We must not +therefore place the ruling part of the soul in the centre; for this is +exempt from the universe; but a certain power of it which guards the +whole order of the world. For nothing else in the universe has so much +the power of entirely subverting the whole of things, as the centre and +the power of the centre, about which the universe with measured motion +harmoniously revolves. Hence it appears to me that Plato divinely +says that the demiurgus placed _soul_ and not _the soul_ in +the middle of the universe. For these differ from each other, because +the latter establishes the whole soul in the centre, but the former a +certain power of it, and a different power in different parts. + +The philosopher himself however, shortly after, when speaking of the +animation itself of the world says, “But the soul being extended from +the middle to the very extremities of the universe, and investing it +externally in a circle, gave rise to the divine commencement of an +unceasing and wise life through the whole of time.” For the words “to +be every way extended from the middle,” have the same meaning as “to +be extended from the middle to the very extremities of the universe.” +But in the latter, the soul herself illuminates from herself the +centre of the universe and the whole sphere of it by her powers; while +in the former, the demiurgus is the cause of the animation, himself +introducing the soul into the universe as into her proper place of +abode. For the same thing is effected by both, but demiurgically +indeed and intellectually by the cause, and self-motively by soul. +Now however, the philosopher delivers the bond which proceeds from +fabrication alone. For we particularly refer wholes and such things +as are good to a divine cause; but we consider partial natures, and +such things as are not good, to be unworthy of divine fabrication; and +we suspend them from other proximate causes, though these also, as +it is frequently said, subsist from divinity. Since therefore both a +divine and a partial soul have communication with bodies, the former +indeed subsisting according to boniform will, and not departing from +intelligible progressions is deific; but the latter which takes place +through a defluxion of the wings of the soul, or through audacity, +or flight, is atheistical, though the former is complicated with the +self-motive energy, and the latter with providential care. But in the +one a subsistence according to deity is apparent through the presence +of divinity; and in the other, a subsistence from soul, through the +representation of aberration. + + + + + CHAPTER L. + + +In the next place Timæus, or rather Plato adds, “And causing circle to +revolve in a circle, he established heaven (i.e. the world) one, only, +solitary nature;” on which Proclus observes as follows: The philosopher +Porphyry well interprets the meaning of circle revolving in a circle. +For it is possible, says he, for that which is not a circle to be moved +in a circle, as a stone when whirled round; and also for a circle to +be moved not in a circle, as a wheel when rolled along. But it is the +peculiarity of the world, that being circular it is moved in a circle, +through harmoniously revolving about the centre. In a still greater +degree however, the divine Jamblichus well interprets the meaning of +these words. For he says that the circle is twofold, the one being +psychical, but the other corporeal, and that the latter is moved in +the former. For this is conformable to what has been before said, and +accords with what is afterwards asserted. For Plato himself shortly +after moves the corporeal nature according to the psychical circle, and +renders the twofold circulations analogous to the periods in the soul. + +Moreover, to comprehend the whole blessedness of the world in three +appellations, is most appropriate to that which subsists according to +a triple cause, viz. the final, the paradigmatic, and the demiurgic. +For of the appellations themselves, the first of them, viz. _one_, +is assumed from the final cause; for _the one_ is the same with _the +good_. But the second, viz. _only_, is assumed from the paradigmatic +cause. For the _only-begotten_ and _onlyness_ (μονωσις) were, prior +to the universe, in all-perfect animal. And the third, viz. the +_solitary_, is assumed from the demiurgic cause. For the ability of +using itself, and through itself governing the world, proceeds from +the demiurgic goodness. The world therefore is _one_, so far as it is +united, and is converted to _the one_. But it is _only_, so far as it +participates of the intelligible, and comprehends all things in itself. +And it is _solitary_, so far as it is similar to its father, and is +able to save itself. From the three however, it appears that it is a +God. For _the one_, the _perfect_, and the _self-sufficient_, are the +elements of deity. Hence, the world receiving these, is also itself a +God; being _one_ indeed, according to hyparxis; but _alone_, according +to a perfection which derives its completion from all sensible natures; +and _solitary_, through being sufficient to itself. For those that +lead a solitary life, being converted to themselves, have the hopes +of salvation in themselves. And that this is the meaning of the term +_solitary_, will be evident from the following words of Plato: “Able +through virtue to converse with itself, indigent of nothing external, +and sufficiently known and friendly to itself.” For in these words, +he clearly manifests what the solitariness is which he ascribes to +the world, and that he denominates that being solitary, who looks to +himself, to that with which he is furnished, and to his own proper +measure. For those that live in solitary places, are the saviours of +themselves, so far as respects human causes. The universe therefore is +likewise after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to itself, and +preserving itself, not through a diminution, but from an exuberance +of power; for self-sufficiency is here indicated; and as he says, +through virtue. For he alone among partial animals [such as we are] who +possesses virtue is able to associate with, and love himself with a +parental affection. But the vicious man looking to his inward baseness, +is indignant with himself and with his own essence, is astonished with +externals, and pursues an association with others, in consequence +of his inability to behold himself. On the contrary, the worthy man +perceiving himself beautiful rejoices and is delighted, and producing +in himself beautiful conceptions, gladly embraces an association +with himself. For we are naturally domesticated to the beautiful, +but hastily withdraw ourselves from deformity. Hence, if the world +possesses virtue adapted to itself, in its intellectual and psychical +essence, and in the perfection of its animal nature, looking to itself, +it loves itself, and is present with, and sufficient to itself. + +It is proper therefore to assert these things to those who place +intelligibles external to intellect. For how can that which tends to +other things, and as being deficient is indigent of externals, be +blessed? Hence, if the world is through virtue converted to itself, +must not intellect do this in a much greater degree? Intellect +therefore intellectually perceives itself. And this is among the number +of things immediately known. This also deserves to be remarked, that +Plato when he gives animation to the world, directly imparts virtue to +it. For the participation of soul is immediately accompanied with the +fulness of virtue, in the being which subsists according to nature; +since the one cause of the virtues,[197] is also co-arranged with +the fountain of souls,[198] and the progression of this fountain is +conjoined with the progression of soul. For with respect to virtue, +one indeed is unical, primary and all-perfect; but another subsists +in the ruling supermundane Gods; another in the liberated Gods; and +another is mundane, through which the whole world possesses undefiled +intelligence, an undeviating life, an energy converted to itself, +and a purity unmingled with the animals which it contains. From this +virtue therefore, the world becomes known and friendly to itself. For +knowledge precedes familiarity. + +Since the universe also is intellectual, an animal, and a God, so far +indeed, as it is intellectual, it becomes known to itself; but so far +as it is a God, it is friendly to itself. For union is more perfect +than knowledge. If therefore, the universe is known to itself, it is +intellectual; for that which is primarily known to itself is intellect. +And if it is friendly to itself, it is united. But that which is +united is deified; for _the one_ which is in intellect is a God. +Again therefore, you have virtue, a knowledge of, and a friendship +with itself, in the world; the first of these proceeding into it from +soul; the second from intellect; and the third from deity. Hence Plato +very properly adds, that on account of these things, the world was +generated by the demiurgus a blessed God; for the presence of soul, +the participation of intellect, and the reception of union, render the +universe a God. And the blessed God which he now mentions is the God +“who at a certain time would exist,” animated, endued with intellect, +and united. Union however is present with it according to the bond of +analogy; but much more from the one soul and the one intellect which it +participates. For through these, greater bonds, and a more excellent +union proceeded into the universe. And still beyond these unions, +divine friendship, and the supply of good, contain and connect the +whole world. For the bond which proceeds from intellect and soul is +strong, as Orpheus also says; but the union of the golden chain [i.e. +of the deific series] is still greater, and is the cause of greater +good to all things. + +Moreover, felicity must likewise be assumed in a way adapted to the +universe. For since it is suspended from the paternal intellect and the +whole fabrication of things, and since it lives conformably to these +causes, it is consequently happy (ευδαιμων)[199] from them. For the +demiurgus also is denominated a dæmon by Plato in the Politicus, and a +great dæmon by Orpheus when he says, + + One the great dæmon and the lord of all.[200] + +He therefore who lives according to the will of the father, and +preserves the intellectual nature which was imparted to him from thence +immutable is happy, and blessed. The first, and the all-perfect form +of felicity likewise, is that of the world. The second is that of the +mundane Gods, whom Plato in the Phædrus calls happy Gods, following the +mighty Jupiter. The third is that of the genera superior to us [viz. +the felicity of angels, dæmons and heroes]. For there is one virtue of +angels, another of dæmons, and another of the heroic genera: and the +form of felicity is triple being different according to each genus. +The fourth form of felicity is that which subsists in the undefiled +souls, who make blameless descents [into the realms of generation,] +and exert an inflexible and untamed life. The fifth is that of partial +souls [such as ours]; and this is multiform. For the soul which is an +attendant on the moon, is not similarly happy with the soul that is +suspended from the solar order; but as the form of life is different, +so likewise perfection is defined by different measures. And the last +form of felicity is that which is seen in irrational animals. For +every thing which obtains a perfection adapted to it according to +nature, is happy. For through its proper perfection, it is conjoined +to its proper dæmon, and partakes of his providential care. The forms +of felicity therefore, being so many, the first and highest must be +placed in the world, and which also is now mentioned by Plato. We must +not however wonder that he immediately calls the world a God, from its +participation of soul. For every thing is deified through that which is +proximately prior to it; the corporeal world indeed through soul; but +soul through intellect, as the Athenian guest also says; and intellect +through _the one_. Hence, intellect is divine, but not a God. +_The one_ however is no longer a God through any thing else, but +is primarily a God; just as intellect is primarily gnostic, as soul is +primarily self-motive, and as body is primarily in place. + + + + + CHAPTER LI. + + +In the last place, I shall present the reader with what Plato says in +the Timæus about the name of the world, and add to it the elucidations +of Proclus; for thus every thing pertaining to the mundane Gods, and +their great recipient the universe will have been amply, and I trust +satisfactorily discussed. Plato therefore says on this subject: “We +shall denominate the universe, _heaven_, or _the world_, or by any +other appellation in which it may especially rejoice.” These names, +says Proclus, were attended with much ambiguity with the ancients. For +some alone called the sublunary region κοσμος _kosmos, the world_, +and the region above it ουρανος _ouranos, heaven_; but others called +_heaven_ a part of _the world_. And some indeed, considered the moon +as the boundary of _heaven_; but others denominated the summits of +generation _heaven_. Thus Homer, + + Extended heaven in ether and the clouds + Fell to the lot of Jove. + +Hence Plato very properly prior to the whole theory speaks definitively +concerning these names, denominating the universe _heaven_ and +_the world_. And he calls it _heaven_ indeed, as perceiving the +things above, contemplating the intelligible, and participating an +intellectual essence; but _the world_, as always being filled and +adorned by true beings. He likewise denominates it _heaven_ as being +converted to the principles of its existence; but _the world_ as +proceeding from them. For it was generated by true beings, and is +converted to them. As however, of statues which are established +by the telestic (or mystic) art, some things are apparent[201] in +them, but others are inwardly concealed, which are symbolical[202] +of the presence of the Gods, and are known to the mystic framers of +them alone; after the same manner the universe being the statue of +the intelligible world, and perfected by the father, has some things +apparent which are indications of its divinity, but others unapparent, +which are the marks, seals, or impressions of the participation of true +being,[203] which it received from the father who gave it perfection; +in order that through these it may be eternally rooted in real essence. +The appellations also _heaven_ and _the world_ are names significant +of the apparent powers in the universe; the latter indeed, so far as +they proceed from the intelligible, but the former, so far as they are +converted to it. + +It is necessary however, to know that the divine name of the abiding +power of the universe, and which is a symbol of the demiurgic seal, +according to which also it subsists in unproceeding union with +real being, is ineffable, and not vocal, and is known to the Gods +themselves. For there are appropriate names in every order of things; +divine indeed, in the Gods; but dianoetic in the subjects of the +discursive power of reason; and doxastic in the objects of opinion. And +this also Plato asserts in the Cratylus, assenting to Homer who places +one kind of names of the same things in the Gods, and another kind in +the opinions of men, as + + Gods call it Xanthus, but Scamander men. + +And + + Chalcis its name with those of heav’nly birth. + But call’d Cymindis by the sons of earth. + +And in a similar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of +the Gods is of one kind, but that of partial souls of another, so +names in the former are different from those in the latter. Divine +names however, unfold the whole essence of the things named; but +those of men only effect this partially. Plato therefore knowing +that this pre-existed in the world, omits to mention what the divine +and ineffable name of it is which is different from the apparent, and +with great caution speaks of it as a symbol of the divine impression +which the world contains. For the words, “or by any other appellation +in which it may especially rejoice,” are a latent hymn of the mundane +name so far as it is allotted an unspeakable and divine essence, in +order that it may be co-ordinate to that which is signified by him. +Hence also, divine mundane names are delivered by theurgists; some +being called by them ineffable, but others effable; and some of them +being the names of the unapparent powers in the world, but others, +of the visible elements from which it derives its completion. Plato +therefore, here delivers both the apparent and the unapparent name of +the world, the former indeed, dyadically, but the latter monadically; +for the words, “or by any other,” are significant of oneness. And +_the ineffable name_ indeed of the universe, is indicative of its +abiding in its father; the name _world_, of its progression; and +_heaven_, of its regression. But through the three, you have the +final cause, on account of which it is full of good, abiding indeed +ineffably, but proceeding perfectly, and returning to _the good_, +as to the pre-existing object of desire. + + + + + THE + + ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY. + + + PROPOSITION I. + +All multitude participates in a certain respect of _the one_. + + * * * * * + +For if it in no respect participates of _the one_, neither will the +whole be one whole, nor each of the many of which the multitude +consists; but there will also be a certain multitude arising from +each of these, and this will be the case to infinity. Each of +these infinites, likewise, will again be infinite multitude. For +participating in no respect of any one, neither according to the whole +of itself, nor according to each of the many which it contains, it will +be in every respect, and according to the whole, infinite. For each of +the many which you may assume, will either be one, or not one, will +either be many or nothing. But if each is nothing, that also which +consists of these will be nothing. And if each is many, each will +consist of infinites infinitely: [and this not in capacity, but in +energy]. These things, however, are impossible. For neither does any +being consist of infinites infinitely assumed; since there is not more +than the infinite; but that which consists of all is more than each. +Nor is it possible for any thing to be composed from nothing. All +multitude, therefore, participates in a certain respect of _the one_. + + + PROPOSITION II. + +Every thing which participates of _the one_, is both one and not +one. + + * * * * * + +For if it is not _the one_ itself (since it participates of _the one_) +being something else besides _the one_, it suffers, or is passive +to it according to participation, and sustains to become one. If, +therefore, it is nothing besides _the one_, it is one alone, and does +not participate of _the one_, but will be _the one itself_. But if +it is something besides _the one_, which is not _the one_, but its +participant, it is both _not one_, and _one_, not indeed such a one as +the one itself, but _one being_, as participating of _the one_. This, +therefore, is not one, nor is it that which _the one_ is. But it is +one, and at the same time a participant of _the one_. Hence, being +of itself not one, it is both one and not one, being something else +besides _the one_. And so far indeed as it abounds, it is not one, but +so far as it is passive [to the one] it is one. Every thing, therefore, +which participates of _the one_, is both one, and not one. + + + PROPOSITION III. + +Every thing which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of +_the one_, and is one, so far as it suffers the participation of _the +one_. + + * * * * * + +For if things which are not one become one, they doubtless become so by +a conjunction and communication with each other, and they sustain the +presence of _the one_, not being that which _the one itself_ is. Hence, +they participate of _the one_ so far as they suffer to become one. For, +if they are already one they will not become one; since that which is +does not become that which it is already. But if they become one from +nothing, i.e. from the privation of _the one_, since a certain one +is ingenerated in them, _the one itself_ is prior to them. [And this +ingenerated one must be derived from _the one itself_. Every thing, +therefore, which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of +_the one_, &c.[204]] + + + PROPOSITION IV. + +Every thing which is united is different from _the one itself_. + + * * * * * + +For if it is united, it will participate in a certain respect of +_the one_, so far as it is said to be united. That, however, which +participates of _the one_, is both one and not one. But _the one +itself_ is not both one and not one. For if this were the case, again +the one which is in it would have both these, and this would take place +to infinity, there being no _one itself_ at which it is possible to +stop; but every thing being one and not one, there will be something +united which is different from _the one_. For if _the one_ is the +same with the united, it will be infinite multitude. And in a similar +manner each of the things of which the united consists will be infinite +multitude. [Every thing, therefore, which is united is different from +_the one itself_.[205]] + + + PROPOSITION V. + +All multitude is posterior to _the one_. + + * * * * * + +For if multitude is prior to _the one_, _the one_ indeed will +participate of multitude, but multitude which is prior to _the one_ +will not participate of _the one_, since that multitude existed prior +to the subsistence of _the one_. For it will not participate of that +which is not; because that which participates of _the one_, is one +and at the same time not one; but _the one_ will not yet subsist, +that which is first being multitude. It is, however, impossible that +there should be a certain multitude, which in no respect whatever +participates of _the one_. Multitude, therefore, is not prior to _the +one_. + +But if multitude subsists simultaneously with _the one_, and they +are naturally co-ordinate with each other; for nothing of time will +prevent them being so; neither will _the one_ of itself be many, nor +will multitude be one, as being at one and the same time oppositely +divided by nature, if neither is prior or posterior to the other. +Hence, multitude of itself will not be one, and each of the things +that are in it will not be one, and this will be the case to infinity, +which is impossible. Multitude, therefore, according to its own nature, +participates of _the one_, and it will not be possible to assume any +thing of it which is not one. For not being one, it will be an infinite +consisting of infinites, as has been demonstrated. Hence, it entirely +participates of _the one_. If, therefore, _the one_ which is of itself +one, in no respect participates of multitude, multitude will be +entirely posterior to _the one_; participating indeed of _the one_, but +not being participated by _the one_. + +But if _the one_ also participates of multitude, subsisting indeed as +one according to hyparxis, but as not one, according to participation, +_the one_ will be multiplied, just as multitude is united on account of +_the one_. _The one_, therefore, will communicate with multitude, and +multitude with _the one_. But things which coalesce, and communicate +in a certain respect with each other, if indeed they are collected +together by something else, that something else is prior to them. But +if they themselves collect themselves, they are not opposed to each +other. For opposites do not hasten to each other. Hence, if _the one_ +and multitude are oppositely divided, and multitude so far as multitude +is not one, and _the one_ so far as one is not multitude, neither will +one of these subsisting in the other be one and at the same time two. +If, also, there is something prior to them which collects them, this +will either be one, or not one. But if it is not one, it will either be +many or nothing. It will not however be many, lest multitude should +be prior to _the one_, nor yet will it be nothing. For how can nothing +congregate? It is, therefore, one alone. For this which is the one +cannot be many, lest there should be a progression to infinity. It is, +therefore, _the one itself_, and all multitude is from _the one itself_. + + + PROPOSITION VI. + + _Concerning Unity._ + +Every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities. + + * * * * * + +For that each of things many will not be itself multitude alone, and +again that each part of this will not be multitude alone is evident. +But if it is not multitude alone, it is either united, or unities +(εναδες). And if, indeed, it participates of _the one_ it is united; +but if it consists of things of which that which is primarily united +consists, it will be unities. For if there is _the one itself_, there +is also that which primarily participates of it, and which is primarily +united. But this consists of unities. For if it consists of things +united, again things united consist of certain things, and this will be +the case to infinity. It is necessary, however, that what is primarily +united should consist of unities. And thus we have discovered what we +proposed at first, [viz. that every multitude consists either of things +united, or of unities.] + + + PROPOSITION VII. + + _Concerning producing causes and things produced._ + +Every thing productive of another is more excellent than the nature of +the thing produced. + + * * * * * + +For it is either more excellent, or less excellent, or equal. Hence, +that which is produced from this, will either also itself possess a +power productive of something else, or it will be entirely unprolific. +But if it is unprolific, according to this very thing it will be +inferior to that by which it was produced. And through its inefficacy +it is unequal to its cause which is prolific, and has the power of +producing. But if it also is productive of other things, it either +likewise produces that which is equal to itself, and this in a similar +manner in all things, and all beings will be equal to each other, and +no one thing will be better than another, that which produces, always +giving subsistence in a consequent series to that which is equal to +itself; or it produces that which is unequal to itself, and thus that +which is produced, will no longer be equal to that which produces it. +For it is the province of equal powers to produce equal things. The +progeny of these, however, will be unequal to each other, if that which +produces indeed, is equal to the cause prior to itself, but the thing +posterior to it is unequal to it. Hence, it is not proper that the +thing produced should be equal to its producing cause. + +Moreover, neither will that which produces ever be less than that which +is produced by it. For if it imparts essence to the thing produced, it +will also supply it with essential power. But if it is productive of +all the power which that posterior to it possesses, it will also be +able to produce itself such as that posterior nature is. And if this +be the case it will also make itself[206] more powerful. For impotency +cannot hinder, productive power being present, nor a defect of will; +since all things naturally aspire after good. Hence, if it is able to +render another thing more perfect, it will also perfect itself before +it perfects that which is posterior to itself. Hence, that which is +produced, is not equal to, nor more excellent than, its producing +cause. The producing cause, therefore, is in every respect better than +the nature of the thing produced. + + + PROPOSITION VIII. + + _Concerning the first good, which is called_ the good itself. + +That which is primarily good, and which is no other than _the good +itself_ is the leader of all things that in any way whatever +participate of good. + + * * * * * + +For if all beings aspire after good, it is evident that what is +primarily good is beyond beings. For if it is the same with some one +being, either being and _the good_ are the same, and this particular +being will no longer be desirous of good, since it is that to which +it is passive, [i.e. since it is _the good_]. For that which aspires +after any thing is indigent of that after which it aspires, and is +different from it. And [if some one being and _the good_ are the same] +being indeed will participate, and that which is participated in being +will be _the good_. Hence, _the good_ is a certain good inherent in a +certain participant, and after which the participant alone aspires, +but is not that which is simply good, and which all beings desire. For +this is the common object of desire to all beings. But that which is +inherent in a certain thing, pertains to that alone which participates +of it. Hence, that which is primarily good, is nothing else than good. +For whatever else you may add to it, you will diminish by the addition +_the good_, and will make it to be a certain good, instead of that +which is simply good. For that which is added not being _the good_, but +something less than it will by its own essence diminish _the good_. + + + PROPOSITION IX. + + _Concerning that which is sufficient to itself._ + +Every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to essence, +or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is not +sufficient to itself, but has the cause of its perfection suspended +from another cause. + + * * * * * + +For if all beings naturally aspire after good, and one thing supplies +well-being from itself,[207] but another is indigent of something +else, the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the +other separate and apart. By how much the nearer, therefore, the +former is to that which supplies the object of desire [i.e. to _the +good_], by so much the more excellent will it be than that which is +indigent of a separate cause, and externally receives the perfection +of its hyparxis, or its energy. For since that which is sufficient to +itself is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to _the good +itself_ [than that which is not self-sufficient]. It is diminished +indeed through participating of _the good_, and because it is not +primarily _the good_. Yet it is in a certain respect allied to it, so +far as it is able to possess good from itself. But to participate, and +to participate through another, are more remote from that which is +primarily good, and which is nothing else than good. + + + PROPOSITION X. + +Every thing which is sufficient to itself is inferior to that which is +simply good. + + * * * * * + +For what else is a thing sufficient to itself, than that which from +itself and in itself possesses good? But this is now full of good, and +participates of it, but is not that which is simply good. For that is +better than participation and plenitude, as has been demonstrated. +If, therefore, that which is sufficient to itself, fills itself with +good, that from which it fills itself, will be more excellent than +the self-sufficient, and will be above self-sufficiency. And neither +will that which is simply good be indigent of any thing. For it does +not aspire after any thing else; since by aspiring after it would be +deficient of good. Nor is that which is simply good sufficient to +itself. For thus it would be full of good, and would not be primarily +the good. + + + PROPOSITION XI. + + _Concerning Cause._ + +All beings proceed from one first cause. + + * * * * * + +For either there is not any cause of beings, or the causes of all +finite things are in a circle, or the ascent is to infinity, and one +thing is the cause of another, and the pre-subsistence of essence +will in no respect stop. If, however, there is no cause of beings, +there will neither be an order of things second and first, of things +perfecting and perfected, of things adorning and adorned, of things +generating and generated, and of agents and patients, nor will there +be any science of beings. For the knowledge of causes is the work of +science, and we are then said to know scientifically, when we know the +causes of things.[208] + +But if causes revolve in a circle, the same things will be prior and +posterior, more powerful and more imbecil. For every thing which +produces is better than the nature of that which is produced. It makes, +however, no difference to conjoin cause to effect, and to produce from +cause, through many, or through fewer media. For cause will be more +excellent than all the intermediate natures of which it is the cause. +And by how much the more numerous the media, by so much greater is the +causality of the cause. + +And if the addition of causes is to infinity, and there is always again +another cause prior to another, there will be no science of any being. +For there is not a knowledge of any thing infinite. But causes being +unknown, neither will there be a science of the things consequent to +the causes. If, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a cause +of beings, and causes are distinct from the things caused, and there +is not an ascent to infinity, there is a first cause of beings, from +which as from a root every thing proceeds; some things indeed being +nearer to, but others more remote from it. For that it is necessary +there should be one principle has been demonstrated;[209] because all +multitude subsists posterior to _the one_. + + + PROPOSITION XII. + +The principle and first cause of all beings is _the good_. + + * * * * * + +For if all things proceed from one cause, [as has been above +demonstrated] it is requisite to call that cause either _the good_, +or that which is more excellent than _the good_. But if it is more +excellent than _the good_, whether is any thing imparted by it to +beings, and to the nature of beings, or nothing? And if indeed nothing +is imparted by it an absurdity will ensue. For we shall no longer +preserve it in the order of cause; since it is every where requisite +that something should be present from cause to things caused,[210] and +especially from the first cause from which all things are suspended, +and on account of which every being exists. But if something is +imparted by it to beings, in the same manner as there is by _the good_, +there will be something better than goodness in beings imparted to +them by the first cause. For being more excellent than, and above _the +good_, it can never bestow on secondary natures any thing subordinate +to that which is imparted by the nature posterior to itself.[211] But +what can be more excellent than goodness? Since we say that the more +excellent itself is that which participates of a greater good. Hence, +if that which is not good cannot be said to be more excellent than, +it must entirely be secondary to _the good_. If, likewise, all beings +aspire after _the good_, how is it any longer possible that there +should be something prior to this cause? For if they also aspire after +that which is prior to _the good_, how can they especially aspire after +_the good_? But if they do not aspire after it, how is it possible that +things which proceed from it should not desire the cause of all? Hence, +if it is _the good_ from which all beings are suspended, _the good_ is +the principle and first cause of all things. + + + PROPOSITION XIII. + +Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union +is good; and _the good_ is the same with _the one_. + + * * * * * + +For if _the good_ is preservative of all beings, (on which account +also it is desirable to all things) but that which is preservative +and connective of the essence of every thing, is _the one_; for all +things are preserved by _the one_, and dispersion removes every +thing from essence;--if this be the case, _the good_ will cause +those things to which it is present, to be one, and will connect and +contain them according to union. And if _the one_ is collective and +connective of beings, it will perfect every thing by its presence. +Hence, therefore, it is good to all things to be united. If, however, +union is of itself good, and good has the power of uniting, the simply +good, and the simply one are the same, uniting and at the same time +benefiting beings. Hence it is that those things which after a manner +fall off from _the good_, are at the same time also deprived of the +participation of _the one_. And those things which become destitute +of _the one_, being filled with separation, are after the same manner +likewise deprived of _the good_. Hence, goodness is union, and union is +goodness, and _the one_ is that which is primarily good. + + + PROPOSITION XIV. + + _Concerning the immoveable and self-motive principle, or cause._ + +Every being is either immoveable or moved. And if moved, it is either +moved by itself, or by another. And if indeed it is moved by itself, +it is self-motive; but if by another, it is alter-motive. Every thing +therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or alter-motive. + + * * * * * + +For it is necessary since there are alter-motive natures, that there +should also be that which is immoveable, and that the self-motive +nature should subsist between these. For if every thing alter-motive +is moved in consequence of being moved by another thing, motions will +either be in a circle, or they will proceed to infinity.[212] But +they will neither be in a circle, nor have an infinite progression, +since all beings are bounded by the principle of things and that which +moves is better than that which is moved. Hence there will be something +immoveable which first moves.[213] But if this be the case, it is also +necessary that there should be something which is self-motive. For +if[214] all things should stop, what will that be which is first moved? +It cannot be that which is immoveable;[215] for it is not naturally +adapted to be moved; nor that which is alter-motive; for that is +moved by something else. It remains therefore, that the self-motive +nature is that which is primarily moved. For it is this also which +conjoins alter-motive natures to that which is immoveable, being in +a certain respect a middle, moving and at the same time being moved. +For of these, the immoveable moves only, but the alter-motive is moved +only. Every thing therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or +alter-motive. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things likewise, it is evident, that of things which are +moved, the self-motive nature is the first; but that of things which +move the immoveable is the first. + + + PROPOSITION XV. + + _Concerning an incorporeal essence, and what the peculiarity of it + is._ + +Every thing which is converted to itself is incorporeal. + + * * * * * + +For no body is naturally adapted to revert to itself. For if that +which is converted to any thing is conjoined with that to which it +is converted, it is evident that all the parts of the body which is +converted to itself, will be conjoined with all the parts. For this +it is for a thing to be converted to itself, when both that which is +converted, and that to which it is converted, become one. This however +is impossible in body, and in short, in all partible things. For the +whole of that which is partible is not conjoined with the whole, on +account of the separation of the parts, some of which are situated +differently from others. No body therefore, is naturally adapted to +revert to itself, so as that the whole may be converted to the whole. +Hence if there is any thing which has the power of reverting to itself, +it is incorporeal and impartible. + + + PROPOSITION XVI. + +Every thing which is converted to itself, has an essence separate from +all body. + + * * * * * + +For if it was inseparable from any body whatever, it would not have a +certain energy separate from body.[216] For thus energy would be more +excellent than essence; since the latter indeed would be indigent of +bodies, but the former would be sufficient to itself, and would not be +in want of bodies: If therefore any thing is essentially inseparable +from body, it is also in a similar manner inseparable according to +energy, or rather it is in a still greater degree inseparable. But +if this be the case, it will not revert to itself. For that which is +converted to itself being something different from body, has an energy +separate from body, and not either through, or together with body, +since the energy, and that to which the energy is directed, are not +at all in want of body. Hence, that which is converted to itself, is +entirely separate from bodies. + + + PROPOSITION XVII. + +Every thing which moves itself primarily, is convertive to itself. + + * * * * * + +For if it moves itself, and its motive energy is directed to itself, +that which moves, and that which is moved are at the same time one. For +it either moves in a part but is moved in a part, or the whole moves +and is moved, [or the whole moves, but a part is moved, or[217]] the +contrary. But if one part indeed, is that which moves, and another part +is that which is moved, it will not be essentially self-motive, since +it will consist of things which are not self-motive, but which appear +indeed to be so, yet are not so essentially. + +If however, the whole moves, but the part is moved, or the contrary, +there will be a certain part in both which according to one, moves and +at the same time is moved.[218] And this is that which is primarily +self-motive. If however, one and the same thing moves and is moved, +it will have the energy of moving to itself, being motive of itself. +But it is converted to that towards which it energizes. Every thing +therefore which primarily moves itself, is converted to itself. + + + PROPOSITION XVIII. + +Every thing which imparts existence to others, is itself that primarily +which it communicates to the natures that are supplied by it with +existence. + + * * * * * + +For if it gives existence, and makes the communication from its own +essence, that which it gives is subordinate to its own essence [by +the 7th Proposition]. But that which it is, it is in a greater and +more perfect degree; since every thing which gives subsistence to a +certain thing, is better than and not the same with it. For it is +primarily, but the other is secondarily that which it is. For it is +necessary either that each should be the same, and that there should +be one definition of both, or that there should be nothing common and +the same in both, or that the one should subsist primarily, but the +other secondarily. If however indeed, there is the same definition of +both, the one will no longer be cause, but the other effect; nor will +the one subsist essentially, but the other by participation; nor will +the one be the maker, but the other the thing made. But if they have +nothing which is the same, the one will not give subsistence to the +other by its very being, in consequence of communicating nothing to +the existence of the other. Hence, it remains that the one should be +primarily that which it gives, but that the other should be secondarily +that to which existence is given; the former supplying the latter from +its very being. + + + PROPOSITION XIX. + +Every thing which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings, +is present to all the beings that are arranged according to that +nature, and this conformably to one reason, and after the same manner. + + * * * * * + +For if it is not present to all of them after the same manner, but to +some and not to others, it is evident that it was not primarily in +that nature, but that it is in some things primarily, and in others +secondarily, that sometimes participate of it. For that which at one +time exists, but at another time does not, does not exist primarily, +nor of itself. But it is adventitious, and is imparted from some other +place to the things in which it is thus inherent. + + + PROPOSITION XX. + +The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intellectual nature +is beyond all souls, and _the one_ is beyond all intellectual +hypostases. + + * * * * * + +For every body is moveable by something else, but is not naturally +adapted to move itself, but by the presence of soul is moved of itself, +lives on account of soul, and when soul is present, is in a certain +respect self-moveable, but when it is absent is alter-moveable, as +deriving this nature from soul which is allotted a self-moveable +essence. For to whatever nature soul is present, to this it imparts +self-motion. It is however, by a much greater priority that which it +imparts by its very being. Hence, it is beyond bodies, which become +self-moveable by participation as being essentially self-moveable. + +Again however, soul which is moved from itself, has an order secondary +to the immoveable nature, which subsists immoveable according to +energy. Because of all the natures that are moved, the self-moveable +essence is the leader; but of all that move, the immoveable is the +leader. If therefore soul being moved from itself, moves other things, +it is necessary that prior to it, there should be that which moves +immoveably. But intellect moves being immoveable, and energizing +always with an invariable sameness of subsistence. For soul on account +of intellect participates of perpetual intellectual energy, just as +body on account of soul possesses the power of moving itself. For if +perpetual intellection was primarily in soul, it would be inherent +in all souls, in the same manner as the self-motive power. Hence, +perpetual intellection is not primarily in soul. It is necessary +therefore, that prior to it, there should be that which is primarily +intellective. And hence, intellect is prior to souls. + +Moreover, _the one_ is prior to intellect. For intellect though it +is immoveable yet is not _the one_; for it intellectually perceives +itself, and energizes about itself. And of _the one_ indeed, all +beings in whatever way they may exist, participate; but all beings +do not participate of intellect. For those beings to whom intellect +is present by participation, necessarily participate of knowledge; +because intellectual knowledge is the principle and first cause of the +gnostic energy. _The one_ therefore, is beyond intellect; and there +is no longer any thing else beyond _the one_. For _the one_ and _the +good_ are the same. But _the good_, as has been demonstrated, is the +principle of all things. + + + PROPOSITION XXI. + + _That intellect is not the first cause._ + +Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude +co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred +to one monad. + + * * * * * + +For the monad having the relation of a principle, generates a multitude +allied to itself. Hence one series, and one whole order has a decrement +into multitude from the monad. For there would no longer be an order, +or a series, if the monad remained of itself unprolific. But multitude +is again referred to the one common cause of all co-ordinate natures. +For that in every multitude which is the same, has not its progression +from one of those things of which the multitude consists. For that +which subsists from one alone of the many, is not common to all, but +eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since +in every order there is a certain communion, connexion, and sameness, +through which some things are said to be co-ordinate, but others of a +different order, it is evident that sameness is derived to every order +from one principle.[219] In each order, therefore, there is one monad +prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connexion to the +natures arranged in it, both to each other, and to the whole. + +For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under +the same series: but that which ranks as the cause of the one series, +must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things must +be generated by it as co-ordinate, not so that each will be a certain +particular thing, but that each will belong to this order. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things it is evident that both unity and multitude are +inherent in the nature of body; that one nature has many natures +co-suspended from it; and that many natures proceed from the one nature +of the universe. It follows also, that the order of souls originates +from one first soul, and proceeds with diminution into the multitude of +souls. That in the intellectual essence also, there is an intellectual +monad; and that a multitude of intellects proceeds from one intellect, +and is converted to it. That a multitude of unities likewise originates +from _the one_ which is prior to all things; and that there is an +extension of these unities to _the one_. Hence, after the first +one there are unities; after the first intellect, there are intellects; +after the first soul there are souls; and after total nature, there are +natures. + + + PROPOSITION XXII. + +Every thing which subsists primarily and principally in each order is +one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is only begotten. + + * * * * * + +For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist; +since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two; +or let that which subsists primarily consist of both these. But if +indeed it consists of both, it will again be one, and there will not be +two things that are first. And if it be one of the two, each will not +be first. Nor if both are equally primary, will each have a principal +subsistence. For if one of them is primary, but this is not the same +with the other, what will it be in that order? For that subsists +primarily, which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But +each of these being different is, and at the same time is not that +which it is said to be. + +If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily +differ so far as they are that which they are said to be; for this +primarily suffers that which is the same; both will not be first, but +that of which both participating, are said to subsist primarily. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things it is evident, that what is primarily being is one +alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two; +that the first intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first +intellects; and that the first soul is one. This is also the case with +every form, such as the primarily beautiful, and the primarily equal. +And in a similar manner in all things. Thus also, with respect to the +form of animal, and the form of man, the first of each is one; for the +demonstration is the same. + + + PROPOSITION XXIII. + + _Concerning the Imparticipable._[220] + +Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which +are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to +imparticipable hyparxes. + + * * * * * + +For that which is imparticipable having the relation of a monad, as +subsisting from itself, and not from another, and being exempt from +participants, generates things which are able to be participated. +For either[221] it remains of itself barren, and possesses nothing +honourable; or it gives something from itself. And that which receives +indeed from it participates, but that which is given subsists in a +participated manner. But every thing which is something belonging to +a certain thing by which it is participated,[222] is secondary to +that which is similarly present to all things, and which fills all +things from itself. For that which is in one thing is not in others. +But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it +may illuminate all things, is not in one thing, but is prior to all +things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or it is +prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things being distributed +into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which +is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same +thing, but this of one thing, and that of another, the one being +divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be common +to all, but to one thing. Hence if it is common to things able to +participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is +imparticipable. + + + PROPOSITION XXIV. + +Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is +participated; and that which is participated is inferior to that which +is imparticipable. + + * * * * * + +For that which participates, being imperfect prior to participation, +but becoming perfect through participation, is entirely secondary to +that which is participated, so far as it is perfect by participating. +For so far as it was imperfect, it is inferior to that which it +participates, which makes it to be perfect. That however which is +participated since it belongs to a certain thing, and not to all +things, is again allotted an hyparxis subordinate to that which is +something belonging to all things, and not to a certain thing. For +the latter is more allied to the cause of all; but the former is less +allied to it. + +The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things which are +participated; but the latter are the leaders of participants. For, in +short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many; but that which is +participated in the many, is one and at the same time not one; and +every thing which participates is not one, and at the same time one. + + + PROPOSITION XXV. + + _Concerning the Perfect._ + +Every thing perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it +is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all. + + * * * * * + +For as that on account of its own goodness, unically gives subsistence +to all beings; for _the good_ and _the one_ are the same, so that the +boniform is the same with the unical; thus also those things which +are posterior to the first, on account of their perfection, hasten +to generate beings inferior to their own essence. For perfection is +a certain portion of _the good_, and the perfect, so far as it is +perfect, imitates _the good_. But _the good_ gives subsistence to all +things. So that the perfect likewise, is productive according to nature +of those things which it is able to produce. And that indeed which is +more perfect, by how much the more perfect it is, by so much the more +numerous are the progeny of which it is the cause. For that which is +more perfect, participates in a greater degree of _the good_. It is, +therefore, nearer to _the good_. But this being the case, it is nearer +to the cause of all. And thus, it is the cause of a greater number of +effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, by how much the more +imperfect it is, by so much the less numerous are the effects of which +it is the cause. For being more remote from that which produces every +thing, it gives subsistence to fewer effects. For to that which gives +subsistence to, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or +fabricates, all things, that nature is more allied which produces a +greater number of each of these; but that is more remote which produces +a less number of each. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things it is evident, that the nature which is most remote +from the principle of all, is unprolific, and is not the cause of +any thing. For if it generated a certain thing, and had something +posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be most +remote, but that which it produced would be more remote than itself, +from the principle of all things, but it would be nearer to productive +power, and besides[223] this, would imitate the cause which is +productive of all beings. + + + PROPOSITION XXVI. + +Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in +itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and such as are +successive. + + * * * * * + +For if it imitates _the one_, but that immoveably gives subsistence to +things posterior to itself, every thing which produces will possess in +a similar manner the cause of productive energy. But _the one_ gives +subsistence to things immoveably. For if through motion, the motion +will be in it, and being moved, it will no longer be _the one_, in +consequence of being changed from _the one_. But if motion subsists +together with it, it will also be from _the one_, and either there will +be a progression to infinity, or _the one_ will produce immoveably; +and every thing which produces will imitate the producing cause of +all things. For every where, from that which is primarily, that which +is not primarily derives its subsistence; so that the nature which is +productive of certain things originates from that which is productive +of all things. Hence every producing cause produces subsequent +natures from itself. And while productive natures abide in themselves +undiminished, secondary natures are produced from them. For that which +is in any respect diminished, cannot abide such as it is. + + + PROPOSITION XXVII. + +Every producing cause, on account of its perfection, and abundance of +power, is productive of secondary natures. + + * * * * * + +For if it produced not on account of the perfect, but through a +defect according to power, it would not be able to preserve its own +order immoveable. For that which imparts existence to another thing +through defect and imbecility, imparts subsistence to it, through its +own mutation and change in quality. But every thing which produces +remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining, that +which is posterior to it[224] proceeds into existence. Hence, being +full and perfect, it gives subsistence to secondary natures immoveably +and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being +changed into them, nor diminished. For that which is produced, is not a +distribution into parts of the producing cause; since this is neither +appropriate to the generating energy, nor to generating causes. Nor +is it a transition. For it does not become the matter of that which +proceeds; since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced +is different from it. Hence that which generates is firmly established +undiminished; through prolific power multiplies itself; and from itself +imparts secondary hypostases. + + + PROPOSITION XXVIII. + +Every producing cause gives subsistence to things similar to itself, +prior to such as are dissimilar. + + * * * * * + +For since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than +that which is produced, they can never be simply the same with each +other, and equal in power. But if they are not the same and equal, but +different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each +other, or they are both united and separated. If, however, they are +entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and no where +will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence neither +will one of these participate of the other, being entirely different +from it. For that which is participated, gives communion to its +participant, with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover, +it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause, +as from thence possessing its essence. + +But if that which is produced, is partly separated from and partly +united to its producing cause, if indeed, it suffers each of these +equally, it will equally participate and not participate. So that after +the same manner, it will both have essence and not have it from the +producing cause. And if it is more separated from than united to it, +the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which +it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and be more +deprived of, than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things +which proceed from causes are allied to them according to their very +being, have sympathy with them, are naturally suspended from them, and +aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object +of their desire through the cause of their existence,--if this be the +case, it is evident that things produced are in a greater degree united +to their producing causes, than separated from them. Things, however, +which are more united, are more similar than dissimilar to the natures +to which they are especially united. Every producing cause, therefore, +gives subsistence to things similar to itself prior to such as are +dissimilar. + + + PROPOSITION XXIX. + +Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to +first natures. + + * * * * * + +For if that which produces, gives subsistence to similars prior to +dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will +give subsistence to the things produced. For similars are rendered +similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If, +therefore, progression in its diminution preserves a [certain] sameness +of that which is generated with that which generates, and exhibits +that which is posterior to the generator such in a secondary degree, +as the generator is primarily, it will have its subsistence through +similitude. + + + PROPOSITION XXX. + +Every thing which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, +abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it. + + * * * * * + +For if every progression is effected, while primary natures remain +permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being +constituted prior to dissimilars,--if this be the case, that which is +produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For +that which entirely proceeds, will have nothing which is the same with +the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separated from it, and will +not have any thing common with and united to it. Hence it will abide +in its cause, in the same manner as that also abides in itself. If, +however, it abides, but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ +from its cause, nor will it, while that abides, be generated something +different from it. For if it is something different it is separated and +apart from its cause. If, however, it is apart, but the cause abides, +it will proceed from the cause, in order that while it abides, it may +be separated from it. So far therefore, as that which is produced has +something which is the same with the producing[225] cause, it abides +in it; but so far as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being, +however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and +different. Hence, it abides, and at the same time proceeds, and it is +neither of these without the other. + + + PROPOSITION XXXI. + +Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing essentially, is +converted to that from which it proceeds. + + * * * * * + +For if it should proceed indeed, but should not return to the cause +of this progression, it would not aspire after its cause. For every +thing which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover, +every thing aspires after good, and to each thing the attainment of it +is through the proximate cause. Every thing, therefore, aspires after +its cause. For well-being is derived to every thing from that through +which its existence is derived. But appetite is first directed to that +through which well-being is derived. And conversion is to that to which +appetite is first directed. + + + PROPOSITION XXXII. + +All conversion is effected through the similitude of the things +converted to that to which they are converted. + + * * * * * + +For every thing which is converted, hastens to be conjoined with its +cause,[226] and aspires after communion and colligation with it. But +similitude binds all things together, just as dissimilitude separates +and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion is a certain +communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through +similitude,--if this be the case, all conversion will be effected +through similitude. + + + PROPOSITION XXXIII. + +Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing and is converted to it, +has a circular energy. + + * * * * * + +For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it conjoins the end +to the beginning, and the motion is one and continued; one motion being +from that which abides, but the other being directed to the abiding +cause. Hence all things proceed in a circle from causes to causes; +greater and less circles being continually formed of conversions, some +of which are to the natures [immediately] placed above the things that +are converted, but others are to still higher natures, and so on as far +as to the principle of all things. For all things proceed from this +principle, and are converted to it. + + + PROPOSITION XXXIV. + +Every thing which is converted according to nature, makes its +conversion to that, from which also it had the progression of its +proper hypostasis. + + * * * * * + +For if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential +desire of that to which it is converted. But if this be the case, the +whole being of it is suspended from that to which it makes an essential +conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also it has a +natural sympathy with, as being allied to the essence of it. If this, +however, be the case, either the being of both is the same, or the +one is derived from the other, or both are allotted similitude from a +certain other one. But if the being of both is the same, how is the one +naturally converted to the other? And if both are from a certain one, +it will be according to nature for both to be converted to that one. It +remains, therefore, that the one must derive its being from the other. +But if this be the case, the progression will be from that to which the +conversion is according to nature. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things, therefore, it is evident that intellect is the +object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect, +and that the whole world though it is perpetual possesses its essence +from intellect. For it is not prevented from proceeding from intellect +because it is perpetual. For neither because it is always arranged is +it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially +perpetual, and is always converted, and indissoluble according to order. + + + PROPOSITION XXXV. + +Every thing caused, abides in, proceeds from, and returns, or is +converted to, its cause. + + * * * * * + +For if it alone abided, it would in no respect differ from its cause, +being without separation and distinction from it. For progression +is accompanied with separation. But if it alone proceeded, it would +be unconjoined and deprived of sympathy with its cause, having no +communication with it whatever. And if it were alone converted, how can +that which has not its essence from the cause, be essentially converted +to that which is foreign to its nature? But if it should abide and +proceed, but should not be converted, how will there be a natural +desire to every thing of well-being, and of good, and an excitation to +its generating cause? And if it should proceed and be converted, but +should not abide, how being separated from its cause will it hasten to +be conjoined with it? For it was unconjoined prior to its departure; +since if it had been conjoined, it would entirely have abided in it. +But if it should abide and be converted, but should not proceed, how +can that which is not[227] separated be able to revert to its cause? +For every thing which is converted resembles that which is resolved +into the nature from which it is essentially divided. It is necessary +however, either that it should abide alone, or be converted alone, or +alone proceed, or that the extremes should be bound to each other, or +that the medium should be conjoined with each of the extremes, or that +all should be conjoined. Hence it remains that every thing must abide +in its cause, proceed from, and be converted to it. + + + PROPOSITION XXXVI. + +Of all things which are multiplied according to progression, the first +are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to +them, and after the same manner successively. + + * * * * * + +For if progressions separate productions from their causes, and there +are diminutions of things secondary with respect to such as are first, +it follows that first natures in proceeding, are more conjoined +with their causes, being [as it were,] germinations from them. But +second natures are more remote from their causes, and in a similar +manner such as are successive. Things however, which are nearer and +more allied to their causes, are more perfect. For causes are more +perfect than things caused. But things which are more remote are more +imperfect, being dissimilar to their causes. + + + PROPOSITION XXXVII. + +Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more +imperfect than the second, and the second than those that follow; but +the last are the most perfect. + + * * * * * + +For if conversions are effected in a circle, and conversion is directed +to that from which progression is derived, but progression is from +that which is most perfect, hence conversion is directed to the most +perfect. And if conversion first begins from that in which progression +terminates, but progression terminates in that which is most imperfect, +conversion will begin from the most imperfect. Hence in things which +subsist according to conversion, such as are most imperfect are the +first, but such as are most perfect, the last. + + + PROPOSITION XXXVIII. + +Every thing which proceeds from certain numerous causes, is converted +through as many causes as those are through which it proceeds, and +all conversion is through the same things as those through which +progression is effected. + + * * * * * + +For since each of these takes place through similitude, that indeed +which has a transition immediately from a certain thing, is also +immediately converted to it. For the similitude here is without a +medium. But that which requires a medium in proceeding, requires also +a medium according to conversion. For it is necessary that each should +be effected with reference to the same thing. Hence the conversion will +be first to the medium, and afterwards to that which is better than +the medium. Through such things therefore as being is derived to each +thing, through so many well-being also is derived, and vice versa. + + + PROPOSITION XXXIX. + +Every being is either alone essentially converted, or vitally, or also +gnostically. + + * * * * * + +For either it alone possesses being from its cause, or life together +with being, or it likewise receives from thence a gnostic power. So far +therefore as it alone _is_, it makes an essential conversion, but +so far as it lives, a vital, and so far as it likewise knows, a gnostic +conversion. For in such a way as it proceeded from its cause, such also +is the mode of its conversion to it, and the measures of its conversion +are defined by the measures according to progression. Desire therefore +is to some things according to being alone, this desire being an +aptitude to the participation of causes; but to others it is according +to life, being a motion to more excellent natures; and to others, it is +according to knowledge, being a co-sensation of the goodness of causes. + + + PROPOSITION XL. + +Of all things which proceed from another cause, those which exist from +themselves, and which are allotted a self-subsistent essence, are the +leaders. + + * * * * * + +For if every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to +essence, or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is +suspended from another cause; but that which produces itself, since it +produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to +essence; but that which is alone produced by another is not sufficient +to itself; and the self-sufficient is more allied to _the good_; but +things more allied and similar to their causes, subsist from cause +prior to such as are dissimilar;--this being the case, things which +are produced by themselves, and are self-subsistent, are more ancient +than those which proceed into existence from another cause alone. For +either there will be nothing self-subsistent, or _the good_ is a thing +of this kind, or the first things that subsist from _the good_. But +if there is nothing self-subsistent, there will not in reality be in +any thing self-sufficiency. Nor will it be in _the good_, since that +being _the one_ is better than self-sufficiency. It is also _the good +itself_, and not that which possesses _the good_. But if _the good_ was +self-subsistent, in consequence of itself producing itself, it will +not be _the one_. For that which proceeds from _the one_ is not _the +one_. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; so +that _the one_, would at the same time be one and not one. Hence, it is +necessary that the self-subsistent should be posterior to the first. +And it is evident that it will be prior to things which alone proceed +from another cause. For it has a more principal subsistence than these, +and is more allied to _the good_, as has been demonstrated. + + + PROPOSITION XLI. + +Every thing which is in another is alone produced by another; but every +thing which is in itself is self-subsistent. + + * * * * * + +For that which is in another thing and is indigent of a subject, can +never be generative of itself. For that which is naturally adapted to +generate itself, does not require another seat, because it is contained +by itself, and is preserved in itself apart from a subject. But that +which abides, and is able to be established in itself, is productive +of itself, itself proceeding into itself, and being connective of +itself. And thus it is in itself, as the thing caused in its cause. +For it is not in itself, as in place, or as in a subject. For place is +different from that which is in place, and that which is in a subject +is different from the subject. But this which is in itself is the same +with that in which it is inherent; for it is self-subsistent. And it +is in such a manner in itself, as that which is from a cause is in the +cause. + + + PROPOSITION XLII. + +Every thing self-subsistent is convertive to itself. + + * * * * * + +For if it proceeds from itself, it will also make a conversion to +itself. For to that from which progression is derived, to that a +conversion co-ordinate to the progression is directed. For if it alone +proceeded from itself, but having proceeded was not converted to +itself, it would never aspire after its proper good, and that which +it is able to impart to itself. Every cause however is able to impart +to that which proceeds from it,[228] together with the essence which +it gives, well-being conjoined with this essence. Hence that which +is self-subsistent will impart this to itself. This therefore is the +proper good to that which is self-subsistent. And hence this will not +be the object of desire to that which is not[229] converted to itself. +But not desiring this, it will not obtain it, and not obtaining it, +it will be imperfect, and not sufficient to itself. If, however, +self-sufficiency and perfection pertain to any thing, they must pertain +to that which is self-subsistent. Hence it will obtain its proper good, +and will be converted to itself. + + + PROPOSITION XLIII. + +Every thing which is convertive to itself is self-subsistent. + + * * * * * + +For if it is converted to itself according to nature, it is perfect in +the conversion to itself, and will possess essence from itself. For to +every thing, essential progression is from that to which conversion +according to nature is directed. If therefore, it imparts well-being to +itself, it will likewise undoubtedly impart being to itself, and will +be the lord of its own hypostasis. Hence, that which is able to revert +to itself is self-subsistent. + + + PROPOSITION XLIV. + +Every thing which is convertive to itself according to energy, is also +converted to itself essentially. + + * * * * * + +For if it is capable of being converted to itself in energy, but is +without conversion in its essence, it will be more excellent according +to energy than according to essence, the former being convertive, +but the latter without conversion. For that which depends on itself, +is better than that which alone depends on another. And that which +has a power of preserving itself, is more perfect than that which is +alone preserved by another. If therefore, it is convertive to itself +according to the energy proceeding from essence,[230] it will also +be allotted a convertive essence, so that it will not alone energize +towards itself, but will depend on itself, and will be contained, +connected, and perfected by itself. + + + PROPOSITION XLV. + +Every thing self-subsistent is unbegotten. + + * * * * * + +For if it is generated, because generated indeed, it will be imperfect +of itself, and will be indigent of perfection from another. Because, +however, it produces itself, it is perfect and sufficient to itself. +For every thing generated is perfected by another which imparts +generation to it not yet[231] existing. For generation is a path from +the imperfect to its contrary the perfect. But if any thing produces +itself, it is always perfect, being always present with the essence +of itself, or rather being inherent in that which is perfective of +essence. + + + PROPOSITION XLVI. + +Every thing self-subsistent is incorruptible. + + * * * * * + +For if it should be corrupted, it would desert itself, and would be +without itself. This however is impossible. For being one thing, it is +at the same time cause and the thing caused. But every thing which is +corrupted, departing from the cause of itself is corrupted. For so far +as it adheres to that which contains, connects and preserves it, it is +connected and preserved. But that which is self-subsistent never leaves +its cause, because it does not desert itself; for it is the cause of +itself. Every thing therefore self-subsistent is incorruptible. + + + PROPOSITION XLVII. + +Every thing self-subsistent, is impartible and simple. + + * * * * * + +For if it is partible, being self-subsistent, it will constitute itself +partible,[232] and the whole will be converted to itself, and all +will be in all itself. This however is impossible. Hence that which +is self-subsistent is impartible. But it is also simple. For if a +composite, one thing in it will be less, but another more excellent, +and the more will be derived from the less excellent, and the less +from the more excellent, if the whole proceeds from itself. Farther +still, it would not be sufficient to itself, being indigent of the +elements of itself of which it consists. Every thing therefore, which +is self-subsistent, is simple. + + + PROPOSITION XLVIII. + + _Concerning the perpetual, in order to demonstrate that the world is + perpetual._ + +Every thing which is not perpetual, is either a composite, or subsists +in another. + + * * * * * + +For either it is dissoluble into those things of which it consists, and +is entirely composed from the things into which it is dissolved, or +it is indigent of a subject, and leaving the subject it departs into +non-entity. But if it is simple in itself, it will be indissoluble, and +incapable of being dissipated. + + + PROPOSITION XLIX. + +Every thing self-subsistent is perpetual. + + * * * * * + +For there are two modes according to which it is necessary a thing +should not be perpetual; the one arising from composition, and the +other from a subsistence in something else [as in a subject]. That +which is self-subsistent however, is neither a composite, but simple, +nor in another, but in itself. Hence it is perpetual. + + + PROPOSITION L. + +Every thing which is measured by time, either according to essence, or +according to energy, is generation, so far as it is measured by time. + + * * * * * + +For if it is measured by time, it will be adapted to it to be, or to +energize in time; and the _was_ and the _will be_, which differ from +each other, pertain to it. For if the _was_ and the _will be_ were the +same according to number, it would suffer nothing by time proceeding, +and always having one part prior, and another posterior. If therefore +the _was_ and the _will be_ are different, that which is measured by +time is becoming to be [or rising into existence], and never _is_,[233] +but proceeds together with time, by which it is measured, existing in +a tendency to being. + +It likewise does not stop in the same state of being, but is always +receiving another and another _to be_, just as _the now_ in time is +always another and another, through the progression of time. Hence +it is not a simultaneous whole; for it subsists in a dispersion of +temporal extension, and is co-extended with time. This however is +to possess being in non-being. For that which is becoming to be is +not that which is become. Such a kind of being therefore as this is +generation. + + + PROPOSITION LI. + +Every thing self-subsistent, is essentially exempt from the natures +which are measured by time. + + * * * * * + +For if that which is self-subsistent is unbegotten, it will not +according to existence be measured by time. For generation is +conversant with the nature which is measured by time. Hence nothing +self-subsistent has its being in time. + + + PROPOSITION LII. + +Every thing eternal is a whole which subsists at once. And whether +it has its essence alone eternal, it will possess the whole at once +present, nor will it have _this_ thing pertaining to itself now +subsisting, but _that_ afterwards which as yet is not; but as +much as is possible it now possesses the whole without diminution, +and without extension. Or whether it has its energy as well as its +essence at once present, it possesses this also collectively, abiding +in the same measure of perfection, and as it were, fixed immoveably and +without transition according to one and the same boundary. + + * * * * * + +For if the eternal, as the name denotes, is perpetual being, but to be +sometimes,[234] and to subsist in becoming to be, are different from +perpetual being, it is not proper that it should have one thing prior +and another posterior. For if it had, it would be generation, and not +being. But where there is neither prior nor posterior, nor was and +will be, but alone _to be_, and this a whole, there every thing +subsists at once that which it is. The same thing also takes place with +respect to the energy of that which is eternal. + + + COROLLARY. + +From this it is evident that eternity is the cause to wholes of +their existence as wholes, since every thing which is eternal either +according to essence, or according to energy, has the whole of its +essence or energy present with itself. + + + PROPOSITION LIII. + + _Concerning Eternity and Eternal Natures._ + +Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and time exists prior +to every thing which subsists according to time. + + * * * * * + +For if every where the natures which are participated are prior to +their participants, and imparticipables are prior to participated +natures, it is evident that the eternal is one thing, the eternity +which is in the eternal, another, and eternity itself, another. And +the first of these indeed subsists as a participant, the second as a +thing participated, and the third as an imparticipable. That also which +is in time is one thing; for it is a participant. The time which is +in this is another thing; for it is participated. And the time prior +to this is another thing; for it is imparticipable. Every where also, +that which is imparticipable is in all things the same. But that which +is participated is in those things only by which it is participated. +For there are many eternal, and many temporal natures in all of which +eternity subsists according to participation. The time also which is +in temporal natures subsists in a distributed manner; but the time +which they participate is indivisible. And there is one time prior to +both these. Eternity itself likewise is an eternity of eternities, and +time itself is a time of times; and they give subsistence, the one to +participated eternity, but the other to participated time. + + + PROPOSITION LIV. + +Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and every time is the +measure of things in time; and these are the only two measures of life +and motion in beings. + + * * * * * + +For every thing which measures, either measures according to a part, +or it measures the whole at once when it is adapted to that which is +measured. That which measures, therefore, according to the whole is +eternity; but that which measures according to parts is time. Hence, +there are only two measures, the one of things eternal, but the other +of things in time. + + + PROPOSITION LV. + +Every thing which subsists according to time, either subsists through +the whole of time, or has its hypostasis once in a part of time. + + * * * * * + +For if all progressions are through similitude, and things more +similar to first natures subsist in union with them prior to such +as are dissimilar, but it is impossible for things which are +generated in a part of time to be conjoined with eternal natures, +(for as being generated they differ from first natures which are +self-subsistent,[235] and as existing once, they are separated from +things which always exist, but the media between these, are such things +as are partly similar and partly dissimilar to them)--this being the +case, the medium between things which are once generated, and those +that exist always, is either that which is always becoming to be, or +that which is once, or that which is not truly being. It is however +impossible it should be that which once only truly is. And that which +is once not truly being is the same with that which is becoming to be. +Hence the medium is not that which is once only. It remains, therefore, +that the medium between both is that which is always becoming to be, +being conjoined indeed with the worse of the two through becoming to +be, but through subsisting always, imitating an eternal nature. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things it is evident that perpetuity is twofold, the one +indeed being eternal, but the other subsisting according to time. +The one also being a stable, but the other a flowing perpetuity. And +the one indeed having its being collected, and the whole subsisting +at once, but the other diffused, and expanded according to temporal +extension. And the one being a whole of itself, but the other +consisting of parts, each of which is separate, according to prior and +posterior. + + + PROPOSITION LVI. + +Every thing which is produced by secondary natures, is produced in a +greater degree by prior and more causal natures, by whom such as are +secondary were also produced. + + * * * * * + +For if that which is secondary has the whole of its essence from that +which is prior to it, its power of producing is also derived from +thence; for powers in producing causes are essentially productive, +and give completion to the essence of them. But if it is allotted the +power of producing from a superior cause, it will possess from that +its existence as the cause of things of which it is the cause, and +its power of giving subsistence to other things will be measured from +thence. If, however, this be the case, the things proceeding from it +are effects through that which is prior to it. For the one perfects a +cause, and the other the thing caused. But if this be the case, the +thing caused is from thence rendered such as it is. + +Moreover, that it is also in a greater degree perfected from thence +is evident. For if that which is first gives to that which is second +the cause of producing, it will primarily possess this cause; and on +this account that which is secondary generates, receiving from thence +a secondary generative power. If, however, the one becomes productive +through participation, but the other in a way superior to participation +and primarily, that will be in a greater degree a cause, which imparts +generative power to another thing proximate to its own nature. + + + PROPOSITION LVII. + +Every cause both energizes prior to the thing caused, and gives +subsistence to a greater number of effects posterior to it. + + * * * * * + +For so far as it is cause, it is more perfect and more powerful than +that which is posterior to it, and in consequence of this is the cause +of a greater number of effects. For it is the province of a greater +power to produce more, of an equal power to produce equal, and of a +less power to produce a less number of effects. And the power which +is able to effect greater things among similars, is also capable of +effecting such as are less. But that which is able to effect such as +are less, is not necessarily capable of producing such as are greater. +If, therefore, the cause is more powerful, it is productive of more +numerous effects. + +Moreover, such effects as the thing caused is able to produce, the +cause is in a greater degree able to produce. For every thing which is +produced by secondary natures, is in a greater degree produced by such +as are prior and more causal. The cause, therefore, gives subsistence +together with the thing caused to such effects as the thing caused is +naturally adapted to produce. But if likewise it produces prior to +it, it is indeed evident that it energizes prior to the thing caused, +according to the energy which is productive of it. Every cause, +therefore, energizes prior to the thing caused, and together with it, +and posterior to it, gives subsistence to other things. + + + COROLLARY. + +Hence, it is evident, that of such things as soul is the cause, +intellect also is the cause; but that soul is not also the cause +of such things as intellect is the cause. But intellect energizes +prior to soul. And such things as soul imparts to secondary natures, +intellect also imparts in a greater degree. Likewise, when soul no +longer energizes, intellect imparts by illumination the gifts of +itself to those things to which soul does not impart herself. For that +which is inanimate, so far as it participates of form, participates of +intellect, and the production of intellect. Moreover, of such things as +intellect is the cause, _the good_ also is the cause; but not vice +versa. For the privations of forms subsist from _the good_; since +all things are from thence. But intellect being form, does not give +subsistence to privation. + + + PROPOSITION LVIII. + +Every thing which is produced by many, is more compounded than that +which is produced by fewer causes. + + * * * * * + +For if every cause imparts something to that which proceeds from +it, more numerous causes will impart a greater number of gifts, but +less numerous causes a less number. Hence, of participants some will +consist of a greater number of things, but others, of a less number, +of which each participates, some indeed through a progression from a +greater number of causes, but others from a less. Those, however, which +proceed from a greater number of causes are more compounded, but those +from a less number of the same causes, are more simple. Every thing, +therefore, which is produced by a greater number of causes, is more +compounded, but that which is produced by a less number is more simple. +For the more compounded participates of those things of which the more +simple participates, but the contrary to this is not true. + + + PROPOSITION LIX. + +Every thing which is essentially simple, is either better or worse than +composite natures. + + * * * * * + +For if such beings as are the extremes of things are produced by fewer +and more simple causes, but such as are in the middle, from a greater +number of causes, the latter indeed will be composites, but of the +former, some are more simple according to that which is better, but +others according to that which is worse. That the extremes, however, +are produced by fewer causes is evident, because such natures as are +higher begin to produce prior to such as are subordinate, and extend +beyond them, to things to which subordinate natures do not proceed +through a diminution of power. For on this account also, the last of +things, [i.e. matter] is most simple, as well as the first of things, +because it proceeds from the first alone. With respect to simplicity, +however, one kind subsists according to that which is better than all +composition, but another according to that which is worse. And there is +the same reasoning in all things. + + + PROPOSITION LX. + +Every thing which is the cause of a greater number of effects, is +better than that which is allotted a power of producing a less number, +and which produces the parts of those things to the wholes of which the +other gives subsistence. + + * * * * * + +For if the one is the cause of a less, but the other of a greater +number of effects, but the former are parts of the latter, that which +gives subsistence to a greater number of effects, will produce all that +the other produces; but not vice versa. Hence the former of these two +is more powerful and more comprehensive. For as that which proceeds is +to that which proceeds, so is one productive power to another, when +assumed with reference to each other. For that which is able to effect +a greater number of things, possesses a greater and more total power. +But this is nearer to the cause of all things. That however, which is +nearer to this cause, is in a greater degree good, just as the cause +of all is _the good_ itself. Hence, that which is the cause of +a greater number of effects, is essentially more excellent than that +which produces a less number. + + + PROPOSITION LXI. + +Every power which is impartible is greater, but when divided is less. + + * * * * * + +For if it is divided it proceeds into multitude. And if this be the +case, it becomes more remote from _the one_. But in consequence of +this it is able to effect a less number of things, through departing +from _the one_, and the unity which contains it, and will be +imperfect, since the good of every thing consists in union. + + + PROPOSITION LXII. + +Every multitude which is nearer to _the one_, is less in quantity +than things more remote from it, but is greater in power. + + * * * * * + +For that which is nearer to is more similar to _the one_. But _the +one_ gives subsistence to all things, without having any multitude in +itself. Hence that which is more similar to it, being the cause of a +greater number of effects, since _the one_ is the cause of all things, +has more the form of unity, and is more impartible, because that is +_one_. As therefore, that which is less multiplied, is more allied to +_the one_, so likewise as being allied to the cause of all things, it +is productive of a greater number of effects. Hence it is more powerful. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things it is evident, that there are more corporeal natures +than souls; more souls than intellectual natures; and more intellects +than divine unities. And there is the same reasoning in all things. + + + PROPOSITION LXIII. + +Every thing which is imparticipable gives subsistence to two-fold +orders of participated natures, one indeed in things which sometimes +participate, but the other in things which always and connascently +participate. + + * * * * * + +For that which is always participated, is more similar to the +imparticipable than that which is sometimes participated. Hence, +before the imparticipable establishes that which is sometimes, it +will establish that which is always participable; and which by being +participated differs from that which is posterior to it, but by _the +always_ is more allied and more similar to the imparticipable. Nor +are there alone things which are sometimes participated; for prior to +these are the natures which are always participated, through which +these also are bound to imparticipables according to a certain well +ordered progression. Nor are there alone things which are sometimes +participated. For these possessing an inextinguishable power, since +they are always, are prolific of other things which are sometimes +participated, and as far as to these the diminution proceeds. + + + COROLLARY. + +From hence it is evident that of the unions proceeding from _the +one_, and which illuminate beings, some are always, but others +sometimes participated. Intellectual participations, likewise, are in +a similar manner two-fold, as also are the animations of souls, and +the participations of other forms. For beauty, similitude, permanency, +and sameness, being imparticipable, are participated by natures which +always participate, and secondarily by those that sometimes participate +according to the same order. + + + PROPOSITION LXIV. + +Every monad which ranks as a principle, gives subsistence to a two-fold +number; one indeed of self-perfect hypostases, but the other of +illuminations which possess their hypostasis in other things. + + * * * * * + +For if progression is according to diminution, through things +appropriate to producing causes, perfect natures will proceed from the +all-perfect, and through these as media, imperfect natures will proceed +in a well-ordered progression, so that some indeed will be self-perfect +hypostases, but others will be imperfect. And these latter will become +the forms of participants. For being imperfect, they will be indigent +of subjects in their very nature. But the self-perfect hypostases will +produce things which participate of themselves. For being perfect, +they will indeed fill these from themselves, and establish them in +themselves. But they will require nothing of inferior natures to their +own subsistence. Self-perfect hypostases, therefore, through their +separation into multitude, are indeed diminished with respect to their +principal monad; but through their self-perfect hyparxis, they are +in a certain respect assimilated to it. But imperfect hypostases, in +consequence of subsisting in other things, are remote from that which +subsists from itself, and through their imperfection are separated from +that which perfects all things. Progressions, however, are through +similars, as far as to natures which are entirely dissimilar. Every +monad, therefore, which ranks as a principle, gives subsistence to a +two-fold number. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things it is evident, that of the unities, some are +self-perfect proceeding from _the one_, but others are illuminations +of unions. And with respect to intellects, that some of them are +self-perfect essences, but others belong to animated natures, being +only the images of souls. And thus, neither is every union a God, but +this is true of a self-perfect unity alone, nor is every intellectual +peculiarity an intellect, but an essential peculiarity alone [is +entitled to this appellation], nor is every illumination of soul a +soul, but there are also images of souls. + + + PROPOSITION LXV. + +Every thing which has any subsistence whatever, either subsists +according to cause, so as to have the form of a principle, or according +to hyparxis, or according to participation, after the manner of an +image. + + * * * * * + +For either that which is produced is seen in that which produces, as +pre-existing in cause, because every cause antecedently comprehends in +itself the thing caused, being that primarily which the thing caused is +secondarily. Or that which produces is seen in that which is produced. +For the latter participating of the former, exhibits in itself +secondarily that which the producing cause is primarily. Or each thing +is beheld in its own order, and is neither seen in the cause nor in the +effect. For the cause subsists more excellently than that which exists +[out of the cause]. But that which is in the effect is less excellent +than that which exists out of the cause [but is not in any thing else]. +It is, however, necessary there should be that which after this manner +_is_. But every thing subsists according to hyparxis in its own +order. + + + PROPOSITION LXVI. + +All beings with reference to each other, are either wholes, or parts, +or the same, or different. + + * * * * * + +For either some of then comprehend, but the rest are comprehended, or +they neither comprehend, nor are comprehended. And they either suffer +something which is the same, as participating of one thing, or they are +separated from each other. But if they comprehend, they will be wholes, +and if they are comprehended, parts. If also many things participate +of one thing, they are the same according to this one. But if they are +alone many things, so far as they are many they will be different from +each other. + + + PROPOSITION LXVII. + +Every wholeness (ολοτης) is either prior to parts, or consists of +parts, or is in a part. + + * * * * * + +For the form of each thing is either surveyed in its cause, and we +call that which subsists in its cause a whole prior to parts. Or it +is seen in the parts which participate of it; and this in a two-fold +respect. For it is either seen in all the parts together, and this is +a whole consisting of parts, any part of which being absent diminishes +the whole. Or it is seen in each of the parts, so that the part also +becomes according to participation a whole; which makes the part to +be a whole partially. The whole, therefore, which is according to +hyparxis consists of parts. But the whole which is prior to parts is +according to cause. And the whole which is in a part is according to +participation. For this also according to an ultimate diminution is a +whole, so far as it imitates the whole which consists of parts, when +it is not any casual part, but is capable of being assimilated to the +whole, of which the parts also are wholes. + + + PROPOSITION LXVIII. + +Every whole which is in a part, is a part of that whole which consists +of parts. + + * * * * * + +For if it is a part, it is a part of a certain whole. And it is either +a part of the whole which it contains, according to which it is said +to be a whole in a part. But thus it will be a part of itself, the +part will be equal to the whole, and each will be the same. Or it is a +part of a certain other whole. And if of some other, it is either the +only part of that, and thus again, it will in no respect differ from +the whole, being one part of one thing. Or it is a part in conjunction +with another part. For of every whole the parts are more than one, and +that will be a whole from many parts, of which it consists. And thus +the whole which is in a part, is a part of the whole which consists of +parts. + + + PROPOSITION LXIX. + +Every whole which consists of parts, participates of the wholeness +which is prior to parts. + + * * * * * + +For if it consists of parts, the whole is passive [i.e. the whole +participates of another whole]. For the parts becoming one, are passive +to a whole on account of their union, and the whole subsists in parts +which are not wholes. But the imparticipable subsists prior to every +thing which is participated. The imparticipable wholeness, therefore, +subsists prior to that which is participated. Hence, there is a certain +form of wholeness, prior to the whole which consists of parts, which +is not passive to a whole, but is wholeness itself, and from which the +wholeness consisting of parts is derived. For the whole indeed, which +consists of parts, subsists in many places, and in many things, in +various ways. It is, however, necessary that there should be a monad +essentially of all totalities. For neither is each of these wholes +genuine, since it is indigent of parts that are not wholes, of which +it consists. Nor is the whole which is in a certain thing capable of +being the cause of wholeness to all other things. Hence, that which is +the cause to all wholes of their being wholes, is prior to parts. For +if this also consisted of parts, it would be a certain whole, and not +simply whole. And again, this would be from another whole, and so on, +to infinity; or it will subsist on account of that which is primarily a +whole, and which is not a whole from parts, but is a wholeness. + + + PROPOSITION LXX. + +Every thing which is more total among principal causes, illuminates +participants, prior to partial natures, and when these fail, still +continues to impart its illuminations. + + * * * * * + +For it begins its energy upon secondary natures prior to that which is +posterior to it, and is present in conjunction with the presence of it. +When likewise that which is posterior to it no longer energizes, it is +still present, and that which is more causal continues to energize. +And this not only in different subjects, but likewise in each of the +natures that sometimes participate. Thus it is necessary, for instance, +that being should be first generated, afterwards animal, and afterwards +man. And man, indeed, is not, if the rational power is absent, but +there is still animal, breathing and sentient. And again, life failing, +being remains. For though a thing does not live, yet it has existence. +And there is a similar reasoning in all things. + +The cause, however, of this is, that the more causal nature being more +efficacious, energizes on the thing caused[236] prior [to that which +is less causal]. For the thing caused participates first of that which +is more powerful. And that which is secondary again energizing, that +which is more powerful energizes with it. Because every thing which +the secondary nature produces, that which is more causal produces +likewise in conjunction with it. When the former also fails, the +latter is still present. For the communication of the more powerful +cause, operating in a greater degree, leaves that which participates +it, posterior to the energy of the less powerful cause. For through +the communication of the secondary nature, it corroborates its own +illumination. + + + PROPOSITION LXXI. + +All things which among principal causes possess a more total and higher +order in their effects, according to the illuminations proceeding +from them, become in a certain respect subjects to the communications +of more partial causes. And the illuminations indeed, from higher +causes, receive the progressions from secondary causes; but the latter +are established in the former. And thus some participations precede +others, and some representations extend after others, beginning from +on high, to the same subject, more total causes having a prior energy, +but such as are more partial, supplying their participants with their +communications, posterior to the energies of more total causes. + + * * * * * + +For if more causal natures energize prior to such as are secondary on +account of exuberance of power, and are present with those that have +a more imperfect aptitude, and illuminate them also; but things more +subordinate, and which are second in order, are supplied from such as +are more causal,--it is evident that the illuminations of superior +natures antecedently comprehend that which participates of both these, +and give stability to the communications of things subordinate. But +these illuminations of superior causes, employ the resemblances +of subordinate natures as foundations, and operate on that which +participates of them, the superior causes themselves having a prior +energy. + + + PROPOSITION LXXII. + +All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject, +proceed from more perfect and total causes. + + * * * * * + +For the causes of a greater number of effects, are more powerful and +total, and are nearer to _the one_ than the causes of fewer +effects. But the natures which give subsistence to such things as are +antecedently the subjects of others, are among causes the sources of a +greater number of effects. + + + COROLLARY. + +From hence it is evident why matter which derives its subsistence from +_the one_, is of itself destitute of form. And why body, though it +participates of being, is of itself without the participation of soul. +For matter being the subject of all things proceeds from the cause of +all. But body being the subject of animation, derives its subsistence +from that which is more total than soul, and participates after a +certain manner of being. + + + PROPOSITION LXXIII. + +Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of +being, but not every being is a whole.[237] + + * * * * * + +For either being and whole are the same, or the one is prior, but +the other posterior. If, however, a part, so far as it is a part, is +being (for a whole is from parts which have a being), yet it is not +of itself also a whole. Being, therefore, and whole are not the same. +For if this were the case, a part would be a non-entity. But if a part +was a non-entity, the whole would have no existence. For every whole +is a whole of parts, either as existing prior to them [and therefore +causally containing them in itself], or as subsisting in them. But the +part not existing, neither is it possible for the whole to exist. If, +however, whole is prior to being, every being will immediately be a +whole. Again, therefore, there will not be a part. This, however, is +impossible. For if the whole is a whole, being the whole of a part, +the part also being a part, will be the part of the whole. It remains, +therefore, that every whole indeed is being, but that not every being +is a whole. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things, it is evident that being which has a primary +subsistence is beyond wholeness. For the one indeed, viz. being, is +present with a greater number of things; since _to be_ is present +with parts, so far as they _are_ parts. But the other, viz. +wholeness, is present with a less number of things. For that which +is the cause of a greater number of effects is more excellent; but +the cause of a less number is of a subordinate nature, as has been +demonstrated. + + + PROPOSITION LXXIV. + +Every form is a certain whole; for it consists of many things, each of +which gives completion to the form. But not every whole is a form. + + * * * * * + +For a particular[238] thing is a whole and also an individual, so +far it is an individual, but neither of them is a form. For every +whole consists of parts; but form is that which may be divided into +individual forms. Whole, therefore, is one thing, and form another. And +the one is present with many things, but the other with a few. Hence, +whole is above the forms of beings. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things it is evident that whole has a middle order between +being and forms. And hence it follows that being subsists prior to +forms, and that forms are beings, but that not every being is form. +Whence also, in effects, privations are in a certain respect beings, +but are no longer forms, and in consequence of the unical power +of being, they also receive a certain obscure representation of +being.[239] + + + PROPOSITION LXXV. + +Every cause which is properly so called, is exempt from its effect. + + * * * * * + +For if it is in the effect, it either gives completion to it, or is in +a certain respect indigent of it in order to its existence, and thus it +will be more imperfect than the thing caused. For being in the effect, +it is rather a concause than a cause, and is either a part of that +which is generated, or an instrument of the maker. For that which is +a part in the thing generated, is more imperfect than the whole. The +cause also which is in the effect, is an instrument of generation to +the maker, being unable to define of itself the measures of production. +Every cause, therefore, which is properly so denominated, if it is more +perfect than that which proceeds from it, imparts to its effect the +measure of generation, and is exempt from instruments and elements, and +in short, from every thing which is called a concause. + + + PROPOSITION LXXVI. + +Every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, has a +immutable hyparxis. But every thing which is generated from a moveable +cause, has a mutable hyparxis. + + * * * * * + +For if that which makes is entirely immoveable, it does not produce +from itself that which is secondary through motion, but by its very +being. If, however, this be the case, it has that which proceeds from +it concurrent with its own essence. And if this also be the case, it +will produce as long as it exists. But it exists always, and therefore +it always gives subsistence to that which is posterior to itself. +Hence, this is always generated from thence, and always is, conjoining +with _the ever_ according to energy of the cause, its own ever +according to progression. If, however, the cause is moved, that also +which is generated from it will be essentially mutable. For that which +has its being through motion, changes its being when its moveable +cause[240] is changed. For if, though produced from motion, it should +itself remain immutable, it would be better than its producing cause. +This, however, is impossible. It will not, therefore, be immutable. +Hence, it will be mutable, and will be essentially moved, imitating the +motion of that which gave it subsistence. + + + PROPOSITION LXXVII. + +Every thing which is in capacity proceeds from that which is in energy. +And that which is in capacity, proceeds into energy. That also which +is in a certain respect in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is +the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in energy. But that +which is all things in capacity, proceeds from that which is all things +in energy. + + * * * * * + +For that which is in capacity is not naturally adapted to produce +itself into energy, because it is imperfect. For if being imperfect +it should become the cause to itself of perfection, and this in +energy, the cause will be more imperfect than that which is produced +by it. Hence, that which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, +will not be the cause to itself of a subsistence in energy. For on +this hypothesis, so far as it is imperfect, it would be the cause of +perfection; since every thing which is in capacity, so far as it is in +capacity, is imperfect, but that which is in energy is perfect. Hence, +if that which was in capacity becomes in energy, it will have its +perfection from something else. And this will either be in capacity; +but thus again the imperfect will be generative of the perfect; or +it will be in energy, and either something else, or this which was +in capacity will be that which becomes in energy. But if something +else which is in energy produces, operating according to its own +peculiarity, it will not by being in capacity make that which is in +another to be in energy; nor will this which is now made be in energy, +unless it becomes this so far as it was in capacity. It remains, +therefore, that from that which is in energy, that which is in capacity +must be changed into energy. + + + PROPOSITION LXXVIII. + +Every power is either perfect or imperfect. + + * * * * * + +For the power which is prolific of energy is perfect. For it makes +other things to be perfect through its own energies. That, however, +which is perfective of other things is in a greater degree perfect, as +being more self-perfect. But the power which is indigent of another +that pre-exists in energy, according to which indigence it is something +in capacity, is imperfect. For it is indigent of the perfection which +is in another, in order that by participating of it, it may become +perfect. Hence, such a power as this is of itself imperfect. So that +the power of that which is in energy is perfect, being prolific of +energy. But the power of that which is in capacity is imperfect, and +obtains perfection from the power which is in energy. + + + PROPOSITION LXXIX. + +Every thing which is generated, is generated from a two-fold power.[241] + + * * * * * + +For it is requisite that the thing generated should possess aptitude +and an imperfect power. And that which makes being in energy[242] that +which the thing generated is in capacity, antecedently comprehends a +perfect power. For all energy proceeds from inherent power. For if that +which makes did not possess power, how could it energize, and produce +something else? And if that which is generated did not possess power +according to aptitude, how could it be generated? For that which makes +or acts, makes or acts in that which is able to suffer, but not in any +casual thing, and which is not naturally adapted to suffer from the +agent. + + + PROPOSITION LXXX. + +Every body is naturally adapted of itself to suffer; but every thing +incorporeal to act. And the former indeed is essentially inefficacious, +but the latter is impassive. That which is incorporeal, however, +suffers through its communion with body; just as bodies are able to act +through the participation of incorporeals. + + * * * * * + +For body, so far as body, is alone divisible, and through this becomes +passive, being entirely partible, and this to infinity. But that which +is incorporeal, being simple, is impassive. For neither is that which +is impartible, capable of being divided, nor can that be changed in +quality which is not compounded. Either, therefore, nothing will be +effective, or this must be affirmed of an incorporeal nature, since +body, so far as body, does not act, because it is alone liable to be +divided, and to suffer. For every thing which acts has an effective +power; so that body, so far as it is body, will not act, but so far as +it contains in itself a power of acting. Hence, when it acts, it acts +through the participation of power. Moreover, incorporeal natures when +they are inherent in bodies, participate of passions, being divided +together with bodies, and enjoying their partible nature, though +according to their own essence they are impartible. + + + PROPOSITION LXXXI. + +Every thing which is participated in a separable manner, is present +with its participant by a certain inseparable power which it inserts in +it. + + * * * * * + +For if it is itself present with the participant in a separate manner, +and is not in it, as if it possessed its subsistence in it, a certain +medium between the two is necessary, connecting the one with the other, +and which is more similar to that which is participated, and subsists +in the participant. For if this medium is separable, how can it be +participated by the participant, since the participant neither contains +the medium, nor any thing proceeding from it? A power, therefore, +and illumination proceeding from that which is separable into the +participant conjoins both. Hence, one of these will be that through +which the participation is effected, another will be that which is +participated, and another that which participates. + + + PROPOSITION LXXXII. + +Every thing incorporeal, which is converted to itself, when it is +participated by other things, is participated in a separable manner. + + * * * * * + +For if in an inseparable manner, the energy of it would not be separate +from its participant, as neither would its essence. If, however, +this were the case, it would not be converted to itself. For being +converted, it will be separate from its participant, each being +different from the other. If, therefore, it is able to be converted +to itself, it will be participated in a separable manner, when it is +participated by other things. + + + PROPOSITION LXXXIII. + +Every thing which has a knowledge of itself, is entirely converted to +itself. + + * * * * * + +For knowing itself, it is evident that it is converted to itself in +energy. For that which knows and that which is known are one. And the +knowledge of itself is directed to itself as to that which is known. +This knowledge also as pertaining to that which knows is a certain +energy; but it is the knowledge of itself directed to itself, because +it is gnostic of itself. Moreover, that it is converted to itself +essentially, if it is so in energy, has been demonstrated. For every +thing which by energizing is converted to itself, has also an essence +verging to, and subsisting in itself. + + + PROPOSITION LXXXIV. + +Every thing which always is, possesses an infinite power. + + * * * * * + +For if its hypostasis is never-failing, the power also according to +which it is that which it is, and is able to exist, is infinite. For +the power of existing being finite, it will some time or other fail. +But this failing, the existence also of that which possesses it will +fail, and it will no longer be that which always is. It is necessary, +therefore, that the power of that which always is, and which connects +and contains it essentially, should be infinite. + + + PROPOSITION LXXXV. + +Every thing which is always becoming to be, or rising into existence, +(αει γινομενον) possesses an infinite power of becoming to be. + + * * * * * + +For if it is always rising into existence, the power of generation in +it is never-failing. For if this power was finite, it would cease in +an infinite time. But the power of becoming to be ceasing, that which +is rising into being according to this power would cease, and thus it +would no longer be always becoming to be.[243] It is, however, supposed +to be always becoming to be. Hence, it possesses an infinite power of +rising into existence. + + + PROPOSITION LXXXVI. + +Every thing which is truly being (οντως ον) is infinite, neither +according to multitude, nor according to magnitude, but according to +power alone. + + * * * * * + +For every infinite, is either in discrete, or in continued quantity, +or in power. But that which always is, is infinite, as having an +inextinguishable life, a never-failing hyparxis, and an undiminished +energy. That which is eternally being, however, is neither infinite +on account of magnitude; for that which is truly being is without +magnitude, being self-subsistent; since every thing self-subsistent is +impartible and simple. Nor is it infinite on account of multitude; for +it has in the most eminent degree the form of _the one_, as being +arranged most near, and being most allied to it. But it is infinite +according to power. Hence, it is also impartible and infinite. And by +how much the more it is one and impartible, by so much the more is it +infinite. For the power which is divided, becomes imbecil and finite, +and powers which are entirely divided, are in every respect finite. For +ultimate powers, and which are most remote from _the one_, are in +a certain respect finite, on account of their distribution into parts. +But first powers, on account of their impartibility, are infinite. +For a separation into parts divulses and dissolves the power of every +thing. But impartibility compressing and contracting that which it +contains, renders it never-failing, and undiminished in itself. + +Moreover, infinity, according to magnitude, and also according to +multitude, is entirely a privation and falling off from impartibility. +For that which is finite is most near to the impartible, but the +infinite is most remote from it, entirely departing from _the +one_. Hence, that which is infinite according to power, is not +infinite either according to multitude or magnitude, since infinite +power subsists in conjunction with impartibility. But the infinite +either in multitude or magnitude, is most remote from the impartible. +If, therefore, that which is truly being was infinite either in +magnitude or multitude, it would not possess infinite power. It does, +however, possess infinite power; and therefore is not infinite either +according to multitude, or according to magnitude. + + + PROPOSITION LXXXVII. + +Every thing eternal indeed is being, but not every being is eternal. + + * * * * * + +For the participation of being is present in a certain respect with +generated natures,[244] so far as each of these is not that which in +no respect is. But if that which is generated is not entirely deprived +of being, it is in a certain respect being. The eternal, however, is +in no respect whatever present with generated natures, and especially +not with such of these as do not even participate of the perpetuity +which subsists according to the whole of time. Moreover, every thing +eternal always is. For it participates of eternity, which imparts to +the natures by which it is participated to be always that which they +are. Being, therefore, is participated by a greater number of things +than eternity. And hence being is beyond eternity. For by those natures +by whom eternity is participated, being is also participated. But not +every thing which participates of being, participates also of eternity. + + + PROPOSITION LXXXVIII. + +Every thing[245] which is truly being, is either prior to eternity, or +in eternity, or participates of eternity. + + * * * * * + +For that there is true being prior to eternity has been demonstrated. +But true being is also in eternity. For eternity possesses the _always_ +in conjunction with _being_. And that which participates of eternity, +has both the _always_ and _being_, according to participation. +Eternity, however, possesses the _always_ primarily, but _being_ +according to participation. But being itself is primarily being. + + + PROPOSITION LXXXIX. + +Every thing which is primarily being consists of bound and infinity. + + * * * * * + +For if it possesses infinite power, it is evident that it is +infinite, and on this account consists from the infinite. If also it +is impartible, and has the form of _the one_, through this, it +participates of bound. For that which participates of unity is bounded. +Moreover, it is impartible, and therefore possesses infinite power. +Hence every thing which is truly [or primarily] being consists of bound +and infinity. + + + PROPOSITION XC. + +The first bound, and the first infinity subsist by themselves prior to +every thing which consists of bound and the infinite. + + * * * * * + +For if beings which subsist by themselves, are prior to those which are +_certain_ beings, as being common to all essences, and principal +causes, and not the causes of certain, but in short of all beings, it +is necessary that the first bound, and the first infinity should be +prior to that[246] which consists of both these. For the bound in that +which is mixed [or the first being,] participates of infinity, and +the infinite participates of bound. But of every thing, that which is +the first, is nothing else than that which it is. It is not therefore +proper that the first infinite should have the form of bound, or that +the first bound should have the form of infinity. These therefore +subsist primarily prior to that which is mixed. + + + PROPOSITION XCI. + +Every power is either finite or infinite. But every finite power +indeed derives its subsistence from infinite power. And infinite power +subsists from the first infinity. + + * * * * * + +For the powers which have an existence at a certain time, are finite, +falling from the infinity of existing always. But the powers of eternal +beings are infinite, never deserting their own hyparxis. + + + PROPOSITION XCII. + +Every multitude of infinite powers, is suspended from one first +infinity, which does not subsist as a participated power, nor in things +which are endued with power, but subsists by itself, not being the +power of a certain participant, but the cause of all beings. + + * * * * * + +For though the first being possesses power, yet it is not power itself. +For it has also bound. But the first power is infinity. For infinite +powers are infinite, through the participation of infinity. Infinity +itself therefore, will be prior to all powers, through which being +also possesses infinite power, and all things participate of infinity. +For infinity is not the first of things [or the ineffable principle of +all] since that is the measure of all things, being _the good_ and _the +one_. Nor is infinity being. For this is infinite, but not infinity. +Hence infinity subsists between that which is first and being, and is +the cause of all infinite powers, and of all the infinity that is in +beings. + + + PROPOSITION XCIII. + +Every infinite which is in [true] beings, is neither infinite to the +natures that are above beings, nor is it infinite to itself. + + * * * * * + +For that by which each thing is infinite, by this also it exists +uncircumscribed. But every thing which is in [true] beings, is bounded +by itself, and by all the things prior to it. It remains therefore, +that the infinite which is in [true] beings, is infinite to subordinate +natures alone, above which it is so expanded in power, as to be +incomprehensible by all of them. For in whatever manner they may extend +themselves towards this infinite, yet it has something[247] entirely +exempt from them. And though all things enter into it, yet it has +something occult, and incomprehensible by secondary natures. Though +likewise it evolves the powers which it contains, yet it possesses +something on account of its union insurmountable, contracted, and +surpassing the evolution of beings. Since however, it contains and +bounds itself, it will not be infinite to itself, nor much less to the +natures situated above it, since it has a portion of the infinity which +is in them. For the powers of more total natures are more infinite, in +consequence of being more total, and having an arrangement nearer to +the first infinity. + + + PROPOSITION XCIV. + +Every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity, but not every infinity +is perpetuity. + + * * * * * + +For there are many infinites which have the infinite not on account +of _the always_, such for instance, as the infinity according +to magnitude, the infinity according to multitude, and the infinity +of matter. And whatever else there may be of the like kind, which is +infinite, either because it cannot be passed over, or through the +indefiniteness of its essence. That perpetuity however is a certain +infinity[248] is evident. For that which never fails is infinite. But +this is that which always has its hypostasis inexhaustible. Infinity +therefore, is prior to perpetuity. For that which gives subsistence to +a greater number of effects, and is more total, is more causal. Hence, +the first infinity is beyond eternity, and infinity itself is prior to +eternity. + + + PROPOSITION XCV. + +Every power which is more single, is more infinite than that which is +multiplied. + + * * * * * + +For if of powers the first infinity is nearest to _the one_, +that power which is more allied to _the one_, is in a greater +degree infinite than that which recedes from it. For being multiplied +it loses the form of _the one_, in which while it remained, it +possessed a transcendency with respect to other powers, being connected +and contained through its impartibility. For in partible natures +themselves, the powers when congregated, are united,[249] but when +divided, they are increased in number, and become obscured. + + + PROPOSITION XCVI. + +The power which is infinite of every finite body, is incorporeal. + + * * * * * + +For if it were corporeal, if this body indeed is finite,[250] the +infinite will be contained in the finite. But if the body is infinite, +it will not be power so far as it is body. For if so far as it is body +it is finite, but power is infinite, it will not be power so far as +it is body. Hence, the power which is infinite in a finite body is +incorporeal. + + + PROPOSITION XCVII. + +In each series of things, every cause which has the relation of a +leader, imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of itself; and that +which the cause is primarily, the series is according to diminution. + + * * * * * + +For if it is the leader of the whole series, and all co-ordinate +natures are co-arranged with reference to it, it is evident that it +imparts to all that the series contains the one idea according to which +they are arranged in that series. For either all things partake of +similitude to this cause without a cause, or that which is the same +in all is derived from it. But the former of these is impossible. For +that which is without a cause is also fortuitous. But the fortuitous +can never take place in things in which there is order, connection, +and an invariable sameness of subsistence. From the cause therefore, +which ranks as a leader, every series receives the peculiarity of the +hypostasis of that cause. But if from it, it is evident that this +is accompanied with a diminution and decrement adapted to secondary +natures. For either the peculiarity exists similarly in the leader, +and the natures that are secondary, and how in this case can the +former be the leader, but the latter be allotted an hypostasis after +the leader? Or it exists dissimilarly. And if this be the case, it is +evident that sameness is derived to the multitude from one thing, but +not vice versa. And the illustrious peculiarity of the series which is +primarily in one thing [or the leader,] is secondarily in the multitude +[suspended from the leading cause]. + + + PROPOSITION XCVIII. + +Every separate cause is at one and the same time every where and no +where. + + * * * * * + +For by the communication of its own power it is every where. For this +is a cause which replenishes the natures that are naturally adapted +to participate of it, rules over all secondary beings, and is present +to all things by the prolific progressions of its illuminations. +But by an essence unmingled with things in place, and by its exempt +purity, it is no where. For if it is separate, it is established above +all things. In a similar manner also, it is in no one of the natures +inferior to itself. For if it was alone every where, it would not +indeed be prevented from being a cause, and from subsisting in all its +participants. But it would not be prior to all of them in a separate +manner. If also it was no where without being every where, it would +not indeed be prevented from being prior to all things, and from being +nothing pertaining to subordinate natures. But it would not be in all +things, as causes are naturally adapted to be in their effects,[251] +by the abundant and unenvying communications of themselves. In order +therefore, that existing as a cause, it may be in all things that are +able to partake of it, and that being separate in itself, it may be +prior to all the natures that are filled by it, it is every where, and +at the same time no where. + +And it is not indeed partly every where and partly no where. For thus +it would be divulsed and separate from itself, if one part of it was +every where in all things, but another was no where, and prior to all +things. But the whole of it is every where, and in a similar manner no +where. For the things which are able to participate of it, meet with +the whole of it, and find the whole present with themselves, that at +the same time being wholly exempt from them. For the participant does +not place this separate cause in itself, but participates of it as much +as it is capable of receiving. Nor in the communication of itself does +it become contracted by the multitude of the participations of it; for +it is separate. Nor do its participants participate of it defectively; +for that which imparts is every where. + + + PROPOSITION XCIX. + +Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, does not derive +its subsistence from another cause. But it is itself the principle and +cause of all its participants. And thus every principle in each series +is unbegotten. + + * * * * * + +For if it is imparticipable in its own proper series, it is allotted +the principality, and does not proceed from other things. For it +would no longer be the first, if it received this peculiarity, +according to which it is imparticipable, from something else.[252] +But if it is inferior to other things, and proceeds from them, it +does not proceed from them so far as it is imparticipable, but so +far as it participates. For of the things from which it originates, +it doubtless participates, and it is not primarily the things of +which it participates. Hence, it is not from a cause so far as it is +imparticipable. For so far as it is from a cause it participates, and +is not imparticipable. But so far as it is imparticipable, it is the +cause of things that are participated, and is not itself a participant +of other things. + + + PROPOSITION C. + +Every series of wholes is extended to an imparticipable cause and +principle. But all imparticipables are suspended from the one principle +of all things. + + * * * * * + +For if each series suffers something which is the same [or a certain +sameness,] there is something in each which is the leader, and the +cause of this sameness. For as all beings are from unity, so every +series is from unity. But again, all imparticipable monads are referred +to _the one_; because all of them are analogous to _the one_. So far +therefore, as they also suffer something which is the same through +an analogy to _the one_, so far a reduction of them to _the one_ is +effected. And so far indeed, as all of them are from _the one_, no +one of these is a principle. But so far as each is imparticipable, +so far each is a principle. Hence, being the principles of certain +things, they are suspended from the principle of all things. For that +is the principle of all things of which all things participate. All +things however alone entirely participate of the first; but of other +things not all, but certain things participate. Hence also that [i.e. +the ineffable] is simply the first, but other things are firsts with +reference to a certain thing, but simply are not firsts. + + + PROPOSITION CI. + +Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things that participate +of intellect, imparticipable life of all things that participate of +life, and imparticipable being of all things that participate of +being. But of these, being is prior to life, but life is prior to +intellect. + + * * * * * + +For because in each series of beings, imparticipables are prior to +things which are participated, it is necessary that intellect should +be prior to intellectuals, that life should be prior to vital natures, +and that being itself should be prior to beings. Because however, +that which is the cause of a greater number of effects, precedes that +which is the cause of a less number, hence, among these, being will +be the first; for it is present with all things to which life and +intellect are present. For every thing that lives and participates of +intelligence necessarily _is_; but not vice versa. For many beings +neither live, nor energize intellectually.[253] But life is the second. +For all things that participate of intellect, participate also of life, +but not vice versa. For many things live indeed, but are left destitute +of knowledge. And intellect is the third. For every thing which is in +any manner whatever gnostic, also lives and is. If therefore being is +the cause of a greater number of effects, but life of a less number, +and intellect of still fewer effects, being is the first, life the +second, and intellect the third. + + + PROPOSITION CII. + +All beings which exist in any manner whatever, consist of bound and the +infinite through that which is primarily being. But all living beings +are motive of themselves through the first life. And all gnostic beings +participate of knowledge, through the first intellect. + + * * * * * + +For if that which is imparticipable in each series imparts its own +peculiarity to all the natures under the same series, it is evident +that the first being also imparts to all things bound, and at the same +time infinity, since it is itself primarily mixed from these. Life also +imparts to all things the motion which it possesses in itself. For +life is the first progression and motion from the stable hypostasis of +being. And intellect imparts knowledge to all things. For the summit +of all knowledge is in intellect. And intellect is the first gnostic +nature. + + + PROPOSITION CIII. + +All things are in all, but appropriately in each. + + * * * * * + +For in being there is life and intellect; and in life, being and +intellection; and in intellect being and life. But in intellect +indeed, all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in +being, all things are truly beings. For since every thing subsists +either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to +participation; and in the first, the rest are according to cause; in +the second, the first is according to participation, but the third, +according to cause; and in the third, the natures prior to it are +according to participation;--this being the case, life and intellect +have a prior or causal subsistence in being. Since however, each thing +is characterized according to hyparxis, and neither according to cause +(for cause pertains to other things, i.e. to effects) nor according +to participation (for a thing derives that elsewhere of which it +participates,)--hence in being there is truly life and intellection, +essential life, and essential intellect. And in life, there is being +indeed according to participation, but intellection according to cause. +Each of these however, subsist there vitally. For the hyparxis is +according to life. And in intellect, life and essence subsist according +to participation, and each of these subsists there intellectually. For +knowledge is the essence and the life of intellect. + + + PROPOSITION CIV. + +Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence and its +energy eternal. + + * * * * * + +For if it primarily participates of the perpetuity of eternity, it +does not partially participate of it, but entirely. For either it +participates of it in energy, but not in essence. This however is +impossible; since in this case, energy would be more excellent than +essence. Or it participates of it according to essence, but does not +participate of it according to energy. In this case however, that which +is primarily eternal, and that which primarily participates of time +will be the same. And time indeed, will primarily measure the essence +of certain things, but eternity which is more excellent than all time, +will not measure the essence of any thing, if that which is primarily +eternal, is not essentially contained by eternity. Hence every thing +which is primarily eternal, has both an eternal essence and energy. + + + PROPOSITION CV. + +Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every thing perpetual is +immortal. + + * * * * * + +For if the immortal is that which always participates of life, but +that which always participates of life, participates also of being, +and that which always lives, always is,--hence, every thing immortal +is perpetual. But the immortal is that which is unreceptive of death, +and always lives. And the perpetual is that which is unreceptive of +non-being, and always is. If however, there are many beings more and +less excellent than life, which are unreceptive of death, but exist +always;--if this be the case, not every thing which is perpetual is +immortal. That however, there are many beings not immortal, that exist +always, is evident. For there are certain beings indeed, which are +destitute of life, but which exist always, and are indestructible. For +as being is to life, so is the perpetual to the immortal. For the life +which cannot be taken away is immortal, and the being which cannot be +taken away is perpetual. But being is more comprehensive than life, and +therefore the perpetual is more comprehensive than the immortal.[254] + + + PROPOSITION CVI. + +The medium of every thing which is entirely eternal both in essence and +energy, and of every thing which has its essence in time, is that which +is partly indeed eternal, and partly is measured by time. + + * * * * * + +For that which has its essence comprehended by time, is entirely +temporal. For by a much greater priority, this will be allotted a +temporal energy. But that which is entirely temporal, is in every +respect dissimilar to that which is entirely eternal. But all +progressions are through similars. Hence there is something between +these. The medium therefore, is either that which is eternal in +essence, but temporal in energy, or vice versa. This latter however, is +impossible. For energy would be more excellent than essence. It remains +therefore, that the medium is the former of these. + + + PROPOSITION CVII. + +Every thing which is partly eternal, and partly temporal, is at one and +the same time being and generation. + + * * * * * + +For every thing eternal is being, and that which is measured by time +is generation. So that if the same thing participates of time and +eternity, yet not according to the same, it will be both being and +generation. + + + COROLLARY. + +From these things it is evident, that generation indeed, having a +temporal essence, is suspended from that which partly partakes of +being, and partly of generation, participating at once of eternity +and time. But this is suspended from that which is in every respect +eternal. And that which is in every respect eternal, is suspended from +being which is prior to the eternal. + + + PROPOSITION CVIII. + +Every thing which is partial in each order, is able to participate in +a twofold respect of the monad which is in the proximately superior +order, viz. either through its own wholeness or through that which is +partial in the superior order, and co-ordinate with the thing according +to an analogy to the whole series. + + * * * * * + +For if conversion is to all things through similitude, that which is +partial in an inferior order, is dissimilar to that which is monadic +and a whole in a superior order. And in short, is as that which is +partial, to a whole, and as one order to another. But a partial nature +is similar to a whole of the same series, through a communion of +peculiarity, and to the proximately superior co-ordinate peculiarity +through an analogous subsistence. It is evident, therefore, that +through these media a conversion from one to the other is effected, as +through similars to that which is similar.[255] For the one is similar +as the partial to that which is partial, but the other as that which +is the appropriate of the same series. But the whole of the superior +series is dissimilar in both these respects. + + + PROPOSITION CIX. + +Every[256] partial intellect participates of the unity which is above +intellect and the first, both through the intellect which ranks as a +whole, and through the partial unity which is co-ordinate with this +partial intellect. Every partial soul, likewise, participates of the +intellect which is a whole, through the soul which ranks as a whole, +and through a partial intellect. And every partial nature of body +participates of the soul which is a whole through the wholeness of +nature, and a partial soul. + + * * * * * + +For every thing partial participates of the monad which is in a +superior order, either through its proper wholeness, or through that +which is partial in that order, and which is co-ordinate to the thing. + + + PROPOSITION CX. + +Of all the things that are arranged in each series, such as are first, +and are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of the +natures which are proximately established in the superior series, +through analogy. But such as are more imperfect and remote from their +proper principle, are not naturally adapted to enjoy these natures. + + * * * * * + +For because such things as are first, are allied to those in a +superior series, being allotted a better and more divine nature in +the order to which they belong, but such things as are more imperfect +proceed further from their principle, and are allotted a secondary and +ministrant, but not a primary and leading progression in the whole +series;--this being the case, the former are necessarily connascently +conjoined to the things in a superior order; but the latter are +unadapted to be conjoined with them. For all things are not of an +equal dignity, though they may belong to the same order. For there is +not one and the same ratio in all. But all things proceed from their +proper monad, as from one, and with reference to one thing. Hence, they +are not allotted the same power. But some things are able to receive +proximately the participations[257] of superior natures; while others +being dissimilar to them by proceeding to a greater distance from their +principles, are deprived of a power of this kind. + + + PROPOSITION CXI. + +Of every intellectual series, some things are divine intellects, +receiving the participations of the Gods; but others are intellects +alone. And of every psychical series, some things are intellectual +souls, suspended from their proper intellects; but others are souls +alone. Of all corporeal natures, likewise, some have souls supernally +presiding over them, but others are natures alone, destitute of the +presence of souls. + + * * * * * + +For of each series, not the whole genus is adapted to be suspended +from that which is prior to itself, but that which is more perfect +in it, and sufficient to be connascent with superior natures. +Neither, therefore, is every intellect suspended from deity, but +those intellects only which are supreme and most single. For these +are allied to the divine unities. Nor do all souls participate of +participable intellect,[258] but such only as are most intellectual. +Nor do all corporeal natures enjoy the presence of soul, and of the +soul which is participated, but those only that are more perfect, and +possess in a greater degree the form of reason. And this is the mode of +demonstration in all things. + + + PROPOSITION CXII. + +Of every order those things that are first, have the form of the +natures prior to them. + + * * * * * + +For the highest genera in each order, are conjoined through similitude +to the natures placed above them,[259] and through the connexion and +coherence of the progression of wholes. Hence, such as the superior +natures are primarily, such also is the form which these highest +genera are allotted, and which is allied to the nature of those in the +superior order. They are also such according to the peculiarity of +subsistence as are the natures prior to them. + + + PROPOSITION CXIII. + +Every divine number is unical. + + * * * * * + +For if a divine number has a precedaneous cause, viz. _the one_, +just as an intellectual number has intellect, and a psychical number +soul, and if multitude is every where analogous to its cause, it is +evident that a divine number is unical, since _the one_ is God. But +this follows, since _the one_ and _the good_ are the same. For _the +good_ and God are the same. For that beyond which there is nothing, +and after which all things aspire, is God. And also that from which +all things proceed, and to which all things tend. But this is good. If +therefore, there is a multitude of Gods, the multitude is unical. But +that there is, is evident. For every principal cause is the leader of +an appropriate multitude which is similar and allied to the cause. + + + PROPOSITION CXIV. + +Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self-perfect unity is a +God. + + * * * * * + +For if the number of unities is twofold, as has been before +demonstrated, and some are self-perfect, but others are illuminations +from the self-perfect unities, and if a divine number is allied to and +connatural with _the one_ and _the good_, the Gods are self-perfect +unities. And vice versa, if there is a self-perfect unity it is a God. +For as unity is in the most eminent degree allied to _the one_, and the +self-perfect to _the good_, so likewise according to both these the +self-perfect participates of the divine peculiarity and is a God. But +if a God was a unity, yet not a self-perfect unity, or a self-perfect +hypostasis, yet not a unity, he would be arranged in another order, on +account of the mutation of the peculiarity.[260] + + + PROPOSITION CXV. + +Every God is superessential, supervital, and superintellectual. + + * * * * * + +For if each is a self-perfect unity, but neither being, life, or +intellect is a unity, but that which is united, it is evident that +every God is beyond each of these. For if these differ from each other, +but all are in all, each of these being all will not be one only. +Farther still, if the first God is superessential, but every God is of +the series of the first, so far as a God, each will be superessential. +But that the first God is superessential,[261] is evident. For essence +is not the same with unity, nor is to exist the same thing as to be +united. If, however, these are not the same, either the first God is +both these, and in this case he will not be one only, but something +else besides _the one_, and will participate of unity, but will not be +_the one itself_; or he is one of these. But if indeed he is essence, +he will be indigent of _the one_. It is, however, impossible that _the +good_, and _the first_ should be indigent. Hence, he is one alone; and +therefore superessential. But if each thing imparts the peculiarity of +that which it is primarily to the whole series [of which it is the +leader], hence, every divine number is superessential; since every +principal cause produces similars prior to dissimilars. If, therefore, +the first God is superessential, all the Gods will be superessential. +For they will be entirely similar [to the first]. Since, however, they +are also essences, they will be produced from the first essence, as the +monads of essences. + + + PROPOSITION CXVI. + +Every deity except _the one_ is participable. + + * * * * * + +For that _the one_ is imparticipable is evident, since if it were +participated, and on this account pertained to something else, it would +no longer be similarly the cause of all things; both of such as are +prior to beings, and of beings themselves. But that the other unities +are participated, we shall thus demonstrate. For if there is another +imparticipable unity after the first, in what does it differ from _the +one_? For either it subsists after the same manner as that; and how +in this case is the one the second, but the other first? Or it does +not subsist after the same manner. And thus one of these will be _the +one itself_, but the other _one_ and _not one_. This _non-one_ also, +if it is no hypostasis whatever, will be _one_ alone. But if it is a +certain other hypostasis besides _the one_, in this case _the one_ +will be participated by the _non-one_. And that will be a self-perfect +one, which conjoins the non-one with _the one_. So that again God will +be this [viz. the one] so far as he is God. But that which is non-one +will subsist in the participation of _the one_. Every unity, therefore, +which subsists after _the one_ is participable, and every God is +participable. + + + PROPOSITION CXVII. + +Every God is the measure of beings. + + * * * * * + +For if every God is unical, he defines and measures all the multitude +of beings. For all multitudes being in their own nature indefinite, are +bounded through _the one_. But that which is one being [or being +characterized by _the one_] measuring and terminating the natures +with which it is present, leads into bound that which according to its +own power is not bounded. For the one being has the form of _the +one_ by participation. + +But that which is uniform, or has the form of the one, recedes from +indefiniteness and infinity. And by how much the more uniform it is, +by so much the less[264] is it indefinite, and without measure. Every +multitude of beings, therefore, is measured by the divine unities. + + + PROPOSITION CXVIII. + +Every thing which is in the Gods pre-exists in them according to +their peculiarities. And the peculiarity of the Gods is unical and +superessential. Hence, all things are contained in them unically and +superessentially. + + * * * * * + +For if every thing subsists in a three-fold manner, viz. either +according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to +participation, but the first number of all things is the divine number, +nothing will be in the Gods according to participation, but all things +will subsist in them either according to hyparxis, or according to +cause. Such things, however, as they antecedently comprehend, as being +the causes of all things, they antecedently comprehend in a manner +appropriate to their own union. For every thing which is the leader of +secondary natures causally, contains the cause of things subordinate, +in a way naturally adapted to itself. All things, therefore, are in the +Gods unically and superessentially. + + + PROPOSITION CXIX. + +Every God subsists according to superessential goodness, and is good +neither according to participation, nor according to essence, but +superessentially; since habits and essences are allotted a secondary +and manifold order from the Gods. + + * * * * * + +For if the first God is _the one_ and _the good_, and so far as he is +_the one_, he is also _the good_, and so far as _the good, the one_, if +this be the case, every series of the Gods has the form of _the one_, +and the form of _the good_, according to one peculiarity, and each of +the Gods is not a unity and goodness according to any thing else. But +each so far as he is a unity, so far he is a goodness, and so far as he +is a goodness, so far he is a unity. So far also as the Gods posterior +to the first God proceed from the first, they have the form of _the +good_, and the form of _the one_, since the first is _the one_ and +_the good_. But so far as all of them are Gods, they are unities and +goodnesses. As, therefore, _the one_ of the Gods is superessential, so +likewise is their goodness, since it is nothing else than _the one_. +For each of them is not any thing else than _the good_, but is good +alone; as neither is each any thing else than _the one_, but is one +alone. + + + PROPOSITION CXX. + +Every God possesses in his own hyparxis a providential inspection of +the whole of things. And a providential energy is primarily in the Gods. + + * * * * * + +For all other things which are posterior to the Gods, energize +providentially through the participation of them. But providence +is connascent with the Gods. For if to impart good to the subjects +of providential energy, is the prerogative of the providential +peculiarity, but all the Gods are goodnesses, either they do not impart +themselves to anything, and thus nothing will be good in secondary +natures. And whence will that be derived which subsists according +to participation, except from those natures that primarily possess +peculiarities? Or if they do impart themselves, they impart good, and +in consequence of this providentially attend to all things. Providence, +therefore, subsists primarily in the Gods. For where is the energy +which is prior to intellect, except in superessential natures? But +providence (προνοια), as the name signifies, is an energy prior to +intellect (ενεργεια εστι προ νου). The Gods, therefore, from being +Gods, and from being goodnesses, provide for all things, and fill all +things with the goodness which is prior to intellect. + + + PROPOSITION CXXI. + +Every divine nature has indeed for its hyparxis goodness, but possesses +a power which is unsubdued and at once incomprehensible by all +secondary natures. + + * * * * * + +For if it providentially attends to the whole of things, there is in +it a power which has dominion over the subjects of its providential +energy; through which being unsubdued and uncircumscribed by all +things, divine natures fill all things with, and subject all things to +themselves. For every thing of a ruling nature, which is the cause of +other things, and has dominion over them, rules through abundance of +power, and predominates according to nature. + +The first power, therefore, is in the Gods, not indeed having dominion +over some things, but not over others, but equally comprehending in +itself according to cause the powers of all beings, this power neither +being essential, nor much less unessential; but being connascent +with the hyparxis of the Gods, and superessential. Moreover, the +boundaries of all knowledge, presubsist uniformly in the Gods. For +through divine knowledge, which is exempt from the whole of things, +all other knowledge has a subsistence; this knowledge neither being +intellectual, nor much less, being a certain knowledge posterior to +intellect, but being established according to the divine peculiarity +above intellect. Whether, therefore, there is a divine knowledge, this +knowledge is occult and uniform [or has the form of _the one_]. +Or whether there is a power uncircumscribed by all things, this power +is in a similar manner comprehensive of all things. Or whether there +is a divine goodness, this goodness defines the hyparxis of the Gods. +For if all things are in the Gods, knowledge, power, and goodness are +also in them. But their hyparxis is characterized by that which is most +excellent, and their hypostasis also is according to that which is +best. But this is goodness. + + + PROPOSITION CXXII. + +Every thing divine provides for secondary natures, and is exempt from +the subjects of its providential care, providence neither relaxing +the unmingled and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a +separate union abolishing providence. + + * * * * * + +For divine beings abiding in their unical nature, and in their own +hyparxis, fill all things with the power of themselves. And every +thing which is able to participate of them, enjoys the good which +it is capable of receiving, according to the measures of its proper +hypostasis; divine natures, in the mean time, illuminating beings +with good, by their very essence, or rather prior to essence. For +that which is divine being nothing else than goodness, it supplies +all things with an unenvying abundance of good, by its very being, +not making a distribution according to a reasoning process; but other +things receiving indeed according to their desert, and divine natures +according to their hyparxis. Neither, therefore, in providing for other +things, do they receive a habitude, or alliance with the subjects of +their providential care. For they benefit all things by being that +which they are. But every thing which makes by its very essence, makes +without habitude, and with an unrestrained energy. For habitude is +an addition to essence. Hence also it is preternatural. Nor being +separate, do they withdraw their providential care. For thus they +would subvert, which it is not lawful to say, their own hyparxis, the +peculiarity of which is goodness. For it is the province of goodness +to extend itself to every thing which is able to participate of it. +And the greatest of all things is not that which is boniform, but that +which is beneficent. Either, therefore, no being will possess this +beneficent nature, or the Gods will possess it prior to beings. For it +is not possible that a greater good should be present with the natures +that are good by participation, but a less good with those that are +primarily good. + + + PROPOSITION CXXIII. + +Every thing divine is itself indeed, on account of its superessential +union, ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures; but it is +comprehended and known by its participants. Hence, _that which is +first_, is alone perfectly unknown, as being imparticipable. + + * * * * * + +For all knowledge which subsists through reasoning and language, +pertains to beings, and in beings possesses the apprehension of +truth. For it comes into contact with conceptions, and subsists in +intellections. But the Gods are beyond all beings. Neither, therefore, +is that which is divine doxastic, or the object of opinion, nor is it +dianoëtic, nor intelligible. For every being is either sensible, and +on this account doxastic, or truly existing being, and on this account +intelligible, or it is between these, subsisting as _being_ and +at the same time _generation_, and on this account is dianoëtic. +If, therefore, the Gods are superessential, and subsist prior to +beings, there is neither any opinion of them, nor science and dianoia, +nor intellection. But the nature of their peculiarities is known by +the beings that are suspended from them. And this by a necessary +consequence. For the differences of participants are co-divided +conformably to the peculiarities of the participated natures. And +neither does every thing participate of every thing; for there is no +co-ordination of things perfectly dissimilar. Nor does any casual thing +participate of that which is casual. But that which is kindred is +conjoined to that which is kindred, and proceeds from that to which it +is allied. + + + PROPOSITION CXXIV. + +Every God knows partible natures impartibly, temporal natures, without +time, things which are not necessary, necessarily, mutable natures, +immutably; and in short, all things in a manner more excellent than the +order of the things known. + + * * * * * + +For if every thing which is with the Gods, is with them according +to their peculiarity, it is evident that the knowledge in the Gods +of things inferior, will not subsist according to the nature of the +inferior things, but according to the exempt transcendency of the +Gods. Hence, their knowledge of multiplied and passive natures, will +be uniform and impassive. If, therefore, the object of knowledge is +partible, divine knowledge will be impartible. If the objects that are +known are mutable, the knowledge of the Gods will be immutable; if they +are contingent, they will be known by the Gods necessarily; and if they +are indefinite, definitely. For that which is divine, does not receive +knowledge from subordinate beings, in order that thus the knowledge may +be such as is the nature of the thing known. But subordinate beings +become indefinite about the definite nature of the Gods, are changed +about their immutability, receive passively that which is impassive +in them, and temporally that which in them is without time. For it is +possible for subordinate to be surpassed by more excellent natures; but +it is not lawful for the Gods to receive any thing from beings inferior +to themselves. + + + PROPOSITION CXXV. + +Every God, from that order from which he began to unfold himself +into light, proceeds through all secondary natures, always indeed +multiplying and dividing the communications of himself, but preserving +the peculiarity of his own hypostasis. + + * * * * * + +For progressions being effected through diminution, first natures are +every where after a manner multiplied into the decrements of secondary +natures. But these proceeding according to a similitude to their +producing causes receive their orderly distribution, so that the whole +of that which proceeds is after a manner the same with, and different +from, that which abides; through its diminution indeed, appearing to +be different, but through continuity with its cause, not departing +from sameness with it. But such as that which abides is among first, +such is that which proceeds, among secondary natures; and thus an +indissoluble communion of the series is preserved. Each of the Gods, +therefore, is unfolded into light appropriately, in the orders in which +he makes his evolution. But he proceeds from thence, as far as to the +last of things, through the generative power of first natures. He is +always, however, multiplied according to a progression from unity into +multitude. But he preserves sameness in the progression, through the +similitude of the things that proceed to the leader and primary cause +of each series. + + + PROPOSITION CXXVI. + +Every God who is nearer to _the one_ is more total, but the God who is +more remote from it is more partial. + + * * * * * + +For the God, who is the cause of a greater number of effects, is nearer +to that which produces all things; but he who is the cause of a less +number is more remote from it. And he indeed, who is the cause of a +greater number of effects, is more total; but he who is the cause of +a less number, is more partial. And each indeed, is a unity; but the +one is greater, and the other less in power. The more partial Gods +also are generated from the more total; the latter not being divided, +for they are unities; nor changed in quality, for they are immoveable; +nor multiplied by habitude, for they are unmingled. But they generate +secondary progressions from themselves, which are the decrements of the +natures prior to them, through abundance of power. + + + PROPOSITION CXXVII. + +Every thing divine, is especially primarily simple, and on this account +most sufficient to itself. + + * * * * * + +For that it is indeed simple, is evident from its union; since every +thing divine is most unical. But a thing of this kind is transcendently +simple. That it is also most sufficient to itself, may be learnt by +considering that a composite nature is indigent, if not of other things +to which it is external, yet of those things of which it is composed. +But that which is most simple and unical, and which establishes itself +in _the good_, is most sufficient to itself. Such, however, is every +thing divine. Neither, therefore, is it indigent of other things, +existing as goodness itself, nor of things requisite to composition, +because it is unical. + + + PROPOSITION CXXVIII. + +Every God, when participated by natures nearer to himself, is +participated without a medium; but when participated by natures +more remote from himself, the participation is through a less or +greater[265] number of media. + + * * * * * + +For the former through their alliance being uniform, are immediately +able to participate of the divine unities; but the latter through their +diminution, and extension into multitude, require other things which +are more united, in order that they may participate of the unities +themselves, and not of things united. For united multitude subsists +between unity itself and divided multitude; being indeed able[266] +to coalesce with unity, but allied in a certain respect to divided +multitude, through the representation of multitude. + + + PROPOSITION CXXIX. + +Every divine body is divine through a deified soul. But every soul +is divine through a divine intellect. And every intellect is divine +through the participation of a divine unity. And unity indeed is of +itself a God; intellect is most divine; soul is divine; but body is +deiform. For if every number of the Gods is above intellect, but +participations are effected through kindred and similar natures, the +impartible essence will primarily participate of the superessential +unities. But the nature which comes into contact with generation will +participate of them secondarily. And generation in the third place. +Each of these likewise participates of them through the proximately +superior natures. And the peculiarity of the Gods indeed proceeds, as +far as to the last of things, in its participants; but through media +allied to itself. For unity indeed imparts the transcendent power +of itself to the first intellect, among divine natures, and causes +this intellect to be like itself according to unical multitude. But +through intellect it is also present with soul, conjoining soul with +intellect and co-inflaming it [with divine fire], when this intellect +is participable. And through the echo[267] of soul, imparting also to +body its own peculiarity, if it is a body which participates something +of soul. And thus body becomes not only animated and intellectual, +but also divine. For it receives life indeed and motion from soul; +but indissoluble permanency from intellect; and divine union from +participated unity.[268] For each of these imparts its own hyparxis to +the subsequent natures. + + + PROPOSITION CXXX. + +In every divine order, such things as are first, are in a greater +degree exempt from the natures proximately arranged under them, than +these latter are from things subsequent. And secondary natures in a +greater degree adhere to their proximate superiors, than following +natures to these. + + * * * * * + +For by how much more unical and total any thing is, by so much the +more is it allotted a greater transcendency with respect to subsequent +natures. And by how much the more diminished it is according to power, +by so much the more is it connascent with the natures posterior to +itself. And more elevated natures indeed are more united with their +more principal causes; but inferior natures are less united with +them. For it is the province of a greater power to be more exempt +from subordinate, and to be more united to better natures. As on the +contrary, it is the province of a diminution of power, to recede +in a greater degree from more excellent, and to be co-passive with +subordinate natures. And this happens to secondary, but not to first +natures, in every order of things. + + + PROPOSITION CXXXI. + +Every God begins his own energy from himself. + + * * * * * + +For he first exhibits the peculiarity of his presence with secondary +natures, in himself; because he imparts himself to other things also +according to his own exuberant plenitude. For neither is deficiency +adapted to the Gods, nor fulness alone. For every thing deficient is +imperfect, and not being itself perfect, it is impossible it should +make another thing to be perfect. But that which is full is alone +sufficient to itself, and is not yet prepared to communicate. It is +necessary, therefore, that the nature which fills other things, and +which extends to other things the communications of itself should be +super-plenary or exuberantly full. Hence, if a divine nature fills all +things from itself with the good which it contains in itself, it is +exuberantly full. And if this be the case, establishing first in itself +the peculiarity which it imparts to others, it will extend to them the +communications of super-plenary goodness. + + + PROPOSITION CXXXII. + +All the orders of the Gods are bound in union by a medium. + + * * * * * + +For all the progressions of beings are effected through similars; +and much more will the orders of the Gods possess an indissoluble +continuity, as subsisting uniformly, and being defined according to +_the one_, which is the principal cause of their existence. The +decrements, therefore, are produced unitedly, and alone according to +the similitude in beings of secondary to first natures. And this, +because the hyparxis of the Gods much more consists in union than the +subsistence of beings. All the divine genera, therefore, are bound +together by appropriate media; and first natures do not proceed into +progressions perfectly different without a medium, but through the +genera common to each, from which they proceed, and of which they are +immediately the causes. For these congregate the extremes into one +union, being spread under some things connascently, but proximately +exempt from others. And they preserve the well-ordered generation of +divine natures. + + + PROPOSITION CXXXIII. + +Every God is a beneficent unity or an unific (ενοποιος) goodness; and +each, so far as a God, possesses this hyparxis. The first God, however, +is simply good, and simply one. But each posterior to the first, is a +certain goodness, and a certain unity. + + * * * * * + +For the divine peculiarity distinguishes the unities and goodnesses of +the Gods, so that each according to a certain peculiarity of goodness, +such as that of perfecting, or connectedly-containing, or defending, +benefits all things. For each of these is a certain good, but not every +good. But the first God pre-establishes a unical cause. Hence, that is +_the good_, as giving subsistence to all goodness. For all the +hyparxes of the Gods, are not together equal to _the one_; so +great a transcendency is the first God allotted with respect to the +multitude of the Gods. + + + PROPOSITION CXXXIV. + +Every divine intellect, intellectually perceives indeed, as intellect, +but energizes providentially as a God. + + * * * * * + +For it is the illustrious prerogative of intellect to know beings, and +to have its perfection in intellections. But it is the province of a +God to energize providentially, and to fill all things with good. This +communication, however, and replenishing with good, is accomplished +through the union of the replenishing natures with the causes prior to +themselves; which intellect, also imitating, passes into sameness with +intelligibles. A divine intellect, therefore, so far as it energizes +providentially, is a God; providence being established in an energy +prior to intellect. Hence, as a God it imparts itself to all things; +but as intellect it is not present with all things. For a divine nature +extends to things into which the intellectual peculiarity does not +proceed. For beings which are without intellect desire to energize +providentially, and to participate of a certain good. But this is +because all things indeed do not aspire after intellect, not even all +such as are able to participate of it. All things, however, aspire +after good, and hasten to obtain it. + + + PROPOSITION CXXXV. + +Every divine unity is participated by some being immediately, or +without a medium; and every deified nature is extended to one divine +unity. As many also as are the participated unities, so many are the +participating genera of beings. + + * * * * * + +For neither two or more unities are participated by one being. For +since the peculiarities in the unities are different, must not that +which is connascent with each be different also, since contact is +effected through similitude? Nor is one unity participated in a divided +manner by many beings. For many beings are unadapted to be conjoined +with unity, and as _beings_ they are unconjoined with the unity which +is prior to beings, and as _many_, they are separated from unity. It +is necessary, however, that the thing which participates should be +partly similar to that which is participated, and partly different and +dissimilar. Since, therefore, that which participates is something +belonging to beings, but unity is superessential, and according to +this they are dissimilar; it is necessary that the participant should +be one, in order that according to this, it may be similar to _the +one_ which is participated, though of these, the latter is one in such +a manner as to be unity, but the former, so as to be passive to _the +one_, and to be united through the participation of unity. + + + PROPOSITION CXXXVI. + +Every God who is more total, and arranged nearer to the first, is +participated by a more total genus of beings. But the God who is more +partial, and more remote from the first, is participated by a more +partial genus of beings. And as being is to being, so is one divine +unity to another. + + * * * * * + +For if unities are as many in number as beings, and vice versa, and +one unity is participated by one being, it is evident that the order +of beings proceeds according to the order of the unities, being +assimilated to the order prior to beings. And more total beings indeed +are connascent with more total unities; but more partial beings +with more partial unities. For if this were not the case, again +similars would be conjoined with dissimilars, and there would not +be a distribution according to desert. These things, however, are +impossible. Since from thence the one, and an appropriate measure are +luminously imparted to all things, and from these proceed. Much more, +therefore, will there be an order of participation in these, similars +being suspended as much as possible from similars. + + + PROPOSITION CXXXVII. + +Every unity in conjunction with _the one_ gives subsistence to the +being which participates of it. + + * * * * * + +For _the one_, as it gives subsistence to all things, so likewise it +is the cause of the participated unities, and of beings suspended +from these unities. But the unity belonging to every being produces +the peculiarity which shines forth in that particular being. And _the +one_ indeed is the cause of existence simply; but unity is the cause +of alliance, because it is connascent with _the one_. Hence, unity is +that which of itself defines the being which participates of it, and +essentially exhibits in itself a superessential peculiarity. For every +where, from that which is primary that which is secondary is that which +it is. If, therefore, there is a certain superessential peculiarity +of deity, this also belongs to the being which participates of it +superessentially. + + + PROPOSITION CXXXVIII. + +Of all the deified natures which participate of the divine peculiarity, +the first and highest is _being itself_. + + * * * * * + +For if being is beyond intellect and life, as has been demonstrated, +and if it is also after _the one_ the cause of the greatest number +of effects, being will be the highest deified nature. For it is more +single than life and intellect, and is on this account entirely more +venerable. But there is not any thing else prior to it except _the +one_. For prior to unical multitude what else can there be except +_the one_? But being is unical multitude as consisting of bound +and infinity. And in short, the superessential one[269] is prior +to essence. Since also in the illuminations which are imparted to +secondary natures, _the one_ alone extends beyond being. But being +is immediately posterior to _the one_. For that which is being in +capacity, but is not yet being, is nevertheless according to its own +nature one. And that which follows the being that is in capacity is +now being in energy. Hence, in the principles of things, non-being is +immediately beyond being, as something more excellent, and no other +than _the one itself_. + + + PROPOSITION CXXXIX. + +All things which participate of the divine unities, originate indeed +from being, but end in a corporeal nature. + + * * * * * + +For being is the first of participants, but body the last; for we say +that there are divine bodies. For the highest of all the genera of +bodies, souls and intellects, are attributed to the Gods, that in every +order, things analogous to the Gods may connect and preserve secondary +natures, and that each number may be a whole, containing all things +in itself, according to the whole which is in a part, and possessing +prior to other things the divine peculiarity. The divine genus, +therefore, subsists corporeally, psychically, and intellectually. And +it is evident that all these are divine according to participation. +For that which is primarily divine subsists in the unities. Hence, the +participants of the divine unities originate indeed from being, but end +in a corporeal nature. + + + PROPOSITION CXL. + +All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and +proceeding through appropriate media, extend as far as to the last of +things, and to places about the earth. + + * * * * * + +For neither does any thing intercept these powers, and exclude them +from being present with all things. For they are not in want of +places and intervals, on account of their unrestrained transcendency +with respect to all things, and a presence every where unmingled. +Nor is that which is adapted to participate of them, prohibited from +participation. But as soon as any thing is prepared for participation, +they also are present, neither then approaching, nor prior to this +being absent, but always possessing an invariable sameness of +subsistence. If, therefore, any terrene nature is adapted to the +participation of these divine powers, they are present with it, and +fill all things with themselves. And indeed they are in a greater +degree present with superior natures. But they are present with those +of a middle nature, according to the order which they possess. And +with such natures as are last, they are present in an ultimate degree. +From on high, therefore, they extend themselves as far as to the last +of things. Hence also, in last natures there are representations of +such as are first, and _all things sympathize with all_;[270] +secondary indeed, pre-existing in first natures, but first natures +presenting themselves to the view in such as are second. For every +thing subsists in a three-fold manner, either according to cause, or +according to hyparxis, or according to participation. + + + PROPOSITION CXLI. + +Every providence of the Gods is twofold, one indeed being exempt from +the natures for which it provides, but the other being co-arranged with +them. + + * * * * * + +For some divine essences indeed, according to hyparxis, and the +peculiarity of their order, are entirely expanded above the illuminated +natures. But others being of the same order, provide for things +subordinate that are of the same co-ordination; these also imitating +the providential energy of the exempt Gods, and desiring to fill +secondary natures with the good which they are able to impart. + + + PROPOSITION CXLII. + +The Gods are present with all things after the same manner, but all +things are not after the same manner present with the Gods. But every +thing participates of their presence according to its own order and +power. And this is accomplished by some things uniformly, but by others +manifoldly; by some things eternally, but by others according to time; +and by some things incorporeally, but by others corporeally. + + * * * * * + +For it is necessary that the different participation of the same +things, should become different, either from the participant, or from +that which is participated. But every thing divine always possesses +the same order, and is without habitude to, and unmingled with all +things. It remains therefore, that the mutation must subsist from the +participants, and that in these that which is not invariably the same +must be found, and that at different times they are differently present +with the Gods. Hence, the Gods being present with all things with +invariable sameness, all things are not after the same manner present +with them. But other things are present with them as far as they are +able, and according to the manner in which they are present they enjoy +their illuminations. For the participation is according to the measure +of the presence of the divinities. + + + PROPOSITION CXLIII. + +All inferior natures fail before the presence of the Gods, though that +which participates of them may be adapted to participation. Every thing +foreign indeed from divine light becomes far removed from it. But all +things are illuminated at once by the Gods. + + * * * * * + +For divine natures are always more comprehensive and more powerful +than the things which proceed from them. But the inaptitude of the +participants, becomes the cause of the privation[271] of divine +illumination. For this inaptitude obscures it by its own imbecility. +And this being obscured, something else appears to receive dominion, +not according to its own power, but according to the imbecility of +the participant, which seems to rise against the divine form of the +illumination. + + + PROPOSITION CXLIV. + +All beings, and all the distributions of beings, extend as far in their +progressions, as the orders of the Gods. + + * * * * * + +For the Gods produce beings in conjunction with themselves, nor is any +thing able to subsist, and to receive measure and order external to the +Gods, [or beyond their influence.] For all things are perfected through +their power, and are arranged and measured by the Gods. Prior therefore +to the last genera in beings, the Gods pre-exist, who also adorn these +genera, and impart to them life, formation and perfection, and convert +them to _the good_. In a similar manner also, the Gods are prior +to the middle and first genera of beings. And all things are bound and +rooted in the Gods, and through this cause are preserved. But when any +thing apostatizes from, and becomes destitute of the Gods, it entirely +departs into non-entity and vanishes, in consequence of being perfectly +deprived of those natures by which it was contained. + + + PROPOSITION CXLV. + +The peculiarity of every divine order pervades through all secondary +natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate genera of beings. + + * * * * * + +For if beings proceed as far as the orders of the Gods extend, in every +genus of beings, there is a supernally-illuminated peculiarity of the +divine powers. For every thing receives from its proximate appropriate +cause, the peculiarity according to which that cause is allotted its +subsistence. I say for instance, if there is a certain cathartic or +purifying deity, there is also a purification in souls, in animals, in +plants, and in stones. And in a similar manner, if there is a guardian, +a convertive, a perfective, and a vivific power. And a stone indeed +participates of the divine cathartic power in a corporeal manner only. +But a plant participates it still more clearly according to life. An +animal possesses this form according to impulse; the rational soul +rationally; intellect, intellectually; and the Gods superessentially +and unically. The whole series also has the same power from one divine +cause. And there is the same mode of reasoning with respect to the +peculiarities of the other divine powers. For all things are suspended +from the Gods. And different natures are illuminated by different +Gods; every divine series extending as far as to the last of things. +And some things indeed are suspended from the Gods immediately, but +others through a greater or less number of media. But _all things are +full[272] of Gods_. And whatever any thing naturally possesses, it +derives from the Gods. + + + PROPOSITION CXLVI. + +The ends of all the divine progressions are assimilated to their +principles, preserving a circle without a beginning and without an end, +through conversion to their principles. + + * * * * * + +For if every thing that has proceeded, is converted to the proper +principle from which it proceeded, much more will total orders +having proceeded from their summit be again converted to it. But +the conversion of the end to the beginning, renders the whole order +one, definite, and converging to itself, and exhibiting through the +convergency, that which has the form of _the one_ in the multitude. + + + PROPOSITION CXLVII. + +The summits of all the divine orders are assimilated to the ends of the +natures [proximately] situated above them. + + * * * * * + +For if it is necessary that there should be an uninterrupted connection +of the divine progression, and that each order should be bound together +by appropriate media, it is necessary that the summits of secondary +should be conjoined with the terminations of first orders. But this +contact is through similitude. Hence there will be a similitude of the +principles of an inferior, to the ends of a [proximately] superior +order. + + + PROPOSITION CXLVIII. + +Every divine order is united to itself in a three-fold manner, from the +summit which is in it, from its middle, and from its end. + + * * * * * + +For the summit possessing a power which is most single, transmits union +to all the series, and unites the whole of it supernally abiding in +itself. But the middle extending to both the extremes, binds together +the whole order about itself; transmitting indeed, the gifts of primary +divine natures, but extending the powers of such as are last, and +inserting communion in all of them, and a conjunction with each other. +For thus the whole order becomes one, from natures that replenish +and those that are filled, converging to the middle as to a certain +centre. And the end again returning to the beginning, and recalling +the proceeding powers, imparts similitude and convergency to the whole +order. And thus the whole order is one through the unific power of +primary natures, through the connexion existing in the middle, and +through the conversion of the end to the principle of the progressions. + + + PROPOSITION CXLIX. + +Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded according to number. + + * * * * * + +For if this multitude is most near to _the one_ it will not be +infinite. For the infinite is not connascent with, but foreign from +_the one_. Indeed, if multitude is of itself, or in its own nature, +separated from _the one_, it is evident that infinite multitude is +perfectly destitute of it. Hence it is powerless, and inefficacious. +The multitude of the Gods therefore, is not infinite. Hence it has the +form of _the one_ and is finite, and is more finite than every other +multitude. For it is nearer to _the one_ than all other multitude. If +therefore the principle of things was multitude, it would be necessary +that what is nearer to the principle should be a greater multitude than +what is more remote from it. For that which is nearer to any thing is +more similar to it. Since however, that which is first is _the one_, +the multitude which is conjoined with it, is a less multitude than that +which is more remote from it. But the infinite is not a less, but is +the greatest possible multitude. + + + PROPOSITION CL. + +Every thing which proceeds in the divine orders, is not naturally +adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor in +short, are secondary natures able to receive all the powers of the +natures prior to themselves, but the latter have certain powers exempt +from things in an inferior order, and incomprehensible by the beings +posterior to themselves. + + * * * * * + +For if the peculiarities of the Gods differ from each other, those of +the subordinate pre-exist in the superior divinities; but those of +the superior being more total, are not in the subordinate. But more +excellent natures impart indeed some things to their progeny, but +antecedently assume others in themselves, in an exempt manner. For it +has been demonstrated that those Gods who are nearer to _the one_ +are more total; and those more remote from it more partial. But if the +more total have powers comprehensive of the more partial, those that +have a secondary and more partial order, will not comprehend the power +of the more total Gods. In the superior therefore, there is something +incomprehensible and uncircumscribed by the inferior orders. For +each of the divine orders is truly infinite.[273] Nor is that which +is infinite, as has been demonstrated,[274] infinite to itself, nor +much less to things above itself, but to all the natures posterior +to itself. But infinite in these last is incapacity. The infinite +however, is incomprehensible by those natures to which it is infinite. +Subordinate natures therefore, do not participate of all the powers +which more excellent natures antecedently comprehend in themselves. +For the latter are incomprehensible by the former. Hence things of a +secondary nature, from their more partial subsistence, will neither +possess all the powers of more excellent beings, nor will they possess +the powers which they do contain after the same manner as superior +natures, on account of that infinity through which the latter transcend +the former. + + + PROPOSITION CLI. + +Every thing paternal in the Gods is of a primary nature, and is +pre-established in the rank of _the good_, according to all the +divine orders. + + * * * * * + +For it produces the hyparxes of secondary natures, and total powers +and essences, according to one ineffable transcendency. Hence also it +is denominated paternal, in consequence of exhibiting the united and +boniform power of _the one_, and the cause which gives subsistence +to secondary natures. And according to each order of the Gods, the +paternal genus ranks as the leader, producing all things from itself, +and adorning them, as being arranged analogous to _the good_. And of +divine fathers, some are more total, but others are more partial, just +as the orders themselves of the Gods, differ by the more total, and the +more partial, according to the reason of cause. As many therefore, as +are the progressions of the Gods, so many also are the differences of +fathers. For if there is that which is analogous to _the good_ in every +order, it is necessary that there should be the paternal in all the +orders, and that each order should proceed from the paternal union. + + + PROPOSITION CLII. + +Every thing which is generative in the Gods, proceeds according to +the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, proceeding through +all things, and transcendently exhibiting the never-failing in the +progressions of secondary natures. + + * * * * * + +For to multiply things which proceed, and to produce things into +progeny, from the occult comprehension in causes, of what else is it +the prerogative, than of the infinite power of the Gods, through which +all divine natures are filled with prolific good? For every thing which +is full produces other things from itself according to a super-plenary +power. The domination of power therefore is the peculiarity of +generative deity, which multiplies the powers of the things generated, +and renders them prolific, and excites them to generate and give +subsistence to other things. For if every thing imparts the appropriate +peculiarity which it possesses primarily to other things, every thing +which is prolific will impart progression, and will adumbrate the +infinity which is the primary leader of wholes, from which every +generative power proceeds, and which in an exempt manner pours forth +the ever-flowing progressions of divine natures. + + + PROPOSITION CLIII. + +[Every thing which is perfect in the Gods,[275]] is the cause of divine +perfection. + + * * * * * + +For as the hypostases of beings are of one kind, but those of +superessential natures of another, so likewise with respect to +perfections, those of the Gods themselves according to hyparxis, are +different from those of beings, which are secondary and posterior to +them. And the former indeed, are self-perfect and primary, because +_the good_ subsists primarily in them; but the latter possess +perfection according to participation. Hence the perfection of the Gods +is one thing, and that of deified natures is another. The perfection +however, which is primarily in the Gods, is not only the cause of +perfection to deified natures, but also to the Gods themselves. For +if every thing so far as it is perfect, is converted to its proper +principle, that which is the cause of all divine conversion, is the +perfective genus of the Gods. + + + PROPOSITION CLIV. + +Every thing which is of a guardian nature in the Gods, preserves every +thing in its proper order, and is uniformly exempt[276] from secondary, +and established[277] in primary natures. + + * * * * * + +For if a guard immutably preserves the measure of the order of every +thing, and connectedly contains all the natures that are guarded +in their appropriate perfection, it will impart to all things a +transcendency exempt from subordinate beings, and will firmly establish +each thing unmingled, in itself, existing as the cause of undefiled +purity to the natures that are guarded, and fixing them in superior +beings. For every thing is perfect which adheres to primary natures, +but is in itself alone, and is expanded above things subordinate. + + + PROPOSITION CLV. + +Every thing vivific in the Gods is [a generative cause, but every +generative cause is not vivific.[278]] + + * * * * * + +For a generative is more total than a vivific cause, and is nearer to +the principle of all things. For generation manifests a cause which +produces beings into multitude. But vivification represents to us +the deity who is the supplier of all life. If therefore the former +multiplies the hypostases of beings, but the latter gives subsistence +to the progressions of life,--if this be the case, as being is to life, +so is the generative order to the vivific series. The former therefore, +will be more total, and the cause of a greater number of effects, and +will on this account be nearer to the principle of all things. + + + PROPOSITION CLVI. + +Every cause of purity is comprehended in the guardian order. But on +the contrary, not every thing of a guardian order is the same with the +purifying genus. + + * * * * * + +For purity imparts to all the Gods the unmingled with things inferior, +and the undefiled in the providence of secondary natures. But a +guardian power also effects this, and contains all things in itself, +and firmly inserts them in superior natures. The guardian therefore is +more total than the purifying genus. For in short, the peculiarity of +the guardian power, is to preserve the order of every thing the same +with reference to itself, and to the natures prior and posterior to +itself. But the peculiarity of purity is to keep more excellent natures +exempt from such as are subordinate. These powers however primarily +subsist in the Gods. For it is necessary that there should be one cause +preceding that which is in all things, and in short, it is requisite +that there should be uniform measures of all good, and that these +should be comprehended by the Gods according to cause. For there is no +good in secondary natures which does not pre-exist in the Gods. [Hence +in the divinities purity is likewise a primary good, guardianship, and +every thing of this kind.[279]] + + + PROPOSITION CLVII. + +Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to all things, and +gives subsistence to the hyparxes of beings. But every thing which +is fabricative of the production of form, exists prior to composite +natures, and precedes their order, and division according to number, +and is also of the same co-ordination with the paternal cause, in the +more partial genera of things. + + * * * * * + +For each of these belongs to the order of bound; since hyparxis also, +number and form, have all of them the nature of bound. Hence, in this +respect they are co-ordinate with each other. But the demiurgic or +fabricative cause indeed, produces fabrication into multitude. And +the uniform, or that which has the form of _the one_ supplies +the progressions of beings. And the former indeed, is the artificer +of form, but the latter produces essence. So far therefore, as these +differ from each other, viz. form and being, so far also does the +paternal differ from the demiurgic cause. But form is a _certain_ +being.[280] Hence the paternal cause is more total and causal, and is +beyond the demiurgic genus, in the same manner as being is beyond form. + + + PROPOSITION CLVIII. + +Every elevating cause in the Gods, differs both from a purifying cause, +and from the convertive genera. + + * * * * * + +For it is evident that this cause also has necessarily a primary +subsistence in the Gods; since all the causes of total good pre-exist +in the divinities. But it subsists prior to the purifying cause. For +the one liberates from things of a subordinate nature, but the other +conjoins with more excellent natures. The elevating however, has a +more partial order than the convertive cause. For every thing which +converts, [is converted either to itself, or to that which is more +excellent than itself.[281]] But the energy of the elevating cause +is characterized by a conversion to that which is more excellent, as +leading that which is converted to a superior and more divine cause. + + + PROPOSITION CLIX. + +Every order of the Gods consists of the first principles, bound and +infinity. But one order is in a greater degree derived from bound, and +another from infinity. + + * * * * * + +For every order proceeds from both these, because the communications +of first causes pervade through all secondary natures. But in some +things bound predominates in the mixture [of bound and infinity,] and +in others infinity. And thus the genus which has the form of bound has +its completion, in which the prerogatives of bound have dominion. This +too is the case with the genus which has the form of the infinite, and +in which the properties of infinity predominate. + + + PROPOSITION CLX. + + _Concerning Intellect._ + +Every divine intellect is uniform, or has the form of _the one_, +and is perfect. And the first intellect subsists from itself, and +produces other intellects. + + * * * * * + +For if it is a God it is filled with divine unities, and is uniform. +But if this be the case, it is also perfect, being full of divine +goodness. And if this be admitted, it is likewise primarily intellect, +as being united to the Gods. But being primarily intellect, it also +gives an hypostasis to other intellects. For all secondary natures +obtain their hyparxis from such as have a primary subsistence. + + + PROPOSITION CLXI. + +Every thing which is truly being, and is suspended from the Gods, is +divine and imparticipable. + + * * * * * + +For since that which is truly being, is the first of the natures +that participate of the divine union, it likewise fills intellect +from itself. For intellect is being, as replete with being, and is +therefore a divine intelligible. And so far indeed as it is deified +it is divine, but as filling intellect, and being participated by +it, it is intelligible. Intellect also is being, on account of that +which is primarily being. But that which is primarily being itself is +separate from intellect; because intellect is posterior to being. But +imparticipables subsist prior to things which are participated. Hence +being which subsists by itself and is imparticipable, is prior to +the being which is conjoined with intellect. For it is intelligible, +not as co-arranged with intellect, but as perfecting intellect in an +exempt manner, because it imparts being to it, and fills it with truly +existing essence. + + + PROPOSITION CLXII. + +Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly existing being, is +occult and intelligible; occult indeed, as being conjoined with unity; +but intelligible,[282] as participated by being. + + * * * * * + +For all the Gods are denominated from the things which are suspended +from them; because from these it is possible to know their different +hypostases, which are [of themselves] unknown. For every thing divine +is of itself ineffable and unknown, as being connascent with the +ineffable one. From the difference, however, of the participants +it happens that the peculiarities of divine natures become known. +The unities, therefore, which illuminate truly existing being are +intelligible; because being, truly so called, is a divine intelligible, +and imparticipable, subsisting prior to intellect. For this would +not be suspended from the first Gods, unless they also possessed a +primary hypostasis, and a power perfective of other Gods; since, as +participants are to each other, so likewise are the hyparxes of the +things that are participated. + + + PROPOSITION CLXIII. + +Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable[283] +intellect, is intellectual. + + * * * * * + +For as intellect is to truly existing being, so are these unities to +the intelligible unities. Since, therefore, the latter which illuminate +being,[284] are intelligible, hence, the former which illuminate a +divine and imparticipable intellect, are intellectual. Yet they are not +intellectual in such a way, as if they subsisted in intellect, but as +causally existing prior to intellect, and generating intellect. + + + PROPOSITION CLXIV. + +Every multitude of unities which is participated by every +imparticipable soul, is supermundane. + + * * * * * + +For because imparticipable soul is primarily above the world, the Gods +also which are participated by it are supermundane, having the same +analogy to the intellectual and intelligible Gods, which soul has +to intellect, and intellect to truly existing being. As, therefore, +every soul is suspended from intellect, and intellect is converted +to the intelligible, thus also the supermundane are suspended from +the intellectual, in the same manner as the intellectual from the +intelligible Gods. + + + PROPOSITION CLXV. + +Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain [sensible +body is mundane.] + + * * * * * + +For it illuminates the parts of the world, through intellect and soul +as media.[285] For intellect is not present with any mundane body +without soul, nor are deity and soul conjoined without a medium; since +participations are through similars. Intellect itself also according +to its intelligible summit, participates of unity. These unities, +therefore, are mundane, as giving completion to the whole world, and as +deifying visible bodies. For each of these is divine, not on account +of soul; for soul is not primarily a God. Nor on account of intellect; +for intellect is not the same with _the one_. But each of these +visible bodies, is animated indeed on account of soul, and moved of +itself. But it possesses a perpetual sameness of subsistence, and is +moved in the most excellent order, on account of intellect. It is, +however, divine on account of union. And if it possesses a providential +power, it possesses it through this cause. + + + PROPOSITION CLXVI. + +Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. And if +participable, it is either participated by supermundane, or by mundane +souls. + + * * * * * + +For imparticipable intellect having the first order, is the leader of +every multitude of intellects. But of participable intellects, some +illuminate supermundane and imparticipable soul, but others the mundane +soul. For the mundane multitude is not immediately derived from the +imparticipable; since progressions are through similars. But that which +is separate from the world, is more similar to the imparticipable, than +that which is divided about it. Nor has a supermundane multitude alone +a subsistence, but there are also mundane intellects; since there is +likewise a mundane multitude of Gods, and the world itself is animated, +and at the same time intellectual. The participation also of the +supermundane Gods by mundane souls, is through mundane intellects as +the media. + + + PROPOSITION CLXVII. + +Every intellect intellectually perceives itself. But the first +intellect indeed, perceives itself alone; and in this, intellect +and the intelligible are one in number. But each of the subsequent +intellects, perceives itself, and the natures prior to itself. And the +intelligible to each of these,[286] is partly that which it is, and +partly that from which it is derived. + + * * * * * + +For every intellect, either[287] intellectually perceives itself, or +that which is above, or that which is posterior to itself. But if +indeed it perceives that which is posterior to itself, it will through +intellect be converted to that which is less excellent than itself; +and thus will not know that to which it is converted, as not being in +itself, but external to itself. But it will only know the image of this +thing, as being generated in itself from it. For it knows that which it +possesses, and the manner in which it is affected, but not that which +it does not possess, and by which it is not affected. + +But if it perceives that which is above itself, if indeed, this is +accomplished through the knowledge of itself, it will at one and the +same time both know itself and that superior nature. But if it knows +that alone, it will be ignorant of itself, though it is intellect. In +short, by knowing that which is prior to itself, it will know that it +is a cause, and will also know the things of which it is the cause. +For if it is ignorant of these, it will likewise be ignorant of that +which is the cause of them; not knowing that which produces what it +produces, by its very being, and what the things are which it does +produce. Hence, by knowing the things of which it is the cause, it will +also know itself, as deriving its subsistence from thence. By knowing, +therefore, that which is prior to itself, it will likewise entirely +know itself. Hence, if there is a certain intelligible intellect, +this by knowing itself, will also know the intelligible, being +itself intelligible. But each of the intellects posterior to this, +will intellectually perceive the intelligible which is in itself, and +at the same time that which is prior to itself. Hence, in intellect +there is the intelligible, and in the intelligible intellect. But one +intellect is the same with the intelligible; and another is the same +with the intelligible which is in itself, but is not the same with the +intelligible prior to itself. For that which is simply intelligible is +one thing, and the intelligible in that which intellectually perceives +is another. + + + PROPOSITION CLXVIII. + +Every intellect knows in energy that which it intellectually perceives, +and it is not the peculiarity of one part of it to perceive, and of +another to perceive that it perceives. + + * * * * * + +For if it is intellect in energy, and perceives itself as not any +thing different from the object of intellectual perception, it +will know itself, and see itself. But seeing that which perceives +intellectually, and knowing that which sees, it will know that it +is intellect in energy. But knowing this, it will know that it +perceives intellectually, and will not alone know the objects of its +intellection. Hence, it will at once both know the intelligible, and +that it intellectually perceives it, and by intellection it will be +intellectually perceived by itself. + + + PROPOSITION CLXIX. + +Every intellect has its essence, power and energy in eternity. + + * * * * * + +For if it intellectually perceives itself, and intellect is the same +with the intelligible, intelligence also is the same with intellect +and the intelligible. For being the medium between that which +intellectually perceives, and the object of intellectual perception, +and these being the same, intelligence also will be the same with both. +Moreover, that the essence of intellect is eternal, is evident.[288] +For the whole of it subsists at once. And this being the case, +intelligence also will be eternal, since it is the same with the +essence of intellect. But if intellect is eternal,[289] it will not be +measured by time, neither according to its being, nor its energy. But +these subsisting with invariable sameness, the power also of intellect +will be eternal. + + + PROPOSITION CLXX. + +Every intellect at once intellectually perceives all things. But +imparticipable intellect indeed, _simply_ perceives all things. +And each of the intellects posterior to it perceives all things +[according to one]. + + * * * * * + +[For if][290] every intellect establishes its essence in eternity, and +together with its essence its energy, it will intellectually perceive +all things at once. For to every thing which is not established in +eternity, the successive objects of its perception subsist according to +parts. For every thing which is successive, is in time; the successive +consisting of prior and posterior, but the whole of it not existing at +once. If therefore all intellects similarly perceive all things,[291] +they will not differ from each other. For if they perceive all things +similarly,[292] they are similarly all things, since they are the +very things which they intellectually perceive. But being similarly +all things, one intellect will not be imparticipable, and another +not. For their essences are the same things as the objects of their +intellection; since the intellection of each is the same with the +being of each, and each is both intellection and essence. It remains +therefore, either that each intellect does not similarly perceive all +things, but one thing, or more than one, but not all things at once; +or that it perceives all things according to one.[293] To assert +however, that each intellect does not perceive all things, is to make +intellect to be ignorant of some particular being. For if it suffers +transition in its energy, and intellectually perceives, not at once, +but according to prior and posterior, at the same time possessing an +immoveable nature, it will be inferior to soul, which understands all +things in being moved, [or in a mutable energy]; because intellect +on this hypothesis, will only understand one thing by its permanent +energy. It will therefore understand all things according to one. For +it either intellectually perceives all things, or one thing, or all +things according to the one of intellection. For in all intellects +indeed, there is always an intellectual perception of all things; yet +so as to bound all things in one of all. Hence there is something +predominant in intellection, and the objects of intellection; since all +things are at once understood as one, through the domination of one, +which characterizes all things with itself. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXI. + +Every intellect is an impartible essence. + + * * * * * + +For if it is without magnitude, incorporeal, [and immoveable, it +is impartible. For every thing][294] which in any way whatever is +partible, is either partible on account of magnitude, or multitude, or +on account of energies which are borne along with the flux of time. But +intellect is eternal according to all things, and is beyond bodies, and +the multitude which is in it is united. It is, therefore, impartible. +That intellect also is incorporeal, is manifest from its conversion to +itself. For no body is converted to itself. But that it is eternal, +the identity of its energy with its essence evinces. For this has been +before demonstrated. And that the multitude in it is united is evident +from the continuity of intellectual multitude with the divine unities. +For these are the first multitude; but intellects are next to these. +Hence, though every intellect is a multitude, yet it is an united +multitude. For prior to that which is divided, that which is collected +into profound union, and is nearer to _the one_, subsists. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXII. + +Every intellect is proximately the producing cause of beings perpetual +and immutable according to essence. + + * * * * * + +For every thing which is produced by an immoveable cause, is immutable +according to essence. But immoveable intellect being all things +eternally, and abiding in eternity, produces by its very being that +which it produces. If however it always is, and is invariably the same, +it always produces, and after the same manner. Hence, it is not the +cause of things which sometimes have existence, and at other times not, +but it is the cause of things which always exist. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXIII. + +Every intellect is intellectually both the things which are prior and +posterior to itself. + + * * * * * + +For it is those things which are posterior to itself, according +to cause, but those things which are prior to itself, according +to participation. Yet it is still intellect, and is allotted an +intellectual essence. [Hence it defines] all things [according to +its essence];[295] both such as are according to cause, and such +as are according to participation. For every thing participates of +more excellent beings in such a way as it is naturally adapted to +participate, and not according to their subsistence. For otherwise, +they would be similarly participated by all things. Participations +therefore, are according to the peculiarity and power of the +participants. Hence in intellect, the natures prior to it subsist +intellectually. But intellect is likewise intellectually the things +posterior to itself. For it does not consist of its effects, nor does +it contain these, but the causes of these in itself. But intellect is +by its very being the cause of all things. And the very being of it +is intellectual. Hence it contains intellectually the causes of all +things. So that every intellect possesses all things intellectually, +both such as are prior, and such as are posterior to it. As therefore, +every intellect contains intelligibles intellectually, so likewise it +contains sensibles intellectually. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXIV. + +Every intellect gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, by +intellection, and its fabrication consists in intellection, and its +intellection or intelligence, in fabrication. + + * * * * * + +For if intelligible and intellect are the same, the essence also of +every intellect will be the same with the intellection in itself. But +it produces that which it produces by essence, and produces according +to the very being, which it is. By intellection therefore, it will +produce the things which are produced. For in intellect, being and +intellection are both of them one. For intellect is the same with every +being which it contains. If therefore, it makes by its very being, but +its very being is intellection, it makes by intellection. Intelligence +also which is in energy, consists in intellection. But this is the same +with the essence of intellect. And the essence of intellect consists +in producing. For that which produces immoveably, [always possesses] +its very being [in producing. The intelligence of intellect therefore +consists in fabrication or production.[296]] + + + PROPOSITION CLXXV. + +Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are +intellectual, both according to essence, and according to energy. + + * * * * * + +For it is necessary that it should either be participated by these, +or by other natures, which possess indeed an intellectual essence, +but do not always energize intellectually. It is however impossible +that it should be participated by the latter of these. For the +energy of intellect is immoveable. And hence, the natures by which +it is participated, always participate of intellectual energy, which +always causes the participants of it to be intellectual. For that +which possesses its energy in a certain part of time, is unadapted to +be conjoined with an eternal energy. But that which has perfection +according to the whole of time, is the medium between every eternal +energy, and that which is perfect in a certain time, as well in the +mutations of energy, as in essences. For progressions are never +effected without a medium, but through kindred and similar natures, +both according to hypostases, and the perfections of energies. After +a similar manner therefore, every intellect is primarily participated +by those beings that are able to perceive intellectually, according to +the whole of time, and who always energize intellectually, though their +intellection is in time, and is not eternally in energy. + + + COROLLARY. + +From this therefore, it is evident that it is impossible for the soul +which sometimes perceives intellectually and sometimes does not, to +participate proximately of intellect. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXVI. + +All intellectual forms are in each other, and each is at the same time +separate and distinct from the rest. + + * * * * * + +For if every intellect is impartible, and the multitude which is in it +is united through intellectual impartibility, all things in it will be +in one, impartibles will be united to each other, and all intellectual +forms will pervade through all. But if all intellectual forms subsist +immaterially and incorporeally, they are unconfused with each other +and separate, and each preserving its own purity, remains that which +it is. The peculiar participation however of each participating in +a separate manner, manifests the unconfused nature of intellectual +forms. For unless the forms which are participated were distinguished +separate from each other, the participants of each of them would not +participate in a separate manner, but in the subordinate natures +[i.e. in the participants] there would be, in a much greater degree, +an indistinct confusion, these being according to their order of an +inferior condition. For whence would there be a separation of these, if +the natures which give subsistence to, and perfect them, were without +distinction, and were confused together? But again the impartible +hypostasis, and uniform essence of that which contains forms, evinces +their united nature. For things which have their hyparxis in the +impartible and the uniform, are impartibly in the same thing. For how +can you divide the impartible and _the one_? Hence, they have a +simultaneous subsistence, and are in each other, each wholly pervading +through the whole of each, in a manner unaccompanied with interval. +For that which comprehends them is not extended with interval, nor is +one of them in this thing, but another elsewhere, as in that which has +interval; but every thing is at once in the impartible and in one. So +that all intellectual forms are in each other, and are in each other +unitedly, and at the same time each is distinctly apart from each. + + + COROLLARY. + +But if some one, in addition to these demonstrations, should require +also examples, let him direct his attention to the theorems which exist +in one soul. For all these are in the same essence, which is truly +without magnitude,[297] and are united to each other. For that which is +without magnitude, does not locally contain the things which are in it, +but the natures which it contains are united and separated, impartibly +and without interval. For the soul genuinely produces all things, and +each apart from each, attracting nothing from the rest, which, unless +they were always separated according to habit, would not be separated +by the energy of the soul. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXVII. + +Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one indeed, is +comprehensive of more total, but another of more partial forms. And +the superior intellects contain in a more total manner, such things +as those posterior to them contain more partially. But the inferior +intellects contain more partially, such things as those that are prior +to them contain more totally. + + * * * * * + +For the superior intellects employ greater powers, having more the form +of _the one_ than secondary intellects. But the inferior intellects +being more multiplied, diminish the powers which they contain. +For things that are more allied to _the one_, being contracted in +quantity, surpass the natures that are posterior to them. And on the +contrary, things more remote from _the one_, as they are increased +in quantity, are inferior to the natures that are nearer to _the +one_. Hence the superior intellects, being established according to a +greater power, but being less in multitude, produce a greater number +of effects, according to power, through fewer things according to the +quantity of forms. But the intellects posterior to them produce fewer +effects through a greater number of things, according to a defect +of power.[298] If therefore, the former produce a greater number of +effects, through fewer things, the forms in them are more total. And if +the latter produce fewer effects, through a greater number of things, +the forms in them are more partial. + + + COROLLARY. + +Hence it happens that the natures which are generated from superior +intellects according to one form, are produced [in a divided manner +from secondary intellects[299]] according to many ideas. And again, +those natures which are produced by inferior intellects through many +and distinct forms, are produced by superior intellects through fewer, +but more total forms. And that indeed which is a whole and common, +accedes supernally to all its participants. But that which is divided +and peculiar accedes from secondary intellects. Hence secondary +intellects, by the more partial separation of peculiarities, accurately +and subtly distinguish the formations of primary intellects. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXVIII. + +Every intellectual form gives subsistence to eternal natures. + + * * * * * + +For if every intellectual form is eternal and immoveable, it is +essentially the cause of immutable and eternal hypostases, but not +of such as are generated and corrupted. So that every thing which +subsists according to an intellectual form is an eternal intellectual +nature. For if all forms produce things posterior to themselves by +their very being, but their essence possesses an invariable sameness of +subsistence, the things produced by them will also be invariably the +same, and will be eternal. Hence, neither the genera which subsist from +a formal cause, according to a certain time, nor corruptible natures +so far as they are corruptible, have a pre-existent intellectual form. +For they would be incorruptible and unbegotten, if they derived their +hypostasis from intellectual forms. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXIX. + +Every intellectual number is bounded. + + * * * * * + +For if there is another multitude posterior to this, essentially +inferior to it, and thus [more remote from _the one_, but the +intellectual number is nearer to _the one_;[300]] and if that which is +nearer to _the one_, is less according to quantity, but that which is +more remote from it, is more according to quantity;--if this be the +case, the intellectual number also will be less than every multitude +posterior to it. Hence, it is not infinite. The multitude of intellects +therefore, is bounded. For that which is less than a certain thing is +not infinite, because the infinite, so far as infinite, is not less +than any thing. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXX. + +Every intellect is a whole, so far as each consists of parts, and is +united to other things, and at the same time separated from them. But +imparticipable intellect indeed, is simply a whole, as containing all +parts in itself totally. But each partial intellect possesses the whole +as in a part; and thus is all things partially. + + * * * * * + +For if a partial intellect is all things according to one, but a +subsistence according to one thing is nothing else than a subsistence +partially, the whole is in each of these intellects partially, being +defined according to a certain one particular thing which predominates +in all of them. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXXI. + +Every participated intellect is either divine, as being suspended from +the Gods, or is intellectual only. + + * * * * * + +For if a divine and imparticipable intellect has a primary subsistence, +the intellect which is allied to this, is not that which differs from +it in both respects, viz. which is neither divine, nor imparticipable. +For things which are dissimilar in both these respects, cannot +be conjoined with each other. It is evident therefore, that the +medium between these is partly similar to that which is primarily +intellect, and partly dissimilar to it. Either[301] therefore, it is +imparticipable and not divine; or it is participated and divine. But +every thing imparticipable is divine, as being allotted an order in +multitude analogous to _the one_. Hence, there will be a certain +intellect which is divine and at the same time participated. It is +necessary however that there should be [an intellect which does not +participate[302]] of the divine unities, but intellectually perceives +them only. For in each series, such things as are first, and which +are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of things +proximately situated in a superior order. But such as are far distant +from the primary monad, cannot be suspended from the natures that +proximately belong to a higher order. There is therefore both [a +divine intellect,[303]] and an intellect which is intellectual only; +the latter indeed, being established according to an intellectual +peculiarity, which it possesses from its own monad, and from +imparticipable intellect; but the former subsisting according to the +union which it receives from the participated monad. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXXII. + +Every [divine[304]] participated intellect, is participated by divine +souls. + + * * * * * + +For if participation assimilates the participant to that which is +participated, and renders the former connascent with the latter, +it is evident that the participant of a divine intellect must be a +divine soul, as being suspended from a divine intellect, and that +through intellect as a medium it must participate of the deity which +it contains. For deity conjoins his soul which participates of it with +intellect, and binds that which is divine to that which is divine. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXXIII. + +Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellectual +alone, is participated by souls which are neither divine, nor +subsisting in a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect. + + * * * * * + +For neither are divine souls of this kind, nor such as participate +of intellect. For souls participate of the Gods through a divine +intellect, as was before demonstrated. Nor are souls which admit of +mutation, of this kind. For every intellect is participated by natures +which are always intellectual, both according to essence and according +to energy. For this is evident from what has been before shown. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXXIV. + + _Concerning Soul._ + +Every soul is either divine, or is changed from intellect into a +privation of intellect; or always remains as a medium between these, +but is inferior to divine souls. + + * * * * * + +For if a divine intellect indeed, is participated by divine souls, +but an intellectual intellect by those souls alone which are neither +divine, nor receive a mutation from intelligence into a privation of +intellect (for there are souls of this kind, which sometimes perceive +intellectually, and sometimes do not);--if this be the case, it +is evident that there are three genera of souls. And the first of +these indeed, are divine. But the second are not divine, yet always +participate of intellect. And the third are those, which are sometimes +changed into an intellectual condition, and sometimes into a privation +of intellect. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXXV. + +All [divine][305] souls, are indeed Gods psychically. But all those +that participate of an intellectual intellect, are the perpetual +attendants of the Gods. And all those that are the recipients of +mutation, are sometimes only the attendants of the Gods. + + * * * * * + +For if some souls have divine light supernally shining upon them, +but others are endued with perpetual intelligence, and others again +only sometimes participate of this perfection;--if this be the case, +the first of these will among the multitude of souls be analogous +to the Gods. But the next to these, will always follow the Gods, in +consequence of always energizing according to intellect, and will be +suspended from divine souls, having the same relation to them as that +which is intellectual[306] to that which is divine. And the souls +which sometimes energize intellectually and follow the Gods, neither +participate of intellect after a manner always the same, nor are always +able to be converted [to the intelligible] in conjunction with divine +souls. For that which sometimes only participates of intellect, cannot +by any contrivance whatever be always conjoined with the Gods. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXXVI. + +Every soul is both an incorporeal essence, [and separate from +body].[307] + + * * * * * + +For if it knows itself, but every thing which knows itself, is +converted to itself, and that which is converted to itself, does not +pertain to body (since every body is without conversion to itself) nor +is inseparable from body, since that which is inseparable from body is +not naturally adapted to revert to itself as it would thus be separated +from body;--if this be the case, every soul is neither a corporeal +essence, nor inseparable from body. Moreover, that the soul knows +itself is evident. For if it knows the natures that are above itself, +and is also naturally adapted to know itself, it will in a much greater +degree know itself from the causes prior to itself. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXXVII. + +Every soul is indestructible, and incorruptible. + + * * * * * + +For every thing which can in any way whatever be dissolved and +destroyed, is either corporeal and a composite, or is allotted its +hypostasis in a subject. And that indeed, which is dissolved, is +corrupted as consisting of many things. But that which is naturally +adapted to be in another thing, vanishes into non-entity when separated +from its subject. Moreover, the soul is incorporeal, and external to +every subject, subsisting in itself, and being converted to itself. +Hence, it is indestructible and incorruptible. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXXVIII. + +Every soul is both life and vital. + + * * * * * + +For that to which soul accedes necessarily lives. And that which +is deprived of soul, is immediately left destitute of life. Either +therefore it lived through soul, or through something else, and not +through soul. It is however impossible that it should have lived +through something else alone. For every thing which is participated, +either imparts itself, or something pertaining to itself to its +participant. But if it suffers neither of these, it will not be +participated. Soul however, is participated by that to which it is +present. And that which participates of soul is said to be animated. +If therefore that which is participated introduces life to animated +natures, it is either life, or vital alone, or both life and vital. If +however, it is alone vital, but not also life, it will consist of life +and non-life. It will not therefore know itself, nor be converted to +itself. For knowledge is life, and the gnostic power so far as it is +such is vital. If therefore, there is any thing in soul without life, +this will not possess essentially the power of knowing. But if soul is +life alone, it will no longer participate of the intellectual life. +For the participant of life is vital, and is not life alone, i.e. the +first and imparticipable life; but the life which is posterior to this, +is both vital and life. Soul however, is not imparticipable life. And +hence it is at the same time both life and vital. + + + PROPOSITION CLXXXIX. + +Every soul is self-vital. + + * * * * * + +For if it is converted to itself, but every thing which is converted +to itself is self-subsistent, the soul also is self-subsistent, and +produces itself. But it is likewise life and vital, and its hyparxis +is according to vitality. For it imparts life by its very being to the +natures to which it is present. And if the participant is adapted, it +immediately becomes animated and vital, [soul in effecting this not +reasoning][308] nor acting from deliberate choice, nor vivifying by +cogitation and judgment, but by its very essence, and by that which +it is, supplying the participant with life. Hence the being of soul +is the same as _to live_. If therefore the soul possesses being +from itself, and this is the same as _to live_, and it has life +essentially;--if this be the case, it will impart life to itself, and +will possess it from itself. And this being admitted, soul will be +self-vital. + + + PROPOSITION CXC. + +Every soul is a medium between impartible natures, and the natures +which are divisible about bodies. + + * * * * * + +For if soul is self-vital and self-subsistent, and has an hyparxis +separate from bodies, it is, in consequence of being more excellent +than, exempt from every thing divisible about body. For the natures +which are divided about bodies, are entirely inseparable from their +subjects, being co-distributed with divisible bulks. They also depart +from themselves, and their own impartibility, and are co-extended +with bodies. And though they subsist in lives, yet these are not the +lives of themselves, but of participants. Though likewise they exist +in essence and in forms, yet they are not the forms of themselves, +but of those things which are fashioned by forms. If therefore, soul +is not these, it is a self-subsistent essence, a self-vital life, and +a knowledge gnostic of itself. Hence, it is entirely separate from +bodies, but is a participant of life. If however, this be the case, it +also participates of essence. But it likewise participates of knowledge +from other causes. It is evident therefore, that it is inferior to +impartible natures, because it is filled [with life externally.][309] +But if with life, it is evident that it is also externally filled +with essence. For imparticipable life and imparticipable essence +are prior to soul.[310] That soul however is not primarily gnostic +is evident.[311] For every soul indeed, so far as soul is life, +but not every soul, so far as it is soul possesses knowledge. For a +certain soul while it remains soul, is ignorant of [real] beings. Soul +therefore, is not primarily gnostic, nor does it possess knowledge from +its very being. Hence, it has an essence secondary to those natures +that are primarily, and by their very being, gnostic. Since however, +the essence of soul is divided from its knowledge, soul does not belong +to natures [entirely] impartible. But it has been demonstrated that +neither does it rank among the natures that are divisible about bodies. +Hence, it is a medium between both. + + + PROPOSITION CXCI. + +Every participable soul has indeed an eternal essence, but its energy +is accompanied with time. + + * * * * * + +For either it possesses both eternally, or both temporally; or the +one eternally, but the other temporally. It cannot however, possess +both eternally: for it would be an impartible essence, and the nature +of soul would in no respect differ from an intellectual hypostasis, +viz. a self-motive from an immoveable nature. Nor can it possess both +temporally: for thus it would be generated alone, and would neither +be self-vital, nor self-subsistent. For nothing which is essentially +measured by time is self-subsistent. But soul is self-subsistent. +For that which is converted to itself, according to energy, is also +essentially converted to itself, and proceeds from itself. It remains +therefore, that every soul is partly eternal, and partly participates +of time. Either therefore, it is essentially eternal, [but participates +of time according to energy,[312]] or vice versa. The latter however, +is impossible. Hence, every participable soul, is allotted an eternal +essence, but a temporal energy. + + + PROPOSITION CXCII. + +Every participable soul ranks among the number of [truly existing] +beings, and is the first of generated natures. + + * * * * * + +For if it is essentially eternal, it is truly being according to its +hyparxis, and always is. For that which participates of eternity, +participates likewise of perpetual existence. But if it is in +time according to energy, it is generated. For every thing which +participates of time, since it is always becoming to be, or rising into +existence, according to the prior and posterior of time, and is not at +once that which it is, is wholly generated. But if every soul is in a +certain respect generated according to energy, it will be the first of +generated natures. For that which is in every respect generated, is +more remote from eternal natures. + + + PROPOSITION CXCIII. + +Every soul subsists proximately from intellect. + + * * * * * + +For if it has an immutable and eternal essence, it proceeds from an +immoveable essence. For that which proceeds from a moveable essence, is +essentially changed in every respect. The cause, therefore, of every +soul is immoveable. But if it proximately subsists from intellect, it +is perfected by, and converted to intellect. And if it participates of +the knowledge which intellect imparts to the natures that are able to +partake of it; (for all knowledge is derived from intellect, and all +things have their progression essentially from that to which they are +naturally converted)--if this be the case, every soul proceeds from +intellect. + + + PROPOSITION CXCIV. + +Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses. + + * * * * * + +For if it proceeds from intellect, and intellect gives subsistence +to soul; and if intellect subsisting immoveably produces all things +by its very being, it will also impart to soul which it fabricates, +the essential reasons [or producing principles] of all things which +it contains. For every thing which produces by its very being, +imparts secondarily to the thing generated by it, that which it is +itself primarily. The soul, therefore, contains secondarily the +representations of intellectual forms. + + + PROPOSITION CXCV. + +Every soul is all things, containing indeed sensibles paradigmatically, +or after the manner of an exemplar; but intelligibles iconically, or +after the manner of an image. + + * * * * * + +For subsisting as a medium between impartible natures, and such as +are divisible about body, it produces and gives subsistence to the +latter of these, but pre-establishes in itself the causes from which +it proceeds. Those things, therefore, of which it is the pre-existent +cause, it antecedently comprehends paradigmatically. But it possesses +according to participation, and as the progeny of first natures the +causes of its subsistence. Hence it antecedently comprehends according +to cause all sensible natures, and contains the immaterial productive +principles of things material, the incorporeal principles of things +corporeal, and without interval, the principles of things which possess +interval. But it contains intelligibles and the forms of them after the +manner of an image; so that it receives partibly indeed impartibles, +with multiplication unical natures, and in a self-motive manner, things +immoveable. Hence it is all beings, containing such as are first, +according to participation, but paradigmatically such as are posterior +to its own nature. + + + PROPOSITION CXCVI. + +Every participable soul, primarily uses a perpetual body, which +possesses an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis. + + * * * * * + +For if every soul is essentially eternal, and by its very being +primarily animates some particular body, [it will always animate this +body. For the essence of every soul is immutable]. But if this be the +case, that which is animated by it is always animated, and always +participates of life. That, however, which always lives, by a much +greater priority always exists. But that which always is, is perpetual. +Hence, that which is primarily suspended from every soul, is perpetual. +But indeed every participable soul is primarily participated by a +certain body, since it is participable and not imparticipable, and +animates its participant by its very being. Every participated soul, +therefore, uses a body which is primarily perpetual, and essentially +unbegotten and incorruptible. + + + PROPOSITION CXCVII. + +Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and a life essential and +gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All things likewise +subsist in it at once, the essential, the vital, and the gnostic; and +all things are in all, and each is separate from the rest. + + * * * * * + +For if it is the medium between impartible forms, and those which are +divided about bodies, it is neither so impartible as all intellectual +natures, nor so partible as corporeal forms. Since, therefore, +essences, lives and cognitions are divided in corporeal natures, these +subsist in souls impartibly, unitedly, and incorporeally, and all of +them exist at once, through their immateriality and impartibility. +Since, likewise, in intellectual natures, all things subsist according +to union, they are distinguished and divided in souls. All things, +therefore, subsist together in these, and at the same time apart. But +if all impartibles subsist together and in one, they pervade through +each other, and if they are separate, they are again divided without +confusion; so that each subsists by itself, and all are in all. For +in the essence of soul there is both life and knowledge;[313] since +every soul would not know itself, if the essence of it was of itself +deprived of life and knowledge. And in the life of the soul there are +both essence and knowledge. For unessential[314] life, and which is +without knowledge, pertains to material lives, which are neither able +to know themselves, nor are genuine essences. Knowledge, also, which is +unessential and without life, is without subsistence. For all knowledge +belongs to that which is vital, and which is of itself allotted an +essence. + + + PROPOSITION CXCVIII. + +Every thing which participates of time, and is always moved, is +measured by periods. + + * * * * * + +For since it is measured by time, the motion of it also participates of +measure and bound, and proceeds according to number. But because it is +always moved, and this always is not[315] eternal, but temporal, it is +necessary that it should use periods. For motion indeed is a mutation +from some things to others. But beings are terminated by multitude +and magnitude. These, however, being bounded, there can neither be a +mutation to infinity according to a right line, nor can that which +is always moved, make its transitions finitely. Hence, that which is +always moved, will proceed from the same to the same, and thus will +proceed periodically. + + + PROPOSITION CXCIX. + +Every mundane soul uses periods of its proper life, and restitutions to +its former state. + + * * * * * + +For if it is measured by time, it energizes transitively, and possesses +a peculiar motion.[316] But every thing which is moved and participates +of time, if it is perpetual, uses periods, periodically revolves, and +is restored from the same things to the same. And every mundane soul +possessing motion, and energizing according to time, will have periods +of motions, and restitutions to its pristine state. For every period of +perpetual natures is _apocatastatic_, or restorative to a former +condition. + + + PROPOSITION CC. + +Every period of soul is measured by time. The period of other souls +indeed is measured by a certain time; but that of the first soul, since +it is measured by time, is measured by the whole of time. + + * * * * * + +For if all motions have prior and posterior, so likewise have periods, +and on this account they participate of time. That also which measures +all the periods of souls is time. But if indeed there were the same +periods of all souls, and they were about the same things, the time of +all would be the same. If, however, the restitutions of different souls +are different, the periodic time also and which restores to a pristine +state, is different in different souls. + +That the soul, therefore, which is primarily measured by time, is +measured by the whole of time, is evident. For if time is the measure +of all motion, that which is primarily moved, will entirely participate +of time, and will be measured by the whole of time. For if the whole +of time did not measure its first participant, it would not measure +any thing else, according to the whole of itself. From these things, +however, it is evident that all souls are measured by certain +measures which are more partial than the whole of time. For if these +souls are more partial than the soul which primarily participates of +time, neither can they adapt their periods to the whole of time. The +multitude of their restitutions, however, will be parts of the one +period, and of the one restitution of things to their pristine state, +which is effected by the soul that primarily participates of time. For +a more partial participation pertains to a less power; but a more total +to a greater power. Other souls, therefore, are not naturally adapted +to receive the whole temporal measure according to one life, because +they are allotted an order inferior to that of the soul which is first +measured by time. + + + PROPOSITION CCI. + +All divine souls have triple energies; some indeed as souls; but others +as receiving a divine intellect; and others as suspended from the Gods. +And they provide indeed for the whole of things as Gods; but they know +all things through an intellectual life; and they move bodies through a +self-moved hyparxis. + + * * * * * + +For because they psychically[317] participate of the natures situated +above them, and are not simply souls, but divine souls, and are +established according to an order, in the psychical extent, analogous +to the Gods, they energize not only psychically, but also divinely, +being allotted a deified summit of their essence, and also because they +have an intellectual hypostasis, through which they are spread under +intellectual essences. Hence, they not only energize divinely, but also +intellectually; the former indeed according to _the one_ which +they contain; but the latter through an energy established according to +intellect. A third energy, likewise, is present with them, according +to their own hyparxis, which is motive indeed of things naturally +alter-motive, but is vivific of such as possess an adventitious life. +For this is the proper employment of every soul; but such energies +as are intellectual and providential, they possess according to +participation. + + + PROPOSITION CCII. + +All souls attending upon, and always following the Gods, are inferior +to divine, but are expanded above partial souls. + + * * * * * + +For divine souls participating of intellect and deity, on which +account, they are at the same time both intellectual and divine, are +the leaders of other souls, just as the Gods also are the leaders +of all beings. But partial souls are deprived of a suspension from +intellect, in consequence of not being able to participate proximately +of an intellectual essence. For they would not fall from intellectual +energy, if they essentially participated of intellect, as has been +before demonstrated [in Prop. 184]. Hence, the souls which always +follow the Gods are of a middle condition; receiving indeed a perfect +intellect, and through this surpassing partial souls, yet not being +suspended from the divine unities. For the intellect which they +participate is not divine. + + + PROPOSITION CCIII. + +Of every psychical multitude, divine souls indeed being greater in +power than other souls, are contracted according to number. But those +that always follow divine souls have a middle order among all souls, +both in power and quantity. And partial souls indeed are inferior in +power to the others, but proceed into a greater number. + + * * * * * + +For divine souls are more allied to _the one_, on account of +their hyparxis being divine; but souls of a middle rank, through +the participation of intellect; and those of the last order, are +essentially dissimilar both to those of the middle, and those of the +first rank. Among perpetual natures, however, those that are nearer +to _the one_, are more single in number, and are more contracted in +multitude, than such as are more remote from it. But such as are more +remote from _the one_, are more multiplied. The powers, therefore, of +superior souls are greater, and have the same ratio to those of souls +in the second rank, which the divine has to the intellectual, and the +intellectual to the psychical peculiarity. Inferior souls also are more +in number. For that which is more remote from _the one_, is a greater, +and that which is nearer to it, is a less multitude. + + + PROPOSITION CCIV. + +Every divine soul is the leader of many souls that always follow the +Gods; and of a still greater number of such as sometimes receive this +order. + + * * * * * + +[For if it is a divine soul] it is necessary that it should be allotted +an order [which is the leader or generator[318]] of all things, and +which has a primary rank among souls. For in all beings that which is +divine, is the leader of wholes. It is likewise requisite that every +divine soul should neither alone preside over such souls as perpetually +follow the Gods, nor over those alone that are sometimes their +attendants. For if any divine soul should alone preside over those +that sometimes follow the Gods, how can there be a contact between +these and a divine soul, since they are entirely different from it, +and neither proximately participate of intellect, nor much less of the +Gods. But if it only presides over those that always follow the Gods, +how is it that the series proceeds as far as to these [alone]? For +thus intellectual natures will be the last, and will be unprolific, +and unadapted to perfect and elevate. It is necessary, therefore, that +such souls as follow the Gods, and energize according to intellect, and +which are elevated to intellects more partial than divine intellects, +should be primarily suspended from a divine soul. But it is necessary +that partial souls, and which through those that are divine as media, +participate of intellect and a divine life, should be suspended from +a divine soul in the second place. For through those which always +participate of a more excellent condition, those that sometimes only +participate of it, are perfected. And again, it is necessary that +about every divine soul, there should be a greater number of those +that only sometimes follow, than of those that always attend on the +Gods. For the power of the monad always proceeds into multitude, +according to diminution; being deficient indeed in power, but redundant +in multitude. Since every soul also of those that always follow the +Gods, is the leader of a greater multitude of partial souls, imitating +in this a divine soul; and elevates a greater number of souls to the +primary monad of the whole series. Every divine soul, therefore, is the +leader of many souls that always follow the Gods, but presides over a +still greater number of those that sometimes only receive this order. + + + PROPOSITION CCV. + +Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is +essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one to the vehicle of the +other. + + * * * * * + +For if the distribution of vehicles to souls is according to nature, +it is necessary that the vehicle of every partial soul should have +the same ratio to the vehicle of the soul which ranks as a whole, as +the essence of the one to the essence of the other. The distribution, +however, is according to nature. For things which primarily participate +are spontaneously conjoined with the natures which they participate. +If, therefore, as a divine soul is to a divine body, so is a partial +soul to a partial body, each soul essentially participating,--if +this be the case, that which was at first asserted is true, that the +vehicles of souls have the same ratio to each other, as the souls +themselves of which they are the vehicles. + + + PROPOSITION CCVI. + +Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into generation, and +to ascend from generation to real being. + + * * * * * + +For if it sometimes follows the Gods, but sometimes falls from an +extension to a divine nature, and participates of intellect and +the privation of intellect, it is evident that it is alternatively +conversant with generation and the Gods. For since it is not for +an infinite time with the Gods, it will not for the whole of the +following time be conversant with bodies. For that which has not a +temporal beginning will never have an end; and that which never has an +end is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, therefore, that +every partial soul must make periods of ascents from, and of descents +into generation, and that this must be unceasing through an infinite +time. Every partial soul, therefore, is able to descend and ascend +infinitely. And this never ceases to be the case with all of them. + + + PROPOSITION CCVII. + +The vehicle of every partial soul, is fabricated by an immoveable cause. + + * * * * * + +For if it is perpetually and connascently suspended from the soul that +uses it,[319] being immutable according to essence, it is allotted its +hypostasis from an immoveable cause. For every thing which is generated +from moveable causes, is essentially changed. Moreover, every soul has +a perpetual body, which primarily participates of it. Hence, the cause +of a partial soul, and therefore of its vehicle,[320] is immoveable, +and on this account supermundane. + + + PROPOSITION CCVIII. + +The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essentially +indivisible and impassive. + + * * * * * + +For if it proceeds from an immoveable fabrication, and is perpetual, +it will have an immaterial and impassive hypostasis. For such things +as are adapted to suffer essentially, and to be changed, are all +of them material, and in consequence of subsisting differently at +different times, are suspended from moveable causes. Hence, likewise, +they receive an all-various mutation, being moved in conjunction with +their principal causes. Moreover, that this vehicle is indivisible, is +manifest. For every thing which is divided, so far as it is divided, +is corrupted, in consequence of departing from the whole, and from its +continuity. If, therefore, it is essentially immutable and impassive, +it will be indivisible. + + + PROPOSITION CCIX. + +The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of +more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an ablation +of every thing material, and a recurrence to its proper form, analogous +to the soul that uses it. + + * * * * * + +For this soul indeed descends irrationally, assuming irrational lives; +but it ascends laying aside all the generation-producing powers, with +which it was invested in its descent, and becoming [pure, returns to +the pristine condition of its nature. For the vehicle[321]] imitates +the lives of the souls that use it, and they being every where moved, +it is moved in conjunction with them. By its circulations likewise +it represents the intellections of some souls; but the falling of +others through their inclination to the realms of generation; and the +purifications of others, through the circumductions which lead to an +immaterial nature. For because it is vivified by the very essence of +souls,[322] and is connascent with them, it is all-variously changed +in conjunction with their energies; follows them every where; becomes +co-passive with them; is restored to its pristine state together +with them when they are purified;[323] and is elevated when they are +elevated, and aspires after its own perfection. For every thing is +perfected when it obtains its proper perfection. + + + PROPOSITION CCX. + +Every connascent vehicle of the soul, always possesses both the same +figure and magnitude. But it is seen to be greater and less, and of a +dissimilar figure, through the additions and ablations of other bodies. + + * * * * * + +For if it derives its essence from an immoveable cause, it is evident +that both its figure and its magnitude are defined by this cause, and +each is immutable and invariable. Moreover, at different times it +appears to be different, as likewise greater and less. Hence, through +other bodies added from the material elements, and again taken away, it +exhibits a different appearance both in quantity and form. + + + PROPOSITION CCXI. + +Every partial soul descending into generation descends wholly; nor does +one part of it remain on high, and another part descend. + + * * * * * + +For if something pertaining to the soul remained on high in the +intelligible world, it will always perceive intellectually, without +transition or transitively. But if without transition, it will +be intellect, and not a part of the soul, and this partial soul +will proximately[324] participate of intellect. This, however, is +impossible. But if it perceives intellectually with transition, from +that which always [and from that which sometimes[325]] energizes +intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, also is +impossible. For these always differ, as has been demonstrated. To which +may be added, the absurdity resulting from supposing that the summit +of the soul is always perfect, and yet does not rule over the other +powers, and cause them to be perfect. Every partial soul, therefore, +wholly descends. + + + + + ON + + PROVIDENCE AND FATE, + + AND THAT + + _WHICH IS IN OUR POWER_. + + TO + + THEODORUS, THE MECHANIST. + + +1. I am of opinion, my friend Theodorus, that the conceptions of your +mind are mature, and adapted to a man who loves the contemplation of +beings; and I am gratified that you have thought fit to write to us +on these subjects, though there are many among you that are able to +investigate and doubt with you about such like problems. But it is +requisite, as it seems, that we also should adduce[326] what appears +to us to be the truth on the subjects which you have proposed for our +discussion, and what we conceive to accord with things themselves, +and with the opinions of the most celebrated of the philosophers +prior to us; and that we should not in vain hear the inquiries of a +man eminently skilled in mechanics, who was formerly known to us, +as I conceive, and as you have asserted. You inquire however, about +things which have been a thousand times investigated, and which in my +opinion will never have any rest, because the soul is excited to the +discussion of them, much light having been already thrown on them by +the elaborate writings of Plotinus and Iamblichus, and prior to these +by the divine Plato; and if it be not too much to say, such particulars +respecting them have been proclaimed by the divinely-inspired mouth +of theologists, as Plato alone has unfolded by demonstrations. And +why is it requisite to adduce to you Plato, and men who were divinely +wise, since they have been most luminously developed[327] by the Gods +themselves, who transcendently know what pertains to themselves, +and what they have produced, and have not been delivered by them in +enigmas, as by theologists. It is requisite therefore, that we also +writing conformably to them, should as I have said adduce to you what +appears to us to be the truth respecting the subjects of your inquiry. + + +2. You deserve indulgence if looking to the all-various tragic and +comic, and other connexions of human affairs, you have conceived that +there is only one fabricator and maker of such colligations in the +universe, and have called this Fate; or rather you have denominated +it the series and consequent generation of things; have thought that +such a dramatic scene is alone directed by some inevitable necessity; +and have celebrated this as providence, and asserted that it alone +possesses freedom of will, and is the lord of all things. But you have +conceived that the freedom of will of the human soul is only a name, +and is truly nothing, since she has an arrangement in the world, is +subservient to the energies of other things, and is a part of the +mundane fabric. Or rather, that I may use your own words, the human +soul is a machine, since there is an irrefragable cause which moves all +things that the world comprehends in itself. But the universe being as +it were one machine, the whole spheres are complicated in each other +analogously to certain drums, but the partial animals and souls that +are moved by them, and in short, all things, depend on one mover. And +perhaps in consequence of honouring your art, you have conceived that +the maker of the universe is a certain mechanic, and that you are an +imitator of the best of causes. These things however we have written, +mingling the jocose with the serious. + + +3. Betaking ourselves therefore to the contest, we say, that the +difference of these three things ought especially to be considered +by you, if you intend to arrive at the gate of the subjects of +investigation. And of these, the first indeed is, that Providence and +Fate do not differ in the way in which you conceive they do, viz. that +the one is a connected consequence, but the other is necessity, the +cause of this consequence. For both indeed are the causes of the world, +and of whatever is produced in the world, but Providence subsists prior +to Fate; and all that is produced according to Fate, is by a much +greater priority produced by Providence, but the contrary is not true; +for in short,[328] the natures which are governed by Providence are +more divine than those which are governed by Fate. The second thing +is this, that the soul which is separable from the body, and which +descends into this mortal abode from the Gods, is different from the +soul which is in bodies, and which subsists in, and is inseparable from +its subjects; and that the latter essentially depends on Fate, but the +former on Providence. The third particular is, that the science and +truth which are inherent in souls conversant with generation, though +they may lead an immaculate life, are different from the science and +truth in souls that have fled from this abode, and are established in +that place whence they first fell, and descended into the realms of +mortality. Of these three particulars therefore, as we have said, if +you can discover sufficient solutions, you will obtain a satisfactory +answer to your inquiries. For Providence indeed, differing in the +above mentioned manner from Fate, it will be evident that many things +escape Fate, but that nothing escapes Providence; that Providence +supernally governs Fate, produces it, and has limited its empire[329] +by alter-motive natures, viz. by things which are allotted their first +subsistence in beings that are moved by something else. But again, +having shown that the soul which is separable from bodies, is different +from that which is planted in bodies, it will be manifest to you which +of these two possesses freedom of will, and that which is in our power; +which is subservient to necessity, and is under the dominion of Fate; +and where the complication of these is to be found, on account of which +the one dulls the freedom of the will through a subordinate life, but +the other participates of a certain image of election, in consequence +of its greater proximity to a more excellent nature.[330] And science +appearing to you to be twofold, it will be evident after what manner +both Plato and Socrates, and to these also may be added the great +Parmenides, assert, that the soul while here is capable of knowing +truth, when it is purified from material darkness, and the passions +introduced into it by the body, and its commixture with corporeal +natures, but that it is allotted science in a greater degree, and in a +mote genuine mode, when it exists beyond bodies, and generation, and +bitter matter. + + +4. These three problems therefore, being necessary and having been +well discussed[331] by the ancients, partly by Iamblichus, in his +copious and elaborate treatises On Providence and Fate, and partly +by all the lovers of Plato, who proclaim that the soul is twofold, +by Plotinus likewise in many places, and also by Porphyry, who make +a distinction between contemplation, and contemplative virtue, and +in short, by all who are able to understand Plato,--this being the +case, it is necessary that beginning from the first thing proposed, we +should discover the difference between Providence and Fate. “But in +every thing, says Plato, it is requisite to know the one principle +of that which is the subject of speculation, or we must err in every +thing.” It is necessary however, as the dæmoniacal Aristotle teaches, +after inquiring _if a thing is_, to investigate in the next place _what +it is_. If therefore, you inquired whether Providence is, or is not, +and in a similar manner concerning Fate, it would be requisite in the +first place to show you _that_ each of them is,[332] and if you still +doubted, I should be unwilling after this to answer your doubts, but +since you acknowledge that both of them have a subsistence, and that +all things are comprehended in their dominion, it evidently remains, +I conceive, that I should demonstrate to you _what_ each of them is; +for from this it will be evident what it is in which they differ. +And this being known, many of your doubts, as we have said, will be +solved. But again, because to the discovery of _what a thing is_, the +dividing method is said to contribute, which Socrates in the Philebus +celebrates as the gift of the Gods to men, and because what are called +our common conceptions contribute to the discovery of principles, from +which conceptions it is possible, as Aristotle writes, to investigate +many things that are demonstrable,--hence it is requisite that we +also employing both these, should unfold Providence and Fate; so far +as pertains to what we say they are, using common conceptions, but so +far as pertains to other things, employing distinctly the divisions of +beings, from which, as it appears to me, we can alone discover what +the definitions are of Providence and Fate. But these being known will +enkindle a clear light in the subjects of investigation, and will +perhaps free us from the doubts by which we are at present detained. + + +5. The common conceptions therefore of all men, and which possess +indubitable evidence, assert, that Providence is indeed the cause of +good to those beings for which it provides, and that Fate is also a +cause, but the cause of a certain connexion and consequence to those +things that are generated. For that all of us have these irrefragable +conceptions about Providence and Fate, is evident from our asserting +that men who are the procurers of good to others, have _well_ provided +for the subjects of their beneficence; and again, we denominate that +which is evolved through many causes complicated with each other and +unknown to us, no otherwise than _Fate_. Our life also is full of these +names, because names testify the truth of these conceptions. For the +word Providence (προνοια) indicates[333] that energy which is prior to +intellect, and which it is necessary to attribute to _the good_ alone; +for this alone is more divine than intellect, because much-honoured +intellect desires good, together with all things and prior to all +things. But the word Fate (ειμαρμενη) indicates _that which connects +all things that are naturally adapted to have such a connexion_. +Moreover, that the thing which is provided for is not the imparting, +nor that which is connected, Fate, nor that which proceeds into this, +connexion, but that which connects, you may assume from this, that all +of us conceive Providence and Fate to be certain productive powers. +But every where effective causes are distinct from their effects: and +these three things differ from each other, viz. that which makes, +that which is made, and the energy of making.[334] Just as in what +pertains to Providence and Fate there are, that which provides, that +which is provided for, and the effective energy which proceeds from the +providing cause into that which is provided for: and again, there are, +that which connects, that which is connected, and the effective energy +proceeding from the connecting cause into the thing connected. And it +is evident that according to each of these triads, that which makes is +not such as that which is made, but if the latter is various, it is +necessary that the former should be simple, and that if the participant +of good is the thing made, the maker should be imparticipable. For +every where that which makes is allotted a part more divine than that +which is made. When we say therefore, that Providence is the cause of +good, we must also say that it is the fountain of good, which does not +require to be benefited by other things. And admitting Fate to be the +cause of connexion, we must not say that it is itself connected by +other things. Such therefore, being the common conceptions which we +antecedently assume of these two, it remains in the next place that we +should consider what it is in which each of them excels [and by which +each is characterized]: and first, in what the characteristic of Fate +consists. + + +6. From these conceptions therefore, we infer that Fate is the cause +of things that are connected. But let us consider what the things are +that are connected. Of beings therefore, some have their essence in +eternity, but others in time. By beings however, whose essence is in +eternity, I mean those whose energy[335] together with their essence +is eternal: but by beings whose essence is in time, I mean those +whose essence _is_ not, but is always in generation, or rising into +existence, though it should be in generation for an infinite time. And +the natures that subsist between these, are such as have their essence +indeed permanent, and better than generation, but their energy measured +by time. For it is necessary that every progression from things first +to last should be effected through media. Since therefore, there are +beings which are eternal both in essence and energy, it is necessary +that there should be a middle extent, and that it should either have +an eternal essence, but an energy indigent of time, or the contrary. +The contrary however is impossible, that we may not confess that we +place energies prior to essences. Hence it remains that the medium must +be that which has an eternal essence, but a temporal energy. We say +therefore, that we have exhibited to you these three orders of beings, +the intellectual, the psychical,[336] and the corporeal. But I call +the intellectual that which exists and is intellective through all +eternity; the corporeal, that which is always rising into existence, +or becoming to be, either in an infinite time, or in a part of time; +and the psychical, that which is eternal indeed in essence, but which +employs temporal energies. Where then, must the things which are +connected be arranged? Consider assuming from the Gods the meaning +of the term ειρεσθαι _to be connected_, as implying nothing else than +this, that the natures which are differently produced according to +time, are conjoined with, and not separated from each other. And if +existing at one and the same time they are distant from each other +according to place, yet they have a certain co-ordination with each +other. Hence being separated either by places or times, they are in a +certain respect collected into unity, and into one sympathy, through +connexion. And in short,[337] the things which are connected, cannot +suffer this from themselves, but require something else which may +impart to them connexion. If therefore the natures which are arranged +under Fate, are such as are connected with each other, according to +our common conception of Fate; but the things which are connected are +partible, being distant either in places or times, and are naturally +adapted to be connected by something else, on account of the opinion +of connexion which prevails among all men; and these are moved by +something else, and are corporeal; for of the natures which are beyond +bodies, some [i.e. intellects] are better both than place and time, but +others [viz. souls] though they energize according to time, appear to +be pure from place;--if this be the case, it is evident that the things +which are governed and connected by Fate, are moved by something else, +and are entirely corporeal. + + +7. If however this is demonstrated, it is evident that admitting Fate +to be the cause of connexion, we must also admit that it presides +over alter-motive and corporeal natures. But assuming this, we will +ask ourselves what that is which is said to be the cause of bodies, +which is proximate to them, and by which things alter-motive are +inspired[338] and contained, and accomplish whatever they are able +to effect. And if you are willing, looking in the first place to our +bodies, let us consider what it is that moves and nourishes, and always +reweaves, and binds them together? Is not this that which is innate in +bodies, which also in other animals exhibits a similar energy,[339] +which extends as far as to things that are rooted in the earth, and +possesses a twofold energy, _this_ indeed renovating bodies that +they may not by discerption entirely vanish, but _that_ preserving +the several individuals in a condition conformable to nature? For it +is not the same thing to add what is deficient, and to preserve the +power of things that are held together. If therefore, not only in us, +and other animals and plants, but in this universe also[340] much prior +to bodies, there is one nature of the world, which is connective and +motive of the subsistence of bodies, as it is also in us, or why do +we call all bodies the progeny of nature, it is indeed necessary that +nature should be the cause of things that are connected, and that in +this what is called Fate should be investigated. And on this account +perhaps the dæmoniacal Aristotle also is accustomed to call those +augmentations or generations which are effected beside the accustomed +time, _deviations from Fate_. And the divine Plato says, “that the +world considered by itself, without the intellectual Gods, is convolved +as being corporeal by Fate, and innate desire.” The oracles of the Gods +also accord with these and bear witness to our demonstrations when they +say: “Look not upon Nature, for the name of it is fatal.” And thus we +have discovered what Fate is, and how it is the nature of this world, +and a certain incorporeal essence. For it presides over and is the life +of bodies, and this essentially, since it internally moves bodies, +and not externally, moves all things according to time, and connects +the motions of all things that are distant both in times and places; +according to which also, mortal are adapted to the participation of +eternal natures, are convolved together with them, and these are +mutually co-passive. For the nature which is in us, binds and connects +all the parts of our body, and their operations on each other: and +this also is a certain Fate of our body. As in our body likewise, some +parts are more, but others are less principal, and the latter follow +the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less principal +follow the motions of the more principal parts, viz. the sublunary +generations follow the periods of the celestial orbs, and the circle +of the former is an image of the circle of the latter. And these things +which have been divulged by all the ancients, I am unwilling to prolong. + + +8. It is not therefore, difficult for you to see what Providence +is. For if you assert that the fountain of good is primarily the +divine cause itself, you will speak rightly. For whence, except from +divinity, is good imparted to all things? So that as Plato says, “no +other cause of good than God, is to be admitted.” In the next place, +Providence being established above both intelligibles and sensibles, +is superior to Fate. And those things which are under Fate, are also +under Providence, possessing indeed, their connexion from Fate, but +their participation of good from Providence, so that the connexion may +have a good end, and that Providence may contain the end of Fate in +itself. But again, with respect to things that are under Providence, +all of them are not likewise indigent of Fate, but intellectual natures +are exempt from it. For the empire of Fate is entirely in corporeal +natures;[341] since to be connected introduces time, and corporeal +motion. To these things also, as it appears to me, Plato looking, +says that a subsistence of this kind, is mingled from intellect and +necessity, intellect ruling[342] over the necessity of bodies. And in +this place, he calls the motive cause necessity, which he elsewhere +denominates Fate, conceiving that bodies act by compulsion. And this +rightly. For every body is compelled both to do whatever it does, and +to suffer whatever it suffers, to heat, or to be heated, to impart +or to receive cold. But choice is not in bodies, because you may say +that their peculiarity is the necessary and an existence unaccompanied +with choice. For if this were not the case, what could there be that +is better than bodies? For the body which is moved in a circle, and +which is of an illustrious nature, is thus moved from necessity, in +the same manner as fire is from necessity moved to the circumference, +but earth to the middle [of the universe]. Plato therefore asserts +that necessity presides over the generations of bodies, and on this +account, over their corruptions also; but he exalts intellect, and +determines that it rules over necessity. If therefore Providence is +above intellect, it is evident that it rules over intellect, and those +things which are under this necessity; and that necessity alone rules +over those things which are under its dominion. Hence, every thing +indeed which has an intellectual subsistence, continues to exist under +Providence alone, but every thing which has a corporeal subsistence, +endures under necessity. + + +9. You must understand therefore, that there are two genera of things, +the one intellectual, but the other sensible, and also that there are +two kingdoms of these, the kingdom of Providence indeed above, which +reigns over both intellectuals and sensibles, and the kingdom of Fate +beneath, which has dominion over sensibles alone. And Providence +differs from Fate, in the same way in which a God differs from that +which is divine indeed, but by participation and not primarily. For in +other things also, as you may see, one thing has a primary subsistence, +and another is according to participation. Thus for instance, there is +light in the sun,[343] and light in the air, but the former subsists +primarily, and the latter subsists on account of the former. And life +is primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body, and subsists +on account of the life of the soul. Thus also, Providence indeed, +is essentially deity, but Fate is something divine, and not deity, +for it depends on Providence, and is as it were its image. For if as +Providence is to intellectual, so is Fate to sensible beings; since +the former reigns over intellectuals, but the latter over sensibles; +then alternately, as geometricians say, as Providence is to Fate, so +are intellectuals to sensibles. But intellectuals are primarily beings, +and sensibles derive their subsistence from them. Hence Providence +is primarily that which it is, and from this the order of Fate is +suspended. But of these things enough. + + +10. If you are willing, however, we will betake ourselves to the second +discussion, viz. the consideration of the soul which is separable, and +of that which is inseparable from bodies. But assume this also from +the philosophy of Aristotle. For he says, that every soul which has an +energy not at all indigent of body, is likewise allotted an essence +beyond and separable from body. And this necessarily. For if we should +arrange energy as existing independent of body, but essence inseparable +from body, energy would be better than essence, since it would not +be at all indigent of a subordinate essence, that being rooted in +it, it might have a subsistence according to nature. This however is +impossible. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul which has an +energy separable from body, should also be itself separable. Consider +then, my friend, what soul it is in us, which we acknowledge is not at +all indigent of body, in the energies of itself according to nature? +Is it sense? But every sensitive power uses corporeal instruments, +and together with them energizes about its proper sensibles; viz. it +uses the eyes, the ears, and all the other senses, being at the same +time moved and co-passive with them. What then shall we say of anger +and desire? But do you not see that these frequently co-operate with +the corporeal parts, with the heart and the liver, and that these +also are not pure from body? For how is it possible that things which +energize with sense, should not also be indigent of body, since sense +is always moved through body? But with respect to the orectic powers, +that these energize with sense, is I conceive known to all of us. For +what deprived of sense, can either be angry, or desire? Plotinus also +rightly asserting, that all the passions are either senses, or are not +without sense. If, therefore, that which is angry is so in conjunction +with sense, possessing at the same time a sense of sorrow, and that +which desires possesses a sense of delight; but that which energizes +with sense energizes with body, for sense subsists with body;--if +this be the case, it is necessary that every thing which is angry and +desires, should energize with body. Hence, these species of life, being +all of them irrational, have that energy which is according to nature +in conjunction with body. + + +11. Looking now, however, to the rational nature itself, consider the +life of it which is seated in the inferior lives, and corrects either +what is deficient in them according to knowledge, as when from above +it evinces that sense is deceived about its own objects of knowledge. +I mean for instance, when it shows that sense is deceived in asserting +that the sun is but a foot in diameter, or when sense with its usual +deception asserts of such things any thing of a similar nature: or when +reason disciplines anger,[344] which is immoderate in its motions, when +it is agitated with fury. Hence Ulysses in Homer exclaims “endure, my +heart,” and represses the impulse of anger barking like a dog: or when +the rational nature represses the wantonness of desire, and frustrates +its endeavours to detain the soul by the delights that germinate +from the body, the petulance of these delights being ameliorated by +the corporeal temperaments. For in all such energies the rational +soul evidently represses all the irrational motions both gnostic and +orectic, and liberates itself from them, as from things foreign to its +nature. It is necessary, however, to investigate the nature of every +thing, not from the perverted use of it, but from its natural energies. +Hence, if reason, when it is moved in us as reason, restrains the +shadowy impression of the delights of desire, punishes the precipitate +motion of anger, and reproves sense as full of deception, asserting +that we neither hear nor see any thing accurately,[345] and if it +asserts these things looking to its internal reasons, none of which +it knows through body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident +that according to this energy it elongates itself from the senses, +contrary to the decision of which it is separated from those sorrows +and delights. + + +12. After this, however, I see another and a better energy of our +rational soul, the inferior powers being now at rest, and exhibiting +no tumult, as in many things they are accustomed to do, according to +which energy she is converted to herself, sees her own essence and the +powers[346] she contains, the harmonic ratios of which she consists, +and the many lives of which she is the completion, and re-discovers +herself to be a rational world, the image indeed of the natures prior +to herself, and from which she has departed, but the paradigm of the +natures posterior to herself, and over which she presides. To this +energy of the soul, my friend, arithmetic, and geometry, the mother of +your art, are said to contribute much,[347] which indeed elongate the +soul from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms +of life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal +comprehension of forms, extending as it were, the lustrations to +the future mystics that are anterior to the most sacred mysteries. +For consider from intellectual energies after what manner the +above-mentioned sciences are allotted the purifying power of which we +have been speaking. For if they assume the soul replete with images, +and knowing nothing subtile, and unattended with material garrulity, +and if they cause reasons to shine forth which possess an irrefragable +necessity of demonstration, and forms full of all certainty and +immateriality, and by no means calling to their assistance the +grossness which is in sensibles, do they not evidently purify our +intellectual life from those things that fill us with folly, and which +are unadapted to the divine circumscription of beings? + + +13. After both these energies of the rational soul, let us survey her +now running back to her highest intelligence, through which she sees +her sister souls in the world, which are allotted the heavens and the +whole of generation according to the will of the father, and of which +she being a part, desires the contemplation of them. But she sees above +all souls, intellectual essences and orders. For above every soul a +deiform intellect resides, which imparts to the soul an intellectual +habit. She also sees prior to these, the monads of the Gods themselves +which are above intellect, and from which the intellectual multitudes +receive their unions. For it is necessary that unific causes should +be placed above things united, in the same manner as vivifying causes +are above things vivified, causes that impart intellect are above +things intellectualized, and in a similar manner imparticipable +hypostases are above all participants. For according to all these +elevating intellections, I conceive it is evident to those that are +not perfectly blind, how the rational soul leaving sense and bodies +behind, is led upward by intellectual surveys about the inflected and +truly mystic intuitions of the supermundane Gods. Or whence, and from +what kind of energies have the progeny of the Gods unfolded to us the +occult dispensations of divinity? And after what manner are souls +said to energize enthusiastically, and assuming a mania better than +temperance[348] to be conjoined to the Gods themselves? I speak of the +Sibyl who soon after she was born uttered admirable things, and told +those who were present at the time who she was, and from what order she +came into this terrestrial abode, and I allude to any other soul who in +a similar manner was of a divine destiny.[349] + + +14. In short, we must say that the rational and intellectual soul in +whatever way it may energize, is beyond body and sense; and therefore +it is necessary that it should have an essence separable from both +these. This however though of itself now evident, I will again manifest +from hence, that when it energizes according to nature, it is superior +to the influence of Fate, but that when it falls into sense, and +becomes irrational and corporeal, it follows the natures that are +beneath it, and living with them as with intoxicated neighbours, is +held in subjection by a cause that has dominion over things that are +different from the rational essence.[350] For again, it is necessary +that there should be a certain genus of beings of this kind, which +according to essence indeed is above Fate, but according to habitude +is sometimes arranged under it. For if indeed the beings which are +wholly eternal are placed above the laws of Fate, but there are beings +which according to the whole of their life, are arranged under the +periods of Fate, it will also be necessary that there should be an +intermediate nature between these two, which sometimes indeed is above +the productions of Fate, and sometimes is under its dominion. For the +progression of beings much more than the situation of bodies, leaves +no vacuum; but there are every where media between the extremes, which +also bind the extremes to each other. And not only Plato, but likewise +the oracles of the Gods have revealed these things to us. For in the +first place indeed, they order those divine men who were thought worthy +to be the auditors of those mystic discourses, “_not to look upon +nature, because the name of it is fatal_.” And again, they order +them “_not to co-augment Fate_.” Every where also, they exhort +them to turn from the life which is according to Fate, and to avoid +“_becoming corporeal with the fatal herds_;” by all which they +withdraw us from the senses and material desires; for through these we +become corporeal, and are then acted upon from necessity by Fate. For +similitude every where copulates[351] beings to each other; but that +which is assimilated enjoys the same polity as that to which it is +assimilated, whatever it may be, and consequently is under the dominion +of the ruler of that polity. For nothing is without a ruler and a +principality in the universe, whether you speak of wholes, or of parts. +But different things have different rulers, because these live in one +way, and those in another. Afterwards, the oracles teaching concerning +our most divine life, and that immaculate polity, which we enjoy when +liberated from every polity of Fate, say, “_The souls that become +venerable by understanding the works of the father will escape the +fatal wing[352] of Destiny_.” + + +15. The soul, therefore, embracing this life, and such a life as this, +will not rank among those souls that are led by Fate. But if it wishes +to conform itself to body, aspires after what are called corporeal +goods, and pursues honours, power and riches, it suffers the same thing +as a philosopher who is chained, and in this condition enters a ship. +For he becomes subservient to the winds that move the ship, [and cannot +help himself] if some one of the sailors should trample on him, or some +fettered slave should insult him. Bidding farewell, therefore, to the +things to which we are bound, we should direct our attention to the +strength of virtue, and consider Fate not as effecting any thing in us, +but in the things which surround us. For with respect, my friend, to +all external circumstances that may befal us, enemies may demolish the +walls of our city, and reduce its buildings to ashes, they may deprive +us of our possessions, and leave us in a state of indigence; but all +these being mortal and external, are in consequence of this in the +power of other beings, and not in ours. But with respect to the things +which are in our power, there is no one so potent as to be able to take +away any one of them, even though he should possess all human power. +For if we are temperate, we shall still continue to be so, though these +calamities may befal us, and if we are contemplators of true beings, +neither shall we be plundered of this habit; but all these dreadful +events taking place, we shall still persevere in celebrating the rulers +of all things, and in investigating the causes of effects. + + +16. By no means, therefore, must we reprobate the necessity of the +soul from its ultimate energies, but looking to its first energies, +we should admire its unconquerable power. And if we are thus wise, +nothing will disturb us pertaining to the passions of the inferior +parts of the soul; but when the body is disturbed, and we say that +we sustain something of a dreadful nature, it is not we who thus +speak, but it is the language of desire;[353] for the delights of the +body, and therefore its sorrows pertain to this part. When also being +robbed of our wealth, or not obtaining riches, we are grieved, this +passion belongs to that power of the soul which is a lover of wealth. +And again, when being reproached, and falling from power, we are +indignant, this is not the passion of the superior soul, but of that +which dwells downward, about the heart. For this pertains to the part +which is a lover of honour. But the reason which is in us, being in all +such particulars deceived, follows and is at the same time disturbed +with the subordinate powers of the soul, being a blind intellect, and +not having that eye[354] yet purified, by which it is able to perceive +itself, and the natures prior and posterior to itself. When, however, +it becomes purified from those things with which it was invested when +it fell, it will then know what that is which is in its power, how it +is neither in corporeal natures; for these are posterior to reason; +nor in those beings in whom there is the liberty of divine will; for +they are prior to reason; but that it consists in living according to +virtue. For this alone is free and unservile, and adapted to liberty, +and is truly the power of the soul, and confers power on its possessor. +For it is the province of all power to contain and preserve that which +possesses it. + + +17. But he who directs his attention to vice, looks at the debility +of the soul, though she should possess all other power. For the power +of instruments is one thing, and the power of those beings that ought +to use the instruments another. Hence, every soul, so far as it +participates of virtue, and so far as it is [a rational soul], is free; +but so far as it is vicious and debilitated, and is not [rational], +it is subservient to other things,[355] and not to Fate only, but to +every thing, in short, that is either willing to give that which is +appetible, or is able to take it away. For he who possesses virtue +is subservient to those beings who are alone sufficient to impart to +and co-augment with him that which is desirable; but these are the +Gods, with whom there is true virtue, and from whom that which is in +our power is derived. Plato also somewhere says, that this voluntary +servitude is the greatest liberty. For by being subservient to those +who possess all the power of all things, we become assimilated to +them, so that, as he says, we govern the whole world; i.e. when we are +perfect and winged, and reign on high. This, therefore, pertains to +the most divine of our souls, just as it pertains to the last of them, +to be as it were bound in prison, and to live an involuntary, instead +of a voluntary free life. But to the souls that have an intermediate +subsistence between these, it belongs, so far as they are liberated +from passions and the body, to ascend above necessity to a life which +has dominion over generation. + + +18. For again, if intellect and deity are prior to soul, but passions +and bodies are posterior to it; and if to these it belongs to act from +compulsion, but to intellect and deity, to act in a manner better than +all necessity, and which is alone free, it is necessary that the soul +betaking itself either to the former or to the latter, should either +enter under the necessity of subordinate, or exert the liberty of +more excellent natures; and that it should be subservient either to a +supernal dominion, or to a dominion inferior to itself.[356] But if it +is subservient, it must either rule in conjunction with the powers that +rule over it, or be alone subservient in conjunction with subservient +natures. Here, therefore, the soul ascending and resuming its power, +which is virtue, will consider nothing as dreadful whatever it may be, +that takes place about and external to the body. For the passions of +instruments do not pass to those that use them; but in whatever manner +they may subsist, it is possible for the soul to energize according to +virtue; strenuously indeed, if the body should happen to be languid, +but moderately when it is sane. And when poverty is present, it may +energize sublimely, but in affluence magnificently; but every where +from occurring circumstances, it may extol virtue that uses them; +and being ameliorated by its inward strength may vanquish external +calamities. For you must not suppose that you mechanists alone, are to +be permitted to say, that you can move a given weight with a given +power; for this you are well known to assert; but it is much more +possible for those who live according to virtue, truly to adorn a power +given from every circumstance by another power. And he who does this is +generous and free; but the bad man is the slave of all things though he +should rule over all things. For he resembles those who are punished in +Egypt, by laughing vizards that surround them. Over these also, who are +not able to govern themselves, necessity prevails. For being elongated +from the Gods, the universe uses them as brutes. + + +19. When, therefore, you wish to see that which is in our power, look +at the soul living according to nature. But the soul which is not +debile lives according to nature. For there is nothing debile in that +which is conformable to nature. The soul, however, is not debile, which +is not replete with vice, [the evil of the soul]; for in all things +evil is debile. And if you consider the soul in this point of view, you +will see what the nature is of that which is in our power. For you will +see that it uses all circumstances rightly, and either prohibits them +from taking place, or providentially attends to calamitous events when +they occur. It also permits Fate to act upon those things which are +posterior to Fate, and of which it is the lord; but is co-ordinated to +the natures prior to itself, and from which being more excellent than +itself, it is not divulsed. And thus much for the second particular +which we proposed to discuss. + + +20. In the third place, we will show what, and of what kind the modes +of knowledge are; for if we suffer these to remain indistinct, we +shall ignorantly err both about things themselves, and the doctrines +of the divine Plato. Let us then direct our attention to that mode of +knowledge divulged by Aristotle, and also Plato, which without the +assignation of cause alone knows the truth of the οτι; or _that a +thing is_;[357] because to souls beginning to be purified, these +philosophers attribute opinion as the first mode of knowledge, and as +adapted to those who are instructed in practical affairs,[358] without +engaging in the contemplation of beings. For erudition is a purgation +of the immoderation of the passions, reason in this case being +co-passive indeed, but moderately, and casting off all the rope of the +passions. + + +21. Such then being this mode of knowledge, another mode of an +elevating nature is delivered to us from the same Gymnasium. But this +knowledge is said to proceed from principles indeed as hypotheses, to +know causes, and to form necessary conclusions in all its reasonings. +And such is the knowledge obtained through arithmetic and geometry, +which syllogize, conclude from things necessary, and are alone placed +above doxastic knowledge. Because, however these sciences abiding in +their principles, do not ascend to the causes of these, on this account +they show themselves to fall short of the most perfect knowledge. +For as Aristotle says, “it is not the business of a geometrician to +discourse with him who subverts the principles of his science.” Hence, +in these sciences, that which is deduced from principles acknowledged +by them will be manifest; but that which pertains to the principles +themselves is obscure and unknown. + + +22. In the third place, ascending higher, conceive me to speak of +that knowledge of the human soul which ascends as far as to _the +one_, and to that which is unhypothetical, through all forms or +ideas, as I may say, dividing some, but analyzing others, and producing +many things from one, and one thing from many. Socrates, in the +Republic, defines this knowledge to be the defensive inclosure of the +mathematical sciences, and the guest in the Epinomis asserts it to +be the bond of them. For from this, geometry, and each of the other +sciences, assume the theory concerning their principles, adapting[359] +to themselves many principles, and which are divided or separated from +the one principle of all things. For what _the one_ is in all +beings, that a point is in geometry, the monad in arithmetic, and +in every thing, that which is most simple; from which principles the +several sciences producing those things which are under them, frame +their demonstrations. Each of these, however, is said to be, and is, a +certain principle. For the principle of all beings is simply principle, +and the highest ascent of the sciences, is as far as to this. + + +23. There still remains for you to understand a fourth mode of our +knowledge, which is more simple than the preceding, because it does +not employ methods, or analyses, or compositions, or definitions, +or demonstrations; but those who are able to energize according to +it, celebrate it as contemplating beings by simple, and as it were +self-visive projections; and they add, that they venerate it as +intellect, and not as science. Or have you not heard that Aristotle +in his demonstrative treatises says, that the intellect which is in +us is our most excellent part, and is that by which we know terms or +boundaries; and that Plato in the Timæus asserts that intellect and +science are the knowledges of the soul about beings? For science indeed +appears to pertain to the soul, so far as the soul is knowledge; but +intellect pertains to it so far as the soul is the image of true and +real intellect. For intellect perceiving intellectuals, or rather being +one with them, Plato says, that it understands them by projecting +energies, by intuition and contact, understanding itself, and beholding +intelligibles in itself, on which account it intellectually sees what +it is, and knows that it is at one and the same time both the perceiver +and the thing perceived. The soul, therefore, imitating this as much as +she is able, becomes herself intellect, running above science, leaving +the many methods with which she was before adorned, elevating her eye +to beings alone, and understanding them by contact in the same manner +as intellect; from which she differs in this, that she comes into +contact with different intelligibles at different times, but intellect +passes into contact with all things at once. + + +24. After all these modes of knowledge, I wish you (who have believed +in Aristotle when he leads the soul upward as far as to intellectual +energy, but insinuates nothing beyond this), to assume a fifth +intelligence; in so doing, following Plato, and prior to Plato +theologists, who are accustomed to celebrate a knowledge which is +above intellect, and have divulged this as a truly divine mania. But +they say that this is obtained by exciting the profundity of the soul, +which is no longer intellectual, and adapting it to union with _the +one_. For all things are known by the similar, that which is sensible +by sense, that which is the object of science by science, that which +is intelligible by intellect, and that which is one by that which is +charactertized by unity. For the soul indeed being intellective knows +herself, and knows whatever she understands, by contact, as we have +before observed. But being superintelligent, she is ignorant both of +herself and of the objects of knowledge, and being near to _the one_, +she loves quiet, having shut up her knowledge, becoming mute, and being +silent with internal silence. For how can she be adjacent to the most +ineffable of all things, except by laying asleep the garrulous matter +that is in her? Hence, she must become one that she may see _the one_, +or rather that she may not see _the one_. For seeing, she will see +that which is intellectual, and not that which is above intellect, and +will intellectually perceive a certain one, and not _the one itself_. +He, my friend, who energizes according to this most divine energy +of the soul, trusting solely to himself, viz. to the flower of his +intellect, causing himself to be at rest not from external, but from +internal motions, and becoming a God as far as it is possible for the +soul to be so, will understand how the Gods alone ineffably know all +things, according to _the one_ of themselves. But as long as we are +rolled about things beneath, it will appear to us to be incredible that +divinity knows all things impartibly and supereternally; eternal beings +indeed, having a real existence, but things which are in generation, +or becoming to be, subsisting temporally, neither time nor eternity +subsisting in _the one_. So many indeed are the species of knowledge +with us, by looking to which it is possible to solve all the doubts +concerning the truth which the soul may know,[360] and concerning that +which it is not possible for her to know, in the present life. + + +25. Because, however, we have made three discussions which we said +were necessary to a distinct survey of the objects of inquiry, let +us now pass to the doubts, and give to each of them an appropriate +solution. In the first place, therefore, you consider this as a +sufficient argument that what is in our power is frivolous, and is the +work alone of the celestial bodies, viz. that we men assert ourselves +to be the causes of those events which are attended with prosperity; +but in things in which we are unfortunate, we transfer the cause to +necessity, instead of ascribing them to choice. And thus doubting, you +think you obtain this as a common conception concerning Fate, that it +has a more principal power in practical affairs than our impulses. +Indeed, I myself do not see men otherwise affected than as ascribing to +themselves the cause of their success, but to others the cause of their +errors. But in this we differ, that you indeed admit the opinion of the +many as sufficient to form a judgment of things; while I conceive them +to reason in this way through a certain immoderate love of themselves. +Among wise men, however, to whom it belongs to look both to whole and +parts, and not to neglect the order which they possess with reference +to them, divinity is considered as the principal cause of all events +from which good is derived to all things; but the next causes to this +are, the period of the world, and time, in which events are co-adapted +and co-ordinated to wholes, nothing being superfluously adventitious +in the polity of wholes; and in the third place, they consider +themselves as causes in those things in which they are allotted a +deliberate choice, and in which by their impulses they co-operate to +the completion of things. + + +26. When, however, any thing happens contrary to their choice, then +they deservedly ascribe the event to wholes alone, and the efficiency +of wholes, as the conquering cause. For it is every where necessary +that partial natures should energize in conjunction with wholes, but +wholes without partial natures. And after this manner intellectual men +divide events, but not as you have divided them. Hear, likewise, Plato +in the Laws exclaiming that divinity indeed governs all things; but +that after divinity, Fortune and Time rule over all human affairs; and +that our art follows as the third after these. For during a tempest, +the pilot’s art contributes something, and in disease the medical +art, and in short, in practical affairs, the political art.[361] If, +therefore, our affairs are prosperous, Fate, Time, and Divinity, must +be considered as the causes that they are so. Hence, there will be +three causes of events, Divinity indeed causing that which comes to +pass to be good; but Time and Fate causing it to be arranged in one +concord with every thing. And in short, another cause is human. For +every human work is a part of the universe, but the contrary is not +true, because it is necessary that other animals also, since they are +parts of the universe, should not only[362] act, but also suffer. For +every part, indeed, of this mundane fabric and drama has for its end +good; since no part of it is left inordinate, but is so woven with +other parts, as to contribute to the well-being of the universe. The +contrary, however, is not true, that every thing which is allotted good +is co-ordinated with the mundane polity. For there is a supermundane +life, and the life of the Gods, and of souls that transcend Fate, and +follow Providence alone. + + +27. Where then does that which is in our power exist? Since that which +is generated, is connected with the period of the world, and again, +since it is produced from that alone. Where else should we say it +exists, than in our internal elections and impulses? For of these alone +we are the lords; but things which take place external to us, have many +other more powerful beings as their lords. For it is necessary that +what is generated externally should become a part of the universe, that +it may also be generated; and that this should be effected through the +consent and co-operation of the universe, that it may produce every +thing in itself, by one part of itself acting on another, and being +passive from another. On this account, therefore, in the actions of +men, we praise these persons, but we blame those, because through +choice they were lords of their deeds, and we do not say that the +universe, but the agent was the cause of the quality of the actions. +For the quality of a deed is not derived from the universe, but from +the life of the agent. It is, however, co-ordinated to the whole on +account of the whole, and is again such as it is on account of a +part. And that we assert these things with truth, the oracles of the +Gods will manifest to you, since they often ascribe victory to our +choice, and not to the order alone of the mundane periods; as for +instance, when they say: “On beholding yourself, fear.” And again; +“Know thyself.” And, “Believe yourself to be above body, and you are.” +In short, they say, “that our sorrows germinate in us as the voluntary +progeny of the particular life which we lead.” + + +28. It is not fit, therefore, to refer all events to the order alone of +the universe, as neither is it fit to refer them to our impulse alone. +Nor again is it proper to separate the soul from those beings that +have an absolute elective power,[363] and whose very being consists in +deliberate choice alone, and in declining this thing, but embracing +that; though the soul in those events which take place is not the +mistress of the universe. For it is requisite that every cause should +aspire after that thing alone which it is naturally adapted to obtain. +But that which is in our power, is not only adapted to be active, but +also to be essentially elective. It is also adapted to act electively +in conjunction with other things, and either to err or act rightly on +account of choice. For though the deed may be good, yet if the agent +acts from a bad choice, we say that the action is bad. For that which +is good in the deed, is on account of something else, but that which +is depraved is on account of the choice of him who performs the deed. +Hence, it is evident to all men that we are the lords of actions, so +far as they are eligible. + + +29. But after this question, you say that all of us are solicitous +about futurity in all things, and even in those things which appear +to be in our power. Speaking summarily, you say well. What then, if +we are all lovers of divination, is there nothing in our power? I, +however, on the contrary say, that if nothing is in our power, but +events are compelled to take place from motion alone, we shall not +be lovers of divination. For what occasion is there for divination +in things which owe their existence to external compulsion, and the +knowledge of which is as of things future or not future. For such +knowledge is superfluous, when events are necessary; since it is +impossible for that which is necessary not to come to pass, though we +should a thousand times consult about, and be prescient of it. If, +therefore, events necessarily happen, we are in vain solicitous about +futurity. We are not, however, in vain solicitous about it, since +this is natural to us; for nothing which is according to nature is in +vain. Hence, it is not proper to consider all things as produced by +compulsion, in consequence of binding them by the circulation of the +heavenly bodies; but we must admit that foreknowledge is in some things +profitable to us, and that we do not live merely for the purpose of +foreknowing events, but that by foreknowing we may contribute or not +contribute something to things future, and may be more prompt in our +energies. We must likewise admit that not divination only, but prayers, +and the whole business of sacred rites contribute something to our +advantage, or we must exile these, pouring oil on their heads, and +crowning them with wool, and we must neither extend our hands upward, +nor grant that we ought to worship those who are able to suspend the +celestial influences. For men when in difficult circumstances will in +vain indulge a hope of being liberated from them by invoking divinity, +and Apollo himself will in vain give responses, unless[364] by +performing certain things it is possible to escape the punishment which +is suspended from the celestial periods, and by not performing them, +the dreaded event will necessarily take place. + + +30. Indeed, if this were not the case, would it not be perfectly absurd +to make this division, and to allow conformably to the oracles of the +Gods that something must be granted to our choice? But neither must we +proclaim this of divinity [viz. that his oracles are given in vain], +nor must we exterminate from human life, the utility of divination, and +of the sacerdotal office; because you have all history both Barbarian +and Grecian conjointly testifying that through divination, whether +from divine inspiration, or from human art, many have frequently known +what it was requisite to do, and through this knowledge have been +liberated from evils, which would have been otherwise inevitable. +This then I determine as appropriate to the present discussion, that +sometimes[365] this much celebrated divination, and the performance +of sacred rites contribute to a certain thing being effected or +not, and sometimes[366] predominate over those generations which +are introduced from the universe. When, therefore, since all things +are in all, divine and dæmoniacal causes concur in one, and as it +were assert the same thing, then the works of sacrifice are seen +to be inefficacious; for it is impossible for a part to oppose and +effect things contrary to the whole; and foreknowledge, in this case, +neither adds nor takes away any thing from the events which are the +subjects of divination. But when, in consequence of there being many +things of this kind, these effect one thing, and those another; as +for instance, these effect the destruction, but those the safety of +the diseased, through the operations of the celestial bodies upon us, +as is evident from all history, then the performance of some sacred +right, by employing co-operative powers, liberates us from the noxious +defluxions, by those that are beneficial. And the consideration of +the future contributes much to effects. In short, that which is in +our power being co-ordinated with these, or with other causes, as in +calamities, in consequence of receiving a greater increase through its +own motion, exhibits sometimes one, and sometimes another end. And +know that this takes place in things which are externally produced. +Every where, however, the quality of the impulse has a prior existence, +and choice characterizes that which is in our power. This also is +the work of the soul, which abides in it and is not to be referred +to the universe.[367] Conformably, therefore, to these things, as it +appears to me, you say that the universe governs all animals, and that +we and other animals have a diminished life imparted from the air, +and the first circulation. And that the rational part indeed is in +the brain; but that what is called sense is in the organs of sense, +and is conversant with different sensibles, but that the sight, the +hearing, and the other senses, differ only in their subjects, but are +essentially one and without diversity.[368] + + +31. Hearing you make this arrangement, I was surprized that a lover +of philosophy and intellectual speculations, and why do I say of +intellectual speculations, but who is also skilled in the paths of +erudition and in the inventions of geometry and arithmetic, should +attribute as much to the senses as to our rational and intellectual +essence, though they scarcely come into contact with the objects +of knowledge through debile organs, and should conceive that they +only differ from each other, and from the rational part by a certain +diversity of organs. For we have indeed elsewhere and prior to this +shown that all the senses are inseparable from body, and incapable of +being converted to themselves, but that the rational and intellectual +life is naturally adapted to know itself, and in consequence of this +knowledge to be converted to itself. For every thing gnostic is +according to energy converted to the object of knowledge; and therefore +that which is gnostic of itself is converted to itself. What identity, +therefore, do you see between the intellectual and the sensitive soul, +between that which looks downward, and that which tends upward? And in +short, what identity do you perceive between the soul which is buried +in bodies, and the soul which is unmingled with bodies? Between that +which can never know truth, and that which always extends itself to +real being? + +32. But if the appetite which is according to nature is not in vain in +any thing else, neither is it in that which is sometimes allotted the +perception of truth. I omit to say that it is absurd to assert that the +essence of a divine soul flows downward from ether, if it is proper to +call that which is impossible absurd. For the souls which are derived +from ether are allotted a corporeal generation; but the Athenian guest +demonstrates that the rational soul is more ancient than all bodies. +But if by ether you do not mean a body, but an etherial intellect, or +an intellectual soul surrounding ether, neither thus do you appear to +me to have discovered the most true cause of the soul. For there is +another fountain of souls from which etherial souls, the souls of the +sublunary elements, dæmoniacal souls, and ours are derived. And it is +necessary to look to that cause which Plato concealing the truth, as it +appears to me, calls the Crater; in which he represents the demiurgus +mingling the soul of the universe, as Timæus says, not from ether, but +prior to bodies. The Chaldean oracles also celebrate the essential +fountain of every soul, viz. of the empyreal, etherial, and material, +and separate this from the whole vivific goddess; from which also +suspending the whole of Fate, they make two series, the one psychical, +and the other fatal. Deriving the soul, therefore, from one of these +series, they assert that it sometimes becomes subservient to Fate, when +becoming irrational it changes its lord, viz. Fate for Providence. + + +33. That, as I have said however, you have not asserted any thing +worthy the intellectual energy of Geometry and Arithmetic, in +co-ordinating our soul with the senses, you may learn, by considering +that the first employment of these sciences is to separate the soul +from that energy which subsists in conjunction with the senses, to +withdraw it from them as much as possible, to accustom it to look +within, to see immaterial reasons, and to investigate demonstrations, +the conclusions of which are contrary to the informations of the +senses. For they indeed reject impartibility, but these sciences +require it, and derive their existence from impartibles; since +partibles are the principles of the former, but impartibles of +the latter. And the knowledge of the senses indeed is confined +to particulars; but universals, and those things the nature of +which is always the same, are the objects of the knowledge of the +above-mentioned sciences; which they do not derive from the senses, +for imperfect are not the causes of perfect things; but supernally from +intellect, on which account also they sit in judgment on the senses, +reprehend the grossness of their knowledge, the passivity of their +perceptions, and their indefinite motions. + + +34. For indeed the knowledge of the senses is truly ludicrous; but the +intention of the mathematical sciences is to liberate us from things +ludicrous, and accustom us instead of pursuing these, to investigate +the knowledge of real being. It belongs to the sensible life therefore, +to be under the dominion of Fate, and to be acted upon differently at +different times, in conjunction with bodies, in which the necessity +from Fate consists. For every form inseparable from matter, is +ingenerated in, and contained by it; since it does not pertain to +it, through being converted to itself to say, that what externally +accedes to it is one thing, and that which is true another. But it +alone says that it announces passion, on which account it belongs to +alter-motive natures, in consequence of not having an energy perfectly +liberated from them. The intellectual life however, is according to +its own nature converted to itself,[369] and cannot endure to follow +the violent passions of sense, but contains in itself criteria of the +fallacious motions externally introduced, and adds indeed what is +deficient to the passive perceptions of sense, and confutes the fallacy +of its information; accomplishing at the same time all this by its own +proper energy. For it is not the province of things which pertain to +sense to form a judgment of sense, but this belongs to intellectual +reasons, which the knowledge of sense is incapable of receiving. The +immaterial therefore and separable life, and which energizes in itself, +must be admitted to be contrary to that of sense; and to this must be +given a choice of inclination, upward and downward, to intellect by +which it was produced, and to sense which it generates; but we must +admit that sense and all corporeal lives are without choice, because +this is also the case with bodies. For the rational soul being a medium +between intellect and sense, tends to both on account of the unstable +inclination of choice; but it becomes according to habitude each of the +extremes, of which it is essentially neither. But the perfection which +it derives from intellect, and the deception which it receives from +sense, manifest its middle nature. And such, as it appears to me, is +the correction[370] of the dogma. + + +35. With respect to your opinion concerning good which you have +introduced into the midst of your enquiries, viz. that what is +delectable to the several individuals of mankind is good, and that this +exists by position, since different things are considered as legal +by different nations; I should be ashamed indeed, if in writing to a +friend I did not manifestly assert that I conceive this opinion to be +unworthy both of my choice and my years. For it does not appear to me +to be at all wonderful that a young man in consequence of looking to +the opinions of men in many things, should form such an opinion. But I +think he who admits that an aged intellect ought to preside as a judge, +will adopt the decisions of intellectual conceptions, and not those +which the rumour and unbalanced motions of the multitude have spread +abroad. Now therefore, because to the Persians, some things appear to +be delectable, and also certain things which are congruous to these +delectables are considered by them as legal; but to the Greeks other +things appear to be delectable and legal; and to other nations other +things; on this account a different thing is imagined to be good and +delectable by different people. And whoever is allotted a delight which +is naturally good to every one, will possess an end adapted to man; +but whoever errs from this end, though he should be a thousand times +delighted with things which are present to him and appear to be good, +yet he will reap but an imperfect fruit of such delight. + + +36. But it is, as it seems, true, that one inconvenience being given, +others follow, which you also appear to me to suffer. For placing the +soul under the dominion of Fate, you have co-ordinated her with the +irrational senses, and collecting these into one and the same thing, +you have mingled good with that which is debile. It is necessary +however to eject both the former and this from the soul, that we may +not ignorantly ascribe the same things to men as to brutes, whose life +is without conversion to itself, and is naturally bent to earth, and +whose knowledge is mingled with material passions. These things also +are unfolded by Plato with, as I may say, adamantine arguments. For +says he that which is not good is not [truly] delectable, though all +oxen should assert it to be so. For we are not to adduce the testimony +of oxen, but of the Gods, with whom there is intellect, and the good of +being, which is more divine than intellect itself. These things being +clearly asserted in the Gorgias, the Philebus, and the Republic, I +think it would be superfluous to dwell on them any farther. + + +37. This however, I will add to what has been said, that the +investigation of good is not to be mingled with the delectable, (for +thus the petulance of delight will cause us to be foolish) but the +all-various diversities of human customs and legal institutions, are to +be referred to the different lives of souls, viz. to the rational, the +irascible and the epithymetic forms of life; for the former germinate +from the latter; since, as it is said, they are not derived from an +oak, nor from a rock. But the many-headed beast persuades these to +establish such things by law as the Persians established; the leonine +soul persuades others to adopt such things as the Thracians adopted; +and in others reason prevails in the adoption of legal and true good. +And the delectable indeed, is common to all these. For the appetible +when present is delectable to every one, but good is not delectable +to all men, but to those in whom reason presides. For the passions do +not see good, but this is alone the province of reason. And to reason +indeed, the delectable and the good are the same; but the fabrication +of things did not give to the blind passions the investigation of +good, but of the delectable; for every species of life when it +energizes without impediment is delighted. Hence there are many legal +institutions, and all-various delectables, and they are different +to different persons; but good is alone with those in whom reason +predominates over the passions. For dominion must not be given to +desire, that we may not be affected in the same manner as asses; nor +to anger, that we may not resemble lions; but it must be given to that +which is the most excellent part of our nature, which we alone are, +or according to which we principally subsist. For the being of every +thing which consists of many things, some better, and others worse, is +according to that which is the best among them. For that which is best +sagaciously conjectures the nature of good. + + +38. As to what you afterwards write in the way of doubt, you seem +to me to have written it in consequence of hearing Socrates in many +places asserting that he knew nothing, deriding those who say that +they know all things, and farther still contending that when we depart +from hence we shall especially know the truth, and be in possession of +more certain sciences, and also inferring that the mathematical are +not truly sciences. You doubt therefore from all this whether it is +not perhaps impossible to know the truth, and whether we do not only +dream about it. Indeed it is requisite you should at the same time +understand, that if it is not possible for us to know the truth, we do +not more know if there is any thing in our power than if there is not. +For our ignorance of both similarly prevents our adoption of either of +these positions. How therefore, can we use the ignorance of truth in +order to show whether there is any thing which is in our power? Since +with respect to the existence, and non-existence of this, ignorance +possesses the same power, or rather impotency. + + +39. That we may not however, suffer any thing of this kind, we have +already enumerated all the modes of knowledge; and have shown what +the modes are of which the soul can participate here, and what those +are when she assumes a supreme order. And of these indeed, Socrates +possessing the former, but hoping that he shall obtain the latter on +being liberated from the body, says, “that arriving thither he shall +know the truth.” For other measures and other objects of knowledge +afforded him an opportunity of indulging such a hope. Because it is a +thing usual with the friends of Plato to inquire whether it is possible +for the soul to live not only cathartically, but also theoretically, +while surrounded with this gross bond the body. And I think the +subject has been sufficiently discussed, and has been brought to this +conclusion, that perhaps it is possible to live theoretically even +here, like the coryphæan philosopher in the Theætetus, astronomizing +above the heavens,[371] and investigating on all sides all the nature +of beings, and also like those guardians in the Republic, who ascend +as far as to _the good itself_, through that dialectic, which Plato +calls the defensive inclosure of the mathematical sciences. Again, +however, that it is impossible while here to lead a theoretic life +in perfection, is evident from the causes which are enumerated in +the Phædo, viz. the occupations and molestations of the body, which +do not suffer us to energize theoretically without impediment, and +disturbance. For the life is theoretic, but the energy is called +contemplation, and the contemplation of _the one_. + + +40. When also Socrates does not permit us to call the mathematical +sciences [truly] sciences, he does not do this as denying that they +have a necessity of demonstrations, but as falling short of the supreme +of sciences. And why should I not say, at falling short of dialectic, +which no longer considers a point, or the monad, as a principle, but +_the good_, and considers the principle of all things. Whence also, as +I conceive, Socrates in the section of a line[372] [in the 6th book of +the Republic] assigns the second part to the mathematical sciences; +but to perfectly immaterial and separate forms, he assigns a part, and +a knowledge prior to these; the former proceeding from hypothesis, +but the latter being unhypothetical. And with Socrates, the author of +the Epinomis likewise accords. For he calls dialectic the bond of the +mathematical sciences, as uniting the principles of all of them. + + +41. But if Socrates asserted that he knew nothing, and the Pythian +oracle pronounced him to be on this account the wisest of all men, +as he himself informs us, consider the profound meaning both of the +Pythian deity and of Socrates, and how by the assertion of knowing +nothing this is implied, that _the good_ alone possesses an exempt +transcendency,[373] but not he who possesses scientific knowledge; and +this it is to know that he does not know. For the attainment of such +a knowledge as this appears to be the principal business of those who +intend to be wise. For in reality, he is truly wise, who knows that he +is not truly wise, and is not ignorant of this. For to whom does it +belong to know that he does not scientifically know every thing, but to +him who possesses knowledge. For it is indeed necessary that he should +perfectly know that he does not know [every thing]; since he will know +himself not to possess a scientific knowledge [of all things]. Hence no +one will perfectly know that he does not possess scientific knowledge +[in perfection], till he knows that he possesses scientific knowledge. +For then he will at one and the same time know that he knows, and what +the things are which he does not know, and will both know that he knows +and that he does not know, possessing a middle knowledge, and science +alone, which subsists between those natures that know truth wholly, +and those that do not know it at all,[374] of which the former is +intellect, but the latter sense. For sense neither knows real, being, +nor the essence itself of sensibles, of which it is feigned to be the +knowledge; but intellect knows essence itself, and the real truth +itself of being. + + +42. The soul therefore, being a medium between these, knows the +essences of things as being prior to sense, and does not know them as +being posterior to intellect. He therefore that is wise, will both know +that he knows, and that he does not know. And thus much, my friend, +in answer to the assertion of Socrates, and concerning that which +is real wisdom. Hence, it is not proper to exterminate the reasons +pertaining to science, neither on account of the mathematical sciences +being distinguished from the first science, nor on account of the +hope of obtaining true knowledge after a separation from hence, nor on +account of the answer of the Pythian deity. For it is Plato himself who +exclaims, that if science is destroyed, it will no longer be possible +to make an assertion about any thing, and not even about that which is +contingent. But he shows indeed, what the knowledge is which the soul +may assume while it is united to the body, and what it may obtain when +it is freed from its bonds; and also what that is which is at the same +time knowledge and not science. He likewise shows that there is one +knowledge which is true science, an intellect better than science, and +an intelligence which deifies intellect; and that the soul perceiving +this knowledge, and not being able to obtain it in this life, desires +a departure from body, that she may then be allotted this supernatural +and divine comprehension of beings. But of these things enough. + + +43. In consequence however of what you have said, you doubt, why good +men are in a worse condition, in consequence of failing to obtain the +end which was the object of their wishes, but bad men are allotted the +things which they desire. You therefore indeed, think that this also +is an argument in favour of the non-existence of any thing which is +in our power. And indeed, if this is an argument of the non-existence +of any thing in our power, that things do not happen to the good +according to their wishes, the success of bad men in gaining the +objects of their desire, will be an argument in proof of the existence +of something which is in our power. It is better however, not to adduce +opposing arguments to what you say, but merely to show you that this +doubt was proposed by some of the ancients not only with a view to the +subversion of that which is in our power, but also with a view to the +investigation whether providence has any existence. And this inquiry +of the ancients has been extended to Plotinus himself, to Iamblichus, +and your namesake [Theodorus Asinæus]. For the unexpected introduction +of fortunate events, shakes in reality our invincible preconceptions +of providence, and the affair requires intellectual inspection, if the +objector being saved from that doubt, ought to commit every thing to +providence. + + +44. If therefore, we are not the lords of any thing, and have not an +elective life from ourselves, and neither good nor evil is from us, +but these are externally produced, there is no longer any occasion to +doubt of events, as if they happened contrary to desert, since both +good and evil derive their subsistence from an external source. For if +we do not cause ourselves to be such characters as we are, it will not +be requisite that there should be any retribution for our life; nor +in short, is any thing due from those, who are not the causes of the +life which they lead. Hence, if the retribution of fortunate events is +contrary to desert, we ourselves shall be the cause of the lives, the +desert of which it is said we are allotted in the distributions from +the universe; because, of all the things that surround us, we do not +require to have retribution in what we derive from wholes, but in those +things in which we co-operate something. If therefore, there is nothing +in our power, we shall have nothing from ourselves. And if this be the +case, neither should we desire retributions of those things which we +derive from an external source. And this being admitted, neither should +we accuse the distribution of events as contrary to desert. + + +45. If, therefore, there is nothing in our power, it is not fit to +enquire why good men fail in obtaining the end they desire, contrary to +desert, but bad men obtain this end. But admitting there is something +which is in our power, and that Providence has dominion over all +things, we say, adducing to you persuasion after violence, that what +is in our power does not predominate over, but co-operates with things +external. The rational soul therefore very properly disposes things +that are internal according to its own power, but it cannot do this +with externals, because these require other things in order to their +distribution, which are not inherent in it. I am delighted however with +these doubts of yours, perceiving in you a generous proselyte whom I +frequently desire not to confound those things which are in our power +with those which are not, nor to be so disposed with respect to things +which are not in our power, as if they ought entirely to take place, +in order that we may bear them without difficulty, when they do take +place. Now, however, the doubt happens, from things which are out of, +not conforming themselves to things which are in our power, though we +fancy that they ought, and also from supposing that to be good for +us which is not, and seeking for its accomplishment. But it would be +better for us always to explore the true and real beings that are in +us, and acquire them for ourselves, and to leave things external, and +which are not in our power to the causes of them, as to masters who +know what they do. We should likewise be prepared for those things +which are not, by those things which are in our power. In what manner, +therefore, the doubt pertains to that which is in our power, we have +shown you through such arguments as these. But you ought rather to +refer it, as we have said, to the doubt concerning Providence. And many +things, as I have before observed, have been said on this subject by +the ancients, and they thus solve the doubt. + + +46. Again, therefore, you inquire what that which is in our power +is. Which it was requisite to investigate in the beginning of the +discussion. And afterwards you doubt concerning it. But inquiring about +it, you define it to be that which is of itself uncircumscribed,[375] +and self-energetic. If, however, this be the case, it is entirely +incorruptible, and most powerful, and alone pertains to the ruler +of all beings, but is not adapted to that which is in our power. +I, therefore, consider this definition to be very remote from that +conception of what is in our power, which the ancients adopting, +attributed this to human souls. But do you also consider the truth of +what I say. For they assumed that which is in our power as indicative +of the energy of choice, making us to be the lords of choice and +aversion, and as indicative of the choice of some good, or the +contrary. For they did not consider choice and will to be the same; but +they asserted that the latter pertains to good alone, but the former +both to good and evil; just as false opinion pertains to that which is +not good. Hence also, they said that election or choice characterizes +the soul, which extends itself both to what is good, and what is not +good, and that this pertains to the middle nature of that being which +is converted to both these. This also common rumour testifies. For +we praise the choice of these, but blame the choice of those. Evil, +however, is not wished for by any one. And evil indeed appears to be +good to those that choose it; for no soul knowing a thing to be evil +would choose, but would avoid it. On account of ignorance, however, the +soul is busily employed about it; for she naturally possesses an acute +love of good, but sometimes is powerless with respect to the attainment +of it. + + +47. The soul, therefore, essentially possessing an inclination to +both, viz. to good and evil, the ancients called this power of her +elective, on account of which we are naturally adapted to choose one +thing instead of another. And indeed, you may obtain from division such +a definition of this power. Because all power is either rational or +irrational, it is necessary that choice should be in one of these. But +since it is not irrational; for we all say that the irrational power is +without choice, it will be a certain rational power. But every rational +as well as every irrational power, is either gnostic or appetitive. +Choice, however, being election and desire, will be a certain appetite. +But every appetite either alone looks to that which is real good, or to +that which is only apparent good, or to both these. We say, however, +that choice does not look to real good alone; for if it did, it would +never be justly blamed; nor to apparent good alone; for in this case, +it would not frequently be praised. Hence such a power is naturally +adapted to look to both these. + + +48. Election, therefore, is in short, a rational power, desirous both +of true and apparent good, leading the soul to both, on account of +which she ascends and descends, errs, and acts with rectitude. The +ancients perceiving the energy of this power, called the inclination of +it both to real and apparent good, a twofold path in our nature. Hence +the elective and that which is in our power, will be the same thing. +And according to this power, we differ from divine, and from mortal +natures; for each of these is unreceptive of this twofold inclination; +since the former, indeed, on account of their transcendent excellence +are alone established in true good; but the latter on account of +defect, in apparent good. For intellect indeed characterizes the +former, but sense the latter. And the former is our king, but the +latter our messenger. We, however, being of a middle nature are +established in choice; and are capable of being moved both to true and +apparent good. But wherever we move, we are on all sides comprehended +by wholes, from which we are allotted what is, according to desert. And +if indeed we tend to that which is better, we thus tend as intellect; +but if to that which is subordinate, as sense. That which is in our +power, therefore, is not capable of effecting all things. For that +which can effect all things is a power characterized by unity, and on +this account can effect all things, because it is one and boniform. +But the power which is elective is dyadic, and on this account cannot +accomplish all things; because by its twofold inclinations, it falls +short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would, however, +be itself effective of all things, if it had not an elective impulse; +for then it would be will alone. For a life characterized by will +subsists according to good, which causes that which is in our power to +be most powerful, and is truly deiform, on account of which the soul +also becomes a God, and as Plato says, governs the whole world. + + +49. Hence that which is in our power, neither pertains to the first, +nor to the last of things, but to the medium between both. You, +however, as it seems, have conceived it to be a power ruling over all +things, leading all things according to its own impulse, and obtaining +every thing which it desires; for you do not define it to be a power +over the objects of desire within the soul, and which cause the +electing soul to be such as it is; but you ascribe to it a power over +things which are not in its power. For things external to the soul are +not in our power; on which account also our life is mingled from things +which are not, and from things which are in our power. And with worthy +men, indeed, there is much of that which is in our power; for they use +all things, modifying even those that are out of our power on account +of virtue, and always adorning the present circumstance. But with the +multitude, there is more of that which is not in our power; for they +follow things external to themselves, not possessing a life within, +which is able to assimilate them to themselves. Hence worthy men, +indeed, are said to be free, and are so on account of the energy both +of that which is in, and of that which is not in their power. But the +multitude are called into servile necessity, in consequence of burying +those things which are in their power, with those that are not, and +possessing all things not in themselves. + + +50. After all this, you have added the colophon (or summit) of the +doubts, by asking whether divinity knows or does not know events which +are future to us. And if, indeed, he does not know them, you will +say that he does not at all differ from us, who have no knowledge of +futurity. But if he does know them, that which he knows will entirely +and from necessity come to pass. This, however, as it would seem, not +only destroys that which is in our power, but likewise every thing +which is said to be contingent. This also, is usually said by those who +conceive all things to exist by compulsion, and as I may say, has been +asserted a thousand times. But they all reason as follows: if divinity +knows every future event, that which is future will be from necessity. +And they indeed assert it to be false that divinity knows every thing +definitely; but they say that his knowledge is indefinite of things +which indefinitely come to pass, in order that they may save what +is contingent. Others, however, attributing a definite knowledge to +divinity, admit necessity in every thing which comes to pass. These are +the dogmas of the Peripatetic and Stoic sects. But Plato, and whoever +is a friend to Plato, affirm that divinity definitely knows future +events, and that nevertheless[376] some things are produced definitely, +and others indefinitely, according to their respective natures. For +those things which in effects subsist with division and contrarily, are +antecedently comprehended in the Gods according to a more excellent +condition only. + + +51. I say, for instance, the causes of generated natures, whether they +are incorporeal or corporeal, subsist incorporeally with the Gods; and +in a similar manner their knowledge is incorporeal. And again, the +causes of intellectual, and of non-intellectual beings, subsist with +the Gods both essentially, and according to science. For they also know +things which are not intellectual intellectually. And again, of things +which are produced by them, that are either temporal or without time, +there is with them a cause and a knowledge exempt from time. Hence +because of effects some are definite, but others indefinite, the Gods +antecedently assume the knowledge of both these according to the more +excellent mode, viz. according to the definite. Moreover, the form +of knowledge is not such as the object of knowledge, but such as the +gnostic nature. For knowledge is not in that which is known, but in +that which knows. Hence, it is similar and of the like form to that in +which it is, and not to that in which it is not. If, therefore, that +which is known is indefinite, but that which knows it is definite, the +knowledge is not also indefinite on account of the thing known, but +definite on account of that which knows. For it is possible to know +that which is subordinate after a more excellent mode, and that which +is supreme after an inferior mode. + + +52. Hence, because the Gods are better than all things, they +antecedently comprehend all things after a more excellent mode. And +beings indeed, they comprehend superessentially;[377] things which are +according to time, as we have already said, prior to time; corporeal +natures, incorporeally; material natures immaterially; definitely, +things indefinite; permanently, things unstable; and ingenerably, +things generable. It does not, therefore, follow that if they know what +will be, the event must happen from necessity; but to the event indeed +we must give an indefinite generation from a definite cause, and to the +Gods a definite foreknowledge of that which is indefinite. For neither +does it follow that because your art[378] employs drums and wheels, and +corporeal materials, these subsisted corporeally in your foreknowledge; +but your imagination comprehended in itself incorporeally and vitally +the productive principle of the future machine; and the astrolabe +was corporeally fashioned from an internal knowledge which is not +corporeal. If this, however, is the case in your art, what ought you +to say of the foreknowledge of the Gods, in which all things subsist +in a manner truly ineffable, and not to be circumscribed by us? Is it +not evident, that this mode of comprehension is different from, and in +no respect allied to the things which are produced by it? Hence the +Gods know divinely, and in a way unaccompanied by time those things +which are in our power, and we energize, as we are naturally adapted. +Whatever we choose also, is foreknown by them, not on account of the +boundary which is in us, but on account of the boundary which is with +them. + + * * * * * + +Such, my friend, is my answer to your inquiries, independent of which +I am able to show you that there is something in our power, from +praise and blame, from counsel, from exhortation and dehortation, from +judicial affairs, from accusation and defence, from all political +erudition, from legislation, from prayer, from sacerdotal methods, +and from philosophy itself. For you well know that my preceptor +[Syrianus,] used frequently to say, that if that which is in our power +were destroyed, philosophy would be superfluous. For what should it +instruct, when there is nothing which can be instructed, when there is +nothing in us by which we may become better? Reconsidering, therefore, +these things again and again, if you still have any doubts, do not be +averse to write to me. For what subjects can we more aptly discuss than +those, in the disquisition of which no one will accuse us of nugacity? + + + + + EXTRACTS + + FROM THE + + TREATISE OF PROCLUS, + + ENTITLED + + TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE. + + +1. Whether Providence extends to all things, to wholes and parts, and +as far as to the most indivisible natures in the heavens and in the +sublunary regions, in things eternal and things corruptible? This +Proclus affirms, and says that every particular, even of the minutest +things, depends on the beneficent providence of divinity. For nothing +escapes that one whether you speak of the essence of a thing, or its +being known. It is said indeed, and is rightly said, that the whole +circle is centrally in the centre, since the centre is the cause, but +the circle the thing caused, and for the same reason every number is +monadically in unity. But in the one of Providence, all things subsist +after a more exalted mode, since that is more transcendently one than a +centre and the monad. + + +2. How divinity foreknows and provides for things contingent? Proclus +answers, that divinity, on account of his most perfect nature, knows +in their seeds and causes things indefinite definitely, as he also +knows things distant and corporeal, without distance and incorporeally. + + +3. Whether Providence is the cause of things definite and indefinite +according to the same, and after the same manner? Proclus answers +that to provide for is nothing else than to benefit; and that hence +every thing participates of that one good according to its own measure +and order, so that Providence retains its unity and liberty even in +things indefinite. In the same chapter also he proves that divinity +provides for things contingent and indefinite, that they may not be as +it were super-adventitious in the universe. For, says he, if the Gods +are willing and able to provide definitely for things indefinite, as +being the authors of them, they will entirely provide for them, and +providing will know the desert of the subjects of their providential +energy. And the Gods indeed, with an exempt transcendency, extend their +providence to all things, but dæmons dividing their superessential +subsistence, receive the guardianship of different herds of animals, +distributing the providence of the Gods, as Plato says, as far as to +the most ultimate division. Hence some of them preside over men, others +over lions, or other animals, and others over plants; and still more +partially, some are the inspective guardians of the eye, others of the +heart, and others of the liver. All things, however, are full of Gods, +some of whom exert their providential energies immediately, but others +through dæmons as media; not that the Gods are incapable of being +present to all things, but that ultimate are of themselves incapable of +participating first natures. + + +4. How the participations of the Gods are effected, or how the Gods +energize providentially on inferior natures? Proclus answers that the +participations are according to the aptitude of the participants; +viz. they subsist rationally in rational, but intellectually in +intellectual natures, and imaginably and sensibly in those beings that +live according to imagination and sense. And they subsist essentially +and through being alone, in those things which are without life. +Hence, Providence being established above all beings, according to +divine union itself, and energizing according to one energy adapted +to _the one_, every thing which accedes to it participates of +it according to its natural adaptation. With respect to the failure +of the oracles he says, that the energy of divinity remaining always +the same, places or men become unadapted to its participation, just +as if a certain statue always remaining the same, a mirror should at +one time exhibit a fulgid image of it, but at another, an obscure or +debile, or indeed no image of it at all. He adds, If, therefore, it +should be said that oracles sometimes participate of the Gods who +are the sources of divination, but at other times fail, becoming +inefficacious, and as it were without spirit, for a certain period, the +causes of this irregularity must be referred to the vapours that are +the instruments of inspiration failing, through an inability of always +being the participants of divine influence. For the oracles are true +which give completion to the phænomena, and angels, dæmons and heroes +are veracious, which the Gods and the perpetually existing allotments +in the universe illuminate, though certain waters and openings of the +earth cannot always participate of them, on account of their unstable +nature. Or if it should be said, that the powers of sacred rites, +sometimes entering into statues, causing them to be vitalized, and +filling them with divine inspiration, fail in certain periods of time, +the failure of these also, I should think it proper to refer to the +recipients, and not to any variation of the energy of the Gods that +inspire them. For neither do we dare to accuse the sun as the cause of +the eclipse of the moon, but the conical shadow of the earth into which +the moon falls. + + +5. Whence and why evil subsists, since there is Providence? Proclus +answers, that there are two kinds of evils, one in bodies, contrary +to nature; the other in souls, contrary to reason. The kingdom of +Providence, however, says he, is molested by neither of them; but +to the former of these evils, the end is good, and the variety and +perfection of the universe. For every thing which is preternatural +takes place, in order that something which is according to nature may +be effected, but not vice versa. And with respect to the latter of +these evils, between beings more perfect than we are, and brutes, it is +necessary that souls should intervene as a medium, which are endued +with reason, anger and desire, and rejoice in freedom of will. + + +6. If Providence is, why are good men oppressed with evil, but bad +men triumph? Proclus answers, that notwithstanding this, virtue and +the matter of virtue are not wanting to the good; and also, that this +praise is peculiar to them, that they had rather cultivate naked +Virtue, than Vice with all her abundance. That it is not an evil to +be deprived of the incentives to evil; that some have even earnestly +desired adverse fortune; and that wise men have always borne it with +fortitude. Nor is it expedient that wise men should at one and the same +time abound with every kind of good. For it is necessary that they +should have a certain experience of the evils of the present life, by +which the soul being excited, desires a transition from hence to that +place which is beyond the reach of evil. He adds, that many through +adversity have arrived at greater attainments in virtue; and that in +short, those things only are evil which we ourselves perpetrate, and +not those which we suffer [from an external cause]. That all bad men +are without glory, and without honour, though they should be surrounded +by thousands of flatterers. To the question which he adjoins to +this, why Providence distributes equal to unequal things, according +to arithmetical, and not according to geometrical equality, as when +a whole city perishes, there is a similar destruction of dissimilar +men, viz. of the good and the bad, he answers as follows. In the first +place, indeed, they do not suffer this similitude of punishment so far +as they are dissimilar, but so far as they are similar; in consequence +of voluntarily inhabiting the same city, or entering the same ship, and +fighting together, or mutually suffering any thing else of the same +species; and so according to the energy of that species, they suffer +a certain something which is the same. So far, however, as they are +better and worse, they participate differently of the common calamity; +since the latter perish, bearing it impatiently, but the former +enduring it mildly. And after a separation from the present life, the +place destined to be the habitation of more excellent beings receives +the former, but the abode of subordinate beings receives the latter. +Proclus afterwards adds, that there is a certain order and a period +of common fate, terminating from different principles in the same end, +and a concurrence of progressions, where the less principal parts are +compelled from necessity to be co-passive, And that we are ignorant of +the true equalities of souls. + + +7. If Providence extends as far as to the lowest beings, whence is the +great inequality in the allotments of brutes, their mutual devorations, +and the like, derived? Proclus answers, that if there is any thing in +them of a self-motive nature, the cause of this must be investigated +from a higher source; but if they are only corporeal, it is of no +consequence if they suffer the same thing as a shadow all-variously +transformed, and are subject to Fate. + + +8. Why punishments do not immediately follow after crimes, but are +inflicted at length after the commission of them, and this sometimes +is very long after?[379] Proclus answers, that the implanted root of +wickedness (just as the earth bearing thorns, though the germes are +a thousand times cut off, still produces the like) renders the same +energies, in consequence of continuing inflexible by punishment. +Providence, therefore, waits for an appropriate time, not such as may +be pleasing to the vulgar, but such as it knows will contribute to the +health of souls, and instructs many by endurance. For, together with +the Gods, says Plato, Fortune and Time govern all things, whether it +be requisite that some good should be imparted, or that there should +be a purification from something contrary to good. In the next place, +vice is a punishment to itself, and the most grievous injury the soul +can sustain. Precipitate anger also is not a good dispensator of +punishments. Plato once, being about to chastize a slave, was seen +holding his hand in an elevated position for some time, and being +asked why he did so, said that he was punishing his own impetuous +anger. Archytas said to his servants in a field, who had not done +what he had ordered them to do, and expected to be punished for their +negligence, “It is well for you that I am angry.” And Theano said to +one of her servants, “If I were not angry I would chastize you.” Among +the Egyptians there was a law, that a pregnant woman who was judged +worthy of death, should not be put to death till she was delivered. +What wonder, therefore, is it that Providence should for a time +spare those who are deserving of death, but are able to perform not +trifling, but illustrious actions, till they have accomplished them? If +Themistocles had been immediately punished for what he did when he was +a young man, who would have delivered Athens from the Persian evils? +Who also would have explained the Pythian oracle? If Dionysius had +perished in the beginning of his tyranny, who would have freed Sicily, +which was thought to be irremediably lost, from the Chalcedonians? If +the punishment of Periander had not been deferred for a long time, +who would have freed the pleasant island of Leucadia, who would have +liberated Anaxorium from its adversaries?--To which may be added, +that the time of deferred punishment seems long to our feeble vision, +but is nothing to the eye of Providence, just as the place also in +which we live, and carry about these bodies is perfectly small for the +punishment of great offences; but there are many and indescribable +places of punishment in the infernal regions, and excessive torments +for the offenders that are there.--On account of the magnitude of the +punishment likewise, the whole of it is not inflicted at once. Souls +also are naturally adapted to feel remorse, which is the forerunner of +their greatest sufferings. For they say that Apollodorus the tyrant +saw himself in a dream scourged and boiled by certain persons, and his +heart exclaiming from the kettle, I am the cause of these thy torments. +But Ptolemy who was surnamed Thunder, thought in a dream that he was +called to judgment by Seleucus, and that vultures and wolves sat there +as his judges. Such are the preludes to the vicious of impending +punishment. + + +9. How the crimes of other persons, as for instance of parents or +potentates are punished in children and subjects? For that certain +persons are said to have suffered punishment for the crimes of their +ancestors, both revelations and the mysteries manifest, and certain +liberating Gods are said to purify from them. Proclus answers, that +a nation, or a family, or a city, must be considered as one body, and +that these have kindred powers that preside over them, so that such +crimes are not foreign, on account of this conjunction and similitude. +Why, therefore, should it be any longer paradoxical, that souls when +transferred into other bodies, should suffer punishment for the crimes +which they have committed in former bodies? + + +10. Since the providence of divinity knows all things and reduces them +to good, how are angels and demons, and if you are also willing, heroes +and souls that govern the world in conjunction with the Gods, said to +exert a providential energy? Proclus answers, that divinity provides +for _all things_ universally and totally, but the other powers +partially, subordinately, and for _certain things_ only. + +In order to supply as much as possible the loss of the entire treatise +of Proclus on this subject, the following admirable observations on +Providence, are added, translated from his Commentary On the Parmenides +of Plato; a work, which to the disgrace of Europe, is still only extant +in manuscript. + +“The Athenian guest in the Laws clearly evinces that there is a +providence, where his discourse shows that the Gods know, and possess a +power which governs, all things. But Parmenides, at the very beginning +of the discussion concerning Providence, evinces the absurdity of +doubting divine knowledge and dominion. For to assert that the +conclusion of this doubt is still _more dire_ than the former [i.e. +that divinity is not known by us] sufficiently shows that he rejects +the arguments which subvert providence. For it is dire to say that +divinity is not known by us who are rational and intellectual natures, +and who essentially possess something divine; but it is still more +dire to deprive divine natures of knowledge; since the former pertains +to those who do not convert themselves to divinity, but the latter to +those who impede the all-pervading goodness of the Gods. And the former +pertains to those who err respecting our essence, but the latter to +those who convert themselves erroneously about a divine cause. But the +expression _still more dire_ (δεινοτερον) is not used as signifying a +more strenuous doubt, in the same manner as we are accustomed to call +those _dire_ (δεινοι) who vanquish by the power of language, but as a +thing worthy of greater dread and caution to the intelligent. For it +divulses the union of things, and dissociates divinity apart from the +world. It also defines divine power as not pervading to all things, and +circumscribes intellectual knowledge as not all-perfect. It likewise +subverts all the fabrication of the universe, the order imparted to +the world from separate causes, and the goodness which fills all +things from one will, in a manner adapted to the nature of unity. Nor +less dire than any one of these is the confusion of piety. For what +communion is there between Gods and men, if the former are deprived +of the knowledge of our concerns? All supplications, therefore, of +divinity, all sacred institutions, all oaths adducing the Gods as a +witness, and the untaught conceptions implanted in our souls concerning +divinity, will perish. What gift also will be left of the Gods to +men, if they do not previously comprehend in themselves the desert of +the recipients, if they do not possess a knowledge of all that we do, +of all we suffer, and of all that we think, though we do not carry +it into effect? With great propriety, therefore, are such assertions +called dire. For if it is unholy to change any legitimately divine +institutions, how can such an innovation as this be unattended with +dread? But that Plato rejects this hypothesis which makes divinity to +be ignorant of our concerns, is evident from these things, since it is +one of his dogmas, that divinity knows and produces all things. Since, +however, some of those posterior to him have vehemently endeavoured to +subvert such-like assertions, let us speak concerning them as much as +may be sufficient for our present purpose. + +Some of those then posterior to Plato, on seeing the unstable +condition of sublunary things, were fearful that they were not under +the direction of Providence and a divine nature; for such events +as are said to take place through fortune, the apparent inequality +respecting lives, and the disordered motion of material natures, +induced them greatly to suspect that they were not under the government +of Providence. Besides, the persuasion that Divinity is not busily +employed in the evolution of all-various reasons, and that he does not +depart from his own blessedness, induced them to frame an hypothesis +so lawless and dire. For they were of opinion that the passion of +our soul and the perturbation which it sustains by descending to +the government of bodies, must happen to divinity, if he converted +himself to the providential inspection of things. Farther still, from +considering that different objects of knowledge are known by different +gnostic powers; as for instance, sensibles by sense, objects of +opinion by opinion, things scientific by science, and intelligibles +by intellect; and, at the same time, neither placing sense, nor +opinion, nor science in divinity, but only an intellect immaterial and +pure;--hence they asserted that divinity had no knowledge of any other +things, than the objects of intellect. [And this was the opinion of the +more early Peripatetics.] For say they, if matter is external to him, +it is necessary that he should be pure from apprehensions which are +converted to matter; but being purified from these, it follows that he +must have no knowledge of material natures. Hence the patrons of this +doctrine deprived him of a knowledge of, and providential exertions +about sensibles; not through any imbecility of nature, but through a +transcendency of gnostic energy; just as those whose eyes are filled +with light, are said to be incapable of perceiving mundane objects, at +the same time that this incapacity is nothing more than transcendency +of vision. They likewise add, that there are many things which it +is beautiful not to know. Thus to the entheastic, (or those who are +divinely inspired) it is beautiful to be ignorant of whatever would +destroy the deific energy; and to the scientific, not to know that +which would defile the indubitable perception of science. + +But others [as the Stoics], ascribe indeed to divinity a knowledge of +sensibles, in order that they may not take away his providence, but +at the same time convert his apprehension to that which is external, +represent him as pervading through the whole of a sensible nature, as +passing into contact with the objects of his government, impelling +every thing, and being locally present with all things; for say they, +he would not otherwise be able to extend a providential energy in +a becoming manner, and impart good to every thing according to its +desert. + +Others again affirm that divinity has a knowledge of himself, but +that he has no occasion to understand sensibles in order to provide +for them, since by his very essence he produced all things, and +adorns whatever he has produced, without having any knowledge of his +productions. They add, that this is by no means wonderful, since +nature operates without knowledge, and unattended with phantasy; but +that divinity differs from nature in this, that he has a knowledge of +himself, though not of the things which are fabricated by him. And such +are the assertions of those who were persuaded that divinity is not +separated from mundane natures, and of those who deprived him of the +knowledge of inferior concerns, and of a knowledge operating in union +with providence. + +With respect to these philosophers, we say, that they speak truly, and +yet not truly, on this subject. For if providence has a subsistence, +neither can there be any thing disordered, nor can divinity be busily +employed, nor can he know sensibles through passive sense: but these +philosophers in consequence of not knowing the exempt power and +uniform knowledge of divinity, appear to deviate from the truth. For +thus we interrogate them: does not every thing energize in a becoming +manner when it energizes according to its own power and nature? as for +instance, does not nature, in conformity to the order of its essence, +energize physically, intellect intellectually, and soul psychically, or +according to the nature of soul? And when the same thing is generated +by many and different causes, does not each of these produce according +to its own power, and not according to the nature of the thing +produced? Or shall we say, that each produces after the same manner, +and that, for example, the sun and man generate man, according to the +same mode of operation, and not according to the natural ability of +each, viz. the one partially, imperfectly, and with a busy energy, but +the other without anxious attention, by its very essence, and totally? +But to assert this would be absurd; for a divine operates in a manner +very different from a mortal nature. + +If therefore, every thing which energizes, energizes according to its +own nature and order, some things divinely and supernaturally, others +naturally, and others in a different manner, it is evident that every +gnostic being knows according to its own nature, and that it does +not follow that because the thing known is one and the same, on this +account, the natures which know, energize in conformity to the essence +of the things known. Thus sense, opinion and our intellect, know that +which is white, but not in the same manner: for sense cannot know what +the essence is of a thing white, nor can opinion obtain a knowledge +of its proper objects in the same manner as intellect; since opinion +knows only _that_ a thing is, but intellect knows the cause of +its existence. _Knowledge therefore subsists according to the nature +of that which knows, and not according to the nature of that which is +known._ What wonder is it then that Divinity should know all things +in such a manner as is accommodated to his nature, viz. divisible +things indivisibly, things multiplied, uniformly, things generated, +according to an eternal intelligence, totally, such things as are +partial; and that with a knowledge of this kind, he should possess a +power productive of all things, or, in other words, that by knowing all +things with simple and united intellections, he should impart to every +thing being, and a progression into being? For the auditory sense knows +audibles in a manner different from the common sense; and prior to, +and different from these, reason knows audibles, together with other +particulars which sense is not able to apprehend. And again, of desire +which tends to one thing, of anger which aspires after another thing, +and of _proairesis_, or deliberate choice, there is one particular +life moving the soul towards all these, which are mutually motive of +each other. It is through this life that we say, I desire, I am angry, +and I deliberately choose this thing or that; for this life verges +to all these powers, and lives in conjunction with them, as being a +power which is impelled to every object of desire. But prior both to +reason and this one life, is _the one_ of the soul, which often +says, I perceive, I reason, I desire, and I deliberate, which follows +all these energies and energizes together with them or we should not +be able to know all these, and to apprehend in what they differ from +each other, unless we contained a certain indivisible nature, which +has a subsistence above the common sense, and which prior to opinion, +desire and will, knows all that these know and desire, according to an +indivisible mode of apprehension. + +If this be the case, it is by no means proper to disbelieve in the +indivisible knowledge of divinity, which knows sensibles without +possessing sense, and divisible natures without possessing a divisible +energy, and which without being present to things in place, knows them +prior to all local presence, and imparts to every thing that which +every thing is capable of receiving. The unstable essence therefore, of +apparent natures is not known by him in an unstable, but in a definite +manner; nor does he know that which is subject to all-various mutations +dubiously, but in a manner perpetually the same; for by knowing +himself, he knows every thing of which he is the cause, possessing a +knowledge transcendently more accurate than that which is co-ordinate +to the objects of knowledge; since a causal knowledge of every thing is +superior to every other kind of knowledge. Divinity therefore, knows +without busily attending to the objects of his intellection, because +he abides in himself, and by alone knowing himself, knows all things. +Nor is he indigent of sense, or opinion, or science, in order to know +sensible natures: for it is himself that produces all these, and that +in the unfathomable depths of the intellection of himself, comprehends +an united knowledge of them, according to cause, and in one simplicity +of perception. Just as if some one having built a ship, should place +in it men of his own formation, and, in consequence of possessing a +various art, should add a sea to the ship, produce certain winds, and +afterwards launch the ship into the new created main. Let us suppose +too, that he causes these to have an existence by merely conceiving +them to exist, so that by imagining all this to take place, he gives +an external subsistence to his inward phantasms, it is evident that in +this case he will contain the cause of every thing which happens to the +ship through the winds on the sea, and that by contemplating his own +conceptions, without being indigent of outward conversion, he will at +the same time both fabricate and know these external particulars. Thus, +and in a far greater degree, that divine intellect the artificer of +the universe, possessing the causes of things, both gives subsistence +to, and contemplates, whatever the universe contains without departing +from the speculation of himself. But if with respect to intellect one +kind is more partial, and another more total, it is evident that there +is not the same intellectual perfection of all things, but that where +intelligibles have a total and undistributed subsistence, there the +knowledge is more total and indivisible, and where the number of forms +proceeds into multitude and extension, there the knowledge is both one +and multiform. Hence, this being admitted, we cannot wonder on hearing +the Orphic verses, in which the theologist says: + + Αυτη δε Ζηνος και εν ομμασι πατρος ανακτος + Ναιουσ’ αθανατοι τε θεοι, θνητοι τ’ ανθρωποι, + Οσσα τε ην γεγαωσα, και υστερον οσσα εμελλον. + +i.e. + + There in the sight of Jove, the parent king, + Th’ immortal gods and mortal men reside, + With all that ever was, and shall hereafter be. + +For the artificer of the universe is full of intelligibles, and +possesses the causes of all things separated from each other; so +that he generates men, and all other things, according to their +characteristic peculiarities, and not so far as each is divine, in +the same manner as the divinity prior to him, the intelligible father +Phanes.” + +The admirable dogma in this most beautiful extract, “that knowledge +subsists according to the nature of that which knows, and not according +to the nature of that which is known,” was originally derived +from Iamblichus, as is evident from the commentary of Ammonius on +Aristotle’s treatise On Interpretation. (See note to p. 162 of my +translation of the Organon.) Boethius in the 5th book of his treatise +De Consolatione, elegantly illustrates this dogma. The passage I allude +to begins with the words: “Omne enim quod cognoscitur, non secundum +sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem.” +The sources however from whence he derived this doctrine, appear to +have been unknown to all his editors and commentators; for they are not +noticed by any of them. + + + + + EXTRACTS + + FROM THE + + TREATISE OF PROCLUS + + ON THE + + SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL. + + +In this treatise Proclus inquires, first, Whether there is such a thing +as evil? secondly, If there is, whether it is in intellectual natures? +thirdly, If evil is in sensibles, whether it subsists according to +a principal cause? fourthly, If it does not subsist according to +a principal cause, whether any essence must be assigned to it, or +whether it must be admitted to be perfectly unessential, and without +hypostasis? fifthly, And if this be the case, how does it subsist, +another principle existing, and whence does it originate, and how far +does it proceed? And farther, still, sixthly, how, since Providence +exists, does evil subsist, and whence is it derived? If the father of +the universe not only produced the nature of good, but was also willing +that there should be nothing evil any where, by what contrivance or +art does evil subsist, which the Demiurgus did not wish to subsist? +For it is not lawful to assert that he was willing some things should +subsist, but produced others, since in divine natures _to be willing_, +and _to produce_ are simultaneous and conjoined. Hence evil is not +only a thing contrary to the will of divinity, but is also without +hypostasis, divinity not only not producing it (for this it is not even +lawful to suppose) but not suffering it to subsist. Proclus answers, +that physical evil, viz. the evil which is corruptive of the essence, +power and energy of a thing, is not evil but good, because it subsists +on account of good, and because generation is from corruption, of +which two the world consists, and by which the order of the universe +is adorned. There is not, however, such a thing as unmingled evil, and +evil itself, or an eternal idea, form and essence of evil, but moral +evil is mixed with good, and so far as it is good, it subsists from +divinity, but so far as evil, it is derived from another cause which is +impotent. For evil is nothing else than a greater or less declination, +departure, defect and privation from _the good itself_, and which is +good alone, in the same manner as darkness from the sun. It is the +debility and absence of power in energizing, but is not power. And that +which is evil to partial natures, is not evil to the universe. + + +2. Evil is not in the Gods, nor in the triple government of the better +genera, viz. it is neither in angels; (for how could we call them +messengers and elucidators of the Gods, if evil of any kind was in +them who are the images of the divinities, and who dwelling in the +vestibules of deity participate of its goodness?) nor in dæmons, nor +in heroes. If divinity produced evil, he either produced it contrary +to his nature, or every thing thence subsisting will be boniform, and +the progeny of the goodness that abides in him. But as it is said, it +is not the property of fire to impart cold, nor of good to produce +evil from itself. Either, therefore, it must be said that evil is not, +if it is necessary to its existence that it should be produced by +divinity, or that it is, and does not originate from deity. Against +those who assert that evil is primarily in dæmons, he observes as +follows: There are certain persons who attribute passions to dæmons, +and say that some of their passions are according to nature as when +they tragically speak of their deaths, and different generations; but +that others are from choice only, as when they denominate certain +dæmons base and evil, who, they also say, defile souls, lead them to +matter, and draw them down from their journey to the heavens to the +subterranean region. It is necessary, however, to ask these persons, +whether are the dæmons, which you say are evil, such to themselves [or +in their own nature,] or not to themselves, but to others? For if they +are evil to themselves, one of two things must follow, either that +they must remain in evil for ever, or that they must be susceptive of +transmutation. And if indeed they are always evil, how can that which +subsists from the Gods be perpetually evil? For it is better not to +be at all, than to be always evil. But if they are transmuted, they +are not essentially evil, but are evil from habitude, in which there +is the better and the worse, and another species of life. Dæmons, +however, are always in the ratio of dæmons, and each of them is always +in its own order. But if they are indeed good to themselves, but evil +to others whom they lead into a worse condition, it is just as if some +one should call teachers depraved, and certain pedagogues, who ranking +as the chastisers of offences, do not suffer the offenders to pursue +a better order in a fluctuating manner, instead of an order which is +adapted to them. Or as if some one should denominate those [officers] +evil, who standing before things of a sacred nature [in temples] keep +the impure from entering into the sanctuary, because they prohibit them +from the participation of the interior rites. Hence, it is not evil to +perform this office, but to be of such an order, and to deserve such a +prohibition.[380] If, therefore, of the dæmons that are in the world, +some lead souls upward, but others keep such in their own manners, as +are not yet able to ascend, we cannot justly call either of them evil, +neither those that separate from nor those that detain souls [in a +corporeal life.] For it is necessary that there should also be those +dæmons who coerce the soul that is defiled with vice, and is unworthy +of a progression into the heavens, in the place which surrounds the +earth. Neither, therefore, in these, does reason appear to discover +evil. For whatever they do, they perform according to their own nature, +and always after the same manner. But this is not evil. + + +3. Evil in souls is a debility of not always and uniformly adhering +to better natures, and to good. Hence arises their descent to things +subordinate, their oblivion, their malefic inclination to things +conversant with body, and their discord with reason. According to +some, matter is that which is primarily evil, and evil itself, and the +debility of souls arises from their lapse into matter. This Proclus +denies, and says that both body and matter originate from deity, and +that both are the progeny of divinity. He adds, that matter is the +first indefinite, and that essential infinity, in the same manner as a +mixed body, depends on one cause, divinity. That souls sinned before +they were thrust into matter. That there are not two principles [matter +and deity.] And that matter is neither good nor evil, but a thing +necessary, and distant in the last degree from _the good itself_. + + +4. Of good there is one eternal, definite, universal and producing +cause, viz. God; but of evils the causes are manifold and infinite, +some to souls, and others to bodies. They are also fluctuating, +indefinite, inordinate, and particular, surrounding the nature of souls +and bodies from necessity, and arising from impotency, incommensuration +void of design, anadaptation, debility, and the victory of a +subordinate nature. Good has an hypostasis, but evil a parhypostasis or +a deviation from hypostasis. Good is form, but evil is without form, +and is as it were privation. + + +5. Evil possesses its power of acting, and its capability from a +contrary good, which becomes debile and inefficacious on account of +the mixture of evil; and evil is allotted its efficacy and energy on +account of the presence of good, for both are in one. Thus in bodies, +that which is preternatural, debilitates that which is according to +nature, the energy, of nature being in this case dormant, and order, +in which good consists, being dissolved. Thus also in souls, evil when +it vanquishes good, uses its power, viz. the power of reason, to its +own purposes, and makes it subservient to desire. Each of these also +imparts something according to its own nature, viz. the one power, +but the other debility; because of itself evil is neither adapted to +act, nor to possess power; for all power is good, and all energy is +an extension of power. And this Plato knowing, says, that injustice +itself is of itself debile and inactive; but through the presence of +justice possesses its power, and is led forth into energy, not abiding +in its own nature. Nor does evil alone consist in a privation of +life, because being which subsists prior to life, gives also to evil +a participation of life. All life, however, is of itself power; but +evil subsisting in a foreign power is contrary to good, employing its +own power for the purpose of opposing good. And the more power indeed +is inherent in it, the greater are the energies and works of evil, and +the less it possesses of power, the less are its energies and works. +In bodies too as soon as the powers of nature cease, the preternatural +energy which is in them ceases also; and hence, all order is entirely +dissolved, that which is preternatural being more abundant. When the +soul, therefore, receives an increase from that which is contrary to +good, according to its base and formless nature, but is diminished +according to virtue and energy, then it becomes at the same time debile +and inefficacious. For the augmentation is not then from power, that +the transition might be to something greater; but it arises from the +presence of the contrary to power, just as if frigidity should use the +power of heat to the accomplishment of its own work, vanquishing and +subjecting its power. The soul, therefore, being deficient through the +absence of good, and possessing more of privation in proportion as +it has more of deficiency, becoming also more debile in its energies +through a diminution of virtue, is indeed more evil, but performs less. + +And how indeed could the increase since it is evil be from power, +if the work of all power is to preserve that in which it is, but +evil dissipates every thing of which it is the evil. Hence evil is +of itself inefficacious and impotent. If also, as Plato says, it is +involuntary, it will not be the object of the will. And thus it will be +a privation of the first triad of _the good_, viz. of _will_, _power_, +and _energy_. For good indeed, is the object of the will, and is in +its own nature powerful and efficacious; but evil is unwished for, +is debile and inefficacious. For that is not the object of the will +to any thing which is corruptive of it, nor does power wish for that +which may corrupt it, nor does energy wish not to have its hypostasis +according to power. But evil is desired in consequence of appearing +to be good; and we say that evil seems to be an object of the will, +on account of the mixture of good with it. Power, therefore, and +energy are apparently in evil, [but are not so in reality] because +they are not essentially inherent in it, nor so far as it is evil, +but they extrinsically accede to it, as that to which a parhypostasis +belongs. Hence, as it appears to me, this is what Socrates shows in the +Theætetus to those who are able to understand his meaning, viz. that +evil is neither privation, nor the contrary to good. For privation is +not able to effect any thing, nor does it in short possess any power; +nor does that which is contrary to good of itself possess either power +or energy. But he denominates evil in a certain respect _subcontrary_ +to good, because of itself indeed, or essentially, it is privation, +yet because it is not altogether perfect privation, but in a similar +manner with habit changes from capacity, it is from thence constituted +in energizing in the part of contrariety, and is neither perfect +privation, nor contrary, but subcontrary to good. + + +7. There are these three things which may debilitate, and in which +there is evil, viz. a partial soul; the image of soul in animals; and +body. The evil to body is to have a preternatural subsistence; the evil +to the image of soul is to be in a state of deviation from reason; +and the evil to soul [i.e. to the rational soul,] is to deviate from +intellect. The defect of life according to reason is the malady of +this life; but ignorance and a privation of intellect are baseness, +whether this takes place about the dianoetic or the doxastic power; +and if about the former it is a want of science, but if about the +latter, of art. Baseness, however, and malady, subsist in one way in +cognitions, and in another in impulses. For the irrational appetites +are hostile to the life which consists in action, and the many senses +and precipitate imaginations intervening in the contemplative energy +destroy its purity and immateriality. Hence unbecoming imaginations, or +evil consent and base choice arise, either from an external source and +in various actions, or internally according to anger and desire. That +also which is preternatural is twofold. For in the body, it is either +deformity, as in monsters, or malady, in consequence of the order and +commensuration of the body being dissolved, as in corruption, disease, +and pain. + + * * * * * + +In many persons meditated evil, and which abides occultly within the +soul, is benefited as being base and unbecoming. But when it subsists +in energy the quality of it becomes apparent. It is manifested, +however, by penitence and the consciousness of the soul. For the +medical art also, in the opening of ulcers, and leading forth +externally the inwardly concealed cause which produced the malady, +exhibits an image of the operations of Providence, which permits base +deeds and passions, in order that the perpetrators of them being +changed from the habit which they have acquired, and which is inflated +with evils, may assume the principle of a better period and life. But +whatever passions are within the soul, are attended with this good, +that they always lead the soul to a proper condition, her improper +choice being accompanied with punishment. Thus also the law which is in +souls leads each to its appropriate state, and to that desert which is +derived from Providence. + + +9. Evil cannot exist, if it is admitted that it is not contrary to +good, because all things, and even evil itself, are for the sake of +good. Divinity, therefore, is not the cause of evil. For evil, so far +as evil never originates from thence, but from other causes which +as we have said generate not according to power, but on account of +debility. Hence it appears to me that Plato[381] when he places all +things about the king of all, and says that all things are for his +sake, (even things which are not good appearing to be good, and in a +similar manner belonging to beings) calls him the cause of every thing +good, and not at once the cause of all things, for he is not the cause +of evil, but is the cause of every being, and of every thing so far as +it is good. If, therefore, we assert these things rightly, all things +will be from Providence, and evil will have a place among beings. Hence +also the Gods produce evil, but they produce it as good; and they know, +as possessing a unical knowledge of all things, partibles impartibly, +evils according to the form of good, and multitude according to the +form of _the one_. For there is one knowledge of soul, another of +an intellectual nature, and another of the Gods themselves. For the +first of these indeed, is a self-motive, the second, an eternal, and +the third an indivisible and unical knowledge, knowing and producing +all things by _the one_. + + * * * * * + +For the further information of the reader on this most important +subject, the Subsistence of Evil, the following admirable extract is +added, from the Commentaries of Proclus On the Timæus, (p. 112.) The +Comment is on these words, “Divinity being willing that all things +should be good, and that as much as possible nothing should be evil;” +and is as follows: + +“The divine fabrication and intellectual production, proceeds from +things impartible to such as are partible, from the united to the +multiplied, and from things without interval to corporeal masses +that are every way distended with interval. This also the discourse +about it adumbrating, in the first place, _enunciatively_ celebrates +the final cause, afterwards _discursively_, and in the third place, +delivers _in an evolved manner_, the whole orderly distribution and +progression from it. For the words “he was good,” _uniformly_ indeed +comprehend every thing final, and the most divine of causes. But +the words, “In that which is good, envy is never inherent about any +thing; and being without this, he was willing that all things should +be generated as much as possible similar to himself,” effect this +_discursively_.[382] For after the one will of intellect, he introduces +the divided contemplation of it. And in the present words, he delivers +to us the intelligence of divinity now proceeding into all multitude +and interval, _evolving_ every demiurgic providence, and all the +parts of fabrication. Moreover, the third of these is in continuity +with the second, and the second with the first. For since the first +particle was, “he was good,” on this account the second begins from the +good, but proceeds as far as to the will of the father. But the third +beginning from will, delivers the whole of his providential energy. For +if he was good, he was willing to make all things good. But if he was +willing, he made them to be so, and led the universe into order. For +providence indeed, is suspended from will, but will from goodness. And +thus much concerning the order and connexion of the words. + +Let us however consider what this will is, in order that we may +understand how it is conjoined with goodness. Superessential union +itself therefore, and which is of itself exempt from beings, is indeed +one, ineffable, and indefinite, having the uncircumscribed, and the +incomprehensible in _the one itself_. If therefore, it be requisite to +survey in this, the above mentioned uniform triad, _goodness_ indeed +has the precedency, but _will_ is the second, and _providence_ is the +third; goodness indeed, producing the perfect, the sufficient, and +the desirable; but will exhibiting exuberant plenitude, the extended, +and the generative; and providence imparting the efficacious, the +perfective, and the undefiled. According to this ineffable and united +hyparxis of the triad, the intelligible also is triply divided into +essence, power, and energy; essence indeed, being firmly established +in it, and being self-perfect; but power having a never-failing and +infinite progression; and energy being allotted perfection, and +essential production. And again, intellect after the same manner is +triply divided, into being, life, and the intellectual. For the first +of these indeed, is the supplier of its existence, the second of its +life, and the third, of its gnostic power. After these also, soul is +divided, into that which is the object of science, into science, and +into that which is scientific. For the first of these is that which is +known, the second is knowledge, and the third is that which derives +its completion from both these. These triads therefore being four, as +goodness is to will, so is essence to power, being to life, and the +object of science to science. And as will is to providence, so is power +to energy, life to intellect, and science to that which is scientific. +For essence, being, and the object of science, have an order analogous +to goodness. For the connective, the stable, the uniform, and the +perfective, pertain to goodness. But power, life, and science, are +analogous to will. For the self-begotten, and that which comprehends +and measures all things, belong to will. And energy, intellect, and +that which is scientific, pertain to providence. For the efficacious, +and that which proceeds through and antecedently comprehends all +things, are the resemblances of divine providence. Since therefore, the +demiurgus also is a God, and an imparticipable intellect, so far as he +is a God indeed, he possesses goodness, will, and providence; but as +intelligible, he has essence, power, and energy; and as intellect, he +is, and has life, and a knowledge of wholes. The monad also which he +possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much concerning will. + +Consequent to this, it remains to enquire how the demiurgus wished all +things to be good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it +may be said, if he was willing that this should be the case, it would +be requisite that the progression of things should stop at the Gods +and undefiled essences. If however, he not only fabricated these, but +also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thing material, he was +not willing that all things should be good. For he was not willing that +better natures should exist, but also fabricated such as are worse. +If he had been willing therefore, that all things should be good, he +would have stopped his fabrication at the Gods. We reply however, +that if the progression of things was only as far as to the Gods, all +things would not be good. For first natures being allotted the last +order, the good would be destroyed; since being able and willing to +generate through their goodness, yet in consequence of an arrangement +as the last of things, they would become unprolific and not good. Our +opponents therefore say, if all things are good, the progression is as +far as to the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends +only as far as to the Gods, all things are not good. For if a divine +nature is unprolific how is it good? But it will be unprolific, if it +is the last of things. For every thing which generates is better than +that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not existing, +that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there be +the Gods therefore, and let them have the first order. But after the +Gods, let there be a progression[383] as far as to matter itself; and +let us give a transition to all beings, from the first to the last of +things. And neither let there be any thing wanting even of the last +of beings, nor any vacuum. For what vacuum can there be, when things +characterized by _itself_[384] have the first subsistence, those +that rank as the second proceed from these, those of the third order, +proceed from these and others, those in the fourth rank, are generated +from things characterized by the term _another_, and those in the +fifth rank being _others_ only; and on each side of these those +natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar?[385] Such therefore, +being the continuity in things, what can be deficient? Immoveable +natures being first established, self-motive natures having the second, +and alter-motive natures the third rank, all of which are the last of +things. For all beings derive their completion from the above-mentioned +orders. In short, the production of things may be shown to be continued +in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak, analogy subsisting +from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the +well-ordered progression of all beings from _the one_. + +Let therefore, all these things be acknowledged, and let the generation +of beings be extended as far as to nothing; but whether is there +nothing evil in these, or shall we admit that there is in a certain +respect, and that there is what is called depravity in bodies, and in +souls? For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil entirely; +but others have been induced to deny a providence, in consequence of +believing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are good. +For if indeed divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he +be good? For it is the province of that which is essentially good to +benefit every thing, just as it is of that which is essentially hot, to +give heat. But it is not lawful for _the good_ to effect any thing +else than what is good. And if divinity was not[386] willing there +should be evil, how can it have a subsistence? For something will exist +contrary to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the +doubt. + +We must say however, conformably to the doctrine of Plato according to +our preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respect to things +subsists in a different manner from that of ours. And again, that the +habitude of things with reference to deity is different from their +habitude with reference to us. For wholes have a relation to parts +different from that of parts to each other. To divinity therefore +nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. For +he uses these also to a good purpose. But again, to partial natures +there is a certain evil, these being naturally adapted to suffer by +it. And the same thing is to a part indeed evil, but to the universe +and to wholes is not evil, but good. For so far as it is a being, and +so far as it participates of a certain order, it is good. For this +thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute of +all good, you will make it to be beyond even that which in no respect +whatever is. For as _the good itself_ is prior to being, so evil +itself is posterior to the nothingness of non-entity. For that which is +most distant from the good is evil, and not that which has no kind of +subsistence.[387] If therefore, that which in no respect whatever is, +has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is +much more impossible that there should be such a thing as evil itself. + +If however, that which is entirely evil has no subsistence, but evil +is complicated with good, you give it a place among beings, and you +make it good to other things. And indeed, how is it possible it should +not, if it ranks among beings? For that which participates of being, +participates also of unity, and that which participates of unity, +participates likewise of good. Hence evil if it is, participates +of good; because evil has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not +entirely deprived of order, and indefinite. Who therefore made it to be +such? Who imparted to it measure and order, and bound? It is evident +that it is the demiurgus, who rendered all things similar to himself. +For he filled both wholes and parts with good. But if he benefits +all things, and colours evil itself with good, there is nothing evil +according to the power of divinity and of recipients. For power is +twofold, one being that of divinity which benefits the depravity that +is so abundantly seen;[388] but the other being that of recipients, +which participate of the goodness of the demiurgus according to the +measure of their order [in the scale of beings]. In consequence +therefore of the demiurgus being willing that there should be nothing +evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as the cause +of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away +the fabrication of the world, subvert the prolific power of wholes, and +confound the nature of things first and last. + +That we assert these things however, conformably to the opinion of +Plato, may be easily seen from his writings. For in the Politicus, +he clearly says, “that the world obtained from[389] its maker all +beautiful things, but from its former habit, all such injustice and +evil, as are produced within the heavens.” For because there is +generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a +subsistence. And because the deformity of matter fills partial souls +with inelegance, through an association with it, on this account that +which is not conformable to reason is allotted a certain resemblance +of subsistence. At the same time however, all these particulars become +beautiful through the goodness of the maker of the universe. But in +the Republic, Plato assigns no other cause of good than God, and says +that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated; through +which he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from +divinity. For it is not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate, +nor of snow to heat, nor of that which is all-good to produce evil. And +he asserts that certain partial causes of these are to be admitted, +and such as are indefinite. For it is not in evils as in things that +are good, viz. that _the one_, and what is primarily good, precede +multitude; and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil. The +words _others_ therefore and _certain_, evince that the causes of evil +are partial and indefinite. But in the Theætetus he says “that it is +neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor for them to be in the +Gods, but that they revolve from necessity about the mortal nature, +and this place of our abode.” If therefore, evil revolves necessarily +in the mortal place, it will not be according to Plato, that which in +no respect whatever has a subsistence, and which is exempt from all +beings. So that according to him evil exists, is from partial causes, +and is benefited through the boniform providence of the demiurgus, +because there is nothing which is entirely evil, but every thing is in +a certain respect accomplished conformably to justice and divinity. + +For we may make the following division: Of all that the world contains, +some things are wholes, but others parts. And of parts, some eternally +preserve their own good, such as a partial intellect, and partial +dæmons, but others are not always able to preserve their proper good. +And of these, some are alter-motive, but others self-motive. And of +self-motive natures, some have evil established in their choice; but +in others, it terminates in actions. With respect to wholes therefore, +they are perfectly good, supplying not only themselves, but also parts +with good. Such things however, as are parts, and yet preserve their +own good, possess good secondarily and partially. But such as are +parts, and alter-motive, deriving their subsistence from other things, +are suspended from the providence of them, and are transmuted in a +becoming manner, as is the case with such bodies as are generated and +corrupted. For if it is necessary that there should be generation, it +is also necessary that there should be corruption. For generation +subsists according to mutation, and is a certain mutation. But if +there is corruption, it is necessary that the preternatural should be +secretly introduced. As therefore, that which is corrupted, is indeed +corrupted with reference to itself, but is not destroyed with reference +to the universe; for it is either air or water, or something else into +which it is changed; thus also that which is preternatural, is indeed +with respect to itself disordered, but with respect to the universe +has an orderly arrangement. For, if though it should be destroyed +and entirely deprived of order, it would not dissolve the order of +the universe, how is it possible that when having a preternatural +subsistence which is of itself nothing when deprived of all order, +it can destroy the whole arrangement of things? But again, partial +natures which are self-motive indeed, and whose energy is directed to +externals, cause that which is effected by their energy to be evil to +themselves, yet in a certain respect this also is good, and conformable +to divinity. For since impulses and actions are from choice, actions +follow elections according to justice, when he who chuses not only +deserves the retribution consequent to his choice, but that also which +follows from his conduct. And simply indeed, the action is not good, +but to him who chuses a certain thing, and is impelled in a certain +way, it is introduced according to justice; and is good to this +individual and this particular life. For of goods, some are good to all +things, others to such as differ according to species, and others to +individuals, so far as they are individuals. For hellebore is not good +to all men, nor to all bodies, nor yet to all diseased bodies, but it +is good to one who is diseased in a particular manner, and is salutary +from a certain principle. Whether therefore, the action is intemperate +or unjust, to those who perform it indeed it is good, so far as it is +conformable to justice, but simply it is not good, nor to those by whom +it is done, but is to them the greatest evil. And so far as it proceeds +from them and is directed to them, it is evil; but so far as it +proceeds from the universe to them, it is not evil. And so far as their +energy is directed to themselves, they destroy their life, becoming +actually depraved; but so far as they suffer from the universe, they +undergo the punishment of their choice; (just as it is said, that those +who deliberate about betraying a suppliant, subvert divinity); or they +suffer the punishment of their will. + +Let us however, direct our attention to what remains, viz. to such +partial natures as energize self-motively, and who stop their depravity +as far as to their choice. For they suffer the punishment of their +cogitation alone. For, as it is said, there is a certain punishment of +mere imagination, impulse and will; since the Gods govern us inwardly, +and as they reward beneficent choice, so likewise they punish the +contrary. But it may be said, how can choice itself have that which is +conformable to justice and divinity? May we not reply, because it is +necessary there should be an essence of this kind and a power of an +ambiguous nature, and which verges to different lives. If therefore +that which has dominion over choice is from divinity, choice also is +from divinity, and if this be the case, it is good. For the electing +soul alone, is transferred to another and another order. For all +choice either elevates the soul, or draws it downward [to an inferior +condition of being]. And if indeed the choice is from a depraved[390] +soul, it is evil; but if it transfers that which chuses to its proper +order, it is according to justice and good. For the choice itself +introduces punishment to the electing soul. Or rather, the choice +becomes punishment in him who chooses, causing the soul to apostatize +from good. For as a beneficent choice becomes truly the reward of +itself, so a depraved choice becomes its own punishment. For this is +the peculiarity of self-motive powers. Hence there is no evil, which +is not also in a certain respect good; but all things participate of +providence. + +If however, certain persons should ask on what account an +evil-producing cause had at first a subsistence, though it should not +rank among wholes, but is of a partial nature, to these it must be +said, that the progression of beings is continued, and that no vacuum +is left among them. Whether therefore, is it necessary that there +should not be every self-motive life? But we shall thus take away many +natures that are divine. Or shall we say it is necessary there should +be wholes that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should +be self-motive parts? But how is it possible they should be wholes, +if deprived of their proper parts?[391] And how will the continuity of +beings be preserved, if wholes and self-motive natures have a prior +existence, and also partial and alter-motive natures, but we entirely +destroy the intermediate natures, viz. such as are self-motive indeed, +but at the same time partial? And which through the partial form become +connected with habitude, but through the self-motive power, are at a +certain time liberated from habitude. It is necessary therefore, that +there should be this life also, which is a medium in beings, and the +bond of things which have as it were an arrangement contrary[392] to +each other. Evil however, is not on this account natural to the soul; +since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated +body has an essential tendency to disease; for it is essentially +corruptible; and yet disease is not according to nature. Hence disease +is indeed evil to the partial nature which is allotted to connect this +particular body, but is good to the wholeness of bodies. For it is +necessary that what is generated from other things, should be changed +into another thing. As therefore, to the nature which is in us, it is +good for the nutriment to be changed, in order to the preservation +of the animal; thus also to every nature it is good for a part to be +corrupted, in order that the wholes may be preserved, which are always +prior to parts. For if parts were generated from wholes, and the +things generated should remain, all things would be rapidly consumed, +in consequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For a continued +ablation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must +necessarily fail. But wholes not existing, either generation will be +stopped, or mutation to partial natures will be derived from other +things. Hence that which is evil to a partial nature is good to the +whole life of the world. + +Farther still therefore, resuming the enquiry after another manner +from the beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there +should be evil, or was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he +was willing indeed, considered as imparting being to all things. For +every thing in the universe which has any kind of being proceeds from +the demiurgic cause. But he was not willing, considered as producing +all things good. For he concealed evil in the use of good. And if you +are willing to argue physically, evil is produced _essentially_ +indeed from a partial soul, but _accidentally_ from divinity, so +far as it is evil, if it is admitted that divinity gave subsistence +to the soul. Evil also so far as it is essentially good, originates +from a divine cause, but accidentally from the soul. For so far as it +subsists according to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in the +Laws defines what punishment is, viz. that it appears to consume him +who suffers it, and resembles the opening of ulcers. And he who is +incapable[393] of being healed without a certain action, is incited +to the performance of it, in order that the soul being liberated from +her parturiency and stupid astonishment about that which is base, and +repenting of her own evils, may begin to be purified. For base and +unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely to those +that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, fill those that +perform them with repentance. And when indeed, they are the subjects +of meditation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased; but when +they have proceeded into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility, +but liberate the soul from the most disgraceful parturition. And some +indeed, exhibit this punishment according to the whole of their life; +but others according to partial energies. For he who does any thing +irrational, does it from choice, is impelled to that which is the +object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in +his imagination. + +In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures; for the whole +intellectual genus is free from all evil; nor in whole souls, or whole +bodies; for all wholes are exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and +always subsisting according to nature. It remains therefore, that it +must be in partial souls, or in partial bodies. But neither is it +in the essences of these; for all their essences are derived from +divinity; nor in their powers; for these subsist according to nature. +Hence it remains, that it must be in their energies. But with respect +to souls, it is neither in such as are rational; for all these aspire +after good; nor in such as are irrational; for these energize according +to nature. But it subsists in the privation of symmetry[394] of these +with reference to each other. And in bodies, it is neither in form; +for it wishes to rule over matter; nor in matter; for it aspires after +the supervening ornaments of form. But it consists in the privation +of symmetry between form and matter. From which also it is evident, +that every thing evil exists according to a _parhypostasis_, or +_resemblance of subsistence_, and that at the same time it is +coloured by good; so that all things are good through the will of +divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it +was not possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have +a shadowy subsistence, since it is necessary to the perfection of the +whole of things. And from what has been said, it is evident, that the +will of divinity is not vain. For all things are good with reference to +him, and there is not any being which is not vanquished by a portion +of good. Nor are the words, “_as much as possible_,” written +superfluously. For they do not signify an imperfect power, but that +power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an +abundance of good.” + + + THE END. + + + + + ADDITIONAL NOTES + + +VOL. I. P. 1. _Becoming unapparent to many._ It is a remarkable +historical fact, as I have observed in my History of the Restoration +of the Platonic Theology, that the philosophy of Plato was in a manner +lost for many centuries after the death of its great master. For its +depths were not penetrated prior to Plotinus, who lived about two +hundred and fifty years after the birth of Christ. + +P. 2. _Jamblichus and Theodorus._ Both these philosophers were the +disciples of Porphyry. For an account of the former, of whom the +Emperor Julian says, that he was posterior indeed in time to Plato, +but not in genius, see my History of the Restoration of the Platonic +Theology, annexed to my translation of Proclus on Euclid. + +P. 5. _Being likewise a partaker of the dialectic of Plato._ +The dialectic of Plato is very different from the dialectic which +is conversant with opinion, and is accurately investigated in the +Topics of Aristotle. For the business of this first of sciences, is +to employ definitions, divisions, analyzations, and demonstrations, +as primary sciences in the investigation of causes; imitating the +progression of beings from the first principle of things, and their +continual conversion to it, as the ultimate object of desire. “But +there are three energies, says Proclus (in MS. Comment. in Parmenid. +lib. 1.) of this most scientific method, the first of which is adapted +to youth, and is useful for the purpose of rousing their intellect, +which is, as it were, in a dormant state. For it is a true exercise of +the soul in the speculation of things, leading forth thro’ opposite +positions the essential impression of ideas which it contains, and +considering not only the divine path, as it were, which conducts to +truth, but exploring whether the deviations from it contain any thing +worthy of belief; and lastly, stimulating the all-various conceptions +of the soul. But the second energy takes place when intellect rests +from its former investigations, as becoming most familiar with the +speculation of beings, and beholds truth itself firmly established on +a pure and holy foundation. And this energy, according to Socrates, +by a progression through ideas, evolves the whole of an intelligible +nature, till it arrives at that which is first; and this by analyzing, +defining, demonstrating and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards, +till, having entirely investigated the nature of intelligibles, it +raises itself to a nature superior to beings. But the soul being +perfectly established in this nature, as in her paternal port, no +longer tends to a more excellent object of desire, as she has now +arrived at the end of her search. And you may say that what is +delivered in the Phædrus and Sophista is the employment of this energy, +giving a twofold division to some, and a fourfold to other operations +of the dialectic art. Hence it is assigned to such as philosophize +purely, and no longer require preparatory exercise, but nourish the +intellect of their soul in pure intellection. But the third energy +purifies from twofold ignorance, when its reasons are employed upon +men full of opinion; and this is spoken of in the Sophista.” So that +the dialectic energy is triple, either subsisting through opposite +arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falsehood. See +admirable specimens of this master science in the notes to my Plato, +Vol. 3. + +P. 13. _Devised wanderings, sections, battles, lacerations, rapes and +adulteries of the Gods._ See the fables in which these things are +asserted of the Gods admirably unfolded by Proclus in the Introduction +to the 2nd. and 3rd. books of the Republic of Plato, in Vol. 1. of my +Plato. + +P. 90. _And thus much concerning divine names._ In addition to what is +here said, Proclus admirably remarks on this subject as follows, in his +MS. Scholia On the Cratylus of Plato. + +Since, however, the present discourse is about divine names, it is +necessary to speak a little concerning them. And in the first place, +let us speak concerning the names which are occultly established in the +Gods themselves; since some of the ancients said that these originated +from the more excellent genera,[395] but that the Gods are established +beyond a signification of this kind; but others admitted that names are +in the Gods themselves, and in those Gods that are allotted the highest +order. + +The Gods, therefore, possess an hyparxis uniform and ineffable, a +power generative of wholes, and an intellect perfect and full of +conceptions; and they give subsistence to all things according to +this triad. Hence it is necessary that the participations of those +divinities who are of a more elevated order, and who are arranged +nearer to _the good_, should proceed triadically through all things to +which they give subsistence. It is also necessary that among these, +those participations should be more ineffable, which are defined +according to the _hyparxes_ of the first Gods; but that those should +be more apparent, and more divided, which are illuminated according to +the _intellect_ of exempt causes; and that those participations which +are between these, should be such as are the effluxions of _prolific +powers_. For the fathers of wholes giving subsistence to all things, +have disseminated in all things vestiges, and impressions of their own +triadic hypostasis; since nature also inserts in bodies an exciting +principle (εναυσμα) derived from her proper idiom through which she +moves bodies, and governs them as by a rudder. And the demiurgus has +established in the universe an image of his own monadic transcendency, +through which he governs the world, holding a rudder, as Plato says, +like a pilot. It is proper to think therefore, that these rudders +and this helm of the universe, in which the demiurgus being seated +orderly disposes the world, are nothing else than a symbol of the whole +fabrication of things, to us indeed difficult of comprehension, but +to the Gods themselves known and manifest. And why is it requisite to +speak concerning these things, since of the ineffable cause of all, +who is beyond intelligibles, there is an impression in every being, +and even as far as to the last of things, through which all things are +suspended from him, some more remotely, and others more near, according +to the clearness and obscurity of the impression which they contain. +This it is which moves all things to the desire of good, and imparts +to beings this inextinguishable love. And this impression is indeed +unknown: for it pervades as far as to things which are incapable of +knowledge. It is also more excellent than life; for it is present with +things inanimate: and has not an intellectual power; since it lies +in things destitute of intellectual energy. As nature therefore, the +demiurgic monad, and the father himself who is exempt from all things, +have disseminated in things posterior, impressions of their respective +peculiarities, and through these convert all things to themselves, in +like manner all the Gods impart to their progeny, symbols of their +cause, and through these establish all things in themselves, The +impressions, therefore, of the hyparxis of the higher order of Gods, +which are disseminated in secondary natures are ineffable and unknown, +and their efficacious and motive energy surpasses all intelligence. And +of this kind are the characters of light, through which the Gods unfold +themselves to their progeny; these characters subsisting unically in +the Gods themselves, but shining forth to the view in the genera more +excellent than man, and presenting themselves to us divisibly, and +accompanied with form. Hence the Gods[396] exhort “To understand the +fore-running form of light.” For subsisting on high without form, it +becomes invested with form through its progression; and there being +established occultly and uniformly, it becomes apparent to us through +motion, from the Gods themselves; possessing indeed an efficacious +energy, through a divine cause, but becoming figured, through the +essence by which it is received. + +Again, the impressions which are illuminated from powers, are in +a certain respect media between things ineffable and effable, and +pervade through all the middle genera. For it is not possible for the +primary gifts of the Gods to arrive to us, without the more excellent +genera (i.e. angels, dæmons and heroes) previously participating the +illuminations which thence proceed. But these illuminations subsisting +appropriately in each of their participants, and co-ordinately in all +things, unfold the powers that give them subsistence. Of this kind +are the symbols of the Gods, which are indeed uniform in the more +elevated orders, but multiform in those that are subordinate; and which +the theurgic art imitating exhibits through inarticulate evocations +(αδιαρθρωτων εκφωνησεων). + +The impressions which rank as the third in order, which pervade from +intellectual essences to all peculiarities, and proceed as far as to +us, are divine names, through which the Gods are invoked, and by which +they are celebrated, being unfolded into light by the Gods themselves, +and reverting to them, and producing to human knowledge as much of +the Gods as is apparent. For through these we are able to signify +something to each other, and to converse with ourselves about the Gods. +Different nations however, participate differently of these, as for +instance the Egyptians according to their native tongue, receiving +names of this kind from the Gods; but the Chaldeans and Indians in a +different manner, according to their proper tongue; and in a similar +manner the Greeks according to their dialect. Though a certain divinity +therefore may be called by the Greeks Briareus, but differently by the +Chaldeans, we must nevertheless admit that each of these names is the +progeny of the Gods, and that it signifies the same essence. But if +some names are more and others less efficacious, it is not wonderful; +since of things which are known to us, such as are dæmoniacal and +angelic are more efficacious; and in short of things denominated the +names of such as are nearer are more perfect than the names of those +that are more remote. + +Not every genus of the Gods however, can be denominated. For Parmenides +evinces that the God who is beyond all things is ineffable. “For, +says he, he can neither be denominated, nor spoken of.” And of the +intelligible Gods the first genera, which are conjoined with _the +one itself_, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and +ineffable. For that which is perfectly apparent and effable, cannot +be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable, but it is requisite that +the progression of intelligibles, should be terminated in this order; +in which there is the first effable,[397] and that which is called +by proper names. For the first forms are there, and the intellectual +nature of intelligibles there shines forth to the view. But all the +natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by +intelligence.[398] Hence the whole of the telestic art energizing +theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says, +that this is first called by a name by the other Gods: for the light +proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual +orders. But he thus speaks, + + μητιν σπερμα φεροντα θεων, κλυτον οντε φανητα, + πρωτογονον μακαρες καλεον κατα μακρον Ολυμπον. + +i.e., “Metis bearing the seed of the Gods, whom the Gods about lofty +Olympus call the illustrious Phanes Protogonus.” In the Gods however +nomination is united with intellectual conception, and both are present +with them through the participation of the light which the mighty +Phanes emits to all things. But in our soul these two are divided from +each other; and intellectual conception is one thing, and name another: +and the one has the order of an image, but the other of a paradigm. In +the middle genera there is indeed a separation, but there is also a +union of the intellective and onomastic energy. The transportive name +(διαπορθμιον ονομα) of _Iynxes_[399] (ιγγυων) which is said to sustain +all the fountains, appears to me to signify a thing of this kind. Such +also is the appellation _teletarchic_ (το τελεταρχικον) which some +one of the Gods[400] says, “leaps into the worlds, through the rapid +reproof of the father.” κοσμοις ενθρωσκειν κραιπνην δια πατρος ενιπην. +For all these things are occultly with the Gods, but are unfolded +according to second and third progressions, and to men that are allied +to the Gods. + +There is therefore a certain abiding name in the Gods, through which +the subordinate invoke the superior, as Orpheus says of Phanes, or +through which the superior denominate the subordinate, as Jupiter in +Plato gives names to the unapparent periods of souls.[401] For fathers +define the energies of their offspring, and the offspring know their +producing causes through the intellectual impressions which they bear. +Such then are the first names which are unfolded from the Gods and +which through the middle genera end in the rational essence. + +There are however other names of a second and third rank; and these +are such as partial souls have produced, at one time energizing +enthusiastically about the Gods, and at another time energizing +according to science; either conjoining their own intelligence with +divine light, and thence deriving perfection; or committing the +fabrication of names to the rational power. For thus artists, such as +geometricians, physicians and rhetoricians give names to the things +the peculiarities of which they understand. Thus too poets inspired by +Phœbus (των ποιητων οι φοιβοληπτοι) ascribe many names to the Gods, +and to human names give a division opposite to these; receiving the +former from enthusiastic energy and the latter from sense and opinion; +concerning which Socrates now says Homer indicates, referring some +names to the Gods and others to men. + +P. 138. _So that language when conversant with that which is ineffable, +being subverted about itself, has no cessation and opposes itself._ +Damascius likewise, in a wonderfully sublime manner speaks of the +immense principle of the universe, conformably to what is now said +by Proclus, in his excellent MS treatise περι αρχων, or “concerning +principles;” and the following is an epitome of what he says on this +subject. + +“Our soul prophesies that the principle which is beyond all things that +can in any respect be conceived, is unco-ordinated with all things. +Neither therefore, must it be called principle, nor cause, nor that +which is first, nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no +means therefore, must we celebrate it as all things, nor in short, +is it to be celebrated, nor recalled into memory. For whatever we +conceive or consider, is either something belonging to all things, or +is all things, though analyzing we should ascend to that which is most +simple, and which is the most comprehensive of all things, being as it +were, the ultimate circumference, not of beings, but of non-beings. +For of beings, that which has an united subsistence, and is perfectly +without separation, is the extremity, since every being is mingled +from elements which are either bound and infinity, or the progeny of +these. But _the one_ is simply the last boundary of _the many_. For +we cannot conceive any thing more simple than that which is perfectly +one; which if we denominate the principle and cause, the first, and +the most simple, these and all other things are there only according +to _the one_. But we not being able to contract our conceptions into +profound union, are divided about it, and predicate of _the one_ the +distributed multitude which is in ourselves; unless we despise these +appellations also, because _the many_ cannot be adapted to _the one_. +Hence it can neither be known nor named; for, if it could, it would in +this respect be _many_. Or, these things also will be contained in it, +according to _the one_. For the nature of _the one_ is all-receptive, +or rather all-producing, and there is not any thing whatever which +_the one_ is not. Hence all things are as it were evolved from it. It +is therefore, properly cause, and the first, the end and the last, the +defensive enclosure of all things, and the one nature of all things; +not that nature which is in things, and which proceeds from _the one_, +but that which is prior to them, which is the most impartible summit of +all things whatever, and the greatest comprehension of all things which +in any respect are said to have a being. + +But if _the one_ is the cause of all things, and is comprehensive of +all things, what ascent will there be for us beyond this also? For we +do not strive in vain, extending ourselves to that which is nothing. +For that which is not even _one_, _is_ not according to the most just +mode of speaking. Whence then do we conceive that there is something +beyond _the one_? For _the many_ require nothing else than _the one_. +And hence _the one_ alone is the cause of the _many_. Hence also _the +one_ is entirely cause, because it is necessary that the cause of +_the many_ should alone be _the one_. For it cannot be nothing; since +nothing is the cause of nothing. Nor can it be _the many_: for so +far as many they are unco-ordinated; and _the many_ will not be one +cause. But if there are many causes, they will not be the causes of +each other, through being unco-ordinated, and through a progression +in a circle, the same things being causes and the things caused. Each +therefore, will be the cause of itself, and thus there will be no cause +of the many. Hence it is necessary that _the one_ should be the cause +of _the many_, and which is also the cause of their co-ordination for +there is a certain conspiring co-ordination, and a union with each +other. + +If, therefore, some one thus doubting should say that _the one_ is a +sufficient principle, and should add as the summit that we have not +any conception or suspicion more simple than that of _the one_, and +should therefore ask how we can suspect any thing beyond the last +suspicion and conception we are able to frame;--if some one should +thus speak, we must pardon the doubt. For a speculation of this kind +is it seems inaccessible and immense: at the same time however, from +things more known to us we must extend the ineffable parturitions of +our soul, to the ineffable co-sensation of this sublime truth. For as +that which subsists without is in every respect more honourable than +that which subsists with habitude, and the unco-ordinated than the +co-ordinated, as the theoretic than the political life, and Saturn +for instance than Jupiter, being than forms, and _the one_ than _the +many_ of which _the one_ is the principle; so in short, that which +transcends every thing of this kind is more honourable than all causes +and principles, and is not to be considered as subsisting in any +co-arrangement and habitude; since _the one_ is naturally prior to +_the many_, that which is most simple to things more composite, and +that which is most comprehensive to the things which it comprehends. +So that if you are willing thus to speak, _the first_ is beyond all +such opposition, not only that which is in things co-ordinate, but +even that which takes place from its subsistence as the first. _The +one_ therefore, and the united are posterior to the first: for these +causally contain multitude as numerous[402] as that which is unfolded +from them. _The one_ however, is no less one, if indeed it is not more +so, because separate multitude is posterior to and not in it; and the +united is no less united because it contracted in one things separated +prior to separation. Each of these therefore, is all things, whether +according to co-ordination, or according to their own nature. But all +things cannot be things first, nor the principle. Nor yet one of them +alone, because this one will be at the same time all things, according +to _the one_: but we shall not yet have discovered that which is +beyond all things. To which we may also add, that _the one_ is the +summit of _the many_, as the cause of the things proceeding from it. +We may likewise say that we form a conception of _the one_ according +to a purified suspicion extended to that which is most simple and most +comprehensive. But that which is most venerable, must necessarily be +incomprehensible by all conceptions and suspicions; since also in +other things, that which always soars beyond our conceptions is more +honourable than that which is more obvious: so that what flies from +all our suspicions will be most honourable. But if this be the case +it is _nothing_. Let however nothing be twofold, one better than _the +one_, the other posterior to sensibles. If also, we strive in vain in +asserting these things, striving in vain is likewise twofold; the one +falling into the ineffable, the other into that which in no respect +whatever has any subsistence. For _this_ also is ineffable, as Plato +says, but according to the worse, but _that_ according to the better. +If too, we search for a certain advantage arising from it, this is the +most necessary advantage of all others, that all things thence proceed +as from an adytum, from the ineffable, and in an ineffable manner. For +neither do they proceed as _the one_ produces _the many_, nor as _the +united_ things _separated_, but as the ineffable similarly produces all +things, ineffably. But if in asserting these things concerning it, that +it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehensible, we subvert +what we say, it is proper to know that these are the names and words of +our parturitions, daring anxiously to explore it, and which standing +in the vestibules of the adytum, announce indeed nothing pertaining to +the ineffable, but signify the manner in which we are affected about +it, our doubts and disappointment; nor yet this clearly, but through +indications to such as are able to understand these investigations. We +also see that our parturitions suffer these things about _the one_, and +that in a similar manner they are solicitous and subverted. For _the +one_, says Plato, if it _is_, is not _the one_. But if it is not, no +assertion can be adapted to it: so that neither can there be a negation +of it, nor can any name be given to it; for neither is a name simple. +Nor is there any opinion nor science of it; for neither are these +simple. So that _the one_ is in every respect unknown and ineffable. + +What then? Shall we investigate something else beyond the ineffable? +Or, perhaps indeed, Plato leads us ineffably through _the one_ as a +medium, to the ineffable beyond _the one_, which is now the subject of +discussion; and this by an ablation of _the one_, in the same manner +as he leads us to _the one_ by an ablation of other things. For, that +he gives to _the one_ a certain position is evident from his Sophista, +where he demonstrates that it subsists prior to being, itself by +itself. But if, having ascended as far as to _the one_, he is silent, +this also is becoming in Plato to be perfectly silent, after the manner +of the ancients concerning things in every respect unspeakable; for +the discourse was indeed most dangerous, in consequence of falling on +idiotical ears. Indeed, when discoursing concerning that which in no +respect has any subsistence, he subverts his assertions, and is fearful +of falling into the sea of dissimilitude, or, rather of unsubsisting +void. But if demonstrations do not accord with _the one_, it is by no +means wonderful; for they are human and divisible, and more composite +than is fit. Indeed, they are not even adapted to being, since they are +formal, or rather, they are neither adapted to forms nor essences. Or, +is it not Plato himself, who in his Epistles[403] evinces that we have +nothing which is significant of form, no type nor name, nor discourse, +nor opinion, nor science? For it is intellect alone which can apprehend +ideas by its projecting energies, which we cannot possess while busily +engaged in discourse. If there fore we even energize intellectually, +since in this case our intellection is characterized by form, we shall +not accord with _the united_ and with being. And if at any time we are +able to project a contracted intelligence, even this is unadapted and +discordant with _the one_. If, also, we energize according to the most +profoundly united intelligence, and through this occultly perceive +_the one itself_, yet even this is expanded only as far as to _the +one_, if there is a knowledge of _the one_; for this we have not yet +determined. At the same time however, let us now apply ourselves to the +discussion of things of such great importance, through indications and +suspicions, being purified with respect to unusual conceptions, and led +through analogies and negations, despising what we possess with respect +to these, and advancing from things more ignoble with us to things more +honorable. + +Shall we therefore say, that the nature which we now investigate +as the first, is so perfectly ineffable, that it must not even be +admitted concerning it that it is thus ineffable; but that _the one_ is +ineffable, as flying from all composition of words and names, and all +distinction of that which is known from that which knows, and is to be +apprehended in a manner the most simple and comprehensive, and that it +is not one alone as the characteristic of one, but as _one all things_, +and _one prior to all things_, and not one which is something belonging +to all things? These indeed, are the parturitions of the soul, and are +thus purified with respect to _the simply one_, and that which is truly +the one cause of all things. But, in short, we thus form a conception +of _the one_ which we contain as the summit or flower of our essence, +as being more proximate and allied to us, and more prompt to such a +suspicion of that which nearly leaves all things behind it. But from +some particular thing which is made the subject of hypothesis, the +transition is easy to that which is simply supposed, though we should +in no respect accede to it, but being carried in that which is most +simple in us, should form a suspicion concerning that which is prior to +all things. _The one_ therefore, is thus effable, and thus ineffable, +but that which is beyond it is to be honoured in the most perfect +silence, and prior to this, by the most perfect ignorance[404] which +despises all knowledge. + +Let us therefore, now consider, in the second place, how it is said +to be perfectly unknown. For if this be true, how do we assert all +these things concerning it? For we do not elucidate by much discussion +about things of which we are ignorant. But if it is in reality +unco-ordinated with all things, and without habitude to all things, and +is nothing of all things, nor even _the one itself_, these very things +are the nature of it. Besides, with respect to its being unknown, we +either know that it is unknown, or we are ignorant of this. But if the +latter, how do we say that it is perfectly unknown? And if we know +this, in this respect therefore it is known. Or shall we say that +it is known, that the unknown is unknown? We cannot therefore deny +one thing of another, not knowing that which is the subject of the +negation; nor can we say that it is not this or that, when we can in +no respect reach it. How therefore can we deny of that of which we are +perfectly ignorant the things which we know? For this is just as if +some one who was blind from his birth should assert that heat is not in +colour. Or perhaps indeed, he also will justly say, that colour is not +hot. For he knows this by the touch; but he knows nothing of colour, +except that it is not tangible; for he knows that he does not know it. +Such a knowledge indeed, is not a knowledge of colour, but of his own +ignorance. And we also when we say that the first is unknown, do not +announce any thing of it, but we confess the manner in which we are +affected about it. For the non-perception of the blind man is not in +the colour, nor yet his blindness, but in him. The ignorance therefore +of that of which we are ignorant is in us. For the knowledge of that +which is known, is in him that knows, and not in the thing known. But +if knowledge is in that which is known being as it were the splendour +of it, so some one should say ignorance is in that which is unknown, +being as it were the darkness of it, or obscurity, according to which +it is unknown by, and is unapparent to all things,--he who says this is +ignorant, that as blindness is a privation, so likewise all ignorance, +and that as is the invisible, so that of which we are ignorant, and +which is unknown. In other things therefore, the privation of this +or that leaves something else. For that which is incorporeal, though +invisible, yet is intelligible; and that which is not intelligible +by a certain intelligence, leaves at the same time something else. +But if we take away every conception and suspicion, this also we must +say is perfectly unknown by us, about which we close every eye. Nor +must we assert any thing of it, as we do of the intelligible, that +it is not adapted to be seen by the eyes, or as we do of _the one_, +that it is not naturally adapted to be understood by an essential +and abundant intellection: for it imparts nothing by which it can be +apprehended, nothing which can lead to a suspicion of its nature. +For neither do we only say that it is unknown, that being something +else it may naturally possess the unknown, but we do not think fit to +predicate of it either _being_, or _the one_, or _all things_, or _the +principle of all things_, or in short, _any thing_. Neither therefore, +are these things the nature of it, viz. _the nothing, the being beyond +all things, supercausal subsistence, and the unco-ordinated with all +things_; but these are only ablations of things posterior to it. How, +therefore, do we speak concerning it? Shall we say, that knowing these +posterior things, we despise them with respect to the position, if +I may so speak, of that which is in every respect ineffable? For as +that which is beyond some particular knowledge is better than that +which is apprehended by such knowledge, so that which is beyond all +suspicion must necessarily be most venerable; not that it is known +to be so, but possessing the most venerable as in us, and as the +consequence of the manner in which we are affected about it. We also +call this a prodigy, from its being entirely incomprehensible by our +conceptions: for it is through analogy, if that which in a certain +respect is unknown, according to a more excellent subsistence, is +superior to that which is in every respect known. Hence that which is +in every respect unknown according to a more excellent subsistence, +must necessarily be acknowledged to be supreme, though it indeed has +neither the supreme, nor the most excellent, nor the most venerable: +for these things are our confessions about that, which entirely flies +from all our conceptions and suspicions. For by this very assertion, +that we can form no suspicion of it, we acknowledge that it is most +wonderful; since if we should suspect any thing concerning it, we must +also investigate something else prior to this suspicion, and either +proceed to infinity in our search, or stop at that which is perfectly +ineffable. Can we therefore, demonstrate any thing concerning it? And +is that demonstrable which we do not think fit to consider as a thing +whose subsistence we can even suspect? Or, when we assert these things, +do we not indeed demonstrate _concerning_ it, but not _it_? For neither +does it contain the demonstrable, nor any thing else. What then? Do +we not opine concerning it these things which we now assert? But if +there is an opinion of it, it is also the object of opinion. Or shall +we say we opine that it is not these things? For Aristotle also says +that there is true opinion. If therefore, the opinion is true, the +thing likewise is to which opinion being adapted becomes true. For, in +consequence of the thing subsisting, the opinion also is true. Though +indeed, how will that be true which is perfectly unknown? Or shall +we say this is true, that it is not these things, and that it is not +known? Is it therefore truly false, that it is these things, and that +it is known? Or shall we say that these things are to be referred to +privations, and to that which in a certain respect is not, in which +there may be a falling from the hypostasis of form? Just as we call +the absence of light darkness. For, light not existing, neither is +there any darkness. But to that which is never and in no respect being, +nothing among beings can, as Plato says, accede. Neither, therefore, +is it non-being, nor, in short, privation; and even the expression +_never in no respect_ (το μηδαμη μηδαμως) is incapable of signifying +its nature. For this expression is being, and _signification_ is +something belonging to beings. Likewise, though we should opine that +it is not in any respect, yet at the same time, since it thus becomes +the object of opinion, it belongs to beings. Hence, Plato very properly +calls that which never and in no respect is, ineffable and incapable +of being opined, and this according to the worse than the effable and +opinion, in the same manner as we say the supreme is according to that +which is better than these. What then, do we not think, and are we not +persuaded that the supreme thus subsists? Or, as we have often said, do +not these things express the manner in which we are affected about it? +But we possess in ourselves this opinion, which is therefore empty, as +is the opinion of a vacuum, and the infinite. As therefore, we form a +phantastic and fictitious opinion of these though they are not, as if +they were, just as we opine the sun to be no larger than a sphere whose +diameter is but a foot, though this is far from being the case;--so +if we opine any thing concerning that which never and in no respect +is, or concerning that of which we write these things, the opinion is +our own, and the vain attempt is in us, in apprehending which we think +that we apprehend the supreme. It is, however, nothing pertaining to +us, so much does it transcend our conceptions. How therefore, do we +demonstrate that there is such an ignorance in us concerning it? And +how do we say that it is unknown? We reply in one word, because we +always find that what is above knowledge is more honourable; so that +what is above all knowledge, if it were to be found, would be found +to be most honourable. But it is sufficient to the demonstration that +it cannot be found. We also say that it is above all things; because +if it were any thing known, it would rank among all things; and there +would be something common to it with all things, viz. the being known. +But there is one co-ordination of things in which there is something +common; so that in consequence of this, it will subsist together with +all things. Hence it is necessary that it should be unknown. + +In the third place, the unknown is inherent in beings as well as the +known, though they are relatively inherent at the same time. As, +therefore, we say that the same thing is relatively large and small, +so likewise we say, that a thing is known and unknown with reference +to different things. And as the same thing, by participating of the +two forms, the great and the small, is at the same time both great +and small, so that which at the same time participates of the known +and the unknown is both these. Thus, the intelligible is unknown to +sense, but is known to intellect. For the more excellent will not +be privation, the inferior at the same time being form; since every +absence, and a privation of this kind, is either in matter, or in soul; +but all things are present in intellect, and still more in a certain +respect in the intelligible. Unless indeed, we denominate privation +according to a more excellent subsistence, as we say that is not form +which is above form; and that is not being which is superessential; and +that is nothing which is truly unknown, according to a transcendency +which surpasses all things. If, therefore, _the one_ is the last known +of things which are in any respect whatever known or suspected, that +which is beyond _the one_ is primarily and perfectly unknown; which +also is so unknown, that neither has it an unknown nature, nor can we +accede to it as to the unknown, but it is even unknown to us whether +it is unknown. For there is an all-perfect ignorance about it, nor can +we know it, neither as known nor unknown. Hence, we are on all sides +subverted, in consequence of not being able to reach it in any respect, +because it is not even one thing, or rather, it is not that which is +not even one thing. Hence it is that which in no respect whatever has +any subsistence; or it is even beyond this, since this is a negation +of being, and that which is not even one thing is a negation of _the +one_. But that which is not one thing, or in other words, that which is +nothing, is a void, and a falling from all things. We do not however +thus conceive concerning the ineffable. Or shall we say that _nothing_ +is twofold, the one being beyond, and the other below, all things? +For _the one_ also is twofold, _this_ being the extreme, as _the one_ +of matter, and _that_ the first, as that which is more ancient than +being. So that with respect to _nothing_ also, _this_ will be as +that which is not even the last one, but _that_ as neither being the +first one. In this way therefore, that which is unknown and ineffable +is twofold, _this_, as not even possessing the last suspicion of +subsistence, and _that_, as not even being the first of things. Must we +therefore, consider it as that which is unknown to us? Or this indeed +is nothing paradoxical: for it will be unknown even to much-honoured +intellect, if it be lawful so to speak. For every intellect looks to +the intelligible; and the intelligible is either _form_ or _being_. +But may not divine knowledge know it; and may it not be known to this +superessentially? This knowledge, however, applies itself to _the +one_, but that which we are now investigating is beyond _the one_. In +short, if it also is known, in conjunction with others, it will also be +something belonging to all things; for it will be common to it with +others to be known, and thus far it will be co-ordinated with others. +Further still, if it is known, divine knowledge will comprehend it. It +will therefore define it. Every boundary however, ascends ultimately as +far as to _the one_; but _that_ is beyond _the one_. It is therefore +perfectly incomprehensible and invisible, and consequently is not to +be apprehended by any kind of knowledge. To which we may add, that +knowledge is of things which may be known as beings, or as having a +subsistence, or as participating of _the one_. But this is beyond all +these. Further still, _the one_ also appears to be unknown, if it +is necessary that what is known should be one thing, and that which +knows another, though both should be in the same thing. So that _the +truly one_ will not know itself: for it does not possess a certain +duplicity. There will not therefore be in it that which knows, and +that which is known. Hence, neither will a God, considered according +to _the one itself_ alone, and as being conjoined with _the one_, be +united with that which is simple, according to duplicity. For how can +the double be conjoined with the simple? But if he knows _the one_ +by _the one_, that which knows, and also that which is known will be +_one_, and in each the nature of _the one_ will be shown, subsisting +alone, and being _one_. So that he will not be conjoined as different +with that which is different, or as that which is gnostic with that +which is known, since this very thing is one alone; so that neither +will he be conjoined according to knowledge. Much more therefore, is +that which is not even _the one_ unknown. But if _the one_ is the last +thing known, we know nothing of that which is beyond _the one_; so +that the present rhapsody is vain. Or shall we say we know that these +things are unworthy to be asserted, if it be lawful so to speak, of the +first hypothesis [in the Parmenides of Plato,] since, not yet knowing +even intelligible forms, we despise the images which subsist in us of +their eternal and impartible nature; since these images are partible, +and multifariously mutable. Again, being ignorant of the contracted +subsistence of intelligible species and genera, but possessing an image +of this, which is a contraction of the genera and species in us, we +suspect that being itself resembles this contraction, but is at the +same time something more excellent; and this must be especially the +case with that which has an united subsistence. But now we are ignorant +of _the one_, not contracting, but expanding all things to it; and +in us simplicity itself consists, with relation to the all which we +contain, but is very far from coming into contact with the all-perfect +nature of _the one_. For _the one and the simple_ in our nature, are +in the smallest degree that which they are said to be, except that +they are a sign or indication of the nature which is there. Thus also +assuming in intellect every thing which can be in any respect known or +suspected, we think fit to ascribe it as far as to _the one_; if it be +requisite to speak of things unspeakable, and to conceive things which +are inconceivable. At the same time also, we think fit to make that the +subject of hypothesis, which cannot be compared, and is unco-ordinated +with all things, and which is so exempt that neither in reality does +it possess the exempt. For that which is exempt is always exempt from +something, and is not in every respect exempt, as possessing habitude +to that from which it is exempt, and in short, preceding in a certain +co-ordination. If, therefore, we intend to make that which is truly +exempt the subject of hypothesis, we must not even suppose it to be +exempt. For, accurately speaking, its proper name will not be verified +when ascribed to _the exempt_; since in this case it would at the same +time be co-ordinated; so that it is necessary even to deny this of it. +Likewise, negation is a certain sentence, and that which is denied is +a certain thing: but that of which we are now endeavouring to speak +is not any thing. Neither therefore, can it be denied, nor spoken of, +nor be in any way known: so that neither is it possible to deny the +negation; but that which appears to us to be a demonstration of what +we say, is a perfect subversion of language and conception. What end +therefore, will there be of the discourse, except the most profound +silence, and an acknowledgement that we know nothing of that which it +is not lawful, since impossible, to lead into knowledge?” + +In another part, near the beginning of the same admirable work, he +remarks that _the one_ in every thing is the more true thing itself. +“Thus for instance, _the one_ of man [or the summit and flower of his +nature,] is the more true man, that of soul is the more true soul, and +that of body the more true body. Thus also _the one_ of the sun, and +_the one_ of the moon, are the more true sun and moon.” After which +he observes as follows: “Neither _the one_, nor _all things_ accords +with the nature of _the one_. For these are opposed to each other, and +distribute our conceptions. For, if we look to the simple and _the +one_, we destroy its immensely great perfection; and if we conceive all +things subsisting together, we abolish _the one_ and _the simple_. But +this is because we are divided, and look to divided peculiarities. At +the same time however, aspiring after the knowledge of it, we connect +all things together, that we may thus be able to apprehend this mighty +nature. But fearing the introduction of all multitudes, or contracting +the peculiar nature of _the one_, and rejoycing in that which is +simple and the first in speaking of the most ancient principle, we +thus introduce _the one itself_ as a symbol of simplicity; since we +likewise introduce _all things_ as a symbol of the comprehension of +all things. But that which is above or prior to both we can neither +conceive nor denominate. And why is it wonderful that we should suffer +these things about it, since the distinct knowledge of it is unical, +which we cannot perceive? Other things too of this kind we suffer +about _being_. For endeavouring to perceive _being_, we dismiss it, +but run round the elements of it, bound and infinity. But if we form +a more true conception of it, that it is an united plenitude of all +things, in this case the conception of _all things_ draws us down to +multitude, and the conception of _the united_ abolishes that of all +things. Neither however is this yet wonderful. For with respect to +forms also, when we wish to survey any one of these, we run round the +elements of it, and, striving to perceive its unity, we obliterate its +elements. At the same time however, every form is one and many; not +indeed partly one, and partly many, but the whole of it is through the +whole a thing of this kind. Not being able, therefore, to apprehend +this collectively, we rejoice in acceding to it with a distribution +of our conceptions. But always adhering in our ascent, like those who +climb clinging with their hands and feet, to things which extend us to +a more impartible nature, we obtain in a certain respect a co-sensation +in the distribution of that which is uniform. We despise therefore +this, with respect to the collected apprehension of it, which we cannot +obtain, unless a certain vestige of collected intelligence in our +nature is agitated. And this is the light of truth, which is suddenly +enkindled, as if from the collision of fire stones. For our greatest +conceptions, when exercised with each other, verge to a uniform and +simple summit as their end, like the extremities of lines in a circle +hastening to the centre. And though even thus they subsist indeed with +distribution, yet a certain vestige of the knowledge of form which we +contain is pre-excited; just as the equal tendency of all the lines +in a circle to terminate in the middle affords a certain obscure +representation of the centre. After the same manner also we ascend to +being, in the first place, by understanding every form which falls +upon us as distributed, not only as impartible, but also as united, +and this by confounding, if it be proper so to speak, the multitude +in each. In the next place, we must collect every thing separated +together, and take away the circumscriptions, just as if making many +streams of water to be one collection of water, except that we must +not understand that which is united from all things, as one collection +of water, but we must conceive that which is prior to all things, as +the form of water prior to divided streams of water. Thus therefore, +we must expand ourselves to _the one_, first collecting and afterwards +dismissing what we have collected, for the super-expanded transcendency +of _the one_. Ascending therefore, shall we meet with it as that which +is known? Or, wishing to meet with it as such shall we arrive at the +unknown? Or may we not say that each of these is true? For we meet +with it afar off as that which is known, and when we are united to it +from afar, passing beyond that in our nature which is gnostic of _the +one_, then are we brought to be one, that is, to be unknown instead of +being gnostic. This contact therefore, as of one with one, is above +knowledge, but the other is as of that which is gnostic with that which +is known. As however, the crooked is known by the straight, so we form +a conjecture of the unknown by the known. And this indeed is a mode +of knowledge. _The one_ therefore, is so far known, that it does not +admit of an approximating knowledge, but appears afar off as known, and +imparts a gnostic indication of itself. Unlike other things however, +the nearer we approach to it, it is not the more, but on the contrary, +less known; knowledge being dissolved by _the one_ into ignorance, +since as we have before observed, where there is knowledge, there also +is separation. But separation approaching to _the one_ is inclosed in +union; so that knowledge also is refunded into ignorance. Thus too, the +analogy of Plato requires. For first we endeavour to see the sun, and +we do indeed see it afar off; but by how much the nearer we approach +to it, by so much the less do we see it; and at length we neither see +other things, nor it, the eye becoming spontaneously dazzled by its +light. Is therefore _the one_ in its proper nature unknown, though +there is something else unknown besides _the one_? _The one_ indeed +wills to be by itself, but with no other; but the unknown beyond _the +one_ is perfectly ineffable, which we acknowledge we neither know, nor +are ignorant of, but which has about itself super-ignorance. Hence by +proximity to this _the one itself_ is darkened: for being very near to +the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it remains as it +were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence. On this account, Plato +in speaking of it finds all his assertions subverted: for it is near +to the subversion of every thing, which takes place about the first. +It differs from it however in this, that it is _one_ simply, and that +according to _the one_ it is also at the same time all things. But +the first is above _the one_ and _all things_, being more simple than +either of these.” + +P. 113. _Origen who was a partaker of the same erudition with +Plotinus._ This Origen was not the Christian father of that name, +but was somewhat junior to him. + +P. 190. _And Plotinus, exhibiting in a most divinely inspired manner, +the peculiarity of eternity, according to the theology of Plato, +defines it to be infinite life, at once unfolding into light the whole +of itself, and its own being._ The 7th book of the 3rd Ennead of +Plotinus is concerning Eternity, and the following beautiful extract +from it contains the definition of eternity alluded to by Proclus. + +“Perhaps we ought to conceive of eternity, as a certain one collected +from many; viz. either as one intelligence or one nature, whether +consequent to things in the intelligible world, or existing together +with it, or beheld as situated in the depths of its essence. All these, +I say, reduced into eternity as one, which is also many, and is endued +with a various capacity. Indeed, he who beholds a various capacity, +when he considers it as a subject denominates its essence; but so +far as he perceives life, he denominates its motion; and afterwards +permanency, considered as abiding in a manner entirely the same. He +will likewise behold difference and sameness, so far us they are many, +bound in one. So that he who contracts the difference, subsisting +in things which are many, into one life alone, and contemplates an +unceasing sameness of energy, never passing its intelligence or life, +from one thing into another, but ever abiding in the same manner in +itself far remote from all interval; he I say, who beholds all these, +contemplates eternity, viewing life ever possessing a present whole, +where all things abide together in sameness, without the order of first +and last, and are comprehended in an indivisible bound. Where all +things are collected into one, as into a point, not yet proceeding into +a linear flux, but abiding in sameness, that is, in itself, in an ever +present _now_; because nothing of its nature is past, nothing in it is +future; but what it is, it always is. Hence eternity is not a subject, +but that which beams as it were from its subject, according to the +possession of an ever present identity; promising itself that its ever +abiding nature, will never be changed. For what should happen to this +in future which it is not at present? Since it is a perfect and present +plenitude of all things. Nor can the term was, the appellation of time +past, belong to eternity. For what can that be, which _was_ present +with its nature, and is _past_? It is in like manner independent of +all connection with futurity. And hence eternity is that which neither +_was_ nor _will be_, but alone _is_, which it possesses in a stable +manner; because it is neither changed into a future, nor altered from a +past duration. So that the eternity which we are now investigating, is +life total and full, abiding in its essence about being itself; and is +every where without interval and one. + +Hence, eternity is something especially venerable, and a God, as +inherent intelligence affirms. But intelligence likewise dictates, +that eternity is the same with that God whom we denominate being and +life. And it may with the greatest propriety be said, that eternity is +a deity shining and unfolding himself in intelligible light, such as +he is in his essence; in an essence, I say, perfectly unchangeable and +the same, and thus firmly abiding in an unceasing energy of life. Nor +ought any one to wonder that we speak of eternity, as consisting of +many things. For every thing which abides in the intelligible world, +is called many, on account of its infinite power; since infinite +there receives its denomination, because it never falls off from the +consummate intellectual plenitude of its nature. And indeed, it is +particularly called after this manner, because it loses nothing of its +own. And if any one should describe eternity, as life already infinite +because universal, and because it never deserts the integrity of its +nature; (since it cannot be diminished by the past, nor increased by +the future, because it is a perfect whole)----if any one should thus +describe eternity, he will approach very near to its true definition. +For what is afterwards added, that it is a perfect whole, and loses +nothing of its integrity, is only a certain exposition of the +definition which affirms it to be infinite life. But because a nature +of this kind, thus all-beautiful and eternal, abides about _the one +itself_, emanating and in no respect departing from it, but ever +abiding about and in it, and living with it in indissoluble union; +hence it is said by Plato, not rashly, but in a manner truly beautiful +and profound, that _eternity abides in one_. So that he not only +reduces that which eternity contains into one; but the life of being +in like manner reduces itself, about _the one itself_. This then +is what we investigate, and that is eternity, which thus abides. For +that which is the energy of life abiding from itself, and residing +in the depths of unity, without any deception, either in essence or +life, is without all controversy eternity. Since _truly to be_, +is _never not to be_, and to possess no diversity of being. But +when in discoursing on eternity, we use the term _ever_; and +also when we say it is not sometimes being, and sometimes non-being, +we must consider these appellations as adopted only for the purpose +of explanation. For the term ever is not perhaps principally assumed, +but is employed, in order to show an incorruptible and never-failing +nature.” + +P. 215. _Let us in the next place speak in common about all the +intelligible triads, &c._ For the further information of the reader +on this most profound subject the intelligible triad, the following +observations are added, being an extract from the Introduction to my +translation of the Parmenides of Plato. + +As the first cause then is _the one_, and this is the same with _the +good_, the universality of things must form a whole, the best and +the most profoundly united in all its parts which can possibly be +conceived: for _the first good_ must be the cause of the greatest +good, that is, the whole of things; and as goodness is union, the +best production must be that which is most united. But as there is a +difference in things, and some are more excellent than others, and this +in proportion to their proximity to the first cause, a profound union +can no otherwise take place than by the extremity of a superior order +coalescing through intimate alliance with the summit of the proximately +inferior. Hence the first of bodies, though they are essentially +corporeal, yet κατα σχεσιν, through _habitude_ or _alliance_, are most +vital, or lives. The highest of souls are after this manner intellects, +and the first of beings are gods. For as _being_ is the highest of +things after _the first cause_, its first subsistence must be according +to a superessential characteristic. + +Now that which is superessential, considered as participated by +the highest or _true being_, constitutes that which is called +_intelligible_. So that every true being depending on the gods is a +_divine intelligible_. It is _divine_ indeed, as that which is deified; +but it is _intelligible_, as the object of desire to intellect, as +perfective and connective of its nature, and as the plenitude of +_being_ itself. But in the first being life and intellect subsist +according to _cause_: for every thing subsists either according to +_cause_, or according to _hyparxis_, or according to _participation_. +That is, every thing may be considered either as subsisting occultly +in its cause, or openly in its own order (or according to what it is,) +or as participated by something else. The first of these is analogous +to light when viewed subsisting in its fountain the sun; the second to +the light immediately proceeding from the sun; and the third to the +splendour communicated to other natures by this light. + +The first procession therefore from the first cause, will be the +intelligible triad, consisting of _being_, _life_, and _intellect_, +which are the three highest things after the first god, and of +which _being_ is prior to _life_, and _life_ to _intellect_. For +whatever partakes of life partakes also of being: but the contrary +is not true, and therefore being is above life; since it is the +characteristic of higher natures to extend their communications +beyond such as are subordinate. But _life_ is prior to _intellect_, +because all intellectual natures are vital, but all vital natures +are not intellectual. But in this intelligible triad, on account of +its superessential characteristic, all things may be considered as +subsisting according to cause: and consequently number here has not a +proper subsistence, but is involved in unproceeding union, and absorbed +in superessential light. Hence, when it is called a triad, we must +not suppose that any _essential distinction_ takes place, but must +consider this appellation as expressive of its ineffable perfection. +For as it is the nearest of all things to _the one_, its union must be +transcendently profound and ineffably occult. + +All the gods indeed considered according to their unities are all in +all, and are at the same time united with the first god like rays to +light, or lines to a centre. And hence they are all established in the +first cause (as Proclus beautifully observes) like the roots of trees +in the earth; so that they are all as much as possible superessential, +just as trees are eminently of an earthly nature, without at the same +time being earth itself: for the nature of the earth as being a whole, +or subsisting according to the eternal, is different from the partial +natures which it produces. The intelligible triad, therefore, from its +being wholly of a superessential idiom, must possess an inconceivable +profundity of union, both with itself and its cause, so as to subsist +wholly according to _the united_, το ηνωμενον; and hence it appears to +the eye of pure intellect, as one simple indivisible splendour beaming +from an unknown and inaccessible fire. + +He then who is able, by opening the greatest eye of the soul, to +see that perfectly which subsists without distinction, will behold +the simplicity of the intelligible triad subsisting in a manner so +transcendent as to be apprehended only by a superintellectual energy, +and a deific union of the perceiver with this most arcane object of +perception. But since in our present state it is impossible to behold +an object so astonishingly lucid with a perfect and steady vision, we +must be content, as Damascius well observes,[405] with a far distant, +scarcely attainable, and most obscure glimpse; or with difficulty +apprehending a trace of this light, like a sudden coruscation bursting +on our sight. Such then is the pre-eminence of the intelligible order, +to which on account of the infirmity of our mental eye, we assign a +triple division, beholding in our phantasy as in a mirror a luminous +triad, beaming from a uniform light; just, says Damascius, as the +uniform colour of the sun appears in a cloud which possesses three +catoptric intervals, through the various coloured nature of the rainbow. + +But when we view this order in a distributed way, or as possessing +distinction in order to accommodate its all-perfect mode of subsistence +to our imperfect conceptions, it is necessary to give the triad itself +a triple division. For we have said that it consists of _being_, +_life_, and _intellect_. But in _being_ we may view life and intellect, +according to cause; in _life_ being according to participation, and +intellect according to cause; and in _intellect_ both being and life +according to participation; while at the same time in reality the whole +is profoundly one, and contains all things occultly, or according to +cause. But when viewed in this divided manner, each triad is said in +the Chaldaic theology to consist of _father_, _power_, and _intellect_; +_father_ being the same with _hyparxis_, _unity_, _summit_, or _that +which is superessential_; _power_ being a certain pouring forth, or +infinity of _the one_[406] (or the summit); and on this account, says +Damascius, it is present with _father_, as a diffused with an abiding +one, and as pouring itself forth into a true chaos: but _intellect_, +that is _paternal intellect_, subsisting according to a conversion to +the paternal one; a conversion transcending all other conversions, as +being neither gnostic, nor vital, nor essential, but an indistinct +surpassing energy, which is union rather than conversion. + +Such then is the intelligible triad, considered according to an +all-perfect distribution, in accommodation to the imbecility of our +mental eye. But if we are desirous, after having bid adieu to corporeal +vision, and the fascinating but delusive forms of the phantasy, which, +Calypso-like, detain us in exile from our fathers’ land: after having +through a long and laborious dialectic wandering gained our paternal +port, and purified ourselves from the baneful rout of the passions, +those domestic foes of the soul; if after all this we are desirous of +gaining a glimpse of the surpassing simplicity and ineffable union of +this occult and astonishing light, we must crowd all our conceptions +together into the most profound indivisibility, and, opening the +greatest eye of the soul, entreat this all-comprehending deity to +approach: for then, preceded by unadorned Beauty, silently walking on +the extremities of her shining feet, he will suddenly from his awful +sanctuary rise to our view. + +But after such a vision, what can language announce concerning this +transcendent object? That it is perfectly indistinct and void of +number. “And,” as Damascius[407] beautifully observes, “since this is +the case, we should consider whether it is proper to call _this_ which +belongs to it _simplicity_, απλοτης; _something else, multiplicity_ +πολλοτης; and _something besides this, universality_ παντοτης. For +that which is intelligible is _one_, _many_, _all_, that we may triply +explain a nature which is one. But how can one nature be _one_ and +_many_? Because _many_ is the infinite power of _the one_. But how +can it be _one_ and _all_? Because _all_ is the every way extended +energy of _the one_. Nor yet is it to be called an energy, as if it +was an extension of power to that which is external; nor power, as an +extension of hyparxis abiding within; but again, it is necessary to +call them three instead of one: for one appellation, as we have often +testified, is by no means sufficient for an explanation of this order. +And are all things then here indistinct? But how can this be easy to +understand? For we have said that there are three principles consequent +to each other; viz. _father_, _power_, and _paternal intellect_. _But +these in reality are neither one, nor three, nor one and at the same +time three._[408] But it is necessary that we should explain these +by names and conceptions of this kind, through our penury in what is +adapted to their nature, or rather through our desire of expressing +something proper on the occasion. For as we denominate this triad +_one_, and _many_, and _all_, and _father_, _power_, and _paternal +intellect_, and again _bound_, _infinite_, and _mixed_--so likewise +we call it a _monad_, and _the indefinite duad_, and _a triad_, and +a paternal nature composed from both these. And as in consequence +of purifying our conceptions we reject the former appellations, as +incapable of harmonizing with the things themselves, we should likewise +reject the latter on the same account.” + +But in order to convince the reader that this doctrine of the +intelligible triad is not a fiction devised by the latter Platonists, I +shall present him with the following translation from Damascius (περι +αρχων) _Concerning Principles_,[409] in which the agreement of all +the ancient theologists concerning this triad is most admirably evinced. + +“The theology contained in the Orphic rhapsodies concerning the +intelligible Gods is as follows _Time_ is symbolically placed for +the one principle of the universe; but _æther_ and _chaos_, for +the two posterior to this one: and _being_, simply considered, is +represented under the symbol of an egg. And this is the first triad +of the intelligible Gods. But for the perfection of the second triad, +they establish either a conceiving and a conceived egg as a God, or +a white garment, or a cloud: because from these Phanes leaps forth +into light. For indeed they philosophize variously concerning the +middle triad. But Phanes here represents intellect. But conceiving +him over and above this, as father and power, contributes nothing to +Orpheus. But they call the third triad Metis as _intellect_,[410] +Ericapæus as _power_, and Phanes as _father_. But sometimes[411] the +middle triad is considered according to the three-shaped God, while +conceived in the egg: for the middle always represents each of the +extremes; as in this instance, where the egg and the three-shaped God +subsist together. And here you may perceive that the egg is that which +is united; but that the three-shaped and really multiform God is the +separating and discriminating cause of that which is intelligible. +Likewise the middle triad subsists according to the egg, as yet united; +but the third[412] according to the God who separates and distributes +the whole intelligible order. And this is the common and familiar +Orphic theology. But that delivered by Hieronymus and Hellanicus is +as follows. According to them _water_ and _matter_ were the first +productions, from which earth was secretly drawn forth: so that water +and earth are established as the two first principles; the latter of +these having a _dispersed_ subsistence; but the former conglutinating +and connecting the latter. But they are silent concerning the +principle prior to these two, as being ineffable: for as there are no +illuminations about him, his arcane and ineffable nature is from hence +sufficiently evinced. But the third principle posterior to these two, +_water_ and _earth_, and which is generated from them, is _a dragon_, +naturally endued with the heads of a bull and a lion, but in the middle +having the countenance of the God himself. They add likewise that he +has wings on his shoulders, and that he is called _undecaying Time_, +and _Hercules_; that _Necessity_ resides with him, which is the same +as _Nature_, and incorporeal _Adrastia_, which is extended throughout +the universe, whose limits she binds in amicable conjunction. But as +it appears to me, they denominate this third principle as established +according to essence; and assert, besides this, that it subsists as +male and female, for the purpose of exhibiting the generative causes of +all things. + +“But I likewise find in the Orphic rhapsodies, that neglecting the two +first principles, together with the one principle who is delivered in +silence, the third principle, posterior to the two, is established +by the theology as the original; because this first of all possesses +something effable and commensurate to human discourse. For in the +former hypothesis, the highly reverenced and undecaying _Time_, the +father of æther and chaos, was the principle: but in this _Time_ is +neglected, and the principle becomes _a dragon_. It likewise calls +triple æther, moist; and Chaos, infinite; and Erebus, cloudy and +dark; delivering this second triad analogous to the first: this being +potential, as that was paternal. Hence the third procession of this +triad is dark Erebus: its paternal and summit æther, not according to +a simple but intellectual subsistence: but its middle infinite chaos, +considered as a progeny or procession, and among these parturient, +because from these the third intelligible triad proceeds. What then +is the third intelligible triad? I answer, the egg; the duad of the +natures of male and female which it contains, and the multitude of +all-various seeds, residing in the middle of this triad: And the +third among these is an incorporeal God, bearing golden wings on his +shoulders; but in his inward parts naturally possessing the heads of +bulls, upon which heads a mighty dragon appears, invested with the +all-various forms of wild-beasts. This last then must be considered +as the _intellect_ of the triad; but the middle progeny, which are +_many_ as well as _two_, correspond to _power_, and the egg itself is +_the paternal principle_ of the third triad: but the third God of this +third triad, this theology celebrates as _Protogonus_, and calls him +_Jupiter_, the disposer of all things and of the whole world; and on +this account denominates him _Pan_. And such is the information which +this theology affords us, concerning the genealogy of the intelligible +principles of things. + +But in the writings of the Peripatetic Eudemus, containing the Theology +of Orpheus, the whole intelligible order is passed over in silence, +as being every way ineffable and unknown, and incapable of verbal +enunciation. Eudemus therefore commences his genealogy from _Night_, +from which also Homer begins: though Eudemus is far from making the +Homeric genealogy consistent and connected, for he asserts that Homer +begins from Ocean and Tethys. It is however apparent, that _Night_ +is according to Homer the greatest divinity, since she is reverenced +even by Jupiter himself. For the poet says of Jupiter--“that he feared +lest he should act in a manner displeasing to swift _Night_.” So that +Homer begins his genealogy of the Gods from _Night_. But it appears +to me that Hesiod, when he asserts that Chaos was first generated, +signifies by Chaos the incomprehensible and perfectly united nature +of that which is intelligible: but that he produces earth[413] the +first from thence, as a certain principle of the whole procession of +the Gods. Unless perhaps Chaos is the second of the two principles: +but Earth,[414] Tartarus, and Love, form the triple intelligible. So +that _Love_ is to be placed for the third monad of the intelligible +order, considered according to its convertive nature; for it is thus +denominated by Orpheus in his rhapsodies. But _Earth_ for the first, +as being first established in a certain firm and essential station. +But _Tartarus_ for the middle, as in a certain respect exciting +and moving forms into distribution. But Acusilaus appears to me to +establish _Chaos_ for the first principle, as entirely unknown; and +after this, two principles, _Erebus_ as male, and _Night_ as female; +placing the latter for _infinity_, but the former for _bound_. But +from the mixture of these, he says that _Æther_, _Love_, and _Counsel_ +are generated, forming three intelligible hypostases. And he places +_Æther_ as the summit; but _Love_ in the middle, according to its +naturally middle subsistence; but _Metis_ or _Counsel_ as the third, +and the same as highly-reverenced intellect. And, according to the +history of Eudemus, from these he produces a great number of other +Gods. But Epimenides establishes _Air_ and _Night_ as the two first +principles; manifestly reverencing in silence the one principle prior +to these two. But from air and night _Tartarus_ is generated, forming +as it appears to me the third principle, as a certain mixed temperature +from the two. And this mixture is called by some an intelligible +medium, because it extends itself to both the summit and the end. But +from the mixture of the extremes with each other, an egg is generated, +which is truly an intelligible animal: and from this again another +progeny proceeds. But according to Pherecydes Syrius, the three first +principles are a _Perpetually-abiding Vital Nature_, _Time_,[415] and +_an Earthly Nature_: one of these subsisting, as I conceive, prior to +the other two. But he asserts that _Time_ generates from the progeny of +itself, _Fire_, _Spirit_, and _Water_: which signify, as it appears to +me, the triple nature of that which is intelligible. But from these, +distributed into five profound recesses, a numerous progeny of Gods +is constituted, which he calls _five-times animated_ (πεντεμψυχος): +and which is perhaps the same as if he had said πεντεκοσμος, or a +_five-fold world_. But we may probably discourse on this subject +at some other opportunity. And thus much may suffice at present +concerning the hypotheses derived from the Grecian fables, which are +both many and various. + +But with respect to the theology of the Barbarians, the Babylonians +seem to pass over in silence the one principle of the universe. But +they establish two principles, Tauthe and Apasoon. And they consider +Apasoon as the husband of Tauthe, whom they denominate the mother of +the Gods; from whom an only-begotten son _Mooumis_ was produced: which, +as it appears to me, is no other than the intelligible world deduced +from two principles.[416] But from these another procession is derived, +_Dache_ and _Dachus_. And likewise a third from these, _Kissare_ and +_Assoorus_. And from these again three deities are produced, _Anus_, +_Illinus_, and _Aus_. But from _Aus_ and _Dache_ a son called Belus is +produced, who they say is the demiurgus of the world. But with respect +to the Magi, and all the Arion race, as we are informed by Eudemus, +some of them call all the intelligible and united world _Place_, +and some of them _Time_: from which _a good divinity_ and _an evil +dæmon_ are distributed; _Light_ and _Darkness_ subsisting prior to +these, according to the assertions of others. However, both the one +and the other, after an undistributed nature, consider that nature +as having a subsistence which distributes the two-fold co-ordination +of better natures: one of which co-ordinations _Orosmades_ presides +over, and the other _Arimanius_. But the Sidonians, according to the +same historian, place before all things, _Time_, _Desire_, and _cloudy +Darkness_. And they assert that from the mingling of _Desire_ and +_Darkness_ as two principles, _Air_ and _a gentle Wind_ were produced: +_Air_ evincing the summit of the intelligible triad; but _the gentle +Wind_ raised and proceeding from this, the vital prototype of the +intelligible. And again that from both these the bird _Otus_, similar +to a night raven, was produced; representing, as it appears to me, +intelligible intellect. But as we find (without the assistance of +Eudemus) the Phœnician mythology, according to Mochus, places _Æther_ +and _Air_ as the two first principles, from which the intelligible +god _Oulomus_ was produced; who, as it appears to me, is the summit +of the intelligible order. But from this god (yet proceeding together +with him) they assert that _Chousorus_ was produced, being the first +unfolding procession. And after this _an egg_ succeeds; which I think +must be called intelligible intellect. But the unfolding _Chousorus_ is +intelligible power, because this is the first nature which distributes +an undistributed subsistence: unless perhaps after the two principles +_Æther_ and _Air_, the summit is _One Wind_: but the middle _Two +Winds_, the _south-west_ and the _south_; for in a certain respect they +place these prior to _Oulomus_. But _Oulomus_ himself is intelligible +intellect: and unfolding _Chousorus_[417] the first order after the +intelligible series. But the _egg itself_ is heaven: from the bursting +of which into two parts, the sections are said to have become heaven +and earth. But with respect to the Egyptians, nothing accurately is +related of them by Eudemus: we have, however, by means of some Egyptian +philosophers resident among us, been instructed in the occult truth +of their theological doctrine. According to these philosophers then, +the Egyptians in certain discourses celebrate _an unknown Darkness_ +as the one principle of the universe, and this _thrice pronounced +as such_: but for the two principles after the first they place +_Water_ and _Sand_, according to Heraiscus; but according to the more +ancient writer Asclepiades, _Sand_ and _Water_; from which and after +which the first _Kamephis_ is generated. But after this _a second_, +and from this again _a third_; by all which, the whole intelligible +distribution is accomplished. For thus Asclepiades determines. But the +more modern Heraiscus says that the Egyptians, denominating the third +Kamephis from his father and grandfather, assert that he is _the Sun_; +which doubtless signifies in this case intelligible intellect. But a +more accurate knowledge of these affairs must be received from the +above-mentioned authors themselves. It must however be observed, that +with the Egyptians there are many distributions of things according to +union; because they unfold an intelligible nature into characteristics, +or peculiarities of many gods, as may be learned from such as are +desirous of consulting their writings on this subject.” + +Thus far Damascius; from which curious and interesting relation +the reader may not only perceive at one view the agreement of the +ancient theologists with each other in celebrating the intelligible +triad, and venerating in silence the ineffable principle of things, +but may likewise see that the Christian trinity is essentially +different from this triad, because according to Plato and the ancient +theologists, the first cause is not a part of any triad, or order of +things. Consonant too with the above relation is the doctrine of the +Chaldeans concerning the intelligible order, as delivered by Johannes +Picus, in his _Conclusions according to the opinion of the Chaldean +Theologists_.[418] “The intelligible co-ordination (says he) is not +in the intellectual co-ordination, as Amasis the Egyptian asserts, +but is above every intellectual hierarchy, imparticipably concealed +in the abyss of the first unity, and under the obscurity of the first +darkness.” Co-ordinatio intelligibilis non est in intellectuali +co-ordinatione, ut dixit Amasis Ægyptius, sed est super omnem +intellectualem hierarchium, in abysso primæ unitatis, et sub caligine +primarum tenebrarum imparticipaliter abscondita. + +But from this triad it may be demonstrated, that all the processions +of the Gods may be comprehended in six orders, viz. the _intelligible +order_, the _intelligible and at the same time intellectual_, +the _intellectual_, the _supermundane_, the _liberated_, and the +_mundane_.[419] For the _intelligible_, as we have already observed, +must hold the first rank, and must consist of _being_, _life_, +and _intellect_; _i.e._ must _abide_, _proceed_, and _return_; at +the same time that it is characterised, or subsists principally +according to _permanent being_. But in the next place that which is +both _intelligible_ and _intellectual_ succeeds, which must likewise +be triple, but must principally subsist according to _life_, or +_intelligence_. And in the third place the _intellectual_ order must +succeed, which is _triply convertive_. But as in consequence of the +existence of the sensible world, it is necessary that there should be +some demiurgic cause of its existence, this cause can only be found in +_intellect_, and in the last hypostasis of the _intellectual triad_. +For all forms in this hypostasis subsist according to all-various +and perfect divisions; and forms can only fabricate when they +have a perfect intellectual separation from each other. But since +_fabrication_ is nothing more than _procession_, the demiurgus will be +to the posterior orders of Gods what _the one_ is to the orders prior +to the _demiurgus_: and consequently he will be that secondarily which +the first cause of all is primarily. Hence his first production will +be an order of Gods analogous to the _intelligible_ order, and which +is denominated _supermundane_. After this he must produce an order of +Gods similar to the _intelligible_ and _intellectual_ order, and which +are denominated _liberated_ Gods. And in the last place, a procession +correspondent to the _intellectual_ order, and which can be no other +than the mundane Gods. For the demiurgus is chiefly characterised +according to diversity, and is allotted the boundary of all universal +hypostases. + +All these orders, as is shown by Proclus in this work, are unfolded by +Plato in the conclusions of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides; +and this in a manner perfectly conformable to the Chaldaic theology. In +proof of this I refer the reader to my collection of Chaldean oracles, +in the Old Monthly Magazine. + +P. 348. _It is difficult to discover the fabricator and father of +this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all +men._ + +The following admirable developement by Proclus of the difficulty of +discovering the maker of the universe, is extracted from p. 91, &c. of +his Commentaries on the Timæus of Plato. + +“Father and fabricator differ from each other, so far as the former is +the cause of matter,[420] but the latter of the world and order, and +in short, of the formal cause; and so far indeed, as the former is the +supplier of being and union, but the latter of powers and a multiform +essence; and so far as the one stably contains all things in himself, +but the other is the cause of progression and generation: and so far as +the former signifies ineffable and divine providence, but the latter +an abundant communication of productive principles. Porphyry however +says, that father is he who generates the universe from himself, but +fabricator he who receives the matter of it from another. Hence Aristo +indeed, is said to be the _father_ of Plato, but the builder of a house +is the _maker_ or fabricator of it, as not himself generating the +matter of which it consists. If however, this is true, there was no +occasion to call the demiurgus father, because according to Timæus, he +does not give subsistence to matter. Is not the demiurgus therefore, +rather the fabricator as producing form? For we call all those makers +who produce any thing from a non-existent state into existence. But so +far as the demiurgus produces that which he produces, in conjunction +with life, he is father. For fathers are the causes of animals, and of +certain living beings, and impart seed together with life. And thus +much concerning this particular. + +But ‘_this universe_’ signifies indeed, the corporeal masses, and +the whole spheres [of which it consists] and the plenitudes of each. +It also signifies the vital and intellectual powers, which ride as +it were in the corporeal masses. It also comprehends all the mundane +causes[421] and the whole divinity of the world, about which the +number of the mundane Gods proceeds; likewise, the one divinity, +the divine soul, and the whole bulk of the world, together with the +divine, intellectual, psychical, and corporeal-formed number that is +conjoined with the world. For every monad has a multitude co-ordinate +to itself. All these therefore must be assumed for the _universe_; +since it signifies all these. Perhaps likewise the addition of the +pronoun _this_, is significant of the universe being in a certain +respect sensible and partial. For the intelligible universe is not +_this_, because it is comprehensive of _all intellectual forms_. But +the term _this_ is adapted to the visible universe which is allotted a +sensible and material nature. It is difficult therefore, as Plato says, +to discover the demiurgus of this universe. For since with respect to +discovery, one kind proceeds scientifically from such things as are +first,[422] but another journeys on from things of a secondary nature, +according to reminiscence; the discovery from such things as are first +may be said to be difficult, because the invention of the intermediate +powers, pertains to the highest theory. But the discovery from such +things as are secondary, is nearly more difficult than the former. For +if we intend from these to survey the essence of the demiurgus, and +his other powers, it is necessary that we should have beheld all the +nature of the things generated by him, all the visible parts of the +world, and the unapparent natural powers which it contains, according +to which the sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the world subsist. +Prior to these also, we must have surveyed the stable physical reasons, +and natures themselves, both the more total and the more partial,[423] +and again, the immaterial and material, the divine and dæmoniacal, and +the natures of mortal animals. And farther still, the genera which +are under life, the perpetual and the mortal, the undefiled and the +material, such as are wholes, and such as are parts, the rational +and the irrational, and the prerogatives which are superior to ours, +through which every thing between the Gods and the mortal nature are +bound together. We must likewise have beheld the all-various souls, +the different numbers of Gods according to the different parts of +the universe, and the ineffable and effable impressions of the world +through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who without +having seen these is impelled to the survey of the demiurgus, is more +imperfect than is requisite to the intellectual perception of the +father. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be conjoined +with that which is all-perfect. + +Moreover, it is necessary,[424] that the soul becoming an intellectual +world, and being assimilated as much as possible to the whole +intelligible world, should introduce herself to the maker of the +universe; and from this introduction, should in a certain respect +become familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For +uninterrupted energy about any thing, calls forth and resuscitates +our [dormant] ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed +at the door of the father, it is necessary, that we should be united +to him. For discovery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, +to associate alone with the alone, and to see him himself, the soul +hastily withdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For then +she is present with her father, banquets together with him on the truth +of real being, and in pure splendour is purely initiated in entire and +stable visions. Such therefore is the discovery of the father, not that +which is doxastic; for this is dubious, and not very remote from the +irrational life. Neither is it scientific; for this is syllogistic and +composite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence +of the intellectual demiurgus. But it is that which subsists according +to intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and +a union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be +denominated difficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to +souls after every evolution of life; or as the true labour of souls. +For after the wandering about generation, after purification, and the +light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect which is in +us shine forth, placing the soul in the father as in a port, purely +establishing her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining light +with light, not such as that of science, but more beautiful, more +intellectual, and partaking more of the nature of _the one_ than +this. For this is the paternal port,[425] and the discovery of the +father, viz. an undefiled union with him. + +But to _say that when found it is impossible to speak of him to all +men_,[426] perhaps indicates the custom of the Pythagoreans, who had +arcane assertions about divine natures, and did not divulge them to +all men. For as the Elean guest says, the eyes of the multitude are +not strong enough to look to truth. Perhaps also this may be said +which is much more venerable, that it is impossible for him who has +discovered the maker and father of the universe to speak of him to +certain persons such as he has seen him. For the discovery was not made +by the soul speaking, but closing her eyes, and being converted[427] +to the divine light. Nor was it made by her being moved with her own +proper motion, but through being silent with a silence which leads the +way [to union]. For since the essence of other things is not naturally +adapted to be spoken of, either through a name, or through definition, +or through science, but is seen through intellection alone, as Plato +says in his Epistles, in what other way can it be possible to discover +the essence of the demiurgus, than by intellectual energy? And how +when having thus found it, is it possible to tell what is seen, and +explain it to others, through nouns and verbs? For the evolution which +is conversant with composition, cannot exhibit a uniform and simple +nature. What then, some one may say, do we not assert many things about +the demiurgus, and about the other Gods, and even of _the one itself_? +To this we reply, we speak indeed _about_ them, but we do not speak _of +each of them itself_. And we are able indeed to speak _scientifically_ +of them, but not _intellectually_. For this, as we have before +observed, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a silence of the +soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth, be sufficient to lead +that which is discovered into light?” + +The following extracts from the _Manuscript Scholia of_ PROCLUS On the +_Cratylus of Plato_, are added on account of their great importance; +and that the reader may be furnished with all the information on the +recondite theology of Greece, that it was in my power to obtain. + +This manuscript is so rare that, if I am not mistaken, no copy of it is +to be found in any of the colleges either of Oxford or Cambridge. My +copy of it is a transcript of that which is now in the possession of +Mr. HEBER of Oxford. + +The reader, however, must be careful to remember that the design of +Plato in the Cratylus was to unfold those peculiarities only of the +Gods that are apparent in their names. + +That Jupiter is not _said to be_, but _is_ the father of those who +genuinely preserve the proper form of life, such as Hercules and the +Dioscuri; but of those who are never at any time able to convert +themselves to a divine nature, he never _is_, nor _is said to be_ +the father. Such therefore as having been partakers of a certain +energy above human nature, have again fallen into _the sea of +dissimilitude_,[428] and for honour among men have embraced error +towards the Gods,--of these Jupiter is _said to be_ the father. + +That the paternal cause originates supernally from the intelligible +and occult gods; for there the first fathers of wholes subsist; but it +proceeds through all the intellectual Gods into the demiurgic order. +For Timæus celebrates this order as at the same time _fabricative_ and +_paternal_; since he calls Jupiter the _demiurgus_ and _father_. The +fathers however who are superior to the one fabrication are called +Gods of Gods, but the demiurgus is the father of Gods and men. Farther +still, Jupiter is said to be _peculiarly_ the father of some, as of +Hercules, who immutably preserve a Jovian and ruling life during +their converse with the realms of generation. Jupiter therefore, is +triply father, of Gods, partial souls, and of souls that embrace an +intellectual and Jovian life. The intellectual order of the Gods +therefore, is supernally bounded by the king[429] of the total divine +genera, and who has a paternal transcendency with respect to all the +intellectual Gods. This king according to Orpheus is called by the +blessed immortals that dwell on lofty Olympus Phanes Protogonus. But +this order proceeds through the three Nights, and the celestial orders, +into the Titanic or Saturnian series, where it first separates itself +from the fathers and changes the kingdom of the _Synoches_,[430] for a +distributive government of wholes, and unfolds every demiurgic genus +of the Gods, from all the above-mentioned ruling and royal causes, +but proximately from Saturn the leader of the Titannic orders. Prior +however to other fabricators (δημιουργοι) it unfolds Jupiter, who is +allotted the unical strength of the whole demiurgic series, and who +produces and gives subsistence to all unapparent and apparent natures. +And he is indeed intellectual according to the order in which he +ranks, but he produces the species and the genera of beings into the +order of sensibles. He is likewise filled with the Gods above himself, +but imparts from himself a progression into being to all mundane +natures. Hence Orpheus represents him fabricating every celestial race, +making the sun and moon and the other starry Gods, together with the +sublunary elements, and diversifying the latter with forms which before +had a disordered subsistence. He likewise represents him presiding +over the Gods who are distributed about the whole world, and who are +suspended from him; and in the character of a legislator assigning +distributions of providence in the universe according to desert to all +the mundane Gods.[431] Homer too, following Orpheus, celebrates him +as the common father of Gods and men, as leader and king, and as the +supreme of rulers. He also says that all the multitude of mundane Gods +is collected about him, abides in and is perfected by him. For all the +mundane Gods are converted to Jupiter through Themis, + + Ζευς δε θεμιστα κελευσε θεους, αγορην δε καλεσσαι + ----ηδ’ αρα παντη + φοιτησασα κελευσε Διος προς δωμα νεεσθαι. + +i.e. “But Jupiter orders Themis to call the Gods to council; and she +directing her course every where commands them to go to the house of +Jupiter.”[432] All of them therefore are excited according to the one +will of Jupiter, and become διος ενδον,[433] _within Jupiter_, +as the poet says. Jupiter too again separates them within himself, +according to two co-ordinations, and excites them to providential +energies about secondary natures; he at the same time as Timæus says, +abiding after his accustomed manner; + + ως εφατο κρονιδης πολεμον δ’ αλιαστον εγειρεν.[434] + +i.e. “Thus spoke Saturnian Jupiter, and excited inevitable war.” +Jupiter however is separate and exempt from all mundane natures; whence +also the most total and leading of the other Gods, though they appear +to have in a certain respect equal authority with Jupiter, through a +progression from the same causes, yet call him father. For both Neptune +and Juno celebrate him by this appellation. And though Juno speaks to +him as one who is of the same order, + + και γαρ εγω θεος ειμι· γενος δε μοι ενθεν οθεν σοι, + και με πρεσβυτατην τεκετο κρονος αγκυλομητις,[435] + +i.e. “For I also am a divinity, and Saturn, of inflected counsel, +endowed me with the greatest dignity, when he begot me:” + +And though Neptune says + + τρεις γαρ τ’εκ κρονου ειμεν αδελφεοι, ους τεκε Ρειη, + Ζευς και εγω, τριτατος δ’Αΐδης ενεροισιν ανασσων,[436] + +i.e. “For we are three brothers from Saturn, whom Rhea bore, Jupiter +and I, and the third is Pluto, who governs the infernal realms:” + +Yet Jupiter is called father by both these divinities; and this +because he comprehends in himself the one and impartible cause of all +fabrication; is prior to the Saturnian triad;[437] connectedly contains +the three fathers; and comprehends on all sides the vivification of +Juno. Hence, at the same time that this goddess gives animation to the +universe, he also together with other Gods gives subsistence to souls. +Very properly therefore do we say that the demiurgus in the Timæus is +the mighty Jupiter. For he it is who produces mundane intellects and +souls, who adorns all bodies with figures and numbers, and inserts in +them one union, and an indissoluble friendship and bond. For Night +also in Orpheus advises Jupiter to employ things of this kind in the +fabrication of the universe. + + αυταρ επην δεσμον κρατερον περι πασι τανυσσης. + + i.e. But when your power around the whole has spread + A strong coercive bond.-- + +The proximate bond indeed of mundane natures, is that which subsists +through analogy; but the more perfect bond is derived from intellect +and soul. Hence Timæus calls the communion of the elements through +analogy, and the indissoluble union from life, a bond. For he says +animals were generated bound with animated bonds. But a more venerable +bond than these subsists from the demiurgic will. “For my will, says +Jupiter in the Timæus, is a greater and more principal bond, &c.” + +Firmly adhering therefore to this conception respecting the mighty +Jupiter, viz. that he is the demiurgus and father of the universe, that +he is an all-perfect imparticipable[438] intellect, and that he fills +all things both with other goods, and with life, let us survey how +from names Socrates unfolds the mystic truth concerning this divinity. +Timæus then says that it is difficult to know the essence of the +demiurgus, and Socrates now says that it is not easy to understand his +name, which manifests his power and energy. + +That our soul knows partibly the impartible nature of the energy of the +Gods, and that which is characterised by unity in this energy, in a +multiplied manner: and this especially takes place about the demiurgus +who expands intellectual forms, and calls forth intelligible causes, +and evolves them to the fabrication of the universe. For Parmenides +characterises him by sameness and difference. According to Homer two +tubs are placed near him; and the most mystic tradition, and the +oracles of the Gods say that the duad is seated with him. For thus +they speak: “He possesses both; containing intelligibles in intellect, +but introducing sense to the worlds.” These oracles likewise call +him _twice beyond_, and _twice there_ (δις επεκεινα και δις εκει). +And in short they celebrate him through the duad. For the demiurgus +comprehends in himself unitedly every thing _prolific_,[439] and which +gives subsistence to mundane natures. Very properly therefore is his +name two-fold, of which δια manifests _the cause through which_, and +this is paternal goodness; but ζηνα signifies _vivification_, the first +causes of which in the universe the demiurgus unically comprehends. The +former too, is a symbol of the Saturnian and paternal series; but the +latter of the vivific and maternal Rhea. So far likewise as Jupiter +receives the whole of Saturn, he gives subsistence to a triple essence, +the impartible, the partible, and that which subsists between these; +but according to the Rhea which he contains in himself, he scatters as +from a fountain, intellectual, psychical, and corporeal life. But by +his demiurgic powers and energies, he gives a formal subsistence to +these and separates them from forms of a prior order, and from each +other. He is also the ruler and king of all things: and is exempt from +the three demiurgi. For they, as Socrates says in the Gorgias, divide +the kingdom of their father; but Jupiter the demiurgus at once, without +division reigns over the three, and unically governs them. + +He is therefore the cause of the paternal triad, and of all +fabrication; but he connectedly contains the three demiurgi. And he +is _a king_ indeed, as being co-ordinated with the fathers; but _a +ruler_, as being proximately established above the demiurgic triad, and +comprehending the uniform cause of it. Plato therefore by considering +his name in two ways evinces that images receive partibly the unical +causes of paradigms, and that this is adapted to him who establishes +the intellectual duad in himself. For he gives subsistence to twofold +orders, the celestial, and the supercelestial; whence also the +theologist Orpheus says, that his sceptre consists of four and twenty +measures; as ruling over a twofold twelve.[440] + +That the soul of the world gives life to alter-motive natures; for to +these it becomes the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato says in +the Phædrus and Laws. But the demiurgus simply imparts to all things +life divine, intellectual, psychical, and that which is divisible about +bodies. No one however should think that the Gods in their generations +of secondary natures are diminished; or that they sustain a division of +their proper essence in giving subsistence to things subordinate; or +that they expose their progeny to the view, externally to themselves, +in the same manner as the causes of mortal offspring. Nor in short, +must we suppose that they generate with motion or mutation, but that +abiding in themselves, they produce by their very essence posterior +natures, comprehend on all sides their progeny, and supernally perfect +the productions and energies of their offspring. Nor again when it is +said that Gods are the sons of more total Gods, must it be supposed +that they are disjoined from more ancient causes, and are cut off +from a union with them; or that they receive the peculiarity of their +hyparxis through motion, and an indefiniteness converting itself to +bound. For there is nothing irrational and without measure, in the +natures superior to us. But we must conceive that their progressions +are effected through similitude; and that there is one communion of +essence, and an indivisible continuity of powers and energies, between +the sons of Gods and their fathers; all those Gods that rank in the +second order, being established in such as are more ancient; and the +more ancient imparting much of perfection, vigour, and efficacious +production to the subordinate. And after this manner we must understand +that Jupiter is said to be the son of Saturn. For Jupiter being the +demiurgic intellect proceeds from another intellect, superior and more +uniform, which increases indeed its proper intellections, but converts +the multitude of them to union; and multiplies its intellectual powers, +but elevates their all-various evolutions to impartible sameness. +Jupiter therefore proximately establishing a communion with this +divinity, and being filled from him with total intellectual good, +is very properly said to be the son of Saturn, both in hymns and in +invocations, as unfolding into light that which is occult, expanding +that which is contracted, and dividing that which is impartible in +the Saturnian monad; and as emitting a second more partial kingdom, +instead of that which is more total, a demiurgic instead of a paternal +dominion, and an empire which proceeds every where instead of that +which stably abides in itself. + +Why does Socrates apprehend the name of king Saturn to be υβριστικον +_insolent_, and looking to what does he assert this? We reply that +according to the poets _satiety_ (κορος) is the cause of _insolence_; +for they thus denominate immoderation and repletion; and they say +that _Satiety_ brought forth _Insolence_. (υβριν φασιν τικτει κορος). +He therefore who looks without attention to the name of Saturn, will +consider it as signifying _insolence_. For to him who suddenly hears +it, it manifests satiety and repletion. Why therefore, since a name +of this kind is expressive of insolence, do we not pass it over in +silence, as not being auspicious and adapted to the Gods? May we not +say that the royal series[441] of the Gods, beginning from Phanes and +ending in Bacchus, and producing the same sceptre supernally as far +as to the last kingdom, Saturn being allotted the fourth royal order; +appears according to the fabulous pretext, differently from the other +kings, to have received the sceptre insolently from Heaven, and to have +given it to Jupiter? For Night receives the sceptre from Phanes; Heaven +derives from Night, the dominion over wholes; and Bacchus who is the +last king of the Gods receives the kingdom from Jupiter. For the father +(Jupiter) establishes him in the royal throne, puts into his hand the +sceptre, and makes him the king of all the mundane Gods. “Hear me ye +Gods, I place over you a king.” + + κλυτε θεοι τον δ’υμμιν βασιλεα τιθημι, + +says Jupiter to the junior Gods. But Saturn alone perfectly deprives +Heaven of the kingdom, and concedes dominion to Jupiter, cutting +and being cut off as the fable says. Plato therefore seeing this +succession, which in Saturn is called by theologists _insolent_ +(υβριστικη) thought it worth while to mention the appearance of +insolence in the name; that from this he might evince the name is +adapted to the God, and that it bears an image of the insolence which +is ascribed to him in fables. At the same time he teaches us to refer +mythical devices to the truth concerning the Gods, and the apparent +absurdity which they contain, to scientific conceptions. + +That _the great_ when ascribed to the Gods, must not be considered as +belonging to interval, but as subsisting intellectually, and according +to the power of cause, but not according to partible transcendency. +But why does Plato now call Saturn διανοια the dianoetic part of the +soul? May we not say, that it is because he looks to the multitude of +intellectual conceptions in him, the orders of intelligibles, and the +evolution of forms which he contains; since also in the Timæus, he +represents the demiurgic intellect as reasoning, and making the world, +dianoetically energising: and this in consequence of looking to his +partible and divided intellections, according to which he fabricates +not only wholes but parts. When Saturn, however, is called intellect, +Jupiter has the order of the dianoetic part: and when again, Saturn is +called the dianoetic part, we must say that he is so called according +to analogy with reference to a certain other intellect of a higher +order. Whether therefore you are willing to speak of intelligible and +occult intellect, or of that which unfolds into light (εκφαντορικος +νους) or of that which connectedly contains (συνεκτικος νους) or of +that which imparts perfection,[442] (τελεσιουργος νους) Saturn will be +as the dianoetic part to all these. For he produces united intellection +into multitude, and fills himself wholly with excited intelligibles. +Whence also, he is said to be the leader of the Titannic race, and the +source of all-various separation and diversifying power. And perhaps +Plato here primarily delivers twofold interpretations of the name of +the Titans, which Jamblichus and Amelius afterwards adopted. For the +one interprets this name from the Titans extending their powers to all +things; but the other from _something insectile_ (παρα το τι ατομον) +because the division and separation of wholes into parts receives its +beginning from the Titans. Socrates therefore now indicates both these +interpretations, by asserting of the king of the Titans that he is a +_certain great dianoetic power_. For the term _great_ is as symbol +of power pervading to all things; but the term _a certain_, of power +proceeding to the most partial natures. + +That the name Saturn is now triply analysed; of which the first +asserting this God to be the plenitude of intellectual good, and to +be the satiety of a divine intellect, from its conveying an image +of the satiety and repletion which are reprobated by the many, is +ejected as insolent. The second also which exhibits the imperfect +and the puerile, is in like manner rejected. But the third, which +celebrates this God as full of purity, and as the leader of undefiled +intelligence, and an undeviating life, is approved. For king Saturn +is intellect, and the supplier of all intellectual life; but he is +an intellect exempt from co-ordination with sensibles, immaterial +and separate, and converted to himself. He likewise converts his +progeny and after producing them into light again embosoms and firmly +establishes them in himself. For the demiurgus of the universe, +though he is a divine intellect, yet he orderly arranges sensibles, +and provides for subordinate natures. But the mighty Saturn is +essentialized in separate intellections, and which transcend wholes. +“For the fire which is beyond the first, says the Chaldean Oracle, +does not incline its power downwards.” But the demiurgus is suspended +and proceeds from Saturn, being himself an intellect subsisting about +an immaterial intellect, energizing about it as the intelligible, +and producing that which is occult in it, into the apparent. For the +maker of the world is an intellect of intellect. And it appears to me, +that as Saturn is the summit of those Gods, that are properly called +intellectual, he is intellect, as with reference to the intelligible +genus of Gods. For all the intellectual adhere to the intelligible +genus of Gods, and are conjoined with them through intellections. +“Ye who understand the supermundane paternal profundity,” says the +hymn to them. But Saturn is intelligible, with reference to all the +intellectual Gods. _Purity_ therefore indicates this impartible +and imparticipable transcendency of Saturn. For the not coming into +contact with matter, the impartible, and an exemption from habitude, +are signified by purity. Such indeed is the transcendency of this +God with respect to all co-ordination with things subordinate, and +such his undefiled union with the intelligible, that he does not +require a Curetic guard, like Rhea, Jupiter, and Proserpine. For all +these, through their progressions into secondary natures, require the +immutable defence of the Curetes. But Saturn being firmly established +in himself, and hastily withdrawing himself from all subordinate +natures is established above the guardianship of the Curetes. He +contains however, the cause of these uniformly in himself. For this +purity, and the undefiled which he possesses, give subsistence to all +the progressions of the Curetes. Hence in the Oracles, he is said to +comprehend the first fountain of the Amilicti, and to ride on all the +others. “The intellect of the father riding on attenuated rulers, they +become refulgent with the furrows of inflexible and implacable fire.” + + Νους πατρος αραιοις εποχουμενος ιθυντηρσιν + Ακναμπτου αστραπτουσιν αμειλικτου πυρος ολκοις. + +He is therefore _pure intellect_, as giving subsistence to the +undefiled order, and as being the leader of the whole intellectual +series. + + Αυτου γαρ εκθρωσκουσιν αμειλικτοι τε κεραυνοι, + Και πρηστηροδοχοι κολποι παμφεγγεος αλκης. + Πατρογενους Εκατης, και υπεζωκος πυρος ανθος, + Ηδε κραταιον πνευμα πολων πυριων επεκεινα. + +i.e. “From him leap forth the implacable thunders, and the +prester-capacious bosoms of the all-splendid strength of the +father-begotten Hecate, together with the environed flower of fire, and +the strong spirit which is beyond the fiery poles.” + +For he convolves all the hebdomad of the fountains,[443] and gives +subsistence to it, from his unical and intelligible summit. For he is, +as the Oracles says, αμιστυλλευτος uncut into fragments, uniform, and +undistributed, and connectedly contains all the fountains, converting +and uniting all of them to himself, and being separate from all things +with immaculate purity. Hence he is κορονους, as an immaterial and pure +intellect, and as establishing himself in the paternal silence. He is +also celebrated as the father of fathers. Saturn therefore is a father, +and intelligible, as with reference to the intellectual Gods. + +That every intellect either abides, and is then intelligible, as being +better than motion; or it is moved, and is then intellectual; or it is +both, and is then intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. The +first of these is Phanes; the second which is alone moved is Saturn; +and the third which is both moved and permanent is Heaven. + +That Saturn from his impartible, unical, paternal, and beneficent +subsistence in the intellectual orders has been considered by some as +the same with the one cause of all things. He is however only analogous +to this cause, just as Orpheus calls the first cause _Time_ (χρονος) +nearly homonymously with Saturn. (κρονος) But the Oracles of the Gods +characterise this deity by the epithet of _the once_; (τῳ απαξ) calling +him _once beyond_ (απαξ επεκεινα). For _the once_ is allied to _the +one_. + +That _Heaven_ the father of Saturn, is an intellect understanding +himself indeed, but united to the first intelligibles; in which he is +also firmly established; and connectedly contains all the intellectual +orders, by abiding in intelligible union. This God too is _connective_, +just as Saturn is of a _separating_ idiom; and on this account he +is _father_. For connecting precede separating causes; and the +intelligible and at the same time intellectual such as are intellectual +only. Whence also _Heaven_ being the _Synocheys_ (συνοχευς) of wholes, +according to one union gives subsistence to the Titannic series, +and prior to this, to other orders of the Gods; some of which abide +only in him, which he retains in himself, but others both abide and +proceed, which he is said to have concealed, after they were unfolded +into light. And after all these he gives subsistence to those divine +orders, which proceed into the universe, and are separated from their +father. For he produces twofold monads, and triads, and hebdomads equal +in number to the monads. These things however will be investigated +more fully elsewhere. But this deity is denominated according to the +similitude of the apparent Heaven. For each of them compresses and +connects all the multitude which it contains, and causes the sympathy +and connection of the whole world to be one. For connection is second +to unifying power, and proceeds from it. In the Phædrus therefore Plato +delivers to us the production of all secondary natures by Heaven, and +shows us how this divinity leads upwards and convolves all things to +the intelligible. He likewise teaches us what its summit is, what the +profundity of its whole order, and what the boundary of the whole of +its progression. Here therefore investigating the truth of things from +names, he declares its energy with respect to things more elevated and +simple, and which are arranged nearer to _the one_. He also clearly +appears here to consider the order of Heaven, as intelligible and at +the same time intellectual. For if it sees things on high, it energizes +intellectually, and there is prior to it the intelligible genus of +Gods, to which looking it is intellectual; just as it is intelligible +to the natures which proceed from it. What then are the things on high +which it beholds? Is it not evident that they are, the supercelestial +place, an essence without colour, without figure, and without the +touch, and all the intelligible extent? An extent comprehending as +Plato would say intelligible animals, the one cause of all eternal +natures, and the occult principles of these; but as the followers of +Orpheus would say, bounded by æther upwards, and by Phanes downwards. +For all between these two gives completion to the intelligible order. +But Plato now calls this both singularly and plurally; since all things +are there united, and at the same time each is separated peculiarly; +and this according to the highest union and separation. + +With respect to the term μετεωρολογοι, i.e. _those who discourse on +sublime affairs_, we must now consider it in a manner adapted to +those who chuse an anagogic life, who live intellectually, and who +do not gravitate to earth, but sublimely tend to a theoretic life. +For that which is called Earth there, maternally gives subsistence to +such things as Heaven, which is co-ordinate to that Earth, produces +paternally. And he who energizes there, may be properly called +μετεωρολογος, or, _one who discourses about things on high_. Heaven +therefore, being of a _connective_ nature, is expanded above the +Saturnian orders, and all the intellectual series; and produces from +himself all the Titannic race; and prior to this, the perfective and +defensive orders: and in short is the leader of every good to the +intellectual Gods. Plato therefore, having celebrated Saturn, for his +intelligence which is without habitude to mundane natures, and for +his life which is converted to his own exalted place of survey, now +celebrates Heaven for another more perfect energy. For to be conjoined +to more elevated natures is a greater good than to be converted +to oneself. Let no one however think, that on this account the +above-mentioned energies are distributed in the Gods; as for instance, +that there is providence alone, in Jupiter, a conversion alone to +himself, in Saturn, and an elevation alone to the intelligible, in +Heaven. For Jupiter no otherwise provides for mundane natures than +by looking to the intelligible; since as Plato says in the Timæus, +intellect understanding ideas in animal itself, thought it requisite +that as many and such as it there perceived should be contained in the +universe; but as Orpheus[444] says with a divinely inspired mouth, +“Jupiter swallows his progenitor Phanes, embosoms all his powers, +and becomes all things intellectually which Phanes is intelligibly.” +Saturn also imparts to Jupiter the principles of fabrication, and of +providential attention to sensibles, and understanding himself, he +becomes united to first intelligibles, and is filled with the goods +which are thence derived. Hence also the theologist (Orpheus) says +“that he was nursed by Night.”[445] If therefore the intelligible +is nutriment, Saturn is replete not only with the intelligibles +co-ordinated with him, but also with the highest and occult +intellections. Heaven himself also fills all secondary natures with +his proper goods, but guards all things by his own most vigorous +powers; and the father supernally committed to him the connecting and +guarding the causes of eternal animal. But he intellectually perceives +himself, and is converted to the intelligibles which he contains; and +this his intelligence, Plato in the Phædrus calls _circulation_. For +as that which is moved in a circle is moved about its own centre, so +Heaven energizes about its own intelligible, according to intellectual +circulation. But all the Gods subsisting in all, and each possessing +all energies, one transcends more in this, and another in a different +energy, and each is particularly characterised according to that in +which it transcends. Thus Jupiter is characterised by providence, +and hence his name is now thus analysed; but Saturn by a conversion +to himself, whence also he is _inflected counsel_ αγκυλομητις; and +Heaven by habitude to things more excellent; from which also he +receives his appellation. For his giving subsistence to a pure and +the Saturnian intellect, represents his energy to the other part. But +as there are many powers in Heaven, such as the connective, guardian, +and convertive, you will find that this name is appropriately adapted +to all these. For the connective is signified through bounding the +intellectual Gods; since the connective bounds the multitude which +he contains. The power which guards wholes subsists through the +termination and security of an intellectual essence. And the convertive +power subsists through converting seeing, and intellectually-energizing +natures, to things on high. But all these are adapted to Heaven. For +there is no fear that the Gods will be dissipated, and that on this +account they require connective causes; or that they will sustain +mutation, and that on this account they stand in need of the saving aid +of guardian causes; but now Socrates at once manifests all the powers +of Heaven, through convertive energy. For this is to behold things +on high, to be converted to them, and through this to be connected +and defended. And it appears to me that Heaven possesses this idiom +according to analogy to the intelligible eternity and the intelligible +wholeness. For Timæus particularly characterizes eternity by this, +viz. by abiding in the one prior to it, and by being established in +the summit of intelligibles; and Socrates says that Heaven surveys +things on high, viz. the supercelestial place, and such things as are +comprehended in the god-nourished silence of the fathers. (και οσα τῃ +θεοθρεμμονι σιγῃ περιειληπται των πατερων). As therefore Parmenides +signifies each of these orders through _wholeness_, the one through +intelligible, and the other through intellectual wholeness; in like +manner both Timæus and Socrates characterise them by a conversion to +more excellent natures. But the conversion as well as the wholeness +is different. For that of eternity is intelligible, on which account +Timæus does not say that it looks to its intelligible, but only that +it stably abides. But the conversion of Heaven is intellectual, and on +this account Socrates says that it sees things on high, and through +this converts, guards, and connects all things posterior to itself. +Whence also in the Phædrus, it is said by the circulation of itself, +to lead all things to the supercelestial place, and the summit of the +first intelligibles. + +That there being three fathers and kings of which Socrates here +makes mention, Saturn alone appears to have received the government +from his father, and to have transmitted it to Jupiter, by violence. +Mythologists therefore celebrate the sections of Heaven and Saturn. +But the cause of this is, that Heaven is of the connective, Saturn +of the Titannic, and Jupiter of the demiurgic order. Again, the +Titannic genus rejoices in separations and differences, progressions +and multiplications of powers. Saturn therefore, as a dividing God, +separates his kingdom from that of Heaven; but as a pure intellect he +is exempt from a fabricative energy proceeding into matter. Hence also +the demiurgic genus is again separated from him. Section therefore +is on both sides of him. For so far as he is a Titan, he is cut off +from the connective causes, but so far as he does not give himself to +material fabrication, he is cut off from the demiurgus Jupiter. + +That with respect to the supercelestial place to which Heaven extends +his intellectual life, some characterise it by ineffable symbols; but +others after giving it a name celebrate it as unknown, neither being +able to speak of its form, or figure. And proceeding somewhat higher +than this, they have been able to manifest the boundary[446] of the +intelligible Gods by name alone. But the natures which are beyond this, +they signify through analogy alone, these natures being ineffable and +incomprehensible. Since that God who closes the paternal order, is +said by the wise to be the only deity among the intelligible Gods, +that is denominated: and theurgy ascends as far as to this order. +Since therefore the natures prior to Heaven, are allotted such a +transcendency of uniform subsistence, that some of them are said to +be effable, and at the same time ineffable, known, and at the same +time unknown, through their alliance to _the one_, Socrates very +properly restrains the discourse about them, in consequence of names +not being able to represent their hyparxes; and in short, because +it requires a certain wonderful employment, to separate the effable +and ineffable, of their hyparxis or power. He accuses therefore his +memory, not as disbelieving in the fables, which assert that there are +certain more ancient causes beyond Heaven, nor as not thinking it worth +while to mention them. For in the Phædrus he himself celebrates the +supercelestial place. But he says this, because the first of beings +cannot become known by the exercise of memory and through phantasy, or +opinion, or the dianoetic part. For we are alone naturally adapted to +be conjoined to them, with the flower of intellect and the hyparxis +of our essence; and through these we receive the sensation of their +unknown nature. Socrates therefore says, that what in them is exempt, +both from our gnostic and recollective life, is the cause of our +inability to give them a name; for they are not naturally adapted to be +known through names. Theologists likewise would not remotely signify +them, and through the analogy of things apparent to them, if they could +be named, and apprehended by knowledge. + +That Homer[447] does not ascend beyond the Saturnian order, but +evincing that Saturn is the proximate cause of the demiurgus, he +calls Jupiter, who is the demiurgus, the son of Saturn. He also calls +the divinities co-ordinate with him Juno, Neptune, and Mars; and he +denominates Jupiter, the father of men and Gods. But he does not +introduce Saturn, as either energizing, or saying any thing, but as +truly αγκυλομητις in consequence of being converted to himself. + +That Orpheus greatly availed himself of the licence of fables, and +manifests every thing prior to Heaven by names, as far as to the +first cause. He also denominates the ineffable, who transcends the +intelligible unities, _Time_; whether because _Time_ pre-subsists as +the cause of all generation, or because, as delivering the generation +of true beings, he thus denominates the ineffable, that he may indicate +the order of true beings, and the transcendency of the more total to +the more partial; that a subsistence according to Time may be the same +with a subsistence according to cause; in the same manner as generation +with an arranged progression. But Hesiod venerates many of the divine +natures in silence, and does not in short name the first. For that what +is posterior to the first proceeds from something else, is evident from +the verse, + + “Chaos of all things was the first produced.” + +For it is perfectly impossible that it could be produced without a +cause; but he does not say what that is which gave subsistence to +Chaos. He is silent indeed with respect to both the fathers[448] of +intelligibles, the exempt, and the co-ordinate; for they are perfectly +ineffable. And with respect to the two co-ordinations, the natures +which are co-ordinate with the one, he passes by in silence, but those +alone which are co-ordinate with the indefinite duad, he unfolds +through genealogy. And on this account Plato now thinks Hesiod deserves +to be mentioned, for passing by the natures prior to Heaven, as being +ineffable. For this also is indicated concerning them by the Oracles, +which likewise add “they possess mystic silence,” σιγ’ εχε μυστα. And +Socrates himself in the Phædrus, calls the intellectual perception of +them μυησις and εποπτεια, _in which nearly the whole business is +ineffable and unknown_. + +That Saturn in conjunction with Rhea produced Vesta and Juno who are +co-ordinate to the demiurgic causes. For Vesta imparts from herself +to the Gods an uninclining permanency, and seat in themselves, +and an indissoluble essence. But Juno imparts progression, and a +multiplication into things secondary. She is also the vivifying +fountain of wholes, and the mother of prolific powers; and on this +account she is said to have proceeded together with Jupiter the +demiurgus; and through this communion she generates maternally, such +things as Jupiter generates paternally. But Vesta abides in herself, +possessing an undefiled virginity, and being the cause of sameness to +all things. Each of these divinities however together with her own +proper perfection, possesses according to participation the power of +the other. Hence some say that Vesta is denominated from essence (απο +της εστιας) looking to her proper hyparxis. But others looking to her +vivific and motive power which she derives from Juno say that she +is thus denominated ως ωσεως ουσαν αιτιαν _as being the cause of +impulsion_. For all divine natures are in all, and particularly such +as are co-ordinate with each other, participate of, and subsist in each +other. Each therefore of the demiurgic and vivific orders, participates +the form by which it is characterised, from Vesta. The orbs of the +planets likewise possess the sameness of their revolutions from her; +and the poles and centres are always allotted from her their rest. + +That Vesta does not manifest essence, but the abiding and firm +establishment of essence in itself; and hence this goddess proceeds +into light after the mighty Saturn. For the divinities prior to +Saturn have not a subsistence in themselves and in another,[449] but +this originates from Saturn. And a subsistence in _self_ is the +peculiarity of Vesta, but in _another_ of Juno. + +That the theology of Hesiod from the monad Rhea produces according +to things which are more excellent in the co-ordination, Vesta, but +according to those which are subordinate Juno; and according to those +which subsist between, Ceres. But according to Orpheus, Ceres is in +a certain respect the same with the whole of vivification, and in a +certain respect is not the same. For on high she is Rhea, but below in +conjunction with Jupiter, she is Ceres: for here the things begotten +are similar to the begetters, and are nearly the same. + +That we ought to receive with caution what is now said concerning +effluxions and motions. For Socrates does not descend to the material +flowing of Heraclitus; for this is false,[450] and unworthy the +dianoetic conceptions of Plato. But since it is lawful to interpret +things divine analogously, through appropriate images, Socrates very +properly assimilates fontal and Saturnian deities to streams; in so +doing jesting and at the same time acting seriously, because good is +always derived as it were in streams from on high, to things below. +Hence, according to the image of rivers, after the fontal deities, +who eternally devolve streams of good, the deities who subsist as +principles are celebrated. For after the _fountain_ of a river the +place where it _begins_ to flow is surveyed. + +That those divinities who are peculiarly denominated total intellectual +gods, of whom the great Saturn is the father, are properly called +fontal. For “from him leap forth the implacable thunders,” says the +oracle concerning Saturn. But concerning the vivific fountain Rhea +from which all life, divine, intellectual, psychical and mundane is +generated, the Chaldean oracles thus speak. + + Ρειη τοι νοερων μακαρων πηγη τε ροη τε. + Παντων γαρ πρωτη δυναμεις κολποισιν αφραστοις + Δεξαμενη, γενεην επι παν προχεει τροχαουσαν. + +i.e. “Rhea[451] is the fountain and river of the blessed intellectual +Gods. For first receiving the powers of all things in her ineffable +bosoms, she pours running generation into every thing.” + +For this divinity gives subsistence to the infinite diffusion of all +life, and to all never-failing powers. She likewise moves all things +according to the measures of divine motions, and converts them to +herself; establishing all things in herself, as being co-ordinate to +Saturn. Rhea therefore is so called from causing a perpetual influx of +good, and through being the cause of divine _facility_, since the +life of the gods is attended with _ease_ (θεοι ρεια ζωντες). + +That Ocean is the cause to all the Gods of acute and vigorous energy, +and bounds the separations of the first, middle, and last orders; +converting himself to himself, and to his proper principles, through +swiftness of intellect, but moving all things from himself, to energies +accommodated to their natures; perfecting their powers, and causing +them to have a never-failing subsistence. But Tethys imparts permanency +to the natures which are moved by Ocean, and stability to the beings +which are excited by him to the generation of secondary natures. She is +also the source of purity of essence to those beings who perpetually +desire to produce all things; as sustaining every thing in the divine +essences which as it were _leaps forth and percolates_. For each +of first causes, though it imparts to secondary natures a participation +of good, yet at the same time retains with itself that which is +undefiled, unmingled and pure from participation. Thus for instance, +intellect is filled with life, being, and intelligence, with which also +it fills soul; but establishing in itself that which in each of these +is genuine and exempt, it also illuminates from itself to beings of +a subordinate rank, inferior measures of these goods. And vigour of +energy indeed, is present with more ancient natures, through Ocean; +but the leaping forth and percolating through Tethys. For every thing +which is imparted from superior to subordinate natures, whether it be +essence, life, or intelligence, is _percolated_. And such of these +as are primary, are established in themselves; but such as are more +imperfect, are transferred to things of a subject order. Just as with +respect to streams of water, such of them as are nearer their source +are purer, but the more remote are more turbid. Both Ocean and Tethys +therefore, are fontal Gods, according to their first subsistence. +Hence Socrates now calls them the fathers of streams. But they also +proceed into other orders of Gods, exhibiting the same powers among +the Gods who rank as principles or rulers, among those of a liberated, +and those of a celestial characteristic; and appropriately in each of +these. Timæus, however, celebrates their sublunary orders, calling them +fathers of Saturn and Rhea, but the progeny of Heaven and Earth. But +their last processions are their divisible allotments about the earth; +both those which are apparent on its surface, and those which under the +earth, separate the kingdom of Hades, from the dominion of Neptune. + +That Saturn is conjoined both to Rhea and Jupiter, but to the +former as father to prolific power, but to the latter, as father to +intelligible[452] intellect. + +That Ocean is said to have married Tethys, and Jupiter Juno, and +the like, as establishing a communion with her, conformably to the +generation of subordinate natures. For an according co-arrangement of +the Gods, and a connascent co-operation in their productions, is called +by theologists _marriage_. + +That Tethys is denominated from leaping forth and _straining_ or +_cleansing_, being as it were _Diatethys_, and by taking away the first +two syllables _Tethys_.[453] + +That Saturn is the monad of the Titannic order of the Gods, but Jupiter +of the demiurgic. This last divinity however is twofold, the one exempt +and co-ordinated with Saturn, being a fontal God, and in short ranking +with the intellectual fathers, and convolving the extremity of them; +but the other being connumerated with the sons of Saturn, and allotted +a Saturnian summit and dominion in this triad; concerning which also +the Homeric Neptune says, + + τρεις γαρ τ’ εκ Κρονου ειμεν αδελφεοι, ους τεκε Ρειη.[454] + + As brother Gods we three from Saturn came, + And Rhea bore us. + +And the first Jupiter indeed, as being the demiurgus of wholes, is the +king of things first, middle, and last, concerning whom Socrates also +had just said, that he is the ruler and king of all things; and life +and salvation are imparted to all things through him. + +But the ruling Jupiter, who ranks as a principle, and who is +co-ordinate with the three sons of Saturn governs the third part of the +whole of things, according to that of Homer, + + τριχθα δε παντα δεδασται----[455] + + A triple distribution all things own. + +He is also the summit of the three, has the same name with the fontal +Jupiter, is united to him, and is monadically called Jupiter. But the +second is called dyadically, marine Jupiter, and Neptune. And the third +is triadically denominated, terrestrial Jupiter, Pluto, and Hades. +The first of these also preserves, fabricates, and vivifies summits, +but the second, things of a second rank, and the third those of a +third order. Hence this last is said to have ravished Proserpine, that +together with her he might animate the extremities of the universe. + +That the Titannic order dividing itself from the connecting order of +Heaven, but having also something in itself abiding, and connascent +with that order, Saturn is the leader of the separation, and on +this account he both arms others against his father, and receives +the scythe[456] from his mother, through which he divides his own +kingdom from that of Heaven. But Ocean is co-ordinated with those that +abide[457] in the manners of the father, and guards the middle of the +two orders; so far as a Titan being connumerated with the Gods that +subsist with Saturn; but so far as rejoicing in a co-ordination with +Heaven conjoining himself with the Synoches. For it is fit that he who +bounds the first and second orders, should be arranged in the middle +of the natures that are bounded. But every where this god is allotted +a power of this kind, and separates the genera of the Gods, the +Titannic from the connecting (των συνοχικων) and the vivific from the +demiurgic. Whence also ancient rumor calls Ocean the God who separates +the apparent part of Heaven from the unapparent; and on this account +poets say, that the sun and the other stars rise from the ocean. What +is now said therefore by Plato comprehends all the Titannic order +through these two conjunctions; this order abiding and at the same time +proceeding. And through the Saturnian order indeed, it comprehends +every thing separated from the fathers; but through that of Ocean, +every thing conjoined with the connecting Gods. Or if you had rather +so speak, through the Saturnian order, he comprehends every maternal +cause, but through the other, every thing subservient to the paternal +cause. For the female is the cause of progression and separation, but +the male of union and stable permanency. + +That of the demiurgic triad[458] which divides the whole world, and +distributes the indivisible, one and whole fabrication of the first +Jupiter, the summit, and which has the relation of father is Jupiter, +who through union with the whole demiurgic intellect having the same +appellation with it, is for this reason not mentioned here by Plato. +But Neptune is allotted the middle and that which binds together both +the extremes; being filled indeed from the essence of Jupiter, but +filling Pluto. For of the whole of this triad, Jupiter indeed is the +father, but Neptune the power, and Pluto the intellect. And all indeed +are in all; but each receives a different character of subsistence. +Thus Jupiter subsists according to _being_; but Neptune according to +_power_, and Pluto according to _intellect_. And though all these +divinities are the causes of the life of all things, yet one is so +_essentially_, another _vitally_, and another _intellectually_. Whence +also the theologist Orpheus says, that the extremes fabricate in +conjunction with Proserpine things first and last; the middle being +co-arranged with generative cause from his own allotment, without +Proserpine. Hence _violence_ is said to have been offered to Proserpine +by Jupiter; but she is said to have been _ravished_ by Pluto. (διο +και φασι την κορην υπο μεν τον διος βιαζεσθαι, υπο δε του πλοντωνος +αρπαζεσθαι.) But the middle is said to be the cause of motion to all +things. Hence also, he is called _earth-shaker_, as being the origin +of motion. And among those who are allotted the kingdom of Saturn, the +middle allotment, and the agile sea (η ευκινηγος θαλaσσa) are assigned +to him. According to every division therefore, the summits are Jovian, +the middles belong to Neptune, and the extremes to Pluto. And if you +look to the centres, such as the east, that of mid-heaven and the west; +if also you divide the whole world, as for instance into the inerratic, +planetary and sublunary spheres;--or again, if you divide that which is +generated into the fiery, terrestrial, and that which subsists between; +or the earth into its summits, middle, and hollow, and subterranean +parts, this triad every where distributes the first, middle and last +differences of things fabricated in demiurgic boundaries. + +That the name Neptune is now triply analysed. For Neptune is the +trident-bearer, and the Tritons, and Amphitrite are the familiars of +this God. And the first analyzation of his name is from the allotment +over which he presides, and from souls coming into generation, in whom +the circle of sameness is fettered; since the sea is analogous to +generation. But the second is from communion with the first. + + αλλα Ζευς προτερος γεονει, και πλειονα ηδει.[459] + +But Jove was born the first, and more he knew. For a Jupiter of this +kind, is the proximate intelligible of Neptune. But the third analysis +of his name is from his energy in externals. For he is motive of +nature, and vivific of things last. He is also the guardian of the +earth, and excites it to generations. + +That Neptune is an intellectual demiurgic God, who receives souls +descending into generation; but Hades is an intellectual demiurgic +God, who frees souls from generation. For as our whole period +receives a triple division, into a life prior to generation, which +is Jovian, into a life in generation which is Neptunian, and into +a life posterior to generation which is Plutonian; Pluto, who is +characterised by intellect, very properly converts ends to beginnings, +effecting a circle without a beginning, and without an end, not only +in souls, but also in every fabrication of bodies, and in short, of +all periods;--which circle also, he perpetually convolves. Thus for +instance, he converts the ends to the beginnings of the souls of +the stars, and the convolutions of souls about generation, and the +like. And hence Jupiter is the guardian of the life of souls prior to +generation. + +That some badly analyze the name of Pluto into wealth from the earth, +through fruits and metals; but Hades into the invisible, dark and +dreadful. These Socrates now reprobates, bringing the two names to +the same signification; referring the name of Pluto, as intellect, +to the wealth of prudence, but that of Hades to an intellect +knowing all things. For this God is a sophist, who purifying souls +after death, frees them from generation. For Hades is not, as some +improperly explain it, evil: for neither is death evil; though Hades +to some appears to be attended with perturbations (εμπαθως); but it +is invisible and better than the apparent; such as is every thing +intelligible. Intellect therefore, in every triad of beings, convolves +itself to being, and the paternal cause, imitating in its energy the +circle. + +That men who are lovers of body, badly refer to themselves the passions +of the animated nature, and on this account consider death to be +dreadful, as being the cause of corruption. The truth however is, that +it is much better for man to die, and live in Hades a life according to +nature, since a life in conjunction with body is contrary to nature, +and is an impediment to intellectual energy. Hence it is necessary to +divest ourselves of the fleshly garments with which we are clothed, +as Ulysses did of his ragged vestments, and no longer like a wretched +mendicant together with the indigence of body, put on our rags. For as +the Chaldean Oracle says, “Things divine cannot be obtained by those +whose intellectual eye is directed to body; but those only can arrive +at the possession of them, who stript of their garments hasten to the +summit.” + +That Neptune when compared with Jupiter is said to know _many_ things; +but Hades compared with souls to whom he imparts knowledge is said to +know _all_ things; though Neptune is more total than Hades. + +That as it is necessary to analyse Pluto, not only into the obvious +wealth from the earth, but also into the wealth of wisdom, so likewise +Ceres must be analysed not only into corporeal nutriment; but beginning +from the Gods themselves it is requisite to conceive her to be the +supplier of aliment, first to the Gods themselves, afterwards to the +natures posterior to the Gods; and in the last place, that the series +of this beneficent energy extends as far as to corporeal nutriment. For +the characteristic of love shines forth first of all in the Gods: and +this is the case with the medicinal and prophetic powers of Apollo, and +with those of every other divinity. But nutriment, when considered with +reference to the Gods, is the communication of intellectual plenitude +from more exalted natures to those of an inferior rank. Gods therefore, +are nourished, when they view with the eye of intellect Gods prior to +themselves; and when they are perfected and view intelligible beauties, +such as justice itself, temperance itself, and the like, as it is said +in the Phædrus. + +That from sportive conceptions about the Gods, it is possible for those +to energize entheastically, or according to a divinely inspired energy, +who apply themselves to things in a more intellectual manner. Thus +for instance, according to the material conceptions of the multitude, +Venus derives her origin from foam; and foam corresponds to seed. +Hence according to them the pleasure arising from this in coition is +Venus. Who however, is so stupid, as not to survey primary and eternal +natures, prior to such as are last and corruptible? I will therefore +unfold the divine conception respecting Venus. + +They say then that the first Venus was produced from twofold +causes, the one as that _through which_,[460] co-operating with her +progression, as calling forth the prolific power of the father, and +imparting it to the intellectual orders; but Heaven as the maker +and cause unfolding the goddess into light, from his own generative +abundance. For whence could that which congregates different genera, +according to one desire of beauty, receive its subsistence except +from the _synochical_ power of Heaven? From the foam therefore of his +own prolific parts thrown into the sea, Heaven produced this goddess, +as Orpheus says. But the second Venus, Jupiter produces from his +own generative powers, in conjunction with Dione; and this goddess +likewise proceeds from foam, after the same manner with the more +ancient Venus, as Orpheus evinces. These goddesses therefore differ +from each other, according to the causes of their production, their +orders and their powers. For she that proceeds from the genitals of +Heaven is supermundane, leads upwards to intelligible beauty, is the +supplier of an unpolluted life, and separates from generation. But +the Venus that proceeds from Dione governs all the co-ordinations +in the celestial world and the earth, binds them to each other, and +perfects their generative progressions, through a kindred conjunction. +These divinities too, are united with each other through a similitude +of subsistence: for they both proceed from generative powers; one +from that of the connectedly-containing power of Heaven, and the +other from Jupiter the demiurgus. But the sea signifies an expanded +and circumscribed life; its profundity, the universally-extended +progression of such a life; and its foam, the greatest purity of +nature, that which is full of prolific light and power, and that which +swims upon all life, and is as it were its highest flower. + +That according to Orpheus Ceres is the same with Rhea. For he says +that subsisting on high in unproceeding union with Saturn, she is +_Rhea_, but that by emitting and generating Jupiter, she is _Ceres_. +For thus he speaks, + + Ρειην το πριν εουσαν, επει διος επλετο μητηρ + Γεγονε δημητηρ.[461] + + i.e. The goddess who was _Rhea_, when she bore Jove became Ceres. + +But Hesiod says that Ceres is the daughter of Rhea. It is however +evident, that these theologists harmonize: for whether this goddess +proceeds from union with Saturn to a secondary order, or whether she +is the first progeny of Rhea, she is still the same. Ceres therefore, +thus subsisting, and receiving the most ancient and ruling order from +the whole vivific Rhea, (της ολης Ζωογονου ρεας) and comprehending the +middle centres of whole vivification, (της ολης Ζωογονιας) she fills +all supermundane natures with the rivers of all-perfect life, pouring +upon all things vitally, indivisibly, and uniformly. + +Prior however to all this, she unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect, +(Jupiter) and imparts to him the power of vivifying wholes. For as +Saturn supplies her from on high with the cause of being; so Ceres from +on high, and from her own prolific bosoms, pours forth vivification to +the demiurgus. But possessing herself the middle of all vivific deity, +she governs the whole fountains which she contains, and comprehends the +one bond of the first and last powers of life. She stably convolves +too, and contains all secondary fountains. But she leads forth the +uniform causes of prior natures to the generation of others. This +goddess too comprehends _Vesta_ and _Juno_: in her right hand parts +Juno, who pours forth the whole order of souls; but in her left hand +parts Vesta, who leads forth all the light of virtue. Hence, Ceres +is with great propriety called by Plato,[462] _mother_, and, at the +same time the _supplier of aliment_. For, so far as she comprehends in +herself the cause of Juno, she is a mother; but as containing Vesta in +her essence, she is the supplier of aliment. But the paradigm of this +goddess is _Night: for immortal Night is called the nurse of the Gods_. +Night however is the cause of aliment intelligibly:[463] for that which +is intelligible is, according to the oracle,[464] the aliment of the +intellectual orders of Gods. But Ceres first of all separates the two +kinds of aliment in the Gods, as Orpheus says: + + Μησατο γαρ προπολους, και αμφιπολους, και σπαδους· + Μησατο δ’ αμβροσιην, και ερυθρου νεκταρος αρθρον· + Μησατο δ’ αγλαα εργα μελισσαων εριβομβων.[465] + + i.e. She cares for pow’rs ministrant, whether they + Or Gods _precede_, or _follow_, or _surround_: + _Ambrosia_, and _tenacious nectar red_ + Are too the objects of her bounteous care. + Last to the bee her providence extends, + Who gathers honey with resounding hum. + +Ceres therefore, our sovereign mistress (δεσποινα) not only generates +life, but that which gives perfection to life; and this from supernal +natures to such as are last: _for virtue is the perfection of souls_. +Hence mothers who are connected with the circulations of time, bring +forth their offspring in imitation of this twofold and eternal +generation of Ceres. For, at the same time that they send forth their +young into the light, they extend to them milk naturally produced as +their food. + +That the conjunction of the demiurgic intellect with the vivific causes +is triple: for it is conjoined with the fountains prior to itself; is +present with its kindred co-ordinate natures; and co-energizes with +the orders posterior to itself. For it is present with the mother +prior to itself, _convertively_; (επιστρεπτικως) with Proserpine +posterior to itself, _providentially_; (προνοητικως) and with Juno +co-ordinate to itself with an _amatory energy_ (ερασμιως). Hence +Jupiter is said to be enamoured of Juno, + + ως σεο νυν εραμαι[466] + + As now I love thee,---- + +And this love indeed is legal, but the other two appear to be illegal. +This goddess therefore produces from herself in conjunction with the +demiurgus and father all the genera of souls, the supermundane and +mundane, the celestial and sublunary, the divine, angelic, dæmoniacal, +and partial. After a certain manner too, she is divided from the +demiurgus, but in a certain respect she is united to him: for Jupiter +is said, in the Philebus, to contain a royal intellect and a royal +soul. For he contains uniformly the paternal and maternal cause of the +world; and the fountain of souls is said to be in Jupiter; just as +again, the intelligence of Jupiter is said to be first participated by +Juno. For no other divinity, says Jupiter in Homer, knows my mind prior +to Juno. Through this ineffable union therefore of these divinities, +the world participates of intellectual souls. They also give +subsistence to intellects who are carried in souls, and who together +with them give completion to the whole fabrication of things. + +That the series of our sovereign mistress Juno, beginning from on high +pervades to the last of things; and her allotment in the sublunary +region is the air. For _air_ is a symbol of _soul_, according to which +also, soul is called a _spirit_ (πνευμα); just as _fire_ is an image of +_intellect_, but _water_ of _nature_, by which the world is nourished, +(της κοσμοτρφου φυσεως) through which all nutriment and increase are +produced. But _earth_ is the image of _body_, through its gross and +material nature. Hence Homer obscurely signifying this, represents Juno +suspended with two anvils under her feet: for the air is allotted two +heavy elements beneath itself. + +For + + ηλιον δ’ ακαμαντα βοωπις ποτνια ηρη + πεμψεν επ’ ωκεανοιο ροας + +i.e. “Fair-eyed venerable Juno sent the sun to the streams of the +ocean,”--is from the same conception. + +For he calls the thick cloud produced by Juno, the setting of the sun. +The assertion likewise that the end of this name will be conjoined +with the beginning, if any one frequently repeats the name of the +goddess, evinces the conversion of rational souls to her which proceed +from her; and that voice is air that is struck. On this account also +the voice of rational animals is especially dedicated to this goddess, +who made the horse of Achilles to become vocal. But Socrates now +delivers these three vivific monads in a consequent order, viz. Ceres, +Juno, Proserpine; calling the first the mother, the second the sister, +and the third the daughter of the demiurgus. All of them however are +partakers of the whole of fabrication; the first in an exempt manner +and intellectually, the second in a fontal manner and at the same time +in a way adapted to a principle (αρχικως) and the third, in a manner +adapted to a principle and leader (αρχικως και ηγεμονικως). + +Of these goddesses the last possesses triple powers, and impartibly +and uniformly comprehends three monads of Gods. But she is called +Core (κορη) through the purity of her essence, and her undefiled +transcendency in her generations. She also possesses a first, middle +and last empire. And according to her summit indeed, she is called +Diana by Orpheus; but according to her middle Proserpine; and according +to the extremity of the order Minerva. Likewise, according to an +hyparxis transcending the other powers of this triple vivific order, +the dominion of Hecate is established; but according to a middle power, +and which is generative of wholes, that of Soul; and according to +intellectual conversion that of virtue.[467] Core therefore, subsisting +on high, and among the supermundane Gods, uniformly extends this triple +order of divinities; and together with Jupiter generates Bacchus, +who impartibly presides over partible fabrication. But beneath, in +conjunction with Pluto, she is particularly beheld according to the +middle peculiarity; for it is this which proceeding every where imparts +vivification to the last of things. Hence she is called Proserpine, +because she especially associates with Pluto, and together with him +orderly distributes the extremities of the universe. And according +to her extremities indeed, she is said to be a virgin, and to remain +undefiled; but according to her middle, to be conjoined with Hades, +and to beget the Furies in the subterranean regions. She therefore is +also called Core, but after another manner than the supermundane and +ruling Core. For the one is the connective unity of the three vivific +principles; but the other is the middle of them, in herself possessing +the peculiarities of the extremes. Hence in the Proserpine conjoined +with Pluto, you will find the peculiarities of Hecate and Minerva; but +these extremes subsist in her occultly, while the idiom of the middle +shines forth, and that which is characteristic of ruling soul, which +in the supermundane Core _was of a ruling_[468] nature, but here +subsists according to a mundane peculiarity. + +That Proserpine is denominated, either through judging of forms +and separating them from each other, thus obscurely signifying the +ablation of slaughter (δια το κρινειν τα ειδη και χωριζειν αλληλων, +ως του φονου την αναιρεσιν αινιττομενον) or through separating souls +perfectly from bodies, through a conversion to things on high, which +is the most fortunate slaughter and death, to such as are worthy +of it. (η δια το χωριζειν τας ψυχας τελεως εκ των σωματων δια της +προς τα ανω επιστροφης, οπερ εστιν ευτυχεστατος φονος και θανατος +τοις αξιουμενοις τουτου.) But the name φερεφαττα _Pherephatta_, +according to a contact with generation is adapted to Proserpine; but +according to wisdom and counsel to Minerva. At the same time however +all the appellations by which she is distinguished are adapted to the +perfection of soul. On this account also she is called Proserpine, +and not by the names of the extremes; since that which was ravished +by Pluto is the middle; the extremes at the same time being firmly +established in themselves, according to which Core is said to remain a +virgin. + +With respect to our sovereign mistress Diana, Plato delivers three +peculiarities of her, the undefiled, the mundane, and the anagogic. +And through the first of these indeed, the goddess is said to be a +lover of virginity; but through the second, according to which she is +perfective of works (τελεσιουργος) she is said to be the inspective +guardian of virtue; and through the third she is said to hate the +impulses arising from generation. Of these three likewise, the first +is especially adapted to the progression of the goddess, according +to which she is allotted an hyparxis in the vivific triad of the +supermundane Gods; whether we call this deity Hecatic, as Theurgists +say, or Diana with Orpheus. For there being established, she is filled +with undefiled powers from the Gods called _Amilicti_.[469] But +she looks to the fountain of virtue, and embraces its virginity. For +the virginity which is there does not proceed forth, as the Oracle +says, but abiding gives subsistence to Diana, and to supermundane +virtue, and is exempt from all communion, conjunction and progression, +according to generation. Hence Core also, according to the Diana and +Minerva which she contains, is said to remain a virgin; but according +to the prolific power of Proserpine, she is said to proceed forth, and +to be conjoined with the third demiurgus, and to bring forth as Orpheus +says, “nine azure-eyed, flower-producing daughters;” + + εννεα θυγατερας γλαυκωπιδας ανθεσιουργους. + +since the Diana and the Minerva which she contains preserve their +virginity always the same. For the former of these is characterised +according to her stability, but the latter according to her convertive +energy. But that which is generative is allotted in her a middle order. +They say too, that she aspires after virginity, since the form of her +is comprehended in the vivific fountain, and she understands fontal +virtue, gives subsistence to supermundane and anagogic virtue, and +despises all material sexual connexion, though she inspects the fruits +arising from it. + +She appears also to be averse to the generations and progressions of +things, but to introduce perfections to them. And she gives perfection +indeed to souls through a life according to virtue; but to mortal +animals she imparts a restitution to form. But that there is a great +union between Diana, the mundane Hecate, and Core, is evident to +those that are in the least degree conversant with the writings of +Orpheus; from which it appears that Latona is comprehended in Ceres, +and together with Jupiter gives subsistence to Core, and the mundane +Hecate. To which we may also add that Orpheus[470] calls Diana Hecate. +So that it is nothing wonderful, if we should elsewhere call the Diana +contained in Core Hecate. + +“Again, theologists especially celebrate two powers of our sovereign +mistress Minerva, the _defensive_, and the _perfective_; the former +preserving the order of wholes undefiled, and unvanquished by +matter, and the latter filling all things with intellectual light, +and converting them to their cause. And on this account, Plato also +in the Timæus, analogously celebrates Minerva as _philopolemic_ and +_philosophic_. But three orders of this Goddess are delivered by +theologists; the one fontal and intellectual, according to which she +establishes herself in her father Jupiter, and subsists in unproceeding +union with him; but the second ranks among the supermundane Gods, +according to which she is present with Core, and bounds and converts +all the progression of that Goddess to herself. And the third is +_liberated_, according to which she perfects and guards the whole +world, and circularly invests it with her powers, as with a veil; +binding together all the mundane summits, and giving subsistence +to all the allotments in the heavens, and to those which proceed +into the sublunary region. Now therefore Socrates celebrates her +_guardian_ power, through the name of _Pallas_; but her perfective +power through that of _Minerva_. She is the cause therefore of orderly +and measured motion, which she first imparts to the Curetic order, and +afterwards to the other Gods. For Minerva according to this power is +the leader of the Curetes, as Orpheus says, whence also, as well as +those divinities she is adorned with empyrean arms, through which she +represses all disorder, preserves the demiurgic series immoveable, and +unfolds dancing through rhythmical motion. She also guards reason as +it proceeds from intellect; through this power vanquishing matter. +For the visible region, says Timæus, is mingled from intellect and +necessity, the latter being obedient to the former, and all material +causes being in subjection to the will of the father. It is this +goddess therefore, who arranges necessity under the productions of +intellect, raises the universe to the participation of Jupiter, excites +and establishes it in the port of its father, and eternally guards and +defends it. Hence, if the universe is said to be indissoluble, it is +this goddess who supplies its permanency; and if it moves in measured +motion, through the whole of time, according to one reason and order, +she is the source of this supply. She watchfully surveys therefore all +the fabrication of her father, and connects and converts it to him; and +vanquishes all material indefiniteness. Hence she is called _Victory_ +and _Health_; the former because she causes intellect to rule over +necessity, and form over matter; and the latter, because she preserves +the universe perpetually whole, perfect, exempt from age, and free from +disease. It is the property therefore of this goddess to elevate and +distribute, and through an intellectual dance as it were, to connect, +establish, and defend inferior natures in such as are more divine.”[471] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] For γονων, it is necessary to read γενων. + +[2] It appears to me that πρωτως is in this place omitted in the +original. + +[3] For αριστα, I read αριστην. + +[4] For κατα τουτο, it is necessary to read κατα ταυτον. + +[5] For διακρινον, it is necessary to read διατεινον. + +[6] For αυτο, I read αυτῳ. + +[7] Instead of εκ της διακοσμησεως, it is necessary to read εκ ταυτης +διακοσμησεως. + +[8] For οπως, it is necessary to read πως, and in consequence of this, +the sentence should not be, as it is in the original, interrogatory. + +[9] From the version of Portus, it appears necessary after the words +τους μεν, αφ’εαυτου τε, to supply the words του νοερου πατρος, τους δε +αφ’εαυτου τε κ. τ. λ. + +[10] For της ολης, it is necessary to read τοις ολοις. + +[11] For τοις ολοις, it is necessary to read τοις πολλοις. + +[12] The word αστρον is omitted in the original. + +[13] εν is omitted in the original. + +[14] For παντος it is necessary to read πατρος. + +[15] αφ’ου signifies an occult, but υφ’ου, a manifest progression. + +[16] For εξῃρηται, it is necessary to read εξηρτηται. + +[17] For επιστησωμεν, I read επισκεψωμεν. + +[18] For γονιμου, it is necessary to read μονιμου. + +[19] For νεαρας, it is necessary to read νοερας. + +[20] The following observations were written in the margin of the +manuscript copy of this work of Proclus, by some scholiast or +commentator: “For end and that which is perfected, and the possession +of beginning, middles and end, first subsist in the intelligible and +at the same time intellectual Gods. And on this account figure, also, +there presents itself to the view. This triad, therefore, in the whole +assimilative series is analogous to intelligibles and intellectuals, as +having from them[21] the beginning, middles, and end. For the demiurgus +produced this triad according to the similitude of the perfective +triad, and connected the straight and the circular with motion. For to +bound in a direct path, and to proceed circularly, are definitive of +motion, as was said by Proclus in the Chapter prior to this. And as +this triad has these properties from intelligibles and intellectuals, +thus also the whole series of assimilative Gods possess them from +this triad. Hence this triad of partial demiurgi, is analogous to the +intelligible and intellectual fathers, i.e. to the perfective power.” + +[21] For απ’ αυτης, it is necessary to read απ’ αυτων. + +[22] For δε ὄντως, it is necessary to read δεοντως. + +[23] It appears to me that after και αι ζητησεις in the original, there +are wanting the words των προνοουντων, ωσπερ. + +[24] For τριας here, it is necessary to read τριαδος. + +[25] The word μιας is omitted in the original. + +[26] For των αγαθων, it is necessary to read τῳ αγαθῳ. + +[27] For θειον νοητον, it is necessary to read θειον γεννητον; every +perpetually circulating body being thus denominated by Plato. + +[28] For νοητοις here, it is necessary to read γεννητοις. + +[29] For περιοδοις, it is necessary to read προοδοις. + +[30] For υπ’ αλληλων it is necessary to read υπ’ αλλων. + +[31] For πασης, it is necessary to read πασι. + +[32] For παρα τι, it is necessary to read περατι. + +[33] It is necessary here to supply the word ομοιου. + +[34] For εαυτῳ, it is necessary to read εαυτο. + +[35] For υλικης, it is necessary to read ολικης. + +[36] It is necessary here to substitute και for το. + +[37] Instead of περι αυτων, it is necessary to read περι αυτην. + +[38] i.e. Phanes, or in Platonic language animal itself, subsisting at +the extremity of the intelligible order. + +[39] i.e. Imitating Saturn and Phanes. + +[40] The Greek scholiast observes on this part of the text of +Proclus as follows: “By the _intellectual_, Proclus means the +_ruling_ Gods; but by an immaterial and separate intellect the +whole demiurgus. And by _essence_ he means a partial hypostasis, +such as that of soul, of a dæmon, and of the intellect which is +co-ordinate to partial souls.” + +[41] For νοητου here, it is necessary to read νοερου. + +[42] viz. The genera of being, essence, sameness, difference, motion +and permanency. + +[43] For εσχατον, it is necessary to read εχουσιν. + +[44] For εν δε, if is necessary to read αι δε. + +[45] By intelligible souls, we must understand partial, but undefiled +souls. + +[46] For χωρικον, it is necessary to read χωριστον. + +[47] Instead of περι τον κοσμον, it is necessary to read υπερ τον +κοσμον. + +[48] For περιοδους, it is necessary to read προοδους. + +[49] For δυαδος, it is necessary to read δυναμεως. + +[50] For εξηςτηται, it is necessary to read εξηρηται. + +[51] For ουτε, it is necessary to read ουκουν. + +[52] For οχετον, I read οχλον. + +[53] For την απογεννησιν, it is necessary to read της απογεννησεως. + +[54] For γονιμον, it is necessary to read μονιμον. + +[55] For αφαιρησωμεθα, it is necessary to read αφορισωμεθα. + +[56] For αρρητον, it is necessary to read αρρηκτον. + +[57] For αυτοτελες, it is necessary to read ατελες. + +[58] For περιφορας, I read περιγραφας. + +[59] For μερων, it is necessary to read Μοιρων. + +[60] In the original το δε μελλον is omitted. + +[61] For τα παραγοντα, it is necessary to read τα παροντα. + +[62] In the original ουχ απτομενον is omitted. + +[63] In the original χωριστον εστι, is wanting. + +[64] For περιοδῳ, it is necessary to read προοδῳ. + +[65] Vid. Sallust. de Diis et Mundo, Cap. 6. + +[66] Vid. Procl. in Tim. p. 45. + +[67] Vid. Jamblich. de Mysteriis Sect. I. Cap. 8. + +[68] Vid. Jamblich. de Myst. Sect. I. Cap. 9. + +[69] Vid. Jamblich. de Myst. Sect. I. Cap. 17. + +[70] Vid. Jamblich. de Myst. Sect. I. Cap. 19. + +[71] See the 5th Book of this work, in which this speech is admirably +discussed by Proclus, though not so fully as in these extracts. + +[72] For μεν ειναι το παμπαν αθανατους in the original, it is necessary +to read μη ειναι κ. τ. λ. + +[73] Instead of νοητον, it is requisite to read νοητῳ. + +[74] This divinity is Vulcan. + +[75] παρ’ ετερου is omitted in the original. + +[76] The words και λυτον απλως παρ’ εαυτου και παρ’ ετερου, are omitted +in the original. + +[77] For ενδοσιν, it is necessary to read ενωσιν. + +[78] Κεχαρασμενην is erroneously printed for κεχαλασμενην. + +[79] After την παραδειγματικην it is necessary to supply the words δια +του καλως, την δημιουργικην, which are wanting in the original. + +[80] The words και λυτοι are omitted in the original. + +[81] For αυτου φυσιν, it is necessary to read αυτων φυσιν. + +[82] Instead of του μη θνητου, it is necessary to read του θνητου. + +[83] The original has erroneously μονας instead of μονον. + +[84] For μετα βουλης, I read μεταβολης. For the mundane Gods are in no +part of the Timæus represented as consulting about the fabrication of +things. + +[85] i.e. Proserpine. + +[86] For τελειοτατα, it is necessary to read τελειοτητα. + +[87] For τα θειοτα, it is necessary to read τα θειοτατα. + +[88] Iliad xx. v. 24. + +[89] Instead of δια τινων εγκοσμιων, it is necessary to read δια τι των +εγκοσμιων. + +[90] αθανατως is omitted in the original. + +[91] For εξ ου σωματος, it is necessary to read εξω σωματος. + +[92] For λυπης, it is requisite to read λοιπης. + +[93] i.e. Jupiter, who is so called in this place by Proclus, because +he contains in himself by participation, the Phanes or Protogonus who +is the paradigm of the universe. + +[94] For πονηρια, it is necessary to read πενια. + +[95] For ιδρυαν, it is necessary to read ιδρυσιν. + +[96] σαφῃ is erroneously printed for αφῃ. + +[97] For και βαθεων, it is necessary to read και βαθμων. + +[98] For πατρος, it is necessary to read παντος. + +[99] Here also for πατρι, it is necessary to read παντι. + +[100] Vid. Proclum in Tim. p. 275. + +[101] These ολοτητες, according to the Platonic philosophy, have so +far as they are wholes, a perpetual subsistence, and are the spheres +of the fixed stars, the spheres of the planets, the sphere of air, the +globe on which we live, and the ocean. See more on this subject in my +Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle. + +[102] Vid. Procl. in Tim. p. 257 and 279. + +[103] Hence, we may perceive at one view, as I have elsewhere observed, +why the sun in the Orphic hymns is called Jupiter, why Apollo is called +Pan, and Bacchus the Sun; and why the moon seems to be the same with +Rhea, Ceres, Proserpine, Juno, Venus, &c. For from this theory it +follows, that every sphere contains a Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Vesta, +Minerva, Mars, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, and in +short, every deity,--each sphere at the same time conferring on these +Gods the peculiar characteristics of its nature; so that for instance, +in the sun they possess a solar property; in the moon a lunar one; and +so of the rest. + +This theory too is one of the grand keys to the theology of the Greeks; +as it shows why one God is so often celebrated by the appellations of +another; an ignorance of the cause of which led Macrobius to think that +all the Gods were nothing more than the different powers of the sun, +and has been one great source of the idle conjectures of the moderns +about the divinities of the ancients. + +[104] Vid. Procl. in Tim. lib. 4. p. 263. + +[105] For περιοδον, it is necessary to read προοδον. + +[106] For γνωριζειν, it is necessary to read οριζει. + +[107] According to the Chaldaic dogmas, as explained by Psellus, there +are seven corporeal worlds, one empyrean and the first; after this +three etherial; and then three material worlds, viz. the inerratic +sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region. They +also assert that there are two solar worlds; one which is subservient +to the etherial profundity; the other zonaic, being one of the seven +spheres. + +[108] Viz. The supermundane Gods. + +[109] It must be carefully observed, however, that this is only true of +the Gods characteristically called supermundane. For it does not apply +to the Gods who are _primarily_ intellectual, since they are above +the supermundane order, to which the sun and Apollo belong. + +[110] That is, according to the Chaldæan oracles, the sun is the middle +of the empyrean, etherial, and material worlds, the two last of which, +as I have observed in a former note, receive a triple division. + +[111] These verses are not in Gesner’s collection of the Orphic +fragments. + +[112] These lines are from Empedocles, and in the original are as +follow: + + Ενθα κοτος τε φονος τε και αλλων εθνεα κηρων, + Αυχμηραι τε νοσοι, και σηψεις, εργα τε ρευστα. + + +[113] Vide Jamblich. de Myst. lib. i. cap. 18. + +[114] In Tim, lib. i. p. 51. + +[115] For χορευτων in this place, it is necessary to read χορων των. + +[116] Iliad. viii. + +[117] Iliad. viii. + +[118] In Tim. p. 48. + +[119] This triad consists of Minerva, Diana, and Proserpine. + +[120] The former part of this inscription is to be found in Plutarch’s +treatise of Isis and Osiris; but the latter part, viz. _the fruit +which I brought forth was the sun_, is only to be found in the above +Commentary of Proclus. The original is, ον εγω καρπον ετεκον ηλιος +εγενετο. + +[121] viz. In _ether_ or _bound_, the summit of the intelligible triad. + +[122] Instead of σχηματος, it is necessary to read οχηματος. + +[123] For according to Plato, plants also, as having life, are animals. + +[124] For δαιμονικας here, it is necessary to read ηγεμονικας. + +[125] παντικα is erroneously printed in the original for μαντικα. + +[126] For αιωνιοι, it is evidently necessary to read in this place +παιωνιοι. + +[127] Apud Porphyr. de Abstin. + +[128] It is necessary here to supply the word θειον. + +[129] It is requisite to read κατ εκεινον, instead of κατ εκεινην. + +[130] The word ουρανιων is omitted in the original. + +[131] It is obviously necessary here for εαυτων to read εαυτου. + +[132] εγγονοι is omitted in the original. + +[133] This is doubtless the Sibyl, of whom Proclus also observes (in +Tim. p. 325.) “that proceeding into light, she knew her own order, and +manifested that she came from the Gods, saying I am the medium between +Gods and men.” ειδε γαρ τοι Σιβυλλα εις φως, και την ταξιν εαυτης, και +ως εκ θεων ηκει δεδηλwκεν, ειμι δ’ εγω μεση τε θεων εἰπουσα μεση τ’ +ἀνθρωπων. + +[134] For επιπορευοντων, it is necessary to read επιτροπευοντων. + +[135] Some of the moderns, from being profoundly ignorant of this +circumstance, have stupidly supposed that the Gods of the ancients were +nothing more than dead men deified; taking for their guides on this +important subject, mere historians, philologists, and rhetoricians, +instead of philosophers. + +[136] For επι της, it is necessary to read επι γης. + +[137] For αποκαταστασεως, it is requisite to read αποστασεως. + +[138] In the original αλογων is erroneously printed for αναλογων. + +[139] This is a very ancient Egyptian doctrine. And hence Kircher in +his Oedipus Egyptiacus says that he read the following words engraved +in a stone near Memphis: _Coelum sursum, coelum deorsum, quod sursum id +omne deorsum, hæc cape et beaberis_, _i.e._ _Heaven is above and heaven +is Beneath. Every thing which is above is also beneath. Understand +this, and you will be blessed._ Conformably to this also the celebrated +Smaragdine Table, which is of such great authority with the Alchemists, +and which whether originally written or not by Hermes Trismegistus, is +doubtless of great antiquity, says that all that is beneath resembles +all that is above. But the Table itself is as follows: “Verum sine +mendacio, certum et verissimum: quod est inferius, est sicut id quod +est superius, et quod est superius, est sicut id, quod est inferius +ad perpetrandum miraculum unius rei. Et sicut res omnes fuerunt ab +uno mediatione unius, sic omnes res natæ ab hac re adoptatione. Pater +ejus est sol, mater ejus luna. Portavit illud ventus in ventre suo. +Nutrix ejus terra, pater omnis telesmi totius mundi est hic. Virtus +ejus integra est, si versa fuerit in terram. Separabis terram ab igne, +subtile a spisso suaviter cum magno ingenio. Ascendit a terra in +coelum, iterumque descendit in terram, et recipit vim superiorum et +inferiorum. Sic habebis gloriam totius mundi, ideo fugiet à te omnis +obscuritas. Hæc est totius fortitudinis fortitudo fortis, quia vincet +omnem rem subtilem, omniaque solida penetrabit. Sic mundus creatus est. +Hinc erunt adoptationes mirabiles, quarum modus hic est. Itaque vocatus +sum Hermes Trismegistus habens tres partes philosophiæ totius mundi. +Completum est quod dixi de opere solis.” i.e. “It is true without a +lie, certain, and most true, that what is beneath is like that which is +above, and what is above is like that which is beneath, for the purpose +of accomplishing the miracle of one thing. And as all things were +from one through the mediation of one, so all things were generated +from this thing by adoption [i.e. by participation.] The sun is its +father, and the moon its mother. The wind carried it in its belly. +The earth is its nurse. This is the father of all the perfection of +the whole world. Its power is entire when it is converted into earth. +You must separate the earth from the fire, the subtil from the thick +sweetly with great genius. It ascends from earth to heaven, and again +descends to the earth, and receives the power of things superior and +inferior. Thus you will have the glory of the whole world, and thus +all obscurity will fly from you. This is the strong fortitude of all +fortitude, because it vanquishes every subtile thing, and penetrates +all solid substances. Thus the world was fabricated. Hence admirable +adoptions will take place of which this is the mode. I am therefore +called Hermes Trismegistus possessing three parts of the philosophy of +the whole world. That which I have said concerning the work of the sun +is complete.” + +[140] Instead of και γαρ ουρανιαν και την σεληγην Ορφευς προσηγορευσεν, +the sense requires we should read και γαρ ουρανιαν γην την σεληνην, κ. +λ. + +[141] For εκ τ’ αυτου, it is necessary to read εκ τ’ αγαθου. + +[142] Instead of λεγω δη τοις του Ουρανου τουδε συνοχικης μεσοτηρος, it +is requisite to read λεγω δια της του Ουρανου, κ. λ. + +[143] For τριαδην, it is necessary to read τριαδαις. + +[144] For νοερων, read νοητων. + +[145] For αποριαν, read απειριαν. + +[146] For ενιαυτον here, it is necessary to read ενιαιον. + +[147] Plato, in the 10th book of the Laws, distinguishes the genus of +motions into ten species, viz. circulation about an immoveable centre, +local transition, condensation, rarefaction, increase, decrease, +generation, corruption, mutation or alteration, produced in another by +another, and a mutation produced from a thing itself, both in itself, +and in another. This last is the motion of an essence separate from +bodies, and is the motion of soul. + +[148] For γονιμον here, it is necessary to read μονιμον. + +[149] πατρος is erroneously printed instead of πατερες. + +[150] As this is a remarkably curious Orphic fragment, and is not to be +found in Gesner’s collection of the Orphic remains, I shall give the +original for the sake of the learned reader. και τοι γε οτι ο κρονος +υπερτερος εστι του ωκεανου, δεδηλωκεν ο θεολογος παλιν λεγων· τον μεν +κρονον αυτον καταλαμβανειν τον ουρανιον ολυμπον, κᾳκει θρονισθεντα, +βασιλευειν των τιτανων· τον δε ωκεανον την ληξιν απασαν την μεσην· +ναιειν γαρ αυτον εν τοις θεσπεσιοις ρειθροις τοις μετα τον ολυμπον, και +τον εκει περιεπειν ουρανον, αλλ’ου τον ακροτατον, ως δε φησιν ό μυθος, +τον εμπεσοντα του ολυμπου, και εχει τεταγμενον. + Procl. in Tim. p. 296. + +[151] For μετ’αυτου, it is necessary to read μετ’αυτης. + +[152] For Θαυμαντα, it is requisite to read Θαυμαντος; and for ποντον, +ποντῳ. + +[153] The original here is evidently erroneous; for it is, ου γαρ εστιν +ο φορκυς ουρανιδης αλλα ο φορκυς, ως εστι δηλον εκ της θεογονιας. For +αλλα ο φορκυς, therefore, I read αλλα ο Ωκεανος; Ocean, according to +the Theogony of Hesiod, being the progeny of Heaven and Earth. + +[154] Κρονος is erroneously printed for χρονος. + +[155] For της υγρας υλης ουσιας, I read της υγρας ολης ουσιας. + +[156] The words ημεις δε εκομενως are omitted in the original. + +[157] For διανοηθεις, it is necessary to read διακινηθεις. + +[158] For αφανη here it is necessary to read εμφανη. + +[159] The meaning of Proclus in asserting that the ennead proceeds +from the monad as far as to the extremities without retrogression is +as follows: The ennead, according to the Pythagoreans, circulates +all numbers within itself, and there can be no number beyond it. For +the natural progression of numbers is as far as to 9, but after it +their retrogression takes place. For 10 becomes as it were again the +monad. Thus, if from each of the numbers 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, +17, 18, and 19, the number 9 is subtracted, the numbers that remain +will be 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. And vice versa, the progression +will receive an increase by the addition of 9. For, if to each of the +numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c. 9 is added, the numbers produced will be 10, +11, 12, 13, &c. Likewise by subtracting from 20 twice 9, from 30 thrice +9, from 40 four times 9, from 50 five times 9 &c, the numbers 2, 3, 4, +5, 6, &c will be produced. By taking likewise from 100 eleven times 9, +we again return to the monad. And after the same manner we may proceed +to infinity. Hence it is not possible there should be any elementary +number beyond the ennead. Hence too the Pythagoreans, called it Ocean +and the Horizon, because all numbers are comprehended by and revolve +within it. On this account likewise, it was called by them Halios, +(παρα το αλιζειν) and Concord and Perseïa because it congregates +all numbers, and collects them into one, and does not permit the +conspiration of the numbers beyond it to be dissipated. Vid. Anonym. in +opere quod inscripsit τα θεολογουμενα της αριθμητικης. + +[160] For εισι, it is requisite to read προεισι. + +[161] προοδους is omitted in the original. + +[162] In the original it is παραπετα instead of παραπετασματα. + +[163] These thirty-six decadarchs are the divinities alluded to by the +Emperor Julian in his Oration to the Sun, when he says, “that the Sun +divides the zodiac into twelve powers of Gods, and each of these into +three others, so that thirty-six are produced in the whole.” + +[164] This is implied by Socrates telling him that he inquires about +_great_ things. + +[165] In Tim. p. 184. + +[166] This is according to the psychical mode of interpreting fables. +See my translation of Sallust On the Gods and the World. + +[167] This is a life pertaining to her own will; for the soul in this +case gives herself up to the will of divinity. + +[168] For an account of divine fables, and specimens of the mode in +which they ought to be explained, see the Introduction to the second +Book of the Republic, in Vol. I. of my translation of Plato. + +[169] Iliad. lib. viii. + +[170] For the irrational soul is an _immaterial body_, or in other +words, _vitalized extension_, such as the mathematical bodies +which we frame in the phantasy; and the celestial bodies are of this +kind. + +[171] It is necessary here to supply the word θειων. + +[172] For τρεφει here, it is necessary to read στρεφει. + +[173] For δεσμων here read θεσμων. + +[174] In Tim. p. 59. + +[175] Lib. ii. p. 81. + +[176] i.e. Angels, dæmons, and heroes. + +[177] Lib. iv. p. 240, &c. + +[178] Viz. the Sun considered as subsisting in the supermundane order +of Gods. + +[179] “But we will certainly do whatsoever thing goeth forth out of our +own mouth, to burn incense unto the queen of heaven, and to pour out +drink offerings unto her, as we have done, we, and our fathers, our +kings, and our princes, in the cities of Judah, and in the streets of +Jerusalem: for _then had we plenty of victuals, and were well, and +saw no evil_. But since we left off to burn incense to the queen of +heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, _we have wanted all +things_, and have been consumed by the sword and by the famine.” +Jeremiah, Chap. xliv, v. 17, 18. + +[180] In this dialogue, Plato assimilates the intimate form of the soul +to a winged chariot and charioteer, drawn by two horses; and says, +“that all the horses and chariots of the Gods are good, and composed of +things that are good.” In which passage, by the chariots of the Gods +are to be understood all the inward discursive powers of their souls, +which pursue the intelligence of all things, and can at the same time +equally contemplate and provide for inferior concerns. But the horses +signify the efficacy and motive vigour of these powers. And the wings +are elevating powers, which particularly belong to the charioteer, or +intellect. + +[181] I. e. In the summit of that order which is called intelligible +and at the same time intellectual. + +[182] ποιμαινων πραπεδεσσιν ανομματον ωκυν ερωτα. + +[183] The author of these verses comprehends the triple genera that +are more excellent than man, viz. angels, dæmons and heroes, under the +appellation of illustrious heroes. + +[184] It must however, be carefully observed, that this divine cause +illuminates, invigorates, and excites these circles in the most +unrestrained and impassive manner, without destroying freedom of energy +in the circles themselves, or causing any partial affection, sympathy +or tendency in illuminating deity. + +[185] See a most masterly defence of the character of Achilles as a +hero in my translation of Proclus’s noble apology for Homer, in the +first Volume of my Plato. + +[186] Vid. Iamblich. de vita Pythag. Cap. 2. + +[187] And this essence, as is shown in the 4th book, subsists at the +summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order. + +[188] This forms the middle of the above-mentioned order. + +[189] This forms the extremity of that order. + +[190] Viz. to Saturn, who subsists at the summit of the intellectual +order. + +[191] Instead of και δια το μη λεγειν, το διδον αει γινομενος, it is +necessary to read δια το μη ληγειν το διδον, αει γινομενος. + +[192] For ορωμενος here, it is necessary to read ορμωμενος. + +[193] Wholes whether corporeal or incorporeal are thus denominated. + +[194] For συνεκτεινατο, it is necessary to read συνετεκταινετο. + +[195] i.e. a circular motion. + +[196] Proclus elsewhere informs us in these Commentaries, that the soul +of the world is called by Orpheus _Ippa_. + +[197] i.e. Vesta. + +[198] i.e. Juno. + +[199] i.e. Having a good dæmon. + +[200] Instead of εις δαιμων εγενετο μεγας αρχος απο παντων, it is +requisite to read εις δαιμων γενετο μεγας αρχος απαντων. + +[201] For αφανη here, it is necessary to read εμφανη. + +[202] For συμβολικης των θεων παρουσιας, it is requisite to read +συμβολικα της των, κ. λ. + +[203] After του οντως here, it is requisite to supply οντος. + +[204] The part within the brackets is wanting in the original, in which +there is evidently a defect, as the stars at the end of the proposition +indicate. + +[205] Here also the part within the brackets is wanting in the original. + +[206] For εαυτῳ here it is necessary to read εαυτο. + +[207] It is here necessary to supply the words αφ’ εαυτου. + +[208] This is asserted by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics. + +[209] In Prop. 5. + +[210] For τοις αιτιοις here, it is obviously necessary to read τοις +αιτιατοις. + +[211] For ων το μεν αυτην διδωσι, it is necessary to read ων το μετ’ +αυτην διδωσι. + +[212] From the 11th Proposition. + +[213] From the 7th Proposition. + +[214] ει is wanting in the original. + +[215] This is asserted in the Phædrus of Plato. + +[216] That if an essence is inseparable from body, it is impossible +that the energy proceeding from this essence should be separate from +body, Aristotle also demonstrates in his treatise On the Soul. + +[217] The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, though +perfectly necessary to the demonstration of the Proposition. Hence, the +words ολον κινει, μερος δε κινειται, η, must be supplied. + +[218] For if the whole moves, the part which is moved will at the same +time be motive. + +[219] The truth of this may be exemplified in light. Thus for instance +we see many species of light; one kind emanating from the sun, another +from fire and the stars, another from the moon, and another from +the eyes of many animals. But this light though various, is every +where similar, and discovers in its operations a unity of nature. On +account of its uniformity therefore, it requires one principle and not +different principles. But the sun is the only principle of all mundane +light. And though there are many participants of light posterior to +the solar orb, yet they scatter their uniform light, through one solar +nature, property and power. But if we again seek for the principle of +light in the sun, we cannot say that the solar orb is this principle; +for the various parts of it diffuse many illuminations. There will +therefore, be many principles. But we now require one first principle +of light. And if we say that the soul of the sun generates light, we +must observe that this is not effected by her psychical multiplicity, +or she would diffuse different lights. Hence we must assert that she +generates visible by intellectual light. But again this production does +not subsist through intellectual variety, but rather through the unity +of intellect which is its flower and summit. This unity is a symbol +of that simple unity which is the principle of the universe. And to +this principle the solar intellect is united by its unity; and through +this it becomes a God. This divine unity of the sun therefore, is the +principle of the uniform light of the world, in the same manner as +simple unity and goodness is the source of intelligible light to all +intelligible natures. + +[220] The imparticipable is that which is not consubsistent with a +subordinate nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is the intellect +which is not consubsistent with soul, but is exempt from it. And +imparticipable soul is the soul which is not consubsistent with body. +And so in other things. + +[221] Instead of ει γαρ αγονον, it is necessary to read η γαρ αγονον. + +[222] The original here is both defective and incorrect. Instead +therefore of τινος γενομενον υφ’ ου μαχεται, I read παν δε τινος +γενομενον υφ’ ου μετεχεται. + +[223] Instead of και οτι αλλο in this place, it appears to me to be +necessary to read και οτι αλλως. + +[224] Instead of μετ’ αυτου here, it is necessary to read μετ’ αυτο. + +[225] For παρον here, it is necessary to read παραγον. + +[226] Instead of προς παν here, it is necessary to read προς αιτιον. + +[227] Instead of πως το διακριθεν, it is necessary to read πως το μη +διακριθεν. + +[228] For το απ’ αυτου here, it is necessary to read τῳ απ’ αυτου. + +[229] For το επιστρεφον, it is requisite to read το μη επιστερφον. + +[230] There is a defect here in the original, which may be supplied, if +instead of εστι την απο της ουσιας προς εαυτο επιστρεπτικον we read ει +ουν εστι κατα την απο της ουσιας ενεργειαν προς εαυτο επιστρεπτικον. + +[231] ουπω is omitted in the original. + +[232] For μεριστην εαυτου, it is requisite to read μεριστον εαυτον. + +[233] The truth of this reasoning may be evinced by the following +considerations. Every thing which is measured by time, and such is +every corporeal nature, depends on time for the perfection of its +being. But time is composed of the past, present and future. And if +we conceive that any one of these parts is taken away from the nature +with which it is connected, that nature must immediately perish. Time +therefore is so essentially and intimately united with the natures +which it measures, that their being such as it is, depends on the +existence of time. But time, as is evident, is perpetually flowing, +and this in the most rapid manner imagination can conceive. It is +evident therefore, that the natures to which it is so essential, must +subsist in a manner equally transitory and flowing; since, unless they +flowed in conjunction with time, they would be separated from it, and +would consequently perish. Hence, as we cannot affirm with propriety +of any part of time, that it _is_; since even before we can form +the assertion, the present time is no more; so with respect to all +corporeal natures, from their subsistence in time, before we can say +they exist, they lose all identity of being. + +Such then is the unreal condition of every thing existing in time, or +of every thing corporeal, and entangled with matter. But this shadowy +essence of body is finely unfolded by Plotinus, in the 6th book of +his 3rd Ennead, as follows: “Being (says he) properly so called is +neither body, nor is subject to corporeal affections; but body and +its properties belong to the region of non-entity. But you will ask, +how is it possible, that visible matter should possess no real being; +that matter in which stones and mountains reside, the solid earth, and +bodies which mutually resist; since bodies which impel each other, +confess by their collision, the reality of their existence? You will +likewise ask after what manner things which neither strike against, +nor resist each other, which neither externally act, nor internally +suffer, nor are in any respect the objects of sight, viz. soul and +intellect, are to be reckoned true and real beings. We reply, that on +the contrary, things more corpulent are more sluggish and inert, as is +evident in bulky masses of earth. But whatever is less ponderous is +more moveable, and the more elevated the more moveable. Hence fire, the +most moveable of all the elements, flies as it were from a corporeal +nature. Besides, as it appears to me, whatever is more sufficient to +itself, disturbs others less and brings less inconvenience; but such +things as are more ponderous and terrene, unable from their defect of +being to raise themselves on high and becoming debile and languid, +strike and oppress surrounding bodies, by their falling ruin and +sluggish weight. Since it is evident that bodies destitute of life, +fall with molestation on any proximate substance, and more vehemently +impel and pain whatever is endued with sense. On the contrary, animated +beings, as participating more of entity, by how much the more of +being they possess, by so much the more harmless they impinge their +neighbouring bodies. Hence motion, which is a kind of life, or soul, or +an imitation of life in bodies, is more present with whatever is less +corpulent; as if more of body was necessarily produced where a defect +of being happens in a greater degree. + +Again, it will more manifestly appear from passivity, that whatever +is more corpulent is more passive; earth in a greater degree than +the other elements; and the rest in a similar proportion. For some +things when divided, suddenly return to their former union, when no +obstacle prevents their conjunction. But from the section of a terrene +body, the divided portions always remain separate, as if destitute +of natural vigour, and without any inherent desire of union and +consent. Hence, they are ready by every trifling impulse, to remain +as they are impelled; to rush from the embraces of bound, and hasten +into multitude and non-entity. So that whatever becomes corporeal in +an eminent degree, as falling fast into non-entity, has but little +power of recalling itself into one. And on this account ponderous and +vehement concussions are attended with ruin, when by mutual rushing +one thing impels another. But when debility runs against debility, +the one is valid against the other, in the same manner as non-entity +rushing on non-entity. And this we think a sufficient confutation of +their opinion, who only place being in the genus of body, persuaded by +the testimony of impulses and concussions, and the phantasms perceived +through the senses, which testify that sense is the only standard of +truth. Such as these are affected in a manner similar to those in a +dream, who imagine that the perceptions of sleep are true. For sense is +alone the employment of the dormant soul; since as much of the soul as +is merged in body, so much of it sleeps. But a true elevation, and true +vigilance are a resurrection from, and not with the dull mass of body. +For indeed a resurrection with body, is only a transmigration from +sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream, like a man passing in the dark +from bed to bed. But that elevation is perfectly true, which entirely +rises from the dead weight of bodies. For these possessing a nature +repugnant to soul, possess something opposite to essence. And this is +farther evident, from their generation, and their continual flowing and +decay, which are properties entirely foreign from the nature of being +substantial and real.” + +[234] ποτε is omitted in the original. + +[235] It is necessary here to supply the word αυθυποστατων. + +[236] For εις το αιτιωτερον, it is necessary to read εις το αιτιατον. + +[237] ολον is omitted in the original. + +[238] i.e. Any thing which is not universal (το τι). + +[239] του οντος seems to be wanting here in the original. + +[240] αιτιου is omitted in the original. + +[241] i.e. As the Greek Scholiast observes in the margin of this +Proposition, from the efficacious cause of that which acts, and the +aptitude of that which suffers. + +[242] The words το ποιουν ενεργειᾳ ον ο αυτο δυναμει, are wanting in +the original. + +[243] The Proposition ends here in the Greek, though very erroneously; +and its conclusion forms the beginning of the next Proposition, which +should begin at the words εαν το οντως ον. But instead of εαν, we must +read παν. + +[244] i.e. With natures rising into existence, or becoming to be, as +opposed to the things which are, or to beings _truly_ so called +(τα οντως οντα). + +[245] Instead of παντως το οντως ον, it is doubtless necessary to read +παν το οντως ον. + +[246] Instead of δει πρωτον εξ αμφοιν ειναι, it is necessary to read +δει προ του εξ αμφοιν ειναι. + +[247] τι is omitted in the original. + +[248] After οτι, there is a chasm in the original, and the words that +are wanting appear to be δε αϊδιοτης απειρια τις εστιν. + +[249] There is evidently a very gross error here in the original which +is as follows: και γαρ εν τοις μεριστοις αι δυναμεις συναγομεναι +μεν, πολλαπλασιαζονται, μεριζομεναι δε, αμυδρουνται. For powers when +congregated are not multiplied, but united. Hence it is necessary to +read και γαρ εν τοις μεριστοις αι δυναμεις συναγομεναι μεν, ενιζονται, +μεριζομεναι δε, πολλαπλασιαζονται, και αμυδρουνται. + +[250] By a strange mistake the original has απειρον here, instead of +πεπερασμενον, and in the next line πεπερασμενον instead of απειρον. + +[251] For αιτιοις here it is necessary to read αιτιατοις. + +[252] Hence, as all things proceed from _the ineffable_, that +which is imparticipable proceeds also from it, yet not as from a cause, +but as from that which is better than cause. The procession, therefore, +of the imparticipable from the ineffable is αρρητος εκφανσις, _an +ineffable evolution into light_. + +[253] Instead of πολλα γαρ ζῃ μεν, ζῃ, και νοει, it is necessary to +read πολλα γαρ οντα μεν ουδε ζῃ, ουδε νοει. + +[254] For του θανατου here, it is necessary to read του αθανατου. + +[255] Instead of ως δι’ ομοιων ανομοιον, it is necessary to read ως δι’ +ομοιων εις ομοιον. + +[256] Instead of πως here it is necessary to read πας, and consequently +the proposition is not interrogatory as in the original. + +[257] It is necessary here to supply the word μεθεξεις. + +[258] It is here requisite to supply νου. + +[259] For υποκειμενοις, it is necessary to read υπερκειμενοις. + +[260] There are two chasms in this sentence in the original, which I +have endeavoured to supply in the translation. + +[261] That the principle of all things is something beyond intellect +and being itself, was asserted by the most ancient Pythagoreans, as +well as by Plato and his best disciples, as the following citations +will abundantly evince. + +And in the first place, this is evident from a fragment of Archytas, +a most ancient Pythagorean, On the Principles of Things, preserved by +Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 82. and in which the following extraordinary +passage occurs: ωστ’ αναγκα τρεις ειμεν τας αρχας, ταν τε εστω των +πραγματων, και ταν μορφω, και το εξ αυτου κινατικον και αορατον +δυναμει· το δε τοιουτον ον ου μονον[262] ειμεν δει, αλλα και νοω τι +κρεσσον· νοω δε κρεσσον εστι, οπερ ονομαζομεν θεον φανερον.--i.e. +“So that it is necessary to assert that there are three principles; +_that which is [the subject] of things (or matter), form, and that +which is of itself motive, and invisible in power_. With respect to +the last of which, it is not only necessary that it should have a +subsistence, _but that it should be something better than intellect_. +But that which is better than intellect is evidently the same with +that which we denominate god.” It must here however be observed, that +by the word _god_ we are not only to understand the first cause, but +every god: for, according to the Pythagoric theology, every deity, +considered according to the characteristic of his nature, is superior +to intellectual essence. Agreeably to the above passage is that also +of Brotinus, as cited by Syrianus in Arist. Meta. p. 102, b. who +expressly asserts that the first cause νου παντος και ουσιας δυναμει +και πρεσβειᾳ υπερεχει--“surpasses every intellect and essence both in +power and dignity.” Again, according to the same Syrianus, p. 103, +b. we are informed “that the Pythagoreans called god the one, as the +cause of union to the universe, and on account of his superiority +to every being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they +denominated him the measure of all things, on account of his conferring +on all things through illumination, essence and bound; and containing +and bounding all things by the ineffable supereminence of his nature, +which is extended beyond every bound.” Των θειων ανδρων εν μεν λεγοντων +τον θεον ως ενωσεως τοις ολοις αιτιον, και παντος του οντος, και +πασης ζωης, και νου του παντελους επεκεινα. μετρον δε των παντων ως +πασι την ουσιαν, και το τελος επιλαμποντα, και ως παντα περιεχοντα, +και οριζοντα ταις αφραστοις αυτου, και παντος υπερηπλωμεναις περατος +υπεροχαις. And again, this is confirmed by Clinius the Pythagorean, as +cited by Syrianus, p. 104, in which place _præclari_ is erroneously +substituted for _Clinii_. “That which is _the one_, and _the measure +of all things_ (says he), is not only entirely exempt from bodies, and +mundane concerns, but likewise from intelligibles themselves: since he +is the venerable principle of beings, the measure of intelligibles, +ingenerable, eternal, and alone (μονον), possessing absolute dominion +(κυριωδες), and himself manifesting himself (αυτο το εαυτο δηλουν).” +This fine passage I have translated agreeably to the manuscript +corrections of the learned Gale, the original of which he has not +inserted. To this we may likewise add the testimony of Philolaus; who, +as Syrianus informs us, p. 102, knew that cause which is superior to +the two first elements of things, _bound_ and _infinite_. For (says he) +“Philolaus asserts that the deity established _bound_ and _infinite_: +by bound indeed exhibiting every co-ordination, which is more allied +to _the one_; but by infinity a nature subjected to _bound_. And prior +to these two principles he places one, and a singular cause, separated +from the universality of things, which Archainetus (Αρχαινετος) +denominates a cause prior to cause; but which, according to Philolaus, +is the principle of all things.” To all these respectable authorities +for the superessential nature of the first cause, we may add the +testimony of Sextus Empiricus himself. For in his books against the +Mathematicians (p. 425) he informs us “that the Pythagoreans placed +_the one_ as transcending the genus of things which are essentially +understood.” και δη των μεν καθ’ αυτα νοουμενων γενος υπεστησαντο +Πυθαγορικοι παιδες, ως επαναβεβηκος το εν. In which passage, by +things which are essentially understood, nothing more is meant than +intelligible essences, as is obvious to every tyro in the Platonic and +Pythagoric philosophy. + +But in consequence of this doctrine of the ancients concerning _the +one_, or the first principle of things, we may discover the meaning +and propriety of those appellations given by the Pythagoreans to +unity, according to Photius and others: such as αλαμπια, σκοτωδια, +αμιξία, βαραθρον υποχθονιον, Απολλων, &c. viz. _obscurity_, +or _without illumination_, _darkness_, _without mixture_, _a +subterranean profundity_, _Apollo_, &c. For, considered as ineffable, +incomprehensible, and superessential, he may be very properly +called _obscurity_, _darkness_, and _a subterranean profundity_; +but considered as perfectly simple and one, he may with no less +propriety be denominated _without mixture_, and _Apollo_; since +Apollo signifies a privation of multitude. “For (says Plotinus) the +Pythagoreans denominated the first God _Apollo_, according to a more +secret signification, implying a negation of many.” Ennead. 5, lib. +5. To which we may add, that the epithets _darkness_ and _obscurity_ +wonderfully agree with the appellation of _a thrice unknown darkness_, +employed by the Egyptians, according to Damascius,[263] in their most +mystical invocations of the first God; and at the same time afford +a sufficient reason for the remarkable silence of the most ancient +philosophers and poets concerning this highest and ineffable cause. + +This silence is indeed remarkably obvious in Hesiod, when in his +Theogony he says: + + ητοι μεν πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ’,---- + +That is, “_Chaos was the first thing which was generated_”--and +consequently there must be some cause prior to Chaos, through which +it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cause. Such, +however, is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions +of Hesiod, γενετο is translated _fuit_, as if the poet had said +that _Chaos was the first of all things_; and he is even accused by +Cudworth on this account, as leaning to the atheistical system. But +the following testimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all +antiquity, γενετο was considered as meaning _was generated_, and not +_was_ simply. And in the first place, this is clearly asserted by +Aristotle in lib. 3, de Cælo. “There are certain persons (says he) +who assert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are +_generated_.--And this is especially the case with the followers of +Hesiod.”--εισι γαρ τινες οι φασιν ουθεν αγεννητον ειναι, αλλα παντα +γιγνεσθαι.----μαλιστα μεν οι περι τον Ησιοδον. And again, by Sextus +Empiricus in his treatise Adversus Mathemat. p. 383, edit. Steph. who +relates, that this very passage was the occasion of Epicurus applying +himself to philosophy. “For (says he) when Epicurus was as yet but a +young man, he asked a grammarian, who was reading to him this line of +Hesiod, + + Chaos of all things was the first produc’d, + +from what Chaos was _generated_, if it was the first thing generated. +And upon the grammarian replying that it was not his business to teach +things of this kind, but was the province of those who are called +philosophers.--To those then, says Epicurus, must I betake myself, +since they know the truth of things.” κομιδη γαρ μειρακισκος ων, ῃρετο +τον επαναγινωσκοντα αυτῳ Γραμματιστην (η τοι μεν πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ’) +εκ τινος το χαος εγενετο, ειπερ πρωτον εγενετο. τουτου δε ειποντος μη +αυτου εργον ειναι τα τοιαυτα διδασκειν, αλλα των καλουμενων φιλοσοφων· +τοινυν εφησεν ο Επικουρος, επ’ εκεινους μοι βαδιστεον εστιν, ειπερ +αυτοι την των οντων αληθειαν ισασιν. + +Simplicius too, in commenting on the passage above cited from +Aristotle, beautifully observes as follows: “Aristotle (says he) ranks +Hesiod among the first physiologists, because he sings Chaos was first +_generated_. He says, therefore, that Hesiod in a particular manner +makes all things to be generated, because that which is first is by +him said to be generated. But it is probable that Aristotle calls +Orpheus and Musæus the first physiologists, who assert that _all +things are generated, except the first_. It is, however, evident that +those theologists, singing in fabulous strains, meant nothing more by +_generation_ than the procession of things from their causes; on which +account _all of them consider the first cause as unbegotten_. For +Hesiod also, when he says that _Chaos was first generated_, insinuates +that there was something prior to Chaos, from which Chaos was produced. +For it is always necessary that every thing which is generated should +be generated from something. But this likewise is insinuated by Hesiod, +that the first cause is above all knowledge and every appellation.” (De +Cœlo, p. 147.) + +[262] Instead of ον ου μονον, which is evidently the true reading, +ονομον μονον is erroneously printed in Stobæus. + +[263] περι αρχων. + +[264] Instead of μαλλον here, it is necessary to read ηττον. + +[265] η πλειονων is omitted in the original. + +[266] δυναμενον is omitted in the original. + +[267] By the echo of soul, Proclus means that vital quality by which +the soul is united to the body; and which is nothing more than the +last image and shadow of the soul. The necessity of such a connecting +quality will easily appear, from considering that a truly incorporeal +nature, like that of soul, cannot be connected with body, without a +vital medium. In consequence of this we may consider with Plotinus +(Ennead. 4. lib. 4.) the animated body as resembling illuminated and +heated air. And the pains and pleasures of the body will be conversant +with this shadow of the soul. + +[268] The original here is defective: for it is ενωσιν δε θειαν, απο +της μετεχο **** εαυτου υπαρξεως μεταδιδωσι τοις εφεξης. From the +version of Patricius, however, the defect may be supplied as follows: +ενωσιν δε θειαν, απο της μετεχομενης εναδος. εκαστον γαρ τουτων εαυτου +κ. τ. λ. This emendation is adopted in the above translation. + +[269] For το υπερουσιον ον, it is necessary to read το υπερουσιον εν. + +[270] Thus too Hippocrates, ξυρροια μια, συμπνοια μια, παντα συμπαθεα. +i.e. “_there is one conflux, one conspiration, and all things +sympathize with all_.” He who understands this will see that the +_magic_ cultivated by the ancient philosophers, is founded in a +theory no less sublime than rational and true. Such a one will survey +the universe as one great animal, all whose parts are in union and +consent with each other; so that nothing is foreign and detached; +nothing, strictly speaking, void of sympathy and life. For though +various parts of the world, when considered as separated from the +whole, are destitute of _peculiar_ life; yet they possess some +degree of animation, however inconsiderable, when viewed with relation +to the universe. Life indeed may be compared to a perpetual and +universal sound; and the soul of the world resembles a lyre, or some +other musical instrument, from which we may suppose this sound to be +emitted. But from the unbounded diffusion as it were of the mundane +soul, every thing participates of this harmonical sound, in greater +or less perfection, according to the dignity of its nature. So that +while life every where resounds, the most abject of beings may be said +to retain a faint echo of the melody produced by the mundane lyre. It +was doubtless from profoundly considering this sympathy between the +mundane soul, and the parts of the world, that the ancient philosophers +were enabled to procure the presence of divinity, and perform effects +beyond the comprehension of the vulgar. And that this was the opinion +of Plotinus, the following passage evinces: “It appears to me that +the ancient wise men, who wished to procure the presence of the Gods, +by fabricating statues and performing sacred rites, directed their +intellectual eye to the nature of the universe, and perceived that the +nature of soul was every where easy to be attracted, when a proper +subject was at hand, easily passive to its influence. But every thing +adapted to imitation, is readily passive, and is like a mirror able to +seize a certain form, and reflect it to the view.” Ennead 4. lib. 3. + +[271] The word στερησεως is omitted in the original. + +[272] For μετα δε παντα θεων, it is necessary to read μεστα δε παντα +θεων. + +[273] There is a chasm here in the original. And it appears from the +version of Patricius, that the words και γαρ απειρος εστιν οντως +εκαστος, are wanting. + +[274] In Prop. 93. + +[275] The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, which +I have supplied from the version of Patricius. In the Greek therefore +it is necessary to supply the words παν το τελειον εν τοις θεοις. + +[276] For εξῃρημενων it is necessary to read εξῃρημενον. + +[277] Here also we must read ενιδρυμενον for ενιδρυμενων. + +[278] The words αιτια γεννητικη, αλλα πασα αιτια γεννητικη ουκ εστι +ζωογονικη, are wanting in the original. + +[279] The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, which +I have supplied from the version of Patricius. Hence, in the printed +Greek text it is necessary to supply the words, εν τοις θεοις αρα, η +μεν καθαροτης εστι και πρωτως αγαθον, και η φρουρα, και παν τοιουτον. + +[280] For τι εν, it appears requisite to read τι ον. + +[281] From the version of Patricius, it is necessary to supply the +words η προς εαυτον, η προς το κρειττον επιστρεφεται which are wanting +in the original. + +[282] For νῳ here it is necessary to read νοητον. + +[283] For μεθεκτου here, it is necessary to read αμεθεκτου. + +[284] For τον νουν, it is necessary to read το ον. + +[285] The original in the beginning of this proposition is both +defective and erroneous. For it is as follows: παν το πληθος των εναδων +των μετεχομενων υπο τινος ***** γαρ εστι των του κοσμου μερων, και +δια μεσου, και της ψυχης. From the version of Patricius, however, the +defect and error may be removed by reading παν το πληθος των εναδων των +μετεχομενων υπο τινος αισθητου σωματος εγκοσμιον εστι. επιλαμπει γαρ +των του κοσμου μερων, και δια μεσου νου, και της ψυχης. + +[286] Instead of νοητον εστι τουτο here, it is necessary to read νοητον +εστι τουτῳ. + +[287] For ει γαρ εαυτον νοει, πας νους, it is requisite to read ἢ γαρ +εαυτον νοει πας νους. + +[288] δηλον is omitted in the original. + +[289] For ακινητος here, it is requisite to read αιωνιος. + +[290] From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to supply the +words καθεν. ει γαρ. + +[291] The word παντα is omitted in the original. + +[292] Here also it is requisite to supply the words ομοιως παντα +νοησουσι. + +[293] By an intellectual perception of all things _according to +one_, Proclus means a perception of all things in one. For all +intellectual forms are in each; so that a perception of one, is a +perception of all forms, and therefore of all things. + +[294] It is here necessary from the version of Patricius to supply the +words και ακινητος, αμεριστος εστι. παν γαρ. + +[295] From the version of Patricius, it is likewise necessary to supply +in this place the words κατα την αυτου ουσιαν αρα οριζει. + +[296] The words within the brackets are omitted in the original, but +may be supplied from the version of Patricius by reading after το +ειναι, as follows, αει εχει εν τῳ ποιειν. η νοησις αρα εν τῳ ποειν. + +[297] αμεγεθει is omitted in the original. + +[298] Instead of οι δε μετ’ εκεινους, δια πλειονων, ελασσω κατα την +δυναμιν ουν ελλαμψιν εκεινοι, κ. λ. it is necessary to read οι δε μετ’ +εκεινους, δια πλειονων ελασσω, κατα την δυναμεως ελλεεψιν. ει ουν +εκεινοι, κ. λ. + +[299] It is here requisite to supply from the version of Patricius, the +words εκ των δευτερων διηρημενως. + +[300] It is necessary here to read and supply from the version of +Patricius, πορρωτερον του ενος, ο δε νοερος αριθμος εγγυτερω του ενος. + +[301] For ει here it is necessary to read η. + +[302] From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to supply the +words δει τον νουν μη μετεχοντα. + +[303] The words και νους θειος are omitted in the original. + +[304] θειος is omitted in the original. + +[305] θειαι is omitted in the original. + +[306] For των νοερων, it is necessary to read το νοερον. + +[307] From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to supply the +words και χωριστος του σωματος. + +[308] The words ψυχης ου λογιζομενης are wanting in the original; but +from the version of Patricius ought to be added. + +[309] Here too, the words οτι ζωης εξωθεν, are wanting in the original. + +[310] The original here is defective, but may be restored to the true +sense by reading αλλα και ουσιας, ειπερ ζωης δηλον. προ γαρ ψυχης κ.λ. +instead of αλλα και ουσιας, ειπερ ζωης. δηλον γαρ ψυχης κ.λ. + +[311] Instead of οτι δε και το πρωτως ζωτικον, ουκ εστι φανερον, it is +necessary to read οτι δε και το πρωτως γνωστικον ουκ εστι, φανερον. + +[312] It is here requisite to supply the words κατ’ ενεργειαν δε του +χρονου μετεχουσα. + +[313] The words ζωη και γνωσις are wanting in the original. And +immediately after, for ου γνωσεται, it is requisite to read ου γαρ +γνωσεται. + +[314] For ανους here, it is necessary to read ανουσιος. + +[315] ουχ is omitted in the original. + +[316] For η διακινησις, it is necessary to read ιδια κινησις. + +[317] For φυσικως here, it is necessary to read ψυχικως. + +[318] There is a chasm here in the original after the word δεχομενων, +which may be supplied by reading ει γαρ θεια ηγεμονικην κ. λ.; and +γεννητικην must be substituted for γενικην. + +[319] For εξῃρηται τοις χρωμενοις αυτῳ ψυχης, it is necessary to read +εξηρτηται της χρωμενης αυτῳ ψυχης. + +[320] Instead of ωστε και η μερικη ψυχη, και το αιτιον αρα του οχηματος +αυτης, it appears to me to be necessary to read ωστε και το αιτιον της +μερικης ψυχης, και αρα του οχηματος αυτης. + +[321] There is a chasm here in the original, which as it is not +supplied in the version of Patricius, I have filled up by conjecture. +Hence, I have added the words καθαραν, ανατρεχει εις την αυτης αρχαιαν +φυσιν. το γαρ οχημα. + +[322] For τας ψυχας here, it is necessary to read των ψυχων. + +[323] For εαυτων here, the sense as well as the version of Patricius, +require that we should read εαυτης. + +[324] That is, not through the medium of dæmoniacal and divine souls. + +[325] From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to supply the +words και του ποτε νοουντος. + +[326] The barbarous version of Morbeka has _insinuare_ here, +but the word employed by Proclus was, I have no doubt, παρεισαγειν +_adducere_. + +[327] “Differenter elucidata.” So Morbeka; _differenter_ being +doubtless his version of διαφεροντως. + +[328] “Summa enim totorum.” This I suppose was in the Greek ολως γαρ. + +[329] “Separavit ejus epistasiam, id est superstationem.” So Morbeka. + +[330] Propter meliorem vicinitatem ipsi animam, in Morbeka’s +translation, should doubtless be, propter vicinitatem hujus animæ ad +meliorem naturam. + +[331] Accessibus in Morbeka, was I suppose in the original εφοδοις, +expositions or discussions. + +[332] “Quia est utrumque,” with Morbeka. + +[333] “Qualificat,” with Morbeka. + +[334] “Et sunt tria hæc differentia ab invicem, faciens, quod fit, +actio.” So Morbeka. But _actio_ was doubtless in the original +ποιησις. + +[335] “Operatio,” with Morbeka; in the original ενεργεια. + +[336] ψυχικην, with Morbeka _animalem_. + +[337] ολως; _totaliter_ Morbeka. + +[338] _aspirantur_ in Morbeka, should evidently be _inspirantur_. + +[339] In Morbeka opportunitatem. + +[340] “Sed et in hoc omni.” So Morbeka. + +[341] “Ubi autem in corporeis penitus.” So Morbeka. + +[342] “Intellectu participante necessitati corporum.” _Participante_ +here is perhaps an error of the transcriber; for Morbeka I have no +doubt wrote _principante_. + +[343] “Velut lumen Sol,” should be _velut lumen sole_. + +[344] Iram is omitted here in the version of Morbeka. + +[345] “Dicens quod neque audimus, circum nihil, neque videmus.” So +Morbeka. + +[346] Virtutes in Morbeka, i.e. δυναμεις in the original. + +[347] “Multam habere partem.” So Morbeka. + +[348] In Morbeka, sobrietate meliorem. + +[349] Divinæ partis. So Morbeka. + +[350] In Morbeka, “obtinetur et ab aliorum regnante causa.” + +[351] In Morbeka _captat_ instead of _copulat_. + +[352] “Quicunque autem pacis opera intelligentes reverendi fient, +sortis fatalem alam effugiunt.” So Morbeka; in which, for _pacis_ read +_patris_, and for _alam_, _aleam_. This oracle in the original is as +follows: + + Νοησασαι τα εργα του πατρος + Μοιρης ειμαρμενης το πτερον φευγουσιν αναιδες. + +See my Collection of Chaldæan Oracles in the Monthly Magazine. + +[353] In Morbeka, _concupiscentiæ_; but in the Greek it was +doubtless επιθυμιας. This word as used by Plato and Aristotle, +signifies an appetite of the soul directed to the possession and +enjoyment of eternal good. + +[354] “Et nondum purgatus illud,” in Morbeka, i.e. illum oculum. + +[355] Morbeka’s version of this part is as follows: “Omnis igitur anima +secundum quod virtute participat, et quod est liberam esse: secundum +quod autem malitia et debilitate et eo quod est servire aliis,” &c. +But it should be, conformably to the above version; Omnis igitur anima +secundum quod virtute participat, et quod est, liberam esse; secundum +quod autem malitia et debilitate, et eo quod non est, servire aliis. + +[356] This is barbarously expressed in the version of Morbeka, as +follows, “et servire quidem aut desuper principatum, aut desuptus.” + +[357] In the version of Morbeka, “quæ sine causa solam cognoscentem +ipsius quia veritatem.” + +[358] In Morbeka, “agibilia;” but in the Greek, I have no doubt, τα +πρακτα. + +[359] In Morbeka rejungentem, but I read adaptantem. + +[360] In Morbeka “_solvere_,” instead of _scire_. + +[361] “Et totaliter agibilium politicam.” So Morbeka. This in the +original was, I suppose, και ολως τοις πρακτοις τῃν πολιτικην. + +[362] Instead of “quia et aliis animalibus necesse partibus entibus +omnes et facere, sed et pati,” as in Morbeka, it is necessary to read, +in order to make sense of the passage, quia et aliis animalibus necesse +partibus entibus, non modo et facere, sed et pati. + +[363] This in Morbeka is, “neque rursum sequestrare animam a dominis +electionum.” + +[364] Morbeka has _quia_ here instead of _nisi_. + +[365] _Quando_ in Morbeka, instead of _aliquando_. + +[366] Here too Morbeka has _quando_ instead of _aliquando_. + +[367] “Inecferribile in universum.” Morbeka. + +[368] Morbeka has _differentem_ here, instead of _indifferentem_. + +[369] The words _ad seipsam convertitur_, are omitted by Morbeka. + +[370] Morbeka has _directionem_, but the original was I have no +doubt κατορθωσιν. + +[371] του ουρανου υπεραστρονομουσα. So Plato. + +[372] In decisione lineæ. So Morbeka. + +[373] The Greek of this, agreeably to my translation, was I have no +doubt τ’ αγαθον μονον εξηρημενον ειναι. + +[374] “Mediam habens notitiam, et solummodo scientiam, et eorum qui +non totaliter.” So Morbeka; but the sense requires the following +emendation: Mediam habens notitiam, et solummodo scientiam, et eorum +qui totaliter, et eorum qui non totaliter. + +[375] Morbeka has αυτοπεριγραπτον; but it should obviously be +αυτοαπεριγραπτον. + +[376] Morbeka has _contra_ here, instead of _nihilominus_. + +[377] _Superessentialiter_ is omitted here in the version of +Morbeka. + +[378] “Neque enim tua fictio,” should be, neque enim si tua factio, +(i.e. ars mechanica). + +[379] See Plutarch’s admirable treatise, concerning those who are +slowly punished by divinity; from which Proclus has derived much in +what follows. + +[380] The Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite, in his treatise On the +Divine Names has evidently taken what follows from this passage of +Proclus: ουκ αρα ουδε εν αγγελοις εστι το κακον, αλλα κολαζειν τους +αμαρτανοντας εισι κακοι. τουτῳ γουν τῳ λογῳ και οι σωφρονισται των +πλημμελουντων κακοι. και των ιερεων οι τον βεβηλον των θειων μυστηριων +απειργοντες. καιτοι ουδε το κολαζεσθαι κακον, αλλα το αξιον γενεσθαι +κολασεως. i.e. “Neither, therefore, is there evil in angels, unless +it should be said they are evil because they punish offenders. For +the same reason, however, the castigators of those that act wrong, +are evil. And in a similar manner those priests are evil who prohibit +the profane from divine mysteries. Though indeed it is not evil to +be punished, but to deserve to be punished.” The reader who peruses +the above-mentioned treatise of this Dionysius will find that he has +extracted largely from the present work of Proclus. + +[381] In his 2d. Epistle. + +[382] διεξοδικως is omitted in the original. + +[383] προοδον is omitted in the original. + +[384] Viz. self-subsistent superessential natures; for to these the +αυτο, or _itself_ primarily belongs. The next to these are +intellects. Those in the third rank, are souls. Those in the fourth, +the natures that are divided about bodies. And those in the fifth and +last rank are bodies. + +[385] Viz. _the one_, and matter. + +[386] μη is wanting in the original. + +[387] _The good itself_ is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not +that which is most distant from _the good_; for it is that in which +the procession of being ends, but that which is most distant from _the +good_ is _evil itself_. Hence, _evil itself_ is posterior to non-entity. + +[388] For πολυαρατον, it is necessary to read πολυορατον. + +[389] For περι here, it is requisite to read παρα. + +[390] μοχθηρας is omitted in the original. + +[391] For the proper parts of a self-motive whole, are also self-motive. + +[392] For απ’ αιτιας here, it is necessary to read απεναντιως. + +[393] For το μεν δυναμενον in this place, it is necessary to read, το +μη δυναμενον. + +[394] For συμμετριᾳ here, it is necessary to read ασυμμετριᾳ. + +[395] viz. angels, dæmons and heroes. + +[396] Proclus here alludes to one of the Chaldæan oracles. + +[397] The first effable subsists in the god Phanes, or the extremity of +the intelligible order. + +[398] See this explained in the notes on my translation of the +Parmenides of Plato. + +[399] The _Iynx, Synoches, and Teletarchæ_ of the Chaldæans, +compose that divine order, which is called by Proclus _intelligible +and at the same time intellectual_, and is unfolded by him in the +fourth book. + +[400] This is one of the Chaldæan oracles. + +[401] See the Timæus. + +[402] It must however be carefully observed that multitude when it +subsists causally, subsists without that distinction and separation +which it possesses when unfolded; and that in _the one_ it has no +distinction whatever. For _the one_ is all things prior to all. + +[403] See the 7th Epistle of Plato. + +[404] As that which is below all knowledge is an ignorance worse +than knowledge, so the silence in which our ascent to the ineffable +terminates is preceded by an ignorance superior to all knowledge. Let +it however, be carefully remembered, that such an ignorance is only to +be obtained after the most scientific and intellectual energies. + +[405] Vid. Excerpta ex Damascio, a Wolfio, p. 232. + +[406] Let the reader be careful to remember that _the one_ of the +gods is their superessential characteristic. + +[407] Vid. Excerpta, p. 228. + +[408] Αλλ’ αυται μεν ουκ εισι κατα αληθειαν, ουτε μιαν, ουτε τρεις, +ουτε μια αμα και τρεις. + +[409] Vid. Wolfii Anecdot. Græc. tom. iii. p. 252. + +[410] ως νουν is omitted in the original. + +[411] μηποτε is erroneously printed instead of ποτε. + +[412] το τριτον is I conceive erroneously omitted in the original. + +[413] Την is printed instead of Γην. + +[414] As the whole of the Grecian theology is the progeny of the +mystic traditions of Orpheus, it is evident that the Gods which Hesiod +celebrates by the epithets of _Earth_, _Heaven_, &c. cannot be the +visible _Heaven_ and _Earth_: for Plato in the Cratylus, following the +Orphic doctrine concerning the Gods, as we have evinced in our notes +on that dialogue, plainly shews, in explaining the name of Jupiter, +that this divinity is the artificer of the sensible universe; and +consequently _Saturn_, _Heaven_, _Earth_, &c. are much superior to +the mundane deities. Indeed if this be not admitted, the Theogony of +Hesiod must be perfectly absurd and inexplicable. For why does he call +Jupiter, agreeably to Homer (πατηρ ανδρων τε θεων τε), “_father of Gods +and men_?” Shall we say that he means literally that Jupiter is the +father of all the Gods? But this is impossible; for he delivers the +generation of Gods who are the parents of Jupiter. He can therefore +only mean that Jupiter is the parent of all the mundane Gods: and his +Theogony, when considered according to this exposition, will be found +to be beautifully consistent, accurate and sublime. I only add, that +την is again erroneously printed in the Excerpta of Wolfius for γην. + +[415] χθονον is printed for χρονον. + +[416] That is, from _bound_ and _infinite_. + +[417] χουσώρος should be read instead of χουσώρου. + +[418] Vid. Pici Opera, tom. i. p. 54. + +[419] _i.e._ θεοι νοητοι, νοητοι και νοεροι, νοεροι, υπερκοσμιοι, +απολυτοι sive υπερουρανιοι, et εγκοσμιοι. + +[420] For ολης here, it is necessary to read υλης, because matter +according to Plato proceeds from the father Phanes, or animal itself, +and not from the demiurgus. + +[421] For αυτους, it is necessary to read αιτιας. + +[422] viz. From axioms and definitions. + +[423] μερικωτερας is omitted in the original. + +[424] For δη here, it is requisite to read δει. + +[425] Proclus here alludes to the fabulous wanderings of Ulysses in the +Odyssey. For Homer by these occultly indicates the life of a man who +passes in a regular manner from a sensible to an intellectual life, and +who being thoroughly purified by the exercise of the cathartic virtues, +is at length able to energize according to the intuitive perception of +intellect, and thus after becoming reunited to Penelope or Philosophy, +meets with and embraces his father. This appears also to have been the +opinion of the Pythagorean Numenius, as we are informed by Porphyry in +his treatise De Antro Nympharum. “For he thought that the person of +Ulysses in the Odyssey represented to us a man who passes in a regular +manner over the dark and stormy sea of generation; and thus at length +arrives at that region (i.e. the intellectual region) where tempests +and seas are unknown, and finds a nation + + Who ne’er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.” + +See more on this subject in my Restoration of the Platonic Theology, p. +294. + +[426] For μηδε ευροντα δυνατα δυνατον ειναι λεγειν, it is necessary to +read, μηδε ευροντα εις απαντας δυνατον, κ. λ. + +[427] For απεστραμμενης, it is requisite to read επιστραμμεγης. + +[428] Plato in the Politicus thus calls the realms of generation, i.e. +the whole of a visible nature. + +[429] That is, intelligible intellect, the extremity of the +intelligible order. + +[430] That is, the divinities who compose the middle of that order +of Gods, which is denominated intelligible and at the same time +intellectual. + +[431] As what is here said from Orpheus concerning Jupiter is very +remarkable, and is no where else to be found, I give the original +for the sake of the learned reader: διο και Ορφευς δημιουργουντα μεν +αυτον την ουρανιαν πασαν γενεαν παραδιδωσι, και ηλιον ποιουντα και +σεληνην, και τους αλλους αστρῳους θεους· δημιουργουντα δε τα υποσεληνην +στοιχεια, και διακρινοντα τοις ειδεσιν ατακτως εχοντα προτερον· σειρας +δ’ εφισταντα θεων περι ολον τον κοσμον εις αυτον ανηρτημενας, και +διαθεσμοθετουντα πασι τοις εγκοσμιοις θεοις κατ’ αξιαν διανομας της εν +τῳ παντι προνοιας. + +[432] Iliad. XX. v. 4. + +[433] See the 14th line. + +[434] Ibid v. 32. + +[435] Iliad. IV. v. 58. + +[436] Iliad. XV. v. 187. + +[437] For the Saturnian triad belongs to that order of Gods which +is called supermundane, and which immediately subsists after the +intellectual order; so that the Jupiter who ranks at the summit of this +triad is different from and inferior to the demiurgus. + +[438] That is, he is not an intellect consubsistent with soul. + +[439] And the duad considered as a divine form or idea is the source of +fecundity. + +[440] i.e. The twelve Gods who first subsist in the _liberated_ or +supercelestial order and who are divided into four triads, and the +twelve mundane Gods, Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan; Vesta, Minerva, Mars; +Ceres, Juno, Diana; and Mercury, Venus, Apollo. The first of these +triads is _fabricative_; the second _defensive_; the third _vivific_; +and the fourth _anagogic_ or _elevating_, as is shown by Proclus in the +6th book of his Theology. + +[441] This royal series consists of Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, +Jupiter, Bacchus. “Ancient theologists, says Syrianus (in his +commentary on the 14th book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics) assert that +Night and Heaven reigned, and prior to these the mighty father of Night +and Heaven, who distributed the world to Gods and mortals, and who +first possessed royal authority, the illustrious Ericapæus. + + τοιον ελων διενειμε θεοις, θνητοισι δε κοσμον + ου πρωτος βασιλευε περικλυτος ηρικεπαιος. + +Night succeeded Ericapæus, in the hands of whom she has a sceptre: + + σκεπτρον εχουσ’ εν χερσιν ηρικεπαιου· + +To Night, Heaven succeeded, who first reigned over the Gods after +mother Night. + + ος πρωτος βασιλευε θεων μετα μητερα νυκτα. + +Chaos transcends the habitude of sovereign dominion: and, with respect +to Jupiter, the oracles given to him by Night, manifestly call him not +the first, but the fifth immortal king of the Gods. + + αθανατον βασιλεα θεων πεμπτον γενεσθαι. + +According to these theologists therefore, that principle which is most +eminently the first, is _the one_ or _the good_, after which +according to Pythagoras, are those two principles Æther and Chaos, +which are superior to the possession of sovereign dominion. In the +next place succeed the first and occult genera of the Gods, in which +first shines forth the father and king of all wholes, and whom on this +account they call _Phanes_.“ + +[442] Of these intellects the first is Phanes, the second Heaven, the +third Earth, and the fourth the Subcelestial Arch which is celebrated +in the Phædrus, viz. νους νοητος ο Φανης, εκφαντορικος νους ο Ουρανος, +συνεκτικος νους η γη, τελεσιουργος δε νους η υπ’ουρανιος αψις. + +[443] That is of the whole intellectual order, which consists of +Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, the three Curetes, and the separating monad +Ocean. + +[444] ως δ’ Ορφευς ενθεῳ στοματι λεγει, και καταπινει τον προγονον +αυτου τον φανητα, και εγκολπιζιται πασας αυτου τας δυναμεις ο ζευς, και +γινεται παντα νοερως, οσαπερ ην εκεινος νοητως. + +[445] διο και τρεφεσθαι φησιν αυτον ο θεολογος υπο της νυκτος. “εκ +παντων δε κρονον νυξ ετρεφεν ηδ’ ατιταλλεν.” + +[446] That is Phanes, intelligible intellect, or in the language of +Plato αυτοζωον _animal_ itself. + +[447] Homer however appears to have ascended as far as to the goddess +Night, or the summit of the intelligible and at the same time +intellectual order. + +[448] That is to say _the first cause and bound_, which is called +by Orpheus _æther_. + +[449] See this explained in the notes of my translation of the +Parmenides of Plato. + +[450] That is to say, it is false to assert of intellectual and divine +natures, that they are in a perpetual flux; for they are eternally +stable themselves, and are the sources of stability to other things. + +[451] Gesner misled by Patricius, has inserted these lines among the +Orphic fragments, in his edition of the works of Orpheus. + +[452] Proclus here means that there is the same analogy between Saturn, +Rhea, and Jupiter, as in the intelligible triad, between father, power, +and intellect. + +[453] Οτι ωνομασται η Τηθυς παρα το διαττομενον και ηθουμενον, οιον +Διατηθυ, και αφαιρεσει των πρωτων δυσσυλλαβων Τηθυς. + +[454] Iliad XV. v. 187. + +[455] Iliad, XV. v. 189. + +[456] See the Theogony of Hesiod, v. 176, &c. + +[457] Proclus here alludes to the following Orphic verses cited by him +in his Commentary on the Timæus, lib. 5. p. 296. + + ενθ’ ουν τ’ ωκεανος μεν, ενι μεγαροισιν εμιμνεν + ορμαινων ποτερωσε νοον τpαποι, ηε πατερα + ον γνωσῃ τε βιης, και ατασθαλα λωβησαιτο + συν κρονῳ, ηδ’ αλλοις αδελφοις οι πεπιθοντο + μητρι φιλῃ, η τους γε λιπων, μενει ενδον εκηλος· + πολλα δε πορφυρων, μενει ημερος εν μεγαροισι + σκυζομενος τῃ μητρι, κασιγνητοισι δε μαλλον. + +i.e. “But Ocean remained within the ample house, considering how he +should act, whether he should deprive his father of his strength, and +basely injure him, together with Saturn and the rest of his brethren, +who were obedient to their dear mother; or whether leaving these, he +should stay quietly at home. After much deliberation, he remained +quietly at home, being angry with his mother, but more so with his +brothers.” + +[458] That is, of the first triad of the supermundane, which subsists +immediately after the intellectual order. + +[459] Hom. Iliad. + +[460] This cause is Saturn, who according to the fable cut off the +genital parts of Heaven. See the Theogony of Hesiod. + +[461] This Orphic fragment is not to be found in Gesner’s collection of +the Orphic remains. + +[462] See p. 521. Vol. V. of my Translation of Plato. + +[463] Because Night subsists at the summit of _the intelligible and +at the same time intellectual_ order, and is wholly absorbed in the +intelligible. + +[464] That is, according to one of the Chaldean Oracles. + +[465] These verses likewise, are not in Gesner’s collection. + +[466] Iliad XIV. v. 328. + +[467] Proclus says this conformably to the theology of the Chaldeans. +For according to that theology, the first monad of the vivific triad is +_Hecate_, the second _Soul_, and the third _Virtue_. + +[468] That is, of a supermundane nature: for the _ruling_, are the +_supermundane_, Gods. + +[469] That is, the Corybantes. + +[470] + + Η δ’ αρα εκατη παιδος μελη αυθι λυπουσα + Λητους ευπλοκαμοιο κορη προσεβησατ’ ολυμπον. + + +[471] These admirable Scholia on the Cratylus end here; being +unfortunately, like most both of the published and unpublished writings +of Proclus, incompleat. These very scholia too appear to be nothing +more than extracts from a copious commentary of Proclus which is lost. + + +Transcriber’s Notes: + +1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been +corrected silently. + +2. Where appropriate, the original spelling has been retained. + +3. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have +been retained as in the original. + +4. Italics are shown as _xxx_. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78800 *** diff --git a/78800-h/78800-h.htm b/78800-h/78800-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1e286ce --- /dev/null +++ b/78800-h/78800-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,25423 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> +<head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <title> + Proclus on the Theology of Plato Vol 2 | Project Gutenberg + </title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + + h1,h2,h3 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; + font-weight: normal; +} + +h1 {font-size: 130%; } + +h2 {font-size: 100%; } + +p { + margin-top: .51em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .49em; + text-indent: 1.5em; +} + +.p-left {text-indent: 0em; } + +.p-min {margin-top: -.5em;} + +.p1 {margin-top: 1em;} +.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} +.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} +.p6 {margin-top: 6em;} + +hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: 33.5%; + margin-right: 33.5%; + clear: both; +} + +hr.tb {width: 45%; margin-left: 27.5%; margin-right: 27.5%;} +hr.chap {width: 20%; margin-left: 40%; margin-right: 40%;} + +hr.r25 {width: 25%; margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 37.5%; margin-right: 37.5%; + border: 3px double black;} + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} + +.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: small; + text-align: right; + font-style: normal; + font-weight: normal; + font-variant: normal; + text-indent: 0; +} /* page numbers */ + +.hangingindent { + padding-left: 2em ; + text-indent: -2em ;} + +p.drop-cap { +text-indent: 0em; } + +p.drop-cap:first-letter +{ +float: left; +margin: 0.1em 0em 0em 0em; +font-size: 250%; +line-height:0.85em; +} + +#half-title { text-align: center; + font-size: 100%; } + +.xs { font-size: x-small;} + +.sm { font-size: small;} + +.lg { font-size: large;} + +.center {text-align: center; + text-indent: 0em;} + +.right {text-align: right;} + +.r2 {text-align: right; + margin-right: 2em;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + +.gesperrt +{ + letter-spacing: 0.2em; + margin-right: -0.2em; +} + +/* Footnotes */ +.footnotes {border: 1px dashed;} + +.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + +.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: + none; +} + +/* Poetry */ +.poetry-container +{ +text-align: center; +font-size: 90%; +} + +.poetry +{ +display: inline-block; +text-align: left; +margin-left: 2.5em; +line-height: 100%; +} + +.poetry .stanza +{ +margin: .5em 0em .5em 1em; +} + +.poetry .i1h {margin-left: 1.5em;} +.poetry .i12 {margin-left: 12em;} + + +/* Transcriber's notes */ +.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; + color: black; + font-size:small; + padding:0.5em; + margin-bottom:5em; + font-family:sans-serif, serif; +} + + </style> +</head> + +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78800 ***</div> + + + + +<p id="half-title" class="p4"><b>PROCLUS</b><br> + +<span class="xs p2">ON</span><br> + +<span class="sm p2"><b>THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO.</b></span></p> + +<p class="center p6 sm"><i>Proc.</i>    <i>Vol. II.</i>    <i>a</i></p> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h1 class="p4"><span class="xs">THE</span><br> + +SIX BOOKS OF PROCLUS</h1></div> + +<p class="center sm"><b>The platonic Successor,</b></p> + +<p class="center sm">ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO,</p> + +<p class="center xs">TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK;</p> + +<p class="center xs">TO WHICH</p> + +<p class="center sm">A SEVENTH BOOK IS ADDED,</p> + +<p class="center xs">IN ORDER TO SUPPLY THE DEFICIENCY OF ANOTHER BOOK ON THIS SUBJECT,</p> + +<p class="center xs">WHICH WAS WRITTEN BY PROCLUS, BUT SINCE LOST.</p> + +<p class="center xs">ALSO, A TRANSLATION FROM THE GREEK OF</p> + +<p class="center gesperrt">PROCLUS’ ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.</p> + +<p class="center xs">TO WHICH ARE ADDED</p> + +<p class="center sm">A TRANSLATION OF THE TREATISE OF PROCLUS,</p> + +<p class="center sm"><b>On Providence and Fate;</b></p> + +<p class="center xs">A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE, ENTITLED,</p> + +<p class="center sm">TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE;</p> + +<p class="center xs">AND</p> + +<p class="center xs">A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE</p> + +<p class="center sm">ON THE SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL;</p> + +<p class="center sm"><i>As preserved in the Bibliotheca Gr. of Fabricius</i>.</p> + +<hr class="r25"> + +<p class="center">BY <b>THOMAS TAYLOR</b>.</p> + +<hr class="r25"> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Αλλ’ εστιν, εστι, καν τις εγγελα λογῳ,</div> + <div>Zευς, xαι θεοι, βροτεια λευσσοντες παθη.</div> + <div class="right"><i>Euripides.</i></div> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <div>There are, there are, though laugh the scoffer may,</div> + <div>Jove and the Gods, who mortal ills survey.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>ωσπερ εισι θεoι πολλοι, και κυριοι πολλοι.</div> + <div class="right">Corinth, I, Cap. 8. v. 5.</div> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <div>As there be <span class="smcap">Gods</span> many, and <span class="smcap">Lords</span> many.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="center sm p2">TWO VOLUMES.<br> +VOL. II.</p> + +<p class="center sm p2">LONDON:<br> +PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR,<br> +<span class="xs"><i>By A. J. Valpy, Tooke’s Court, Chancery Lane</i>.<br> +AND SOLD BY MESSRS. LAW AND Co.; LONGMAN AND Co.; BALDWIN AND Co.;<br> +AND ALL OTHER BOOKSELLERS.</span></p> + +<p class="center sm">1816.</p> + + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[1]</span></p> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="center lg p4">PROCLUS,</p></div> + +<p class="center p1">THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR,</p> + +<p class="center p2 xs">ON</p> + +<p class="center p2 lg"><b>The Theology of Plato.</b></p> + +<hr class="r25 p2"> + +<p class="center">BOOK VI.</p> + +<hr class="r25"> + +<h2>CHAPTER I.</h2> + + +<p class="drop-cap p-left">The hebdomatic <i>aion</i> (eternity) therefore, of the intellectual +Gods has been through these things celebrated by us, following the +mystic conceptions of Plato. But after this, let us in the next place +contemplate the multiform progressions of the ruling orders, and refer +the one union of them to the intellectual theory of Parmenides. For +this order is woven together in continuity with the demiurgus and +father of wholes, proceeds from, is perfected by, and converted to +him, according to his perfective power. Hence also, it is necessary to +connect the narration about the governors of the universe, with the +discussion concerning the demiurgus, and to assimilate words to the +things of which they are the interpreters. For all the series of the +ruling Gods, are collected into the intellectual fabrication as into a +summit, and subsist<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[2]</span> about it. And as all the fountains are the progeny +of the intelligible father, and are filled from him with intelligible +union, thus likewise, all the orders of the principles or rulers, are +suspended according to nature from the demiurgus, and participate +from thence of an intellectual life. And let no one be offended with +me, on hearing in this place the names of fountain and principle, nor +accuse these names, as not at all pertaining to Plato. For, as we have +before observed, Plato does not leave unnoticed any one of these mystic +names. But in his discussions about souls, when he denominates them the +fountains and principles of motion, he at the same time indicates the +difference between the peculiarity of fountain, and the peculiarity of +principle, and the inferiority of principle with respect to the exempt +transcendency of fountain.</p> + +<p>He likewise manifests that the self-vital extends to all things as far +as to soul, from fountain; but the unbegotten from principle. And this +is because the fontal genus indeed of the Gods is self-begotten, and +first-effective, and produces other things from itself; but the ruling +genus of the Gods, and which has the relation of a principle, though +it proceeds from the fountains, and is allotted a more partial order +among beings, yet it is expanded above every thing which is generated, +and neither is in a certain respect connected with generated natures, +nor communicates with a sensible nature. For the mundane Gods, indeed, +are in a certain respect generated; whence also, they are denominated +generated by Timæus, and this whole world is likewise called by him +a generated god. But the ruling Gods, and who have the relation of +principles, are perfectly exempt from generated natures, and are not +co-arranged with them. Hence also, the unbegotten is most particularly +adapted to them. Those Gods, however, who preside over the liberated +dominion being the media between the unbegotten and generated Gods, +come into contact indeed with the latter, but do not give completion to +the choir of mundane Gods. Hence, they are in a certain respect both +generated and unbegotten. The Gods, therefore, who are the summits of +supermundane natures, and the rulers of wholes, are alone allotted an +unbegotten subsistence in the orders that proceed from the demiurgus. +Hence, likewise, this peculiarity is from thence derived to souls. +For,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[3]</span> as Plato says, principle is unbegotten. For it is necessary that +every thing which is generated should be generated from a principle, +but that the principle should not be generated from any thing.</p> + +<p>At the same time, therefore, it is manifest through these things, +how the [ruling] principles proceed from the Gods prior to them. For +they are not allotted a progression from them according to motion, +nor in short, according to mutation; but the orders of the ruling +Gods subsist by their very being, according to their prolific power, +and unenvying and exuberant will; and the self-begotten power of the +intellectual Gods, gives to the principles also the first generation +from itself. Whether, therefore, some one is willing to adopt these, or +other names of the divine orders, we shall consider it as a thing of +no consequence. But receiving the peculiarity of them, whatever it may +be, according to the rumours of theologists, we shall transfer their +mystic tradition to the Platonic narration. For thus we shall make the +investigation of what follows conformable to what has been before said, +and what we assert will be adapted to the things themselves.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2>CHAPTER II.</h2> +</div> + + +<p>Again therefore, let us assume the principles of the science concerning +these Gods, and demonstrate that the theory pertaining to them is +consequent to the first causes. The intelligible Gods therefore, +surpass wholes according to supreme transcendency, and primarily +participate the union and divine light, in which all the Gods perfectly +establish their hypostases. They likewise unically produce all things +from themselves, according to the paternal and exuberant will of the +communication of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[4]</span> good, and pre-establish in themselves occultly the +first effective causes of secondary natures. For the whole and common +measures of forms presubsist in them, and they comprehend according to +one cause the uniform genera of being, and prior to these, bound and +infinity, from which the superessential orders of the Gods generate all +beings.</p> + +<p>But in the second rank after these, the intelligible and at the +same time intellectual Gods subsist, being divided indeed according +to the same number, and preserving the measure of the all-perfect +triad in a second order, but producing into multitude the unities of +intelligibles, and transferring the unical boundaries of those triads +into essential hypostases, and which participate of <i>the one</i>. +Instead of powers however, which are whole, without separation, and +occult, they are transferred into divided causes, and which proceed far +from <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<p>Again, in the third rank after the intelligible Gods, those that are +called intellectual are arranged at one and the same time indeed, +proceeding into an order diminished with respect to that which is +prior to it, and changing the number according to which they subsist. +For instead of the perfective triads, they are intellectually divided +according to hebdomads. And with respect to the hebdomads, the division +of them into two triads, is supernally derived from the first triads; +but the terminations of them into monads, express the ends of those +orders. For every thing which is the peculiarity of difference and +multitude, proceeds from thence to all the genera.</p> + +<p>Again therefore, from these, the multiform orders of the ruling +principles are generated, being divided indeed analogous to all the +intelligible Gods, and to those that are prior to these intellectual +Gods, viz. to those that are called intelligible and at the same +time intellectual. They have however, their proximate and peculiar +hypostasis from the one fabrication; but their united generation +together with intellectuals, from the third triad of intelligibles. For +that all-perfect cause produces also from itself, the whole orders of +the Gods. Hence likewise Parmenides denominates it infinite multitude, +as unfolding into light all the genera of being, and all the orders of +divine natures, and as being sufficient through one all-perfect power +to the generation of wholes.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[5]</span></p> + +<p>Farther still, we may also assert this of these leading and ruling +Gods, that the intellectual monads make their progression according +to imparticipable intellect, in the same manner as the Gods prior to +them illuminate imparticipable life, and prior to all things, the +intelligible Gods constitute about themselves truly existing and +intelligible essence. For every God is participated indeed by beings, +and on this account falls short of the unity which is imparticipable +and exempt from all things. But a different deity proceeds according +to a different peculiarity. And some of the Gods indeed, being +defined according to the ineffable good itself, comprehend the +intelligible causes of wholes. But others produce the vivific powers, +and connectedly contain the first genera of the Gods. Others again, +unfold into light all the intellectual involutions, and preside over +the participants of the unities that produce divided hypostases. +Since therefore, the intellectual Gods primarily subsist according +to imparticipable intellect, and on this account are denominated +intellectual, the orders that first proceed immediately after them, +illuminate the summit of participated intellect, and are intellectual +indeed, as with reference to the inferior orders, and which are now +divided according to providential energies about the world. But they +are secondary to the first intellectuals, and are allotted a more +partial government; just as the first of intellectuals, are indeed +intelligible with respect to the Gods produced from them, but fall +short of the union of first intelligibles. As therefore, they unfold +into light the first and imparticipable life, which the intelligible +monads pre-established in themselves according to cause only, and +occultly; (for all the causes of wholes are pre-assumed there according +to one ineffable union) after the same manner also, these Gods, shining +forth the first of the intellectuals, express the Gods from whom they +derive their subsistence, and are intellectual indeed, but produce the +pure, uniform, and total hyparxis of the fathers, into a secondary, +and multiplied progression, which is divided about themselves, and +into a diminution of essence. By first emissions also from the +first-effective, and self-subsistent fountains, they shine forth +similarly to the intellectual Gods.</p> + +<p>Hence also, they bind to themselves the ruling and generative causes<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[6]</span> +of all the partial orders, and which exist prior to these orders both +in dignity and power. And in short, they have the same transcendency +with respect to the other Gods [subordinate to them,] which the +intelligible Gods have to those that are produced from them. For the +intelligible Gods being expanded above all the intellectual genera,<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> +have pre-established the intelligible hyparxis, by itself, unmingled +and pure; and these ruling Gods have also established in themselves +the supermundane union, and this peculiarity perfectly exempt from +mundane natures. And as in the imparticipable and total hypostases, +there is indeed, the intelligible genus, itself by itself; there is +also the intellectual which is foreign from this; and there is that +which is collective of both, which is celebrated as subsisting in +the middle, and is denominated intelligible and at the same time +intellectual,—thus also, in these partial orders, the peculiarity +of the supermundane Gods, pre-exists by itself exempt from the parts +of the universe, unco-ordinated with this world, and on all sides +comprehending it according to cause.</p> + +<p>But the essence of all the mundane Gods is allotted the third +order, being proximately carried as in a vehicle in the parts of +the world, giving completion to this one and only begotten God, +and connectedly-containing the different progressions in it. The +government however of the liberated Gods is allotted the middle bond +of the extremes, possessing sovereign authority over all [mundane] +natures, and in a certain respect communicating with the divisions +about the world, but unitedly ascending at the same time into many of +its parts, and collecting the divided numbers of the mundane Gods into +unical bounds, and more simple causes. Every genus likewise, of the +mundane Gods is spread under this liberated order, being on all sides +connected, contained, and perfected by it, and filled with the first +of goods. If therefore, there is any thing supermundane in the Gods, +and if it imparts a certain definite hyparxis of essence to them, and +defines a certain peculiarity of powers and a transcendency of order by +itself, we must admit that it primarily subsists in the ruling Gods, +being derived to them from the intellectual<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[7]</span> fathers, unmingled with +a mundane nature. And this supermundane order indeed is universal, +as with reference to all the partible rivers of the Gods, but it is +partial, as with reference to the all-perfect, one and whole kingdom of +the intellectual Gods. For it is everywhere necessary that the leading +causes of secondary orders, should be in a certain respect assimilated +to the terminations of the orders established above them.</p> + +<p>And thus the progression of the Gods is one and continued, originating +supernally from the intelligible and occult unities, and ending in the +last division of a divine cause. For, as in sensibles the most gross +and solid bodies, are not immediately connascent with the etherial +expanse, but those which are simple and more immaterial than others, +are proximately spread under the celestial periods, and of containing +bodies, those which are primarily<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> contained, are allotted a greater +communion than those which are situated remotely, and are conjoined +to them through other media; thus also, in the divine essences prior +to the world, the second orders are in continuity with those prior +to them. The progressions of beings however, are completed through +similitude. But the terminations of the higher orders are united to the +beginnings of second orders. And one series and indissoluble order, +extends from on high, through the surpassing goodness of the first +cause, and his unical power. For because indeed, he is <i>one</i>, +he is the supplier of union; but because he is <i>the good</i>, he +constitutes things similar to him, prior to such as are dissimilar. +And thus all things are in continuity with each other. For if this +continuity were broken, there would not be union. And things dissimilar +to each other being placed in a consequent order, that which is more +similar to the principle, would not have a more ancient and honourable +progression into being. If therefore, we assert these things rightly, +it is necessary that the first hypostases of the partial orders should +be total, according to an intellectual transcendency which they are +allotted in the divided genera of the Gods, and thus that they should +causally comprehend all secondary natures, and conjoin them to the +Gods prior to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[8]</span> themselves. The order of the ruling Gods therefore, is +in continuity with the kingdom of the intellectual Gods. Hence also, +Parmenides proximately constitutes it from the demiurgic monad. These +things however, will afterwards be apparent.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER III.</h2> + + +<p>For the present, however, let us survey the common peculiarity of the +whole of this order, that we may to the utmost of our power admire the +divinely-inspired intellection of Plato, which unfolds to us the most +mystic of dogmas. The progression, therefore, of these Gods is said to +be supermundane, as we have observed, and to have the second dominion +in wholes, after the intellectual Gods. But being defined according +to the hyparxis itself of this essence, it unfolds indeed the united +nature of the intellectual Gods; but produces into multitude the causes +comprehended in them. It also arranges and adorns the more partial +genera of beings, from total and first-effective monads, divides them +according to the best<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> order, and co-arranges them to each other. +But it collects and binds all secondary natures, and inserts in them +an admirable communion of essences and powers. Besides this, likewise, +it conjoins all the natures posterior to itself, to those prior to +itself, and calls forth the beneficent will of exempt causes, into the +providential care of secondary natures, but establishes the hyparxes of +subordinate in first essences, and imparts to all beings continuity, +and one series of hypostasis. Conferring also all these benefits, it +comprehends in itself the supply of them according to one peculiarity. +For it assimilates all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[9]</span> things, subordinate natures, to those prior +to them, and co-ordinate natures, to each other. And through this +similitude, at one, and the same time, indeed, it unfolds the essences +and multiform powers of them, and is the collector of many things into +union, and of divided natures, into the divine communion of goods.</p> + +<p>From hence, therefore, the orders of different images primarily +subsist. For every image is produced according to a similitude to its +paradigm. But that which assimilates secondary to first natures, and +binds all things through similitude, especially pertains to these Gods. +For what else is able to assimilate the world itself, and every thing +in the world to their paradigms, but this supermundane genus of Gods? +For all intellectuals constitute the natures in the world according to +one union, and an all-perfect providence, and impartibly preside over +the essence of them. But the liberated genus of Gods, in a certain +respect now comes into contact with the world, and co-operates with +the mundane Gods. It is necessary, therefore, that the assimilating +nature should every where according to essence indeed be exempt from +the things assimilated, and which are impressed through similitude; +but that it should adorn secondary natures with separation, and a +division according to species. For how would it be possible for it to +assimilate some things to others, and appropriately conjoin all things +to their paradigms, unless it proceeded as far as to the last forms, +and separated all those things from each other, of which there are +immoveable pre-existing causes? For the demiurgus, indeed, appears +to assimilate all things to himself, as Timæus says, being good, he +produced all things similar to himself on account of his beneficent +will. He likewise imparts to the world the order of time, by this +mean rendering the world more similar to intelligible animal. And in +short, on account of the similitude of the universe to its paradigm, he +produces all things, and perfects his own fabrication.</p> + +<p>In the demiurgus, however, all things, and likewise the second genera +of Gods, are according to cause. And as he is the plenitude of all the +natures prior to himself, thus also, he comprehends the united causes +of the natures posterior to himself. Hence, he perfects the universe, +energizes assimilatively, vivifies wholes, is the father of souls, +the plastic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[10]</span> framer of bodies, the supplier of harmony, the author of +bonds, the cause of the impartible and partible genera, and the maker +of all figures. And these things, indeed, he constitutes unically; but +the Gods posterior to him in a divided manner. Let not, however, any +one assert, that the assimilative nature is primarily in the demiurgus, +but [let him rather say] that existence is present to the demiurgus +according to sameness.<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> But if from him similitude subsists in all +things, and his very being is in sameness, as Parmenides teaches us, +we must indeed admit, that such a genus of Gods [as the assimilative] +is proximate to him, which also first unfolds his whole fabrication, +and inserts it in secondary natures, but is essentially different +from and posterior to him, and falls short of the first-effective +principle of all things which he contains. In short, the demiurgic +monad, and all the multitude co-arranged with it, presides over the +similitude of wholes, uniformly, originally, and impartibly; but the +order of the ruling Gods, divides indeed that which is united in the +demiurgic fabrication, expands that which is total in the energy of the +intellectual Gods, and produces into variety the simplicity of their +providence. Hence similitude extends from these to all the natures in +the world, and to the first, middle, and last forms of life. For that +which is assimilated presides over a second form of communion with +appropriate principles, on account of progression from causes.</p> + +<p>If, however, you are willing by investigating each particular to +survey the providence pervading to all things through similitude, you +will find that the whole world is the image of the perpetual Gods on +account of this, and also that all the wholenesses in it are in a +similar manner suspended from their paradigms, that whole souls always +dance about the intelligible, and that the more excellent genera that +follow the Gods, and such of our souls as are happy, are on account +of similitude extended from the wandering produced by generation, to +their proper fountain. In short, you will find, that all progressions +and conversions are effected and perfected on account of the cause of +similitude. For every thing which proceeds subsists through similitude +to its generator, and every<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[11]</span> thing which is converted, in consequence +of being assimilated to its proper principles, makes a conversion to +them. Moreover, similitude eternally guards the never-failing nature +of all the forms in the world, extending supernally from the Gods +themselves. And the stable similitude of forms, brings back again to +the circle of generation, the unstable mutation of particulars, not +only in immaterial, but also in material forms, which are conversant +with mutability. And it closes in a finite period, the infinite variety +of generated natures. But it refers the all-various division of reasons +[i.e. of productive principles] to their united and first-effective +cause. And on this account, the world being perpetually all-perfect, +is completely filled by total genera and species. Hence also, it is +similar to intelligible animal, possessing and comprehending all such +things after the manner of an image, as all-perfect animal possesses +paradigmatically.</p> + +<p>We must not, therefore, suppose that the genus of similitude is +something small, and extended only to a few things, since it is the +cause of perfection to the whole world, gives completion through +similitude to its first generation and self-sufficiency, and supplies +from itself, its entire comprehension of all things. But neither +must we admit that a production of this kind, is to be referred to +one certain intellectual form. For that which extends<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> to all the +superessential, essential, psychical, incorporeal, and corporeal +genera, exists prior to all forms and genera, and to incorporeal +and corporeal causes. For the Gods in the world, do not proceed +assimilated to their causes, on account of the intellectual form of +similitude. Nor on account of the paradigmatic idea of the dissimilar, +are the superessential unities of the Gods divided, the intellectual +nature separated from itself, and the psychical essences allotted +a progression in order; but, I think, that both similitude and +dissimilitude have their hypostasis analogous to intellectual sameness +and difference. And as they are primarily in the Gods themselves, +but secondarily in intellectual forms, being unfolded into light +together with the hyparxes of the Gods, thus also, this similitude and +dissimilitude, are allotted indeed a precedaneous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[12]</span> hyparxis in the +superessential unities, but a successive hyparxis in the descending +progressions of beings. And on this account Parmenides, as he evinced +that <i>the one</i> is moved and stands still, is same and different, +separate from being, thus also he demonstrates to us the similar and +the dissimilar in the uniform hyparxes themselves of the Gods. And +Socrates indeed presents to our view in the beginning of the dialogue, +the similar and the dissimilar, and defines each paradigm of these +to be separate, and exempt from the many similars and dissimilars. +But Parmenides recurring to the superessential hypostases of wholes, +produces beings from thence, according to the peculiarities of the +first causes.</p> + +<p>For as every thing in generation is adorned with forms from essences, +thus also the peculiarities of hyparxes extend to all essences from +superessential natures. For generation is the image of essence; but +essence has its progression according to superessential union. The +genus of similitude, therefore, is primarily in the Gods; but is +divided secondarily in intellectual forms. And on this account the +progressions of the whole of things are according to similitude; +but the conversions of all things to their principles are through +similitude, it being said that all things proceed, and receive the +power of conversion from divinity. The intelligible paradigm indeed +preassumes in itself the occult cause of the assimilative Gods. For +it is not sluggish from itself, and established unprolific. But it +produces all things essentially assimilated to itself, constitutes +them paternally, and is by its very being alone. It likewise imparts +by illumination hyparxis to secondary natures, and the power of +assimilation to itself. But again, that which is demiurgic of the +divine genera, being suspended from the precedaneous cause of the +intelligible paradigm, and adhering to, and energizing about it, +assimilates indeed all things both to itself and the paradigm, but +does not define its proper hyparxis in the genus of similitude. For it +comprehends intellectually and unitedly the causes of the similitude +of wholes, and employs such like genera of Gods as ministrant to +the generation of secondary natures. But the tribe of ruling Gods, +being wholly arranged in the partible orders, but first unfolding +the intellectual fabrication of the father, is suspended indeed from +him<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[13]</span> through the similitude of the causes pre-existing in him, but +extends and expands all things to the demiurgic union. It converts, +however, the partible genera of the Gods to impartible intellectual +sameness. But it assimilates the proceeding orders to the intelligible +paradigms, and gives completion to the one series of all beings. Very +properly, therefore, do those who are wise in divine concerns assert, +that the last triad of intelligibles is the cause of the fontal and +ruling Gods, and that the whole series of rulers subsists about the +intellectual father. For the genus of assimilating natures pertains +to the perfect paradigm, just as the genus of things assimilated +pertains to the extremity of the intellectual order. For all things +are assimilated to the first paradigm, and the conversion of all +secondary natures to it is through similitude. And with the demiurgus +of wholes, the cause of intellectual sameness and difference is united, +being partibly unfolded into light through the power of similitude and +dissimilitude, and producing the one and whole form of that fabrication +in all beings through divided energies, and the separations of essence. +Through these things, therefore, we have reminded the reader, that the +first and most total of the partible divine genera, and which is united +to the intellectual orders, is allotted the assimilative peculiarity, +and being defined according to this, conjoins all things to the +demiurgic monad; and [we have also shown] how it proceeds from the +intelligible paradigm to all mundane natures, and is the primary origin +of their generation.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER IV.</h2> + + +<p>Again, it follows in addition to what has been said, that we should +separate all the assimilative powers, properly arrange them, and survey +them proceeding about the one essence of the Gods. Plato, therefore,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[14]</span> +asserts that the first and most ruling of these powers, are those +that unfold the intellectual production of the father, and expand it +to all the divided orders of beings. But that the second, are those +which are connective of wholes, and which preserve one series and +indissoluble connexion of the divine progressions. And that the third, +are those which are the primary leaders of perfection to all secondary +natures, and produce through similitude self-perfect conversions to +principles. But next to these he arranges those powers that extend +all the proceeding genera of the Gods to impartible monads, and which +pre-exist as the collectors of partible natures. Farther still, he +likewise asserts that other assimilative powers give subsistence to +the divided genera, and are definitely the suppliers of existence and +essence to first and last natures. And besides all these, that other +powers are the causes of undefiled distribution, and of perpetually +stable perfection.</p> + +<p>Moreover, together with these, I should arrange the authors of prolific +production, and those that pour upon and distribute to all secondary +natures the partible rivers of life. And farther still, after these, +I should arrange the powers that elevate secondary beings, cut off +every thing material, confused, and inordinate, and are the suppliers +of all goods. For there is no one of all the beautiful things in the +world that does not proceed from this<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> order of Gods, which fills its +participants with divine goods. Or whence indeed is the world always +established in its proper principles, whence does its circulation +remain immutable, and whence is the universe connected by indissoluble +bonds? For the ends of its periods become the principles of the +subsequent revolutions. But the circle of generation imitates the +invariable supply of the celestial orbs, and all things are converted +to more divine natures. Matter, indeed, is assimilated to beings, +through the last representations of the production of form. But that +which is moved in a confused and disordered manner, is circularly led +to order and bound by demiurgic reasons, being assimilated to natures +which always subsist with invariable sameness and permanency. Things, +however, which are borne along in a diversified generation,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[15]</span> and +multiform mutations, are assimilated to the celestial orbs, and being +moved in an all-various manner, follow the revolutions of the heavenly +bodies. But the convolutions of the heavens, represent as in images the +psychical periods; and the circulations of the spheres inscribe as it +were the intellections of the celestial souls. Time itself, likewise, +which proceeds according to number, and forms a circular dance, is +in a certain respect<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> assimilated to stable intellections, and to +[eternity] the measure of all intelligibles. For the whole of this time +was generated an image of eternity abiding in one, since it is evolved +after the same manner according to number. All things, therefore, +are allotted a progression into existence, and the distribution of +perfection according to measure, from the assimilative leaders, and +connect the essence of themselves through similitude.</p> + +<p>Moreover, this order of Gods in a particular manner, presides over +the sympathy of things in the world, and their communion with each +other. For all things concur with each other through similitude, and +communicate the powers which they possess. And first natures, indeed, +impart by illumination the gift of themselves to secondary natures, +in unenvying abundance. But effects are established in their causes. +An indissoluble connexion, likewise, and communion of wholes, and a +colligation of agents and patients, are surveyed in the world. For in +effects their generative causes subsist through similitude. And in +causes, the progeny that proceed from them are contained according to +comprehension. All things, likewise, are in each other, and similitude +is the collector of all things. On this account, also, celestial, +impart to sublunary natures, an exuberant and unenvying communication +of their own effluxions; but sublunary, being in a certain respect +assimilated to celestial natures, participate of an appropriate +perfection. A chain likewise extends from on high, as far as to the +last of things, secondary, always expressing the powers of the natures +prior to them, progression indeed diminishing the similitude, but all +things at the same time, and even such as most obscurely participate +of existence, bearing a similitude to the first causes,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[16]</span> and being +co-passive with each other, and with their original causes. For there +is naturally a two-fold similitude in things which have proceeded from +their causes. For they are assimilated to each other, according to +their progression from <i>the one</i>, and their conversion again to +it, and they are also assimilated to their ruling and first-effective +causes. And through the former similitude, indeed, the elements +conspire, are connascent, and are mingled with each other. But through +the latter, they hasten to their proper principles, and are conjoined +with their paradigms. On this account, all things which participate of +the solar effluxion, are suspended from the circulation of the sun; I +mean, not only the genera that are more excellent than us, but likewise +the number of souls, animals, plants, and stones. But all things adhere +to the Mercurial circulation, which receive the peculiarity of this +God. And the like takes place in the other [mundane] Gods. For all of +them are leaders and rulers in the universe. And many orders indeed of +angels dance round them; many numbers of demons; many herds of heroes; +the copious multitude of partial souls; the multiform genera of mortal +animals; and the various powers of plants. And all things indeed +aspire after their leaders, and in all things there is an impression +of their proper monad; but in some this impression is more clear, and +in others more obscure; since similitude also subsists in a greater +degree, in the first progeny, but is obscured in the middle, and last +progeny, according to the ratio of progression. Images, therefore, +and paradigms, are allotted their hypostasis on account of collective +similitude. And every thing on account of similitude is familiar to +itself, and to co-ordinate natures. But there is an unshaken friendship +between the co-ordinate natures in the world through the presence of +similitude; since contraries, also, and things which are most distant +from each other, are irreprehensibly bound through it, and connected so +as to produce the perfection of the universe.</p> + +<p>In short, therefore, we may say, that the assimilative leaders +of wholes, produce and generate all things from themselves. For +progressions are through similitude; and every thing which is +constituted, is wont to be assimilated to its generative cause. The +assimilative rulers also convert all things to their principles; for +every conversion is through similitude.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[17]</span> They likewise bind co-ordinate +natures to each other. For the communion of the one cause [of all] +produces similitude indeed in its participants, but from this, it +inserts in them an indissoluble connexion. They also cause all things +to sympathize, be friendly, and familiar with each other; exhibiting +indeed, through participation, more elevated in more abject natures; +but subordinate in more perfect essences, through causal comprehension. +They likewise extend series and periods from on high, as far as to +the last of things. And they produce monads indeed, into diminution, +through appropriate numbers; but collect multitudes into union, through +communion according to essence. They also adapt wholes to parts; but +comprehend parts in wholes. And things imperfect, indeed, they perfect, +through contact with ends; but they guard immutably perfect natures, +through a similar cause. They likewise lead into definite order, by +similar forms and reasons, the sea of dissimilitude; but they terminate +the very-mutable generation of sublunary natures, by stable paradigms. +Thus much, therefore, we have to say in common concerning the order +of divine natures, which we assert to be proximate indeed to the +intellectual Gods, but to be the leader, and cause of the assimilation +of all secondary natures to their proper principles.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER V.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place, I wish prior to the theory of Parmenides to teach, +what the Gods are, possessing this peculiarity, of whom Plato makes +mention in other dialogues. For perhaps thus the doctrine of Parmenides +will become more credible, and more manifest to reason. The ruling +Gods, therefore, are divided in a three-fold manner; and some of them +indeed are united to the intellectual kings, and extend the whole<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[18]</span> +series under themselves to a union with those kings; but others give +completion to the middle genera, and distribute the all-perfect +progression of these Gods; and others close the end of this order, +and unfold the powers of these divinities to secondary natures. This +being the case, those Gods that are arranged in the summits, do not +immediately participate of the similitude of the assimilative Gods; +but some of them are in a certain respect established above it, are +are essentially connected with the intellectual Gods; but others +proceed from it, and are mingled with the secondary genera. Hence, +those only who give completion to the middle breadth, genuinely define +in themselves the hyparxis of this order. We, therefore, likewise +beginning from these, shall embrace by a reasoning process the whole +theory of Plato. For we shall find in these, the perfect measures of +the ruling order, perfectly delivered to us by him.</p> + +<p>Again, therefore, let us refer the whole progression of these +middle orders to a triad, it being allotted a division of this kind +supernally, from the three intellectual fathers. Hence, indeed, this +whole order of Gods, is suspended from the demiurgic monad. But the +demiurgic intellect produces indeed some of them from itself and +the intellectual father; but others from itself,<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> and the whole +vivification; and others from appropriate rivers. Hence, also, of +the Gods that thus derive their subsistence, some are allotted a +paternal dignity, and are ruling fathers; but others are allotted a +generative; and others an elevating and convertive dignity. But since +a certain order of the unpolluted Gods is conjoined with each of the +intellectual kings, it is indeed necessary that in the ruling Gods +also, a second progression from them should shine forth to the view, +and that on this account the guardian order should be connascent with +the above-mentioned triple orders, being appropriately consubsistent +with each of them; viz. paternally indeed in the first; but vivifically +in the middle; and intellectually and convertively tn the third +order. And thus it is necessary that this whole order of Gods should +be divided by paternal powers, and prolific progressions, by powers +that lead upward all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[19]</span> secondary natures, and by those that are of an +undefiled guardian characteristic. For being allotted their hypostasis +from the intellectual Gods, some indeed ascend totally into parts, but +others partibly pour on wholes, the exuberant powers of themselves. +They likewise distribute the providence of the demiurgus and father, +some indeed arranging and adorning the universe with the first, middle, +and last forms of production; others educing the rivers of life, and +pouring them on all things; others elevating the natures that have +proceeded, and recalling them to the father; and others presiding over +purity, and being the guardians of secondary natures.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VI.</h2> + + +<p>Again, therefore, receiving the beginning of the theory of Plato from +the paternal cause, we assert as follows: The demiurgus and father of +this universe, being allotted this order in the intellectual kings, as +was before demonstrated, as he produced wholes totally, and referred +all things to the one form of the world, and the one perfection of the +universe, thus also he arranged and adorned the parts of the world, and +gave completion to the whole, contriving that all immortal and mortal +natures should be generated for the sake of the universe. And this is +what Plato introduces him saying in the Timæus to the junior Gods: +“That mortal natures therefore may exist, and that this universe may be +truly all, convert yourselves according to nature to the fabrication of +animals.” Since, however, after the monad, it is every where necessary +that a multitude should be generated proximate to the monad, and that +prior to an all-perfect division, united number should subsist (for +that which has proceeded to all things is not allied to that which +abides, nor is it possible<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[20]</span> that what is all-variously divided, should +be connascent with that which is impartible)—this being the case, the +demiurgus of wholes, produces indeed from himself, and his father a +number proximate to the monad of the fathers. But the three [fathers] +deriving their subsistence from one father, and first receiving the +power and dominion of fabrication, produce other second and third +fabricators from themselves, till through a diminution proceeding +according to [appropriate] measures, they evolve the whole demiurgic +number, the cause of which indeed, the demiurgic monad comprehends in +itself.</p> + +<p>The orderly progression, however, of multitude becomes at length +apparent. And thus the three ruling fathers of wholes, separate their +productions, by first, middle, and last boundaries of fabrication, +and are all of them total, but they are fabricators and fathers of +parts totally; through being in continuity indeed with the monad, +not changing the form of production; but on account of diminished +progression, not possessing an energy impartibly extended to all +things. And the one demiurgus indeed, being arranged prior to the +triad, comprehends in himself uniformly the productions of all [the +demiurgi]. But these three fathers multiply the unical dominion and +power of the first demiurgus, divide his impartible production, and +lead forth into secondary natures the stable energy of the father. And +the exempt monad indeed comprehends in itself the all-perfect measure +of the triad, according to supreme union; but the triad unfolds into +light from itself the undivided power of the monad.</p> + +<p>Plato, therefore, celebrates indeed, in other dialogues, these three +fabricators and fathers, but particularly in the Gorgias, adducing as +a witness of the theory concerning them, divinely-inspired poetry, +he refers the whole progression of them to Saturn the father of the +intellectual Gods, and from thence gives to them their first production +into light. He exempts, however, the demiurgic intellect from the +triadic division of them, co-arranges it with the father, and says, +that they have an intellectual dominion secondary to him. He likewise +calls them the sons of Saturn, but indicates that they are allotted +their progression from Jupiter. For there is a twofold Jupiter both +according to Plato, and all the theology,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[21]</span> as I may say, of the Greeks; +the one indeed convolving the end of the intellectual triad to the +beginning; but the other being allotted the summit of the ruling triad. +And the one being the demiurgus of wholes totally; but the other being +allotted the first parts of divided fabrication. And the one indeed +being arranged prior to the three fathers; but the other being the +first of the three, and proximate to the remaining fathers. Whence, +also, I think that many who discuss these particulars are ignorant +that Jupiter the demiurgus of the universe, is not the first of the +three fathers, and that Saturn the leader and ruler of the intellectual +kings, is not the same with the demiurgic intellect. For of those who +immediately suspend the triad of the ruling fathers from the paternal +kingdom of Saturn, some indeed refer the whole fabrication of things +to Saturn himself; but others ascribe to the summit of the triad the +generation of wholes. Is not, however, each of these impossible? For +the one abiding in himself, and converting to himself every thing which +has proceeded, is exempt from demiurgic production; but the other +being divided oppositely to the total<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> fathers, will not be the +impartible fabricator of wholes. For it is necessary that the whole and +all-perfect demiurgus of the world, should neither be connumerated with +the many<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> demiurgi, nor be the same with the cause which is stable, +and perfectly established in itself. For he has a subsistence contrary +to the cause which recalls that which has proceeded, and again exhibits +it unemanent from itself. To be present likewise to all things by no +means accords with that nature which energizes separately, and takes +away its generative power. How, therefore, can he who converts his own +children to himself, and shuts his own progeny in himself, possess +the same power with the demiurgus who unfolds all things into light, +and produces them into multitude? And how can he who is allotted the +universe in conjunction with the remaining demiurgi, be uniformly the +cause of the universe?</p> + +<p>For, if you are willing, consider each of these three demiurgi, and +survey what will happen from this assertion. For we say that the first<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[22]</span> +of them is the cause of essence, and of existence to the fabrications +in the world; but that the second is the source of the motion, life, +and generation of sensibles; and that the third is the cause of the +divided production of form, of partible circumscription, and of the +circular conversion of wholes to their one principle. We likewise +definitely assert these things, admitting that the fabrication of each +of the three extends to the whole world. But surveying the peculiar +mode of fabrication in each, we say that the first is the effector of +essence, the second of life, and the third of intellect. And that the +first is the cause of hyparxis, the second of motion, and the third of +conversion. Hence, the whole world, so far as it participates of being, +is produced from the first father; but so far as it subsists through +motion, and is generation, it receives its progression from the second +father; and so far as it is perfectly divided, and after all-various +division, is converted to its proper principle, it is produced from the +third father.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VII.</h2> + + +<p>These things, therefore, being thus determined, we may see how in the +Timæus, the demiurgus and father of this universe, at one and the +same time impartibly constitutes the world, gives to it essence, and +supplies it with existence, fashioning bodies, generating souls in +the middle of an impartible and partible essence, and constituting +intellects ingenerably [i.e. without generation] and indivisibly, +from the first genera. And farther still, besides these things, he +distributes different motions to souls and bodies, divides each of them +all-variously, according to harmonic reasons, binds them by analogies, +and converts them to himself, and his own will. How, therefore, can we +any longer rank such a demiurgus as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[23]</span> this in the same order with one +of these three fathers. For those things which they are said to give +to the universe divisibly, he constitutes impartibly from himself. Nor +does he produce some things precedaneously, and others according to +accident, but by his very being he generates essence, supplies motions, +and extends the divisions of mundane forms, and after the progression +of other things, converts all things to himself, abiding in his own +accustomed manner.</p> + +<p>In the second place, therefore, we say that the three demiurgi differ +from each other, because the first paternally comprehends the rest, and +is the father of this whole triad. But the second is the power of the +triad, and participates of the extremes according to the peculiarity of +powers. And the third is the intellect of the triad, and contains the +paternal, and intellectual power [by participation]. And in short, the +first is the father of both; but the second is the power of both; and +the third is the intellect of both. How, therefore, can the demiurgus +of wholes be the same with one of the above mentioned fathers? For he, +as Timæus says, is the father of all the world, and is allotted in +himself a paternal power and divine intellect, converting all things to +the watch-tower of himself. Again, therefore, we find that the partible +peculiarities of the three demiurgi, pre-exist in him impartibly and +uniformly. And as the demiurgic triad participates of union with him, +on account of the uncircumscribed transcendency of the monad, thus +also the monad antecedently and occultly comprehends in itself the +triad, according to the power of cause. Nor is it proper to confound +these with each other, but it is requisite to exempt the monad from +the triad, and to suspend the triad from the monad. And neither ought +we to make the three fathers, the rulers of total fabrication, nor to +rank the first of them in the same order with the one demiurgus. For +a co-ordinated entirely differs from an exempt cause. And that which +produces all things according to comprehension perfectly differs from +that which is similarly present to all things, and is equally distant +from all things. Besides this also, multitude is every where suspended +from its proper monad. And as <i>the one</i> precedes the total orders +of things, so likewise each order of the Gods has its progression from +a monad; since also each God is allotted a union which antecedes the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[24]</span> +multitude he contains. But if the whole genus of the Gods, and each God +proceed after the same manner, it is also necessary that each of the +divided orders should have the same mode of subsistence.</p> + +<p>In the third place we say that both Plato and the ancient theology +of the Greeks assert, that these three demiurgi divide the uniform +kingdom of their father Saturn. And that one of these three every +where arranges and adorns the first of wholes, another the middles, +and another the extremities of wholes; and that each is allotted this +order, not in fabrication only, but also in the providence of partial +souls. For of these, some indeed are arranged and perfected under +the first, prior to generation; but others, that give completion to +generation, are arranged under the second; and others, that require +purification after generation, are perfected under the third. Moreover, +the first demiurgus, as it is written in the Timæus, produces the whole +world. For he constitutes the circulation of the <i>same</i>, and +arranges and adorns the circulation of the <i>different</i>, and all +sublunary natures as far as to the earth, which he fabricated to be the +guardian of night and day, being immoveably fixed about the axis which +is extended through the poles of the universe. He also fills the whole +parts of the world with their proper numbers, and gives generation to +all of them, both to those that revolve manifestly, and to those that +become manifest when they please. Again, he defines the whole period +to partial souls, the measures of their descent into generation, the +vicissitudes of the present life, and their restitutions to their +kindred star,<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> and he is also said to unfold to them all the laws +of Fate, and to point out to them the nature of the universe. Hence, +he is not one<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> of these three fathers, nor is he co-arranged with +them, but is perfectly exempt from the triad. According likewise to the +proper prerogative of his empire, he is expanded separately above each, +and in common above all of them. And the operations indeed, of these +fathers, are divided about him, and are distinguished by more partial +boundaries. But his fabrication is uncircumscribed, is one whole, and +is impartible.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[25]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER VIII.</h2> + + +<p>Let it therefore, from these things be manifest, that the demiurgic +monad, is exempt from the ruling fathers, and that according to one +undivided cause he generates beings eternally. But if Jupiter is +according to Plato, the one and whole fabricator of the only-begotten +world, as we have before demonstrated, and we grant these things +without being deceived, and if, as it is now said, and Socrates in +the Gorgias teaches us, the first of the demiurgi that divide the +kingdom of Saturn, is in a similar manner called Jupiter, there will +be according to this theory a twofold Jupiter, the one being an +intellectual God prior to the three fathers; but the other being of +a ruling, assimilative, and principal nature, and arranged at the +summit of the three. For Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, divide, says +Plato, the kingdom of their father, three leaders of wholes subsisting +from one great king as it were, and producing the one fountain of the +demiurgic series, into one all-perfect principal triad, which Plato +also indicating, denominates the providence divided in the three a +kingdom, attributing the first-effective, and the uniform to the Gods +prior to these. If these however, are not the only orders of Jupiter, +but there is also another Jovian multitude, how this proceeds will +be evident in what follows. For all these three fathers participate +of the same appellation, and are after the same manner celebrated by +poets inspired by Phœbus; but one is called simply Jupiter, another +marine Jupiter, and another subterranean Jupiter. The leader however +of the three, possesses primarily the paternal dignity in the triad, +and the appellation of the great Jupiter. For on account of the supreme +union which he is allotted with the fontal demiurgus, who is beyond +the three, he also participates of the same name as the total Jupiter, +without any distinction. And on this account, I think, Socrates in the +Cratylus, unfolding to us the arcane and mystic discipline concerning +the Gods, from names, and at one time co-arranging Jupiter with Saturn, +and at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[26]</span> another with the remaining demiurgi, does not think it worth +while to speak twice about the same things, but in the intellectual +conceptions about the all-perfect demiurgus, he also thinks fit to +deliver the arcane discipline concerning the first of the three +demiurgi, through the truth of names. For in a certain respect, it +was not possible for him to do otherwise who shows that the theory in +things accords with names; since also, the father of this triad, is +inseparably united to the whole demiurgus. But of these things enough.</p> + +<p>If you are willing however, we will add the following observations to +what has been said. For perhaps some one may apprehend that the fable +in the Gorgias, gives to the three sons of Saturn, a progression from +Saturn proximately, but not, as we have said, through the demiurgic +monad as a medium. For again, the three are said to divide the kingdom +of Saturn, but not of the whole demiurgus and father. That we may not +however, ignorantly wander beyond measure from the conception of Plato, +and the truth of things, in consequence of following fabulous fictions, +we must affirm from the beginning, that both the whole demiurgus, +and this triad of the ruling fathers, proceed from the father of the +intellectual Gods. But the whole demiurgus proceeding from a whole, +impartibly participates of his father. For he abides in the allness +of his power, and imitates, if it be lawful so to speak, his uniform +and unmultiplied nature, by being monadic and whole, and the father of +things first, middle and last. But the three demiurgi, in a divided +manner participate of, and proceed from their generating cause, being +divided indeed from each other, but dividing his unical providence. And +Saturn indeed, is a God one and numerous, establishing multitude in +himself, and occultly comprehending it in appropriate boundaries. But +Jupiter expresses the paternal monad, and produces the unical nature of +it into the providence of wholes. And the three sons of Saturn unfold +into light the multitude which is there, in the all-perfect boundary +of the triad. Hence also they are said to divide the kingdom of their +father,<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> which Jupiter possessed indivisibly. Hence, if it be +requisite to speak boldly,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[27]</span> he indeed is a proceeding father, hastening +to arrange and adorn, and being parturient in order to the generation +of wholes. But they distribute his providence. This however, is the +same thing as to say they distribute the providence of Jupiter. For +the progression to them was from each of these divinities, from Saturn +indeed, according to the <i>from which</i> (αφ’ου), but from Jupiter +according to the <i>by which</i>, υφ’ου.<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> For Jupiter indeed, +unfolds them into light; but they proceed from the Saturnian adyta.</p> + +<p>If again, you are willing [to consider the affair] according to the +Parmenides of Plato, since in the Saturnian order there are both +wholeness and parts, if you assume the subsistence there of <i>that +which is in another</i>, according to whole, but of <i>that which is +in itself</i>, according to parts, Jupiter indeed, who is prior to +the three, proceeds from his father according to whole; but the three +demiurgi, according to parts. Hence, Jupiter reigns, possessing in +himself, as Socrates says in the Philebus, a royal intellect. But they +reign in a divided manner, and are allotted the universe according to +parts. Hence therefore, the Elean guest in the Politicus, celebrates +these two intellectual kings, one indeed, being the cause of the +unapparent life to wholes, and of the other circulation, but the other +being the source of the manifest order of things, and of the present +period; and he attributes to Jupiter the cause of both these periods. +But at one time indeed, he ascribes this cause to Jupiter, as leading +all things in the universe to the kingdom of Saturn; but at another, +as binding to himself the providence of secondary natures. For he is +united to his father by intellectual bonds, of which Socrates makes +mention in the Cratylus. He is likewise a whole extended to a whole, +and as it were adapts himself by his own light to the light of his +father, and possesses a second dominion. Hence also, he is said to +define the providence of his father. The Athenian guest however [in +the Laws,] extending us to the one demiurgic kingdom, to the law, and +the total justice which are there asserts, “that God, as it is said, +possesses the beginning, middle, and end of all beings, and bounds all +things by a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[28]</span> circular progression according to nature, in a direct +path.” For because we do not think it right to consider Plato here +as speaking of the first God, or of any other of the intellectual or +intelligible fathers, but of the whole demiurgus, it is sufficient +for those who are moderately able to understand things of this kind, +that he is said to bound all things in a direct path, and to proceed +circularly according to nature. It is also sufficient, that Justice +is said to be the attendant of this God, being the avenger of those +who transgress the divine law. For the first God, and all the Gods +who are established above the perfective order, are exempt from this +rectilinear, and also from the circular progression, as Parmenides +teaches us. They likewise transcend all motion. But the first that +proceeds after motion, is the whole and all-perfect demiurgus. To this +divinity therefore, it pertains to bound wholes in a direct path, to +proceed circularly, and to be followed by Justice. For we say indeed, +that the thing which follows, follows that which is moved.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the Gods who are secondary to the demiurgus, have not a +unical dominion over wholes as he has, nor do they antecedently assume +the beginnings, middles and ends of all beings. But some of them +indeed, preside over partial natures totally, as these three fathers; +but others preside over wholes partibly, as those who pour upon all +things the rivers of life, in a divided manner; and others preside over +parts partibly, as the last of the demiurgi, and who are conversant +with the world. The one and impartible demiurgus of wholes therefore, +alone comprehends in himself, the beginning, middle, and end of all +beings, and equally rules over all secondary natures according to one +cause. But Justice follows him, bounding the desert of the whole of +things, and circumscribing each thing in its proper limits. And these +things the Athenian guest manifests in the above-mentioned words; but +Orpheus clearly refers them to the whole demiurgus. For he says that +total Justice follows him, now reigning over, and beginning to arrange +and adorn the universe.</p> + +<p> +Justice th’ abundant punisher of crimes, +Aid and defence of all things, follows Jove. +</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[29]</span></p> + +<p>Moreover, that Jupiter comprehends the beginnings, middles and ends of +wholes, the theologist says, in addition to these things,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Jove’s the beginning, and the middle’s Jove,</div> + <div>And all things flow from Jove’s prolific mind.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p>And it appears to me that Plato looking to all the Grecian theology, +and particularly to the Orphic-mystic discipline says, that God, +according to the ancient assertion, possesses the beginning, middle, +and end of all things, bounding the whole of things in a direct path, +and proceeding circularly according to nature, and that he has Justice +for his attendant, through which every thing that departs from the +providential empire of Jupiter is converted to it, and obtains an +appropriate end. Through these things therefore, we have reminded the +reader, that the Athenian guest also looking to the whole demiurgus, +proclaims things of this kind to his pupils. If however, these things +are rightly determined, it is indeed entirely necessary to exempt the +one demiurgus, according to essence, from these three [demiurgi]. For +if one of them indeed, comprehends the beginnings of every thing in +the world, but another the middles, and another, every where convolves +the ends, is it not necessary that he who uniformly rules over the +universe, should be established above divided causes? But, the Athenian +guest gives to him a power generative of this triad [of demiurgi]. +For if he comprehends the beginnings, middles, and ends of the whole +of things, according to the primary cause indeed, he generates the +demiurgus, who arranges and adorns first natures; but according to +middle causes, the demiurgus who gives completion to the middle +boundaries of fabrication; and according to the end, the demiurgus who +adapts an appropriate production to the last of things.</p> +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[30]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER IX.</h2> + + +<p>The Athenian guest therefore, does all but clearly say, that the +distribution to the three sons of Saturn, the measures of providence, +and in short, progression, are suspended<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> from the great Jupiter, +and that it is he who supernally defines their allotments, and +uniformly comprehends all of them in himself. Moreover, with respect to +the assertions, that he bounds all things in a direct path, and that he +proceeds circularly according to nature, the former of these, manifests +the progression of wholes from him; for the direct is a symbol of +progression; but the latter manifests the conversion of wholes to him. +For he being intellectually converted in, and to himself, convolves +all things to the watch-tower of himself. But if the straight and +the circular first subsist in the perfective Gods, the demiurgus of +wholes is filled indeed from thence, but fills the natures posterior +to himself with the powers that proceed from him. And as according +to the triple cause of wholes, he constitutes the triad of demiurgi +in conjunction with his father, thus also according to these twofold +powers, he generates twofold [orders of] Gods; one indeed, which adorns +a sensible nature, according to the straight which is in him; but the +other which elevates all things to him, according to the circular. +Moreover, because he proceeds indeed from the whole fabrication, (i +e. from Rhea) but participates of the perfective triad, he connects +this straight and circular with motion. For to bound according to the +straight, and to proceed circularly, designate motion; the former +indeed, being significant of motion proceeding to all things, and +adorning all things with boundaries, forms and reasons; but the latter, +of motion convolving to itself, and calling upward all things to itself.</p> + +<p>Again, therefore, Plato placing in the one demiurgus the cause of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[31]</span> +triad, exempts him, who abides as it were in himself, from production +according to parts; but attributes to the triad a division according +to the demiurgus. For Timæus also, by placing in him a paternal cause, +a generative power, and a royal intellect, theologizes the same things +about him as the Athenian guest. The paternal, indeed, is every where +principal; but power belongs to the middle; and intellect closes the +end of the triad. For power, according to the Oracle, is with them; +[i.e. with father and intellect], but intellect is from him, [i.e. +from the father]. Hence, of the natures which have proceeded, one +is the father of the whole triad, but another the intellect of it. +And one indeed is allotted the beginning of total fabrication; but +another, gives completion to the middle of the generation of wholes; +and another, bounds the end of it. Nor must we here omit to observe the +accuracy of Plato, but survey<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> how the Athenian guest magnificently +celebrates the extremities of the three demiurgi, by more singular +names, calling one the <i>beginning</i>, and the other the <i>end</i>, +but that which is between the extremes even in causes, he manifests +through multitude. For he denominates it <i>middles</i>; since power +also, as being co-ordinate with the infinite, or rather being a certain +infinity, is the cause of multitude and division to wholes. Hence also, +of the three demiurgi, one indeed, is the cause to mundane natures of +a stable<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> collocation; but another, of generation proceeding to all +things; and another, of the circulation of things to the principle of +their progression.</p> + +<p>Let us, however, return whence we digressed, to the discussion +concerning the first demiurgus, in which it was said, that Jupiter, +Neptune, and Pluto divide the kingdom of their father. For prior +to these, the demiurgus received the kingdom of his father in an +undivided and uniform manner. For both the demiurgic monad and the +triad, were thence allotted their progression from the beginning, and +their dominion over secondary natures; but the former impartibly, +and the latter partibly; and the former monadically, but the latter +triadically.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[32]</span> That you may not, therefore, think that these three +proceed after the same manner from the father, as the one king who +is prior to the three, Socrates, [in the Gorgias] in the form of a +fable, says that they divide the kingdom of the father, and on this +account require secondary laws, and a subordinate order, and which is +adapted to parts. For the law under Saturn, and the law of Jupiter who +recently possesses the kingdom [of his father] appear to be by no means +adapted to the providence of those powers who produce a partial and +various form of life. And do you not see how Socrates gives to total +Jupiter and to Saturn an exempt transcendency, and connects one law +with both kingdoms; but to the three demiurgi that divide the kingdom, +he definitely assigns as it were another polity, and more various +laws commensurate to the subjects of their providential care? For he +says that Pluto, and the curators were present enquiring of Jupiter +respecting the second legislation; but that he placed over partible +lives, other judges, and laws adapted to these lives. Again, therefore, +Jupiter, who definitely assigns things of this kind, and who generates +the three judges, is not the same with the Jupiter who is prior to the +three [demiurgi]. For the latter was together with his father according +to a prior law, and the simplicity of a divine life; but the former +together with Pluto, leads into order and bound the variety of partial +natures, and is the leader of secondary laws.</p> + +<p>The divine law, therefore, is with the intellectual kings, Saturn and +Jupiter; and also Justice the avenger of those who transgress the +divine law, as the Athenian guest says. But other more various laws are +with the three sons of Saturn, and also judges co-ordinate to such like +laws, as it is written in the Gorgias. And there indeed, [i.e. with the +intellectual kings,] all things are impartibly, and unitedly; but here, +[i.e. with the three sons of Saturn], all things subsist in a divided +and partible manner. And the things which are there being primary, the +law indeed is more Saturnian. But Justice follows the great Jupiter. +And the laws indeed pertaining to secondary natures, confer perfection +under the first of the sons of Saturn. But the judges give completion +to the empire of the third of these sons. And Pluto participates from +the second Jupiter of the separation of the laws; in the same manner as +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[33]</span> total Jupiter receives from Saturn the one law which is to be the +co-administrator with him in the total fabrication of things. In short, +the Jupiter who is co-arranged with Neptune and Pluto, is the summit of +the ruling triad; but the Jupiter who is co-arranged with Saturn and +the mistress Rhea, is the third of the intellectual<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> triad. Hence +also, Socrates, in the Cratylus, at one time ascends from Jupiter to +Saturn, and conjoins the two kingdoms; but at another time he proceeds +from Jupiter to Neptune and Pluto, and unfolds this one ruling triad; +just as in the Gorgias, he weaves together the Saturnian and Jovian +order, when he says that there is one and the same law in both. He +co-arranges therefore, the second and more partial Jupiter with +Pluto, according to the apparent correction of the prior law, and the +distribution of the second laws. And thus much may suffice concerning +these particulars.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER X.<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></h2> + + +<p>It now remains that we should begin to speak about these three fathers, +following the mystic narrations of Plato, since all of them are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[34]</span> +suspended from the demiurgic monad, and present themselves to our view +as the second [in rank] after it. These three leaders, therefore, of +wholes, and rulers, are emitted indeed from the intellectual fathers, +and are divided according to them; but they are unfolded into light +in all the partible orders of the Gods. For among the rulers they are +allotted the first order, and are analogous to the intelligible and +intellectual fathers, in the whole assimilative series, and having +made a second progression in the liberated Gods, they rule over the +universe. Together also with the mundane Gods, they give completion +to the apparent order of things, being allotted in one way an essence +in the heavens, but in another way distributing the total parts in +the sublunary region, but every where energizing paternally and +demiurgically, expanding the one fabrication, and adapting it to parts.</p> + +<p>With respect, however, to the allotment and distribution of them, +in the first place, if you please, it is according to the whole +universe, the first of them producing essences, the second lives +and generations, and the third administering formal divisions. And +the first indeed establishing in the one demiurgus all things that +thence proceed; but the second calling all things into progression; +and the third converting all things to itself. In the second place, +the allotment and division of them are according to the parts of the +universe. For the first of them adorns the inerratic sphere, and the +circulation of it; but the second governs the planetary region, and +perfects the multiform, efficacious, and prolific motions in it; and +the last administers the sublunary region, and intellectually perfects +the terrestrial world. Again, in the third place, we may survey in +that which is generated, these three demiurgic progressions; since +Timæus also here makes mention of the offspring of Saturn. Jupiter, +therefore, administers the summit of generated natures, and governs the +spheres of fire and air. But Neptune all-variously moves the middle and +very-mutable elements, and is the inspective guardian of every moist +essence, which is beheld in air and water. And Pluto providentially +attends to the earth, and to every thing in the earth. Hence also he is +called terrestrial Jupiter.</p> + +<p>In the fourth place, therefore, in the whole of generation, Jupiter +indeed is allotted the summits, and the parts which are raised above +others, in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[35]</span> which also are the allotments of happy souls, as Socrates +says in the Phædrus, because they then live under Jupiter, beyond +generation. But Neptune is allotted cavities, and cavernous places, +with which generation, motion, and the incursion of concussions are +conversant. Hence, they call this God, the earth-shaker. And Pluto is +allotted the places under the earth, various streams, Tartarus itself, +and in short, the places in which souls are judged and punished. Whence +also, of souls themselves, they say that such of them as have not yet +proceeded into generation, but abide in the intelligible, are Jovian; +but that such as are conversant with generation, are arranged under +Neptune; and that such as are purified and punished after generation, +and wander under the earth, according to a journey of a thousand years, +or which are again converted and led back to their principle, are +perfected under Pluto.</p> + +<p>In the fifth place, therefore, we must say that the allotments of these +divinities, are divided according to the centres of the universe. And +Jupiter, indeed, has the eastern centre, as being allotted an order +analogous to fire; but Neptune, the middle centre, which pertains to +vivification, and according to which especially generation enjoys +celestial natures; and Pluto the western centre, since we say that the +west is co-ordinate to earth, as being nocturnal, and the cause of the +unapparent. For shadow is from earth, and earth is the privation of +light from west to east. In short, according to every division of the +world, we admit that the first and most leading parts are Jovian; but +we say that the middle parts pertain to the kingdom of Neptune; and we +consider the last parts as belonging to the empire of Pluto.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XI.</h2> + + +<p>Through these things, therefore, the triad of the ruling fathers +has been celebrated by us. Let us, however, survey another order in +this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[36]</span> progression, prolific, and vivific, and which is delivered by +Plato in a divinely-inspired manner. For the proximate decrements +and generations from all the intellectual fathers, are unfolded into +light in the assimilative Gods. For here the partible progressions +exist of things which there subsist uniformly, since it is lawful for +progeny which every where are allotted an order inferior to their +causes, to give multitude to the monads, and to multiply the stable +hypostases of them, and to render the energies of the simplicity, +which is in first natures, more composite. As, therefore, from the +paternal monad [Saturn] a triad subsists of ruling demiurgi, thus also +from the vivific fountain [Rhea] which is allotted the middle centre +in the intellectual Gods, the vivific order of the assimilative Gods +is emitted. And here also there is a triad connectedly contained by +one monad; since the paternal triad also subsists according to one +perfect intellect, and was, as we have said, monadic. After the same +manner, therefore, the triad which is the supplier of life is monadic, +being indeed full of prolific power, and full of undefiled perfection. +It likewise participates of the whole vivification, and through the +rivers of life, fills all secondary natures with generative goods, +and produces the vivific light, into the unenvying and exuberant +participation of subordinate essences. And it converts indeed all +things to itself, but is present to all things, and imparts to them +its own appropriate powers. It likewise pervades from on high, as far +as to the last parts of the world, but every where preserves the union +of itself unmingled with its participants. And it embosoms indeed the +generative, perfect, and beneficent light of the demiurgic monad; but +weaves together with the third father [Pluto] the order of life; and +co-arranges the boundaries of wholes in a becoming manner.<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> In +short, it extends itself from the middle to all the genera of rulers, +both the first and the last. And together with them indeed, it perfects +all secondary natures, and co-arranges that which is generative, +with the demiurgus. In addition to these things also, it illuminates +all things with an analogous power, and connects the undefiled with +the convertive peculiarity. For stable power pertains indeed to the +demiurgic genera, but undefiled purity to the elevating genera.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[37]</span></p> + +<p>Plato, therefore, in the same manner as Orpheus, calls this triad by +one name; but in a certain respect he also indicates the multitude of +the powers it contains. For all the theology of the Greeks denominates +the second vivification <i>Coric</i>, (i.e. <i>Virginal</i>) and +conjoins it with the whole vivific fountain. Plato also says, that it +has its hypostasis from this fountain, and energizes together with it. +For effects are never divulsed from the providence of their causes. +But wanderings indeed, and investigations, [belong to the powers that +energize providentially, just as<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a>] participations according to +periods pertain to the subjects of providential energy. The divine +cause, however, of a partible life [i.e. Proserpine] conjoins herself +from eternity, with the whole vivific fountain [i.e. with Ceres] which +theologists call the mother of the ruling Goddess. And Plato every +where conjoins Proserpine with Ceres. And he pre-establishes indeed, +the latter as a generative cause; but he celebrates the former as +being filled from the latter, and filling secondary natures. Since, +however, the Coric order is twofold, one indeed shining forth above +the world, where it is also co-arranged with Jupiter, and constitutes +with him the one demiurgus of partible natures [i.e. Bacchus], but the +other, and which is secondary, shining forth in the world, where also +it is said to be ravished by Pluto, and to animate the extremities +of the universe, which are under the administration of Pluto,—this +being the case, Plato perfectly unfolds to us both these, at one time +indeed conjoining Proserpine with Ceres, but at another with Pluto, +and evincing that she is the wife of this God. For the rumour of +theologists who delivered to us the most holy mysteries in Eleusis, +says, that above indeed, Proserpine abides in the dwellings of her +mother, which her mother had fabricated in inaccessible places, exempt +from the universe, but that beneath she governs terrestrial concerns in +conjunction with Pluto, rules over the recesses of the earth, extends +life to the extremities of the universe, and imparts soul to things +which are of themselves inanimate, and dead. Where also you may wonder +that Proserpine associates with Jupiter indeed and Pluto, the former, +as fables say violating, but the latter ravishing the Goddess,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[38]</span> but +is not connected with Neptune. For he alone of the sons of Saturn, +is not conjoined with Proserpine. [The reason, however, of this is,] +that Neptune possessing the middle centre in the triad, is allotted +a vivific dignity and power, and is characterized according to this. +From himself, therefore, he has the vivific cause, animates the whole +of his proper allotment, and fills it with middle life from his own +peculiarity. For Pluto indeed is the supplier of wisdom and intellect +to souls according to Socrates in the Cratylus. But Jupiter is the +cause of existence to beings, as the father of the triad. Proserpine, +therefore, being co-arranged with the extremes, and prior to the world, +with Jupiter indeed paternally, but in the world with Pluto, according +to the beneficent will of the father, in the former case she is said +to be violated by Jupiter, but in the latter, to be ravished by Pluto, +in order that the first and last of fabrications may participate of +vivification. For as the whole fountain of life [Rhea] being conjoined +with the whole, according to one impartible cause, illuminates all +things with life, thus also Proserpine, weaving in conjunction with the +leaders of the universe, things first, middle, and last, illuminates +them with the vivification of herself.</p> + +<p>Moreover, we may know from Plato, through these signs, the union of +the whole triad, since denominating it <i>Core</i> (i.e. a virgin or +Proserpine) he celebrates it with Ceres. But again, we must survey +where it is that he indicates the division of the triad. For there +are three monads in it, and one of them is arranged, as being the +highest, according to hyparxis, but another is arranged according to +the power which is definitive of life, and another according to vivific +intellect. And theologists indeed are accustomed to call the first of +these Coric, (i.e. virginal) Diana, but the second Proserpine, and the +third, Coric Minerva. I speak, however, of the authors of the Grecian +theology, since among the Barbarians [i.e. the Chaldeans] the same +things are manifested through other names. For they indeed call the +first monad, Hecate, but the middle monad, Soul, and the third, Virtue. +Since, therefore, these things are made known to us after this manner +by the names of the Greeks, Plato indeed indicates the order of Coric +Minerva, by denominating Minerva Mistress, celebrating her as Core, +asserting that she is the cause of the whole of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[39]</span> virtue, and calling +her the lover of wisdom, and the lover of war, and also Ethonoe, +as being intelligence in manners. For all these names sufficiently +represent to us her intellectual and ruling nature, and that power +of her which promptly supplies the whole of virtue. But in the same +dialogue, he indicates the order of Proserpine, celebrating her as +Pherephatta, and employing this name, which is likewise used by all +other theologists. These things he manifests in the Cratylus, where he +unfolds the truth concealed in the name of Pherephatta. And in the same +dialogue he indicates the order of Diana, by calling her skilful in +virtue. For it is evident that the whole triad being united to itself, +the first [monad] of the triad,<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> unically comprehends the third, the +third is converted to the first, and the middle has a power extending +to both. There are, therefore, these three vivific monads, viz. Diana, +Proserpine, and our mistress Minerva. And the first of these indeed is +the summit of the whole triad, and which also converts to herself the +third. But the second is a power vivific of wholes. And the third is +a divine and undefiled intellect, comprehending in one, in a ruling +manner, total virtues. Timæus, therefore, manifests this, calling +the third monad (Minerva) philosophic, as being full of intellectual +knowledge, and true wisdom; but philopolemic, as the cause of undefiled +power, and the inspective guardian of the whole of fortitude. And +again, the Athenian guest, calls her Core, as being a virgin, and as +purifying from all conversion to externals.</p> + +<p>If, however, you are willing, we will survey the triad of Core, from +what is said in the Cratylus concerning Pherephatta. She is called, +therefore, wisdom, and is said to come into contact with that which +is generated and borne along; she also produces fear in those that +hear her name, and excites astonishment in the multitude. With respect +to the appellation of wisdom, therefore, it is evident that it is a +sign [of the characteristic property] of Minerva, and the summit of +virtue. For if in us, all the sciences are the first of the virtues, +how is it possible that wisdom should not be rightly denominated, the +first-effective cause of all the virtues? And if philosophy pertains +to her, so far as she is wisdom, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[40]</span> immaterial intelligence, but +not because she is indigent of wisdom, (for no one of the Gods, says +Diotima, philosophizes), on this account, therefore, she is not +indigent of wisdom; and the intellectual good of the ruling order +entirely pertains to her. But to come into contact with that which +is borne along, and with generation, will in a particular manner +be adapted to soul. For it is soul that knows every thing which is +generated, and continually communicates with it. She, likewise, in a +certain respect comes entirely into contact with that which is borne +along. Moreover, the incommensurability of Pherephatta with multitude, +and the terrour and astonishment which she excites, are indicative of +the power in her which is exempt from all things, which is unapparent +to the many and unknown. For the Barbarians also [i.e. the Chaldeans,] +call the Goddess who is the leader of this triad, dire and terrible. +Hence Plato does not more clearly indicate these things to us about +this mighty Goddess [than the Barbarians;] but he announces names +adapted to the theology concerning her.</p> + +<p>To the Core, therefore, that is beneath, and that associates with +Pluto, all the above-mentioned particulars are inherent according to +participation, and, as some one might say, according to similitude to +the total Core; but they are inherent in the ruling Core, according +to the first hypostasis. And in reality these three Goddesses are +consubsistent. As, likewise, the whole vivific deity comprehends in +herself the fountains of virtue and soul, which the demiurgus also +imparts to the world, causing it to subsist perfectly, thus too, this +deity [Core] possessing the primary cause of all the partible forms of +life, possesses likewise the principle of souls, and of the virtues, +and on this account, the ascent to partial souls [such as ours], is +through similitude, and virtue is a similitude to the Gods. Hence also, +the form of each of these, I mean of virtue and soul, presubsist in +the assimilative Gods; since, likewise, the immortality of souls is +inferred by Socrates, from their similitude to divinity. If, therefore, +they are allotted immortality essentially, it is indeed necessary +that the cause which assimilates them [to divinity] should primarily +be in the Gods. For they are assimilated to their fountain. But they +participate of similitude from the assimilative causes. Hence in these, +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[41]</span> cause of such an immortality of souls as this, shines forth. On +this account also, Socrates arguing from similitude says, it is fit +that souls should govern and despotically rule over bodies, since they +are allotted the power of governing and despotically ruling, from the +same cause from which they derive their similitude [to divinity.] +The one cause itself, therefore, of all the partible forms of life, +pre-exists in the assimilative rulers. But one, whole, and impartible +virtue exists prior to all the virtues which afford a similitude [to a +divine nature.] And neither is the essential similitude of souls, nor +the similitude of virtue, derived from any other source than that of +these rulers and principles.</p> + +<p>Since, however, there are, as we have said, triple monads in Core; +and one, indeed, establishes all things in itself; but another leads +all things into generation; (for it belongs to soul to generate) and +another converts all things to itself; (for this is the illustrious +work of virtue) and since all things are perfectly pre-arranged in +Core,—this being the case, the monad which associates with Pluto, +participates, indeed, in a certain respect of the extremes, but is +particularly allotted its progression according to the middle. Hence +also, it is called Proserpine, because it comes into contact, as we +have observed, with generation and things which are borne along. +For the unmingled and the virginal were adapted to the extremes. +But mixture, and a contact with generated natures, are adapted to +the middle, which rejoices in progressions and multiplications. +This ravishment therefore, of Core, is indeed perfectly established +in Proserpine. But she also imparts herself, and the vivification +proceeding from herself to the last of things. Hence likewise, Socrates +in the Cratylus co-arranges Proserpine with Pluto, but every where +ranks total Core with Ceres, and comprehends her in the name of Core. +The power however, which proceeds from her to the realms beneath, he +comprehends in the name of Proserpine. For the psychical nature is in +this power essentially; but the remaining things are in it, as we have +said, according to representation, and not primarily. And thus much +concerning the vivific triad, since Plato has delivered to us but few +auxiliaries about it, from which as from firestones rubbed against each +other, it is possible to enkindle the light of truth.</p> +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[42]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XII.</h2> + + +<p>In the third place, let us discuss the elevating, among the ruling +Gods, and the triad which converts all things to their principle. For +since there are three intellectual monads, as we have said, which are +pre-arranged in the Gods prior to these, three triads of the ruling +Gods proceed conformably to those monads; the paternal triad indeed, +conformably to the first intellectual monad; (whence also they are +called the sons of Saturn, and are said to have divided the kingdom of +their father) but the vivific triad conformably to the middle monad; +(whence also we are accustomed to co-arrange Core with Ceres as with +a precedaneous cause) and the convertive triad, conformably to the +third monad. Hence likewise we establish the peculiar cause of this +triad in the demiurgus. For all the triads of the ruling Gods, are +suspended from the demiurgic monad, and the progression to all of +them is from this. One of them however, he constitutes in conjunction +with his father; another in conjunction with the vivific Goddess; and +another from the fountain in himself. For in the all-perfect demiurgus +there are many fountains, which exist prior to all the second and +third generations. For there the fountain of ideas subsists, according +to which he adorns the universe, fashions the several particulars in +it with forms and reasons, and arranges, and leads them into bound +and morphe. For the fountain of souls likewise, and the fountain of +all the intellectual Gods which proceed from him, are there. For he +possesses a royal soul, and a royal intellect, according to the power +of cause, as Socrates says in the Philebus. For there also the fontal +sun subsists. Hence Timæus, after the generation of the seven bodies, +and their position into total circulations, says, that the demiurgus +enkindled that light which we now call the sun in the second of the +revolutions from the earth, as affording an hypostasis to the sun from +his own essence. For that which enkindles the whole sun, produces it, +and constitutes that which is enkindled.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[43]</span></p> + +<p>The demiurgus therefore, possessing, and comprehending in himself +the solar fountain, generates likewise in conjunction with the +principles and rulers of wholes, solar powers, and the triad of solar +Gods, through which all things are elevated, perfected, and filled +with intellectual goods; from one<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> monad indeed, participating +unpolluted light, and intelligible harmony, but from the remaining two, +efficacious power, acme, and demiurgic perfection. How therefore, does +Plato deliver to us these divine orders, and where does he indicate +concerning them? Here then, he comprehends the whole triad through +one name, in the same manner as he does the triad prior to it. And as +there he manifests the whole genus of the vivific principles by the +name of Core, so likewise in these, he denominates the whole triad +Apolloniacal. But he indicates the multitude in this triad by the many +powers of this God.</p> + +<p>In the first place therefore, let us survey how Plato, in the same +manner as Orpheus, considers the sun to be in a certain respect the +same as Apollo, and how he venerates the communion of these Gods. +For Orpheus clearly says that the sun is the same with Apollo, and +asserts this (as I may say) through the whole of his poetry. But the +Athenian guest indicates this through the union of these divinities, +constructing a common temple to Apollo and the sun, and at one time +making mention of both, but at another, of one only, in consequence +of their subsisting according to one union. But he says as follows: +“Every year after the conversions of the sun from summer to winter, +it is requisite that the whole city should assemble in the temple +common to the sun and Apollo, consecrating three of the citizens to the +God.” In these words therefore, speaking in common about both these +divinities, that it is fit there should be a temple of Apollo and the +sun, into which it is necessary the whole city should assemble, after +the summer solstice, he discourses in what follows about both, as if +they were one, adding, that three of the citizens should be consecrated +to the God; thus recurring from the division to the union of both. +But elsewhere, he latently indicates the communion of them with each +other. And again, in what follows, at one time he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[44]</span> says that the +citizens [consecrated to the God] should offer common first fruits to +the sun and Apollo, but at another to the sun alone, in consequence +of Apollo being in the sun. According to Plato therefore, there is a +kindred conjunction of these divinities, a communion of powers, and an +ineffable union.</p> + +<p>Socrates also in the Cratylus, proposing to discover the essence of +Apollo from his appellation, ascends to the simplicity of his hyparxis, +to his power of unfolding truth into light, and to his intellect +which is the cause of knowledge, thus sufficiently indicating to us +the unmultiplied, simple, and uniform nature of the God. But in the +[6th book of the] Republic, arranging the sun analogous to <i>the +good</i>, and sensible light, to the light proceeding from <i>the +good</i> to the intelligible, and calling the light which is present +to the intelligible from <i>the good</i>, truth, connecting likewise +intellect and the intelligible with each other, he evidently collects +together these two series, I mean the Apolloniacal and the solar. +For each of these is analogous to <i>the good</i>.<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> But sensible +light, and intellectual truth, are analogous to superessential light. +And these three lights are successive to each other, viz. the divine, +the intellectual, and sensible light; the last indeed pervading to +sensibles from the visible sun; but the second extending from Apollo to +intellectuals; and the first, from <i>the good</i> to intelligibles.</p> + +<p>Again therefore, these Gods are demonstrated to be connascent with +each other, according to their analogy to <i>the good</i>. But +together with union, they have also a separation adapted to them. +Hence by poets inspired by Phœbus, the different generative causes +and fountains of them are celebrated, from which being allotted their +hypostasis, they are separated from each other. But they are likewise +celebrated by these poets, as mutually connascent and united, and are +praised by the appellations of each other. For the sun vehemently +rejoices, to be celebrated in hymns as Apollo. And Apollo when he is +invoked as the sun, benevolently causes the light of truth to shine +forth. If therefore, the hyparxes of these divinities are united to, +and subsist together with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[45]</span> each other, but many powers of Apollo +are delivered to us by Plato himself, and are happily allotted an +appropriate theory, it is certainly proper to collect from these by +a reasoning process, the solar progressions. But I say these things, +looking to Socrates in the Cratylus, and his conceptions through +images, which are there delivered, of the Apolloniacal powers. For +the name of this God being one, unfolds all his powers, to the lovers +of the contemplation of truth. This therefore is a very illustrious +indication of the Apolloniacal peculiarity, viz. to collect multitude +into one, to comprehend number in unity, to produce many things from +one, and through intellectual simplicity to convolve to himself all +the variety of secondary natures, and by one hyparxis to unite in +one, multiform essences and powers. This Socrates says happens to the +name Apollo, it being sufficient to signify in one, the various and +different powers of the God, so that receiving his last image, and the +most obscure representation from him, it is assimilated to his unific, +and collective hyparxis, and contributes to our recollection of the +Apolloniacal peculiarity. This one name therefore, possesses occultly +many indications of the powers of the God. And by this simplicity +indeed, which is exempt from multitude, the truth which the God through +prophesy unfolds to secondary natures, is presented to our view. For +the simple is the same with the true. But by the representation [in +his name] of dissolution and liberation, the purifying and undefiled +nature of the God is signified, and also his power which is the saviour +of wholes. By his emission of arrows, his power is indicated which is +subversive of every thing inordinate, confused, and incommensurate, +through a cause which is the source of the jaculation of arrows. And by +his revolution, the harmonious motion of wholes, and the symphony which +coalesces in itself, and binds all things, are indicated. Referring +therefore, these four powers of the God to forms adapted to the powers, +we may thus accommodate them to the solar monads. Hence the first of +these monads is enunciative of truth and the intellectual light which +subsists occultly in the Gods themselves. But the second is subversive +of every thing confused, and exterminative of all disorder. And the +third renders all things commensurate and friendly to each other, +through harmonic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[46]</span> reasons. An undefiled however, and most pure cause +presides over these monads, illuminating all things with perfection, +and a subsistence according to nature, and expelling the contraries to +these.</p> + +<p>Of the solar triad, therefore, the first monad, indeed, unfolds +intellectual light, and announces it to all secondary natures, fills +all things with total truth, and elevates them to the intellect of +the Gods. And this we say is the employment of the prophetic power of +Apollo, viz. to lead forth into light the truth comprehended in divine +natures, and to perfect that which is unknown to secondary natures. +But the second and third monads, emit efficacious and demiurgic acme, +in order to the production of wholes, and perfect energy, according +to which they adorn indeed every thing sensible, but exterminate +the inordinate and indefinite from the universe. And one of these +monads is analogous to the production in wholes through music, and to +the harmonious providence of things that are moved. But another is +analogous to the power which is subversive of all disorder, and of the +confusion and tumult which are contrary to form, and to the arrangement +of wholes. And the remaining monad which supplies all things with an +unenvying and exuberant communication of what is beautiful, which +extends the beneficial, and imparts true blessedness, closes indeed +the solar principles, but guards its triple progression. In a similar +manner also, it illuminates ascending natures, with the perfect and +intellectual measure of a happy life, presiding in the sun analogous to +the purifying and Pœonian powers of the king Apollo.</p> + +<p>From what is written likewise in the Republic concerning the sun, we +may be able to collect the same things by a reasoning process. For +Socrates there gives to it a transcendency exempt from every thing +generated, and says that it is established above things which are +borne along in a sensible nature; just as <i>the good</i> is perfectly +exempt from intelligibles. He likewise says that the sun generates +sense, that which is sensible, and generated natures, just as <i>the +good</i> produces essence and true being, and is antecedently the +cause of intellect and intelligibles.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[47]</span> If, therefore, this sensible +world is generated and generation, as Timæus says, and a divine +generated<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> nature, as it is asserted in the Republic, but the sun is +beyond generation, as Socrates affirms, and in short, is allotted an +essence different from sensibles, it is perfectly evident that it is +allotted a supermundane order in the world, and exhibits an unbegotten +transcendency in generated<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> natures, and an intellectual dignity in +sensibles. Hence, Timæus also delivers a twofold progression of the +sun from the demiurgus, one indeed being co-arranged with the other +planets, but the other exempt, supernatural, and unknown. For the +demiurgus, when producing the seven bodies of the planets, and placing +them in their proper circulations, at the same time constitutes the sun +with the other planets arranging the moon the first from the earth, +but the sun in the second circulation; and after these, he enkindles a +light in the solar sphere, similar to none of the others; nor does he +receive this light from the subject matter, but himself produces and +generates it from himself, and extends as it were from certain adyta +to mundane natures, a symbol of intellectual essences, and unfolds to +the universe that which is arcane in the Gods that are above the world. +Hence also the sun when he [first] appeared, astonished the [mundane] +Gods, and all of them were desirous to dance round him, and to be +filled with his light. This world likewise is beautiful and solar-form.</p> + +<p>As we have said, therefore, from the fabrication [of the universe,] +in the Timæus, the sun is demonstrated to possess this order beyond +sensibles, and to be allotted an essence above every thing which is +generated, but every thing in the world receives from him, perfection +and essence. Hence also, Socrates in the Republic calls the sun the +offspring of <i>the good</i>, the demiurgus of a generated nature, +and the author of all mundane light. These things, therefore, we must +likewise understand analogously about the ruling order of the God; for +they are thence communicated to this visible sun. And on this account, +here also, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[48]</span> sun is allotted an exempt transcendency with respect to +the Gods in the world, because he possesses a precedaneous hypostasis +among the leaders and rulers of wholes.</p> + +<p>Farther still, in those Gods likewise, the first effective cause of +light subsists, generating those supermundane and intellectual rays, +through which souls, and all the more excellent genera obtain an +elevating progression. With these Gods also, there is the demiurgic +duad which produces both simple and composite natures, those that are +of a more ruling, and those that are of an inferior order. And in +short, this demiurgic duad governs the twofold co-ordinations of the +world. Hence those who are wise in divine concerns call this primary +cause of light, and the demiurgic duad hands, as being efficacious, +motive, and fabricative of wholes. But they establish them to be +twofold, the one indeed being dexter, but the other sinister; which +things also Timæus admits to be primarily in the celestial periods, +and says that this division is derived from the first demiurgus. If, +therefore, the demiurgic monad constituted the solar order prior to the +world, why is it wonderful that in that order he should establish this +division according to the right and left? For Socrates also calls the +motive powers of the Parcæ hands, and says that the eldest of the three +moves the universe with both her hands; so that we must not refuse +to transfer the name of hands to divine concerns. Moreover, will not +likewise the last of the solar principles according to Plato be that +from which the interpreters of divine concerns say, a happy life, and +unpolluted fruits are derived to wholes? Since he calls the sun the +offspring of <i>the good</i>, and this essentially pertains to it. For +it is evident that as the good extends felicity to all beings, thus +also the sun extends to mundane natures measures of felicity adapted to +each, and gives completion to this through similitudes, and a tendency +to the whole demiurgus. Hence also I think, felicity is said to consist +in an assimilation to divinity. And felicity pertains to all the Gods +in the world, according to the one ruling cause of them. For thence +perfection and blessedness flow upon all things.</p> +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[49]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIII.</h2> + + +<p>And thus much, following Plato, we have collected by a reasoning +process, concerning these particulars. We shall add, however, to what +has been said, the theory pertaining to the unpolluted Gods, among the +ruling divinities. For Plato also gives us an opportunity of mentioning +these, since it is necessary that the rulers and leaders of wholes +should subsist analogous to the intellectual kings, though they make +their progression in conjunction with division and a separation into +parts. For as they imitate the paternal, generative, and convertive +powers of the intellectual kings, thus also it is necessary that they +should receive the immutable monads in themselves, according to the +ruling peculiarity, and establish over their own progressions secondary +causes of a guardian characteristic. And the mystic tradition indeed +of Orpheus, makes mention of these more clearly. But Plato being +persuaded by the mysteries, and by what is performed in them, indicates +concerning these unpolluted Gods. And in the Laws indeed he reminds +us of the inflation of the pipe by the Corybantes, which represses +every inordinate and tumultuous motion. But in the Euthydemus, he +makes mention of the collocation on a throne, which is performed in +the Corybantic mysteries; just as in other dialogues he makes mention +of the Curetic order, speaking of the armed sports of the Curetes. For +they are said to surround and to dance round the demiurgus of wholes, +when he was unfolded into light from Rhea. In the intellectual Gods, +therefore, the first Curetic order is allotted its hypostasis. But the +order of the Corybantes which precedes Core, (i.e. Proserpine) and +guards her on all sides, as the theology says, is analogous to the +Curetes in the intellectual order. If, however, you are willing to +speak according to Platonic custom, because these divinities preside +over purity, and preserve the Curetic order undefiled, and also +preserve immutability in their generations, and stability in their +progressions<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[50]</span> into the worlds, on this account they were called +Corybantes. For το κορον, <i>to koron</i>, is every where significant +of purity, as Socrates says in the Cratylus; since also you may say, +that our mistress Core was no otherwise denominated than from purity, +and an unpolluted life. But in consequence of her alliance to this +order, she produces twofold guardian triads, one indeed in conjunction +with her father, but the other herself, by and from herself, imitating +in this respect the whole vivific Goddess. For she constitutes the +first Curetes.</p> + +<p>Every where, therefore, the guardian and undefiled order is thus +denominated by the Grecian theology. Above, however, it is more simple +and impartible; but beneath, among the ruling Gods, it presents itself +to the view with division and variety. Hence the Corybantes require +the Minerval monad, and in a particular manner they are in want of the +third Minerval monad, which unites their progression, sustains their +armed motion, and in short, converts them to their proper principles. +Moreover, this number the triad, is adapted to these guardian powers, +as being perfect, and uniformly comprehending the beginning, middle, +and end of secondary natures; for every thing which guards, hastens +on all sides to comprehend that which is guarded. The triad also, +preserves the essences, powers, and energies of secondary natures, firm +and unmoved. In the intellectual Gods indeed the three [unpolluted] +monads, were divided about the three fathers; but here the triad is +said to guard Core on all sides, since she also has pre-established +triple monads in herself, as we before observed. All these monads, +therefore, are preserved immutable through the guardianship of the +unpolluted Gods, both in abiding and proceeding. And what else besides +this guardian genus of Gods is fit to be co-arranged with prolific +powers? For this co-arrangement is necessary, in order that these +guardian deities may sustain all the progressions of these powers, +and the multiplications in their generations, and may manifestly +render their motions immutably established in themselves. And on this +account indeed the Gods fill all things with themselves, and generate +all things, and do not depart from any thing either<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[51]</span> of first or last +natures. But by being in themselves, they are present to all things, +and filling themselves, they fill all secondary natures. And neither +does their inflexibility remain unprolific, nor does their fecundity, +receive any thing from subordinate natures, but prolific abundance, +and immutable power, are in them connascently conjoined. These things +have been briefly asserted concerning the undefiled deity, who is +co-arranged with the ruling Gods, both by Plato, and the Grecian +theologists.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIV.</h2> + + +<p>Again, resuming [the same subject,] let us discuss in common such +things as Parmenides delivers to us concerning the whole order of +Gods that are called assimilative rulers and leaders. For it is +necessary, as we have before observed, to refer the whole divided +theory [respecting the Gods] to the common and one mystic doctrine of +Parmenides. For there we shall find the connexion of the divine orders, +and their common powers delivered to us by Plato in a continued series. +The same and the different, therefore, define for us the peculiarity of +the demiurgic order. And according to these, we have unfolded in what +has been before said, the paternal and prolific cause of the demiurgus, +his unpolluted fountain, and the separative power in him, conformably +to which he divides his own kingdom from that of Saturn. Since, +however, the whole order of the assimilative Gods, is suspended from +the demiurgic monad, subsists about, is converted to, and perfected +by it, it is indeed necessary to refer the signs of this order to the +demiurgic signs, and to give to the former a well-ordered generation +proceeding in measures from the latter. For thus the coherence of the +divine genera with each other, will become more apparent, and the +evolution into light of secondary from more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[52]</span> ancient natures, will +through these very things become perfectly known to us.</p> + +<p>What, therefore, are the peculiarities of this order, which is +celebrated as of a ruling and leading nature by others,<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> but is +demonstrated by arguments to be of an assimilative nature? Every thing +then which is assimilative, imparts the communication of similitude, +and of communion with paradigms to all<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> the beings that are +assimilated by it. Together with the similar, however, it produces and +commingles the dissimilar; since in the images [of the similar] the +genus of similitude is not naturally adapted to be present, separate +from its contrary. If, therefore, this order of Gods assimilates +sensibles to intellectuals, and produces all things posterior to itself +according to an imitation of causes, it is indeed the first-effective +cause of similitude to natures posterior to itself. But if it is the +cause of this, it is also of the dissimilitude which is co-ordinate +with similitude. For it is necessary that all things which participate +of the similar, should also participate of the dissimilar. And this +order of Gods indeed imparts the similar in a greater degree than the +dissimilar to the progeny that are more proximate to their principles; +but it constitutes the essence of things that proceed farther from +their principles, according to dissimilitude rather than similitude.</p> + +<p>For, in short, similitude will have in itself an hypostasis analogous +to the paternal causes, and to the causes which convert to principles. +But the hypostasis of dissimilitude is analogous to prolific causes, +and to those that preside over multitude and division. For similitude +indeed proceeds analogous to intelligible bound,<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> but dissimilitude +to intelligible infinity. Hence the former is collective, but the +latter separative of progressions. Since, however, every divine nature +begins its own energy from itself, and though its energy is directed +to secondary natures, and it imparts its own peculiarity to things +subordinate, yet it establishes and defines itself according to that +energy, prior to other things;—this being the case,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[53]</span> that which +supplies other things with the participation of the similar<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> and +the dissimilar, from itself, will entirely possess in itself this +similitude and dissimilitude. It is also mingled from both these, +though here similitude is emitted in a greater degree, and there +dissimilitude. For generative are united to paternal causes, and +unpolluted causes to those that hasten to proceed to every thing. +Twofold co-ordinations likewise of the divine genera, are connected +with each other, energize together with, and subsist in each other. +For the genus of the ruling Gods, is similar and dissimilar to itself, +and to other things. But being similar and dissimilar to itself, it +conjoins itself<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> to, and separates itself from its principles, +preserving the proper boundaries of progression. That, however, which +is similar and dissimilar to other things, converts and congregates +other things to itself, and separates them from itself. Such, +therefore, are the peculiarities of these Gods.</p> + +<p>But that the similar and the dissimilar proceed from the demiurgic +monad, and the signs which there pre-exist, into this order, Parmenides +sufficiently demonstrates to us. For the demiurgic same and different, +are the antecedently-existing causes, as he says, of the similitude +and dissimilitude in this order. Since, however, though this order of +Gods is the summit of the partible genera, and of genera which energize +partibly, yet it has a total transcendency with respect to them, in +order that being in continuity with the total orders of the Gods, its +progression may not be separately allotted its generation from divided +causes, but that each of the opposites, as it were, may proceed from +the whole demiurgus. For the similar is from same and different, and +the dissimilar receives its hypostasis from both these; and thus each +participates of the whole demiurgic monad. And this is an indication +of total<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> hyparxis, viz. to refer each of the parts that are, as +it were different, to the whole. Sameness, therefore, and difference +generate similitude; but the one indeed paternally, and the other +in an unpolluted manner; and the one generatively,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[54]</span> but the other +separatively. And again, each constitutes dissimilitude in a manner +appropriate to itself. And thus the genera of the assimilative Gods are +varied, subsisting as paternal, generative, and collective of wholes. +For they are allotted their evolution into light, doubled according to +pre-existent causes. And the demiurgic duad energizing through each +of the causes that are pre-established in him, makes a progression +from each into secondary natures. The whole conclusions, likewise, are +dyadic, (or pertaining to the duad) but they are comprehended by the +demiurgic tetrad in pre-arranged boundaries. And the multitude of the +assimilative progressions is convolved to union, by the simplicity of +the intellectual genera.</p> + +<p>Each also of the progressions, has indeed one progression supernatural +and unknown to the multitude, but the other apparent and known to all. +I mean, for instance, that the similar, so far as it is constituted +by difference, has a progression from thence difficult to be known; +but that so far as it proceeds from sameness, it exhibits a manifest +reason of cause. After the same manner, dissimilitude has difference +for the manifest principle of its proper hyparxis; but sameness, for +its principle difficult to be known. Hence also Parmenides beginning +from things unknown to the multitude, and which are alone apparent to +science and intellect, ends in things which are known to all men, and +are effable. For in the Gods themselves, the ineffable precedes the +effable. And the latent and unknown mode of their hypostasis, precedes +that which is known according to progression. And thus much concerning +these Gods from the Parmenides of Plato.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XV.</h2> + + +<p>Making, however, another beginning, let us discuss the orders +that follow successively. Since the partial orders of the Gods, +therefore, are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[55]</span> divided in a three-fold manner, according to the +all-perfect measure of the triad, proceeding supernally from the +first intelligibles, as far as to the last of things, measuring and +defining all things as the Oracles say,—the ruling Gods, indeed, are +allotted the first and highest rank [among the partial orders,] making +their progression proximately after the intellectual order, elevating +secondary natures and conjoining them with the demiurgus of wholes, +unfolding all impartible and united intellectual goods to things +subordinate, and connecting and containing exemptly, their essence and +perfection. But the Gods who give completion to the sensible world are +allotted the last order, and close the end of the divine progression. +These divide the universe, and obtain perpetual allotments and +receptacles in it, and through these weave one and the best polity of +the world. Between these mundane Gods, however, who are our rulers and +saviours, and the supermundane leaders, those Gods subsist who preside +over the separable and at the same time inseparable order of sensibles, +and define according to this their proper progression, being at one and +the same time exempt from the Gods in the universe, and co-arranged +with them. And they are expanded, indeed, above the allotment which +is adequate to the divided parts of the world, and supernally ascend +into many numbers of the mundane Gods; but they make a progression +subordinate to the government which extends to all things and to wholes.</p> + +<p>For in short, being the media between the supermundane and mundane +Gods, they in a certain respect communicate with both, and have an +indissoluble communion with both, being mundane, and at the same time +supermundane according to order. And above indeed, they are united by +the ruling leaders, but beneath, they are produced into multitude by +the junior Gods, as Timæus says. For they ride on the mundane Gods, +and are in an undefiled manner established on their summits; but they +are suspended from the supermundane Gods, and subsist about them. They +are also more united than the former; but are more multiplied than the +latter. And they divide indeed, the whole monads of the supermundane +Gods, into perfect numbers; but they collect the multitudes and the +numbers of the mundane Gods into united<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[56]</span> bounds, converting these +Gods to their exempt principles, but calling forth the Gods that are +above the world into the generation and providential care of sensible +natures, and immutably preserving in themselves the middle form of +empire. For the middle bonds give completion to all the genera of the +Gods. Thus in intelligibles, between the intelligible and occult order, +and the paradigmatic triad, and all-perfect multitude, the intelligible +centre subsists, being parturient indeed, with multitude and the first +(forms,) but vanquished by the uniform comprehension of the first +order. Again, in intelligibles and intellectuals, the connective genus +extending from the middle to all the extremes, conjoins and binds all +their essences, powers and providential energies.</p> + +<p>After the same manner therefore, in these orders also, viz. in the +kings exempt from, and in those that are co-arranged with the universe, +those Gods that emit in themselves uniformly the peculiarities of +both these kings, afford a communication to them with each other. +Whence also it belongs to them to transport first to second natures, +to convert second to first natures, to unite both by an indissoluble +connexion, and to guard the whole order in the world. The immutable, +therefore, the inflexible, the indissoluble in providential energies, +dominion over wholes, the administration of many partible allotments +of the Gods at once, and the elevating to supermundane perfection many +of their progressions and orders, pertain to these Gods. Hence, we are +accustomed to celebrate this genus of Gods as <i>liberated</i>, in +consequence of being freed from all division according to parts;<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> +as <i>supercelestial</i>, in consequence of proximately establishing +itself above the Gods in the heavens; as <i>undefiled</i>, in +consequence of not verging to subordinate natures, nor dissolving its +exempt transcendency by a providential attention to the world; as +<i>elevating</i>, in consequence of extending the mundane Gods to the +intellectual and intelligible place of survey; and as <i>perfect</i>, +in consequence of illuminating all the celestials with the measures +of perfection. Since therefore, this order is in continuity with the +assimilative rulers, but is arranged prior to the mundane Gods, it is +indeed proper to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[57]</span> evince that the theology pertaining to it<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> is +suspended from the doctrine concerning the ruling Gods, and at the same +time affords from itself the principles of the conceptions about the +sensible Gods.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVI.</h2> + + +<p>The intelligible king<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> therefore, of all intellectuals, luminously +emitting from himself the first causes, and which measure wholes, +according to the all-perfect triad in himself, defines all wholes as +far as to the last of things, and triples the progressions of the +Gods from himself, so as to generate indeed three orders, but refer +each of them to one monad, and an intelligible transcendency. On +this account he constitutes three collective, three connective, and +three perfective causes of all intellectuals; extending the triadic +light to all things, and imparting by illumination the perfect in the +progressions of its proper offspring, to the beginnings, middles, and +ends of all separated natures. But again, the demiurgus and father, +imitating his father and grandfather,<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> to the latter of whom he +extends his total intelligence, being the same in intellectuals, as +he is in intelligibles, and terminating the genus of the intellectual +fathers, in the same manner as his grandfather closes the paternal +profundity of intelligibles, produces from himself three orders of +Gods. And as the total progressions were divided from his grandfather +triadically, so the partial progressions are perfected on account of +him, according to the triad. Hence, there are also three orders from +the demiurgus; but they proceed according to the end adapted to each. +And one of them indeed,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[58]</span> is supermundane alone; another is mundane; and +another is in a certain respect the middle of both. They are likewise +allotted the triple proximately from the paternal cause; but each +derives the peculiarity of hyparxis from definite principles, and a +diminution proceeding according to measures. For they have neither an +hypostasis of equal dignity, as mathematical monads have in the triad, +nor a disorderly difference of dignity, but they receive the difference +of a subordinate essence, and arrangement in their generation from +the first causes. And thus, the ruling Gods indeed, are allotted +the highest order in the partial progressions, and the exempt cause +of the proceeding natures. But the liberated Gods are allotted the +second order, being arranged indeed under the ruling, but riding on +the mundane Gods. And the mundane Gods are allotted the third order, +being elevated through the liberated, but united by the ruling, to the +intellectual Gods. In what manner however, the Gods in the world and +all the mundane genera participate of the ruling Gods, we have already +shown.</p> + + + +<p>But each of the mundane genera enjoy the energy of the liberated +governors of the universe, according to a measure adapted to each, and +especially such as are able to follow the powers of these Gods. For in +the Gods themselves, we may perceive a twofold energy, the one indeed, +being co-arranged with the subjects of their providential care, but the +other being exempt and separate. According therefore, to the first of +these energies, the mundane Gods govern sensibles, and convolve, and +convert them to themselves; but according to the other, they follow the +liberated Gods, and together with them are elevated to an intelligible +nature. And on this account, the Elean guest, makes the periods of the +whole world, and of each of the Gods in it to be twofold. For, he says, +that the sun, and each of the heavenly bodies, subsist according to +both these circulations, viz. the intellectual and the mundane; or, if +you are willing so to speak, according to the power which is motive of +secondary natures, and the power which ascends in conjunction with the +liberated Gods.</p> + +<p>Moreover, he says, that our souls, and all the natures that have a life +separate from bodies, at one time live according to that elevating<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[59]</span> +progression, and at another according to the mundane; and now indeed +we proceed from youth to old age, since we have departed from a +flourishing and undefiled life, and are borne to earth, and generation; +but then on the contrary, we proceeded from old age to youth. On +which account, we were led round to a flourishing, intellectual, and +liberated form of energy. Hence also, the corporeal-formed nature [with +which we are connected,] was gradually obliterated, and whatever causes +us to tend downward, and renders us inseparable from the universe. But +an incorporeal, and immaterial nature shone forth, and was filled with +the Gods who are the leaders of a life of this kind.</p> + +<p>If also, you are willing, we may collect the same thing by a reasoning +process, from what is written in the Phædrus. Socrates, therefore, +says in that dialogue, that the soul which is perfect and winged, +revolves on high, and governs the whole world; and that this will be +the case with our soul, when it arrives at the summit of a happy life. +But this is in a much greater degree present with the genera superior +to us, and with the Gods themselves. For our souls obtain this end, +and this true blessedness, through the Gods. For whence do you think, +and from what other causes, is a disencumbered energy, and which has +dominion over wholes, imparted to us, and to the genera in the world +more excellent than us, but from the liberated Gods? For each of the +mundane Gods obtains the administration of its allotment, and of the +proper series over which it rules; and which it constitutes about +itself, according to the will of the father. For the demiurgus arranges +under the several mundane Gods, the herds of dæmons, and partial +souls, as Timæus says. But to energize through the whole world, is a +supernatural good, and the peculiarity of the exempt government of the +supercelestial Gods. Hence, from these this good is imparted to the +mundane Gods, and to our souls. Or how can that which is partial extend +its proper energy to the whole? And how departing from its own divided +peculiarity, can it change its life? For that which directs its energy +to the universe, withdraws itself from an energy which is arranged in a +part. We must not therefore say, that this divine good is by any means +present to mundane natures from any other source than these Gods, who +establish their kingdom<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[60]</span> proximately above the world. As, therefore, +the progression to all things through similitude, and the conversion +according to similitude to causes, are imparted from the assimilative +rulers to the celestial Gods, to the more excellent genera, and to +us, thus also, that which is liberated from partial natures, which is +disencumbered and which tends spontaneously to many energies, is an +impression derived from the liberated rulers. And thus much concerning +the providence of these rulers which pervades to all things, and the +goods which they impart to subordinate natures. But we shall add to +what has been before said, the peculiarity of their essence, according +to which they are allotted this order.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVII.</h2> + + +<p>From the intellectual<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> Gods, therefore, [i.e. from the assimilative +rulers] an immaterial and divine intellect is suspended. But a separate +and total intellect is an intellect of this kind. Hence also these Gods +are called intellectual. For according to their hyparxes, they are +beyond essence and multitude; but according to the participations of +them which receive the illumination of a progression of this kind, they +are called assimilative. For because they have intellectual hypostases, +and perfect powers, since intellect is the last of their participants, +and the intellectual peculiarity defines their whole essence,—hence +they are allotted this appellation. Of the mundane Gods, indeed, +an intellectual nature participates primarily, an undefiled soul +also participates of them, and that portion of the world together +with which they render the whole<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[61]</span> world, an intellectual and divine +animal, emitting the splendour of themselves as far as to bodies, and +imparting to these a vestige of their own peculiarity. It is necessary, +therefore, that the orders which are between both these, should +rejoice in certain additions, by which they are more multitudinous +than the intellectual Gods, and in progressions into participants; but +that they should be more singular and simple than the mundane Gods. +For the diminutions of the divine essences multiply the receptacles +that are suspended from them. Hence, together with the intellectual +peculiarity, these Gods assume the psychical power, in order that by +the incorporeal nature, they may have the supermundane [property,] but +by the psychical, they may be more manifold than the intellectual Gods.</p> + +<p>For again, considering the affair in another way, since soul presents +itself to the view, and the one fountain of whole souls, in pure +[intellectuals,] and constitutes all things in conjunction with the +demiurgus, is it not necessary that the supermundane Gods should +participate of the psychical peculiarity? For the Gods that are divided +about the world, are not filled with the unical soul without a medium, +but through other more total media, which do not proceed out of the +monad, [i.e. out of Juno, or the crater,] and possess an eternal +life. From thence, therefore, that is, from the crater of souls, the +presence of soul is derived to the ruling and liberated Gods. For the +demiurgus Jupiter also, as Socrates says in the Philebus, possessing in +himself a royal soul, and a royal intellect, according to the reason +of cause, and generating according to the whole of himself those +Gods that are of a ruling characteristic among the supermundane and +mundane divinities, entirely likewise imparts the intellectual and +the psychical peculiarity. But the supermundane Gods indeed, being +primarily unfolded into light, participate more of an intellectual +essence. Hence also, the psychical peculiarity is in them occultly. +But the Gods who are allotted the middle order, cause the psychical +peculiarity, indeed, to shine forth, yet subsisting with a more +abundant separation (than in the supermundane Gods.) The mundane Gods, +however, perfectly unfold the psychical peculiarity into light; since +intellect also, was indeed occultly in the first intellectuals,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[62]</span> but +exhibits a fore-running light in the middle, and shines forth in the +last intellectuals. And the supermundane Gods, indeed, being perfectly +[supermundane] derive the power of soul from the intellectual<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> +crater, or the royal soul in the demiurgus; but they pre-establish in +themselves another monad of the divided psychical genera. The liberated +however, now communicating in essence with the mundane Gods, have the +psychical peculiarity from a twofold source, i.e. from the fountain of +total animations, and from the assimilative principle. And in the last +place, the mundane Gods receive the illuminations of all the divinities +prior to them. Hence also, they rule over the universe, imitating the +liberated Gods, adorn sublunary natures with forms, and assimilate them +to intellectual paradigms, imitating the ruling Gods. They likewise +pour forth the whole of the life which is inseparable [from body,] from +the one fountain of souls, establishing it as an image [of the life +which is separate from a corporeal nature] and conjoin themselves to +this fountain.</p> + +<p>In short, all the genera<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> being mingled by the demiurgus in the +fountain of souls, in order to the generation of the different ranks +of souls, some of these ranks have one thing, but others a different +thing at hand. And in some indeed, the essential has dominion over +the remaining genera; in others sameness; and in others difference. +But those souls that are connascent with the assimilative Gods, +have<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> their whole hypostasis according to essence. Hence they are +near to an intellectual hyparxis, and are allotted in the genera of +souls, an intelligible and occult transcendency. But those<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> that +are co-arranged with the liberated Gods, characterize their proper +progression, according to sameness. Hence also, they are consubsistent +with the Gods that bind together and congregate the supermundane and +mundane Gods. And those souls that are co-divided with the mundane +Gods, define the essence of themselves according to difference: and +on this account also, the demiurgus, in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[63]</span> constituting the soul of the +universe, is said to co-adapt difference to other souls by force.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the separation into parts in these, the union through +harmony, and the energy according to time are effected through the +illuminations of difference. But [in the souls] above these essence and +sameness subsist, with which there are eternal life, and a union of +powers. And thus much concerning these particulars.</p> + +<p>From what has been said, however, we may collect by a reasoning +process, that intellect, essence, and intellectual life, are suspended +from the liberated Gods. In them also soul, and the nature of the +supercelestial souls shine with a fore-running light. For they are +established above the celestial Gods who ride in bodies, just as the +celestial Gods are exempt from the sublunary divinities, and from those +who are allotted the government of matter. If, however, the genus of +the liberated Gods is of this kind, they are very properly said to +belong to the partial orders, in the same manner as the Gods prior to +them. But they indeed are more total, because the psychical peculiarity +was in them occultly. But the liberated Gods have that which is partial +in providential energies more apparent because the psychical power also +in these is more manifest, just as the mundane Gods who now preside +over partial allotments, perfectly unfold into light the psychical +essence. The whole, however, and impartible genera of the Gods shine +forth as far as to the intellectual hypostasis. For intellect according +to its own nature is impartible.</p> + +<p>The liberated leaders, therefore, being such as we have shown them +to be, let us survey the multiform orders of them adapted to this +order. Some of them, therefore, we call <i>transporters</i>, and +these are such as unfold to secondary natures, the progressions +of the assimilative genera. But others are <i>elevators</i>, who +draw upward the mundane orders, to a separate energy. Others are +<i>colligators</i>, who administer equally the communion of the +extremes. Others are <i>undefiled</i>, and these are such as entirely +obliterate matter, and impart by illumination the disencumbered +to the providential energies of secondary natures. Others are +<i>perfective</i>, and these are such as are the suppliers of +perfection to mundane natures. And others are <i>prolific</i>, who +multiply the progressions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[64]</span> of subordinate essences. For according +to these, and far more numerous powers, incomprehensible by our +conceptions, they preside over the Gods in the world, and give +completion to the divine genera which subsist between the Gods that are +exempt, and those that are co-arranged with the parts of the universe.</p> + +<p>Moreover, we must assign to them energies in symphony with their +powers, viz. such energies as are disencumbered, every where apparent, +amputating every thing material, and corporeal-formed, emitting an +idea undefiled, without contact, and incorporeal, and converting all +secondary natures to themselves, and extending them to intellectual +light. And farther still, we must ascribe to them energies that unfold +the exempt principles of the universe, and also energies more excellent +than these, which draw upward to the intellectual Gods, and others +still more elevated which conjoin themselves with the intellectual +Gods, and exhibit an essence uncoloured, unfigured, and without +contact. Again, according to another mode, [we must admit] that some of +their energies operate about the secondary Gods, and are collectors of +their divine unities to a union prior to the world. But others operate +about the mundane intellects, and extend the intellections of them from +co-ordinate intelligibles to such as are first, and exempt from the +universe. Others again, are elevators of souls to the one fountain of +them. And some of their energies, indeed, are the leaders of divine +souls themselves; but others preside over the genera that are more +excellent than us. And others convolve the multitude of intelligible +[souls<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a>] to an undefiled life. For being as it were certain leaders +of herds, they ascend supernally into all the natures in the world, and +as dæmon Gods, they proximately rule over Gods, and are the leaders of +the progression to the intelligible, to some in one, and to others in a +different way, according to the order which is adapted to the elevated +natures. For every thing [mundane] participates of the liberated Gods. +But the participation is different. For it is either according to +the divine, dæmoniacal, and partible, or according to the uniform, +intellectual, and psychical. For all things, as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[65]</span> I may say, are +allotted a separate<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> life, a disencumbered energy, a supernatural +providence, and a common prefecture, from this order of Gods. Let the +common definition, therefore, of the liberated Gods, be such as this.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVIII.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place it follows that we should unfold the theory of +Plato, first, that which may be obtained in other dialogues, and +afterwards, the all-perfect doctrine concerning these Gods, which is +to be found in the Parmenides. In the Phædrus therefore, Socrates +energizing enthusiastically, and expanding his intellect to the whole +connexion of the divine orders, and not only mystically surveying the +mundane progressions of them, but also their indescribable and blessed +visions, and discursive energies above<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> the world, divides indeed, +in a three-fold manner, all the separate hypostases in the world, from +the subjects of their government. And he calls the first of these +hypostases divine; but the middle dæmoniacal; and he gives completion +to the last from our souls. He also suspends partial souls [such as +ours] from dæmons. Hence he denominates them co-attendants, and extends +them through dæmons as media, to the divine empire. But he suspends the +dæmoniacal orders from the mundane Gods. For dæmons are the attendants +of these. He refers however, these whole divine principalities, the +dæmoniacal herds, and choirs of partial souls, to the liberated order; +and he says that the triadic army of mundane souls is elevated under +this order, to the intellectual and intelligible Gods, together at the +same time with their first causes.</p> + +<p>Here therefore, he defines according to the measure of the dodecad<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[66]</span> +(i.e. the number twelve) all the liberated Gods, though the multitude +of them is incomprehensible, and not to be numbered by human +conceptions; and though none of those theologists that have written +any thing concerning them, have been able to define their whole +number, in the same manner as they have the ruling multitude (i.e. the +multitude of supermundane Gods,) or the multitude of the intellectual, +or intelligible Gods. Plato however, apprehended that the number of +the dodecad is adapted to the liberated Gods, as being all-perfect, +composed from the first numbers, and completed from things perfect; and +he comprehends in this measure all the progressions<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> of these Gods. +For he refers all the genera and peculiarities of them to this dodecad, +and defines them according to it. But again dividing the dodecad into +two monads and one decad; he suspends all [mundane natures] from the +two monads, but delivers to us each of these energizing on the monad +posterior to itself, according to its own hyparxis. And one of these +monads indeed, he calls Jovian, but he denominates the other Vesta. He +likewise makes mention of other more partial principalities, and which +give completion to the aforesaid decad, such as those of Apollo, Mars, +and Venus. And he suspends indeed, the prophetic form of life from the +Apolloniacal principality; but the amatory from the principality of +Venus; and the divisive, from that of Mars; for hence the most total +and first genera of lives are derived; just as when he introduces into +the world souls recently fashioned, he says that some preside over one, +and others over another form of life. And it appears to me, that as +Timæus makes the division of souls, at one time supermundane, but at +another mundane, for he distributes souls equal in number to the stars, +and disseminates one into the moon, another into the earth, and others +into the other instruments of time; after the same manner also Socrates +prearranges twofold rulers and leaders of them; proximately indeed the +mundane Gods, but in a still higher rank than these, the liberated Gods.</p> + +<p>As we have said however, the twelve Gods convolve every mundane genus, +whether it be divine, or dæmoniacal, to the vision of intelligibles,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[67]</span> +and perfect their separate energy. They likewise comprehend in +themselves all the supercelestial genera, so that whether there be a +paternal genus of the liberated Gods, or a vivific, or an undefiled +and guardian genus, they are comprehended in this number. For this +number must not be surveyed as if it was such as twelve is in units; +for number in the Gods is not of this kind; but it must be beheld in +the peculiarity of hyparxis. For as the duad in the Gods presides over +prolific power,<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> and the triad, over the first perfection, thus also +the dodecad [in the Gods,] is a symbol of all-perfect progression. For +since these Gods close the end of the powers that are unapparent and +exempt from the world, and ride on the celestial Gods, according to +each of these, the dodecad pertains to them, viz. it belongs to them +as terminating the all-perfect in the progression of the supermundane, +and as presiding over the celestial Gods. For they impart to the latter +a distribution from themselves into the dodecad, and especially guard +them in this number. The ruling dodecad therefore, was all-perfectly +supermundane; but the celestial, is evidently mundane only; and the +dodecad of the liberated rulers contains the communion of the extremes, +and binds the order posterior, to that which is prior to itself. And on +this account indeed, the liberated Gods are perfective of the mundane +Gods, and lead them upward. But they are proximately suspended from the +ruling Gods, are emitted from them, and administer the indissoluble +connexion of both [i.e. of the supermundane and mundane Gods.]</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIX.</h2> + + +<p>That we may not however present the reader with our conceptions, but +may unfold to the utmost of our power the theory of Plato, to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[68]</span> +lovers of the contemplation of truth, let us consider by ourselves, +where those leaders must be arranged, which Socrates celebrates in the +Phædrus, and with whom it is fit to connumerate, and with what orders +of Gods, it is proper to co-arrange the great ruler of those leaders, +who drives a winged chariot. For it is necessary either to give to +him an intellectual, or an assimilative, or a liberated, or a mundane +order. For these are the decrements accompanying the progression of the +great God Jupiter. If however, he is the intellectual Jupiter, whom we +have denominated the demiurgus of the universe, and have made Plato +bear testimony to our assertion, how is he the leader of the above +mentioned dodecad? And how is he divided oppositely to the principality +of Vesta? For the demiurgic monad closes indeed, the intellectual +breadth, but is exempt from all other numbers, and unco-ordinated +with all [the monads of other numbers.] For it neither was, nor is +lawful for effects to have an hypostasis opposed in division to their +causes. It is not therefore proper to make twelve leaders of wholes, +but to make the number of causes to be one, as Timæus says. Moreover, +Jupiter the demiurgus is exempt<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> from the universe, as being himself +the author of the apparent order of things. But the first of the +twelve leaders, is said by Socrates to drive a winged chariot in the +heavens. How therefore, can he who is connected with the world, and who +approximates to the Gods in the heavens, be considered as the same with +him who is exempt from all [mundane natures,] and who abides, as Timæus +says, in his own accustomed manner?</p> + +<p>Farther still, this Jupiter indeed, presides over a philosophic life, +and souls [that follow him] perpetually lead this life. But another God +presides over the prophetic, amatory, and poetic life. The demiurgus +of wholes, however, contains in himself the paradigms of all lives; +and as he uniformly comprehends the essence of souls, after the same +manner also, he comprehends all the different mutations of their +lives. He is not, therefore, divisibly the cause of the lives in the +soul, but pre-establishes according to one demiurgic cause, all the +periods of souls, all the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[69]</span> variety, and all the measures of life. And +as the mundane sun is not the cause of some things, but the demiurgus +of others, but of whatever the sun is the author, the demiurgus is in +a greater degree the fabricator, and precedaneous cause,—thus also +in the lives of souls, it is not proper to refer the cause to the +demiurgus in a divided manner. For the demiurgic monad, presides as +the impartible, common, and one cause of all lives; but the divisions +according to lives, and the different paradigms of mundane natures, +pertain to the Gods posterior to him.</p> + +<p>If, however, some one should think that we ought to abandon this +hypothesis, but that we should assert this Jupiter, and the other +leaders to be mundane, where must we arrange the Gods that follow +him? For Socrates says, “that the army of Gods and dæmons divided +into eleven parts, follows Jupiter.” For there are more comprehensive +and partial orders of Gods in the universe than these, and some of +them have the relation of leaders, but others of followers. The +magnitude, however, of the principality celebrated by Socrates, does +not manifest to us a transcendency co-arranged with, but exempt from +mundane natures. For in incorporeal causes, <i>the great</i>, imparts +a peculiarity of this kind to those to whom it is present. And as +Love being not simply called a dæmon by Diotima, but a <i>great</i> +dæmon, is demonstrated to be expanded above all dæmons, and is a god, +but is not arranged in the genus of dæmons, thus also Jupiter, being +celebrated as the <i>great</i> leader, not as the mundane leader of +mundane natures, but as exempt from, and transcending the mundane +order, is allotted this appellation. But if Jupiter is exempt from +the Gods in the world, it is necessary that the other leaders also +should have an essence antecedent to those that follow Jupiter. For all +of them are allotted a ruling dignity. But if the other leaders are +arranged as mundane, and Jupiter alone is a leader beyond these, again +we must transfer the whole principality from the dodecad, to the Jovian +monad. It is necessary, however, to attribute a ruling power to all of +them, and to preserve to Jupiter the principal authority among them.</p> + +<p>It remains, therefore, that a principality such as this of the Gods, +must either be that of the assimilative Gods, or of those that are +allotted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[70]</span> a liberated dominion in the universe, as we say it must. +If, however, we should admit it to belong to the assimilative orders, +it will be the leader of a demiurgic triad, but not of the dodecad +which is now celebrated. The Jupiter, therefore, who is among the +assimilative Gods, and whom we have before unfolded, is the first of +the sons of Saturn. For these sons, as Socrates says in the Gorgias, +divide the whole kingdom of Saturn. And the first of them indeed is the +author of first, the second of middle, and the third of last natures. +The division, therefore, of mundane natures being three-fold, the first +of the sons of Saturn may be called the leader of the triadic division, +and the multitude proximately suspended from him will be the first of +the triadic division in the universe. But the leader of the twelve +Gods, presides over an army distributed into eleven parts. Hence<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> +the one defines his proper dominion in the thirds of wholes, but the +other in the twelfths. And according to the power of comprehension, +one of them defines his principality conformably to the triad, but the +other according to the endecad [or the number eleven.] By no means, +therefore, is each of these allotted the same order. The demiurgus, +therefore, and saviour Jupiter is uncoarranged with all these. But +the assimilative Jupiter is the leader of the division of wholes into +a triad. And the mundane Jupiter is among the number of leaders that +follow, and not of those that are exempt. The Jupiter, however, who is +celebrated by Socrates in the Phædrus, is co-arranged with the other +leaders, and presides over those that are disposed in an orderly manner +according to eleven parts, and not over those that receive a tripartite +division; and he is also exempt from all mundane natures on account of +the magnitude of his ruling transcendency. Hence he is different from +all the above-mentioned orders, and exhibits in no one of them the +peculiarity which is now presented to our view.</p> + +<p>It remains, therefore, that we should connumerate him with the +liberated Gods, in order that he may be proximate to the mundane +Gods; and on this account he is said to be in the heavens, and to be +exempt<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[71]</span> from the mundane divinities. On this account, likewise, he is +celebrated as <i>great</i>. For frequently media present themselves to +our view, from the extremes being surveyed according to mixture. Since +therefore, Jupiter is said to drive a winged chariot in the heavens, +and is denominated great, he is in a certain respect co-arranged with +the celestial Gods, and is exempt from them. But he who is at one and +the same time co-arranged with the Gods in the universe, among whom the +celestial Jupiter is allotted the highest dignity, and is exempt from +them, ranks among the liberated Gods, if in what has been before said, +we have rightly determined. Hence, of the Gods, some are exempt from +the universe; but others give completion to it; and others are at one +and the same time allotted a co-arranged, and an exempt transcendency. +This great leader in the heavens therefore Jupiter, is liberated and +supercelestial, and the whole dodecad shines forth in this order of +Gods. For there is one all-perfect and divine number, to which the +twelve leaders give completion. So that it is necessary the whole +number should be placed in this order of Gods, but we must not call +in a divided manner some of the leading and ruling Gods mundane, and +others supermundane. But if the first of them is supermundane, the rest +also will after the same manner establish themselves above the Gods in +the world. Each also is the leader of an appropriate multitude, and +is surrounded with a great number<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> of Gods and dæmons. But partial +souls rank among the last of their followers. For they are co-divided +with dæmons, and divine natures, and participate of the liberated +principality of the Gods, as far as they are able. For, as Socrates +says, “that which is willing and able always follows the Gods.” Through +these things therefore, we have reminded the reader, that the twelve +leaders of wholes celebrated by Socrates in the Phædrus, belong to the +liberated Gods.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[72]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XX.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place, let us show whence they derive the whole of this +number. It is necessary therefore, that they should have their +hypostasis from the Gods prior to them; since the progression to +the assimilative Gods was from the intellectual fathers, and to the +intellectual fathers supernally from the intelligible and at the same +time intellectual Gods, just as to these the progression was from +the first intelligibles. For since the order of the assimilative +rulers is prior to that of the liberated Gods; as is also the triad +of the intellectual kings; or rather the demiurgic monad establishing +in itself the all-perfect measure of the division of wholes into +the triad,—this being the case we must survey the causes of the +generation<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> of the liberated Gods according to both these, viz. +according to the demiurgic measure, and the genera of the assimilative +Gods. For the different orders of them are imparted from these two.</p> + +<p>Moreover, if we remember what has been before observed, we gave a +fourfold division to the middle progressions of the assimilative Gods. +And we said, that some of them are paternal, others prolific, others +of an elevating, and others of a guardian nature. Since therefore, the +demiurgic monad divides progressions into first, middle, and last, in +the same manner as the intelligible father prior to it, but the Gods +posterior to this monad, emit the rivers of themselves tetradically +to secondary natures,—this being the case, the dodecad of liberated +Gods presents itself to our view, above indeed proceeding according +to the triad, but beneath being quadruply multiplied. Hence, of the +genera which give completion to it; some indeed, are allotted the +demiurgic and paternal triadically; others, the generative and vivific +triadically; others, the elevating peculiarity triadically; and others +after the same manner the undefiled and guardian characteristic. +For all their peculiarities are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[73]</span> derived from the multitude of the +assimilative Gods. But the division of them into first, middle and +last, proceeds from the demiurgic cause. And thus much concerning the +number of the liberated Gods, whence, and how it is generated.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXI.</h2> + + +<p>Since therefore, as we have before observed, there are twelve leaders +of all the mundane Gods, of all dæmons, and farther still, of such +partial souls as are able to be extended to the intelligible, again +in this dodecad, the mighty Jupiter and Vesta are allotted the more +ruling order. But the principality of the rest is co-arranged with +these, and has a secondary dignity. And Jupiter indeed, being neither +the intellect of the universe, as some say he is, nor the intellect +in the sun, nor in short, any one of mundane intellects or souls, but +being expanded above all these, and pre-existing among the liberated +Gods, elevates the choir of Gods, and of the genera superior to us that +follow him, and imparts paternal goodness to the multitude converted to +him. But he is the leader of all the other numbers that terminate under +the twelve Gods. Again however, Vesta indeed governs an appropriate +multitude, but she neither has the order of the first soul, nor is that +which is called the earth in the universe. But prior to these, she is +allotted a ruling power among the supercelestial Gods. She imparts +however, her own peculiarity to the numbers of the other leaders, in +the same manner as Jupiter. For the leaders that are suspended from the +decad, participate also of these two monads.</p> + +<p>Jupiter however, being indeed the cause of motion is the leader to all +things of a progression to the intelligible. But Vesta illuminates +all things with stable<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> and inflexible power; though Jupiter also +abiding in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[74]</span> himself, is thus elevated to the intelligible place of +survey; and Vesta on account of an inflexible and undefiled permanency +in herself, is conjoined to the first causes. The emission however of +a different peculiarity, affords the difference of dominion. For since +there are twofold conversions in the Gods (for all things are converted +to themselves and to their principles) each form of conversion indeed, +was impartibly in king Saturn. For according to Parmenides he is +demonstrated to be in himself, and in another. And the latter indeed, +pertains to a conversion to a more excellent nature, but the former +implies a conversion to himself. In the secondary however, and more +partial Gods, both these forms shine forth in a divided manner. And +Vesta indeed, imparts to the mundane Gods an undefiled establishment +in themselves; but Jupiter imparts to them an elevating motion to +first natures. For Vesta belongs to the undefiled, but Jupiter to +the paternal series; but they are divided by a subsistence in self, +and a subsistence in another, as we have before observed. It must +be said therefore, that every thing stable and immutable, and which +possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, arrives to all mundane +natures from the supercelestial Vesta, and that on this account all +the poles are immoveable, and the axes about which the circulations +of the spheres convolve themselves. It must also be said, that the +wholenesses of the circulations are firmly established, that the earth +abides immoveably in the middle, and that the centres have an unshaken +permanency [from this supercelestial Vesta.]</p> + +<p>Again therefore, it must be admitted that all motions, separate +energies, and the conversions of secondary to first natures, are +derived to wholes from Jupiter. For the intellectual orders are not +only united to co-ordinate intelligibles, but also to such as are +exempt, on account of the elevating progression of Jupiter. And divine +souls following the mighty Jupiter are extended as far as to the first +causes. The attendants of these also are collected together with the +Gods, in consequence of being suspended from the paternal government +of Jupiter. But again, with respect to all the remaining leaders, +each presides over his proper series and imparts from himself his +peculiarity to the whole multitude [suspended from him.] And one of +them indeed, imparts as far as to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[75]</span> last of things an unfolding, +another, a prolific, and another, an immutable peculiarity, being +themselves allotted a supercelestial order, and drawing upward a +numerous army of partible Gods. Hence Socrates also at one and the same +time denominates them rulers, says that they have an arrangement, and +that their energy is directed to secondary natures, according to the +order in which they are placed. Each, however, of the other ruling Gods +who are ranked in the number of the twelve, is a leader according to +the order in which he is arranged. The ruling and leading peculiarity, +therefore, alone, pertains to the supermundane Gods. But to be +arranged, and that which is arranged itself by itself, pertain to the +mundane Gods. For these are they who participate of order, and who are +allotted order according to participation. Both these peculiarities, +however, pertain to the liberated Gods. For they are rulers and +leaders, as being in continuity with the ruling [supermundane] Gods, +and they are arranged and participate of order, as being proximate +to the mundane Gods. But being the middle of both, they connect the +whole progressions of them according to one intellectual bond. Farther +still, as presiding indeed over the ruling order in the heavens, they +come into contact with the mundane Gods, and as being in themselves, +and extended to the intelligible, they are allotted a transcendency +separate from the universe, and exempt from their participants. Thus +much, therefore, may suffice concerning the first division of these +Gods. Since, however, we have before observed that their progression is +tetradic and triadic, we shall concisely define<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> the peculiarities +of the arranged triads.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXII.</h2> + + +<p>These, therefore, being arranged according to triads, as we have +said, of the demiurgic triad, indeed, Jupiter is allotted the highest +order, supernally<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[76]</span> from intellect governing souls and bodies, and as +Socrates says, taking care of all things. But Neptune here also gives +completion to the middle of the demiurgic [triad], and especially +governs the psychical order. For this God is the cause of motion, and +of all generation. But soul is the first of generated natures, and +is essentially motion. And Vulcan inspires the nature of bodies, and +fabricates all the mundane seats of the Gods. Again, of the guardian +and immutable triad, the first indeed is Vesta, because she preserves +the very being of things, and an undefiled essence. For Socrates in +the Cratylus gives to her the highest order, as connectedly containing +the summits of wholes. But Minerva preserves middle lives inflexible, +through intellection, and a self-energizing life, sustaining them from +[the incursions of] matter. And Mars illuminates corporeal-formed +natures with power, and an infrangible<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> strength, as Socrates says +in the Cratylus. Hence he is perfected by Minerva, and participates of +a more intellectual inspiration, as the poetry [of Orpheus] says, and +of a life separate from generated natures.</p> + +<p>Moreover, of the vivific triad, Ceres is the chief, entirely generating +all mundane life, viz. the intellectual, the psychical, and that which +is inseparable from body. But Juno contains the middle of the triad, +and imparts the generation of soul. For the intellectual goddess emits +from herself all the progressions of the other psychical genera. And +Diana is allotted the end of the triad, moving all natural reasons +into energy, and perfecting the imperfection<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> of matter. Hence +theologists, and Socrates in the Theætetus, call her <i>Lochia</i>, (or +the power that presides over births) as being the inspective guardian +of psychical progression and generation. Of the remaining triad, +therefore, the anagogic, or elevating, Hermes indeed is the supplier +of philosophy, and through this elevates souls, and by the dialectic +powers, sends upward both total and partial souls to the good itself. +But Venus is the first-effective cause of the amatory inspiration which +pervades through wholes, and familiarizes to the beautiful the lives +that are elevated by her. And Apollo perfects and converts all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[77]</span> things +through music, convolving, as Socrates says [in the Cratylus], and +through harmony and rhythm attracting to intellectual truth, and the +light which is there.</p> + +<p>We say, however, in common respecting all of them, that establishing +themselves above the mundane Gods, they contain all the choir of +the liberated Gods. And souls indeed are suspended from them, but +intellectual souls, and such as are as it were powers generative of +souls. Hence Socrates also gives to them chariots. For Jupiter is said +to drive a winged chariot, and the other Gods after the same manner +as Jupiter use secondary vehicles. But what else can we say these are +than supermundane souls, on which they ride, and which are intellectual +indeed, but the sources of partibility and division, from which mundane +souls are allotted their hypostasis; a more abundant separation, and +a greater number of parts appearing in them, in consequence of their +being adapted to be bound through analogy? In the liberated Gods, +therefore, the psychical peculiarity unites itself to intellect. Hence +also, Jupiter is said to drive a winged chariot, without division, +in consequence of this chariot being intellectual, and not departing +from an immaterial and divine intellect. But in the mundane Gods, +divisions of horses and charioteers are delivered. [For Socrates says +in the Phædrus], “All the horses, therefore, and chariots of the Gods +are good, and consist of such things as are good.” Hence an energy +according to time first shines forth in the mundane Gods, where there +is a more abundant separation of powers. But in the liberated Gods, +time is always with eternity, and partibility with union. For they are +the principles of souls, and the causes of mundane natures, and are as +it were intellectual seeds abiding in the intellectual comprehensions +of themselves. And thus much concerning these things.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[78]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIII.</h2> + + +<p>I wish, however, to show from other writings of Plato what the +peculiarity is which he exhibits to us of the liberated order. In +the Republic, therefore, teaching us the order of the universe which +pervades through the mundane wholes, supernally from the inerratic +sphere, and which governs the elections of human life that are +different at different times, this life also varying the measure of +justice adapted to it, he refers the first-effective cause of this +order to a monad and triad exempt from [the mundane] wholes. And to the +monad indeed, he gives the power of dominion, extending the authority +of it to all heaven, its empire being at one and the same time +impartibly present to all things, governing all things indivisibly, +and according to one energy, and moving wholes by the lowest powers +of itself. Giving also to the triad a progression from the monad, he +distributes from it into the universe a partible energy and production. +For that which is simple and united in exempt providence, is educed +into multitude through secondary inspection. Thus, therefore, the one +cause of multitude possesses a greater authority, but the distributed +cause appears to be more proximate to its effects. For all the variety +of powers in the world, the infinity of motions, and the multiform +difference of reasons, [i.e. of productive principles] are convolved +under the triad of the Fates. But again this triad is extended to +the one monad which is prior to the three Fates, and which Socrates +denominates Necessity, not as ruling over wholes by violence, nor as +obliterating the self-motive nature of our life, nor as deprived of +intellect and the most excellent knowledge, but as comprehending all +things intellectually, and introducing bound to things indefinite, and +order to things inordinate. And farther still, he thus denominates it, +as causing all things to be obedient to itself, and extending them +to good, as subjecting them to demiurgic sacred laws, as guarding +all things within the world, and as comprehending all things in the +universe in a circle, and leaving nothing deprived<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[79]</span> of the justice +pertaining to it, nor suffering it, besides this, to fly from the +divine law.</p> + +<p>Since, therefore, we give a twofold division to the causes of the order +of the world, and we admit one of the causes to be monadic, but the +other triadic, and we acknowledge that the monad is productive of the +triad, being persuaded by Plato, and since we have shown that the triad +is the offspring of the monad, let us see in what order it is possible +to arrange each of these. For wishing to learn this, we have undertaken +the present discussion concerning them. The monad, therefore, which, +as we have said, Socrates calls Necessity, is perfectly exempt from +mundane natures, and by the last of her powers imparts motion to all +heaven, neither being converted to it, nor energizing about it, but +imparting an orderly circulation to the world, by her very essence, and +by being firmly established. For [Socrates says] that the spindle is +moved on the knees of Necessity; but that she herself having royally +established herself on a throne near to the universe, governs the +heavens in a silent path. But the triad is now in a certain respect +co-arranged with the circulations of the heavens, convolves them with +hands, and energizes about them, and no longer causes them to revolve +by its very being alone [in the same manner as the monad]. For the +triad is the cause of the order and circulations of the universe, by +producing and performing a certain thing; though in this also there is +a different energy. For Lachesis indeed moves with both her hands; but +each of the remaining Parcæ, with one hand only. This however we shall +again discuss. But it is obvious to every one, that of this production +which subsists according to the monad, and the triad proceeding from +it, it must be granted that the monad is established in a more ancient +order of Gods, but the triad in an inferior order.</p> + +<p>We say, therefore, that Necessity who is called the mother of the +Parcæ, first subsists in the intellectual Gods, analogous to the +intelligible and intellectual monad of Adrastia; and that thence +being unfolded into light in the ruling orders, she generates this +triad of the Parcæ. For that which is total in providence, energy, +and the convolution of wholes by the very being itself of that which +convolves them, are indications of intellectual transcendency. To +extend, likewise, impartibly production to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[80]</span> all things, is coequalized +with demiurgic dominion. And this Goddess appears to me to illuminate +all the progeny of the demiurgus with an ineffable guard. As likewise +he is the generator of wholes impartibly, thus too Necessity guards +inflexibly all things in herself, and comprehends them monadically, +preserving indissoluble the order which proceeds from the demiurgus +into the world. Necessity, therefore, being allotted such an authority +and kingdom in wholes, the triad of the Parcæ rules over the universe +in a liberated manner. For it comes into contact with the heavens, and +for a time relinquishes the contact, as Socrates says. And through +contact indeed, it is co-arranged with the bodies that are moved, and +is connascent with them; but through a retention of energies, it is +without contact, is separate from the things governed, and is exempt +from them. Being, however, at one and the same time allotted both these +peculiarities, it exists in the liberated Gods. For to touch, and +not to touch, to move and not to move, as the fable relates, are not +according to a part in the Gods, but are coexistent, and subsist with +each other at once. For divine natures do not change their energies +according to time, nor like partial souls, do they at one time energize +separately, and at another providentially attend to secondary natures; +but abiding in them selves they are every where present, and being +present to all things, they do not depart from the watch-tower of +themselves. At one and the same time, therefore, the being without +contact, and the coming into contact with the celestial periods, are +present with the Parcæ, and they also comprehend that which is exempt +and liberated from sensibles, according to one peculiarity, and that +which is co-arranged with, and allied to them. And on this account, +they possess a liberated order with reference to the whole heaven.</p> + +<p>If, however, there is also a mundane triad of the Parcæ, and a +providence proximate to the subjects of their government, it is not +wonderful. For of Jupiter, and Juno, Apollo and Minerva, there are +common progressions and co-arrangements, after the supercelestial +allotment, and together with the mundane Gods. For powers which give +completion to the last order of the Gods, approximate to the universe +from all the liberated Gods. But Socrates, celebrating the liberated +and supermundane<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[81]</span> kingdoms of the Parcæ, has represented them to us +as touching and not touching the whole circulations, dividing the +limitation<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> of their peculiarities, by mutation according to time. +For to relinquish [the contact] for a time, affords a representation +of a temporal mutation of energies. This, however, pertains to the +concealment which is adapted to divine fables. For fables introducing +generations of things unbegotten, compositions of things simple, and +distributions of things impartible, obumbrate under many veils the +truth of things. If, however, as fables call the transition from +cause to existence, generation, denominate the causal comprehension +of composite in simple natures, composition itself, and say that the +division of secondary about first natures, is the distribution of the +latter into parts,—thus also, if we do not apprehend according to +time, the alternately coming into contact with, and being separated +from things that are moved, conformably to the apparent meaning of the +fable, but according to the different peculiarities of the Parcæ,<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> +and an hypostasis mingled from the extremes, we shall be most near to +the conception of Plato. Here, therefore, let us terminate this, which +does not require much discussion at present.</p> + +<p>But let us consider the order of the Parcæ by itself. For of these, +some think that Lachesis should be arranged as the first, but others +as the last of the three. And of the remaining two, some give a prior +arrangement to Atropos, and place her in the order of a monad, but +others to Clotho. Since, however, Plato in the Laws clearly says, +that Lachesis is the first, Clotho the second, and Atropos the third, +I think that what is said in the Republic should be referred to this +definite order in them, and that we should not make any innovation by +following the mutable opinions of interpreters. Socrates, therefore, +says, that Lachesis sings the past, but Clotho the present, and +Atropos the future; here also in a similar manner using an order of +division conformably to their energies. And to Lachesis indeed he +gives predominance, and a uniform dominion over the rest. But he +gives to Clotho a dominion subordinate to that of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[82]</span> Lachesis, but +more comprehensive than the kingdom of Atropos. And to Atropos he +attributes the third kingdom, which is comprehended by both the others, +and is arranged under them. The multitude, therefore, are ignorant +that Socrates uses the parts of time as symbols of the comprehension +according to cause. For the past was once the future, and the present, +but the future<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> is not yet the past, but has the whole of its +essence in existing in some after time. We must assume, therefore, +the triple causes analogous to these three parts of time; and say +that the cause which is the most perfect, and the most comprehensive +of the others, sings the past, as the cause of the others, and the +source of their energy. For the past is comprehensive of the future +and the present. But the second cause is the present,<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> which +partly comprehends, and is partly comprehended. For this prior to its +being the present was the future. And the third cause, and which is +comprehended by both the others, is the future. For this requires the +present and the past, the one unfolding it, but the other bounding +its progression. Lachesis, therefore, is the first-effective cause, +comprehending the other causes in herself; but each of the remaining +Parcæ is comprehended by her. And Clotho indeed is allotted a superior, +but Atropos an inferior order. And on this account, Lachesis indeed +moves with both her hands, as giving completion in a greater and more +total manner to those things which are effected by them more partially. +But Clotho turns the spindle with her right, and Atropos with her +left hand, so far as the former indeed is the primary leader of the +energies, but the latter follows, and governs all things in conjunction +with the former. For in mortal animals, the right hand is the principle +of motion; and in wholes, the motion to the right is comprehensive of +the motion to the left hand. On this account, therefore, the triad +of the Fates, in the Laws and in the Republic, is divided by Plato +according to the same order, into first, middle, and last.</p> + +<p>And not only in the before mentioned passages, but also at the end +of the fable, in which he leads the soul to the mortal place, and to +a polity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[83]</span> the work of generation under the dæmon allotted to it as a +ruler, supernally from the heavens, and the summit of the universe, +he arranges souls under Lachesis as the first, under Clotho as the +second, and under Atropos as the third. And after these, when they +become perfectly situated under the throne of Necessity, he leads them +to the plain of Oblivion, and the river of Negligence. It is necessary, +therefore, either to disturb the descent of souls, and subvert the +continuity of remission, which the prefecture of the governing dæmon +affords to souls, or to assign to Lachesis a rank more elevated than +that of the other Parcæ; but to give to Clotho the second, and to +Atropos after the same manner the third rank. For the progression into +generation beginning from more perfect natures, and subsiding according +to a tendency to an earthly nature, originates indeed from Lachesis, +but ends in Atropos.</p> + +<p>Farther still, the lots, and the paradigms of lives, are extended to +souls from the knees of Lachesis, through the prophet as a medium. And +as the fable before said that the whole spindle is turned on the knees +of Necessity, thus also it suspends the providence about partial souls +from the knees of Lachesis, who moves the universe perpetually with +her hands, as with more elevated powers, but in her knees possesses +subordinately the causes of the psychical periods. Hence the prophet +in a remarkable manner celebrates this daughter of the Goddess: “This +is the speech of the virgin Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity.” But +again, Clotho is said to weave things consequent to the elections made +by souls, and to distribute to each of them an appropriate destiny. And +after her, Atropos imparts to the webs the immutable and the definite, +giving completion to the end of the canons of the Fates, and to the +order which extends from the universe to us. If, therefore, Lachesis +energizes in souls prior to their election, and after their choice is +made, defines all the periods of them in the realms of generation, by +the most beautiful boundaries; but the other Parcæ after the election +made by souls, allot them what is convenient, and connect their lives +with the order of the universe, does it not appear that Lachesis +precedes Clotho and Atropos, and that they follow her, and together +with her give completion to their appropriate providence? Lachesis, +therefore, appears to possess the second dignity of a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[84]</span> mother with +respect to the other Parcæ, and to be a certain monad co-arranged with +them, just as Necessity in an exempt manner comprehends the powers of +all of them. But the other Parcæ are proximately indeed perfected under +Lachesis, but still higher than her, under Necessity. Such, therefore, +is the order of them according to the narration of Plato.</p> + +<p>The symbols, however, which the fable attributes to them, magnificently +celebrate their kingdoms. For their walking on the [celestial] +circles, signifies their exempt and separate dominion. But their +sitting on thrones, and not on the circles themselves, as the Sirens +do, indicates that the receptacles which are primarily illuminated +by them, are established above the celestial bodies. For a throne is +the vehicle and receptacle of those that are seated on it. And all +the participants of the participable Gods, are placed under them like +vehicles, and the [participable] Gods are eternally established in, +ride on, and energize through them. But the Fates being seated at equal +distances from each other, manifest the orderly separation of them, +their remission proceeding according to analogy, and the distribution +supernally derived to them from their mother. For from thence, that +which is arranged in progression, and that which is according to desert +in energies, are imparted to the Fates.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the having a crown on their heads, signifies that their +summits are surrounded with a divine light, and that they are adorned +by prolific and undefiled causes, through which also they fill the +heavens with generative power, and immutable purity. But their being +invested with white garments evinces that all their externally +emitted reasons, and the lives which they propose to themselves, are +intellectual and luciform, and full of divine splendour. And the +garments indeed appear to indicate the essences which participate of +the Fates; but the thrones, the receptacles in the first firmaments. +For with us also, garments are proximately connected with our bodies; +but vehicles are apprehended to be more remote from us. This, however, +is assumed from another theology, from which we are instructed in the +orders that are above the inerratic sphere. But the assertion that +one of the Fates sings the past, another the present, and the third +the future, evinces that all their externally proceeding energies are +elegant and intellectual, and full of harmony. For the Fates<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[85]</span> perfect +the songs of the Sirens, and the very orderly and elegant motions of +the heavens, and fill all things with their hymns; calling forth indeed +the production of their mother into the universe, through intellectual +hymns, but converting all things to themselves through the harmonious +motion of wholes. All these particulars, however, sufficiently +demonstrate to us the perfect, undefiled, and supercelestial order of +the Fates.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIV.</h2> + + +<p>It remains, therefore, for us to adduce the Parmenides as a witness of +the doctrine concerning these gods. For Plato in that dialogue most +clearly delivers the one peculiarity of them. For after the progression +of the assimilative orders, in which the similar and dissimilar +shine forth to the view from intellectual sameness and difference, +at one time indeed according to analogy, but at another according to +a generation which is different [from that of the other orders], and +difficult to be surveyed, he demonstrates that <i>the one</i> touches +and does not touch,<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> both itself and other things. For all the +divine genera after the demiurgic monad double their energies or +they are naturally adapted to energize both towards themselves, and +other things, posterior to themselves, rejoicing in progressions, +being subservient to the providence of secondary natures, through the +will of their father, and calling forth his supernatural, impartible, +and all-perfect production, and communicating the streams of it to +secondary natures. Does not, therefore, this contact and division +with things subordinate, represent to us the liberated peculiarity? +For to touch, is an indication of alliance with us, and of a +co-arranged providence.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[86]</span> But again, not to touch, is an indication of +a transcendency exempt and separate from mundane natures. In what has +been before said, therefore, we have demonstrated that a thing of this +kind pertains to the genus of the liberated Gods, who at one and the +same time come into contact with celestial natures, and are expanded +above them, and proceed to all things with an unrestrained energy, +and free from all habitude. On this account also, we have placed the +Fates in the supercelestial order. For Socrates says that they touch +the [celestial] circulations; and in the Cratylus he asserts that the +mundane Core (or Proserpine) who associates with Pluto, and administers +the whole of generation, comes into contact with a mutable essence, and +that through this contact she is called Pherephatta.</p> + +<p>Farther still, in the Phædo, teaching us what the mode of the cathartic +life of souls is, he says “that the soul when it does not associate +with the body, comes into contact with [true] being.” Through all these +particulars, therefore, he indicates that contact is the work of an +inseparable providence, and of a co-arranged administration; but that +the negation of contact is the business of a prefecture, separate, +unrestrained, and exempt from the subjects of government. <i>The +one</i>, therefore, which touches and does not touch other things, is +conjoined with other things, and established above them. Hence, at one +and the same time it is allotted the power of things established above +the world, and of mundane natures. For being in the middle of both, +it comprehends in one the divided peculiarities of the extremes. And +moreover, it touches, and does not touch itself prior to other things; +because there are in it multitude, a separation of wholeness, and the +parts of wholeness, and a union collective of all the multitude. For +if it has proceeded from its principles, and if it energizes partibly, +it is various and multiform. For every progression diminishes indeed, +the powers of the proceeding natures, but increases the multitude +which is in them, and if it has not entirely proceeded, the uniform +nature of its essence shines forth to the view, at one and the same +time, with the multitude it contains. This genus of Gods, therefore, is +co-arranged with the mundane Gods, and transcends the subjects of its +government. It is also liberated, being separated from things which are +perfectly divided.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[87]</span> Hence, if it is one and multitude, producing indeed +into secondary natures the many rivers of the fountains, but surpassing +partible allotments, it will at one and the same time touch and not +touch itself. On account of its separate union indeed, it is not in +want of contact; but on account of its progression into multitude, it +touches itself. “For it comprehends many things in itself, and touches +itself, so far as it is in itself,”<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> says Parmenides.[1] In short, so +far as it is without contact, it is separate; but so far as it proceeds +from itself, and is again established in itself, it touches itself. +And so far indeed, as it is in other things, it comes into contact +with other things; but so far as it is uncoarranged with others, and +so far as it has not a co-ordinate number in them, it is separated +from them. At one and the same time therefore, this genus of Gods +is uniform and multiplied, and is uniformly varied. It also abides +and proceeds, and is participated by more imperfect natures, and is +imparticipable, existing prior to them. All these particulars, however, +are the elements of the supercelestial order, presenting to our view an +hypostasis mingled from perfectly divided peculiarities. And thus much +concerning the essence and hyparxis of these Gods, which Parmenides +exhibits to us in the above citation.</p> + +<p>It is necessary, however, to assume from the things placed before us, +the causes of the generation of these Gods. Since it is demonstrated, +therefore, that these divinities are according to union itself +beyond all partible separation, and contact, they will have their +progression from <i>the one</i>. For union is thence derived to all +things, from the first unity, which is exempt from all multitude, +and all division. But in consequence of their having pre-assumed the +power of touching themselves, according to a subsistence in self they +derive their existence from the unpolluted Gods. For the subsistence +in self in the first of the intellectual fathers, was the symbol +of a cause inflexible, and which immutably sustains multitude from +secondary natures. If, therefore, this one touches itself, on account +of a subsistence in self, it establishes multitude in <i>the one</i>, +and contains parts in wholeness, on account of undefiled power in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[88]</span> +progression. And in the intellectual fathers, indeed, a subsistence +in self primarily shines forth to the view, and comprehends contact +causally, as was demonstrated to us through the first hypothesis. +But in the liberated Gods, a subsistence in self is according to +participation. Contact, however, is in this one according to essence, +and is consubsistent with the multitude it contains.</p> + +<p>Farther still, [<i>the one</i>] being in other things touches other +things; but not being co-arranged with them according to any common +number, it is separated from them. By this, therefore, Parmenides +appears indeed to form his reasoning from a subsistence in another; +since that <i>the one</i> touches itself, was before demonstrated, +through a subsistence in itself. It is, however, wonderful that a +subsistence in another is, in the first progression,<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> superior to a +subsistence in self, but in the participation of the liberated Gods is +subordinate to a subsistence in self. For we say, that for a thing to +come into contact, and be co-arranged with other things, is in every +respect more imperfect than for it to convert multitude to itself. We +must, therefore, say that the liberated Gods have their progression +from the demiurgic and the assimilative order. Hence Parmenides does +not say that <i>the one</i> is in another thing, but in other things. +But other things are primarily suspended from the [demiurgic] monad; +but secondarily from the assimilative Gods. The liberated Gods, +therefore, from thence receive their subsistence in others. For the +demiurgic one being same and different, imparts to them sameness and +union exemptly. But the assimilative one illuminates them with a +separate similitude. But <i>the one</i> of the liberated Gods subsists +now with others, so far as it is co-arranged with them, and proximately +presides over them. Again, however, because it differs from the mundane +unities, it is allotted the whole of its appropriate number exempt +from others. And thus other things participating of no number which is +common with this one, cannot proximately participate of it. Hence the +progression to the liberated Gods, is from the first causes, and from +causes that are arranged near to them. For their progression is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[89]</span> from +<i>the one</i>; since as <i>the one</i> is exempt from intelligibles, +thus also the liberated Gods are exempt from sensibles. And their +progression is likewise from the undefiled order. For they have not the +disencumbered from any other source than that of immutable power, and +the demiurgic cause. Being likewise generated from the assimilative +Gods, they receive a communion with other things, and from themselves +they are established above others. For they establish their appropriate +number above the subsistence of other things. And thus much concerning +these Gods may be assumed from the Parmenides. But we have elsewhere +accurately explained the several particulars relating to them, and +there is no occasion to write the same things in the present treatise +[as we have there written].</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[90]</span></p> + +<p class="center lg p4"><b>BOOK VII.</b></p> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER I.</h2> + + +<p>The mundane Gods, or those divinities who give completion to the +sensible world, are assigned the last order of deific progression, as +we are informed by Proclus in the preceding book. They also divide +the universe, and obtain perpetual allotments and receptacles in it, +and through these weave one and the best polity of the universe. Each +of the mundane genera likewise enjoy the energy of the liberated +governors of the universe, according to a measure adapted to each, +and especially such as are able to follow the powers of these Gods. +For in the Gods themselves we may perceive a twofold energy, the one +indeed being co-arranged with the subjects of their providential care, +but the other being exempt and separate. According, therefore, to +the first of these energies, the mundane Gods govern sensibles, and +convolve and convert them to themselves; but according to the other, +they follow the liberated Gods, and together with them are elevated +to an intelligible nature. The mundane Gods also perfectly unfold the +psychical peculiarity into light; and receive the illuminations of all +the divinities prior to them. Hence too, they rule over the universe +imitating the liberated Gods, adorn sublunary natures with forms, and +assimilate them to intellectual paradigms, imitating the ruling Gods. +They likewise pour<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[91]</span> forth the whole of the life which is inseparable +from body, from the one fountain of souls, establishing it as an image +of the life which is separate from a corporeal nature, and unite +themselves to this fountain.</p> + +<p>Again, the world is said by Plato in the Timæus to be the image of the +eternal, i.e. of the intelligible Gods. For it is filled from them +with deity, and the progressions into it of the mundane Gods, are as +it were certain rivers and illuminations of the intelligible Gods. +These progressions also the world receives, not only according to the +celestial part of it, but according to the whole of itself. For in the +air, the earth and sea, there are advents of terrestrial, aquatic, +and aerial Gods. Hence the world is throughout filled with deity; and +on this account is according to the whole of itself the image of the +intelligible Gods. Not that it receives indeed these Gods themselves; +for images do not receive the exempt essences of the total Gods; but +illuminations poured from thence on the secondary orders, to the +reception of which they are commensurate.</p> + +<p>Farther still, of the mundane Gods, some are the causes of the +existence of the world; others animate it; others again harmonize +it thus composed of different natures; and others, lastly, guard +and preserve it when harmonically arranged. And since these orders +are four, and each consists of things first, middle and last, it is +necessary that the disposers of these should be twelve. Hence Jupiter, +Neptune, and Vulcan, fabricate the world; Ceres, Juno and Diana animate +it; Mercury, Venus, and Apollo harmonize it; and lastly, Vesta, +Minerva, and Mars, preside over it with a guardian power. But the truth +of this may be seen in statues as in enigmas. For Apollo harmonizes the +lyre; Pallas is invested with arms; and Venus is naked; since harmony +generates beauty, and beauty is not concealed in objects of sensible +inspection. Since, however, these Gods primarily possess the world, it +is necessary to consider the other mundane Gods as subsisting in these; +as Bacchus in Jupiter, Esculapius in Apollo, and the Graces in Venus. +We may likewise, behold the spheres with which they are connected; viz. +Vesta with earth, Neptune with water, Juno with air, and Vulcan with +fire. But the six superior Gods we denominate from general custom. For +Apollo and Diana are assumed for the sun and moon; but the orb of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[92]</span> +Saturn is attributed to Ceres; æther to Pallas; and heaven is common +to them all. And thus much concerning the mundane Gods in general, the +sources of their progression, their orders, powers, and spheres.<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a></p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER II.</h2> + + +<p>The division, however, of the mundane Gods is into the celestial and +sublunary. And of the celestial, the divinity of the inerratic sphere +has the relation of a monad to the divinities of the planets. But +the triad under this monad consists of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars; of +which the first is the cause of connected comprehension, the second of +symmetry, and the third of division and separation. And again, with +respect to the sublunary deities, the moon ranks as a monad, being +the cause of all generation and corruption. But the triad under it, +consists of the divinities who preside over the elements of air, water +and earth. Between these are the planets that revolve with an equal +velocity. And of these, the sun indeed unfolds truth into light, Venus +beauty, and Mercury the symmetry of reasons or productive principles, +conformably to the analogy of the three monads mentioned by Plato in +the Philebus, as subsisting in the vestibule of <i>the good</i>. It may +also be said that the moon is the cause of nature to the mortal genera, +being the visible image of the fontal nature existing in the goddess +Rhea. But the sun is the fabricator of all the senses, because he is +the author of seeing and of being seen. Mercury is the cause of the +motions of the phantasy; for the sun gives subsistence to the essence +of the phantasy, so far as it is the same with sense. But Venus is +the cause of the appetites of that irrational part of the soul which +is called desire; and Mars, of those irascible motions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[93]</span> which are +conformable to nature. Jupiter also, is the common cause of all vital, +and Saturn of all gnostic powers. For all the irrational forms may be +divided into these. The causes, therefore, of these, are antecedently +comprehended in the celestial Gods, and in the spheres with which they +are connected.</p> + +<p>The allotments also of the mundane Gods are conformable to the +divisions of the universe. But the universe is divided by demiurgic +numbers, viz. by the duad, triad, tetrad, pentad, hebdomad, and +dodecad. For after the one fabrication of things by the demiurgus, +the division of the universe into two parts, heaven and generation +(or the sublunary region), gives subsistence to twofold allotments, +the celestial and the sublunary. After this, the triad divides +the universe, to which Homer alludes when he says that Neptune is +allotted the hoary deep, Jupiter, the extended heavens, and Pluto, the +subterranean darkness. But after the triple distribution, the tetradic +follows, which gives a fourfold arrangement to the elements in the +universe, as the Pythagoreans say, viz. the celestial and the ethereal, +above the earth and under the earth. The universe also receives a +division into five parts. For the world is one and quintuple, and +is appropriately divided by celestial, empyreal, aerial, aquatic +and terrestrial figures and presiding Gods. After this follows its +division into seven parts. For the heptad beginning supernally from the +inerratic sphere, pervades through all the elements. And in the last +place is the division of the universe by the dodecad, viz. into the +sphere of the fixed stars, the spheres of the seven planets, and the +spheres of the four elements.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the allotment of angels and dæmons is co-suspended from +the divine allotments, but has a more various distribution. For one +divine allotment comprehends in itself many angelic, and a still +greater number of dæmoniacal allotments; since every angel rules over +many dæmons, and every angelic allotment is surrounded with numerous +dæmoniacal allotments. For what a monad is in the Gods, that a tribe +is among dæmons. Here, therefore, instead of the triad we must assume +three compositions, and instead of the tetrad or dodecad, four or +twelve choirs following their respective leaders. And thus we shall +always<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[94]</span> preserve the higher allotments. For as in essences, powers and +energies, progressions generate multitude; thus also in allotments, +such as are first, have a precedency in power, but are diminished in +multitude, as being nearer to the one father of the universe, and the +whole and one providence which extends to all things. But secondary +allotments, have a diminution of power, but an increase of multitude. +And thus much concerning allotments in general.</p> + +<p>Since, however, according to a division of the universe into two parts, +we have distributed allotments into the celestial and sublunary, +there can be no doubt what the former are, and whether they possess +an invariable sameness of subsistence. But the sublunary allotments +are deservedly a subject of admiration, whether they are said to be +perpetual or not. For since all things in generation are continually +changing and flowing, how can the allotments of the providential +rulers of them be said to be perpetual? For things in generation are +not perpetual. But if their allotments are not perpetual, how is it +possible to suppose that divine government can subsist differently at +different times? For an allotment is neither a certain separate energy +of the Gods, so that sublunary natures changing, we might say that +it is exempt and remains immutable, nor is it that which is governed +alone, so that no absurdity would follow from admitting that an +allotment is in a flowing condition, and is conversant with all-various +mutations; but it is a providential inspection, and unrestrained +government of divinity over sublunary concerns. Such being the doubts +with which this subject is attended, the following appears to be the +only solution of the difficulty.</p> + +<p>We must say then, that it is not proper to consider all the natures +that are in generation and generation itself, as alone consisting of +things mutable and flowing, but that there is also something immutable +in these, and which is naturally adapted to remain perpetually the +same. For the interval which receives and comprehends in itself all the +parts of the world, and which has an arrangement through all bodies, +is immoveable, lest being moved it should require another place, and +thus should proceed from one receptacle to another ad infinitum. The +etherial vehicles also of divine souls with which they are circularly +invested, and which imitate<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[95]</span> the lives in the heavens, have a +perpetual essence, and are eternally suspended from these divine souls +themselves, being full of prolific powers, and performing a circular +motion, according to a certain secondary revolution of the celestial +orbs. And in the third place the wholeness (ολοτης) of the elements +has a permanent subsistence, though the parts are all-variously +corrupted. For it is necessary that every form in the universe should +be never failing, in order that the universe may be perfect, and that +being generated from an immoveable cause, it may be immoveable in its +essence. But every wholeness is a form; or rather it is that which it +is said to be through the participation of one all-perfect form.</p> + +<p>And here we may see the orderly progression of the nature of bodies. +For the interval of the universe is immoveable according to every kind +of motion. But the vehicles of divine souls alone receive a mutation +according to place; for such a motion as this, is most remote from +essential mutation. And the wholeness of the elements admits in its +parts the other motions of bodies, but the whole remains perfectly +immutable. The celestial allotments also which proximately divide +the interval of the universe, co-distribute likewise the heavens +themselves. But those in the sublunary region, are primarily indeed +allotted the parts which are in the interval of the universe, but +afterwards they make a distribution according to the definite vehicles +of souls. And in the third place, they remain perpetually the same +according to the total parts of generation. The allotments of the Gods +therefore do not change, nor do they subsist differently at different +times; for they have not their subsistence proximately in that which +may be changed.</p> + +<p>How therefore do the illuminations of the Gods accede to these? How +are the dissolutions of sacred rites effected? And how is the same +place at different times under the influence of different spirits? +May it not be said, that since the Gods have perpetual allotments, +and divide the earth according to divine numbers, similarly to the +sections of the heavens, the parts of the earth also are illuminated, +so far as they participate of aptitude. But the circulation of the +heavenly bodies, through the figures which they possess produce this +aptitude; divine illumination at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[96]</span> same time imparting a power more +excellent than the nature which is present to these parts of the earth. +This aptitude is also effected by nature herself as a whole inserting +divine impressions in each of the illuminated parts, through which they +spontaneously participate of the Gods. For as these parts depend on +the Gods, nature inserts in such of them as are different, different +images of the divinities. Times too co-operate in producing this +aptitude, according to which other things also are governed; the proper +temperature of the air; and in short, every thing by which we are +surrounded contributes to the increase and diminution of this aptitude. +When therefore conformably to a concurrence of these many causes, an +aptitude to the participation of the Gods is ingenerated in some one of +the natures which are disposed to be changed, then a certain divinity +is unfolded into light, which prior to this was concealed through +the inaptitude of the recipients; possessing indeed his appropriate +allotment eternally, and always extending the participation of +himself, similarly to illuminations from the sun, but not being always +participated by sublunary natures, in consequence of their inaptitude +to such participation. For as with respect to partial souls such as +ours, which at different times embrace different lives, some of them +indeed, choose lives accommodated to their appropriate Gods, but others +foreign lives, through oblivion of the divinities to whom they belong; +thus also with respect to sacred places, some are adapted to the power +which there receives its allotment, but others are suspended from a +different order. And on this account, as the Athenian guest in Plato +says, some places are more fortunate, but others more unfortunate.</p> + +<p>The divine Iamblichus however, doubts how the Gods are said to be +allotted certain places according to definite times, as by Plato in the +Timæus, Minerva is said to have been first allotted the guardianship of +Athens, and afterwards of Sais. For if their allotment commenced from +a certain time, it will also at a certain time cease. For every thing +which is measured by time is of this kind. And farther still was the +place which at a certain time they are allotted, without a presiding +deity prior to this allotment, or was it under the government of other +Gods? For if it was without a presiding deity, how is it to be admitted +that a certain part of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[97]</span> the universe was once entirely destitute of +divinity? How can any place remain without the guardianship of superior +beings? And, if any place is sufficient to the preservation of itself, +how does it afterwards become the allotment of some one of the Gods? +But if it should be said that it is afterwards under the government of +another God, of whom it becomes the allotment, this also is absurd. +For the second God does not divulse the government and allotment of +the former, nor do the Gods alternately occupy the places of each +other, nor dæmons change their allotments. Such being the doubts on +this subject, he solves them by saying that the allotments of the Gods +remain perpetually unchanged, but that the participants of them, at one +time indeed enjoy the beneficent influence of the presiding powers, but +at another are deprived of it. He adds that these are the mutations +measured by time, which sacred institutes frequently call the birth-day +of the Gods.<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER III.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place, it is necessary to observe of the mundane Gods +that they do not obtain the rank which they hold in the universe from +any habitude or arrangement towards bodies; for they are all of them +essentially liberated from body, unrestrained in their energies, and +have no proximity or alliance to a corporeal nature. For bodies are +ministrant to them, and are subservient to the generation of mutable +essences. Hence they are not in bodies, but rule over them externally; +so that they are not changed together with them. Farther still, they +impart from themselves to bodies, every good which they are capable +of receiving, but do not in return receive any thing from bodies; and +consequently they do not receive certain peculiarities from them. +For<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[98]</span> if indeed they had a subsistence like the habits of bodies, or +like material forms, or were corporeal after any other manner, it +might perhaps be possible for them to be transmuted together with +the differences of bodies. But if they antecedently subsist separate +from bodies, and are essentially unmingled with them, what reasonable +distinction can they derive from a corporeal nature? To which may be +added, that such an hypothesis makes bodies to be better than the +divine genera, if they afford a seat to more excellent causes, and +essentially insert in them characteristic peculiarities. He therefore, +who co-arranges the allotments and distributions of the governors with +the governed, will evidently ascribe authority and dominion to better +natures. For because the presiding powers possess such peculiarities, +on this account they chuse such an allotment, and give it essentially +a specific distinction; but the allotment itself is not assimilated to +the nature of the recipient.</p> + +<p>With respect indeed to partial souls such as ours it is requisite to +admit that such as is the life which it emitted before it was inserted +in a human body, such also will be the organic body with which it is +connected, and such will be the nature consequent to it, and which +receives from the soul a more perfect life. But with respect to the +natures superior to man, and which have dominion as wholes, it must be +admitted, that inferior are produced in more excellent natures, bodies +in incorporeal essences, and fabrications in the fabricators of them, +and that being circularly comprehended in them, they are governed +according to invariable rectitude. The circulations therefore of the +celestial orbs are primarily inserted in the celestial circulations +of the etherial soul, in which they are perpetually inherent. And +the souls of the spheres being extended to the intellect which they +participate, are perfectly comprehended by, and are primarily generated +in it. Intellect also, both that which is partial, and that which +is universal, are comprehended in the more excellent genera. Since +therefore secondary natures are always converted to such as are first, +and superior natures as paradigms are the leaders of those that are +subordinate, both essence and form are derived from more excellent +beings to those of an inferior rank, and the latter are primarily +produced in the former, so as to derive from them order and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[99]</span> measure, +and the properties by which they are characterized; while on the +contrary such properties do not flow from subordinate natures to such +as have a precedency and a greater dignity of essence.</p> + +<p>In short, neither are the Gods held in subjection by certain parts +of the world, nor are terrestrial natures destitute of their +all-preserving influence; but superior powers at the same time that +they comprehend all things in themselves, are not comprehended +by any thing. And terrestrial natures having their very being in +the plenitudes of the Gods, when they become adapted to divine +participation, immediately prior to their own proper essence manifestly +possess the Gods which latently pre-subsisted in it.<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a></p> + +<p>Farther still, divinity whether it is allotted certain portions of +the universe, such as the heavens or the earth, or sacred cities and +regions, or certain groves and sacred statues, illuminates all these +externally, viz. without any alliance to the things themselves, in +the same manner as the sun externally enlightens all things with its +rays; except that in the latter instance, the illuminating cause is +locally, but in the former is impassively, unextendedly, and in short +incorporeally external. As therefore, the solar light comprehends +in itself the illuminated objects, thus also the power of the Gods, +externally comprehends its participants. And as light is present with +the air, without being essentially mingled with it; which is evident +from no light remaining in the air, when once the illuminating source +has departed, though heat is present with it when that which heated +is entirely withdrawn; thus also the light of the Gods illuminates in +a separate manner, and being firmly established in itself, pervades +totally through all things. Indeed, this visible light of the sun, is +one, continued, and is every where the same whole, so that it is not +possible for any part of it to be separated and cut off from the rest, +nor to inclose it on all sides, nor divulge it from its source. After +the same manner therefore, the whole world being partible, is divided +about the one impartible light of the Gods. But this light is one +and every where the same whole, and is impartibly present to all the +natures that are able<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[100]</span> to partake of it. It likewise fills all things +through an all-perfect power, and bounds in itself wholes, by a certain +infinite causal transcendency; is every where united to itself, and +conjoins the terminations with the beginnings of things. But all heaven +and the world imitating this light, is circularly convolved, is united +to itself, conducts the elements in their circular motion, causes all +things to be in, and tend to each other, and ends to have juxtaposition +with their principles, and produces one connexion and consent of wholes +with wholes.</p> + +<p>He therefore who surveys this visible image of the Gods (the world) +thus united in itself, will be ashamed to have a different opinion +of the Gods the causes of it, and to introduce in them divisions, +obstructions, and corporeal circumscriptions. For if there is no ratio, +no habitude of symmetry, no communion of essence, no connexion either +according to power or energy, between the adorning cause and adorned +effect; if this be the case, in the former there is neither a certain +extension according to interval, nor any local comprehension, or any +partible interception, nor any other similar innate equalization in +the manner in which the Gods are present. For in things which are of +a kindred nature either according to essence or power, or which are +in a certain respect similar in species, or homogeneous, a certain +mutual comprehension or retention may be perceived; but what coercion, +or transition through the universe, or partible circumscription, or +local comprehension, or any thing else of the like kind can there be in +natures perfectly exempt from the whole of things? For the participants +indeed of the divinities are such, that some of them participate +etherially, others aerially, and others aquatically of a divine +nature. And this the ancients perceiving, employed in their divine +operations, adaptations and invocations, conformably to a division of +this kind. And thus much concerning the distribution of the Gods in the +world.<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a></p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[101]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER IV.</h2> + + +<p>If, however, the mundane as well as the supermundane Gods are +incorporeal, it may be asked how the visible celestial orbs can be +Gods? To this we reply, that the celestial Gods are not comprehended +by bodies, but that they contain bodies in their divine lives and +energies; that they are not converted to body, but that the body +which is suspended from their essence is converted to a divine cause; +and that body is no impediment to their intellectual and incorporeal +perfection, and is not the cause of any molestation to them by its +intervention. Hence it does not require an abundant care and attention, +but spontaneously and after a certain manner self-motively follows +the divinities with which it is connected, not being in want of any +manuduction, but by its elevation to the one of the Gods, is also +itself uniformly raised by itself.</p> + +<p>Indeed, a celestial body is allied in the most eminent degree to the +incorporeal essence of the Gods. For as the latter is characterized +by unity, so the former is simple. As that is impartible, this is +indivisible. And as that is immutable, this after a similar manner is +unchanged in quality. If also it is admitted that the energies of the +Gods are uniform, this body likewise has one circulation. Besides this, +it imitates the sameness of the Gods, by its perpetual and invariable +motion according to, and towards the same things, conformably to one +reason and order. It likewise imitates the divine life of the Gods by +the life which is connascent with the ethereal bodies. Hence, neither +is a celestial body so constituted as if composed of contrary and +different natures, as is the case with our bodies; nor does the soul +of the celestial Gods so coalesce with the body suspended from it, as +to form one animal from the two; but the animals of these divinities +are perfectly similar and united to the Gods from whom they depend; +and are throughout whole, uniform, and free from all composition. For +more excellent natures always subsisting with invariable sameness in +themselves, but inferior being suspended from the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[102]</span> dominion of superior +beings, yet so as never to draw down this dominion to themselves, +wholes likewise being collected into one order and one perfection, +and after a certain manner all things in the celestial Gods being +incorporeal and throughout divine, because the divine form universally +predominates in them,—this being the case, one total essence in the +nature of these divinities every where prevails. And thus the visible +celestial orbs are all of them Gods, and are after a certain manner +incorporeal.<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a></p> + +<p>If, therefore, these divinities as being incorporeal, intellectual, +and united, ride as it were in the celestial spheres, they have their +origin in the intelligible world, and there intellectually perceiving +the divine forms of themselves, they govern the whole of heaven +according to one infinite energy. And if being present to the heavens +in a separate manner, they lead its perpetual circulations by their +will alone, they are themselves unmingled with a sensible nature, and +are consubsistent with the intelligible Gods. Indeed, the celestial +orbs, those visible statues as it were of the Gods, are generated from, +and subsist about, the intelligible Gods, and being thus generated +are established in them, and have the image elevated to them which +from them also receives its perfection. The divine intellectual forms +also which are present to the visible bodies of the Gods, have a +subsistence prior to them in a separate manner; but the unmingled and +supercelestial intelligible paradigms of them, abide in themselves, +containing all things simultaneously in one, according to the eternal +transcendency of their nature.</p> + +<p>Hence there is one common indivisible bond of them according to +intellectual energies. There is also the same bond between them +according to the common participations of forms, since there is +nothing to intercept them, nor any intervening medium. Indeed, an +immaterial and incorporeal essence, being neither separated by places +nor subjects, nor defined by any divisible circumscriptions of parts, +immediately coalesces in sameness; and the elevation of wholes to +<i>the one</i>, and the universal dominion of <i>the one</i>, collects +the communion of the mundane Gods with the divinities that presubsist +in the intelligible world.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[103]</span></p> + +<p>Farther still, the intellectual conversion of secondary to first +natures, and the gift of the same essence and power from the primary to +the secondary Gods connects their congress into an indissoluble one. +In things of different essences indeed, such as soul and body, and in +things of different species, such as material forms, and those natures +which in any other way are separated from each other, the connascent +union is adventitious, being derived from supernal causes, and lost +in certain definite periods of time. But the higher we ascend, to the +sameness of first causes, both according to form and according to +essence, and the more we raise ourselves from parts to wholes, by so +much the more shall we discover and survey that union which is eternal, +precedaneous and more principal, and which contains about and in itself +difference and multitude.</p> + +<p>Since, however, the order of all the Gods consists in union, and the +first and second genera of them, and the multitude which germinates +about them coexist in unity; since also every thing in them is +characterized by <i>the one</i>; hence the beginning, middle, and end +of their essence consubsists according to <i>the one</i>. It is not +proper, therefore, to enquire whence unity extends to all things in +them; for their very being, whatever it may be, consists in <i>the +one</i>. And secondary genera indeed remain with invariable sameness +in <i>the one</i> of the first genera. But the latter impart from +themselves union to the former; while all of them possess in each other +the communion of an indissoluble connexion.</p> + +<p>From this cause, therefore, the perfectly incorporeal Gods, are united +to the sensible Gods who are connected with bodies. For the visible +Gods themselves are external to bodies, and on this account are in +the intelligible world. And the intelligible Gods on account of their +infinite union comprehend in themselves the apparent divinities; while +in the mean time both these are established according to a common union +and one energy. In a similar manner, this likewise is the illustrious +prerogative of a deific cause and orderly distribution, that the same +union of all things pervades from on high as far as to the end of the +divine order. And thus much concerning the contact of the sensible with +the intelligible Gods.<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a></p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[104]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER V.</h2> + + +<p>What has been above delivered concerning the mundane Gods is perfectly +conformable to the doctrine of Plato, as delivered by him in the +Timæus, in the speech<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> of the demiurgus to the junior Gods. For it +is there said, “When, therefore, all such Gods as visibly revolve, +and all such as become apparent when they please, were generated, he +who fabricated this universe thus addressed them: Gods of Gods, of +whom I am the demiurgus and father, whatever is generated by me is +indissoluble, such being my will in its fabrication. Indeed every thing +which is bound is dissoluble; but to be willing to dissolve that which +is beautifully harmonized and well composed is the property of an evil +nature. Hence, so far as you are generated, you are not immortal, nor +in every respect indissoluble, yet you shall never be dissolved, nor +become subject to the fatality of death; my will being a much greater +and more excellent bond than the vital connectives with which you were +bound at the commencement of your generation. Learn now, therefore, +what I say to you indicating my desire. Three genera of mortals yet +remain to be produced. Without the generation of these, therefore, +the universe will be imperfect; for it will not contain every kind of +animal in its spacious extent. But it ought to contain them, that it +may be sufficiently perfect. Yet if these are generated and participate +of life through me they will become equal to the Gods. That mortal +natures, therefore, may subsist, and that the universe may be truly +all, convert yourselves according to your nature to the fabrication +of animals, imitating the power which I employed in your generation. +And whatever among these is of such a nature as to deserve the same +appellation with immortals, which is called divine, obtains sovereignty +in them, and willingly pursues justice and reverences you,—of this +I myself will deliver the seed and beginning. It is your business +to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[105]</span> accomplish the rest; to weave together the mortal and immortal +nature; by this mean fabricating and generating animals, causing them +to increase by supplying them with nutriment, and receiving them back +again when dissolved by corruption.”</p> + +<p>As the commentary of Proclus on this speech most admirably unfolds +its recondite meaning, and is at the same time replete with the most +interesting information respecting the mundane Gods, I shall give the +following extracts from it, in which the most magnificent exuberance of +diction is combined with the greatest fecundity and scientific accuracy +of conception.</p> + +<p>“The scope of this speech (says Proclus) is to insert demiurgic power +and providence in the mundane genera of Gods, to lead them forth to +the generation of the remaining kinds of animals, and to place them +over mortals, analogously to the father of wholes over the one orderly +distribution of the universe. For it is necessary that some things +should be primarily generated by the demiurgic monad, and others +through other media; the Demiurgus, indeed, producing all things from +himself, at once and eternally, but the things produced in order, and +first proceeding from him, producing together with him the natures +posterior to themselves. Thus, for instance, the celestial produce +sublunary Gods, and these generate mortal animals; the Demiurgus at +the same time fabricating these in conjunction with the celestial and +sublunary divinities. For in speaking he understands all things, and by +understanding all things he also makes the mortal genera of animals; +these requiring another proximate generating cause, so far as they +are mortal, and through this receiving a progression into being. But +the character of the words is enthusiastic, shining with intellectual +intuitions, pure and venerable as being perfected by the father of the +Gods, differing from and transcending human conceptions, delicate and +at the same time terrific, full of grace and beauty—at once concise +and perfectly accurate. Plato, therefore, particularly studies these +things in the imitations of divine speeches; as he also evinces in the +Republic, when he represents the Muses speaking sublimely, and the +prophet ascending to a lofty seat. He also adorns both these speeches +with conciseness and venerableness, employing the accurate<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[106]</span> powers of +colons, directly shadowing forth divine intellections through such a +form of words. But in the words before us he omits no transcendency +either of the grand and robust in the sentences and the names +adapted to these devices, or of magnitude in the conceptions and the +figures which give completion to this idea. Besides this, also, much +distinction and purity, the unfolding of truth, and the illustrious +prerogatives of beauty, are mingled with the idea of magnitude, this +being especially adapted to the subject things, to the speaker, and to +the hearers. For the objects of this speech are, the perfection of the +universe, an assimilation to all-perfect animal [i.e. to its paradigm], +and the generation of all mortal animals; the maker of all things, at +the same time, presubsisting and adorning all things through exempt +transcendency; but the secondary fabricators adding what was wanting +to the formation of the universe. All, therefore, being great and +divine, as well the persons as the things, and shining with beauty and +a distinction from each other, Plato has employed words adapted to the +form of the speech.</p> + +<p>“Homer, also, when energizing enthusiastically, represents Jupiter +speaking, converting to himself the two-fold co-ordinations of Gods; +becoming himself, as it were, the centre of all the divine genera in +the world, and making all things obedient to his intellection. But +at one time he conjoins the multitude of Gods with himself without a +medium, and at another through Themis as the medium.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>But Jove to Themis gives command to call</div> + <div>The Gods to council.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p>“This Goddess pervading everywhere collects the divine number, and +converts it to the demiurgic monad. For the Gods are both separate +from mundane affairs, and eternally provide for all things, being at +the same time exempt from them through the highest transcendency, and +extending their providence everywhere. For their unmingled nature +is not without providential energy, nor is their providence mingled +with matter. Through transcendency of power they are not filled +with the subjects of their government, and through beneficent will, +they make all things similar to themselves; in permanently abiding, +proceeding, and in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[107]</span> being separated from all things, being similarly +present to all things. Since, therefore, the Gods that govern the +world, and the dæmons the attendants of these, receive after this +manner unmingled purity, and providential administration from their +father; at one time he converts them to himself without a medium, and +illuminates them with a separate, unmingled, and pure form of life. +Whence also I think he orders them to be separated from all things, +to remain exempt in Olympus, and neither convert themselves to Greeks +nor Barbarians; which is just the same as to say, that they must +transcend the two-fold orders of mundane natures, and abide immutably +in undefiled intellection. But at another time he converts them to a +providential attention to secondary natures, through Themis, and calls +upon them to direct the mundane battle, and excites different Gods +to different works. These divinities, therefore, especially require +the assistance of Themis, who contains in herself the divine laws, +according to which providence is intimately connected with wholes. +Homer, therefore, divinely delivers two-fold speeches, accompanying +the two-fold energies of Jupiter; but Plato, through this one speech, +comprehends those two-fold modes of discourse. For the Demiurgus +renders the Gods unmingled with secondary natures, and causes them to +provide for, and give existence to, mortals. But he orders them to +fabricate in imitation of himself: and in an injunction of this kind, +both these are comprehended, viz. the unmingled through the imitation +of the father, for he is separate, being exempt from mundane wholes; +but providential energy, through the command to fabricate, nourish, and +increase mortal natures. Or rather, we may survey both in each; for +in imitating the demiurgus, they provide for secondary natures, as he +does for the immortals; and in fabricating they are separate from the +things fabricated. For every demiurgic cause is exempt from the things +generated by it; but that which is mingled with and filled from them is +imbecil and inefficacious, and is unable to adorn and fabricate them. +And thus much in common respecting the whole of the speech.</p> + +<p>“Let us then, in the first place, consider what we are to understand by +“Gods of Gods,” and what power it possesses: for that this invocation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[108]</span> +is collective and convertive of multitude to its monad, that it calls +upwards the natures which have proceeded to the one fabrication of +them, and inserts a boundary and divine measure in them, is clear to +those who are not entirely unacquainted with such-like discourses. But +how those that are allotted the world by their father are called Gods +of Gods, and according to what conception, cannot easily be indicated +to the many; for there is an unfolding of one divine intelligence in +these names.” Proclus then proceeds to relate the explanations given +by others of these words; which having rejected as erroneous, he very +properly, in my opinion, adopts the following, which is that of his +preceptor, the great Syrianus. “All the mundane Gods are not simply +Gods, but they are wholly Gods which participate: for there is in them +that which is separate, unapparent, and supermundane, and also that +which is the apparent image of them, and has an orderly establishment +in the world. And that, indeed, which is unapparent in them is +primarily a God, this being undistributed and one: but this vehicle +which is suspended from their unapparent essence is secondarily a God. +For if, with respect to us, man is two-fold, one inward, according to +the soul, the other apparent, which we see, much more must both these +be asserted of the mundane Gods; since divinity also is two-fold, one +unapparent and the other apparent. This being the case, we must say, +that “Gods of Gods” is addressed to all the mundane divinities, in whom +there is a connection of unapparent with apparent Gods: for they are +Gods that participate. In short, since two-fold orders are produced +by the Demiurgus, some being supermundane, and others mundane, and +some being without, and others with participation [of body], if the +Demiurgus now addressed the supermundane orders, he would have alone +said to them, “Gods:” for they are without participation [i.e. without +the participation of body], are separate and unapparent:—but since the +speech is to the mundane Gods, he calls them Gods of Gods, as being +participated by other apparent divinities. In these also dæmons are +comprehended; for they also are Gods, as to their order with respect +to the Gods, whose peculiarity they indivisibly participate. Thus also +Plato, in the Phædrus, when he calls the twelve Gods the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[109]</span> leaders +of dæmons, at the same time denominates all the attendants of the +divinities Gods, adding, ‘and this is the life of the Gods.’ All these, +therefore, are Gods of Gods, as possessing the apparent connected with +the unapparent, and the mundane with the supermundane.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VI.</h2> + + +<p>And thus much concerning the whole conception of the speech. It is +necessary, however, since we have said the words are demiurgic or +fabricative, that they should be received in a manner adapted to +demiurgic providence. But if these words are intellectual conceptions, +and the intellectual conceptions themselves are productions, what shall +we say the demiurgus effects in the multitude of mundane Gods by the +first words of his speech? Is it not evident we must say that this +energy of his is deific? For this one divine intellectual conception +which is the first and most simple proceeding from the demiurgus, +deifies all the recipients of it, and makes them demiurgic Gods, +participated Gods, and Gods unapparent, and at the same time apparent. +For this, as has been said, is the meaning of “Gods of Gods.” For +the term Gods is not alone adapted to them; since they are not alone +unapparent; nor the word Gods twice enunciated, as if some one should +say Gods and Gods; for every bond of this kind is artificial, and +foreign from divine union.</p> + +<p>It is also necessary to observe that every mundane God has an animal +suspended from him, according to which he is denominated mundane. He +has likewise a divine soul, which rules over its depending vehicle; and +an immaterial and separate intellect, according to which he is united +to the intelligible, in order that he may imitate the world in which +all these are contained. And by the animal suspended from him, he is +indeed a part of the sensible universe; but by intellect he belongs to +an intelligible essence; and by soul he conjoins the impartible life +which is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[110]</span> in him, with the life that is divisible about body. Such a +composition, however, being triple in each mundane God, neither does +Plato here deliver the demiurgus speaking to intellects; for intellects +subsist in unproceeding union with the divine intellect, and are +entirely unbegotten; but soul is the first of generated natures, and +a little after the demiurgus addresses these when he says, “since ye +are generated.” Nor does he represent the demiurgus as speaking only +to the animals which are suspended from the souls of these Gods; for +they pertain to corporeal natures, and are not adapted to enjoy the one +demiurgic intelligence, without a medium. Nor yet does he represent him +as speaking to souls by themselves; for they are entirely immortal; +but the Gods whom he now addresses are said by him not<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> to be in +every respect immortal. If therefore it be requisite for me to say +what appears to me to be the truth, the words of the demiurgus are +addressed to the composite from soul and animal, viz. to the animal +which is divine, and partakes of a soul. For intellect does not know +the demiurgic will through reason, but through intelligence, or in +other words, through intellectual vision; nor through conversion, but +through a union with that intellect which ranks as a whole, as being +itself intellect, and as it were of the same colour with it. But soul +as being reason, and not intellect itself, requires appropriately +to its essence the energy of reason, and a rational conversion to +the intelligible.<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> To these, therefore, as being essentially +rational, and as being essentialized in reasons, the demiurgic speech +proceeds. And it is adapted to them in a twofold respect; first, as +being participated by bodies; for they are Gods of those Gods; and +secondly, as participating of intellects; for they are Gods of [viz. +derived from] intellects which are also Gods. And they participate of +intellects, and are participable by bodies. Hence the assertions that +they are generated, and that they are not entirely immortal, and every +thing else in the speech, are appropriately adapted to them, so far as +they have a certain co-ordination and connexion with mundane natures, +and so far<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[111]</span> as they are participated by them. But the mandates “learn +and generate,” and every thing else of this kind which is more divine +than generated natures, are adapted to them as intellectual essences.</p> + +<p>Let us in the next place attend to the meaning of the words, “Of +whom I am the demiurgus and father, whatever is generated by me is +indissoluble, such being my will in its fabrication.” Plato then +appears to give a triple division to the energy of the one demiurgus +in his production of the junior Gods, viz. a division into the deific, +into that which imparts connexion and into that which supplies a +similitude to animal itself. For the address of the demiurgus evinces +those to be Gods that proceed from him. But the assertions respecting +the indissoluble and dissoluble, by defining the measure of a medium +between these, impart a distribution and connexion commensurate to +the order of the mundane Gods. And the words calling on them to +the fabrication of mortal natures, cause them to be the sources of +perfection to the universe, and the fabricators of secondary animals, +conformably to the imitation of the paradigm. But through these three +energies the demiurgus elevates his offspring to all the intelligible +Gods, and establishes them in the intelligible triads. In the one being +indeed, [or the summit of these triads] through the first of these +energies; for that is primarily deified, in which <i>the one</i> is +deity, but <i>being</i> is the first participant of it. For <i>the one +itself</i> is alone deity, without habitude to any thing, and is not +participable; but <i>the one being</i> in which there is the first +participation is God of God. And being is deity as the summit of all +things; but <i>the one</i> of it is deity as proceeding from <i>the +one</i> itself, which is primarily God. But through the second of these +energies the demiurgus establishes his offspring in the second of the +intelligible triads, i.e. in eternity itself. For eternity is the +cause of this indissoluble permanency to every thing which continues +perpetually undissolved. Hence all mundane natures are bound according +to the demiurgic will, and have something of the indissoluble through +the participation of him; the natures which are primarily indissoluble +being different from these, and those that are truly immortal +subsisting for his sake. And he establishes them in all-perfect animal +[or the third of the intelligible<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[112]</span> triads] through the third of these +energies. For to this the vivific assimilates the mundane Gods, and +inserts in them the paradigms of animals which they generate. And this, +indeed, will be one scope of generation, the converting and perfecting +the proceeding multitude of the Gods. But after the one there will be a +triple design, which establishes them in the three intelligible orders.</p> + +<p>This second demiurgic intelligence, therefore, after the first which +is deific, illuminates the mundane Gods with a firm establishment, an +immutable power, and an eternal essence, through which the whole world, +and all the divine allotments subsist always the same, participating +through the father of an immutable nature and undecaying power. +For every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, is +indissoluble and immutable; but all the progeny of a moveable cause +are moveable. Hence among mundane natures, such as proceed from the +demiurgic cause alone, in consequence of being generated according to +an invariable sameness are permanent, and are exempt from every mutable +and variable essence. But such as proceed both from this cause, and +from other moveable principles, are indeed immutable so far as they +proceed from the demiurgus, but mutable so far as they proceed from +the latter. For those natures which the demiurgus alone generates, +these he fabricates immutable and indissoluble, both according to their +own nature, and according to his power and will. For he imparts to +them a guardian and preserving power, and he connects their essence +in a manner transcendent and exempt. For all things are preserved in +a twofold respect, from the power which he contains, and from his +providential goodness, which is truly able and willing to preserve +every thing which may be lawfully perpetually saved. The most divine of +visible natures therefore, are, as we have said, from their own nature +indissoluble; but they are likewise so from the demiurgic power which +pervades through all things, and eternally connects them. For this +power is the guard and the divine law which connectedly contains all +things. But a still greater and more principal cause than these is the +demiurgic will which employs this power in its productions. For what +is superior to goodness, or what bond is more perfect than this, which +imparts by illumination<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[113]</span> union, connects an eternal essence, and is +the bound and measure of all things; to which also the demiurgus now +refers the cause of immutable power, saying, “such being my will in its +fabrication.” For he established his own will as a guard over his own +proper works, as that which gives union, connexion and measure to the +whole of things.</p> + +<p>Who the demiurgus, however, is, and who father is, has been unfolded by +us before, and will be now also concisely shown. There are then these +four; father alone; maker alone; father and maker; maker and father. +And father indeed is æther [or bound] being the first procession from +<i>the one</i>. Father and maker is the divinity who subsists according +to the intelligible paradigm [at the extremity of the intelligible +order,] and whom Orpheus says, the blessed Gods call Phanes Protogonus. +But maker and father is Jupiter, who is now called by himself the +demiurgus, but whom the Orphic writers would call the father of works. +And maker alone, is the cause of partible fabrication,<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> as the +same writers would say. To father alone, therefore, all intelligible, +intellectual, supermundane and mundane natures are in subjection. To +father and maker, all intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures +are subordinate. To maker and father who is an intellectual deity, +supermundane and mundane natures are subservient. But to maker alone, +mundane natures alone are in subjection. And all these particulars we +learn from the narration of Orpheus; for according to each peculiarity +of the four there is a subject multitude of Gods.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VII.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place, the demiurgus says: “Every thing, therefore, which +is bound is dissoluble, but to be willing to dissolve that which is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[114]</span> +beautifully harmonized and well composed, is the province of an evil +nature.” It is requisite then to consider how the dissoluble and +indissoluble are asserted of the Gods, and to conjoin proper modes of +solution with appropriate bonds. For every thing is not bound after +a similar manner, nor is that which is bound in one way, dissolved +in different ways. But that which is in a certain respect bound, has +also its dissolution according to this mode. That which is in every +respect bound, is likewise in every respect dissolved. And that which +is bound by itself is also by itself dissolved. But that which is bound +by something different from itself, has also on that its dissolution +depending. That likewise which is bound in time, is also dissolved +according to time. But that which is allotted a perpetual bond, must +also be said to be perpetually dissolved. For in short, dissolution +is conjoined with every bond. For a bond is not union without +multitude; since <i>the one</i> does not require a bond. Nor is it an +assemblage of many and different things, no longer preserving their +characteristic peculiarities. For a thing of this kind is confusion; +and that which results from them is one thing, consisting of things +corrupted together, but does not become bound. For it is necessary +that things that are bound should remain as they are, but not be bound +when corrupted. Hence a bond then alone takes place, when there are +many things, and which are preserved, having one power connective and +collective of them, whether this power be corporeal or incorporeal. If +this, however, be the case, things that are bound are united through +the bond, and separated, because each preserves its own proper nature.</p> + +<p>Every where, therefore, as we have said, a bond has also dissolution +connected with it. Bonds, however, and their dissolutions differ in +subsisting in a certain respect, and simply, from themselves, and +from others, according to time, and perpetually. For in these their +differences consist. We must not, therefore, wonder if the same thing +is both dissoluble and indissoluble; and if it is in a certain respect +indissoluble, and in a certain respect dissoluble. So that the works +of the father, if they are indeed indissoluble, are so, as not to +be dissolved according to time. But they are dissoluble, as having +together with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[115]</span> a bond, a separation of the simple things of which they +consist, according to the definite causes of things that are bound, +existing in him that binds. For as that which is self-subsistent is +said to be so in a twofold respect, one, as supplying all things from +itself alone, but another, as subsisting indeed from itself, and also +from another which is the cause of it, thus also the indissoluble is +so, from another,<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> and from itself; just as that which is moved is +twofold, and subsists in a similar manner.</p> + +<p>To these two modes, however, two modes of dissolution are also opposed; +viz. that which is dissoluble from another and from itself is opposed +to that which is indissoluble from another and from itself. And this, +indeed, is dissoluble in itself, as consisting of things that are +separate. But in consequence of having in something else prior to +itself the causes of its subsistence, by this cause, and according to +this mode alone it becomes dissoluble. Again, that which is simply +dissoluble in a twofold respect, and which contains in itself the cause +of its dissolution, and also receives it from another, is opposed to +that which is simply indissoluble in a twofold respect, from itself and +from another. These, therefore, are four in number, viz. that which +is simply indissoluble from another and from itself. And again, that +which is indissoluble after a certain manner in a twofold respect; that +which is dissoluble after a certain manner in a twofold respect; and +that which is dissoluble simply from itself, and from another.<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> Of +these four, however, the first pertains to intelligibles; for they are +indissoluble, as being entirely simple, and receiving no composition +or dissolution whatever. But the fourth belongs to mortal natures, +which are dissoluble from themselves and from others, as consisting of +many things, and being composed by their causes in such a way, as to +be at a certain time dissolved. And the middles pertain to the mundane +Gods; for the second and the third of these four concur with them. +For after a certain manner, these as being the works of the father +are indissoluble; and they are saved from themselves<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[116]</span> and through his +will. And again, they are in a certain respect dissoluble, because they +are bound by him; and he contains the productive principle of those +simple natures from which they are composed. Every thing, therefore, +which is bound is dissoluble; and this is also the case with the works +of the father. For these are, all bodies, the composition of animals, +and the number of participated souls. But intellects which ride as +it were in souls as in a vehicle, cannot be called the works of the +father; for they were not generated, but were unfolded into light in +an unbegotten manner, as if fashioned within the adyta of his essence, +and not proceeding out of them. For there are no paradigms of these, +but of middle and last natures; since soul is the first of images. But +the wholes such as animals, the participants of soul and intellect, +and generated natures, derive their subsistence from intellectual +paradigms, of which animal itself is the comprehending cause.</p> + +<p>Bodies, therefore, are bound through analogy; for this is the most +beautiful bond of them. But animals are bound with animated bonds. +And souls which contain something of a partible nature are bound by +media, [viz. by geometrical, arithmetical and harmonical ratios;] for +Plato calls these and all the productive principles of which the soul +consists, bonds. Hence the indissoluble in the mundane Gods subsists +according to nature; for each of them is generated indissoluble; such +being the works of the father through the power, which he contains. +They are also indissoluble from the demiurgic will, since they are of a +composite nature, and possess the indissoluble with a bond. But there +is likewise in a certain respect a dissolution of them, so far as they +consist of things of a simple nature, of which the father contains in +himself the definite causes. At one and the same time, therefore, they +are indissoluble and dissoluble. They are not, however, so indissoluble +as the intelligible; for that is indissoluble through transcendency +of simplicity. But these are at the same time indissoluble and +dissoluble, as consisting of simple natures, and as being perpetually +bound. For all the natures that are bound being dissoluble, such as +are perpetual, possessing through the whole of time, beauty from the +intelligible, divine union, and demiurgic harmony, are indissoluble. +But mortal natures are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[117]</span> dissoluble alone, because they are connected +with the deformity and inaptitude of matter. And the former indeed are +beautifully harmonized through the union inserted in them by their +harmonizing cause; but this is not the case with the latter, on account +of the multitude of causes which no longer insert in them a similar +union;<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> for their union is dissipated through the multitude which is +mingled in their composition: so that they are very properly allotted a +remitted<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> harmony.</p> + +<p>Hence, every thing which is bound is dissoluble. But one thing is +thus dissoluble and indissoluble, and another is dissoluble only, +just as the intelligible is alone indissoluble. Why, therefore, is +that which is primarily bound at one and the same time dissoluble and +indissoluble? Because it is <i>beautifully</i> harmonized, and is +<i>well</i> composed. For from being <i>well</i> composed it obtains +union; since <i>goodness</i> is unific. But from the intelligible it +obtains the <i>beautifully</i>; for from thence beauty is derived. And +from fabricating power it obtains <i>harmony</i>; for this is the cause +of the Muses, and is the source of harmonical arrangement to mundane +natures. Hence we again have the three causes, the final through the +<i>well</i>, the paradigmatic through the <i>beautifully</i>; and the +demiurgic through the <i>harmonized</i>.<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> But it is necessary that +a composition of this kind, harmonized by the one fabricating power, +filled with divine beauty, and obtaining a boniform union, should +be indissoluble; for the demiurgus says, that to dissolve it is the +province of an evil nature.</p> + +<p>Moreover, prior to this Plato had said, that the universe is +indissoluble except by him by whom it was bound. If, however, it is +entirely impossible for the universe to be dissolved by any other, +but the father alone is able to dissolve it, and it is impossible for +him to effect this, for it is the province of an evil nature,—it +is impossible for the universe to be dissolved. For either he must +dissolve it, or some other. But if some other, who is it that is +able to offer violence to the demiurgus?<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[118]</span> For it is impossible that +a dissolution of it should be effected, except by him that bound it. +But if he dissolves it, how being good, can he dissolve that which is +beautifully harmonized and well composed. For that which is subversive +of these, is productive of evil; just as that which is subversive +of evil is allotted a beneficent nature. Hence, there is an equal +necessity that the demiurgus should be depraved, if it be lawful so +to speak, or that this world should be dissolved, [viz. each of these +is equally impossible.] Such, therefore, is the necessity which Plato +assigns to the incorruptibility of the universe. Hence, that Plato +gives the indissoluble to the composition of the mundane Gods, he +clearly manifests when he orders them to bind mortal natures, not with +those indissoluble bonds with which they are connected. For if the +connective bonds of these Gods are indissoluble, they themselves must +be essentially indissoluble. Here, however, he says that they are not +in every respect indissoluble. It is evident, therefore, from both +these assertions, that they are indissoluble, and at the same time +dissoluble,<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> and that they are not in every respect indissoluble, +in consequence of their being appropriately bound. But if these things +are true, there is every necessity that the dissolution of them +should be very different from that which we call corruption. For that +which is dissoluble after such a manner as the corruptible, not being +indissoluble, is so far from being not in every respect indissoluble, +that it is in every respect dissoluble. Hence it is not proper to +say that the mundane Gods are of themselves corruptible, but remain +incorruptible through the will of the father; but we ought to say that +they are in their own nature<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> incorruptible.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[119]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER VIII.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place let us attend to the meaning of the following part +of the speech of the demiurgus to the mundane Gods, as beautifully +unfolded by Proclus: “Hence so far as you are generated, you are not +immortal, nor in every respect indissoluble, yet you shall never be +dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality of death; my will being +a much greater and more excellent bond than the vital connectives +with which you were bound at the commencement of your generation.” +Since all the mundane Gods to whom these words are addressed consist +of divine souls, and animals suspended from them, or in other words, +since they are participated souls, and since the demiurgus denominates +them indissoluble and at the same time dissoluble, in the way above +explained, he now wishes to collect in one point of view, and into one +truth, all that he had said separately about them. For at one and the +same time he takes away from them the immortal and the indissoluble, +and again confers these on them through a subversion of their +opposites. For media are allotted this nature, not receiving the nature +of the extremes, and appearing to comprehend the whole of both. Just +as if some one should call the soul impartible and at the same time +partible, as consisting of both, and neither impartible, nor partible, +as being different from the extremes. For see how a middle of this kind +may be surveyed in the mundane Gods.</p> + +<p>That is principally and primarily called immortal, which supplies +itself with immortality; since that also is primarily being which +is being from itself; intellect which is intellect from itself; and +one which is from itself one. For every where that which primarily +possesses any thing is such from itself; since if it were not so +from itself but from another, that other would be primarily, either +intellect, or life, or <i>the one</i>, or something else; and either +this would be primarily so, or if there is nothing primarily, the +ascent will be to infinity. Thus therefore, that is truly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[120]</span> immortal, +which is immortal from itself, and which imparts to itself immortality. +But that which is neither vital according to the whole of itself, +nor self-subsistent, nor possesses immortality from itself, is not +primarily immortal. Hence as that which is secondarily being is not +being, so that which is secondarily immortal is not immortal, yet it +is not mortal; for this is entirely a defection or departure from the +immortal, neither possessing a connascent life, nor infinite power. For +these three are in a successive order: That which possesses from itself +infinite life; that which receives infinite life from another; and that +which neither from itself nor another exhibits the infinity of life. +And the first indeed, is immortal; the second is not immortal; the +third is mortal; and the mean is adapted to the mundane Gods. For they +neither have the immortal from themselves, so far as they derive it +from that which is truly and primarily immortal, and so far as bodies +are suspended from them; nor have they a finite life; but they are +filled indeed from the eternal Gods, and produce mortal natures. For +the second fabrication is connected with the first, proceeds about it, +is governed by it, and refers to it the production of the mortal genera.</p> + +<p>Again, with respect to the indissoluble, that which is principally and +primarily so is simple and free from all composition. For where there +is no composition what representation can there be of dissolution? But +that is secondarily indissoluble, which is indissoluble with a bond; +which is at the same time dissoluble in consequence of proceeding +from divided causes. For it is not simply dissoluble, but dissoluble +by its cause. For that which is bound prior to all time, is alone +bound according to cause; but that which is alone causally bound, is +alone causally dissolved. And the third from that which is properly +indissoluble, is that which was indissoluble for a certain time; +because the first indeed, is properly indissoluble in conjunction +with simplicity; but the second is subordinately so, together with +composition: and the third, falling off from both, is in its own nature +dissoluble.</p> + +<p>Neither therefore, are the mundane Gods entirely indissoluble; for this +pertains to the most simple natures. Nor are they dissoluble according +to time; for the composition of them proceeds from the demiurgic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[121]</span> +union. As therefore in the cause union precedes things of a simple +nature, after the same manner here also, a bond precedes dissolution; +for it is more excellent, and the resemblance of a more divine power. +And this is seen in souls; for there were bonds and media in them, +as has been before observed in the generation of the soul. It is +also seen in bodies; for analogy is a bond. And likewise in animals; +for being bound with animated bonds they became animals. Hence, the +immortal and the indissoluble, do not entirely pertain to the mundane +Gods; yet at the same time they do pertain to them. And because they +are not in every respect present with them nor in such a manner as +in intelligibles, immortality must be taken from them. For in the +Banquet also, Plato does not think fit to call Love immortal, yet he +does not denominate it mortal; but asserts it to be something between +both these. For there is a great extent of the mortal and immortal, +and they are bound together by many media. It appears likewise, with +respect to the immortal, that one kind of it is common to all the +beings that differ from a mortal nature,<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> and which consists in not +being deprived of the life which it possesses. According to this sense +of the word, Plato says that the demiurgus is the cause of immortal +natures, but the junior Gods, of such as are mortal. But another kind +of the immortal is the peculiarity of intelligibles, being eternally +so. And another belongs to the mundane Gods, which is an immortality +perpetually rising into existence, and having its subsistence in always +becoming to be. Hence, it may be said that the immortal and mortal are +oppositely divided without a medium, if the common signification of +the immortal is assumed; and that they are not opposed to each other +without a medium, if that which is primarily immortal is considered; +and this is that which <i>is</i> always immortal. For the medium +between this and the mortal, is that which is always <i>becoming +to be</i> immortal. But that which is properly immortal possesses +the whole of its life in eternity. That however which has its life +evolved through the whole of time, and has not always one and the same +indivisible life, this possesses an immortality co-extended with the +flux of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[122]</span> generation, but is not immortal according to the stability of +being. And again, the medium between the immortality of the mundane +Gods and that of partial souls, is that which has a life always rising +into existence, and which ascends and descends in intellectual energy, +so as to be nearer to mortal natures, leaving indeed a more excellent +intellection, but transferring itself into one that is subordinate, +and again recurring to its pristine condition without oblivion. And +of these, the former indeed, is the peculiarity of the mundane Gods; +but the latter, of dæmons the attendants on these Gods. But if the +nature which remains is filled with oblivion in descending, becomes +most proximate to mortals, entirely destroys the true life which it +contains, and alone possesses the essential life,—such an immortality +as this belongs to partial souls. Hence, the demiurgus in his speech +calls the immortality in these homonymous to that of the immortals. +If however, there is any nature after these which casts aside its +essential life, this is alone<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> mortal. Hence, the primarily +immortal and the mortal are the extremes. But the immortality of the +mundane Gods, and that of partial souls, are the sub-extremes. And the +immortality which is truly the medium between these, is that of dæmons. +Hence too, dæmons are in reality entirely of a middle nature.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER IX.</h2> + + +<p>After this, the demiurgus sublimely addresses the mundane Gods in the +following words: “Learn now therefore what I say to you indicating +my desire.” The first address to the mundane Gods, says Proclus, was +deific of or deified the auditors; for it evinced all of them to be +Gods, and to be participated by the bodies in which they ride. For +these very<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[123]</span> bodies also are Gods, as being the statues [as it were] +of Gods; since Plato likewise calls the earth the first and most +ancient of the Gods within the heavens. But these deified bodies +are participants of the Gods truly so called, from which they are +suspended, and which are prior to generation. For these bodies have, +as we have observed, generation. But the second address to the mundane +Gods, inserted in them an eternal power, through the participation +of an indissoluble connexion. And the present words fill them with +divine, and demiurgic conceptions, proceeding supernally from +intelligible animal [the paradigm of the universe.] For the being +instructed in the fabrication of animals, so far as it is mathesis +or learning, is adapted to soul. But these words fill the multitude +of Gods with the demiurgic intelligence of all the forms that are +contained in intelligible animal. And through the word <i>now</i> +indeed, the <i>eternal</i> is after a manner indicated; through the +word <i>what</i> the united, and convolved; through <i>I say</i>, +that which proceeds into multitude, and is disseminated about +the many Gods; and through <i>indication</i> a plenitude derived +from intelligible and unapparent causes is signified. For we only +<i>indicate</i> in things unapparent to the multitude. But through all +the words together it is evident that the demiurgus establishes himself +analogous to intelligible intellect, and fills the mundane number +of Gods with intellectual conceptions. Farther still, these words +convert this multitude to the one demiurgic intelligence, and prior +to a providential attention to secondary natures, illuminate it with +unmingled purity, and stable intellection. For as the demiurgus makes +by energizing intellectually, and generates from inward, externally +proceeding energy, thus also he wishes the mundane Gods first to learn +and understand the will of their father, and thus afterwards to imitate +his power.</p> + +<p>In the next place, the demiurgus says, “Three genera of mortals yet +remain to be produced. Without the generation of these therefore, the +universe will be imperfect; for it will not contain every kind of +animal in its spacious extent. But it ought to contain them that it may +be sufficiently perfect. Yet if these are generated and participate of +life through me they will become equal to the Gods.” On these words +Proclus observes: The most total, first, and most divine of ideas, +not only give subsistence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[124]</span> to such mundane natures as are perpetual, +in an exempt manner, but likewise to all mortal natures, according to +one united cause. For the idea of winged natures which is there is the +paradigm of all winged animals whatever; the idea of the aquatic, of +all aquatic; and the idea of the pedestrial, of all pedestrial animals. +But the progressions of intelligibles into the intellectual orders, +become the sources of division to united ideas, produce into multitude +total causes, and unfold the definite principles of multiform natures. +For there is no longer in intelligibles one intellectual cause of all +aerial animals; since there is not a separate intellection of perpetual +animals of this kind; nor one intellectual cause of aquatic, nor in +a similar manner of terrestrial animals; but the power of difference +[in the intellectual order] minutely distributes the whole into parts, +and monads into numbers. Hence the causes of divine animals, according +to which the demiurgus gives subsistence to the orders of Gods and +dæmons that produce generation, exist in him separate from the causes +of mortal natures, according to which he calls on the junior Gods to +generate mortal animals. For the demiurgus precedes the generative +energy of these Gods, and makes by merely saying that a thing is to +be made. For the words of the father are demiurgic intellections, and +his intellections are creations; but a proximate making is adapted to +the multitude of Gods. And again you see how the order of effective +and generative causes is unfolded into light. For the choir of mundane +Gods produces indeed mortal animals, but in conjunction with motion and +mutation.<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> And the demiurgus also produces them but by speaking, +viz. by intellection. For he speaks indeed, intellectually perceiving, +and immoveably and intellectually. Animal itself also produces them; +for it contains the one cause of all winged, of all aquatic, and of all +terrestrial animals. But it produces them with silence, by its very +essence and intelligibly. For the demiurgic speech receives indeed the +paternal silence, but the intellectual production, the intelligible +cause, and the generation which subsists according to energizing, the +providence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[125]</span> according to existence. Motion also receives the demiurgic +words, but the orderly distribution which is mingled with a sensible +nature, receives the intellectual energy. For the fabrications which +exist at the extremity of things require a producing cause of this +kind. Every thing therefore which is mutable, which is changed in +quality, which is generated and corruptible, is generated from a cause, +immoveable indeed according to essence, but moved according to energy. +For the motion which is there separated from essence, here produces an +essence which is moved. Hence, because that which makes, makes both +according to essence and according to energy, both which are as it were +woven together, mutation of essence thence derives its progression. +Mortal natures therefore require moveable causes, and those that +are very mutable, many such causes. For it is impossible that they +should remain only begotten; since the mortal genera would not have an +existence.</p> + +<p>It is necessary however, that the mortal nature should exist, in the +first place, in order that every thing may have a subsistence which +is capable of being generated, viz. both perpetual beings, and those +which at a certain time cease to exist. For beyond these is that which +in no respect whatever is. In the next place this is necessary, in +order that divine natures and being may not be the last of things; +since that which is generative of any thing is more excellent and +more divine than the thing which it generates. And in the third place +it is necessary in order that the world may not be imperfect, not +comprehending every thing the causes of which are contained in animal +itself. For the ideas which are there, are the causes of every thing +whether divine or mortal. Hence Orpheus says that the vivific cause<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> +of partible natures, while she remained on high weaving the order of +celestials, was a nymph, as being undefiled, and in consequence of +this connected with Jupiter, and abiding in her appropriate manners; +but that proceeding from her proper habitation, she left her webs +unfinished, was ravished, having been ravished was married, and being +married generated, in order that she might animate things which have +an adventitious life. For the unfinished<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[126]</span> state of her webs indicates, +I think, that the universe is imperfect or unfinished as far as to +perpetual animals. Hence Plato says, that the one demiurgus calls on +the many demiurgi to weave together the mortal and immortal natures, +after a manner reminding us that the addition of the mortal genera +is the perfection of the textorial life of the universe, and also +exciting our recollection of the divine Orphic fable, and affording us +interpretative causes of the unfinished webs [of Proserpine].</p> + +<p>The divine number therefore, has its proper boundary and end, and is +perfect. But it is also necessary that the mortal nature should exist, +and have an appropriate limit; and this triply, aerially, aquatically +and terrestrially. For celestially, is impossible, because the summit, +and the first genus of every order is undefiled and perpetual, in +consequence of being assimilated to the cause which is prior to it. As +therefore, the first of intellectuals is intelligible, and the first +of angels is a God, thus also the first of sensibles is perpetual and +divine.</p> + +<p>When however the demiurgus says, “Yet if these are generated and +participate of life through me they will become equal to the Gods,” +he confirms what has been before asserted, that every thing which +is produced by an immoveable cause is unbegotten and immutable; but +that every thing which is produced indeed by an immoveable cause, yet +through the medium of a cause that is moved, is partly unbegotten, and +partly mutable. For from the immoveable cause indeed it receives unity, +but from the moveable cause multitude. And from the former it derives +being and form, but from the latter individuality, and a flowing +existence; through which the form or species is preserved, but the +individual is destroyed.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[127]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER X.</h2> + + +<p>After this, the demiurgus says, “That mortal natures therefore may +subsist, and that the universe may be truly all, convert yourselves +according to nature to the fabrication of animals, imitating the power +which I employed in your generation.” A twofold scope of fabrication, +says Proclus, is here delivered, one indeed providential, but the +other assimilative; the one being more proximate, but the other more +total. For to fabricate for the sake of giving subsistence to mortal +natures, indicates providence, and the perfection<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> of power. For +all super-plenitude of power is prolific of other things subordinate +to itself. But to fabricate for the sake of giving completion to the +universe, indicates an energy according to assimilative power, in order +that this universe may be rendered similar to all-perfect animal, +in consequence of being adorned with all the numbers of divine and +mortal animals. For if all things were immortal, the most divine<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> +of sensible natures would be unprolific. And if the universe was +not filled with all the forms of life, it would not be perfect, nor +sufficiently similar to all-perfect animal. That neither of these +defects therefore might happen, the first demiurgus excites the second +fabrication supernally from his own exalted place of survey. He also +pours on the mundane Gods vivific and demiurgic power, through which +they generate from themselves secondary essences, fill them with life, +and give them a specific distinction. For the peculiarity of vivific +deity is to vivify, but of demiurgic deity to be productive of form. +The expression therefore “<i>convert yourselves</i>” is of an exciting +nature, and is similar to the mandate of Jupiter to the Gods in Homer,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Haste, to the Greek and Trojan hosts descend.<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p>For as that calls them to the war of generation, so this in Plato +excites<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[128]</span> them to the fabrication of mortals, which they effect through +motion. And this indeed is accomplished by all the mundane Gods, but +especially by the governors of the world [or the planets], and in the +most eminent degree by the sovereign sun. For the demiurgus gave him +dominion over wholes, fabricated him as a guardian, and ordered him, as +Orpheus says,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>——O’er all to rule.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p>The words likewise, “according to nature,” bound their fabrication +according to measure and the good: and besides this, spread under +them all physical production as an instrument to their energies. This +therefore which is subservient to their will they move and govern. And +in the third place, these words define their subsistence as media; +for it pertains to the middle to fabricate the extremes according to +nature. For things which sometimes have an existence are suspended +from those that are perpetual according to time; and the latter are +suspended from eternal entities. And primary natures indeed are +generative of media; but these are productive of such beings as are +last in the series of things. The word “<i>yourselves</i>” also which +denotes manual operation, excites the divine lives themselves to +fabrication. Nor ought we to wonder whence demiurgic power is derived +to divine souls, this being the peculiarity of the superessential +Gods. For as Orpheus, placing an intellectual essence in Jupiter, +renders it demiurgic, thus also Plato producing words from the father, +evinces that the souls which rank as wholes are divine and demiurgic. +Nor must we doubt why of mundane natures<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> some are immortal, +but others mortal, since all of them are generated according to +intelligible causes; for some of them proceed from one, but others +from another proximate producing cause. And it is necessary to look +to these, and not to paradigms alone. Nor must we investigate ideas +of Socrates, Plato, or of any thing that ranks as a particular. For +the demiurgus divides mortal animals according to genera, and stops +at total intellections; and through these comprehends every thing of +a partial nature.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[129]</span> For as the demiurgus makes that which is material +immaterially, and that which is generated ingenerably, thus also he +produces mortal natures immortally.<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> For he makes these indeed, +but through the junior Gods; since prior to their making, he made by +intellection alone. Nor must we deny that mortal natures subsist also +divinely, and not mortally only. For the things which the demiurgus +now extends in his speech are hypostases or subsisting natures about +the junior or mundane Gods, which the heavens primarily receive; and +according to which the Gods fabricate the mortal genera. For the +monads of every mortal-formed life proceed into the heavens from the +intelligible forms. But from these monads which are divine, all the +multitude of material animals is generated. For if we adopt these +conceptions, we shall accord with Plato, and shall not wander from the +nature of things.</p> + +<p>Again, when the demiurgus says, “<i>Imitating the power which I +employed about your generation</i>,” we must understand by this that an +assimilation to the one exempt fabrication of things, and a conversion +to it, is the highest end of the second fabrication. For it is +necessary that self-motive should follow immoveable natures, and such +as are very mutable, such as are always moved, and that there should +be perpetually a series of secondary beings assimilated to those that +are prior to them. Since however there was a divine will and a divine +power in the demiurgus, he unfolds his will to the mundane Gods through +<i>learning</i>; and through this perfects their demiurgic will. But +he unfolds his power to them through this <i>imitation</i>, according +to which he orders them to imitate the power of the one demiurgus, +conformably to which they were generated by him. For by saying that +which he wills, he imparts to them will; and by saying that which he +is able to effect, he supplies them with power. And in the last place +he demonstrates them to be secondary fabricators imitators of their +father. Whether, therefore, there is a mundane power, or an efficacious +energy of dæmons, or a fortitude and supernatural strength of heroes, +to all this the demiurgus gives subsistence,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[130]</span> and imparts it to those +that give completion to the whole of the second fabrication. For the +first power is in him, and the monad of demiurgic powers. Since, +however, he is also intellect and father, all things will be in him, +viz. father, the power of the father, and the paternal intellect. +Hence Plato was not ignorant of this division; and on this account +the demiurgus as being father, calls power his power. This also he +manifests by adding, “<i>which I employed about your generation</i>.” +For the father is the cause of this in conjunction with power; +just as father here in conjunction with the female is the cause of +the propagation of the human species. [For power is of a feminine +characteristic.]</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XI.</h2> + + +<p>And thus much for the developement of such particulars in the speech of +the demiurgus as relate to the junior or mundane Gods. Others, however, +no less important respecting the fabrication of these Gods remain to +be collected from another part of the Timæus; and which accompanied +with the admirable elucidations of Proclus are as follow: After the +demiurgus had instructed souls in all that was necessary to their well +being, and had disseminated some of them into the earth, others into +the moon, and others into the remaining different instruments of time, +Plato adds: “But after this semination he delivered to the junior Gods +the province of fabricating mortal bodies, and generating whatever +else remained necessary to the human soul; and gave them dominion +over every thing consequent to their fabrications.” Who the junior +Gods are, says Proclus, must now be shown; for that the mundane Gods +are thus denominated is evident. But it seems they are thus called +by Plato, either from a comparison with the more ancient dignity of +the unapparent [i.e. the intellectual] fabrication, and with the +transcendency<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[131]</span> of the power in it, and the perfection of intellectual +vision. For that which is more intellectual is with the Gods more +ancient.</p> + +<p>“But Jove was born the first, and more he knows,” says Homer. Or they +are thus denominated, because they always make generation to be new; +and when it becomes old and imbecil through its subject nature, again +recall it to a subsistence according to nature by their motions, +sending into it effluxions of all-various productive principles +and powers, and thus render it perpetually new. Or, they are thus +called, because having intellectual essences suspended from them, +they eternally energize with the acme of intellectual vigor. For as +the poets say, Hebe pours out their wine, and they drink nectar, and +survey the whole sensible world. Employing, therefore, immutable and +undeviating intellections, they fill all things with their demiurgic +providence. Or they have this appellation, because Curetic deity is +present with them, [or deity belonging to the order of the Curetes,] +illuminating their intellectual conceptions with purity, their motion +with inflexibility, and supplying the whole of them with rigid power, +through which they govern all things without departing from the +characteristics of their nature. Or, which is the truest reason of all +the preceding, they are thus denominated, because the monad of them is +called the <i>recent</i> God. For theologists give this appellation to +Bacchus, who is the monad of all the second fabrication. For Jupiter +established him the king of all the mundane Gods, and distributed to +him the first honours. On this account also, theologists are accustomed +to call the sun <i>a recent God</i>, and Heraclitus says, that the +sun is <i>a diurnal youth</i>, as participating of Dionysiacal power. +Or, for a reason most appropriate to Platonic principles, they are +thus denominated, because bodies which have generation are suspended +from them; and the essence of these is not allotted a subsistence in +eternity, but in the whole of time. They are junior, therefore, not as +once beginning to exist, but as being always generated, and as we have +before observed, subsisting in becoming to be, or perpetually rising +into existence. For every thing which is generated has not the whole +of what it possesses present at once, nor a simultaneous infinity, +but an infinity which is perpetually supplying. Thus, therefore, they +are called junior,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[132]</span> as having a subsistence co-extended with time, +and always advancing into existence, and as possessing a renovated +immortality.</p> + +<p>Again, the delivery of the first fabrication is a communication and +generation of demiurgic powers, exempt from every thing which the +second fabrication produces proximately, a progression of production +from the unapparent into the apparent, and a division of uniform power +into the multiplied government of the world. But the formation of +bodies assimilates the junior Gods to the unapparent fabrication. For +that was the cause of bodies that rank as wholes, just as they are the +causes of partial bodies, at the same time exhibiting a diminution +of power. For of the body of which they are the makers and formers, +the demiurgus also is the cause; but they are the formers of partial +bodies, which are bodies endued with certain qualities. Hence body +indeed is simply unbegotten as from time, and incorruptible as was also +the opinion of Aristotle. “For,” says he, “there would be a vacuum if +body could be generated, external<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> to the body of the universe. +But this <i>particular</i> body is corruptible, as being of a partial +nature; for the <i>wholes</i> of the elements derived their subsistence +from <i>total</i> fabrication. The accession, however, of the human +soul which remained<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> to be generated, assimilates the mundane Gods +to the paternal power. For it is the province of a father to generate +life; since the first father, and every father is the cause of life; +the intelligible father, indeed, of intelligible, but the intellectual +of intellectual, and the supermundane of supermundane life. And +hence, the mundane Gods who generate corporeal life are fathers. The +fabrication, however, adapted to these Gods, produces the nature of +partial animals. For this partial animal which is suspended from the +immortal soul, consists of soul and body. But the <i>dominion</i> +which the demiurgus gave the junior Gods, excites their providential +inspection, their connective power, and their guardian comprehensions. +For without these, the bodies that are fashioned, and the mortal form +of life, would rapidly vanish into non-entity. Prior,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[133]</span> therefore, to +the generation of these, the demiurgus made their ruling Gods to be the +guardians and saviours of them. In the junior Gods, therefore, there +are demiurgic powers, according to which they invest generated natures +with forms; vivific powers, according to which they give subsistence +to a secondary life; and perfective powers, through which they give +completion to what is deficient in generation. There are also many +other powers in them besides these, which are inexplicable by our +conceptions.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XII.</h2> + + +<p>After this, Plato adds, “He likewise commanded them to govern as much +as possible in the best and most beautiful manner the mortal animal, +that it might not become the cause of evil to itself.” On these words +Proclus observes: Of all that the one demiurgus delivers to the +junior Gods, it must be admitted that there are three most beautiful +boundaries, the boniform will of him that delivers, the perfect power +of the recipients, and the symmetry of both these with each other. Of +the demiurgic production, however, of the junior Gods themselves, three +elements and these the greatest must be again surveyed, a reduction to +the good, a conversion to intelligible beauty, and a liberated power +sufficient to rule over all the subjects of its government. For as +Phanes,<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> himself the demiurgus of wholes, rendered the whole world +as much as possible the most beautiful and the best, thus also he was +willing that the second fabricators should govern the mortal animal +in a way the most beautiful and the best; pouring on them indeed from +intelligibles, beauty, but filling them with that boniform power and +will, which he himself possessing fabricated the whole world. For thus +generation also will participate of beauty and goodness, as far as it +is naturally adapted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[134]</span> to such participation, if the Gods by whom it is +connected and contained, adorn it, who are themselves transcendently +decorated with beauty and good.</p> + +<p>If, however, the second demiurgi have such a nature as this, nothing +evil or preternatural is generated from the celestial Gods; nor is +it proper to divide the Gods in the heavens after this manner, as +many do, viz. into the beneficent and malignant; for being Gods this +is impossible. But the mortal animal is the cause of evil to itself. +For neither disease, nor poverty,<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> nor any thing else of this kind +is evil; but the depravity of the soul, intemperance, timidity, and +every vice. Of these things, however, we are the causes to ourselves. +For though being impelled by others to these vices we are badly +affected, yet again it is through ourselves; since we have the power +of associating with the good, and separating ourselves from the bad. +According to Plato, therefore, we must not think that of the Gods some +are malignant and others beneficent, but we must admit that all of +them are the sources to mortals of all the good which they are able to +receive; and that things which are truly evils are not produced, but +are only signified by them, as we have before observed. For they extend +terrific appearances and signs to those who are able to see and read +the letters in the universe, which the framers of mortal natures during +their revolutions write by their configurations. And though some one +should derive a certain evil from the motions of the celestial Gods, +so as to become timid or intemperate, yet they operate in one way, and +their influences are participated by souls in another. For the efflux +of intellect, says Plotinus, becomes craft in him who receives the +efflux badly; the gift of an elegant life becomes intemperance through +a similar cause; and in short, while they produce beneficently, their +gifts are participated by terrestrial natures, after a contrary manner. +Hence the givers who bestow beneficently are not to be accused as the +authors of evil, but the recipients who pervert their gifts by their +own inaptitudes. Thus also Jupiter in Homer blames souls as in vain +accusing the Gods, while they themselves are the causes of evils. For +the Gods are the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[135]</span> sources of good, and the suppliers of intellect and +life, but are not the causes of any evil; since even a partial nature +is not the cause of evil to its offspring. What, therefore, ought we +to think concerning the Gods themselves? Is it not, that they are much +more the causes of good to their productions; since with them there +is power, with them there is a self-perfect nature, with them there +is universal goodness, to all which evil is contrary. For in its own +nature it is powerless, imperfect, and without measure.</p> + +<p>In the next place Plato says, “At the same time he who orderly disposed +all these particulars, remained in his own accustomed manner.” And +Proclus observes, that Plato every where after having employed many +words, summarily comprehends the multitude of them in the conclusion. +For he knew that in the Demiurgus, one intellectual perception +comprehends the multitude of intellectual conceptions; that one power +connects many powers; and that a uniform cause collects into one union +divided causes. Hence the words [prior to these], “Having, therefore, +instructed souls in all these particulars,” and the words before us, +“He who orderly disposed all these particulars,” lead the distinct +energy of the Demiurgus to an united cause. Farther still, the word +<i>all</i> manifests that which is consummated from all its appropriate +boundaries. But the words <i>orderly disposed</i>, indicate the order +pervading through all beings, which the Demiurgus introduced to the +mundane Gods, and to partial souls; demonstrating the former to be +demiurgi, but inscribing in the latter the laws of Fate. Moreover, +the word <i>remained</i>, does not manifest station, and inflexible +intellection, but an <i>establishment<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> in the one</i>. For according +to this, he is exempt from wholes, and is separated from the beings +that intellectually perceive him. But this establishment itself is +eternal, and always invariably permanent. These things, therefore, are +also indicated by the words <i>accustomed</i> and <i>manner</i>; the +one exhibiting sameness of permanency; but the other the peculiarity +of the demiurgic stability. For <i>manner</i> is indicative of +peculiarity; since connective is different from immutable, and both +these from demiurgic permanency.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[136]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIII.</h2> + + +<p>“But in consequence of his abiding, says Plato, as soon as his children +understood the order of their father, they became obedient to it.” +When the Demiurgus speaks, says Proclus, then the junior Gods have the +order of hearers. When he intellectually perceives, then they learn; +for learning is dianoetic. When he abides according to union itself, +then his children intellectually perceive. For they always receive from +him an inferior order. And as filled indeed from him, they preserve +the analogy of hearers with reference to him; but as evolving his one +power, they are analogous to learners. For he who learns evolves the +intellect of his preceptor. As being deified, however, by him, they +have the analogy of those that perceive intellectually. For intellect +becomes deific, by its contact<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> with <i>the one</i>. The father, +therefore, abiding, his children very properly intellectually perceive. +For they are intellects participated by divine souls, that ride in +the vehicles of undefiled bodies. But they intellectually perceive +the order of the father presubsisting in him prior to the arranged +effects, according to which order he became all things. Mortal natures, +therefore, were fashioned and animated by the demiurgic intellection +alone. But the junior Gods unfold his total production, through their +own manifest fabrication; being filled from the demiurgic monad.</p> + +<p>In the last place, Plato adds, “And receiving the immortal principle +of mortal animal, in imitation of their artificer, they borrowed from +the world the parts of fire and earth, water and air, as things which +they should restore back again; and conglutinated the received parts +together, but not with the same indissoluble bonds by which they were +connected.” On-these words Proclus admirably comments as follows: +Plato indicates to us, the separation of the second from the first +fabrication, through<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[137]</span> many words and steps.<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> For if the Demiurgus +orderly disposes, but the junior Gods are obedient to his mandates, +the former by merely commanding is the cause of generated natures, but +the latter being excited by the Demiurgus, receive from thence the +boundary of the whole of their fabrication. And if, indeed, he abides +in himself, but they are moved about him, it is evident that he is +eternally the cause of things which subsist in time, but that they +being filled from him energize according to the whole of time. And if +he perfectly establishes himself in his own accustomed manner, but +they proceeding from him, unfold into light this united and ineffable +disposition of himself, they derive from him secondary measures of +fabrication.</p> + +<p>Moreover, he is said to have a paternal dignity, but they are +denominated his children, as expressing his prolific power, and his +single goodness. And he indeed, is celebrated as delivering from his +exalted abode the principles of fabrication; but they are celebrated +as receiving the immortal principle contributing to the orderly +distribution of mortals. He is said to have the fountain of the +vivification of perpetual natures; but they are the causes of the +subsistence of mortal-formed animals. And he indeed extends himself as +a paradigm to the many Gods; but they are said to imitate the demiurgic +intellect. He is said to produce the whole world, and the plenitudes +of it; but they are said to borrow parts from the fabrications of +their father, in order to the completion of their proper works. And he +indeed employs all incorporeal powers; but they also employ such as +are corporeal. He gives subsistence to indissoluble bonds; but they +to such as are dissoluble. And he, indeed, is said to insert a union +more ancient than the natures which it unites; but they are said to +introduce an adventitious union, and which is of an origin posterior +to this, to the beings that consist of many contrary natures. And he +is said to produce all things impartibly; but they with division, +minutely distributing the subsistence of mortal natures into small and +invisible nails. From these things, therefore the separation of the two +fabrications may be assumed; but the union and contact of them may<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[138]</span> be +surveyed from the words before us. For here a contact is effected of +the second with the first fabrication; of apparent with unapparent, and +of divided with monadic production.</p> + +<p>Hence it is necessary that the lowest part of the first and unapparent +fabrication, should coalesce with the summit of the second. For thus +also the heavens are conjoined with generation [or the sublunary +region] the lowest of the celestial bodies exhibiting the principle +of mutation; but the summit of the essence of sublunary natures, +being moved in conjunction with the heavens. Hence too, here also the +rational soul is conjoined with the mortal form of life; viz. the +lowest and most partial of the productions of the father, with the +highest of the natures generated by the junior Gods. For they, indeed, +as being certain fathers produce lives; but as fabricators, bodies. And +they imitate indeed Vulcan by the fabrication of bodies; but Juno by +vivification. But through both these they imitate the whole Demiurgus. +For he is maker and father; but they fashion bodies by borrowing +parts from wholes. For every where parts derive their composition +from wholes. When, however, the wholes are incorporeal, they remain +undiminished by the subsistence of the parts; but when they are +corporeal, the parts that are generated from them diminish the wholes. +Hence an ablation always taking place, but the parts always remaining, +the wholes perish. And thus generation will no longer exist, and the +works of the first fabrication will all vanish through the second, +which it is not lawful to assert. That nothing of this kind, therefore, +may take place in the universe, the composite parts are again +dissolved, in order to fill up their wholes. And the generation of one +thing is the corruption of another; but the corruption of one thing +is the generation of another; in order that generation and corruption +may always remain. For if generation existed only once, it would at a +certain time stop, in consequence of consisting of finite things, and +these being consumed. But these perishing corruption also would stop, +all things being destroyed. Hence if it is necessary that one of these +should exist, the other also will exist. Every thing, therefore, which +is generated from the second fabrication is a composite and dissoluble, +and deriving its composition from time, will also in time be again +dissolved. The junior<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[139]</span> Gods, therefore, are very properly said to +borrow parts which are again to be restored to their wholes. But they +borrow them from the universe.<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> For that which they borrow is fire, +earth, water and air; and they again restore them to the universe.<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> +The father, therefore, wishes the wholes to remain which he generated +and arranged. And thus much concerning all the fabrication of the +junior Gods.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIV.</h2> + + +<p>Having, therefore, thus largely presented to the reader what pertains +to the mundane Gods in general, it is now requisite to descend to +particulars, and to discuss separately the peculiarities of the +celestial, and those of the sublunary Gods. The order of the celestial +Gods then consisting of the fixed stars and the planets, the sphere in +which the former are placed has the relation of a monad, as we have +before observed, to the starry deities which that sphere contains. +For the first of the four ideas in the paradigm of the universe being +an exempt monad, the multitude of the stars proceeding from it is +comprehended by a co-ordinate monad, which is the inerratic sphere. +This sphere is called by Plato in the Timæus a true world, because +it is more properly a world than the sublunary region, which always +requires a foreign arrangement, and is conversant with unceasing +mutation. It is also a world thus variegated with stars, as expressing +intellectual variety, and receiving from thence as it were in the whole +of itself the uniform flowers with which the intellectual world is +surrounded, and which imitate the beauty of the celestial paradigms. +But Plato very accurately says, that the Demiurgus gave this sphere a +circular <i>distribution</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[140]</span> about the whole of the heavens. For to +<i>distribute</i> and <i>to distribute in a circle</i>, is adapted to +this sphere; since the former signifies intellectual distribution, but +the latter demiurgic order. Hence theologists<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> establish Eunomia +in the inerratic sphere, who separates the multitude it contains, and +always preserves each of the stars in its proper order. Hence also +celebrating Vulcan as the maker of the heavens, they conjoin with him +Aglaia, as causing all heaven to be splendid through the variety of the +stars. And again, of the Seasons, they place Dice or Justice over the +planetary region, as bringing in a circular order the inequability of +the motions of the planets to an equability according to reason; but of +the Graces, Thalia, as causing their lives to be ever-flourishing. And +in the sublunary region, they establish Irene or peace, as conciliating +the war of the elements; but of the Graces Euphrosune, as conferring on +every thing a facility of natural energy.</p> + +<p>But the planets are called the Governors of the world, (κοσμοκρατορες) +and are allotted a total power. As the inerratic sphere too, has a +number of starry animals, so each of the planets is the leader of +a multitude of animals, or of certain other things of this kind. +Hence the doubt may be solved, why the one sphere of the fixed stars +comprehends a multitude of stars, but each of the planetary spheres +convolves only one star. For it must be said, that in the former case +the sphere indeed is a monad, comprehending in itself an appropriate +multitude, and is sufficient to the comprehension of a mundane +multitude which ranks as the first. But in the latter case, the +governing power is twofold, viz. the sphere, and each of the governors +of the world, who is a monad co-arranged with multitude. The sphere +itself, however, is a leader, a co-arranged monad and a wholeness; +(ολοτης) but each of the governors of the world is a leader and a +monad, but is not a wholeness. Indeed, subordinate natures require +a greater number of leaders, and a multitude in each of the spheres +unapparent on account of diminution. But in the sublunary region, the +orders which are the leaders of the genera in each of the elements are +still more numerous than those of the planets, as we learn from the +Grecian theogony.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[141]</span></p> + +<p>In each of the planetary spheres, therefore, there is a number of +satellites analogous to the choir of the fixed stars, subsisting +with proper circulations of their own. The revolution also of these +satellites is similar to that of the planets which they follow; and +this according to Plato is a spiral revolution. With respect, likewise, +to these satellites, the first in order about every planet are Gods; +after these dæmons revolve in lucid orbicular bodies; and these are +followed by partial souls such as ours. That in each of the planetary +spheres, however, there is a multitude co-ordinate to each may be +inferred from the extremes. For if the inerratic sphere has a multitude +co-ordinate to itself, and earth is with respect to terrestrial animals +what the inerratic sphere is to such as are celestial, it is necessary +that every <i>wholeness</i> should entirely possess certain partial +animals co-ordinate to itself, through which also the spheres derive +the appellation of <i>wholenesses</i>.<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> But the natures situated +in the middle are concealed from our sense, while in the mean time +those contained in the extremes are apparent,—-one kind through +their transcendently luminous essence, and the other through their +alliance to ourselves. If also partial souls are disseminated about +these spheres, some indeed about the sun, but others about the moon, +and others about each of the remaining spheres; and if prior to souls, +there are dæmons giving completion to the herds of which they are the +leaders; it is evident that it is beautifully said, that <i>each of +the spheres is a world</i>. And this is conformable to the doctrines +of theologists,<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> when they teach us that there are Gods in every +sphere prior to dæmons, the government of some receiving its perfection +under that of others. As for instance, with respect to our queen the +moon, that she contains the Goddess Hecate, and Diana; and with respect +to the sovereign sun, and the Gods which he contains, theologists +celebrate Bacchus as subsisting there.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[142]</span></p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>The sun’s assessor, who with watchful eye</div> + <div>Inspects the sacred pole.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p>They also celebrate Jupiter as seated there, Osiris, and a solar Pan, +as likewise other divinities, of which the books of theologists and +theurgists are full. From all which it is evident how true it is that +each of the planets is the prefect of many Gods, who give completion to +its proper circulation.<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XV.</h2> + + +<p>Owing to the loss of a seventh book On the Theology of Plato, written +by Proclus, copious information respecting the peculiarities of all +the celestial Gods is unfortunately not to be obtained. All that can +be procured, however, on this subject, and which I have diligently +collected from Platonic writings, I shall now present to the +philosophic reader, beginning in the first place with the moon. This +divinity then has the relation of nature and of a mother with respect +to generation, or the sublunary region. For all things are convolved +and co-increased by her when she increases; but are diminished when +she diminishes. This Goddess, too,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[143]</span> benevolently leads into light +the unapparent productive principles of nature. She likewise gives +perfection to souls through a life according to virtue; but imparts to +mortal animals a restitution to form.</p> + +<p>Next to the moon is Mercury, who is the cause of symmetry to +all mundane natures, having the relation of reason to things in +generation. For all symmetry proceeds according to one ratio, and +according to number of which this God is the giver. This deity, too, +is the inspective guardian of <i>gymnastic</i> exercises; and hence +<i>hermæ</i>, or carved statues of Mercury were placed in the Palæstræ; +of <i>music</i>, and hence he is honoured as the lyrist (λυραιος) among +the celestial constellations; and of <i>disciplines</i>, because the +invention of geometry, reasoning and discourse is referred to this God. +He presides, therefore, over every species of discipline, leading us to +an intelligible essence from this mortal abode, governing the different +herds of souls, and dispersing the sleep and oblivion with which they +are oppressed. He is likewise the supplier of recollection, the end of +which is a genuine intellectual apprehension of divine natures. Hence, +among the Athenians, certain images of these things were preserved; +grammar having a reference to dialectic discipline; playing on the harp +pertaining to music; and wrestling to gymnastic, in which those youths +that were well born were instructed.</p> + +<p>In the next place follows Venus, who is the cause of beauty to +generated natures, which is an imitation of intelligible beauty. This +goddess also is the source of the union of form with matter; connecting +and comprehending the powers of all the elements; and her principal +employment consists in beautifully illuminating the order, harmony, +and communion of all mundane concerns. She likewise governs all the +co-ordinations in the celestial world and the earth, binds them to each +other, and perfects their generative progressions through a kindred +conjunction. And she unites and leads into communion the Hermaic +production which has a remitted subsistence, and is in subjection to +the solar fabrication.</p> + +<p>The next celestial divinity in order after Venus is the sovereign Sun, +whose essence and dignity are so great, according to the theology of +Plato, as to possess a supermundane prerogative among mundane natures. +This Plato indicates in the Timæus, when speaking of the sun he says:<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[144]</span> +“In order that these circles might possess a certain manifest measure +of slowness and swiftness with reference to each other, and that the +motion of the eight circulations might be conspicuous, the divinity +enkindled a light which we now denominate the sun, in the second +revolution from the earth; that the heavens might become eminently +apparent to all things, and that such animals might participate of +number as are adapted to its participation, receiving numerical +information from the revolution of a nature similar and the same.” +On these words Proclus admirably comments as follows:<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> Plato +here delivers the one ruling cause of the generation of apparent +time. For as the Demiurgus gives subsistence to unapparent time, thus +also the sun to the time which is apparent, and which measures the +motion of bodies. For through light he leads into visibility every +temporal interval, gives bound to all periods, and exhibits measures +of restoration to a pristine state. Deservedly, therefore, is the sun +a manifest measure, as especially unfolding the progression<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> of +time according to number, into the universe. For it has a more accurate +period than that of the five planets, its motions being less anomalous +than theirs; and also than that of the moon, by always terminating at +the same point, its progressions to the north and the south. But if it +has a more accurate period, it is deservedly a measure of measures, and +from itself bounds<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a> the periodic measures of the other planets, +and the swiftness of their motions with reference to each other. It +also in a greater degree imitates the perpetual permanency of eternity, +by always revolving after the same manner. In this way, therefore, it +differs from the planets.</p> + +<p>After another manner, likewise, the sun is a more manifest measure +than the measure of the inerratic sphere. For though this sphere has +a certain appropriate measure, a proper interval, and one immutable +number of its peculiar motion, yet the solar light causes this measure +and all the evolution of apparent time to be manifest and known. Hence +Plato says, “In order that there might be a certain manifest measure.” +For though there is a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[145]</span> certain measure in the other planets, yet it +is not clear and manifest. But the sun unfolds into light both other +intelligibles and time. You must not however on this account say that +the solar light was generated for the sake of measurement. For how is +it possible that wholes should subsist for the sake of parts; governing +natures for the sake of the governed; and perpetual for the sake of +corruptible natures? But we should rather say that light possessing an +evolving power unfolds total time, and calls forth its supermundane +monad, and one measure into the measurement of the periods of bodies. +And this makes time to be, as it were, sensible. Hence, it is the +light of the sun which causes every thing that is moved to have a +clear and manifest measure. And this indeed is its whole good. After +wholes, however, it likewise benefits parts in a secondary degree. For +it imparts the generation of number, and measure to the natures which +are adapted to participate of these. For irrational beings indeed are +destitute of these; but the genera of dæmons who follow the periods +of the Gods, and men become partakers of them. The supply of good, +therefore, through the solar light, beginning supernally from wholes, +descends as far as to parts. And if beginning from visible natures, +you are willing to speak of such as are invisible, the light of the +sun gives splendor to the whole world, causes a corporeal-formed +nature to be divine, and wholly filled through the whole of itself +with life. But it leads souls through undefiled light, imparts to them +a pure and elevating power, and governs the world by its rays. And it +likewise fills souls with empyrean fruits. For the order of the sun is +supernally derived from supermundane natures. Hence Plato does not here +fabricate the solar light, but says that the Demiurgus enkindled it, as +giving subsistence from his own essence to this sphere, and emitting +from the solar fountain a life extended into interval and continually +renewed. <i>And this also is asserted by theologists concerning the +supermundane firmaments.</i></p> + +<p>On this account, it appears to me that Plato delivers a two-fold +generation of the sun; one indeed in conjunction with the seven +governors of the world, when he fashions the bodies of them, and +inserts them in their circulations; but the other according to the +enkindling of light, through which he imparts to the sun supermundane +power. For it is one thing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[146]</span> to generate the bulk of the sun itself +by itself, and another in conjunction with a ruling characteristic, +through which the sun is called the king of every visible nature, and +is established analogous to the one fountain of good. For as this +fountain being better than the intelligible essence, illuminates +both intellect and the intelligible, thus also the sun being better +than a visible nature, illuminates both that which is visible and +sight. But if the sun is beyond a visible essence, it will have a +supermundane nature. For the world is visible and tangible, and has a +body. Hence, we must survey the sun in a twofold respect; viz. as one +of the sever planets, and as the leader of wholes; and as mundane and +supermundane, according to the latter of which he splendidly emits a +divine light. For in the same manner as <i>the good</i> luminously +emits truth which deifies the intelligible and intellectual orders; +as Phanes in Orpheus sends forth intelligible light which fills with +intelligence all the intellectual Gods; and as Jupiter enkindles an +intellectual and demiurgic light in all the supermundane Gods; thus +also the sun illuminates every thing visible through this undefiled +light. The illuminating cause too is always in an order superior to the +illuminated natures. For neither is <i>the good</i> intelligible, nor +Phanes intellectual, nor Jupiter supermundane. In consequence of this +reasoning, therefore, the sun being supermundane emits the fountains of +light. And according to the most mystic doctrines, the wholeness of the +sun is in the supermundane orders; for in them there is a solar world, +and a total light, as the Chaldæan oracles<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> assert, and which I am +persuaded is true.</p> + +<p>That the stars, however, and the whole of the heavens receive their +light from the sun may easily be perceived. For that which is common +in many things derives its subsistence from one cause; and in one way +indeed from an exempt, but in another from a co-arranged cause. But +this cause is that which primarily participates of that form. The +primary<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[147]</span> participant, however, is that in which either primarily or +especially this form exists. If, therefore, light especially subsists +in the sun, this will be the first light; and from this that which is +in other things will be derived.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVI.</h2> + + +<p>Conformably, also, to this doctrine of Plato concerning the sun, the +emperor Julian sublimely theologizes about this divinity in his very +elegant oration to him, from which the following is an extract. The +apparent and splendid orbicular sun is the cause of well-being to +sensible natures. And whatever we have asserted as flowing from the +mighty intellectual sun among the intellectual Gods,<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> the same +perfections the apparent sun communicates to apparent forms; the +truth of which will be clearly evinced by contemplating invisible +natures from the objects of sensible inspection. And in the first +place, is not light the incorporeal and divine form of that which +is diaphanous in energy? But whatever that which is diaphanous may +be, which is subjected to all the elements, and is their proximate +form, it is certain that it is neither corporeal nor mixed, nor does +it display any of the peculiar qualities of body. Hence, you cannot +affirm that heat is one of its properties, nor its contrary cold; +you can neither ascribe to it hardness nor softness, nor any other +tangible difference; nor attribute taste or smell as peculiarities of +its essence. For a nature of this kind, which is called forth into +energy by the interposition of light, is alone subject to the power of +sight. But light is the form of a diaphanous essence which resembles +that common matter the subject of bodies, through which it is every +where diffused; and rays are the summit, and as it were flower of +light, which is an incorporeal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[148]</span> nature. According to the opinion of the +Phœnicians, however, who are skilled in divine science and wisdom, the +universally-diffused splendour of light is the unmingled energy of an +intellect perfectly pure. And this doctrine will be found agreeable to +reason, when we consider that since light is incorporeal, its fountain +cannot be body, but the pure energy of intellect, illuminating in its +proper habitation the middle region of the heavens: and from this +exalted situation scattering its light, it fills all the celestial orbs +with powerful vigour, and illuminates the universe with divine and +incorruptible light.</p> + +<p>Whatever, likewise, we first perceive by the sight, is nothing but +a mere name of honourable labour, unless it receives the ruling +assistance of light. For how can any thing be visible, unless, +like matter, it is moved to the artificer that it may receive the +supervening investments of form? Just as gold in a state of simple +fusion is indeed gold, but is not a statue or an image till the +artificer invests it with form. In a similar manner all naturally +visible objects cease to be apparent, unless light is present with +the perceiver. Hence, since it confers vision on the perceiver, and +visibility on the objects of perception, it perfects two natures in +energy, sight and that which is visible. Perfections, however, are form +and essence; though perhaps an assertion of this kind is more subtle +than is suited to our present purpose.</p> + +<p>Of this, however, all men are persuaded, both the scientific and the +illiterate, philosophers and the learned, that day and night are +fabricated by the power of this rising and setting divinity; and that +he manifestly changes and convolves the world. But to which of the +other stars does a province of this kind belong? Do we not, therefore, +derive conviction from hence, that the unapparent and divine race of +intellectual Gods,<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> above the heavens, are replenished from the sun +with boniform powers; to whose authority the whole choir of the stars +submits; and whose nod generation, which he governs by his providence, +attentively obeys? For the planets, indeed, dancing round him as their +king, harmoniously<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[149]</span> revolve in a circle, with definite intervals, about +his orb; producing certain stable energies, and advancing backwards and +forwards; terms by which the skilful in the spheric theory signify such +like phænomena of the stars. To which we may add, as manifest to every +one, that the light of the moon is augmented or diminished according to +her distance from the sun.</p> + +<p>Is it not then highly probable that the orderly disposition of +the intellectual Gods, which is more ancient than that of bodies, +is analogous to the mundane arrangement? Hence we infer his +<i>perfective</i> power from the whole phænomena, because he gives +vision to visive natures; for he perfects these by his light. But +we collect his <i>demiurgic</i> and <i>prolific</i> power from the +mutation of the universe; and his <i>capacity of collecting all things +into one</i>, from the properties of motion conspiring into union and +consent; and <i>middle position</i>, from his own central situation. +Lastly, we infer his <i>royal establishment among the intellectual +Gods</i>, from his middle order between the planets. For if we +perceived these, or as many other properties, belonging to any other of +the apparent Gods, we should not ascribe the principality among them to +the sun.</p> + +<p>Again, that we may consider this affair in a different mode, since +there is one demiurgus of the universe, but many demiurgic Gods, who +revolve round the heavens, it is proper to place in the midst of these +the mundane administration of the sun. Besides, the fertile power of +life is copious and redundant in intelligibles, and the world is full +of the same prolific life. Hence it is evident that the fertile life of +the sovereign sun is a medium between the two, as the mundane phænomena +perpetually evince. For with respect to forms, some he perfects, and +others he fabricates; some he adorns, and others he excites; nor is +any thing capable of advancing into light and generation without +the demiurgic power of the sun. Add too, that if we attend to the +unmingled, pure and immaterial essence of intelligibles, to which +nothing extrinsical flows, and nothing foreign adheres, but which is +full of its own appropriate simplicity, and afterwards consider the +defecated nature of that pure and divine body which is conversant +with mundane bodies revolving in an orb, and which is free from all +elementary mixture, we shall find that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[150]</span> the splendid and incorruptible +essence of the royal sun, is a medium between the immaterial purity of +intelligibles and that which in sensibles is unmingled and remote from +generation and corruption.</p> + +<p>The greatest argument, however, for the truth of this is derived from +hence, that the light which flows from the sun upon the earth will not +suffer itself to be mingled with any thing; nor is it polluted by any +sordid nature, or by any contagion; but it abides every where pure, +undefiled, and impassive. Again, if we consider not only immaterial and +intelligible forms, but such as are sensible, subsisting in matter, +the middle intellectual situation of forms about the mighty sun will +be no less certain and clear. For these afford continual assistance to +forms merged in matter: so that they could neither exist, nor preserve +themselves in existence, unless this beneficent deity co-operated with +their essence. In short, is he not the cause of the separation of forms +and the concretion of matter? From whom we not only possess the power +of understanding his nature, but from whom our eyes are endued with the +faculty of sight? For the distribution of rays throughout the world, +and union of light, exhibit the demiurgic separation of the artificer.</p> + +<p>Again, the solar orb is moved in the starless, which is far higher than +the inerratic sphere. Hence, he is not the middle of the planets, but +of the three worlds, according to the mystic hypotheses;<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> if it +be proper to call them hypotheses, and not rather dogmas; confining +the appellation of hypotheses to the doctrine of the sphere. For the +truth of the former is testified by men who audibly received this +information from Gods, or mighty dæmons; but the latter is founded +on the probability arising from the agreement of the phænomena. But +besides those which I have mentioned, there is an innumerable multitude +of celestial Gods, perceived by such as do not contemplate the heavens +indolently and after the manner of brutes. As the sun quadruply divides +these three worlds, on account of the communion of the zodiac with +each, so he again divides the zodiac into twelve powers of Gods, and +each of these into<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[151]</span> three others, so that thirty-six are produced in +the whole. Hence, as it appears to me, a triple benefit of the Graces +proceeds to us from the heavens, I mean from those circles which the +God quadruply dividing produces in consequence of this, a quadripartite +beauty and elegance of seasons and times. But the Graces also imitate +a circle in their resemblances on the earth. Add too, that Bacchus +is the source of joy, who is said to obtain a common kingdom with +the sun. But why should I here mention the epithet Horus, or other +names of the Gods, all of which correspond with the divinity of the +sun? Mankind, indeed, may conceive the excellence of the God from his +operations; since he perfects the heavens with intellectual goods, and +renders them partakers of intelligible beauty. For as he originates +from this beauty, he applies himself both wholly and by parts, to the +distribution of good.</p> + +<p>In the last place, as the sun is the source of our existence, so +likewise of the aliment by which that existence is supported. And, +indeed, he confers on us more divine advantages peculiar to souls; for +he loosens these from the bands of a corporeal nature, reduces them +to the kindred essence of divinity, and assigns them the subtile and +firm texture of divine splendor, as a vehicle in which they may safely +descend to the realms of generation. And these benefits of the God have +been celebrated by others according to their desert, and require the +assistance of faith more than the evidence of demonstration.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVII.</h2> + + +<p>From the MS. Scholia likewise of Proclus on the Cratylus of Plato, we +derive the following very important information concerning Apollo; in +which the principal powers of the God are unfolded by him with his +usual magnificence of diction, and divine fecundity of conception. +Socrates, therefore, in the Cratylus says, “that there is no other name +[than that of Apollo] which can more harmonize with the four powers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[152]</span> of +this God, because it touches upon them all, and evinces in a certain +respect his <i>harmonic</i>, <i>prophetic</i>, <i>medicinal</i>, and +<i>arrow-darting skill</i>.” And shortly after he adds, “that the name +is so composed that it touches upon all the powers of the God, viz. his +<i>simplicity</i>, <i>perpetual jaculation</i>, <i>purifying</i>, and +<i>joint-revolving nature</i>.” On these words Proclus observes, that +very rationally after Proserpine, Plato analyzes Apollo. For there is +a great communion between the Coric and the Apolloniacal series; since +the former is the unity of the middle triad of the supermundane Gods, +and emits from herself vivific powers; but the latter converts the +solar principles to one union; and the solar principles are allotted +a subsistence immediately after the vivific. Hence, according to +Orpheus, when Ceres delivered up the government to Proserpine, she thus +admonished her:</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Αυταρ Απολλωνος θαλερον λεχος εισαναβασα,</div> + <div>Τεξεται αγλαα τεκνα πυριφλεγεθοντα προσωποις.<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">That is,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>But next Apollo’s florid bed ascend;</div> + <div>For thus the God fam’d offspring shall beget,</div> + <div>Refulgent with the beams of glowing fire.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">But how could this be the case, unless there was a considerable degree +of communion between these divinities?</p> + +<p>It is necessary however, to know thus much concerning Apollo, that +according to the first and most natural conception, his name signifies +the cause of union, and that power which collects multitude into one; +and this mode of speculation concerning his name harmonizes with all +the orders of the God. But Socrates alone considers his more partial +powers: for the multitude of the powers of Apollo are not to be +comprehended, nor described by us. For when will man who is merely +rational, be able to comprehend not only all the peculiarities of +Apollo, but all those of any other God? Theologists indeed deliver +to us a great multitude of Apolloniacal peculiarities; but Socrates +now only mentions four of them. For the world is as it were a decad, +being filled from all productive principles, receiving all things in +itself, and being converted to the proper<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[153]</span> principle of the decad, +of which the tetrad proximately contains the cause, but in an exempt +manner the monad. And the former without separation and occultly, but +the latter with separation; just as Apollo proximately unites the +multitude of mundane natures, but the demiurgic intellect exemptly. +Why then does Socrates use an order of this kind? For beginning from +the <i>medicinal</i> power of the god, and proceeding through his +<i>prophetic</i> and <i>arrow-darting</i> powers, he ends in his +<i>harmonic</i> power. We reply, that all the energies of this god, +are in all the orders of beings, beginning from on high and proceeding +as far as to the last of things; but different energies appear to +have more or less dominion in different orders. Thus for instance the +<i>medicinal</i> power of Apollo is most apparent in the sublunary +region, for</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>There slaughter, rage, and countless ills beside,</div> + <div>Disease, decay, and rottenness reside.<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">And as these are moved in an inordinate manner, they require to be +restored from a condition contrary, into one agreeable to nature, and +from incommensuration and manifold division, into symmetry and union.</p> + +<p>But the <i>prophetic</i> energy of the god is most apparent in the +heavens; for there his enunciative power shines forth, unfolding +intelligible good to celestial natures, and on this account he revolves +together with the sun, with whom he participates the same intellect +in common; since the sun also illuminates whatever the heavens +contain, and extends a unifying power to all their parts. But his +<i>arrow-darting</i> energy mostly prevails among the <i>liberated</i> +gods; for there ruling over the wholes which the universe contains, +he excites their motions by his rays, which are always assimilated to +arrows, extirpates every thing inordinate, and fills all things with +demiurgic gifts. And though he has a separate and exempt subsistence, +he reaches all things by his energies.</p> + +<p>Again, his <i>harmonic</i> power is more predominant in the <i>ruling +supermundane</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[154]</span> order; for it is this divinity who harmonizing the +universe, establishes about himself according to one union the choir +of the Muses, and produces by this mean as a certain Theurgist says +“<i>the harmony of exulting light</i>.” Apollo therefore as we have +shown is <i>harmonic</i>, and this is likewise the case with the other +Apollos which are contained in the earth and the other spheres; but +this power appears in some places more, and in others less. These +powers too subsist in the god himself in an united manner, and exempt +from other natures, but in those attendants of the Gods who are +superior to us, divisibly, and according to participation; for there is +a great multitude of medicinal, prophetic, harmonic, and arrow-darting +angels, dæmons, and heroes, suspended from Apollo, who distribute in a +partial manner the uniform powers of the god.</p> + +<p>But it is necessary to consider each of these powers according to +one definite characteristic; as for instance, his <i>harmonic</i> +power, according to its binding together separated multitude; +his <i>prophetic</i> power according to the enunciative; his +<i>arrow-darting</i> power, according to its being subvertive of an +inordinate nature; and his <i>medicinal</i> power, according to its +perfective energy. We should likewise speculate these characteristics +differently in Gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, men, animals, and plants; +for the powers of the Gods extend from on high to the last of things, +and at the same time appear in an accommodated manner in each; and +the telestic (i.e. mystic) art endeavours through sympathy to conjoin +these ultimate participants with the Gods. But in all these orders +we must carefully observe, that this God is the cause of union to +multiplied natures: for his <i>medicinal</i> power, which takes away +the <i>multiform</i> nature of disease, imparts <i>uniform</i> health; +since health is symmetry and a subsistence according to nature, but +that which is contrary to nature is multifarious. Thus too, his +<i>prophetic</i> power, which unfolds the simplicity of truth, takes +away the variety of that which is false; but his <i>arrow-darting</i> +power, which exterminates every thing furious and wild, but prepares +that which is orderly and gentle to exercise dominion, vindicates +to itself unity, and exterminates a disordered nature tending to +multitude; and his <i>musical</i> power, through rhythm and harmony, +places a bond, friendship and union in <i>wholes</i>, and subdues the +contraries to these.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[155]</span></p> + +<p>And all these powers indeed, subsist primarily, in an exempt manner, +and uniformly in Jupiter the demiurgus of wholes, but secondarily +and separately in Apollo. Hence Apollo is not the same with the +demiurgic intellect; for this comprehends these powers totally and +paternally, but Apollo with subjection, imitating his father; since +all the energies and powers of secondary Gods, are comprehended in the +demiurgus according to cause. And the demiurgus fabricates and adorns +the universe according to all these powers, and in a collected manner; +but the other deities which proceed from him, co-operate with their +father according to different powers.</p> + +<p>Purification however being seen not only in the medicinal, but also +in the prophetic art evinces, that the cathartic power of Apollo +comprehends the two powers: for it illustrates the world with the +glittering splendors of light, and purifies all material immoderation +by Pæonian energies; which physicians and prophets among us imitating, +the former purify bodies, and the latter through sulphureous +preparations render themselves and their associates pure. For, as +Timæus says, the Gods purify the universe, either by fire or water; +and prophets also in this respect imitate the Gods. In the most sacred +of the mysteries too, purifications are employed prior to initiation +into them, in order to take away every thing foreign from the proposed +sacred mystery. We may likewise add, that the referring multiform +purifications to the one cathartic power of the Gods, is adapted to +him. For Apollo every where unites and elevates multitude to <i>the +one</i>, and uniformly comprehends all the modes of purification; +purifying all heaven, generation, and all mundane lives, and separating +partial souls from the grossness of matter. Hence the theurgist who is +the leader of the mysteries of this God begins from purifications and +sprinklings:</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Αυτος δ’ εν πρωτοις ιερευς πυρος εργα κυβερνων,</div> + <div>Κυματι ραινεσθω παγερῳ βαρυηχετος αλμης.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “The priest in the first place governing the works of fire, must +sprinkle with the cold water of the loud-sounding sea,” as the Oracle +says concerning him. But the assertion that the God presides over +simplicity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[156]</span> according to knowledge, and unfolds truth into light, +presents him to our view as analogous to <i>the good</i>, which +Socrates celebrates in the Republic; in which place he calls the sun +the progeny of <i>the good</i>, and says that the former is analogous +to the latter. Apollo therefore being the source of union, and this to +the mundane Gods, is arranged analogous to <i>the good</i>; and through +<i>truth</i>, he unfolds to us his similitude to it, if it be lawful so +to speak. For <i>the simple</i> is a manifestation of <i>the one</i>, +and the truth which subsists according to knowledge is a luminous +representation of superessential truth, which first proceeds from +<i>the good</i>. But <i>the perpetually prevailing might of the God in +the jaculation of arrows</i>, evinces his dominion which vanquishes +every thing in the world. For on high from the supercelestial order, he +scatters the rivers of Jupiter, and pours his rays on the whole world: +for his arrows obscurely signify his rays. Again, the assertion that he +presides over music, represents to us that this God is the cause of all +harmony, both unapparent and apparent, through his ruling supermundane +powers, according to which he generates together with Mnemosyne and +Jupiter, the Muses. But he orderly disposes every thing sensible by his +<i>demiurgic powers</i>, which the sons of <i>theurgists</i> denominate +<i>hands</i>; since the energy of the harmony of sounds is suspended +from the motion of the hands. He likewise orderly disposes souls and +bodies through harmonic reasons, using their different powers as if +they were sounds; and he moves all things harmoniously and rythmically +by his demiurgic motions. The whole of the celestial order too, and +motion, exhibit the harmonious work of the God; on which account also, +partial souls are no otherwise perfected than through an harmonic +similitude to the universe, and abandoning the dissonance arising from +generation; for then they obtain the most excellent life, which is +proposed to them by the God.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[157]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVIII.</h2> + + +<p>As the Muses derive their subsistence from Apollo, and are perpetually +united to him, it is necessary to consider the nature of these +divinities in the next place, and the good which they confer on the +universe in conjunction with their leader Apollo. Plato therefore in +the Cratylus says “That the name of the Muses, and universally that of +music, was derived, as it seems, from μωσθαι, <i>to inquire</i>, and +from investigation and philosophy.” On which Proclus in his MS. Scholia +on that dialogue observes as follows:</p> + +<p>“From discoursing about king Apollo, Plato proceeds to the Muses, and +the name of music; for Apollo is celebrated as Musagetes, or the leader +of the Muses. And he indeed is a monad with respect to the harmony +in the world; but the choir of the Muses is the monad of all the +number of the ennead (i.e. nine): From both likewise the whole world +is bound in indissoluble bonds, and is one and all-perfect, through +the communications of these divinities; possessing the former through +the Apolloniacal monad, but its all-perfect subsistence through the +number of the Muses. For the number nine which is generated from the +first perfect number (that is 3) is, through similitude and sameness, +accommodated to the multiform causes of the mundane order and harmony; +all these causes at the same time being collected into one summit for +the purpose of producing one consummate perfection. For the Muses +generate the variety of reasons with which the world is replete; but +Apollo comprehends in union all the multitude of these. And the Muses +give subsistence to the harmony of soul; but Apollo is the leader of +intellectual and impartible harmony. The Muses distribute the phænomena +according to harmonical reasons; but Apollo comprehends unapparent and +separate harmony. And though both give subsistence to the same things, +yet the Muses effect this according to number, but Apollo according +to union. And the Muses indeed distribute the unity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[158]</span> of Apollo; +but Apollo unites harmonic multitude, which he also converts and +comprehends. For the multitude of the Muses proceeds from the essence +of <i>Musagetes</i>, which is both separate, and subsists according +to the nature of <i>the one</i>; and their number evolves the one and +primary cause of the harmony of the universe.</p> + +<p>That such being the etymology of the name of the Muses, since Plato +calls philosophy the greatest music, as causing our psychical powers +to be moved harmoniously, in symphony with real beings, and in +conformity to the orderly motions of the celestial orbs; and since the +investigation of our own essence and that of the universe leads us to +this harmony, through a conversion to ourselves and more excellent +natures,—hence also we denominate the Muses from investigation. For +Musagetes himself unfolds truth to souls, according to one intellectual +simplicity; but the Muses perfect our various energies elevating them +to an intellectual unity. For investigations have the relation of +matter, with reference to the end from invention; just as multitude +with respect to <i>the one</i>, and variety with respect to simplicity. +We know therefore, that the Muses impart to souls the investigation of +truth, to bodies the multitude of powers, and that they are every where +the sources of the variety of harmonies.</p> + +<p>In the fable likewise in the Phædrus about the grasshoppers Plato +speaks of the four Muses, Terpsichore, Erato, Calliope, and Urania, +as follows: “It is said the race of the grasshoppers received this +gift from the Muses, that they should never want nutriment, but should +continue singing without meat or drink till they died; and that after +death they should depart to the Muses, and inform them what Muse was +honoured by some particular person among us. Hence that by acquainting +Terpsichore with those who reverence her in the dance, they render her +propitious to such. By informing Erato of her votaries, they render +her favourable in amatory concerns; and the rest in a similar manner, +according to the species of veneration belonging to each. But that +they announce to the most ancient Calliope, and after her to Urania, +those who have lived in the exercise of philosophy, and have cultivated +the music over which they preside; these Muses more than all the rest +being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[159]</span> conversant with the heavens, and with both divine and human +discourse; and sending forth the most beautiful voice.”</p> + +<p>On what Plato here says of these Muses, Hermeas in his MS. Commentary +On the Phædrus, makes the following beautiful remarks: “Dancing here +must not be understood literally, as if Terpsichore was propitious +to those who engage in that kind of dancing which is the object of +sense; for this would be ridiculous. We must say therefore, that there +are divine dances; in the first place, the dance of the Gods; and +in the second place, that of divine souls. In the third place, the +revolution of the celestial divinities, viz. of the seven planets, and +the inerratic sphere, is called a dance. In the fourth place, those +who are initiated in the mysteries perform a certain dance. And in the +last place, the whole life of a philosopher is a dance. Who then are +those that honour the Goddess in the dance? Not those who dance well, +but those who live well through the whole of the present existence, +elegantly arranging their life, and dancing in symphony with the +universe. Again, Erato is denominated from Love, and from making the +works of Love, lovely; for she co-operates with Love. But Calliope +is denominated from the eye; and Urania presides over astronomy. +Through these two Goddesses we preserve our rational part from being +in subjection to the irrational nature. For through sight surveying +the order of the celestial Gods, we properly arrange our irrational +part. And farther still, through rythms, philosophy, and hearing, we +elegantly dispose that which we contain of the disorderly and void of +rythm.”</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIX.</h2> + + +<p>The triad of celestial Gods immediately above the sun consists of +Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, of which the first who is the source of +division and motion, perpetually separates, nourishes and excites the +contrarieties<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[160]</span> of the universe, that the world may exist perfect and +entire from all its parts. He requires, however, the assistance of +Venus, that he may insert order and harmony into things contrary and +discordant. But Jupiter is the cause of a royal and political life, +and is the supplier of a ruling prudence and a practical and adorning +intellect. And Saturn is the source of intellect, in consequence of +being an intellectual deity, and ascending as far as to the first +cause. Hence, as there is nothing disordered and novel in intellect, +Saturn is represented as an old man, and as slow in his motion: and on +this account, astrologers say, that such as have Saturn well situated +in their nativity are endued with intellect.</p> + +<p>Plato in the Timæus delivers to us the manner in which each of these +seven divinities becomes an animal, and is suspended from a more +divine soul, and what kind of perfection it affords to the universe. +For he says, “When therefore, each of the natures necessary to a +joint fabrication of time had arrived at a local motion adapted to +its condition, and their bodies became animals through the connecting +power of vital bonds, they then learned their prescribed order.” For +each of them, says Proclus, is allotted an appropriate life and motion. +For since the demiurgic sacred law distributes to every mortal nature +that which is adapted to it, and co-arranges every thing with a view +to the blessedness of the universe, what ought we to say concerning +the governors of the world? Ought we not to assert that they have +received from their father, every thing appropriate and every good; +and that shining with the splendors of beauty, they not only fabricate +the generation of time in conjunction with the father, but also lead +and govern the whole world? For by thus speaking of them we shall +speak rightly. In addition to these things likewise, we ought to +assert, that they not only receive the beautiful and the good from the +demiurgic monad, but also that being self-motive, they impart these to +themselves; and that from themselves the giving of good originates. +Plato indeed, indicating this says, “that each of them <i>arrives</i> +(αφικεσθαι) at a local motion, adapted to its condition,” as defining +from itself the measure of the life, the order, and the motion which it +is allotted in the universe.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[161]</span></p> + +<p>Since, however, each of the seven bodies has a twofold life, the one +inseparable, but the other separable; and the one indeed intellectual, +and in a ruling manner established in itself, but the other divided +about body, which it connects and moves; according to the latter +indeed, it is an animal, but according to the former a God. Plato, +therefore, distinguishing both these, and rightly conceiving that +a divine and intellectual soul, and which does not depart from +intelligibles, is one thing, but another, the animal which is suspended +from it, possesses life from, and is the image of it says, “that their +bodies became animals through the connecting power of vital bonds, +and that they then learned their prescribed order.” For a divine +soul learns indeed the demiurgic will, understands the works of the +father, and fabricates in conjunction with him mundane natures; and +this, through intellectually perceiving him, and being filled from +him with divine powers. For it is not possible for either intellect +or soul to provide for wholes in an exempt manner, in any other way +than by the participation of deity, and through a deific life. The +words, therefore, “a joint fabrication of time,” manifest that they +are allotted a secondary power in the generation of it; in consequence +of their father possessing a primary power. For he, indeed, generated +the wholeness of time; but these divinities co-operate with him in +the production of the parts of which time consists. For the periods +of these are the parts of the whole of time; just as they also were +generated parts of the world.</p> + +<p>But the animated body is an animal bound with vital bonds, possessing +life from the soul which it receives according to the demiurgic +allotments. For if with us also, the animal is different from the man, +and the visible Socrates is one thing, but the true another, much more +are the true sun and the true Jupiter different from the visible orbs +of these divinities, and not composites of body and soul. Conformably +to this Socrates in the Phædrus says, “that we do not sufficiently +understand that a God is an immortal animal, possessing indeed a +soul and a body, connascent through the whole of time.” Indeed the +unity in each of these divinities, and the ineffable participation +of the fountain of all the numbers characterized by unity, form that +which is primarily a God. But the intellect<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[162]</span> which connects each of +these deities stably, uniformly, and invariably, is secondarily a +God. And the soul which is filled from intellect, and evolves the +one comprehension of it, is a God in the third place. And the first +indeed of these is truly a God; the second is most divine; and the +third is itself also divine, but illuminates the animal with which it +is connected with the peculiarity of deity; according to which this +likewise is divine, being bound with animated bonds, which may be said +to be vivific, demiurgic and indissoluble bonds, as Plato himself +afterwards asserts. For the whole of the divine bodies, are bound +in souls, are comprehended by and established in them; the <i>being +bound</i> indeed indicating the stable and immutable comprehension +of bodies in souls, and their undisjoined communion with them. Such +therefore being the nature of divine bodies, they fabricate time in +conjunction with the demiurgus, call forth its one and unapparent +power, and impart a progression to it into the world, which unfolds +many temporal measures.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XX.</h2> + + +<p>The celestial Gods therefore, according to Plato subsisting after this +manner, and the unity in each of them ineffably proceeding from the +fountain of good, it is evident that they are all of them beneficent, +and after a similar manner the causes of good. The bodies also which +are suspended from their divine souls possess indescribable powers, +some indeed being firmly established in the divine bodies themselves, +but others proceeding from them into the nature of the world and into +the world itself, descending in an orderly manner through the whole of +generation, and without impediment extending as far as to particulars. +With respect to the powers therefore, which remain in the divine +celestial bodies themselves, there can be no doubt but that they are +all similar;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[163]</span> hence those powers remain to be considered which are sent +to this terrestrial region, and are mingled with generation.</p> + +<p>These then descend after the same manner for the safety of the +universe, and connect with invariable sameness the whole of generation. +They are likewise impassive and immutable, though they arrive at that +which is mutable and passive. Generation indeed, being multiform, and +consisting of things of a different nature, it receives the unity +and simplicity of these Gods through its appropriate contrariety and +division, in a hostile and partible manner. It likewise receives that +which is impassive passively: and in short it participates of these +Gods according to its own nature, and not according to their power. +Hence, as that which is generated participates of being according to +a flux of existence; and body participates of an incorporeal nature +corporeally; thus also the natural and material substances which are +in generation, participate of the immaterial and etherial bodies which +are above nature and generation, in a confused and disorderly manner. +Those therefore are absurd who attribute colour, figure and contact +to intelligible forms, because the participants of them are coloured, +figured and tangible; and they are no less absurd who ascribe evil to +the celestial bodies, because the participants of them are sometimes +evil. For there could be no participation, if the participant was +not different from that which it participates. But if that which is +participated is received in something different from itself, this +something different, is in terrestrial places that which is evil and +disorderly.</p> + +<p>This participation therefore, becomes the cause of the abundant +difference in secondary natures, and also the mixture of material with +immaterial influences. To which may be added likewise, as another +cause, that what is imparted in one way, is received after another in +these inferior realms. Thus for instance, the influence of Saturn is +connective, but that of Mars motive. In these material realms however, +the passive receptacle of generation, receives the former according to +congelation and frigidity; but the latter according to immoderate heat. +Hence, corruption and the privation of symmetry are to be ascribed to +the alterant, material and passive nature of the recipients.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[164]</span></p> + +<p>Farther still, the imbecility of material and terrestrial places, not +being able to receive the genuine power and most pure life of the +etherial natures, ascribes its own defects to first causes. Just as if +some one being weak in his body, and not able to bear the vivifying +heat of the sun, should falsely dare to say, influenced by his own +infirmities, that the sun is not advantageous to health and life. +A thing of this kind likewise, may take place in the harmony and +temperament of the universe, I mean, that the same things which are +salutary to the whole, through the perfection of the recipients and +things received, may be noxious to the parts though their partible +privation of symmetry. In the motion of the universe therefore, all the +circulations preserve the whole world after a similar manner, though +frequently one certain part is injured by another; just as in a dance, +where the order of the whole choir is still preserved, though a foot +or a finger may happen to be hurt. Again, to be corrupted, and to be +changed, are affections connascent with particulars. But it is not +proper to accuse on this account wholes and first causes, either as +containing these in themselves, or as if these proceeded from them into +these inferior realms. And thus it appears, that neither the celestial +Gods themselves, nor their gifts are productive of evil.<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a></p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXI.</h2> + + +<p>And thus much concerning the planetary deities, who were called by the +ancients, the governors of the world. In the next place therefore, +let us direct our attention to what Plato and his best interpreter +Proclus have transmitted to us concerning Minerva, who as a mundane +divinity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[165]</span> is connected with ether, and has also an allotment in the +celestial regions. Plato then in the Timæus describes this Goddess as +both a lover of war, and a lover of wisdom; for he says that she is +philopolemic and philosophic. As she every where however exerts this +twofold power, according to her intellectual, supermundane, and mundane +subsistence, I shall present the reader with the whole of what Proclus +says<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> respecting these two powers of the goddess, in his commentary +on that part of the Timæus where she is celebrated by Plato.</p> + +<p>In the demiurgus and father, says he, of the whole world, many orders +of Gods that have the form of <i>the one</i> present themselves to +the view. And these are of a guardian, or demiurgic, or elevating, +or connective, or perfective characteristic. But the undefiled and +untamed deity Minerva, is one of the first intellectual unities +subsisting in the demiurgus, according to which he himself remains +firm and immutable, and all things proceeding from him participate +of inflexible power; and through which he intellectually perceives +every thing, and is separate in an exempt manner from all beings. +All theologists therefore, call this divinity Minerva, as being +brought forth indeed from the summit of her father, and abiding in +him, being a demiurgic, separate, and immaterial intelligence. Hence +Socrates in the Cratylus, celebrates her as <i>theonoe</i> (θεονοη) +or <i>deific intellection</i>. But as, in conjunction with other +divinities sustaining all things in the one demiurgus, and arranging +wholes, together with her father;—through the first of these, they +denominate her philosophic, but through the second philopolemic. For +she who according to the form of one connectedly contains all the +paternal wisdom is a philosopher. And she who invariably rules over +all contrariety, may be properly called a lover of war. Hence Orpheus +speaking of her birth says, that Jupiter generated her from his head,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>With armour shining like a brazen flower.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p>Since however, it was necessary that she should proceed into second and +third orders, she appears in the order to which Proserpine belongs,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[166]</span> +according to the undefiled heptad; but she generates every virtue +from herself, and elevating powers, and illuminates secondary natures +with intellect, and an undefiled life. Hence she is called <i>Core +Tritogenes</i>. She likewise appears among the liberated Gods, uniting +the lunar order with intellectual and demiurgic light, causing the +productions of those divinities to be undefiled, and demonstrating the +one unity of them to be unmingled with their depending powers. She also +appears in the heavens and the sublunary region; and according to the +united gift of herself, imparts the cause both of the philosophic and +the philopolemic power. For her inflexibility is intellectual, and her +separate wisdom is pure and unmingled with secondary natures; and the +one characteristic peculiarity of Minerval providence, extends as far +as to the last orders. For since wherever there are partial souls that +resemble her divinity, they exert an admirable prudence, and exhibit +an unconquerable strength, what ought we to say of her attendant +choirs<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> of dæmons or divine, mundane, liberated, and ruling orders? +For all these receive as from a fountain the twofold peculiarity of +this Goddess. Hence also the divine poet [Homer] indicating both these +powers of Minerva, in conjunction with fabulous devices says,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>The radiant veil her sacred fingers wove,</div> + <div>Floats in rich waves, and spreads the court of Jove.</div> + <div>Her father’s warlike robe her limbs invest.<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">In which verses by the veil which she wove, and to which she gave +subsistence by her intellections, her intellectual wisdom is signified. +But by the warlike robe of Jupiter we must understand her demiurgic +providence, which immutably takes care of mundane natures, and prepares +more divine beings always to have dominion in the world. Hence also, I +think Homer represents her as an associate in battle with the Greeks +against the Barbarians; just as Plato here relates that she was an +associate with the Greeks against the inhabitants of the Atlantic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[167]</span> +island; in order that every where more intellectual and divine natures +may rule over such as are more irrational and vile. For Mars also is +a friend to war and contrarieties, but with a separation and division +more adapted to the things themselves. Minerva however, connects +contrariety, and illuminates the subjects of her government with union. +Hence likewise she is said to be philopolemic. For,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Strife, fighting, war, she always loves.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">And she is a friend to war indeed, because she is allotted the summit +of separation; but she is a lover of contrarieties, because these are +in a certain respect congregated through this goddess, in consequence +of better natures having dominion. On this account likewise, the +ancients co-arranged Victory with Minerva.</p> + +<p>If therefore, these things are rightly asserted, she is philosophic +indeed, as being demiurgic intelligence, and as separate and immaterial +wisdom. Hence also, she is called Metis by the Gods. But she is +philopolemic, as connecting the contrarieties in wholes, and as an +untamed and inflexible deity. On this account likewise, she preserves +Bacchus undefiled, but vanquishes the giants in conjunction with her +father. She too alone shakes the ægis, without waiting for the mandate +of Jupiter. She also hurls the javelin,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Shook by her arm, the massy javelin bends,</div> + <div>Huge, ponderous, strong! that when her fury burns</div> + <div>Whole ranks of heroes tames and overturns.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">Again, she is <i>Phosphoros</i>, as every way extending intellectual +light; the <i>Saviour</i>, as establishing every partial intellect in +the total intellections of her father; <i>Ergane</i>, or the artificer, +as presiding over demiurgic works. Hence the theologist Orpheus says, +that the father produced her,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>That she the queen might be of mighty works.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">But she is <i>Calliergos</i>, or the beautiful fabricator, as +connecting by beauty all the works of the father; a <i>Virgin</i>, as +exerting an undefiled and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[168]</span> unmingled purity; and <i>Aigiochos</i>, or +ægis-bearing, as moving the whole of fate, and being the leader of its +productions.</p> + +<p>With respect to the spear and shield with which this Goddess, in +the statues of her, is represented as armed, Jamblichus, as we are +informed by Proclus,<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> explains these in a most divinely-inspired +manner as follows: Since every divine nature ought to act and not to +suffer; in order that by operating it may not have the inefficacious +which is similar to matter, but by not suffering, it may not have that +efficacy which resembles material natures, that produce accompanied +with passion,—that it may have neither of these, he asserts that +shields are powers, through which a divine nature remains impassive +and pure, surrounding itself with an infrangible guard. But spears +are powers, according to which it proceeds without contact through +all things, operates in all things, amputating a material nature, and +giving assistance to every generation-producing form. These powers, +however, are first seen about Minerva. Hence also in the statues of her +she is armed with a spear and shield. For she vanquishes every thing, +and according to theologists, remains inflexibly, and uncontaminated +in her father. But these things are seen in a secondary degree in the +Minerval powers, both in such as are whole, and such as are partial. +For as the Jovian and demiurgic multitudes imitate their monads; +and as the prophetic and Apolloniacal multitudes participate of the +characteristic peculiarity of Apollo; thus also the Minerval number +adumbrates the uncontaminated and unmingled nature of Minerva. And they +are seen ultimately in Minerval souls. For in these also the shield is +the untamed and inflexible power of reason; but the spear is that which +is incisive of matter, and which liberates souls from the perturbations +arising from dæmons or destiny.</p> + +<p>With respect to the mundane allotment also of this Goddess who +proceeds supernally from intellectual causes to the earth, Proclus +observes, (in Tim. p. 43.) that she primarily subsists in her father; +but secondarily in the supermundane Gods; that her third progression +is in the twelve liberated rulers; and that after this, she unfolds +into light a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[169]</span> liberated authority in the heavens. In one way indeed +in the inerratic sphere; for there also, a certain allotment of this +Goddess is expanded; whether it be the place about the ram, or that +about the virgin, or whether it be some one of the northern stars, as +the Electra which is there is by certain persons asserted to be. But +she unfolds this power in another way in the sun. For there also an +admirable power, and a Minerval order, fabricates wholes, according to +theologists, in conjunction with the sun. And again, in another way +in the moon, being the monad of the triad<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> which is there. But in +another way in the earth, according to the similitude of the allotments +of the earth to the celestial distributions. And lastly, she unfolds +this liberated authority differently in different parts of the earth, +according to the peculiarities of providential energy. This being the +case, it is by no means wonderful that one deity, Minerva, is said by +Plato to have been allotted Athens, and Saïs in Egypt. For it must +not be supposed, that because partial souls are not naturally adapted +to inhabit two bodies at once, this is also impossible to the Gods. +But there is a participation of the same divine power according to +different places, yet in the one power there is also multitude. And by +this place, indeed, it is participated in one way; but by other places +in a different way. And in some sameness is more abundant, but in +others difference.</p> + +<p>In another part, likewise, of the same admirable work (p. 30) Proclus +observes of this Goddess, that it is manifest from the Greeks, that +her dominion extends from on high as far as to the last of things; +for they say she was generated from the summit or head of Jupiter. +But the Egyptians relate that this inscription was written in the +adytum of the Goddess. <i>I am the things that are, that will be, and +that have been. No one has ever laid open the garment by which I am +concealed. The fruit which I brought forth was the sun.</i><a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> The +Goddess, therefore, being demiurgic, and at the same time apparent +and unapparent, has an allotment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[170]</span> in the heavens, and illuminates +generation with forms. For of the signs of the zodiack, the ram is +ascribed to the Goddess, and the equinoctial circle itself, where +especially a power motive of the universe is established. And thus much +concerning the philopolemic and philosophic Goddess Minerva.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXII.</h2> + + +<p>Let us in the next place direct our attention to that great mundane +divinity the earth, and consider what it is, whence it proceeds, +and how it is said by Plato in the Timæus to be our nurse, and the +most ancient and first of the Gods within the heavens, deriving our +information about this Goddess also from Proclus, (in Tim. p. 280). +Earth then proceeds primarily from the intelligible earth which +comprehends all the intelligible orders of the Gods, and is eternally +established in the father.<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> It also proceeds from the intellectual +Earth which is co-arranged with Heaven, and all the productions of +which it receives. For being analogous to these, it also abides +perpetually as in the centre of the heavens, and being contained, +on all sides by them, is full of generative power, and demiurgic +perfection. The true earth, therefore, is neither this corporeal-formed +and gross bulk; for it will not be the most ancient of the Gods from +its bulk, nor the first of the Gods that are arranged within the +heavens; nor is it the soul of this body; for it would not be, as +Plato says it is, extended about the pole of the universe, since not +the soul, but the body of the earth is a thing of this kind; but if +it be necessary to speak what is most true concerning it, it is an +animal consisting of a divine soul, and a living body. Hence the whole +is, as Plato says, an animal. For there are in it an immaterial and +separate intellect; a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[171]</span> divine soul dancing round this intellect; an +etherial body proximately suspended from its informing soul; and in +the last place, this visible bulk, which is on all sides inspired with +life by the vehicle<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> of this soul, with which also being filled, +it generates and nourishes all-various animals. For some animals<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> +are rooted in it, but others about it. And this likewise, Aristotle +perceiving, was ashamed not to give to the earth a natural life. For +whence is it that plants while they remain in the earth live, but when +divulsed from it die, unless this earthly mass was full of life? It +is necessary, also, to assume universally, that wholes are animated +prior to parts. For it would be ridiculous that man indeed should +participate of a rational soul and of intellect, but that no soul +should be assigned to the earth and the air, supernally riding in [as +it were] and governing the elements, and preserving them in their +proper boundaries. For wholes, as Theophrastus says, would have less +authority than parts, and perpetual than corruptible natures, if they +were destitute of soul. Hence, it is necessary to grant that a soul and +an intellect are in the earth; the former causing it to be prolific, +but the latter connectedly-containing it in the middle of the universe.</p> + +<p>Earth herself, therefore, being a divine animal, is also a plenitude +of intellectual and psychical essences, and of immaterial powers. For +if a partial soul has besides a material body an immaterial vehicle, +what ought we to think of a soul so divine as that of the earth? Is +it not, that by a much greater priority visible bodies are suspended +from this soul through other vehicles as media, and that through these, +the visible bodies are able to receive the illuminations of soul? +Such then being the nature of earth herself, she is said to be our +nurse; in the first place, indeed, as possessing a power in a certain +respect equivalent to Heaven. For as that comprehends in itself divine +animals, thus also earth is seen to contain terrestrial animals. But +in the second place, she is our nurse, as inspiring our lives from +her own proper life. For she not only produces fruits, and nourishes +our bodies through these, but she also fills our<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[172]</span> souls with the +illuminations of herself. For being a divine animal, and generating +us who are partial animals, through her own body indeed she nourishes +and connectedly-contains our bulk; but from her own soul perfects +ours. By her own intellect, likewise, she excites the intellect +which is in us; and thus according to the whole of herself becomes +the nurse of our whole composition. On this account it appears to me +that Plato calls her our nurse, indicating by this her intellectual +nutritive energy. For if she is our nurse, but we are truly souls and +intellects, according to these especially, she will be the perfector +of our essence, moving and exciting our intellectual part. But being +a divine animal, and comprehending in herself many partial animals, +she is said by Plato to be conglobed about the pole which is extended +through the universe; because she is contained and compressed about +its axis. For the axis also is the pole. And the pole is thus now +denominated, because the universe revolves about it. Because, however, +the pole [properly so called] is impartible, but the axis is a pole +with interval, just as if some one should say that a line is a flowing +point,—on this account, the pole is said by Plato to be extended +through the universe, as entirely pervading through the centre of the +earth.</p> + +<p>But we must survey the poles as powers that give stability to the +universe, exciting indeed the whole bulk of it to intelligible love, +and impartibly connecting that which is partible, and unitedly and +without interval that which is extended by interval. Hence, also, Plato +in the Republic, makes the spindle of Lachesis of adamant, indicating, +as we have said, their inflexible and untamed power. And we must +consider the axis, as that one divinity which collects the centres +of the universe, which is connective of the whole world, and motive +of the divine circulations; and as that about which wholes dance and +are convolved, and as sustaining all heaven, being on this account +denominated Atlas, as possessing an immutable and unwearied energy. +The word τεταμενον also, or <i>extended</i>, used here by Plato, +indicates that this one power is Titannic guarding the circulations +of wholes. But if, as the divine Jamblichus says, we understand by the +pole extended through the universe, the heavens, neither thus shall +we wander from the conception of Plato. For,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[173]</span> as Plato says in the +Cratylus, those who are skilled in astronomy call the heavens the pole, +as harmoniously revolving. According to this conception, therefore, +you may call heaven the pole extended through the universe, as being +incurvated through the whole of itself, in consequence of being +without an angle. For after this manner the superficies of a circle +is extended. About this, however, earth is conglobed, not locally, +but through a desire of becoming assimilated to it, converging to the +middle, in order that as heaven is moved about the centre, so she by +tending to the centre, may become similar to that which is essentially +spherical, being herself as much as possible conglobed. Hence she is +compressed about the heaven in such a way as to be wholly extended +about it.</p> + +<p>According to each of these conceptions, therefore, Plato delivers the +cause through which earth is contained in the middle. For the axis +is a power connective of the earth; and the earth is on all sides +compressed by the circulation of the heaven, and is collected together +into the centre of the universe. Earth, therefore, being such, Timæus +afterwards clearly shows what utility she affords to the universe; for +he calls her the guardian and artificer of day and night. And indeed +that she is the maker of night, is evident. For she produces a conical +shadow; and her magnitude and figure, are the causes of the dimension +and quality of the figure of this shadow. But after what manner is she +likewise the fabricator of day? Or does she not produce this day which +is conjoined with night? For about her the risings and settings of the +sun are surveyed. And that Plato assumes this day which is convolved +with night, is evident from his arranging the former under the latter; +as also prior to this, when he says, night therefore and day were thus +generated. Earth, therefore, is the fabricator of both these, producing +both in conjunction with the sun; the sun indeed being in a greater +degree the cause of day, but the earth of night.</p> + +<p>Being, however, the fabricator, she is also the guardian of them, +preserving their boundaries and contrariety with reference to each +other, and also their augmentations and diminutions, according to a +certain analogy. Hence, some denominate her Isis, as equalizing the +inequality, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[174]</span> bringing to an analogy the increase and decrease of +both day and night. But others looking to her prolific power call her +Ceres, as Plotinus, who denominates the intellect of the earth Vesta, +but the soul of it Ceres. We, however, say that the first causes of +these divinities are intellectual, ruling<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> and liberated; but that +from these causes illuminations and powers extend to the earth. Hence +there is a terrestrial Ceres and Vesta, and a terrestrial Isis, in +the same manner as there is a terrestrial Jupiter, and a terrestrial +Hermes; these terrene deities being arranged about the one divinity of +the earth; just as a multitude of celestial Gods proceeds about the one +divinity of the heavens. For there are progressions and terminations +of all the celestial Gods into the earth; and all things are in her +terrestrially, which are contained in the heavens celestially. For +the intellectual earth receives the paternal powers of heaven, and +contains all things after a generative manner. Thus, therefore, we say +that there is a terrestrial Bacchus, and a terrestrial Apollo, who is +the source of prophetic<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> waters in many parts of the earth, and of +openings which predict future events. But the Pæonian<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> and judicial +powers which proceed into it, render other places of it of a purifying +or medicinal nature. All the other powers of the earth, however, it is +impossible to enumerate. For divine powers are indeed inexplicable. But +the orders of angels and demons that follow these powers are still more +numerous, and are circularly allotted the whole earth, and dance round +its one divinity, its one intellect, and one soul.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIII.</h2> + + +<p>It remains in the next place, that we should survey how the earth is +said to be the most ancient, and the first of the Gods within the +heavens.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[175]</span> For this will be taken literally by those who are accustomed +to look only to its material, gross and dark bulk. But we indeed grant +them that there is something of such a kind in the bulk of the earth +as they say there is; but we think it proper that they should likewise +look to the other goods of the earth, through which it surpasses the +prerogatives of the other elements, viz. its stability, its generative +power, its concord with the heavens, and its position in the centre of +the universe. For the centre has great power in the universe, as being +connective of every circulation. Hence also the Pythagoreans call the +centre the tower of Jupiter, in consequence of containing in itself a +demiurgic guard. We shall likewise remind our opponents of the Platonic +hypothesis concerning the earth, mentioned by Socrates in the Phædo, +where he says that the place of our abode is hollow and dark, and +bound by the sea; but that there is another true earth, containing the +receptacles of the Gods, and possessing a beauty resembling that of the +heavens. We ought not, therefore, to wonder if now the earth is said to +be the most ancient and the first of the Gods within the heavens, since +she possesses so great an altitude, and such a surpassing beauty, and +as Socrates afterwards says, was fashioned by the Demiurgus resembling +a sphere covered with twelve skins, just as the heaven is similar to a +dodecahedron. We must likewise understand that the Demiurgus gave to +the earth alone among the elements to have all the elements separately, +causing her to be wholly a world, variegated analogous to the heavens. +For she contains a river of fire, of air, and of water, and of another +earth, which has the same relation to her which she has to the +universe, as Socrates says in the Phædo. But if this be the case, she +very much transcends the other elements as imitating the heavens, and +possessing every thing in herself terrestrially, which is celestially +contained in the heavens.</p> + +<p>To this also we may add, that the Demiurgus produced these two elements +the first, earth and fire; but the others for the sake of these, in +order that they might have the ratio of bonds with respect to them. And +that the four elements are both in the heavens, and in the sublunary +region; but in the former, indeed, according to a fiery characteristic, +since fire there predominates, as Plato says, but in the latter +according<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[176]</span> to a terrestrial peculiarity. For the profundity of air, and +the bulk of water are spread round the earth, and possess much of an +earthly property, on which account they are in their own nature dark. +In the heavens, therefore, there is a predominance of fire, but in the +sublunary region of earth. Since, however, generation is connascently +conjoined with the heavens, the end of the latter is earth, so far +as earth is in the heavens, but the beginning of generation is fire, +considered as subsisting in generation. For it is usual to call the +moon earth, as having the same ratio to the sun, which earth has to +fire. “But [the Demiurgus] says Orpheus, fabricated another infinite +earth, which the immortals call <i>Selene</i>, but terrestrials +<i>Mene</i>.” And it is usual to denominate the summit of generation +fire, which Aristotle also does, when he calls ether fire. In another +place, however, he does not think it proper to call ether fire, but +fiery-formed. Hence, the end of the heavens is not entirely destitute +of mutation, in consequence of its propinquity to generation; but the +beginning of generation is moved in a circle imitating the heavens.</p> + +<p>Farther still, this likewise must be considered, that we ought not +to judge of the dignity of things from places, but from powers and +essence. By what peculiarities, therefore, are we to form a judgment +of transcendencies? By what others than those which the divine orders +exhibit? For transcendency truly so called is with the Gods. From the +divine orders, therefore, we must assume <i>the monadic</i>, <i>the +stable</i>, <i>the all-perfect</i>, <i>the prolific</i>, <i>the +connective</i>, <i>the perfective</i>, <i>the every-way extended</i>, +<i>the vivific</i>, <i>the adorning</i>, <i>the assimilative</i>, and +<i>the comprehending</i> power. For these are the peculiarities of all +the divine orders. According to all these however, the earth surpasses +the other elements, so that she may justly be called the most ancient, +and the first of the Gods.</p> + +<p>Again, a two-fold nature of things may be surveyed, the one indeed +according to progression, which always makes things that have a +secondary arrangement subordinate to those that are prior to them; but +the other according to conversion, which conjoins extremes to primary +natures through similitude, and produces one circle of the whole +generation. Since also the world is spherical, but a figure of this +kind is the peculiarity of things that subsist according to conversion, +earth likewise<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[177]</span> must be conjoined in it to the heavens, through one. +circle, and one similitude. For thus also the centre is most similar +to the poles. For the heavens indeed entirely comprehend wholes, being +moved about the poles; but the earth is allotted permanency in the +centre. For it is appropriate to generation that the immoveable should +be more ancient than that which is moved. Hence, according to all these +conceptions it may be said, that earth as co-ordinate with heaven, is +the most ancient of the Gods within the heavens. For she is within +them, as being on all sides comprehended by them. For as the demiurgus +fashioned the whole of a corporeal nature within the soul of the world, +thus also he fabricated earth within the heavens, as compressed and +contained by them, and in conjunction with them fabricating wholes.</p> + +<p>She has, however, so far as she is <i>the first</i> of the Gods, an +indication of transcendency according to essence; but so far as she is +<i>the most ancient</i>, she exhibits to our view the dignity which +she is allotted. For how is it possible not to admit that she is +allotted a great portion in the world, and is very honourable, in whom +there are the tower of Jupiter, and the progression of Saturn? For not +only Tartarus, which is the extremity of the earth, is on all sides +comprehended by Saturn, and the Saturnian power, but also whatever +else may be conceived subordinate to this. For Homer says that this +is connectedly contained through the sub-tartarean Gods. Not that he +arranges Gods beyond Tartarus, as the words indicate; but that Tartarus +itself is on all sides comprehended by them.</p> + +<p>Farther still, we may survey the analogy which earth has to the +intellectual earth. For as the latter comprehends and gives subsistence +to perfective, guardian, and Titannic orders of Gods, of which +the Orphic theologies are full, so likewise the former possesses +various powers. And as a nurse indeed she imitates the perfective +order, according to which the Athenians also are accustomed to call +her κουροτροφος, or <i>the nourisher of youth</i>, and ανησιδωρα, +or <i>scattering gifts</i>, as producing and nourishing plants and +animals. But as a guard she imitates the guardian, and as conglobed +about the pole which is extended (τεταμενη) through the universe, the +<i>Titannic</i> order. Since, however, the intellectual earth prior to +other divinities generated Aigle and the Hesperian Erithya, thus also +our<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[178]</span> earth is the fabricator of day and night. And the analogy of the +latter to the former is evident.</p> + +<p>In the last place, Proclus adds, if also you are willing after another +manner to understand that she is the first and most ancient of the +Gods, as deriving her subsistence from the first and most ancient +causes, this reason also will be attended with probability, since first +causes proceed by their energies to the utmost extent of things; and +besides this, the last of things frequently preserve the analogy of +such as are first, as possessing their order from them alone. Hence, +every way the assertion of Plato is true, whether you are willing to +look to the bulk of the earth, or to the powers which she contains. And +thus much from Proclus, concerning that great mundane divinity, the +earth, who in the language of Theophrastus<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> is the common Vesta +of Gods and men; and on whose fertile surface reclining, says he, as +on the soft bosom of a mother or a nurse, we ought to celebrate her +divinity with hymns, and incline to her with filial affection, as to +the source of our existence.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIV.</h2> + + +<p>Having thus amply discussed the theory pertaining to the celestial +Gods, it is necessary in the next place, that we should direct our +attention to the sublunary deities, who are denominated γενεσιουργοι, +or <i>the fabricators of generation</i>. Plato in the Timæus calls +these Gods dæmons, because they are so with reference to the celestial +Gods. For they are suspended from them, and together with them +providentially attend to their appropriate allotments. Conformably +to this, also, in the Banquet he calls Love a dæmon, as being the +attendant of Venus, and as proceeding from the God Porus, who is truly +the source of abundance; though<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[179]</span> in the Phædrus he admits Love to be +a God, as with reference to the life of which he is the leader. What +Plato, therefore, says of these Gods in the Timæus is as follows: “But +to speak concerning the other dæmons, and to know their generation, +is a task beyond our ability to perform. It is, therefore, necessary +in this case to believe in ancient men; who being the progeny of the +Gods, as they themselves assert, must have a clear knowledge of their +parents. It is impossible, therefore, not to believe in the children +of the Gods, though they should speak without probable and necessary +arguments: but as they declare that their narrations are about affairs +to which they are naturally allied, it is proper that complying with +the law, we should assent to their tradition. In this manner then, +according to them, the generation of these Gods is to be described. +That Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of Heaven and Earth. That from +hence Phorcys, Saturn, and Rhea, and such as subsist together with +these, were produced. That from Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter, Juno, and all +such as we know are called the brethren of these descended. And lastly +others, which are reported to be the progeny of these.”</p> + +<p>Proclus, in his usual admirable manner, copiously elucidates these +words of Plato, and in his comment fully unfolds the theory of the +sublunary Gods. But unfortunately there are many chasms in some of the +most important parts of his elucidations, which no critical acumen, nor +sagacious conjecture, can fully supply. I shall endeavour, however, +to extract from his commentary, in the best manner I am able, all the +information on this subject which can at present be derived from this +invaluable work, occasionally attempting to restore the sense, where +from the mutilated state of the original it is wanting.</p> + +<p>Plato then, intending now to speak of the sublunary Gods, says, +that the discourse about them is admirable, and beyond our ability +to perform, if we intend to discover the generation of them, and +promulgate it to others. For what he before said of the demiurgus, +that it is difficult to discover him, and impossible to speak of him +to all men, this he now says of the sublunary Gods, that to know and +to speak of the generation of them, surpasses our ability. What, +therefore, does Plato mean by this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[180]</span> mode of indication? For as he has +delivered so many and such admirable things concerning all heaven, and +the intelligible paradigm, how is it that he says, that to speak of +the Gods who are the fabricators of generation, is a task beyond our +ability to perform? Perhaps it is because many physiologists considered +these sublunary elements to be inanimate natures casually borne along, +and destitute of providential care. For they acknowledged that the +celestial bodies, on account of their orderly motions, participate +of intellect and the Gods; but they left generation, as being very +mutable and indefinite, deprived of providential inspection. In order, +therefore, that we might not be affected in the same manner as they +were, he antecedently celebrates and proclaims the generation of the +sublunary Gods to be divine and intellectual, requiring no such mode +of indication in speaking of the celestial Gods. Perhaps also it may +be said, that souls more swiftly forget things nearer to themselves, +but have a greater remembrance of superior principles. For they in a +greater degree operate upon them through transcendency of power, and +appear through energy to be present with them. The same thing also +happens with respect to our sight. For though we do not see many things +that are situated on the earth, yet at the same time we appear to see +the inerratic sphere, and the stars themselves, because they illuminate +our sight with their light. The eye of the soul, therefore, becomes +in a greater degree oblivious of, and blind to, more proximate than +to higher and more divine principles. Thus, all religions and sects +acknowledge that there is a first principle of things, and all men +invoke God as their helper; but all do not believe that there are Gods +posterior to this principle, and that a providential energy proceeds +from them into the universe. For <i>the one</i> is seen by them in a +clearer manner than multitude. Others, again, believe indeed that there +are Gods, but after the Gads, admitting the dæmoniacal genus, they are +ignorant of the heroic order. And in short, this is the greatest work +of science, subtilly to distinguish the media and the progressions of +beings. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, Plato, when +speaking of the celestial Gods, very properly indicates nothing of the +difficulty of the subject; but when speaking of the sublunary Gods, +says that it surpasses our ability. For<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[181]</span> the discussion of these is +more difficult, because we cannot collect any thing about them from +apparent objects, but it alone requires a divinely-inspired energy, and +intellectual projection. And thus much concerning this doubt.</p> + +<p>Again, though we have assigned a reason why Plato calls the sublunary +Gods dæmons, we may likewise say according to another conception, +that in the celestial regions there are dæmons, and in the sublunary, +Gods; but that in the former the genus is indeed divine,<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> though +dæmons also are generated according to it;<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a> and that in the +latter the whole multitude are dæmons. For there indeed, the divine +peculiarity, but here the dæmoniacal predominates, to which some alone +looking, have divided the divine and the dæmoniacal, according to the +heavens and generation. They ought however, to have arranged both in +both; but in the former indeed the divine nature, and in the latter +the dæmoniacal predominates; though in the former there is also the +divine peculiarity. For if the whole world is a blessed God, no one of +the parts which give completion to it is destitute of divinity, and +providential inspection. But if all things participate of deity and +providence, the world is allotted a divine nature. And if this be the +case, appropriate orders of Gods preside over its different parts. For +if the heavens through souls and intellects as media participate of +one soul, and one intellect, what ought we to think of these sublunary +elements? How is it possible, that these should not in a much greater +degree participate through certain middle divine orders, of the one +deity of the world?</p> + +<p>Farther still, it would also be absurd that the telestic art (or the +art pertaining to mystic ceremonies) should establish on the earth +places fitted for oracles, and statues of the Gods, and through certain +symbols should cause things generated from a partial and corruptible +matter, to become adapted to the participation of deity, to be moved by +him, and to predict future events; but that the demiurgus of wholes, +should not place over the whole elements which are the incorruptible +plenitudes of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[182]</span> the world, divine souls, intellects and Gods. For +whether was he unwilling? But how could he be unwilling, since he +wished to make all things similar to himself? Was he then unable? But +what could hinder him? For we see that this is possible from telestic +works. But if he was both willing and able, it is evident that he gave +subsistence to Gods, who have allotments in, and are the inspective +guardians of generation. Since however the genus of dæmons is every +where an attendant on the Gods, there are also dæmons who are the +fabricators of generation; some of whom indeed rule over the whole +elements, but others are the guardians of climates, others are the +rulers of nations, others of cities, others of certain families, and +others are the guardians of individuals. For the guardianship of dæmons +extends as far as to the most extreme division.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXV.</h2> + + +<p>Having therefore solved the problem pertaining to the essence, let us +in the next place consider the order of the sublunary Gods, and the +meaning of the subsequent words of Plato. For let them be Gods, and +let them be called dæmons for the cause above assigned, where must we +arrange them? Must it be, as we have before said, under the moon, or +prior to the celestial<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> Gods? For this may appear to be proper +for these two reasons; one indeed, because Plato indicates that he +ascends to a greater order, by saying that it exceeds our ability to +speak concerning them, having already spoken concerning the celestial +Gods; but the other, because he follows in what he says, those who +have delivered to us Theogonies. For they prior to the world and the +demiurgus, delivered these generations of Gods proceeding from Heaven +and Earth. In answer to this query however, we must say, that he +produces them after<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[183]</span> the celestial Gods, and through this from Heaven +and Earth. For on this account he said that Earth was the most ancient +of the Gods within the Heaven, because from this and Heaven, he was +about to produce the other Gods which the heavens contain. This we +demonstrate from the demiurgus addressing his speech to these Gods, +and to all the rest, as being produced by him within the universe. +Why, however, Plato says that he follows the Theogony, and why he +shall omit to speak concerning the sublunary deities, we must refer to +his having no clear indications of the subsistence of these from the +phænomena, as he had of the celestial divinities, from the order of +their periods, which is adapted to the government of Gods. It exceeds +the province therefore of physiology to speak of beings, concerning +whom natural effects afford us no stable belief. Hence Plato says, as a +physiologist, that it surpasses his ability to speak of these.</p> + +<p>If, however, he says that he follows those who are divinely inspired, +but they speaking concerning the supercelestial Gods, he adopts a +similar Theogony, though discoursing of the sub-celestial divinities, +we must not consider this as wonderful. For he knew that all the +orders of the Gods, proceed as far as to the last of things, from the +arrangement which is the principle of their progression, every where +generating series from themselves analogous to the superior deities +from which they proceed. Hence, though the orders of these Gods which +are celebrated by theologists, are above the world, yet they subsist +also in the sensible universe. And as this visible heaven is allied +to that which is supermundane, so likewise our earth is allied to the +earth which is there, and the orders subsisting from the one to the +orders proceeding from the other. From these things too, this also +may be assumed, that according to Plato as well as according to other +theologists, first natures as they proceed, produce things subordinate +in conjunction with the causes of themselves. For these sublunary Gods +proceeding from the demiurgus, are also said to be generated from +Heaven and Earth that first proceed from him. The demiurgus therefore +says to all of them that they ought to fabricate mortal natures, +imitating his<a id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> power about their generation. Hence all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[184]</span> of them +proceed from one producing cause, though those of a secondary order +proceed likewise from the Gods that are prior to them. It follows +therefore from this, that not every thing which is produced by the +junior Gods is mortal, since some of these proceed from other junior +Gods; but the contrary alone is true, that every thing mortal is +generated by these divinities. And again, it follows from this, that +the junior Gods produce some things according to the immoveable, but +others according to the moveable hyparxes of themselves. For they would +not be the causes of immortals, if they produced all things according +to moveable hyparxes; if it be true that every thing which subsists +from a moveable cause, is essentially mutable.</p> + +<p>Again, when Plato says, “It is therefore necessary to believe in +ancient men, who being the progeny of the Gods as they themselves +assert, must have a clear knowledge of their parents; for it is +impossible not to believe in the children of the Gods, though they +should speak without probable and necessary arguments,” we may collect +from this, that he who simply believes in things which seem difficult +to be known, and which are of a dubious nature, runs in the paths of +abundance, recurring to divine knowledge, and deific intelligence, +through which all things become apparent and known. For all things +are contained in the Gods. But that which antecedently comprehends +all things, is likewise able to fill other things with the knowledge +of itself. Hence, Timæus here sends us to theologists, and to the +generation of the Gods celebrated by them. Who therefore are they, and +what is their knowledge? They indeed are the progeny of the Gods, and +clearly know their progenitors; being the progeny and children of the +Gods, as preserving the form of their presiding deity according to +the present life. For Apolloniacal souls, in consequence of chusing a +prophetic, or telestic life, are called the children and progeny of +Apollo; children indeed, so far as they are souls pertaining to this +God, and adapted to this series; but progeny because they demonstrate +their present life to be conformable to these characteristics of the +God. All souls therefore, are the children of the Gods; but all do not +know their presiding God. Such however, as have this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[185]</span> knowledge and +chuse a similar life, are called the children and progeny<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> of the +Gods. Hence Plato adds, “as they say,” for they unfold the order from +which they came. Thus the Sibyl<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> as soon as she was born, uttered +oracles; and Hercules appeared at his birth with demiurgic symbols. But +souls of this kind convert themselves to their progenitors, and are +filled from them with deific knowledge. Their knowledge however, is +enthusiastic, being conjoined to deity through divine light, and exempt +from all other knowledge, both that which is probable, and that which +is demonstrative. For the former is conversant with nature, and the +universal in particulars; but the latter with an incorporeal essence, +and the objects of science. Divinely-inspired knowledge however, alone, +is conjoined with the Gods themselves.</p> + +<p>Timæus, or in other words Plato, afterwards adds: “But as they declare +that their narrations are about affairs, to which they are naturally +allied, it is proper that complying with the law, we should assent to +their tradition.” From these words, he who considers them accurately +may assume many things, such as that divinely-inspired knowledge is +perfected through familiarity with and alliance to the Gods. For the +sun is seen through solar-form light, and divinity becomes apparent +through divine illumination. It may likewise be inferred that the +divine law defines the orders of the Gods which the divinely-inspired +conceptions of the ancients unfold, according to which also souls +energizing, though not enthusiastically, are persuaded by those +that enthusiastically energize. Complying with this law, Timæus in +the beginning of this dialogue says that he shall invoke the Gods +and Goddesses. From these words also we may infer, that all the +kingdoms both in the heavens and the sublunary region, are adorned +and distributed in order, according to the first and intellectual +principles; and that all of them are every where according to the +analogous. Likewise that the order of things precedes<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[186]</span> our conceptions. +But it is Pythagoric to follow the Orphic genealogies. For the science +concerning the Gods proceeded from the Orphic tradition through +Pythagoras, to the Greeks, as Pythagoras himself says in the <i>Sacred +Discourse</i>.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVI.</h2> + + +<p>Again then, following Proclus, we say that the theory of the sublunary +is immediately connected with that of the celestial Gods; and in +consequence of being suspended from it, possesses the perfect and +the scientific: For the generation-producing choir of Gods, follows +the Gods in the heavens, and in imitation of the celestial circle, +convolves also the circle in generation. For secondary follow the +natures prior to them, according to an indivisible and united +progression. Because however, the divinities that govern generation, +subsist immediately from the celestial Gods, on this account also they +are converted to them according to one undisjoined union; just as the +celestial are converted to the supercelestial deities, from whom they +were proximately generated; but the supercelestial to the intellectual, +by whom they were adorned and distributed; and again the intellectual +to the intelligible Gods, from whom they were ineffably unfolded into +light, and who indescribably and occultly comprehend all things.</p> + +<p>Of the whole of this truly golden chain therefore, the summit is +indeed the genus of the intelligible Gods, but the end is that of the +sublunary deities, who govern<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> generation in an unbegotten, and +nature in a supernatural manner, to which the demiurgic intellect +now gives subsistence; the dominion of the Gods extending supernally +from the heavens, as far as to the last of things. Of these sublunary +deities however, it is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[187]</span> necessary to observe in the first place, that +all of them preserve the generative and perfective energy of their +generating cause, and also his demiurgic and stable productive power. +They likewise receive measures, boundaries, and order from their +father. And such things as he governs exemptly and totally, they being +divided according to allotments, fabricate, generate, and perfect. Some +of them also are proximate to the celestial Gods; but others proceed +to a greater distance from them. Hence, some preserve the idea of +these Gods, so far as it can be preserved in the sublunary order; but +others are established according to their appropriate power. For of +every order, the summit is analogous to the order prior to it. Thus the +summit of intelligibles is unity; of intellectuals is intelligible; +of the supermundane order, is intellectual; and of the mundane order, +supermundane. And some of the sublunary Gods indeed, are in a greater +degree united to the demiurgic monad; but others are more distant +from it. Hence, some being analogous to it, are the leaders of the +whole of this series; but others have a more partial similitude to +it. For the father established in every order powers analogous to him +in their arrangement; since in all the divine orders a certain cause +pre-subsists analogous to <i>the good</i>.</p> + +<p>Conformably to these causes which are thus analogous to the ineffable +principle of things, and which with reference to it are called monads, +the sublunary Gods proceed, and adorn and distribute generation in a +becoming manner. And some indeed, give completion to this, but others +to some other will of their father. For some complete his connective, +others his prolific, others his motive, others his guardian will, and +others, some other will of the demiurgus pertaining to the wholes in +the sublunary region. And some of them have dominion over souls, others +over dæmons, and others over Gods. All of them however are intellectual +according to essence, but mundane according to allotment. They are also +perfective, and powerful, governing generation in an unbegotten manner, +beings deprived of intellect, intellectually, and inanimate natures, +vitally. For they adorn all things according to their own essence, +and not according to the imbecility of the recipients. But Plato is +evidently of opinion that these Gods use certain other bodies more +simple and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[188]</span> perpetual than these elements by saying, that they appear +when they please and become visible to us. That he likewise gives them +souls is manifest from his saying that every mundane God is conjoined +to bodies through soul. For he then first called the world itself a +God, when he had established a soul in it. And again that he suspends +intellects from them, through which their souls are intellectual, and +are immediately converted to the demiurgus, is evident from the speech +of the demiurgus to them.</p> + +<p>If likewise it is requisite that the whole world should be perfect, it +is necessary that together with the divine genera we should conceive +that the dæmoniacal order was generated prior to our souls, and which +receives a triple division, viz. into angels, dæmons properly so +called, and heroes. For the whole of this order fills up the middle +space between Gods and men; because there is an all-perfect separation +or interval between our concerns, and those of the Gods. For the latter +are eternal, but the former are frail and mortal. And the former indeed +are satisfied with the enjoyment of intellect in energy partially; but +the latter ascend into total intellects themselves. On this account, +there is a triad which conjoins our concerns with the Gods, and which +proceeds analogous to the three principal causes of things; though +Plato is accustomed to call the whole of this triad dæmoniacal. For +the angelic is analogous to being, or the intelligible which is first +unfolded into light from the ineffable and occult fountain of beings. +Hence also, it unfolds the Gods themselves, and announces that which is +occult in their essence. But the dæmoniacal is analogous to infinite +life. On which account it proceeds every where according to many +orders, and is of a multiform nature. And the heroic is analogous to +intellect and conversion. Hence also, it is the inspective guardian +of purification, and is the supplier of a magnificent and elevated +life. Farther still, the angelic indeed proceeds according to the +intellectual life of the demiurgus. Hence it also is essentially +intellectual, and interprets, and transmits a divine intellect to +secondary natures. But the dæmoniacal proceeds according to the +demiurgic providence of wholes, governs nature, and rightly gives +completion to the order of the whole world. And the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[189]</span> heroic again, +proceeds according to the convertive providence of all these. Hence, +this genus likewise is elevated, raises souls on high, and is the cause +of a grand and vigorous energy.</p> + +<p>Such therefore being the nature of these triple genera, they are +suspended from the Gods; some indeed from the celestial Gods, but +others from the divinities who are the inspective guardians of +generation. And about every God there is an appropriate number of +angels, heroes and dæmons. For, every God is the leader of a multitude +which receives his characteristic form. Hence of the celestial Gods, +the angels, dæmons aid heroes are celestial; but of the fabricators of +generation, they have a generation-producing characteristic. Of the +elevating Gods, they have an elevating property: but of the demiurgic, +a demiurgic; of the vivific, a vivific property. And so of the rest. +And again, among the elevating Gods, of those that are of a Saturnian +characteristic, the angels, dæmons, and heroes are Saturnian; but of +those that are Solar, they are Solar. Among the vivific Gods likewise +of those that are Lunar, the ministrant powers are Lunar; but of the +Aphrodisiacal, or those that have the characteristic of Venus, they +are Aphrodisiacal. For they bear the names of the Gods from whom +they are suspended, as being in connected continuity with them, and +receiving one and the same idea with an appropriate subjection. Nor is +this wonderful, since partial souls also, when they know their patron +and leading Gods, call themselves by their names. Or whence were the +Esculapiuses, the Bacchuses, and the Dioscuri denominated, who being +men of an heroic character, took the names of the deities from whom +they descended?<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> As therefore, of the celestial, so likewise of +the Gods who are the fabricators of generation, it is necessary to +survey about each of them, a co-ordinate angelical, dæmoniacal, and +heroical multitude; and that the number suspended from them retains +the appellation of its producing monad. Hence, there is a celestial +God, angel and hero; and the like is also true of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[190]</span> earth.<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a> In a +similar manner we must say that Ocean and Tethys proceed into all the +orders; and conformably to this the other Gods. For there is likewise a +Jovian, a Junonian, and a Saturnian multitude, which is called by the +same appellation of life. Nor is there any absurdity, in calling man +both the intelligible and the sensible man; though in these, there is +a much greater separation and interval.<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> And thus much in common +concerning the Gods and dæmons who are the fabricators of generation.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVII.</h2> + + +<p>It now remains to show what conceptions we ought to have of the Gods +mentioned by Plato in the passage before cited from the Timæus. For +of the ancients, some referred what is said about them to fables, +others to the fathers of cities, others to guardian powers, others +to ethical explanations, and others to souls. These, however, are +sufficiently confuted by the divine Jamblichus, who demonstrates +that they wander from the meaning of Plato, and from the truth of +things. After this manner, therefore, we must say, that Timæus being +a Pythagorean, follows the Pythagorean principles. But these are the +Orphic traditions. For what Orpheus delivered mystically through arcane +narrations, these Pythagoras learned, being initiated by Aglaophemus in +the mystic wisdom which Orpheus derived from his mother Calliope. For +these things Pythagoras says in the <i>Sacred Discourse</i>. What then +are the Orphic traditions, since we are of opinion that the doctrine of +Timæus about the Gods should be referred to these? They are as follow: +Orpheus delivered the kingdoms of the Gods who preside over wholes,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[191]</span> +according to a perfect number, viz. Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, +Jupiter, Bacchus. For Phanes is the first that bears a sceptre, and the +first king is the celebrated Ericapæus. But the second is Night, who +receives the sceptre from her father [Phanes.] The third is Heaven, +who receives it from Night. The fourth is Saturn, who, as they say, +offered violence to his father. The fifth is Jupiter, who subdued +his father. And after him, the sixth is Bacchus. All these kings, +therefore, beginning supernally from the intelligible and intellectual +Gods, proceed through the middle orders, and into the world, that they +may adorn mundane affairs. For Phanes is not only in intelligibles, +but also in intellectuals, in the demiurgic, and in the supermundane +order; and in a similar manner, Heaven and Night. For the peculiarities +of them proceed through all the middle orders. And with respect to the +mighty Saturn, is he not arranged prior to Jupiter, and does he not +after the Jovian kingdom, divide the Bacchic fabrication in conjunction +with the other Titans? And this indeed, he effects in one way in the +heavens, and in another in the sublunary region; in one way in the +inerratic sphere, and in another among the planets. And in a similar +manner Jupiter and Bacchus. <i>These things, therefore, are clearly +asserted by the ancients.</i></p> + +<p>If, however we are right in these assertions, these divinities have +every where an analogous subsistence; and he who wishes to survey +the progressions of them into the heavens, or the sublunary region, +should look to the first and principal causes of their kingdoms. For +from thence, and according to them, their generation is derived. Some, +therefore, say, that Plato omits to investigate the Gods who are +analogous to the two kings in the heavens, I mean Phanes and Night. +For it is necessary to place them in a superior order, and not among +the mundane Gods; because prior to the world, they are the leaders of +the intellectual Gods, being eternally established in the adytum, as +Orpheus says of Phanes, who by the word adytum signifies their occult +and immanifest order. Whether, therefore, we refer the circulation of +same and different, mentioned by Plato in this dialogue, to the analogy +of these, as male and female, or paternal and generative, we shall +not wander from the truth. Or whether we refer the sun and moon, as +opposed to each other among<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[192]</span> the planets, to the same analogy, we shall +not err. For the sun indeed through his light preserves a similitude +to Phanes, but the moon to Night. Jupiter, or the demiurgus, in the +intellectual, is analogous to Phanes in the intelligible order. And +the vivific crater Juno is analogous to Night, who produces all life +in conjunction with Phanes from unapparent causes; just as Juno is +parturient with, and emits into light, all the soul contained in the +world. For it is better to conceive both these as prior to the world; +and to arrange the demiurgus himself as analogous to Phanes; since he +is said to be assimilated to him according to the production of wholes; +but to arrange the power conjoined with Jupiter, (i.e. Juno) and which +is generative of wholes, to Night, who produces all things from the +father Phanes. After these, however, we must consider the remaining, as +analogous to the intellectual kingdoms.</p> + +<p>If, likewise, it should be asked why Plato does not mention the +kingdoms of Phanes and Night, to whom we have said Jupiter and Juno are +analogous? It may be readily answered, that the tradition of Orpheus +contains these; on which account Plato celebrates the kingdom of Heaven +and Earth as the first, the Greeks being more accustomed to this than +to the Orphic traditions; as he himself says in the Cratylus, where he +particularly mentions the Theogony of Hesiod, and recurs as far as to +this kingdom according to that poet. Beginning, therefore, from this +Theogony as more known, and assuming Heaven and Earth as the first +kingdoms above the world, he produces the visible Heaven and Earth +analogous to those in the intellectual order, and celebrates the latter +as the most ancient of the Gods within the former. From these also, he +begins the Theogony of the sublunary Gods. These things, however, if +divinity pleases, will be manifest from what follows. At present we +shall only add, that it is requisite to survey all these names divinely +or dæmoniacally, and according to the allotments of these divinities in +the four elements. For this ennead is in ether and water, in earth and +in air, all-variously, according to the divine, and also according to +the dæmoniacal peculiarity. And again, these names are to be surveyed +aquatically and aerially, and likewise in the earth terrestrially, in +order that all of them may be every where, according to an all-various<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[193]</span> +mode of subsistence. For there are many modes of providence divine +and dæmoniacal, and many allotments according to the division of the +elements.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVIII.</h2> + + +<p>Let us, therefore, now return to the words of Plato. In the first place +then he says that Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of Heaven and +Earth. And here we may observe, that as this whole world is ample and +various, as adumbrating the intellectual order of forms, it contains +these two extremities in itself, Earth and Heaven; the latter having +the relation of a father, but the former of a mother. On this account +Plato calls Earth the most ancient of the Gods within the heavens, in +order that conformably to this he might say, that Earth is the mother +of all that Heaven is the father; at the same time evincing that +partial causes are not only subordinate to their progeny, as Poverty, +in the Banquet of Plato to Love, but are likewise superior to them, as +alone receiving the offspring proceeding from the fathers. These two +extremities, therefore, must be conceived in the world, Heaven as the +father, and Earth as the mother of her common progeny. For all the rest +terminate in these, some giving completion to the celestial number, +but others to the wholeness of Earth. After the same manner, likewise, +in each of the elements of the world, these two principles, Heaven +and Earth, must be admitted, subsisting aerially indeed in air, but +aquatically in water, and terrestrially in earth; and according to all +the above-mentioned modes; in order that each may be a perfect world, +adorned and distributed from analogous<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> principles. For if man is +said to be a microcosm, is it not necessary that each of the elements +by a much greater priority should contain in itself<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[194]</span> appropriately all +that the world contains totally? Hence, it appears to me that Plato +immediately after speaking about Heaven and Earth, delivers the theory +of these Gods, beginning from those two divinities; for the other +divinities proceed analogous to Heaven and Earth. These two divinities, +however, are totally the causes of all the Gods that are now produced. +And these divinities that are the progeny of Heaven and Earth, are +analogous to the whole of each. These two, likewise, as we have before +observed, are in each of the elements, aerially, or aquatically, or +terrestrially. For Heaven is in Earth, and Earth in Heaven.<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> +And here, indeed, Heaven subsists terrestrially, but there Earth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[195]</span> +celestially. For Orpheus calls the moon celestial earth.<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> Nor is it +proper to wonder that this should be the case. For we may survey the +same things every where, according to the analogous, in intelligibles, +in intellectuals, in the supermundane order, in the heavens, and in +generation, conformably to the proper order of each.</p> + +<p>With respect, however, to each of these divinities, some of the +interpreters of Plato understand by Earth, this solid bulk which is the +object of sensible inspection; others as that which has an arrangement +analogous to matter, and is supposed to exist prior to generated +natures; others, as intelligible matter; others, as the power of +intellect; others, as life; others, as an incorporeal form inseparable +from earth; others conceive it to be soul; and others intellect. In +a similar manner with respect to Heaven, some suppose it to be the +visible heavens; others, the motion about the middle of the universe; +others, power aptly proceeding in conjunction with motion; others, +that which possesses intellect; others, a pure and separate intellect; +others, the nature of circulation; others, soul; and others, intellect. +I know, likewise, that the divine Jamblichus understands by Earth, +every thing stable and firm, according to the essence of the mundane +Gods, and which according to energy and a perpetual circulation, +comprehends more excellent powers and total lives. But by Heaven, he +understands the total and perfect energy proceeding from the demiurgus, +which is full of appropriate power, and subsists about the demiurgus, +as being the boundary of itself and of wholes. I know, likewise, that +the admirable Theodorus establishes both these powers in the life which +subsists according to habitude.</p> + +<p>In order, however, that we may avoid erroneous opinions, and may +adhere to the most pure conceptions of Jamblichus, and the traditions +of Syrianus, if is necessary in the first place to recollect, that +Plato is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[196]</span> now speaking of the sublunary Gods, that all of them are +every where, and that they proceed according to the analogy of the +intelligible and intellectual kings. And in the second place we must +say, that as the first Heaven is the boundary of and connectedly +contains the intellectual Gods, containing the measure which proceeds +from <i>the good</i><a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> and the intelligible Gods, into the +intellectual orders, after the same manner the Heaven which is now +mentioned by Plato, is the boundary and container of the Gods that +are the fabricators of generation, comprehending in one bound the +demiurgic measure, and also that which proceeds from the celestial Gods +to those divinities that are allotted the realms of generation, and +connecting them with the celestial government of the Gods. For as the +demiurgus is to <i>the good itself</i>, so is the one divinity of this +Heaven, to the intellectual Heaven. Hence, as there, measure and bound +proceeds from <i>the good</i> through Heaven to all the intellectual +Gods, so likewise here a bound arrives to the Gods the fabricators of +generation and to the more excellent genera [viz. to angels, dæmons and +heroes] from the demiurgus, and the summit of the mundane Gods; viz. +through the connectedly-containing medium of this Heaven.<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a> For the +everywhere proceeding Heaven is allotted this order; in one procession +of things indeed, unitedly and occultly; but in another manifestly +and separately. For in one order, it introduces bound to souls; in +another to the works of nature; and in another in a different manner +to other things. And in air indeed, it effects this primarily; but in +the aquatic orders secondarily; and in earth, and terrestrial works, +in an ultimate degree. But there are also complications of these. For +the divine mode of subsistence, and also the dæmoniacal are different +in the air, and in the earth. For in one place, the mode is the same +in different orders; but in another the mode is different in one +allotment. And thus much concerning the power of Heaven.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[197]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIX.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place, directing our attention to Earth, we shall derive +the whole of the theory concerning her from her first evolution into +light. She first becomes manifest, therefore, in the middle triads<a id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> +of the intellectual Gods, together with Heaven who connectedly +contains the whole intellectual order. She likewise proceeds analogous +to the intelligible Earth, which we find to be the first of the +intelligible<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a> triads. And as ranking in the vivific orders, she is +assimilated to the first infinity. But she is the receiving bosom of +the generative deity of Heaven, and the middle centre of his paternal +goodness. She also reigns together with him, and is the power of him +who ranks as a father. The Earth, however, which is analogous to her, +and presides in the sublunary regions, is as it were the prolific power +of the Heaven pertaining to the realms of generation, unfolding into +light his paternal, definitive, measuring and containing providence, +which prolifically extends to all things. She likewise generates +all the sublunary infinity;<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> just as Heaven who belongs to the +co-ordination of bound, introduces termination and end to secondary +natures. Bound, therefore, and end define the hyparxis of every thing +according to which Gods and dæmons, souls and bodies are connected and +made to be one, imitating the one unity of wholes, or in other words, +the ineffable principle of things; but infinity multiplies the powers +of every being. For there is much bound in all sublunary natures, and +likewise much infinity, which through divinity, and after the Gods +extends to all things. We have, therefore, these two orders, which +are generative of the divine or dæmoniacal progressions, in all the +sublunary genera and elements; and one kingdom of them in the same +manner as in the intellectual orders.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[198]</span></p> + +<p>From these, however, a second duad proceeds, Ocean and Tethys, this +generation not being effected by copulation, nor by any conjunction +of things separated, nor by division, nor according to a certain +abscission, for all these are foreign from the Gods; but they are +accomplished according to one union and indivisible conjunction of +powers. And this union theologists are accustomed to call marriage. +For marriage, as the theologist Orpheus says, is appropriate to this +order. For he calls Earth the first Nymph, and the union of her +with Heaven the first marriage; since there is no marriage in the +divinities that are in the most eminent degree united. Hence there +is no marriage between Phanes and Night, who are intelligibly united +to each other. And marriage appears on this account to be adapted to +the Heaven and Earth which we are at present considering, so far as +they adumbrate the intellectual Heaven and Earth; which the sacred +laws of the Athenians likewise knowing, ordered that the marriages of +Heaven and Earth should be celebrated, as preparatory to initiation +into the mysteries. Directing their attention to these also, in the +Eleusinian mysteries looking upward to the heavens, they exclaimed, O +son! but looking downward to the earth, O parent! According to this +union, therefore, in conjunction with separation, Heaven and Earth +produce through their goodness Ocean and Tethys. Or rather, they do not +immediately produce these, but prior to these two monads, two triads, +and duple hebdomads, among which are Ocean and Tethys. And the monads +indeed, together with the triads, remain with the father. But of the +hebdomads, Ocean, together with Tethys, abide, and at the same time +proceed. All the rest, however, proceed into another order of Gods. And +this indeed is the mode of their subsistence in the intellectual order. +But here, Plato entirely omits the causes that abide in the father, +but delivers to us those that proceed and at the same time abide, +because his intention is to speak of the Gods that are the fabricators +of generation. To these, however, progression, motion, and difference, +are adapted, and a co-arrangement of the male with the female; in +order that there may be generation, that matter may be adorned with +forms, and that difference may be combined with sameness. Hence Plato +commences from the duad, proceeds through it, and again returns to it. +For<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[199]</span> the duad is adapted to material natures, as well as difference, on +account of the division of forms about matter. Having mentioned a duad, +likewise, he begins from Earth; for this is more adapted to things +pertaining to generation.</p> + +<p>With respect to these two divinities, however, Ocean and Tethys, who +abide in their causes and at the same time proceed from them, some +say that Ocean is a corporeal essence; others, that it is a swiftly +pervading nature; others, that it is the motion of a humid essence; +others, that it is ether, through the velocity of its motion; and +others, that it is the intelligible profundity itself of life. The +divine Jamblichus, however, defines it to be the middle motive divine +cause, which middle souls, lives, and intellections, efficacious +natures, and those elements that are pneumatic, such as air and fire, +first participate. And with respect to Tethys, some say that it is a +humid essence; others, that it is a very-mutable nature; and others, +that it is the hilarity of the universe. But the divine Jamblichus +asserts it to be a productive power, possessing in energizing an +efficacious establishment, the stable intellections of which, souls, +natures, and powers participate, and which is likewise participated by +certain solid receptacles, either of earth or water, which prepare a +seat for the elements.</p> + +<p>We, however, again assuming our principles, say, that the causes of +these are indeed in the intellectual Gods, and that they are likewise +in the sensible universe. For Ocean every where distinguishes first +from second orders, in consequence of which poets do not improperly +call it the boundary of the earth. But the Ocean which is now the +subject of discussion, is the cause of motion, progression, and power; +inserting in intellectual lives indeed, acme, and prolific abundance; +but in souls, celerity and vigour, in their energies, and purity in +their generations; and in bodies facility of motion. And in the Gods +indeed it imparts a motive and providential cause; but in angels an +unfolding and intellectual celerity and vigour. Again, in dæmons it +is the supplier of efficacious power; but in heroes, of a magnificent +and flourishing life. It likewise subsists in each of the elements, +according to its characteristic peculiarity. Hence, the aerial Ocean +is the cause of all the mutation of aerial natures,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[200]</span> and of the circle +of the meteors, as also Aristotle says. But the aquatic Ocean gives +subsistence to fertility, facility of motion, and all-various powers. +For according to the poets,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>From this all seas, and every river flow.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">And the terrestrial ocean is the producing cause of generative +perfection, of the separation of forms, and of generation and +corruption. Whether also there are certain terrestrial orders, vivific +and demiurgic, it is the source of their distinction; or whether there +are powers connective of the productive principles of the earth, and +the inspective guardians of generation,—these also it excites and +multiplies, and calls into motion.</p> + +<p>With respect to Tethys, as the name indeed evinces, she is the most +ancient, and the progenitor, of the Gods, in the same manner as it +is fit to acknowledge of the mother Rhea. For theologists denominate +another Goddess prior to her, Maia. Thus, Orpheus,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Maia, of Gods supreme, immortal Night,</div> + <div>What mean you, say?</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">But according to the etymology of Plato, she is a certain fontal deity. +For the undefiled and pure, and that which percolates are signified +through her name. For since Ocean produces all things, and is the +source of all motions, whence also it is called the generation of the +Gods, Tethys separates the unical cause of his motions into primary and +secondary motions. Hence Plato says, that she derives her appellation +from <i>leaping</i> and <i>percolating</i>. For these are separative +names, in the same manner, as he says in the Sophista, (το ξαινειν και +κερκιζειν) to card, and to separate threads in weaving with a shuttle. +Ocean, therefore, generating all motion collectively, whether divine, +or intellectual, or psychical, Tethys separating both internal and +external motions, is so called from causing material motions to leap +and be percolated from such as are immaterial. Hence, the separating +characteristic is adapted to the female, and the unical<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> to the +male, Plato, therefore, would assert such<span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[201]</span> peculiarities as these, of +Ocean and Tethys, and does assert them in the Cratylus. But according +to the divine Jamblichus, Tethys must be defined to be the supplier of +position and firm establishment. From all that has been said, however, +it may be summarily asserted that Tethys is the cause of permanency, +and a firm establishment of things in herself, separating them from the +motions that proceed externally.</p> + +<p>In short, Ocean is the cause of all motion, intellectual, psychical, +and physical to all secondary natures; but Tethys is the cause of all +the separation of the streams proceeding from Ocean, imparting to each +a proper purity in the motion adapted to it by nature; through which +each, though it may move itself, or though it may move other things, +yet moves in a transcendent manner. But theologists manifest that Ocean +is the supplier of all motion, when they say that he sends forth ten +streams, nine of which proceed into the sea; because it is necessary, +that of motions nine should be corporeal, but that there should be one +alone of the essence which is separate from bodies, as we are informed +by Plato in the Laws.<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> Such divine natures, therefore, as the +mighty Ocean generates, these he excites to motion, and renders them +efficacious. But Tethys distinguishes these, preserving generative +causes pure from their progeny, and establishing them in energies more +ancient than those that proceed into the external world. And thus much +concerning each of these divinities, Ocean and Tethys.</p> + +<p>Since, however, as we have said, the generation of these, is from +the prior divinities, Heaven and Earth, but is not effected either +by a copulation such as that which is in sensibles, nor according to +such a union as that of Night and Phanes in intelligibles, it very +properly follows that their progeny are separated from each other, +analogously to their parents, and that each receives a similitude to +both. For Ocean indeed, as being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[202]</span> the male, is assimilated to the +paternal cause, Heaven; but as the supplier of motion to the maternal +cause, Earth, who is the cause of progressions. And Tethys indeed, as +the female, is assimilated to the prolific cause; but as producing a +firm establishment<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> of her progeny in their proper lives, she is +assimilated to the fabricating cause. For the male is analogous to the +monadic; but the female to the dyadic. And the stable is adapted to the +former; but the motive to the latter. A duad, therefore, proceeding +from a duad, and being assimilated according to the whole of itself +to the duad which is generative of it, defines and distinguishes the +causes of itself, and all the number posterior to itself; in order that +every where we may ascribe that which defines and separates, to the +order of Ocean and Tethys.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXX.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place Plato says, “that from Ocean and Tethys, Phorcys, +Saturn, and Rhea, and such as subsist together with these were +produced;” the theory of which divinities is as follows. In the former +progeny, a duad generative and motive, was produced from a terminating +and definitive duad; viz. Ocean and Tethys, from Heaven and Earth; but +in the second progeny, a multitude converted to its causes through the +triad, ts generated from the duad; indicating likewise an all-perfect +progression. For this multitude also is divided, into the analogous +to bound, and the co-ordinate to infinity. For the triad is the bound +in this multitude; but the nameless number is the infinity in it. And +of the triad itself, likewise, one thing is analogous to the monad +and bound, but another to the duad and infinity. And in the former +progression, indeed, the progeny alone proceeded according to bound +and the intellectual; but in this there<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[203]</span> is also a mixture of the +indefinite. But after the boundary from the triad, Plato adds, “And +such as subsist together with these,” indicating the entire progression +and separation of these triple orders; so that the progeny of this +progression is triadic through the peculiarity of conversion, and +dyadic through the intervention of the infinite and indefinite.</p> + +<p>Since, however, these differ according to their intellectual causes, in +the same manner as the before-mentioned orders; but in them Ocean and +Tethys were said to be the brethren, and not the fathers<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a> of Saturn +and Rhea; for the progression to these was from Heaven and Earth, and +all the Titannic order is thence derived; let us see on what account +Plato here gives subsistence to Phorcys, Saturn and Rhea, from Ocean +and Tethys. For he may appear to say this not conformably to the Orphic +principles. For “Earth latently bore from Heaven, as the theologist +says, seven pure beautiful virgins with rolling eyes, and seven sons +that were kings, with fine long hair. And the daughters indeed were +Themis, and the joyful Tethys, Mnemosyne with thick-curled hair, and +the blessed Thea. She likewise bore Dione having a very-graceful form, +and Phœbe, and Rhea the mother of king Jupiter. But the venerable +Earth brought forth those celestial youths, who are called by the +appellation of Titans, because they revenged the mighty starry Heaven. +And she also bore Cæus, the great Cræus, and the strong Phorcys, and +likewise Saturn, and Ocean, Hyperion and Japetus.” These things then +having been written by the theologist prior to Plato, how is it that +Timæus produces Saturn and Rhea, from Ocean and Tethys? In answer to +this, as we have before arranged Ocean and Tethys above Saturn and +Rhea, as being the media between these and the fathers, and guardians +of the boundaries of both, as it is usual to celebrate them; we must +say in the first place, indeed, that it is not wonderful that the same +divinities should be brothers, and yet through transcendency of dignity +should be called the fathers of certain Gods. For such things as are +first, when they proceed from their causes, produce in conjunction +with those causes, the natures posterior to themselves. Thus all souls +indeed are sisters, according to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[204]</span> one demiurgic cause, and according to +the vivific principle and fountain from which they proceed; at the same +time divine souls produce partial souls together with the demiurgus +and vivific causes, in consequence of first proceeding into light, +and abiding in their wholeness, receiving the power of fabricating +natures similar to themselves. Besides, in the Gods themselves, all the +offspring of Saturn are brethren, according to the one generative monad +by which they were produced; yet at the same time Jupiter is called +father, in the divine poet Homer, both by Juno and Neptune. So that it +is not at all wonderful, if Ocean and Tethys are called both brethren +and fathers of Saturn and Rhea; in consequence of preserving as among +brethren the paternal peculiarity. In the first place, therefore, the +doubt may after this manner be solved.</p> + +<p>In the next place, it may be said, that of the divine Titannic +hebdomads, Ocean indeed both abides and proceeds, uniting himself +to his father, and not departing from his kingdom. But all the rest +rejoicing in progression, are said to have given completion to the +will of Earth, but to have assaulted their father, dividing themselves +from his kingdom, and proceeding into another order. Or rather, of +all the celestial genera, some alone abide in their principles, as +the two first triads. For, as soon as Heaven understood that they +had an implacable heart, and a lawless nature, he hurled them into +Tartarus, the profundity of the earth, [says Orpheus]. He concealed +them, therefore, in the unapparent, through transcendency of power. But +others both abide in, and proceed from, their principles, as Ocean and +Tethys. For when the other Titans proceeded to assault their father +Heaven, Ocean prohibited them from obeying the mandates of their +mother, being dubious of their rectitude. He, therefore, abides, and +at the same time proceeds, together with Tethys; for she is conjoined +with him according to the first progeny. But the other Titans are +induced to separation and progression. And the leader of these is the +mighty Saturn, as the theologist says; though he evinces that Saturn +is superior to Ocean, by saying, that Saturn himself received the +celestial Olympus, and that there being throned he reigns over the +Titans; but that Ocean obtained all the middle allotment. For he says, +that he dwells in the divine streams which are posterior to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[205]</span> Olympus, +and that he environs the Heaven which is there, and not the highest +Heaven, but as the fable says, that which fell from Olympus, and was +there arranged.<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a></p> + +<p>Ocean and Tethys, therefore, so far as they abide, and are united to +Heaven, produce in conjunction with him the kingdom of Saturn and +Rhea; and so far as they are established in the first power of their +mother, so far they produce Phorcys in conjunction with her.<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a> For +she produces him together with Nereus and Thaumas,<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> from being +mingled through love with the sea. For Phorcys is not celestial, but +Ocean, as is evident from the Theogony.<a id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> And so far as Tethys is +full of Earth, so far being as it were a certain Earth, she may be said +to produce this Phorcys in conjunction with Ocean; so far as Ocean +also comprehends the intelligible in himself. Hence Tethys, so far as +she is Earth according to participation, and Ocean so far as he is +causally the sea, give subsistence in conjunction with Saturn and Rhea +to this God. If, however, any arguments should demonstrate that in the +intellectual order Saturn is above Ocean, or Rhea above Tethys, it must +be said that this arrangement is indeed there; for in that order the +causes of intellection are superior to those of motion; but that here +on the contrary, all things are in mutation and a flowing condition, +so that here Ocean is very properly prior to Saturn, since it is the +fountain of motion, and Tethys is prior to Rhea. Hence, after another +manner, the doubt may be thus solved.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[206]</span></p> + +<p>That we may speak, however, about each of these Gods, Theodorus refers +souls that subsist in habitude to these divinities, and arranges +them as presiding over the three divisions of the world. And Phorcys +indeed, he arranges in the starless sphere, as moving the lation of the +universe. He ought, however, to persuade us that Plato was acquainted +with a certain starless sphere, and afterwards, that he thus arranged +Phorcys in this sphere. But he places Saturn over the motions of +the stars, because time<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a> is from these, and the generations and +corruptions of things. And he places Rhea over the material part of +the world, because by materiality she has a redundancy with respect to +the divinities prior to herself. But the divine Jamblichus arranges +them in the three spheres between the heavens and the earth. For some +of the sublunary deities give a two-fold division to the sublunary +region, but these divide it in a three-fold manner. And Phorcys indeed, +according to him, presides over the whole<a id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> of a humid essence, +containing all of it impartibly. But Rhea is a divinity connective of +flowing and aerial-formed spirits. And Saturn governs the highest and +most attenuated sphere of ether, having a middle arrangement according +to Plato; because the middle and the centre in incorporeal essences, +have a greater authority than the powers situated about the middle. +We, indeed, admire this intellectual explanation of Jamblichus; but +we think it proper to survey these Gods every where, both in all the +elements, and all orders. For thus we shall behold that which is common +in them, and which extends to all things. And we say, indeed, that +Phorcys is the inspective guardian of every spermatic essence, and of +physical, and as it were spermatic productive principles, as being +pregnant with, and the cause of generation. For there are spermatic +productive principles in each of the elements; and different orders of +Gods and dæmons preside over them, all which Plato comprehends through +Phorcys. But king Saturn divides forms and productive principles, and +produces more total into more partial powers. Hence he is not only +an animal but pedestrious, aquatic and a bird. And he is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[207]</span> not only +pedestrious, but likewise man and horse. For the productive principles +in him are more partial than in the celestial deities. Among the +intellectual Gods, therefore, he is allotted this power, viz. to +multiply and divide intelligibles. Hence, he is the leader of the +Titans, as being especially characterized by the dividing peculiarity.</p> + +<p>Again, we say that Rhea receives the unapparent powers of king Saturn, +leads them forth to secondary natures, and excites the paternal powers +to the fabrication of visible objects. For thus also, her first order +is moved, is filled with power and life, and produces into that which +is apparent, the causes that abide in Saturn. Hence Saturn is every +where the supplier of intellectual forms; Rhea is the cause of all +souls, and of every kind of life; and Phorcys is prolific with physical +productive principles. Since however another number of Gods pertains +to the kingdom of these, and which Saturn and Rhea comprehend, on this +account Plato adds, “and such as subsist together with these.” For he +not only through this comprehends dæmons, as some say, but both the +angelic and the dæmoniacal Saturn have with themselves a multitude, +the one angelic, but the other dæmoniacal. And the multitude which is +in the Gods is divine; that which is in the air is aerial; and in a +similar manner in the other elements, and in the other more excellent +genera arranged under these Gods.</p> + +<p>By the words also “such as subsist together with these,” Plato appears +to signify the remaining Titans, viz. Cæus and Hyperion, Creus, +Japetus, and likewise the remaining Titanidæ, viz. Phœbe, Theia, +Mnemosyne, Themis, and Dione, with whom Saturn and Rhea proceeded into +light. Also, those that proceeded together with Phorcys, viz. Nereus +and Thaumas, the most motive Eurybia, and those who especially contain +and connect the whole of generation. Moreover, it is worth while to +observe that it is not proper to discuss accurately the arrangement in +these divinities, and whether Saturn or Phorcys is the superior deity; +for they are united and similar to each other. But if it be requisite +to make a division, it is better to adopt the arrangement of the divine +Jamblichus, viz. that Saturn is a monad; but Rhea a certain duad +calling forth the powers that are in Saturn; and that Phorcys gives +perfection to their progression.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[208]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXI.</h2> + + +<p>It now remains that we direct our attention to the other kings, who +produce the apparent sublunary order of things; for such is the +arrangement which they are allotted. Plato adds therefore, “That from +Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter, Juno, and all such as we know are called +the brethren of these descended.” This is the third progression of +the Gods who are the fabricators of generation, but the fourth order, +closing as a tetrad the nomination of the leading Gods. For the tetrad +is comprehensive of the divine orders. But as a duad this progression +is assimilated to the first kingdom; because that as well as this is +dyadic. There are, however, present with it, the all-perfect according +to progression, and the uncircumscribed according to number. But Plato +here not only adds the words “<i>such as</i>,” as in the progression +prior to it, but likewise the word “<i>all</i>,” that he may indicate +the progression of them to every thing. For we use the term το οσον +<i>such as</i> in speaking of things united, but the term το παντας +<i>all</i>, in speaking of things now divided and multiplied. The total +(το ολικον) likewise pertains to this progression. For the Gods which +are denominated in it, and those that proceed every where together with +them, are characterized according to this form of fabrication. For all +demiurgi are total. Who therefore are they, and what kind of order do +they possess?</p> + +<p>The divine Jamblichus then asserts that Jupiter is the perfector of all +generation; but that Juno is the cause of power, connexion, plenitude +and life to all things; and that the brethren of them are those that +communicate with them in the fabrication of generation, being also +themselves intellects, and receiving a completion according to a +perfection and power similar to them. But Theodorus, again dividing +the life which animates the total in habitude, and forming it as he is +accustomed to do into triads, calls Jupiter the power that governs the +upper region as far as to the air; but Juno the power who is allotted +the aerial part of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[209]</span> the world; and the brethren of them those that give +completion to the remaining parts. For Jupiter is the essential of +the soul that subsists in a material habit, because there is nothing +more vital than essence. But Juno is the intellectual part of such a +soul, because the natures on the earth are governed by the productive +principles proceeding from the air. And the other number is the +psychical distributed into particulars.</p> + +<p>We, however, consequently<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a> to what has been before asserted, say, +that according to Plato there are many orders of Jupiter. For one is +the demiurgus, as it is written in the Cratylus; another, is the first +of the Saturnian triad, as it is asserted in the Gorgias; another is +the liberated, as it is delivered in the Phædrus; and another is the +celestial, whether in the inerratic sphere, or among the planets. +Moreover, as the first Jupiter produced into the visible fabrication +the power of his father, which was concealed in the unapparent, being +excited<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> to this by his mother Rhea; after the same manner the +Jupiter delivered here, who is the fabricator of generation, causes the +unapparent divisions and separations of forms made by Saturn to become +apparent; but Rhea calls them forth, into motion and generation; and +Phorcys inserts them in matter, produces sensible natures, and adorns +the visible essence, in order that there may not only be divisions of +productive principles in natures and in souls, and in intellectual +essences prior to these, but likewise in sensibles. For this is the +peculiarity of fabrication. And if it be requisite to speak what +appears to me to be the truth, Saturn indeed produces intellectual +sections, but Rhea such as are psychical, and Phorcys such as are +physical. For all spermatic productive principles are under nature. +But Jupiter adorning sensible and visible sections, gives a specific +distinction to such beings in the sublunary region as are totally +vital, and causes them to be moved. Since, however, these sensible +forms which are generated and perfected, are multiformly evolved, +being moved and changed according to all-various evolutions, on this +account, the queen Juno is conjoined with Jupiter, giving perfection to +this motion<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[210]</span> of visible natures, and to the evolution of forms. Hence +fables represent her as at one time sending mania to certain persons, +but ordering others to undergo severe labours, in order that through +intellect being present with all things, and partial souls energizing +divinely both theoretically and practically, every progression, and all +the generation of the sublunary region may obtain complete perfection.</p> + +<p>Such, therefore, being the nature of this duad, there are also other +demiurgic powers which triply divide the apparent<a id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> world of +generation; one of these being allotted the government of air; another, +that of water; and another that of earth, conformably to demiurgic +allotments. Hence they are said to be the brothers of these, because +they also preside over the visible fabrication. And farther still, +there are others the progeny of these; which is the last progression +of the divinities mentioned in this place by Plato. Hence, they are +delivered anonymously; Plato by this indicating the diminution of it +as far as to the last division: For as in the Gods that are above the +world, the partible proceeds from the total fabrication, and the series +of kings terminates in this; after the same manner also among the +sublunary Gods, the progeny of Jupiter proceed from the Jovian order; +among which progeny, likewise, is the choir of partible fabrication. +For the before-mentioned demiurgi producing sensibles totally, it is +necessary that those deities should have a subsistence who distribute +different powers and peculiarities to different natures, and divide the +sublunary generation into multitude. Hence Plato alone denominates them +<i>others</i>, and does not employ the expressions <i>such as</i>, and +<i>all</i>, because they associate with all-various diversity.</p> + +<p>With respect, therefore, to this ennead of Gods, Heaven terminates, +Earth corroborates, and Ocean moves all generation. But Tethys +establishes every thing in its proper motion; intellectual essences in +intellectual; middle essences in psychical; and such as are corporeal +in physical, motion; Ocean at the same time collectively moving all +things. Saturn alone divides intellectually; Rhea vivifies; Phorcys +distributes spermatic productive principles; Jupiter perfects things +apparent from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[211]</span> such as are unapparent; and Juno evolves according +to the all-various mutations of visible natures. And thus through +this ennead all the sublunary world derives its completion, and is +fitly arranged; divinely indeed from the Gods, but angelically, as +we say, from angels, and dæmoniacally from dæmons; the Gods indeed +subsisting about bodies, souls and intellects; but angels exhibiting +their providence about souls and bodies; and dæmons being distributed +about the fabrication of nature, and the providential care of bodies. +But again, the number of the ennead is adapted to generation. For +it proceeds from the monad as far as to the extremities without +retrogression;<a id="FNanchor_159" href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> which is the peculiarity of generation. For reasons +(i.e. productive principles) fall into matter, and are unable to +convert themselves to the principles of their existence. Moreover, the +duad is triadic; for three dyadic orders were assumed; viz. Heaven and +Earth; Ocean and Tethys; Jupiter and Juno. And this last duad ranks +as the fourth progression, because prior to it, is the triad Phorcys, +Saturn, and Rhea; which manifests the complication here, of the perfect +and the imperfect, and of bound with infinity. For all celestial +natures are definite, and as Aristotle says, are always in the end. But +things in generation proceed<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> from the imperfect to the perfect, +and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[212]</span> receive the same boundary indefinitely. Besides this, the tetrad +arising from the generation of these divinities is adapted to the +orders of the fabricators of the sublunary region; in order that they +may contain multitude unitedly, and the partible impartibly; and also +to the natures that exist in generation. For the sublunary elements are +four; the seasons according to which generation is evolved are four; +and the centres are four. And in short, there is an abundant dominion +of the tetrad in generation.</p> + +<p>Why, however, it may be said, does Plato comprehend all the multitude +of the Gods that fabricate generation, in this ennead? I answer, +because this ennead gives completion to all the fabrication of +generation. For in the sublunary realms there are bodies and natures, +souls, and intellects, and this both totally and partially. And all +these are in both respects in each of the elements. This ennead in each +of the elements, is as follows, viz. total and partial bodies, total +and partial natures, total and partial souls, and total and partial +intellects, and the monad which contains these, viz. the elementary +sphere itself; because wholes and parts are consubsistent with each +other. Heaven and Earth, however, generate the unapparent essences +of these, i.e. of wholes and parts, the former indeed according to +union, but the latter according to multiplication. And the former +according to bound, but the latter according to infinity; being the +leaders of essence to all things. But Ocean and Tethys give perfection +to both the common and divided motion of them. There is, however, a +different motion of different things, viz. of total intellect, of +total soul, and of total nature; and in a similar manner in such of +these as are partial. The sublunary wholes, therefore, being thus +adorned and distributed, Saturn, indeed, divides partial from total +natures, but intellectually; Rhea, calls forth this division from +intellectuals, into all-various progressions,<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a> as far as to the +last forms of life, being a vivific deity; but Phorcys produces the +Titannic separation, to physical productive principles. After these +three, are the fathers of composite natures. And<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[213]</span> Jupiter indeed, +adorns sensibles totally, according to an imitation of Heaven. For +the Jupiter in the intellectual order, proceeds analogous to the +intellectual Heaven, in the royal series. But Juno moves wholes, fills +them with powers, and evolves, according to every progression. And the +Gods posterior to these fabricate the partial works of sensibles, some +according to one, but others according to another peculiarity, either +demiurgic, or vivific, or perfective, or connective, being evolved and +dividing themselves, as far as to the last of things, analogously to +the Saturnian order. For the dividing peculiarity originates from the +Saturnian dominion.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXII.</h2> + + +<p>In the last place, let us consider why Plato denominates the sublunary +deities, “such as become apparent when they please.” Shall we say +it is because these material elements are hurled forth before them +as veils<a id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> of the splendour of the etherial vehicles which are +proximately suspended from them? For it is evident that being mundane +they must also necessarily have a mundane starry vehicle. The light of +them, however, shines forth to the view, when they are about to benefit +the places that receive their illumination. But if Plato says that they +become visible when they please, it is necessary that this appearance +of them should either be an evolution into light of the incorporeal +powers which they contain, or of the bodies which are entirely spread +under them. But if it is an evolution of their incorporeal powers, this +is also common to the visible Gods. For they are not always apparent +by their incorporeal powers, but only sometimes, and when they please. +It is not proper, therefore, to divide the sublunary oppositely to the +visible Gods,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[214]</span> according to that which is common to both, but so far as +they have entirely something peculiar. But if they produce a luminous +evolution of certain bodies when they please, they must necessarily use +other bodies prior to these material elements; and which then become +visible to us, when it seems fit to the powers that use them. Hence, +other bodies more divine than such as are apparent, are spread under +the invisible Gods; and according to these, they are said to be, and +are mundane. Through these also as media, they ride in and govern these +elements. For they impart to them as much of themselves as they are +able to receive, and contain the forms and the natures of them in their +powers. For since no one of these is an object of sense, and it is +necessary that the vehicles of rational souls should be things of this +kind, it is evident that they must use other vehicles prior to these +visible bodies.</p> + +<p>With respect, however, to all the Gods that govern generation, we +must not say, that they have an essence mingled with matter, as the +Stoics assert they have. For nothing which verges to matter is able +to govern with intellect and wisdom, nor is properly a producing +cause, but an organ of something else. Nor must we say that they have +an essence unmingled with matter, but powers and energies mingled +with it, as Numenius and his followers assert. For the energies of +the Gods concur with their essences, and their inward subsist prior +to their externally proceeding energies; since a partial soul also +prior to the life which is inserted in the animal suspended from it, +contains a more principal life in itself; and prior to the externally +proceeding motion, through which it moves other things, it is moved +with a motion converted to itself. The sublunary Gods, therefore, are +entirely unmingled with matter; adorning indeed things mingled in an +unmingled, and things generated, in an unbegotten manner. They likewise +contain partibles impartibly, are the causes of life, the suppliers of +intellect, the replenishers of power, the givers of soul, the primary +leaders of all good, and the sources of order, providence, and the best +administration. They also give subsistence to more excellent animals +about themselves, are the leaders of angels, the rulers of dæmons, and +the prefects of heroes; governing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[215]</span> through this triple army the whole +of generation. If, therefore, we assert that the appropriate order +of these divinities about generation, is the basis and seat of the +total Gods, we shall speak rightly. And we shall likewise not err in +asserting that they convolve the end of the divine decrement to the +beginning. Such then being the nature of these divinities, Plato indeed +looking to the Gods that are both intelligible and intellectual, and to +those that are properly called intellectual, surveyed four progressions +of them in common. But they also contain powers derived from the +supermundane Gods; whether they proceed from the twelve leaders, or +from certain other deities.</p> + +<p>From the celestial choir of Gods likewise, a certain order proceeds +into generation, which, as the divine Jamblichus says, is doubled in +its progression. For from the twenty-one leaders, forty-two governments +of Gods who are the fabricators of generation, are derived, according +to each elementary allotment. But from the thirty-six decadarchs,<a id="FNanchor_163" href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> +seventy-two sublunary rulers proceed; and in a similar manner other +Gods; being the double of the celestial Gods in multitude, but falling +short of them in power. It is likewise necessary to survey their triple +progressions, their quintuple divisions, and their divine generation +according to the hebdomad. For they receive an orderly distribution in +a three-fold, five-fold, and sevenfold manner analogous to the whole +world; in order that each of the elements may be a world, and may be +truly an imitation of the universe. Such, therefore, is the concise +doctrine concerning the sublunary Gods, according to twofold essences, +lives, and allotments; just as Plato also makes the ruling progeny of +them to be dyadic.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[216]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIII.</h2> + + +<p>Having therefore discussed the theory pertaining to the celestial and +sublunary Gods, it now remains that we ascend to the summit or monad +of all the mundane Gods, Bacchus, in whose divinity they all subsist +and are rooted, similarly to the fixed stars in the inerratic sphere. +For after this manner, every monad analogously contains its co-ordinate +multitude.</p> + +<p>Bacchus therefore, is the mundane intellect, from which the soul and +body of the world are suspended. With respect however, to intellect +it is necessary to observe that one kind is imparticipable and total; +another is participable indeed but essentially so; and a third is +participable, and subsists as a habit. All intellects unconnected +with soul belong to the first kind. The mundane intellect, and the +intellects of all the mundane Gods and beneficent dæmons, rank in the +second division. And to the third class such intellects as ours belong. +This deity also is the monad of the Titans, or ultimate fabricators +of things, by whom he is said in divine fables to have been torn in +pieces; because the mundane soul which participates of this divinity, +and is on this account intellectual, is participated by the Titans, +and through them distributed into every part of the universe. Plato +in the Cratylus says of this divinity “that he is the giver of wine; +and that οινος <i>wine</i> may most justly be denominated οιονους +because it is accustomed to deprive those of intellect who possessed +it before.” On which words Proclus in his MS Scholia on that dialogue +observes as follows: “The young man Cratylus appears to inquire about +our sovereign master Bacchus, as if it were about things of small +importance, and on this account he is silenced by Socrates.<a id="FNanchor_164" href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> And +he does not indeed pay attention to the occult, but only to the last +and mundane progressions of the Gods.” These indeed, the wise man +venerates, though<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[217]</span> as he says, they are sports, through these Gods +[Bacchus and Venus] being lovers of sport. For as he says of the +terminations of the other Gods, that they are terrible, and that they +avenge and punish, and thus give perfection to souls; as for instance, +that Justice follows Jupiter, the avenger of the divine law, and that +this divinity is benevolent to those whose manners are orderly, and +who live according to intellect, but that she is baneful to those who +mingle their life with insolence and ignorance, till she has entirely +subverted them, their houses and cities;—in like manner, he venerates +the terminations of Bacchus and Venus, which produce γλυκυθυμια +<i>sweetness of sensation</i>; every where purifying our conceptions +concerning the Gods, and preparing us to understand that all things +look to the best end, whatever it may be. For because the terminations +of these divinities strengthen the infirmity of the mortal nature, and +alleviate corporeal molestation, on this account the Gods the causes +of these things, are φιλοπαιγμονες lovers of sport. Hence, of statues, +they make some of them laughing and dancing, and exhibiting relaxation, +but others austere, astonishing, and terrible to the view, analogously +to the mundane allotments of the Gods.</p> + +<p>But theologists frequently call Bacchus <i>wine</i>, from the last of +his gifts, as for instance, Orpheus,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Οινου παντα μελη κοσμῳ λαβε, και μοι ενεικε.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “Take all the members of <i>Wine</i> [that are distributed] in the +world, and bring them to me.” If however the God is thus denominated, +certainly his first and middle energies will be thus called, as well +as his last; so that Socrates now looking to this calls the God +διδοινυσος, beginning from wine, which as we have said manifests +all the powers of Bacchus. Thus also in the Phædrus, Socrates calls +Love in common <i>great</i>, both that which is divine, and that +which is a lover of body. By this epithet <i>wine</i> therefore, we +must understand that the peculiarity of a partial intellect, is in +common presented to our view. For the word οιουν <i>such as</i>, is +nothing else than intellectual form separated from a total intellect, +and in consequence of this becoming participated, particular and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[218]</span> +<i>alone</i>. For an all-perfect intellect is all things, and energizes +according to all things with invariable sameness: but a partial and +participated intellect, is indeed all things, but this according to one +form, such as a solar, lunar, or mercurial form. This therefore, the +peculiarity of which is to be separated from the rest, wine indicates, +signifying an intellect <i>such as</i>, and <i>particular</i>. +(σημαινων τον οιον και τινα νουν)</p> + +<p>Since, therefore, every partial fabrication is suspended from the +Dionysiacal or Bacchic monad, which distributes participated mundane +intellects from total intellect, (or that intellect which ranks as a +whole) many souls from one soul, and all sensible forms from their +proper wholenesses; on this account theologists call both this God +and all his fabrications <i>wine</i>. For all these are the progeny +of intellect. And some things participate of the partial distribution +of intellect in a more distant, but others in a nearer degree. Wine +therefore energizes in things analogous to its subsistence in them; +in body indeed, after the manner of an image, according to a false +opinion and imagination; but in intellectual natures, according to an +intellectual energy and fabrication. For in the laceration of Bacchus +by the Titans, the <i>heart</i> of the God is said to have alone +remained undistributed, i.e. <i>the indivisible</i> or impartible +<i>essence of intellect</i>.</p> + +<p>With respect to the mundane soul which is the immediate participant +of this Bacchic intellect, the composition of it is most accurately +delivered by Plato in the Timæus, and admirably unfolded by Proclus +in his Commentaries on that dialogue. For full information therefore +on this subject I refer the reader to those works; and shall only +summarily observe at present that there are five genera of being, +from which all things after the first being are composed; viz. +<i>essence</i>, <i>permanency</i>, <i>motion</i>, <i>sameness</i>, and +<i>difference</i>. For every thing must possess <i>essence</i>; must +<i>abide</i> in its cause, from which also it must <i>proceed</i>, +and to which it must be <i>converted</i>; must be the <i>same</i> +with itself and certain other natures, and at the same time different +from others, and distinguished in itself. But Plato for the sake of +brevity, assumes only three of these in the composition of the mundane +soul, viz. <i>essence, sameness, and difference</i>; for the other two +must necessarily subsist in conjunction with these. When<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[219]</span> therefore +Plato says, “that from an essence impartible, and always subsisting +according to sameness of being, and from a nature divisible about +bodies, the demiurgus mingled from both a third form of essence, having +a middle subsistence between the two,”—by the impartible essence he +means intellect, and by the nature which is divisible about bodies, +a corporeal life. Hence the mundane soul is a medium between the +mundane intellect, and the whole of that corporeal life which the +world participates. We must not however suppose that when the soul +is said to be mingled from these two, the indivisible and divisible +natures are consumed in the mixture, as is the case when corporeal +substances are mingled together; but we must understand that the soul +is of a middle nature between these, so as to be different from each, +and yet a participant of each. In short, the intellect participated by +soul, is called by Plato impartible; but the nature which is divisible +about bodies is the corporeal-formed life proceeding from the mundane +soul, and which has the relation of splendour to it. For intellect is +analogous to the sun; soul, to the light proceeding from the sun; and a +divisible life to the splendour proceeding from light.</p> + +<p>Proclus observes on the above cited words of Plato, that they are +conformable to the Orphic traditions. “For, says he,<a id="FNanchor_165" href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a> Orpheus does +not predicate the impartible of every intelligible or intellectual +order, but according to him there are certain natures superior to this +appellation, in the same manner as others are superior to other names. +For king and father are not adapted to all the divine orders. Where, +therefore, according to Orpheus, shall we first survey the impartible, +in order that we may understand the divine conception of Plato? Orpheus +therefore establishes one demiurgus of every divisible fabrication, +analogous to the one father who generates the total fabrication, and +from him produces the whole intellectual mundane multitude, the number +of souls, and corporeal compositions. And this one demiurgus indeed +(i.e. Bacchus) generates all these unitedly; but the Gods that surround +him, divide and separate his fabrications. Orpheus however says, that +all his other<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[220]</span> fabrications were distributed into parts by the Gods +whose characteristic is of a dividing nature; but that his heart alone +was preserved impartible, through the providence of Minerva. For +since he gives subsistence to intellects, souls and bodies; but souls +and bodies indeed, receive in themselves an abundant division and +distribution into parts, intellect remaining united and indivisible, +being all things in one, and comprehending total intelligibles in one +intellection;—this being the case, he says that the intellectual +essence alone, and the intellectual number was saved entire by Minerva. +For says he,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>The intellectual heart alone was left,</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">directly calling it intellectual.</p> + +<p>If therefore the impartible heart is intellectual, it will evidently +be intellect and an intellectual number; not indeed every intellect, +but the mundane; for this is the impartible heart, since the divided +God was also the fabricator of this. Orpheus therefore calls the +impartible essence of Bacchus intellect. But he denominates the life +which is divisible about body, which is physical, and pregnant with +seeds, the genitals of the God. And he says that Diana who presides +over all the generation in nature, and is the midwife of physical +productive principles, extends these genitals, distributing as far as +to subterranean natures, the prolific power of the God. But all the +remaining body of Bacchus was, he says, the psychical essence, this +also being divided into seven parts. For they divided all the seven +parts of the boy, says the theologist, speaking of the Titans; just as +Timæus divides the soul into seven parts. And perhaps Timæus, when he +says that soul is extended through the whole world, will remind the +followers of Orpheus of the Titannic division, through which soul is +not only spread round the universe like a veil, but is also extended +through it. Very properly therefore, does Plato call the essence which +is proximately above soul, an impartible essence. And in short, he thus +denominates the intellect which is participated by soul, following the +Orphic fables, and wishing to be as it were an interpreter of what is +said in the mysteries.” And thus much concerning Bacchus, or the monad +of the mundane Gods.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[221]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIV.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place let us direct our attention to the Parmenides of +Plato, and see how in that most theological dialogue the mundane +Gods are characterized. In the first hypothesis therefore of that +dialogue, in which all the divine orders are denied of <i>the one</i>, +Parmenides characterizes the mundane Gods by the equal and the unequal +as follows: “But since <i>the one</i> is such, it will neither be +equal nor unequal either to itself or to another. How so? If it were +equal, indeed, it would be of the same measures with that to which it +is equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or less than the things +with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the +less quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But to those +to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will +consist of less; and with respect to the other of greater measures. How +should it not? Is it not therefore impossible that a thing which does +not participate of same should either be of the same measures, or admit +any thing in any respect the same? It is impossible. It will therefore +neither be equal to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of +the same measures. It does not appear that it will. But if it consists +of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are +measures; and so again, it will no longer be <i>the one</i>, but as +many as there are measures. Right. But if it should be of one measure, +it would become equal to that measure. It has, however, appeared that +<i>the one</i> cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared so. <i>The +one</i>, therefore, neither participates of one measure, nor of many, +nor of a few; nor (since it in no respect participates of <i>same</i>) +can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again +greater or less either than itself or another. It is in every respect +so.”</p> + +<p>As the commentary of Proclus on the second hypothesis of the +Parmenides, in which the equal and the unequal are affirmed of <i>the +one</i>, is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[222]</span> lost, and in which I have no doubt, the properties of the +mundane Gods were most fully unfolded, I shall present the reader with +the following extract from his commentary on the above passage in the +Parmenides of Plato. The peculiarity of the mundane Gods is the equal +and the unequal, the former of these indicating their fulness, and +their receiving neither any addition nor ablation; (for such is that +which is equal to itself, always preserving the same boundary;) but the +latter, the multitude of their powers, and the excess and defect which +they contain. For in these, divisions, variety of powers, differences +of progressions, analogies, and bonds through these, are, according to +ancient theologists, especially allotted a place. Hence, Timæus also +constitutes souls through analogy, the causes of which must necessarily +presubsist in the Gods that proximately preside over souls. And as all +analogies subsist from equality, Plato very properly indicates the +peculiarity of these divinities by the equal and the unequal. But he +now rightly frames the demonstrations of the negations of the equal +and the unequal from <i>sameness and the many</i>, and not from <i>the +similar and the dissimilar</i>, though immediately before he spoke of +these. For every mundane deity proceeds from the demiurgic monad, and +the first multitude which he denies of <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<p>Of this then we must be entirely persuaded, that the things of which +demonstrations consist are the preceding causes of the particulars +about which Parmenides discourses; so that <i>the equal</i> and +<i>the unequal</i>, so far as they proceed from <i>the one</i>, and +subsist through <i>sameness</i> and <i>the many</i>, so far through +these they are denied of <i>the one</i>. Hence, Plato thus begins his +discussion of them:—“But since it (viz. <i>the one</i>) is such,” +i.e. not as we have just now demonstrated, but as was formerly shown, +that it neither receives <i>same</i> nor <i>different</i>, and is +<i>without multitude</i>,—being such, it is neither equal nor unequal, +neither to itself, nor to others. For again, there are here twofold +conclusions, in the same manner as concerning the similar and the +dissimilar, and the same and the different. But that <i>the equal</i> +and <i>the unequal</i> are suspended from the twofold co-ordinations +of divine natures is not immanifest. For <i>the equal</i> is arranged +under <i>the similar</i>, and <i>the same, subsistence in another, +the round, and the whole</i>; but <i>the unequal</i>, under <i>the +dissimilar</i>, <i>the different</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[223]</span> <i>subsistence in itself</i>, +<i>the straight</i>, and <i>the possession of parts</i>. And again, of +these the former are suspended from <i>bound</i>, but the latter from +infinity. Plato also appears to produce the discourse through certain +oppositions, as it were, that he may show that <i>the one</i> is above +all opposition. For <i>the one</i> cannot be the worse of the two +opposites, since this would be absurd; nor can it be the better of the +two, since in this case it would not be the cause of all things. For +the better opposite is not the cause of the worse, but in a certain +respect communicates with it, without being properly its cause. For +neither does sameness give subsistence to difference, nor permanency +to motion; but comprehension and union pervade from the better to the +worse.</p> + +<p>It is, however, by no means wonderful that the demonstrations of <i>the +equal</i> and <i>the unequal</i>, which are here assumed as symbols of +mundane deity, should be adapted to physical and mathematical equals, +to the equals in the reasons of soul, and to those in intellectual +forms. For it is necessary that demonstrations in all these negations +should begin supernally, and should extend through all secondary +natures, that they may show that <i>the one</i> of the Gods is exempt +from intellectual, psychical, mathematical, and physical forms. All +such axioms, therefore, as are now assumed concerning things equal +and unequal, must be adapted to this order of Gods. Hence, as it +contains many powers, some of which are co-ordinate with each other, +and extend themselves to the self-perfect and <i>the good</i>, but +others differ according to transcendency and subjection—the former +must be said to be characterized by <i>equality</i>, but the latter by +<i>inequality</i>. For <i>the good</i> is the measure of every thing: +and hence such things as are united by the same good are measured by +the same measure, and are equal to each other. But things which are +unco-ordinated with each other make their progression according to the +unequal.</p> + +<p>Since, however, of things unequal, some are commensurate and others +incommensurate, it is evident that these also must be adapted to +divine natures. Hence commensuration must be referred to those Gods, +through whom secondary natures are mingled with those prior to them, +and participate of the whole of more excellent beings. For thus, in +things commensurate,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[224]</span> the less is willing to have a common measure +with the greater, the same thing measuring the whole of each. But +incommensuration must be ascribed to those divinities from whom things +subordinate, through the exempt transcendency of more excellent +natures, participate of them in a certain respect, but are incapable +through their subjection of being conjoined with the whole of them. +For the communion proceeding from first to partial and multifarious +natures is incommensurate to the latter. If, indeed, <i>the equal</i> +and <i>the unequal</i> are symbols of the mundane Gods, <i>the +commensurate</i> and <i>the incommensurate</i> are here very properly +introduced. For in things incorporeal and immaterial this opposition +has no place, all things being there effable; but where there is a +material subject, and a mixture of form and something formless, there +an opposition of commensuration very properly subsists. Hence, as the +mundane Gods are proximately connective of souls and bodies, form and +matter, a division appears in them, according to <i>the equal</i> and +<i>the unequal</i>.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXV.</h2> + + +<p>After the mundane Gods, the scientific order of discussion requires +that we should consider divine souls, and the triple genera of natures +more excellent than man, viz. angels, dæmons, and heroes. Previous, +however, to this, that I may as much as possible unfold to the reader +the whole of the Platonic theory about the Gods, I shall present him +with a development of the nature of certain other divinities mentioned +by Plato; and which, owing to the loss of the seventh book of Proclus, +and of other theological works of the most genuine Platonists, cannot +at this remote and barren period be scientifically classed.</p> + +<p>In the first place, then, I shall present the reader with what Plato +says in the Phædrus of Boreas and Orithya, the Centaurs, Chimæras, +Gorgons,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[225]</span> Pegasuses, Typhons, Achelous, and the Nymphs, accompanied +with the elucidations of Ammonius Hermeas. “Phædr. Inform me, Socrates, +whether this is not the place in which Boreas is reported to have +ravished Orithya from Ilissus. Soc. It is reported so indeed. Phædr. +Was it not just here then? for the brooks hereabouts appear to be +grateful to the view, pure and transparent, and very well adapted to +the sports of virgins. Soc. It was not, but two or three stadia lower +down, where we meet with the temple of Diana, and in that very place +there is a certain altar sacred to Boreas. Phædr. I did not perfectly +know this. But tell me by Jupiter, Socrates, are you persuaded that +this fabulous narration is true? Soc. If I should not believe in it, +as is the case with the wise, I should not be absurd: and afterwards, +speaking sophistically, I should say that the wind Boreas hurled from +the neighbouring rocks Orithya, sporting with Pharmacia; and that she +dying in consequence of this, was said to have been ravished by Boreas, +or from the hill of Mars. There is also another report, that she was +not ravished from this place, but from that. But for my own part, +Phædrus, I consider interpretations of this kind as pleasant enough, +but at the same time, as the province of a man vehemently curious +and laborious, and not entirely happy; and this for no other reason, +than because after such an explanation, it is necessary for him to +correct the shape of the Centaurs, and Chimæra. And besides this, a +crowd of Gorgons and Pegasuses will pour upon him for an exposition +of this kind, and of certain other prodigious natures, immense both +in multitude and novelty. All which, if any one, not believing in +their literal meaning, should draw to a probable sense, employing for +this purpose a certain rustic wisdom, he will stand in need of most +abundant leisure. With respect to myself, indeed, I have not leisure +for such an undertaking; and this because I am not yet able, according +to the Delphic precept, to know myself. But it appears to me to be +ridiculous, while I am yet ignorant of this, to speculate things +foreign from the knowledge of myself. Hence, bidding farewell to these, +and being persuaded in the opinion which I have just now mentioned +respecting them, I do not contemplate these, but myself, considering +whether I am not a wild beast, possessing more folds than Typhon, +and far more raging and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[226]</span> fierce; or whether I am a more mild and +simple animal, naturally participating of a certain divine and modest +condition. But are we not, my friend, in the midst of our discourse +arrived at our destined seat? And is not yonder the oak to which you +were to lead us? Phædr. That indeed is it. Soc. By Juno, a beautiful +retreat. For the plane-tree very widely spreads its shady branches, +and is remarkably tall; and the height and opacity of the willow, are +perfectly beautiful, being now in the vigour of its vegetation, and, on +this account, filling all the place with the most agreeable odour. Add +too, that a most pleasant fountain of extreme cool water flows under +the plane-tree, as may be inferred from its effect on our feet, and +which appears to be sacred to certain Nymphs, and to Achelous, from the +virgins and statues with which it is adorned.”</p> + +<p>On this very beautiful passage, Hermes comments as follows: The +Athenians established a temple of Rural Diana, because this Goddess is +the inspective guardian of every thing rural, and represses every thing +rustic and uncultivated. But the altars and temples of the Gods signify +their allotments; as you may also call this mundane body, or apparent +solar orb, the altar and temple of the sun, and of the soul of the sun.</p> + +<p>With respect to the fable, a two-fold solution may be given of it; one +from history, more ethical, but the other transferring us to wholes. +And the former of these is as follows: Orithya was the daughter of +Erectheus, and the priestess of Boreas; for each of the winds has a +presiding deity, which the telestic art, or the art pertaining to +sacred mysteries, religiously cultivates. To this Orithya, then, +the God was so very propitious, that he sent the north wind for the +safety of the country; and besides this, he is said to have assisted +the Athenians in their naval battles. Orithya, therefore, becoming +enthusiastic, being possessed by her proper God Boreas, and no longer +energizing as a human being (for animals cease to energize according to +their own peculiarities when possessed by superior causes) died under +the inspiring influence, and thus was said to have been ravished by +Boreas. And this is the more ethical explanation of the fable.</p> + +<p>But the second, which transfers the narration to wholes, is as follows, +and does not entirely subvert the former: for divine fables often +employ<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[227]</span> transactions and histories in subserviency to the discipline +of wholes. They say, then, that Erectheus is the God that rules +over the three elements, air, water, and earth. Sometimes, however, +he is considered as alone the ruler of the earth, and sometimes +as the presiding deity of Attica alone. Of this deity, Orithya is +the daughter. And she is the prolific power of the earth, which is +indeed co-extended with the word <i>Erectheus</i>, as the unfolding +of the name signifies. For it is <i>the prolific power of the earth +flourishing and restored according to the seasons</i>. But Boreas is +the providence of the Gods supernally illuminating secondary natures; +for the providence of the Gods in the world is signified by Boreas, +because this divinity blows from lofty places. But the elevating power +of the Gods is signified by the south wind, because this wind blows +from low to lofty places; and besides this, things situated towards the +south are more divine. The providence of the Gods, therefore, causes +the prolific power of the earth, or of the Attic land, to ascend, and +proceed into the apparent.</p> + +<p>Orithya, also, may be said to be a soul<a id="FNanchor_166" href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> aspiring after things +above, from ορουω and θειω, according to the Attic custom of adding a +letter at the end of a word, which letter is here an ω. Such a soul, +therefore, is ravished by Boreas supernally blowing. But if Orithya +was hurled from a precipice, this also is appropriate. For such a +soul dies a philosophic, not receiving a physical death, and abandons +a <i>proairetic</i>,<a id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> at the same time that she lives a physical +life. And philosophy, according to Socrates in the Phædo, is nothing +else than a meditation of death.</p> + +<p>According to some, however, Socrates in what he here says about Orithya +and Boreas does not admit the explanation of fables. But it is evident +that he frequently does admit and employ fables. Now, indeed, he blames +those explanations which make fables to be nothing more than certain +histories, and unfold them into material causes, airs, and earth,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[228]</span> and +winds, which do not revert to true beings, nor harmonize with divine +concerns. Hence, Socrates now says, If unfolding this fable I should +recur to physical causes, and should assert that the wind Boreas, +blowing vehemently, hurled Orithya as she was playing from the rock, +and thus dying she was said to have been ravished by Boreas,—should +I not speak absurdly? For this explanation which is adopted by the +<i>wise</i>, viz. by those who are employed in physical speculations, +is meagre and conjectural; since it does not recur to true beings, +but to natures, and winds, airs and vortices, as he also says in the +Phædo. He rejects, therefore, these naturalists, and those who thus +explain this fable, as falling into the indefinite and infinite, and +not recurring to soul, intellect, and the Gods. But when Socrates says +that he considers such interpretations as the province of a man <i>very +curious and laborious, and not entirely happy</i>, these words indicate +the being conversant with things sensible and material. And the +Centaurs, Chimæras, Gorgons, and Pegasuses, are powers which preside +over a material nature, and the region about the earth.<a id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a></p> + +<p>When Socrates also says, that he is not yet able to know himself, his +meaning may be, either that he does not yet know himself as pure soul +itself, but that as being in body he knows himself; or that he does not +yet know himself, as he is known by divinity. For if ever any man knew +himself, this was certainly the case with Socrates.</p> + +<p>When likewise he says, “I do not contemplate these, but myself;” this +is because he who knows himself knows all things. For in consequence +of the soul being παμμορφον αγαλμα an omniform image, he beholds all +things in himself. But by Typhon here we must understand that power +which presides over the confused and disordered in the universe, +or in other words over the last procession of things. The term +<i>manifold</i>, therefore, in this place, must not be applied to the +God Typhon, but to that over which he presides, as being in its own +nature moved in a confused, disordered,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[229]</span> and manifold manner. For +it is usual with fables to refer the properties of the objects of +providential care to the providing powers themselves.</p> + +<p>Farther still, Socrates mentions Juno, as generating and adorning +the beauty of the mundane fabrication; and hence she is said to have +received the Cestus from Venus. But Achelous is the deity who presides +over the much-honoured power of water. For by this mighty river, the +God who is the inspective guardian of potable water is manifested. And +Nymphs are Goddesses who preside over regeneration, and are ministrant +to Bacchus the offspring of Semele. But this Bacchus supplies the +regeneration of the whole sensible world.</p> + +<p>I shall only add, that Nymphs according to Servius on the first Æneid +are distributed into three classes. But Nymphs belonging to mountains +are called Oreades; to woods, Dryades; those that are born with woods, +Hamadryades; those that belong to fountains, Napæ, or Naiades; and +those that belong to the sea, Nereides.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVI.</h2> + + +<p>Again, the following divinities are also mentioned by Plato in +different parts of his works. In the first place, Pan, at the end +of the Phædrus; to which divinity Socrates addresses the following +admirable prayer: “O beloved Pan, and all ye other Gods, who are +residents of this place, grant that I may become beautiful within, +and that whatever I possess externally may be friendly to my inward +attainments! Grant also, that I may consider the wise man as one who +abounds in wealth; and that I may enjoy that portion of gold, which no +other than a prudent man is able either to bear, or properly manage!” +In this prayer, by Pan and the other Gods, we must understand local +deities under the moon. But<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[230]</span> Pan is denominated as it were <i>all</i>, +because he possesses the most ample sway in the order of local Gods. +For as the supermundane Gods are referred to Jupiter, and the celestial +to Bacchus, so all the sublunary local Gods and dæmons are referred to +Pan.</p> + +<p>In the next place, Tartarus is mentioned by Plato in the Phædo, as one +of the greatest chasms of the earth; and of which, says he, Homer<a id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> +thus speaks:</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Far, very far, where under earth is found</div> + <div>A gulf, of every depth, the most profound.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">But Tartarus, says Olympiodorus, is the extremity of the universe, and +subsists oppositely to Olympus. It is also a deity, the inspective +guardian of that which is last in every order. Hence, there is a +celestial Tartarus, in which Heaven concealed his offspring; a +Saturnian Tartarus, in which likewise Saturn concealed his offspring; +and also a Jovian of this kind, which is demiurgic.</p> + +<p>Again, the characteristic peculiarity of Prometheus, as mentioned by +Plato in the Gorgias, is thus unfolded by Olympiodorus in his MS. +Scholia on that dialogue: Prometheus is the inspective guardian of the +descent of rational souls. For to exert a <i>providential energy</i> +is the employment of the rational soul, and, prior to any thing else, +to know itself. Irrational natures indeed perceive through percussion, +and prior to impulsion know nothing; but the rational nature is able, +prior to information from another, to know what is useful. Hence, +<i>Epimetheus</i> is the inspective guardian of the irrational soul, +because it knows through percussion, and not prior to it. Prometheus, +therefore, is that power which presides over the descent of rational +souls. But <i>fire</i> signifies the rational soul itself; because, as +fire tends upwards, so the rational soul pursues things on high. But +you will say, why is this fire said to have been stolen? Because that +which is stolen is transferred from its proper place to one that is +foreign. Hence, since the rational soul is sent from its proper place +of abode on high, to earth, as to a foreign region, on this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[231]</span> account +the fire is said to be stolen. But why was it concealed in a reed? +Because a reed is full of cavities, and therefore signifies the flowing +body in which the soul is carried. But why was the fire stolen contrary +to the will of Jupiter? Again, the fable speaks as a fable. For both +Prometheus and Jupiter are willing that the soul should abide on high; +but as it is requisite that she should descend, the fable fabricates +particulars accommodated to the persons. And it represents indeed the +superior character, which is Jupiter, as unwilling; for he wishes the +soul always to abide on high. But the inferior character, Prometheus, +obliges her to descend: Jupiter, therefore, ordered Pandora to be made. +And what else is this than the irrational soul, which is of a feminine +characteristic? For as it was necessary that the soul should descend +to these lower regions, but being incorporeal and divine, it was +impossible for her to be conjoined with body without a medium, hence +she becomes united with it through <i>the irrational soul</i>. But this +irrational soul was called Pandora, because each of the Gods bestowed +on it some particular gift. And this signifies that the illuminations +which terrestrial natures receive take place through the celestial +bodies.<a id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a></p> + +<p>Again, in the Phædo, mention is made by Plato of Cadmus, who, according +to Olympiodorus, is the sublunary world, as being Dionysiacal, on which +account Harmonia or Harmony is united to the God, and also as being the +father of the four Bacchuses. The four elements likewise he informs +us are said to be Dionysiacal, viz. <i>fire</i> to be <i>Semele</i>; +<i>earth</i>, <i>Agave</i>, tearing in pieces her own offspring; +<i>water</i>, <i>Ino</i>; and lastly, <i>air</i>, <i>Autonoe</i>. There +is great beauty in conjoining Harmony, the daughter of Venus and Mars, +with Cadmus. For Venus, as we have before observed, is the cause of all +the harmony and analogy in the universe, and beautifully illuminates +the order and communion of all mundane concerns. But Mars excites +the contrarieties of the universe, that the world may exist perfect +and entire from all its parts. The progeny, therefore, of these two +divinities must be the <i>concordant discord</i>, or <i>harmony</i> of +the sublunary world.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[232]</span></p> + +<p>Farther still, the Syrens are mentioned by Plato, both in the 10th book +of the Republic, and in the Cratylus. And Proclus, in the 6th book of +this work, has explained the meaning of what Plato says of them in the +former of those dialogues. But in his MS. Scholia on the Cratylus he +says, “The divine Plato knew that there are three kinds of Sirens; the +<i>celestial</i>, which is under the government of Jupiter; <i>that +which produces generation</i>, and is under the government of Neptune; +and that which is <i>cathartic</i>, and is under the government of +Pluto. It is common to all these, to incline all things through an +harmonic motion to their ruling Gods. Hence, when the soul is in the +heavens, the Sirens are desirous of uniting it to the divine life which +flourishes there. But it is proper that souls living in generation +should sail beyond them, like the Homeric Ulysses, that they may not be +allured by generation, of which the sea is an image. And when souls are +in Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through intellectual +conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the kingdom of Hades +there are Gods, dæmons, and souls, who dance as it were round Pluto, +allured by the Sirens that dwell there.”</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVII.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place, let us direct our attention to Plato’s theological +conceptions of Nature, Fate, and Fortune. From the Timæus, therefore, +it appears that Plato does not consider either matter, or material +form, or body, or natural powers, as worthy to be called Nature, though +it has been thus denominated by others. Nor does he think proper +to call Nature soul; but establishing its essence between soul and +corporeal powers, he considers it as inferior to the former through +its being divided about bodies, and its incapacity of conversion to +itself, but as surpassing the latter through containing the productive +principles, and generating<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[233]</span> and vivifying every part of the visible +world. For Nature verges towards bodies, and is inseparable from their +fluctuating empire. But soul is separate from body, is established in +herself, and subsists both from herself and another; from another, that +is, from intellect through participation; and from herself, on account +of not verging to body, but abiding in her own essence, and at the +same time illuminating the obscure nature of matter with a secondary +life. Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this +corporeal and sensible world; bounds the progressions of incorporeal +essences; and is full of reasons and powers through which she governs +mundane affairs. And she is a Goddess indeed considered as deified, +and not according to the primary signification of the word; for divine +bodies also are called Gods, as being the statues or images of the +Gods. But she governs the whole world by her powers; by her summit +comprehending the heavens; but through heaven governing generation. And +she every where weaves partial natures in amicable conjunction with +wholes.</p> + +<p>Nature, however, thus subsisting, she proceeds from the vivific Goddess +Rhea; (for “immense Nature, says the Chaldean oracle, is suspended from +the shoulders of the Goddess;”) from whom all life is derived, both +that which is intellectual, and that which is inseparable from the +subjects of its government. But Nature being from thence suspended, +she pervades through and inspires all things without impediment. +Hence, the most inanimate beings participate of a certain soul, and +corruptible natures remain perpetually in the world, being connected +and comprehended by the causes of forms which she contains. And those +indeed who call Nature demiurgic art, if they mean by this the Nature +which abides in the demiurgus himself, they do not speak rightly; +but if they mean that which proceeds from him, their conception +is accurate. For art must be considered as having a three-fold +subsistence; one, that which does not proceed out of the artist; the +second, that which proceeds indeed, but is converted to him; and +the third, that which has now proceeded, and has its subsistence in +something else. The art, therefore, which is in the demiurgus, abides +indeed in him; but the intellectual soul is art, yet at the same time +both abiding and proceeding. And<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[234]</span> Nature is art, alone proceeding into +something different from herself. Hence, she is said to be the organ of +the Gods, not deprived of life, nor alter-motive alone, but having in a +certain respect, a self-motive power, in consequence of energizing from +herself. For the organs of the Gods are essentialized in efficacious +powers, are vital, and concur with their energies. And thus much +concerning Nature according to the conceptions of Plato, as unfolded by +Proclus.</p> + +<p>In the next place with respect to Fate, in the fable in the Politicus, +Plato says, that “Fate and connate desire convolve the world, when it +is considered by itself as a corporeal nature, without the intellectual +Gods.” And in the Timæus he represents the demiurgus exhibiting to +souls the nature of the universe, and announcing to them the laws of +Fate. On which Proclus admirably comments as follows: It must not be +said, that Fate is a partial nature, as some of the Peripatetics assert +it is; as for instance, Alexander; for such a nature is imbecil and not +perpetual. For from common conceptions, we pre-assume that the power of +Fate is something very great and stable. Nor must it be said, that it +is the order of the mundane periods, as Aristotle asserts it to be, who +denominates the increase which is contrary to order <i>preterfatal</i>, +as if order and Fate were the same. For the cause of order is one +thing, but order itself is another. Nor is it soul subsisting in +habitude, as Theodorus says; for such a form of life in wholes is not +a principle. Nor is it simply Nature, as Porphyry says it is. For many +things which are supernatural, and out of the dominion of Nature are +produced by Fate, such as nobility, renown, and wealth. For where is +it seen that physical motions become the cause of these? Nor is it the +intellect of the universe, as again Aristotle says in a certain place, +if the treatise On the World was written by him. For intellect produces +every thing which it produces at once, and is not at all in want of +an administration which proceeds according to a certain period, and a +continued and well-ordered series of things. But the chain, the order, +the periodic production of many causes constitute the peculiarity of +Fate.</p> + +<p>If, however, it be requisite to comprehend the whole form of it +concisely, we must say, that the subject matter as it were of it is +Nature herself, but<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[235]</span> considered as deified, and filled with divine, +intellectual, and psychical illuminations. For the order of Gods called +the presidents of destiny, (των μοιρηγετων καλουμενων) and the genera +that are more excellent than man terminate in Nature. For these impart +powers from themselves to the one life of Nature; and the demiurgus of +wholes collects and unites all these gifts, and demonstrates them to +be one power. For if visible bodies [i.e. the celestial bodies], are +filled with divine<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> powers, Nature, is by a much greater priority +divine. And if the whole visible world is one, much more is the whole +essence of Fate one, and derives from many causes the completion of +its composition. For being suspended from the providence of the Gods, +and from demiurgic goodness, it is united and governed by it, being +a productive principle subsisting from productive principles, one +multiform power, a divine life, and an order of things that have a +prior arrangement. Hence, the ancients looking to this its various +and multiform nature, were led to form different opinions concerning +it. And some indeed said that it is a Goddess, on account of that +which is divine in it; others, that it is a dæmon, on account of the +efficacious and at the same time multiform nature of its production; +others, that it is intellect, because a certain participation of +intellect reaches it; but others, that it is order, so that every +thing which has an arrangement is invisibly comprehended by it. Plato, +however, alone surveyed the essence of it, asserting indeed that it +is Nature, but Nature suspended from the demiurgus. For how could the +demiurgus exhibit Nature to souls, otherwise than by containing the +principle of it in himself? And how could he announce to them the laws +of Fate, after exhibiting to them the Nature of the universe, except by +constituting Nature as the one power that comprehends these laws?</p> + +<p>Farther still, in the Politicus, Plato more clearly suspends the second +life of the universe from Fate, after the departure of the one dæmon +that governed it, and the many dæmons that were the followers of that +one. Hence, he separates all the providential care of these powers +from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[236]</span> the universe, and alone leaves it the government according to +Fate; the world, indeed, always possessing both these, but the fable +separating the first from the second. For he says, “that Fate and +connate desire convolve the world,” just as the Chaldæan oracles say, +“that unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws +downward in order that the heavens may run an eternal course; and +that the other periods of the sun, the moon, the seasons, night and +day may be accomplished.” Thus, therefore, Plato also says, that the +second period of the world is convolved by Fate, and not the first and +intellectual period, all but clearly asserting that Fate is the power +which proximately moves the sensible world, and is suspended from +the invisible providence of the Gods. For establishing Necessity the +mother of the Fates prior to these, he represents her in the Republic +convolving<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a> the world on her knees. And if it be requisite to give +my opinion, Plato arranges these three causes of order successive +to each other, viz. Adrastia, Necessity, and Fate; the first being +intellectual, the second supermundane, and the third mundane. For +the demiurgus as Orpheus says, was nourished indeed by Adrastia, +but associated with Necessity, and generated Fate. And as Adrastia +was comprehensive of divine institutions,<a id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> and the collector of +all-various laws, thus also Fate is comprehensive of all the mundane +laws, which the demiurgus now inscribes in souls, that he may lead +them in conjunction with wholes, and may define what is adapted to +them according to the different elections of lives. Hence, a vicious +life tends to that which is dark and atheistical, but a pious life +leads the soul to the heavens to which she is also conducted by wholes; +because each of these lives is full of the laws of Fate; and souls +lead themselves, as Plotinus says, thither where the law that is in +them announces. For this is the peculiarity of the providence of the +Gods, to conduct inwardly the subjects for which it provides. And +why is it wonderful that this should be the case, since Nature also +inserting material and corporeal-formed powers in bodies, moves them +through these powers; earth indeed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[237]</span> through gravity, but fire through +levity. In a much greater degree, therefore, do the Gods move souls +through the powers which they disseminate in them. Hence, if they +lead souls according to the laws of Fate, these laws also subsist in +souls. And they pre-exist indeed intellectually in the demiurgus; +for the divine law is established with him. But they exist in divine +souls; for according to these laws they govern the universe. And they +are participated by partial souls; for through these they conduct +themselves to an appropriate place, themselves moving themselves. +And through deliberate choice, indeed, they act erroneously and with +rectitude; but through law they distribute to themselves an order +adapted to their former conduct.</p> + +<p>in the last place with respect to Fortune, it is necessary to observe +that Plato does not assert as the Stoics do, that the worthy man has +no need of the assistance of this divinity; but he is of opinion that +the energies of our reasoning power, since according to their external +progression they are complicated with corporeal energies, require the +inspiration of good Fortune, in order that they may be prosperous and +benefit others. Hence in the Timæus and the Parmenides, the persons of +the dialogues are represented as meeting together through a certain +good Fortune. And in the Laws he says, that God, and after God, +Fortune and Time govern all human affairs. “Fortune, therefore,” says +Proclus,<a id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> “and her gifts, are not things destitute of design and +indefinite; but she is a power collective of many dispersed causes, and +which adorns things disordered, and gives completion to the allotments +assigned to every thing from the universe.” According to Sallust in his +elegant treatise On the Gods and the World, “Fortune must be considered +as a power of the Gods, disposing things differing from each other, and +happening contrary to expectation, to beneficent purposes.” He adds, +“On this account it is proper that cities should celebrate this Goddess +in common; since every city is composed of different particulars. But +this Goddess holds her dominion in sublunary concerns, since every +thing fortuitous is excluded from the regions above the moon.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[238]</span></p> + +<p>In conformity to this, Simplicius also, in his Commentary On the +Physics of Aristotle,<a id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> admirably observes concerning Fortune as +follows: “The power of Fortune particularly disposes in an orderly +manner the sublunary part of the universe, in which contingencies +subsist, and which being essentially disordered, Fortune, in +conjunction with other primary causes, directs, places in order, and +governs. Hence she is represented guiding a rudder, because she governs +things sailing on the sea of generation. Her rudder too is fixed on +a globe, because she directs that which is unstable in generation. +In her other hand, she holds the horn of Amalthea, which is full of +fruits, because she is the cause of obtaining all divine fruits. And +on this account, we venerate the fortunes of cities and houses, and +of each individual; because being very remote from divine union, we +are in danger of being deprived of its participation, and require in +order to obtain it the assistance of the Goddess Fortune, and of those +natures<a id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a> superior to the human who possess the characteristic of +this divinity. Indeed, every fortune is good; for every attainment +respects something good, nor does any thing evil subsist from divinity. +But of things that are good, some are precedaneous, and others are of +a punishing or revenging characteristic, which we are accustomed to +call evils. Hence we speak of two Fortunes, one of which we denominate +<span class="smcap">Good</span>, and which is the cause of our obtaining precedaneous +goods, but the other <span class="smcap">Evil</span>, which prepares us to receive +punishment or revenge.” And thus much concerning Fortune.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[239]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVIII.</h2> + + +<p>It remains that we should consider in the next place, what Time, Day +and Night, Month and Year are, so far as they are deities, according +to the theology of Plato; the Commentaries of Proclus on the Timæus +fortunately presenting us with much valuable information respecting +the nature of these divinities. The speculation also of Time in this +place will be very appropriate, as immediately after, the discussion +of divine souls, angels, dæmons and heroes will naturally follow, with +whose essence Time is intimately and inseparably connected. Plato +therefore in the Timæus says, “that while the demiurgus was adorning +and distributing the universe, he at the same time formed an eternal +image flowing according to number, of eternity abiding in one; and +which receives from us the appellation of time. But besides this he +fabricated the generation of days and nights, and months and years, +which had no subsistence prior to the universe, but which together with +it rose into existence. And all these indeed, are the proper parts of +Time.” Proclus<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a> in commenting on what Plato here says about Time, +after having shown that it is neither any thing belonging to motion, +nor an attendant on the energy of soul, nor, in short, the offspring of +soul, investigates what it is in the following admirable manner:</p> + +<p>“Perhaps, says he, it is not sufficient to say that it is the measure +of mundane natures, nor to enumerate the goods of which it is the +cause, but to the utmost of our power we should endeavour to apprehend +its peculiarity. May we not therefore say, since its essence is most +excellent, perfective of soul, and present to all things, that it is +an intellect not only abiding but also subsisting in motion? Abiding +indeed according to its inward energy, and by which it is truly +eternal, but being moved according to its externally proceeding energy, +by which it becomes the boundary of all transition. For eternity +possessing permanency, both<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[240]</span> according to its inward energy, and that +which it exerts to things eternal, Time being assimilated to it, +according to the former of these energies, becomes separated from it +according to the latter, abiding and being moved. And as with respect +to the essence of the soul, we say that it is intelligible and at the +same time generated, partible, and at the same time impartible, and +are no otherwise able to apprehend its middle nature than by employing +after a manner opposites, what wonder is there if, perceiving the +nature of Time to be partly immoveable, and partly subsisting in +motion, we, or rather not we, but prior to us, the philosopher, through +<i>the eternal</i>, should indicate its intellectual monad abiding in +sameness, and through <i>the moveable</i> its externally proceeding +energy, which is participated by soul and the whole world? For we must +not think that the expression <i>the eternal</i> simply indicates that +Time is the image of eternity; for if this were the case, what would +have hindered Plato from directly saying that it is the <i>image</i>, +and not the <i>eternal image</i> of eternity? But he was willing to +indicate this very thing, that time has an eternal nature, but not in +such a manner as animal itself [the paradigm of the universe] is said +to be eternal. For that is eternal both in essence and energy; but +Time is partly eternal, and partly, by its external gift, moveable. +Hence theurgists call it eternal; and Plato very properly denominates +it not <i>only</i> so. For one thing is <i>alone</i> moveable, +both essentially and according to the participants of it, being +<i>alone</i> the cause of motion, as soul, and hence it <i>alone</i> +moves itself and other things; but another thing is <i>alone</i> +immoveable, preserving itself without transition, and being the cause +to other things of a perpetual subsistence after the same manner, and +to moveable natures through soul. It is necessary therefore, that +the medium between these two extremes should be that which, both +according to its own nature, and the gifts which it imparts to others, +is immoveable and at the same time moveable, essentially immoveable +indeed, but moved in its participants. A thing however of this kind is +Time.</p> + +<p>Hence Time is truly, so far as it is considered in itself, immoveable; +but so far as it is in its participants, it is moveable, and subsists +together with them, unfolding itself into them. It is therefore, +eternal, and a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[241]</span> monad and center essentially, and according to its own +abiding energy; but it is at the same time, continuous, and number, and +a circle, according to its proceeding and being participated. Hence, +it is a certain proceeding intellect, established indeed in eternity, +and on this account is said to be eternal. For it would not otherwise +contribute to the assimilation of mundane natures to more perfect +paradigms, unless it were itself previously suspended from them. But +it proceeds and abundantly flows into the things which are guarded +by it. Whence I think the chief of theurgists celebrate Time as a +God, as Julian in the seventh of the Zones, and venerate it by those +names, through which it is unfolded in its participants, causing some +things to be older, and others to be younger, and leading all things +in a circle. Time therefore, possessing a certain intellectual nature, +circularly leads according to number, both its other participants +and souls. For Time is eternal, not in essence only, but also in its +inward energy; but so far as it is participated by externals, it is +alone moveable, coextending and harmonizing with them the gift which it +imparts. But every soul is transitively moved, both according to its +inward and external energies, by the latter of which it moves bodies. +And it appears to me that those who thus denominated Time χρονος had +this conception of its nature, and were therefore willing to call it as +it were χορευοντος νους, an intellect moving in measure; but dividing +the words, perhaps for the sake of concealment, they called it χρονος. +Perhaps too, they gave it this appellation because it abides and is at +the same time moved in measure; by one part of itself abiding, and by +the other proceeding with measured motion. By the conjunction therefore +of both these, they signify the wonderful and demiurgic nature of +this God. And it appears, that as the demiurgus being intellectual +began from intellect to adorn the universe, so Time being itself +supermundane, began from soul to impart perfection. For that Time is +not only mundane, but by a much greater priority supermundane, is +evident; since as eternity is to animal itself, the paradigm of the +universe, so is Time to the world, which is animated and illuminated +by intellect, and wholly an image of animal itself, in the same manner +as Time of eternity. And thus much<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[242]</span> concerning Time, according to its +first subsistence, and considered as a God.</p> + +<p>With respect to Day and Night, according to their more principal +subsistence, they are demiurgic measures of Time, exciting and +convolving all the apparent and unapparent life and motion, and orderly +distribution of the inerratic sphere. For these are the true parts of +Time, are present after the same manner to all things, and comprehend +the primary cause of apparent day and night, each of these having a +different subsistence in apparent time; to which also Timæus looking +reminds us how time was generated together with the world. Hence he +says in the plural number <i>nights</i> and <i>days</i>, and also +<i>months</i> and <i>years</i>. But these are obvious to all men. For +the unapparent causes of these have a uniform subsistence prior to +things multiplied, and which circulate infinitely. Things immoveable +also subsist prior to such as are moved, and intellectual natures are +prior to sensibles. Such therefore, must be our conceptions of Night +and Day according to their first subsistence.</p> + +<p>By Month we must understand that truly divine temporal measure which +convolves the lunar sphere, and every termination of the circulation +about the zodiac. But Year is that which perfects and connects +the whole of middle fabrication, according to which the Sun is +seen possessing the greatest strength, and measuring all things in +conjunction with Time. For neither Day nor Night, nor Month is without +the Sun, nor much more Year, nor any other mundane nature. I do not +here speak according to the apparent fabrication of things alone; for +the apparent Sun is the cause of these measures; but also according to +that fabrication which is unapparent. For, ascending higher, we shall +find that the more true Sun<a id="FNanchor_178" href="#Footnote_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a> measures all things in conjunction +with Time, being itself in reality Time of Time, according to the +Chaldæan oracle concerning it. For that Plato not only knew these +apparent parts of Time, but also those divine parts to which these are +homonymous, is evident from the 10th book of his Laws. For he there +asserts that we call Hours and Months divine, as having the same divine +lives, and divine intellects<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[243]</span> presiding over them, as the universe. Let +these therefore be the parts of Time, of which some are accommodated +to the inerratic Gods, others to the Gods that revolve about the poles +of the oblique circle, and others to other Gods, or attendants of the +Gods, or to mortal animals, or the more sublime or more abject parts of +the universe.</p> + +<p>Farther still, concerning Night and Day, Plato afterwards says, “that +through these, the period of one most wise circulation [i.e. the +circulation of the inerratic sphere,] was produced;” on which Proclus +observes as follows: “It may be doubted how Plato calls Night and Day +the measure of the circulation of this sphere. For this measure is +every where, originating supernally from the one intelligible cause +of the universe, and the first paradigm; but in the sublunary region +it is the space of day and night. In answer to this, it must be said +that the temporal interval which first subsists in the circulation +of the inerratic sphere, and the solar light are productive of the +<i>nycthemeron</i> or space of day and night. From the last of things +therefore, and which are known to us, the whole measure is defined. +For this <i>nycthemeron</i> is one thing, but another that which +subsists in unapparent time. And the former is the image and ultimate +termination of the latter. For there are many orders of Night and Day, +intelligible and intellectual, supermundane, celestial and sublunary, +as we are taught by the Orphic theology. And some of these indeed, are +prior to fabrication; but others are comprehended in it; and others +proceed from it. Some also are unapparent, but others are apparent. +For with respect likewise to Month and Year, one order of these is +unapparent, measures, connectedly contains, and gives perfection to the +intellectual and corporeal periods of the sun and moon; but another is +apparent, which terminates and is the measure of the solar revolution. +Thus too in the other Gods, the unapparent Saturnian number is one +thing, and the apparent another. And in a similar manner the unapparent +and apparent Martial, Jovian and Mercurial numbers differ from each +other. For with respect to Month and Year, each of these being one +according to each period, and always the same, is a certain God, +immoveably bounding the measure of motion. For whence have the periods +always an invariable sameness, except from a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[244]</span> certain immoveable cause? +And whence do they derive the difference of their restitutions to their +pristine state, except from different immoveable causes? Whence also +the unceasing, and the again and again to infinity, except from the +infinite powers they contain? But Plato considering all this series +as temporal, arranges it under one and that the first Time, which +defines the periodic time of a perpetually circulating body, and is, +as we have before observed, true number. From these invisible causes +however, we must conceive the visible periodic times are derived, +proceeding from them according to that which is numbered, since they +are able both to number and generate them. And in all these astronomy +beautifully instructs us, doxastically apprehending the number of the +periodic restitutions of each; and making comparisons of the ratios of +the periods to each other; such as that the Saturnian period, is the +double and a half of the period of Jupiter, and in a similar manner of +the rest. For though their restitutions differ, yet they have a ratio +to each other. Sacred rumour also venerates the unapparent causes of +these, proclaiming the divine names of Night and Day, and also the +causes that constitute, and the invocations, and self-manifestations +of Month and Year. Hence, they are not to be surveyed superficially, +but as having a subsistence in divine hyparxes. And these the laws of +sacred institutions, and the oracles of Apollo ordered to be worshiped +and honoured by statues and sacrifices, as histories inform us. When +these also are reverenced, mankind are supplied with the benefits +arising from the periods of the Seasons, and of the other divinities +in a similar manner; but a preternatural disposition of every thing +about the earth, is the consequence of the worship of these being +neglected.”<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a> Plato likewise in the Laws proclaims that all these +are Gods, viz. the Seasons, Years and Months, in the same manner as the +stars and the sun; and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[245]</span> we do not introduce any thing new by thinking +it proper to direct our attention to the unapparent powers of these +prior to those that are apparent.” And thus much concerning Time, +Day and Night, Month and Year, considered according to their first +subsistence, by which they are Gods.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIX.</h2> + + +<p>After the Gods, it is necessary in the next place to consider the +order of divine souls, who are deified by always participating of the +Gods. This order, Plato in the Parmenides denies of <i>the one</i> as +follows: “Does it appear that <i>the one</i> can be either older or +younger, or be of the same age? What should hinder? If it had in any +respect the same age, either with itself, or with another, it would +participate equally of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless +asserted <i>the one</i> does not participate. We have asserted so. And +this also we have said, that it neither participates of dissimilitude +nor inequality. Entirely so. How therefore being such, can it either +be older or younger than any thing, or possess the same age with any +thing? It can in no respect. <i>The one</i> therefore, will neither +be younger nor older, nor will it be of the same age, either with +itself or with another. It does not appear that it will. Will it not +therefore, be impossible that <i>the one</i> should be at all in time, +if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if any thing is in time, +it should always become older than itself? It is necessary. But is not +that which is older, always older than the younger? What then? Hence +that which is becoming to be older than itself, is at the same time +becoming to be younger than itself, if it is about to have that through +which it may become older. How do you say? Thus: It is requisite that +nothing should subsist in <i>becoming</i> to be different from another, +when it <i>is</i> already different, but that it should <i>be</i> now +different from that which <i>is</i> different,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[246]</span> <i>have been</i> from +that which <i>was</i>, and <i>will be</i> from that which <i>is to be +hereafter</i>. But from that which is <i>becoming to be</i> different, +it ought neither to <i>have been</i>, nor to <i>be hereafter</i>, nor +<i>to be</i>, but to subsist in <i>becoming to be</i> different, and no +otherwise. It is necessary. But the older differs from the younger, and +no other. Certainly. Hence, that which is <i>becoming to be</i> older +than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in <i>becoming +to be</i> younger than itself. It seems so. But likewise it ought not +to subsist in <i>becoming to be</i> in a longer time than itself, nor +yet in a shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in +<i>becoming to be</i>, should <i>be</i>, <i>have been</i>, and <i>be +hereafter</i>. For these are necessary. It is necessary, therefore, +as it appears, that such things as are in time, and participate an +affection of this kind, should each one possess the same age with +itself, and should subsist in becoming to be both older and younger +than itself. It seems so. But no one of these passions belongs to +<i>the one</i>. None. Neither, therefore, is time present with it, +nor does it subsist in any time. It does not indeed according to the +decisions of reason.”</p> + +<p>Plato having proceeded, says Proclus, as far as to the mundane Gods, +always taking away things in a consequent order from <i>the one</i>, +through the middle genera, or, to speak more clearly, the negations +always producing things secondary, through such as are proximate to +<i>the one</i>, from the exempt cause of wholes, he is now about to +separate from <i>the one</i> the divine essence itself, which first +participates of the Gods, and receives their progression into the +world; or, to speak more accurately, he is now about to produce this +essence from the ineffable fountain of all beings. For, as every thing +which has being derives its subsistence from the monad of beings, both +<i>true being</i>, and that which is assimilated to it, which of itself +indeed is not, but through its communion with true being receives an +obscure representation of being; in like manner from the one unity of +every deity, the peculiarity of which, if it be lawful so to speak, +is to deify all things according to a certain exempt and ineffable +transcendency, every divine number subsists, or rather proceeds, and +every deified order of things. The design, therefore, as we have before +observed, of what is now said, is to show that <i>the one</i> is exempt +from, and therefore produces this essence.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[247]</span></p> + +<p>And here we may see how Parmenides subverts their hypothesis who +contend that the first cause is soul, or any thing else of this kind, +and this by showing that <i>the one</i> does not participate of time. +For it is impossible that a nature which is exempt from time should be +soul; since every soul participates of time, and uses periods which are +measured by time. <i>The one</i> also is better than, and is beyond +intellect, because every intellect is both moved and permanent; but +it is demonstrated that <i>the one</i> neither stands still, nor is +moved. Hence through these things, the three hypostases which rank as +principles, viz. <i>the one</i>, <i>intellect</i>, and <i>soul</i>, +become known to us. But that <i>the one</i> is perfectly exempt from +time, Parmenides demonstrates by showing in the first place, that it +is neither older nor younger, nor of the same age with itself, nor +with any other. For every thing which participates of time necessarily +participates of these; so that by showing that <i>the one</i> is +exempt from these which happen to every thing that participates +of time, he also shows that <i>the one</i> has no connexion with +time. This, however, is incredible to the many, and appeared so to +the physiologists prior to Plato, who thought that all things were +comprehended in time, and that, if there is any thing perpetual, it +is infinite time, but that there is not any thing which time does not +measure. For, as they were of opinion that all things are in place, in +consequence of thinking that all things are bodies, and that nothing is +incorporeal, so they thought that all things subsist in time, and are +in motion, and that nothing is immoveable; for the conception of bodies +introduces with itself place, but motion time. As, therefore, it was +demonstrated that <i>the one</i> is not in place, because it is not in +another, and on this account is incorporeal,—in like manner through +these arguments it is also shown that neither is it in time, and on +this account that it is not soul, nor any thing else which requires +and participates of time, either according to essence or according to +energy.</p> + +<p>And here it is well worthy our observation that Parmenides no longer +stops at the dyad as in the former conclusions, but triadically +enumerates the peculiarities of this order, viz. <i>the older</i>, +<i>the younger</i>, and <i>the possession of the same age</i>, though +he might have said dyadically, <i>of an equal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[248]</span> age</i>, and <i>of an +unequal age</i>, as there <i>the equal</i> and <i>the unequal</i>. But +there indeed having previously introduced the dyad, he passes from the +division of the unequal to the triadic distribution; but here he begins +from the triad. For there union precedes multitude, and the whole +the parts; but in this order of things multitude is most apparent, +and a division into parts, as Timæus says, whom Parmenides, in what +is now said imitating, begins indeed from the triad, but proceeds as +far as to the hexad. For, <i>the older</i> and <i>the younger</i>, +and <i>the possession of the same age</i>, are doubled, being divided +into <i>itself</i> and <i>relation to another</i>. That the triad, +indeed, and the hexad are adapted to this order is not immanifest. For +the triple nature of soul, consisting of <i>essence</i>, <i>same</i> +and <i>different</i>, and its triple power, which receives its +completion from the charioteer and the two horses, as we learn from the +Phædrus,<a id="FNanchor_180" href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> evince its alliance with the triad; and its essence being +combined from both these shows its natural alliance with the hexad.</p> + +<p>It is likewise necessary to observe, that as the discourse is about +divine souls who are deified by always participating of the Gods, Time +according to its first subsistence pertains to these souls,—not that +which proceeds into the apparent, but that which is liberated, and +without habitude; and this is the Time which is now denied of <i>the +one</i>. All the periods of souls, their harmonious motions about the +intelligible, and their circulations, are measured by this Time. For +it has a supernal origin, imitates eternity, and connects, evolves, +and perfects every motion, whether vital, or pertaining to soul, or +in whatever other manner it may be said to subsist. This Time also is +indeed essentially an intellect, as we have before observed; but it +is the cause to divine souls, of their harmonic and infinite motion +about the intelligible, through which these likewise are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[249]</span> led to <i>the +older</i> and to <i>the same age</i>: and this in a twofold respect. +For <i>the older</i> in these <i>with respect to themselves</i> +takes place, so far as with their more excellent powers they enjoy +in a greater degree the infinity of Time, and participate it more +abundantly. For they are not filled with similar perfection from more +divine natures, according to all their powers, but with some more, and +with others less. But that is said to be older which participates more +of time. That which is older in these divine souls <i>with respect to +other things</i> is effected, so far as some of these receive the whole +measure of Time, and the whole of its extension proceeding to souls, +but others are measured by more partial periods. Those therefore are +older, whose period is more total, and is extended to a longer time. +They may also be said to be <i>older and at the same time younger with +respect to themselves</i>, by becoming <i>hoary</i> as it were above, +through extending themselves to the whole power of Time, but juvenile +<i>beneath</i>, by enjoying Time more partially. But, <i>as with +respect to others</i>, they may be said to be <i>older and at the same +time younger</i> according to a diminution of energy. For that which +has its circulation measured by a less period is younger than that +whose circulation is measured by a more extended period.</p> + +<p>Again, among things co-ordinate, that which has the same participation +and the same measure of perfection with others may be said to be of +<i>the same age with itself and others</i>. But every divine soul, +though its own period is measured according to one Time, and that of +the body which is suspended from it according to another, yet it has an +equal restitution to the same condition; itself always according to its +own Time, and its body also according to its time. Hence, again, it is +of the same age with itself and its body, according to the analogous. +By thus interpreting what is now said of <i>the one</i>, we shall +accord with Plato in the Timæus, who there evinces that Time is the +measure of every transitive life, and who says that soul is the origin +of a divine and wise life through the whole of time. And we shall also +accord with his assertion in the Phædrus, that souls see true being +through Time, because they perceive temporally and not eternally.</p> + +<p>Farther still, Plato here demonstrates that <i>the one</i> is neither +older nor<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[250]</span> younger than itself, or another. For it was necessary to +show that <i>the one</i> is beyond every divine soul, prior to other +souls, in the same manner as it is demonstrated to be prior to true +beings, and to be the cause of all things. Hence, since it is the cause +of every divine soul, so far as these derive their subsistence as well +as all beings from the divine unities, with great propriety is it +necessary to show that <i>the one</i> is beyond the order of deified +souls. For these souls so far as they are intellectual have intellect +for their cause; so far as they are essences they originate from being; +and so far as they have the form of unity, they are derived from <i>the +one</i>; receiving their subsistence from this, so far as each is a +multitude consisting of certain unities, and of these as elements.</p> + +<p>Again, that which participates of time is twofold, the one proceeding, +as it were, in a right line, and beginning from one thing, and ending +in another; but the other proceeding circularly, and having its motion +from the same to the same, to which both the beginning and the end +are the same, and the motion is unceasing, every thing in it being +both beginning and end. That, therefore, which energizes circularly, +participates of time periodically: and so far as it departs from the +beginning it becomes older, but so far as it approaches to the end it +becomes younger. For becoming nearer the end, it becomes nearer to +its proper beginning. But that which becomes nearer to its beginning +becomes younger. Hence, that which circularly approaches to the end +becomes younger, the same also according to the same becoming older; +for that which approximates to its end proceeds to that which is +older. That to which the beginning therefore is one thing, and the end +another, to this the younger is different from the older; but that to +which the beginning and the end are the same, is in no respect older +than younger, but as Plato says, at the same time becomes younger and +older than itself. Every thing, therefore, which participates of time, +if it becomes both older and younger than itself, is circularly moved. +But divine souls are of this kind: for they participate of time, and +the time of their proper motion is periodical.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[251]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XL.</h2> + + +<p>Having in the preceding chapters presented the reader from the most +genuine sources, with all the information that can at present be +obtained concerning the mundane Gods, the order of scientific theology +requires that those perpetual attendants of the Gods, denominated +angels, dæmons and heroes, should be in the next place considered. +As all these ministrant powers however, are frequently called by one +name dæmons; and as Love is denominated by Plato a great dæmon, and +contains in himself the paradigm of the whole dæmoniacal series, it is +necessary that the developement of the nature of Love should precede +the discussion of the peculiarities of dæmons. The following admirable +account therefore of this mighty divinity, by Proclus the Coryphæus +of all true philosophers, is extracted from his MS. Commentary on the +First Alcibiades of Plato.</p> + +<p>There are different properties of different Gods. For some are the +fabricators of wholes, of the form of beings, and of their essential +ornament. But others are the suppliers of life, and are the sources of +its various genera. Others again preserve the unchangeable order, and +guard the indissoluble connexion of things. And others lastly, who are +allotted a different power, preserve all things by their beneficent +energies. In like manner every amatory order is the cause to all +things of conversion to divine beauty, leading back, conjoining, and +establishing all secondary natures in the beautiful, replenishing them +from thence, and irradiating all things with the gifts of its light. +On this account it is asserted in the Banquet of Plato that Love is a +great dæmon, because Love first demonstrates in itself a power of this +kind, and is the medium between the object of desire and the desiring +nature, and is the cause of the conversion of subsequent to prior +natures. The whole amatory series therefore, being established in the +vestibule of the cause of beauty, calls upwards all things to this +cause, and forms a middle progression between the object of Love and +the natures which are recalled by Love. Hence it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">[252]</span> pre-establishes in +itself the paradigm of the whole dæmoniacal order, obtaining the same +middle situation among the Gods as dæmons between divine and mortal +natures. Since therefore, every amatory series possesses this property +among the Gods, we must consider its uniform and occult summit as +ineffably established in the first orders of the Gods, and conjoined +with the first and intelligible beauty; its middle process as shining +forth among the supermundane Gods, with an intellectual condition; its +third progression as possessing an exempt power among the liberated +Gods; and its fourth as multifariously distributed about the world, +producing many orders and powers from itself, and distributing gifts of +this kind to the different parts of the world.</p> + +<p>But after the unific and first principle of Love, and after the +tripartite essence perfected from thence, a various multitude of Loves +shines forth with divine light, from whence the choirs of angels are +filled with Love; and the herds of dæmons full of this God attend on +the Gods who are recalled to intelligible beauty. Add too, that the +army of heroes, together with dæmons and angels, are agitated about +the participation of the beautiful with divine bacchanalian fury. +Lastly, all things are excited, revive and flourish through the influx +of the beautiful. But the souls of such men as receive an inspiration +of this kind, and are naturally allied to the God, assiduously move +about beauty, and fall into the realms of generation, for the purpose +of benefiting more imperfect souls, and providing for those natures +which require to be saved. The Gods indeed, and the attendants on the +Gods, abiding in their proper habits, benefit all following natures, +and convert them to themselves; but the souls of men descending, and +touching on the coasts of generation, imitate the beneficent providence +of the Gods. As, therefore, souls established according to some other +God descend with purity into the regions of mortality, and benefit +souls that revolve in it; and some indeed benefit more imperfect +souls by prophecy, others by mystic ceremonies, and others by divine +medicinal skill;—thus also souls that chose an amatory life, are moved +about the deity who presides over beautiful natures, for the purpose +of taking care of well-born souls. But from apparent beauty they are +led back to divine beauty, and together with themselves elevate those<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[253]</span> +who are the objects of their love. And this also divine Love primarily +effects in intelligibles. For he unites himself to the object of +love, extends to it the participants of his power, and inserts in all +things one bond, and one indissoluble friendship with each other, and +with the beautiful itself. Souls therefore possessed with Love, and +participating the inspiration thence derived, in consequence of using +an undefiled vehicle, are led from apparent to intelligible beauty, and +make this the end of their energy. Likewise enkindling a light in more +imperfect souls, they also lead these back to a divine nature, and are +divinely agitated together with them about the fountain of all-perfect +beauty.</p> + +<p>But such souls as from a perverse education fall from the gift which +is thence derived, yet are allotted an amatory nature, these, through +their ignorance of true beauty, are busily employed about that which +is material and divisible, at which also they are astonished in +consequence of not knowing the passion which they suffer. Hence, they +abandon every thing divine, and gradually decline into impiety and the +darkness of matter. They appear indeed to hasten to a union with the +beautiful, in the same manner as perfectly amatory souls; but they are +ignorant of the union, and tend to a dissipated condition of life, and +to matter, which Plato calls the sea of dissimilitude. They are also +conjoined with the base itself, and material privation of form. For +where are material natures able to pervade through each other? Or where +is apparent beauty, pure and genuine, being thus mingled with matter, +and replete with the deformity of its subject? Some souls therefore +genuinely participate the gifts of Love, and by others these gifts are +perverted. For as according to Plotinus the defluxion of intellect +produces craft, and an erroneous participation of wisdom sophistry, +so likewise the illumination of Love when it meets with a depraved +recipient, produces a tyrannic and intemperate life.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[254]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLI.</h2> + + +<p>In another part, likewise, of the same admirable Commentary, Proclus +presents us, as he says, with some of the more arcane assertions +concerning Love; and these are as follow:</p> + +<p>Love is neither to be placed in the first, nor among the last of +beings. Not in the first, because the object of Love is superior to +Love: nor yet among the last, because the lover participates of Love. +It is requisite, therefore, that love should be established between the +object of Love and the lover, and that it should be posterior to the +beautiful, but prior to every nature endued with love. Where then does +it first subsist? How does it extend itself through the universe, and +with what monads does it leap forth?</p> + +<p>There are three hypostases, therefore, among the intelligible and +occult Gods. And the first, indeed, is characterized by <i>the +good</i>, understanding <i>the good itself</i>, and residing in that +place where according to the oracle the paternal monad abides. But +the second is characterized by wisdom, where the first intelligence +flourishes. And the third by the beautiful, where, as Timæus says, +the most beautiful of intelligibles abides. There are, however, three +monads according to these intelligible causes, subsisting uniformly +and causally in intelligibles, but first unfolding themselves into +light in the ineffable order of the Gods,<a id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a> I mean Faith, Truth, +and Love. And Faith indeed establishes all things in good; but Truth +unfolds all the knowledge in beings; and lastly, Love converts all +things, and congregates them into the nature of the beautiful. This +triad, indeed, thence proceeds through all the orders of the Gods, +and imparts to all things, by its light, a union with intelligible +itself. It also unfolds itself differently in different orders, every +where combining its powers with the peculiarities of the Gods. And +among some it subsists ineffably, incomprehensibly, and unifically; +but among others, as the cause of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[255]</span> connecting and binding; and among +others, as endued with a perfective and forming power. Here again, it +subsists intellectually and paternally; but there in a manner entirely +motive, vivific, and effective. Here, as governing and assimilating; +there in a liberated and undefiled manner; and elsewhere according to +a multiplied and dividing mode. Love, therefore, supernally descends +from intelligibles to mundane natures, calling all things upwards to +divine beauty. Truth also proceeds through all things, illuminating all +things with knowledge. And lastly, Faith proceeds through the universe, +establishing all things unically in good. Hence the Chaldæan oracles +assert that all things are governed by, and abide in, these. And on +this account they order Theurgists to conjoin themselves to divinity +through this triad. Intelligibles themselves, indeed, do not require +the amatory medium, on account of their ineffable union. But where +there is a union and separation of beings, there also Love abides. For +it is the binder and conciliator of natures posterior and prior to +itself; but the converter of subsequent into prior, and the elevating +and perfecting case of imperfect natures.</p> + +<p>The Chaldæan oracles, therefore, speak of Love as binding, and residing +in all things: and hence, if it connects all things, it also copulates +us with the governments of dæmons. But Diotima in the Banquet, calls +Love a great dæmon, because it every where fills up the medium between +desiring and desirable natures. And indeed that which is the object of +Love vindicates to itself the first order; but that which loves is in +the third order from the beloved object. Lastly, Love usurps a middle +situation between each, congregating and collecting together that +which desires and that which is desired, and filling subordinate from +better natures. But among the intelligible and occult Gods, it unites +intelligible intellect to the first and secret beauty by a certain +life better than intelligence. Hence, the theologist of the Greeks +[Orpheus], calls this Love, blind; for he says,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>In his breast feeding, eyless, rapid Love.<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[256]</span></p> + +<p class="p-left">But in natures posterior to intelligibles, it imparts by illumination +an indissoluble bond to all things perfected by itself; for a bond is +a certain union, but accompanied with much separation. On this account +the Chaldæan oracles are accustomed to call the fire of this Love a +copulator. For proceeding from intelligible intellect, it binds all +following natures to each other, and to itself. Hence, it conjoins +all the Gods with intelligible beauty, and dæmons with Gods; but it +conjoins us both with Gods and dæmons. In the Gods indeed it has a +primary subsistence; in dæmons a secondary one; and in partial souls +a subsistence through a certain third procession from principles. +Again, in the Gods it subsists above essence; for every genus of Gods +is superessential. But in dæmons it subsists according to essence; +and in souls according to illumination. And this triple order appears +similar to the triple power of intellect. For one intellect subsists as +imparticipable, being exempt from all partial genera; but another as +participated, of which also the souls of the Gods participate as of a +better nature; and another is from this ingenerated in souls, and which +is indeed their perfection. And these three distinctions of intellect +Tamæus himself indicates. Hence, that Love which subsists in the Gods +must be considered as analogous to imparticipable intellect; for this +is exempt from all the beings which receive and are illuminated by its +nature. But dæmoniacal Love is analogous to participated intellect; +for this is essential and is perfected from itself, in the same manner +as participated intellect is proximately resident in souls. And the +third Love is analogous to intellect which subsists as a habit, and +which inserts an illumination in souls. Nor is it unjustly that we +consider Love as co-ordinate with this intellectual difference; for in +intelligible intellect it possesses its first and occult subsistence. +And if it thence leaps forth, it is also established there according to +cause. It likewise appears to me that Plato finding that intelligible +intellect was called by Orpheus both Love and a great dæmon, was +himself pleased to celebrate Love in a similar manner. Very properly, +therefore, does Diotima call it a great demon. And Socrates conjoins +the discourse about Love with that concerning dæmons. For as every +thing dæmoniacal is suspended from the amatory medium, so likewise +the discourse concerning a dæmoniacal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">[257]</span> nature is conjoined with that +concerning Love, and is allied to it. For Love is a medium between the +object of Love and the lover; and a dæmon is a medium between man and +divinity.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLII.</h2> + + +<p>The nature of dæmons, therefore, remains in the next place to be +more fully disclosed; for the reader has been already presented with +some very important information concerning them, in the discussion +of the sublunary Gods. As there is no vacuum then in corporeal, so +neither in incorporeal natures. Hence, between divine essences which +are the first of things, and partial essences such as ours, which +are nothing more than the dregs of the rational nature, there must +necessarily be a middle rank of beings, in order that divinity may +be connected with man, and that the progression of things may form +an entire whole, suspended like the golden chain of Homer from the +summit of Olympus. This middle rank of beings, considered according +to a two-fold division, consists of dæmons and heroes, the latter of +which is proximate to partial souls such as ours, and the former to, +divine natures, just as air and water subsist between fire and earth. +Hence, whatever is ineffable and occult in the Gods, dæmons and heroes +express and unfold. They likewise conciliate all things, and are the +sources of the harmonic consent and sympathy of all things with each +other. They transmit divine gifts to us, and equally carry back ours +to the divinities. But the characteristics of divine natures are +unity, permanency in themselves, a subsistence as an immoveable cause +of motion, transcendent providence, and which possesses nothing in +common with the subjects of their providential energies. And these +characteristics are preserved in them according to essence, power +and energy. On the other hand, the characteristics of partial souls +are, a declination to multitude<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[258]</span> and motion, a conjunction with the +Gods, an aptitude to receive something from other natures, and to +mingle together all things in itself, and through itself. And these +characteristics they also possess according to essence, power and +energy. Such then being the peculiarities of the two extremes, we +shall find that those of dæmons are to contain in themselves the gifts +of divine natures, in a more inferior manner indeed than the Gods, +but yet so as to comprehend the conditions of subordinate natures, +under the idea of a divine essence. In other words, the prerogatives +of deity characterize and absorb as it were by their powerful light, +whatever dæmons possess peculiar to inferior beings. Hence, they are +multiplied indeed but unitedly; mingled, but yet so that the unmingled +predominates; and are moved, but with stability. On the contrary, +heroes possess unity, identity, permanency, and every excellence, under +the condition of multitude, motion, and mixture; viz. the prerogatives +of subordinate predominate in these over the characteristics of +superior natures, yet so as never to induce a cessation of energy +about, or oblivion of, divinity. In short, dæmons and heroes are +composed of the properties of the two extremes—Gods and partial souls; +but in dæmons there is more of the divine, and in heroes more of the +human nature.</p> + +<p>Having premised thus much, I shall next present the reader with all +the information I have been able to collect from the most genuine +Platonists, and especially from Proclus, on the nature of this middle +order of beings. In the first place, therefore, what follows on this +subject is derived from the MS. Commentary of Proclus On the First +Alcibiades, in which extract also the nature of the dæmon of Socrates +is unfolded, about which modern wit has been so much puzzled, and so +egregiously mistaken.</p> + +<p>Let us now speak first, concerning dæmons in general; secondly, +concerning those that are allotted us in common; and thirdly, +concerning the dæmon of Socrates. For it is always requisite that +demonstrations should begin from things more universal, and proceed +from these as far as to individuals. For this mode of proceeding is +natural, and is more adapted to science. Dæmons, therefore, deriving +their first subsistence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[259]</span> from the vivific Goddess [Juno], and flowing +from thence as from a certain fountain, are allotted an essence +characterized by soul. This essence in those of a superior order is +more intellectual, and more perfect according to hyparxis; in those +of a middle order it is more rational; and in those which rank in the +third degree, and which subsist at the extremity of the dæmoniacal +order, it is various, more irrational, and more material. Possessing, +therefore, an essence of this kind, they are distributed in conjunction +with the Gods, as being allotted a power ministrant to deity. Hence, +they are in one way subservient to the liberated Gods, who are the +leaders of wholes prior to the world; and in another to the mundane +Gods, who proximately preside over the parts of the universe. For there +is one division of dæmons according to the twelve supercelestial Gods, +and another according to all the peculiarities of the mundane Gods. +For every mundane God is the leader of a certain dæmoniacal order, +to which he proximately imparts his power; viz. if he is a demiurgic +God, he imparts a demiurgic power; if immutable, an undefiled power; +if telesiurgic, a perfective power. And about each of the divinities, +there is an innumerable multitude of dæmons, and which are dignified +with the same appellations as their leading Gods. Hence, they rejoice +when they are called by the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hermes, &c. +as expressing the peculiarity of their proper deities. And from these, +mortal natures also participate of divine influxions. And thus animals +and plants are fabricated, bearing the images of different Gods; dæmons +proximately imparting to these the representations of their leaders. +But the Gods in an exempt manner supernally preside over dæmons; and +through this last natures sympathize with such as are first. For the +representations of first are seen in last natures; and the causes of +things that are last are comprehended in primary beings. The middle +genera, too, of dæmons give completion to wholes, the communion of +which they bind and connect; participating indeed of the Gods, but +participated by mortal natures. He, therefore, will not err who asserts +that the mundane artificer established the centres of the order of +the universe in dæmons; since Diotima also assigns them this order, +viz. that of binding together divine and mortal natures, of deducing +supernal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">[260]</span> streams, elevating all secondary natures to the Gods, and +giving completion to wholes through the connexion of a medium.</p> + +<p>Hence, we must not assent to their doctrine, who say that dæmons are +the souls of men that have changed the present life. For it is not +proper to consider a dæmoniacal nature <i>according to habitude</i>, as +the same with a nature essentially dæmoniacal; nor to assert that the +perpetual medium of all mundane natures consists from a life conversant +with multiform mutations. For a dæmoniacal guard subsists always the +same, connecting the mundane wholes. But soul does not always thus +retain its own order, as Socrates says in the Republic; since at +different times it chooses different lives. Nor do we praise those who +make certain of the Gods to be dæmons, such as the erratic Gods, [i.e. +the planets] according to Amelius. But we are persuaded by Plato, who +calls the Gods the rulers of the universe, but subjects to them the +herds of dæmons. And we shall every where preserve the doctrine of +Diotima, who assigns the middle order, between all divine and mortal +natures, to a dæmoniacal essence. Let this then be the conception +respecting the whole of the dæmoniacal order in common.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLIII.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place, let us speak concerning the dæmons, who are allotted +the superintendence of mankind. For of these dæmons, which, as we +have said, rank in the middle order, the first and highest are divine +dæmons, and who often appear as Gods, through their transcendent +similitude to the divinities. For, in short, that which is first +in every order preserves the form of the nature prior to itself. +Thus, the first intellect is a God, and the most ancient of souls is +intellectual. Hence, the highest genus of dæmons, as being proximate to +the Gods, is uniform and divine. The next to these in order are those +dæmons who participate of an intellectual<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[261]</span> peculiarity, and preside +over the ascent and descent of souls, and who unfold into light and +deliver to all things the productions of the Gods. The third are those +who distribute the productions of divine souls to secondary natures, +and complete the bond of those that receive effluxions from thence. The +fourth are those that transmit the efficacious powers of whole natures +to things generated and corrupted, and who inspire partial natures +with life, order, reasons, and the all-various perfect operations +which things mortal are able to effect. The fifth are corporeal, and +bind together the extremes in bodies. For, how can perpetual accord +with corruptible bodies, and efficients with effects, except through +this medium? For it is this ultimate nature which has dominion over +corporeal goods, and provides for all natural prerogatives. The sixth +in order are those that revolve about matter, connect the powers +which descend from celestial to sublunary matter, perpetually guard +this matter, and defend the shadowy representation of forms which it +contains.</p> + +<p>Dæmons, therefore, as Diotima also says, being many and all-various, +the highest of them conjoin souls proceeding from their father to +their leading Gods. For every God, as we have said, is the leader in +the first place of dæmons, and in the next of partial souls. For the +demiurgus disseminated these, as Timæus says, into the sun and moon, +and the other instruments of time. These divine dæmons, therefore, +are those which are essentially allotted to souls, and conjoin them +to their proper leaders. And every soul, though it revolves together +with its leading deity, requires a dæmon of this kind. But dæmons of +the second rank preside over the ascensions and descensions of souls; +and from these the souls of the multitude derive their elections. +For the most perfect souls, who are conversant with generation in an +undefiled manner, as they choose a life conformable to their presiding +God, so they live according to a divine dæmon, who conjoined them +to their proper deity when they dwelt on high. Hence, the Egyptian +priest admired Plotinus, as being governed by a divine dæmon. To +souls, therefore, who live as those that will shortly return to the +intelligible world whence they came, the supernal is the same with the +dæmon which attends them here. But to imperfect<span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">[262]</span> souls the essential is +different from the dæmon that attends them at their birth.</p> + +<p>If these things then are rightly asserted, we must not assent to those +who make our rational soul a dæmon. For a dæmon is different from +man, as Diotima says, who places dæmons between Gods and men, and as +Socrates also evinces, when he divides a dæmoniacal oppositely to the +human nature. “For,” says he, “not a human but a dæmoniacal obstacle +detains me.” But man is a soul using the body as an instrument. A +dæmon, therefore, is not the same with the rational soul.</p> + +<p>This also is evident from Plato in the Timæus, where he says that +intellect has in us the relation of a dæmon. But this is only true +as far as pertains to analogy. For a dæmon according to essence is +different from a dæmon according to analogy. For in many instances, +that which proximately presides, subsisting in the order of a dæmon +with respect to that which is inferior, is called a dæmon. Thus Jupiter +in Orpheus calls his father Saturn an illustrious dæmon; and Plato in +the Timæus calls those Gods who proximately preside over, and orderly +distribute the realms of generation, dæmons. “For,” says he, “to speak +concerning other dæmons, and to know their generation, exceeds the +ability of human nature.” But a dæmon according to analogy is that +which proximately presides over any thing, though it should be a God, +or though it should be some one of the natures posterior to the Gods. +And the soul that through similitude to the dæmoniacal genus produces +energies more wonderful than those which belong to human nature, and +which suspends the whole of its life from dæmons, is a dæmon κατα +σχεσιν, according to habitude, i.e. proximity or alliance. Thus, as it +appears to me, Socrates in the Republic calls those dæmons, who have +lived well, and who in consequence of this are transferred to a better +condition of being, and to more holy places. But an essential dæmon +is neither called a dæmon through habitude to secondary natures, nor +through an assimilation to something different from itself; but is +allotted this peculiarity from himself, and is defined by a certain +hyparxis, by appropriate powers, and by different modes of energies. +In short, the rational soul is called in the Timæus the dæmon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">[263]</span> of the +animal; but we investigate the dæmon of man, and not of the animal; +that which governs the rational soul itself, and not its instrument; +and that which leads the soul to its judges, after the dissolution of +the animal, as Socrates says in the Phædo. For when the animal is no +more, the dæmon which the soul was allotted while connected with the +body, conducts it to its judge. For, if the soul possesses that dæmon +while living in the body, which is said to lead it to judgment after +death, this dæmon must be the dæmon of the man, and not of the animal +alone. To which we may add, that beginning from on high, it governs the +whole of our composition.</p> + +<p>Nor again, dismissing the rational soul, must it be said that a dæmon +is that which energizes in the soul: as for instance, that in those +who live according to reason, reason is the dæmon; in those that +live according to anger, the irascible part; and in those that live +according to desire, the epithymetic or desiring part. Nor must it +be said that the nature which proximately presides over that which +energizes in our life, is a dæmon: as for instance, that reason is +the dæmon of the irascible, and anger of those that live according to +desire. For, in the first place, to assert that dæmons are parts of +our soul, is to admire human life in an improper degree, and oppose +the division of Socrates in the Republic, who after Gods and dæmons +places the heroic and human race, and blames the poets for introducing +in their poems heroes in no respect better than men, but subject to +similar passions. By this accusation, therefore, it is plain that +Socrates was very far from thinking that dæmons, who are of a sublimer +order than heroes, are to be ranked among the parts and powers of the +soul. For from this doctrine it will follow that things essentially +more excellent give completion to such as are subordinate. And in the +second place, from this hypothesis, mutations of lives would also +introduce multiform mutations of dæmons. For the avaricious character +is frequently changed into an ambitious life, this again into a life +which is formed by right opinion, and this last into a scientific life. +The dæmon, therefore, will vary according to these changes; for the +energizing part will be different at different times. If, therefore, +either this energizing part itself is a dæmon, or that part which has +an arrangement<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[264]</span> prior to it, dæmons will be changed together with the +mutation of human life, and the same person will have many dæmons in +one life; which is of all things the most impossible. For the soul +never changes in one life the government of its dæmon; but it is the +same dæmon which presides over us till we are brought before the judges +of our conduct, as also Socrates asserts in the Phædo.</p> + +<p>Again, those who consider a partial intellect, or that intellect which +subsists at the extremity of the intellectual order, as the same with +the dæmon which is assigned to man, appear to me to confound the +intellectual peculiarity with the dæmoniacal essence. For all dæmons +subsist in the extent of souls, and rank as the next in order to divine +souls. But the intellectual order is different from that of soul, and +is neither allotted the same essence, nor power, nor energy.</p> + +<p>Further still, this also may be said, that souls enjoy intellect then +only when they convert themselves to it, receive its light, and conjoin +their own with intellectual energy; but they experience the presiding +care of a dæmoniacal nature through the whole of life, and in every +thing which proceeds from fate and providence. For it is the dæmon that +governs the whole of our life, and that fulfils the elections which we +made prior to generation, together with the gifts of fate, and of those +Gods that preside over fate. It is likewise the dæmon that supplies and +measures the illuminations from providence. And as souls indeed, we +are suspended from intellect, but as souls using the body we require +the aid of a dæmon. Hence, Plato in the Phædrus calls intellect the +governor of the soul; but he every where calls a dæmon the inspector +and guardian of mankind. And no one who considers the affair rightly, +will find any other one and proximate providence of every thing +pertaining to us, besides that of a dæmon. For intellect, as we have +said, is participated by the rational soul, but not by the body; and +nature is participated by the body, but not by the dianoëtic part. +And further still, the rational soul rules over anger and desire, but +it has no dominion over fortuitous events. But the dæmon alone moves, +governs, and orderly disposes all our affairs. For he gives perfection +to reason, measures the passions, inspires nature, connects the body, +supplies things fortuitous, accomplishes the decrees<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[265]</span> of fate, and +imparts the gifts of providence. In short, he is the king of every +thing in and about us, and is the pilot of the whole of our life. And +thus much concerning our allotted dæmons.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLIV.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place, with respect to the dæmon of Socrates, these three +things are to be particularly considered. First, that he not only ranks +as a dæmon, but also as a God. For in the First Alcibiades Socrates +clearly says, “I have long been of opinion that the God did not as +yet direct me to hold any conversation with you.” He calls the same +power therefore a dæmon and a God. And in the Apology he more clearly +evinces that this dæmon is allotted a divine transcendency, considered +as ranking in a dæmoniacal order. And this is what we before said, that +the dæmons of divine souls, and who make choice of an intellectual and +elevating life, are divine, transcending the whole of a dæmoniacal +genus, and being the first participants of the Gods. For, as is a dæmon +among Gods, such also is a God among dæmons. Among the divinities +however the hyparxis is divine; but in dæmons on the contrary, the +peculiarity of their essence is dæmoniacal, but the analogy which they +bear to divinity evinces their essence to be godlike. For on account +of their transcendency with respect to other dæmons they frequently +appear as Gods. With great propriety therefore, does Socrates call his +dæmon a God; for he belonged to the first and highest dæmons. Hence +Socrates was most perfect, being governed by such a presiding power, +and conducting himself by the will of such a leader and guardian of his +life. This then was one of the illustrious prerogatives of the dæmon of +Socrates. The second was this: that Socrates perceived a certain voice +proceeding from his dæmon. For this is asserted by him in the Theætetus +and in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">[266]</span> Phædrus. This voice also is the signal from the dæmon, +which he speaks of in the Theages. And again in the Phædrus, when he +was about to pass over the river, he experienced the accustomed signal +from the dæmon. What then, does Socrates indicate by these assertions, +and what was the voice through which he says the dæmon signified to him +his will?</p> + +<p>In the first place, we must say that Socrates, through his dianoëtic +power, and his science of things, enjoyed the inspiration of his dæmon, +who continually recalled him to divine love. In the second place, in +the affairs of life, Socrates supernally directed his providential +attention to more imperfect souls. And according to the energy of +his dæmon, he received the light proceeding from thence, neither in +his dianoëtic part alone, nor in his doxastic powers, but also in +his spirit, the illumination of the dæmon suddenly diffusing itself +through the whole of his life, and now moving sense itself. For it is +evident that reason, imagination, and sense, enjoy the same energy +differently; and that each of our inward parts is passive to, and is +moved by the dæmon in a peculiar manner. The voice therefore, did +not act upon Socrates externally with passivity; but the dæmoniacal +inspiration, proceeding inwardly through his whole soul, and diffusing +itself as far as to the organs of sense, became at last a voice, which +was rather recognized by consciousness than by sense. For such are the +illuminations of good dæmons and the Gods.</p> + +<p>In the third place, let us consider the peculiarity of the dæmon of +Socrates; for it never exhorted, bet perpetually recalled him. This +also must be again referred to the Socratic life. For it is not a +property common to our allotted dæmons, but was the characteristic of +the guardian of Socrates. We must say therefore, that the beneficent +and philanthropic disposition of Socrates, and his great promptitude +with respect to the communication of good, did not require the +exhortation of the dæmon. For he was impelled from himself, and was +ready at all times to impart to all men the most excellent life. But +since many of those that came to him were unadapted to the pursuit +of virtue and the science of wholes, his governing good dæmon +restrained him from a providential care of such as these. Just as a +good charioteer alone<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">[267]</span> restrains the impetus of a horse naturally +well adapted for the race, but does not stimulate him, in consequence +of his being excited to motion from himself, and not requiring the +spur, but the bridle. And hence Socrates, from his great readiness +to benefit those with whom he conversed, rather required a recalling +than an exciting dæmon. For the inaptitude of auditors, which is for +the most part concealed from human sagacity, requires a dæmoniacal +discrimination; and the knowledge of favourable opportunities can by +this alone be accurately announced to us. Socrates therefore being +naturally impelled to good, alone required to be recalled in his +unseasonable impulses.</p> + +<p>But farther still, it may be said, that of dæmons, some are allotted +a purifying and undefiled power; others a perfective; and others a +demiurgic power. And in short, they are divided according to the +characteristic peculiarities of the Gods, and the powers under which +they are arranged. Each likewise, according to his hyparxis, incites +the object of his providential care to a blessed life; some of them +moving us to an attention to inferior concerns; and others restraining +us from action, and an energy verging to externals. It appears +therefore, that the dæmon of Socrates being allotted this peculiarity, +viz. cathartic, and the source of an undefiled life, and being arranged +under this power of Apollo, and uniformly presiding over the whole of +purification, separated also Socrates from too much commerce with the +vulgar, and a life extending itself into multitude. But it led him into +the depths of his soul, and an energy undefiled by subordinate natures. +And hence it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. For, what +else is to recall, than to withdraw him from the multitude to inward +energy? And of what is this the peculiarity except of purification? +Indeed, it appears to me, that as Orpheus places the Apolloniacal monad +over king Bacchus, which recalls him from a progression into Titannic +multitude, and a desertion of his royal throne, in like manner the +dæmon of Socrates conducted him to an intellectual place of survey, +and restrained his association with the multitude. For the dæmon is +analogous to Apollo, being his attendant, but the intellect of Socrates +to Bacchus; for our intellect is the progeny of the power of this +divinity.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">[268]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLV.</h2> + + +<p>From the MS. Scholia also of Proclus on the Cratylus, we derive the +following important information concerning this order of beings who +connect the divine and human nature together. Of the genera posterior +to the Gods, and which are indeed their perpetual attendants, but +produce in conjunction with them mundane fabrications from on high, as +far as to the last of things,—of these genera, some unfold generation +into light; others are transporters of union; others of power; and +others call forth the knowledge of the Gods, and an intellectual +essence. But of these, some are called angelic, by those that are +skilful in divine concerns, in consequence of being established +according to the hyparxis itself of the Gods, and making that which is +uniform in their nature commensurate with things of a secondary rank. +Hence, the angelic tribe is <i>boniform</i>, as unfolding into light +the occult <i>goodness</i> of the Gods. Others among these are called +by theologists dæmoniacal, as binding the middle of all things, and as +distributing divine power, and producing it as far as to the last of +things. For δαισαι is το μερισαι. But this genus possesses abundance +of power, and is multifarious, as giving subsistence to those last +dæmons who are material, who draw down souls, and proceed to the most +partial and material form of energy. Others again, are denominated +by them heroic, who lead human souls on high through love, and who +are the suppliers of an intellectual life, of magnitude of operation, +and transcendency of wisdom. In short, they are allotted a convertive +order and providence, and an alliance to a divine intellect, to which +they also convert secondary natures. Hence, they are allotted this +appellation, as being able to <i>raise</i> and <i>extend</i> souls to +the Gods. (ως αιρειν και ανατεινειν τας ψυχας επι θεους δυναμενα)</p> + +<p>These triple genera posterior to, are indeed, always suspended from +the Gods, but they are divided from each other. And some of them are +essentially intellectual; others are essentialized in rational souls; +and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">[269]</span> others subsist in irrational and phantastic lives, i.e. in lives +characterized by imagination. It is also evident that such of them as +are intellectual, are allotted a prudence or wisdom transcending that +of human nature, and which is eternally conjoined with the objects +of their intellection. But such of them as are rational, energize +discursively according to prudence. And the irrational kind are +destitute of prudence. For they dwell in matter, and the darkest parts +of the universe. They also bind souls to image-producing bosoms, (και +συνδει τας ψυχας τοις ειδωλοποιοις κολποις) and strangle such as are +brought into that region, until they have suffered the punishment which +is their due. These three genera therefore, which are more excellent +than us, Socrates now calls dæmons. And thus much concerning these +triple genera, according to Proclus.</p> + +<p>Again, with respect to dæmons properly so called, there are three +species of them according to the Platonic theology; the first of +which is rational only, and the last is irrational only; but the +middle species is partly rational and partly irrational. And again, of +these the first is perfectly beneficent, but many among the other two +species are malevolent and noxious to mankind: not indeed essentially +malevolent (for there is nothing in the universe, the ample abode of +all-bountiful Jove, essentially evil), but only so from the office +which they are destined to perform. For nothing which operates +naturally, operates as to itself evilly. But the Platonic Hermeas in +his MS. Commentary on the Phædrus, and on that part of it in which +Plato says, “There are indeed, other evils besides these, but a certain +dæmon immediately mingles pleasure with most of them,” admirably +observes respecting dæmons as follows: “The distribution of good and +evil originates from the dæmoniacal genus. For every genus transcending +that of dæmons, uniformly possesses good. There are therefore, certain +genera of dæmons, some of which adorn and administer certain parts of +the world; but others certain species of animals. Hence, the dæmon who +is the inspective guardian of life, hastens souls into that condition +which he himself is allotted; as for instance, into injustice or +intemperance, and continually mingles pleasure in them as a snare. But +there are other dæmons transcending these,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">[270]</span> who are the punishers of +souls, converting them to a more perfect and elevated life. And the +first of these it is necessary to avoid; but the second sort we should +render propitious. There are other dæmons however, more excellent than +these, who distribute good in an uniform manner.”</p> + +<p>Farther still, Plato in the Phædo, says, “that the dæmon of each +person, which was allotted to him while living, endeavours to lead +each to a certain place, where it is necessary that all of them being +collected together, after they have been judged, should proceed to +Hades, together with their leader, who is ordered to conduct them from +hence thither. But there receiving the allotments proper to their +condition, and abiding for a necessary time, another leader brings them +back hither again, in many and long periods of time.” Olympiodorus +in his MS. Commentary on that dialogue, observes on this passage as +follows:</p> + +<p>“Since there are in the universe, things which subsist differently at +different times, and since there are also natures which are conjoined +with the superessential unities, it is necessary that there should be +a certain middle genus, which is neither immediately suspended from +deity, nor subsists differently at different times according to better +and worse, but which is always perfect, and does not depart from its +proper virtue; and is immutable indeed but is not conjoined with the +superessential. The whole of this genus is dæmoniacal. There are also +different genera of dæmons; for they are arranged under the mundane +Gods. The highest of these subsists according to <i>the one</i> of the +Gods, which is called an unific and divine genus of dæmons. The next +according to the intellect which is suspended from Deity, and is called +intellectual. The third subsists according to soul, and is called +rational. The fourth according to nature, and is denominated physical. +The fifth according to body, and is called corporeal-formed. And the +sixth according to matter, and this is denominated material. Or after +another manner it may be said, that some of these are celestial, others +ethereal, others aerial, others aquatic, others terrestrial, and others +subterranean. With respect also to this division, it is evident that +it is derived from the parts of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[271]</span> universe. But irrational dæmons +originate from the serial governors, whence also the [Chaldean] Oracle +says,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>ηεριων ελατηρα κυνων χθονιων τε και υγρων.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “being the charioteer of the aerial, terrestrial and aquatic +dogs.” Our guardian dæmons, however, belong to that order of dæmons, +which is arranged under the Gods that preside over the ascent and +descent of souls.”</p> + +<p>Olympiodorus further observes, “that the dæmon endeavours to lead +the soul as exciting its conceptions and imaginations, at the same +time, however, yielding to the self-motive power of the soul. But +in consequence of the dæmon exciting, one soul follows voluntarily, +another violently, and another according to a mode subsisting between +these. There is also one dæmon who leads the soul to its judges from +the present life; another who is ministrant to the judges, giving +completion, as it were, to the sentence which is passed; and a third +who is allotted the guardianship of life.”</p> + +<p>In the next place, with respect to irrational dæmons, it remains to +investigate how they subsist. For if they derive their subsistence +from the junior Gods, how, since these are the fathers of mortal +natures, are these dæmons immortal? But if from the demiurgus how are +they irrational? For he is the father of things in conjunction with +intellect. This doubt is beautifully solved by Proclus as follows: +irrational dæmons derive their subsistence from the junior Gods, yet +are not on this account mortal, since of these Gods some generate +others. And perhaps the generated Gods are called by Plato, in the +Timæus, dæmons, because those that are truly dæmons are produced by the +junior Gods. But they likewise proceed from the one demiurgus. For as +Timæus says, he is the cause of all immortal natures. If, however, the +demiurgus imparts intellect to all things, there is also in irrational +dæmons an ultimate vestige of the intellectual peculiarity, so far as +they have a facility of imagination; for this is the last echo as it +were of intellect. And on this account the phantasy is not improperly +called by others passive intellect.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">[272]</span></p> + +<p>Lastly, after essential heroes, an order of souls follows, who +proximately govern the affairs of men, and are dæmoniacal according to +habitude or alliance, but not essentially. These souls likewise are +the perpetual attendants of the Gods, but they have not an essence +<i>wholly</i> superior to man. Of this kind, as we are informed by +Proclus in his MS. Scholia on the Cratylus, are the Nymphs that +sympathize with waters, Pans with the feet of goats and the like. They +also differ from those powers that are essentially of a dæmoniacal +characteristic in this, that they assume a variety of shapes (each +of the others immutably preserving one form) are subject to various +passions, and are the causes of every kind of deception to mankind. +Proclus likewise observes, that the Minerva which so often appeared to +Ulysses and Telemachus belonged to this order of souls.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLVI.</h2> + + +<p>After the triple genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, +those human souls follow that are of an heroic characteristic, are +undefiled, associating with generation, and abandoning their proper +order but for a little time. For the souls that descend and are +defiled with vice, are very remote from those that abide on high with +immaculate purity. The media, therefore, between these, are the souls +that descend indeed, but without defilement; since it is not lawful +for the contrary to take place, viz. to be defiled with vice, and yet +to abide on high. For evil is not in the Gods, but in the regions of +mortality, and material affairs. The first genus of souls, therefore, +is divine. For every where, that which is the recipient of deity has a +ruling and leading order, in essences, in intellects, in souls and in +bodies. But the second genus of souls is always conjoined to the Gods, +in order that through this those that sometimes<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">[273]</span> depart from, may again +be recalled to them. The third genus is that which descends indeed into +generation, but descends with purity, exchanges a more divine life for +one of a subordinate nature, but is exempt from vice, and liberated +from the dominion of the passions. For this genus exists in continuity +with that which always abides on high, and is always undefiled. And +the fourth and last genus is that of the souls of the bulk of mankind, +which wanders abundantly, descends as far as to Tartarus, and is +again excited from thence. It likewise evolves all-various forms of +life, uses a variety of manners, is under the influence of different +passions at different times, and assumes the forms of dæmons, men, and +irrational animals. At the same time, however, it is corrected and +amended by Justice, recurs from earth to heaven, and is led round from +matter to intellect, but according to certain orderly periods of wholes.</p> + +<p>Plotinus beautifully alludes to this undefiled genus of human souls +in the 9th book of his 5th Ennead, On Intellect, Ideas, and Being, +as follows: “Since all men from their birth employ sense prior to +intellect, and are necessarily first conversant with sensibles, some +proceeding no farther pass through life, considering these as the +first and last of things, and apprehending that whatever is painful +among these is evil, and whatever is pleasant is good; thus thinking +it sufficient to pursue the one and avoid the other. Those too, among +them, who pretend to a greater share of reason than others, esteem +this to be wisdom, being affected in a manner similar to more heavy +birds, who, collecting many things from the earth, and being oppressed +with the weight, are unable to fly on high, though they have received +wings for this purpose from nature. But others are in a small degree +elevated from things subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul +recalling them from pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, +however, unable to look on high, and as not possessing any thing else +which can afford them rest, they betake themselves together with the +name of virtue to actions and the election of things inferior, from +which they at first endeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain. +<i>In the third class is the race of divine men</i>, who through a more +excellent power, and with piercing eyes, acutely<span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">[274]</span> perceive supernal +light, to the vision of which they raise themselves above the clouds +and darkness as it were of this lower world, and there abiding despise +every thing in these regions of sense; being no otherwise delighted +with the place which is truly and properly their own, than he who after +many wanderings is at length restored to his lawful country.”</p> + +<p>These undefiled souls are called by the author of the Golden Verses, +“terrestrial dæmons,” because, as Hierocles observes, they are by +nature men, but by habitude dæmons, and possess a scientific knowledge +of divinity. For since all men are terrestrial, as ranking in the third +degree of rational beings, but all are not skilful (δαημονων) and wise, +the author of the verses very properly calls wise men both terrestrial +and dæmons conjointly. For neither are all men wise, nor are all the +beings that are wise, men. But the illustrious heroes<a id="FNanchor_183" href="#Footnote_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> and the +immortal Gods, being naturally more excellent than men, are wise and +good. The verses therefore exhort us to reverence those men who are +co-arranged with the divine genera, and who (according to habitude) are +equal to angels and dæmons, and are similar to the illustrious heroes.</p> + +<p>Plato, in the Cratylus, calls these undefiled souls both dæmons and +heroes, and speaks of them as follows: “Soc. Do you not know who those +dæmons are which Hesiod speaks of? Herm. I do not. Soc. And are you +ignorant that he says the golden race of men was first generated? +Herm. This I know. Soc. He says, therefore, that after this race was +concealed by Fate, it produced dæmons denominated holy, terrestrial, +good, expellers of evil, and guardians of mortal men. Herm. But what +then? Soc. I think, indeed, that he calls it a golden race, not as +naturally consisting of gold, but as being beautiful and good. I infer +this, however, from his denominating our race an iron one. Herm. You +speak the truth. Soc. Do you not therefore think, that if any one +of the present times should appear to be good, Hesiod would say he +belonged to the golden race? Herm. It is probable he would. Soc. But +are the good any other than such as are [intellectually] prudent? +Herm. They<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">[275]</span> are not. Soc. On this account, therefore, as it appears +to me, more than any other he calls them dæmons, because they were +<i>prudent</i> and <i>learned</i> (δαημονες). And in our ancient +tongue this very name is to be found. Hence both he and many other +poets, speak in a becoming manner, when they say that a good man after +death will receive a mighty destiny and renown, and will become a +<i>dæmon</i>, according to the surname of prudence. I therefore assert +the same, that every good man is <i>learned</i> and <i>skilful</i>; +that he is dæmoniacal both while living and when dead; and that he +is properly denominated a dæmon. Herm. And I also, Socrates, seem +to myself to agree with you perfectly in this particular. But what +does the name hero signify? Soc. This is by no means difficult to +understand. For this name is very little different from its original, +evincing that its generation is derived from love. Herm. How is this? +Soc. Do you not know that heroes are demigods? Herm. What then? Soc. +All of them were doubtless generated either from the love of a God +towards a mortal maid, or from the love of a man towards a Goddess. +If, therefore, you consider this matter according to the ancient Attic +tongue, you will more clearly understand the truth of this derivation. +For it will be evident to you that the word hero is derived from love, +with a trifling mutation for the sake of the name.”</p> + +<p>The meaning of Plato in this passage, and also the characteristic +properties of terrestrial heroes are beautifully unfolded by Proclus as +follows, in his very rare and invaluable MS. Scholia on the Cratylus. +“Every where the extremities of a prior, are conjoined with the +summits of a secondary order. Thus for instance, our master Hermes +(ο δεσποτης ημων Ερμης) being an archangelic monad, is celebrated as +a God. But Plato calls the whole extent between Gods and men dæmons. +And they indeed, are dæmons by nature. Those dæmons, however, that are +now mentioned, together with the demigods heroes, are not dæmons and +heroes by nature, for they do not always follow the Gods; but they are +only so from habitude, being souls who naturally deliver themselves +to generation, such as was the great Hercules, and others of the like +kind. But the peculiarity of heroic souls is magnitude of operation, +elevation and magnificence.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">[276]</span> Such heroes also it is necessary to +honour, and to perform funeral rites to their memory, conformably to +the exhortation of the Athenian guest in the Laws. This heroic genus +of souls, therefore, does not always follow the Gods, but is undefiled, +and more intellectual than other souls. And it descends indeed for +the benefit of the life of men, as partaking of a destiny inclining +downwards; but it has much of an elevated nature, and which is properly +liberated from matter. Hence souls of this kind are easily led back to +the intelligible world, in which they live for many periods; while on +the contrary, the more irrational kind of souls, are either never led +back, or this is accomplished with great difficulty, or continues for a +very inconsiderable period of time.”</p> + +<p>Each of the Gods indeed is perfectly exempt from secondary natures, +and the first and more total of dæmons are likewise established above +a habitude of this kind. They employ, however, terrestrial and partial +spirits in the generations of some of the human race, not physically +mingling with mortals, but moving nature, perfecting its power, +expanding the path of generation, and removing all impediments. Fables, +therefore, through the similitude of appellation conceal the things +themselves. For spirits of this kind are similarly denominated with the +Gods, the leading causes of their series. Hence they say, either that +Gods have connexion with women, or men with Goddesses. But if they were +willing to speak plainly and clearly, they would say that Venus, Mars, +Thetis, and the other divinities, produce their respective series, +beginning from on high, as far as to the last of things; each of which +series comprehends in itself many essences differing from each other; +such as the angelical, dæmoniacal, heroical, nymphical, and the like. +The lowest powers, therefore, of these orders, have much communion with +the human race; for the extremities of first are connascent with the +summits of secondary natures. And they contribute to our other natural +operations, and to the production of our species. On this account it is +frequently seen that from the mixture of these powers with men heroes +are generated, who appear to possess a certain prerogative above human +nature. Not only a dæmoniacal genus, however, of this kind, physically<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">[277]</span> +sympathizes with men, but a different genus sympathizes with other +animals, as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with +stags, or serpents.</p> + +<p>But how is it that at one time the Gods are said to have connexion +with mortal females, and at another time mortal females with the +Gods? We reply, that the communion of Gods with Goddesses gives +subsistence to Gods or dæmons eternally; but heroic souls having a +two-fold form of life, viz. <i>doxastic</i> and <i>dianoëtic</i>, +the former of which is called by Plato in the Timæus <i>the circle +of difference</i>, and the latter, <i>the circle of sameness</i>, +and which are characterized by the properties of <i>male</i> and +<i>female</i>;—hence these souls at one time exhibit a deiform power, +by energizing according to the masculine prerogative of their nature, +or <i>the circle of sameness</i>, and at another time according to +their feminine prerogative, or <i>the circle of difference</i>; yet +so as that according to both these energies they act with rectitude, +and without merging themselves in the darkness of body. They likewise +know the natures prior to their own, and exercise a providential care +over inferior concerns, without at the same time having that propensity +to such concerns which is found in the bulk of mankind. But the +souls which act erroneously according to the energies of both these +circles, or which, in other words, neither exhibit accurate specimens +of practical, nor of intellectual virtue—these differ in no respect +from <i>gregarious</i> souls, or the herd of mankind, with whom the +circle of sameness is fettered, and the circle of difference sustains +all-various fractions and distortions.</p> + +<p>As it is impossible therefore, that these heroic souls can act with +equal vigour and perfection, according to both these circles at once, +since this is the province of natures more divine than the human, it is +necessary that they should sometimes descend and energize principally +according to their doxastic part, and sometimes according to their +more intellectual part. Hence, one of these circles must energize +naturally, and the other be hindered from its proper energy. On this +account heroes are called <i>demigods</i>, as having only one of their +circles illuminated by the Gods. Such of these therefore, as have the +circle of sameness unfettered, as are excited to an intellectual life, +and are moved about it according to a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">[278]</span> deific energy,—these are said +to have a God for their father, and a mortal for their mother, through +a defect with respect to the doxastic form of life. But such, on the +contrary, as energize without impediment according to the circle of +difference, who act with becoming rectitude in practical affairs, and +at the same time <i>enthusiastically</i>, or in other words, under +the inspiring influence of divinity,—these are said to have a mortal +for their father, and a Goddess for their mother. In short, rectitude +of energy in each of these circles is to be ascribed to a divine +cause.<a id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> Hence when the circle of sameness has dominion, the divine +cause of illumination is said to be masculine and paternal; but when +the circle of difference predominates, it is said to be maternal. Hence +too, Achilles in Homer acts with rectitude in practical affairs,<a id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> +and at the same time exhibits specimens of magnificent, vehement, and +divinely-inspired energy, as being the son of a Goddess. And such +is his attachment to practical virtue, that even when in Hades, he +desires a union with body, that he may assist his father. While on +the contrary, Minos and Rhadamanthus, who were heroes illuminated by +Jupiter, raised themselves from generation to true being, and meddled +with mortal concerns no further than absolute necessity required.</p> + +<p>In the last place Proclus adds, that heroes are very properly +denominated from Love, since Love is a great dæmon: and from the +co-operation of dæmons heroes are produced. To which may also be +added, that Love originated from Plenty as the more excellent cause, +and from Poverty as the recipient and the worse cause; and heroes are +analogously produced from different genera.</p> + +<p>Plato who was one of these heroes or demigods, was the offspring of +Apollo in the way above explained by Proclus, as we are informed by +Olympiodorus in his life of him. For he says, “It is reported that +an<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">[279]</span> Apolloniacal spectre had connection with Perictione the mother of +Plato, and that appearing in the night to Aristo the father of Plato, +it commanded him not to sleep with Perictione during the time of her +pregnancy—which mandate Aristo obeyed.” The like account of the divine +origin of Plato is also given by Apuleius in his treatise on the dogmas +of Plato, and by Plutarch in the 8th book of his Symposiacs. Epimenides +likewise, Eudoxus and Xenocrates asserted that Apollo becoming +connected with Parthenis the mother of Pythagoras, and causing her to +be pregnant, had in consequence of this predicted concerning Pythagoras +by his priest.<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> And thus much concerning those undefiled souls who +were called by the ancients terrestrial dæmons, heroes and demigods, +and who descended into the regions of mortality for the benevolent +purpose of benefiting those apostate souls, who are elegantly called by +Empedocles,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Heaven’s exiles straying from the orb of light.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLVII.</h2> + + +<p>The triple genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, and +which have been unfolded in the preceding chapters, are indicated +by the following division of time, in the first hypothesis of the +Parmenides; from which division <i>the one</i> is shown to be +exempt: “Do not the terms <i>it was</i>, <i>it has been</i>, <i>it +did become</i>, seem to signify the participation of the time +past? Certainly. And do not the terms <i>it will be</i>, <i>it may +become</i>, and <i>it will be generated</i>, signify that which +is about to be hereafter? Certainly. But are not the terms <i>it +is</i>, and <i>it is becoming to be</i>, marks of the present time? +Entirely so. If then <i>the one</i> participates in no respect<span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">[280]</span> of +any time, it neither ever <i>was</i>, nor <i>has been</i>, nor <i>did +become</i>. Nor is it <i>now generated</i>, nor is <i>becoming to +be</i>, nor <i>is</i>, nor <i>may become</i> hereafter, nor <i>will be +generated</i>, nor <i>will be</i>. It is most true.”</p> + +<p>The commentary of Proclus on this passage is as follows: “This division +of time accords with the multitude of the divine genera, which are +suspended from divine souls, viz. with angels, dæmons, and heroes. +And in the first place, this division proceeds to them supernally, +according to a triadic distribution into the <i>present</i>, +<i>past</i>, and <i>future</i>; and in the next place, according to +a distribution into nine, each of these three being again subdivided +into three. For the monad of souls is united to the one whole of time, +but this is participated secondarily by the multitude of souls. And of +this multitude, those participate of this whole <i>totally</i>, that +subsist according to <i>the past</i>, or <i>the present</i>, or <i>the +future</i>; but those participate of it <i>partially</i>, that are +essentialized according to the differences of these. For to each of the +wholes a multitude is co-ordinated, divided into things first, middle, +and last. For a certain multitude subsists in conjunction with that +which is established conformably to <i>the past</i>, the <i>summit</i> +of which is according to <i>the was</i>, but the <i>middle</i> +according to <i>it has been</i>, and the <i>end</i> according to <i>it +did become</i>. With that also which is established according to <i>the +present</i>, there is another multitude, the <i>principal</i> part of +which is characterized by <i>the is</i>, the <i>middle</i> by <i>it is +generated</i>, and the <i>end</i> by <i>it is becoming to be</i>. And +there is another triad with that which subsists according to <i>the +future</i>, the <i>most elevated</i> part of which is characterized +by <i>the will be</i>, that which ranks in the <i>middle</i> by <i>it +may become</i>, and the <i>end</i> by <i>it will be generated</i>. And +thus there will be three triads proximately suspended from these three +totalities, but all these are suspended from their monad.</p> + +<p>All these orders, likewise, which are distributed according to the +parts of time, energize according to the whole of time; this whole +containing in itself triple powers, one of which is <i>perfective</i> +of all motion, the second <i>connects</i> and <i>guards</i> things +which are governed by it, and the third <i>unfolds</i> divine natures +into light. For, as all such things as are not eternal, are led round +in a circle, the wholeness or the monad of time, perfects and connects +their essence, and discloses to them the united infinity of eternity,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">[281]</span> +evolving the contracted multitude which subsists in eternal natures; +whence also this apparent time, as Timæus says, unfolds to us the +measures of divine periods, perfects sensibles, and guards things which +are generated in their proper numbers. Time, therefore, possesses +triple powers prior to souls, viz. <i>the perfective</i>, <i>the +connective</i>, and <i>the unfolding</i>, according to a similitude to +eternity. For eternity, possessing a middle order in intelligibles, +<i>perfects</i> the order posterior to itself, supplying it with union, +but <i>unfolds into light</i> that which is prior to itself, producing +into multitude its ineffable union, and <i>connects</i> the middle +bond of intelligibles, and guards all things intransitively through +its power. Time, therefore, receiving supernally the triple powers of +eternity, imparts them to souls. Eternity, however, possesses this +triad unitedly; but time both unitedly and distributively; and souls +distributively alone. Hence, of souls, some are characterized according +to one, and others according to another power of time; some imitating +its <i>unfolding</i>, others its <i>perfective</i>, and others its +<i>connective</i> power. Thus also with respect to the Fates, some of +these being adapted to give completion and perfection to things, are +said to sing the past, always indeed energizing, and always singing, +their songs being intellections, and fabricative energies about the +world: for <i>the past</i> is the source of <i>completion</i>. Others +again of these are adapted to <i>connect</i> things <i>present</i>; +for they guard the essence and the generation of these. And others are +adapted to <i>unfold the future</i>; for they lead into essence and to +an end that which as yet is not.</p> + +<p>We may also say, since there is an order of souls more excellent than +ours divided into such as are first, such as are middle, and such as +are last, the most total of these are adapted to <i>the past</i>. For +as this comprehends in itself the present and the future, so these +souls comprehend in themselves the rest. But souls of a middle rank are +adapted to <i>the present</i>; for this was once <i>future</i>, but is +not yet <i>the past</i>. As, therefore, <i>the present</i> contains +in itself <i>the future</i>, so these middle souls comprehend those +posterior, but are comprehended in those prior to themselves. And souls +of the third order correspond to <i>the future</i>. For this does not +proceed through <i>the present</i>, nor has become <i>the past</i>, but +is <i>the future</i> alone; just as these third souls are of themselves +alone, but through<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">[282]</span> falling into a more partial subsistence, are by no +means comprehensive of others. For they convolve the boundary according +to a triadic division of the genera posterior to the Gods.</p> + +<p>The whole of the first triad, therefore, has <i>the once</i>, for this +is the peculiarity of <i>the past</i>, and of completion; but it is +divided into <i>the was</i>, <i>it was generated</i>, and <i>it did +become</i>. Again, therefore, of these three, <i>the was</i> signifies +the summit of the triad, bounded according to hyparxis itself; but +<i>it was generated</i>, signifies an at-once-collected perfection; +and <i>it did become</i>, an extension in being perfected; these +things being imitations of intelligibles. For <i>the was</i> is an +imitation of <i>being</i>, <i>it was generated</i>, of <i>eternity</i>, +and <i>it did become</i>, of that which is <i>primarily eternal</i>. +For <i>being</i> is derived to all things from the first of these; a +subsistence at once as <i>all</i>, and a <i>whole</i> from the second; +and an <i>extension into multitude</i> from the third.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLVIII.</h2> + + +<p>Having, therefore, unfolded to the readers the orders and +characteristic properties of the mundane Gods, and of the triple genera +that are perpetually suspended from them, I shall in the next place +present him with what Plato says, in celebration of the divinity of +the World, the great monad which comprehends all these, so far as the +whole of it is a God, consisting of a superessential unity derived from +the ineffable principle of all things, a divine intellect, a divine +soul, and a deified body. In the Timæus then, Plato celebrates the +world as a deity in the following manner; “When, therefore, that God +who is an eternally reasoning divinity cogitated about the God who at +a certain time would exist, he fabricated his body smooth and equable, +and every way from the middle equal and whole, and perfect from the +composition of perfect bodies. But placing soul in the middle of the +world, he extended it through the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">[283]</span> whole; and besides this, externally +surrounded the body of the universe with soul. And causing circle to +revolve in a circle, he established heaven (i.e. the world) one, only, +solitary nature, able through virtue to converse with itself, indigent +of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself. And +on all these accounts the world was generated by him, a blessed God.” +The first part of this extract, as far as to the word “perfect bodies,” +is admirably elucidated by Proclus as follows:</p> + +<p>What is here said, imitating the one intellect which comprehends the +intellection of wholes in one, collects all things into sameness, +and refers to one summit all the fabrication of the corporeal +system. It is necessary, therefore, that we should recall to our +memory what has been already asserted. It has been said then, that +the elements through analogy rendered all things in concord with +each other. That the universe was generated a whole consisting of +wholes. That it is spherical and smooth, and has itself a knowledge +of itself, and a motion in itself. Hence, it is evident that the +whole world is assimilated to [its paradigm] all-perfect animal. But +the orderly distribution according to the wholes which it contains +proceeds analogous to its second and third causes. And the number of +its elements indeed, and the unifying bond of them through analogy, +corresponds to the essence which is without colour, without figure, and +without contact;<a id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a> for number is there. The first wholeness of the +world which adorns all things, and which consists of the wholes of the +elements, proceeds analogous to the intellectual wholeness.<a id="FNanchor_188" href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a> Its +sphericity is analogous to intellectual figure.<a id="FNanchor_189" href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> Its sufficiency, +intellectual motion, and sameness of convolution, are analogous to +the God who absorbs all his offspring in himself.<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a> Its animation +corresponds to its vivific cause [Rhea]. And its possession of +intellect is analogous to the demiurgic intellect; though from this all +things proceed, and from the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">[284]</span> natures prior to it, different things +being analogous to different causes. And the more excellent natures +indeed are the causes of all that proceeds from secondary principles; +but secondary principles are the causes of less numerous and less +excellent effects. For with respect to the demiurgus himself, so far as +he is <i>intellectual</i>, he produces all things intellectual; but so +far as he is <i>being</i>, he is the father of all bodies and of every +thing incorporeal; and so far as he is a God, he also gives subsistence +to matter itself. In what is now said, therefore, Plato makes a +summary repetition of every thing which the universe derives from the +intellectual Gods. And thus much concerning the whole theory.</p> + +<p>Let us survey, however, more particularly the truth of what is now +said. When, therefore, Plato calls the demiurgus, “an eternally +reasoning being,” he makes the essence and at the same time the +intellection of him through which the world is perpetual, to be +eternal. It is requisite, likewise, to observe how he arranges +the demiurgus among beings that always exist, assigning to him an +eternal order; so that he will not be soul. For in the Laws Plato +says that soul is immortal indeed, and indestructible, but is not +eternal. Hence, it appears that every one who fancies soul is the +demiurgus, is ignorant of the difference between the eternal and the +indestructible. But <i>reasoning</i> is significant of distributed +or divided fabrication. And the words, “who at a certain time would +exist,” do not indicate a temporal beginning, as Atticus imagined +they did, but an essence conjoined with time. For Plato says in this +dialogue, “that time was generated together with the universe,” and +the world is temporal, and time is mundane. For time and the world +are consubsistent with each other, and co-produced from the one +fabrication of things. And a <i>temporal ever</i>, may be said to be +<i>at a certain time</i>, when compared with that which is eternal, +just as that which is <i>generatively being</i>, is <i>non-being</i>, +when compared with that which is <i>intelligibly being</i>. Though +the world, therefore, exists through the whole of time, yet its being +consists in <i>becoming to be</i>, and is in a part of time. But this +is the ποτε or the <i>at a certain time</i>, mentioned by Plato, +and is not a simultaneous subsistence in all time, but is always +<i>at a certain time</i>. For the eternal is always in the whole of +eternity; but the temporal in a certain time, is always differently<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">[285]</span> +in a different time. Hence, the world, as with reference to an +<i>eternally</i> existing God, is very properly called a God, who at +<i>a certain time</i> would exist. For the former is sensible with +reference to the latter, who is intellectual. That which is sensible, +therefore, is <i>always generated</i>, but <i>is</i> at a certain time. +For it possesses existence partibly, and is perpetually advancing into +being from that which always is. For since, as we have before observed, +it derives from something else an infinite power of existing, and that +which it possesses is finite, but it is perpetual by always receiving, +the ability of existing infinitely, being numbered in that which is +finite, it is evident that it is at a certain time; from <i>a certain +time</i> always possessing existence; and in consequence of that which +is imparted to it never ceasing, always becoming to be;<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a> but in its +own nature existing at a certain time, and having, as Plato says in +the Politicus, a renovated immortality. For subsisting in rising into +existence, the whole of it does not at once participate of the whole of +being, but again and again, not existing without an extension of being. +Unless, perhaps, the expression <i>at a certain time</i>, signifies the +<i>whole</i> of time. For the evolution of time, as with reference to +an <i>eternal infinity</i> is ποτε <i>a certain time</i>. And the whole +of time has the same ratio to eternity, that a part of time the ποτε +has to the whole.</p> + +<p>If, also, you are willing, it may be said after another manner, that +Plato denominates the world “a God that at a certain time would exist,” +since he has now fashioned a corporeal nature, and given subsistence +to intellect, but not yet to soul, because the world also as a God +will have a subsistence in the course of his narration. For divinity +produces at once both parts and the whole, but language divides things +that are consubsistent, generates things that are unbegotten, and +distributes eternal natures according to time. The God, therefore, +that at a certain time would exist, is that which is fashioned in the +narration of Plato, and according to which there are division and +composition. For this, also, the Pythagoric Timæus himself indicates to +those who are able to understand<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">[286]</span> him, when he says in his treatise [On +the soul of the world], “Before heaven (i.e. the world) was generated +in words, there were idea and matter, and God the demiurgus.” For he +clearly manifests that he fashions in words the generation of the world.</p> + +<p>When Plato, likewise, says that the demiurgus fabricated the body of +the world smooth and equable, this manifests the one comprehension +in the world, and its supreme aptitude to the participation of a +divine soul. But the words, “every way from the middle equal,” +exhibit the peculiarity of a spherical figure; for this is every way +equally distant according to all intervals. And the words “whole and +perfect from the composition of perfect bodies,” give to the world +a consummate similitude to all-perfect animal; for that was in all +things perfect; and also to the demiurgus himself. For as he is the +father of fathers, and the supreme of rulers, so the world is the most +perfect of perfect natures, and the most total of wholes. You may also +say, that Plato calls the world smooth, as not being in want of any +motive, or nutritive, or sensitive organs; for this had just before +been demonstrated by him. But that it is every way equal from the +middle, as having a spherical figure. And that it is whole and perfect, +as being all-perfect, and leaving nothing external to itself; for +this is properly a whole and perfect. It likewise consists of perfect +bodies, as being composed of the four elements. But Plato calls it in +the singular number a body, as being only-begotten. And thus beginning +from the only-begotten, and proceeding as far as to perfection, he +again returns to it through the above-mentioned words, imitating the +progression of the world from its paradigm, and its perfect conversion +to it.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLIX.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place, let us direct our attention to the words, “But +placing soul in the middle of the world, he extended it through the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">[287]</span> +whole; and besides this, externally surrounded the body of the universe +with soul.” Divinity, says Proclus, at once and eternally produces +all things. For according to his very being, and according to the +eternal intellection of wholes, he generates all things from himself, +supermundane and mundane beings, intellects, souls, natures, bodies, +and matter itself. And indeed, an at-once-collected subsistence in a +greater degree belongs to the demiurgic progeny, than to the solar +illumination; though in this the whole light proceeds simultaneously +with the sun. But it is evident that the sun imitating the father of +the universe through visible fabrication is inferior to eternal and +invisible production. All things, therefore, as we have said, being +produced from the invisible fabrication at once and eternally, at the +same time, the order of the effects is likewise preserved. For all +things proceed collectively together with their own proper order. +For in the producing cause, there was also an eternal intellection, +and order prior to the things that were arranged. Hence, though all +things proceed at once from one cause, yet some have a first, and +others a diminished dignity. For some things proceed in a greater, but +others in a less degree. And some are co-arranged with the demiurgus +according to union, others according to contact, and others according +to participation. For intellect is able to be connascent with intellect +through union; but soul is naturally adapted to be conjoined with +intellect; and bodies participate of it only, just as things in the +profundity of the earth participate of the splendour of the sun. All +these, therefore, subsisting in the world, viz. intellect, soul, and +body, and all these being produced at once, and at the same time, there +being an order in these proceeding from the demiurgus, language at +one time beginning supernally according to progression, ends at the +boundaries of fabrication, but at another time being incited<a id="FNanchor_192" href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> from +things last, according to conversion, recurs to the summits of the +universe, conformably to things themselves. For all things proceed, and +are converted to the cause and principle from which they proceeded; in +so doing exhibiting a certain demiurgic circle.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">[288]</span></p> + +<p>Plato, however, delivered to us the order of the plenitudes +(πληρωματων)<a id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> of the world, according to progression, in what he +before said, when the demiurgus placing intellect in soul, and soul +in body fabricated<a id="FNanchor_194" href="#Footnote_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> the universe, but in the present passage, he +unfolds to us the order according to conversion. And in the first +place, he assumes two contraries in the universe, adds two media to +these, and unites them through analogy. Afterwards giving completion +to the world, by rendering it a whole of wholes, he surrounds it with +an intellectual [i.e. with a spherical] figure, gives it the power of +participating a divine life, and a motion imitating intellect.<a id="FNanchor_195" href="#Footnote_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a> +Always, likewise, causing the world to be more perfect by the +additions, he introduces soul into it as her proper place of abode, and +fills all things with life, but different things with a different life. +He also inserts intellect in soul, and through this conjoins her with +her fountain. For the soul of the universe participating of intellect, +is connected with intelligibles themselves. And thus he ends at the +principle from which the mundane intellect, soul and the body of the +world proceed. For giving a three-fold division to the universe, viz. +into intellect, soul, and body, he discusses in the first place the +two latter which are subordinate. For such is the mode according to +conversion. And he terminates indeed the discussion of the body of the +world, having unfolded its essence, its figure, and its motion. But the +theory of soul is connected with this, just as the body itself of the +world is suspended from a divine soul.</p> + +<p>With respect, however, to the position of soul in the middle of the +universe, it is differently explained by the different interpreters of +Plato. For some call the centre of the earth the middle, but others +the moon, as being the isthmus of generated and divine natures. Others +again say that the sun is the middle, as being established in the place +of a heart [in the world], others the inerratic sphere, others the +equinoctial, as bounding the breadth of the universe, and others the +zodiac. And some<span class="pagenum" id="Page_289">[289]</span> indeed place the governing principle in the centre +of the universe, others in the moon, others in the sun, others in the +equinoctial, and others in the zodiac. And the power of the centre +testifies in favour of the first of these, since it is connective of +every circulation; the motion of the moon, in favour of the second, +since it variously changes generation; the vivific heat of the sun, +in favour of the third; the facility of the motion of the equinoctial +circle, of the fourth; and in favour of the fifth, the circulation of +the stars about the zodiac. Porphyry, however, and Jamblichus, oppose +all these interpretations, and reprobate them as understanding the +middle in a way accompanied with interval, and enclosing in a certain +part the soul of the whole world, which is every where similarly +present, which rules over all things, and leads all things by its own +motions. Of these divine men, however, Porphyry assuming the soul to +be the soul of the universe, interprets the <i>middle</i> according +to the psychical essence; for soul is the middle of intelligibles and +sensibles. This interpretation, however, does not appear to say any +thing as with reference to the words of Plato. But if we assume this, +that the universe derives its completion from intellect, soul and +body, and that it is a psychical and intellectual animal, we shall +find in this system that soul is the middle. This, therefore, Plato +had before asserted; and now he will appear to say nothing else, than +that the soul of the world is extended through the universe, being +allotted a middle order in it. But the philosopher Jamblichus thinks +that by <i>soul</i> we should understand the exempt, supermundane, and +liberated soul, and which has dominion over all things. For according +to him, Plato does not here speak of the mundane soul, but of the +soul which is not participated by body, and which is arranged as a +monad above all mundane souls. For the first soul is of this kind, +and the <i>middle</i> is asserted of this, as being similarly present +to all things, because it does not belong to any body, has no manner +of habitude whatever, similarly animates all things, and is equally +distant from all things. For it is not distant from some things in +a less, and from others in a greater degree, since it is without +habitude; but it is alike distant from all things; though all things +are not after the same manner distant from it. For in its participants +there is the more and the less.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_290">[290]</span></p> + +<p>Our leader, however, [Syrianus] more aptly interprets the words of +Plato. For the soul of the world has indeed that which is supermundane +and exempt from the universe, according to which it is conjoined with +intellect, which Plato in the Phædrus, and Orpheus in his verses +concerning <i>Ippa</i><a id="FNanchor_196" href="#Footnote_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a> denominate the head or summit of the soul. +It has also another multitude of powers proceeding from this monad, +divided about the world, and appropriately present to all the parts of +the universe. And these subsist in one way indeed about the middle, in +another way about the earth, in another about the sun, and in another +about each of the spheres. Our leader, therefore, says that all these +are comprehended in the present words of Plato, who indicates by them, +that the soul of the world in one way animates the middle, in another +the whole bulk, and that it leaves something else prior to these exempt +from the universe.</p> + +<p>That we may not, however, carelessly attend to what is here said by +Plato, but may offer something demonstrative about the psychical +powers, it must be said, that soul by a much greater priority than body +is a vital world, and is both one and number. And by the one indeed, it +is better than every form of habitude; but by the multitude it rules +over the different parts of the universe. For in its guardian powers it +contains the centre; since from thence the whole sphere is governed, to +which also it converges. Farther still, every thing turbulent in the +world is impelled to the middle, and requires a divine guard, which +is able to arrange it, and detain it in its proper boundaries. Hence +also, theologists terminate the progressions of the highest Gods in +that place; and the Pythagoreans call the middle either the tower or +the prison of Jupiter. But in its stable and at the same time vivific +powers, it contains the sphere of the earth. In its perfective and +generative powers, the sphere of water. In its connective and motive +powers it comprehends the air. In its undefiled powers, fire. And in +its intellectual powers, the whole heaven. In these powers, likewise, +it in one way contains the lunar, in another the solar, and in another +the inerratic sphere.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">[291]</span></p> + +<p>Such therefore, being the animation of the world, or its participation +of soul, Plato, as it is usual with him, beginning according to +conversion from things that are last, first imparts soul to the middle, +afterwards to the universe, and in the third place leaves something +of soul external to the universe. For as he gave subsistence to body +prior to soul, and to parts prior to wholes, thus also he imparts soul +to the world, beginning from things that have an ultimate existence. +When Plato therefore delivered the order of the plenitudes of the world +according to progression, beginning supernally, he placed intellect in +soul, and soul in body. But here where he delivers the order according +to conversion, he first animates the middle, and afterwards the +universe itself. For the river of vivification proceeds as far as to +the centre; as the Chaldean oracles also assert, when speaking about +the middle of the five centres, which from on high passes entirely to +the opposite part, through the centre of the earth. For they say: “And +another fifth middle fiery centre, where a life-bearing fire descends +as far as to the material rivers.” Hence Plato beginning from those +things in which animation ends, recurs to the whole vivification, +and prior to this surveys the exempt power of the soul. We must not +therefore place the ruling part of the soul in the centre; for this is +exempt from the universe; but a certain power of it which guards the +whole order of the world. For nothing else in the universe has so much +the power of entirely subverting the whole of things, as the centre and +the power of the centre, about which the universe with measured motion +harmoniously revolves. Hence it appears to me that Plato divinely +says that the demiurgus placed <i>soul</i> and not <i>the soul</i> in +the middle of the universe. For these differ from each other, because +the latter establishes the whole soul in the centre, but the former a +certain power of it, and a different power in different parts.</p> + +<p>The philosopher himself however, shortly after, when speaking of the +animation itself of the world says, “But the soul being extended from +the middle to the very extremities of the universe, and investing it +externally in a circle, gave rise to the divine commencement of an +unceasing and wise life through the whole of time.” For the words “to +be every way extended from the middle,” have the same meaning as “to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">[292]</span> +be extended from the middle to the very extremities of the universe.” +But in the latter, the soul herself illuminates from herself the +centre of the universe and the whole sphere of it by her powers; while +in the former, the demiurgus is the cause of the animation, himself +introducing the soul into the universe as into her proper place of +abode. For the same thing is effected by both, but demiurgically +indeed and intellectually by the cause, and self-motively by soul. +Now however, the philosopher delivers the bond which proceeds from +fabrication alone. For we particularly refer wholes and such things +as are good to a divine cause; but we consider partial natures, and +such things as are not good, to be unworthy of divine fabrication; and +we suspend them from other proximate causes, though these also, as +it is frequently said, subsist from divinity. Since therefore both a +divine and a partial soul have communication with bodies, the former +indeed subsisting according to boniform will, and not departing from +intelligible progressions is deific; but the latter which takes place +through a defluxion of the wings of the soul, or through audacity, +or flight, is atheistical, though the former is complicated with the +self-motive energy, and the latter with providential care. But in the +one a subsistence according to deity is apparent through the presence +of divinity; and in the other, a subsistence from soul, through the +representation of aberration.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER L.</h2> + + +<p>In the next place Timæus, or rather Plato adds, “And causing circle to +revolve in a circle, he established heaven (i.e. the world) one, only, +solitary nature;” on which Proclus observes as follows: The philosopher +Porphyry well interprets the meaning of circle revolving in a circle. +For it is possible, says he, for that which is not a circle to be moved +in a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_293">[293]</span> circle, as a stone when whirled round; and also for a circle to +be moved not in a circle, as a wheel when rolled along. But it is the +peculiarity of the world, that being circular it is moved in a circle, +through harmoniously revolving about the centre. In a still greater +degree however, the divine Jamblichus well interprets the meaning of +these words. For he says that the circle is twofold, the one being +psychical, but the other corporeal, and that the latter is moved in +the former. For this is conformable to what has been before said, and +accords with what is afterwards asserted. For Plato himself shortly +after moves the corporeal nature according to the psychical circle, and +renders the twofold circulations analogous to the periods in the soul.</p> + +<p>Moreover, to comprehend the whole blessedness of the world in three +appellations, is most appropriate to that which subsists according to +a triple cause, viz. the final, the paradigmatic, and the demiurgic. +For of the appellations themselves, the first of them, viz. <i>one</i>, +is assumed from the final cause; for <i>the one</i> is the same with +<i>the good</i>. But the second, viz. <i>only</i>, is assumed from the +paradigmatic cause. For the <i>only-begotten</i> and <i>onlyness</i> +(μονωσις) were, prior to the universe, in all-perfect animal. And the +third, viz. the <i>solitary</i>, is assumed from the demiurgic cause. +For the ability of using itself, and through itself governing the +world, proceeds from the demiurgic goodness. The world therefore is +<i>one</i>, so far as it is united, and is converted to <i>the one</i>. +But it is <i>only</i>, so far as it participates of the intelligible, +and comprehends all things in itself. And it is <i>solitary</i>, so far +as it is similar to its father, and is able to save itself. From the +three however, it appears that it is a God. For <i>the one</i>, the +<i>perfect</i>, and the <i>self-sufficient</i>, are the elements of +deity. Hence, the world receiving these, is also itself a God; being +<i>one</i> indeed, according to hyparxis; but <i>alone</i>, according +to a perfection which derives its completion from all sensible natures; +and <i>solitary</i>, through being sufficient to itself. For those that +lead a solitary life, being converted to themselves, have the hopes +of salvation in themselves. And that this is the meaning of the term +<i>solitary</i>, will be evident from the following words of Plato: +“Able through virtue to converse with itself, indigent of nothing +external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself.” For in these +words, he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_294">[294]</span> clearly manifests what the solitariness is which he ascribes +to the world, and that he denominates that being solitary, who looks +to himself, to that with which he is furnished, and to his own proper +measure. For those that live in solitary places, are the saviours of +themselves, so far as respects human causes. The universe therefore is +likewise after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to itself, and +preserving itself, not through a diminution, but from an exuberance +of power; for self-sufficiency is here indicated; and as he says, +through virtue. For he alone among partial animals [such as we are] who +possesses virtue is able to associate with, and love himself with a +parental affection. But the vicious man looking to his inward baseness, +is indignant with himself and with his own essence, is astonished with +externals, and pursues an association with others, in consequence +of his inability to behold himself. On the contrary, the worthy man +perceiving himself beautiful rejoices and is delighted, and producing +in himself beautiful conceptions, gladly embraces an association +with himself. For we are naturally domesticated to the beautiful, +but hastily withdraw ourselves from deformity. Hence, if the world +possesses virtue adapted to itself, in its intellectual and psychical +essence, and in the perfection of its animal nature, looking to itself, +it loves itself, and is present with, and sufficient to itself.</p> + +<p>It is proper therefore to assert these things to those who place +intelligibles external to intellect. For how can that which tends to +other things, and as being deficient is indigent of externals, be +blessed? Hence, if the world is through virtue converted to itself, +must not intellect do this in a much greater degree? Intellect +therefore intellectually perceives itself. And this is among the number +of things immediately known. This also deserves to be remarked, that +Plato when he gives animation to the world, directly imparts virtue to +it. For the participation of soul is immediately accompanied with the +fulness of virtue, in the being which subsists according to nature; +since the one cause of the virtues,<a id="FNanchor_197" href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> is also co-arranged with +the fountain of souls,<a id="FNanchor_198" href="#Footnote_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> and the progression of this fountain is +conjoined with the progression of soul. For with respect to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">[295]</span> virtue, +one indeed is unical, primary and all-perfect; but another subsists +in the ruling supermundane Gods; another in the liberated Gods; and +another is mundane, through which the whole world possesses undefiled +intelligence, an undeviating life, an energy converted to itself, +and a purity unmingled with the animals which it contains. From this +virtue therefore, the world becomes known and friendly to itself. For +knowledge precedes familiarity.</p> + +<p>Since the universe also is intellectual, an animal, and a God, so far +indeed, as it is intellectual, it becomes known to itself; but so far +as it is a God, it is friendly to itself. For union is more perfect +than knowledge. If therefore, the universe is known to itself, it is +intellectual; for that which is primarily known to itself is intellect. +And if it is friendly to itself, it is united. But that which is +united is deified; for <i>the one</i> which is in intellect is a God. +Again therefore, you have virtue, a knowledge of, and a friendship +with itself, in the world; the first of these proceeding into it from +soul; the second from intellect; and the third from deity. Hence Plato +very properly adds, that on account of these things, the world was +generated by the demiurgus a blessed God; for the presence of soul, +the participation of intellect, and the reception of union, render the +universe a God. And the blessed God which he now mentions is the God +“who at a certain time would exist,” animated, endued with intellect, +and united. Union however is present with it according to the bond of +analogy; but much more from the one soul and the one intellect which it +participates. For through these, greater bonds, and a more excellent +union proceeded into the universe. And still beyond these unions, +divine friendship, and the supply of good, contain and connect the +whole world. For the bond which proceeds from intellect and soul is +strong, as Orpheus also says; but the union of the golden chain [i.e. +of the deific series] is still greater, and is the cause of greater +good to all things.</p> + +<p>Moreover, felicity must likewise be assumed in a way adapted to the +universe. For since it is suspended from the paternal intellect and the +whole fabrication of things, and since it lives conformably to these +causes, it is consequently happy (ευδαιμων)<a id="FNanchor_199" href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a> from them. For the +demiurgus also<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">[296]</span> is denominated a dæmon by Plato in the Politicus, and a +great dæmon by Orpheus when he says,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>One the great dæmon and the lord of all.<a id="FNanchor_200" href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">He therefore who lives according to the will of the father, and +preserves the intellectual nature which was imparted to him from thence +immutable is happy, and blessed. The first, and the all-perfect form +of felicity likewise, is that of the world. The second is that of the +mundane Gods, whom Plato in the Phædrus calls happy Gods, following the +mighty Jupiter. The third is that of the genera superior to us [viz. +the felicity of angels, dæmons and heroes]. For there is one virtue of +angels, another of dæmons, and another of the heroic genera: and the +form of felicity is triple being different according to each genus. +The fourth form of felicity is that which subsists in the undefiled +souls, who make blameless descents [into the realms of generation,] +and exert an inflexible and untamed life. The fifth is that of partial +souls [such as ours]; and this is multiform. For the soul which is an +attendant on the moon, is not similarly happy with the soul that is +suspended from the solar order; but as the form of life is different, +so likewise perfection is defined by different measures. And the last +form of felicity is that which is seen in irrational animals. For +every thing which obtains a perfection adapted to it according to +nature, is happy. For through its proper perfection, it is conjoined +to its proper dæmon, and partakes of his providential care. The forms +of felicity therefore, being so many, the first and highest must be +placed in the world, and which also is now mentioned by Plato. We must +not however wonder that he immediately calls the world a God, from its +participation of soul. For every thing is deified through that which is +proximately prior to it; the corporeal world indeed through soul; but +soul through intellect, as the Athenian guest also says; and intellect +through <i>the one</i>. Hence, intellect is divine, but not a God.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">[297]</span> +<i>The one</i> however is no longer a God through any thing else, but +is primarily a God; just as intellect is primarily gnostic, as soul is +primarily self-motive, and as body is primarily in place.</p> + + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LI.</h2> + + +<p>In the last place, I shall present the reader with what Plato says in +the Timæus about the name of the world, and add to it the elucidations +of Proclus; for thus every thing pertaining to the mundane Gods, and +their great recipient the universe will have been amply, and I trust +satisfactorily discussed. Plato therefore says on this subject: “We +shall denominate the universe, <i>heaven</i>, or <i>the world</i>, +or by any other appellation in which it may especially rejoice.” +These names, says Proclus, were attended with much ambiguity with the +ancients. For some alone called the sublunary region κοσμος <i>kosmos, +the world</i>, and the region above it ουρανος <i>ouranos, heaven</i>; +but others called <i>heaven</i> a part of <i>the world</i>. And some +indeed, considered the moon as the boundary of <i>heaven</i>; but +others denominated the summits of generation <i>heaven</i>. Thus Homer,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Extended heaven in ether and the clouds</div> + <div>Fell to the lot of Jove.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">Hence Plato very properly prior to the whole theory speaks definitively +concerning these names, denominating the universe <i>heaven</i> and +<i>the world</i>. And he calls it <i>heaven</i> indeed, as perceiving +the things above, contemplating the intelligible, and participating +an intellectual essence; but <i>the world</i>, as always being filled +and adorned by true beings. He likewise denominates it <i>heaven</i> +as being converted to the principles of its existence; but <i>the +world</i> as proceeding from them. For it was generated by true beings, +and is converted to them. As however, of statues which are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">[298]</span> established +by the telestic (or mystic) art, some things are apparent<a id="FNanchor_201" href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> in +them, but others are inwardly concealed, which are symbolical<a id="FNanchor_202" href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a> +of the presence of the Gods, and are known to the mystic framers of +them alone; after the same manner the universe being the statue of +the intelligible world, and perfected by the father, has some things +apparent which are indications of its divinity, but others unapparent, +which are the marks, seals, or impressions of the participation of true +being,<a id="FNanchor_203" href="#Footnote_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a> which it received from the father who gave it perfection; +in order that through these it may be eternally rooted in real essence. +The appellations also <i>heaven</i> and <i>the world</i> are names +significant of the apparent powers in the universe; the latter indeed, +so far as they proceed from the intelligible, but the former, so far as +they are converted to it.</p> + +<p>It is necessary however, to know that the divine name of the abiding +power of the universe, and which is a symbol of the demiurgic seal, +according to which also it subsists in unproceeding union with +real being, is ineffable, and not vocal, and is known to the Gods +themselves. For there are appropriate names in every order of things; +divine indeed, in the Gods; but dianoetic in the subjects of the +discursive power of reason; and doxastic in the objects of opinion. And +this also Plato asserts in the Cratylus, assenting to Homer who places +one kind of names of the same things in the Gods, and another kind in +the opinions of men, as</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Gods call it Xanthus, but Scamander men.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">And</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Chalcis its name with those of heav’nly birth.</div> + <div>But call’d Cymindis by the sons of earth.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">And in a similar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of +the Gods is of one kind, but that of partial souls of another, so +names in the former are different from those in the latter. Divine +names however, unfold the whole essence of the things named; but +those of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_299">[299]</span> men only effect this partially. Plato therefore knowing +that this pre-existed in the world, omits to mention what the divine +and ineffable name of it is which is different from the apparent, and +with great caution speaks of it as a symbol of the divine impression +which the world contains. For the words, “or by any other appellation +in which it may especially rejoice,” are a latent hymn of the mundane +name so far as it is allotted an unspeakable and divine essence, in +order that it may be co-ordinate to that which is signified by him. +Hence also, divine mundane names are delivered by theurgists; some +being called by them ineffable, but others effable; and some of them +being the names of the unapparent powers in the world, but others, +of the visible elements from which it derives its completion. Plato +therefore, here delivers both the apparent and the unapparent name of +the world, the former indeed, dyadically, but the latter monadically; +for the words, “or by any other,” are significant of oneness. And +<i>the ineffable name</i> indeed of the universe, is indicative of its +abiding in its father; the name <i>world</i>, of its progression; and +<i>heaven</i>, of its regression. But through the three, you have the +final cause, on account of which it is full of good, abiding indeed +ineffably, but proceeding perfectly, and returning to <i>the good</i>, +as to the pre-existing object of desire.</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">[300]</span></p> + +<p class="center p4 xs">THE</p> +</div> + +<p class="center p1"><b>ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.</b></p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION I.</p> + +<p>All multitude participates in a certain respect of <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it in no respect participates of <i>the one</i>, neither will +the whole be one whole, nor each of the many of which the multitude +consists; but there will also be a certain multitude arising from +each of these, and this will be the case to infinity. Each of +these infinites, likewise, will again be infinite multitude. For +participating in no respect of any one, neither according to the whole +of itself, nor according to each of the many which it contains, it +will be in every respect, and according to the whole, infinite. For +each of the many which you may assume, will either be one, or not one, +will either be many or nothing. But if each is nothing, that also +which consists of these will be nothing. And if each is many, each +will consist of infinites infinitely: [and this not in capacity, but +in energy]. These things, however, are impossible. For neither does +any being consist of infinites infinitely assumed; since there is not +more than the infinite; but that which consists of all is more than +each. Nor is it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_301">[301]</span> possible for any thing to be composed from nothing. +All multitude, therefore, participates in a certain respect of <i>the +one</i>.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION II.</p> + +<p>Every thing which participates of <i>the one</i>, is both one and not +one.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is not <i>the one</i> itself (since it participates of <i>the +one</i>) being something else besides <i>the one</i>, it suffers, or +is passive to it according to participation, and sustains to become +one. If, therefore, it is nothing besides <i>the one</i>, it is one +alone, and does not participate of <i>the one</i>, but will be <i>the +one itself</i>. But if it is something besides <i>the one</i>, which +is not <i>the one</i>, but its participant, it is both <i>not one</i>, +and <i>one</i>, not indeed such a one as the one itself, but <i>one +being</i>, as participating of <i>the one</i>. This, therefore, is not +one, nor is it that which <i>the one</i> is. But it is one, and at the +same time a participant of <i>the one</i>. Hence, being of itself not +one, it is both one and not one, being something else besides <i>the +one</i>. And so far indeed as it abounds, it is not one, but so far as +it is passive [to the one] it is one. Every thing, therefore, which +participates of <i>the one</i>, is both one, and not one.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION III.</p> + +<p>Every thing which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of +<i>the one</i>, and is one, so far as it suffers the participation of +<i>the one</i>.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if things which are not one become one, they doubtless become so by +a conjunction and communication with each other, and they sustain the +presence of <i>the one</i>, not being that which <i>the one itself</i> +is. Hence, they participate of <i>the one</i> so far as they suffer +to become one. For, if they are already one they will not become one; +since that which is does<span class="pagenum" id="Page_302">[302]</span> not become that which it is already. But +if they become one from nothing, i.e. from the privation of <i>the +one</i>, since a certain one is ingenerated in them, <i>the one +itself</i> is prior to them. [And this ingenerated one must be derived +from <i>the one itself</i>. Every thing, therefore, which becomes one, +becomes so through the participation of <i>the one</i>, &c.<a id="FNanchor_204" href="#Footnote_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a>]</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION IV.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is united is different from <i>the one itself</i>.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is united, it will participate in a certain respect of <i>the +one</i>, so far as it is said to be united. That, however, which +participates of <i>the one</i>, is both one and not one. But <i>the +one itself</i> is not both one and not one. For if this were the case, +again the one which is in it would have both these, and this would take +place to infinity, there being no <i>one itself</i> at which it is +possible to stop; but every thing being one and not one, there will be +something united which is different from <i>the one</i>. For if <i>the +one</i> is the same with the united, it will be infinite multitude. And +in a similar manner each of the things of which the united consists +will be infinite multitude. [Every thing, therefore, which is united is +different from <i>the one itself</i>.<a id="FNanchor_205" href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a>]</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION V.</p> + +<p>All multitude is posterior to <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if multitude is prior to <i>the one</i>, <i>the one</i> indeed +will participate of multitude, but multitude which is prior to <i>the +one</i> will not participate of <i>the one</i>, since that multitude +existed prior to the subsistence of <i>the one</i>.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">[303]</span> For it will not +participate of that which is not; because that which participates +of <i>the one</i>, is one and at the same time not one; but <i>the +one</i> will not yet subsist, that which is first being multitude. +It is, however, impossible that there should be a certain multitude, +which in no respect whatever participates of <i>the one</i>. Multitude, +therefore, is not prior to <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<p>But if multitude subsists simultaneously with <i>the one</i>, and they +are naturally co-ordinate with each other; for nothing of time will +prevent them being so; neither will <i>the one</i> of itself be many, +nor will multitude be one, as being at one and the same time oppositely +divided by nature, if neither is prior or posterior to the other. +Hence, multitude of itself will not be one, and each of the things +that are in it will not be one, and this will be the case to infinity, +which is impossible. Multitude, therefore, according to its own nature, +participates of <i>the one</i>, and it will not be possible to assume +any thing of it which is not one. For not being one, it will be an +infinite consisting of infinites, as has been demonstrated. Hence, it +entirely participates of <i>the one</i>. If, therefore, <i>the one</i> +which is of itself one, in no respect participates of multitude, +multitude will be entirely posterior to <i>the one</i>; participating +indeed of <i>the one</i>, but not being participated by <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<p>But if <i>the one</i> also participates of multitude, subsisting +indeed as one according to hyparxis, but as not one, according to +participation, <i>the one</i> will be multiplied, just as multitude +is united on account of <i>the one</i>. <i>The one</i>, therefore, +will communicate with multitude, and multitude with <i>the one</i>. +But things which coalesce, and communicate in a certain respect with +each other, if indeed they are collected together by something else, +that something else is prior to them. But if they themselves collect +themselves, they are not opposed to each other. For opposites do not +hasten to each other. Hence, if <i>the one</i> and multitude are +oppositely divided, and multitude so far as multitude is not one, and +<i>the one</i> so far as one is not multitude, neither will one of +these subsisting in the other be one and at the same time two. If, +also, there is something prior to them which collects them, this will +either be one, or not one. But if it is not one, it will either be +many or nothing. It will not however be many, lest multitude<span class="pagenum" id="Page_304">[304]</span> should +be prior to <i>the one</i>, nor yet will it be nothing. For how can +nothing congregate? It is, therefore, one alone. For this which is the +one cannot be many, lest there should be a progression to infinity. It +is, therefore, <i>the one itself</i>, and all multitude is from <i>the +one itself</i>.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION VI.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Concerning Unity.</i></p> + +<p>Every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that each of things many will not be itself multitude alone, and +again that each part of this will not be multitude alone is evident. +But if it is not multitude alone, it is either united, or unities +(εναδες). And if, indeed, it participates of <i>the one</i> it is +united; but if it consists of things of which that which is primarily +united consists, it will be unities. For if there is <i>the one +itself</i>, there is also that which primarily participates of it, +and which is primarily united. But this consists of unities. For if +it consists of things united, again things united consist of certain +things, and this will be the case to infinity. It is necessary, +however, that what is primarily united should consist of unities. And +thus we have discovered what we proposed at first, [viz. that every +multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.]</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION VII.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Concerning producing causes and things produced.</i></p> + +<p>Every thing productive of another is more excellent than the nature of +the thing produced.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it is either more excellent, or less excellent, or equal. Hence, +that which is produced from this, will either also itself possess a +power productive<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">[305]</span> of something else, or it will be entirely unprolific. +But if it is unprolific, according to this very thing it will be +inferior to that by which it was produced. And through its inefficacy +it is unequal to its cause which is prolific, and has the power of +producing. But if it also is productive of other things, it either +likewise produces that which is equal to itself, and this in a similar +manner in all things, and all beings will be equal to each other, and +no one thing will be better than another, that which produces, always +giving subsistence in a consequent series to that which is equal to +itself; or it produces that which is unequal to itself, and thus that +which is produced, will no longer be equal to that which produces it. +For it is the province of equal powers to produce equal things. The +progeny of these, however, will be unequal to each other, if that which +produces indeed, is equal to the cause prior to itself, but the thing +posterior to it is unequal to it. Hence, it is not proper that the +thing produced should be equal to its producing cause.</p> + +<p>Moreover, neither will that which produces ever be less than that which +is produced by it. For if it imparts essence to the thing produced, it +will also supply it with essential power. But if it is productive of +all the power which that posterior to it possesses, it will also be +able to produce itself such as that posterior nature is. And if this +be the case it will also make itself<a id="FNanchor_206" href="#Footnote_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a> more powerful. For impotency +cannot hinder, productive power being present, nor a defect of will; +since all things naturally aspire after good. Hence, if it is able to +render another thing more perfect, it will also perfect itself before +it perfects that which is posterior to itself. Hence, that which is +produced, is not equal to, nor more excellent than, its producing +cause. The producing cause, therefore, is in every respect better than +the nature of the thing produced.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_306">[306]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION VIII.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Concerning the first good, which is called</i> the good itself.</p> + +<p>That which is primarily good, and which is no other than <i>the good +itself</i> is the leader of all things that in any way whatever +participate of good.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if all beings aspire after good, it is evident that what is +primarily good is beyond beings. For if it is the same with some +one being, either being and <i>the good</i> are the same, and this +particular being will no longer be desirous of good, since it is that +to which it is passive, [i.e. since it is <i>the good</i>]. For that +which aspires after any thing is indigent of that after which it +aspires, and is different from it. And [if some one being and <i>the +good</i> are the same] being indeed will participate, and that which is +participated in being will be <i>the good</i>. Hence, <i>the good</i> +is a certain good inherent in a certain participant, and after which +the participant alone aspires, but is not that which is simply good, +and which all beings desire. For this is the common object of desire +to all beings. But that which is inherent in a certain thing, pertains +to that alone which participates of it. Hence, that which is primarily +good, is nothing else than good. For whatever else you may add to it, +you will diminish by the addition <i>the good</i>, and will make it to +be a certain good, instead of that which is simply good. For that which +is added not being <i>the good</i>, but something less than it will by +its own essence diminish <i>the good</i>.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION IX.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Concerning that which is sufficient to itself.</i></p> + +<p>Every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to essence, +or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is not +sufficient to itself, but has the cause of its perfection suspended +from another cause.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">[307]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if all beings naturally aspire after good, and one thing supplies +well-being from itself,<a id="FNanchor_207" href="#Footnote_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a> but another is indigent of something else, +the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the other +separate and apart. By how much the nearer, therefore, the former is +to that which supplies the object of desire [i.e. to <i>the good</i>], +by so much the more excellent will it be than that which is indigent +of a separate cause, and externally receives the perfection of its +hyparxis, or its energy. For since that which is sufficient to itself +is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to <i>the good +itself</i> [than that which is not self-sufficient]. It is diminished +indeed through participating of <i>the good</i>, and because it is not +primarily <i>the good</i>. Yet it is in a certain respect allied to it, +so far as it is able to possess good from itself. But to participate, +and to participate through another, are more remote from that which is +primarily good, and which is nothing else than good.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION X.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is sufficient to itself is inferior to that which is +simply good.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For what else is a thing sufficient to itself, than that which from +itself and in itself possesses good? But this is now full of good, and +participates of it, but is not that which is simply good. For that is +better than participation and plenitude, as has been demonstrated. +If, therefore, that which is sufficient to itself, fills itself with +good, that from which it fills itself, will be more excellent than +the self-sufficient, and will be above self-sufficiency. And neither +will that which is simply good be indigent of any thing. For it does +not aspire after any thing else; since by aspiring after it would be +deficient of good. Nor is that which is simply good sufficient to +itself. For thus it would be full of good, and would not be primarily +the good.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">[308]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XI.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Concerning Cause.</i></p> + +<p>All beings proceed from one first cause.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For either there is not any cause of beings, or the causes of all +finite things are in a circle, or the ascent is to infinity, and one +thing is the cause of another, and the pre-subsistence of essence +will in no respect stop. If, however, there is no cause of beings, +there will neither be an order of things second and first, of things +perfecting and perfected, of things adorning and adorned, of things +generating and generated, and of agents and patients, nor will there +be any science of beings. For the knowledge of causes is the work of +science, and we are then said to know scientifically, when we know the +causes of things.<a id="FNanchor_208" href="#Footnote_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a></p> + +<p>But if causes revolve in a circle, the same things will be prior and +posterior, more powerful and more imbecil. For every thing which +produces is better than the nature of that which is produced. It makes, +however, no difference to conjoin cause to effect, and to produce from +cause, through many, or through fewer media. For cause will be more +excellent than all the intermediate natures of which it is the cause. +And by how much the more numerous the media, by so much greater is the +causality of the cause.</p> + +<p>And if the addition of causes is to infinity, and there is always again +another cause prior to another, there will be no science of any being. +For there is not a knowledge of any thing infinite. But causes being +unknown, neither will there be a science of the things consequent to +the causes. If, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a cause +of beings, and causes are distinct from the things caused, and there +is not an ascent to infinity, there is a first cause of beings, from +which as from a root every thing proceeds; some things indeed being +nearer to, but others more remote from it. For that it is necessary +there should be one principle has been demonstrated;<a id="FNanchor_209" href="#Footnote_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a> because all +multitude subsists posterior to <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_309">[309]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XII.</p> + +<p>The principle and first cause of all beings is <i>the good</i>.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if all things proceed from one cause, [as has been above +demonstrated] it is requisite to call that cause either <i>the +good</i>, or that which is more excellent than <i>the good</i>. But +if it is more excellent than <i>the good</i>, whether is any thing +imparted by it to beings, and to the nature of beings, or nothing? And +if indeed nothing is imparted by it an absurdity will ensue. For we +shall no longer preserve it in the order of cause; since it is every +where requisite that something should be present from cause to things +caused,<a id="FNanchor_210" href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a> and especially from the first cause from which all things +are suspended, and on account of which every being exists. But if +something is imparted by it to beings, in the same manner as there is +by <i>the good</i>, there will be something better than goodness in +beings imparted to them by the first cause. For being more excellent +than, and above <i>the good</i>, it can never bestow on secondary +natures any thing subordinate to that which is imparted by the nature +posterior to itself.<a id="FNanchor_211" href="#Footnote_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a> But what can be more excellent than goodness? +Since we say that the more excellent itself is that which participates +of a greater good. Hence, if that which is not good cannot be said +to be more excellent than, it must entirely be secondary to <i>the +good</i>. If, likewise, all beings aspire after <i>the good</i>, how +is it any longer possible that there should be something prior to this +cause? For if they also aspire after that which is prior to <i>the +good</i>, how can they especially aspire after <i>the good</i>? But +if they do not aspire after it, how is it possible that things which +proceed from it should not desire the cause of all? Hence, if it is +<i>the good</i> from which all beings are suspended, <i>the good</i> is +the principle and first cause of all things.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_310">[310]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XIII.</p> + +<p>Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union +is good; and <i>the good</i> is the same with <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if <i>the good</i> is preservative of all beings, (on which account +also it is desirable to all things) but that which is preservative and +connective of the essence of every thing, is <i>the one</i>; for all +things are preserved by <i>the one</i>, and dispersion removes every +thing from essence;—if this be the case, <i>the good</i> will cause +those things to which it is present, to be one, and will connect and +contain them according to union. And if <i>the one</i> is collective +and connective of beings, it will perfect every thing by its presence. +Hence, therefore, it is good to all things to be united. If, however, +union is of itself good, and good has the power of uniting, the simply +good, and the simply one are the same, uniting and at the same time +benefiting beings. Hence it is that those things which after a manner +fall off from <i>the good</i>, are at the same time also deprived of +the participation of <i>the one</i>. And those things which become +destitute of <i>the one</i>, being filled with separation, are after +the same manner likewise deprived of <i>the good</i>. Hence, goodness +is union, and union is goodness, and <i>the one</i> is that which is +primarily good.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XIV.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Concerning the immoveable and self-motive principle, or cause.</i></p> + +<p>Every being is either immoveable or moved. And if moved, it is either +moved by itself, or by another. And if indeed it is moved by itself, +it is self-motive; but if by another, it is alter-motive. Every thing +therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or alter-motive.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it is necessary since there are alter-motive natures, that there +should also be that which is immoveable, and that the self-motive +nature should subsist between these. For if every thing alter-motive +is moved in consequence of being moved by another thing, motions will +either be in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">[311]</span> a circle, or they will proceed to infinity.<a id="FNanchor_212" href="#Footnote_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> But +they will neither be in a circle, nor have an infinite progression, +since all beings are bounded by the principle of things and that which +moves is better than that which is moved. Hence there will be something +immoveable which first moves.<a id="FNanchor_213" href="#Footnote_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a> But if this be the case, it is also +necessary that there should be something which is self-motive. For +if<a id="FNanchor_214" href="#Footnote_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a> all things should stop, what will that be which is first moved? +It cannot be that which is immoveable;<a id="FNanchor_215" href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> for it is not naturally +adapted to be moved; nor that which is alter-motive; for that is +moved by something else. It remains therefore, that the self-motive +nature is that which is primarily moved. For it is this also which +conjoins alter-motive natures to that which is immoveable, being in +a certain respect a middle, moving and at the same time being moved. +For of these, the immoveable moves only, but the alter-motive is moved +only. Every thing therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or +alter-motive.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things likewise, it is evident, that of things which are +moved, the self-motive nature is the first; but that of things which +move the immoveable is the first.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XV.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Concerning an incorporeal essence, and what the peculiarity of it +is.</i></p> + +<p>Every thing which is converted to itself is incorporeal.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For no body is naturally adapted to revert to itself. For if that +which is converted to any thing is conjoined with that to which it +is converted, it is evident that all the parts of the body which is +converted to itself, will be conjoined with all the parts. For this +it is for a thing to be converted to itself, when both that which is +converted, and that to which it is converted, become one. This however +is impossible in body, and in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">[312]</span> short, in all partible things. For the +whole of that which is partible is not conjoined with the whole, on +account of the separation of the parts, some of which are situated +differently from others. No body therefore, is naturally adapted to +revert to itself, so as that the whole may be converted to the whole. +Hence if there is any thing which has the power of reverting to itself, +it is incorporeal and impartible.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XVI.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is converted to itself, has an essence separate from +all body.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it was inseparable from any body whatever, it would not have a +certain energy separate from body.<a id="FNanchor_216" href="#Footnote_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> For thus energy would be more +excellent than essence; since the latter indeed would be indigent of +bodies, but the former would be sufficient to itself, and would not be +in want of bodies: If therefore any thing is essentially inseparable +from body, it is also in a similar manner inseparable according to +energy, or rather it is in a still greater degree inseparable. But +if this be the case, it will not revert to itself. For that which is +converted to itself being something different from body, has an energy +separate from body, and not either through, or together with body, +since the energy, and that to which the energy is directed, are not +at all in want of body. Hence, that which is converted to itself, is +entirely separate from bodies.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XVII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which moves itself primarily, is convertive to itself.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it moves itself, and its motive energy is directed to itself, +that which moves, and that which is moved are at the same time one. For +it either moves in a part but is moved in a part, or the whole moves +and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">[313]</span> is moved, [or the whole moves, but a part is moved, or<a id="FNanchor_217" href="#Footnote_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a>] the +contrary. But if one part indeed, is that which moves, and another part +is that which is moved, it will not be essentially self-motive, since +it will consist of things which are not self-motive, but which appear +indeed to be so, yet are not so essentially.</p> + +<p>If however, the whole moves, but the part is moved, or the contrary, +there will be a certain part in both which according to one, moves and +at the same time is moved.<a id="FNanchor_218" href="#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> And this is that which is primarily +self-motive. If however, one and the same thing moves and is moved, +it will have the energy of moving to itself, being motive of itself. +But it is converted to that towards which it energizes. Every thing +therefore which primarily moves itself, is converted to itself.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XVIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which imparts existence to others, is itself that primarily +which it communicates to the natures that are supplied by it with +existence.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it gives existence, and makes the communication from its own +essence, that which it gives is subordinate to its own essence [by +the 7th Proposition]. But that which it is, it is in a greater and +more perfect degree; since every thing which gives subsistence to a +certain thing, is better than and not the same with it. For it is +primarily, but the other is secondarily that which it is. For it is +necessary either that each should be the same, and that there should +be one definition of both, or that there should be nothing common and +the same in both, or that the one should subsist primarily, but the +other secondarily. If however indeed, there is the same definition of +both, the one will no longer be cause, but the other effect; nor will +the one subsist essentially, but the other by participation;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_314">[314]</span> nor will +the one be the maker, but the other the thing made. But if they have +nothing which is the same, the one will not give subsistence to the +other by its very being, in consequence of communicating nothing to +the existence of the other. Hence, it remains that the one should be +primarily that which it gives, but that the other should be secondarily +that to which existence is given; the former supplying the latter from +its very being.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XIX.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings, +is present to all the beings that are arranged according to that +nature, and this conformably to one reason, and after the same manner.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is not present to all of them after the same manner, but to +some and not to others, it is evident that it was not primarily in +that nature, but that it is in some things primarily, and in others +secondarily, that sometimes participate of it. For that which at one +time exists, but at another time does not, does not exist primarily, +nor of itself. But it is adventitious, and is imparted from some other +place to the things in which it is thus inherent.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XX.</p> + +<p>The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intellectual nature +is beyond all souls, and <i>the one</i> is beyond all intellectual +hypostases.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For every body is moveable by something else, but is not naturally +adapted to move itself, but by the presence of soul is moved of itself, +lives on account of soul, and when soul is present, is in a certain +respect self-moveable, but when it is absent is alter-moveable, as +deriving this nature from soul which is allotted a self-moveable +essence. For to whatever nature soul is present, to this it imparts +self-motion. It is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">[315]</span> however, by a much greater priority that which it +imparts by its very being. Hence, it is beyond bodies, which become +self-moveable by participation as being essentially self-moveable.</p> + +<p>Again however, soul which is moved from itself, has an order secondary +to the immoveable nature, which subsists immoveable according to +energy. Because of all the natures that are moved, the self-moveable +essence is the leader; but of all that move, the immoveable is the +leader. If therefore soul being moved from itself, moves other things, +it is necessary that prior to it, there should be that which moves +immoveably. But intellect moves being immoveable, and energizing +always with an invariable sameness of subsistence. For soul on account +of intellect participates of perpetual intellectual energy, just as +body on account of soul possesses the power of moving itself. For if +perpetual intellection was primarily in soul, it would be inherent +in all souls, in the same manner as the self-motive power. Hence, +perpetual intellection is not primarily in soul. It is necessary +therefore, that prior to it, there should be that which is primarily +intellective. And hence, intellect is prior to souls.</p> + +<p>Moreover, <i>the one</i> is prior to intellect. For intellect though +it is immoveable yet is not <i>the one</i>; for it intellectually +perceives itself, and energizes about itself. And of <i>the one</i> +indeed, all beings in whatever way they may exist, participate; but +all beings do not participate of intellect. For those beings to whom +intellect is present by participation, necessarily participate of +knowledge; because intellectual knowledge is the principle and first +cause of the gnostic energy. <i>The one</i> therefore, is beyond +intellect; and there is no longer any thing else beyond <i>the one</i>. +For <i>the one</i> and <i>the good</i> are the same. But <i>the +good</i>, as has been demonstrated, is the principle of all things.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXI.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>That intellect is not the first cause.</i></p> + +<p>Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude +co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred +to one monad.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">[316]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the monad having the relation of a principle, generates a multitude +allied to itself. Hence one series, and one whole order has a decrement +into multitude from the monad. For there would no longer be an order, +or a series, if the monad remained of itself unprolific. But multitude +is again referred to the one common cause of all co-ordinate natures. +For that in every multitude which is the same, has not its progression +from one of those things of which the multitude consists. For that +which subsists from one alone of the many, is not common to all, but +eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since +in every order there is a certain communion, connexion, and sameness, +through which some things are said to be co-ordinate, but others of a +different order, it is evident that sameness is derived to every order +from one principle.<a id="FNanchor_219" href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> In each order, therefore, there is one monad +prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connexion to the +natures arranged in it, both to each other, and to the whole.</p> + +<p>For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under +the same series: but that which ranks as the cause of the one series, +must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things must +be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">[317]</span> generated by it as co-ordinate, not so that each will be a certain +particular thing, but that each will belong to this order.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things it is evident that both unity and multitude are +inherent in the nature of body; that one nature has many natures +co-suspended from it; and that many natures proceed from the one nature +of the universe. It follows also, that the order of souls originates +from one first soul, and proceeds with diminution into the multitude of +souls. That in the intellectual essence also, there is an intellectual +monad; and that a multitude of intellects proceeds from one intellect, +and is converted to it. That a multitude of unities likewise originates +from <i>the one</i> which is prior to all things; and that there is an +extension of these unities to <i>the one</i>. Hence, after the first +one there are unities; after the first intellect, there are intellects; +after the first soul there are souls; and after total nature, there are +natures.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which subsists primarily and principally in each order is +one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is only begotten.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist; +since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two; +or let that which subsists primarily consist of both these. But if +indeed it consists of both, it will again be one, and there will not be +two things that are first. And if it be one of the two, each will not +be first. Nor if both are equally primary, will each have a principal +subsistence. For if one of them is primary, but this is not the same +with the other, what will it be in that order? For that subsists +primarily, which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But +each of these being different is, and at the same time is not that +which it is said to be.</p> + +<p>If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily<span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">[318]</span> +differ so far as they are that which they are said to be; for this +primarily suffers that which is the same; both will not be first, but +that of which both participating, are said to subsist primarily.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things it is evident, that what is primarily being is one +alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two; +that the first intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first +intellects; and that the first soul is one. This is also the case with +every form, such as the primarily beautiful, and the primarily equal. +And in a similar manner in all things. Thus also, with respect to the +form of animal, and the form of man, the first of each is one; for the +demonstration is the same.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXIII.</p> + +<p><i>Concerning the Imparticipable.</i><a id="FNanchor_220" href="#Footnote_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a></p> + +<p>Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which +are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to +imparticipable hyparxes.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that which is imparticipable having the relation of a monad, as +subsisting from itself, and not from another, and being exempt from +participants, generates things which are able to be participated. +For either<a id="FNanchor_221" href="#Footnote_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> it remains of itself barren, and possesses nothing +honourable; or it gives something from itself. And that which receives +indeed from it participates, but that which is given subsists in a +participated manner. But every thing which is something belonging to +a certain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">[319]</span> thing by which it is participated,<a id="FNanchor_222" href="#Footnote_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a> is secondary to +that which is similarly present to all things, and which fills all +things from itself. For that which is in one thing is not in others. +But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it +may illuminate all things, is not in one thing, but is prior to all +things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or it is +prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things being distributed +into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which +is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same +thing, but this of one thing, and that of another, the one being +divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be common +to all, but to one thing. Hence if it is common to things able to +participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is +imparticipable.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXIV.</p> + +<p>Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is +participated; and that which is participated is inferior to that which +is imparticipable.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that which participates, being imperfect prior to participation, +but becoming perfect through participation, is entirely secondary to +that which is participated, so far as it is perfect by participating. +For so far as it was imperfect, it is inferior to that which it +participates, which makes it to be perfect. That however which is +participated since it belongs to a certain thing, and not to all +things, is again allotted an hyparxis subordinate to that which is +something belonging to all things, and not to a certain thing. For +the latter is more allied to the cause of all; but the former is less +allied to it.</p> + +<p>The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things which are +participated; but the latter are the leaders of participants. For, in +short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many; but that which is +participated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">[320]</span> in the many, is one and at the same time not one; and +every thing which participates is not one, and at the same time one.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXV.</p> + +<p><i>Concerning the Perfect.</i></p> + +<p>Every thing perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it +is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For as that on account of its own goodness, unically gives subsistence +to all beings; for <i>the good</i> and <i>the one</i> are the same, so +that the boniform is the same with the unical; thus also those things +which are posterior to the first, on account of their perfection, +hasten to generate beings inferior to their own essence. For perfection +is a certain portion of <i>the good</i>, and the perfect, so far as +it is perfect, imitates <i>the good</i>. But <i>the good</i> gives +subsistence to all things. So that the perfect likewise, is productive +according to nature of those things which it is able to produce. And +that indeed which is more perfect, by how much the more perfect it +is, by so much the more numerous are the progeny of which it is the +cause. For that which is more perfect, participates in a greater degree +of <i>the good</i>. It is, therefore, nearer to <i>the good</i>. But +this being the case, it is nearer to the cause of all. And thus, it +is the cause of a greater number of effects. That, however, which is +more imperfect, by how much the more imperfect it is, by so much the +less numerous are the effects of which it is the cause. For being more +remote from that which produces every thing, it gives subsistence to +fewer effects. For to that which gives subsistence to, or adorns, or +perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or fabricates, all things, that +nature is more allied which produces a greater number of each of these; +but that is more remote which produces a less number of each.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things it is evident, that the nature which is most remote +from the principle of all, is unprolific, and is not the cause of +any thing.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">[321]</span> For if it generated a certain thing, and had something +posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be most +remote, but that which it produced would be more remote than itself, +from the principle of all things, but it would be nearer to productive +power, and besides<a id="FNanchor_223" href="#Footnote_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> this, would imitate the cause which is +productive of all beings.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXVI.</p> + +<p>Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in +itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and such as are +successive.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it imitates <i>the one</i>, but that immoveably gives +subsistence to things posterior to itself, every thing which produces +will possess in a similar manner the cause of productive energy. But +<i>the one</i> gives subsistence to things immoveably. For if through +motion, the motion will be in it, and being moved, it will no longer be +<i>the one</i>, in consequence of being changed from <i>the one</i>. +But if motion subsists together with it, it will also be from <i>the +one</i>, and either there will be a progression to infinity, or <i>the +one</i> will produce immoveably; and every thing which produces will +imitate the producing cause of all things. For every where, from +that which is primarily, that which is not primarily derives its +subsistence; so that the nature which is productive of certain things +originates from that which is productive of all things. Hence every +producing cause produces subsequent natures from itself. And while +productive natures abide in themselves undiminished, secondary natures +are produced from them. For that which is in any respect diminished, +cannot abide such as it is.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXVII.</p> + +<p>Every producing cause, on account of its perfection, and abundance of +power, is productive of secondary natures.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it produced not on account of the perfect, but through a +defect<span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">[322]</span> according to power, it would not be able to preserve its own +order immoveable. For that which imparts existence to another thing +through defect and imbecility, imparts subsistence to it, through its +own mutation and change in quality. But every thing which produces +remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining, that +which is posterior to it<a id="FNanchor_224" href="#Footnote_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a> proceeds into existence. Hence, being +full and perfect, it gives subsistence to secondary natures immoveably +and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being +changed into them, nor diminished. For that which is produced, is not a +distribution into parts of the producing cause; since this is neither +appropriate to the generating energy, nor to generating causes. Nor +is it a transition. For it does not become the matter of that which +proceeds; since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced +is different from it. Hence that which generates is firmly established +undiminished; through prolific power multiplies itself; and from itself +imparts secondary hypostases.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXVIII.</p> + +<p>Every producing cause gives subsistence to things similar to itself, +prior to such as are dissimilar.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than +that which is produced, they can never be simply the same with each +other, and equal in power. But if they are not the same and equal, but +different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each +other, or they are both united and separated. If, however, they are +entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and no where +will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence neither +will one of these participate of the other, being entirely different +from it. For that which is participated, gives communion to its +participant, with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover, +it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause, +as from thence possessing its essence.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">[323]</span></p> + +<p>But if that which is produced, is partly separated from and partly +united to its producing cause, if indeed, it suffers each of these +equally, it will equally participate and not participate. So that after +the same manner, it will both have essence and not have it from the +producing cause. And if it is more separated from than united to it, +the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which +it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and be more +deprived of, than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things +which proceed from causes are allied to them according to their very +being, have sympathy with them, are naturally suspended from them, and +aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object +of their desire through the cause of their existence,—if this be the +case, it is evident that things produced are in a greater degree united +to their producing causes, than separated from them. Things, however, +which are more united, are more similar than dissimilar to the natures +to which they are especially united. Every producing cause, therefore, +gives subsistence to things similar to itself prior to such as are +dissimilar.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXIX.</p> + +<p>Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to +first natures.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if that which produces, gives subsistence to similars prior to +dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will +give subsistence to the things produced. For similars are rendered +similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If, +therefore, progression in its diminution preserves a [certain] sameness +of that which is generated with that which generates, and exhibits +that which is posterior to the generator such in a secondary degree, +as the generator is primarily, it will have its subsistence through +similitude.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">[324]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXX.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, +abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every progression is effected, while primary natures remain +permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being +constituted prior to dissimilars,—if this be the case, that which is +produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For +that which entirely proceeds, will have nothing which is the same with +the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separated from it, and will +not have any thing common with and united to it. Hence it will abide +in its cause, in the same manner as that also abides in itself. If, +however, it abides, but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ +from its cause, nor will it, while that abides, be generated something +different from it. For if it is something different it is separated and +apart from its cause. If, however, it is apart, but the cause abides, +it will proceed from the cause, in order that while it abides, it may +be separated from it. So far therefore, as that which is produced has +something which is the same with the producing<a id="FNanchor_225" href="#Footnote_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a> cause, it abides +in it; but so far as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being, +however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and +different. Hence, it abides, and at the same time proceeds, and it is +neither of these without the other.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXXI.</p> + +<p>Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing essentially, is +converted to that from which it proceeds.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it should proceed indeed, but should not return to the cause +of this progression, it would not aspire after its cause. For every +thing which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover, +every<span class="pagenum" id="Page_325">[325]</span> thing aspires after good, and to each thing the attainment of it +is through the proximate cause. Every thing, therefore, aspires after +its cause. For well-being is derived to every thing from that through +which its existence is derived. But appetite is first directed to that +through which well-being is derived. And conversion is to that to which +appetite is first directed.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXXII.</p> + +<p>All conversion is effected through the similitude of the things +converted to that to which they are converted.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For every thing which is converted, hastens to be conjoined with its +cause,<a id="FNanchor_226" href="#Footnote_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a> and aspires after communion and colligation with it. But +similitude binds all things together, just as dissimilitude separates +and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion is a certain +communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through +similitude,—if this be the case, all conversion will be effected +through similitude.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXXIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing and is converted to it, +has a circular energy.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it conjoins the end +to the beginning, and the motion is one and continued; one motion being +from that which abides, but the other being directed to the abiding +cause. Hence all things proceed in a circle from causes to causes; +greater and less circles being continually formed of conversions, some +of which are to the natures [immediately] placed above the things that +are converted, but others are to still higher natures, and so on as far +as to the principle of all things. For all things proceed from this +principle, and are converted to it.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">[326]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXXIV.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is converted according to nature, makes its +conversion to that, from which also it had the progression of its +proper hypostasis.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential +desire of that to which it is converted. But if this be the case, the +whole being of it is suspended from that to which it makes an essential +conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also it has a +natural sympathy with, as being allied to the essence of it. If this, +however, be the case, either the being of both is the same, or the +one is derived from the other, or both are allotted similitude from a +certain other one. But if the being of both is the same, how is the one +naturally converted to the other? And if both are from a certain one, +it will be according to nature for both to be converted to that one. It +remains, therefore, that the one must derive its being from the other. +But if this be the case, the progression will be from that to which the +conversion is according to nature.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things, therefore, it is evident that intellect is the +object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect, +and that the whole world though it is perpetual possesses its essence +from intellect. For it is not prevented from proceeding from intellect +because it is perpetual. For neither because it is always arranged is +it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially +perpetual, and is always converted, and indissoluble according to order.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXXV.</p> + +<p>Every thing caused, abides in, proceeds from, and returns, or is +converted to, its cause.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">[327]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it alone abided, it would in no respect differ from its cause, +being without separation and distinction from it. For progression +is accompanied with separation. But if it alone proceeded, it would +be unconjoined and deprived of sympathy with its cause, having no +communication with it whatever. And if it were alone converted, how can +that which has not its essence from the cause, be essentially converted +to that which is foreign to its nature? But if it should abide and +proceed, but should not be converted, how will there be a natural +desire to every thing of well-being, and of good, and an excitation to +its generating cause? And if it should proceed and be converted, but +should not abide, how being separated from its cause will it hasten to +be conjoined with it? For it was unconjoined prior to its departure; +since if it had been conjoined, it would entirely have abided in it. +But if it should abide and be converted, but should not proceed, how +can that which is not<a id="FNanchor_227" href="#Footnote_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a> separated be able to revert to its cause? +For every thing which is converted resembles that which is resolved +into the nature from which it is essentially divided. It is necessary +however, either that it should abide alone, or be converted alone, or +alone proceed, or that the extremes should be bound to each other, or +that the medium should be conjoined with each of the extremes, or that +all should be conjoined. Hence it remains that every thing must abide +in its cause, proceed from, and be converted to it.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXXVI.</p> + +<p>Of all things which are multiplied according to progression, the first +are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to +them, and after the same manner successively.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if progressions separate productions from their causes, and there +are diminutions of things secondary with respect to such as are first, +it follows that first natures in proceeding, are more conjoined +with their causes, being [as it were,] germinations from them. But +second natures<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">[328]</span> are more remote from their causes, and in a similar +manner such as are successive. Things however, which are nearer and +more allied to their causes, are more perfect. For causes are more +perfect than things caused. But things which are more remote are more +imperfect, being dissimilar to their causes.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXXVII.</p> + +<p>Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more +imperfect than the second, and the second than those that follow; but +the last are the most perfect.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if conversions are effected in a circle, and conversion is directed +to that from which progression is derived, but progression is from +that which is most perfect, hence conversion is directed to the most +perfect. And if conversion first begins from that in which progression +terminates, but progression terminates in that which is most imperfect, +conversion will begin from the most imperfect. Hence in things which +subsist according to conversion, such as are most imperfect are the +first, but such as are most perfect, the last.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXXVIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which proceeds from certain numerous causes, is converted +through as many causes as those are through which it proceeds, and +all conversion is through the same things as those through which +progression is effected.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For since each of these takes place through similitude, that indeed +which has a transition immediately from a certain thing, is also +immediately converted to it. For the similitude here is without a +medium. But that which requires a medium in proceeding, requires also +a medium according to conversion. For it is necessary that each should +be effected with reference to the same thing. Hence the conversion will +be first to the medium, and afterwards to that which is better than +the medium.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_329">[329]</span> Through such things therefore as being is derived to each +thing, through so many well-being also is derived, and vice versa.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XXXIX.</p> + +<p>Every being is either alone essentially converted, or vitally, or also +gnostically.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For either it alone possesses being from its cause, or life together +with being, or it likewise receives from thence a gnostic power. So far +therefore as it alone <i>is</i>, it makes an essential conversion, but +so far as it lives, a vital, and so far as it likewise knows, a gnostic +conversion. For in such a way as it proceeded from its cause, such also +is the mode of its conversion to it, and the measures of its conversion +are defined by the measures according to progression. Desire therefore +is to some things according to being alone, this desire being an +aptitude to the participation of causes; but to others it is according +to life, being a motion to more excellent natures; and to others, it is +according to knowledge, being a co-sensation of the goodness of causes.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XL.</p> + +<p>Of all things which proceed from another cause, those which exist from +themselves, and which are allotted a self-subsistent essence, are the +leaders.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to +essence, or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is +suspended from another cause; but that which produces itself, since it +produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to +essence; but that which is alone produced by another is not sufficient +to itself; and the self-sufficient is more allied to <i>the good</i>; +but things more allied and similar to their causes, subsist from +cause prior to such as are dissimilar;—this being the case, things +which are produced by themselves, and are self-subsistent, are more +ancient than those which proceed into<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">[330]</span> existence from another cause +alone. For either there will be nothing self-subsistent, or <i>the +good</i> is a thing of this kind, or the first things that subsist +from <i>the good</i>. But if there is nothing self-subsistent, there +will not in reality be in any thing self-sufficiency. Nor will it be +in <i>the good</i>, since that being <i>the one</i> is better than +self-sufficiency. It is also <i>the good itself</i>, and not that which +possesses <i>the good</i>. But if <i>the good</i> was self-subsistent, +in consequence of itself producing itself, it will not be <i>the +one</i>. For that which proceeds from <i>the one</i> is not <i>the +one</i>. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; +so that <i>the one</i>, would at the same time be one and not one. +Hence, it is necessary that the self-subsistent should be posterior +to the first. And it is evident that it will be prior to things +which alone proceed from another cause. For it has a more principal +subsistence than these, and is more allied to <i>the good</i>, as has +been demonstrated.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XLI.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is in another is alone produced by another; but every +thing which is in itself is self-subsistent.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that which is in another thing and is indigent of a subject, can +never be generative of itself. For that which is naturally adapted to +generate itself, does not require another seat, because it is contained +by itself, and is preserved in itself apart from a subject. But that +which abides, and is able to be established in itself, is productive +of itself, itself proceeding into itself, and being connective of +itself. And thus it is in itself, as the thing caused in its cause. +For it is not in itself, as in place, or as in a subject. For place is +different from that which is in place, and that which is in a subject +is different from the subject. But this which is in itself is the same +with that in which it is inherent; for it is self-subsistent. And it +is in such a manner in itself, as that which is from a cause is in the +cause.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">[331]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XLII.</p> + +<p>Every thing self-subsistent is convertive to itself.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it proceeds from itself, it will also make a conversion to +itself. For to that from which progression is derived, to that a +conversion co-ordinate to the progression is directed. For if it alone +proceeded from itself, but having proceeded was not converted to +itself, it would never aspire after its proper good, and that which +it is able to impart to itself. Every cause however is able to impart +to that which proceeds from it,<a id="FNanchor_228" href="#Footnote_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a> together with the essence which +it gives, well-being conjoined with this essence. Hence that which +is self-subsistent will impart this to itself. This therefore is the +proper good to that which is self-subsistent. And hence this will not +be the object of desire to that which is not<a id="FNanchor_229" href="#Footnote_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a> converted to itself. +But not desiring this, it will not obtain it, and not obtaining it, +it will be imperfect, and not sufficient to itself. If, however, +self-sufficiency and perfection pertain to any thing, they must pertain +to that which is self-subsistent. Hence it will obtain its proper good, +and will be converted to itself.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XLIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is convertive to itself is self-subsistent.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is converted to itself according to nature, it is perfect in +the conversion to itself, and will possess essence from itself. For to +every thing, essential progression is from that to which conversion +according to nature is directed. If therefore, it imparts well-being to +itself, it will likewise undoubtedly impart being to itself, and will +be the lord of its own hypostasis. Hence, that which is able to revert +to itself is self-subsistent.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">[332]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XLIV.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is convertive to itself according to energy, is also +converted to itself essentially.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is capable of being converted to itself in energy, but is +without conversion in its essence, it will be more excellent according +to energy than according to essence, the former being convertive, +but the latter without conversion. For that which depends on itself, +is better than that which alone depends on another. And that which +has a power of preserving itself, is more perfect than that which is +alone preserved by another. If therefore, it is convertive to itself +according to the energy proceeding from essence,<a id="FNanchor_230" href="#Footnote_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a> it will also +be allotted a convertive essence, so that it will not alone energize +towards itself, but will depend on itself, and will be contained, +connected, and perfected by itself.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XLV.</p> + +<p>Every thing self-subsistent is unbegotten.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is generated, because generated indeed, it will be imperfect +of itself, and will be indigent of perfection from another. Because, +however, it produces itself, it is perfect and sufficient to itself. +For every thing generated is perfected by another which imparts +generation to it not yet<a id="FNanchor_231" href="#Footnote_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a> existing. For generation is a path from +the imperfect to its contrary the perfect. But if any thing produces +itself, it is always perfect, being always present with the essence +of itself, or rather being inherent in that which is perfective of +essence.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">[333]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XLVI.</p> + +<p>Every thing self-subsistent is incorruptible.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it should be corrupted, it would desert itself, and would be +without itself. This however is impossible. For being one thing, it is +at the same time cause and the thing caused. But every thing which is +corrupted, departing from the cause of itself is corrupted. For so far +as it adheres to that which contains, connects and preserves it, it is +connected and preserved. But that which is self-subsistent never leaves +its cause, because it does not desert itself; for it is the cause of +itself. Every thing therefore self-subsistent is incorruptible.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XLVII.</p> + +<p>Every thing self-subsistent, is impartible and simple.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is partible, being self-subsistent, it will constitute itself +partible,<a id="FNanchor_232" href="#Footnote_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> and the whole will be converted to itself, and all +will be in all itself. This however is impossible. Hence that which +is self-subsistent is impartible. But it is also simple. For if a +composite, one thing in it will be less, but another more excellent, +and the more will be derived from the less excellent, and the less +from the more excellent, if the whole proceeds from itself. Farther +still, it would not be sufficient to itself, being indigent of the +elements of itself of which it consists. Every thing therefore, which +is self-subsistent, is simple.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XLVIII.</p> + +<p><i>Concerning the perpetual, in order to demonstrate that the world is +perpetual.</i></p> + +<p>Every thing which is not perpetual, is either a composite, or subsists +in another.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">[334]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For either it is dissoluble into those things of which it consists, and +is entirely composed from the things into which it is dissolved, or +it is indigent of a subject, and leaving the subject it departs into +non-entity. But if it is simple in itself, it will be indissoluble, and +incapable of being dissipated.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XLIX.</p> + +<p>Every thing self-subsistent is perpetual.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For there are two modes according to which it is necessary a thing +should not be perpetual; the one arising from composition, and the +other from a subsistence in something else [as in a subject]. That +which is self-subsistent however, is neither a composite, but simple, +nor in another, but in itself. Hence it is perpetual.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION L.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is measured by time, either according to essence, or +according to energy, is generation, so far as it is measured by time.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is measured by time, it will be adapted to it to be, or to +energize in time; and the <i>was</i> and the <i>will be</i>, which +differ from each other, pertain to it. For if the <i>was</i> and the +<i>will be</i> were the same according to number, it would suffer +nothing by time proceeding, and always having one part prior, and +another posterior. If therefore the <i>was</i> and the <i>will be</i> +are different, that which is measured by time is becoming to be [or +rising into existence], and never <i>is</i>,<a id="FNanchor_233" href="#Footnote_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a> but proceeds<span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">[335]</span> +together with time, by which it is measured, existing in a tendency to +being.</p> + +<p>It likewise does not stop in the same state of being, but is always +receiving another and another <i>to be</i>, just as <i>the now</i> in +time is always<span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">[336]</span> another and another, through the progression of time. +Hence it is not a simultaneous whole; for it subsists in a dispersion +of temporal extension, and is co-extended with time. This however is +to possess being in non-being. For that which is becoming to be is +not that which is become. Such a kind of being therefore as this is +generation.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LI.</p> + +<p>Every thing self-subsistent, is essentially exempt from the natures +which are measured by time.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if that which is self-subsistent is unbegotten, it will not +according to existence be measured by time. For generation is +conversant with the nature which is measured by time. Hence nothing +self-subsistent has its being in time.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">[337]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LII.</p> + +<p>Every thing eternal is a whole which subsists at once. And whether +it has its essence alone eternal, it will possess the whole at once +present, nor will it have <i>this</i> thing pertaining to itself now +subsisting, but <i>that</i> afterwards which as yet is not; but as +much as is possible it now possesses the whole without diminution, +and without extension. Or whether it has its energy as well as its +essence at once present, it possesses this also collectively, abiding +in the same measure of perfection, and as it were, fixed immoveably and +without transition according to one and the same boundary.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if the eternal, as the name denotes, is perpetual being, but to be +sometimes,<a id="FNanchor_234" href="#Footnote_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a> and to subsist in becoming to be, are different from +perpetual being, it is not proper that it should have one thing prior +and another posterior. For if it had, it would be generation, and not +being. But where there is neither prior nor posterior, nor was and +will be, but alone <i>to be</i>, and this a whole, there every thing +subsists at once that which it is. The same thing also takes place with +respect to the energy of that which is eternal.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From this it is evident that eternity is the cause to wholes of +their existence as wholes, since every thing which is eternal either +according to essence, or according to energy, has the whole of its +essence or energy present with itself.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LIII.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Concerning Eternity and Eternal Natures.</i></p> + +<p>Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and time exists prior +to every thing which subsists according to time.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">[338]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every where the natures which are participated are prior to +their participants, and imparticipables are prior to participated +natures, it is evident that the eternal is one thing, the eternity +which is in the eternal, another, and eternity itself, another. And +the first of these indeed subsists as a participant, the second as a +thing participated, and the third as an imparticipable. That also which +is in time is one thing; for it is a participant. The time which is +in this is another thing; for it is participated. And the time prior +to this is another thing; for it is imparticipable. Every where also, +that which is imparticipable is in all things the same. But that which +is participated is in those things only by which it is participated. +For there are many eternal, and many temporal natures in all of which +eternity subsists according to participation. The time also which is +in temporal natures subsists in a distributed manner; but the time +which they participate is indivisible. And there is one time prior to +both these. Eternity itself likewise is an eternity of eternities, and +time itself is a time of times; and they give subsistence, the one to +participated eternity, but the other to participated time.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LIV.</p> + +<p>Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and every time is the +measure of things in time; and these are the only two measures of life +and motion in beings.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For every thing which measures, either measures according to a part, +or it measures the whole at once when it is adapted to that which is +measured. That which measures, therefore, according to the whole is +eternity; but that which measures according to parts is time. Hence, +there are only two measures, the one of things eternal, but the other +of things in time.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LV.</p> + +<p>Every thing which subsists according to time, either subsists through +the whole of time, or has its hypostasis once in a part of time.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">[339]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if all progressions are through similitude, and things more +similar to first natures subsist in union with them prior to such +as are dissimilar, but it is impossible for things which are +generated in a part of time to be conjoined with eternal natures, +(for as being generated they differ from first natures which are +self-subsistent,<a id="FNanchor_235" href="#Footnote_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a> and as existing once, they are separated from +things which always exist, but the media between these, are such things +as are partly similar and partly dissimilar to them)—this being the +case, the medium between things which are once generated, and those +that exist always, is either that which is always becoming to be, or +that which is once, or that which is not truly being. It is however +impossible it should be that which once only truly is. And that which +is once not truly being is the same with that which is becoming to be. +Hence the medium is not that which is once only. It remains, therefore, +that the medium between both is that which is always becoming to be, +being conjoined indeed with the worse of the two through becoming to +be, but through subsisting always, imitating an eternal nature.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things it is evident that perpetuity is twofold, the one +indeed being eternal, but the other subsisting according to time. +The one also being a stable, but the other a flowing perpetuity. And +the one indeed having its being collected, and the whole subsisting +at once, but the other diffused, and expanded according to temporal +extension. And the one being a whole of itself, but the other +consisting of parts, each of which is separate, according to prior and +posterior.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LVI.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is produced by secondary natures, is produced in a +greater degree by prior and more causal natures, by whom such as are +secondary were also produced.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if that which is secondary has the whole of its essence from that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">[340]</span> +which is prior to it, its power of producing is also derived from +thence; for powers in producing causes are essentially productive, +and give completion to the essence of them. But if it is allotted the +power of producing from a superior cause, it will possess from that +its existence as the cause of things of which it is the cause, and +its power of giving subsistence to other things will be measured from +thence. If, however, this be the case, the things proceeding from it +are effects through that which is prior to it. For the one perfects a +cause, and the other the thing caused. But if this be the case, the +thing caused is from thence rendered such as it is.</p> + +<p>Moreover, that it is also in a greater degree perfected from thence +is evident. For if that which is first gives to that which is second +the cause of producing, it will primarily possess this cause; and on +this account that which is secondary generates, receiving from thence +a secondary generative power. If, however, the one becomes productive +through participation, but the other in a way superior to participation +and primarily, that will be in a greater degree a cause, which imparts +generative power to another thing proximate to its own nature.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LVII.</p> + +<p>Every cause both energizes prior to the thing caused, and gives +subsistence to a greater number of effects posterior to it.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For so far as it is cause, it is more perfect and more powerful than +that which is posterior to it, and in consequence of this is the cause +of a greater number of effects. For it is the province of a greater +power to produce more, of an equal power to produce equal, and of a +less power to produce a less number of effects. And the power which +is able to effect greater things among similars, is also capable of +effecting such as are less. But that which is able to effect such as +are less, is not necessarily capable of producing such as are greater. +If, therefore, the cause is more powerful, it is productive of more +numerous effects.</p> + +<p>Moreover, such effects as the thing caused is able to produce, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">[341]</span> +cause is in a greater degree able to produce. For every thing which is +produced by secondary natures, is in a greater degree produced by such +as are prior and more causal. The cause, therefore, gives subsistence +together with the thing caused to such effects as the thing caused is +naturally adapted to produce. But if likewise it produces prior to +it, it is indeed evident that it energizes prior to the thing caused, +according to the energy which is productive of it. Every cause, +therefore, energizes prior to the thing caused, and together with it, +and posterior to it, gives subsistence to other things.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>Hence, it is evident, that of such things as soul is the cause, +intellect also is the cause; but that soul is not also the cause +of such things as intellect is the cause. But intellect energizes +prior to soul. And such things as soul imparts to secondary natures, +intellect also imparts in a greater degree. Likewise, when soul no +longer energizes, intellect imparts by illumination the gifts of +itself to those things to which soul does not impart herself. For that +which is inanimate, so far as it participates of form, participates of +intellect, and the production of intellect. Moreover, of such things as +intellect is the cause, <i>the good</i> also is the cause; but not vice +versa. For the privations of forms subsist from <i>the good</i>; since +all things are from thence. But intellect being form, does not give +subsistence to privation.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LVIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is produced by many, is more compounded than that +which is produced by fewer causes.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every cause imparts something to that which proceeds from +it, more numerous causes will impart a greater number of gifts, but +less numerous causes a less number. Hence, of participants some will +consist of a greater number of things, but others, of a less number, +of which each participates, some indeed through a progression from a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">[342]</span> +greater number of causes, but others from a less. Those, however, which +proceed from a greater number of causes are more compounded, but those +from a less number of the same causes, are more simple. Every thing, +therefore, which is produced by a greater number of causes, is more +compounded, but that which is produced by a less number is more simple. +For the more compounded participates of those things of which the more +simple participates, but the contrary to this is not true.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LIX.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is essentially simple, is either better or worse than +composite natures.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if such beings as are the extremes of things are produced by fewer +and more simple causes, but such as are in the middle, from a greater +number of causes, the latter indeed will be composites, but of the +former, some are more simple according to that which is better, but +others according to that which is worse. That the extremes, however, +are produced by fewer causes is evident, because such natures as are +higher begin to produce prior to such as are subordinate, and extend +beyond them, to things to which subordinate natures do not proceed +through a diminution of power. For on this account also, the last of +things, [i.e. matter] is most simple, as well as the first of things, +because it proceeds from the first alone. With respect to simplicity, +however, one kind subsists according to that which is better than all +composition, but another according to that which is worse. And there is +the same reasoning in all things.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LX.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is the cause of a greater number of effects, is +better than that which is allotted a power of producing a less number, +and which produces the parts of those things to the wholes of which the +other gives subsistence.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">[343]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if the one is the cause of a less, but the other of a greater +number of effects, but the former are parts of the latter, that which +gives subsistence to a greater number of effects, will produce all that +the other produces; but not vice versa. Hence the former of these two +is more powerful and more comprehensive. For as that which proceeds is +to that which proceeds, so is one productive power to another, when +assumed with reference to each other. For that which is able to effect +a greater number of things, possesses a greater and more total power. +But this is nearer to the cause of all things. That however, which is +nearer to this cause, is in a greater degree good, just as the cause +of all is <i>the good</i> itself. Hence, that which is the cause of +a greater number of effects, is essentially more excellent than that +which produces a less number.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXI.</p> + +<p>Every power which is impartible is greater, but when divided is less.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is divided it proceeds into multitude. And if this be the +case, it becomes more remote from <i>the one</i>. But in consequence of +this it is able to effect a less number of things, through departing +from <i>the one</i>, and the unity which contains it, and will be +imperfect, since the good of every thing consists in union.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXII.</p> + +<p>Every multitude which is nearer to <i>the one</i>, is less in quantity +than things more remote from it, but is greater in power.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that which is nearer to is more similar to <i>the one</i>. But +<i>the one</i> gives subsistence to all things, without having any +multitude in itself. Hence that which is more similar to it, being +the cause of a greater<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">[344]</span> number of effects, since <i>the one</i> is +the cause of all things, has more the form of unity, and is more +impartible, because that is <i>one</i>. As therefore, that which is +less multiplied, is more allied to <i>the one</i>, so likewise as being +allied to the cause of all things, it is productive of a greater number +of effects. Hence it is more powerful.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things it is evident, that there are more corporeal natures +than souls; more souls than intellectual natures; and more intellects +than divine unities. And there is the same reasoning in all things.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is imparticipable gives subsistence to two-fold +orders of participated natures, one indeed in things which sometimes +participate, but the other in things which always and connascently +participate.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that which is always participated, is more similar to the +imparticipable than that which is sometimes participated. Hence, +before the imparticipable establishes that which is sometimes, it +will establish that which is always participable; and which by being +participated differs from that which is posterior to it, but by <i>the +always</i> is more allied and more similar to the imparticipable. Nor +are there alone things which are sometimes participated; for prior to +these are the natures which are always participated, through which +these also are bound to imparticipables according to a certain well +ordered progression. Nor are there alone things which are sometimes +participated. For these possessing an inextinguishable power, since +they are always, are prolific of other things which are sometimes +participated, and as far as to these the diminution proceeds.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_345">[345]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From hence it is evident that of the unions proceeding from <i>the +one</i>, and which illuminate beings, some are always, but others +sometimes participated. Intellectual participations, likewise, are in +a similar manner two-fold, as also are the animations of souls, and +the participations of other forms. For beauty, similitude, permanency, +and sameness, being imparticipable, are participated by natures which +always participate, and secondarily by those that sometimes participate +according to the same order.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXIV.</p> + +<p>Every monad which ranks as a principle, gives subsistence to a two-fold +number; one indeed of self-perfect hypostases, but the other of +illuminations which possess their hypostasis in other things.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if progression is according to diminution, through things +appropriate to producing causes, perfect natures will proceed from the +all-perfect, and through these as media, imperfect natures will proceed +in a well-ordered progression, so that some indeed will be self-perfect +hypostases, but others will be imperfect. And these latter will become +the forms of participants. For being imperfect, they will be indigent +of subjects in their very nature. But the self-perfect hypostases will +produce things which participate of themselves. For being perfect, +they will indeed fill these from themselves, and establish them in +themselves. But they will require nothing of inferior natures to their +own subsistence. Self-perfect hypostases, therefore, through their +separation into multitude, are indeed diminished with respect to their +principal monad; but through their self-perfect hyparxis, they are +in a certain respect assimilated to it. But imperfect hypostases, in +consequence of subsisting in other things, are remote from that which +subsists from itself, and through their imperfection are separated from +that which perfects all things. Progressions,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_346">[346]</span> however, are through +similars, as far as to natures which are entirely dissimilar. Every +monad, therefore, which ranks as a principle, gives subsistence to a +two-fold number.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things it is evident, that of the unities, some are +self-perfect proceeding from <i>the one</i>, but others are +illuminations of unions. And with respect to intellects, that some of +them are self-perfect essences, but others belong to animated natures, +being only the images of souls. And thus, neither is every union a +God, but this is true of a self-perfect unity alone, nor is every +intellectual peculiarity an intellect, but an essential peculiarity +alone [is entitled to this appellation], nor is every illumination of +soul a soul, but there are also images of souls.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXV.</p> + +<p>Every thing which has any subsistence whatever, either subsists +according to cause, so as to have the form of a principle, or according +to hyparxis, or according to participation, after the manner of an +image.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For either that which is produced is seen in that which produces, as +pre-existing in cause, because every cause antecedently comprehends in +itself the thing caused, being that primarily which the thing caused is +secondarily. Or that which produces is seen in that which is produced. +For the latter participating of the former, exhibits in itself +secondarily that which the producing cause is primarily. Or each thing +is beheld in its own order, and is neither seen in the cause nor in the +effect. For the cause subsists more excellently than that which exists +[out of the cause]. But that which is in the effect is less excellent +than that which exists out of the cause [but is not in any thing else]. +It is, however, necessary there should be that which after this manner +<i>is</i>. But every thing subsists according to hyparxis in its own +order.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">[347]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXVI.</p> + +<p>All beings with reference to each other, are either wholes, or parts, +or the same, or different.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For either some of then comprehend, but the rest are comprehended, or +they neither comprehend, nor are comprehended. And they either suffer +something which is the same, as participating of one thing, or they are +separated from each other. But if they comprehend, they will be wholes, +and if they are comprehended, parts. If also many things participate +of one thing, they are the same according to this one. But if they are +alone many things, so far as they are many they will be different from +each other.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXVII.</p> + +<p>Every wholeness (ολοτης) is either prior to parts, or consists of +parts, or is in a part.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the form of each thing is either surveyed in its cause, and we +call that which subsists in its cause a whole prior to parts. Or it +is seen in the parts which participate of it; and this in a two-fold +respect. For it is either seen in all the parts together, and this is +a whole consisting of parts, any part of which being absent diminishes +the whole. Or it is seen in each of the parts, so that the part also +becomes according to participation a whole; which makes the part to +be a whole partially. The whole, therefore, which is according to +hyparxis consists of parts. But the whole which is prior to parts is +according to cause. And the whole which is in a part is according to +participation. For this also according to an ultimate diminution is a +whole, so far as it imitates the whole which consists of parts, when +it is not any casual part, but is capable of being assimilated to the +whole, of which the parts also are wholes.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">[348]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXVIII.</p> + +<p>Every whole which is in a part, is a part of that whole which consists +of parts.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is a part, it is a part of a certain whole. And it is either +a part of the whole which it contains, according to which it is said +to be a whole in a part. But thus it will be a part of itself, the +part will be equal to the whole, and each will be the same. Or it is a +part of a certain other whole. And if of some other, it is either the +only part of that, and thus again, it will in no respect differ from +the whole, being one part of one thing. Or it is a part in conjunction +with another part. For of every whole the parts are more than one, and +that will be a whole from many parts, of which it consists. And thus +the whole which is in a part, is a part of the whole which consists of +parts.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXIX.</p> + +<p>Every whole which consists of parts, participates of the wholeness +which is prior to parts.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it consists of parts, the whole is passive [i.e. the whole +participates of another whole]. For the parts becoming one, are passive +to a whole on account of their union, and the whole subsists in parts +which are not wholes. But the imparticipable subsists prior to every +thing which is participated. The imparticipable wholeness, therefore, +subsists prior to that which is participated. Hence, there is a certain +form of wholeness, prior to the whole which consists of parts, which +is not passive to a whole, but is wholeness itself, and from which the +wholeness consisting of parts is derived. For the whole indeed, which +consists of parts, subsists in many places, and in many things, in +various ways. It is, however, necessary that there should be a monad +essentially of all totalities. For<span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">[349]</span> neither is each of these wholes +genuine, since it is indigent of parts that are not wholes, of which +it consists. Nor is the whole which is in a certain thing capable of +being the cause of wholeness to all other things. Hence, that which is +the cause to all wholes of their being wholes, is prior to parts. For +if this also consisted of parts, it would be a certain whole, and not +simply whole. And again, this would be from another whole, and so on, +to infinity; or it will subsist on account of that which is primarily a +whole, and which is not a whole from parts, but is a wholeness.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXX.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is more total among principal causes, illuminates +participants, prior to partial natures, and when these fail, still +continues to impart its illuminations.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it begins its energy upon secondary natures prior to that which is +posterior to it, and is present in conjunction with the presence of it. +When likewise that which is posterior to it no longer energizes, it is +still present, and that which is more causal continues to energize. +And this not only in different subjects, but likewise in each of the +natures that sometimes participate. Thus it is necessary, for instance, +that being should be first generated, afterwards animal, and afterwards +man. And man, indeed, is not, if the rational power is absent, but +there is still animal, breathing and sentient. And again, life failing, +being remains. For though a thing does not live, yet it has existence. +And there is a similar reasoning in all things.</p> + +<p>The cause, however, of this is, that the more causal nature being more +efficacious, energizes on the thing caused<a id="FNanchor_236" href="#Footnote_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> prior [to that which +is less causal]. For the thing caused participates first of that which +is more powerful. And that which is secondary again energizing, that +which is more powerful energizes with it. Because every thing which +the secondary nature produces, that which is more causal produces +likewise in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_350">[350]</span> conjunction with it. When the former also fails, the +latter is still present. For the communication of the more powerful +cause, operating in a greater degree, leaves that which participates +it, posterior to the energy of the less powerful cause. For through +the communication of the secondary nature, it corroborates its own +illumination.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXI.</p> + +<p>All things which among principal causes possess a more total and higher +order in their effects, according to the illuminations proceeding +from them, become in a certain respect subjects to the communications +of more partial causes. And the illuminations indeed, from higher +causes, receive the progressions from secondary causes; but the latter +are established in the former. And thus some participations precede +others, and some representations extend after others, beginning from +on high, to the same subject, more total causes having a prior energy, +but such as are more partial, supplying their participants with their +communications, posterior to the energies of more total causes.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if more causal natures energize prior to such as are secondary on +account of exuberance of power, and are present with those that have +a more imperfect aptitude, and illuminate them also; but things more +subordinate, and which are second in order, are supplied from such as +are more causal,—it is evident that the illuminations of superior +natures antecedently comprehend that which participates of both these, +and give stability to the communications of things subordinate. But +these illuminations of superior causes, employ the resemblances +of subordinate natures as foundations, and operate on that which +participates of them, the superior causes themselves having a prior +energy.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXII.</p> + +<p>All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject, +proceed from more perfect and total causes.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">[351]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the causes of a greater number of effects, are more powerful and +total, and are nearer to <i>the one</i> than the causes of fewer +effects. But the natures which give subsistence to such things as are +antecedently the subjects of others, are among causes the sources of a +greater number of effects.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From hence it is evident why matter which derives its subsistence from +<i>the one</i>, is of itself destitute of form. And why body, though it +participates of being, is of itself without the participation of soul. +For matter being the subject of all things proceeds from the cause of +all. But body being the subject of animation, derives its subsistence +from that which is more total than soul, and participates after a +certain manner of being.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXIII.</p> + +<p>Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of +being, but not every being is a whole.<a id="FNanchor_237" href="#Footnote_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For either being and whole are the same, or the one is prior, but +the other posterior. If, however, a part, so far as it is a part, is +being (for a whole is from parts which have a being), yet it is not +of itself also a whole. Being, therefore, and whole are not the same. +For if this were the case, a part would be a non-entity. But if a part +was a non-entity, the whole would have no existence. For every whole +is a whole of parts, either as existing prior to them [and therefore +causally containing them in itself], or as subsisting in them. But the +part not existing, neither is it possible for the whole to exist. If, +however, whole is prior to being, every being will immediately be a +whole. Again, therefore, there will not be a part. This, however, is +impossible. For if the whole is a whole, being the whole of a part, +the part also being a part, will be the part of the whole. It remains, +therefore, that every whole indeed is being, but that not every being +is a whole.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">[352]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things, it is evident that being which has a primary +subsistence is beyond wholeness. For the one indeed, viz. being, is +present with a greater number of things; since <i>to be</i> is present +with parts, so far as they <i>are</i> parts. But the other, viz. +wholeness, is present with a less number of things. For that which +is the cause of a greater number of effects is more excellent; but +the cause of a less number is of a subordinate nature, as has been +demonstrated.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXIV.</p> + +<p>Every form is a certain whole; for it consists of many things, each of +which gives completion to the form. But not every whole is a form.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For a particular<a id="FNanchor_238" href="#Footnote_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a> thing is a whole and also an individual, so +far it is an individual, but neither of them is a form. For every +whole consists of parts; but form is that which may be divided into +individual forms. Whole, therefore, is one thing, and form another. And +the one is present with many things, but the other with a few. Hence, +whole is above the forms of beings.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things it is evident that whole has a middle order between +being and forms. And hence it follows that being subsists prior to +forms, and that forms are beings, but that not every being is form. +Whence also, in effects, privations are in a certain respect beings, +but are no longer forms, and in consequence of the unical power +of being, they also receive a certain obscure representation of +being.<a id="FNanchor_239" href="#Footnote_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">[353]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXV.</p> + +<p>Every cause which is properly so called, is exempt from its effect.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is in the effect, it either gives completion to it, or is in +a certain respect indigent of it in order to its existence, and thus it +will be more imperfect than the thing caused. For being in the effect, +it is rather a concause than a cause, and is either a part of that +which is generated, or an instrument of the maker. For that which is +a part in the thing generated, is more imperfect than the whole. The +cause also which is in the effect, is an instrument of generation to +the maker, being unable to define of itself the measures of production. +Every cause, therefore, which is properly so denominated, if it is more +perfect than that which proceeds from it, imparts to its effect the +measure of generation, and is exempt from instruments and elements, and +in short, from every thing which is called a concause.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXVI.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, has a +immutable hyparxis. But every thing which is generated from a moveable +cause, has a mutable hyparxis.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if that which makes is entirely immoveable, it does not produce +from itself that which is secondary through motion, but by its very +being. If, however, this be the case, it has that which proceeds from +it concurrent with its own essence. And if this also be the case, it +will produce as long as it exists. But it exists always, and therefore +it always gives subsistence to that which is posterior to itself. +Hence, this is always generated from thence, and always is, conjoining +with <i>the ever</i> according to energy of the cause, its own ever +according to progression. If, however, the cause is moved, that also +which is generated from it will be essentially mutable. For that which +has its being through motion,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">[354]</span> changes its being when its moveable +cause<a id="FNanchor_240" href="#Footnote_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> is changed. For if, though produced from motion, it should +itself remain immutable, it would be better than its producing cause. +This, however, is impossible. It will not, therefore, be immutable. +Hence, it will be mutable, and will be essentially moved, imitating the +motion of that which gave it subsistence.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXVII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is in capacity proceeds from that which is in energy. +And that which is in capacity, proceeds into energy. That also which +is in a certain respect in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is +the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in energy. But that +which is all things in capacity, proceeds from that which is all things +in energy.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that which is in capacity is not naturally adapted to produce +itself into energy, because it is imperfect. For if being imperfect +it should become the cause to itself of perfection, and this in +energy, the cause will be more imperfect than that which is produced +by it. Hence, that which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, +will not be the cause to itself of a subsistence in energy. For on +this hypothesis, so far as it is imperfect, it would be the cause of +perfection; since every thing which is in capacity, so far as it is in +capacity, is imperfect, but that which is in energy is perfect. Hence, +if that which was in capacity becomes in energy, it will have its +perfection from something else. And this will either be in capacity; +but thus again the imperfect will be generative of the perfect; or +it will be in energy, and either something else, or this which was +in capacity will be that which becomes in energy. But if something +else which is in energy produces, operating according to its own +peculiarity, it will not by being in capacity make that which is in +another to be in energy; nor will this which is now made be in energy,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">[355]</span> +unless it becomes this so far as it was in capacity. It remains, +therefore, that from that which is in energy, that which is in capacity +must be changed into energy.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXVIII.</p> + +<p>Every power is either perfect or imperfect.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the power which is prolific of energy is perfect. For it makes +other things to be perfect through its own energies. That, however, +which is perfective of other things is in a greater degree perfect, as +being more self-perfect. But the power which is indigent of another +that pre-exists in energy, according to which indigence it is something +in capacity, is imperfect. For it is indigent of the perfection which +is in another, in order that by participating of it, it may become +perfect. Hence, such a power as this is of itself imperfect. So that +the power of that which is in energy is perfect, being prolific of +energy. But the power of that which is in capacity is imperfect, and +obtains perfection from the power which is in energy.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXIX.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is generated, is generated from a two-fold power.<a id="FNanchor_241" href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it is requisite that the thing generated should possess aptitude +and an imperfect power. And that which makes being in energy<a id="FNanchor_242" href="#Footnote_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> that +which the thing generated is in capacity, antecedently comprehends a +perfect power. For all energy proceeds from inherent power. For if that +which makes did not possess power, how could it energize, and produce +something<span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">[356]</span> else? And if that which is generated did not possess power +according to aptitude, how could it be generated? For that which makes +or acts, makes or acts in that which is able to suffer, but not in any +casual thing, and which is not naturally adapted to suffer from the +agent.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXX.</p> + +<p>Every body is naturally adapted of itself to suffer; but every thing +incorporeal to act. And the former indeed is essentially inefficacious, +but the latter is impassive. That which is incorporeal, however, +suffers through its communion with body; just as bodies are able to act +through the participation of incorporeals.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For body, so far as body, is alone divisible, and through this becomes +passive, being entirely partible, and this to infinity. But that which +is incorporeal, being simple, is impassive. For neither is that which +is impartible, capable of being divided, nor can that be changed in +quality which is not compounded. Either, therefore, nothing will be +effective, or this must be affirmed of an incorporeal nature, since +body, so far as body, does not act, because it is alone liable to be +divided, and to suffer. For every thing which acts has an effective +power; so that body, so far as it is body, will not act, but so far as +it contains in itself a power of acting. Hence, when it acts, it acts +through the participation of power. Moreover, incorporeal natures when +they are inherent in bodies, participate of passions, being divided +together with bodies, and enjoying their partible nature, though +according to their own essence they are impartible.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXXI.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is participated in a separable manner, is present +with its participant by a certain inseparable power which it inserts in +it.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">[357]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is itself present with the participant in a separate manner, +and is not in it, as if it possessed its subsistence in it, a certain +medium between the two is necessary, connecting the one with the other, +and which is more similar to that which is participated, and subsists +in the participant. For if this medium is separable, how can it be +participated by the participant, since the participant neither contains +the medium, nor any thing proceeding from it? A power, therefore, +and illumination proceeding from that which is separable into the +participant conjoins both. Hence, one of these will be that through +which the participation is effected, another will be that which is +participated, and another that which participates.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXXII.</p> + +<p>Every thing incorporeal, which is converted to itself, when it is +participated by other things, is participated in a separable manner.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if in an inseparable manner, the energy of it would not be separate +from its participant, as neither would its essence. If, however, +this were the case, it would not be converted to itself. For being +converted, it will be separate from its participant, each being +different from the other. If, therefore, it is able to be converted +to itself, it will be participated in a separable manner, when it is +participated by other things.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXXIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which has a knowledge of itself, is entirely converted to +itself.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For knowing itself, it is evident that it is converted to itself in +energy. For that which knows and that which is known are one. And the +knowledge of itself is directed to itself as to that which is known. +This knowledge also as pertaining to that which knows is a certain +energy; but<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">[358]</span> it is the knowledge of itself directed to itself, because +it is gnostic of itself. Moreover, that it is converted to itself +essentially, if it is so in energy, has been demonstrated. For every +thing which by energizing is converted to itself, has also an essence +verging to, and subsisting in itself.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXXIV.</p> + +<p>Every thing which always is, possesses an infinite power.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if its hypostasis is never-failing, the power also according to +which it is that which it is, and is able to exist, is infinite. For +the power of existing being finite, it will some time or other fail. +But this failing, the existence also of that which possesses it will +fail, and it will no longer be that which always is. It is necessary, +therefore, that the power of that which always is, and which connects +and contains it essentially, should be infinite.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXXV.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is always becoming to be, or rising into existence, +(αει γινομενον) possesses an infinite power of becoming to be.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is always rising into existence, the power of generation in +it is never-failing. For if this power was finite, it would cease in +an infinite time. But the power of becoming to be ceasing, that which +is rising into being according to this power would cease, and thus it +would no longer be always becoming to be.<a id="FNanchor_243" href="#Footnote_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a> It is, however, supposed +to be always becoming to be. Hence, it possesses an infinite power of +rising into existence.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">[359]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXXVI.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is truly being (οντως ον) is infinite, neither +according to multitude, nor according to magnitude, but according to +power alone.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For every infinite, is either in discrete, or in continued quantity, +or in power. But that which always is, is infinite, as having an +inextinguishable life, a never-failing hyparxis, and an undiminished +energy. That which is eternally being, however, is neither infinite +on account of magnitude; for that which is truly being is without +magnitude, being self-subsistent; since every thing self-subsistent is +impartible and simple. Nor is it infinite on account of multitude; for +it has in the most eminent degree the form of <i>the one</i>, as being +arranged most near, and being most allied to it. But it is infinite +according to power. Hence, it is also impartible and infinite. And by +how much the more it is one and impartible, by so much the more is it +infinite. For the power which is divided, becomes imbecil and finite, +and powers which are entirely divided, are in every respect finite. For +ultimate powers, and which are most remote from <i>the one</i>, are in +a certain respect finite, on account of their distribution into parts. +But first powers, on account of their impartibility, are infinite. +For a separation into parts divulses and dissolves the power of every +thing. But impartibility compressing and contracting that which it +contains, renders it never-failing, and undiminished in itself.</p> + +<p>Moreover, infinity, according to magnitude, and also according to +multitude, is entirely a privation and falling off from impartibility. +For that which is finite is most near to the impartible, but the +infinite is most remote from it, entirely departing from <i>the +one</i>. Hence, that which is infinite according to power, is not +infinite either according to multitude or magnitude, since infinite +power subsists in conjunction with impartibility. But the infinite +either in multitude or magnitude, is most remote from the impartible. +If, therefore, that which is truly being was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">[360]</span> infinite either in +magnitude or multitude, it would not possess infinite power. It does, +however, possess infinite power; and therefore is not infinite either +according to multitude, or according to magnitude.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXXVII.</p> + +<p>Every thing eternal indeed is being, but not every being is eternal.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the participation of being is present in a certain respect with +generated natures,<a id="FNanchor_244" href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a> so far as each of these is not that which in +no respect is. But if that which is generated is not entirely deprived +of being, it is in a certain respect being. The eternal, however, is +in no respect whatever present with generated natures, and especially +not with such of these as do not even participate of the perpetuity +which subsists according to the whole of time. Moreover, every thing +eternal always is. For it participates of eternity, which imparts to +the natures by which it is participated to be always that which they +are. Being, therefore, is participated by a greater number of things +than eternity. And hence being is beyond eternity. For by those natures +by whom eternity is participated, being is also participated. But not +every thing which participates of being, participates also of eternity.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing<a id="FNanchor_245" href="#Footnote_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> which is truly being, is either prior to eternity, or +in eternity, or participates of eternity.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that there is true being prior to eternity has been demonstrated. +But true being is also in eternity. For eternity possesses the +<i>always</i> in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">[361]</span> conjunction with <i>being</i>. And that which +participates of eternity, has both the <i>always</i> and <i>being</i>, +according to participation. Eternity, however, possesses the +<i>always</i> primarily, but <i>being</i> according to participation. +But being itself is primarily being.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION LXXXIX.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is primarily being consists of bound and infinity.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it possesses infinite power, it is evident that it is +infinite, and on this account consists from the infinite. If also it +is impartible, and has the form of <i>the one</i>, through this, it +participates of bound. For that which participates of unity is bounded. +Moreover, it is impartible, and therefore possesses infinite power. +Hence every thing which is truly [or primarily] being consists of bound +and infinity.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XC.</p> + +<p>The first bound, and the first infinity subsist by themselves prior to +every thing which consists of bound and the infinite.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if beings which subsist by themselves, are prior to those which are +<i>certain</i> beings, as being common to all essences, and principal +causes, and not the causes of certain, but in short of all beings, it +is necessary that the first bound, and the first infinity should be +prior to that<a id="FNanchor_246" href="#Footnote_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> which consists of both these. For the bound in that +which is mixed [or the first being,] participates of infinity, and +the infinite participates of bound. But of every thing, that which is +the first, is nothing else than that which it is. It is not therefore +proper that the first infinite should have the form of bound, or that +the first bound should have the form of infinity. These therefore +subsist primarily prior to that which is mixed.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XCI.</p> + +<p>Every power is either finite or infinite. But every finite power +indeed derives its subsistence from infinite power. And infinite power +subsists from the first infinity.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">[362]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the powers which have an existence at a certain time, are finite, +falling from the infinity of existing always. But the powers of eternal +beings are infinite, never deserting their own hyparxis.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XCII.</p> + +<p>Every multitude of infinite powers, is suspended from one first +infinity, which does not subsist as a participated power, nor in things +which are endued with power, but subsists by itself, not being the +power of a certain participant, but the cause of all beings.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For though the first being possesses power, yet it is not power itself. +For it has also bound. But the first power is infinity. For infinite +powers are infinite, through the participation of infinity. Infinity +itself therefore, will be prior to all powers, through which being +also possesses infinite power, and all things participate of infinity. +For infinity is not the first of things [or the ineffable principle of +all] since that is the measure of all things, being <i>the good</i> +and <i>the one</i>. Nor is infinity being. For this is infinite, but +not infinity. Hence infinity subsists between that which is first and +being, and is the cause of all infinite powers, and of all the infinity +that is in beings.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XCIII.</p> + +<p>Every infinite which is in [true] beings, is neither infinite to the +natures that are above beings, nor is it infinite to itself.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that by which each thing is infinite, by this also it exists +uncircumscribed. But every thing which is in [true] beings, is bounded +by itself, and by all the things prior to it. It remains therefore, +that the infinite which is in [true] beings, is infinite to subordinate +natures alone, above which it is so expanded in power, as to be +incomprehensible by all of them. For in whatever manner they may extend +themselves towards<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">[363]</span> this infinite, yet it has something<a id="FNanchor_247" href="#Footnote_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> entirely +exempt from them. And though all things enter into it, yet it has +something occult, and incomprehensible by secondary natures. Though +likewise it evolves the powers which it contains, yet it possesses +something on account of its union insurmountable, contracted, and +surpassing the evolution of beings. Since however, it contains and +bounds itself, it will not be infinite to itself, nor much less to the +natures situated above it, since it has a portion of the infinity which +is in them. For the powers of more total natures are more infinite, in +consequence of being more total, and having an arrangement nearer to +the first infinity.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XCIV.</p> + +<p>Every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity, but not every infinity +is perpetuity.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For there are many infinites which have the infinite not on account +of <i>the always</i>, such for instance, as the infinity according +to magnitude, the infinity according to multitude, and the infinity +of matter. And whatever else there may be of the like kind, which is +infinite, either because it cannot be passed over, or through the +indefiniteness of its essence. That perpetuity however is a certain +infinity<a id="FNanchor_248" href="#Footnote_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> is evident. For that which never fails is infinite. But +this is that which always has its hypostasis inexhaustible. Infinity +therefore, is prior to perpetuity. For that which gives subsistence to +a greater number of effects, and is more total, is more causal. Hence, +the first infinity is beyond eternity, and infinity itself is prior to +eternity.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XCV.</p> + +<p>Every power which is more single, is more infinite than that which is +multiplied.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">[364]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if of powers the first infinity is nearest to <i>the one</i>, +that power which is more allied to <i>the one</i>, is in a greater +degree infinite than that which recedes from it. For being multiplied +it loses the form of <i>the one</i>, in which while it remained, it +possessed a transcendency with respect to other powers, being connected +and contained through its impartibility. For in partible natures +themselves, the powers when congregated, are united,<a id="FNanchor_249" href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> but when +divided, they are increased in number, and become obscured.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XCVI.</p> + +<p>The power which is infinite of every finite body, is incorporeal.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it were corporeal, if this body indeed is finite,<a id="FNanchor_250" href="#Footnote_250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a> the +infinite will be contained in the finite. But if the body is infinite, +it will not be power so far as it is body. For if so far as it is body +it is finite, but power is infinite, it will not be power so far as +it is body. Hence, the power which is infinite in a finite body is +incorporeal.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XCVII.</p> + +<p>In each series of things, every cause which has the relation of a +leader, imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of itself; and that +which the cause is primarily, the series is according to diminution.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is the leader of the whole series, and all co-ordinate +natures are co-arranged with reference to it, it is evident that it +imparts to all that the series contains the one idea according to which +they are arranged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">[365]</span> in that series. For either all things partake of +similitude to this cause without a cause, or that which is the same +in all is derived from it. But the former of these is impossible. For +that which is without a cause is also fortuitous. But the fortuitous +can never take place in things in which there is order, connection, +and an invariable sameness of subsistence. From the cause therefore, +which ranks as a leader, every series receives the peculiarity of the +hypostasis of that cause. But if from it, it is evident that this +is accompanied with a diminution and decrement adapted to secondary +natures. For either the peculiarity exists similarly in the leader, +and the natures that are secondary, and how in this case can the +former be the leader, but the latter be allotted an hypostasis after +the leader? Or it exists dissimilarly. And if this be the case, it is +evident that sameness is derived to the multitude from one thing, but +not vice versa. And the illustrious peculiarity of the series which is +primarily in one thing [or the leader,] is secondarily in the multitude +[suspended from the leading cause].</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XCVIII.</p> + +<p>Every separate cause is at one and the same time every where and no +where.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For by the communication of its own power it is every where. For this +is a cause which replenishes the natures that are naturally adapted +to participate of it, rules over all secondary beings, and is present +to all things by the prolific progressions of its illuminations. +But by an essence unmingled with things in place, and by its exempt +purity, it is no where. For if it is separate, it is established above +all things. In a similar manner also, it is in no one of the natures +inferior to itself. For if it was alone every where, it would not +indeed be prevented from being a cause, and from subsisting in all its +participants. But it would not be prior to all of them in a separate +manner. If also it was no where without being every where, it would +not indeed be prevented from being prior to all things, and from being +nothing pertaining to subordinate<span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">[366]</span> natures. But it would not be in all +things, as causes are naturally adapted to be in their effects,<a id="FNanchor_251" href="#Footnote_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a> +by the abundant and unenvying communications of themselves. In order +therefore, that existing as a cause, it may be in all things that are +able to partake of it, and that being separate in itself, it may be +prior to all the natures that are filled by it, it is every where, and +at the same time no where.</p> + +<p>And it is not indeed partly every where and partly no where. For thus +it would be divulsed and separate from itself, if one part of it was +every where in all things, but another was no where, and prior to all +things. But the whole of it is every where, and in a similar manner no +where. For the things which are able to participate of it, meet with +the whole of it, and find the whole present with themselves, that at +the same time being wholly exempt from them. For the participant does +not place this separate cause in itself, but participates of it as much +as it is capable of receiving. Nor in the communication of itself does +it become contracted by the multitude of the participations of it; for +it is separate. Nor do its participants participate of it defectively; +for that which imparts is every where.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION XCIX.</p> + +<p>Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, does not derive +its subsistence from another cause. But it is itself the principle and +cause of all its participants. And thus every principle in each series +is unbegotten.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is imparticipable in its own proper series, it is allotted +the principality, and does not proceed from other things. For it +would no longer be the first, if it received this peculiarity, +according to which it is imparticipable, from something else.<a id="FNanchor_252" href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> +But if it is inferior to other things,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">[367]</span> and proceeds from them, it +does not proceed from them so far as it is imparticipable, but so +far as it participates. For of the things from which it originates, +it doubtless participates, and it is not primarily the things of +which it participates. Hence, it is not from a cause so far as it is +imparticipable. For so far as it is from a cause it participates, and +is not imparticipable. But so far as it is imparticipable, it is the +cause of things that are participated, and is not itself a participant +of other things.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION C.</p> + +<p>Every series of wholes is extended to an imparticipable cause and +principle. But all imparticipables are suspended from the one principle +of all things.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if each series suffers something which is the same [or a certain +sameness,] there is something in each which is the leader, and the +cause of this sameness. For as all beings are from unity, so every +series is from unity. But again, all imparticipable monads are referred +to <i>the one</i>; because all of them are analogous to <i>the one</i>. +So far therefore, as they also suffer something which is the same +through an analogy to <i>the one</i>, so far a reduction of them to +<i>the one</i> is effected. And so far indeed, as all of them are +from <i>the one</i>, no one of these is a principle. But so far as +each is imparticipable, so far each is a principle. Hence, being the +principles of certain things, they are suspended from the principle +of all things. For that is the principle of all things of which all +things participate. All things however alone entirely participate of +the first; but of other things not all, but certain things participate. +Hence also that [i.e. the ineffable] is simply the first, but other +things are firsts with reference to a certain thing, but simply are not +firsts.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CI.</p> + +<p>Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things that participate +of intellect, imparticipable life of all things that participate of +life, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_368">[368]</span> imparticipable being of all things that participate of +being. But of these, being is prior to life, but life is prior to +intellect.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For because in each series of beings, imparticipables are prior to +things which are participated, it is necessary that intellect should +be prior to intellectuals, that life should be prior to vital natures, +and that being itself should be prior to beings. Because however, +that which is the cause of a greater number of effects, precedes that +which is the cause of a less number, hence, among these, being will +be the first; for it is present with all things to which life and +intellect are present. For every thing that lives and participates of +intelligence necessarily <i>is</i>; but not vice versa. For many beings +neither live, nor energize intellectually.<a id="FNanchor_253" href="#Footnote_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> But life is the second. +For all things that participate of intellect, participate also of life, +but not vice versa. For many things live indeed, but are left destitute +of knowledge. And intellect is the third. For every thing which is in +any manner whatever gnostic, also lives and is. If therefore being is +the cause of a greater number of effects, but life of a less number, +and intellect of still fewer effects, being is the first, life the +second, and intellect the third.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CII.</p> + +<p>All beings which exist in any manner whatever, consist of bound and the +infinite through that which is primarily being. But all living beings +are motive of themselves through the first life. And all gnostic beings +participate of knowledge, through the first intellect.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if that which is imparticipable in each series imparts its own +peculiarity to all the natures under the same series, it is evident +that the first being also imparts to all things bound, and at the same +time infinity, since it is itself primarily mixed from these. Life also +imparts to all things<span class="pagenum" id="Page_369">[369]</span> the motion which it possesses in itself. For +life is the first progression and motion from the stable hypostasis of +being. And intellect imparts knowledge to all things. For the summit +of all knowledge is in intellect. And intellect is the first gnostic +nature.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CIII.</p> + +<p>All things are in all, but appropriately in each.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For in being there is life and intellect; and in life, being and +intellection; and in intellect being and life. But in intellect +indeed, all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in +being, all things are truly beings. For since every thing subsists +either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to +participation; and in the first, the rest are according to cause; in +the second, the first is according to participation, but the third, +according to cause; and in the third, the natures prior to it are +according to participation;—this being the case, life and intellect +have a prior or causal subsistence in being. Since however, each thing +is characterized according to hyparxis, and neither according to cause +(for cause pertains to other things, i.e. to effects) nor according +to participation (for a thing derives that elsewhere of which it +participates,)—hence in being there is truly life and intellection, +essential life, and essential intellect. And in life, there is being +indeed according to participation, but intellection according to cause. +Each of these however, subsist there vitally. For the hyparxis is +according to life. And in intellect, life and essence subsist according +to participation, and each of these subsists there intellectually. For +knowledge is the essence and the life of intellect.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CIV.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence and its +energy eternal.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">[370]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it primarily participates of the perpetuity of eternity, it +does not partially participate of it, but entirely. For either it +participates of it in energy, but not in essence. This however is +impossible; since in this case, energy would be more excellent than +essence. Or it participates of it according to essence, but does not +participate of it according to energy. In this case however, that which +is primarily eternal, and that which primarily participates of time +will be the same. And time indeed, will primarily measure the essence +of certain things, but eternity which is more excellent than all time, +will not measure the essence of any thing, if that which is primarily +eternal, is not essentially contained by eternity. Hence every thing +which is primarily eternal, has both an eternal essence and energy.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CV.</p> + +<p>Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every thing perpetual is +immortal.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if the immortal is that which always participates of life, but +that which always participates of life, participates also of being, +and that which always lives, always is,—hence, every thing immortal +is perpetual. But the immortal is that which is unreceptive of death, +and always lives. And the perpetual is that which is unreceptive of +non-being, and always is. If however, there are many beings more and +less excellent than life, which are unreceptive of death, but exist +always;—if this be the case, not every thing which is perpetual is +immortal. That however, there are many beings not immortal, that exist +always, is evident. For there are certain beings indeed, which are +destitute of life, but which exist always, and are indestructible. For +as being is to life, so is the perpetual to the immortal. For the life +which cannot be taken away is immortal, and the being which cannot be +taken away is perpetual. But being is more comprehensive than life, and +therefore the perpetual is more comprehensive than the immortal.<a id="FNanchor_254" href="#Footnote_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_371">[371]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CVI.</p> + +<p>The medium of every thing which is entirely eternal both in essence and +energy, and of every thing which has its essence in time, is that which +is partly indeed eternal, and partly is measured by time.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that which has its essence comprehended by time, is entirely +temporal. For by a much greater priority, this will be allotted a +temporal energy. But that which is entirely temporal, is in every +respect dissimilar to that which is entirely eternal. But all +progressions are through similars. Hence there is something between +these. The medium therefore, is either that which is eternal in +essence, but temporal in energy, or vice versa. This latter however, is +impossible. For energy would be more excellent than essence. It remains +therefore, that the medium is the former of these.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CVII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is partly eternal, and partly temporal, is at one and +the same time being and generation.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For every thing eternal is being, and that which is measured by time +is generation. So that if the same thing participates of time and +eternity, yet not according to the same, it will be both being and +generation.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From these things it is evident, that generation indeed, having a +temporal essence, is suspended from that which partly partakes of +being, and partly of generation, participating at once of eternity +and time. But this is suspended from that which is in every respect +eternal. And that which is in every respect eternal, is suspended from +being which is prior to the eternal.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_372">[372]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CVIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is partial in each order, is able to participate in +a twofold respect of the monad which is in the proximately superior +order, viz. either through its own wholeness or through that which is +partial in the superior order, and co-ordinate with the thing according +to an analogy to the whole series.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if conversion is to all things through similitude, that which is +partial in an inferior order, is dissimilar to that which is monadic +and a whole in a superior order. And in short, is as that which is +partial, to a whole, and as one order to another. But a partial nature +is similar to a whole of the same series, through a communion of +peculiarity, and to the proximately superior co-ordinate peculiarity +through an analogous subsistence. It is evident, therefore, that +through these media a conversion from one to the other is effected, as +through similars to that which is similar.<a id="FNanchor_255" href="#Footnote_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a> For the one is similar +as the partial to that which is partial, but the other as that which +is the appropriate of the same series. But the whole of the superior +series is dissimilar in both these respects.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CIX.</p> + +<p>Every<a id="FNanchor_256" href="#Footnote_256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a> partial intellect participates of the unity which is above +intellect and the first, both through the intellect which ranks as a +whole, and through the partial unity which is co-ordinate with this +partial intellect. Every partial soul, likewise, participates of the +intellect which is a whole, through the soul which ranks as a whole, +and through a partial intellect. And every partial nature of body +participates of the soul which is a whole through the wholeness of +nature, and a partial soul.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">[373]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For every thing partial participates of the monad which is in a +superior order, either through its proper wholeness, or through that +which is partial in that order, and which is co-ordinate to the thing.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CX.</p> + +<p>Of all the things that are arranged in each series, such as are first, +and are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of the +natures which are proximately established in the superior series, +through analogy. But such as are more imperfect and remote from their +proper principle, are not naturally adapted to enjoy these natures.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For because such things as are first, are allied to those in a +superior series, being allotted a better and more divine nature in +the order to which they belong, but such things as are more imperfect +proceed further from their principle, and are allotted a secondary and +ministrant, but not a primary and leading progression in the whole +series;—this being the case, the former are necessarily connascently +conjoined to the things in a superior order; but the latter are +unadapted to be conjoined with them. For all things are not of an +equal dignity, though they may belong to the same order. For there is +not one and the same ratio in all. But all things proceed from their +proper monad, as from one, and with reference to one thing. Hence, they +are not allotted the same power. But some things are able to receive +proximately the participations<a id="FNanchor_257" href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> of superior natures; while others +being dissimilar to them by proceeding to a greater distance from their +principles, are deprived of a power of this kind.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXI.</p> + +<p>Of every intellectual series, some things are divine intellects, +receiving the participations of the Gods; but others are intellects +alone. And of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">[374]</span> every psychical series, some things are intellectual +souls, suspended from their proper intellects; but others are souls +alone. Of all corporeal natures, likewise, some have souls supernally +presiding over them, but others are natures alone, destitute of the +presence of souls.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For of each series, not the whole genus is adapted to be suspended +from that which is prior to itself, but that which is more perfect +in it, and sufficient to be connascent with superior natures. +Neither, therefore, is every intellect suspended from deity, but +those intellects only which are supreme and most single. For these +are allied to the divine unities. Nor do all souls participate of +participable intellect,<a id="FNanchor_258" href="#Footnote_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> but such only as are most intellectual. +Nor do all corporeal natures enjoy the presence of soul, and of the +soul which is participated, but those only that are more perfect, and +possess in a greater degree the form of reason. And this is the mode of +demonstration in all things.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXII.</p> + +<p>Of every order those things that are first, have the form of the +natures prior to them.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the highest genera in each order, are conjoined through similitude +to the natures placed above them,<a id="FNanchor_259" href="#Footnote_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a> and through the connexion and +coherence of the progression of wholes. Hence, such as the superior +natures are primarily, such also is the form which these highest +genera are allotted, and which is allied to the nature of those in the +superior order. They are also such according to the peculiarity of +subsistence as are the natures prior to them.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_375">[375]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXIII.</p> + +<p>Every divine number is unical.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if a divine number has a precedaneous cause, viz. <i>the one</i>, +just as an intellectual number has intellect, and a psychical number +soul, and if multitude is every where analogous to its cause, it is +evident that a divine number is unical, since <i>the one</i> is God. +But this follows, since <i>the one</i> and <i>the good</i> are the +same. For <i>the good</i> and God are the same. For that beyond which +there is nothing, and after which all things aspire, is God. And also +that from which all things proceed, and to which all things tend. But +this is good. If therefore, there is a multitude of Gods, the multitude +is unical. But that there is, is evident. For every principal cause is +the leader of an appropriate multitude which is similar and allied to +the cause.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXIV.</p> + +<p>Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self-perfect unity is a +God.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if the number of unities is twofold, as has been before +demonstrated, and some are self-perfect, but others are illuminations +from the self-perfect unities, and if a divine number is allied to +and connatural with <i>the one</i> and <i>the good</i>, the Gods are +self-perfect unities. And vice versa, if there is a self-perfect +unity it is a God. For as unity is in the most eminent degree allied +to <i>the one</i>, and the self-perfect to <i>the good</i>, so +likewise according to both these the self-perfect participates of the +divine peculiarity and is a God. But if a God was a unity, yet not a +self-perfect unity, or a self-perfect hypostasis, yet not a unity, he +would be arranged in another order, on account of the mutation of the +peculiarity.<a id="FNanchor_260" href="#Footnote_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">[376]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXV.</p> + +<p>Every God is superessential, supervital, and superintellectual.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if each is a self-perfect unity, but neither being, life, or +intellect is a unity, but that which is united, it is evident that +every God is beyond each of these. For if these differ from each other, +but all are in all, each of these being all will not be one only. +Farther still, if the first God is superessential, but every God is of +the series of the first, so far as a God, each will be superessential. +But that the first God is superessential,<a id="FNanchor_261" href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a> is evident. For essence +is not the same with unity, nor is to exist the same thing as to be +united. If, however, these are not the same, either the first God is +both these, and in this case he will not be one only, but something +else besides <i>the one</i>, and will participate of unity, but will +not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">[377]</span> be <i>the one itself</i>; or he is one of these. But if indeed +he is essence, he will be indigent of <i>the one</i>. It is, however, +impossible that <i>the good</i>, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">[378]</span> <i>the first</i> should be +indigent. Hence, he is one alone; and therefore superessential. But +if each thing imparts the peculiarity of that which it is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">[379]</span> primarily +to the whole series [of which it is the leader], hence, every divine +number is superessential; since every principal cause produces similars +prior to dissimilars. If, therefore, the first God is superessential, +all the Gods will be superessential. For they will be entirely similar +[to the first]. Since, however, they are also essences, they will be +produced from the first essence, as the monads of essences.</p> + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXVI.</p> + +<p>Every deity except <i>the one</i> is participable.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that <i>the one</i> is imparticipable is evident, since if it were +participated, and on this account pertained to something else, it would +no longer be similarly the cause of all things; both of such as are +prior to beings, and of beings themselves. But that the other unities +are participated, we shall thus demonstrate. For if there is another +imparticipable unity after the first, in what does it differ from +<i>the one</i>? For either it subsists after the same manner as that; +and how in this case is the one the second, but the other first? Or it +does not subsist after the same manner. And thus one of these will be +<i>the one itself</i>, but the other <i>one</i> and <i>not one</i>. +This <i>non-one</i> also, if it is no hypostasis whatever, will be +<i>one</i> alone. But if it is a certain other hypostasis besides +<i>the one</i>, in this case <i>the one</i> will be participated by the +<i>non-one</i>. And that will be a self-perfect one, which conjoins the +non-one with <i>the one</i>. So that again God will be this [viz. the +one] so far as he is God. But that which is non-one will subsist in the +participation of <i>the one</i>. Every unity, therefore, which subsists +after <i>the one</i> is participable, and every God is participable.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">[380]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXVII.</p> + +<p>Every God is the measure of beings.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every God is unical, he defines and measures all the multitude +of beings. For all multitudes being in their own nature indefinite, are +bounded through <i>the one</i>. But that which is one being [or being +characterized by <i>the one</i>] measuring and terminating the natures +with which it is present, leads into bound that which according to its +own power is not bounded. For the one being has the form of <i>the +one</i> by participation.</p> + +<p>But that which is uniform, or has the form of the one, recedes from +indefiniteness and infinity. And by how much the more uniform it is, +by so much the less<a id="FNanchor_264" href="#Footnote_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> is it indefinite, and without measure. Every +multitude of beings, therefore, is measured by the divine unities.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXVIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is in the Gods pre-exists in them according to +their peculiarities. And the peculiarity of the Gods is unical and +superessential. Hence, all things are contained in them unically and +superessentially.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every thing subsists in a three-fold manner, viz. either +according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to +participation, but the first number of all things is the divine number, +nothing will be in the Gods according to participation, but all things +will subsist in them either according to hyparxis, or according to +cause. Such things, however, as they antecedently comprehend, as being +the causes of all things, they antecedently comprehend in a manner +appropriate to their own union. For every thing which is the leader of +secondary natures causally, contains the cause of things subordinate, +in a way naturally adapted to itself. All things, therefore, are in the +Gods unically and superessentially.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">[381]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXIX.</p> + +<p>Every God subsists according to superessential goodness, and is good +neither according to participation, nor according to essence, but +superessentially; since habits and essences are allotted a secondary +and manifold order from the Gods.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if the first God is <i>the one</i> and <i>the good</i>, and so +far as he is <i>the one</i>, he is also <i>the good</i>, and so far +as <i>the good, the one</i>, if this be the case, every series of the +Gods has the form of <i>the one</i>, and the form of <i>the good</i>, +according to one peculiarity, and each of the Gods is not a unity and +goodness according to any thing else. But each so far as he is a unity, +so far he is a goodness, and so far as he is a goodness, so far he is +a unity. So far also as the Gods posterior to the first God proceed +from the first, they have the form of <i>the good</i>, and the form of +<i>the one</i>, since the first is <i>the one</i> and <i>the good</i>. +But so far as all of them are Gods, they are unities and goodnesses. +As, therefore, <i>the one</i> of the Gods is superessential, so +likewise is their goodness, since it is nothing else than <i>the +one</i>. For each of them is not any thing else than <i>the good</i>, +but is good alone; as neither is each any thing else than <i>the +one</i>, but is one alone.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXX.</p> + +<p>Every God possesses in his own hyparxis a providential inspection of +the whole of things. And a providential energy is primarily in the Gods.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For all other things which are posterior to the Gods, energize +providentially through the participation of them. But providence +is connascent with the Gods. For if to impart good to the subjects +of providential energy, is the prerogative of the providential +peculiarity, but all the Gods are goodnesses, either they do not impart +themselves to anything, and thus nothing will be good in secondary +natures. And whence will that be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">[382]</span> derived which subsists according +to participation, except from those natures that primarily possess +peculiarities? Or if they do impart themselves, they impart good, and +in consequence of this providentially attend to all things. Providence, +therefore, subsists primarily in the Gods. For where is the energy +which is prior to intellect, except in superessential natures? But +providence (προνοια), as the name signifies, is an energy prior to +intellect (ενεργεια εστι προ νου). The Gods, therefore, from being +Gods, and from being goodnesses, provide for all things, and fill all +things with the goodness which is prior to intellect.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXI.</p> + +<p>Every divine nature has indeed for its hyparxis goodness, but possesses +a power which is unsubdued and at once incomprehensible by all +secondary natures.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it providentially attends to the whole of things, there is in +it a power which has dominion over the subjects of its providential +energy; through which being unsubdued and uncircumscribed by all +things, divine natures fill all things with, and subject all things to +themselves. For every thing of a ruling nature, which is the cause of +other things, and has dominion over them, rules through abundance of +power, and predominates according to nature.</p> + +<p>The first power, therefore, is in the Gods, not indeed having dominion +over some things, but not over others, but equally comprehending in +itself according to cause the powers of all beings, this power neither +being essential, nor much less unessential; but being connascent +with the hyparxis of the Gods, and superessential. Moreover, the +boundaries of all knowledge, presubsist uniformly in the Gods. For +through divine knowledge, which is exempt from the whole of things, +all other knowledge has a subsistence; this knowledge neither being +intellectual, nor much less, being a certain knowledge posterior to +intellect, but being established according to the divine peculiarity +above intellect. Whether, therefore, there is a divine knowledge, this +knowledge<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">[383]</span> is occult and uniform [or has the form of <i>the one</i>]. +Or whether there is a power uncircumscribed by all things, this power +is in a similar manner comprehensive of all things. Or whether there +is a divine goodness, this goodness defines the hyparxis of the Gods. +For if all things are in the Gods, knowledge, power, and goodness are +also in them. But their hyparxis is characterized by that which is most +excellent, and their hypostasis also is according to that which is +best. But this is goodness.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXII.</p> + +<p>Every thing divine provides for secondary natures, and is exempt from +the subjects of its providential care, providence neither relaxing +the unmingled and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a +separate union abolishing providence.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For divine beings abiding in their unical nature, and in their own +hyparxis, fill all things with the power of themselves. And every +thing which is able to participate of them, enjoys the good which +it is capable of receiving, according to the measures of its proper +hypostasis; divine natures, in the mean time, illuminating beings +with good, by their very essence, or rather prior to essence. For +that which is divine being nothing else than goodness, it supplies +all things with an unenvying abundance of good, by its very being, +not making a distribution according to a reasoning process; but other +things receiving indeed according to their desert, and divine natures +according to their hyparxis. Neither, therefore, in providing for other +things, do they receive a habitude, or alliance with the subjects of +their providential care. For they benefit all things by being that +which they are. But every thing which makes by its very essence, makes +without habitude, and with an unrestrained energy. For habitude is +an addition to essence. Hence also it is preternatural. Nor being +separate, do they withdraw their providential care. For thus they +would subvert, which it is not lawful to say, their own hyparxis, the +peculiarity of which is goodness. For it is the province of goodness +to extend itself<span class="pagenum" id="Page_384">[384]</span> to every thing which is able to participate of it. +And the greatest of all things is not that which is boniform, but that +which is beneficent. Either, therefore, no being will possess this +beneficent nature, or the Gods will possess it prior to beings. For it +is not possible that a greater good should be present with the natures +that are good by participation, but a less good with those that are +primarily good.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing divine is itself indeed, on account of its superessential +union, ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures; but it is +comprehended and known by its participants. Hence, <i>that which is +first</i>, is alone perfectly unknown, as being imparticipable.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For all knowledge which subsists through reasoning and language, +pertains to beings, and in beings possesses the apprehension of +truth. For it comes into contact with conceptions, and subsists in +intellections. But the Gods are beyond all beings. Neither, therefore, +is that which is divine doxastic, or the object of opinion, nor is it +dianoëtic, nor intelligible. For every being is either sensible, and +on this account doxastic, or truly existing being, and on this account +intelligible, or it is between these, subsisting as <i>being</i> and +at the same time <i>generation</i>, and on this account is dianoëtic. +If, therefore, the Gods are superessential, and subsist prior to +beings, there is neither any opinion of them, nor science and dianoia, +nor intellection. But the nature of their peculiarities is known by +the beings that are suspended from them. And this by a necessary +consequence. For the differences of participants are co-divided +conformably to the peculiarities of the participated natures. And +neither does every thing participate of every thing; for there is no +co-ordination of things perfectly dissimilar. Nor does any casual thing +participate of that which is casual. But that which is kindred is +conjoined to that which is kindred, and proceeds from that to which it +is allied.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">[385]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXIV.</p> + +<p>Every God knows partible natures impartibly, temporal natures, without +time, things which are not necessary, necessarily, mutable natures, +immutably; and in short, all things in a manner more excellent than the +order of the things known.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every thing which is with the Gods, is with them according +to their peculiarity, it is evident that the knowledge in the Gods +of things inferior, will not subsist according to the nature of the +inferior things, but according to the exempt transcendency of the +Gods. Hence, their knowledge of multiplied and passive natures, will +be uniform and impassive. If, therefore, the object of knowledge is +partible, divine knowledge will be impartible. If the objects that are +known are mutable, the knowledge of the Gods will be immutable; if they +are contingent, they will be known by the Gods necessarily; and if they +are indefinite, definitely. For that which is divine, does not receive +knowledge from subordinate beings, in order that thus the knowledge may +be such as is the nature of the thing known. But subordinate beings +become indefinite about the definite nature of the Gods, are changed +about their immutability, receive passively that which is impassive +in them, and temporally that which in them is without time. For it is +possible for subordinate to be surpassed by more excellent natures; but +it is not lawful for the Gods to receive any thing from beings inferior +to themselves.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXV.</p> + +<p>Every God, from that order from which he began to unfold himself +into light, proceeds through all secondary natures, always indeed +multiplying and dividing the communications of himself, but preserving +the peculiarity of his own hypostasis.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">[386]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For progressions being effected through diminution, first natures are +every where after a manner multiplied into the decrements of secondary +natures. But these proceeding according to a similitude to their +producing causes receive their orderly distribution, so that the whole +of that which proceeds is after a manner the same with, and different +from, that which abides; through its diminution indeed, appearing to +be different, but through continuity with its cause, not departing +from sameness with it. But such as that which abides is among first, +such is that which proceeds, among secondary natures; and thus an +indissoluble communion of the series is preserved. Each of the Gods, +therefore, is unfolded into light appropriately, in the orders in which +he makes his evolution. But he proceeds from thence, as far as to the +last of things, through the generative power of first natures. He is +always, however, multiplied according to a progression from unity into +multitude. But he preserves sameness in the progression, through the +similitude of the things that proceed to the leader and primary cause +of each series.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXVI.</p> + +<p>Every God who is nearer to <i>the one</i> is more total, but the God +who is more remote from it is more partial.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the God, who is the cause of a greater number of effects, is nearer +to that which produces all things; but he who is the cause of a less +number is more remote from it. And he indeed, who is the cause of a +greater number of effects, is more total; but he who is the cause of +a less number, is more partial. And each indeed, is a unity; but the +one is greater, and the other less in power. The more partial Gods +also are generated from the more total; the latter not being divided, +for they are unities; nor changed in quality, for they are immoveable; +nor multiplied by habitude, for they are unmingled. But they generate +secondary progressions from themselves, which are the decrements of the +natures prior to them, through abundance of power.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">[387]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXVII.</p> + +<p>Every thing divine, is especially primarily simple, and on this account +most sufficient to itself.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that it is indeed simple, is evident from its union; since every +thing divine is most unical. But a thing of this kind is transcendently +simple. That it is also most sufficient to itself, may be learnt by +considering that a composite nature is indigent, if not of other things +to which it is external, yet of those things of which it is composed. +But that which is most simple and unical, and which establishes itself +in <i>the good</i>, is most sufficient to itself. Such, however, is +every thing divine. Neither, therefore, is it indigent of other things, +existing as goodness itself, nor of things requisite to composition, +because it is unical.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXVIII.</p> + +<p>Every God, when participated by natures nearer to himself, is +participated without a medium; but when participated by natures +more remote from himself, the participation is through a less or +greater<a id="FNanchor_265" href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a> number of media.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the former through their alliance being uniform, are immediately +able to participate of the divine unities; but the latter through their +diminution, and extension into multitude, require other things which +are more united, in order that they may participate of the unities +themselves, and not of things united. For united multitude subsists +between unity itself and divided multitude; being indeed able<a id="FNanchor_266" href="#Footnote_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> +to coalesce with unity, but allied in a certain respect to divided +multitude, through the representation of multitude.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">[388]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXIX.</p> + +<p>Every divine body is divine through a deified soul. But every soul +is divine through a divine intellect. And every intellect is divine +through the participation of a divine unity. And unity indeed is of +itself a God; intellect is most divine; soul is divine; but body is +deiform. For if every number of the Gods is above intellect, but +participations are effected through kindred and similar natures, the +impartible essence will primarily participate of the superessential +unities. But the nature which comes into contact with generation will +participate of them secondarily. And generation in the third place. +Each of these likewise participates of them through the proximately +superior natures. And the peculiarity of the Gods indeed proceeds, as +far as to the last of things, in its participants; but through media +allied to itself. For unity indeed imparts the transcendent power +of itself to the first intellect, among divine natures, and causes +this intellect to be like itself according to unical multitude. But +through intellect it is also present with soul, conjoining soul with +intellect and co-inflaming it [with divine fire], when this intellect +is participable. And through the echo<a id="FNanchor_267" href="#Footnote_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> of soul, imparting also to +body its own peculiarity, if it is a body which participates something +of soul. And thus body becomes not only animated and intellectual, +but also divine. For it receives life indeed and motion from soul; +but indissoluble permanency from intellect; and divine union from +participated unity.<a id="FNanchor_268" href="#Footnote_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a> For each of these imparts its own hyparxis to +the subsequent natures.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">[389]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXX.</p> + +<p>In every divine order, such things as are first, are in a greater +degree exempt from the natures proximately arranged under them, than +these latter are from things subsequent. And secondary natures in a +greater degree adhere to their proximate superiors, than following +natures to these.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For by how much more unical and total any thing is, by so much the +more is it allotted a greater transcendency with respect to subsequent +natures. And by how much the more diminished it is according to power, +by so much the more is it connascent with the natures posterior to +itself. And more elevated natures indeed are more united with their +more principal causes; but inferior natures are less united with +them. For it is the province of a greater power to be more exempt +from subordinate, and to be more united to better natures. As on the +contrary, it is the province of a diminution of power, to recede +in a greater degree from more excellent, and to be co-passive with +subordinate natures. And this happens to secondary, but not to first +natures, in every order of things.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXXI.</p> + +<p>Every God begins his own energy from himself.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For he first exhibits the peculiarity of his presence with secondary +natures, in himself; because he imparts himself to other things also +according to his own exuberant plenitude. For neither is deficiency +adapted to the Gods, nor fulness alone. For every thing deficient is +imperfect, and not being itself perfect, it is impossible it should +make another thing to be perfect. But that which is full is alone +sufficient to itself, and is not yet prepared to communicate. It is +necessary, therefore, that the nature which fills other things, and +which extends to other things the communications of itself should be +super-plenary or exuberantly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">[390]</span> full. Hence, if a divine nature fills all +things from itself with the good which it contains in itself, it is +exuberantly full. And if this be the case, establishing first in itself +the peculiarity which it imparts to others, it will extend to them the +communications of super-plenary goodness.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXXII.</p> + +<p>All the orders of the Gods are bound in union by a medium.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For all the progressions of beings are effected through similars; +and much more will the orders of the Gods possess an indissoluble +continuity, as subsisting uniformly, and being defined according to +<i>the one</i>, which is the principal cause of their existence. The +decrements, therefore, are produced unitedly, and alone according to +the similitude in beings of secondary to first natures. And this, +because the hyparxis of the Gods much more consists in union than the +subsistence of beings. All the divine genera, therefore, are bound +together by appropriate media; and first natures do not proceed into +progressions perfectly different without a medium, but through the +genera common to each, from which they proceed, and of which they are +immediately the causes. For these congregate the extremes into one +union, being spread under some things connascently, but proximately +exempt from others. And they preserve the well-ordered generation of +divine natures.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXXIII.</p> + +<p>Every God is a beneficent unity or an unific (ενοποιος) goodness; and +each, so far as a God, possesses this hyparxis. The first God, however, +is simply good, and simply one. But each posterior to the first, is a +certain goodness, and a certain unity.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the divine peculiarity distinguishes the unities and goodnesses of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">[391]</span> +the Gods, so that each according to a certain peculiarity of goodness, +such as that of perfecting, or connectedly-containing, or defending, +benefits all things. For each of these is a certain good, but not every +good. But the first God pre-establishes a unical cause. Hence, that is +<i>the good</i>, as giving subsistence to all goodness. For all the +hyparxes of the Gods, are not together equal to <i>the one</i>; so +great a transcendency is the first God allotted with respect to the +multitude of the Gods.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXXIV.</p> + +<p>Every divine intellect, intellectually perceives indeed, as intellect, +but energizes providentially as a God.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it is the illustrious prerogative of intellect to know beings, and +to have its perfection in intellections. But it is the province of a +God to energize providentially, and to fill all things with good. This +communication, however, and replenishing with good, is accomplished +through the union of the replenishing natures with the causes prior to +themselves; which intellect, also imitating, passes into sameness with +intelligibles. A divine intellect, therefore, so far as it energizes +providentially, is a God; providence being established in an energy +prior to intellect. Hence, as a God it imparts itself to all things; +but as intellect it is not present with all things. For a divine nature +extends to things into which the intellectual peculiarity does not +proceed. For beings which are without intellect desire to energize +providentially, and to participate of a certain good. But this is +because all things indeed do not aspire after intellect, not even all +such as are able to participate of it. All things, however, aspire +after good, and hasten to obtain it.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXXV.</p> + +<p>Every divine unity is participated by some being immediately, or +without a medium; and every deified nature is extended to one divine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">[392]</span> +unity. As many also as are the participated unities, so many are the +participating genera of beings.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For neither two or more unities are participated by one being. For +since the peculiarities in the unities are different, must not that +which is connascent with each be different also, since contact is +effected through similitude? Nor is one unity participated in a divided +manner by many beings. For many beings are unadapted to be conjoined +with unity, and as <i>beings</i> they are unconjoined with the unity +which is prior to beings, and as <i>many</i>, they are separated from +unity. It is necessary, however, that the thing which participates +should be partly similar to that which is participated, and partly +different and dissimilar. Since, therefore, that which participates +is something belonging to beings, but unity is superessential, and +according to this they are dissimilar; it is necessary that the +participant should be one, in order that according to this, it may +be similar to <i>the one</i> which is participated, though of these, +the latter is one in such a manner as to be unity, but the former, +so as to be passive to <i>the one</i>, and to be united through the +participation of unity.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXXVI.</p> + +<p>Every God who is more total, and arranged nearer to the first, is +participated by a more total genus of beings. But the God who is more +partial, and more remote from the first, is participated by a more +partial genus of beings. And as being is to being, so is one divine +unity to another.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if unities are as many in number as beings, and vice versa, and +one unity is participated by one being, it is evident that the order +of beings proceeds according to the order of the unities, being +assimilated to the order prior to beings. And more total beings indeed +are connascent with more total unities; but more partial beings +with more partial unities. For if this were not the case, again +similars would be conjoined with dissimilars, and there would not +be a distribution according to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_393">[393]</span> desert. These things, however, are +impossible. Since from thence the one, and an appropriate measure are +luminously imparted to all things, and from these proceed. Much more, +therefore, will there be an order of participation in these, similars +being suspended as much as possible from similars.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXXVII.</p> + +<p>Every unity in conjunction with <i>the one</i> gives subsistence to the +being which participates of it.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For <i>the one</i>, as it gives subsistence to all things, so likewise +it is the cause of the participated unities, and of beings suspended +from these unities. But the unity belonging to every being produces the +peculiarity which shines forth in that particular being. And <i>the +one</i> indeed is the cause of existence simply; but unity is the cause +of alliance, because it is connascent with <i>the one</i>. Hence, unity +is that which of itself defines the being which participates of it, and +essentially exhibits in itself a superessential peculiarity. For every +where, from that which is primary that which is secondary is that which +it is. If, therefore, there is a certain superessential peculiarity +of deity, this also belongs to the being which participates of it +superessentially.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXXVIII.</p> + +<p>Of all the deified natures which participate of the divine peculiarity, +the first and highest is <i>being itself</i>.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if being is beyond intellect and life, as has been demonstrated, +and if it is also after <i>the one</i> the cause of the greatest number +of effects, being will be the highest deified nature. For it is more +single than life and intellect, and is on this account entirely more +venerable. But there is not any thing else prior to it except <i>the +one</i>. For prior to unical<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">[394]</span> multitude what else can there be except +<i>the one</i>? But being is unical multitude as consisting of bound +and infinity. And in short, the superessential one<a id="FNanchor_269" href="#Footnote_269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a> is prior +to essence. Since also in the illuminations which are imparted to +secondary natures, <i>the one</i> alone extends beyond being. But being +is immediately posterior to <i>the one</i>. For that which is being in +capacity, but is not yet being, is nevertheless according to its own +nature one. And that which follows the being that is in capacity is +now being in energy. Hence, in the principles of things, non-being is +immediately beyond being, as something more excellent, and no other +than <i>the one itself</i>.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXXXIX.</p> + +<p>All things which participate of the divine unities, originate indeed +from being, but end in a corporeal nature.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For being is the first of participants, but body the last; for we say +that there are divine bodies. For the highest of all the genera of +bodies, souls and intellects, are attributed to the Gods, that in every +order, things analogous to the Gods may connect and preserve secondary +natures, and that each number may be a whole, containing all things +in itself, according to the whole which is in a part, and possessing +prior to other things the divine peculiarity. The divine genus, +therefore, subsists corporeally, psychically, and intellectually. And +it is evident that all these are divine according to participation. +For that which is primarily divine subsists in the unities. Hence, the +participants of the divine unities originate indeed from being, but end +in a corporeal nature.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXL.</p> + +<p>All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and +proceeding through appropriate media, extend as far as to the last of +things, and to places about the earth.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_395">[395]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For neither does any thing intercept these powers, and exclude them +from being present with all things. For they are not in want of +places and intervals, on account of their unrestrained transcendency +with respect to all things, and a presence every where unmingled. +Nor is that which is adapted to participate of them, prohibited from +participation. But as soon as any thing is prepared for participation, +they also are present, neither then approaching, nor prior to this +being absent, but always possessing an invariable sameness of +subsistence. If, therefore, any terrene nature is adapted to the +participation of these divine powers, they are present with it, and +fill all things with themselves. And indeed they are in a greater +degree present with superior natures. But they are present with those +of a middle nature, according to the order which they possess. And +with such natures as are last, they are present in an ultimate degree. +From on high, therefore, they extend themselves as far as to the last +of things. Hence also, in last natures there are representations of +such as are first, and <i>all things sympathize with all</i>;<a id="FNanchor_270" href="#Footnote_270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a> +secondary<span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">[396]</span> indeed, pre-existing in first natures, but first natures +presenting themselves to the view in such as are second. For every +thing subsists in a three-fold manner, either according to cause, or +according to hyparxis, or according to participation.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXLI.</p> + +<p>Every providence of the Gods is twofold, one indeed being exempt from +the natures for which it provides, but the other being co-arranged with +them.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For some divine essences indeed, according to hyparxis, and the +peculiarity of their order, are entirely expanded above the illuminated +natures. But others being of the same order, provide for things +subordinate that are of the same co-ordination; these also imitating +the providential energy of the exempt Gods, and desiring to fill +secondary natures with the good which they are able to impart.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXLII.</p> + +<p>The Gods are present with all things after the same manner, but all +things are not after the same manner present with the Gods. But every +thing participates of their presence according to its own order and +power. And this is accomplished by some things uniformly, but by others +manifoldly; by some things eternally, but by others according to time; +and by some things incorporeally, but by others corporeally.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it is necessary that the different participation of the same +things, should become different, either from the participant, or from +that which is participated. But every thing divine always possesses +the same order, and is without habitude to, and unmingled with all +things. It remains therefore, that the mutation must subsist from the +participants, and that in these that which is not invariably the same +must be found, and that at different times they are differently present +with the Gods. Hence, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">[397]</span> Gods being present with all things with +invariable sameness, all things are not after the same manner present +with them. But other things are present with them as far as they are +able, and according to the manner in which they are present they enjoy +their illuminations. For the participation is according to the measure +of the presence of the divinities.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXLIII.</p> + +<p>All inferior natures fail before the presence of the Gods, though that +which participates of them may be adapted to participation. Every thing +foreign indeed from divine light becomes far removed from it. But all +things are illuminated at once by the Gods.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For divine natures are always more comprehensive and more powerful +than the things which proceed from them. But the inaptitude of the +participants, becomes the cause of the privation<a id="FNanchor_271" href="#Footnote_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> of divine +illumination. For this inaptitude obscures it by its own imbecility. +And this being obscured, something else appears to receive dominion, +not according to its own power, but according to the imbecility of +the participant, which seems to rise against the divine form of the +illumination.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXLIV.</p> + +<p>All beings, and all the distributions of beings, extend as far in their +progressions, as the orders of the Gods.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the Gods produce beings in conjunction with themselves, nor is any +thing able to subsist, and to receive measure and order external to the +Gods, [or beyond their influence.] For all things are perfected through +their power, and are arranged and measured by the Gods. Prior therefore +to the last genera in beings, the Gods pre-exist, who also adorn these<span class="pagenum" id="Page_398">[398]</span> +genera, and impart to them life, formation and perfection, and convert +them to <i>the good</i>. In a similar manner also, the Gods are prior +to the middle and first genera of beings. And all things are bound and +rooted in the Gods, and through this cause are preserved. But when any +thing apostatizes from, and becomes destitute of the Gods, it entirely +departs into non-entity and vanishes, in consequence of being perfectly +deprived of those natures by which it was contained.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXLV.</p> + +<p>The peculiarity of every divine order pervades through all secondary +natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate genera of beings.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if beings proceed as far as the orders of the Gods extend, in every +genus of beings, there is a supernally-illuminated peculiarity of the +divine powers. For every thing receives from its proximate appropriate +cause, the peculiarity according to which that cause is allotted its +subsistence. I say for instance, if there is a certain cathartic or +purifying deity, there is also a purification in souls, in animals, in +plants, and in stones. And in a similar manner, if there is a guardian, +a convertive, a perfective, and a vivific power. And a stone indeed +participates of the divine cathartic power in a corporeal manner only. +But a plant participates it still more clearly according to life. An +animal possesses this form according to impulse; the rational soul +rationally; intellect, intellectually; and the Gods superessentially +and unically. The whole series also has the same power from one divine +cause. And there is the same mode of reasoning with respect to the +peculiarities of the other divine powers. For all things are suspended +from the Gods. And different natures are illuminated by different +Gods; every divine series extending as far as to the last of things. +And some things indeed are suspended from the Gods immediately, but +others through a greater or less number of media. But <i>all things are +full<a id="FNanchor_272" href="#Footnote_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a> of Gods</i>. And whatever any thing naturally possesses, it +derives from the Gods.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">[399]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXLVI.</p> + +<p>The ends of all the divine progressions are assimilated to their +principles, preserving a circle without a beginning and without an end, +through conversion to their principles.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every thing that has proceeded, is converted to the proper +principle from which it proceeded, much more will total orders +having proceeded from their summit be again converted to it. But +the conversion of the end to the beginning, renders the whole order +one, definite, and converging to itself, and exhibiting through the +convergency, that which has the form of <i>the one</i> in the multitude.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXLVII.</p> + +<p>The summits of all the divine orders are assimilated to the ends of the +natures [proximately] situated above them.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is necessary that there should be an uninterrupted connection +of the divine progression, and that each order should be bound together +by appropriate media, it is necessary that the summits of secondary +should be conjoined with the terminations of first orders. But this +contact is through similitude. Hence there will be a similitude of the +principles of an inferior, to the ends of a [proximately] superior +order.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXLVIII.</p> + +<p>Every divine order is united to itself in a three-fold manner, from the +summit which is in it, from its middle, and from its end.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the summit possessing a power which is most single, transmits union +to all the series, and unites the whole of it supernally abiding in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_400">[400]</span> +itself. But the middle extending to both the extremes, binds together +the whole order about itself; transmitting indeed, the gifts of primary +divine natures, but extending the powers of such as are last, and +inserting communion in all of them, and a conjunction with each other. +For thus the whole order becomes one, from natures that replenish +and those that are filled, converging to the middle as to a certain +centre. And the end again returning to the beginning, and recalling +the proceeding powers, imparts similitude and convergency to the whole +order. And thus the whole order is one through the unific power of +primary natures, through the connexion existing in the middle, and +through the conversion of the end to the principle of the progressions.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXLIX.</p> + +<p>Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded according to number.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if this multitude is most near to <i>the one</i> it will not be +infinite. For the infinite is not connascent with, but foreign from +<i>the one</i>. Indeed, if multitude is of itself, or in its own +nature, separated from <i>the one</i>, it is evident that infinite +multitude is perfectly destitute of it. Hence it is powerless, and +inefficacious. The multitude of the Gods therefore, is not infinite. +Hence it has the form of <i>the one</i> and is finite, and is more +finite than every other multitude. For it is nearer to <i>the one</i> +than all other multitude. If therefore the principle of things was +multitude, it would be necessary that what is nearer to the principle +should be a greater multitude than what is more remote from it. For +that which is nearer to any thing is more similar to it. Since however, +that which is first is <i>the one</i>, the multitude which is conjoined +with it, is a less multitude than that which is more remote from it. +But the infinite is not a less, but is the greatest possible multitude.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">[401]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CL.</p> + +<p>Every thing which proceeds in the divine orders, is not naturally +adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor in +short, are secondary natures able to receive all the powers of the +natures prior to themselves, but the latter have certain powers exempt +from things in an inferior order, and incomprehensible by the beings +posterior to themselves.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if the peculiarities of the Gods differ from each other, those of +the subordinate pre-exist in the superior divinities; but those of +the superior being more total, are not in the subordinate. But more +excellent natures impart indeed some things to their progeny, but +antecedently assume others in themselves, in an exempt manner. For it +has been demonstrated that those Gods who are nearer to <i>the one</i> +are more total; and those more remote from it more partial. But if the +more total have powers comprehensive of the more partial, those that +have a secondary and more partial order, will not comprehend the power +of the more total Gods. In the superior therefore, there is something +incomprehensible and uncircumscribed by the inferior orders. For +each of the divine orders is truly infinite.<a id="FNanchor_273" href="#Footnote_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a> Nor is that which +is infinite, as has been demonstrated,<a id="FNanchor_274" href="#Footnote_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a> infinite to itself, nor +much less to things above itself, but to all the natures posterior +to itself. But infinite in these last is incapacity. The infinite +however, is incomprehensible by those natures to which it is infinite. +Subordinate natures therefore, do not participate of all the powers +which more excellent natures antecedently comprehend in themselves. +For the latter are incomprehensible by the former. Hence things of a +secondary nature, from their more partial subsistence, will neither +possess all the powers of more excellent beings, nor will they possess +the powers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_402">[402]</span> which they do contain after the same manner as superior +natures, on account of that infinity through which the latter transcend +the former.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLI.</p> + +<p>Every thing paternal in the Gods is of a primary nature, and is +pre-established in the rank of <i>the good</i>, according to all the +divine orders.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it produces the hyparxes of secondary natures, and total powers +and essences, according to one ineffable transcendency. Hence also it +is denominated paternal, in consequence of exhibiting the united and +boniform power of <i>the one</i>, and the cause which gives subsistence +to secondary natures. And according to each order of the Gods, the +paternal genus ranks as the leader, producing all things from itself, +and adorning them, as being arranged analogous to <i>the good</i>. And +of divine fathers, some are more total, but others are more partial, +just as the orders themselves of the Gods, differ by the more total, +and the more partial, according to the reason of cause. As many +therefore, as are the progressions of the Gods, so many also are the +differences of fathers. For if there is that which is analogous to +<i>the good</i> in every order, it is necessary that there should be +the paternal in all the orders, and that each order should proceed from +the paternal union.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is generative in the Gods, proceeds according to +the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, proceeding through +all things, and transcendently exhibiting the never-failing in the +progressions of secondary natures.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For to multiply things which proceed, and to produce things into +progeny, from the occult comprehension in causes, of what else is it +the prerogative, than of the infinite power of the Gods, through which +all divine natures are filled with prolific good? For every thing which +is full<span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">[403]</span> produces other things from itself according to a super-plenary +power. The domination of power therefore is the peculiarity of +generative deity, which multiplies the powers of the things generated, +and renders them prolific, and excites them to generate and give +subsistence to other things. For if every thing imparts the appropriate +peculiarity which it possesses primarily to other things, every thing +which is prolific will impart progression, and will adumbrate the +infinity which is the primary leader of wholes, from which every +generative power proceeds, and which in an exempt manner pours forth +the ever-flowing progressions of divine natures.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLIII.</p> + +<p>[Every thing which is perfect in the Gods,<a id="FNanchor_275" href="#Footnote_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a>] is the cause of divine +perfection.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For as the hypostases of beings are of one kind, but those of +superessential natures of another, so likewise with respect to +perfections, those of the Gods themselves according to hyparxis, are +different from those of beings, which are secondary and posterior to +them. And the former indeed, are self-perfect and primary, because +<i>the good</i> subsists primarily in them; but the latter possess +perfection according to participation. Hence the perfection of the Gods +is one thing, and that of deified natures is another. The perfection +however, which is primarily in the Gods, is not only the cause of +perfection to deified natures, but also to the Gods themselves. For +if every thing so far as it is perfect, is converted to its proper +principle, that which is the cause of all divine conversion, is the +perfective genus of the Gods.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_404">[404]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLIV.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is of a guardian nature in the Gods, preserves every +thing in its proper order, and is uniformly exempt<a id="FNanchor_276" href="#Footnote_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a> from secondary, +and established<a id="FNanchor_277" href="#Footnote_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a> in primary natures.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if a guard immutably preserves the measure of the order of every +thing, and connectedly contains all the natures that are guarded +in their appropriate perfection, it will impart to all things a +transcendency exempt from subordinate beings, and will firmly establish +each thing unmingled, in itself, existing as the cause of undefiled +purity to the natures that are guarded, and fixing them in superior +beings. For every thing is perfect which adheres to primary natures, +but is in itself alone, and is expanded above things subordinate.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLV.</p> + +<p>Every thing vivific in the Gods is [a generative cause, but every +generative cause is not vivific.<a id="FNanchor_278" href="#Footnote_278" class="fnanchor">[278]</a>]</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For a generative is more total than a vivific cause, and is nearer to +the principle of all things. For generation manifests a cause which +produces beings into multitude. But vivification represents to us +the deity who is the supplier of all life. If therefore the former +multiplies the hypostases of beings, but the latter gives subsistence +to the progressions of life,—if this be the case, as being is to life, +so is the generative order to the vivific series. The former therefore, +will be more total, and the cause of a greater number of effects, and +will on this account be nearer to the principle of all things.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_405">[405]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLVI.</p> + +<p>Every cause of purity is comprehended in the guardian order. But on +the contrary, not every thing of a guardian order is the same with the +purifying genus.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For purity imparts to all the Gods the unmingled with things inferior, +and the undefiled in the providence of secondary natures. But a +guardian power also effects this, and contains all things in itself, +and firmly inserts them in superior natures. The guardian therefore is +more total than the purifying genus. For in short, the peculiarity of +the guardian power, is to preserve the order of every thing the same +with reference to itself, and to the natures prior and posterior to +itself. But the peculiarity of purity is to keep more excellent natures +exempt from such as are subordinate. These powers however primarily +subsist in the Gods. For it is necessary that there should be one cause +preceding that which is in all things, and in short, it is requisite +that there should be uniform measures of all good, and that these +should be comprehended by the Gods according to cause. For there is no +good in secondary natures which does not pre-exist in the Gods. [Hence +in the divinities purity is likewise a primary good, guardianship, and +every thing of this kind.<a id="FNanchor_279" href="#Footnote_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a>]</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLVII.</p> + +<p>Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to all things, and +gives subsistence to the hyparxes of beings. But every thing which +is fabricative of the production of form, exists prior to composite +natures, and precedes their order, and division according to number, +and is also of the same co-ordination with the paternal cause, in the +more partial genera of things.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">[406]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For each of these belongs to the order of bound; since hyparxis also, +number and form, have all of them the nature of bound. Hence, in this +respect they are co-ordinate with each other. But the demiurgic or +fabricative cause indeed, produces fabrication into multitude. And +the uniform, or that which has the form of <i>the one</i> supplies +the progressions of beings. And the former indeed, is the artificer +of form, but the latter produces essence. So far therefore, as these +differ from each other, viz. form and being, so far also does the +paternal differ from the demiurgic cause. But form is a <i>certain</i> +being.<a id="FNanchor_280" href="#Footnote_280" class="fnanchor">[280]</a> Hence the paternal cause is more total and causal, and is +beyond the demiurgic genus, in the same manner as being is beyond form.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLVIII.</p> + +<p>Every elevating cause in the Gods, differs both from a purifying cause, +and from the convertive genera.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it is evident that this cause also has necessarily a primary +subsistence in the Gods; since all the causes of total good pre-exist +in the divinities. But it subsists prior to the purifying cause. For +the one liberates from things of a subordinate nature, but the other +conjoins with more excellent natures. The elevating however, has a +more partial order than the convertive cause. For every thing which +converts, [is converted either to itself, or to that which is more +excellent than itself.<a id="FNanchor_281" href="#Footnote_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a>] But the energy of the elevating cause +is characterized by a conversion to that which is more excellent, as +leading that which is converted to a superior and more divine cause.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_407">[407]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLIX.</p> + +<p>Every order of the Gods consists of the first principles, bound and +infinity. But one order is in a greater degree derived from bound, and +another from infinity.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For every order proceeds from both these, because the communications +of first causes pervade through all secondary natures. But in some +things bound predominates in the mixture [of bound and infinity,] and +in others infinity. And thus the genus which has the form of bound has +its completion, in which the prerogatives of bound have dominion. This +too is the case with the genus which has the form of the infinite, and +in which the properties of infinity predominate.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLX.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Concerning Intellect.</i></p> + +<p>Every divine intellect is uniform, or has the form of <i>the one</i>, +and is perfect. And the first intellect subsists from itself, and +produces other intellects.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is a God it is filled with divine unities, and is uniform. +But if this be the case, it is also perfect, being full of divine +goodness. And if this be admitted, it is likewise primarily intellect, +as being united to the Gods. But being primarily intellect, it also +gives an hypostasis to other intellects. For all secondary natures +obtain their hyparxis from such as have a primary subsistence.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXI.</p> + +<p>Every thing which is truly being, and is suspended from the Gods, is +divine and imparticipable.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_408">[408]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For since that which is truly being, is the first of the natures +that participate of the divine union, it likewise fills intellect +from itself. For intellect is being, as replete with being, and is +therefore a divine intelligible. And so far indeed as it is deified +it is divine, but as filling intellect, and being participated by +it, it is intelligible. Intellect also is being, on account of that +which is primarily being. But that which is primarily being itself is +separate from intellect; because intellect is posterior to being. But +imparticipables subsist prior to things which are participated. Hence +being which subsists by itself and is imparticipable, is prior to +the being which is conjoined with intellect. For it is intelligible, +not as co-arranged with intellect, but as perfecting intellect in an +exempt manner, because it imparts being to it, and fills it with truly +existing essence.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXII.</p> + +<p>Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly existing being, is +occult and intelligible; occult indeed, as being conjoined with unity; +but intelligible,<a id="FNanchor_282" href="#Footnote_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a> as participated by being.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For all the Gods are denominated from the things which are suspended +from them; because from these it is possible to know their different +hypostases, which are [of themselves] unknown. For every thing divine +is of itself ineffable and unknown, as being connascent with the +ineffable one. From the difference, however, of the participants +it happens that the peculiarities of divine natures become known. +The unities, therefore, which illuminate truly existing being are +intelligible; because being, truly so called, is a divine intelligible, +and imparticipable, subsisting prior to intellect. For this would +not be suspended from the first Gods, unless they also possessed a +primary hypostasis, and a power perfective of other Gods; since, as +participants are to each other, so likewise are the hyparxes of the +things that are participated.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_409">[409]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXIII.</p> + +<p>Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable<a id="FNanchor_283" href="#Footnote_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a> +intellect, is intellectual.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For as intellect is to truly existing being, so are these unities to +the intelligible unities. Since, therefore, the latter which illuminate +being,<a id="FNanchor_284" href="#Footnote_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a> are intelligible, hence, the former which illuminate a +divine and imparticipable intellect, are intellectual. Yet they are not +intellectual in such a way, as if they subsisted in intellect, but as +causally existing prior to intellect, and generating intellect.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXIV.</p> + +<p>Every multitude of unities which is participated by every +imparticipable soul, is supermundane.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For because imparticipable soul is primarily above the world, the Gods +also which are participated by it are supermundane, having the same +analogy to the intellectual and intelligible Gods, which soul has +to intellect, and intellect to truly existing being. As, therefore, +every soul is suspended from intellect, and intellect is converted +to the intelligible, thus also the supermundane are suspended from +the intellectual, in the same manner as the intellectual from the +intelligible Gods.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXV.</p> + +<p>Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain [sensible +body is mundane.]</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it illuminates the parts of the world, through intellect and soul +as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">[410]</span> media.<a id="FNanchor_285" href="#Footnote_285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a> For intellect is not present with any mundane body +without soul, nor are deity and soul conjoined without a medium; since +participations are through similars. Intellect itself also according +to its intelligible summit, participates of unity. These unities, +therefore, are mundane, as giving completion to the whole world, and as +deifying visible bodies. For each of these is divine, not on account +of soul; for soul is not primarily a God. Nor on account of intellect; +for intellect is not the same with <i>the one</i>. But each of these +visible bodies, is animated indeed on account of soul, and moved of +itself. But it possesses a perpetual sameness of subsistence, and is +moved in the most excellent order, on account of intellect. It is, +however, divine on account of union. And if it possesses a providential +power, it possesses it through this cause.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXVI.</p> + +<p>Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. And if +participable, it is either participated by supermundane, or by mundane +souls.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For imparticipable intellect having the first order, is the leader of +every multitude of intellects. But of participable intellects, some +illuminate supermundane and imparticipable soul, but others the mundane +soul. For the mundane multitude is not immediately derived from the +imparticipable; since progressions are through similars. But that which +is separate from the world, is more similar to the imparticipable, than +that which is divided about it. Nor has a supermundane multitude alone +a subsistence, but there are also mundane intellects; since there is +likewise a mundane multitude of Gods, and the world itself is animated, +and at the same time intellectual. The participation also of the +supermundane Gods by mundane souls, is through mundane intellects as +the media.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_411">[411]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXVII.</p> + +<p>Every intellect intellectually perceives itself. But the first +intellect indeed, perceives itself alone; and in this, intellect +and the intelligible are one in number. But each of the subsequent +intellects, perceives itself, and the natures prior to itself. And the +intelligible to each of these,<a id="FNanchor_286" href="#Footnote_286" class="fnanchor">[286]</a> is partly that which it is, and +partly that from which it is derived.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For every intellect, either<a id="FNanchor_287" href="#Footnote_287" class="fnanchor">[287]</a> intellectually perceives itself, or +that which is above, or that which is posterior to itself. But if +indeed it perceives that which is posterior to itself, it will through +intellect be converted to that which is less excellent than itself; +and thus will not know that to which it is converted, as not being in +itself, but external to itself. But it will only know the image of this +thing, as being generated in itself from it. For it knows that which it +possesses, and the manner in which it is affected, but not that which +it does not possess, and by which it is not affected.</p> + +<p>But if it perceives that which is above itself, if indeed, this is +accomplished through the knowledge of itself, it will at one and the +same time both know itself and that superior nature. But if it knows +that alone, it will be ignorant of itself, though it is intellect. In +short, by knowing that which is prior to itself, it will know that it +is a cause, and will also know the things of which it is the cause. +For if it is ignorant of these, it will likewise be ignorant of that +which is the cause of them; not knowing that which produces what it +produces, by its very being, and what the things are which it does +produce. Hence, by knowing the things of which it is the cause, it will +also know itself, as deriving its subsistence from thence. By knowing, +therefore, that which is prior to itself, it will likewise entirely +know itself. Hence, if there is a certain intelligible intellect, +this by knowing itself, will also know the intelligible,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">[412]</span> being +itself intelligible. But each of the intellects posterior to this, +will intellectually perceive the intelligible which is in itself, and +at the same time that which is prior to itself. Hence, in intellect +there is the intelligible, and in the intelligible intellect. But one +intellect is the same with the intelligible; and another is the same +with the intelligible which is in itself, but is not the same with the +intelligible prior to itself. For that which is simply intelligible is +one thing, and the intelligible in that which intellectually perceives +is another.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXVIII.</p> + +<p>Every intellect knows in energy that which it intellectually perceives, +and it is not the peculiarity of one part of it to perceive, and of +another to perceive that it perceives.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is intellect in energy, and perceives itself as not any +thing different from the object of intellectual perception, it +will know itself, and see itself. But seeing that which perceives +intellectually, and knowing that which sees, it will know that it +is intellect in energy. But knowing this, it will know that it +perceives intellectually, and will not alone know the objects of its +intellection. Hence, it will at once both know the intelligible, and +that it intellectually perceives it, and by intellection it will be +intellectually perceived by itself.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXIX.</p> + +<p>Every intellect has its essence, power and energy in eternity.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it intellectually perceives itself, and intellect is the same +with the intelligible, intelligence also is the same with intellect +and the intelligible. For being the medium between that which +intellectually perceives, and the object of intellectual perception, +and these being the same, intelligence also will be the same with both. +Moreover, that the essence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_413">[413]</span> of intellect is eternal, is evident.<a id="FNanchor_288" href="#Footnote_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a> +For the whole of it subsists at once. And this being the case, +intelligence also will be eternal, since it is the same with the +essence of intellect. But if intellect is eternal,<a id="FNanchor_289" href="#Footnote_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a> it will not be +measured by time, neither according to its being, nor its energy. But +these subsisting with invariable sameness, the power also of intellect +will be eternal.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXX.</p> + +<p>Every intellect at once intellectually perceives all things. But +imparticipable intellect indeed, <i>simply</i> perceives all things. +And each of the intellects posterior to it perceives all things +[according to one].</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>[For if]<a id="FNanchor_290" href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a> every intellect establishes its essence in eternity, and +together with its essence its energy, it will intellectually perceive +all things at once. For to every thing which is not established in +eternity, the successive objects of its perception subsist according to +parts. For every thing which is successive, is in time; the successive +consisting of prior and posterior, but the whole of it not existing at +once. If therefore all intellects similarly perceive all things,<a id="FNanchor_291" href="#Footnote_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a> +they will not differ from each other. For if they perceive all things +similarly,<a id="FNanchor_292" href="#Footnote_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a> they are similarly all things, since they are the +very things which they intellectually perceive. But being similarly +all things, one intellect will not be imparticipable, and another +not. For their essences are the same things as the objects of their +intellection; since the intellection of each is the same with the +being of each, and each is both intellection and essence. It remains +therefore, either that each intellect does not similarly perceive all +things, but one thing, or more than one, but not all things at once; +or that it perceives<span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">[414]</span> all things according to one.<a id="FNanchor_293" href="#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> To assert +however, that each intellect does not perceive all things, is to make +intellect to be ignorant of some particular being. For if it suffers +transition in its energy, and intellectually perceives, not at once, +but according to prior and posterior, at the same time possessing an +immoveable nature, it will be inferior to soul, which understands all +things in being moved, [or in a mutable energy]; because intellect +on this hypothesis, will only understand one thing by its permanent +energy. It will therefore understand all things according to one. For +it either intellectually perceives all things, or one thing, or all +things according to the one of intellection. For in all intellects +indeed, there is always an intellectual perception of all things; yet +so as to bound all things in one of all. Hence there is something +predominant in intellection, and the objects of intellection; since all +things are at once understood as one, through the domination of one, +which characterizes all things with itself.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXI.</p> + +<p>Every intellect is an impartible essence.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is without magnitude, incorporeal, [and immoveable, it +is impartible. For every thing]<a id="FNanchor_294" href="#Footnote_294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a> which in any way whatever is +partible, is either partible on account of magnitude, or multitude, or +on account of energies which are borne along with the flux of time. But +intellect is eternal according to all things, and is beyond bodies, and +the multitude which is in it is united. It is, therefore, impartible. +That intellect also is incorporeal, is manifest from its conversion to +itself. For no body is converted to itself. But that it is eternal, +the identity of its energy with its essence evinces. For this has been +before demonstrated. And that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_415">[415]</span> the multitude in it is united is evident +from the continuity of intellectual multitude with the divine unities. +For these are the first multitude; but intellects are next to these. +Hence, though every intellect is a multitude, yet it is an united +multitude. For prior to that which is divided, that which is collected +into profound union, and is nearer to <i>the one</i>, subsists.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXII.</p> + +<p>Every intellect is proximately the producing cause of beings perpetual +and immutable according to essence.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For every thing which is produced by an immoveable cause, is immutable +according to essence. But immoveable intellect being all things +eternally, and abiding in eternity, produces by its very being that +which it produces. If however it always is, and is invariably the same, +it always produces, and after the same manner. Hence, it is not the +cause of things which sometimes have existence, and at other times not, +but it is the cause of things which always exist.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXIII.</p> + +<p>Every intellect is intellectually both the things which are prior and +posterior to itself.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it is those things which are posterior to itself, according +to cause, but those things which are prior to itself, according +to participation. Yet it is still intellect, and is allotted an +intellectual essence. [Hence it defines] all things [according to +its essence];<a id="FNanchor_295" href="#Footnote_295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a> both such as are according to cause, and such +as are according to participation. For every thing participates of +more excellent beings in such a way as it is naturally adapted to +participate, and not according to their subsistence. For otherwise, +they would be similarly participated by all things. Participations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">[416]</span> +therefore, are according to the peculiarity and power of the +participants. Hence in intellect, the natures prior to it subsist +intellectually. But intellect is likewise intellectually the things +posterior to itself. For it does not consist of its effects, nor does +it contain these, but the causes of these in itself. But intellect is +by its very being the cause of all things. And the very being of it +is intellectual. Hence it contains intellectually the causes of all +things. So that every intellect possesses all things intellectually, +both such as are prior, and such as are posterior to it. As therefore, +every intellect contains intelligibles intellectually, so likewise it +contains sensibles intellectually.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXIV.</p> + +<p>Every intellect gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, by +intellection, and its fabrication consists in intellection, and its +intellection or intelligence, in fabrication.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if intelligible and intellect are the same, the essence also of +every intellect will be the same with the intellection in itself. But +it produces that which it produces by essence, and produces according +to the very being, which it is. By intellection therefore, it will +produce the things which are produced. For in intellect, being and +intellection are both of them one. For intellect is the same with every +being which it contains. If therefore, it makes by its very being, but +its very being is intellection, it makes by intellection. Intelligence +also which is in energy, consists in intellection. But this is the same +with the essence of intellect. And the essence of intellect consists +in producing. For that which produces immoveably, [always possesses] +its very being [in producing. The intelligence of intellect therefore +consists in fabrication or production.<a id="FNanchor_296" href="#Footnote_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a>]</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_417">[417]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXV.</p> + +<p>Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are +intellectual, both according to essence, and according to energy.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For it is necessary that it should either be participated by these, +or by other natures, which possess indeed an intellectual essence, +but do not always energize intellectually. It is however impossible +that it should be participated by the latter of these. For the +energy of intellect is immoveable. And hence, the natures by which +it is participated, always participate of intellectual energy, which +always causes the participants of it to be intellectual. For that +which possesses its energy in a certain part of time, is unadapted to +be conjoined with an eternal energy. But that which has perfection +according to the whole of time, is the medium between every eternal +energy, and that which is perfect in a certain time, as well in the +mutations of energy, as in essences. For progressions are never +effected without a medium, but through kindred and similar natures, +both according to hypostases, and the perfections of energies. After +a similar manner therefore, every intellect is primarily participated +by those beings that are able to perceive intellectually, according to +the whole of time, and who always energize intellectually, though their +intellection is in time, and is not eternally in energy.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>From this therefore, it is evident that it is impossible for the soul +which sometimes perceives intellectually and sometimes does not, to +participate proximately of intellect.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXVI.</p> + +<p>All intellectual forms are in each other, and each is at the same time +separate and distinct from the rest.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every intellect is impartible, and the multitude which is in it +is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">[418]</span> united through intellectual impartibility, all things in it will be +in one, impartibles will be united to each other, and all intellectual +forms will pervade through all. But if all intellectual forms subsist +immaterially and incorporeally, they are unconfused with each other +and separate, and each preserving its own purity, remains that which +it is. The peculiar participation however of each participating in +a separate manner, manifests the unconfused nature of intellectual +forms. For unless the forms which are participated were distinguished +separate from each other, the participants of each of them would not +participate in a separate manner, but in the subordinate natures +[i.e. in the participants] there would be, in a much greater degree, +an indistinct confusion, these being according to their order of an +inferior condition. For whence would there be a separation of these, if +the natures which give subsistence to, and perfect them, were without +distinction, and were confused together? But again the impartible +hypostasis, and uniform essence of that which contains forms, evinces +their united nature. For things which have their hyparxis in the +impartible and the uniform, are impartibly in the same thing. For how +can you divide the impartible and <i>the one</i>? Hence, they have a +simultaneous subsistence, and are in each other, each wholly pervading +through the whole of each, in a manner unaccompanied with interval. +For that which comprehends them is not extended with interval, nor is +one of them in this thing, but another elsewhere, as in that which has +interval; but every thing is at once in the impartible and in one. So +that all intellectual forms are in each other, and are in each other +unitedly, and at the same time each is distinctly apart from each.</p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>But if some one, in addition to these demonstrations, should require +also examples, let him direct his attention to the theorems which exist +in one soul. For all these are in the same essence, which is truly +without magnitude,<a id="FNanchor_297" href="#Footnote_297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a> and are united to each other. For that which is +without magnitude, does not locally contain the things which are in it, +but the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">[419]</span> natures which it contains are united and separated, impartibly +and without interval. For the soul genuinely produces all things, and +each apart from each, attracting nothing from the rest, which, unless +they were always separated according to habit, would not be separated +by the energy of the soul.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXVII.</p> + +<p>Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one indeed, is +comprehensive of more total, but another of more partial forms. And +the superior intellects contain in a more total manner, such things +as those posterior to them contain more partially. But the inferior +intellects contain more partially, such things as those that are prior +to them contain more totally.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the superior intellects employ greater powers, having more the +form of <i>the one</i> than secondary intellects. But the inferior +intellects being more multiplied, diminish the powers which they +contain. For things that are more allied to <i>the one</i>, being +contracted in quantity, surpass the natures that are posterior to them. +And on the contrary, things more remote from <i>the one</i>, as they +are increased in quantity, are inferior to the natures that are nearer +to <i>the one</i>. Hence the superior intellects, being established +according to a greater power, but being less in multitude, produce a +greater number of effects, according to power, through fewer things +according to the quantity of forms. But the intellects posterior +to them produce fewer effects through a greater number of things, +according to a defect of power.<a id="FNanchor_298" href="#Footnote_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a> If therefore, the former produce a +greater number of effects, through fewer things, the forms in them are +more total. And if the latter produce fewer effects, through a greater +number of things, the forms in them are more partial.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">[420]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p1 sm">COROLLARY.</p> + +<p>Hence it happens that the natures which are generated from superior +intellects according to one form, are produced [in a divided manner +from secondary intellects<a id="FNanchor_299" href="#Footnote_299" class="fnanchor">[299]</a>] according to many ideas. And again, +those natures which are produced by inferior intellects through many +and distinct forms, are produced by superior intellects through fewer, +but more total forms. And that indeed which is a whole and common, +accedes supernally to all its participants. But that which is divided +and peculiar accedes from secondary intellects. Hence secondary +intellects, by the more partial separation of peculiarities, accurately +and subtly distinguish the formations of primary intellects.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXVIII.</p> + +<p>Every intellectual form gives subsistence to eternal natures.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every intellectual form is eternal and immoveable, it is +essentially the cause of immutable and eternal hypostases, but not +of such as are generated and corrupted. So that every thing which +subsists according to an intellectual form is an eternal intellectual +nature. For if all forms produce things posterior to themselves by +their very being, but their essence possesses an invariable sameness of +subsistence, the things produced by them will also be invariably the +same, and will be eternal. Hence, neither the genera which subsist from +a formal cause, according to a certain time, nor corruptible natures +so far as they are corruptible, have a pre-existent intellectual form. +For they would be incorruptible and unbegotten, if they derived their +hypostasis from intellectual forms.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_421">[421]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXIX.</p> + +<p>Every intellectual number is bounded.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if there is another multitude posterior to this, essentially +inferior to it, and thus [more remote from <i>the one</i>, but the +intellectual number is nearer to <i>the one</i>;<a id="FNanchor_300" href="#Footnote_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a>] and if that +which is nearer to <i>the one</i>, is less according to quantity, but +that which is more remote from it, is more according to quantity;—if +this be the case, the intellectual number also will be less than every +multitude posterior to it. Hence, it is not infinite. The multitude of +intellects therefore, is bounded. For that which is less than a certain +thing is not infinite, because the infinite, so far as infinite, is not +less than any thing.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXX.</p> + +<p>Every intellect is a whole, so far as each consists of parts, and is +united to other things, and at the same time separated from them. But +imparticipable intellect indeed, is simply a whole, as containing all +parts in itself totally. But each partial intellect possesses the whole +as in a part; and thus is all things partially.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if a partial intellect is all things according to one, but a +subsistence according to one thing is nothing else than a subsistence +partially, the whole is in each of these intellects partially, being +defined according to a certain one particular thing which predominates +in all of them.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_422">[422]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXXI.</p> + +<p>Every participated intellect is either divine, as being suspended from +the Gods, or is intellectual only.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if a divine and imparticipable intellect has a primary subsistence, +the intellect which is allied to this, is not that which differs from +it in both respects, viz. which is neither divine, nor imparticipable. +For things which are dissimilar in both these respects, cannot +be conjoined with each other. It is evident therefore, that the +medium between these is partly similar to that which is primarily +intellect, and partly dissimilar to it. Either<a id="FNanchor_301" href="#Footnote_301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a> therefore, it is +imparticipable and not divine; or it is participated and divine. But +every thing imparticipable is divine, as being allotted an order in +multitude analogous to <i>the one</i>. Hence, there will be a certain +intellect which is divine and at the same time participated. It is +necessary however that there should be [an intellect which does not +participate<a id="FNanchor_302" href="#Footnote_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a>] of the divine unities, but intellectually perceives +them only. For in each series, such things as are first, and which +are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of things +proximately situated in a superior order. But such as are far distant +from the primary monad, cannot be suspended from the natures that +proximately belong to a higher order. There is therefore both [a +divine intellect,<a id="FNanchor_303" href="#Footnote_303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a>] and an intellect which is intellectual only; +the latter indeed, being established according to an intellectual +peculiarity, which it possesses from its own monad, and from +imparticipable intellect; but the former subsisting according to the +union which it receives from the participated monad.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_423">[423]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXXII.</p> + +<p>Every [divine<a id="FNanchor_304" href="#Footnote_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a>] participated intellect, is participated by divine +souls.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if participation assimilates the participant to that which is +participated, and renders the former connascent with the latter, +it is evident that the participant of a divine intellect must be a +divine soul, as being suspended from a divine intellect, and that +through intellect as a medium it must participate of the deity which +it contains. For deity conjoins his soul which participates of it with +intellect, and binds that which is divine to that which is divine.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXXIII.</p> + +<p>Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellectual +alone, is participated by souls which are neither divine, nor +subsisting in a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For neither are divine souls of this kind, nor such as participate +of intellect. For souls participate of the Gods through a divine +intellect, as was before demonstrated. Nor are souls which admit of +mutation, of this kind. For every intellect is participated by natures +which are always intellectual, both according to essence and according +to energy. For this is evident from what has been before shown.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXXIV.</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Concerning Soul.</i></p> + +<p>Every soul is either divine, or is changed from intellect into a +privation of intellect; or always remains as a medium between these, +but is inferior to divine souls.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_424">[424]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if a divine intellect indeed, is participated by divine souls, +but an intellectual intellect by those souls alone which are neither +divine, nor receive a mutation from intelligence into a privation of +intellect (for there are souls of this kind, which sometimes perceive +intellectually, and sometimes do not);—if this be the case, it +is evident that there are three genera of souls. And the first of +these indeed, are divine. But the second are not divine, yet always +participate of intellect. And the third are those, which are sometimes +changed into an intellectual condition, and sometimes into a privation +of intellect.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXXV.</p> + +<p>All [divine]<a id="FNanchor_305" href="#Footnote_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a> souls, are indeed Gods psychically. But all those +that participate of an intellectual intellect, are the perpetual +attendants of the Gods. And all those that are the recipients of +mutation, are sometimes only the attendants of the Gods.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if some souls have divine light supernally shining upon them, +but others are endued with perpetual intelligence, and others again +only sometimes participate of this perfection;—if this be the case, +the first of these will among the multitude of souls be analogous +to the Gods. But the next to these, will always follow the Gods, in +consequence of always energizing according to intellect, and will be +suspended from divine souls, having the same relation to them as that +which is intellectual<a id="FNanchor_306" href="#Footnote_306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a> to that which is divine. And the souls +which sometimes energize intellectually and follow the Gods, neither +participate of intellect after a manner always the same, nor are always +able to be converted [to the intelligible] in conjunction with divine +souls. For that which sometimes only participates of intellect, cannot +by any contrivance whatever be always conjoined with the Gods.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_425">[425]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXXVI.</p> + +<p>Every soul is both an incorporeal essence, [and separate from +body].<a id="FNanchor_307" href="#Footnote_307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it knows itself, but every thing which knows itself, is +converted to itself, and that which is converted to itself, does not +pertain to body (since every body is without conversion to itself) nor +is inseparable from body, since that which is inseparable from body is +not naturally adapted to revert to itself as it would thus be separated +from body;—if this be the case, every soul is neither a corporeal +essence, nor inseparable from body. Moreover, that the soul knows +itself is evident. For if it knows the natures that are above itself, +and is also naturally adapted to know itself, it will in a much greater +degree know itself from the causes prior to itself.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXXVII.</p> + +<p>Every soul is indestructible, and incorruptible.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For every thing which can in any way whatever be dissolved and +destroyed, is either corporeal and a composite, or is allotted its +hypostasis in a subject. And that indeed, which is dissolved, is +corrupted as consisting of many things. But that which is naturally +adapted to be in another thing, vanishes into non-entity when separated +from its subject. Moreover, the soul is incorporeal, and external to +every subject, subsisting in itself, and being converted to itself. +Hence, it is indestructible and incorruptible.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXXVIII.</p> + +<p>Every soul is both life and vital.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For that to which soul accedes necessarily lives. And that which +is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_426">[426]</span> deprived of soul, is immediately left destitute of life. Either +therefore it lived through soul, or through something else, and not +through soul. It is however impossible that it should have lived +through something else alone. For every thing which is participated, +either imparts itself, or something pertaining to itself to its +participant. But if it suffers neither of these, it will not be +participated. Soul however, is participated by that to which it is +present. And that which participates of soul is said to be animated. +If therefore that which is participated introduces life to animated +natures, it is either life, or vital alone, or both life and vital. If +however, it is alone vital, but not also life, it will consist of life +and non-life. It will not therefore know itself, nor be converted to +itself. For knowledge is life, and the gnostic power so far as it is +such is vital. If therefore, there is any thing in soul without life, +this will not possess essentially the power of knowing. But if soul is +life alone, it will no longer participate of the intellectual life. +For the participant of life is vital, and is not life alone, i.e. the +first and imparticipable life; but the life which is posterior to this, +is both vital and life. Soul however, is not imparticipable life. And +hence it is at the same time both life and vital.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CLXXXIX.</p> + +<p>Every soul is self-vital.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is converted to itself, but every thing which is converted +to itself is self-subsistent, the soul also is self-subsistent, and +produces itself. But it is likewise life and vital, and its hyparxis +is according to vitality. For it imparts life by its very being to the +natures to which it is present. And if the participant is adapted, it +immediately becomes animated and vital, [soul in effecting this not +reasoning]<a id="FNanchor_308" href="#Footnote_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a> nor acting from deliberate choice, nor vivifying by +cogitation and judgment, but by its very essence,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_427">[427]</span> and by that which +it is, supplying the participant with life. Hence the being of soul +is the same as <i>to live</i>. If therefore the soul possesses being +from itself, and this is the same as <i>to live</i>, and it has life +essentially;—if this be the case, it will impart life to itself, and +will possess it from itself. And this being admitted, soul will be +self-vital.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXC.</p> + +<p>Every soul is a medium between impartible natures, and the natures +which are divisible about bodies.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if soul is self-vital and self-subsistent, and has an hyparxis +separate from bodies, it is, in consequence of being more excellent +than, exempt from every thing divisible about body. For the natures +which are divided about bodies, are entirely inseparable from their +subjects, being co-distributed with divisible bulks. They also depart +from themselves, and their own impartibility, and are co-extended +with bodies. And though they subsist in lives, yet these are not the +lives of themselves, but of participants. Though likewise they exist +in essence and in forms, yet they are not the forms of themselves, +but of those things which are fashioned by forms. If therefore, soul +is not these, it is a self-subsistent essence, a self-vital life, and +a knowledge gnostic of itself. Hence, it is entirely separate from +bodies, but is a participant of life. If however, this be the case, it +also participates of essence. But it likewise participates of knowledge +from other causes. It is evident therefore, that it is inferior to +impartible natures, because it is filled [with life externally.]<a id="FNanchor_309" href="#Footnote_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> +But if with life, it is evident that it is also externally filled +with essence. For imparticipable life and imparticipable essence +are prior to soul.<a id="FNanchor_310" href="#Footnote_310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a> That soul however is not primarily gnostic +is evident.<a id="FNanchor_311" href="#Footnote_311" class="fnanchor">[311]</a> For every soul<span class="pagenum" id="Page_428">[428]</span> indeed, so far as soul is life, +but not every soul, so far as it is soul possesses knowledge. For a +certain soul while it remains soul, is ignorant of [real] beings. Soul +therefore, is not primarily gnostic, nor does it possess knowledge from +its very being. Hence, it has an essence secondary to those natures +that are primarily, and by their very being, gnostic. Since however, +the essence of soul is divided from its knowledge, soul does not belong +to natures [entirely] impartible. But it has been demonstrated that +neither does it rank among the natures that are divisible about bodies. +Hence, it is a medium between both.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXCI.</p> + +<p>Every participable soul has indeed an eternal essence, but its energy +is accompanied with time.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For either it possesses both eternally, or both temporally; or the +one eternally, but the other temporally. It cannot however, possess +both eternally: for it would be an impartible essence, and the nature +of soul would in no respect differ from an intellectual hypostasis, +viz. a self-motive from an immoveable nature. Nor can it possess both +temporally: for thus it would be generated alone, and would neither +be self-vital, nor self-subsistent. For nothing which is essentially +measured by time is self-subsistent. But soul is self-subsistent. +For that which is converted to itself, according to energy, is also +essentially converted to itself, and proceeds from itself. It remains +therefore, that every soul is partly eternal, and partly participates +of time. Either therefore, it is essentially eternal, [but participates +of time according to energy,<a id="FNanchor_312" href="#Footnote_312" class="fnanchor">[312]</a>] or vice versa. The latter however, +is impossible. Hence, every participable soul, is allotted an eternal +essence, but a temporal energy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_429">[429]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXCII.</p> + +<p>Every participable soul ranks among the number of [truly existing] +beings, and is the first of generated natures.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is essentially eternal, it is truly being according to its +hyparxis, and always is. For that which participates of eternity, +participates likewise of perpetual existence. But if it is in +time according to energy, it is generated. For every thing which +participates of time, since it is always becoming to be, or rising into +existence, according to the prior and posterior of time, and is not at +once that which it is, is wholly generated. But if every soul is in a +certain respect generated according to energy, it will be the first of +generated natures. For that which is in every respect generated, is +more remote from eternal natures.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXCIII.</p> + +<p>Every soul subsists proximately from intellect.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it has an immutable and eternal essence, it proceeds from an +immoveable essence. For that which proceeds from a moveable essence, is +essentially changed in every respect. The cause, therefore, of every +soul is immoveable. But if it proximately subsists from intellect, it +is perfected by, and converted to intellect. And if it participates of +the knowledge which intellect imparts to the natures that are able to +partake of it; (for all knowledge is derived from intellect, and all +things have their progression essentially from that to which they are +naturally converted)—if this be the case, every soul proceeds from +intellect.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXCIV.</p> + +<p>Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_430">[430]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it proceeds from intellect, and intellect gives subsistence +to soul; and if intellect subsisting immoveably produces all things +by its very being, it will also impart to soul which it fabricates, +the essential reasons [or producing principles] of all things which +it contains. For every thing which produces by its very being, +imparts secondarily to the thing generated by it, that which it is +itself primarily. The soul, therefore, contains secondarily the +representations of intellectual forms.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXCV.</p> + +<p>Every soul is all things, containing indeed sensibles paradigmatically, +or after the manner of an exemplar; but intelligibles iconically, or +after the manner of an image.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For subsisting as a medium between impartible natures, and such as +are divisible about body, it produces and gives subsistence to the +latter of these, but pre-establishes in itself the causes from which +it proceeds. Those things, therefore, of which it is the pre-existent +cause, it antecedently comprehends paradigmatically. But it possesses +according to participation, and as the progeny of first natures the +causes of its subsistence. Hence it antecedently comprehends according +to cause all sensible natures, and contains the immaterial productive +principles of things material, the incorporeal principles of things +corporeal, and without interval, the principles of things which possess +interval. But it contains intelligibles and the forms of them after the +manner of an image; so that it receives partibly indeed impartibles, +with multiplication unical natures, and in a self-motive manner, things +immoveable. Hence it is all beings, containing such as are first, +according to participation, but paradigmatically such as are posterior +to its own nature.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_431">[431]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXCVI.</p> + +<p>Every participable soul, primarily uses a perpetual body, which +possesses an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if every soul is essentially eternal, and by its very being +primarily animates some particular body, [it will always animate this +body. For the essence of every soul is immutable]. But if this be the +case, that which is animated by it is always animated, and always +participates of life. That, however, which always lives, by a much +greater priority always exists. But that which always is, is perpetual. +Hence, that which is primarily suspended from every soul, is perpetual. +But indeed every participable soul is primarily participated by a +certain body, since it is participable and not imparticipable, and +animates its participant by its very being. Every participated soul, +therefore, uses a body which is primarily perpetual, and essentially +unbegotten and incorruptible.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXCVII.</p> + +<p>Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and a life essential and +gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All things likewise +subsist in it at once, the essential, the vital, and the gnostic; and +all things are in all, and each is separate from the rest.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is the medium between impartible forms, and those which are +divided about bodies, it is neither so impartible as all intellectual +natures, nor so partible as corporeal forms. Since, therefore, +essences, lives and cognitions are divided in corporeal natures, these +subsist in souls impartibly, unitedly, and incorporeally, and all of +them exist at once, through their immateriality and impartibility. +Since, likewise, in intellectual natures, all things subsist according +to union, they are distinguished and divided in souls. All things, +therefore, subsist together in these, and at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_432">[432]</span> the same time apart. But +if all impartibles subsist together and in one, they pervade through +each other, and if they are separate, they are again divided without +confusion; so that each subsists by itself, and all are in all. For +in the essence of soul there is both life and knowledge;<a id="FNanchor_313" href="#Footnote_313" class="fnanchor">[313]</a> since +every soul would not know itself, if the essence of it was of itself +deprived of life and knowledge. And in the life of the soul there are +both essence and knowledge. For unessential<a id="FNanchor_314" href="#Footnote_314" class="fnanchor">[314]</a> life, and which is +without knowledge, pertains to material lives, which are neither able +to know themselves, nor are genuine essences. Knowledge, also, which is +unessential and without life, is without subsistence. For all knowledge +belongs to that which is vital, and which is of itself allotted an +essence.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXCVIII.</p> + +<p>Every thing which participates of time, and is always moved, is +measured by periods.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For since it is measured by time, the motion of it also participates of +measure and bound, and proceeds according to number. But because it is +always moved, and this always is not<a id="FNanchor_315" href="#Footnote_315" class="fnanchor">[315]</a> eternal, but temporal, it is +necessary that it should use periods. For motion indeed is a mutation +from some things to others. But beings are terminated by multitude +and magnitude. These, however, being bounded, there can neither be a +mutation to infinity according to a right line, nor can that which +is always moved, make its transitions finitely. Hence, that which is +always moved, will proceed from the same to the same, and thus will +proceed periodically.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_433">[433]</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CXCIX.</p> + +<p>Every mundane soul uses periods of its proper life, and restitutions to +its former state.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is measured by time, it energizes transitively, and possesses +a peculiar motion.<a id="FNanchor_316" href="#Footnote_316" class="fnanchor">[316]</a> But every thing which is moved and participates +of time, if it is perpetual, uses periods, periodically revolves, and +is restored from the same things to the same. And every mundane soul +possessing motion, and energizing according to time, will have periods +of motions, and restitutions to its pristine state. For every period of +perpetual natures is <i>apocatastatic</i>, or restorative to a former +condition.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CC.</p> + +<p>Every period of soul is measured by time. The period of other souls +indeed is measured by a certain time; but that of the first soul, since +it is measured by time, is measured by the whole of time.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if all motions have prior and posterior, so likewise have periods, +and on this account they participate of time. That also which measures +all the periods of souls is time. But if indeed there were the same +periods of all souls, and they were about the same things, the time of +all would be the same. If, however, the restitutions of different souls +are different, the periodic time also and which restores to a pristine +state, is different in different souls.</p> + +<p>That the soul, therefore, which is primarily measured by time, is +measured by the whole of time, is evident. For if time is the measure +of all motion, that which is primarily moved, will entirely participate +of time, and will be measured by the whole of time. For if the whole +of time did not measure its first participant, it would not measure +any thing else, according to the whole of itself. From these things, +however, it is evident<span class="pagenum" id="Page_434">[434]</span> that all souls are measured by certain +measures which are more partial than the whole of time. For if these +souls are more partial than the soul which primarily participates of +time, neither can they adapt their periods to the whole of time. The +multitude of their restitutions, however, will be parts of the one +period, and of the one restitution of things to their pristine state, +which is effected by the soul that primarily participates of time. For +a more partial participation pertains to a less power; but a more total +to a greater power. Other souls, therefore, are not naturally adapted +to receive the whole temporal measure according to one life, because +they are allotted an order inferior to that of the soul which is first +measured by time.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCI.</p> + +<p>All divine souls have triple energies; some indeed as souls; but others +as receiving a divine intellect; and others as suspended from the Gods. +And they provide indeed for the whole of things as Gods; but they know +all things through an intellectual life; and they move bodies through a +self-moved hyparxis.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For because they psychically<a id="FNanchor_317" href="#Footnote_317" class="fnanchor">[317]</a> participate of the natures situated +above them, and are not simply souls, but divine souls, and are +established according to an order, in the psychical extent, analogous +to the Gods, they energize not only psychically, but also divinely, +being allotted a deified summit of their essence, and also because they +have an intellectual hypostasis, through which they are spread under +intellectual essences. Hence, they not only energize divinely, but also +intellectually; the former indeed according to <i>the one</i> which +they contain; but the latter through an energy established according to +intellect. A third energy, likewise, is present with them, according +to their own hyparxis, which is motive indeed of things naturally +alter-motive, but is vivific of such as possess an adventitious life. +For this is the proper employment of every soul; but<span class="pagenum" id="Page_435">[435]</span> such energies +as are intellectual and providential, they possess according to +participation.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCII.</p> + +<p>All souls attending upon, and always following the Gods, are inferior +to divine, but are expanded above partial souls.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For divine souls participating of intellect and deity, on which +account, they are at the same time both intellectual and divine, are +the leaders of other souls, just as the Gods also are the leaders +of all beings. But partial souls are deprived of a suspension from +intellect, in consequence of not being able to participate proximately +of an intellectual essence. For they would not fall from intellectual +energy, if they essentially participated of intellect, as has been +before demonstrated [in Prop. 184]. Hence, the souls which always +follow the Gods are of a middle condition; receiving indeed a perfect +intellect, and through this surpassing partial souls, yet not being +suspended from the divine unities. For the intellect which they +participate is not divine.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCIII.</p> + +<p>Of every psychical multitude, divine souls indeed being greater in +power than other souls, are contracted according to number. But those +that always follow divine souls have a middle order among all souls, +both in power and quantity. And partial souls indeed are inferior in +power to the others, but proceed into a greater number.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For divine souls are more allied to <i>the one</i>, on account of +their hyparxis being divine; but souls of a middle rank, through +the participation of intellect; and those of the last order, are +essentially dissimilar both to those of the middle, and those of the +first rank. Among perpetual natures, however, those that are nearer to +<i>the one</i>, are more single in number, and are more contracted in +multitude, than such as are more remote from it.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_436">[436]</span> But such as are more +remote from <i>the one</i>, are more multiplied. The powers, therefore, +of superior souls are greater, and have the same ratio to those of +souls in the second rank, which the divine has to the intellectual, and +the intellectual to the psychical peculiarity. Inferior souls also are +more in number. For that which is more remote from <i>the one</i>, is a +greater, and that which is nearer to it, is a less multitude.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCIV.</p> + +<p>Every divine soul is the leader of many souls that always follow the +Gods; and of a still greater number of such as sometimes receive this +order.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>[For if it is a divine soul] it is necessary that it should be allotted +an order [which is the leader or generator<a id="FNanchor_318" href="#Footnote_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a>] of all things, and +which has a primary rank among souls. For in all beings that which is +divine, is the leader of wholes. It is likewise requisite that every +divine soul should neither alone preside over such souls as perpetually +follow the Gods, nor over those alone that are sometimes their +attendants. For if any divine soul should alone preside over those +that sometimes follow the Gods, how can there be a contact between +these and a divine soul, since they are entirely different from it, +and neither proximately participate of intellect, nor much less of the +Gods. But if it only presides over those that always follow the Gods, +how is it that the series proceeds as far as to these [alone]? For +thus intellectual natures will be the last, and will be unprolific, +and unadapted to perfect and elevate. It is necessary, therefore, that +such souls as follow the Gods, and energize according to intellect, and +which are elevated to intellects more partial than divine intellects, +should be primarily suspended from a divine soul. But it is necessary +that partial souls, and which through those that are divine as media, +participate of intellect and a divine life, should be suspended from +a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_437">[437]</span> divine soul in the second place. For through those which always +participate of a more excellent condition, those that sometimes only +participate of it, are perfected. And again, it is necessary that +about every divine soul, there should be a greater number of those +that only sometimes follow, than of those that always attend on the +Gods. For the power of the monad always proceeds into multitude, +according to diminution; being deficient indeed in power, but redundant +in multitude. Since every soul also of those that always follow the +Gods, is the leader of a greater multitude of partial souls, imitating +in this a divine soul; and elevates a greater number of souls to the +primary monad of the whole series. Every divine soul, therefore, is the +leader of many souls that always follow the Gods, but presides over a +still greater number of those that sometimes only receive this order.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCV.</p> + +<p>Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is +essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one to the vehicle of the +other.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if the distribution of vehicles to souls is according to nature, +it is necessary that the vehicle of every partial soul should have +the same ratio to the vehicle of the soul which ranks as a whole, as +the essence of the one to the essence of the other. The distribution, +however, is according to nature. For things which primarily participate +are spontaneously conjoined with the natures which they participate. +If, therefore, as a divine soul is to a divine body, so is a partial +soul to a partial body, each soul essentially participating,—if +this be the case, that which was at first asserted is true, that the +vehicles of souls have the same ratio to each other, as the souls +themselves of which they are the vehicles.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCVI.</p> + +<p>Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into generation, and +to ascend from generation to real being.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_438">[438]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it sometimes follows the Gods, but sometimes falls from an +extension to a divine nature, and participates of intellect and +the privation of intellect, it is evident that it is alternatively +conversant with generation and the Gods. For since it is not for +an infinite time with the Gods, it will not for the whole of the +following time be conversant with bodies. For that which has not a +temporal beginning will never have an end; and that which never has an +end is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, therefore, that +every partial soul must make periods of ascents from, and of descents +into generation, and that this must be unceasing through an infinite +time. Every partial soul, therefore, is able to descend and ascend +infinitely. And this never ceases to be the case with all of them.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCVII.</p> + +<p>The vehicle of every partial soul, is fabricated by an immoveable cause.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it is perpetually and connascently suspended from the soul that +uses it,<a id="FNanchor_319" href="#Footnote_319" class="fnanchor">[319]</a> being immutable according to essence, it is allotted its +hypostasis from an immoveable cause. For every thing which is generated +from moveable causes, is essentially changed. Moreover, every soul has +a perpetual body, which primarily participates of it. Hence, the cause +of a partial soul, and therefore of its vehicle,<a id="FNanchor_320" href="#Footnote_320" class="fnanchor">[320]</a> is immoveable, +and on this account supermundane.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCVIII.</p> + +<p>The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essentially +indivisible and impassive.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_439">[439]</span></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it proceeds from an immoveable fabrication, and is perpetual, +it will have an immaterial and impassive hypostasis. For such things +as are adapted to suffer essentially, and to be changed, are all +of them material, and in consequence of subsisting differently at +different times, are suspended from moveable causes. Hence, likewise, +they receive an all-various mutation, being moved in conjunction with +their principal causes. Moreover, that this vehicle is indivisible, is +manifest. For every thing which is divided, so far as it is divided, +is corrupted, in consequence of departing from the whole, and from its +continuity. If, therefore, it is essentially immutable and impassive, +it will be indivisible.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCIX.</p> + +<p>The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of +more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an ablation +of every thing material, and a recurrence to its proper form, analogous +to the soul that uses it.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For this soul indeed descends irrationally, assuming irrational lives; +but it ascends laying aside all the generation-producing powers, with +which it was invested in its descent, and becoming [pure, returns to +the pristine condition of its nature. For the vehicle<a id="FNanchor_321" href="#Footnote_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a>] imitates +the lives of the souls that use it, and they being every where moved, +it is moved in conjunction with them. By its circulations likewise +it represents the intellections of some souls; but the falling of +others through their inclination to the realms of generation; and the +purifications of others, through the circumductions which lead to an +immaterial nature. For because it is vivified by the very essence of +souls,<a id="FNanchor_322" href="#Footnote_322" class="fnanchor">[322]</a> and is connascent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_440">[440]</span> with them, it is all-variously changed +in conjunction with their energies; follows them every where; becomes +co-passive with them; is restored to its pristine state together +with them when they are purified;<a id="FNanchor_323" href="#Footnote_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a> and is elevated when they are +elevated, and aspires after its own perfection. For every thing is +perfected when it obtains its proper perfection.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCX.</p> + +<p>Every connascent vehicle of the soul, always possesses both the same +figure and magnitude. But it is seen to be greater and less, and of a +dissimilar figure, through the additions and ablations of other bodies.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if it derives its essence from an immoveable cause, it is evident +that both its figure and its magnitude are defined by this cause, and +each is immutable and invariable. Moreover, at different times it +appears to be different, as likewise greater and less. Hence, through +other bodies added from the material elements, and again taken away, it +exhibits a different appearance both in quantity and form.</p> + + +<p class="center p2">PROPOSITION CCXI.</p> + +<p>Every partial soul descending into generation descends wholly; nor does +one part of it remain on high, and another part descend.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For if something pertaining to the soul remained on high in the +intelligible world, it will always perceive intellectually, without +transition or transitively. But if without transition, it will +be intellect, and not a part of the soul, and this partial soul +will proximately<a id="FNanchor_324" href="#Footnote_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a> participate of intellect. This, however, is +impossible. But if it perceives intellectually with transition,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_441">[441]</span> from +that which always [and from that which sometimes<a id="FNanchor_325" href="#Footnote_325" class="fnanchor">[325]</a>] energizes +intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, also is +impossible. For these always differ, as has been demonstrated. To which +may be added, the absurdity resulting from supposing that the summit +of the soul is always perfect, and yet does not rule over the other +powers, and cause them to be perfect. Every partial soul, therefore, +wholly descends.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_442">[442]</span></p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="center p4 xs">ON</p></div> + +<p class="center gesperrt p1"><b>PROVIDENCE AND FATE,</b></p> + +<p class="center xs p1">AND THAT</p> + +<p class="center sm p1"><i>WHICH IS IN OUR POWER</i>.</p> + +<p class="center xs p1">TO</p> + +<p class="center sm p1">THEODORUS, THE MECHANIST.</p> + +<hr class="r25"> + + +<p class="p2">1. I am of opinion, my friend Theodorus, that the conceptions of your +mind are mature, and adapted to a man who loves the contemplation of +beings; and I am gratified that you have thought fit to write to us +on these subjects, though there are many among you that are able to +investigate and doubt with you about such like problems. But it is +requisite, as it seems, that we also should adduce<a id="FNanchor_326" href="#Footnote_326" class="fnanchor">[326]</a> what appears +to us to be the truth on the subjects which you have proposed for our +discussion, and what we conceive to accord with things themselves, +and with the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_443">[443]</span> opinions of the most celebrated of the philosophers +prior to us; and that we should not in vain hear the inquiries of a +man eminently skilled in mechanics, who was formerly known to us, +as I conceive, and as you have asserted. You inquire however, about +things which have been a thousand times investigated, and which in my +opinion will never have any rest, because the soul is excited to the +discussion of them, much light having been already thrown on them by +the elaborate writings of Plotinus and Iamblichus, and prior to these +by the divine Plato; and if it be not too much to say, such particulars +respecting them have been proclaimed by the divinely-inspired mouth +of theologists, as Plato alone has unfolded by demonstrations. And +why is it requisite to adduce to you Plato, and men who were divinely +wise, since they have been most luminously developed<a id="FNanchor_327" href="#Footnote_327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a> by the Gods +themselves, who transcendently know what pertains to themselves, +and what they have produced, and have not been delivered by them in +enigmas, as by theologists. It is requisite therefore, that we also +writing conformably to them, should as I have said adduce to you what +appears to us to be the truth respecting the subjects of your inquiry.</p> + + +<p class="p2">2. You deserve indulgence if looking to the all-various tragic and +comic, and other connexions of human affairs, you have conceived that +there is only one fabricator and maker of such colligations in the +universe, and have called this Fate; or rather you have denominated +it the series and consequent generation of things; have thought that +such a dramatic scene is alone directed by some inevitable necessity; +and have celebrated this as providence, and asserted that it alone +possesses freedom of will, and is the lord of all things. But you have +conceived that the freedom of will of the human soul is only a name, +and is truly nothing, since she has an arrangement in the world, is +subservient to the energies of other things, and is a part of the +mundane fabric. Or rather, that I may use your own words, the human +soul is a machine, since there is an irrefragable cause which moves all +things that the world comprehends in itself. But<span class="pagenum" id="Page_444">[444]</span> the universe being as +it were one machine, the whole spheres are complicated in each other +analogously to certain drums, but the partial animals and souls that +are moved by them, and in short, all things, depend on one mover. And +perhaps in consequence of honouring your art, you have conceived that +the maker of the universe is a certain mechanic, and that you are an +imitator of the best of causes. These things however we have written, +mingling the jocose with the serious.</p> + + +<p class="p2">3. Betaking ourselves therefore to the contest, we say, that the +difference of these three things ought especially to be considered +by you, if you intend to arrive at the gate of the subjects of +investigation. And of these, the first indeed is, that Providence and +Fate do not differ in the way in which you conceive they do, viz. that +the one is a connected consequence, but the other is necessity, the +cause of this consequence. For both indeed are the causes of the world, +and of whatever is produced in the world, but Providence subsists prior +to Fate; and all that is produced according to Fate, is by a much +greater priority produced by Providence, but the contrary is not true; +for in short,<a id="FNanchor_328" href="#Footnote_328" class="fnanchor">[328]</a> the natures which are governed by Providence are +more divine than those which are governed by Fate. The second thing +is this, that the soul which is separable from the body, and which +descends into this mortal abode from the Gods, is different from the +soul which is in bodies, and which subsists in, and is inseparable from +its subjects; and that the latter essentially depends on Fate, but the +former on Providence. The third particular is, that the science and +truth which are inherent in souls conversant with generation, though +they may lead an immaculate life, are different from the science and +truth in souls that have fled from this abode, and are established in +that place whence they first fell, and descended into the realms of +mortality. Of these three particulars therefore, as we have said, if +you can discover sufficient solutions, you will obtain a satisfactory +answer to your inquiries. For Providence indeed, differing in the +above mentioned manner from Fate, it will be evident that many things +escape<span class="pagenum" id="Page_445">[445]</span> Fate, but that nothing escapes Providence; that Providence +supernally governs Fate, produces it, and has limited its empire<a id="FNanchor_329" href="#Footnote_329" class="fnanchor">[329]</a> +by alter-motive natures, viz. by things which are allotted their first +subsistence in beings that are moved by something else. But again, +having shown that the soul which is separable from bodies, is different +from that which is planted in bodies, it will be manifest to you which +of these two possesses freedom of will, and that which is in our power; +which is subservient to necessity, and is under the dominion of Fate; +and where the complication of these is to be found, on account of which +the one dulls the freedom of the will through a subordinate life, but +the other participates of a certain image of election, in consequence +of its greater proximity to a more excellent nature.<a id="FNanchor_330" href="#Footnote_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a> And science +appearing to you to be twofold, it will be evident after what manner +both Plato and Socrates, and to these also may be added the great +Parmenides, assert, that the soul while here is capable of knowing +truth, when it is purified from material darkness, and the passions +introduced into it by the body, and its commixture with corporeal +natures, but that it is allotted science in a greater degree, and in a +mote genuine mode, when it exists beyond bodies, and generation, and +bitter matter.</p> + + +<p class="p2">4. These three problems therefore, being necessary and having been well +discussed<a id="FNanchor_331" href="#Footnote_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a> by the ancients, partly by Iamblichus, in his copious +and elaborate treatises On Providence and Fate, and partly by all the +lovers of Plato, who proclaim that the soul is twofold, by Plotinus +likewise in many places, and also by Porphyry, who make a distinction +between contemplation, and contemplative virtue, and in short, by all +who are able to understand Plato,—this being the case, it is necessary +that beginning from the first thing proposed, we should discover the +difference between Providence and Fate. “But in every thing, says +Plato, it is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_446">[446]</span> requisite to know the one principle of that which is the +subject of speculation, or we must err in every thing.” It is necessary +however, as the dæmoniacal Aristotle teaches, after inquiring <i>if +a thing is</i>, to investigate in the next place <i>what it is</i>. +If therefore, you inquired whether Providence is, or is not, and in +a similar manner concerning Fate, it would be requisite in the first +place to show you <i>that</i> each of them is,<a id="FNanchor_332" href="#Footnote_332" class="fnanchor">[332]</a> and if you still +doubted, I should be unwilling after this to answer your doubts, but +since you acknowledge that both of them have a subsistence, and that +all things are comprehended in their dominion, it evidently remains, I +conceive, that I should demonstrate to you <i>what</i> each of them is; +for from this it will be evident what it is in which they differ. And +this being known, many of your doubts, as we have said, will be solved. +But again, because to the discovery of <i>what a thing is</i>, the +dividing method is said to contribute, which Socrates in the Philebus +celebrates as the gift of the Gods to men, and because what are called +our common conceptions contribute to the discovery of principles, from +which conceptions it is possible, as Aristotle writes, to investigate +many things that are demonstrable,—hence it is requisite that we +also employing both these, should unfold Providence and Fate; so far +as pertains to what we say they are, using common conceptions, but so +far as pertains to other things, employing distinctly the divisions of +beings, from which, as it appears to me, we can alone discover what +the definitions are of Providence and Fate. But these being known will +enkindle a clear light in the subjects of investigation, and will +perhaps free us from the doubts by which we are at present detained.</p> + + +<p class="p2">5. The common conceptions therefore of all men, and which possess +indubitable evidence, assert, that Providence is indeed the cause +of good to those beings for which it provides, and that Fate is +also a cause, but the cause of a certain connexion and consequence +to those things that are generated. For that all of us have these +irrefragable conceptions about Providence and Fate, is evident from +our asserting that men who<span class="pagenum" id="Page_447">[447]</span> are the procurers of good to others, have +<i>well</i> provided for the subjects of their beneficence; and again, +we denominate that which is evolved through many causes complicated +with each other and unknown to us, no otherwise than <i>Fate</i>. Our +life also is full of these names, because names testify the truth of +these conceptions. For the word Providence (προνοια) indicates<a id="FNanchor_333" href="#Footnote_333" class="fnanchor">[333]</a> +that energy which is prior to intellect, and which it is necessary +to attribute to <i>the good</i> alone; for this alone is more divine +than intellect, because much-honoured intellect desires good, together +with all things and prior to all things. But the word Fate (ειμαρμενη) +indicates <i>that which connects all things that are naturally adapted +to have such a connexion</i>. Moreover, that the thing which is +provided for is not the imparting, nor that which is connected, Fate, +nor that which proceeds into this, connexion, but that which connects, +you may assume from this, that all of us conceive Providence and Fate +to be certain productive powers. But every where effective causes are +distinct from their effects: and these three things differ from each +other, viz. that which makes, that which is made, and the energy of +making.<a id="FNanchor_334" href="#Footnote_334" class="fnanchor">[334]</a> Just as in what pertains to Providence and Fate there are, +that which provides, that which is provided for, and the effective +energy which proceeds from the providing cause into that which is +provided for: and again, there are, that which connects, that which +is connected, and the effective energy proceeding from the connecting +cause into the thing connected. And it is evident that according to +each of these triads, that which makes is not such as that which is +made, but if the latter is various, it is necessary that the former +should be simple, and that if the participant of good is the thing +made, the maker should be imparticipable. For every where that which +makes is allotted a part more divine than that which is made. When we +say therefore, that Providence is the cause of good, we must also say +that it is the fountain of good, which does not require to be benefited +by other things. And admitting Fate to be the cause of connexion, +we must not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_448">[448]</span> say that it is itself connected by other things. Such +therefore, being the common conceptions which we antecedently assume of +these two, it remains in the next place that we should consider what it +is in which each of them excels [and by which each is characterized]: +and first, in what the characteristic of Fate consists.</p> + + +<p class="p2">6. From these conceptions therefore, we infer that Fate is the cause +of things that are connected. But let us consider what the things are +that are connected. Of beings therefore, some have their essence in +eternity, but others in time. By beings however, whose essence is in +eternity, I mean those whose energy<a id="FNanchor_335" href="#Footnote_335" class="fnanchor">[335]</a> together with their essence +is eternal: but by beings whose essence is in time, I mean those whose +essence <i>is</i> not, but is always in generation, or rising into +existence, though it should be in generation for an infinite time. And +the natures that subsist between these, are such as have their essence +indeed permanent, and better than generation, but their energy measured +by time. For it is necessary that every progression from things first +to last should be effected through media. Since therefore, there are +beings which are eternal both in essence and energy, it is necessary +that there should be a middle extent, and that it should either have +an eternal essence, but an energy indigent of time, or the contrary. +The contrary however is impossible, that we may not confess that we +place energies prior to essences. Hence it remains that the medium must +be that which has an eternal essence, but a temporal energy. We say +therefore, that we have exhibited to you these three orders of beings, +the intellectual, the psychical,<a id="FNanchor_336" href="#Footnote_336" class="fnanchor">[336]</a> and the corporeal. But I call +the intellectual that which exists and is intellective through all +eternity; the corporeal, that which is always rising into existence, +or becoming to be, either in an infinite time, or in a part of time; +and the psychical, that which is eternal indeed in essence, but which +employs temporal energies. Where then, must the things which are +connected be arranged? Consider assuming from the Gods the meaning<span class="pagenum" id="Page_449">[449]</span> +of the term ειρεσθαι <i>to be connected</i>, as implying nothing else +than this, that the natures which are differently produced according +to time, are conjoined with, and not separated from each other. And +if existing at one and the same time they are distant from each other +according to place, yet they have a certain co-ordination with each +other. Hence being separated either by places or times, they are in a +certain respect collected into unity, and into one sympathy, through +connexion. And in short,<a id="FNanchor_337" href="#Footnote_337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a> the things which are connected, cannot +suffer this from themselves, but require something else which may +impart to them connexion. If therefore the natures which are arranged +under Fate, are such as are connected with each other, according to +our common conception of Fate; but the things which are connected are +partible, being distant either in places or times, and are naturally +adapted to be connected by something else, on account of the opinion +of connexion which prevails among all men; and these are moved by +something else, and are corporeal; for of the natures which are beyond +bodies, some [i.e. intellects] are better both than place and time, but +others [viz. souls] though they energize according to time, appear to +be pure from place;—if this be the case, it is evident that the things +which are governed and connected by Fate, are moved by something else, +and are entirely corporeal.</p> + + +<p class="p2">7. If however this is demonstrated, it is evident that admitting Fate +to be the cause of connexion, we must also admit that it presides +over alter-motive and corporeal natures. But assuming this, we will +ask ourselves what that is which is said to be the cause of bodies, +which is proximate to them, and by which things alter-motive are +inspired<a id="FNanchor_338" href="#Footnote_338" class="fnanchor">[338]</a> and contained, and accomplish whatever they are able +to effect. And if you are willing, looking in the first place to our +bodies, let us consider what it is that moves and nourishes, and always +reweaves, and binds them together? Is not this that which is innate in +bodies, which also in other animals<span class="pagenum" id="Page_450">[450]</span> exhibits a similar energy,<a id="FNanchor_339" href="#Footnote_339" class="fnanchor">[339]</a> +which extends as far as to things that are rooted in the earth, and +possesses a twofold energy, <i>this</i> indeed renovating bodies that +they may not by discerption entirely vanish, but <i>that</i> preserving +the several individuals in a condition conformable to nature? For it +is not the same thing to add what is deficient, and to preserve the +power of things that are held together. If therefore, not only in us, +and other animals and plants, but in this universe also<a id="FNanchor_340" href="#Footnote_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a> much prior +to bodies, there is one nature of the world, which is connective and +motive of the subsistence of bodies, as it is also in us, or why do +we call all bodies the progeny of nature, it is indeed necessary that +nature should be the cause of things that are connected, and that in +this what is called Fate should be investigated. And on this account +perhaps the dæmoniacal Aristotle also is accustomed to call those +augmentations or generations which are effected beside the accustomed +time, <i>deviations from Fate</i>. And the divine Plato says, “that the +world considered by itself, without the intellectual Gods, is convolved +as being corporeal by Fate, and innate desire.” The oracles of the Gods +also accord with these and bear witness to our demonstrations when they +say: “Look not upon Nature, for the name of it is fatal.” And thus we +have discovered what Fate is, and how it is the nature of this world, +and a certain incorporeal essence. For it presides over and is the life +of bodies, and this essentially, since it internally moves bodies, +and not externally, moves all things according to time, and connects +the motions of all things that are distant both in times and places; +according to which also, mortal are adapted to the participation of +eternal natures, are convolved together with them, and these are +mutually co-passive. For the nature which is in us, binds and connects +all the parts of our body, and their operations on each other: and +this also is a certain Fate of our body. As in our body likewise, some +parts are more, but others are less principal, and the latter follow +the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less principal +follow the motions of the more principal parts, viz. the sublunary +generations follow the periods of the celestial orbs, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_451">[451]</span> the circle +of the former is an image of the circle of the latter. And these things +which have been divulged by all the ancients, I am unwilling to prolong.</p> + + +<p class="p2">8. It is not therefore, difficult for you to see what Providence +is. For if you assert that the fountain of good is primarily the +divine cause itself, you will speak rightly. For whence, except from +divinity, is good imparted to all things? So that as Plato says, “no +other cause of good than God, is to be admitted.” In the next place, +Providence being established above both intelligibles and sensibles, +is superior to Fate. And those things which are under Fate, are also +under Providence, possessing indeed, their connexion from Fate, but +their participation of good from Providence, so that the connexion may +have a good end, and that Providence may contain the end of Fate in +itself. But again, with respect to things that are under Providence, +all of them are not likewise indigent of Fate, but intellectual natures +are exempt from it. For the empire of Fate is entirely in corporeal +natures;<a id="FNanchor_341" href="#Footnote_341" class="fnanchor">[341]</a> since to be connected introduces time, and corporeal +motion. To these things also, as it appears to me, Plato looking, +says that a subsistence of this kind, is mingled from intellect and +necessity, intellect ruling<a id="FNanchor_342" href="#Footnote_342" class="fnanchor">[342]</a> over the necessity of bodies. And in +this place, he calls the motive cause necessity, which he elsewhere +denominates Fate, conceiving that bodies act by compulsion. And this +rightly. For every body is compelled both to do whatever it does, and +to suffer whatever it suffers, to heat, or to be heated, to impart +or to receive cold. But choice is not in bodies, because you may say +that their peculiarity is the necessary and an existence unaccompanied +with choice. For if this were not the case, what could there be that +is better than bodies? For the body which is moved in a circle, and +which is of an illustrious nature, is thus moved from necessity, in +the same manner as fire is from necessity moved to the circumference, +but earth to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_452">[452]</span> middle [of the universe]. Plato therefore asserts +that necessity presides over the generations of bodies, and on this +account, over their corruptions also; but he exalts intellect, and +determines that it rules over necessity. If therefore Providence is +above intellect, it is evident that it rules over intellect, and those +things which are under this necessity; and that necessity alone rules +over those things which are under its dominion. Hence, every thing +indeed which has an intellectual subsistence, continues to exist under +Providence alone, but every thing which has a corporeal subsistence, +endures under necessity.</p> + + +<p class="p2">9. You must understand therefore, that there are two genera of things, +the one intellectual, but the other sensible, and also that there are +two kingdoms of these, the kingdom of Providence indeed above, which +reigns over both intellectuals and sensibles, and the kingdom of Fate +beneath, which has dominion over sensibles alone. And Providence +differs from Fate, in the same way in which a God differs from that +which is divine indeed, but by participation and not primarily. For in +other things also, as you may see, one thing has a primary subsistence, +and another is according to participation. Thus for instance, there is +light in the sun,<a id="FNanchor_343" href="#Footnote_343" class="fnanchor">[343]</a> and light in the air, but the former subsists +primarily, and the latter subsists on account of the former. And life +is primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body, and subsists +on account of the life of the soul. Thus also, Providence indeed, +is essentially deity, but Fate is something divine, and not deity, +for it depends on Providence, and is as it were its image. For if as +Providence is to intellectual, so is Fate to sensible beings; since +the former reigns over intellectuals, but the latter over sensibles; +then alternately, as geometricians say, as Providence is to Fate, so +are intellectuals to sensibles. But intellectuals are primarily beings, +and sensibles derive their subsistence from them. Hence Providence +is primarily that which it is, and from this the order of Fate is +suspended. But of these things enough.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_453">[453]</span></p> + + +<p class="p2">10. If you are willing, however, we will betake ourselves to the second +discussion, viz. the consideration of the soul which is separable, and +of that which is inseparable from bodies. But assume this also from +the philosophy of Aristotle. For he says, that every soul which has an +energy not at all indigent of body, is likewise allotted an essence +beyond and separable from body. And this necessarily. For if we should +arrange energy as existing independent of body, but essence inseparable +from body, energy would be better than essence, since it would not +be at all indigent of a subordinate essence, that being rooted in +it, it might have a subsistence according to nature. This however is +impossible. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul which has an +energy separable from body, should also be itself separable. Consider +then, my friend, what soul it is in us, which we acknowledge is not at +all indigent of body, in the energies of itself according to nature? +Is it sense? But every sensitive power uses corporeal instruments, +and together with them energizes about its proper sensibles; viz. it +uses the eyes, the ears, and all the other senses, being at the same +time moved and co-passive with them. What then shall we say of anger +and desire? But do you not see that these frequently co-operate with +the corporeal parts, with the heart and the liver, and that these +also are not pure from body? For how is it possible that things which +energize with sense, should not also be indigent of body, since sense +is always moved through body? But with respect to the orectic powers, +that these energize with sense, is I conceive known to all of us. For +what deprived of sense, can either be angry, or desire? Plotinus also +rightly asserting, that all the passions are either senses, or are not +without sense. If, therefore, that which is angry is so in conjunction +with sense, possessing at the same time a sense of sorrow, and that +which desires possesses a sense of delight; but that which energizes +with sense energizes with body, for sense subsists with body;—if +this be the case, it is necessary that every thing which is angry and +desires, should energize with body. Hence, these species of life, being +all of them irrational, have that energy which is according to nature +in conjunction with body.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_454">[454]</span></p> + + +<p class="p2">11. Looking now, however, to the rational nature itself, consider the +life of it which is seated in the inferior lives, and corrects either +what is deficient in them according to knowledge, as when from above +it evinces that sense is deceived about its own objects of knowledge. +I mean for instance, when it shows that sense is deceived in asserting +that the sun is but a foot in diameter, or when sense with its usual +deception asserts of such things any thing of a similar nature: or when +reason disciplines anger,<a id="FNanchor_344" href="#Footnote_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a> which is immoderate in its motions, when +it is agitated with fury. Hence Ulysses in Homer exclaims “endure, my +heart,” and represses the impulse of anger barking like a dog: or when +the rational nature represses the wantonness of desire, and frustrates +its endeavours to detain the soul by the delights that germinate +from the body, the petulance of these delights being ameliorated by +the corporeal temperaments. For in all such energies the rational +soul evidently represses all the irrational motions both gnostic and +orectic, and liberates itself from them, as from things foreign to its +nature. It is necessary, however, to investigate the nature of every +thing, not from the perverted use of it, but from its natural energies. +Hence, if reason, when it is moved in us as reason, restrains the +shadowy impression of the delights of desire, punishes the precipitate +motion of anger, and reproves sense as full of deception, asserting +that we neither hear nor see any thing accurately,<a id="FNanchor_345" href="#Footnote_345" class="fnanchor">[345]</a> and if it +asserts these things looking to its internal reasons, none of which +it knows through body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident +that according to this energy it elongates itself from the senses, +contrary to the decision of which it is separated from those sorrows +and delights.</p> + + +<p class="p2">12. After this, however, I see another and a better energy of our +rational soul, the inferior powers being now at rest, and exhibiting +no tumult, as in many things they are accustomed to do, according to +which energy she is converted to herself, sees her own essence and the +powers<a id="FNanchor_346" href="#Footnote_346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_455">[455]</span> she contains, the harmonic ratios of which she consists, +and the many lives of which she is the completion, and re-discovers +herself to be a rational world, the image indeed of the natures prior +to herself, and from which she has departed, but the paradigm of the +natures posterior to herself, and over which she presides. To this +energy of the soul, my friend, arithmetic, and geometry, the mother of +your art, are said to contribute much,<a id="FNanchor_347" href="#Footnote_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a> which indeed elongate the +soul from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms +of life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal +comprehension of forms, extending as it were, the lustrations to +the future mystics that are anterior to the most sacred mysteries. +For consider from intellectual energies after what manner the +above-mentioned sciences are allotted the purifying power of which we +have been speaking. For if they assume the soul replete with images, +and knowing nothing subtile, and unattended with material garrulity, +and if they cause reasons to shine forth which possess an irrefragable +necessity of demonstration, and forms full of all certainty and +immateriality, and by no means calling to their assistance the +grossness which is in sensibles, do they not evidently purify our +intellectual life from those things that fill us with folly, and which +are unadapted to the divine circumscription of beings?</p> + + +<p class="p2">13. After both these energies of the rational soul, let us survey her +now running back to her highest intelligence, through which she sees +her sister souls in the world, which are allotted the heavens and the +whole of generation according to the will of the father, and of which +she being a part, desires the contemplation of them. But she sees above +all souls, intellectual essences and orders. For above every soul a +deiform intellect resides, which imparts to the soul an intellectual +habit. She also sees prior to these, the monads of the Gods themselves +which are above intellect, and from which the intellectual multitudes +receive their unions. For it is necessary that unific causes should +be placed above things united, in the same manner as vivifying causes +are above things vivified,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_456">[456]</span> causes that impart intellect are above +things intellectualized, and in a similar manner imparticipable +hypostases are above all participants. For according to all these +elevating intellections, I conceive it is evident to those that are +not perfectly blind, how the rational soul leaving sense and bodies +behind, is led upward by intellectual surveys about the inflected and +truly mystic intuitions of the supermundane Gods. Or whence, and from +what kind of energies have the progeny of the Gods unfolded to us the +occult dispensations of divinity? And after what manner are souls +said to energize enthusiastically, and assuming a mania better than +temperance<a id="FNanchor_348" href="#Footnote_348" class="fnanchor">[348]</a> to be conjoined to the Gods themselves? I speak of the +Sibyl who soon after she was born uttered admirable things, and told +those who were present at the time who she was, and from what order she +came into this terrestrial abode, and I allude to any other soul who in +a similar manner was of a divine destiny.<a id="FNanchor_349" href="#Footnote_349" class="fnanchor">[349]</a></p> + + +<p class="p2">14. In short, we must say that the rational and intellectual soul in +whatever way it may energize, is beyond body and sense; and therefore +it is necessary that it should have an essence separable from both +these. This however though of itself now evident, I will again manifest +from hence, that when it energizes according to nature, it is superior +to the influence of Fate, but that when it falls into sense, and +becomes irrational and corporeal, it follows the natures that are +beneath it, and living with them as with intoxicated neighbours, is +held in subjection by a cause that has dominion over things that are +different from the rational essence.<a id="FNanchor_350" href="#Footnote_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a> For again, it is necessary +that there should be a certain genus of beings of this kind, which +according to essence indeed is above Fate, but according to habitude +is sometimes arranged under it. For if indeed the beings which are +wholly eternal are placed above the laws of Fate, but there are beings +which according to the whole of their life, are arranged under the +periods of Fate, it will also be necessary that there should be an +intermediate nature between these two, which sometimes<span class="pagenum" id="Page_457">[457]</span> indeed is above +the productions of Fate, and sometimes is under its dominion. For the +progression of beings much more than the situation of bodies, leaves +no vacuum; but there are every where media between the extremes, which +also bind the extremes to each other. And not only Plato, but likewise +the oracles of the Gods have revealed these things to us. For in the +first place indeed, they order those divine men who were thought worthy +to be the auditors of those mystic discourses, “<i>not to look upon +nature, because the name of it is fatal</i>.” And again, they order +them “<i>not to co-augment Fate</i>.” Every where also, they exhort +them to turn from the life which is according to Fate, and to avoid +“<i>becoming corporeal with the fatal herds</i>;” by all which they +withdraw us from the senses and material desires; for through these we +become corporeal, and are then acted upon from necessity by Fate. For +similitude every where copulates<a id="FNanchor_351" href="#Footnote_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a> beings to each other; but that +which is assimilated enjoys the same polity as that to which it is +assimilated, whatever it may be, and consequently is under the dominion +of the ruler of that polity. For nothing is without a ruler and a +principality in the universe, whether you speak of wholes, or of parts. +But different things have different rulers, because these live in one +way, and those in another. Afterwards, the oracles teaching concerning +our most divine life, and that immaculate polity, which we enjoy when +liberated from every polity of Fate, say, “<i>The souls that become +venerable by understanding the works of the father will escape the +fatal wing<a id="FNanchor_352" href="#Footnote_352" class="fnanchor">[352]</a> of Destiny</i>.”</p> + + +<p class="p2">15. The soul, therefore, embracing this life, and such a life as this, +will not rank among those souls that are led by Fate. But if it wishes +to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_458">[458]</span> conform itself to body, aspires after what are called corporeal +goods, and pursues honours, power and riches, it suffers the same thing +as a philosopher who is chained, and in this condition enters a ship. +For he becomes subservient to the winds that move the ship, [and cannot +help himself] if some one of the sailors should trample on him, or some +fettered slave should insult him. Bidding farewell, therefore, to the +things to which we are bound, we should direct our attention to the +strength of virtue, and consider Fate not as effecting any thing in us, +but in the things which surround us. For with respect, my friend, to +all external circumstances that may befal us, enemies may demolish the +walls of our city, and reduce its buildings to ashes, they may deprive +us of our possessions, and leave us in a state of indigence; but all +these being mortal and external, are in consequence of this in the +power of other beings, and not in ours. But with respect to the things +which are in our power, there is no one so potent as to be able to take +away any one of them, even though he should possess all human power. +For if we are temperate, we shall still continue to be so, though these +calamities may befal us, and if we are contemplators of true beings, +neither shall we be plundered of this habit; but all these dreadful +events taking place, we shall still persevere in celebrating the rulers +of all things, and in investigating the causes of effects.</p> + + +<p class="p2">16. By no means, therefore, must we reprobate the necessity of the +soul from its ultimate energies, but looking to its first energies, +we should admire its unconquerable power. And if we are thus wise, +nothing will disturb us pertaining to the passions of the inferior +parts of the soul; but when the body is disturbed, and we say that +we sustain something of a dreadful nature, it is not we who thus +speak, but it is the language of desire;<a id="FNanchor_353" href="#Footnote_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a> for the delights of the +body, and therefore its sorrows pertain to this part. When also being +robbed of our wealth, or not obtaining riches, we are grieved, this +passion belongs to that power of the soul which is a lover of wealth. +And again, when being reproached, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_459">[459]</span> falling from power, we are +indignant, this is not the passion of the superior soul, but of that +which dwells downward, about the heart. For this pertains to the part +which is a lover of honour. But the reason which is in us, being in all +such particulars deceived, follows and is at the same time disturbed +with the subordinate powers of the soul, being a blind intellect, and +not having that eye<a id="FNanchor_354" href="#Footnote_354" class="fnanchor">[354]</a> yet purified, by which it is able to perceive +itself, and the natures prior and posterior to itself. When, however, +it becomes purified from those things with which it was invested when +it fell, it will then know what that is which is in its power, how it +is neither in corporeal natures; for these are posterior to reason; +nor in those beings in whom there is the liberty of divine will; for +they are prior to reason; but that it consists in living according to +virtue. For this alone is free and unservile, and adapted to liberty, +and is truly the power of the soul, and confers power on its possessor. +For it is the province of all power to contain and preserve that which +possesses it.</p> + + +<p class="p2">17. But he who directs his attention to vice, looks at the debility +of the soul, though she should possess all other power. For the power +of instruments is one thing, and the power of those beings that ought +to use the instruments another. Hence, every soul, so far as it +participates of virtue, and so far as it is [a rational soul], is free; +but so far as it is vicious and debilitated, and is not [rational], +it is subservient to other things,<a id="FNanchor_355" href="#Footnote_355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a> and not to Fate only, but to +every thing, in short, that is either willing to give that which is +appetible, or is able to take it away. For he who possesses virtue +is subservient to those beings who are alone sufficient to impart to +and co-augment with him that which is desirable; but these are the +Gods, with whom there is true virtue, and from whom that which is in +our power is derived. Plato also somewhere says, that this voluntary +servitude<span class="pagenum" id="Page_460">[460]</span> is the greatest liberty. For by being subservient to those +who possess all the power of all things, we become assimilated to +them, so that, as he says, we govern the whole world; i.e. when we are +perfect and winged, and reign on high. This, therefore, pertains to +the most divine of our souls, just as it pertains to the last of them, +to be as it were bound in prison, and to live an involuntary, instead +of a voluntary free life. But to the souls that have an intermediate +subsistence between these, it belongs, so far as they are liberated +from passions and the body, to ascend above necessity to a life which +has dominion over generation.</p> + + +<p class="p2">18. For again, if intellect and deity are prior to soul, but passions +and bodies are posterior to it; and if to these it belongs to act from +compulsion, but to intellect and deity, to act in a manner better than +all necessity, and which is alone free, it is necessary that the soul +betaking itself either to the former or to the latter, should either +enter under the necessity of subordinate, or exert the liberty of +more excellent natures; and that it should be subservient either to a +supernal dominion, or to a dominion inferior to itself.<a id="FNanchor_356" href="#Footnote_356" class="fnanchor">[356]</a> But if it +is subservient, it must either rule in conjunction with the powers that +rule over it, or be alone subservient in conjunction with subservient +natures. Here, therefore, the soul ascending and resuming its power, +which is virtue, will consider nothing as dreadful whatever it may be, +that takes place about and external to the body. For the passions of +instruments do not pass to those that use them; but in whatever manner +they may subsist, it is possible for the soul to energize according to +virtue; strenuously indeed, if the body should happen to be languid, +but moderately when it is sane. And when poverty is present, it may +energize sublimely, but in affluence magnificently; but every where +from occurring circumstances, it may extol virtue that uses them; +and being ameliorated by its inward strength may vanquish external +calamities. For you must not suppose that you mechanists alone, are to +be permitted to say, that you can move a given<span class="pagenum" id="Page_461">[461]</span> weight with a given +power; for this you are well known to assert; but it is much more +possible for those who live according to virtue, truly to adorn a power +given from every circumstance by another power. And he who does this is +generous and free; but the bad man is the slave of all things though he +should rule over all things. For he resembles those who are punished in +Egypt, by laughing vizards that surround them. Over these also, who are +not able to govern themselves, necessity prevails. For being elongated +from the Gods, the universe uses them as brutes.</p> + + +<p class="p2">19. When, therefore, you wish to see that which is in our power, look +at the soul living according to nature. But the soul which is not +debile lives according to nature. For there is nothing debile in that +which is conformable to nature. The soul, however, is not debile, which +is not replete with vice, [the evil of the soul]; for in all things +evil is debile. And if you consider the soul in this point of view, you +will see what the nature is of that which is in our power. For you will +see that it uses all circumstances rightly, and either prohibits them +from taking place, or providentially attends to calamitous events when +they occur. It also permits Fate to act upon those things which are +posterior to Fate, and of which it is the lord; but is co-ordinated to +the natures prior to itself, and from which being more excellent than +itself, it is not divulsed. And thus much for the second particular +which we proposed to discuss.</p> + + +<p class="p2">20. In the third place, we will show what, and of what kind the modes +of knowledge are; for if we suffer these to remain indistinct, we +shall ignorantly err both about things themselves, and the doctrines +of the divine Plato. Let us then direct our attention to that mode of +knowledge divulged by Aristotle, and also Plato, which without the +assignation of cause alone knows the truth of the οτι; or <i>that a +thing is</i>;<a id="FNanchor_357" href="#Footnote_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> because to souls beginning to be purified, these +philosophers attribute opinion as the first mode of knowledge, and as +adapted to those who are instructed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_462">[462]</span> in practical affairs,<a id="FNanchor_358" href="#Footnote_358" class="fnanchor">[358]</a> without +engaging in the contemplation of beings. For erudition is a purgation +of the immoderation of the passions, reason in this case being +co-passive indeed, but moderately, and casting off all the rope of the +passions.</p> + + +<p class="p2">21. Such then being this mode of knowledge, another mode of an +elevating nature is delivered to us from the same Gymnasium. But this +knowledge is said to proceed from principles indeed as hypotheses, to +know causes, and to form necessary conclusions in all its reasonings. +And such is the knowledge obtained through arithmetic and geometry, +which syllogize, conclude from things necessary, and are alone placed +above doxastic knowledge. Because, however these sciences abiding in +their principles, do not ascend to the causes of these, on this account +they show themselves to fall short of the most perfect knowledge. +For as Aristotle says, “it is not the business of a geometrician to +discourse with him who subverts the principles of his science.” Hence, +in these sciences, that which is deduced from principles acknowledged +by them will be manifest; but that which pertains to the principles +themselves is obscure and unknown.</p> + + +<p class="p2">22. In the third place, ascending higher, conceive me to speak of +that knowledge of the human soul which ascends as far as to <i>the +one</i>, and to that which is unhypothetical, through all forms or +ideas, as I may say, dividing some, but analyzing others, and producing +many things from one, and one thing from many. Socrates, in the +Republic, defines this knowledge to be the defensive inclosure of the +mathematical sciences, and the guest in the Epinomis asserts it to +be the bond of them. For from this, geometry, and each of the other +sciences, assume the theory concerning their principles, adapting<a id="FNanchor_359" href="#Footnote_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a> +to themselves many principles, and which are divided or separated from +the one principle of all things. For what <i>the one</i> is in all +beings, that a point is in geometry, the monad in arithmetic,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_463">[463]</span> and +in every thing, that which is most simple; from which principles the +several sciences producing those things which are under them, frame +their demonstrations. Each of these, however, is said to be, and is, a +certain principle. For the principle of all beings is simply principle, +and the highest ascent of the sciences, is as far as to this.</p> + + +<p class="p2">23. There still remains for you to understand a fourth mode of our +knowledge, which is more simple than the preceding, because it does +not employ methods, or analyses, or compositions, or definitions, +or demonstrations; but those who are able to energize according to +it, celebrate it as contemplating beings by simple, and as it were +self-visive projections; and they add, that they venerate it as +intellect, and not as science. Or have you not heard that Aristotle +in his demonstrative treatises says, that the intellect which is in +us is our most excellent part, and is that by which we know terms or +boundaries; and that Plato in the Timæus asserts that intellect and +science are the knowledges of the soul about beings? For science indeed +appears to pertain to the soul, so far as the soul is knowledge; but +intellect pertains to it so far as the soul is the image of true and +real intellect. For intellect perceiving intellectuals, or rather being +one with them, Plato says, that it understands them by projecting +energies, by intuition and contact, understanding itself, and beholding +intelligibles in itself, on which account it intellectually sees what +it is, and knows that it is at one and the same time both the perceiver +and the thing perceived. The soul, therefore, imitating this as much as +she is able, becomes herself intellect, running above science, leaving +the many methods with which she was before adorned, elevating her eye +to beings alone, and understanding them by contact in the same manner +as intellect; from which she differs in this, that she comes into +contact with different intelligibles at different times, but intellect +passes into contact with all things at once.</p> + + +<p class="p2">24. After all these modes of knowledge, I wish you (who have believed +in Aristotle when he leads the soul upward as far as to intellectual +energy, but insinuates nothing beyond this), to assume a fifth +intelligence;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_464">[464]</span> in so doing, following Plato, and prior to Plato +theologists, who are accustomed to celebrate a knowledge which is above +intellect, and have divulged this as a truly divine mania. But they say +that this is obtained by exciting the profundity of the soul, which is +no longer intellectual, and adapting it to union with <i>the one</i>. +For all things are known by the similar, that which is sensible by +sense, that which is the object of science by science, that which is +intelligible by intellect, and that which is one by that which is +charactertized by unity. For the soul indeed being intellective knows +herself, and knows whatever she understands, by contact, as we have +before observed. But being superintelligent, she is ignorant both of +herself and of the objects of knowledge, and being near to <i>the +one</i>, she loves quiet, having shut up her knowledge, becoming mute, +and being silent with internal silence. For how can she be adjacent to +the most ineffable of all things, except by laying asleep the garrulous +matter that is in her? Hence, she must become one that she may see +<i>the one</i>, or rather that she may not see <i>the one</i>. For +seeing, she will see that which is intellectual, and not that which +is above intellect, and will intellectually perceive a certain one, +and not <i>the one itself</i>. He, my friend, who energizes according +to this most divine energy of the soul, trusting solely to himself, +viz. to the flower of his intellect, causing himself to be at rest +not from external, but from internal motions, and becoming a God as +far as it is possible for the soul to be so, will understand how the +Gods alone ineffably know all things, according to <i>the one</i> of +themselves. But as long as we are rolled about things beneath, it will +appear to us to be incredible that divinity knows all things impartibly +and supereternally; eternal beings indeed, having a real existence, +but things which are in generation, or becoming to be, subsisting +temporally, neither time nor eternity subsisting in <i>the one</i>. So +many indeed are the species of knowledge with us, by looking to which +it is possible to solve all the doubts concerning the truth which the +soul may know,<a id="FNanchor_360" href="#Footnote_360" class="fnanchor">[360]</a> and concerning that which it is not possible for +her to know, in the present life.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_465">[465]</span></p> + + +<p class="p2">25. Because, however, we have made three discussions which we said +were necessary to a distinct survey of the objects of inquiry, let +us now pass to the doubts, and give to each of them an appropriate +solution. In the first place, therefore, you consider this as a +sufficient argument that what is in our power is frivolous, and is the +work alone of the celestial bodies, viz. that we men assert ourselves +to be the causes of those events which are attended with prosperity; +but in things in which we are unfortunate, we transfer the cause to +necessity, instead of ascribing them to choice. And thus doubting, you +think you obtain this as a common conception concerning Fate, that it +has a more principal power in practical affairs than our impulses. +Indeed, I myself do not see men otherwise affected than as ascribing to +themselves the cause of their success, but to others the cause of their +errors. But in this we differ, that you indeed admit the opinion of the +many as sufficient to form a judgment of things; while I conceive them +to reason in this way through a certain immoderate love of themselves. +Among wise men, however, to whom it belongs to look both to whole and +parts, and not to neglect the order which they possess with reference +to them, divinity is considered as the principal cause of all events +from which good is derived to all things; but the next causes to this +are, the period of the world, and time, in which events are co-adapted +and co-ordinated to wholes, nothing being superfluously adventitious +in the polity of wholes; and in the third place, they consider +themselves as causes in those things in which they are allotted a +deliberate choice, and in which by their impulses they co-operate to +the completion of things.</p> + + +<p class="p2">26. When, however, any thing happens contrary to their choice, then +they deservedly ascribe the event to wholes alone, and the efficiency +of wholes, as the conquering cause. For it is every where necessary +that partial natures should energize in conjunction with wholes, but +wholes without partial natures. And after this manner intellectual men +divide events, but not as you have divided them. Hear, likewise, Plato +in the Laws exclaiming that divinity indeed governs all things; but +that after divinity, Fortune and Time rule over all human affairs; and +that our art<span class="pagenum" id="Page_466">[466]</span> follows as the third after these. For during a tempest, +the pilot’s art contributes something, and in disease the medical +art, and in short, in practical affairs, the political art.<a id="FNanchor_361" href="#Footnote_361" class="fnanchor">[361]</a> If, +therefore, our affairs are prosperous, Fate, Time, and Divinity, must +be considered as the causes that they are so. Hence, there will be +three causes of events, Divinity indeed causing that which comes to +pass to be good; but Time and Fate causing it to be arranged in one +concord with every thing. And in short, another cause is human. For +every human work is a part of the universe, but the contrary is not +true, because it is necessary that other animals also, since they are +parts of the universe, should not only<a id="FNanchor_362" href="#Footnote_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a> act, but also suffer. For +every part, indeed, of this mundane fabric and drama has for its end +good; since no part of it is left inordinate, but is so woven with +other parts, as to contribute to the well-being of the universe. The +contrary, however, is not true, that every thing which is allotted good +is co-ordinated with the mundane polity. For there is a supermundane +life, and the life of the Gods, and of souls that transcend Fate, and +follow Providence alone.</p> + + +<p class="p2">27. Where then does that which is in our power exist? Since that which +is generated, is connected with the period of the world, and again, +since it is produced from that alone. Where else should we say it +exists, than in our internal elections and impulses? For of these alone +we are the lords; but things which take place external to us, have many +other more powerful beings as their lords. For it is necessary that +what is generated externally should become a part of the universe, that +it may also be generated; and that this should be effected through the +consent and co-operation of the universe, that it may produce every +thing in itself, by one part of itself acting on another, and being +passive from another. On this account, therefore, in the actions of +men, we praise these persons,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_467">[467]</span> but we blame those, because through +choice they were lords of their deeds, and we do not say that the +universe, but the agent was the cause of the quality of the actions. +For the quality of a deed is not derived from the universe, but from +the life of the agent. It is, however, co-ordinated to the whole on +account of the whole, and is again such as it is on account of a +part. And that we assert these things with truth, the oracles of the +Gods will manifest to you, since they often ascribe victory to our +choice, and not to the order alone of the mundane periods; as for +instance, when they say: “On beholding yourself, fear.” And again; +“Know thyself.” And, “Believe yourself to be above body, and you are.” +In short, they say, “that our sorrows germinate in us as the voluntary +progeny of the particular life which we lead.”</p> + + +<p class="p2">28. It is not fit, therefore, to refer all events to the order alone of +the universe, as neither is it fit to refer them to our impulse alone. +Nor again is it proper to separate the soul from those beings that +have an absolute elective power,<a id="FNanchor_363" href="#Footnote_363" class="fnanchor">[363]</a> and whose very being consists in +deliberate choice alone, and in declining this thing, but embracing +that; though the soul in those events which take place is not the +mistress of the universe. For it is requisite that every cause should +aspire after that thing alone which it is naturally adapted to obtain. +But that which is in our power, is not only adapted to be active, but +also to be essentially elective. It is also adapted to act electively +in conjunction with other things, and either to err or act rightly on +account of choice. For though the deed may be good, yet if the agent +acts from a bad choice, we say that the action is bad. For that which +is good in the deed, is on account of something else, but that which +is depraved is on account of the choice of him who performs the deed. +Hence, it is evident to all men that we are the lords of actions, so +far as they are eligible.</p> + + +<p class="p2">29. But after this question, you say that all of us are solicitous +about futurity in all things, and even in those things which appear +to be in our<span class="pagenum" id="Page_468">[468]</span> power. Speaking summarily, you say well. What then, if +we are all lovers of divination, is there nothing in our power? I, +however, on the contrary say, that if nothing is in our power, but +events are compelled to take place from motion alone, we shall not +be lovers of divination. For what occasion is there for divination +in things which owe their existence to external compulsion, and the +knowledge of which is as of things future or not future. For such +knowledge is superfluous, when events are necessary; since it is +impossible for that which is necessary not to come to pass, though we +should a thousand times consult about, and be prescient of it. If, +therefore, events necessarily happen, we are in vain solicitous about +futurity. We are not, however, in vain solicitous about it, since +this is natural to us; for nothing which is according to nature is in +vain. Hence, it is not proper to consider all things as produced by +compulsion, in consequence of binding them by the circulation of the +heavenly bodies; but we must admit that foreknowledge is in some things +profitable to us, and that we do not live merely for the purpose of +foreknowing events, but that by foreknowing we may contribute or not +contribute something to things future, and may be more prompt in our +energies. We must likewise admit that not divination only, but prayers, +and the whole business of sacred rites contribute something to our +advantage, or we must exile these, pouring oil on their heads, and +crowning them with wool, and we must neither extend our hands upward, +nor grant that we ought to worship those who are able to suspend the +celestial influences. For men when in difficult circumstances will in +vain indulge a hope of being liberated from them by invoking divinity, +and Apollo himself will in vain give responses, unless<a id="FNanchor_364" href="#Footnote_364" class="fnanchor">[364]</a> by +performing certain things it is possible to escape the punishment which +is suspended from the celestial periods, and by not performing them, +the dreaded event will necessarily take place.</p> + + +<p class="p2">30. Indeed, if this were not the case, would it not be perfectly absurd +to make this division, and to allow conformably to the oracles of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_469">[469]</span> +Gods that something must be granted to our choice? But neither must we +proclaim this of divinity [viz. that his oracles are given in vain], +nor must we exterminate from human life, the utility of divination, and +of the sacerdotal office; because you have all history both Barbarian +and Grecian conjointly testifying that through divination, whether +from divine inspiration, or from human art, many have frequently known +what it was requisite to do, and through this knowledge have been +liberated from evils, which would have been otherwise inevitable. +This then I determine as appropriate to the present discussion, that +sometimes<a id="FNanchor_365" href="#Footnote_365" class="fnanchor">[365]</a> this much celebrated divination, and the performance +of sacred rites contribute to a certain thing being effected or +not, and sometimes<a id="FNanchor_366" href="#Footnote_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a> predominate over those generations which +are introduced from the universe. When, therefore, since all things +are in all, divine and dæmoniacal causes concur in one, and as it +were assert the same thing, then the works of sacrifice are seen +to be inefficacious; for it is impossible for a part to oppose and +effect things contrary to the whole; and foreknowledge, in this case, +neither adds nor takes away any thing from the events which are the +subjects of divination. But when, in consequence of there being many +things of this kind, these effect one thing, and those another; as +for instance, these effect the destruction, but those the safety of +the diseased, through the operations of the celestial bodies upon us, +as is evident from all history, then the performance of some sacred +right, by employing co-operative powers, liberates us from the noxious +defluxions, by those that are beneficial. And the consideration of +the future contributes much to effects. In short, that which is in +our power being co-ordinated with these, or with other causes, as in +calamities, in consequence of receiving a greater increase through its +own motion, exhibits sometimes one, and sometimes another end. And +know that this takes place in things which are externally produced. +Every where, however, the quality of the impulse has a prior existence, +and choice characterizes that which is in our power. This also is +the work of the soul, which abides in it and is not to be referred<span class="pagenum" id="Page_470">[470]</span> +to the universe.<a id="FNanchor_367" href="#Footnote_367" class="fnanchor">[367]</a> Conformably, therefore, to these things, as it +appears to me, you say that the universe governs all animals, and that +we and other animals have a diminished life imparted from the air, +and the first circulation. And that the rational part indeed is in +the brain; but that what is called sense is in the organs of sense, +and is conversant with different sensibles, but that the sight, the +hearing, and the other senses, differ only in their subjects, but are +essentially one and without diversity.<a id="FNanchor_368" href="#Footnote_368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a></p> + + +<p class="p2">31. Hearing you make this arrangement, I was surprized that a lover +of philosophy and intellectual speculations, and why do I say of +intellectual speculations, but who is also skilled in the paths of +erudition and in the inventions of geometry and arithmetic, should +attribute as much to the senses as to our rational and intellectual +essence, though they scarcely come into contact with the objects +of knowledge through debile organs, and should conceive that they +only differ from each other, and from the rational part by a certain +diversity of organs. For we have indeed elsewhere and prior to this +shown that all the senses are inseparable from body, and incapable of +being converted to themselves, but that the rational and intellectual +life is naturally adapted to know itself, and in consequence of this +knowledge to be converted to itself. For every thing gnostic is +according to energy converted to the object of knowledge; and therefore +that which is gnostic of itself is converted to itself. What identity, +therefore, do you see between the intellectual and the sensitive soul, +between that which looks downward, and that which tends upward? And in +short, what identity do you perceive between the soul which is buried +in bodies, and the soul which is unmingled with bodies? Between that +which can never know truth, and that which always extends itself to +real being?</p> + +<p class="p2">32. But if the appetite which is according to nature is not in vain in +any thing else, neither is it in that which is sometimes allotted the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_471">[471]</span> +perception of truth. I omit to say that it is absurd to assert that the +essence of a divine soul flows downward from ether, if it is proper to +call that which is impossible absurd. For the souls which are derived +from ether are allotted a corporeal generation; but the Athenian guest +demonstrates that the rational soul is more ancient than all bodies. +But if by ether you do not mean a body, but an etherial intellect, or +an intellectual soul surrounding ether, neither thus do you appear to +me to have discovered the most true cause of the soul. For there is +another fountain of souls from which etherial souls, the souls of the +sublunary elements, dæmoniacal souls, and ours are derived. And it is +necessary to look to that cause which Plato concealing the truth, as it +appears to me, calls the Crater; in which he represents the demiurgus +mingling the soul of the universe, as Timæus says, not from ether, but +prior to bodies. The Chaldean oracles also celebrate the essential +fountain of every soul, viz. of the empyreal, etherial, and material, +and separate this from the whole vivific goddess; from which also +suspending the whole of Fate, they make two series, the one psychical, +and the other fatal. Deriving the soul, therefore, from one of these +series, they assert that it sometimes becomes subservient to Fate, when +becoming irrational it changes its lord, viz. Fate for Providence.</p> + + +<p class="p2">33. That, as I have said however, you have not asserted any thing +worthy the intellectual energy of Geometry and Arithmetic, in +co-ordinating our soul with the senses, you may learn, by considering +that the first employment of these sciences is to separate the soul +from that energy which subsists in conjunction with the senses, to +withdraw it from them as much as possible, to accustom it to look +within, to see immaterial reasons, and to investigate demonstrations, +the conclusions of which are contrary to the informations of the +senses. For they indeed reject impartibility, but these sciences +require it, and derive their existence from impartibles; since +partibles are the principles of the former, but impartibles of +the latter. And the knowledge of the senses indeed is confined +to particulars; but universals, and those things the nature of +which is always the same, are the objects of the knowledge of the +above-mentioned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_472">[472]</span> sciences; which they do not derive from the senses, +for imperfect are not the causes of perfect things; but supernally from +intellect, on which account also they sit in judgment on the senses, +reprehend the grossness of their knowledge, the passivity of their +perceptions, and their indefinite motions.</p> + + +<p class="p2">34. For indeed the knowledge of the senses is truly ludicrous; but the +intention of the mathematical sciences is to liberate us from things +ludicrous, and accustom us instead of pursuing these, to investigate +the knowledge of real being. It belongs to the sensible life therefore, +to be under the dominion of Fate, and to be acted upon differently at +different times, in conjunction with bodies, in which the necessity +from Fate consists. For every form inseparable from matter, is +ingenerated in, and contained by it; since it does not pertain to +it, through being converted to itself to say, that what externally +accedes to it is one thing, and that which is true another. But it +alone says that it announces passion, on which account it belongs to +alter-motive natures, in consequence of not having an energy perfectly +liberated from them. The intellectual life however, is according to +its own nature converted to itself,<a id="FNanchor_369" href="#Footnote_369" class="fnanchor">[369]</a> and cannot endure to follow +the violent passions of sense, but contains in itself criteria of the +fallacious motions externally introduced, and adds indeed what is +deficient to the passive perceptions of sense, and confutes the fallacy +of its information; accomplishing at the same time all this by its own +proper energy. For it is not the province of things which pertain to +sense to form a judgment of sense, but this belongs to intellectual +reasons, which the knowledge of sense is incapable of receiving. The +immaterial therefore and separable life, and which energizes in itself, +must be admitted to be contrary to that of sense; and to this must be +given a choice of inclination, upward and downward, to intellect by +which it was produced, and to sense which it generates; but we must +admit that sense and all corporeal lives are without choice, because +this is also the case with bodies. For the rational soul being a medium +between intellect and sense,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_473">[473]</span> tends to both on account of the unstable +inclination of choice; but it becomes according to habitude each of the +extremes, of which it is essentially neither. But the perfection which +it derives from intellect, and the deception which it receives from +sense, manifest its middle nature. And such, as it appears to me, is +the correction<a id="FNanchor_370" href="#Footnote_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a> of the dogma.</p> + + +<p class="p2">35. With respect to your opinion concerning good which you have +introduced into the midst of your enquiries, viz. that what is +delectable to the several individuals of mankind is good, and that this +exists by position, since different things are considered as legal +by different nations; I should be ashamed indeed, if in writing to a +friend I did not manifestly assert that I conceive this opinion to be +unworthy both of my choice and my years. For it does not appear to me +to be at all wonderful that a young man in consequence of looking to +the opinions of men in many things, should form such an opinion. But I +think he who admits that an aged intellect ought to preside as a judge, +will adopt the decisions of intellectual conceptions, and not those +which the rumour and unbalanced motions of the multitude have spread +abroad. Now therefore, because to the Persians, some things appear to +be delectable, and also certain things which are congruous to these +delectables are considered by them as legal; but to the Greeks other +things appear to be delectable and legal; and to other nations other +things; on this account a different thing is imagined to be good and +delectable by different people. And whoever is allotted a delight which +is naturally good to every one, will possess an end adapted to man; +but whoever errs from this end, though he should be a thousand times +delighted with things which are present to him and appear to be good, +yet he will reap but an imperfect fruit of such delight.</p> + + +<p class="p2">36. But it is, as it seems, true, that one inconvenience being given, +others follow, which you also appear to me to suffer. For placing the +soul under the dominion of Fate, you have co-ordinated her with the +irrational senses, and collecting these into one and the same thing, +you<span class="pagenum" id="Page_474">[474]</span> have mingled good with that which is debile. It is necessary +however to eject both the former and this from the soul, that we may +not ignorantly ascribe the same things to men as to brutes, whose life +is without conversion to itself, and is naturally bent to earth, and +whose knowledge is mingled with material passions. These things also +are unfolded by Plato with, as I may say, adamantine arguments. For +says he that which is not good is not [truly] delectable, though all +oxen should assert it to be so. For we are not to adduce the testimony +of oxen, but of the Gods, with whom there is intellect, and the good of +being, which is more divine than intellect itself. These things being +clearly asserted in the Gorgias, the Philebus, and the Republic, I +think it would be superfluous to dwell on them any farther.</p> + + +<p class="p2">37. This however, I will add to what has been said, that the +investigation of good is not to be mingled with the delectable, (for +thus the petulance of delight will cause us to be foolish) but the +all-various diversities of human customs and legal institutions, are to +be referred to the different lives of souls, viz. to the rational, the +irascible and the epithymetic forms of life; for the former germinate +from the latter; since, as it is said, they are not derived from an +oak, nor from a rock. But the many-headed beast persuades these to +establish such things by law as the Persians established; the leonine +soul persuades others to adopt such things as the Thracians adopted; +and in others reason prevails in the adoption of legal and true good. +And the delectable indeed, is common to all these. For the appetible +when present is delectable to every one, but good is not delectable +to all men, but to those in whom reason presides. For the passions do +not see good, but this is alone the province of reason. And to reason +indeed, the delectable and the good are the same; but the fabrication +of things did not give to the blind passions the investigation of +good, but of the delectable; for every species of life when it +energizes without impediment is delighted. Hence there are many legal +institutions, and all-various delectables, and they are different +to different persons; but good is alone with those in whom reason +predominates over the passions. For dominion must not be given to +desire, that we may<span class="pagenum" id="Page_475">[475]</span> not be affected in the same manner as asses; nor +to anger, that we may not resemble lions; but it must be given to that +which is the most excellent part of our nature, which we alone are, +or according to which we principally subsist. For the being of every +thing which consists of many things, some better, and others worse, is +according to that which is the best among them. For that which is best +sagaciously conjectures the nature of good.</p> + + +<p class="p2">38. As to what you afterwards write in the way of doubt, you seem +to me to have written it in consequence of hearing Socrates in many +places asserting that he knew nothing, deriding those who say that +they know all things, and farther still contending that when we depart +from hence we shall especially know the truth, and be in possession of +more certain sciences, and also inferring that the mathematical are +not truly sciences. You doubt therefore from all this whether it is +not perhaps impossible to know the truth, and whether we do not only +dream about it. Indeed it is requisite you should at the same time +understand, that if it is not possible for us to know the truth, we do +not more know if there is any thing in our power than if there is not. +For our ignorance of both similarly prevents our adoption of either of +these positions. How therefore, can we use the ignorance of truth in +order to show whether there is any thing which is in our power? Since +with respect to the existence, and non-existence of this, ignorance +possesses the same power, or rather impotency.</p> + + +<p class="p2">39. That we may not however, suffer any thing of this kind, we have +already enumerated all the modes of knowledge; and have shown what +the modes are of which the soul can participate here, and what those +are when she assumes a supreme order. And of these indeed, Socrates +possessing the former, but hoping that he shall obtain the latter on +being liberated from the body, says, “that arriving thither he shall +know the truth.” For other measures and other objects of knowledge +afforded him an opportunity of indulging such a hope. Because it is a +thing usual with the friends of Plato to inquire whether it is possible +for the soul to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_476">[476]</span> live not only cathartically, but also theoretically, +while surrounded with this gross bond the body. And I think the +subject has been sufficiently discussed, and has been brought to this +conclusion, that perhaps it is possible to live theoretically even +here, like the coryphæan philosopher in the Theætetus, astronomizing +above the heavens,<a id="FNanchor_371" href="#Footnote_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> and investigating on all sides all the nature +of beings, and also like those guardians in the Republic, who ascend +as far as to <i>the good itself</i>, through that dialectic, which +Plato calls the defensive inclosure of the mathematical sciences. +Again, however, that it is impossible while here to lead a theoretic +life in perfection, is evident from the causes which are enumerated +in the Phædo, viz. the occupations and molestations of the body, +which do not suffer us to energize theoretically without impediment, +and disturbance. For the life is theoretic, but the energy is called +contemplation, and the contemplation of <i>the one</i>.</p> + + +<p class="p2">40. When also Socrates does not permit us to call the mathematical +sciences [truly] sciences, he does not do this as denying that they +have a necessity of demonstrations, but as falling short of the supreme +of sciences. And why should I not say, at falling short of dialectic, +which no longer considers a point, or the monad, as a principle, but +<i>the good</i>, and considers the principle of all things. Whence +also, as I conceive, Socrates in the section of a line<a id="FNanchor_372" href="#Footnote_372" class="fnanchor">[372]</a> [in the +6th book of the Republic] assigns the second part to the mathematical +sciences; but to perfectly immaterial and separate forms, he assigns +a part, and a knowledge prior to these; the former proceeding from +hypothesis, but the latter being unhypothetical. And with Socrates, the +author of the Epinomis likewise accords. For he calls dialectic the +bond of the mathematical sciences, as uniting the principles of all of +them.</p> + + +<p class="p2">41. But if Socrates asserted that he knew nothing, and the Pythian +oracle pronounced him to be on this account the wisest of all men, +as he himself informs us, consider the profound meaning both of the +Pythian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_477">[477]</span> deity and of Socrates, and how by the assertion of knowing +nothing this is implied, that <i>the good</i> alone possesses an exempt +transcendency,<a id="FNanchor_373" href="#Footnote_373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a> but not he who possesses scientific knowledge; and +this it is to know that he does not know. For the attainment of such +a knowledge as this appears to be the principal business of those who +intend to be wise. For in reality, he is truly wise, who knows that he +is not truly wise, and is not ignorant of this. For to whom does it +belong to know that he does not scientifically know every thing, but to +him who possesses knowledge. For it is indeed necessary that he should +perfectly know that he does not know [every thing]; since he will know +himself not to possess a scientific knowledge [of all things]. Hence no +one will perfectly know that he does not possess scientific knowledge +[in perfection], till he knows that he possesses scientific knowledge. +For then he will at one and the same time know that he knows, and what +the things are which he does not know, and will both know that he knows +and that he does not know, possessing a middle knowledge, and science +alone, which subsists between those natures that know truth wholly, +and those that do not know it at all,<a id="FNanchor_374" href="#Footnote_374" class="fnanchor">[374]</a> of which the former is +intellect, but the latter sense. For sense neither knows real, being, +nor the essence itself of sensibles, of which it is feigned to be the +knowledge; but intellect knows essence itself, and the real truth +itself of being.</p> + + +<p class="p2">42. The soul therefore, being a medium between these, knows the +essences of things as being prior to sense, and does not know them as +being posterior to intellect. He therefore that is wise, will both know +that he knows, and that he does not know. And thus much, my friend, +in answer to the assertion of Socrates, and concerning that which +is real wisdom. Hence, it is not proper to exterminate the reasons +pertaining to science, neither on account of the mathematical sciences +being distinguished<span class="pagenum" id="Page_478">[478]</span> from the first science, nor on account of the +hope of obtaining true knowledge after a separation from hence, nor on +account of the answer of the Pythian deity. For it is Plato himself who +exclaims, that if science is destroyed, it will no longer be possible +to make an assertion about any thing, and not even about that which is +contingent. But he shows indeed, what the knowledge is which the soul +may assume while it is united to the body, and what it may obtain when +it is freed from its bonds; and also what that is which is at the same +time knowledge and not science. He likewise shows that there is one +knowledge which is true science, an intellect better than science, and +an intelligence which deifies intellect; and that the soul perceiving +this knowledge, and not being able to obtain it in this life, desires +a departure from body, that she may then be allotted this supernatural +and divine comprehension of beings. But of these things enough.</p> + + +<p class="p2">43. In consequence however of what you have said, you doubt, why good +men are in a worse condition, in consequence of failing to obtain the +end which was the object of their wishes, but bad men are allotted the +things which they desire. You therefore indeed, think that this also +is an argument in favour of the non-existence of any thing which is +in our power. And indeed, if this is an argument of the non-existence +of any thing in our power, that things do not happen to the good +according to their wishes, the success of bad men in gaining the +objects of their desire, will be an argument in proof of the existence +of something which is in our power. It is better however, not to adduce +opposing arguments to what you say, but merely to show you that this +doubt was proposed by some of the ancients not only with a view to the +subversion of that which is in our power, but also with a view to the +investigation whether providence has any existence. And this inquiry +of the ancients has been extended to Plotinus himself, to Iamblichus, +and your namesake [Theodorus Asinæus]. For the unexpected introduction +of fortunate events, shakes in reality our invincible preconceptions +of providence, and the affair requires intellectual inspection, if the +objector being saved from that doubt, ought to commit every thing to +providence.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_479">[479]</span></p> + + +<p class="p2">44. If therefore, we are not the lords of any thing, and have not an +elective life from ourselves, and neither good nor evil is from us, +but these are externally produced, there is no longer any occasion to +doubt of events, as if they happened contrary to desert, since both +good and evil derive their subsistence from an external source. For if +we do not cause ourselves to be such characters as we are, it will not +be requisite that there should be any retribution for our life; nor +in short, is any thing due from those, who are not the causes of the +life which they lead. Hence, if the retribution of fortunate events is +contrary to desert, we ourselves shall be the cause of the lives, the +desert of which it is said we are allotted in the distributions from +the universe; because, of all the things that surround us, we do not +require to have retribution in what we derive from wholes, but in those +things in which we co-operate something. If therefore, there is nothing +in our power, we shall have nothing from ourselves. And if this be the +case, neither should we desire retributions of those things which we +derive from an external source. And this being admitted, neither should +we accuse the distribution of events as contrary to desert.</p> + + +<p class="p2">45. If, therefore, there is nothing in our power, it is not fit to +enquire why good men fail in obtaining the end they desire, contrary to +desert, but bad men obtain this end. But admitting there is something +which is in our power, and that Providence has dominion over all +things, we say, adducing to you persuasion after violence, that what +is in our power does not predominate over, but co-operates with things +external. The rational soul therefore very properly disposes things +that are internal according to its own power, but it cannot do this +with externals, because these require other things in order to their +distribution, which are not inherent in it. I am delighted however with +these doubts of yours, perceiving in you a generous proselyte whom I +frequently desire not to confound those things which are in our power +with those which are not, nor to be so disposed with respect to things +which are not in our power, as if they ought entirely to take place, +in order that we may bear them without difficulty, when they do take +place. Now, however, the doubt<span class="pagenum" id="Page_480">[480]</span> happens, from things which are out of, +not conforming themselves to things which are in our power, though we +fancy that they ought, and also from supposing that to be good for +us which is not, and seeking for its accomplishment. But it would be +better for us always to explore the true and real beings that are in +us, and acquire them for ourselves, and to leave things external, and +which are not in our power to the causes of them, as to masters who +know what they do. We should likewise be prepared for those things +which are not, by those things which are in our power. In what manner, +therefore, the doubt pertains to that which is in our power, we have +shown you through such arguments as these. But you ought rather to +refer it, as we have said, to the doubt concerning Providence. And many +things, as I have before observed, have been said on this subject by +the ancients, and they thus solve the doubt.</p> + + +<p class="p2">46. Again, therefore, you inquire what that which is in our power +is. Which it was requisite to investigate in the beginning of the +discussion. And afterwards you doubt concerning it. But inquiring about +it, you define it to be that which is of itself uncircumscribed,<a id="FNanchor_375" href="#Footnote_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a> +and self-energetic. If, however, this be the case, it is entirely +incorruptible, and most powerful, and alone pertains to the ruler +of all beings, but is not adapted to that which is in our power. +I, therefore, consider this definition to be very remote from that +conception of what is in our power, which the ancients adopting, +attributed this to human souls. But do you also consider the truth of +what I say. For they assumed that which is in our power as indicative +of the energy of choice, making us to be the lords of choice and +aversion, and as indicative of the choice of some good, or the +contrary. For they did not consider choice and will to be the same; but +they asserted that the latter pertains to good alone, but the former +both to good and evil; just as false opinion pertains to that which is +not good. Hence also, they said that election or choice characterizes +the soul, which extends itself both to what is good, and what is not +good, and that this pertains to the middle nature of that being which +is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_481">[481]</span> converted to both these. This also common rumour testifies. For +we praise the choice of these, but blame the choice of those. Evil, +however, is not wished for by any one. And evil indeed appears to be +good to those that choose it; for no soul knowing a thing to be evil +would choose, but would avoid it. On account of ignorance, however, the +soul is busily employed about it; for she naturally possesses an acute +love of good, but sometimes is powerless with respect to the attainment +of it.</p> + + +<p class="p2">47. The soul, therefore, essentially possessing an inclination to +both, viz. to good and evil, the ancients called this power of her +elective, on account of which we are naturally adapted to choose one +thing instead of another. And indeed, you may obtain from division such +a definition of this power. Because all power is either rational or +irrational, it is necessary that choice should be in one of these. But +since it is not irrational; for we all say that the irrational power is +without choice, it will be a certain rational power. But every rational +as well as every irrational power, is either gnostic or appetitive. +Choice, however, being election and desire, will be a certain appetite. +But every appetite either alone looks to that which is real good, or to +that which is only apparent good, or to both these. We say, however, +that choice does not look to real good alone; for if it did, it would +never be justly blamed; nor to apparent good alone; for in this case, +it would not frequently be praised. Hence such a power is naturally +adapted to look to both these.</p> + + +<p class="p2">48. Election, therefore, is in short, a rational power, desirous both +of true and apparent good, leading the soul to both, on account of +which she ascends and descends, errs, and acts with rectitude. The +ancients perceiving the energy of this power, called the inclination of +it both to real and apparent good, a twofold path in our nature. Hence +the elective and that which is in our power, will be the same thing. +And according to this power, we differ from divine, and from mortal +natures; for each of these is unreceptive of this twofold inclination; +since the former, indeed, on account of their transcendent excellence +are alone established in true good; but the latter on account of +defect, in apparent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_482">[482]</span> good. For intellect indeed characterizes the +former, but sense the latter. And the former is our king, but the +latter our messenger. We, however, being of a middle nature are +established in choice; and are capable of being moved both to true and +apparent good. But wherever we move, we are on all sides comprehended +by wholes, from which we are allotted what is, according to desert. And +if indeed we tend to that which is better, we thus tend as intellect; +but if to that which is subordinate, as sense. That which is in our +power, therefore, is not capable of effecting all things. For that +which can effect all things is a power characterized by unity, and on +this account can effect all things, because it is one and boniform. +But the power which is elective is dyadic, and on this account cannot +accomplish all things; because by its twofold inclinations, it falls +short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would, however, +be itself effective of all things, if it had not an elective impulse; +for then it would be will alone. For a life characterized by will +subsists according to good, which causes that which is in our power to +be most powerful, and is truly deiform, on account of which the soul +also becomes a God, and as Plato says, governs the whole world.</p> + + +<p class="p2">49. Hence that which is in our power, neither pertains to the first, +nor to the last of things, but to the medium between both. You, +however, as it seems, have conceived it to be a power ruling over all +things, leading all things according to its own impulse, and obtaining +every thing which it desires; for you do not define it to be a power +over the objects of desire within the soul, and which cause the +electing soul to be such as it is; but you ascribe to it a power over +things which are not in its power. For things external to the soul are +not in our power; on which account also our life is mingled from things +which are not, and from things which are in our power. And with worthy +men, indeed, there is much of that which is in our power; for they use +all things, modifying even those that are out of our power on account +of virtue, and always adorning the present circumstance. But with the +multitude, there is more of that which is not in our power; for they +follow things external to themselves, not possessing a life within, +which is able to assimilate them<span class="pagenum" id="Page_483">[483]</span> to themselves. Hence worthy men, +indeed, are said to be free, and are so on account of the energy both +of that which is in, and of that which is not in their power. But the +multitude are called into servile necessity, in consequence of burying +those things which are in their power, with those that are not, and +possessing all things not in themselves.</p> + + +<p class="p2">50. After all this, you have added the colophon (or summit) of the +doubts, by asking whether divinity knows or does not know events which +are future to us. And if, indeed, he does not know them, you will +say that he does not at all differ from us, who have no knowledge of +futurity. But if he does know them, that which he knows will entirely +and from necessity come to pass. This, however, as it would seem, not +only destroys that which is in our power, but likewise every thing +which is said to be contingent. This also, is usually said by those who +conceive all things to exist by compulsion, and as I may say, has been +asserted a thousand times. But they all reason as follows: if divinity +knows every future event, that which is future will be from necessity. +And they indeed assert it to be false that divinity knows every thing +definitely; but they say that his knowledge is indefinite of things +which indefinitely come to pass, in order that they may save what +is contingent. Others, however, attributing a definite knowledge to +divinity, admit necessity in every thing which comes to pass. These are +the dogmas of the Peripatetic and Stoic sects. But Plato, and whoever +is a friend to Plato, affirm that divinity definitely knows future +events, and that nevertheless<a id="FNanchor_376" href="#Footnote_376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a> some things are produced definitely, +and others indefinitely, according to their respective natures. For +those things which in effects subsist with division and contrarily, are +antecedently comprehended in the Gods according to a more excellent +condition only.</p> + + +<p class="p2">51. I say, for instance, the causes of generated natures, whether they +are incorporeal or corporeal, subsist incorporeally with the Gods; and +in a similar manner their knowledge is incorporeal. And again, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_484">[484]</span> +causes of intellectual, and of non-intellectual beings, subsist with +the Gods both essentially, and according to science. For they also know +things which are not intellectual intellectually. And again, of things +which are produced by them, that are either temporal or without time, +there is with them a cause and a knowledge exempt from time. Hence +because of effects some are definite, but others indefinite, the Gods +antecedently assume the knowledge of both these according to the more +excellent mode, viz. according to the definite. Moreover, the form +of knowledge is not such as the object of knowledge, but such as the +gnostic nature. For knowledge is not in that which is known, but in +that which knows. Hence, it is similar and of the like form to that in +which it is, and not to that in which it is not. If, therefore, that +which is known is indefinite, but that which knows it is definite, the +knowledge is not also indefinite on account of the thing known, but +definite on account of that which knows. For it is possible to know +that which is subordinate after a more excellent mode, and that which +is supreme after an inferior mode.</p> + + +<p class="p2">52. Hence, because the Gods are better than all things, they +antecedently comprehend all things after a more excellent mode. And +beings indeed, they comprehend superessentially;<a id="FNanchor_377" href="#Footnote_377" class="fnanchor">[377]</a> things which are +according to time, as we have already said, prior to time; corporeal +natures, incorporeally; material natures immaterially; definitely, +things indefinite; permanently, things unstable; and ingenerably, +things generable. It does not, therefore, follow that if they know what +will be, the event must happen from necessity; but to the event indeed +we must give an indefinite generation from a definite cause, and to the +Gods a definite foreknowledge of that which is indefinite. For neither +does it follow that because your art<a id="FNanchor_378" href="#Footnote_378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a> employs drums and wheels, and +corporeal materials, these subsisted corporeally in your foreknowledge; +but your imagination comprehended in itself incorporeally and vitally +the productive principle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_485">[485]</span> of the future machine; and the astrolabe +was corporeally fashioned from an internal knowledge which is not +corporeal. If this, however, is the case in your art, what ought you +to say of the foreknowledge of the Gods, in which all things subsist +in a manner truly ineffable, and not to be circumscribed by us? Is it +not evident, that this mode of comprehension is different from, and in +no respect allied to the things which are produced by it? Hence the +Gods know divinely, and in a way unaccompanied by time those things +which are in our power, and we energize, as we are naturally adapted. +Whatever we choose also, is foreknown by them, not on account of the +boundary which is in us, but on account of the boundary which is with +them.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>Such, my friend, is my answer to your inquiries, independent of which +I am able to show you that there is something in our power, from +praise and blame, from counsel, from exhortation and dehortation, from +judicial affairs, from accusation and defence, from all political +erudition, from legislation, from prayer, from sacerdotal methods, +and from philosophy itself. For you well know that my preceptor +[Syrianus,] used frequently to say, that if that which is in our power +were destroyed, philosophy would be superfluous. For what should it +instruct, when there is nothing which can be instructed, when there is +nothing in us by which we may become better? Reconsidering, therefore, +these things again and again, if you still have any doubts, do not be +averse to write to me. For what subjects can we more aptly discuss than +those, in the disquisition of which no one will accuse us of nugacity?</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_486">[486]</span></p> +<hr class="chap"> + + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="center p4 lg"><b>EXTRACTS</b></p></div> + +<p class="center p1 xs">FROM THE</p> + +<p class="center p1 sm">TREATISE OF PROCLUS,</p> + +<p class="center p1 xs">ENTITLED</p> + +<p class="center p1">TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.</p> + +<hr class="r25"> + + + +<p class="p2">1. Whether Providence extends to all things, to wholes and parts, and +as far as to the most indivisible natures in the heavens and in the +sublunary regions, in things eternal and things corruptible? This +Proclus affirms, and says that every particular, even of the minutest +things, depends on the beneficent providence of divinity. For nothing +escapes that one whether you speak of the essence of a thing, or its +being known. It is said indeed, and is rightly said, that the whole +circle is centrally in the centre, since the centre is the cause, but +the circle the thing caused, and for the same reason every number is +monadically in unity. But in the one of Providence, all things subsist +after a more exalted mode, since that is more transcendently one than a +centre and the monad.</p> + + +<p class="p2">2. How divinity foreknows and provides for things contingent? Proclus +answers, that divinity, on account of his most perfect nature,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_487">[487]</span> knows +in their seeds and causes things indefinite definitely, as he also +knows things distant and corporeal, without distance and incorporeally.</p> + + +<p class="p2">3. Whether Providence is the cause of things definite and indefinite +according to the same, and after the same manner? Proclus answers +that to provide for is nothing else than to benefit; and that hence +every thing participates of that one good according to its own measure +and order, so that Providence retains its unity and liberty even in +things indefinite. In the same chapter also he proves that divinity +provides for things contingent and indefinite, that they may not be as +it were super-adventitious in the universe. For, says he, if the Gods +are willing and able to provide definitely for things indefinite, as +being the authors of them, they will entirely provide for them, and +providing will know the desert of the subjects of their providential +energy. And the Gods indeed, with an exempt transcendency, extend their +providence to all things, but dæmons dividing their superessential +subsistence, receive the guardianship of different herds of animals, +distributing the providence of the Gods, as Plato says, as far as to +the most ultimate division. Hence some of them preside over men, others +over lions, or other animals, and others over plants; and still more +partially, some are the inspective guardians of the eye, others of the +heart, and others of the liver. All things, however, are full of Gods, +some of whom exert their providential energies immediately, but others +through dæmons as media; not that the Gods are incapable of being +present to all things, but that ultimate are of themselves incapable of +participating first natures.</p> + + +<p class="p2">4. How the participations of the Gods are effected, or how the Gods +energize providentially on inferior natures? Proclus answers that the +participations are according to the aptitude of the participants; +viz. they subsist rationally in rational, but intellectually in +intellectual natures, and imaginably and sensibly in those beings that +live according to imagination and sense. And they subsist essentially +and through being alone, in those things which are without life. +Hence, Providence being established above all beings, according to +divine union itself, and energizing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_488">[488]</span> according to one energy adapted +to <i>the one</i>, every thing which accedes to it participates of +it according to its natural adaptation. With respect to the failure +of the oracles he says, that the energy of divinity remaining always +the same, places or men become unadapted to its participation, just +as if a certain statue always remaining the same, a mirror should at +one time exhibit a fulgid image of it, but at another, an obscure or +debile, or indeed no image of it at all. He adds, If, therefore, it +should be said that oracles sometimes participate of the Gods who +are the sources of divination, but at other times fail, becoming +inefficacious, and as it were without spirit, for a certain period, the +causes of this irregularity must be referred to the vapours that are +the instruments of inspiration failing, through an inability of always +being the participants of divine influence. For the oracles are true +which give completion to the phænomena, and angels, dæmons and heroes +are veracious, which the Gods and the perpetually existing allotments +in the universe illuminate, though certain waters and openings of the +earth cannot always participate of them, on account of their unstable +nature. Or if it should be said, that the powers of sacred rites, +sometimes entering into statues, causing them to be vitalized, and +filling them with divine inspiration, fail in certain periods of time, +the failure of these also, I should think it proper to refer to the +recipients, and not to any variation of the energy of the Gods that +inspire them. For neither do we dare to accuse the sun as the cause of +the eclipse of the moon, but the conical shadow of the earth into which +the moon falls.</p> + + +<p class="p2">5. Whence and why evil subsists, since there is Providence? Proclus +answers, that there are two kinds of evils, one in bodies, contrary +to nature; the other in souls, contrary to reason. The kingdom of +Providence, however, says he, is molested by neither of them; but +to the former of these evils, the end is good, and the variety and +perfection of the universe. For every thing which is preternatural +takes place, in order that something which is according to nature may +be effected, but not vice versa. And with respect to the latter of +these evils, between beings more perfect than we are, and brutes, it is +necessary that souls should<span class="pagenum" id="Page_489">[489]</span> intervene as a medium, which are endued +with reason, anger and desire, and rejoice in freedom of will.</p> + + +<p class="p2">6. If Providence is, why are good men oppressed with evil, but bad +men triumph? Proclus answers, that notwithstanding this, virtue and +the matter of virtue are not wanting to the good; and also, that this +praise is peculiar to them, that they had rather cultivate naked +Virtue, than Vice with all her abundance. That it is not an evil to +be deprived of the incentives to evil; that some have even earnestly +desired adverse fortune; and that wise men have always borne it with +fortitude. Nor is it expedient that wise men should at one and the same +time abound with every kind of good. For it is necessary that they +should have a certain experience of the evils of the present life, by +which the soul being excited, desires a transition from hence to that +place which is beyond the reach of evil. He adds, that many through +adversity have arrived at greater attainments in virtue; and that in +short, those things only are evil which we ourselves perpetrate, and +not those which we suffer [from an external cause]. That all bad men +are without glory, and without honour, though they should be surrounded +by thousands of flatterers. To the question which he adjoins to +this, why Providence distributes equal to unequal things, according +to arithmetical, and not according to geometrical equality, as when +a whole city perishes, there is a similar destruction of dissimilar +men, viz. of the good and the bad, he answers as follows. In the first +place, indeed, they do not suffer this similitude of punishment so far +as they are dissimilar, but so far as they are similar; in consequence +of voluntarily inhabiting the same city, or entering the same ship, and +fighting together, or mutually suffering any thing else of the same +species; and so according to the energy of that species, they suffer +a certain something which is the same. So far, however, as they are +better and worse, they participate differently of the common calamity; +since the latter perish, bearing it impatiently, but the former +enduring it mildly. And after a separation from the present life, the +place destined to be the habitation of more excellent beings receives +the former, but the abode of subordinate beings receives the latter. +Proclus afterwards adds, that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_490">[490]</span> there is a certain order and a period +of common fate, terminating from different principles in the same end, +and a concurrence of progressions, where the less principal parts are +compelled from necessity to be co-passive, And that we are ignorant of +the true equalities of souls.</p> + + +<p class="p2">7. If Providence extends as far as to the lowest beings, whence is the +great inequality in the allotments of brutes, their mutual devorations, +and the like, derived? Proclus answers, that if there is any thing in +them of a self-motive nature, the cause of this must be investigated +from a higher source; but if they are only corporeal, it is of no +consequence if they suffer the same thing as a shadow all-variously +transformed, and are subject to Fate.</p> + + +<p class="p2">8. Why punishments do not immediately follow after crimes, but are +inflicted at length after the commission of them, and this sometimes +is very long after?<a id="FNanchor_379" href="#Footnote_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> Proclus answers, that the implanted root of +wickedness (just as the earth bearing thorns, though the germes are +a thousand times cut off, still produces the like) renders the same +energies, in consequence of continuing inflexible by punishment. +Providence, therefore, waits for an appropriate time, not such as may +be pleasing to the vulgar, but such as it knows will contribute to the +health of souls, and instructs many by endurance. For, together with +the Gods, says Plato, Fortune and Time govern all things, whether it +be requisite that some good should be imparted, or that there should +be a purification from something contrary to good. In the next place, +vice is a punishment to itself, and the most grievous injury the soul +can sustain. Precipitate anger also is not a good dispensator of +punishments. Plato once, being about to chastize a slave, was seen +holding his hand in an elevated position for some time, and being +asked why he did so, said that he was punishing his own impetuous +anger. Archytas said to his servants in a field, who had not done +what he had ordered them to do, and expected to be punished for their +negligence,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_491">[491]</span> “It is well for you that I am angry.” And Theano said to +one of her servants, “If I were not angry I would chastize you.” Among +the Egyptians there was a law, that a pregnant woman who was judged +worthy of death, should not be put to death till she was delivered. +What wonder, therefore, is it that Providence should for a time +spare those who are deserving of death, but are able to perform not +trifling, but illustrious actions, till they have accomplished them? If +Themistocles had been immediately punished for what he did when he was +a young man, who would have delivered Athens from the Persian evils? +Who also would have explained the Pythian oracle? If Dionysius had +perished in the beginning of his tyranny, who would have freed Sicily, +which was thought to be irremediably lost, from the Chalcedonians? If +the punishment of Periander had not been deferred for a long time, +who would have freed the pleasant island of Leucadia, who would have +liberated Anaxorium from its adversaries?—To which may be added, +that the time of deferred punishment seems long to our feeble vision, +but is nothing to the eye of Providence, just as the place also in +which we live, and carry about these bodies is perfectly small for the +punishment of great offences; but there are many and indescribable +places of punishment in the infernal regions, and excessive torments +for the offenders that are there.—On account of the magnitude of the +punishment likewise, the whole of it is not inflicted at once. Souls +also are naturally adapted to feel remorse, which is the forerunner of +their greatest sufferings. For they say that Apollodorus the tyrant +saw himself in a dream scourged and boiled by certain persons, and his +heart exclaiming from the kettle, I am the cause of these thy torments. +But Ptolemy who was surnamed Thunder, thought in a dream that he was +called to judgment by Seleucus, and that vultures and wolves sat there +as his judges. Such are the preludes to the vicious of impending +punishment.</p> + + +<p class="p2">9. How the crimes of other persons, as for instance of parents or +potentates are punished in children and subjects? For that certain +persons are said to have suffered punishment for the crimes of their +ancestors, both revelations and the mysteries manifest, and certain +liberating<span class="pagenum" id="Page_492">[492]</span> Gods are said to purify from them. Proclus answers, that +a nation, or a family, or a city, must be considered as one body, and +that these have kindred powers that preside over them, so that such +crimes are not foreign, on account of this conjunction and similitude. +Why, therefore, should it be any longer paradoxical, that souls when +transferred into other bodies, should suffer punishment for the crimes +which they have committed in former bodies?</p> + + +<p class="p2">10. Since the providence of divinity knows all things and reduces them +to good, how are angels and demons, and if you are also willing, heroes +and souls that govern the world in conjunction with the Gods, said to +exert a providential energy? Proclus answers, that divinity provides +for <i>all things</i> universally and totally, but the other powers +partially, subordinately, and for <i>certain things</i> only.</p> + +<p>In order to supply as much as possible the loss of the entire treatise +of Proclus on this subject, the following admirable observations on +Providence, are added, translated from his Commentary On the Parmenides +of Plato; a work, which to the disgrace of Europe, is still only extant +in manuscript.</p> + +<p>“The Athenian guest in the Laws clearly evinces that there is a +providence, where his discourse shows that the Gods know, and possess a +power which governs, all things. But Parmenides, at the very beginning +of the discussion concerning Providence, evinces the absurdity of +doubting divine knowledge and dominion. For to assert that the +conclusion of this doubt is still <i>more dire</i> than the former +[i.e. that divinity is not known by us] sufficiently shows that he +rejects the arguments which subvert providence. For it is dire to say +that divinity is not known by us who are rational and intellectual +natures, and who essentially possess something divine; but it is still +more dire to deprive divine natures of knowledge; since the former +pertains to those who do not convert themselves to divinity, but the +latter to those who impede the all-pervading goodness of the Gods. +And the former pertains to those who err respecting our essence, but +the latter to those who convert themselves erroneously about a divine +cause. But the expression <i>still more dire</i> (δεινοτερον) is not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_493">[493]</span> +used as signifying a more strenuous doubt, in the same manner as we +are accustomed to call those <i>dire</i> (δεινοι) who vanquish by +the power of language, but as a thing worthy of greater dread and +caution to the intelligent. For it divulses the union of things, and +dissociates divinity apart from the world. It also defines divine +power as not pervading to all things, and circumscribes intellectual +knowledge as not all-perfect. It likewise subverts all the fabrication +of the universe, the order imparted to the world from separate causes, +and the goodness which fills all things from one will, in a manner +adapted to the nature of unity. Nor less dire than any one of these +is the confusion of piety. For what communion is there between Gods +and men, if the former are deprived of the knowledge of our concerns? +All supplications, therefore, of divinity, all sacred institutions, +all oaths adducing the Gods as a witness, and the untaught conceptions +implanted in our souls concerning divinity, will perish. What gift +also will be left of the Gods to men, if they do not previously +comprehend in themselves the desert of the recipients, if they do +not possess a knowledge of all that we do, of all we suffer, and of +all that we think, though we do not carry it into effect? With great +propriety, therefore, are such assertions called dire. For if it is +unholy to change any legitimately divine institutions, how can such an +innovation as this be unattended with dread? But that Plato rejects +this hypothesis which makes divinity to be ignorant of our concerns, is +evident from these things, since it is one of his dogmas, that divinity +knows and produces all things. Since, however, some of those posterior +to him have vehemently endeavoured to subvert such-like assertions, let +us speak concerning them as much as may be sufficient for our present +purpose.</p> + +<p>Some of those then posterior to Plato, on seeing the unstable +condition of sublunary things, were fearful that they were not under +the direction of Providence and a divine nature; for such events +as are said to take place through fortune, the apparent inequality +respecting lives, and the disordered motion of material natures, +induced them greatly to suspect that they were not under the government +of Providence. Besides, the persuasion that Divinity is not busily +employed in the evolution of all-various reasons, and that he does not +depart from his own blessedness,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_494">[494]</span> induced them to frame an hypothesis +so lawless and dire. For they were of opinion that the passion of +our soul and the perturbation which it sustains by descending to +the government of bodies, must happen to divinity, if he converted +himself to the providential inspection of things. Farther still, from +considering that different objects of knowledge are known by different +gnostic powers; as for instance, sensibles by sense, objects of +opinion by opinion, things scientific by science, and intelligibles +by intellect; and, at the same time, neither placing sense, nor +opinion, nor science in divinity, but only an intellect immaterial and +pure;—hence they asserted that divinity had no knowledge of any other +things, than the objects of intellect. [And this was the opinion of the +more early Peripatetics.] For say they, if matter is external to him, +it is necessary that he should be pure from apprehensions which are +converted to matter; but being purified from these, it follows that he +must have no knowledge of material natures. Hence the patrons of this +doctrine deprived him of a knowledge of, and providential exertions +about sensibles; not through any imbecility of nature, but through a +transcendency of gnostic energy; just as those whose eyes are filled +with light, are said to be incapable of perceiving mundane objects, at +the same time that this incapacity is nothing more than transcendency +of vision. They likewise add, that there are many things which it +is beautiful not to know. Thus to the entheastic, (or those who are +divinely inspired) it is beautiful to be ignorant of whatever would +destroy the deific energy; and to the scientific, not to know that +which would defile the indubitable perception of science.</p> + +<p>But others [as the Stoics], ascribe indeed to divinity a knowledge of +sensibles, in order that they may not take away his providence, but +at the same time convert his apprehension to that which is external, +represent him as pervading through the whole of a sensible nature, as +passing into contact with the objects of his government, impelling +every thing, and being locally present with all things; for say they, +he would not otherwise be able to extend a providential energy in +a becoming manner, and impart good to every thing according to its +desert.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_495">[495]</span></p> + +<p>Others again affirm that divinity has a knowledge of himself, but +that he has no occasion to understand sensibles in order to provide +for them, since by his very essence he produced all things, and +adorns whatever he has produced, without having any knowledge of his +productions. They add, that this is by no means wonderful, since +nature operates without knowledge, and unattended with phantasy; but +that divinity differs from nature in this, that he has a knowledge of +himself, though not of the things which are fabricated by him. And such +are the assertions of those who were persuaded that divinity is not +separated from mundane natures, and of those who deprived him of the +knowledge of inferior concerns, and of a knowledge operating in union +with providence.</p> + +<p>With respect to these philosophers, we say, that they speak truly, and +yet not truly, on this subject. For if providence has a subsistence, +neither can there be any thing disordered, nor can divinity be busily +employed, nor can he know sensibles through passive sense: but these +philosophers in consequence of not knowing the exempt power and +uniform knowledge of divinity, appear to deviate from the truth. For +thus we interrogate them: does not every thing energize in a becoming +manner when it energizes according to its own power and nature? as for +instance, does not nature, in conformity to the order of its essence, +energize physically, intellect intellectually, and soul psychically, or +according to the nature of soul? And when the same thing is generated +by many and different causes, does not each of these produce according +to its own power, and not according to the nature of the thing +produced? Or shall we say, that each produces after the same manner, +and that, for example, the sun and man generate man, according to the +same mode of operation, and not according to the natural ability of +each, viz. the one partially, imperfectly, and with a busy energy, but +the other without anxious attention, by its very essence, and totally? +But to assert this would be absurd; for a divine operates in a manner +very different from a mortal nature.</p> + +<p>If therefore, every thing which energizes, energizes according to its +own nature and order, some things divinely and supernaturally, others +naturally, and others in a different manner, it is evident that every +gnostic being knows<span class="pagenum" id="Page_496">[496]</span> according to its own nature, and that it does +not follow that because the thing known is one and the same, on this +account, the natures which know, energize in conformity to the essence +of the things known. Thus sense, opinion and our intellect, know that +which is white, but not in the same manner: for sense cannot know what +the essence is of a thing white, nor can opinion obtain a knowledge +of its proper objects in the same manner as intellect; since opinion +knows only <i>that</i> a thing is, but intellect knows the cause of +its existence. <i>Knowledge therefore subsists according to the nature +of that which knows, and not according to the nature of that which is +known.</i> What wonder is it then that Divinity should know all things +in such a manner as is accommodated to his nature, viz. divisible +things indivisibly, things multiplied, uniformly, things generated, +according to an eternal intelligence, totally, such things as are +partial; and that with a knowledge of this kind, he should possess a +power productive of all things, or, in other words, that by knowing all +things with simple and united intellections, he should impart to every +thing being, and a progression into being? For the auditory sense knows +audibles in a manner different from the common sense; and prior to, +and different from these, reason knows audibles, together with other +particulars which sense is not able to apprehend. And again, of desire +which tends to one thing, of anger which aspires after another thing, +and of <i>proairesis</i>, or deliberate choice, there is one particular +life moving the soul towards all these, which are mutually motive of +each other. It is through this life that we say, I desire, I am angry, +and I deliberately choose this thing or that; for this life verges +to all these powers, and lives in conjunction with them, as being a +power which is impelled to every object of desire. But prior both to +reason and this one life, is <i>the one</i> of the soul, which often +says, I perceive, I reason, I desire, and I deliberate, which follows +all these energies and energizes together with them or we should not +be able to know all these, and to apprehend in what they differ from +each other, unless we contained a certain indivisible nature, which +has a subsistence above the common sense, and which prior to opinion, +desire and will, knows all that these know and desire, according to an +indivisible mode of apprehension.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_497">[497]</span></p> + +<p>If this be the case, it is by no means proper to disbelieve in the +indivisible knowledge of divinity, which knows sensibles without +possessing sense, and divisible natures without possessing a divisible +energy, and which without being present to things in place, knows them +prior to all local presence, and imparts to every thing that which +every thing is capable of receiving. The unstable essence therefore, of +apparent natures is not known by him in an unstable, but in a definite +manner; nor does he know that which is subject to all-various mutations +dubiously, but in a manner perpetually the same; for by knowing +himself, he knows every thing of which he is the cause, possessing a +knowledge transcendently more accurate than that which is co-ordinate +to the objects of knowledge; since a causal knowledge of every thing is +superior to every other kind of knowledge. Divinity therefore, knows +without busily attending to the objects of his intellection, because +he abides in himself, and by alone knowing himself, knows all things. +Nor is he indigent of sense, or opinion, or science, in order to know +sensible natures: for it is himself that produces all these, and that +in the unfathomable depths of the intellection of himself, comprehends +an united knowledge of them, according to cause, and in one simplicity +of perception. Just as if some one having built a ship, should place +in it men of his own formation, and, in consequence of possessing a +various art, should add a sea to the ship, produce certain winds, and +afterwards launch the ship into the new created main. Let us suppose +too, that he causes these to have an existence by merely conceiving +them to exist, so that by imagining all this to take place, he gives +an external subsistence to his inward phantasms, it is evident that in +this case he will contain the cause of every thing which happens to the +ship through the winds on the sea, and that by contemplating his own +conceptions, without being indigent of outward conversion, he will at +the same time both fabricate and know these external particulars. Thus, +and in a far greater degree, that divine intellect the artificer of +the universe, possessing the causes of things, both gives subsistence +to, and contemplates, whatever the universe contains without departing +from the speculation of himself. But if with respect to intellect one +kind is more partial, and another more total, it is evident<span class="pagenum" id="Page_498">[498]</span> that there +is not the same intellectual perfection of all things, but that where +intelligibles have a total and undistributed subsistence, there the +knowledge is more total and indivisible, and where the number of forms +proceeds into multitude and extension, there the knowledge is both one +and multiform. Hence, this being admitted, we cannot wonder on hearing +the Orphic verses, in which the theologist says:</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Αυτη δε Ζηνος και εν ομμασι πατρος ανακτος</div> + <div>Ναιουσ’ αθανατοι τε θεοι, θνητοι τ’ ανθρωποι,</div> + <div>Οσσα τε ην γεγαωσα, και υστερον οσσα εμελλον.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>There in the sight of Jove, the parent king,</div> + <div>Th’ immortal gods and mortal men reside,</div> + <div>With all that ever was, and shall hereafter be.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">For the artificer of the universe is full of intelligibles, and +possesses the causes of all things separated from each other; so +that he generates men, and all other things, according to their +characteristic peculiarities, and not so far as each is divine, in +the same manner as the divinity prior to him, the intelligible father +Phanes.”</p> + +<p>The admirable dogma in this most beautiful extract, “that knowledge +subsists according to the nature of that which knows, and not according +to the nature of that which is known,” was originally derived +from Iamblichus, as is evident from the commentary of Ammonius on +Aristotle’s treatise On Interpretation. (See note to p. 162 of my +translation of the Organon.) Boethius in the 5th book of his treatise +De Consolatione, elegantly illustrates this dogma. The passage I allude +to begins with the words: “Omne enim quod cognoscitur, non secundum +sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem.” +The sources however from whence he derived this doctrine, appear to +have been unknown to all his editors and commentators; for they are not +noticed by any of them.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_499">[499]</span></p> +<hr class="chap"> + + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="center p4 lg"><b>EXTRACTS</b></p></div> + +<p class="center p1 xs">FROM THE</p> + +<p class="center p1 sm">TREATISE OF PROCLUS</p> + +<p class="center p1 xs">ON THE</p> + +<p class="center p1">SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL.</p> + +<hr class="r25"> + + +<p>In this treatise Proclus inquires, first, Whether there is such a thing +as evil? secondly, If there is, whether it is in intellectual natures? +thirdly, If evil is in sensibles, whether it subsists according to +a principal cause? fourthly, If it does not subsist according to +a principal cause, whether any essence must be assigned to it, or +whether it must be admitted to be perfectly unessential, and without +hypostasis? fifthly, And if this be the case, how does it subsist, +another principle existing, and whence does it originate, and how far +does it proceed? And farther, still, sixthly, how, since Providence +exists, does evil subsist, and whence is it derived? If the father of +the universe not only produced the nature of good, but was also willing +that there should be nothing evil any where, by what contrivance or art +does evil subsist, which the Demiurgus did not wish to subsist? For it +is not lawful to assert that he was willing some things should subsist, +but produced others, since in divine natures<span class="pagenum" id="Page_500">[500]</span> <i>to be willing</i>, +and <i>to produce</i> are simultaneous and conjoined. Hence evil is +not only a thing contrary to the will of divinity, but is also without +hypostasis, divinity not only not producing it (for this it is not even +lawful to suppose) but not suffering it to subsist. Proclus answers, +that physical evil, viz. the evil which is corruptive of the essence, +power and energy of a thing, is not evil but good, because it subsists +on account of good, and because generation is from corruption, of +which two the world consists, and by which the order of the universe +is adorned. There is not, however, such a thing as unmingled evil, and +evil itself, or an eternal idea, form and essence of evil, but moral +evil is mixed with good, and so far as it is good, it subsists from +divinity, but so far as evil, it is derived from another cause which is +impotent. For evil is nothing else than a greater or less declination, +departure, defect and privation from <i>the good itself</i>, and which +is good alone, in the same manner as darkness from the sun. It is the +debility and absence of power in energizing, but is not power. And that +which is evil to partial natures, is not evil to the universe.</p> + + +<p class="p2">2. Evil is not in the Gods, nor in the triple government of the better +genera, viz. it is neither in angels; (for how could we call them +messengers and elucidators of the Gods, if evil of any kind was in +them who are the images of the divinities, and who dwelling in the +vestibules of deity participate of its goodness?) nor in dæmons, nor +in heroes. If divinity produced evil, he either produced it contrary +to his nature, or every thing thence subsisting will be boniform, and +the progeny of the goodness that abides in him. But as it is said, it +is not the property of fire to impart cold, nor of good to produce +evil from itself. Either, therefore, it must be said that evil is not, +if it is necessary to its existence that it should be produced by +divinity, or that it is, and does not originate from deity. Against +those who assert that evil is primarily in dæmons, he observes as +follows: There are certain persons who attribute passions to dæmons, +and say that some of their passions are according to nature as when +they tragically speak of their deaths, and different generations; but +that others are from choice only, as when they denominate certain +dæmons base and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_501">[501]</span> evil, who, they also say, defile souls, lead them to +matter, and draw them down from their journey to the heavens to the +subterranean region. It is necessary, however, to ask these persons, +whether are the dæmons, which you say are evil, such to themselves [or +in their own nature,] or not to themselves, but to others? For if they +are evil to themselves, one of two things must follow, either that +they must remain in evil for ever, or that they must be susceptive of +transmutation. And if indeed they are always evil, how can that which +subsists from the Gods be perpetually evil? For it is better not to +be at all, than to be always evil. But if they are transmuted, they +are not essentially evil, but are evil from habitude, in which there +is the better and the worse, and another species of life. Dæmons, +however, are always in the ratio of dæmons, and each of them is always +in its own order. But if they are indeed good to themselves, but evil +to others whom they lead into a worse condition, it is just as if some +one should call teachers depraved, and certain pedagogues, who ranking +as the chastisers of offences, do not suffer the offenders to pursue +a better order in a fluctuating manner, instead of an order which is +adapted to them. Or as if some one should denominate those [officers] +evil, who standing before things of a sacred nature [in temples] keep +the impure from entering into the sanctuary, because they prohibit them +from the participation of the interior rites. Hence, it is not evil to +perform this office, but to be of such an order, and to deserve such a +prohibition.<a id="FNanchor_380" href="#Footnote_380" class="fnanchor">[380]</a> If, therefore, of the dæmons that are in the world, +some lead souls upward, but others keep such in their own manners, as +are not yet able to ascend, we cannot justly call either of them evil, +neither those<span class="pagenum" id="Page_502">[502]</span> that separate from nor those that detain souls [in a +corporeal life.] For it is necessary that there should also be those +dæmons who coerce the soul that is defiled with vice, and is unworthy +of a progression into the heavens, in the place which surrounds the +earth. Neither, therefore, in these, does reason appear to discover +evil. For whatever they do, they perform according to their own nature, +and always after the same manner. But this is not evil.</p> + + +<p class="p2">3. Evil in souls is a debility of not always and uniformly adhering +to better natures, and to good. Hence arises their descent to things +subordinate, their oblivion, their malefic inclination to things +conversant with body, and their discord with reason. According to +some, matter is that which is primarily evil, and evil itself, and the +debility of souls arises from their lapse into matter. This Proclus +denies, and says that both body and matter originate from deity, and +that both are the progeny of divinity. He adds, that matter is the +first indefinite, and that essential infinity, in the same manner as a +mixed body, depends on one cause, divinity. That souls sinned before +they were thrust into matter. That there are not two principles [matter +and deity.] And that matter is neither good nor evil, but a thing +necessary, and distant in the last degree from <i>the good itself</i>.</p> + + +<p class="p2">4. Of good there is one eternal, definite, universal and producing +cause, viz. God; but of evils the causes are manifold and infinite, +some to souls, and others to bodies. They are also fluctuating, +indefinite, inordinate, and particular, surrounding the nature of souls +and bodies from necessity, and arising from impotency, incommensuration +void of design, anadaptation, debility, and the victory of a +subordinate nature. Good has an hypostasis, but evil a parhypostasis or +a deviation from hypostasis. Good is form, but evil is without form, +and is as it were privation.</p> + + +<p class="p2">5. Evil possesses its power of acting, and its capability from a +contrary good, which becomes debile and inefficacious on account of +the mixture of evil; and evil is allotted its efficacy and energy on +account of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_503">[503]</span> presence of good, for both are in one. Thus in bodies, +that which is preternatural, debilitates that which is according to +nature, the energy, of nature being in this case dormant, and order, +in which good consists, being dissolved. Thus also in souls, evil when +it vanquishes good, uses its power, viz. the power of reason, to its +own purposes, and makes it subservient to desire. Each of these also +imparts something according to its own nature, viz. the one power, +but the other debility; because of itself evil is neither adapted to +act, nor to possess power; for all power is good, and all energy is +an extension of power. And this Plato knowing, says, that injustice +itself is of itself debile and inactive; but through the presence of +justice possesses its power, and is led forth into energy, not abiding +in its own nature. Nor does evil alone consist in a privation of +life, because being which subsists prior to life, gives also to evil +a participation of life. All life, however, is of itself power; but +evil subsisting in a foreign power is contrary to good, employing its +own power for the purpose of opposing good. And the more power indeed +is inherent in it, the greater are the energies and works of evil, and +the less it possesses of power, the less are its energies and works. +In bodies too as soon as the powers of nature cease, the preternatural +energy which is in them ceases also; and hence, all order is entirely +dissolved, that which is preternatural being more abundant. When the +soul, therefore, receives an increase from that which is contrary to +good, according to its base and formless nature, but is diminished +according to virtue and energy, then it becomes at the same time debile +and inefficacious. For the augmentation is not then from power, that +the transition might be to something greater; but it arises from the +presence of the contrary to power, just as if frigidity should use the +power of heat to the accomplishment of its own work, vanquishing and +subjecting its power. The soul, therefore, being deficient through the +absence of good, and possessing more of privation in proportion as +it has more of deficiency, becoming also more debile in its energies +through a diminution of virtue, is indeed more evil, but performs less.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_504">[504]</span></p> + +<p>And how indeed could the increase since it is evil be from power, +if the work of all power is to preserve that in which it is, but +evil dissipates every thing of which it is the evil. Hence evil is +of itself inefficacious and impotent. If also, as Plato says, it is +involuntary, it will not be the object of the will. And thus it will be +a privation of the first triad of <i>the good</i>, viz. of <i>will</i>, +<i>power</i>, and <i>energy</i>. For good indeed, is the object of the +will, and is in its own nature powerful and efficacious; but evil is +unwished for, is debile and inefficacious. For that is not the object +of the will to any thing which is corruptive of it, nor does power +wish for that which may corrupt it, nor does energy wish not to have +its hypostasis according to power. But evil is desired in consequence +of appearing to be good; and we say that evil seems to be an object of +the will, on account of the mixture of good with it. Power, therefore, +and energy are apparently in evil, [but are not so in reality] because +they are not essentially inherent in it, nor so far as it is evil, +but they extrinsically accede to it, as that to which a parhypostasis +belongs. Hence, as it appears to me, this is what Socrates shows in +the Theætetus to those who are able to understand his meaning, viz. +that evil is neither privation, nor the contrary to good. For privation +is not able to effect any thing, nor does it in short possess any +power; nor does that which is contrary to good of itself possess +either power or energy. But he denominates evil in a certain respect +<i>subcontrary</i> to good, because of itself indeed, or essentially, +it is privation, yet because it is not altogether perfect privation, +but in a similar manner with habit changes from capacity, it is from +thence constituted in energizing in the part of contrariety, and is +neither perfect privation, nor contrary, but subcontrary to good.</p> + + +<p class="p2">7. There are these three things which may debilitate, and in which +there is evil, viz. a partial soul; the image of soul in animals; and +body. The evil to body is to have a preternatural subsistence; the evil +to the image of soul is to be in a state of deviation from reason; +and the evil to soul [i.e. to the rational soul,] is to deviate from +intellect. The defect of life according to reason is the malady of +this life; but ignorance and a privation of intellect are baseness, +whether this takes place about the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_505">[505]</span> dianoetic or the doxastic power; +and if about the former it is a want of science, but if about the +latter, of art. Baseness, however, and malady, subsist in one way in +cognitions, and in another in impulses. For the irrational appetites +are hostile to the life which consists in action, and the many senses +and precipitate imaginations intervening in the contemplative energy +destroy its purity and immateriality. Hence unbecoming imaginations, or +evil consent and base choice arise, either from an external source and +in various actions, or internally according to anger and desire. That +also which is preternatural is twofold. For in the body, it is either +deformity, as in monsters, or malady, in consequence of the order and +commensuration of the body being dissolved, as in corruption, disease, +and pain.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>In many persons meditated evil, and which abides occultly within the +soul, is benefited as being base and unbecoming. But when it subsists +in energy the quality of it becomes apparent. It is manifested, +however, by penitence and the consciousness of the soul. For the +medical art also, in the opening of ulcers, and leading forth +externally the inwardly concealed cause which produced the malady, +exhibits an image of the operations of Providence, which permits base +deeds and passions, in order that the perpetrators of them being +changed from the habit which they have acquired, and which is inflated +with evils, may assume the principle of a better period and life. But +whatever passions are within the soul, are attended with this good, +that they always lead the soul to a proper condition, her improper +choice being accompanied with punishment. Thus also the law which is in +souls leads each to its appropriate state, and to that desert which is +derived from Providence.</p> + + +<p class="p2">9. Evil cannot exist, if it is admitted that it is not contrary to +good, because all things, and even evil itself, are for the sake of +good. Divinity, therefore, is not the cause of evil. For evil, so far +as evil never originates from thence, but from other causes which +as we have said generate not according to power, but on account of +debility. Hence it appears to me<span class="pagenum" id="Page_506">[506]</span> that Plato<a id="FNanchor_381" href="#Footnote_381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a> when he places all +things about the king of all, and says that all things are for his +sake, (even things which are not good appearing to be good, and in a +similar manner belonging to beings) calls him the cause of every thing +good, and not at once the cause of all things, for he is not the cause +of evil, but is the cause of every being, and of every thing so far as +it is good. If, therefore, we assert these things rightly, all things +will be from Providence, and evil will have a place among beings. Hence +also the Gods produce evil, but they produce it as good; and they know, +as possessing a unical knowledge of all things, partibles impartibly, +evils according to the form of good, and multitude according to the +form of <i>the one</i>. For there is one knowledge of soul, another of +an intellectual nature, and another of the Gods themselves. For the +first of these indeed, is a self-motive, the second, an eternal, and +the third an indivisible and unical knowledge, knowing and producing +all things by <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>For the further information of the reader on this most important +subject, the Subsistence of Evil, the following admirable extract is +added, from the Commentaries of Proclus On the Timæus, (p. 112.) The +Comment is on these words, “Divinity being willing that all things +should be good, and that as much as possible nothing should be evil;” +and is as follows:</p> + +<p>“The divine fabrication and intellectual production, proceeds from +things impartible to such as are partible, from the united to the +multiplied, and from things without interval to corporeal masses that +are every way distended with interval. This also the discourse about it +adumbrating, in the first place, <i>enunciatively</i> celebrates the +final cause, afterwards <i>discursively</i>, and in the third place, +delivers <i>in an evolved manner</i>, the whole orderly distribution +and progression from it. For the words “he was good,” <i>uniformly</i> +indeed comprehend every thing final, and the most<span class="pagenum" id="Page_507">[507]</span> divine of causes. +But the words, “In that which is good, envy is never inherent about +any thing; and being without this, he was willing that all things +should be generated as much as possible similar to himself,” effect +this <i>discursively</i>.<a id="FNanchor_382" href="#Footnote_382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a> For after the one will of intellect, +he introduces the divided contemplation of it. And in the present +words, he delivers to us the intelligence of divinity now proceeding +into all multitude and interval, <i>evolving</i> every demiurgic +providence, and all the parts of fabrication. Moreover, the third of +these is in continuity with the second, and the second with the first. +For since the first particle was, “he was good,” on this account the +second begins from the good, but proceeds as far as to the will of the +father. But the third beginning from will, delivers the whole of his +providential energy. For if he was good, he was willing to make all +things good. But if he was willing, he made them to be so, and led the +universe into order. For providence indeed, is suspended from will, but +will from goodness. And thus much concerning the order and connexion of +the words.</p> + +<p>Let us however consider what this will is, in order that we may +understand how it is conjoined with goodness. Superessential union +itself therefore, and which is of itself exempt from beings, is +indeed one, ineffable, and indefinite, having the uncircumscribed, +and the incomprehensible in <i>the one itself</i>. If therefore, it +be requisite to survey in this, the above mentioned uniform triad, +<i>goodness</i> indeed has the precedency, but <i>will</i> is the +second, and <i>providence</i> is the third; goodness indeed, producing +the perfect, the sufficient, and the desirable; but will exhibiting +exuberant plenitude, the extended, and the generative; and providence +imparting the efficacious, the perfective, and the undefiled. According +to this ineffable and united hyparxis of the triad, the intelligible +also is triply divided into essence, power, and energy; essence indeed, +being firmly established in it, and being self-perfect; but power +having a never-failing and infinite progression; and energy being +allotted perfection, and essential production. And again, intellect +after the same manner is triply divided, into being, life, and the +intellectual. For the first of these<span class="pagenum" id="Page_508">[508]</span> indeed, is the supplier of its +existence, the second of its life, and the third, of its gnostic power. +After these also, soul is divided, into that which is the object of +science, into science, and into that which is scientific. For the +first of these is that which is known, the second is knowledge, and +the third is that which derives its completion from both these. These +triads therefore being four, as goodness is to will, so is essence to +power, being to life, and the object of science to science. And as +will is to providence, so is power to energy, life to intellect, and +science to that which is scientific. For essence, being, and the object +of science, have an order analogous to goodness. For the connective, +the stable, the uniform, and the perfective, pertain to goodness. But +power, life, and science, are analogous to will. For the self-begotten, +and that which comprehends and measures all things, belong to will. And +energy, intellect, and that which is scientific, pertain to providence. +For the efficacious, and that which proceeds through and antecedently +comprehends all things, are the resemblances of divine providence. +Since therefore, the demiurgus also is a God, and an imparticipable +intellect, so far as he is a God indeed, he possesses goodness, will, +and providence; but as intelligible, he has essence, power, and energy; +and as intellect, he is, and has life, and a knowledge of wholes. The +monad also which he possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much +concerning will.</p> + +<p>Consequent to this, it remains to enquire how the demiurgus wished all +things to be good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it +may be said, if he was willing that this should be the case, it would +be requisite that the progression of things should stop at the Gods +and undefiled essences. If however, he not only fabricated these, but +also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thing material, he was +not willing that all things should be good. For he was not willing that +better natures should exist, but also fabricated such as are worse. +If he had been willing therefore, that all things should be good, he +would have stopped his fabrication at the Gods. We reply however, +that if the progression of things was only as far as to the Gods, all +things would not be good. For first natures being allotted the last +order, the good would be destroyed; since being able and willing to +generate through their goodness,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_509">[509]</span> yet in consequence of an arrangement +as the last of things, they would become unprolific and not good. Our +opponents therefore say, if all things are good, the progression is as +far as to the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends +only as far as to the Gods, all things are not good. For if a divine +nature is unprolific how is it good? But it will be unprolific, if it +is the last of things. For every thing which generates is better than +that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not existing, +that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there be +the Gods therefore, and let them have the first order. But after the +Gods, let there be a progression<a id="FNanchor_383" href="#Footnote_383" class="fnanchor">[383]</a> as far as to matter itself; and +let us give a transition to all beings, from the first to the last of +things. And neither let there be any thing wanting even of the last +of beings, nor any vacuum. For what vacuum can there be, when things +characterized by <i>itself</i><a id="FNanchor_384" href="#Footnote_384" class="fnanchor">[384]</a> have the first subsistence, those +that rank as the second proceed from these, those of the third order, +proceed from these and others, those in the fourth rank, are generated +from things characterized by the term <i>another</i>, and those in the +fifth rank being <i>others</i> only; and on each side of these those +natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar?<a id="FNanchor_385" href="#Footnote_385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a> Such therefore, +being the continuity in things, what can be deficient? Immoveable +natures being first established, self-motive natures having the second, +and alter-motive natures the third rank, all of which are the last of +things. For all beings derive their completion from the above-mentioned +orders. In short, the production of things may be shown to be continued +in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak, analogy subsisting +from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the +well-ordered progression of all beings from <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<p>Let therefore, all these things be acknowledged, and let the generation +of beings be extended as far as to nothing; but whether is there +nothing evil in these, or shall we admit that there is in a certain +respect, and that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_510">[510]</span> there is what is called depravity in bodies, and in +souls? For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil entirely; +but others have been induced to deny a providence, in consequence of +believing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are good. +For if indeed divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he +be good? For it is the province of that which is essentially good to +benefit every thing, just as it is of that which is essentially hot, to +give heat. But it is not lawful for <i>the good</i> to effect any thing +else than what is good. And if divinity was not<a id="FNanchor_386" href="#Footnote_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a> willing there +should be evil, how can it have a subsistence? For something will exist +contrary to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the +doubt.</p> + +<p>We must say however, conformably to the doctrine of Plato according to +our preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respect to things +subsists in a different manner from that of ours. And again, that the +habitude of things with reference to deity is different from their +habitude with reference to us. For wholes have a relation to parts +different from that of parts to each other. To divinity therefore +nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. For +he uses these also to a good purpose. But again, to partial natures +there is a certain evil, these being naturally adapted to suffer by +it. And the same thing is to a part indeed evil, but to the universe +and to wholes is not evil, but good. For so far as it is a being, and +so far as it participates of a certain order, it is good. For this +thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute of +all good, you will make it to be beyond even that which in no respect +whatever is. For as <i>the good itself</i> is prior to being, so evil +itself is posterior to the nothingness of non-entity. For that which is +most distant from the good is evil, and not that which has no kind of +subsistence.<a id="FNanchor_387" href="#Footnote_387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a> If therefore, that which in no respect whatever is, +has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is +much more impossible that there should be such a thing as evil itself.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_511">[511]</span></p> + +<p>If however, that which is entirely evil has no subsistence, but evil +is complicated with good, you give it a place among beings, and you +make it good to other things. And indeed, how is it possible it should +not, if it ranks among beings? For that which participates of being, +participates also of unity, and that which participates of unity, +participates likewise of good. Hence evil if it is, participates +of good; because evil has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not +entirely deprived of order, and indefinite. Who therefore made it to be +such? Who imparted to it measure and order, and bound? It is evident +that it is the demiurgus, who rendered all things similar to himself. +For he filled both wholes and parts with good. But if he benefits +all things, and colours evil itself with good, there is nothing evil +according to the power of divinity and of recipients. For power is +twofold, one being that of divinity which benefits the depravity that +is so abundantly seen;<a id="FNanchor_388" href="#Footnote_388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a> but the other being that of recipients, +which participate of the goodness of the demiurgus according to the +measure of their order [in the scale of beings]. In consequence +therefore of the demiurgus being willing that there should be nothing +evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as the cause +of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away +the fabrication of the world, subvert the prolific power of wholes, and +confound the nature of things first and last.</p> + +<p>That we assert these things however, conformably to the opinion of +Plato, may be easily seen from his writings. For in the Politicus, +he clearly says, “that the world obtained from<a id="FNanchor_389" href="#Footnote_389" class="fnanchor">[389]</a> its maker all +beautiful things, but from its former habit, all such injustice and +evil, as are produced within the heavens.” For because there is +generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a +subsistence. And because the deformity of matter fills partial souls +with inelegance, through an association with it, on this account that +which is not conformable to reason is allotted a certain resemblance +of subsistence. At the same time however, all these particulars become +beautiful through the goodness of the maker of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_512">[512]</span> universe. But in +the Republic, Plato assigns no other cause of good than God, and says +that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated; through +which he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from +divinity. For it is not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate, +nor of snow to heat, nor of that which is all-good to produce evil. And +he asserts that certain partial causes of these are to be admitted, and +such as are indefinite. For it is not in evils as in things that are +good, viz. that <i>the one</i>, and what is primarily good, precede +multitude; and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil. +The words <i>others</i> therefore and <i>certain</i>, evince that the +causes of evil are partial and indefinite. But in the Theætetus he +says “that it is neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor for +them to be in the Gods, but that they revolve from necessity about +the mortal nature, and this place of our abode.” If therefore, evil +revolves necessarily in the mortal place, it will not be according to +Plato, that which in no respect whatever has a subsistence, and which +is exempt from all beings. So that according to him evil exists, is +from partial causes, and is benefited through the boniform providence +of the demiurgus, because there is nothing which is entirely evil, but +every thing is in a certain respect accomplished conformably to justice +and divinity.</p> + +<p>For we may make the following division: Of all that the world contains, +some things are wholes, but others parts. And of parts, some eternally +preserve their own good, such as a partial intellect, and partial +dæmons, but others are not always able to preserve their proper good. +And of these, some are alter-motive, but others self-motive. And of +self-motive natures, some have evil established in their choice; but +in others, it terminates in actions. With respect to wholes therefore, +they are perfectly good, supplying not only themselves, but also parts +with good. Such things however, as are parts, and yet preserve their +own good, possess good secondarily and partially. But such as are +parts, and alter-motive, deriving their subsistence from other things, +are suspended from the providence of them, and are transmuted in a +becoming manner, as is the case with such bodies as are generated and +corrupted. For if it is necessary that there should be generation, it +is also necessary that there<span class="pagenum" id="Page_513">[513]</span> should be corruption. For generation +subsists according to mutation, and is a certain mutation. But if +there is corruption, it is necessary that the preternatural should be +secretly introduced. As therefore, that which is corrupted, is indeed +corrupted with reference to itself, but is not destroyed with reference +to the universe; for it is either air or water, or something else into +which it is changed; thus also that which is preternatural, is indeed +with respect to itself disordered, but with respect to the universe +has an orderly arrangement. For, if though it should be destroyed +and entirely deprived of order, it would not dissolve the order of +the universe, how is it possible that when having a preternatural +subsistence which is of itself nothing when deprived of all order, +it can destroy the whole arrangement of things? But again, partial +natures which are self-motive indeed, and whose energy is directed to +externals, cause that which is effected by their energy to be evil to +themselves, yet in a certain respect this also is good, and conformable +to divinity. For since impulses and actions are from choice, actions +follow elections according to justice, when he who chuses not only +deserves the retribution consequent to his choice, but that also which +follows from his conduct. And simply indeed, the action is not good, +but to him who chuses a certain thing, and is impelled in a certain +way, it is introduced according to justice; and is good to this +individual and this particular life. For of goods, some are good to all +things, others to such as differ according to species, and others to +individuals, so far as they are individuals. For hellebore is not good +to all men, nor to all bodies, nor yet to all diseased bodies, but it +is good to one who is diseased in a particular manner, and is salutary +from a certain principle. Whether therefore, the action is intemperate +or unjust, to those who perform it indeed it is good, so far as it is +conformable to justice, but simply it is not good, nor to those by whom +it is done, but is to them the greatest evil. And so far as it proceeds +from them and is directed to them, it is evil; but so far as it +proceeds from the universe to them, it is not evil. And so far as their +energy is directed to themselves, they destroy their life, becoming +actually depraved; but so far as they suffer from the universe, they +undergo the punishment of their choice; (just as it is said, that those +who deliberate<span class="pagenum" id="Page_514">[514]</span> about betraying a suppliant, subvert divinity); or they +suffer the punishment of their will.</p> + +<p>Let us however, direct our attention to what remains, viz. to such +partial natures as energize self-motively, and who stop their depravity +as far as to their choice. For they suffer the punishment of their +cogitation alone. For, as it is said, there is a certain punishment of +mere imagination, impulse and will; since the Gods govern us inwardly, +and as they reward beneficent choice, so likewise they punish the +contrary. But it may be said, how can choice itself have that which is +conformable to justice and divinity? May we not reply, because it is +necessary there should be an essence of this kind and a power of an +ambiguous nature, and which verges to different lives. If therefore +that which has dominion over choice is from divinity, choice also is +from divinity, and if this be the case, it is good. For the electing +soul alone, is transferred to another and another order. For all +choice either elevates the soul, or draws it downward [to an inferior +condition of being]. And if indeed the choice is from a depraved<a id="FNanchor_390" href="#Footnote_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a> +soul, it is evil; but if it transfers that which chuses to its proper +order, it is according to justice and good. For the choice itself +introduces punishment to the electing soul. Or rather, the choice +becomes punishment in him who chooses, causing the soul to apostatize +from good. For as a beneficent choice becomes truly the reward of +itself, so a depraved choice becomes its own punishment. For this is +the peculiarity of self-motive powers. Hence there is no evil, which +is not also in a certain respect good; but all things participate of +providence.</p> + +<p>If however, certain persons should ask on what account an +evil-producing cause had at first a subsistence, though it should not +rank among wholes, but is of a partial nature, to these it must be +said, that the progression of beings is continued, and that no vacuum +is left among them. Whether therefore, is it necessary that there +should not be every self-motive life? But we shall thus take away many +natures that are divine. Or shall we say it is necessary there should +be wholes that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should +be self-motive parts?<span class="pagenum" id="Page_515">[515]</span> But how is it possible they should be wholes, +if deprived of their proper parts?<a id="FNanchor_391" href="#Footnote_391" class="fnanchor">[391]</a> And how will the continuity of +beings be preserved, if wholes and self-motive natures have a prior +existence, and also partial and alter-motive natures, but we entirely +destroy the intermediate natures, viz. such as are self-motive indeed, +but at the same time partial? And which through the partial form become +connected with habitude, but through the self-motive power, are at a +certain time liberated from habitude. It is necessary therefore, that +there should be this life also, which is a medium in beings, and the +bond of things which have as it were an arrangement contrary<a id="FNanchor_392" href="#Footnote_392" class="fnanchor">[392]</a> to +each other. Evil however, is not on this account natural to the soul; +since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated +body has an essential tendency to disease; for it is essentially +corruptible; and yet disease is not according to nature. Hence disease +is indeed evil to the partial nature which is allotted to connect this +particular body, but is good to the wholeness of bodies. For it is +necessary that what is generated from other things, should be changed +into another thing. As therefore, to the nature which is in us, it is +good for the nutriment to be changed, in order to the preservation +of the animal; thus also to every nature it is good for a part to be +corrupted, in order that the wholes may be preserved, which are always +prior to parts. For if parts were generated from wholes, and the +things generated should remain, all things would be rapidly consumed, +in consequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For a continued +ablation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must +necessarily fail. But wholes not existing, either generation will be +stopped, or mutation to partial natures will be derived from other +things. Hence that which is evil to a partial nature is good to the +whole life of the world.</p> + +<p>Farther still therefore, resuming the enquiry after another manner +from the beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there +should be evil, or was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he +was willing indeed, considered as imparting being to all things. For +every<span class="pagenum" id="Page_516">[516]</span> thing in the universe which has any kind of being proceeds from +the demiurgic cause. But he was not willing, considered as producing +all things good. For he concealed evil in the use of good. And if you +are willing to argue physically, evil is produced <i>essentially</i> +indeed from a partial soul, but <i>accidentally</i> from divinity, so +far as it is evil, if it is admitted that divinity gave subsistence +to the soul. Evil also so far as it is essentially good, originates +from a divine cause, but accidentally from the soul. For so far as it +subsists according to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in the +Laws defines what punishment is, viz. that it appears to consume him +who suffers it, and resembles the opening of ulcers. And he who is +incapable<a id="FNanchor_393" href="#Footnote_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> of being healed without a certain action, is incited +to the performance of it, in order that the soul being liberated from +her parturiency and stupid astonishment about that which is base, and +repenting of her own evils, may begin to be purified. For base and +unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely to those +that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, fill those that +perform them with repentance. And when indeed, they are the subjects +of meditation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased; but when +they have proceeded into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility, +but liberate the soul from the most disgraceful parturition. And some +indeed, exhibit this punishment according to the whole of their life; +but others according to partial energies. For he who does any thing +irrational, does it from choice, is impelled to that which is the +object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in +his imagination.</p> + +<p>In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures; for the whole +intellectual genus is free from all evil; nor in whole souls, or whole +bodies; for all wholes are exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and +always subsisting according to nature. It remains therefore, that it +must be in partial souls, or in partial bodies. But neither is it +in the essences of these; for all their essences are derived from +divinity; nor in their powers; for these subsist according to nature. +Hence it remains, that it must be in their energies. But with respect +to souls, it is neither in such as are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_517">[517]</span> rational; for all these aspire +after good; nor in such as are irrational; for these energize according +to nature. But it subsists in the privation of symmetry<a id="FNanchor_394" href="#Footnote_394" class="fnanchor">[394]</a> of these +with reference to each other. And in bodies, it is neither in form; +for it wishes to rule over matter; nor in matter; for it aspires after +the supervening ornaments of form. But it consists in the privation +of symmetry between form and matter. From which also it is evident, +that every thing evil exists according to a <i>parhypostasis</i>, or +<i>resemblance of subsistence</i>, and that at the same time it is +coloured by good; so that all things are good through the will of +divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it +was not possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have +a shadowy subsistence, since it is necessary to the perfection of the +whole of things. And from what has been said, it is evident, that the +will of divinity is not vain. For all things are good with reference to +him, and there is not any being which is not vanquished by a portion +of good. Nor are the words, “<i>as much as possible</i>,” written +superfluously. For they do not signify an imperfect power, but that +power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an +abundance of good.”</p> + +<hr class="r25"> + +<p class="center sm">THE END.</p> + + +<hr class="r25"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_i">[i]</span></p> + +<h2 class="p2"><b>ADDITIONAL NOTES</b></h2> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Vol. I.</span> P. 1. <i>Becoming unapparent to many.</i> It is a +remarkable historical fact, as I have observed in my History of the +Restoration of the Platonic Theology, that the philosophy of Plato +was in a manner lost for many centuries after the death of its great +master. For its depths were not penetrated prior to Plotinus, who lived +about two hundred and fifty years after the birth of Christ.</p> + +<p>P. 2. <i>Jamblichus and Theodorus.</i> Both these philosophers were +the disciples of Porphyry. For an account of the former, of whom the +Emperor Julian says, that he was posterior indeed in time to Plato, +but not in genius, see my History of the Restoration of the Platonic +Theology, annexed to my translation of Proclus on Euclid.</p> + +<p>P. 5. <i>Being likewise a partaker of the dialectic of Plato.</i> +The dialectic of Plato is very different from the dialectic which +is conversant with opinion, and is accurately investigated in the +Topics of Aristotle. For the business of this first of sciences, is +to employ definitions, divisions, analyzations, and demonstrations, +as primary sciences in the investigation of causes; imitating the +progression of beings from the first principle of things, and their +continual conversion to it, as the ultimate object of desire. “But +there are three energies, says Proclus (in MS. Comment. in Parmenid. +lib. 1.) of this most scientific method, the first of which is adapted +to youth, and is useful for the purpose of rousing their intellect, +which is, as it were, in a dormant state. For it is a true exercise of +the soul in the speculation of things, leading forth thro’ opposite +positions the essential impression of ideas which it contains, and +considering not only the divine path, as it were, which conducts to +truth, but exploring whether the deviations from it contain any thing +worthy of belief; and lastly, stimulating the all-various conceptions +of the soul. But the second energy takes place when intellect rests +from its former investigations, as becoming most familiar with the +speculation of beings, and beholds truth itself firmly established on +a pure and holy foundation. And this energy, according to Socrates, +by a progression through ideas, evolves the whole of an intelligible +nature, till it arrives at that which is first; and this by analyzing, +defining, demonstrating and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards, +till, having entirely investigated the nature of intelligibles, it +raises itself to a nature superior to beings. But the soul being +perfectly established in this nature, as in her paternal port, no +longer tends to a more excellent object of desire, as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_ii">[ii]</span> she has now +arrived at the end of her search. And you may say that what is +delivered in the Phædrus and Sophista is the employment of this energy, +giving a twofold division to some, and a fourfold to other operations +of the dialectic art. Hence it is assigned to such as philosophize +purely, and no longer require preparatory exercise, but nourish the +intellect of their soul in pure intellection. But the third energy +purifies from twofold ignorance, when its reasons are employed upon +men full of opinion; and this is spoken of in the Sophista.” So that +the dialectic energy is triple, either subsisting through opposite +arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falsehood. See +admirable specimens of this master science in the notes to my Plato, +Vol. 3.</p> + +<p>P. 13. <i>Devised wanderings, sections, battles, lacerations, rapes and +adulteries of the Gods.</i> See the fables in which these things are +asserted of the Gods admirably unfolded by Proclus in the Introduction +to the 2nd. and 3rd. books of the Republic of Plato, in Vol. 1. of my +Plato.</p> + +<p>P. 90. <i>And thus much concerning divine names.</i> In addition +to what is here said, Proclus admirably remarks on this subject as +follows, in his MS. Scholia On the Cratylus of Plato.</p> + +<p>Since, however, the present discourse is about divine names, it is +necessary to speak a little concerning them. And in the first place, +let us speak concerning the names which are occultly established in the +Gods themselves; since some of the ancients said that these originated +from the more excellent genera,<a id="FNanchor_395" href="#Footnote_395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a> but that the Gods are established +beyond a signification of this kind; but others admitted that names are +in the Gods themselves, and in those Gods that are allotted the highest +order.</p> + +<p>The Gods, therefore, possess an hyparxis uniform and ineffable, a power +generative of wholes, and an intellect perfect and full of conceptions; +and they give subsistence to all things according to this triad. +Hence it is necessary that the participations of those divinities who +are of a more elevated order, and who are arranged nearer to <i>the +good</i>, should proceed triadically through all things to which +they give subsistence. It is also necessary that among these, those +participations should be more ineffable, which are defined according to +the <i>hyparxes</i> of the first Gods; but that those should be more +apparent, and more divided, which are illuminated according to the +<i>intellect</i> of exempt causes; and that those participations which +are between these, should be such as are the effluxions of <i>prolific +powers</i>. For the fathers of wholes giving subsistence to all things, +have disseminated in all things vestiges, and impressions of their own +triadic hypostasis; since nature also inserts in bodies an exciting +principle (εναυσμα) derived from her proper idiom through which she +moves bodies, and governs them as by a rudder. And the demiurgus has +established in the universe an image of his own monadic transcendency, +through which he governs the world, holding a rudder, as Plato says, +like a pilot. It is proper to think therefore, that these rudders +and this helm of the universe, in which the demiurgus being seated +orderly disposes the world, are nothing else than a symbol of the whole +fabrication of things, to us indeed difficult of comprehension, but +to the Gods themselves known and manifest. And why is it requisite to +speak concerning these things, since of the ineffable cause of all, +who is beyond intelligibles, there is an impression in every being, +and even as far as to the last of things, through which all things are +suspended from him, some more remotely, and others more near, according +to the clearness and obscurity of the impression which they contain. +This it is which moves all things to the desire of good, and imparts +to beings this inextinguishable love. And this impression is indeed +unknown: for it pervades as far as to things which are incapable of +knowledge. It is also more excellent than life; for it is present with +things inanimate: and has not an intellectual power; since it lies +in things destitute of intellectual energy. As nature therefore, the +demiurgic monad, and the father himself who is exempt from all things, +have disseminated in things posterior, impressions of their respective +peculiarities, and through these convert all things to themselves, in +like manner all the Gods impart to their progeny, symbols<span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[iii]</span> of their +cause, and through these establish all things in themselves, The +impressions, therefore, of the hyparxis of the higher order of Gods, +which are disseminated in secondary natures are ineffable and unknown, +and their efficacious and motive energy surpasses all intelligence. And +of this kind are the characters of light, through which the Gods unfold +themselves to their progeny; these characters subsisting unically in +the Gods themselves, but shining forth to the view in the genera more +excellent than man, and presenting themselves to us divisibly, and +accompanied with form. Hence the Gods<a id="FNanchor_396" href="#Footnote_396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a> exhort “To understand the +fore-running form of light.” For subsisting on high without form, it +becomes invested with form through its progression; and there being +established occultly and uniformly, it becomes apparent to us through +motion, from the Gods themselves; possessing indeed an efficacious +energy, through a divine cause, but becoming figured, through the +essence by which it is received.</p> + +<p>Again, the impressions which are illuminated from powers, are in +a certain respect media between things ineffable and effable, and +pervade through all the middle genera. For it is not possible for the +primary gifts of the Gods to arrive to us, without the more excellent +genera (i.e. angels, dæmons and heroes) previously participating the +illuminations which thence proceed. But these illuminations subsisting +appropriately in each of their participants, and co-ordinately in all +things, unfold the powers that give them subsistence. Of this kind +are the symbols of the Gods, which are indeed uniform in the more +elevated orders, but multiform in those that are subordinate; and which +the theurgic art imitating exhibits through inarticulate evocations +(αδιαρθρωτων εκφωνησεων).</p> + +<p>The impressions which rank as the third in order, which pervade from +intellectual essences to all peculiarities, and proceed as far as to +us, are divine names, through which the Gods are invoked, and by which +they are celebrated, being unfolded into light by the Gods themselves, +and reverting to them, and producing to human knowledge as much of +the Gods as is apparent. For through these we are able to signify +something to each other, and to converse with ourselves about the Gods. +Different nations however, participate differently of these, as for +instance the Egyptians according to their native tongue, receiving +names of this kind from the Gods; but the Chaldeans and Indians in a +different manner, according to their proper tongue; and in a similar +manner the Greeks according to their dialect. Though a certain divinity +therefore may be called by the Greeks Briareus, but differently by the +Chaldeans, we must nevertheless admit that each of these names is the +progeny of the Gods, and that it signifies the same essence. But if +some names are more and others less efficacious, it is not wonderful; +since of things which are known to us, such as are dæmoniacal and +angelic are more efficacious; and in short of things denominated the +names of such as are nearer are more perfect than the names of those +that are more remote.</p> + +<p>Not every genus of the Gods however, can be denominated. For Parmenides +evinces that the God who is beyond all things is ineffable. “For, +says he, he can neither be denominated, nor spoken of.” And of the +intelligible Gods the first genera, which are conjoined with <i>the +one itself</i>, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and +ineffable. For that which is perfectly apparent and effable, cannot +be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable, but it is requisite that +the progression of intelligibles, should be terminated in this order; +in which there is the first effable,<a id="FNanchor_397" href="#Footnote_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a> and that which is called +by proper names. For the first forms are there, and the intellectual +nature of intelligibles there shines forth to the view. But all the +natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by +intelligence.<a id="FNanchor_398" href="#Footnote_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a> Hence the whole of the telestic art energizing +theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says, +that this is first called by a name by the other Gods: for the light +proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual +orders. But he thus speaks,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>μητιν σπερμα φεροντα θεων, κλυτον οντε φανητα,</div> + <div>πρωτογονον μακαρες καλεον κατα μακρον Ολυμπον.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e., “Metis bearing the seed of the Gods, whom the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[iv]</span> Gods +about lofty Olympus call the illustrious Phanes Protogonus.” In the +Gods however nomination is united with intellectual conception, and +both are present with them through the participation of the light which +the mighty Phanes emits to all things. But in our soul these two are +divided from each other; and intellectual conception is one thing, and +name another: and the one has the order of an image, but the other of +a paradigm. In the middle genera there is indeed a separation, but +there is also a union of the intellective and onomastic energy. The +transportive name (διαπορθμιον ονομα) of <i>Iynxes</i><a id="FNanchor_399" href="#Footnote_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> (ιγγυων) +which is said to sustain all the fountains, appears to me to signify +a thing of this kind. Such also is the appellation <i>teletarchic</i> +(το τελεταρχικον) which some one of the Gods<a id="FNanchor_400" href="#Footnote_400" class="fnanchor">[400]</a> says, “leaps into the +worlds, through the rapid reproof of the father.” κοσμοις ενθρωσκειν +κραιπνην δια πατρος ενιπην. For all these things are occultly with the +Gods, but are unfolded according to second and third progressions, and +to men that are allied to the Gods.</p> + +<p>There is therefore a certain abiding name in the Gods, through which +the subordinate invoke the superior, as Orpheus says of Phanes, or +through which the superior denominate the subordinate, as Jupiter in +Plato gives names to the unapparent periods of souls.<a id="FNanchor_401" href="#Footnote_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a> For fathers +define the energies of their offspring, and the offspring know their +producing causes through the intellectual impressions which they bear. +Such then are the first names which are unfolded from the Gods and +which through the middle genera end in the rational essence.</p> + +<p>There are however other names of a second and third rank; and these +are such as partial souls have produced, at one time energizing +enthusiastically about the Gods, and at another time energizing +according to science; either conjoining their own intelligence with +divine light, and thence deriving perfection; or committing the +fabrication of names to the rational power. For thus artists, such as +geometricians, physicians and rhetoricians give names to the things +the peculiarities of which they understand. Thus too poets inspired by +Phœbus (των ποιητων οι φοιβοληπτοι) ascribe many names to the Gods, +and to human names give a division opposite to these; receiving the +former from enthusiastic energy and the latter from sense and opinion; +concerning which Socrates now says Homer indicates, referring some +names to the Gods and others to men.</p> + +<p>P. 138. <i>So that language when conversant with that which is +ineffable, being subverted about itself, has no cessation and opposes +itself.</i> Damascius likewise, in a wonderfully sublime manner +speaks of the immense principle of the universe, conformably to what +is now said by Proclus, in his excellent MS treatise περι αρχων, or +“concerning principles;” and the following is an epitome of what he +says on this subject.</p> + +<p>“Our soul prophesies that the principle which is beyond all things that +can in any respect be conceived, is unco-ordinated with all things. +Neither therefore, must it be called principle, nor cause, nor that +which is first, nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no +means therefore, must we celebrate it as all things, nor in short, +is it to be celebrated, nor recalled into memory. For whatever we +conceive or consider, is either something belonging to all things, or +is all things, though analyzing we should ascend to that which is most +simple, and which is the most comprehensive of all things, being as it +were, the ultimate circumference, not of beings, but of non-beings. +For of beings, that which has an united subsistence, and is perfectly +without separation, is the extremity, since every being is mingled from +elements which are either bound and infinity, or the progeny of these. +But <i>the one</i> is simply the last boundary of <i>the many</i>. For +we cannot conceive any thing more simple than that which is perfectly +one; which if we denominate the principle and cause, the first, and the +most simple, these and all other things are there only according to +<i>the one</i>. But we not being able to contract our conceptions into<span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[v]</span> +profound union, are divided about it, and predicate of <i>the one</i> +the distributed multitude which is in ourselves; unless we despise +these appellations also, because <i>the many</i> cannot be adapted to +<i>the one</i>. Hence it can neither be known nor named; for, if it +could, it would in this respect be <i>many</i>. Or, these things also +will be contained in it, according to <i>the one</i>. For the nature of +<i>the one</i> is all-receptive, or rather all-producing, and there is +not any thing whatever which <i>the one</i> is not. Hence all things +are as it were evolved from it. It is therefore, properly cause, and +the first, the end and the last, the defensive enclosure of all things, +and the one nature of all things; not that nature which is in things, +and which proceeds from <i>the one</i>, but that which is prior to +them, which is the most impartible summit of all things whatever, and +the greatest comprehension of all things which in any respect are said +to have a being.</p> + +<p>But if <i>the one</i> is the cause of all things, and is comprehensive +of all things, what ascent will there be for us beyond this also? For +we do not strive in vain, extending ourselves to that which is nothing. +For that which is not even <i>one</i>, <i>is</i> not according to the +most just mode of speaking. Whence then do we conceive that there is +something beyond <i>the one</i>? For <i>the many</i> require nothing +else than <i>the one</i>. And hence <i>the one</i> alone is the cause +of the <i>many</i>. Hence also <i>the one</i> is entirely cause, +because it is necessary that the cause of <i>the many</i> should alone +be <i>the one</i>. For it cannot be nothing; since nothing is the cause +of nothing. Nor can it be <i>the many</i>: for so far as many they are +unco-ordinated; and <i>the many</i> will not be one cause. But if there +are many causes, they will not be the causes of each other, through +being unco-ordinated, and through a progression in a circle, the same +things being causes and the things caused. Each therefore, will be the +cause of itself, and thus there will be no cause of the many. Hence +it is necessary that <i>the one</i> should be the cause of <i>the +many</i>, and which is also the cause of their co-ordination for there +is a certain conspiring co-ordination, and a union with each other.</p> + +<p>If, therefore, some one thus doubting should say that <i>the one</i> is +a sufficient principle, and should add as the summit that we have not +any conception or suspicion more simple than that of <i>the one</i>, +and should therefore ask how we can suspect any thing beyond the last +suspicion and conception we are able to frame;—if some one should +thus speak, we must pardon the doubt. For a speculation of this kind +is it seems inaccessible and immense: at the same time however, from +things more known to us we must extend the ineffable parturitions of +our soul, to the ineffable co-sensation of this sublime truth. For as +that which subsists without is in every respect more honourable than +that which subsists with habitude, and the unco-ordinated than the +co-ordinated, as the theoretic than the political life, and Saturn +for instance than Jupiter, being than forms, and <i>the one</i> than +<i>the many</i> of which <i>the one</i> is the principle; so in short, +that which transcends every thing of this kind is more honourable than +all causes and principles, and is not to be considered as subsisting +in any co-arrangement and habitude; since <i>the one</i> is naturally +prior to <i>the many</i>, that which is most simple to things more +composite, and that which is most comprehensive to the things which it +comprehends. So that if you are willing thus to speak, <i>the first</i> +is beyond all such opposition, not only that which is in things +co-ordinate, but even that which takes place from its subsistence as +the first. <i>The one</i> therefore, and the united are posterior +to the first: for these causally contain multitude as numerous<a id="FNanchor_402" href="#Footnote_402" class="fnanchor">[402]</a> +as that which is unfolded from them. <i>The one</i> however, is no +less one, if indeed it is not more so, because separate multitude is +posterior to and not in it; and the united is no less united because +it contracted in one things separated prior to separation. Each of +these therefore, is all things, whether according to co-ordination, or +according to their own nature. But all things cannot be things first, +nor the principle. Nor yet one of them alone, because this one will be +at the same time all things, according to <i>the one</i>: but we shall +not yet have discovered that which is beyond all things. To<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">[vi]</span> which we +may also add, that <i>the one</i> is the summit of <i>the many</i>, +as the cause of the things proceeding from it. We may likewise say +that we form a conception of <i>the one</i> according to a purified +suspicion extended to that which is most simple and most comprehensive. +But that which is most venerable, must necessarily be incomprehensible +by all conceptions and suspicions; since also in other things, that +which always soars beyond our conceptions is more honourable than that +which is more obvious: so that what flies from all our suspicions will +be most honourable. But if this be the case it is <i>nothing</i>. Let +however nothing be twofold, one better than <i>the one</i>, the other +posterior to sensibles. If also, we strive in vain in asserting these +things, striving in vain is likewise twofold; the one falling into +the ineffable, the other into that which in no respect whatever has +any subsistence. For <i>this</i> also is ineffable, as Plato says, +but according to the worse, but <i>that</i> according to the better. +If too, we search for a certain advantage arising from it, this is +the most necessary advantage of all others, that all things thence +proceed as from an adytum, from the ineffable, and in an ineffable +manner. For neither do they proceed as <i>the one</i> produces <i>the +many</i>, nor as <i>the united</i> things <i>separated</i>, but as +the ineffable similarly produces all things, ineffably. But if in +asserting these things concerning it, that it is no one of all things, +that it is incomprehensible, we subvert what we say, it is proper to +know that these are the names and words of our parturitions, daring +anxiously to explore it, and which standing in the vestibules of the +adytum, announce indeed nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but +signify the manner in which we are affected about it, our doubts and +disappointment; nor yet this clearly, but through indications to such +as are able to understand these investigations. We also see that our +parturitions suffer these things about <i>the one</i>, and that in a +similar manner they are solicitous and subverted. For <i>the one</i>, +says Plato, if it <i>is</i>, is not <i>the one</i>. But if it is not, +no assertion can be adapted to it: so that neither can there be a +negation of it, nor can any name be given to it; for neither is a name +simple. Nor is there any opinion nor science of it; for neither are +these simple. So that <i>the one</i> is in every respect unknown and +ineffable.</p> + +<p>What then? Shall we investigate something else beyond the ineffable? +Or, perhaps indeed, Plato leads us ineffably through <i>the one</i> +as a medium, to the ineffable beyond <i>the one</i>, which is now the +subject of discussion; and this by an ablation of <i>the one</i>, in +the same manner as he leads us to <i>the one</i> by an ablation of +other things. For, that he gives to <i>the one</i> a certain position +is evident from his Sophista, where he demonstrates that it subsists +prior to being, itself by itself. But if, having ascended as far as +to <i>the one</i>, he is silent, this also is becoming in Plato to +be perfectly silent, after the manner of the ancients concerning +things in every respect unspeakable; for the discourse was indeed most +dangerous, in consequence of falling on idiotical ears. Indeed, when +discoursing concerning that which in no respect has any subsistence, +he subverts his assertions, and is fearful of falling into the sea of +dissimilitude, or, rather of unsubsisting void. But if demonstrations +do not accord with <i>the one</i>, it is by no means wonderful; for +they are human and divisible, and more composite than is fit. Indeed, +they are not even adapted to being, since they are formal, or rather, +they are neither adapted to forms nor essences. Or, is it not Plato +himself, who in his Epistles<a id="FNanchor_403" href="#Footnote_403" class="fnanchor">[403]</a> evinces that we have nothing which +is significant of form, no type nor name, nor discourse, nor opinion, +nor science? For it is intellect alone which can apprehend ideas by +its projecting energies, which we cannot possess while busily engaged +in discourse. If there fore we even energize intellectually, since +in this case our intellection is characterized by form, we shall not +accord with <i>the united</i> and with being. And if at any time we are +able to project a contracted intelligence, even this is unadapted and +discordant with <i>the one</i>. If, also, we energize according to the +most profoundly united intelligence, and through this occultly perceive +<i>the one itself</i>, yet even this is expanded only as far as to +<i>the one</i>, if there is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[vii]</span> a knowledge of <i>the one</i>; for this +we have not yet determined. At the same time however, let us now apply +ourselves to the discussion of things of such great importance, through +indications and suspicions, being purified with respect to unusual +conceptions, and led through analogies and negations, despising what we +possess with respect to these, and advancing from things more ignoble +with us to things more honorable.</p> + +<p>Shall we therefore say, that the nature which we now investigate as the +first, is so perfectly ineffable, that it must not even be admitted +concerning it that it is thus ineffable; but that <i>the one</i> is +ineffable, as flying from all composition of words and names, and all +distinction of that which is known from that which knows, and is to be +apprehended in a manner the most simple and comprehensive, and that +it is not one alone as the characteristic of one, but as <i>one all +things</i>, and <i>one prior to all things</i>, and not one which is +something belonging to all things? These indeed, are the parturitions +of the soul, and are thus purified with respect to <i>the simply +one</i>, and that which is truly the one cause of all things. But, in +short, we thus form a conception of <i>the one</i> which we contain +as the summit or flower of our essence, as being more proximate and +allied to us, and more prompt to such a suspicion of that which nearly +leaves all things behind it. But from some particular thing which is +made the subject of hypothesis, the transition is easy to that which is +simply supposed, though we should in no respect accede to it, but being +carried in that which is most simple in us, should form a suspicion +concerning that which is prior to all things. <i>The one</i> therefore, +is thus effable, and thus ineffable, but that which is beyond it is to +be honoured in the most perfect silence, and prior to this, by the most +perfect ignorance<a id="FNanchor_404" href="#Footnote_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a> which despises all knowledge.</p> + +<p>Let us therefore, now consider, in the second place, how it is said +to be perfectly unknown. For if this be true, how do we assert all +these things concerning it? For we do not elucidate by much discussion +about things of which we are ignorant. But if it is in reality +unco-ordinated with all things, and without habitude to all things, +and is nothing of all things, nor even <i>the one itself</i>, these +very things are the nature of it. Besides, with respect to its being +unknown, we either know that it is unknown, or we are ignorant of this. +But if the latter, how do we say that it is perfectly unknown? And if +we know this, in this respect therefore it is known. Or shall we say +that it is known, that the unknown is unknown? We cannot therefore +deny one thing of another, not knowing that which is the subject of +the negation; nor can we say that it is not this or that, when we can +in no respect reach it. How therefore can we deny of that of which we +are perfectly ignorant the things which we know? For this is just as +if some one who was blind from his birth should assert that heat is +not in colour. Or perhaps indeed, he also will justly say, that colour +is not hot. For he knows this by the touch; but he knows nothing of +colour, except that it is not tangible; for he knows that he does not +know it. Such a knowledge indeed, is not a knowledge of colour, but of +his own ignorance. And we also when we say that the first is unknown, +do not announce any thing of it, but we confess the manner in which +we are affected about it. For the non-perception of the blind man is +not in the colour, nor yet his blindness, but in him. The ignorance +therefore of that of which we are ignorant is in us. For the knowledge +of that which is known, is in him that knows, and not in the thing +known. But if knowledge is in that which is known being as it were the +splendour of it, so some one should say ignorance is in that which is +unknown, being as it were the darkness of it, or obscurity, according +to which it is unknown by, and is unapparent to all things,—he who +says this is ignorant, that as blindness is a privation, so likewise +all ignorance, and that as is the invisible, so that of which we +are ignorant, and which is unknown. In other things therefore, the +privation of this or that leaves something else. For that which is +incorporeal, though invisible, yet is intelligible; and that which is +not intelligible by a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">[viii]</span> certain intelligence, leaves at the same time +something else. But if we take away every conception and suspicion, +this also we must say is perfectly unknown by us, about which we +close every eye. Nor must we assert any thing of it, as we do of the +intelligible, that it is not adapted to be seen by the eyes, or as we +do of <i>the one</i>, that it is not naturally adapted to be understood +by an essential and abundant intellection: for it imparts nothing by +which it can be apprehended, nothing which can lead to a suspicion of +its nature. For neither do we only say that it is unknown, that being +something else it may naturally possess the unknown, but we do not +think fit to predicate of it either <i>being</i>, or <i>the one</i>, +or <i>all things</i>, or <i>the principle of all things</i>, or in +short, <i>any thing</i>. Neither therefore, are these things the nature +of it, viz. <i>the nothing, the being beyond all things, supercausal +subsistence, and the unco-ordinated with all things</i>; but these are +only ablations of things posterior to it. How, therefore, do we speak +concerning it? Shall we say, that knowing these posterior things, we +despise them with respect to the position, if I may so speak, of that +which is in every respect ineffable? For as that which is beyond some +particular knowledge is better than that which is apprehended by such +knowledge, so that which is beyond all suspicion must necessarily be +most venerable; not that it is known to be so, but possessing the +most venerable as in us, and as the consequence of the manner in +which we are affected about it. We also call this a prodigy, from its +being entirely incomprehensible by our conceptions: for it is through +analogy, if that which in a certain respect is unknown, according to +a more excellent subsistence, is superior to that which is in every +respect known. Hence that which is in every respect unknown according +to a more excellent subsistence, must necessarily be acknowledged to +be supreme, though it indeed has neither the supreme, nor the most +excellent, nor the most venerable: for these things are our confessions +about that, which entirely flies from all our conceptions and +suspicions. For by this very assertion, that we can form no suspicion +of it, we acknowledge that it is most wonderful; since if we should +suspect any thing concerning it, we must also investigate something +else prior to this suspicion, and either proceed to infinity in our +search, or stop at that which is perfectly ineffable. Can we therefore, +demonstrate any thing concerning it? And is that demonstrable which we +do not think fit to consider as a thing whose subsistence we can even +suspect? Or, when we assert these things, do we not indeed demonstrate +<i>concerning</i> it, but not <i>it</i>? For neither does it contain +the demonstrable, nor any thing else. What then? Do we not opine +concerning it these things which we now assert? But if there is an +opinion of it, it is also the object of opinion. Or shall we say we +opine that it is not these things? For Aristotle also says that there +is true opinion. If therefore, the opinion is true, the thing likewise +is to which opinion being adapted becomes true. For, in consequence of +the thing subsisting, the opinion also is true. Though indeed, how will +that be true which is perfectly unknown? Or shall we say this is true, +that it is not these things, and that it is not known? Is it therefore +truly false, that it is these things, and that it is known? Or shall +we say that these things are to be referred to privations, and to that +which in a certain respect is not, in which there may be a falling from +the hypostasis of form? Just as we call the absence of light darkness. +For, light not existing, neither is there any darkness. But to that +which is never and in no respect being, nothing among beings can, +as Plato says, accede. Neither, therefore, is it non-being, nor, in +short, privation; and even the expression <i>never in no respect</i> +(το μηδαμη μηδαμως) is incapable of signifying its nature. For this +expression is being, and <i>signification</i> is something belonging to +beings. Likewise, though we should opine that it is not in any respect, +yet at the same time, since it thus becomes the object of opinion, it +belongs to beings. Hence, Plato very properly calls that which never +and in no respect is, ineffable and incapable of being opined, and +this according to the worse than the effable and opinion, in the same +manner as we say the supreme is according to that which is better than +these. What then, do we not think, and are we not persuaded that the +supreme thus subsists? Or, as we have often said, do not these things +express the manner in which we are affected about it? But we possess in +ourselves this opinion, which is therefore<span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[ix]</span> empty, as is the opinion +of a vacuum, and the infinite. As therefore, we form a phantastic and +fictitious opinion of these though they are not, as if they were, just +as we opine the sun to be no larger than a sphere whose diameter is but +a foot, though this is far from being the case;—so if we opine any +thing concerning that which never and in no respect is, or concerning +that of which we write these things, the opinion is our own, and the +vain attempt is in us, in apprehending which we think that we apprehend +the supreme. It is, however, nothing pertaining to us, so much does +it transcend our conceptions. How therefore, do we demonstrate that +there is such an ignorance in us concerning it? And how do we say +that it is unknown? We reply in one word, because we always find that +what is above knowledge is more honourable; so that what is above +all knowledge, if it were to be found, would be found to be most +honourable. But it is sufficient to the demonstration that it cannot +be found. We also say that it is above all things; because if it were +any thing known, it would rank among all things; and there would be +something common to it with all things, viz. the being known. But there +is one co-ordination of things in which there is something common; so +that in consequence of this, it will subsist together with all things. +Hence it is necessary that it should be unknown.</p> + +<p>In the third place, the unknown is inherent in beings as well as the +known, though they are relatively inherent at the same time. As, +therefore, we say that the same thing is relatively large and small, +so likewise we say, that a thing is known and unknown with reference +to different things. And as the same thing, by participating of the +two forms, the great and the small, is at the same time both great and +small, so that which at the same time participates of the known and the +unknown is both these. Thus, the intelligible is unknown to sense, but +is known to intellect. For the more excellent will not be privation, +the inferior at the same time being form; since every absence, and +a privation of this kind, is either in matter, or in soul; but all +things are present in intellect, and still more in a certain respect +in the intelligible. Unless indeed, we denominate privation according +to a more excellent subsistence, as we say that is not form which is +above form; and that is not being which is superessential; and that +is nothing which is truly unknown, according to a transcendency which +surpasses all things. If, therefore, <i>the one</i> is the last known +of things which are in any respect whatever known or suspected, that +which is beyond <i>the one</i> is primarily and perfectly unknown; +which also is so unknown, that neither has it an unknown nature, nor +can we accede to it as to the unknown, but it is even unknown to us +whether it is unknown. For there is an all-perfect ignorance about +it, nor can we know it, neither as known nor unknown. Hence, we are +on all sides subverted, in consequence of not being able to reach +it in any respect, because it is not even one thing, or rather, it +is not that which is not even one thing. Hence it is that which in +no respect whatever has any subsistence; or it is even beyond this, +since this is a negation of being, and that which is not even one +thing is a negation of <i>the one</i>. But that which is not one +thing, or in other words, that which is nothing, is a void, and a +falling from all things. We do not however thus conceive concerning +the ineffable. Or shall we say that <i>nothing</i> is twofold, the +one being beyond, and the other below, all things? For <i>the one</i> +also is twofold, <i>this</i> being the extreme, as <i>the one</i> of +matter, and <i>that</i> the first, as that which is more ancient than +being. So that with respect to <i>nothing</i> also, <i>this</i> will +be as that which is not even the last one, but <i>that</i> as neither +being the first one. In this way therefore, that which is unknown and +ineffable is twofold, <i>this</i>, as not even possessing the last +suspicion of subsistence, and <i>that</i>, as not even being the first +of things. Must we therefore, consider it as that which is unknown +to us? Or this indeed is nothing paradoxical: for it will be unknown +even to much-honoured intellect, if it be lawful so to speak. For +every intellect looks to the intelligible; and the intelligible is +either <i>form</i> or <i>being</i>. But may not divine knowledge know +it; and may it not be known to this superessentially? This knowledge, +however, applies itself to <i>the one</i>, but that which we are now +investigating is beyond <i>the one</i>. In short, if it also is known, +in conjunction with others, it will also be something belonging to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">[x]</span> +all things; for it will be common to it with others to be known, and +thus far it will be co-ordinated with others. Further still, if it is +known, divine knowledge will comprehend it. It will therefore define +it. Every boundary however, ascends ultimately as far as to <i>the +one</i>; but <i>that</i> is beyond <i>the one</i>. It is therefore +perfectly incomprehensible and invisible, and consequently is not to +be apprehended by any kind of knowledge. To which we may add, that +knowledge is of things which may be known as beings, or as having a +subsistence, or as participating of <i>the one</i>. But this is beyond +all these. Further still, <i>the one</i> also appears to be unknown, if +it is necessary that what is known should be one thing, and that which +knows another, though both should be in the same thing. So that <i>the +truly one</i> will not know itself: for it does not possess a certain +duplicity. There will not therefore be in it that which knows, and +that which is known. Hence, neither will a God, considered according +to <i>the one itself</i> alone, and as being conjoined with <i>the +one</i>, be united with that which is simple, according to duplicity. +For how can the double be conjoined with the simple? But if he knows +<i>the one</i> by <i>the one</i>, that which knows, and also that which +is known will be <i>one</i>, and in each the nature of <i>the one</i> +will be shown, subsisting alone, and being <i>one</i>. So that he will +not be conjoined as different with that which is different, or as that +which is gnostic with that which is known, since this very thing is one +alone; so that neither will he be conjoined according to knowledge. +Much more therefore, is that which is not even <i>the one</i> unknown. +But if <i>the one</i> is the last thing known, we know nothing of that +which is beyond <i>the one</i>; so that the present rhapsody is vain. +Or shall we say we know that these things are unworthy to be asserted, +if it be lawful so to speak, of the first hypothesis [in the Parmenides +of Plato,] since, not yet knowing even intelligible forms, we despise +the images which subsist in us of their eternal and impartible nature; +since these images are partible, and multifariously mutable. Again, +being ignorant of the contracted subsistence of intelligible species +and genera, but possessing an image of this, which is a contraction +of the genera and species in us, we suspect that being itself +resembles this contraction, but is at the same time something more +excellent; and this must be especially the case with that which has +an united subsistence. But now we are ignorant of <i>the one</i>, not +contracting, but expanding all things to it; and in us simplicity +itself consists, with relation to the all which we contain, but is very +far from coming into contact with the all-perfect nature of <i>the +one</i>. For <i>the one and the simple</i> in our nature, are in the +smallest degree that which they are said to be, except that they are a +sign or indication of the nature which is there. Thus also assuming in +intellect every thing which can be in any respect known or suspected, +we think fit to ascribe it as far as to <i>the one</i>; if it be +requisite to speak of things unspeakable, and to conceive things which +are inconceivable. At the same time also, we think fit to make that the +subject of hypothesis, which cannot be compared, and is unco-ordinated +with all things, and which is so exempt that neither in reality does +it possess the exempt. For that which is exempt is always exempt from +something, and is not in every respect exempt, as possessing habitude +to that from which it is exempt, and in short, preceding in a certain +co-ordination. If, therefore, we intend to make that which is truly +exempt the subject of hypothesis, we must not even suppose it to be +exempt. For, accurately speaking, its proper name will not be verified +when ascribed to <i>the exempt</i>; since in this case it would at the +same time be co-ordinated; so that it is necessary even to deny this of +it. Likewise, negation is a certain sentence, and that which is denied +is a certain thing: but that of which we are now endeavouring to speak +is not any thing. Neither therefore, can it be denied, nor spoken of, +nor be in any way known: so that neither is it possible to deny the +negation; but that which appears to us to be a demonstration of what +we say, is a perfect subversion of language and conception. What end +therefore, will there be of the discourse, except the most profound +silence, and an acknowledgement that we know nothing of that which it +is not lawful, since impossible, to lead into knowledge?”</p> + +<p>In another part, near the beginning of the same admirable work, he +remarks that <i>the one</i> in every thing is the more true thing +itself. “Thus for instance,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">[xi]</span> <i>the one</i> of man [or the summit +and flower of his nature,] is the more true man, that of soul is +the more true soul, and that of body the more true body. Thus also +<i>the one</i> of the sun, and <i>the one</i> of the moon, are the +more true sun and moon.” After which he observes as follows: “Neither +<i>the one</i>, nor <i>all things</i> accords with the nature of +<i>the one</i>. For these are opposed to each other, and distribute +our conceptions. For, if we look to the simple and <i>the one</i>, we +destroy its immensely great perfection; and if we conceive all things +subsisting together, we abolish <i>the one</i> and <i>the simple</i>. +But this is because we are divided, and look to divided peculiarities. +At the same time however, aspiring after the knowledge of it, we +connect all things together, that we may thus be able to apprehend +this mighty nature. But fearing the introduction of all multitudes, +or contracting the peculiar nature of <i>the one</i>, and rejoycing +in that which is simple and the first in speaking of the most ancient +principle, we thus introduce <i>the one itself</i> as a symbol of +simplicity; since we likewise introduce <i>all things</i> as a symbol +of the comprehension of all things. But that which is above or prior to +both we can neither conceive nor denominate. And why is it wonderful +that we should suffer these things about it, since the distinct +knowledge of it is unical, which we cannot perceive? Other things too +of this kind we suffer about <i>being</i>. For endeavouring to perceive +<i>being</i>, we dismiss it, but run round the elements of it, bound +and infinity. But if we form a more true conception of it, that it +is an united plenitude of all things, in this case the conception of +<i>all things</i> draws us down to multitude, and the conception of +<i>the united</i> abolishes that of all things. Neither however is +this yet wonderful. For with respect to forms also, when we wish to +survey any one of these, we run round the elements of it, and, striving +to perceive its unity, we obliterate its elements. At the same time +however, every form is one and many; not indeed partly one, and partly +many, but the whole of it is through the whole a thing of this kind. +Not being able, therefore, to apprehend this collectively, we rejoice +in acceding to it with a distribution of our conceptions. But always +adhering in our ascent, like those who climb clinging with their +hands and feet, to things which extend us to a more impartible nature, +we obtain in a certain respect a co-sensation in the distribution of +that which is uniform. We despise therefore this, with respect to the +collected apprehension of it, which we cannot obtain, unless a certain +vestige of collected intelligence in our nature is agitated. And this +is the light of truth, which is suddenly enkindled, as if from the +collision of fire stones. For our greatest conceptions, when exercised +with each other, verge to a uniform and simple summit as their end, +like the extremities of lines in a circle hastening to the centre. And +though even thus they subsist indeed with distribution, yet a certain +vestige of the knowledge of form which we contain is pre-excited; +just as the equal tendency of all the lines in a circle to terminate +in the middle affords a certain obscure representation of the centre. +After the same manner also we ascend to being, in the first place, +by understanding every form which falls upon us as distributed, not +only as impartible, but also as united, and this by confounding, if +it be proper so to speak, the multitude in each. In the next place, +we must collect every thing separated together, and take away the +circumscriptions, just as if making many streams of water to be one +collection of water, except that we must not understand that which +is united from all things, as one collection of water, but we must +conceive that which is prior to all things, as the form of water prior +to divided streams of water. Thus therefore, we must expand ourselves +to <i>the one</i>, first collecting and afterwards dismissing what we +have collected, for the super-expanded transcendency of <i>the one</i>. +Ascending therefore, shall we meet with it as that which is known? Or, +wishing to meet with it as such shall we arrive at the unknown? Or may +we not say that each of these is true? For we meet with it afar off as +that which is known, and when we are united to it from afar, passing +beyond that in our nature which is gnostic of <i>the one</i>, then are +we brought to be one, that is, to be unknown instead of being gnostic. +This contact therefore, as of one with one, is above knowledge, but +the other is as of that which is gnostic with that which is known. As +however, the crooked is known by the straight, so we form<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xii">[xii]</span> a conjecture +of the unknown by the known. And this indeed is a mode of knowledge. +<i>The one</i> therefore, is so far known, that it does not admit of an +approximating knowledge, but appears afar off as known, and imparts a +gnostic indication of itself. Unlike other things however, the nearer +we approach to it, it is not the more, but on the contrary, less known; +knowledge being dissolved by <i>the one</i> into ignorance, since +as we have before observed, where there is knowledge, there also is +separation. But separation approaching to <i>the one</i> is inclosed in +union; so that knowledge also is refunded into ignorance. Thus too, the +analogy of Plato requires. For first we endeavour to see the sun, and +we do indeed see it afar off; but by how much the nearer we approach +to it, by so much the less do we see it; and at length we neither see +other things, nor it, the eye becoming spontaneously dazzled by its +light. Is therefore <i>the one</i> in its proper nature unknown, though +there is something else unknown besides <i>the one</i>? <i>The one</i> +indeed wills to be by itself, but with no other; but the unknown beyond +<i>the one</i> is perfectly ineffable, which we acknowledge we neither +know, nor are ignorant of, but which has about itself super-ignorance. +Hence by proximity to this <i>the one itself</i> is darkened: for +being very near to the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, +it remains as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence. +On this account, Plato in speaking of it finds all his assertions +subverted: for it is near to the subversion of every thing, which takes +place about the first. It differs from it however in this, that it is +<i>one</i> simply, and that according to <i>the one</i> it is also at +the same time all things. But the first is above <i>the one</i> and +<i>all things</i>, being more simple than either of these.”</p> + +<p>P. 113. <i>Origen who was a partaker of the same erudition with +Plotinus.</i> This Origen was not the Christian father of that name, +but was somewhat junior to him.</p> + +<p>P. 190. <i>And Plotinus, exhibiting in a most divinely inspired manner, +the peculiarity of eternity, according to the theology of Plato, +defines it to be infinite life, at once unfolding into light the whole +of itself, and its own being.</i> The 7th book of the 3rd Ennead of +Plotinus is concerning Eternity, and the following beautiful extract +from it contains the definition of eternity alluded to by Proclus.</p> + +<p>“Perhaps we ought to conceive of eternity, as a certain one collected +from many; viz. either as one intelligence or one nature, whether +consequent to things in the intelligible world, or existing together +with it, or beheld as situated in the depths of its essence. All these, +I say, reduced into eternity as one, which is also many, and is endued +with a various capacity. Indeed, he who beholds a various capacity, +when he considers it as a subject denominates its essence; but so +far as he perceives life, he denominates its motion; and afterwards +permanency, considered as abiding in a manner entirely the same. He +will likewise behold difference and sameness, so far us they are many, +bound in one. So that he who contracts the difference, subsisting +in things which are many, into one life alone, and contemplates an +unceasing sameness of energy, never passing its intelligence or life, +from one thing into another, but ever abiding in the same manner in +itself far remote from all interval; he I say, who beholds all these, +contemplates eternity, viewing life ever possessing a present whole, +where all things abide together in sameness, without the order of +first and last, and are comprehended in an indivisible bound. Where +all things are collected into one, as into a point, not yet proceeding +into a linear flux, but abiding in sameness, that is, in itself, in +an ever present <i>now</i>; because nothing of its nature is past, +nothing in it is future; but what it is, it always is. Hence eternity +is not a subject, but that which beams as it were from its subject, +according to the possession of an ever present identity; promising +itself that its ever abiding nature, will never be changed. For what +should happen to this in future which it is not at present? Since it is +a perfect and present plenitude of all things. Nor can the term was, +the appellation of time past, belong to eternity. For what can that be, +which <i>was</i> present with its nature, and is <i>past</i>? It is +in like manner independent of all connection with futurity. And hence +eternity is that which neither <i>was</i> nor <i>will be</i>, but alone +<i>is</i>, which it possesses in a stable manner; because it is neither +changed into a future, nor altered from a past duration. So that the +eternity which we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiii">[xiii]</span> are now investigating, is life total and full, +abiding in its essence about being itself; and is every where without +interval and one.</p> + +<p>Hence, eternity is something especially venerable, and a God, as +inherent intelligence affirms. But intelligence likewise dictates, +that eternity is the same with that God whom we denominate being and +life. And it may with the greatest propriety be said, that eternity is +a deity shining and unfolding himself in intelligible light, such as +he is in his essence; in an essence, I say, perfectly unchangeable and +the same, and thus firmly abiding in an unceasing energy of life. Nor +ought any one to wonder that we speak of eternity, as consisting of +many things. For every thing which abides in the intelligible world, +is called many, on account of its infinite power; since infinite +there receives its denomination, because it never falls off from the +consummate intellectual plenitude of its nature. And indeed, it is +particularly called after this manner, because it loses nothing of its +own. And if any one should describe eternity, as life already infinite +because universal, and because it never deserts the integrity of its +nature; (since it cannot be diminished by the past, nor increased by +the future, because it is a perfect whole)——if any one should thus +describe eternity, he will approach very near to its true definition. +For what is afterwards added, that it is a perfect whole, and loses +nothing of its integrity, is only a certain exposition of the +definition which affirms it to be infinite life. But because a nature +of this kind, thus all-beautiful and eternal, abides about <i>the one +itself</i>, emanating and in no respect departing from it, but ever +abiding about and in it, and living with it in indissoluble union; +hence it is said by Plato, not rashly, but in a manner truly beautiful +and profound, that <i>eternity abides in one</i>. So that he not only +reduces that which eternity contains into one; but the life of being +in like manner reduces itself, about <i>the one itself</i>. This then +is what we investigate, and that is eternity, which thus abides. For +that which is the energy of life abiding from itself, and residing +in the depths of unity, without any deception, either in essence or +life, is without all controversy eternity. Since <i>truly to be</i>, +is <i>never not to be</i>, and to possess no diversity of being. But +when in discoursing on eternity, we use the term <i>ever</i>; and +also when we say it is not sometimes being, and sometimes non-being, +we must consider these appellations as adopted only for the purpose +of explanation. For the term ever is not perhaps principally assumed, +but is employed, in order to show an incorruptible and never-failing +nature.”</p> + +<p>P. 215. <i>Let us in the next place speak in common about all the +intelligible triads, &c.</i> For the further information of the reader +on this most profound subject the intelligible triad, the following +observations are added, being an extract from the Introduction to my +translation of the Parmenides of Plato.</p> + +<p>As the first cause then is <i>the one</i>, and this is the same +with <i>the good</i>, the universality of things must form a whole, +the best and the most profoundly united in all its parts which can +possibly be conceived: for <i>the first good</i> must be the cause +of the greatest good, that is, the whole of things; and as goodness +is union, the best production must be that which is most united. But +as there is a difference in things, and some are more excellent than +others, and this in proportion to their proximity to the first cause, +a profound union can no otherwise take place than by the extremity of +a superior order coalescing through intimate alliance with the summit +of the proximately inferior. Hence the first of bodies, though they +are essentially corporeal, yet κατα σχεσιν, through <i>habitude</i> or +<i>alliance</i>, are most vital, or lives. The highest of souls are +after this manner intellects, and the first of beings are gods. For as +<i>being</i> is the highest of things after <i>the first cause</i>, its +first subsistence must be according to a superessential characteristic.</p> + +<p>Now that which is superessential, considered as participated by +the highest or <i>true being</i>, constitutes that which is called +<i>intelligible</i>. So that every true being depending on the gods +is a <i>divine intelligible</i>. It is <i>divine</i> indeed, as that +which is deified; but it is <i>intelligible</i>, as the object of +desire to intellect, as perfective and connective of its nature, and as +the plenitude of <i>being</i> itself. But in the first being life and +intellect subsist according to <i>cause</i>: for every thing subsists +either according to <i>cause</i>, or according to <i>hyparxis</i>, +or according to <i>participation</i>. That is,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiv">[xiv]</span> every thing may be +considered either as subsisting occultly in its cause, or openly in its +own order (or according to what it is,) or as participated by something +else. The first of these is analogous to light when viewed subsisting +in its fountain the sun; the second to the light immediately proceeding +from the sun; and the third to the splendour communicated to other +natures by this light.</p> + +<p>The first procession therefore from the first cause, will be the +intelligible triad, consisting of <i>being</i>, <i>life</i>, and +<i>intellect</i>, which are the three highest things after the first +god, and of which <i>being</i> is prior to <i>life</i>, and <i>life</i> +to <i>intellect</i>. For whatever partakes of life partakes also of +being: but the contrary is not true, and therefore being is above +life; since it is the characteristic of higher natures to extend their +communications beyond such as are subordinate. But <i>life</i> is prior +to <i>intellect</i>, because all intellectual natures are vital, but +all vital natures are not intellectual. But in this intelligible triad, +on account of its superessential characteristic, all things may be +considered as subsisting according to cause: and consequently number +here has not a proper subsistence, but is involved in unproceeding +union, and absorbed in superessential light. Hence, when it is called +a triad, we must not suppose that any <i>essential distinction</i> +takes place, but must consider this appellation as expressive of its +ineffable perfection. For as it is the nearest of all things to <i>the +one</i>, its union must be transcendently profound and ineffably occult.</p> + +<p>All the gods indeed considered according to their unities are all in +all, and are at the same time united with the first god like rays to +light, or lines to a centre. And hence they are all established in the +first cause (as Proclus beautifully observes) like the roots of trees +in the earth; so that they are all as much as possible superessential, +just as trees are eminently of an earthly nature, without at the same +time being earth itself: for the nature of the earth as being a whole, +or subsisting according to the eternal, is different from the partial +natures which it produces. The intelligible triad, therefore, from its +being wholly of a superessential idiom, must possess an inconceivable +profundity of union, both with itself and its cause, so as to +subsist wholly according to <i>the united</i>, το ηνωμενον; and hence +it appears to the eye of pure intellect, as one simple indivisible +splendour beaming from an unknown and inaccessible fire.</p> + +<p>He then who is able, by opening the greatest eye of the soul, to +see that perfectly which subsists without distinction, will behold +the simplicity of the intelligible triad subsisting in a manner so +transcendent as to be apprehended only by a superintellectual energy, +and a deific union of the perceiver with this most arcane object of +perception. But since in our present state it is impossible to behold +an object so astonishingly lucid with a perfect and steady vision, we +must be content, as Damascius well observes,<a id="FNanchor_405" href="#Footnote_405" class="fnanchor">[405]</a> with a far distant, +scarcely attainable, and most obscure glimpse; or with difficulty +apprehending a trace of this light, like a sudden coruscation bursting +on our sight. Such then is the pre-eminence of the intelligible order, +to which on account of the infirmity of our mental eye, we assign a +triple division, beholding in our phantasy as in a mirror a luminous +triad, beaming from a uniform light; just, says Damascius, as the +uniform colour of the sun appears in a cloud which possesses three +catoptric intervals, through the various coloured nature of the rainbow.</p> + +<p>But when we view this order in a distributed way, or as possessing +distinction in order to accommodate its all-perfect mode of subsistence +to our imperfect conceptions, it is necessary to give the triad itself +a triple division. For we have said that it consists of <i>being</i>, +<i>life</i>, and <i>intellect</i>. But in <i>being</i> we may +view life and intellect, according to cause; in <i>life</i> being +according to participation, and intellect according to cause; and in +<i>intellect</i> both being and life according to participation; while +at the same time in reality the whole is profoundly one, and contains +all things occultly, or according to cause. But when viewed in this +divided manner, each triad is said in the Chaldaic theology to consist +of <i>father</i>, <i>power</i>, and <i>intellect</i>; <i>father</i> +being the same with <i>hyparxis</i>, <i>unity</i>, <i>summit</i>, or +<i>that which is superessential</i>; <i>power</i> being a certain +pouring forth, or infinity of <i>the one</i><a id="FNanchor_406" href="#Footnote_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a> (or the summit); and +on this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xv">[xv]</span> account, says Damascius, it is present with <i>father</i>, +as a diffused with an abiding one, and as pouring itself forth into a +true chaos: but <i>intellect</i>, that is <i>paternal intellect</i>, +subsisting according to a conversion to the paternal one; a conversion +transcending all other conversions, as being neither gnostic, nor +vital, nor essential, but an indistinct surpassing energy, which is +union rather than conversion.</p> + +<p>Such then is the intelligible triad, considered according to an +all-perfect distribution, in accommodation to the imbecility of our +mental eye. But if we are desirous, after having bid adieu to corporeal +vision, and the fascinating but delusive forms of the phantasy, which, +Calypso-like, detain us in exile from our fathers’ land: after having +through a long and laborious dialectic wandering gained our paternal +port, and purified ourselves from the baneful rout of the passions, +those domestic foes of the soul; if after all this we are desirous of +gaining a glimpse of the surpassing simplicity and ineffable union of +this occult and astonishing light, we must crowd all our conceptions +together into the most profound indivisibility, and, opening the +greatest eye of the soul, entreat this all-comprehending deity to +approach: for then, preceded by unadorned Beauty, silently walking on +the extremities of her shining feet, he will suddenly from his awful +sanctuary rise to our view.</p> + +<p>But after such a vision, what can language announce concerning +this transcendent object? That it is perfectly indistinct and void +of number. “And,” as Damascius<a id="FNanchor_407" href="#Footnote_407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a> beautifully observes, “since +this is the case, we should consider whether it is proper to +call <i>this</i> which belongs to it <i>simplicity</i>, απλοτης; +<i>something else, multiplicity</i> πολλοτης; and <i>something besides +this, universality</i> παντοτης. For that which is intelligible is +<i>one</i>, <i>many</i>, <i>all</i>, that we may triply explain +a nature which is one. But how can one nature be <i>one</i> and +<i>many</i>? Because <i>many</i> is the infinite power of <i>the +one</i>. But how can it be <i>one</i> and <i>all</i>? Because +<i>all</i> is the every way extended energy of <i>the one</i>. Nor +yet is it to be called an energy, as if it was an extension of power +to that which is external; nor power, as an extension of hyparxis +abiding within; but again, it is necessary to call them three instead +of one: for one appellation, as we have often testified, is by no +means sufficient for an explanation of this order. And are all things +then here indistinct? But how can this be easy to understand? For we +have said that there are three principles consequent to each other; +viz. <i>father</i>, <i>power</i>, and <i>paternal intellect</i>. +<i>But these in reality are neither one, nor three, nor one and at +the same time three.</i><a id="FNanchor_408" href="#Footnote_408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a> But it is necessary that we should +explain these by names and conceptions of this kind, through our +penury in what is adapted to their nature, or rather through our +desire of expressing something proper on the occasion. For as we +denominate this triad <i>one</i>, and <i>many</i>, and <i>all</i>, and +<i>father</i>, <i>power</i>, and <i>paternal intellect</i>, and again +<i>bound</i>, <i>infinite</i>, and <i>mixed</i>—so likewise we call +it a <i>monad</i>, and <i>the indefinite duad</i>, and <i>a triad</i>, +and a paternal nature composed from both these. And as in consequence +of purifying our conceptions we reject the former appellations, as +incapable of harmonizing with the things themselves, we should likewise +reject the latter on the same account.”</p> + +<p>But in order to convince the reader that this doctrine of the +intelligible triad is not a fiction devised by the latter Platonists, I +shall present him with the following translation from Damascius (περι +αρχων) <i>Concerning Principles</i>,<a id="FNanchor_409" href="#Footnote_409" class="fnanchor">[409]</a> in which the agreement of all +the ancient theologists concerning this triad is most admirably evinced.</p> + +<p>“The theology contained in the Orphic rhapsodies concerning the +intelligible Gods is as follows <i>Time</i> is symbolically placed for +the one principle of the universe; but <i>æther</i> and <i>chaos</i>, +for the two posterior to this one: and <i>being</i>, simply considered, +is represented under the symbol of an egg. And this is the first triad +of the intelligible Gods. But for the perfection of the second triad, +they establish either a conceiving and a conceived egg as a God, or a +white garment, or a cloud: because from these<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xvi">[xvi]</span> Phanes leaps forth into +light. For indeed they philosophize variously concerning the middle +triad. But Phanes here represents intellect. But conceiving him over +and above this, as father and power, contributes nothing to Orpheus. +But they call the third triad Metis as <i>intellect</i>,<a id="FNanchor_410" href="#Footnote_410" class="fnanchor">[410]</a> Ericapæus +as <i>power</i>, and Phanes as <i>father</i>. But sometimes<a id="FNanchor_411" href="#Footnote_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> the +middle triad is considered according to the three-shaped God, while +conceived in the egg: for the middle always represents each of the +extremes; as in this instance, where the egg and the three-shaped God +subsist together. And here you may perceive that the egg is that which +is united; but that the three-shaped and really multiform God is the +separating and discriminating cause of that which is intelligible. +Likewise the middle triad subsists according to the egg, as yet united; +but the third<a id="FNanchor_412" href="#Footnote_412" class="fnanchor">[412]</a> according to the God who separates and distributes +the whole intelligible order. And this is the common and familiar +Orphic theology. But that delivered by Hieronymus and Hellanicus is +as follows. According to them <i>water</i> and <i>matter</i> were +the first productions, from which earth was secretly drawn forth: so +that water and earth are established as the two first principles; +the latter of these having a <i>dispersed</i> subsistence; but the +former conglutinating and connecting the latter. But they are silent +concerning the principle prior to these two, as being ineffable: for as +there are no illuminations about him, his arcane and ineffable nature +is from hence sufficiently evinced. But the third principle posterior +to these two, <i>water</i> and <i>earth</i>, and which is generated +from them, is <i>a dragon</i>, naturally endued with the heads of a +bull and a lion, but in the middle having the countenance of the God +himself. They add likewise that he has wings on his shoulders, and +that he is called <i>undecaying Time</i>, and <i>Hercules</i>; that +<i>Necessity</i> resides with him, which is the same as <i>Nature</i>, +and incorporeal <i>Adrastia</i>, which is extended throughout the +universe, whose limits she binds in amicable conjunction. But as it +appears to me, they denominate this third principle as established +according to essence; and assert, besides this, that it subsists as +male and female, for the purpose of exhibiting the generative causes of +all things.</p> + +<p>“But I likewise find in the Orphic rhapsodies, that neglecting the two +first principles, together with the one principle who is delivered in +silence, the third principle, posterior to the two, is established +by the theology as the original; because this first of all possesses +something effable and commensurate to human discourse. For in the +former hypothesis, the highly reverenced and undecaying <i>Time</i>, +the father of æther and chaos, was the principle: but in this +<i>Time</i> is neglected, and the principle becomes <i>a dragon</i>. It +likewise calls triple æther, moist; and Chaos, infinite; and Erebus, +cloudy and dark; delivering this second triad analogous to the first: +this being potential, as that was paternal. Hence the third procession +of this triad is dark Erebus: its paternal and summit æther, not +according to a simple but intellectual subsistence: but its middle +infinite chaos, considered as a progeny or procession, and among these +parturient, because from these the third intelligible triad proceeds. +What then is the third intelligible triad? I answer, the egg; the duad +of the natures of male and female which it contains, and the multitude +of all-various seeds, residing in the middle of this triad: And the +third among these is an incorporeal God, bearing golden wings on his +shoulders; but in his inward parts naturally possessing the heads of +bulls, upon which heads a mighty dragon appears, invested with the +all-various forms of wild-beasts. This last then must be considered +as the <i>intellect</i> of the triad; but the middle progeny, which +are <i>many</i> as well as <i>two</i>, correspond to <i>power</i>, and +the egg itself is <i>the paternal principle</i> of the third triad: +but the third God of this third triad, this theology celebrates as +<i>Protogonus</i>, and calls him <i>Jupiter</i>, the disposer of all +things and of the whole world; and on this account denominates him +<i>Pan</i>. And such is the information which this theology affords us, +concerning the genealogy of the intelligible principles of things.</p> + +<p>But in the writings of the Peripatetic Eudemus, containing the +Theology of Orpheus, the whole intelligible<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xvii">[xvii]</span> order is passed over in +silence, as being every way ineffable and unknown, and incapable of +verbal enunciation. Eudemus therefore commences his genealogy from +<i>Night</i>, from which also Homer begins: though Eudemus is far from +making the Homeric genealogy consistent and connected, for he asserts +that Homer begins from Ocean and Tethys. It is however apparent, +that <i>Night</i> is according to Homer the greatest divinity, since +she is reverenced even by Jupiter himself. For the poet says of +Jupiter—“that he feared lest he should act in a manner displeasing to +swift <i>Night</i>.” So that Homer begins his genealogy of the Gods +from <i>Night</i>. But it appears to me that Hesiod, when he asserts +that Chaos was first generated, signifies by Chaos the incomprehensible +and perfectly united nature of that which is intelligible: but that +he produces earth<a id="FNanchor_413" href="#Footnote_413" class="fnanchor">[413]</a> the first from thence, as a certain principle +of the whole procession of the Gods. Unless perhaps Chaos is the +second of the two principles: but Earth,<a id="FNanchor_414" href="#Footnote_414" class="fnanchor">[414]</a> Tartarus, and Love, +form the triple intelligible. So that <i>Love</i> is to be placed for +the third monad of the intelligible order, considered according to +its convertive nature; for it is thus denominated by Orpheus in his +rhapsodies. But <i>Earth</i> for the first, as being first established +in a certain firm and essential station. But <i>Tartarus</i> for +the middle, as in a certain respect exciting and moving forms into +distribution. But Acusilaus appears to me to establish <i>Chaos</i> +for the first principle, as entirely unknown; and after this, two +principles, <i>Erebus</i> as male, and <i>Night</i> as female; placing +the latter for <i>infinity</i>, but the former for <i>bound</i>. But +from the mixture of these, he says that <i>Æther</i>, <i>Love</i>, and +<i>Counsel</i> are generated, forming three intelligible hypostases. +And he places <i>Æther</i> as the summit; but <i>Love</i> in the +middle, according to its naturally middle subsistence; but <i>Metis</i> +or <i>Counsel</i> as the third, and the same as highly-reverenced +intellect. And, according to the history of Eudemus, from these he +produces a great number of other Gods. But Epimenides establishes +<i>Air</i> and <i>Night</i> as the two first principles; manifestly +reverencing in silence the one principle prior to these two. But from +air and night <i>Tartarus</i> is generated, forming as it appears to +me the third principle, as a certain mixed temperature from the two. +And this mixture is called by some an intelligible medium, because it +extends itself to both the summit and the end. But from the mixture +of the extremes with each other, an egg is generated, which is truly +an intelligible animal: and from this again another progeny proceeds. +But according to Pherecydes Syrius, the three first principles are a +<i>Perpetually-abiding Vital Nature</i>, <i>Time</i>,<a id="FNanchor_415" href="#Footnote_415" class="fnanchor">[415]</a> and <i>an +Earthly Nature</i>: one of these subsisting, as I conceive, prior to +the other two. But he asserts that <i>Time</i> generates from the +progeny of itself, <i>Fire</i>, <i>Spirit</i>, and <i>Water</i>: which +signify, as it appears to me, the triple nature of that which is +intelligible. But from these, distributed into five profound recesses, +a numerous progeny of Gods is constituted, which he calls <i>five-times +animated</i> (πεντεμψυχος): and which is perhaps the same as if he had +said πεντεκοσμος, or a <i>five-fold world</i>. But we may probably +discourse on this subject at some other opportunity. And thus<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xviii">[xviii]</span> much may +suffice at present concerning the hypotheses derived from the Grecian +fables, which are both many and various.</p> + +<p>But with respect to the theology of the Barbarians, the Babylonians +seem to pass over in silence the one principle of the universe. But +they establish two principles, Tauthe and Apasoon. And they consider +Apasoon as the husband of Tauthe, whom they denominate the mother of +the Gods; from whom an only-begotten son <i>Mooumis</i> was produced: +which, as it appears to me, is no other than the intelligible world +deduced from two principles.<a id="FNanchor_416" href="#Footnote_416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a> But from these another procession +is derived, <i>Dache</i> and <i>Dachus</i>. And likewise a third from +these, <i>Kissare</i> and <i>Assoorus</i>. And from these again three +deities are produced, <i>Anus</i>, <i>Illinus</i>, and <i>Aus</i>. +But from <i>Aus</i> and <i>Dache</i> a son called Belus is produced, +who they say is the demiurgus of the world. But with respect to the +Magi, and all the Arion race, as we are informed by Eudemus, some of +them call all the intelligible and united world <i>Place</i>, and +some of them <i>Time</i>: from which <i>a good divinity</i> and <i>an +evil dæmon</i> are distributed; <i>Light</i> and <i>Darkness</i> +subsisting prior to these, according to the assertions of others. +However, both the one and the other, after an undistributed nature, +consider that nature as having a subsistence which distributes the +two-fold co-ordination of better natures: one of which co-ordinations +<i>Orosmades</i> presides over, and the other <i>Arimanius</i>. But +the Sidonians, according to the same historian, place before all +things, <i>Time</i>, <i>Desire</i>, and <i>cloudy Darkness</i>. And +they assert that from the mingling of <i>Desire</i> and <i>Darkness</i> +as two principles, <i>Air</i> and <i>a gentle Wind</i> were produced: +<i>Air</i> evincing the summit of the intelligible triad; but <i>the +gentle Wind</i> raised and proceeding from this, the vital prototype of +the intelligible. And again that from both these the bird <i>Otus</i>, +similar to a night raven, was produced; representing, as it appears +to me, intelligible intellect. But as we find (without the assistance +of Eudemus) the Phœnician mythology, according to Mochus, places +<i>Æther</i> and <i>Air</i> as the two first principles, from which +the intelligible god <i>Oulomus</i> was produced; who, as it appears +to me, is the summit of the intelligible order. But from this god +(yet proceeding together with him) they assert that <i>Chousorus</i> +was produced, being the first unfolding procession. And after this +<i>an egg</i> succeeds; which I think must be called intelligible +intellect. But the unfolding <i>Chousorus</i> is intelligible power, +because this is the first nature which distributes an undistributed +subsistence: unless perhaps after the two principles <i>Æther</i> +and <i>Air</i>, the summit is <i>One Wind</i>: but the middle <i>Two +Winds</i>, the <i>south-west</i> and the <i>south</i>; for in a certain +respect they place these prior to <i>Oulomus</i>. But <i>Oulomus</i> +himself is intelligible intellect: and unfolding <i>Chousorus</i><a id="FNanchor_417" href="#Footnote_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a> +the first order after the intelligible series. But the <i>egg +itself</i> is heaven: from the bursting of which into two parts, the +sections are said to have become heaven and earth. But with respect +to the Egyptians, nothing accurately is related of them by Eudemus: +we have, however, by means of some Egyptian philosophers resident +among us, been instructed in the occult truth of their theological +doctrine. According to these philosophers then, the Egyptians in +certain discourses celebrate <i>an unknown Darkness</i> as the one +principle of the universe, and this <i>thrice pronounced as such</i>: +but for the two principles after the first they place <i>Water</i> +and <i>Sand</i>, according to Heraiscus; but according to the more +ancient writer Asclepiades, <i>Sand</i> and <i>Water</i>; from which +and after which the first <i>Kamephis</i> is generated. But after this +<i>a second</i>, and from this again <i>a third</i>; by all which, the +whole intelligible distribution is accomplished. For thus Asclepiades +determines. But the more modern Heraiscus says that the Egyptians, +denominating the third Kamephis from his father and grandfather, +assert that he is <i>the Sun</i>; which doubtless signifies in this +case intelligible intellect. But a more accurate knowledge of these +affairs must be received from the above-mentioned authors themselves. +It<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xix">[xix]</span> must however be observed, that with the Egyptians there are many +distributions of things according to union; because they unfold an +intelligible nature into characteristics, or peculiarities of many +gods, as may be learned from such as are desirous of consulting their +writings on this subject.”</p> + +<p>Thus far Damascius; from which curious and interesting relation +the reader may not only perceive at one view the agreement of the +ancient theologists with each other in celebrating the intelligible +triad, and venerating in silence the ineffable principle of things, +but may likewise see that the Christian trinity is essentially +different from this triad, because according to Plato and the ancient +theologists, the first cause is not a part of any triad, or order of +things. Consonant too with the above relation is the doctrine of the +Chaldeans concerning the intelligible order, as delivered by Johannes +Picus, in his <i>Conclusions according to the opinion of the Chaldean +Theologists</i>.<a id="FNanchor_418" href="#Footnote_418" class="fnanchor">[418]</a> “The intelligible co-ordination (says he) is not +in the intellectual co-ordination, as Amasis the Egyptian asserts, +but is above every intellectual hierarchy, imparticipably concealed +in the abyss of the first unity, and under the obscurity of the first +darkness.” Co-ordinatio intelligibilis non est in intellectuali +co-ordinatione, ut dixit Amasis Ægyptius, sed est super omnem +intellectualem hierarchium, in abysso primæ unitatis, et sub caligine +primarum tenebrarum imparticipaliter abscondita.</p> + +<p>But from this triad it may be demonstrated, that all the processions of +the Gods may be comprehended in six orders, viz. the <i>intelligible +order</i>, the <i>intelligible and at the same time intellectual</i>, +the <i>intellectual</i>, the <i>supermundane</i>, the <i>liberated</i>, +and the <i>mundane</i>.<a id="FNanchor_419" href="#Footnote_419" class="fnanchor">[419]</a> For the <i>intelligible</i>, as we +have already observed, must hold the first rank, and must consist +of <i>being</i>, <i>life</i>, and <i>intellect</i>; <i>i.e.</i> +must <i>abide</i>, <i>proceed</i>, and <i>return</i>; at the same +time that it is characterised, or subsists principally according +to <i>permanent being</i>. But in the next place that which is +both <i>intelligible</i> and <i>intellectual</i> succeeds, which +must likewise be triple, but must principally subsist according +to <i>life</i>, or <i>intelligence</i>. And in the third place +the <i>intellectual</i> order must succeed, which is <i>triply +convertive</i>. But as in consequence of the existence of the sensible +world, it is necessary that there should be some demiurgic cause of its +existence, this cause can only be found in <i>intellect</i>, and in +the last hypostasis of the <i>intellectual triad</i>. For all forms in +this hypostasis subsist according to all-various and perfect divisions; +and forms can only fabricate when they have a perfect intellectual +separation from each other. But since <i>fabrication</i> is nothing +more than <i>procession</i>, the demiurgus will be to the posterior +orders of Gods what <i>the one</i> is to the orders prior to the +<i>demiurgus</i>: and consequently he will be that secondarily which +the first cause of all is primarily. Hence his first production will be +an order of Gods analogous to the <i>intelligible</i> order, and which +is denominated <i>supermundane</i>. After this he must produce an order +of Gods similar to the <i>intelligible</i> and <i>intellectual</i> +order, and which are denominated <i>liberated</i> Gods. And in the last +place, a procession correspondent to the <i>intellectual</i> order, +and which can be no other than the mundane Gods. For the demiurgus +is chiefly characterised according to diversity, and is allotted the +boundary of all universal hypostases.</p> + +<p>All these orders, as is shown by Proclus in this work, are unfolded by +Plato in the conclusions of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides; +and this in a manner perfectly conformable to the Chaldaic theology. In +proof of this I refer the reader to my collection of Chaldean oracles, +in the Old Monthly Magazine.</p> + +<p>P. 348. <i>It is difficult to discover the fabricator and father of +this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all +men.</i></p> + +<p>The following admirable developement by Proclus of the difficulty of +discovering the maker of the universe, is extracted from p. 91, &c. of +his Commentaries on the Timæus of Plato.</p> + +<p>“Father and fabricator differ from each other, so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xx">[xx]</span> far as the former is +the cause of matter,<a id="FNanchor_420" href="#Footnote_420" class="fnanchor">[420]</a> but the latter of the world and order, and +in short, of the formal cause; and so far indeed, as the former is the +supplier of being and union, but the latter of powers and a multiform +essence; and so far as the one stably contains all things in himself, +but the other is the cause of progression and generation: and so far as +the former signifies ineffable and divine providence, but the latter +an abundant communication of productive principles. Porphyry however +says, that father is he who generates the universe from himself, but +fabricator he who receives the matter of it from another. Hence Aristo +indeed, is said to be the <i>father</i> of Plato, but the builder +of a house is the <i>maker</i> or fabricator of it, as not himself +generating the matter of which it consists. If however, this is true, +there was no occasion to call the demiurgus father, because according +to Timæus, he does not give subsistence to matter. Is not the demiurgus +therefore, rather the fabricator as producing form? For we call all +those makers who produce any thing from a non-existent state into +existence. But so far as the demiurgus produces that which he produces, +in conjunction with life, he is father. For fathers are the causes of +animals, and of certain living beings, and impart seed together with +life. And thus much concerning this particular.</p> + +<p>But ‘<i>this universe</i>’ signifies indeed, the corporeal masses, and +the whole spheres [of which it consists] and the plenitudes of each. +It also signifies the vital and intellectual powers, which ride as +it were in the corporeal masses. It also comprehends all the mundane +causes<a id="FNanchor_421" href="#Footnote_421" class="fnanchor">[421]</a> and the whole divinity of the world, about which the number +of the mundane Gods proceeds; likewise, the one divinity, the divine +soul, and the whole bulk of the world, together with the divine, +intellectual, psychical, and corporeal-formed number that is conjoined +with the world. For every monad has a multitude co-ordinate to itself. +All these therefore must be assumed for the <i>universe</i>; since +it signifies all these. Perhaps likewise the addition of the pronoun +<i>this</i>, is significant of the universe being in a certain respect +sensible and partial. For the intelligible universe is not <i>this</i>, +because it is comprehensive of <i>all intellectual forms</i>. But the +term <i>this</i> is adapted to the visible universe which is allotted a +sensible and material nature. It is difficult therefore, as Plato says, +to discover the demiurgus of this universe. For since with respect to +discovery, one kind proceeds scientifically from such things as are +first,<a id="FNanchor_422" href="#Footnote_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a> but another journeys on from things of a secondary nature, +according to reminiscence; the discovery from such things as are first +may be said to be difficult, because the invention of the intermediate +powers, pertains to the highest theory. But the discovery from such +things as are secondary, is nearly more difficult than the former. For +if we intend from these to survey the essence of the demiurgus, and +his other powers, it is necessary that we should have beheld all the +nature of the things generated by him, all the visible parts of the +world, and the unapparent natural powers which it contains, according +to which the sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the world subsist. +Prior to these also, we must have surveyed the stable physical reasons, +and natures themselves, both the more total and the more partial,<a id="FNanchor_423" href="#Footnote_423" class="fnanchor">[423]</a> +and again, the immaterial and material, the divine and dæmoniacal, and +the natures of mortal animals. And farther still, the genera which +are under life, the perpetual and the mortal, the undefiled and the +material, such as are wholes, and such as are parts, the rational +and the irrational, and the prerogatives which are superior to ours, +through which every thing between the Gods and the mortal nature are +bound together. We must likewise have beheld the all-various souls, +the different numbers of Gods according to the different parts of +the universe, and the ineffable and effable impressions of the world +through<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxi">[xxi]</span> which it is conjoined with the father. For he who without +having seen these is impelled to the survey of the demiurgus, is more +imperfect than is requisite to the intellectual perception of the +father. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be conjoined +with that which is all-perfect.</p> + +<p>Moreover, it is necessary,<a id="FNanchor_424" href="#Footnote_424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a> that the soul becoming an intellectual +world, and being assimilated as much as possible to the whole +intelligible world, should introduce herself to the maker of the +universe; and from this introduction, should in a certain respect +become familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For +uninterrupted energy about any thing, calls forth and resuscitates +our [dormant] ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed +at the door of the father, it is necessary, that we should be united +to him. For discovery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, +to associate alone with the alone, and to see him himself, the soul +hastily withdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For then +she is present with her father, banquets together with him on the truth +of real being, and in pure splendour is purely initiated in entire and +stable visions. Such therefore is the discovery of the father, not that +which is doxastic; for this is dubious, and not very remote from the +irrational life. Neither is it scientific; for this is syllogistic and +composite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence +of the intellectual demiurgus. But it is that which subsists according +to intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and +a union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be +denominated difficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to +souls after every evolution of life; or as the true labour of souls. +For after the wandering about generation, after purification, and the +light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect which is in +us shine forth, placing the soul in the father as in a port, purely +establishing her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining light +with light, not such as that of science, but more beautiful, more +intellectual, and partaking more of the nature of <i>the one</i> than +this. For this is the paternal port,<a id="FNanchor_425" href="#Footnote_425" class="fnanchor">[425]</a> and the discovery of the +father, viz. an undefiled union with him.</p> + +<p>But to <i>say that when found it is impossible to speak of him to all +men</i>,<a id="FNanchor_426" href="#Footnote_426" class="fnanchor">[426]</a> perhaps indicates the custom of the Pythagoreans, who +had arcane assertions about divine natures, and did not divulge them +to all men. For as the Elean guest says, the eyes of the multitude +are not strong enough to look to truth. Perhaps also this may be said +which is much more venerable, that it is impossible for him who has +discovered the maker and father of the universe to speak of him to +certain persons such as he has seen him. For the discovery was not made +by the soul speaking, but closing her eyes, and being converted<a id="FNanchor_427" href="#Footnote_427" class="fnanchor">[427]</a> +to the divine light. Nor was it made by her being moved with her own +proper motion, but through being silent with a silence which leads the +way [to union]. For since the essence of other things is not naturally +adapted to be spoken of, either through a name, or through definition, +or through science, but is seen through intellection alone, as Plato +says in his Epistles, in what<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxii">[xxii]</span> other way can it be possible to discover +the essence of the demiurgus, than by intellectual energy? And how +when having thus found it, is it possible to tell what is seen, and +explain it to others, through nouns and verbs? For the evolution which +is conversant with composition, cannot exhibit a uniform and simple +nature. What then, some one may say, do we not assert many things +about the demiurgus, and about the other Gods, and even of <i>the one +itself</i>? To this we reply, we speak indeed <i>about</i> them, but +we do not speak <i>of each of them itself</i>. And we are able indeed +to speak <i>scientifically</i> of them, but not <i>intellectually</i>. +For this, as we have before observed, is to discover them. But if the +discovery is a silence of the soul, how can speech flowing through the +mouth, be sufficient to lead that which is discovered into light?”</p> + +<p>The following extracts from the <i>Manuscript Scholia of</i> +<span class="smcap">Proclus</span> On the <i>Cratylus of Plato</i>, are added on account +of their great importance; and that the reader may be furnished with +all the information on the recondite theology of Greece, that it was in +my power to obtain.</p> + +<p>This manuscript is so rare that, if I am not mistaken, no copy of it is +to be found in any of the colleges either of Oxford or Cambridge. My +copy of it is a transcript of that which is now in the possession of +Mr. <span class="smcap">Heber</span> of Oxford.</p> + +<p>The reader, however, must be careful to remember that the design of +Plato in the Cratylus was to unfold those peculiarities only of the +Gods that are apparent in their names.</p> + +<p>That Jupiter is not <i>said to be</i>, but <i>is</i> the father of +those who genuinely preserve the proper form of life, such as Hercules +and the Dioscuri; but of those who are never at any time able to +convert themselves to a divine nature, he never <i>is</i>, nor <i>is +said to be</i> the father. Such therefore as having been partakers of a +certain energy above human nature, have again fallen into <i>the sea of +dissimilitude</i>,<a id="FNanchor_428" href="#Footnote_428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a> and for honour among men have embraced error +towards the Gods,—of these Jupiter is <i>said to be</i> the father.</p> + +<p>That the paternal cause originates supernally from the intelligible +and occult gods; for there the first fathers of wholes subsist; but it +proceeds through all the intellectual Gods into the demiurgic order. +For Timæus celebrates this order as at the same time <i>fabricative</i> +and <i>paternal</i>; since he calls Jupiter the <i>demiurgus</i> +and <i>father</i>. The fathers however who are superior to the one +fabrication are called Gods of Gods, but the demiurgus is the father of +Gods and men. Farther still, Jupiter is said to be <i>peculiarly</i> +the father of some, as of Hercules, who immutably preserve a Jovian +and ruling life during their converse with the realms of generation. +Jupiter therefore, is triply father, of Gods, partial souls, and of +souls that embrace an intellectual and Jovian life. The intellectual +order of the Gods therefore, is supernally bounded by the king<a id="FNanchor_429" href="#Footnote_429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a> +of the total divine genera, and who has a paternal transcendency +with respect to all the intellectual Gods. This king according to +Orpheus is called by the blessed immortals that dwell on lofty Olympus +Phanes Protogonus. But this order proceeds through the three Nights, +and the celestial orders, into the Titanic or Saturnian series, +where it first separates itself from the fathers and changes the +kingdom of the <i>Synoches</i>,<a id="FNanchor_430" href="#Footnote_430" class="fnanchor">[430]</a> for a distributive government +of wholes, and unfolds every demiurgic genus of the Gods, from all +the above-mentioned ruling and royal causes, but proximately from +Saturn the leader of the Titannic orders. Prior however to other +fabricators (δημιουργοι) it unfolds Jupiter, who is allotted the unical +strength of the whole demiurgic series, and who produces and gives +subsistence to all unapparent and apparent natures. And he is indeed +intellectual according to the order in which he ranks, but he produces +the species and the genera of beings into the order of sensibles. +He is likewise filled with the Gods above himself, but imparts from +himself a progression into being to all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxiii">[xxiii]</span> mundane natures. Hence Orpheus +represents him fabricating every celestial race, making the sun and +moon and the other starry Gods, together with the sublunary elements, +and diversifying the latter with forms which before had a disordered +subsistence. He likewise represents him presiding over the Gods who are +distributed about the whole world, and who are suspended from him; and +in the character of a legislator assigning distributions of providence +in the universe according to desert to all the mundane Gods.<a id="FNanchor_431" href="#Footnote_431" class="fnanchor">[431]</a> Homer +too, following Orpheus, celebrates him as the common father of Gods and +men, as leader and king, and as the supreme of rulers. He also says +that all the multitude of mundane Gods is collected about him, abides +in and is perfected by him. For all the mundane Gods are converted to +Jupiter through Themis,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Ζευς δε θεμιστα κελευσε θεους, αγορην δε καλεσσαι</div> + <div class="i12">——ηδ’ αρα παντη</div> + <div>φοιτησασα κελευσε Διος προς δωμα νεεσθαι.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “But Jupiter orders Themis to call the Gods to council; and she +directing her course every where commands them to go to the house of +Jupiter.”<a id="FNanchor_432" href="#Footnote_432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a> All of them therefore are excited according to the one +will of Jupiter, and become διος ενδον,<a id="FNanchor_433" href="#Footnote_433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a> <i>within Jupiter</i>, +as the poet says. Jupiter too again separates them within himself, +according to two co-ordinations, and excites them to providential +energies about secondary natures; he at the same time as Timæus says, +abiding after his accustomed manner;</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>ως εφατο κρονιδης πολεμον δ’ αλιαστον εγειρεν.<a id="FNanchor_434" href="#Footnote_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “Thus spoke Saturnian Jupiter, and excited inevitable war.” +Jupiter however is separate and exempt from all mundane natures; whence +also the most total and leading of the other Gods, though they appear +to have in a certain respect equal authority with Jupiter, through a +progression from the same causes, yet call him father. For both Neptune +and Juno celebrate him by this appellation. And though Juno speaks to +him as one who is of the same order,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>και γαρ εγω θεος ειμι· γενος δε μοι ενθεν οθεν σοι,</div> + <div>και με πρεσβυτατην τεκετο κρονος αγκυλομητις,<a id="FNanchor_435" href="#Footnote_435" class="fnanchor">[435]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “For I also am a divinity, and Saturn, of inflected counsel, +endowed me with the greatest dignity, when he begot me:”</p> + +<p>And though Neptune says</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>τρεις γαρ τ’εκ κρονου ειμεν αδελφεοι, ους τεκε Ρειη,</div> + <div>Ζευς και εγω, τριτατος δ’Αΐδης ενεροισιν ανασσων,<a id="FNanchor_436" href="#Footnote_436" class="fnanchor">[436]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “For we are three brothers from Saturn, whom Rhea bore, Jupiter +and I, and the third is Pluto, who governs the infernal realms:”</p> + +<p>Yet Jupiter is called father by both these divinities; and this +because he comprehends in himself the one and impartible cause of all +fabrication; is prior to the Saturnian triad;<a id="FNanchor_437" href="#Footnote_437" class="fnanchor">[437]</a> connectedly contains +the three fathers; and comprehends on all sides the vivification of +Juno. Hence, at the same time that this goddess gives animation to the +universe, he also together with other Gods gives subsistence to souls. +Very properly therefore do we say that the demiurgus in the Timæus is +the mighty Jupiter. For he it is who produces mundane intellects and +souls, who adorns all bodies with figures and numbers, and inserts in +them one union, and an indissoluble friendship and bond. For Night +also in Orpheus advises Jupiter to employ things of this kind in the +fabrication of the universe.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>αυταρ επην δεσμον κρατερον περι πασι τανυσσης.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>i.e. But when your power around the whole has spread</div> + <div class="i1h">A strong coercive bond.—</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxiv">[xxiv]</span></p> + +<p class="p-left">The proximate bond indeed of mundane natures, is that which subsists +through analogy; but the more perfect bond is derived from intellect +and soul. Hence Timæus calls the communion of the elements through +analogy, and the indissoluble union from life, a bond. For he says +animals were generated bound with animated bonds. But a more venerable +bond than these subsists from the demiurgic will. “For my will, says +Jupiter in the Timæus, is a greater and more principal bond, &c.”</p> + +<p>Firmly adhering therefore to this conception respecting the mighty +Jupiter, viz. that he is the demiurgus and father of the universe, that +he is an all-perfect imparticipable<a id="FNanchor_438" href="#Footnote_438" class="fnanchor">[438]</a> intellect, and that he fills +all things both with other goods, and with life, let us survey how +from names Socrates unfolds the mystic truth concerning this divinity. +Timæus then says that it is difficult to know the essence of the +demiurgus, and Socrates now says that it is not easy to understand his +name, which manifests his power and energy.</p> + +<p>That our soul knows partibly the impartible nature of the energy of +the Gods, and that which is characterised by unity in this energy, +in a multiplied manner: and this especially takes place about the +demiurgus who expands intellectual forms, and calls forth intelligible +causes, and evolves them to the fabrication of the universe. For +Parmenides characterises him by sameness and difference. According to +Homer two tubs are placed near him; and the most mystic tradition, +and the oracles of the Gods say that the duad is seated with him. +For thus they speak: “He possesses both; containing intelligibles +in intellect, but introducing sense to the worlds.” These oracles +likewise call him <i>twice beyond</i>, and <i>twice there</i> (δις +επεκεινα και δις εκει). And in short they celebrate him through the +duad. For the demiurgus comprehends in himself unitedly every thing +<i>prolific</i>,<a id="FNanchor_439" href="#Footnote_439" class="fnanchor">[439]</a> and which gives subsistence to mundane natures. +Very properly therefore is his name two-fold, of which δια manifests +<i>the cause through which</i>, and this is paternal goodness; but +ζηνα signifies <i>vivification</i>, the first causes of which in +the universe the demiurgus unically comprehends. The former too, is +a symbol of the Saturnian and paternal series; but the latter of +the vivific and maternal Rhea. So far likewise as Jupiter receives +the whole of Saturn, he gives subsistence to a triple essence, the +impartible, the partible, and that which subsists between these; but +according to the Rhea which he contains in himself, he scatters as from +a fountain, intellectual, psychical, and corporeal life. But by his +demiurgic powers and energies, he gives a formal subsistence to these +and separates them from forms of a prior order, and from each other. He +is also the ruler and king of all things: and is exempt from the three +demiurgi. For they, as Socrates says in the Gorgias, divide the kingdom +of their father; but Jupiter the demiurgus at once, without division +reigns over the three, and unically governs them.</p> + +<p>He is therefore the cause of the paternal triad, and of all +fabrication; but he connectedly contains the three demiurgi. And he +is <i>a king</i> indeed, as being co-ordinated with the fathers; but +<i>a ruler</i>, as being proximately established above the demiurgic +triad, and comprehending the uniform cause of it. Plato therefore by +considering his name in two ways evinces that images receive partibly +the unical causes of paradigms, and that this is adapted to him who +establishes the intellectual duad in himself. For he gives subsistence +to twofold orders, the celestial, and the supercelestial; whence also +the theologist Orpheus says, that his sceptre consists of four and +twenty measures; as ruling over a twofold twelve.<a id="FNanchor_440" href="#Footnote_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a></p> + +<p>That the soul of the world gives life to alter-motive natures; for to +these it becomes the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato says in +the Phædrus and Laws. But the demiurgus simply imparts to all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxv">[xxv]</span> things +life divine, intellectual, psychical, and that which is divisible about +bodies. No one however should think that the Gods in their generations +of secondary natures are diminished; or that they sustain a division of +their proper essence in giving subsistence to things subordinate; or +that they expose their progeny to the view, externally to themselves, +in the same manner as the causes of mortal offspring. Nor in short, +must we suppose that they generate with motion or mutation, but that +abiding in themselves, they produce by their very essence posterior +natures, comprehend on all sides their progeny, and supernally perfect +the productions and energies of their offspring. Nor again when it is +said that Gods are the sons of more total Gods, must it be supposed +that they are disjoined from more ancient causes, and are cut off +from a union with them; or that they receive the peculiarity of their +hyparxis through motion, and an indefiniteness converting itself to +bound. For there is nothing irrational and without measure, in the +natures superior to us. But we must conceive that their progressions +are effected through similitude; and that there is one communion of +essence, and an indivisible continuity of powers and energies, between +the sons of Gods and their fathers; all those Gods that rank in the +second order, being established in such as are more ancient; and the +more ancient imparting much of perfection, vigour, and efficacious +production to the subordinate. And after this manner we must understand +that Jupiter is said to be the son of Saturn. For Jupiter being the +demiurgic intellect proceeds from another intellect, superior and more +uniform, which increases indeed its proper intellections, but converts +the multitude of them to union; and multiplies its intellectual powers, +but elevates their all-various evolutions to impartible sameness. +Jupiter therefore proximately establishing a communion with this +divinity, and being filled from him with total intellectual good, +is very properly said to be the son of Saturn, both in hymns and in +invocations, as unfolding into light that which is occult, expanding +that which is contracted, and dividing that which is impartible in +the Saturnian monad; and as emitting a second more partial kingdom, +instead of that which is more total, a demiurgic instead of a paternal +dominion, and an empire which proceeds every where instead of that +which stably abides in itself.</p> + +<p>Why does Socrates apprehend the name of king Saturn to be υβριστικον +<i>insolent</i>, and looking to what does he assert this? We reply +that according to the poets <i>satiety</i> (κορος) is the cause of +<i>insolence</i>; for they thus denominate immoderation and repletion; +and they say that <i>Satiety</i> brought forth <i>Insolence</i>. (υβριν +φασιν τικτει κορος). He therefore who looks without attention to the +name of Saturn, will consider it as signifying <i>insolence</i>. For +to him who suddenly hears it, it manifests satiety and repletion. Why +therefore, since a name of this kind is expressive of insolence, do +we not pass it over in silence, as not being auspicious and adapted +to the Gods? May we not say that the royal series<a id="FNanchor_441" href="#Footnote_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> of the Gods, +beginning<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxvi">[xxvi]</span> from Phanes and ending in Bacchus, and producing the +same sceptre supernally as far as to the last kingdom, Saturn being +allotted the fourth royal order; appears according to the fabulous +pretext, differently from the other kings, to have received the sceptre +insolently from Heaven, and to have given it to Jupiter? For Night +receives the sceptre from Phanes; Heaven derives from Night, the +dominion over wholes; and Bacchus who is the last king of the Gods +receives the kingdom from Jupiter. For the father (Jupiter) establishes +him in the royal throne, puts into his hand the sceptre, and makes him +the king of all the mundane Gods. “Hear me ye Gods, I place over you a +king.”</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>κλυτε θεοι τον δ’υμμιν βασιλεα τιθημι,</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">says Jupiter to the junior Gods. But Saturn alone perfectly deprives +Heaven of the kingdom, and concedes dominion to Jupiter, cutting +and being cut off as the fable says. Plato therefore seeing this +succession, which in Saturn is called by theologists <i>insolent</i> +(υβριστικη) thought it worth while to mention the appearance of +insolence in the name; that from this he might evince the name is +adapted to the God, and that it bears an image of the insolence which +is ascribed to him in fables. At the same time he teaches us to refer +mythical devices to the truth concerning the Gods, and the apparent +absurdity which they contain, to scientific conceptions.</p> + +<p>That <i>the great</i> when ascribed to the Gods, must not be considered +as belonging to interval, but as subsisting intellectually, and +according to the power of cause, but not according to partible +transcendency. But why does Plato now call Saturn διανοια the dianoetic +part of the soul? May we not say, that it is because he looks to +the multitude of intellectual conceptions in him, the orders of +intelligibles, and the evolution of forms which he contains; since also +in the Timæus, he represents the demiurgic intellect as reasoning, and +making the world, dianoetically energising: and this in consequence of +looking to his partible and divided intellections, according to which +he fabricates not only wholes but parts. When Saturn, however, is +called intellect, Jupiter has the order of the dianoetic part: and when +again, Saturn is called the dianoetic part, we must say that he is so +called according to analogy with reference to a certain other intellect +of a higher order. Whether therefore you are willing to speak of +intelligible and occult intellect, or of that which unfolds into light +(εκφαντορικος νους) or of that which connectedly contains (συνεκτικος +νους) or of that which imparts perfection,<a id="FNanchor_442" href="#Footnote_442" class="fnanchor">[442]</a> (τελεσιουργος νους) +Saturn will be as the dianoetic part to all these. For he produces +united intellection into multitude, and fills himself wholly with +excited intelligibles. Whence also, he is said to be the leader of +the Titannic race, and the source of all-various separation and +diversifying power. And perhaps Plato here primarily delivers twofold +interpretations of the name of the Titans, which Jamblichus and Amelius +afterwards adopted. For the one interprets this name from the Titans +extending their powers to all things; but the other from <i>something +insectile</i> (παρα το τι ατομον) because the division and separation +of wholes into parts receives its beginning from the Titans. Socrates +therefore now indicates both these interpretations, by asserting of the +king of the Titans that he is a <i>certain great dianoetic power</i>. +For the term <i>great</i> is as symbol of power pervading to all +things; but the term <i>a certain</i>, of power proceeding to the most +partial natures.</p> + +<p>That the name Saturn is now triply analysed; of which the first +asserting this God to be the plenitude of intellectual good, and to +be the satiety of a divine intellect, from its conveying an image +of the satiety and repletion which are reprobated by the many, is +ejected as insolent. The second also which exhibits<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxvii">[xxvii]</span> the imperfect +and the puerile, is in like manner rejected. But the third, which +celebrates this God as full of purity, and as the leader of undefiled +intelligence, and an undeviating life, is approved. For king Saturn +is intellect, and the supplier of all intellectual life; but he is +an intellect exempt from co-ordination with sensibles, immaterial +and separate, and converted to himself. He likewise converts his +progeny and after producing them into light again embosoms and firmly +establishes them in himself. For the demiurgus of the universe, +though he is a divine intellect, yet he orderly arranges sensibles, +and provides for subordinate natures. But the mighty Saturn is +essentialized in separate intellections, and which transcend wholes. +“For the fire which is beyond the first, says the Chaldean Oracle, +does not incline its power downwards.” But the demiurgus is suspended +and proceeds from Saturn, being himself an intellect subsisting about +an immaterial intellect, energizing about it as the intelligible, +and producing that which is occult in it, into the apparent. For the +maker of the world is an intellect of intellect. And it appears to me, +that as Saturn is the summit of those Gods, that are properly called +intellectual, he is intellect, as with reference to the intelligible +genus of Gods. For all the intellectual adhere to the intelligible +genus of Gods, and are conjoined with them through intellections. +“Ye who understand the supermundane paternal profundity,” says the +hymn to them. But Saturn is intelligible, with reference to all the +intellectual Gods. <i>Purity</i> therefore indicates this impartible +and imparticipable transcendency of Saturn. For the not coming into +contact with matter, the impartible, and an exemption from habitude, +are signified by purity. Such indeed is the transcendency of this +God with respect to all co-ordination with things subordinate, and +such his undefiled union with the intelligible, that he does not +require a Curetic guard, like Rhea, Jupiter, and Proserpine. For all +these, through their progressions into secondary natures, require the +immutable defence of the Curetes. But Saturn being firmly established +in himself, and hastily withdrawing himself from all subordinate +natures is established above the guardianship of the Curetes. He +contains however, the cause of these uniformly in himself. For this +purity, and the undefiled which he possesses, give subsistence to all +the progressions of the Curetes. Hence in the Oracles, he is said to +comprehend the first fountain of the Amilicti, and to ride on all the +others. “The intellect of the father riding on attenuated rulers, they +become refulgent with the furrows of inflexible and implacable fire.”</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Νους πατρος αραιοις εποχουμενος ιθυντηρσιν</div> + <div>Ακναμπτου αστραπτουσιν αμειλικτου πυρος ολκοις.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">He is therefore <i>pure intellect</i>, as giving subsistence to the +undefiled order, and as being the leader of the whole intellectual +series.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Αυτου γαρ εκθρωσκουσιν αμειλικτοι τε κεραυνοι,</div> + <div>Και πρηστηροδοχοι κολποι παμφεγγεος αλκης.</div> + <div>Πατρογενους Εκατης, και υπεζωκος πυρος ανθος,</div> + <div>Ηδε κραταιον πνευμα πολων πυριων επεκεινα.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “From him leap forth the implacable thunders, and the +prester-capacious bosoms of the all-splendid strength of the +father-begotten Hecate, together with the environed flower of fire, and +the strong spirit which is beyond the fiery poles.”</p> + +<p>For he convolves all the hebdomad of the fountains,<a id="FNanchor_443" href="#Footnote_443" class="fnanchor">[443]</a> and gives +subsistence to it, from his unical and intelligible summit. For he is, +as the Oracles says, αμιστυλλευτος uncut into fragments, uniform, and +undistributed, and connectedly contains all the fountains, converting +and uniting all of them to himself, and being separate from all things +with immaculate purity. Hence he is κορονους, as an immaterial and pure +intellect, and as establishing himself in the paternal silence. He is +also celebrated as the father of fathers. Saturn therefore is a father, +and intelligible, as with reference to the intellectual Gods.</p> + +<p>That every intellect either abides, and is then intelligible, as being +better than motion; or it is moved, and is then intellectual; or it is +both, and is then intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. The +first of these is Phanes; the second which is alone<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxviii">[xxviii]</span> moved is Saturn; +and the third which is both moved and permanent is Heaven.</p> + +<p>That Saturn from his impartible, unical, paternal, and beneficent +subsistence in the intellectual orders has been considered by some as +the same with the one cause of all things. He is however only analogous +to this cause, just as Orpheus calls the first cause <i>Time</i> +(χρονος) nearly homonymously with Saturn. (κρονος) But the Oracles of +the Gods characterise this deity by the epithet of <i>the once</i>; +(τῳ απαξ) calling him <i>once beyond</i> (απαξ επεκεινα). For <i>the +once</i> is allied to <i>the one</i>.</p> + +<p>That <i>Heaven</i> the father of Saturn, is an intellect understanding +himself indeed, but united to the first intelligibles; in which +he is also firmly established; and connectedly contains all the +intellectual orders, by abiding in intelligible union. This God too is +<i>connective</i>, just as Saturn is of a <i>separating</i> idiom; and +on this account he is <i>father</i>. For connecting precede separating +causes; and the intelligible and at the same time intellectual +such as are intellectual only. Whence also <i>Heaven</i> being the +<i>Synocheys</i> (συνοχευς) of wholes, according to one union gives +subsistence to the Titannic series, and prior to this, to other orders +of the Gods; some of which abide only in him, which he retains in +himself, but others both abide and proceed, which he is said to have +concealed, after they were unfolded into light. And after all these +he gives subsistence to those divine orders, which proceed into the +universe, and are separated from their father. For he produces twofold +monads, and triads, and hebdomads equal in number to the monads. +These things however will be investigated more fully elsewhere. But +this deity is denominated according to the similitude of the apparent +Heaven. For each of them compresses and connects all the multitude +which it contains, and causes the sympathy and connection of the whole +world to be one. For connection is second to unifying power, and +proceeds from it. In the Phædrus therefore Plato delivers to us the +production of all secondary natures by Heaven, and shows us how this +divinity leads upwards and convolves all things to the intelligible. +He likewise teaches us what its summit is, what the profundity of its +whole order, and what the boundary of the whole of its progression. +Here therefore investigating the truth of things from names, he +declares its energy with respect to things more elevated and simple, +and which are arranged nearer to <i>the one</i>. He also clearly +appears here to consider the order of Heaven, as intelligible and at +the same time intellectual. For if it sees things on high, it energizes +intellectually, and there is prior to it the intelligible genus of +Gods, to which looking it is intellectual; just as it is intelligible +to the natures which proceed from it. What then are the things on high +which it beholds? Is it not evident that they are, the supercelestial +place, an essence without colour, without figure, and without the +touch, and all the intelligible extent? An extent comprehending as +Plato would say intelligible animals, the one cause of all eternal +natures, and the occult principles of these; but as the followers of +Orpheus would say, bounded by æther upwards, and by Phanes downwards. +For all between these two gives completion to the intelligible order. +But Plato now calls this both singularly and plurally; since all things +are there united, and at the same time each is separated peculiarly; +and this according to the highest union and separation.</p> + +<p>With respect to the term μετεωρολογοι, i.e. <i>those who discourse on +sublime affairs</i>, we must now consider it in a manner adapted to +those who chuse an anagogic life, who live intellectually, and who +do not gravitate to earth, but sublimely tend to a theoretic life. +For that which is called Earth there, maternally gives subsistence to +such things as Heaven, which is co-ordinate to that Earth, produces +paternally. And he who energizes there, may be properly called +μετεωρολογος, or, <i>one who discourses about things on high</i>. +Heaven therefore, being of a <i>connective</i> nature, is expanded +above the Saturnian orders, and all the intellectual series; and +produces from himself all the Titannic race; and prior to this, the +perfective and defensive orders: and in short is the leader of every +good to the intellectual Gods. Plato therefore, having celebrated +Saturn, for his intelligence which is without habitude to mundane +natures, and for his life which is converted to his own exalted +place of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxix">[xxix]</span> survey, now celebrates Heaven for another more perfect +energy. For to be conjoined to more elevated natures is a greater +good than to be converted to oneself. Let no one however think, that +on this account the above-mentioned energies are distributed in the +Gods; as for instance, that there is providence alone, in Jupiter, +a conversion alone to himself, in Saturn, and an elevation alone to +the intelligible, in Heaven. For Jupiter no otherwise provides for +mundane natures than by looking to the intelligible; since as Plato +says in the Timæus, intellect understanding ideas in animal itself, +thought it requisite that as many and such as it there perceived +should be contained in the universe; but as Orpheus<a id="FNanchor_444" href="#Footnote_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a> says with +a divinely inspired mouth, “Jupiter swallows his progenitor Phanes, +embosoms all his powers, and becomes all things intellectually which +Phanes is intelligibly.” Saturn also imparts to Jupiter the principles +of fabrication, and of providential attention to sensibles, and +understanding himself, he becomes united to first intelligibles, +and is filled with the goods which are thence derived. Hence also +the theologist (Orpheus) says “that he was nursed by Night.”<a id="FNanchor_445" href="#Footnote_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a> +If therefore the intelligible is nutriment, Saturn is replete not +only with the intelligibles co-ordinated with him, but also with +the highest and occult intellections. Heaven himself also fills all +secondary natures with his proper goods, but guards all things by +his own most vigorous powers; and the father supernally committed +to him the connecting and guarding the causes of eternal animal. +But he intellectually perceives himself, and is converted to the +intelligibles which he contains; and this his intelligence, Plato in +the Phædrus calls <i>circulation</i>. For as that which is moved in +a circle is moved about its own centre, so Heaven energizes about +its own intelligible, according to intellectual circulation. But all +the Gods subsisting in all, and each possessing all energies, one +transcends more in this, and another in a different energy, and each is +particularly characterised according to that in which it transcends. +Thus Jupiter is characterised by providence, and hence his name is now +thus analysed; but Saturn by a conversion to himself, whence also he is +<i>inflected counsel</i> αγκυλομητις; and Heaven by habitude to things +more excellent; from which also he receives his appellation. For his +giving subsistence to a pure and the Saturnian intellect, represents +his energy to the other part. But as there are many powers in Heaven, +such as the connective, guardian, and convertive, you will find that +this name is appropriately adapted to all these. For the connective is +signified through bounding the intellectual Gods; since the connective +bounds the multitude which he contains. The power which guards wholes +subsists through the termination and security of an intellectual +essence. And the convertive power subsists through converting seeing, +and intellectually-energizing natures, to things on high. But all these +are adapted to Heaven. For there is no fear that the Gods will be +dissipated, and that on this account they require connective causes; or +that they will sustain mutation, and that on this account they stand +in need of the saving aid of guardian causes; but now Socrates at once +manifests all the powers of Heaven, through convertive energy. For +this is to behold things on high, to be converted to them, and through +this to be connected and defended. And it appears to me that Heaven +possesses this idiom according to analogy to the intelligible eternity +and the intelligible wholeness. For Timæus particularly characterizes +eternity by this, viz. by abiding in the one prior to it, and by being +established in the summit of intelligibles; and Socrates says that +Heaven surveys things on high, viz. the supercelestial place, and such +things as are comprehended in the god-nourished silence of the fathers. +(και οσα τῃ θεοθρεμμονι σιγῃ περιειληπται των πατερων). As therefore +Parmenides signifies each of these orders through <i>wholeness</i>, the +one through intelligible, and the other through intellectual wholeness; +in like manner both<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxx">[xxx]</span> Timæus and Socrates characterise them by a +conversion to more excellent natures. But the conversion as well as the +wholeness is different. For that of eternity is intelligible, on which +account Timæus does not say that it looks to its intelligible, but only +that it stably abides. But the conversion of Heaven is intellectual, +and on this account Socrates says that it sees things on high, and +through this converts, guards, and connects all things posterior to +itself. Whence also in the Phædrus, it is said by the circulation of +itself, to lead all things to the supercelestial place, and the summit +of the first intelligibles.</p> + +<p>That there being three fathers and kings of which Socrates here +makes mention, Saturn alone appears to have received the government +from his father, and to have transmitted it to Jupiter, by violence. +Mythologists therefore celebrate the sections of Heaven and Saturn. +But the cause of this is, that Heaven is of the connective, Saturn +of the Titannic, and Jupiter of the demiurgic order. Again, the +Titannic genus rejoices in separations and differences, progressions +and multiplications of powers. Saturn therefore, as a dividing God, +separates his kingdom from that of Heaven; but as a pure intellect he +is exempt from a fabricative energy proceeding into matter. Hence also +the demiurgic genus is again separated from him. Section therefore +is on both sides of him. For so far as he is a Titan, he is cut off +from the connective causes, but so far as he does not give himself to +material fabrication, he is cut off from the demiurgus Jupiter.</p> + +<p>That with respect to the supercelestial place to which Heaven extends +his intellectual life, some characterise it by ineffable symbols; but +others after giving it a name celebrate it as unknown, neither being +able to speak of its form, or figure. And proceeding somewhat higher +than this, they have been able to manifest the boundary<a id="FNanchor_446" href="#Footnote_446" class="fnanchor">[446]</a> of the +intelligible Gods by name alone. But the natures which are beyond this, +they signify through analogy alone, these natures being ineffable and +incomprehensible. Since that God who closes the paternal order, is +said by the wise to be the only deity among the intelligible Gods, +that is denominated: and theurgy ascends as far as to this order. +Since therefore the natures prior to Heaven, are allotted such a +transcendency of uniform subsistence, that some of them are said to +be effable, and at the same time ineffable, known, and at the same +time unknown, through their alliance to <i>the one</i>, Socrates very +properly restrains the discourse about them, in consequence of names +not being able to represent their hyparxes; and in short, because +it requires a certain wonderful employment, to separate the effable +and ineffable, of their hyparxis or power. He accuses therefore his +memory, not as disbelieving in the fables, which assert that there are +certain more ancient causes beyond Heaven, nor as not thinking it worth +while to mention them. For in the Phædrus he himself celebrates the +supercelestial place. But he says this, because the first of beings +cannot become known by the exercise of memory and through phantasy, or +opinion, or the dianoetic part. For we are alone naturally adapted to +be conjoined to them, with the flower of intellect and the hyparxis +of our essence; and through these we receive the sensation of their +unknown nature. Socrates therefore says, that what in them is exempt, +both from our gnostic and recollective life, is the cause of our +inability to give them a name; for they are not naturally adapted to be +known through names. Theologists likewise would not remotely signify +them, and through the analogy of things apparent to them, if they could +be named, and apprehended by knowledge.</p> + +<p>That Homer<a id="FNanchor_447" href="#Footnote_447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a> does not ascend beyond the Saturnian order, but +evincing that Saturn is the proximate cause of the demiurgus, he +calls Jupiter, who is the demiurgus, the son of Saturn. He also calls +the divinities co-ordinate with him Juno, Neptune, and Mars; and he +denominates Jupiter, the father of men and Gods. But he does not +introduce Saturn, as either energizing, or saying any thing, but as +truly αγκυλομητις in consequence of being converted to himself.</p> + +<p>That Orpheus greatly availed himself of the licence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxxi">[xxxi]</span> of fables, +and manifests every thing prior to Heaven by names, as far as to +the first cause. He also denominates the ineffable, who transcends +the intelligible unities, <i>Time</i>; whether because <i>Time</i> +pre-subsists as the cause of all generation, or because, as delivering +the generation of true beings, he thus denominates the ineffable, that +he may indicate the order of true beings, and the transcendency of the +more total to the more partial; that a subsistence according to Time +may be the same with a subsistence according to cause; in the same +manner as generation with an arranged progression. But Hesiod venerates +many of the divine natures in silence, and does not in short name the +first. For that what is posterior to the first proceeds from something +else, is evident from the verse,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>“Chaos of all things was the first produced.”</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">For it is perfectly impossible that it could be produced without a +cause; but he does not say what that is which gave subsistence to +Chaos. He is silent indeed with respect to both the fathers<a id="FNanchor_448" href="#Footnote_448" class="fnanchor">[448]</a> of +intelligibles, the exempt, and the co-ordinate; for they are perfectly +ineffable. And with respect to the two co-ordinations, the natures +which are co-ordinate with the one, he passes by in silence, but those +alone which are co-ordinate with the indefinite duad, he unfolds +through genealogy. And on this account Plato now thinks Hesiod deserves +to be mentioned, for passing by the natures prior to Heaven, as being +ineffable. For this also is indicated concerning them by the Oracles, +which likewise add “they possess mystic silence,” σιγ’ εχε μυστα. And +Socrates himself in the Phædrus, calls the intellectual perception of +them μυησις and εποπτεια, <i>in which nearly the whole business is +ineffable and unknown</i>.</p> + +<p>That Saturn in conjunction with Rhea produced Vesta and Juno who are +co-ordinate to the demiurgic causes. For Vesta imparts from herself +to the Gods an uninclining permanency, and seat in themselves, +and an indissoluble essence. But Juno imparts progression, and a +multiplication into things secondary. She is also the vivifying +fountain of wholes, and the mother of prolific powers; and on this +account she is said to have proceeded together with Jupiter the +demiurgus; and through this communion she generates maternally, such +things as Jupiter generates paternally. But Vesta abides in herself, +possessing an undefiled virginity, and being the cause of sameness to +all things. Each of these divinities however together with her own +proper perfection, possesses according to participation the power of +the other. Hence some say that Vesta is denominated from essence (απο +της εστιας) looking to her proper hyparxis. But others looking to her +vivific and motive power which she derives from Juno say that she +is thus denominated ως ωσεως ουσαν αιτιαν <i>as being the cause of +impulsion</i>. For all divine natures are in all, and particularly such +as are co-ordinate with each other, participate of, and subsist in each +other. Each therefore of the demiurgic and vivific orders, participates +the form by which it is characterised, from Vesta. The orbs of the +planets likewise possess the sameness of their revolutions from her; +and the poles and centres are always allotted from her their rest.</p> + +<p>That Vesta does not manifest essence, but the abiding and firm +establishment of essence in itself; and hence this goddess proceeds +into light after the mighty Saturn. For the divinities prior to +Saturn have not a subsistence in themselves and in another,<a id="FNanchor_449" href="#Footnote_449" class="fnanchor">[449]</a> but +this originates from Saturn. And a subsistence in <i>self</i> is the +peculiarity of Vesta, but in <i>another</i> of Juno.</p> + +<p>That the theology of Hesiod from the monad Rhea produces according +to things which are more excellent in the co-ordination, Vesta, but +according to those which are subordinate Juno; and according to those +which subsist between, Ceres. But according to Orpheus, Ceres is in +a certain respect the same with the whole of vivification, and in a +certain respect is not the same. For on high she is Rhea, but below in +conjunction with Jupiter, she is Ceres: for here the things begotten +are similar to the begetters, and are nearly the same.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxxii">[xxxii]</span></p> + +<p>That we ought to receive with caution what is now said concerning +effluxions and motions. For Socrates does not descend to the material +flowing of Heraclitus; for this is false,<a id="FNanchor_450" href="#Footnote_450" class="fnanchor">[450]</a> and unworthy the +dianoetic conceptions of Plato. But since it is lawful to interpret +things divine analogously, through appropriate images, Socrates very +properly assimilates fontal and Saturnian deities to streams; in so +doing jesting and at the same time acting seriously, because good is +always derived as it were in streams from on high, to things below. +Hence, according to the image of rivers, after the fontal deities, +who eternally devolve streams of good, the deities who subsist as +principles are celebrated. For after the <i>fountain</i> of a river the +place where it <i>begins</i> to flow is surveyed.</p> + +<p>That those divinities who are peculiarly denominated total intellectual +gods, of whom the great Saturn is the father, are properly called +fontal. For “from him leap forth the implacable thunders,” says the +oracle concerning Saturn. But concerning the vivific fountain Rhea +from which all life, divine, intellectual, psychical and mundane is +generated, the Chaldean oracles thus speak.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Ρειη τοι νοερων μακαρων πηγη τε ροη τε.</div> + <div>Παντων γαρ πρωτη δυναμεις κολποισιν αφραστοις</div> + <div>Δεξαμενη, γενεην επι παν προχεει τροχαουσαν.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “Rhea<a id="FNanchor_451" href="#Footnote_451" class="fnanchor">[451]</a> is the fountain and river of the blessed intellectual +Gods. For first receiving the powers of all things in her ineffable +bosoms, she pours running generation into every thing.”</p> + +<p>For this divinity gives subsistence to the infinite diffusion of all +life, and to all never-failing powers. She likewise moves all things +according to the measures of divine motions, and converts them to +herself; establishing all things in herself, as being co-ordinate to +Saturn. Rhea therefore is so called from causing a perpetual influx of +good, and through being the cause of divine <i>facility</i>, since the +life of the gods is attended with <i>ease</i> (θεοι ρεια ζωντες).</p> + +<p>That Ocean is the cause to all the Gods of acute and vigorous energy, +and bounds the separations of the first, middle, and last orders; +converting himself to himself, and to his proper principles, through +swiftness of intellect, but moving all things from himself, to energies +accommodated to their natures; perfecting their powers, and causing +them to have a never-failing subsistence. But Tethys imparts permanency +to the natures which are moved by Ocean, and stability to the beings +which are excited by him to the generation of secondary natures. She is +also the source of purity of essence to those beings who perpetually +desire to produce all things; as sustaining every thing in the divine +essences which as it were <i>leaps forth and percolates</i>. For each +of first causes, though it imparts to secondary natures a participation +of good, yet at the same time retains with itself that which is +undefiled, unmingled and pure from participation. Thus for instance, +intellect is filled with life, being, and intelligence, with which also +it fills soul; but establishing in itself that which in each of these +is genuine and exempt, it also illuminates from itself to beings of +a subordinate rank, inferior measures of these goods. And vigour of +energy indeed, is present with more ancient natures, through Ocean; +but the leaping forth and percolating through Tethys. For every thing +which is imparted from superior to subordinate natures, whether it be +essence, life, or intelligence, is <i>percolated</i>. And such of these +as are primary, are established in themselves; but such as are more +imperfect, are transferred to things of a subject order. Just as with +respect to streams of water, such of them as are nearer their source +are purer, but the more remote are more turbid. Both Ocean and Tethys +therefore, are fontal Gods, according to their first subsistence. +Hence Socrates now calls them the fathers of streams. But they also +proceed into other orders of Gods, exhibiting the same powers among +the Gods who rank as principles or rulers, among those of a liberated, +and those of a celestial characteristic; and appropriately in each of +these. Timæus, however, celebrates their sublunary orders, calling them +fathers of Saturn and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxxiii">[xxxiii]</span> Rhea, but the progeny of Heaven and Earth. But +their last processions are their divisible allotments about the earth; +both those which are apparent on its surface, and those which under the +earth, separate the kingdom of Hades, from the dominion of Neptune.</p> + +<p>That Saturn is conjoined both to Rhea and Jupiter, but to the +former as father to prolific power, but to the latter, as father to +intelligible<a id="FNanchor_452" href="#Footnote_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> intellect.</p> + +<p>That Ocean is said to have married Tethys, and Jupiter Juno, and +the like, as establishing a communion with her, conformably to the +generation of subordinate natures. For an according co-arrangement of +the Gods, and a connascent co-operation in their productions, is called +by theologists <i>marriage</i>.</p> + +<p>That Tethys is denominated from leaping forth and <i>straining</i> or +<i>cleansing</i>, being as it were <i>Diatethys</i>, and by taking away +the first two syllables <i>Tethys</i>.<a id="FNanchor_453" href="#Footnote_453" class="fnanchor">[453]</a></p> + +<p>That Saturn is the monad of the Titannic order of the Gods, but Jupiter +of the demiurgic. This last divinity however is twofold, the one exempt +and co-ordinated with Saturn, being a fontal God, and in short ranking +with the intellectual fathers, and convolving the extremity of them; +but the other being connumerated with the sons of Saturn, and allotted +a Saturnian summit and dominion in this triad; concerning which also +the Homeric Neptune says,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>τρεις γαρ τ’ εκ Κρονου ειμεν αδελφεοι, ους τεκε Ρειη.<a id="FNanchor_454" href="#Footnote_454" class="fnanchor">[454]</a></div> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <div>As brother Gods we three from Saturn came,</div> + <div>And Rhea bore us.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">And the first Jupiter indeed, as being the demiurgus of wholes, is the +king of things first, middle, and last, concerning whom Socrates also +had just said, that he is the ruler and king of all things; and life +and salvation are imparted to all things through him.</p> + +<p>But the ruling Jupiter, who ranks as a principle, and who is +co-ordinate with the three sons of Saturn governs the third part of the +whole of things, according to that of Homer,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>τριχθα δε παντα δεδασται——<a id="FNanchor_455" href="#Footnote_455" class="fnanchor">[455]</a></div> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <div>A triple distribution all things own.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">He is also the summit of the three, has the same name with the fontal +Jupiter, is united to him, and is monadically called Jupiter. But the +second is called dyadically, marine Jupiter, and Neptune. And the third +is triadically denominated, terrestrial Jupiter, Pluto, and Hades. +The first of these also preserves, fabricates, and vivifies summits, +but the second, things of a second rank, and the third those of a +third order. Hence this last is said to have ravished Proserpine, that +together with her he might animate the extremities of the universe.</p> + +<p>That the Titannic order dividing itself from the connecting order of +Heaven, but having also something in itself abiding, and connascent +with that order, Saturn is the leader of the separation, and on +this account he both arms others against his father, and receives +the scythe<a id="FNanchor_456" href="#Footnote_456" class="fnanchor">[456]</a> from his mother, through which he divides his own +kingdom from that of Heaven. But Ocean is co-ordinated with those that +abide<a id="FNanchor_457" href="#Footnote_457" class="fnanchor">[457]</a> in the manners of the father, and guards the middle of the +two orders; so far as a Titan being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxxiv">[xxxiv]</span> connumerated with the Gods that +subsist with Saturn; but so far as rejoicing in a co-ordination with +Heaven conjoining himself with the Synoches. For it is fit that he who +bounds the first and second orders, should be arranged in the middle +of the natures that are bounded. But every where this god is allotted +a power of this kind, and separates the genera of the Gods, the +Titannic from the connecting (των συνοχικων) and the vivific from the +demiurgic. Whence also ancient rumor calls Ocean the God who separates +the apparent part of Heaven from the unapparent; and on this account +poets say, that the sun and the other stars rise from the ocean. What +is now said therefore by Plato comprehends all the Titannic order +through these two conjunctions; this order abiding and at the same time +proceeding. And through the Saturnian order indeed, it comprehends +every thing separated from the fathers; but through that of Ocean, +every thing conjoined with the connecting Gods. Or if you had rather +so speak, through the Saturnian order, he comprehends every maternal +cause, but through the other, every thing subservient to the paternal +cause. For the female is the cause of progression and separation, but +the male of union and stable permanency.</p> + +<p>That of the demiurgic triad<a id="FNanchor_458" href="#Footnote_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a> which divides the whole world, and +distributes the indivisible, one and whole fabrication of the first +Jupiter, the summit, and which has the relation of father is Jupiter, +who through union with the whole demiurgic intellect having the same +appellation with it, is for this reason not mentioned here by Plato. +But Neptune is allotted the middle and that which binds together both +the extremes; being filled indeed from the essence of Jupiter, but +filling Pluto. For of the whole of this triad, Jupiter indeed is the +father, but Neptune the power, and Pluto the intellect. And all indeed +are in all; but each receives a different character of subsistence. +Thus Jupiter subsists according to <i>being</i>; but Neptune according +to <i>power</i>, and Pluto according to <i>intellect</i>. And though +all these divinities are the causes of the life of all things, yet +one is so <i>essentially</i>, another <i>vitally</i>, and another +<i>intellectually</i>. Whence also the theologist Orpheus says, that +the extremes fabricate in conjunction with Proserpine things first +and last; the middle being co-arranged with generative cause from his +own allotment, without Proserpine. Hence <i>violence</i> is said to +have been offered to Proserpine by Jupiter; but she is said to have +been <i>ravished</i> by Pluto. (διο και φασι την κορην υπο μεν τον +διος βιαζεσθαι, υπο δε του πλοντωνος αρπαζεσθαι.) But the middle is +said to be the cause of motion to all things. Hence also, he is called +<i>earth-shaker</i>, as being the origin of motion. And among those +who are allotted the kingdom of Saturn, the middle allotment, and the +agile sea (η ευκινηγος θαλaσσa) are assigned to him. According to +every division therefore, the summits are Jovian, the middles belong +to Neptune, and the extremes to Pluto. And if you look to the centres, +such as the east, that of mid-heaven and the west; if also you divide +the whole world, as for instance into the inerratic, planetary and +sublunary spheres;—or again, if you divide that which is generated +into the fiery, terrestrial, and that which subsists between; or +the earth into its summits, middle, and hollow, and subterranean +parts, this triad every where distributes the first, middle and last +differences of things fabricated in demiurgic boundaries.</p> + +<p>That the name Neptune is now triply analysed. For Neptune is the +trident-bearer, and the Tritons, and Amphitrite are the familiars of +this God. And the first analyzation of his name is from the allotment +over which he presides, and from souls coming into generation, in whom +the circle of sameness is fettered; since the sea is analogous to +generation. But the second is from communion with the first.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>αλλα Ζευς προτερος γεονει, και πλειονα ηδει.<a id="FNanchor_459" href="#Footnote_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">But Jove was born the first, and more he knew. For a Jupiter of this +kind, is the proximate intelligible<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxxv">[xxxv]</span> of Neptune. But the third analysis +of his name is from his energy in externals. For he is motive of +nature, and vivific of things last. He is also the guardian of the +earth, and excites it to generations.</p> + +<p>That Neptune is an intellectual demiurgic God, who receives souls +descending into generation; but Hades is an intellectual demiurgic +God, who frees souls from generation. For as our whole period +receives a triple division, into a life prior to generation, which +is Jovian, into a life in generation which is Neptunian, and into +a life posterior to generation which is Plutonian; Pluto, who is +characterised by intellect, very properly converts ends to beginnings, +effecting a circle without a beginning, and without an end, not only +in souls, but also in every fabrication of bodies, and in short, of +all periods;—which circle also, he perpetually convolves. Thus for +instance, he converts the ends to the beginnings of the souls of +the stars, and the convolutions of souls about generation, and the +like. And hence Jupiter is the guardian of the life of souls prior to +generation.</p> + +<p>That some badly analyze the name of Pluto into wealth from the earth, +through fruits and metals; but Hades into the invisible, dark and +dreadful. These Socrates now reprobates, bringing the two names to +the same signification; referring the name of Pluto, as intellect, +to the wealth of prudence, but that of Hades to an intellect +knowing all things. For this God is a sophist, who purifying souls +after death, frees them from generation. For Hades is not, as some +improperly explain it, evil: for neither is death evil; though Hades +to some appears to be attended with perturbations (εμπαθως); but it +is invisible and better than the apparent; such as is every thing +intelligible. Intellect therefore, in every triad of beings, convolves +itself to being, and the paternal cause, imitating in its energy the +circle.</p> + +<p>That men who are lovers of body, badly refer to themselves the passions +of the animated nature, and on this account consider death to be +dreadful, as being the cause of corruption. The truth however is, that +it is much better for man to die, and live in Hades a life according to +nature, since a life in conjunction with body is contrary to nature, +and is an impediment to intellectual energy. Hence it is necessary to +divest ourselves of the fleshly garments with which we are clothed, +as Ulysses did of his ragged vestments, and no longer like a wretched +mendicant together with the indigence of body, put on our rags. For as +the Chaldean Oracle says, “Things divine cannot be obtained by those +whose intellectual eye is directed to body; but those only can arrive +at the possession of them, who stript of their garments hasten to the +summit.”</p> + +<p>That Neptune when compared with Jupiter is said to know <i>many</i> +things; but Hades compared with souls to whom he imparts knowledge is +said to know <i>all</i> things; though Neptune is more total than Hades.</p> + +<p>That as it is necessary to analyse Pluto, not only into the obvious +wealth from the earth, but also into the wealth of wisdom, so likewise +Ceres must be analysed not only into corporeal nutriment; but beginning +from the Gods themselves it is requisite to conceive her to be the +supplier of aliment, first to the Gods themselves, afterwards to the +natures posterior to the Gods; and in the last place, that the series +of this beneficent energy extends as far as to corporeal nutriment. For +the characteristic of love shines forth first of all in the Gods: and +this is the case with the medicinal and prophetic powers of Apollo, and +with those of every other divinity. But nutriment, when considered with +reference to the Gods, is the communication of intellectual plenitude +from more exalted natures to those of an inferior rank. Gods therefore, +are nourished, when they view with the eye of intellect Gods prior to +themselves; and when they are perfected and view intelligible beauties, +such as justice itself, temperance itself, and the like, as it is said +in the Phædrus.</p> + +<p>That from sportive conceptions about the Gods, it is possible for those +to energize entheastically, or according to a divinely inspired energy, +who apply themselves to things in a more intellectual manner. Thus +for instance, according to the material conceptions of the multitude, +Venus derives her origin from foam; and foam corresponds to seed. +Hence according to them the pleasure arising from this in coition is +Venus. Who however, is so stupid, as not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxxvi">[xxxvi]</span> to survey primary and eternal +natures, prior to such as are last and corruptible? I will therefore +unfold the divine conception respecting Venus.</p> + +<p>They say then that the first Venus was produced from twofold causes, +the one as that <i>through which</i>,<a id="FNanchor_460" href="#Footnote_460" class="fnanchor">[460]</a> co-operating with her +progression, as calling forth the prolific power of the father, and +imparting it to the intellectual orders; but Heaven as the maker +and cause unfolding the goddess into light, from his own generative +abundance. For whence could that which congregates different genera, +according to one desire of beauty, receive its subsistence except +from the <i>synochical</i> power of Heaven? From the foam therefore +of his own prolific parts thrown into the sea, Heaven produced this +goddess, as Orpheus says. But the second Venus, Jupiter produces from +his own generative powers, in conjunction with Dione; and this goddess +likewise proceeds from foam, after the same manner with the more +ancient Venus, as Orpheus evinces. These goddesses therefore differ +from each other, according to the causes of their production, their +orders and their powers. For she that proceeds from the genitals of +Heaven is supermundane, leads upwards to intelligible beauty, is the +supplier of an unpolluted life, and separates from generation. But +the Venus that proceeds from Dione governs all the co-ordinations +in the celestial world and the earth, binds them to each other, and +perfects their generative progressions, through a kindred conjunction. +These divinities too, are united with each other through a similitude +of subsistence: for they both proceed from generative powers; one +from that of the connectedly-containing power of Heaven, and the +other from Jupiter the demiurgus. But the sea signifies an expanded +and circumscribed life; its profundity, the universally-extended +progression of such a life; and its foam, the greatest purity of +nature, that which is full of prolific light and power, and that which +swims upon all life, and is as it were its highest flower.</p> + +<p>That according to Orpheus Ceres is the same with Rhea. For he says +that subsisting on high in unproceeding union with Saturn, she is +<i>Rhea</i>, but that by emitting and generating Jupiter, she is +<i>Ceres</i>. For thus he speaks,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Ρειην το πριν εουσαν, επει διος επλετο μητηρ</div> + <div>Γεγονε δημητηρ.<a id="FNanchor_461" href="#Footnote_461" class="fnanchor">[461]</a></div> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="hangingindent">i.e. The goddess who was <i>Rhea</i>, when she bore Jove became Ceres.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">But Hesiod says that Ceres is the daughter of Rhea. It is however +evident, that these theologists harmonize: for whether this goddess +proceeds from union with Saturn to a secondary order, or whether she +is the first progeny of Rhea, she is still the same. Ceres therefore, +thus subsisting, and receiving the most ancient and ruling order from +the whole vivific Rhea, (της ολης Ζωογονου ρεας) and comprehending the +middle centres of whole vivification, (της ολης Ζωογονιας) she fills +all supermundane natures with the rivers of all-perfect life, pouring +upon all things vitally, indivisibly, and uniformly.</p> + +<p>Prior however to all this, she unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect, +(Jupiter) and imparts to him the power of vivifying wholes. For as +Saturn supplies her from on high with the cause of being; so Ceres from +on high, and from her own prolific bosoms, pours forth vivification to +the demiurgus. But possessing herself the middle of all vivific deity, +she governs the whole fountains which she contains, and comprehends the +one bond of the first and last powers of life. She stably convolves +too, and contains all secondary fountains. But she leads forth the +uniform causes of prior natures to the generation of others. This +goddess too comprehends <i>Vesta</i> and <i>Juno</i>: in her right +hand parts Juno, who pours forth the whole order of souls; but in her +left hand parts Vesta, who leads forth all the light of virtue. Hence, +Ceres is with great propriety called by Plato,<a id="FNanchor_462" href="#Footnote_462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a> <i>mother</i>, +and, at the same time the <i>supplier of aliment</i>. For, so far as +she comprehends in herself the cause of Juno, she is a mother; but +as containing Vesta in her essence, she is the supplier of aliment. +But the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxxvii">[xxxvii]</span> paradigm of this goddess is <i>Night: for immortal Night is +called the nurse of the Gods</i>. Night however is the cause of aliment +intelligibly:<a id="FNanchor_463" href="#Footnote_463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a> for that which is intelligible is, according to the +oracle,<a id="FNanchor_464" href="#Footnote_464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> the aliment of the intellectual orders of Gods. But Ceres +first of all separates the two kinds of aliment in the Gods, as Orpheus +says:</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Μησατο γαρ προπολους, και αμφιπολους, και σπαδους·</div> + <div>Μησατο δ’ αμβροσιην, και ερυθρου νεκταρος αρθρον·</div> + <div>Μησατο δ’ αγλαα εργα μελισσαων εριβομβων.<a id="FNanchor_465" href="#Footnote_465" class="fnanchor">[465]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>i.e. She cares for pow’rs ministrant, whether they</div> + <div class="i1h">Or Gods <i>precede</i>, or <i>follow</i>, or <i>surround</i>:</div> + <div class="i1h"><i>Ambrosia</i>, and <i>tenacious nectar red</i></div> + <div class="i1h">Are too the objects of her bounteous care.</div> + <div class="i1h">Last to the bee her providence extends,</div> + <div class="i1h">Who gathers honey with resounding hum.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">Ceres therefore, our sovereign mistress (δεσποινα) not only generates +life, but that which gives perfection to life; and this from supernal +natures to such as are last: <i>for virtue is the perfection of +souls</i>. Hence mothers who are connected with the circulations of +time, bring forth their offspring in imitation of this twofold and +eternal generation of Ceres. For, at the same time that they send forth +their young into the light, they extend to them milk naturally produced +as their food.</p> + +<p>That the conjunction of the demiurgic intellect with the vivific causes +is triple: for it is conjoined with the fountains prior to itself; is +present with its kindred co-ordinate natures; and co-energizes with +the orders posterior to itself. For it is present with the mother +prior to itself, <i>convertively</i>; (επιστρεπτικως) with Proserpine +posterior to itself, <i>providentially</i>; (προνοητικως) and with Juno +co-ordinate to itself with an <i>amatory energy</i> (ερασμιως). Hence +Jupiter is said to be enamoured of Juno,</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>ως σεο νυν εραμαι<a id="FNanchor_466" href="#Footnote_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a></div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>As now I love thee,——</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">And this love indeed is legal, but the other two appear to be illegal. +This goddess therefore produces from herself in conjunction with the +demiurgus and father all the genera of souls, the supermundane and +mundane, the celestial and sublunary, the divine, angelic, dæmoniacal, +and partial. After a certain manner too, she is divided from the +demiurgus, but in a certain respect she is united to him: for Jupiter +is said, in the Philebus, to contain a royal intellect and a royal +soul. For he contains uniformly the paternal and maternal cause of the +world; and the fountain of souls is said to be in Jupiter; just as +again, the intelligence of Jupiter is said to be first participated by +Juno. For no other divinity, says Jupiter in Homer, knows my mind prior +to Juno. Through this ineffable union therefore of these divinities, +the world participates of intellectual souls. They also give +subsistence to intellects who are carried in souls, and who together +with them give completion to the whole fabrication of things.</p> + +<p>That the series of our sovereign mistress Juno, beginning from on high +pervades to the last of things; and her allotment in the sublunary +region is the air. For <i>air</i> is a symbol of <i>soul</i>, according +to which also, soul is called a <i>spirit</i> (πνευμα); just as +<i>fire</i> is an image of <i>intellect</i>, but <i>water</i> of +<i>nature</i>, by which the world is nourished, (της κοσμοτρφου φυσεως) +through which all nutriment and increase are produced. But <i>earth</i> +is the image of <i>body</i>, through its gross and material nature. +Hence Homer obscurely signifying this, represents Juno suspended with +two anvils under her feet: for the air is allotted two heavy elements +beneath itself.</p> + +<p>For</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>ηλιον δ’ ακαμαντα βοωπις ποτνια ηρη</div> + <div>πεμψεν επ’ ωκεανοιο ροας</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “Fair-eyed venerable Juno sent the sun to the streams of the +ocean,”—is from the same conception.</p> + +<p>For he calls the thick cloud produced by Juno, the setting of the sun. +The assertion likewise that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxxviii">[xxxviii]</span> the end of this name will be conjoined +with the beginning, if any one frequently repeats the name of the +goddess, evinces the conversion of rational souls to her which proceed +from her; and that voice is air that is struck. On this account also +the voice of rational animals is especially dedicated to this goddess, +who made the horse of Achilles to become vocal. But Socrates now +delivers these three vivific monads in a consequent order, viz. Ceres, +Juno, Proserpine; calling the first the mother, the second the sister, +and the third the daughter of the demiurgus. All of them however are +partakers of the whole of fabrication; the first in an exempt manner +and intellectually, the second in a fontal manner and at the same time +in a way adapted to a principle (αρχικως) and the third, in a manner +adapted to a principle and leader (αρχικως και ηγεμονικως).</p> + +<p>Of these goddesses the last possesses triple powers, and impartibly +and uniformly comprehends three monads of Gods. But she is called +Core (κορη) through the purity of her essence, and her undefiled +transcendency in her generations. She also possesses a first, middle +and last empire. And according to her summit indeed, she is called +Diana by Orpheus; but according to her middle Proserpine; and according +to the extremity of the order Minerva. Likewise, according to an +hyparxis transcending the other powers of this triple vivific order, +the dominion of Hecate is established; but according to a middle power, +and which is generative of wholes, that of Soul; and according to +intellectual conversion that of virtue.<a id="FNanchor_467" href="#Footnote_467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a> Core therefore, subsisting +on high, and among the supermundane Gods, uniformly extends this triple +order of divinities; and together with Jupiter generates Bacchus, +who impartibly presides over partible fabrication. But beneath, in +conjunction with Pluto, she is particularly beheld according to the +middle peculiarity; for it is this which proceeding every where imparts +vivification to the last of things. Hence she is called Proserpine, +because she especially associates with Pluto, and together with him +orderly distributes the extremities of the universe. And according +to her extremities indeed, she is said to be a virgin, and to remain +undefiled; but according to her middle, to be conjoined with Hades, +and to beget the Furies in the subterranean regions. She therefore is +also called Core, but after another manner than the supermundane and +ruling Core. For the one is the connective unity of the three vivific +principles; but the other is the middle of them, in herself possessing +the peculiarities of the extremes. Hence in the Proserpine conjoined +with Pluto, you will find the peculiarities of Hecate and Minerva; but +these extremes subsist in her occultly, while the idiom of the middle +shines forth, and that which is characteristic of ruling soul, which +in the supermundane Core <i>was of a ruling</i><a id="FNanchor_468" href="#Footnote_468" class="fnanchor">[468]</a> nature, but here +subsists according to a mundane peculiarity.</p> + +<p>That Proserpine is denominated, either through judging of forms +and separating them from each other, thus obscurely signifying the +ablation of slaughter (δια το κρινειν τα ειδη και χωριζειν αλληλων, +ως του φονου την αναιρεσιν αινιττομενον) or through separating souls +perfectly from bodies, through a conversion to things on high, which +is the most fortunate slaughter and death, to such as are worthy +of it. (η δια το χωριζειν τας ψυχας τελεως εκ των σωματων δια της +προς τα ανω επιστροφης, οπερ εστιν ευτυχεστατος φονος και θανατος +τοις αξιουμενοις τουτου.) But the name φερεφαττα <i>Pherephatta</i>, +according to a contact with generation is adapted to Proserpine; but +according to wisdom and counsel to Minerva. At the same time however +all the appellations by which she is distinguished are adapted to the +perfection of soul. On this account also she is called Proserpine, +and not by the names of the extremes; since that which was ravished +by Pluto is the middle; the extremes at the same time being firmly +established in themselves, according to which Core is said to remain a +virgin.</p> + +<p>With respect to our sovereign mistress Diana, Plato delivers three +peculiarities of her, the undefiled, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xxxix">[xxxix]</span> mundane, and the anagogic. +And through the first of these indeed, the goddess is said to be a +lover of virginity; but through the second, according to which she is +perfective of works (τελεσιουργος) she is said to be the inspective +guardian of virtue; and through the third she is said to hate the +impulses arising from generation. Of these three likewise, the first +is especially adapted to the progression of the goddess, according +to which she is allotted an hyparxis in the vivific triad of the +supermundane Gods; whether we call this deity Hecatic, as Theurgists +say, or Diana with Orpheus. For there being established, she is filled +with undefiled powers from the Gods called <i>Amilicti</i>.<a id="FNanchor_469" href="#Footnote_469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a> But +she looks to the fountain of virtue, and embraces its virginity. For +the virginity which is there does not proceed forth, as the Oracle +says, but abiding gives subsistence to Diana, and to supermundane +virtue, and is exempt from all communion, conjunction and progression, +according to generation. Hence Core also, according to the Diana and +Minerva which she contains, is said to remain a virgin; but according +to the prolific power of Proserpine, she is said to proceed forth, and +to be conjoined with the third demiurgus, and to bring forth as Orpheus +says, “nine azure-eyed, flower-producing daughters;”</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>εννεα θυγατερας γλαυκωπιδας ανθεσιουργους.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">since the Diana and the Minerva which she contains preserve their +virginity always the same. For the former of these is characterised +according to her stability, but the latter according to her convertive +energy. But that which is generative is allotted in her a middle order. +They say too, that she aspires after virginity, since the form of her +is comprehended in the vivific fountain, and she understands fontal +virtue, gives subsistence to supermundane and anagogic virtue, and +despises all material sexual connexion, though she inspects the fruits +arising from it.</p> + +<p>She appears also to be averse to the generations and progressions of +things, but to introduce perfections to them. And she gives perfection +indeed to souls through a life according to virtue; but to mortal +animals she imparts a restitution to form. But that there is a great +union between Diana, the mundane Hecate, and Core, is evident to +those that are in the least degree conversant with the writings of +Orpheus; from which it appears that Latona is comprehended in Ceres, +and together with Jupiter gives subsistence to Core, and the mundane +Hecate. To which we may also add that Orpheus<a id="FNanchor_470" href="#Footnote_470" class="fnanchor">[470]</a> calls Diana Hecate. +So that it is nothing wonderful, if we should elsewhere call the Diana +contained in Core Hecate.</p> + +<p>“Again, theologists especially celebrate two powers of our sovereign +mistress Minerva, the <i>defensive</i>, and the <i>perfective</i>; +the former preserving the order of wholes undefiled, and unvanquished +by matter, and the latter filling all things with intellectual light, +and converting them to their cause. And on this account, Plato also in +the Timæus, analogously celebrates Minerva as <i>philopolemic</i> and +<i>philosophic</i>. But three orders of this Goddess are delivered by +theologists; the one fontal and intellectual, according to which she +establishes herself in her father Jupiter, and subsists in unproceeding +union with him; but the second ranks among the supermundane Gods, +according to which she is present with Core, and bounds and converts +all the progression of that Goddess to herself. And the third is +<i>liberated</i>, according to which she perfects and guards the whole +world, and circularly invests it with her powers, as with a veil; +binding together all the mundane summits, and giving subsistence to +all the allotments in the heavens, and to those which proceed into the +sublunary region. Now therefore Socrates celebrates her <i>guardian</i> +power, through the name of <i>Pallas</i>; but her perfective power +through that of <i>Minerva</i>. She is the cause therefore of orderly +and measured motion, which she first imparts to the Curetic order, and +afterwards to the other Gods. For Minerva according to this power is +the leader of the Curetes, as Orpheus says, whence also, as well as +those divinities she is adorned with empyrean arms, through which she +represses all disorder, preserves the demiurgic series immoveable, and +unfolds dancing through rhythmical motion. She also guards reason as +it proceeds from intellect; through<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xl">[xl]</span> this power vanquishing matter. +For the visible region, says Timæus, is mingled from intellect and +necessity, the latter being obedient to the former, and all material +causes being in subjection to the will of the father. It is this +goddess therefore, who arranges necessity under the productions of +intellect, raises the universe to the participation of Jupiter, excites +and establishes it in the port of its father, and eternally guards +and defends it. Hence, if the universe is said to be indissoluble, +it is this goddess who supplies its permanency; and if it moves in +measured motion, through the whole of time, according to one reason +and order, she is the source of this supply. She watchfully surveys +therefore all the fabrication of her father, and connects and converts +it to him; and vanquishes all material indefiniteness. Hence she is +called <i>Victory</i> and <i>Health</i>; the former because she causes +intellect to rule over necessity, and form over matter; and the latter, +because she preserves the universe perpetually whole, perfect, exempt +from age, and free from disease. It is the property therefore of this +goddess to elevate and distribute, and through an intellectual dance as +it were, to connect, establish, and defend inferior natures in such as +are more divine.”<a id="FNanchor_471" href="#Footnote_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a></p> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a>For γονων, it is necessary to read γενων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> It appears to me that πρωτως is in this place omitted in +the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> For αριστα, I read αριστην.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> For κατα τουτο, it is necessary to read κατα ταυτον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> For διακρινον, it is necessary to read διατεινον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> For αυτο, I read αυτῳ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a> Instead of εκ της διακοσμησεως, it is necessary to read εκ +ταυτης διακοσμησεως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> For οπως, it is necessary to read πως, and in consequence +of this, the sentence should not be, as it is in the original, +interrogatory.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[9]</a> From the version of Portus, it appears necessary after the +words τους μεν, αφ’εαυτου τε, to supply the words του νοερου πατρος, +τους δε αφ’εαυτου τε κ. τ. λ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">[10]</a> For της ολης, it is necessary to read τοις ολοις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">[11]</a> For τοις ολοις, it is necessary to read τοις πολλοις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">[12]</a> The word αστρον is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">[13]</a> εν is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="label">[14]</a> For παντος it is necessary to read πατρος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="label">[15]</a> αφ’ου signifies an occult, but υφ’ου, a manifest +progression.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="label">[16]</a> For εξῃρηται, it is necessary to read εξηρτηται.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="label">[17]</a> For επιστησωμεν, I read επισκεψωμεν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="label">[18]</a> For γονιμου, it is necessary to read μονιμου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="label">[19]</a> For νεαρας, it is necessary to read νοερας.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="label">[20]</a> The following observations were written in the margin +of the manuscript copy of this work of Proclus, by some scholiast or +commentator: “For end and that which is perfected, and the possession +of beginning, middles and end, first subsist in the intelligible and +at the same time intellectual Gods. And on this account figure, also, +there presents itself to the view. This triad, therefore, in the whole +assimilative series is analogous to intelligibles and intellectuals, as +having from them<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> the beginning, middles, and end. For the demiurgus +produced this triad according to the similitude of the perfective +triad, and connected the straight and the circular with motion. For to +bound in a direct path, and to proceed circularly, are definitive of +motion, as was said by Proclus in the Chapter prior to this. And as +this triad has these properties from intelligibles and intellectuals, +thus also the whole series of assimilative Gods possess them from +this triad. Hence this triad of partial demiurgi, is analogous to the +intelligible and intellectual fathers, i.e. to the perfective power.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="label">[21]</a> For απ’ αυτης, it is necessary to read απ’ αυτων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="label">[22]</a> For δε ὄντως, it is necessary to read δεοντως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="label">[23]</a> It appears to me that after και αι ζητησεις in the +original, there are wanting the words των προνοουντων, ωσπερ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="label">[24]</a> For τριας here, it is necessary to read τριαδος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="label">[25]</a> The word μιας is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="label">[26]</a> For των αγαθων, it is necessary to read τῳ αγαθῳ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="label">[27]</a> For θειον νοητον, it is necessary to read θειον γεννητον; +every perpetually circulating body being thus denominated by Plato.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="label">[28]</a> For νοητοις here, it is necessary to read γεννητοις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="label">[29]</a> For περιοδοις, it is necessary to read προοδοις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="label">[30]</a> For υπ’ αλληλων it is necessary to read υπ’ αλλων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="label">[31]</a> For πασης, it is necessary to read πασι.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="label">[32]</a> For παρα τι, it is necessary to read περατι.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="label">[33]</a> It is necessary here to supply the word ομοιου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="label">[34]</a> For εαυτῳ, it is necessary to read εαυτο.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="label">[35]</a> For υλικης, it is necessary to read ολικης.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="label">[36]</a> It is necessary here to substitute και for το.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="label">[37]</a> Instead of περι αυτων, it is necessary to read περι +αυτην.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="label">[38]</a> i.e. Phanes, or in Platonic language animal itself, +subsisting at the extremity of the intelligible order.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="label">[39]</a> i.e. Imitating Saturn and Phanes.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="label">[40]</a> The Greek scholiast observes on this part of the text +of Proclus as follows: “By the <i>intellectual</i>, Proclus means the +<i>ruling</i> Gods; but by an immaterial and separate intellect the +whole demiurgus. And by <i>essence</i> he means a partial hypostasis, +such as that of soul, of a dæmon, and of the intellect which is +co-ordinate to partial souls.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="label">[41]</a> For νοητου here, it is necessary to read νοερου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="label">[42]</a> viz. The genera of being, essence, sameness, difference, +motion and permanency.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="label">[43]</a> For εσχατον, it is necessary to read εχουσιν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="label">[44]</a> For εν δε, if is necessary to read αι δε.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="label">[45]</a> By intelligible souls, we must understand partial, but +undefiled souls.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="label">[46]</a> For χωρικον, it is necessary to read χωριστον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="label">[47]</a> Instead of περι τον κοσμον, it is necessary to read υπερ +τον κοσμον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="label">[48]</a> For περιοδους, it is necessary to read προοδους.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="label">[49]</a> For δυαδος, it is necessary to read δυναμεως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="label">[50]</a> For εξηςτηται, it is necessary to read εξηρηται.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="label">[51]</a> For ουτε, it is necessary to read ουκουν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="label">[52]</a> For οχετον, I read οχλον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="label">[53]</a> For την απογεννησιν, it is necessary to read της +απογεννησεως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="label">[54]</a> For γονιμον, it is necessary to read μονιμον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="label">[55]</a> For αφαιρησωμεθα, it is necessary to read αφορισωμεθα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="label">[56]</a> For αρρητον, it is necessary to read αρρηκτον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="label">[57]</a> For αυτοτελες, it is necessary to read ατελες.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="label">[58]</a> For περιφορας, I read περιγραφας.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="label">[59]</a> For μερων, it is necessary to read Μοιρων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="label">[60]</a> In the original το δε μελλον is omitted.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="label">[61]</a> For τα παραγοντα, it is necessary to read τα παροντα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="label">[62]</a> In the original ουχ απτομενον is omitted.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="label">[63]</a> In the original χωριστον εστι, is wanting.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="label">[64]</a> For περιοδῳ, it is necessary to read προοδῳ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="label">[65]</a> Vid. Sallust. de Diis et Mundo, Cap. 6.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="label">[66]</a> Vid. Procl. in Tim. p. 45.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="label">[67]</a> Vid. Jamblich. de Mysteriis Sect. I. Cap. 8.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="label">[68]</a> Vid. Jamblich. de Myst. Sect. I. Cap. 9.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="label">[69]</a> Vid. Jamblich. de Myst. Sect. I. Cap. 17.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="label">[70]</a> Vid. Jamblich. de Myst. Sect. I. Cap. 19.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="label">[71]</a> See the 5th Book of this work, in which this speech +is admirably discussed by Proclus, though not so fully as in these +extracts.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="label">[72]</a> For μεν ειναι το παμπαν αθανατους in the original, it is +necessary to read μη ειναι κ. τ. λ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="label">[73]</a> Instead of νοητον, it is requisite to read νοητῳ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="label">[74]</a> This divinity is Vulcan.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="label">[75]</a> παρ’ ετερου is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="label">[76]</a> The words και λυτον απλως παρ’ εαυτου και παρ’ ετερου, +are omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="label">[77]</a> For ενδοσιν, it is necessary to read ενωσιν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="label">[78]</a> Κεχαρασμενην is erroneously printed for κεχαλασμενην.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="label">[79]</a> After την παραδειγματικην it is necessary to supply +the words δια του καλως, την δημιουργικην, which are wanting in the +original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="label">[80]</a> The words και λυτοι are omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="label">[81]</a> For αυτου φυσιν, it is necessary to read αυτων φυσιν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="label">[82]</a> Instead of του μη θνητου, it is necessary to read του +θνητου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="label">[83]</a> The original has erroneously μονας instead of μονον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="label">[84]</a> For μετα βουλης, I read μεταβολης. For the mundane Gods +are in no part of the Timæus represented as consulting about the +fabrication of things.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="label">[85]</a> i.e. Proserpine.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="label">[86]</a> For τελειοτατα, it is necessary to read τελειοτητα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="label">[87]</a> For τα θειοτα, it is necessary to read τα θειοτατα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="label">[88]</a> Iliad xx. v. 24.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="label">[89]</a> Instead of δια τινων εγκοσμιων, it is necessary to read +δια τι των εγκοσμιων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="label">[90]</a> αθανατως is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="label">[91]</a> For εξ ου σωματος, it is necessary to read εξω σωματος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="label">[92]</a> For λυπης, it is requisite to read λοιπης.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="label">[93]</a> i.e. Jupiter, who is so called in this place by Proclus, +because he contains in himself by participation, the Phanes or +Protogonus who is the paradigm of the universe.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="label">[94]</a> For πονηρια, it is necessary to read πενια.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="label">[95]</a> For ιδρυαν, it is necessary to read ιδρυσιν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="label">[96]</a> σαφῃ is erroneously printed for αφῃ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="label">[97]</a> For και βαθεων, it is necessary to read και βαθμων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="label">[98]</a> For πατρος, it is necessary to read παντος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="label">[99]</a> Here also for πατρι, it is necessary to read παντι.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="label">[100]</a> Vid. Proclum in Tim. p. 275.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="label">[101]</a> These ολοτητες, according to the Platonic philosophy, +have so far as they are wholes, a perpetual subsistence, and are the +spheres of the fixed stars, the spheres of the planets, the sphere +of air, the globe on which we live, and the ocean. See more on this +subject in my Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="label">[102]</a> Vid. Procl. in Tim. p. 257 and 279.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="label">[103]</a> Hence, we may perceive at one view, as I have elsewhere +observed, why the sun in the Orphic hymns is called Jupiter, why +Apollo is called Pan, and Bacchus the Sun; and why the moon seems to +be the same with Rhea, Ceres, Proserpine, Juno, Venus, &c. For from +this theory it follows, that every sphere contains a Jupiter, Neptune, +Vulcan, Vesta, Minerva, Mars, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, +Apollo, and in short, every deity,—each sphere at the same time +conferring on these Gods the peculiar characteristics of its nature; +so that for instance, in the sun they possess a solar property; in the +moon a lunar one; and so of the rest.</p> + +<p>This theory too is one of the grand keys to the theology of the Greeks; +as it shows why one God is so often celebrated by the appellations of +another; an ignorance of the cause of which led Macrobius to think that +all the Gods were nothing more than the different powers of the sun, +and has been one great source of the idle conjectures of the moderns +about the divinities of the ancients.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="label">[104]</a> Vid. Procl. in Tim. lib. 4. p. 263.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="label">[105]</a> For περιοδον, it is necessary to read προοδον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="label">[106]</a> For γνωριζειν, it is necessary to read οριζει.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="label">[107]</a> According to the Chaldaic dogmas, as explained by +Psellus, there are seven corporeal worlds, one empyrean and the first; +after this three etherial; and then three material worlds, viz. the +inerratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary +region. They also assert that there are two solar worlds; one which is +subservient to the etherial profundity; the other zonaic, being one of +the seven spheres.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="label">[108]</a> Viz. The supermundane Gods.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="label">[109]</a> It must be carefully observed, however, that this is +only true of the Gods characteristically called supermundane. For it +does not apply to the Gods who are <i>primarily</i> intellectual, since +they are above the supermundane order, to which the sun and Apollo +belong.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="label">[110]</a> That is, according to the Chaldæan oracles, the sun is +the middle of the empyrean, etherial, and material worlds, the two +last of which, as I have observed in a former note, receive a triple +division.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="label">[111]</a> These verses are not in Gesner’s collection of the +Orphic fragments.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="label">[112]</a> These lines are from Empedocles, and in the original are +as follow:</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Ενθα κοτος τε φονος τε και αλλων εθνεα κηρων,</div> + <div>Αυχμηραι τε νοσοι, και σηψεις, εργα τε ρευστα.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="label">[113]</a> Vide Jamblich. de Myst. lib. i. cap. 18.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="label">[114]</a> In Tim, lib. i. p. 51.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="label">[115]</a> For χορευτων in this place, it is necessary to read +χορων των.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116" class="label">[116]</a> Iliad. viii.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117" class="label">[117]</a> Iliad. viii.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118" class="label">[118]</a> In Tim. p. 48.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119" class="label">[119]</a> This triad consists of Minerva, Diana, and Proserpine.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120" class="label">[120]</a> The former part of this inscription is to be found in +Plutarch’s treatise of Isis and Osiris; but the latter part, viz. +<i>the fruit which I brought forth was the sun</i>, is only to be found +in the above Commentary of Proclus. The original is, ον εγω καρπον +ετεκον ηλιος εγενετο.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121" class="label">[121]</a> viz. In <i>ether</i> or <i>bound</i>, the summit of the +intelligible triad.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122" class="label">[122]</a> Instead of σχηματος, it is necessary to read οχηματος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_123" href="#FNanchor_123" class="label">[123]</a> For according to Plato, plants also, as having life, are +animals.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_124" href="#FNanchor_124" class="label">[124]</a> For δαιμονικας here, it is necessary to read ηγεμονικας.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_125" href="#FNanchor_125" class="label">[125]</a> παντικα is erroneously printed in the original for +μαντικα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_126" href="#FNanchor_126" class="label">[126]</a> For αιωνιοι, it is evidently necessary to read in this +place παιωνιοι.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_127" href="#FNanchor_127" class="label">[127]</a> Apud Porphyr. de Abstin.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128" class="label">[128]</a> It is necessary here to supply the word θειον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129" class="label">[129]</a> It is requisite to read κατ εκεινον, instead of κατ +εκεινην.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130" class="label">[130]</a> The word ουρανιων is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131" class="label">[131]</a> It is obviously necessary here for εαυτων to read +εαυτου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_132" href="#FNanchor_132" class="label">[132]</a> εγγονοι is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133" class="label">[133]</a> This is doubtless the Sibyl, of whom Proclus also +observes (in Tim. p. 325.) “that proceeding into light, she knew her +own order, and manifested that she came from the Gods, saying I am the +medium between Gods and men.” ειδε γαρ τοι Σιβυλλα εις φως, και την +ταξιν εαυτης, και ως εκ θεων ηκει δεδηλwκεν, ειμι δ’ εγω μεση τε θεων +εἰπουσα μεση τ’ ἀνθρωπων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134" class="label">[134]</a> For επιπορευοντων, it is necessary to read +επιτροπευοντων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135" class="label">[135]</a> Some of the moderns, from being profoundly ignorant +of this circumstance, have stupidly supposed that the Gods of the +ancients were nothing more than dead men deified; taking for their +guides on this important subject, mere historians, philologists, and +rhetoricians, instead of philosophers.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136" class="label">[136]</a> For επι της, it is necessary to read επι γης.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137" class="label">[137]</a> For αποκαταστασεως, it is requisite to read αποστασεως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138" class="label">[138]</a> In the original αλογων is erroneously printed for +αναλογων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139" class="label">[139]</a> This is a very ancient Egyptian doctrine. And hence +Kircher in his Oedipus Egyptiacus says that he read the following words +engraved in a stone near Memphis: <i>Coelum sursum, coelum deorsum, +quod sursum id omne deorsum, hæc cape et beaberis</i>, <i>i.e.</i> +<i>Heaven is above and heaven is Beneath. Every thing which is above is +also beneath. Understand this, and you will be blessed.</i> Conformably +to this also the celebrated Smaragdine Table, which is of such great +authority with the Alchemists, and which whether originally written or +not by Hermes Trismegistus, is doubtless of great antiquity, says that +all that is beneath resembles all that is above. But the Table itself +is as follows: “Verum sine mendacio, certum et verissimum: quod est +inferius, est sicut id quod est superius, et quod est superius, est +sicut id, quod est inferius ad perpetrandum miraculum unius rei. Et +sicut res omnes fuerunt ab uno mediatione unius, sic omnes res natæ ab +hac re adoptatione. Pater ejus est sol, mater ejus luna. Portavit illud +ventus in ventre suo. Nutrix ejus terra, pater omnis telesmi totius +mundi est hic. Virtus ejus integra est, si versa fuerit in terram. +Separabis terram ab igne, subtile a spisso suaviter cum magno ingenio. +Ascendit a terra in coelum, iterumque descendit in terram, et recipit +vim superiorum et inferiorum. Sic habebis gloriam totius mundi, ideo +fugiet à te omnis obscuritas. Hæc est totius fortitudinis fortitudo +fortis, quia vincet omnem rem subtilem, omniaque solida penetrabit. Sic +mundus creatus est. Hinc erunt adoptationes mirabiles, quarum modus +hic est. Itaque vocatus sum Hermes Trismegistus habens tres partes +philosophiæ totius mundi. Completum est quod dixi de opere solis.” i.e. +“It is true without a lie, certain, and most true, that what is beneath +is like that which is above, and what is above is like that which is +beneath, for the purpose of accomplishing the miracle of one thing. And +as all things were from one through the mediation of one, so all things +were generated from this thing by adoption [i.e. by participation.] The +sun is its father, and the moon its mother. The wind carried it in its +belly. The earth is its nurse. This is the father of all the perfection +of the whole world. Its power is entire when it is converted into +earth. You must separate the earth from the fire, the subtil from the +thick sweetly with great genius. It ascends from earth to heaven, and +again descends to the earth, and receives the power of things superior +and inferior. Thus you will have the glory of the whole world, and thus +all obscurity will fly from you. This is the strong fortitude of all +fortitude, because it vanquishes every subtile thing, and penetrates +all solid substances. Thus the world was fabricated. Hence admirable +adoptions will take place of which this is the mode. I am therefore +called Hermes Trismegistus possessing three parts of the philosophy of +the whole world. That which I have said concerning the work of the sun +is complete.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140" class="label">[140]</a> Instead of και γαρ ουρανιαν και την σεληγην Ορφευς +προσηγορευσεν, the sense requires we should read και γαρ ουρανιαν γην +την σεληνην, κ. λ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141" class="label">[141]</a> For εκ τ’ αυτου, it is necessary to read εκ τ’ αγαθου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_142" href="#FNanchor_142" class="label">[142]</a> Instead of λεγω δη τοις του Ουρανου τουδε συνοχικης +μεσοτηρος, it is requisite to read λεγω δια της του Ουρανου, κ. λ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_143" href="#FNanchor_143" class="label">[143]</a> For τριαδην, it is necessary to read τριαδαις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_144" href="#FNanchor_144" class="label">[144]</a> For νοερων, read νοητων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_145" href="#FNanchor_145" class="label">[145]</a> For αποριαν, read απειριαν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_146" href="#FNanchor_146" class="label">[146]</a> For ενιαυτον here, it is necessary to read ενιαιον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_147" href="#FNanchor_147" class="label">[147]</a> Plato, in the 10th book of the Laws, distinguishes the +genus of motions into ten species, viz. circulation about an immoveable +centre, local transition, condensation, rarefaction, increase, +decrease, generation, corruption, mutation or alteration, produced +in another by another, and a mutation produced from a thing itself, +both in itself, and in another. This last is the motion of an essence +separate from bodies, and is the motion of soul.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_148" href="#FNanchor_148" class="label">[148]</a> For γονιμον here, it is necessary to read μονιμον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_149" href="#FNanchor_149" class="label">[149]</a> πατρος is erroneously printed instead of πατερες.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_150" href="#FNanchor_150" class="label">[150]</a> As this is a remarkably curious Orphic fragment, and +is not to be found in Gesner’s collection of the Orphic remains, I +shall give the original for the sake of the learned reader. και τοι γε +οτι ο κρονος υπερτερος εστι του ωκεανου, δεδηλωκεν ο θεολογος παλιν +λεγων· τον μεν κρονον αυτον καταλαμβανειν τον ουρανιον ολυμπον, κᾳκει +θρονισθεντα, βασιλευειν των τιτανων· τον δε ωκεανον την ληξιν απασαν +την μεσην· ναιειν γαρ αυτον εν τοις θεσπεσιοις ρειθροις τοις μετα τον +ολυμπον, και τον εκει περιεπειν ουρανον, αλλ’ου τον ακροτατον, ως δε +φησιν ό μυθος, τον εμπεσοντα του ολυμπου, και εχει τεταγμενον.</p> + +<p class="r2 p-min">Procl. in Tim. p. 296.</p> + + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_151" href="#FNanchor_151" class="label">[151]</a> For μετ’αυτου, it is necessary to read μετ’αυτης.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_152" href="#FNanchor_152" class="label">[152]</a> For Θαυμαντα, it is requisite to read Θαυμαντος; and for +ποντον, ποντῳ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_153" href="#FNanchor_153" class="label">[153]</a> The original here is evidently erroneous; for it is, +ου γαρ εστιν ο φορκυς ουρανιδης αλλα ο φορκυς, ως εστι δηλον εκ της +θεογονιας. For αλλα ο φορκυς, therefore, I read αλλα ο Ωκεανος; Ocean, +according to the Theogony of Hesiod, being the progeny of Heaven and +Earth.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_154" href="#FNanchor_154" class="label">[154]</a> Κρονος is erroneously printed for χρονος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_155" href="#FNanchor_155" class="label">[155]</a> For της υγρας υλης ουσιας, I read της υγρας ολης ουσιας.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_156" href="#FNanchor_156" class="label">[156]</a> The words ημεις δε εκομενως are omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_157" href="#FNanchor_157" class="label">[157]</a> For διανοηθεις, it is necessary to read διακινηθεις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_158" href="#FNanchor_158" class="label">[158]</a> For αφανη here it is necessary to read εμφανη.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_159" href="#FNanchor_159" class="label">[159]</a> The meaning of Proclus in asserting that the ennead +proceeds from the monad as far as to the extremities without +retrogression is as follows: The ennead, according to the Pythagoreans, +circulates all numbers within itself, and there can be no number beyond +it. For the natural progression of numbers is as far as to 9, but after +it their retrogression takes place. For 10 becomes as it were again the +monad. Thus, if from each of the numbers 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, +17, 18, and 19, the number 9 is subtracted, the numbers that remain +will be 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. And vice versa, the progression +will receive an increase by the addition of 9. For, if to each of the +numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c. 9 is added, the numbers produced will be 10, +11, 12, 13, &c. Likewise by subtracting from 20 twice 9, from 30 thrice +9, from 40 four times 9, from 50 five times 9 &c, the numbers 2, 3, 4, +5, 6, &c will be produced. By taking likewise from 100 eleven times 9, +we again return to the monad. And after the same manner we may proceed +to infinity. Hence it is not possible there should be any elementary +number beyond the ennead. Hence too the Pythagoreans, called it Ocean +and the Horizon, because all numbers are comprehended by and revolve +within it. On this account likewise, it was called by them Halios, +(παρα το αλιζειν) and Concord and Perseïa because it congregates +all numbers, and collects them into one, and does not permit the +conspiration of the numbers beyond it to be dissipated. Vid. Anonym. in +opere quod inscripsit τα θεολογουμενα της αριθμητικης.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_160" href="#FNanchor_160" class="label">[160]</a> For εισι, it is requisite to read προεισι.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_161" href="#FNanchor_161" class="label">[161]</a> προοδους is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_162" href="#FNanchor_162" class="label">[162]</a> In the original it is παραπετα instead of παραπετασματα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_163" href="#FNanchor_163" class="label">[163]</a> These thirty-six decadarchs are the divinities alluded +to by the Emperor Julian in his Oration to the Sun, when he says, “that +the Sun divides the zodiac into twelve powers of Gods, and each of +these into three others, so that thirty-six are produced in the whole.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_164" href="#FNanchor_164" class="label">[164]</a> This is implied by Socrates telling him that he inquires +about <i>great</i> things.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_165" href="#FNanchor_165" class="label">[165]</a> In Tim. p. 184.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_166" href="#FNanchor_166" class="label">[166]</a> This is according to the psychical mode of interpreting +fables. See my translation of Sallust On the Gods and the World.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_167" href="#FNanchor_167" class="label">[167]</a> This is a life pertaining to her own will; for the soul +in this case gives herself up to the will of divinity.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_168" href="#FNanchor_168" class="label">[168]</a> For an account of divine fables, and specimens of the +mode in which they ought to be explained, see the Introduction to the +second Book of the Republic, in Vol. I. of my translation of Plato.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_169" href="#FNanchor_169" class="label">[169]</a> Iliad. lib. viii.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_170" href="#FNanchor_170" class="label">[170]</a> For the irrational soul is an <i>immaterial body</i>, or +in other words, <i>vitalized extension</i>, such as the mathematical +bodies which we frame in the phantasy; and the celestial bodies are of +this kind.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_171" href="#FNanchor_171" class="label">[171]</a> It is necessary here to supply the word θειων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_172" href="#FNanchor_172" class="label">[172]</a> For τρεφει here, it is necessary to read στρεφει.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_173" href="#FNanchor_173" class="label">[173]</a> For δεσμων here read θεσμων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_174" href="#FNanchor_174" class="label">[174]</a> In Tim. p. 59.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_175" href="#FNanchor_175" class="label">[175]</a> Lib. ii. p. 81.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_176" href="#FNanchor_176" class="label">[176]</a> i.e. Angels, dæmons, and heroes.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_177" href="#FNanchor_177" class="label">[177]</a> Lib. iv. p. 240, &c.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_178" href="#FNanchor_178" class="label">[178]</a> Viz. the Sun considered as subsisting in the +supermundane order of Gods.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_179" href="#FNanchor_179" class="label">[179]</a> “But we will certainly do whatsoever thing goeth forth +out of our own mouth, to burn incense unto the queen of heaven, and +to pour out drink offerings unto her, as we have done, we, and our +fathers, our kings, and our princes, in the cities of Judah, and in the +streets of Jerusalem: for <i>then had we plenty of victuals, and were +well, and saw no evil</i>. But since we left off to burn incense to the +queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, <i>we have +wanted all things</i>, and have been consumed by the sword and by the +famine.” Jeremiah, Chap. xliv, v. 17, 18.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_180" href="#FNanchor_180" class="label">[180]</a> In this dialogue, Plato assimilates the intimate form +of the soul to a winged chariot and charioteer, drawn by two horses; +and says, “that all the horses and chariots of the Gods are good, and +composed of things that are good.” In which passage, by the chariots +of the Gods are to be understood all the inward discursive powers of +their souls, which pursue the intelligence of all things, and can at +the same time equally contemplate and provide for inferior concerns. +But the horses signify the efficacy and motive vigour of these powers. +And the wings are elevating powers, which particularly belong to the +charioteer, or intellect.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_181" href="#FNanchor_181" class="label">[181]</a> I. e. In the summit of that order which is called +intelligible and at the same time intellectual.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_182" href="#FNanchor_182" class="label">[182]</a> ποιμαινων πραπεδεσσιν ανομματον ωκυν ερωτα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_183" href="#FNanchor_183" class="label">[183]</a> The author of these verses comprehends the triple genera +that are more excellent than man, viz. angels, dæmons and heroes, under +the appellation of illustrious heroes.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_184" href="#FNanchor_184" class="label">[184]</a> It must however, be carefully observed, that this divine +cause illuminates, invigorates, and excites these circles in the most +unrestrained and impassive manner, without destroying freedom of energy +in the circles themselves, or causing any partial affection, sympathy +or tendency in illuminating deity.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_185" href="#FNanchor_185" class="label">[185]</a> See a most masterly defence of the character of Achilles +as a hero in my translation of Proclus’s noble apology for Homer, in +the first Volume of my Plato.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_186" href="#FNanchor_186" class="label">[186]</a> Vid. Iamblich. de vita Pythag. Cap. 2.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_187" href="#FNanchor_187" class="label">[187]</a> And this essence, as is shown in the 4th book, subsists +at the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual +order.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_188" href="#FNanchor_188" class="label">[188]</a> This forms the middle of the above-mentioned order.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_189" href="#FNanchor_189" class="label">[189]</a> This forms the extremity of that order.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_190" href="#FNanchor_190" class="label">[190]</a> Viz. to Saturn, who subsists at the summit of the +intellectual order.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_191" href="#FNanchor_191" class="label">[191]</a> Instead of και δια το μη λεγειν, το διδον αει γινομενος, +it is necessary to read δια το μη ληγειν το διδον, αει γινομενος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_192" href="#FNanchor_192" class="label">[192]</a> For ορωμενος here, it is necessary to read ορμωμενος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_193" href="#FNanchor_193" class="label">[193]</a> Wholes whether corporeal or incorporeal are thus +denominated.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_194" href="#FNanchor_194" class="label">[194]</a> For συνεκτεινατο, it is necessary to read +συνετεκταινετο.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_195" href="#FNanchor_195" class="label">[195]</a> i.e. a circular motion.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_196" href="#FNanchor_196" class="label">[196]</a> Proclus elsewhere informs us in these Commentaries, that +the soul of the world is called by Orpheus <i>Ippa</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_197" href="#FNanchor_197" class="label">[197]</a> i.e. Vesta.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_198" href="#FNanchor_198" class="label">[198]</a> i.e. Juno.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_199" href="#FNanchor_199" class="label">[199]</a> i.e. Having a good dæmon.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_200" href="#FNanchor_200" class="label">[200]</a> Instead of εις δαιμων εγενετο μεγας αρχος απο παντων, it +is requisite to read εις δαιμων γενετο μεγας αρχος απαντων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_201" href="#FNanchor_201" class="label">[201]</a> For αφανη here, it is necessary to read εμφανη.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_202" href="#FNanchor_202" class="label">[202]</a> For συμβολικης των θεων παρουσιας, it is requisite to +read συμβολικα της των, κ. λ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_203" href="#FNanchor_203" class="label">[203]</a> After του οντως here, it is requisite to supply οντος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_204" href="#FNanchor_204" class="label">[204]</a> The part within the brackets is wanting in the original, +in which there is evidently a defect, as the stars at the end of the +proposition indicate.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_205" href="#FNanchor_205" class="label">[205]</a> Here also the part within the brackets is wanting in the +original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_206" href="#FNanchor_206" class="label">[206]</a> For εαυτῳ here it is necessary to read εαυτο.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_207" href="#FNanchor_207" class="label">[207]</a> It is here necessary to supply the words αφ’ εαυτου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_208" href="#FNanchor_208" class="label">[208]</a> This is asserted by Aristotle in his Posterior +Analytics.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_209" href="#FNanchor_209" class="label">[209]</a> In Prop. 5.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_210" href="#FNanchor_210" class="label">[210]</a> For τοις αιτιοις here, it is obviously necessary to read +τοις αιτιατοις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_211" href="#FNanchor_211" class="label">[211]</a> For ων το μεν αυτην διδωσι, it is necessary to read ων +το μετ’ αυτην διδωσι.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_212" href="#FNanchor_212" class="label">[212]</a> From the 11th Proposition.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_213" href="#FNanchor_213" class="label">[213]</a> From the 7th Proposition.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_214" href="#FNanchor_214" class="label">[214]</a> ει is wanting in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_215" href="#FNanchor_215" class="label">[215]</a> This is asserted in the Phædrus of Plato.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_216" href="#FNanchor_216" class="label">[216]</a> That if an essence is inseparable from body, it is +impossible that the energy proceeding from this essence should be +separate from body, Aristotle also demonstrates in his treatise On the +Soul.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_217" href="#FNanchor_217" class="label">[217]</a> The words within the brackets are wanting in the +original, though perfectly necessary to the demonstration of the +Proposition. Hence, the words ολον κινει, μερος δε κινειται, η, must be +supplied.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_218" href="#FNanchor_218" class="label">[218]</a> For if the whole moves, the part which is moved will at +the same time be motive.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_219" href="#FNanchor_219" class="label">[219]</a> The truth of this may be exemplified in light. Thus for +instance we see many species of light; one kind emanating from the sun, +another from fire and the stars, another from the moon, and another +from the eyes of many animals. But this light though various, is every +where similar, and discovers in its operations a unity of nature. On +account of its uniformity therefore, it requires one principle and not +different principles. But the sun is the only principle of all mundane +light. And though there are many participants of light posterior to +the solar orb, yet they scatter their uniform light, through one solar +nature, property and power. But if we again seek for the principle of +light in the sun, we cannot say that the solar orb is this principle; +for the various parts of it diffuse many illuminations. There will +therefore, be many principles. But we now require one first principle +of light. And if we say that the soul of the sun generates light, we +must observe that this is not effected by her psychical multiplicity, +or she would diffuse different lights. Hence we must assert that she +generates visible by intellectual light. But again this production does +not subsist through intellectual variety, but rather through the unity +of intellect which is its flower and summit. This unity is a symbol +of that simple unity which is the principle of the universe. And to +this principle the solar intellect is united by its unity; and through +this it becomes a God. This divine unity of the sun therefore, is the +principle of the uniform light of the world, in the same manner as +simple unity and goodness is the source of intelligible light to all +intelligible natures.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_220" href="#FNanchor_220" class="label">[220]</a> The imparticipable is that which is not consubsistent +with a subordinate nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is the +intellect which is not consubsistent with soul, but is exempt from it. +And imparticipable soul is the soul which is not consubsistent with +body. And so in other things.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_221" href="#FNanchor_221" class="label">[221]</a> Instead of ει γαρ αγονον, it is necessary to read η γαρ +αγονον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_222" href="#FNanchor_222" class="label">[222]</a> The original here is both defective and incorrect. +Instead therefore of τινος γενομενον υφ’ ου μαχεται, I read παν δε +τινος γενομενον υφ’ ου μετεχεται.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_223" href="#FNanchor_223" class="label">[223]</a> Instead of και οτι αλλο in this place, it appears to me +to be necessary to read και οτι αλλως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_224" href="#FNanchor_224" class="label">[224]</a> Instead of μετ’ αυτου here, it is necessary to read μετ’ +αυτο.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_225" href="#FNanchor_225" class="label">[225]</a> For παρον here, it is necessary to read παραγον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_226" href="#FNanchor_226" class="label">[226]</a> Instead of προς παν here, it is necessary to read προς +αιτιον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_227" href="#FNanchor_227" class="label">[227]</a> Instead of πως το διακριθεν, it is necessary to read πως +το μη διακριθεν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_228" href="#FNanchor_228" class="label">[228]</a> For το απ’ αυτου here, it is necessary to read τῳ απ’ +αυτου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_229" href="#FNanchor_229" class="label">[229]</a> For το επιστρεφον, it is requisite to read το μη +επιστερφον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_230" href="#FNanchor_230" class="label">[230]</a> There is a defect here in the original, which may +be supplied, if instead of εστι την απο της ουσιας προς εαυτο +επιστρεπτικον we read ει ουν εστι κατα την απο της ουσιας ενεργειαν +προς εαυτο επιστρεπτικον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_231" href="#FNanchor_231" class="label">[231]</a> ουπω is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_232" href="#FNanchor_232" class="label">[232]</a> For μεριστην εαυτου, it is requisite to read μεριστον +εαυτον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_233" href="#FNanchor_233" class="label">[233]</a> The truth of this reasoning may be evinced by the +following considerations. Every thing which is measured by time, and +such is every corporeal nature, depends on time for the perfection of +its being. But time is composed of the past, present and future. And if +we conceive that any one of these parts is taken away from the nature +with which it is connected, that nature must immediately perish. Time +therefore is so essentially and intimately united with the natures +which it measures, that their being such as it is, depends on the +existence of time. But time, as is evident, is perpetually flowing, +and this in the most rapid manner imagination can conceive. It is +evident therefore, that the natures to which it is so essential, must +subsist in a manner equally transitory and flowing; since, unless they +flowed in conjunction with time, they would be separated from it, and +would consequently perish. Hence, as we cannot affirm with propriety +of any part of time, that it <i>is</i>; since even before we can form +the assertion, the present time is no more; so with respect to all +corporeal natures, from their subsistence in time, before we can say +they exist, they lose all identity of being.</p> + +<p>Such then is the unreal condition of every thing existing in time, or +of every thing corporeal, and entangled with matter. But this shadowy +essence of body is finely unfolded by Plotinus, in the 6th book of +his 3rd Ennead, as follows: “Being (says he) properly so called is +neither body, nor is subject to corporeal affections; but body and +its properties belong to the region of non-entity. But you will ask, +how is it possible, that visible matter should possess no real being; +that matter in which stones and mountains reside, the solid earth, and +bodies which mutually resist; since bodies which impel each other, +confess by their collision, the reality of their existence? You will +likewise ask after what manner things which neither strike against, +nor resist each other, which neither externally act, nor internally +suffer, nor are in any respect the objects of sight, viz. soul and +intellect, are to be reckoned true and real beings. We reply, that on +the contrary, things more corpulent are more sluggish and inert, as is +evident in bulky masses of earth. But whatever is less ponderous is +more moveable, and the more elevated the more moveable. Hence fire, the +most moveable of all the elements, flies as it were from a corporeal +nature. Besides, as it appears to me, whatever is more sufficient to +itself, disturbs others less and brings less inconvenience; but such +things as are more ponderous and terrene, unable from their defect of +being to raise themselves on high and becoming debile and languid, +strike and oppress surrounding bodies, by their falling ruin and +sluggish weight. Since it is evident that bodies destitute of life, +fall with molestation on any proximate substance, and more vehemently +impel and pain whatever is endued with sense. On the contrary, animated +beings, as participating more of entity, by how much the more of +being they possess, by so much the more harmless they impinge their +neighbouring bodies. Hence motion, which is a kind of life, or soul, or +an imitation of life in bodies, is more present with whatever is less +corpulent; as if more of body was necessarily produced where a defect +of being happens in a greater degree.</p> + +<p>Again, it will more manifestly appear from passivity, that whatever +is more corpulent is more passive; earth in a greater degree than +the other elements; and the rest in a similar proportion. For some +things when divided, suddenly return to their former union, when no +obstacle prevents their conjunction. But from the section of a terrene +body, the divided portions always remain separate, as if destitute +of natural vigour, and without any inherent desire of union and +consent. Hence, they are ready by every trifling impulse, to remain +as they are impelled; to rush from the embraces of bound, and hasten +into multitude and non-entity. So that whatever becomes corporeal in +an eminent degree, as falling fast into non-entity, has but little +power of recalling itself into one. And on this account ponderous and +vehement concussions are attended with ruin, when by mutual rushing +one thing impels another. But when debility runs against debility, +the one is valid against the other, in the same manner as non-entity +rushing on non-entity. And this we think a sufficient confutation of +their opinion, who only place being in the genus of body, persuaded by +the testimony of impulses and concussions, and the phantasms perceived +through the senses, which testify that sense is the only standard of +truth. Such as these are affected in a manner similar to those in a +dream, who imagine that the perceptions of sleep are true. For sense is +alone the employment of the dormant soul; since as much of the soul as +is merged in body, so much of it sleeps. But a true elevation, and true +vigilance are a resurrection from, and not with the dull mass of body. +For indeed a resurrection with body, is only a transmigration from +sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream, like a man passing in the dark +from bed to bed. But that elevation is perfectly true, which entirely +rises from the dead weight of bodies. For these possessing a nature +repugnant to soul, possess something opposite to essence. And this is +farther evident, from their generation, and their continual flowing and +decay, which are properties entirely foreign from the nature of being +substantial and real.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_234" href="#FNanchor_234" class="label">[234]</a> ποτε is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_235" href="#FNanchor_235" class="label">[235]</a> It is necessary here to supply the word αυθυποστατων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_236" href="#FNanchor_236" class="label">[236]</a> For εις το αιτιωτερον, it is necessary to read εις το +αιτιατον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_237" href="#FNanchor_237" class="label">[237]</a> ολον is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_238" href="#FNanchor_238" class="label">[238]</a> i.e. Any thing which is not universal (το τι).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_239" href="#FNanchor_239" class="label">[239]</a> του οντος seems to be wanting here in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_240" href="#FNanchor_240" class="label">[240]</a> αιτιου is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_241" href="#FNanchor_241" class="label">[241]</a> i.e. As the Greek Scholiast observes in the margin of +this Proposition, from the efficacious cause of that which acts, and +the aptitude of that which suffers.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_242" href="#FNanchor_242" class="label">[242]</a> The words το ποιουν ενεργειᾳ ον ο αυτο δυναμει, are +wanting in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_243" href="#FNanchor_243" class="label">[243]</a> The Proposition ends here in the Greek, though very +erroneously; and its conclusion forms the beginning of the next +Proposition, which should begin at the words εαν το οντως ον. But +instead of εαν, we must read παν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_244" href="#FNanchor_244" class="label">[244]</a> i.e. With natures rising into existence, or becoming to +be, as opposed to the things which are, or to beings <i>truly</i> so +called (τα οντως οντα).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_245" href="#FNanchor_245" class="label">[245]</a> Instead of παντως το οντως ον, it is doubtless necessary +to read παν το οντως ον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_246" href="#FNanchor_246" class="label">[246]</a> Instead of δει πρωτον εξ αμφοιν ειναι, it is necessary +to read δει προ του εξ αμφοιν ειναι.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_247" href="#FNanchor_247" class="label">[247]</a> τι is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_248" href="#FNanchor_248" class="label">[248]</a> After οτι, there is a chasm in the original, and the +words that are wanting appear to be δε αϊδιοτης απειρια τις εστιν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_249" href="#FNanchor_249" class="label">[249]</a> There is evidently a very gross error here in the +original which is as follows: και γαρ εν τοις μεριστοις αι δυναμεις +συναγομεναι μεν, πολλαπλασιαζονται, μεριζομεναι δε, αμυδρουνται. For +powers when congregated are not multiplied, but united. Hence it is +necessary to read και γαρ εν τοις μεριστοις αι δυναμεις συναγομεναι +μεν, ενιζονται, μεριζομεναι δε, πολλαπλασιαζονται, και αμυδρουνται.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_250" href="#FNanchor_250" class="label">[250]</a> By a strange mistake the original has απειρον here, +instead of πεπερασμενον, and in the next line πεπερασμενον instead of +απειρον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_251" href="#FNanchor_251" class="label">[251]</a> For αιτιοις here it is necessary to read αιτιατοις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_252" href="#FNanchor_252" class="label">[252]</a> Hence, as all things proceed from <i>the ineffable</i>, +that which is imparticipable proceeds also from it, yet not as from a +cause, but as from that which is better than cause. The procession, +therefore, of the imparticipable from the ineffable is αρρητος +εκφανσις, <i>an ineffable evolution into light</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_253" href="#FNanchor_253" class="label">[253]</a> Instead of πολλα γαρ ζῃ μεν, ζῃ, και νοει, it is +necessary to read πολλα γαρ οντα μεν ουδε ζῃ, ουδε νοει.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_254" href="#FNanchor_254" class="label">[254]</a> For του θανατου here, it is necessary to read του +αθανατου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_255" href="#FNanchor_255" class="label">[255]</a> Instead of ως δι’ ομοιων ανομοιον, it is necessary to +read ως δι’ ομοιων εις ομοιον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_256" href="#FNanchor_256" class="label">[256]</a> Instead of πως here it is necessary to read πας, and +consequently the proposition is not interrogatory as in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_257" href="#FNanchor_257" class="label">[257]</a> It is necessary here to supply the word μεθεξεις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_258" href="#FNanchor_258" class="label">[258]</a> It is here requisite to supply νου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_259" href="#FNanchor_259" class="label">[259]</a> For υποκειμενοις, it is necessary to read υπερκειμενοις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_260" href="#FNanchor_260" class="label">[260]</a> There are two chasms in this sentence in the original, +which I have endeavoured to supply in the translation.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_261" href="#FNanchor_261" class="label">[261]</a> That the principle of all things is something beyond +intellect and being itself, was asserted by the most ancient +Pythagoreans, as well as by Plato and his best disciples, as the +following citations will abundantly evince.</p> + +<p>And in the first place, this is evident from a fragment of Archytas, +a most ancient Pythagorean, On the Principles of Things, preserved by +Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 82. and in which the following extraordinary +passage occurs: ωστ’ αναγκα τρεις ειμεν τας αρχας, ταν τε εστω των +πραγματων, και ταν μορφω, και το εξ αυτου κινατικον και αορατον +δυναμει· το δε τοιουτον ον ου μονον<a id="FNanchor_262" href="#Footnote_262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a> ειμεν δει, αλλα και νοω τι +κρεσσον· νοω δε κρεσσον εστι, οπερ ονομαζομεν θεον φανερον.—i.e. “So +that it is necessary to assert that there are three principles; <i>that +which is [the subject] of things (or matter), form, and that which is +of itself motive, and invisible in power</i>. With respect to the last +of which, it is not only necessary that it should have a subsistence, +<i>but that it should be something better than intellect</i>. But +that which is better than intellect is evidently the same with that +which we denominate god.” It must here however be observed, that by +the word <i>god</i> we are not only to understand the first cause, but +every god: for, according to the Pythagoric theology, every deity, +considered according to the characteristic of his nature, is superior +to intellectual essence. Agreeably to the above passage is that also +of Brotinus, as cited by Syrianus in Arist. Meta. p. 102, b. who +expressly asserts that the first cause νου παντος και ουσιας δυναμει +και πρεσβειᾳ υπερεχει—“surpasses every intellect and essence both in +power and dignity.” Again, according to the same Syrianus, p. 103, b. +we are informed “that the Pythagoreans called god the one, as the cause +of union to the universe, and on account of his superiority to every +being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they denominated +him the measure of all things, on account of his conferring on all +things through illumination, essence and bound; and containing and +bounding all things by the ineffable supereminence of his nature, which +is extended beyond every bound.” Των θειων ανδρων εν μεν λεγοντων τον +θεον ως ενωσεως τοις ολοις αιτιον, και παντος του οντος, και πασης +ζωης, και νου του παντελους επεκεινα. μετρον δε των παντων ως πασι την +ουσιαν, και το τελος επιλαμποντα, και ως παντα περιεχοντα, και οριζοντα +ταις αφραστοις αυτου, και παντος υπερηπλωμεναις περατος υπεροχαις. +And again, this is confirmed by Clinius the Pythagorean, as cited +by Syrianus, p. 104, in which place <i>præclari</i> is erroneously +substituted for <i>Clinii</i>. “That which is <i>the one</i>, and +<i>the measure of all things</i> (says he), is not only entirely exempt +from bodies, and mundane concerns, but likewise from intelligibles +themselves: since he is the venerable principle of beings, the measure +of intelligibles, ingenerable, eternal, and alone (μονον), possessing +absolute dominion (κυριωδες), and himself manifesting himself (αυτο +το εαυτο δηλουν).” This fine passage I have translated agreeably +to the manuscript corrections of the learned Gale, the original of +which he has not inserted. To this we may likewise add the testimony +of Philolaus; who, as Syrianus informs us, p. 102, knew that cause +which is superior to the two first elements of things, <i>bound</i> +and <i>infinite</i>. For (says he) “Philolaus asserts that the +deity established <i>bound</i> and <i>infinite</i>: by bound indeed +exhibiting every co-ordination, which is more allied to <i>the one</i>; +but by infinity a nature subjected to <i>bound</i>. And prior to these +two principles he places one, and a singular cause, separated from the +universality of things, which Archainetus (Αρχαινετος) denominates +a cause prior to cause; but which, according to Philolaus, is the +principle of all things.” To all these respectable authorities for the +superessential nature of the first cause, we may add the testimony of +Sextus Empiricus himself. For in his books against the Mathematicians +(p. 425) he informs us “that the Pythagoreans placed <i>the one</i> as +transcending the genus of things which are essentially understood.” και +δη των μεν καθ’ αυτα νοουμενων γενος υπεστησαντο Πυθαγορικοι παιδες, ως +επαναβεβηκος το εν. In which passage, by things which are essentially +understood, nothing more is meant than intelligible essences, as is +obvious to every tyro in the Platonic and Pythagoric philosophy.</p> + +<p>But in consequence of this doctrine of the ancients concerning <i>the +one</i>, or the first principle of things, we may discover the meaning +and propriety of those appellations given by the Pythagoreans to +unity, according to Photius and others: such as αλαμπια, σκοτωδια, +αμιξία, βαραθρον υποχθονιον, Απολλων, &c. viz. <i>obscurity</i>, or +<i>without illumination</i>, <i>darkness</i>, <i>without mixture</i>, +<i>a subterranean profundity</i>, <i>Apollo</i>, &c. For, considered +as ineffable, incomprehensible, and superessential, he may be +very properly called <i>obscurity</i>, <i>darkness</i>, and <i>a +subterranean profundity</i>; but considered as perfectly simple +and one, he may with no less propriety be denominated <i>without +mixture</i>, and <i>Apollo</i>; since Apollo signifies a privation of +multitude. “For (says Plotinus) the Pythagoreans denominated the first +God <i>Apollo</i>, according to a more secret signification, implying +a negation of many.” Ennead. 5, lib. 5. To which we may add, that +the epithets <i>darkness</i> and <i>obscurity</i> wonderfully agree +with the appellation of <i>a thrice unknown darkness</i>, employed by +the Egyptians, according to Damascius,<a id="FNanchor_263" href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> in their most mystical +invocations of the first God; and at the same time afford a sufficient +reason for the remarkable silence of the most ancient philosophers and +poets concerning this highest and ineffable cause.</p> + +<p>This silence is indeed remarkably obvious in Hesiod, when in his +Theogony he says:</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>ητοι μεν πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ’,——</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">That is, “<i>Chaos was the first thing which was generated</i>”—and +consequently there must be some cause prior to Chaos, through which +it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cause. Such, +however, is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions of +Hesiod, γενετο is translated <i>fuit</i>, as if the poet had said that +<i>Chaos was the first of all things</i>; and he is even accused by +Cudworth on this account, as leaning to the atheistical system. But +the following testimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all +antiquity, γενετο was considered as meaning <i>was generated</i>, and +not <i>was</i> simply. And in the first place, this is clearly asserted +by Aristotle in lib. 3, de Cælo. “There are certain persons (says he) +who assert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are +<i>generated</i>.—And this is especially the case with the followers +of Hesiod.”—εισι γαρ τινες οι φασιν ουθεν αγεννητον ειναι, αλλα παντα +γιγνεσθαι.——μαλιστα μεν οι περι τον Ησιοδον. And again, by Sextus +Empiricus in his treatise Adversus Mathemat. p. 383, edit. Steph. who +relates, that this very passage was the occasion of Epicurus applying +himself to philosophy. “For (says he) when Epicurus was as yet but a +young man, he asked a grammarian, who was reading to him this line of +Hesiod,</p> + +<p> +Chaos of all things was the first produc’d, +</p> + +<p>from what Chaos was <i>generated</i>, if it was the first thing +generated. And upon the grammarian replying that it was not his +business to teach things of this kind, but was the province of those +who are called philosophers.—To those then, says Epicurus, must +I betake myself, since they know the truth of things.” κομιδη γαρ +μειρακισκος ων, ῃρετο τον επαναγινωσκοντα αυτῳ Γραμματιστην (η τοι μεν +πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ’) εκ τινος το χαος εγενετο, ειπερ πρωτον εγενετο. +τουτου δε ειποντος μη αυτου εργον ειναι τα τοιαυτα διδασκειν, αλλα +των καλουμενων φιλοσοφων· τοινυν εφησεν ο Επικουρος, επ’ εκεινους μοι +βαδιστεον εστιν, ειπερ αυτοι την των οντων αληθειαν ισασιν.</p> + +<p>Simplicius too, in commenting on the passage above cited from +Aristotle, beautifully observes as follows: “Aristotle (says he) ranks +Hesiod among the first physiologists, because he sings Chaos was first +<i>generated</i>. He says, therefore, that Hesiod in a particular +manner makes all things to be generated, because that which is first is +by him said to be generated. But it is probable that Aristotle calls +Orpheus and Musæus the first physiologists, who assert that <i>all +things are generated, except the first</i>. It is, however, evident +that those theologists, singing in fabulous strains, meant nothing +more by <i>generation</i> than the procession of things from their +causes; on which account <i>all of them consider the first cause as +unbegotten</i>. For Hesiod also, when he says that <i>Chaos was first +generated</i>, insinuates that there was something prior to Chaos, +from which Chaos was produced. For it is always necessary that every +thing which is generated should be generated from something. But this +likewise is insinuated by Hesiod, that the first cause is above all +knowledge and every appellation.” (De Cœlo, p. 147.)</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_262" href="#FNanchor_262" class="label">[262]</a> Instead of ον ου μονον, which is evidently the true +reading, ονομον μονον is erroneously printed in Stobæus.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_263" href="#FNanchor_263" class="label">[263]</a> περι αρχων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_264" href="#FNanchor_264" class="label">[264]</a> Instead of μαλλον here, it is necessary to read ηττον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_265" href="#FNanchor_265" class="label">[265]</a> η πλειονων is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_266" href="#FNanchor_266" class="label">[266]</a> δυναμενον is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_267" href="#FNanchor_267" class="label">[267]</a> By the echo of soul, Proclus means that vital quality +by which the soul is united to the body; and which is nothing more +than the last image and shadow of the soul. The necessity of such a +connecting quality will easily appear, from considering that a truly +incorporeal nature, like that of soul, cannot be connected with +body, without a vital medium. In consequence of this we may consider +with Plotinus (Ennead. 4. lib. 4.) the animated body as resembling +illuminated and heated air. And the pains and pleasures of the body +will be conversant with this shadow of the soul.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_268" href="#FNanchor_268" class="label">[268]</a> The original here is defective: for it is ενωσιν δε +θειαν, απο της μετεχο **** εαυτου υπαρξεως μεταδιδωσι τοις εφεξης. +From the version of Patricius, however, the defect may be supplied +as follows: ενωσιν δε θειαν, απο της μετεχομενης εναδος. εκαστον +γαρ τουτων εαυτου κ. τ. λ. This emendation is adopted in the above +translation.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_269" href="#FNanchor_269" class="label">[269]</a> For το υπερουσιον ον, it is necessary to read το +υπερουσιον εν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_270" href="#FNanchor_270" class="label">[270]</a> Thus too Hippocrates, ξυρροια μια, συμπνοια μια, παντα +συμπαθεα. i.e. “<i>there is one conflux, one conspiration, and all +things sympathize with all</i>.” He who understands this will see +that the <i>magic</i> cultivated by the ancient philosophers, is +founded in a theory no less sublime than rational and true. Such a +one will survey the universe as one great animal, all whose parts are +in union and consent with each other; so that nothing is foreign and +detached; nothing, strictly speaking, void of sympathy and life. For +though various parts of the world, when considered as separated from +the whole, are destitute of <i>peculiar</i> life; yet they possess +some degree of animation, however inconsiderable, when viewed with +relation to the universe. Life indeed may be compared to a perpetual +and universal sound; and the soul of the world resembles a lyre, or +some other musical instrument, from which we may suppose this sound to +be emitted. But from the unbounded diffusion as it were of the mundane +soul, every thing participates of this harmonical sound, in greater +or less perfection, according to the dignity of its nature. So that +while life every where resounds, the most abject of beings may be said +to retain a faint echo of the melody produced by the mundane lyre. It +was doubtless from profoundly considering this sympathy between the +mundane soul, and the parts of the world, that the ancient philosophers +were enabled to procure the presence of divinity, and perform effects +beyond the comprehension of the vulgar. And that this was the opinion +of Plotinus, the following passage evinces: “It appears to me that +the ancient wise men, who wished to procure the presence of the Gods, +by fabricating statues and performing sacred rites, directed their +intellectual eye to the nature of the universe, and perceived that the +nature of soul was every where easy to be attracted, when a proper +subject was at hand, easily passive to its influence. But every thing +adapted to imitation, is readily passive, and is like a mirror able to +seize a certain form, and reflect it to the view.” Ennead 4. lib. 3.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_271" href="#FNanchor_271" class="label">[271]</a> The word στερησεως is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_272" href="#FNanchor_272" class="label">[272]</a> For μετα δε παντα θεων, it is necessary to read μεστα δε +παντα θεων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_273" href="#FNanchor_273" class="label">[273]</a> There is a chasm here in the original. And it appears +from the version of Patricius, that the words και γαρ απειρος εστιν +οντως εκαστος, are wanting.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_274" href="#FNanchor_274" class="label">[274]</a> In Prop. 93.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_275" href="#FNanchor_275" class="label">[275]</a> The words within the brackets are wanting in the +original, which I have supplied from the version of Patricius. In the +Greek therefore it is necessary to supply the words παν το τελειον εν +τοις θεοις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_276" href="#FNanchor_276" class="label">[276]</a> For εξῃρημενων it is necessary to read εξῃρημενον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_277" href="#FNanchor_277" class="label">[277]</a> Here also we must read ενιδρυμενον for ενιδρυμενων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_278" href="#FNanchor_278" class="label">[278]</a> The words αιτια γεννητικη, αλλα πασα αιτια γεννητικη ουκ +εστι ζωογονικη, are wanting in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_279" href="#FNanchor_279" class="label">[279]</a> The words within the brackets are wanting in the +original, which I have supplied from the version of Patricius. Hence, +in the printed Greek text it is necessary to supply the words, εν τοις +θεοις αρα, η μεν καθαροτης εστι και πρωτως αγαθον, και η φρουρα, και +παν τοιουτον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_280" href="#FNanchor_280" class="label">[280]</a> For τι εν, it appears requisite to read τι ον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_281" href="#FNanchor_281" class="label">[281]</a> From the version of Patricius, it is necessary to supply +the words η προς εαυτον, η προς το κρειττον επιστρεφεται which are +wanting in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_282" href="#FNanchor_282" class="label">[282]</a> For νῳ here it is necessary to read νοητον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_283" href="#FNanchor_283" class="label">[283]</a> For μεθεκτου here, it is necessary to read αμεθεκτου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_284" href="#FNanchor_284" class="label">[284]</a> For τον νουν, it is necessary to read το ον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_285" href="#FNanchor_285" class="label">[285]</a> The original in the beginning of this proposition is +both defective and erroneous. For it is as follows: παν το πληθος των +εναδων των μετεχομενων υπο τινος ***** γαρ εστι των του κοσμου μερων, +και δια μεσου, και της ψυχης. From the version of Patricius, however, +the defect and error may be removed by reading παν το πληθος των εναδων +των μετεχομενων υπο τινος αισθητου σωματος εγκοσμιον εστι. επιλαμπει +γαρ των του κοσμου μερων, και δια μεσου νου, και της ψυχης.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_286" href="#FNanchor_286" class="label">[286]</a> Instead of νοητον εστι τουτο here, it is necessary to +read νοητον εστι τουτῳ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_287" href="#FNanchor_287" class="label">[287]</a> For ει γαρ εαυτον νοει, πας νους, it is requisite to +read ἢ γαρ εαυτον νοει πας νους.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_288" href="#FNanchor_288" class="label">[288]</a> δηλον is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_289" href="#FNanchor_289" class="label">[289]</a> For ακινητος here, it is requisite to read αιωνιος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_290" href="#FNanchor_290" class="label">[290]</a> From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to +supply the words καθεν. ει γαρ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_291" href="#FNanchor_291" class="label">[291]</a> The word παντα is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_292" href="#FNanchor_292" class="label">[292]</a> Here also it is requisite to supply the words ομοιως +παντα νοησουσι.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_293" href="#FNanchor_293" class="label">[293]</a> By an intellectual perception of all things <i>according +to one</i>, Proclus means a perception of all things in one. For all +intellectual forms are in each; so that a perception of one, is a +perception of all forms, and therefore of all things.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_294" href="#FNanchor_294" class="label">[294]</a> It is here necessary from the version of Patricius to +supply the words και ακινητος, αμεριστος εστι. παν γαρ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_295" href="#FNanchor_295" class="label">[295]</a> From the version of Patricius, it is likewise necessary +to supply in this place the words κατα την αυτου ουσιαν αρα οριζει.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_296" href="#FNanchor_296" class="label">[296]</a> The words within the brackets are omitted in the +original, but may be supplied from the version of Patricius by reading +after το ειναι, as follows, αει εχει εν τῳ ποιειν. η νοησις αρα εν τῳ +ποειν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_297" href="#FNanchor_297" class="label">[297]</a> αμεγεθει is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_298" href="#FNanchor_298" class="label">[298]</a> Instead of οι δε μετ’ εκεινους, δια πλειονων, ελασσω +κατα την δυναμιν ουν ελλαμψιν εκεινοι, κ. λ. it is necessary to read οι +δε μετ’ εκεινους, δια πλειονων ελασσω, κατα την δυναμεως ελλεεψιν. ει +ουν εκεινοι, κ. λ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_299" href="#FNanchor_299" class="label">[299]</a> It is here requisite to supply from the version of +Patricius, the words εκ των δευτερων διηρημενως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_300" href="#FNanchor_300" class="label">[300]</a> It is necessary here to read and supply from the version +of Patricius, πορρωτερον του ενος, ο δε νοερος αριθμος εγγυτερω του +ενος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_301" href="#FNanchor_301" class="label">[301]</a> For ει here it is necessary to read η.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_302" href="#FNanchor_302" class="label">[302]</a> From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to +supply the words δει τον νουν μη μετεχοντα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_303" href="#FNanchor_303" class="label">[303]</a> The words και νους θειος are omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_304" href="#FNanchor_304" class="label">[304]</a> θειος is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_305" href="#FNanchor_305" class="label">[305]</a> θειαι is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_306" href="#FNanchor_306" class="label">[306]</a> For των νοερων, it is necessary to read το νοερον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_307" href="#FNanchor_307" class="label">[307]</a> From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to +supply the words και χωριστος του σωματος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_308" href="#FNanchor_308" class="label">[308]</a> The words ψυχης ου λογιζομενης are wanting in the +original; but from the version of Patricius ought to be added.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_309" href="#FNanchor_309" class="label">[309]</a> Here too, the words οτι ζωης εξωθεν, are wanting in the +original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_310" href="#FNanchor_310" class="label">[310]</a> The original here is defective, but may be restored to +the true sense by reading αλλα και ουσιας, ειπερ ζωης δηλον. προ γαρ +ψυχης κ.λ. instead of αλλα και ουσιας, ειπερ ζωης. δηλον γαρ ψυχης κ.λ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_311" href="#FNanchor_311" class="label">[311]</a> Instead of οτι δε και το πρωτως ζωτικον, ουκ εστι +φανερον, it is necessary to read οτι δε και το πρωτως γνωστικον ουκ +εστι, φανερον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_312" href="#FNanchor_312" class="label">[312]</a> It is here requisite to supply the words κατ’ ενεργειαν +δε του χρονου μετεχουσα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_313" href="#FNanchor_313" class="label">[313]</a> The words ζωη και γνωσις are wanting in the original. +And immediately after, for ου γνωσεται, it is requisite to read ου γαρ +γνωσεται.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_314" href="#FNanchor_314" class="label">[314]</a> For ανους here, it is necessary to read ανουσιος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_315" href="#FNanchor_315" class="label">[315]</a> ουχ is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_316" href="#FNanchor_316" class="label">[316]</a> For η διακινησις, it is necessary to read ιδια κινησις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_317" href="#FNanchor_317" class="label">[317]</a> For φυσικως here, it is necessary to read ψυχικως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_318" href="#FNanchor_318" class="label">[318]</a> There is a chasm here in the original after the word +δεχομενων, which may be supplied by reading ει γαρ θεια ηγεμονικην κ. +λ.; and γεννητικην must be substituted for γενικην.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_319" href="#FNanchor_319" class="label">[319]</a> For εξῃρηται τοις χρωμενοις αυτῳ ψυχης, it is necessary +to read εξηρτηται της χρωμενης αυτῳ ψυχης.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_320" href="#FNanchor_320" class="label">[320]</a> Instead of ωστε και η μερικη ψυχη, και το αιτιον αρα του +οχηματος αυτης, it appears to me to be necessary to read ωστε και το +αιτιον της μερικης ψυχης, και αρα του οχηματος αυτης.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_321" href="#FNanchor_321" class="label">[321]</a> There is a chasm here in the original, which as it +is not supplied in the version of Patricius, I have filled up by +conjecture. Hence, I have added the words καθαραν, ανατρεχει εις την +αυτης αρχαιαν φυσιν. το γαρ οχημα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_322" href="#FNanchor_322" class="label">[322]</a> For τας ψυχας here, it is necessary to read των ψυχων.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_323" href="#FNanchor_323" class="label">[323]</a> For εαυτων here, the sense as well as the version of +Patricius, require that we should read εαυτης.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_324" href="#FNanchor_324" class="label">[324]</a> That is, not through the medium of dæmoniacal and divine +souls.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_325" href="#FNanchor_325" class="label">[325]</a> From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to +supply the words και του ποτε νοουντος.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_326" href="#FNanchor_326" class="label">[326]</a> The barbarous version of Morbeka has <i>insinuare</i> +here, but the word employed by Proclus was, I have no doubt, +παρεισαγειν <i>adducere</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_327" href="#FNanchor_327" class="label">[327]</a> “Differenter elucidata.” So Morbeka; <i>differenter</i> +being doubtless his version of διαφεροντως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_328" href="#FNanchor_328" class="label">[328]</a> “Summa enim totorum.” This I suppose was in the Greek +ολως γαρ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_329" href="#FNanchor_329" class="label">[329]</a> “Separavit ejus epistasiam, id est superstationem.” So +Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_330" href="#FNanchor_330" class="label">[330]</a> Propter meliorem vicinitatem ipsi animam, in Morbeka’s +translation, should doubtless be, propter vicinitatem hujus animæ ad +meliorem naturam.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_331" href="#FNanchor_331" class="label">[331]</a> Accessibus in Morbeka, was I suppose in the original +εφοδοις, expositions or discussions.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_332" href="#FNanchor_332" class="label">[332]</a> “Quia est utrumque,” with Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_333" href="#FNanchor_333" class="label">[333]</a> “Qualificat,” with Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_334" href="#FNanchor_334" class="label">[334]</a> “Et sunt tria hæc differentia ab invicem, faciens, quod +fit, actio.” So Morbeka. But <i>actio</i> was doubtless in the original +ποιησις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_335" href="#FNanchor_335" class="label">[335]</a> “Operatio,” with Morbeka; in the original ενεργεια.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_336" href="#FNanchor_336" class="label">[336]</a> ψυχικην, with Morbeka <i>animalem</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_337" href="#FNanchor_337" class="label">[337]</a> ολως; <i>totaliter</i> Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_338" href="#FNanchor_338" class="label">[338]</a> <i>aspirantur</i> in Morbeka, should evidently be +<i>inspirantur</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_339" href="#FNanchor_339" class="label">[339]</a> In Morbeka opportunitatem.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_340" href="#FNanchor_340" class="label">[340]</a> “Sed et in hoc omni.” So Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_341" href="#FNanchor_341" class="label">[341]</a> “Ubi autem in corporeis penitus.” So Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_342" href="#FNanchor_342" class="label">[342]</a> “Intellectu participante necessitati corporum.” +<i>Participante</i> here is perhaps an error of the transcriber; for +Morbeka I have no doubt wrote <i>principante</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_343" href="#FNanchor_343" class="label">[343]</a> “Velut lumen Sol,” should be <i>velut lumen sole</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_344" href="#FNanchor_344" class="label">[344]</a> Iram is omitted here in the version of Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_345" href="#FNanchor_345" class="label">[345]</a> “Dicens quod neque audimus, circum nihil, neque +videmus.” So Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_346" href="#FNanchor_346" class="label">[346]</a> Virtutes in Morbeka, i.e. δυναμεις in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_347" href="#FNanchor_347" class="label">[347]</a> “Multam habere partem.” So Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_348" href="#FNanchor_348" class="label">[348]</a> In Morbeka, sobrietate meliorem.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_349" href="#FNanchor_349" class="label">[349]</a> Divinæ partis. So Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_350" href="#FNanchor_350" class="label">[350]</a> In Morbeka, “obtinetur et ab aliorum regnante causa.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_351" href="#FNanchor_351" class="label">[351]</a> In Morbeka <i>captat</i> instead of <i>copulat</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_352" href="#FNanchor_352" class="label">[352]</a> “Quicunque autem pacis opera intelligentes reverendi +fient, sortis fatalem alam effugiunt.” So Morbeka; in which, for +<i>pacis</i> read <i>patris</i>, and for <i>alam</i>, <i>aleam</i>. +This oracle in the original is as follows:</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Νοησασαι τα εργα του πατρος</div> + <div>Μοιρης ειμαρμενης το πτερον φευγουσιν αναιδες.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p>See my Collection of Chaldæan Oracles in the Monthly Magazine.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_353" href="#FNanchor_353" class="label">[353]</a> In Morbeka, <i>concupiscentiæ</i>; but in the Greek it +was doubtless επιθυμιας. This word as used by Plato and Aristotle, +signifies an appetite of the soul directed to the possession and +enjoyment of eternal good.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_354" href="#FNanchor_354" class="label">[354]</a> “Et nondum purgatus illud,” in Morbeka, i.e. illum +oculum.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_355" href="#FNanchor_355" class="label">[355]</a> Morbeka’s version of this part is as follows: “Omnis +igitur anima secundum quod virtute participat, et quod est liberam +esse: secundum quod autem malitia et debilitate et eo quod est servire +aliis,” &c. But it should be, conformably to the above version; Omnis +igitur anima secundum quod virtute participat, et quod est, liberam +esse; secundum quod autem malitia et debilitate, et eo quod non est, +servire aliis.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_356" href="#FNanchor_356" class="label">[356]</a> This is barbarously expressed in the version of Morbeka, +as follows, “et servire quidem aut desuper principatum, aut desuptus.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_357" href="#FNanchor_357" class="label">[357]</a> In the version of Morbeka, “quæ sine causa solam +cognoscentem ipsius quia veritatem.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_358" href="#FNanchor_358" class="label">[358]</a> In Morbeka, “agibilia;” but in the Greek, I have no +doubt, τα πρακτα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_359" href="#FNanchor_359" class="label">[359]</a> In Morbeka rejungentem, but I read adaptantem.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_360" href="#FNanchor_360" class="label">[360]</a> In Morbeka “<i>solvere</i>,” instead of <i>scire</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_361" href="#FNanchor_361" class="label">[361]</a> “Et totaliter agibilium politicam.” So Morbeka. This in +the original was, I suppose, και ολως τοις πρακτοις τῃν πολιτικην.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_362" href="#FNanchor_362" class="label">[362]</a> Instead of “quia et aliis animalibus necesse partibus +entibus omnes et facere, sed et pati,” as in Morbeka, it is necessary +to read, in order to make sense of the passage, quia et aliis +animalibus necesse partibus entibus, non modo et facere, sed et pati.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_363" href="#FNanchor_363" class="label">[363]</a> This in Morbeka is, “neque rursum sequestrare animam a +dominis electionum.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_364" href="#FNanchor_364" class="label">[364]</a> Morbeka has <i>quia</i> here instead of <i>nisi</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_365" href="#FNanchor_365" class="label">[365]</a> <i>Quando</i> in Morbeka, instead of <i>aliquando</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_366" href="#FNanchor_366" class="label">[366]</a> Here too Morbeka has <i>quando</i> instead of +<i>aliquando</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_367" href="#FNanchor_367" class="label">[367]</a> “Inecferribile in universum.” Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_368" href="#FNanchor_368" class="label">[368]</a> Morbeka has <i>differentem</i> here, instead of +<i>indifferentem</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_369" href="#FNanchor_369" class="label">[369]</a> The words <i>ad seipsam convertitur</i>, are omitted by +Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_370" href="#FNanchor_370" class="label">[370]</a> Morbeka has <i>directionem</i>, but the original was I +have no doubt κατορθωσιν.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_371" href="#FNanchor_371" class="label">[371]</a> του ουρανου υπεραστρονομουσα. So Plato.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_372" href="#FNanchor_372" class="label">[372]</a> In decisione lineæ. So Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_373" href="#FNanchor_373" class="label">[373]</a> The Greek of this, agreeably to my translation, was I +have no doubt τ’ αγαθον μονον εξηρημενον ειναι.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_374" href="#FNanchor_374" class="label">[374]</a> “Mediam habens notitiam, et solummodo scientiam, et +eorum qui non totaliter.” So Morbeka; but the sense requires the +following emendation: Mediam habens notitiam, et solummodo scientiam, +et eorum qui totaliter, et eorum qui non totaliter.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_375" href="#FNanchor_375" class="label">[375]</a> Morbeka has αυτοπεριγραπτον; but it should obviously be +αυτοαπεριγραπτον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_376" href="#FNanchor_376" class="label">[376]</a> Morbeka has <i>contra</i> here, instead of +<i>nihilominus</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_377" href="#FNanchor_377" class="label">[377]</a> <i>Superessentialiter</i> is omitted here in the version +of Morbeka.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_378" href="#FNanchor_378" class="label">[378]</a> “Neque enim tua fictio,” should be, neque enim si tua +factio, (i.e. ars mechanica).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_379" href="#FNanchor_379" class="label">[379]</a> See Plutarch’s admirable treatise, concerning those who +are slowly punished by divinity; from which Proclus has derived much in +what follows.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_380" href="#FNanchor_380" class="label">[380]</a> The Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite, in his treatise +On the Divine Names has evidently taken what follows from this passage +of Proclus: ουκ αρα ουδε εν αγγελοις εστι το κακον, αλλα κολαζειν τους +αμαρτανοντας εισι κακοι. τουτῳ γουν τῳ λογῳ και οι σωφρονισται των +πλημμελουντων κακοι. και των ιερεων οι τον βεβηλον των θειων μυστηριων +απειργοντες. καιτοι ουδε το κολαζεσθαι κακον, αλλα το αξιον γενεσθαι +κολασεως. i.e. “Neither, therefore, is there evil in angels, unless +it should be said they are evil because they punish offenders. For +the same reason, however, the castigators of those that act wrong, +are evil. And in a similar manner those priests are evil who prohibit +the profane from divine mysteries. Though indeed it is not evil to +be punished, but to deserve to be punished.” The reader who peruses +the above-mentioned treatise of this Dionysius will find that he has +extracted largely from the present work of Proclus.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_381" href="#FNanchor_381" class="label">[381]</a> In his 2d. Epistle.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_382" href="#FNanchor_382" class="label">[382]</a> διεξοδικως is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_383" href="#FNanchor_383" class="label">[383]</a> προοδον is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_384" href="#FNanchor_384" class="label">[384]</a> Viz. self-subsistent superessential natures; for to +these the αυτο, or <i>itself</i> primarily belongs. The next to these +are intellects. Those in the third rank, are souls. Those in the +fourth, the natures that are divided about bodies. And those in the +fifth and last rank are bodies.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_385" href="#FNanchor_385" class="label">[385]</a> Viz. <i>the one</i>, and matter.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_386" href="#FNanchor_386" class="label">[386]</a> μη is wanting in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_387" href="#FNanchor_387" class="label">[387]</a> <i>The good itself</i> is prior to being. Nothing or +non-being is not that which is most distant from <i>the good</i>; for +it is that in which the procession of being ends, but that which is +most distant from <i>the good</i> is <i>evil itself</i>. Hence, <i>evil +itself</i> is posterior to non-entity.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_388" href="#FNanchor_388" class="label">[388]</a> For πολυαρατον, it is necessary to read πολυορατον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_389" href="#FNanchor_389" class="label">[389]</a> For περι here, it is requisite to read παρα.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_390" href="#FNanchor_390" class="label">[390]</a> μοχθηρας is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_391" href="#FNanchor_391" class="label">[391]</a> For the proper parts of a self-motive whole, are also +self-motive.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_392" href="#FNanchor_392" class="label">[392]</a> For απ’ αιτιας here, it is necessary to read απεναντιως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_393" href="#FNanchor_393" class="label">[393]</a> For το μεν δυναμενον in this place, it is necessary to +read, το μη δυναμενον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_394" href="#FNanchor_394" class="label">[394]</a> For συμμετριᾳ here, it is necessary to read ασυμμετριᾳ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_395" href="#FNanchor_395" class="label">[395]</a> viz. angels, dæmons and heroes.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_396" href="#FNanchor_396" class="label">[396]</a> Proclus here alludes to one of the Chaldæan oracles.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_397" href="#FNanchor_397" class="label">[397]</a> The first effable subsists in the god Phanes, or the +extremity of the intelligible order.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_398" href="#FNanchor_398" class="label">[398]</a> See this explained in the notes on my translation of the +Parmenides of Plato.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_399" href="#FNanchor_399" class="label">[399]</a> The <i>Iynx, Synoches, and Teletarchæ</i> of the +Chaldæans, compose that divine order, which is called by Proclus +<i>intelligible and at the same time intellectual</i>, and is unfolded +by him in the fourth book.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_400" href="#FNanchor_400" class="label">[400]</a> This is one of the Chaldæan oracles.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_401" href="#FNanchor_401" class="label">[401]</a> See the Timæus.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_402" href="#FNanchor_402" class="label">[402]</a> It must however be carefully observed that multitude +when it subsists causally, subsists without that distinction and +separation which it possesses when unfolded; and that in <i>the one</i> +it has no distinction whatever. For <i>the one</i> is all things prior +to all.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_403" href="#FNanchor_403" class="label">[403]</a> See the 7th Epistle of Plato.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_404" href="#FNanchor_404" class="label">[404]</a> As that which is below all knowledge is an ignorance +worse than knowledge, so the silence in which our ascent to the +ineffable terminates is preceded by an ignorance superior to all +knowledge. Let it however, be carefully remembered, that such an +ignorance is only to be obtained after the most scientific and +intellectual energies.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_405" href="#FNanchor_405" class="label">[405]</a> Vid. Excerpta ex Damascio, a Wolfio, p. 232.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_406" href="#FNanchor_406" class="label">[406]</a> Let the reader be careful to remember that <i>the +one</i> of the gods is their superessential characteristic.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_407" href="#FNanchor_407" class="label">[407]</a> Vid. Excerpta, p. 228.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_408" href="#FNanchor_408" class="label">[408]</a> Αλλ’ αυται μεν ουκ εισι κατα αληθειαν, ουτε μιαν, ουτε +τρεις, ουτε μια αμα και τρεις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_409" href="#FNanchor_409" class="label">[409]</a> Vid. Wolfii Anecdot. Græc. tom. iii. p. 252.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_410" href="#FNanchor_410" class="label">[410]</a> ως νουν is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_411" href="#FNanchor_411" class="label">[411]</a> μηποτε is erroneously printed instead of ποτε.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_412" href="#FNanchor_412" class="label">[412]</a> το τριτον is I conceive erroneously omitted in the +original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_413" href="#FNanchor_413" class="label">[413]</a> Την is printed instead of Γην.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_414" href="#FNanchor_414" class="label">[414]</a> As the whole of the Grecian theology is the progeny of +the mystic traditions of Orpheus, it is evident that the Gods which +Hesiod celebrates by the epithets of <i>Earth</i>, <i>Heaven</i>, +&c. cannot be the visible <i>Heaven</i> and <i>Earth</i>: for Plato +in the Cratylus, following the Orphic doctrine concerning the Gods, +as we have evinced in our notes on that dialogue, plainly shews, in +explaining the name of Jupiter, that this divinity is the artificer of +the sensible universe; and consequently <i>Saturn</i>, <i>Heaven</i>, +<i>Earth</i>, &c. are much superior to the mundane deities. Indeed +if this be not admitted, the Theogony of Hesiod must be perfectly +absurd and inexplicable. For why does he call Jupiter, agreeably to +Homer (πατηρ ανδρων τε θεων τε), “<i>father of Gods and men</i>?” +Shall we say that he means literally that Jupiter is the father of +all the Gods? But this is impossible; for he delivers the generation +of Gods who are the parents of Jupiter. He can therefore only mean +that Jupiter is the parent of all the mundane Gods: and his Theogony, +when considered according to this exposition, will be found to be +beautifully consistent, accurate and sublime. I only add, that την is +again erroneously printed in the Excerpta of Wolfius for γην.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_415" href="#FNanchor_415" class="label">[415]</a> χθονον is printed for χρονον.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_416" href="#FNanchor_416" class="label">[416]</a> That is, from <i>bound</i> and <i>infinite</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_417" href="#FNanchor_417" class="label">[417]</a> χουσώρος should be read instead of χουσώρου.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_418" href="#FNanchor_418" class="label">[418]</a> Vid. Pici Opera, tom. i. p. 54.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_419" href="#FNanchor_419" class="label">[419]</a> <i>i.e.</i> θεοι νοητοι, νοητοι και νοεροι, νοεροι, +υπερκοσμιοι, απολυτοι sive υπερουρανιοι, et εγκοσμιοι.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_420" href="#FNanchor_420" class="label">[420]</a> For ολης here, it is necessary to read υλης, because +matter according to Plato proceeds from the father Phanes, or animal +itself, and not from the demiurgus.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_421" href="#FNanchor_421" class="label">[421]</a> For αυτους, it is necessary to read αιτιας.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_422" href="#FNanchor_422" class="label">[422]</a> viz. From axioms and definitions.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_423" href="#FNanchor_423" class="label">[423]</a> μερικωτερας is omitted in the original.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_424" href="#FNanchor_424" class="label">[424]</a> For δη here, it is requisite to read δει.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_425" href="#FNanchor_425" class="label">[425]</a> Proclus here alludes to the fabulous wanderings of +Ulysses in the Odyssey. For Homer by these occultly indicates the +life of a man who passes in a regular manner from a sensible to an +intellectual life, and who being thoroughly purified by the exercise +of the cathartic virtues, is at length able to energize according to +the intuitive perception of intellect, and thus after becoming reunited +to Penelope or Philosophy, meets with and embraces his father. This +appears also to have been the opinion of the Pythagorean Numenius, as +we are informed by Porphyry in his treatise De Antro Nympharum. “For +he thought that the person of Ulysses in the Odyssey represented to +us a man who passes in a regular manner over the dark and stormy sea +of generation; and thus at length arrives at that region (i.e. the +intellectual region) where tempests and seas are unknown, and finds a +nation</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Who ne’er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.”</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p>See more on this subject in my Restoration of the Platonic Theology, p. +294.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_426" href="#FNanchor_426" class="label">[426]</a> For μηδε ευροντα δυνατα δυνατον ειναι λεγειν, it is +necessary to read, μηδε ευροντα εις απαντας δυνατον, κ. λ.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_427" href="#FNanchor_427" class="label">[427]</a> For απεστραμμενης, it is requisite to read +επιστραμμεγης.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_428" href="#FNanchor_428" class="label">[428]</a> Plato in the Politicus thus calls the realms of +generation, i.e. the whole of a visible nature.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_429" href="#FNanchor_429" class="label">[429]</a> That is, intelligible intellect, the extremity of the +intelligible order.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_430" href="#FNanchor_430" class="label">[430]</a> That is, the divinities who compose the middle of that +order of Gods, which is denominated intelligible and at the same time +intellectual.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_431" href="#FNanchor_431" class="label">[431]</a> As what is here said from Orpheus concerning Jupiter is +very remarkable, and is no where else to be found, I give the original +for the sake of the learned reader: διο και Ορφευς δημιουργουντα μεν +αυτον την ουρανιαν πασαν γενεαν παραδιδωσι, και ηλιον ποιουντα και +σεληνην, και τους αλλους αστρῳους θεους· δημιουργουντα δε τα υποσεληνην +στοιχεια, και διακρινοντα τοις ειδεσιν ατακτως εχοντα προτερον· σειρας +δ’ εφισταντα θεων περι ολον τον κοσμον εις αυτον ανηρτημενας, και +διαθεσμοθετουντα πασι τοις εγκοσμιοις θεοις κατ’ αξιαν διανομας της εν +τῳ παντι προνοιας.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_432" href="#FNanchor_432" class="label">[432]</a> Iliad. XX. v. 4.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_433" href="#FNanchor_433" class="label">[433]</a> See the 14th line.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_434" href="#FNanchor_434" class="label">[434]</a> Ibid v. 32.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_435" href="#FNanchor_435" class="label">[435]</a> Iliad. IV. v. 58.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_436" href="#FNanchor_436" class="label">[436]</a> Iliad. XV. v. 187.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_437" href="#FNanchor_437" class="label">[437]</a> For the Saturnian triad belongs to that order of Gods +which is called supermundane, and which immediately subsists after the +intellectual order; so that the Jupiter who ranks at the summit of this +triad is different from and inferior to the demiurgus.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_438" href="#FNanchor_438" class="label">[438]</a> That is, he is not an intellect consubsistent with soul.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_439" href="#FNanchor_439" class="label">[439]</a> And the duad considered as a divine form or idea is the +source of fecundity.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_440" href="#FNanchor_440" class="label">[440]</a> i.e. The twelve Gods who first subsist in the +<i>liberated</i> or supercelestial order and who are divided +into four triads, and the twelve mundane Gods, Jupiter, Neptune, +Vulcan; Vesta, Minerva, Mars; Ceres, Juno, Diana; and Mercury, +Venus, Apollo. The first of these triads is <i>fabricative</i>; the +second <i>defensive</i>; the third <i>vivific</i>; and the fourth +<i>anagogic</i> or <i>elevating</i>, as is shown by Proclus in the 6th +book of his Theology.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_441" href="#FNanchor_441" class="label">[441]</a> This royal series consists of Phanes, Night, Heaven, +Saturn, Jupiter, Bacchus. “Ancient theologists, says Syrianus (in his +commentary on the 14th book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics) assert that +Night and Heaven reigned, and prior to these the mighty father of Night +and Heaven, who distributed the world to Gods and mortals, and who +first possessed royal authority, the illustrious Ericapæus.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>τοιον ελων διενειμε θεοις, θνητοισι δε κοσμον</div> + <div>ου πρωτος βασιλευε περικλυτος ηρικεπαιος.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">Night succeeded Ericapæus, in the hands of whom she has a sceptre:</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>σκεπτρον εχουσ’ εν χερσιν ηρικεπαιου·</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">To Night, Heaven succeeded, who first reigned over the Gods after +mother Night.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>ος πρωτος βασιλευε θεων μετα μητερα νυκτα.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">Chaos transcends the habitude of sovereign dominion: and, with respect +to Jupiter, the oracles given to him by Night, manifestly call him not +the first, but the fifth immortal king of the Gods.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>αθανατον βασιλεα θεων πεμπτον γενεσθαι.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">According to these theologists therefore, that principle which is most +eminently the first, is <i>the one</i> or <i>the good</i>, after which +according to Pythagoras, are those two principles Æther and Chaos, +which are superior to the possession of sovereign dominion. In the +next place succeed the first and occult genera of the Gods, in which +first shines forth the father and king of all wholes, and whom on this +account they call <i>Phanes</i>.“</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_442" href="#FNanchor_442" class="label">[442]</a> Of these intellects the first is Phanes, the second +Heaven, the third Earth, and the fourth the Subcelestial Arch which is +celebrated in the Phædrus, viz. νους νοητος ο Φανης, εκφαντορικος νους +ο Ουρανος, συνεκτικος νους η γη, τελεσιουργος δε νους η υπ’ουρανιος +αψις.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_443" href="#FNanchor_443" class="label">[443]</a> That is of the whole intellectual order, which consists +of Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, the three Curetes, and the separating monad +Ocean.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_444" href="#FNanchor_444" class="label">[444]</a> ως δ’ Ορφευς ενθεῳ στοματι λεγει, και καταπινει τον +προγονον αυτου τον φανητα, και εγκολπιζιται πασας αυτου τας δυναμεις ο +ζευς, και γινεται παντα νοερως, οσαπερ ην εκεινος νοητως.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_445" href="#FNanchor_445" class="label">[445]</a> διο και τρεφεσθαι φησιν αυτον ο θεολογος υπο της νυκτος. +“εκ παντων δε κρονον νυξ ετρεφεν ηδ’ ατιταλλεν.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_446" href="#FNanchor_446" class="label">[446]</a> That is Phanes, intelligible intellect, or in the +language of Plato αυτοζωον <i>animal</i> itself.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_447" href="#FNanchor_447" class="label">[447]</a> Homer however appears to have ascended as far as to the +goddess Night, or the summit of the intelligible and at the same time +intellectual order.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_448" href="#FNanchor_448" class="label">[448]</a> That is to say <i>the first cause and bound</i>, which +is called by Orpheus <i>æther</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_449" href="#FNanchor_449" class="label">[449]</a> See this explained in the notes of my translation of the +Parmenides of Plato.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_450" href="#FNanchor_450" class="label">[450]</a> That is to say, it is false to assert of intellectual +and divine natures, that they are in a perpetual flux; for they are +eternally stable themselves, and are the sources of stability to other +things.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_451" href="#FNanchor_451" class="label">[451]</a> Gesner misled by Patricius, has inserted these lines +among the Orphic fragments, in his edition of the works of Orpheus.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_452" href="#FNanchor_452" class="label">[452]</a> Proclus here means that there is the same analogy +between Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, as in the intelligible triad, +between father, power, and intellect.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_453" href="#FNanchor_453" class="label">[453]</a> Οτι ωνομασται η Τηθυς παρα το διαττομενον και ηθουμενον, +οιον Διατηθυ, και αφαιρεσει των πρωτων δυσσυλλαβων Τηθυς.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_454" href="#FNanchor_454" class="label">[454]</a> Iliad XV. v. 187.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_455" href="#FNanchor_455" class="label">[455]</a> Iliad, XV. v. 189.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_456" href="#FNanchor_456" class="label">[456]</a> See the Theogony of Hesiod, v. 176, &c.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_457" href="#FNanchor_457" class="label">[457]</a> Proclus here alludes to the following Orphic verses +cited by him in his Commentary on the Timæus, lib. 5. p. 296.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>ενθ’ ουν τ’ ωκεανος μεν, ενι μεγαροισιν εμιμνεν</div> + <div>ορμαινων ποτερωσε νοον τpαποι, ηε πατερα</div> + <div>ον γνωσῃ τε βιης, και ατασθαλα λωβησαιτο</div> + <div>συν κρονῳ, ηδ’ αλλοις αδελφοις οι πεπιθοντο</div> + <div>μητρι φιλῃ, η τους γε λιπων, μενει ενδον εκηλος·</div> + <div>πολλα δε πορφυρων, μενει ημερος εν μεγαροισι</div> + <div>σκυζομενος τῃ μητρι, κασιγνητοισι δε μαλλον.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p class="p-left">i.e. “But Ocean remained within the ample house, considering how he +should act, whether he should deprive his father of his strength, and +basely injure him, together with Saturn and the rest of his brethren, +who were obedient to their dear mother; or whether leaving these, he +should stay quietly at home. After much deliberation, he remained +quietly at home, being angry with his mother, but more so with his +brothers.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_458" href="#FNanchor_458" class="label">[458]</a> That is, of the first triad of the supermundane, which +subsists immediately after the intellectual order.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_459" href="#FNanchor_459" class="label">[459]</a> Hom. Iliad.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_460" href="#FNanchor_460" class="label">[460]</a> This cause is Saturn, who according to the fable cut off +the genital parts of Heaven. See the Theogony of Hesiod.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_461" href="#FNanchor_461" class="label">[461]</a> This Orphic fragment is not to be found in Gesner’s +collection of the Orphic remains.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_462" href="#FNanchor_462" class="label">[462]</a> See p. 521. Vol. V. of my Translation of Plato.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_463" href="#FNanchor_463" class="label">[463]</a> Because Night subsists at the summit of <i>the +intelligible and at the same time intellectual</i> order, and is wholly +absorbed in the intelligible.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_464" href="#FNanchor_464" class="label">[464]</a> That is, according to one of the Chaldean Oracles.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_465" href="#FNanchor_465" class="label">[465]</a> These verses likewise, are not in Gesner’s collection.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_466" href="#FNanchor_466" class="label">[466]</a> Iliad XIV. v. 328.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_467" href="#FNanchor_467" class="label">[467]</a> Proclus says this conformably to the theology of the +Chaldeans. For according to that theology, the first monad of the +vivific triad is <i>Hecate</i>, the second <i>Soul</i>, and the third +<i>Virtue</i>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_468" href="#FNanchor_468" class="label">[468]</a> That is, of a supermundane nature: for the +<i>ruling</i>, are the <i>supermundane</i>, Gods.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_469" href="#FNanchor_469" class="label">[469]</a> That is, the Corybantes.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_470" href="#FNanchor_470" class="label">[470]</a></p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Η δ’ αρα εκατη παιδος μελη αυθι λυπουσα</div> + <div>Λητους ευπλοκαμοιο κορη προσεβησατ’ ολυμπον.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_471" href="#FNanchor_471" class="label">[471]</a> These admirable Scholia on the Cratylus end here; being +unfortunately, like most both of the published and unpublished writings +of Proclus, incompleat. These very scholia too appear to be nothing +more than extracts from a copious commentary of Proclus which is lost.</p> + +</div> +</div> + + +<p class="transnote">Transcriber’s Notes:<br> +<br> +1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been +corrected silently.<br> +<br> +2. Where appropriate, the original spelling has been retained.<br> +<br> +3. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have +been retained as in the original.</p> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78800 ***</div> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/78800-h/images/cover.jpg b/78800-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..7b537c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/78800-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c72794 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This book, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. 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