diff options
Diffstat (limited to '948.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 948.txt | 2941 |
1 files changed, 2941 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,2941 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Ethics [Part III], by Benedict de Spinoza + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Ethics [Part III] + +Author: Benedict de Spinoza + +Translator: R. H. M. Elwes + +Posting Date: April 15, 2013 [EBook #948] +Release Date: June, 1997 +First Posted: June 16, 1997 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ETHICS [PART III] *** + + + + +Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer. + + + + + + + + + + +Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS +(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata) +Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes + + + +PART III: ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS + + +Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem +to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural +phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to +conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a +kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows +nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, +and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute +human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature +in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, +which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as +usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off +the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more +acutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer. Still there +has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and +industry I confess myself much indebted), who have written +many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life, +and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, +so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the +emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their +restraint. + +I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he +believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions, +strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, +and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind +might attain to absolute dominion over them. However, +in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display +of the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show +in the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to +those, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions +than understand them. Such persons will, doubtless think +it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and +folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid +reasoning those matters which they cry out against as +repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. +However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, +which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always +the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy +and power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances, +whereby all things come to pass and change from one form +to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that +there should be one and the same method of understanding +the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's +universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, +envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this +same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain +definite causes, through which they are understood, and +possess certain properties as worthy of being known as +the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation +in itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the +nature and strength of the emotions according to the same +method, as I employed heretofore in my investigations +concerning God and the mind. I shall consider human +actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though +I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids. + + +DEFINITIONS + +I. By an 'adequate' cause, I mean a cause through which +its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an +'inadequate' or partial cause, I mean a cause through which, +by itself, its effect cannot be understood. + +II. I say that we 'act' when anything takes place, either +within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate +cause; that is (by the foregoing definition) when through +our nature something takes place within us or externally +to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and +distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we +are passive as regards something when that something +takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, +we being only the partial cause. + +III. By 'emotion' I mean the modifications of the body, +whereby the active power of the said body is increased +or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas +of such modifications. + +N.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these +modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, +otherwise I call it a passion, or state wherein the mind +is passive. + + +POSTULATES + +I. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby +its power of activity is increased or diminished, and also +in other ways which do not render its power of activity +either greater or less. + +N.B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and +Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii. + +II. The human body can undergo many changes, and, +nevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects +(cf. II. Post. v.), and, consequently, the same images +of things (see note II. xvii.). + + +PROPOSITIONS + +I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases +passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily +active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is +necessarily passive. + +>>>>>Proof--In every human mind there are some +adequate ideas, and some ideas that are fragmentary +and confused (II. xl. note). Those ideas which are +adequate in the mind are adequate also in God, inasmuch +as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl. Cor.), +and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise +(by the same Cor.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he +contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, +but as he, at the same time, contains the minds of other +things. Again, from any given idea some effect must +necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.); of this effect God is the +adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not inasmuch as he is +infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by +the given idea (II. ix.). But of that effect whereof God +is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which +is adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the +mind in question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Cor.). +Therefore our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas +(III. Def. ii.), is in certain cases necessarily active; +this was our first point. Again, whatsoever necessarily +follows from the idea which is adequate in God, not by +virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man +only, but by virtue of his containing, together with the +mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, +of such an effect (II. xi. Cor.) the mind of the given man +is not an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus +(III. Def. ii.) the mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate +ideas, is in certain cases necessarily passive; this was +our second point. Therefore our mind, &c. Q.E.D. + +<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that the mind is more +or less liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses +inadequate ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active +in proportion as it possesses adequate ideas. + +II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind +determine body to motion or rest or any state different +from these, if such there be. + +>>>>>Proof--All modes of thinking have for their cause +God, by virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by +virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute (II. +vi.). That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought +is a mode of thought, and not a mode of extension; that +is (II. Def. i.), it is not body. This was our first point. +Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from +another body, which has also been determined to a state +of motion or rest by a third body, and absolutely +everything which takes place in a body must spring from +God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some +mode of extension, and not by some mode of thought +(II. vi.); that is, it cannot spring from the mind, which +is a mode of thought. This was our second point. +Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--This is made more clear by what was said +in the note to II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one +and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of +thought, secondly, under the attribute of extension. Thus +it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical, +whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the +other; consequently the order of states of activity and +passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the +order of states of activity and passivity in the mind. +The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which +we proved II. xii. + +Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there +be no further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, +until the fact is proved by experience, that men can be +induced to consider the question calmly and fairly, so firmly +are they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of the +mind, that the body is set in motion or at rest, or performs +a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will +or the exercise of thought. However, no one has hitherto +laid down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, no +one has as yet been taught by experience what the body +can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as +she is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained +such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that +he can explain all its functions; nor need I call attention +to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower +animals, which far transcend human sagacity, and +that somnambulists do many things in their sleep, which +they would not venture to do when awake: these instances +are enough to show, that the body can by the sole laws +of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at. + +Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind +moves the body, nor how many various degrees of motion +it can impart to the body, nor how quickly it can move it. +Thus, when men say that this or that physical action has +its origin in the mind, which latter has dominion over the +body, they are using words without meaning, or are +confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant +of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it. + +But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the +means whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at +any rate, experience of the fact that unless the human mind +is in a fit state to think, the body remains inert. Moreover, +we have experience, that the mind alone can determine +whether we speak or are silent, and a variety of similar +states which, accordingly, we say depend on the mind's +decree. But, as to the first point, I ask such objectors, +whether experience does not also teach, that if the body +be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for +thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind +simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no +power of thinking, such as it possesses when the body +is awake. Again, I think everyone's experience will +confirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times +equally fit for thinking on a given subject, but according +as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by +the image of this or that object, so also is the mind more +or less fitted for contemplating the said object. + +But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from +the laws of nature considered as extended substance, +we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings, +pictures, and things of that kind, which are produced +only by human art; nor would the human body, unless +it were determined and led by the mind, be capable of +building a single temple. However, I have just pointed +out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's +power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration +of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many +things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, +which they would never have believed possible except +under the direction of mind: such are the actions performed +by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their +performers when awake. I would further call attention +to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses +in complexity all that has been put together by human art, +not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that +from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, +infinite results follow. As for the second objection, I +submit that the world would be much happier, if men were +as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak. +Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything +more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more +easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many + believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which +we moderately desire, because our desire for such can +easily be controlled by the thought of something else +frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free +in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our +desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of +anything else. However, unless such persons had proved +by experience that we do many things which we afterwards +repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary +emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would +be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all +things. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it +desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires +to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters +from the free decision of his mind words which, when he +is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a +delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others +of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free +decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to +restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no +less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be +free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, +and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are +determined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the +mind are but another name for the appetites, and therefore +vary according to the varying state of the body. Everyone +shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who are +assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish; +those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed +this way or that. All these considerations clearly show that +a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, +are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which +we call decision, when it is regarded under and explained +through the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when +it is regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced +from the laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more +plainly in the sequel. For the present I wish to call attention +to another point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision +of the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having done +so. For instance, we cannot say a word without remembering +that we have done so. Again, it is not within the free power +of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will. Therefore +the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the +power of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers. +But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak +from a free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or, if we +do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we +dream that we are concealing something, and we seem to act +from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby we keep +silence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly, +we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do +something, which we should not dare to do when awake. + +Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two +sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free? +If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily +admit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to be +free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, +and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, by +virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II. xlix.). +Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by +the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. +Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence +or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do +but dream with their eyes open. + +III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate +ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely +on inadequate ideas. + +>>>>>Proof--The first element, which constitutes the essence +of the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent +body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many +other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate +(II. xxix. Cor., II. xxxviii. Cor.). Whatsoever therefore follows +from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate cause, +through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow +either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. But in +so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily +passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from +adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only passive in so +far as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--Thus we see, that passive states are not +attributed to the mind, except in so far as it contains something +involving negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of +nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived +through itself without other parts: I could thus show, that +passive states are attributed to individual things in the same +way that they are attributed to the mind, and that they cannot +otherwise be perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat +of the human mind. + +IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to +itself. + +>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for the +definition of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but +does not negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence +of the thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as +we regard only the thing itself, without taking into account +external causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything +which could destroy it. Q.E.D. + +V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same +object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other. + +>>>>>Proof--If they could agree together or co-exist in the same +object, there would then be in the said object something which +could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is absurd, +therefore things, &c. Q.E.D. + +VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in +its own being. + +>>>>>Proof--Individual things are modes whereby the +attributes of God are expressed in a given determinate manner +(I. xxv.Cor.); that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express +in a given determinate manner the power of God, whereby +God is and acts; now no thing contains in itself anything +whereby it can be destroyed, or which can take away its +existence (III. iv.); but contrariwise it is opposed to all that +could take away its existence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far as +it can, and in so far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist +in its own being. Q.E.D. + +VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to +persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence +of the thing in question. + +>>>>>Proof--From the given essence of any thing certain +consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any +power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as +determined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing, +or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, +it acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or +endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being, +is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in +question. Q.E.D. + +VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist +in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time. + +>>>>>Proof--If it involved a limited time, which should determine +the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that +power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist +beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed; but +this (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore the endeavour wherewith a +thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise, since +(III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already exists +always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some external +cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time. + +IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and +also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its +being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is conscious. + +>>>>>Proof--The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate +and inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so far +as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the latter, +it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for an indefinite +time (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is necessarily conscious +of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind +is therefore (III. vii.) conscious of its own endeavour. + +*****Note--This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is +called "will," when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it +is called "appetite"; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence, +from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which +tend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determined +to perform. + +Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except +that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they +are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined: +"Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof." It is thus plain from +what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long +for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the +other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, +wish for it, long for it, or desire it. + +X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be +postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto. + +>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be +postulated therein (III. v.). Therefore neither can the idea of such +a thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II. ix. +Cor.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing cannot be postulated +as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II. xi., xiii.) the first element, +that constitutes the essence of the mind, is the idea of the human +body as actually existing, it follows that the first and chief endeavour +of our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body: +thus, an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary +to our mind, &c. Q.E.D. + +XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power +of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps +or hinders the power of thought in our mind. + +>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II. xiv. + +*****Note--Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, +and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes +to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transition +explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By "pleasure" +therefore in the following propositions I shall signify "a passive state +wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection." By "pain" I shall +signify "a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection." +Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind +together I shall call "stimulation" (titillatio) or "merriment" (hilaritas), +the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call "suffering" or +"melancholy." But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and +suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more +affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts +are alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the +note to Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no +other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other +emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I should +like here to explain at greater length Prop. x. of this part, in order +that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another. +In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutes +the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as +the body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we pointed out +in the Corollary to II. viii., that the present existence of our mind +depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual +existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and +Note) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and +remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the +actual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the present +existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed, +as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the +body. Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this +existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III. iv.), nor +again the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (by II. vi.) +the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body, +is not that the body began to exist; therefore, for the same +reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, +because the body ceases to exist; but (II. xvii.) this result +follows from another idea, which excludes the present +existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and +which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence +of our mind. + +XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those +things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body. + +>>>>>Proof--So long as the human body is affected in a mode, +which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind +will regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and consequently +(II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an external body as +present, that is (II. xvii. Note), conceives it, the human body is +affected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external +body; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increase +or help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in +modes which increase or help its power of activity (III. Post. i.); +consequently (III. xi.) the mind's power of thinking is for that +period increased or helped. Thus (III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far +as it can, endeavours to imagine such things. Q.E.D. + +XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the +body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to +remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named +things. + +>>>>>Proof--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind +alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or +constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue to +conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes +the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as I have just shown), +the power of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained, +until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the +existence of the former thing conceived: therefore the mind (III. ix.), +as far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter. +Q.E.D. + +<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from +conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of +itself and of the body. + +*****Note--From what has been said we may clearly understand +the nature of Love and Hate. "Love" is nothing else but "pleasure +accompanied by the idea of an external cause." We further see, +that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep +present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavours +to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat of +these matters at more length hereafter. + +XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the +same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of these +two, be also affected by the other. + +>>>>>Proof--If the human body has once been affected by two +bodies at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of +them, it will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). But +the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body +than the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Cor. ii.); therefore, if +the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been once +affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is +afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the +other. + +XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, +or desire. + +>>>>>Proof--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously +affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor +diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increase +or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.). From the foregoing +proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is afterwards +affected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) +neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at +the same time affected by the latter, which does increase or +diminish its power of activity, that is (III. xi. note) it will be affected +with pleasure or pain. Thus the former of the two emotions will, +not through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or +pain. In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing +may be accidentally the cause of desire. Q.E.D. + +<<<<<Corollary--Simply from the fact that we have regarded +a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be +not the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it. + +>>>>>Proof--For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that +the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the +emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note), according as +the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished, +&c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the mind may +desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii. Cor.), in other +words (III. xiii. note), according as it may love or hate the same. +Q.E.D. + +*****Note--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we +love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known +to us; merely, as a phrase is, from "sympathy" or "antipathy." We +should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us +pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other +objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the +next Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to +introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signify +thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may +be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest +qualities. + +XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given object +has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont +to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of +resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we +shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate. + +>>>>>Proof--The point of resemblance was in the object (by +hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus +(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will +straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and +consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point +of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of pleasure +or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although the point +in which the two objects resemble one another be not the +efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-named +object with love or hate. Q.E.D. + +XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us +painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing which +is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, +we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall +love it. + +>>>>>Proof--The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause +of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with this +emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive that +it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is wont +to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall +with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it (III. xvi.); thus +we shall both hate and love the same thing. Q.E.D. + + +*****Note--This disposition of the mind, which arises from two +contrary emotions, is called "vacillation"; it stands to the emotions +in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination (II. xliv. note); +vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other, except as +greater differs from less. But we must bear in mind that I have +deduced this vacillation from causes, which give rise through +themselves to one of the emotions, and to the other accidentally. +I have done this, in order that they might be more easily deduced +from what went before; but I do not deny that vacillation of the +disposition generally arises from an object, which is the efficient +cause of both emotions. The human body is composed +(II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts of different nature, +and may therefore (Ax. i. after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) be +affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body; +and contrariwise, as one and the same thing can be affected in +many ways, it can also in many different ways affect one and +the same part of the body. Hence we can easily conceive, that +one and the same object may be the cause of many and +conflicting emotions. + +XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully +by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing +present. + +>>>>>Proof--So long as a man is affected by the image of +anything, he will regard that thing as present, even though it be +non-existent (II. xvii. and Cor.), he will not conceive it as past +or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the image +of time past or future (II. xliv. note). Wherefore the image of +a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether it be referred +to time past, time future, or time present; that is (II. xvi. Cor.), the +disposition or emotion of the body is identical, whether the image +be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D. + +*****Note I.--I call a thing past or future, according as we either +have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according +as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has +recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us, +or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its +existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which +excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.) the +body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as if +the thing were actually present. However, as it generally happens +that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so long as +they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt about +its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the emotions which arise from +similar images of things are not so constant, but are generally +disturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured +of the issue. + +*****Note II.--From what has just been said, we understand what +is meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and +Disappointment. "Hope" is nothing else but "an inconstant pleasure, +arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do +not yet know the issue." "Fear," on the other hand, is "an inconstant +pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we +are in doubt." If the element of doubt be removed from these +emotions, hope becomes "Confidence" and fear becomes "Despair." +In other words, "Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of +something concerning which we have hoped or feared." Again, +"Joy" is "Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof +we have doubted the issue." "Disappointment" is "the Pain opposed +to Joy." + +XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed +will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure. + +>>>>>Proof--The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to +conceive those things which increase or help the body's power +of activity (III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things +which it loves. But conception is helped by those things which +postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered +by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.); +therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence +of an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive +the object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind +pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the existence +of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental endeavour; in +other words, affect the mind painfully. He, therefore, who +conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain, +&c. Q.E.D. + +XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will +also feel pleasure. + +>>>>>Proof--The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those +things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's +power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III. xiii. +note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the +existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing, which +excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the aforesaid +mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects the mind +pleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object of his hate +is destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D. + +XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected +pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably or +painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less +in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved. + +>>>>>Proof--The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) +which postulate the existence of the object of love, help the +mind's endeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasure +postulates the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much +the more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; +for it is (III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore +the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental +endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover pleasurably, +and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion may have +been greater in the object of love. This was our first point. +Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it is to that +extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to the amount +of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who conceives, +that the object of his love is affected painfully, will himself be +affected painfully, in proportion as the said emotion is greater +or less in the object of love. Q.E.D. + +XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some +object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that +thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of +our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it. + +>>>>>Proof--He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object +of our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if we +conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure +or pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come +to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore +(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object of +our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with love +or hatred towards him. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of 'Pity,' which +we may define as 'pain arising from another's hurt.' What term +we can use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not. + +We will call the 'love towards him who confers a benefit on +another,' 'Approval;' and the 'hatred towards him who injures +another,' we will call 'Indignation.' We must further remark, +that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as +shown in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto +regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles +ourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval +on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and, +contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury. + +XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully +affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said +object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these +emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater +or less in the object of hatred. + +>>>>>Proof--In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected, +it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the strength of the +pain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.) who conceives, that +some object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure, +to an extent proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives +in the object of his hatred. This was our first point. Again, +pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected +thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as the pleasure is greater or +less. If anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurably +affected, this conception (III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour +to persist; in other words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be +painfully affected. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and +without any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop. +xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to +himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like +manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary +circumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only. + +XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object +of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we +conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall feel +love towards him. + +>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as III. +xxii., which see. + +*****Note--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable +to 'envy,' which, accordingly, is nothing else but 'hatred, in so far +as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt, +and to grieve at another's advantage.' + +XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and +concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive +to affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. +Contrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, which +we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object. + +>>>>>Proof--That, which we conceive to affect an object +of our love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably +or painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as +far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us +pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Cor.), it endeavours +to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III. xiii.), it +endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affect +us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm concerning +ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever we +conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably. +Q.E.D. + +XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, +everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and, +contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything +which we conceive to affect it pleasurably. + +>>>>>Proof--This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the +foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi. + +*****Note--Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a +man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, +and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling +is called 'pride,' in reference to the man who thinks too highly +of himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams +with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things +that fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon +accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is +unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, +and determines his own power of action. 'Pride,' therefore, +is 'pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself.' +Again, the 'pleasure which arises from a man thinking too +highly of another' is called 'over-esteem.' Whereas the +'pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man' is +called 'disdain.' + +XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like +ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, +to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with +a like emotion (affectus). + +>>>>>Proof--The images of things are modifications of the +human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as +present to us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the +ideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, +the nature of the external bodies as present. If, therefore, +the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our +body, then the idea which we form of the external body will +involve a modification of our own body similar to the +modification of the external body. Consequently, if we +conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any +emotion, this conception will express a modification of our +body similar to that emotion. Thus, from the fact of +conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any +emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion. +If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, +to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, +emotion. Q.E.D. + +*****Note I--This imitation of emotions, when it is referred +to pain, is called "compassion" (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is +referred to desire, it is called "emulation," which is nothing +else but "the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact +that we conceive that others have the like desire." + +<<<<<Corollary I--If we conceive that anyone, whom we +have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects +something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love +towards him. If, on the other hand, we conceive that he +painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred +towards him. + +>>>>>Proof--This is proved from the last proposition in the +same manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi. + +<<<<<Corollary II--We cannot hate a thing which we pity, +because its misery affects us painfully. + +>>>>>Proof--If we could hate it for this reason, we should +rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis. + +<<<<<Corollary III--We seek to free from misery, as far as +we can, a thing which we pity. + +>>>>>Proof--That, which painfully affects the object of +our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing +proposition); therefore, we shall endeavour to recall +everything which removes its existence, or which destroys +it (cf. III. xiii.); in other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire +to destroy it, or we shall be determined for its destruction; +thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which +we pity. Q.E.D. + +*****Note II--This will or appetite for doing good, which +arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a +benefit, is called "benevolence," and is nothing else but "desire +arising from compassion." Concerning love or hate towards +him who has done good or harm to something, which we +conceive to be like ourselves, see III. xxii. note. + +XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we +conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to +remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly +repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain. + +>>>>>Proof--We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive +that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in +other words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far +as possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour +of the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and +simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's +power of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Cor. and II. xi. +Cor.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its +existence, in other words (which by III. ix., note, come to the +same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point. +Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed to +be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we hate, +is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall, therefore +(by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy the +same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may not +regard it as present; this was our second point. Wherefore +whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D. + +XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we +conceive men* to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we +shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink +from. + +[*N.B. By "men" in this and the following propositions, I +mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion.] + +>>>>>Proof--From the fact of imagining, that men love or +hate anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.). +That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure +or pain at the thing's presence. And so we shall endeavour to +do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure, +etc. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, +solely in order to please men, we call "ambition," especially +when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we +do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other +cases it is generally called "kindliness." Furthermore I give the +name of "praise" to the "pleasure, with which we conceive the +action of another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us"; +but of "blame" to the "pain wherewith we feel aversion to his +action." + +XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives +as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by +pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in +other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the +other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as +affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain. + +>>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that he affects others +with pleasure or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be +affected with pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. +xix. and xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications +whereby he is determined to action, it follows that he who +conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected +with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in +other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so +"mutatis mutandis" in the case of pain. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by +the idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied +by the idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in +question will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms +love and hatred are used in reference to external objects, we +will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion: +pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we will +style "Honour," and the emotion contrary thereto we will style +"Shame": I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain +arises from a man's belief, that he is being praised or blamed: +otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external +cause is called "self-complacency," and its contrary pain is +called "repentance." Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Cor.) +that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects +others, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III. +xxv.) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself +that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may +easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may +imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be +an annoyance to all. + +XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates +anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall +thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast +love, &c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks +from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations +of soul. + +>>>>>Proof--From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone +loves anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.): +but we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a +new cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; +hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again, +from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from +anything, we shall ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.). +If we assume that we at the same time love it, we shall then +simultaneously love it and shrink from it; in other words, we +shall be subject to vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D. + +<<<<<Corollary--From the foregoing, and also from III. +xxviii. it follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, +to cause others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what +he himself hates: as the poet* says: "As lover let us share every +hope and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love +what the other leaves."** +[* Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5] +[** Spinoza transposes the verses: "Speremus pariter, pariter +metuamus amantes; Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."] + +*****Note--This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes +and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition +(see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone by nature +desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should live according +to his own individual disposition: when such a desire is equally +present in all, everyone stands in everyone else's way, and in +wishing to be loved or praised by all, all become mutually hateful. + +XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something, +which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour to bring +it about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof. + +>>>>>Proof--From the mere fact of our conceiving that another +person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Cor.) we shall +ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein. But +we assumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented by +another's delight in its object; we shall, therefore, endeavour to +prevent his possession thereof (III. xxviii.). Q.E.D. + +*****Note--We thus see that man's nature is generally so +constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies +those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to +his own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see +that from the same property of human nature, whence it follows +that men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and +ambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall +find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more especially +if we turn our attention to the first years of our life. We find that +children, whose body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium, +laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying; +moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see +others doing, and to possess themselves of whatever they +conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the images of things +are, as we have said, modifications of the human body, or +modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by +external causes to act in this or that manner. + +XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour, +as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return. + +>>>>>Proof--That which we love we endeavour, as far as we +can, to conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.). If the +thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it +pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.). In other +words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about, +that the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied by +the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note), that it should love +us in return. Q.E.D. + +XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a +loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our +complacency. + +>>>>>Proof--We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to +bring about, that what we love should love us in return: in other +words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure +accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, in +proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected +because of us, our endeavour will be assisted. --that is (III. xi. +and note) the greater will be our pleasure. But when we take +pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something similar +to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. xxx); +therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a +loved object to be affected, &c. Q.E.D. + +XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins +itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself +has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the +loved object and with envy towards his rival. + +>>>>>Proof--In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved +object is well affected towards him, will be the strength of +his self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), +of his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, +as far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely +bound to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if +he thinks that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.). +But this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by +the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image +of him whom the loved object has joined to itself; therefore +(III. xi. note) he will for that reason be affected with pain, +accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in +conjunction with the image of his rival; that is, he will be +(III. xiii.) affected with hatred towards the loved object +and also towards his rival (III. xv. Cor.), which latter he +will envy as enjoying the beloved object. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--This hatred towards an object of love joined +with envy is called "Jealousy," which accordingly is nothing +else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined +love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who +is envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love will +be greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous +man had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of +the said object; and also in proportion to the feelings he had +previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him, +he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he +conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself +hates: and also because he is compelled to associate the image +of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. This +condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a +woman: for he who thinks, that a woman whom he loves +prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not only because +his own desire is restrained, but also because, being compelled +to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame +and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from her. + +We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved +with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives +him pain as a lover, as I will now show. + +XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken +delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as +when he first took delight therein. + +>>>>>Proof--Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction +with the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of +pleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it, in +conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other words, +he will desire to possess the object of his love under the same +circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D. + +<<<<<Corollary--A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the +aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing. + +>>>>>Proof--For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to +be missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence. +As he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or +circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he conceives +it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D. + +*****This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence of +the object of love, is called "Regret." + +XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or +love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater. + +>>>>>Proof--Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power +of activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes or +constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in his +own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said endeavour: +thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed +to removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain), in proportion +as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater +part of man's power of activity; therefore the greater the pain, +the greater the power of activity employed to remove it; that is, +the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to +remove it. Again, since pleasure (III. xi. note) increases or aids +a man's power of activity, it may easily be shown in like manner, +that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to +preserve it, and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitude +of the pleasure. + +Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain +and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite, +or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in +proportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D. + +XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so +that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, +regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and +his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love. + +>>>>>Proof--If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, +more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never +loved it. For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man +endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.); +he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and +by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is +greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the +endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his +affection (III. xxxiii.). Now these endeavours are constrained +by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Cor. and III. xxiii.); +wherefore the love (III. xi. note) will for this cause also be +affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love has +been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred, +there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object; +wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain, +or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved +it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love +was greater. Q.E.D. + +XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an +injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue +to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the +same law, seek to benefit him. + +>>>>>Proof--To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him +as a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour +to remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in +other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater thereby +--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying +out the injury, which he planned against the object of his hatred +--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury (III. xxviii.), +and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be greater +than his former endeavour to do injury, and will therefore prevail +over it, as we asserted. The second part of this proof proceeds +in the same manner. Wherefore he who hates another, etc. +Q.E.D. + +*****Note--By "good" I here mean every kind of pleasure, +and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our +longings, whatsoever they may be. By "evil," I mean every kind +of pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have +shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because we +deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because +we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink +from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions, +judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better, +what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a +miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of +money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as +glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man +nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing +more painful than another's success. So every man, according +to his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or +useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that +which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is +called "timidity," which may accordingly be defined as "the fear +whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as +future by encountering a lesser evil" (III. xxviii.). But if the evil +which he fears be shame, timidity becomes "bashfulness." +Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the +fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose, +fear becomes "consternation," especially if both the evils feared +be very great. + +XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and +believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate +that other in return. + +>>>>>Proof--He who conceives another as affected with +hatred, will thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. +xxvii.), that is, with pain, accompanied by the idea of an +external cause. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives no +cause for this pain except him who is his enemy; therefore, +from conceiving that he is hated by some one, he will be +affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of his enemy; +in other words, he will hate his enemy in return. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--He who thinks that he has given just cause for +hatred will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but +this case (III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred +may also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to +injure the object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who +conceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy +as the cause of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with +pain or fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; +in other words, he will be affected with hatred towards his +enemy, as I said above. + +<<<<<Corollary I--He who conceives, that one whom he loves +hates him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in +so far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is +determined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis, +he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to +conflicting hatred and love. + +<<<<<Corollary II--If a man conceives that one, whom he has +hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from +motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in +kind. + +>>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that another hates him, will +(by the last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) +will endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully; +he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.). +Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury +done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to repay +it in kind. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is +called "Anger;" the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to +ourselves is called "Revenge." + +XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and +believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love +that other in return. (Cf. XIII. xv. Cor., and III. xvi.) + +>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as +the preceding one. See also the note appended thereto. + +*****Note--If he believes that he has given just cause for the +love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is what +most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its contrary +took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by +another. (See note to preceding proposition.) This reciprocal +love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves +us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is called +"gratitude" or "thankfulness." It thus appears that men are much +more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits. + +<<<<<Corollary--He who imagines that he is loved by one +whom he hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. +This is proved in the same way as the first corollary of the +preceding proposition. + +*****Note--If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will +endeavour to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called +cruelty, especially if the victim be believed to have given no +ordinary cause for hatred. + +XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives +of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is +received without gratitude. + +>>>>>Proof--When a man loves something similar to himself, +he endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should +be loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.). Therefore he who has +conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which +he feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from the hope +of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will endeavour, +as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or to regard +it as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives +something else, which excludes the existence of the said cause +of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D. + +XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on +the other hand be destroyed by love. + +>>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that an object of his hatred +hates him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the +former hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.). But if, on +the other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, +he will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure, +and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion. +In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III. xli.), and +not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be +greater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises. +Therefore, if it be greater than that which arises from hatred, +and through which the man endeavours to affect painfully the +thing which he hates, it will get the better of it and banish the +hatred from his mind. Q.E.D. + +XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes +into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not +preceded it. + +>>>>>Proof--The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. +xxxviii. of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he +was wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of +loving feels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is added +the pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove +the pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the +idea of the former object of hatred as cause. + +*****Note--Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate +anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying +this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he should +be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor long +to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will always +endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as far as +he can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a man should +desire to hate someone, in order that he might love him the more +thereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For the strength of +love is in proportion to the strength of the hatred, wherefore the +man would desire, that the hatred be continually increased more +and more, and, for a similar reason, he would desire to become +more and more ill, in order that he might take a greater pleasure +in being restored to health: in such a case he would always +endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.) is absurd. + +XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates +anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that +person. + +>>>>>Proof--The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards +him who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that +anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as +affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain; consequently +he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the +hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he will hate him who +hates anything which he himself loves (III. xiii. note). Q.E.D. + +XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by +anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the +pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said +stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or +nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual +stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs. + +>>>>>Proof--This is evident from III. xvi. + +XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is +destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by +a certain pain in us. + +>>>>>Proof--This is evident from III. xxvii. For in so far as +we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain, +we ourselves feel pain. + +*****Note--This proposition can also be proved from the +Corollary to II. xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even +if it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and +the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far +as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined +to regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of the +thing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance +of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, +but is not destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so +far as the said determination is checked: for this reason the +joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, +every time we remember that object of hatred. For, as we +have said, when the image of the thing in question, is aroused, +inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it determines the +man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to +do, when it actually did exist. However, since he has joined +to the image of the thing other images, which exclude its +existence, this determination to pain is forthwith checked, and +the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place. +This is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and +delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped. +For when men conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, +and are determined to fear it; this determination is checked +afresh by the idea of freedom, which became associated with +the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom: +this renders them secure afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh. + +XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed, +if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the +latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause: and +will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have +been the sole cause of either emotion. + +>>>>>Proof--This Prop. is evident from the mere definition +of love and hatred (III. xiii. note). For pleasure is called love +towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply +in so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the +other. When this condition of causality is either wholly or partly +removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part +vanishes. Q.E.D. + +XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive +to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than +if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity. + +>>>>>Proof--A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. +vii.) be perceived through itself without anything else. If, therefore, +we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall therefore +(III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmost +love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion. But if the +thing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by +necessity, we shall then (by the same Def. vii. Part I.) conceive +it not as the sole cause, but as one of the causes of the emotion, +and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves +to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than +towards anything else: to this consideration we must add the +imitation of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii. + +L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or +fear. + +>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as +III. xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii. + +*****Note--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope +or fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such +omens are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions +of hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of +pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them +with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as +means towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as +obstacles, or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further, +from III. xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe +readily in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which +we fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above +or below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions, +whereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do not +think it worth while to point out here the vacillations springing +from hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these +emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear +without hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further, +in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love +or hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear +what we have said concerning love and hatred. + +LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, +and the same man may be differently affected at different times +by the same object. + +>>>>>Proof--The human body is affected by external bodies +in a variety of ways (II. Post. iii.). Two men may therefore be +differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i. +after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by one +and the same object. Further (by the same Post.) the human +body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another; +consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected +at different times by one and the same object. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--We thus see that it is possible, that what one man +loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may +not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he +once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. +Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, +what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it follows +that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions*, hence +when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely +by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, others +timid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call a +man "intrepid," if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to +fear; if I further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injure +his enemies and to benefit those whom he loves, he is not +restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, +I shall call him "daring." Again, a man will appear "timid" to me, +if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I +further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the +fear of an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say +that he is "cowardly;" and in like manner will everyone pass +judgment. +[*This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine +intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.] + +Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment, +inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions, +and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or +pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent, are often +purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded +to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that a man may be at +one time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain, +accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily +understand what are "Repentance" and "Self-complacency." +"Repentance" is "pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as +cause;" "Self-complacency" is "pleasure, accompanied by the +idea of one's self as cause," and these emotions are most intense +because men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.). + +LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with +others, and which we do not conceive to have any property that +is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long, +as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar +to itself. + +>>>>>Proof--As soon as we conceive an object which we have +seen in conjunction with others, we at once remember those +others (II. xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the +contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another +object. And this is the case with the object, which we conceive +to have no property that is not common to many. For we +thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which +we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects. +But when we suppose that we conceive an object something +special, which we have never seen before, we must needs say +that the mind, while regarding that object, has in itself nothing +which it can fall to regarding instead thereof; therefore it is +determined to the contemplation of that object only. Therefore +an object, &c. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--This mental modification, or imagination of a +particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called +"Wonder;" but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called +"Consternation," because wonder at an evil keeps a man so +engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no +power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the +evil. If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, +industry, or anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, +is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is +called "Veneration;" otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., +be what we wonder at, the emotion is called "Horror." Again, +if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love, +that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater +(III. xii.), and when joined to wonder or veneration is called +"Devotion." We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope, +confidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder; +and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than +those which have obtained names in ordinary speech. Whence +it is evident, that the names of the emotions have been applied +in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with +an accurate knowledge of their nature. + +To wonder is opposed "Contempt," which generally arises + from the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, +loving, or fearing something, or because something, at first sight, +appears to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, +fear, &c., we are, in consequence (III. xv. Cor. and III. xxvii.), +determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from the +presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, we +are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of +wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the +thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities which +are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on the other +hand, the presence of the object would cause it more particularly +to regard that which is therein. As devotion springs from wonder +at a thing which we love, so does "Derision" spring from contempt +of a thing which we hate or fear, and "Scorn" from contempt of +folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Lastly, we can +conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c., in association +with contempt, and can thence deduce other emotions, which are +not distinguished one from another by any recognized name. + +LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, +it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the +distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of +activity. + +>>>>>Proof--A man does not know himself except through the +modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and xxiii.). +When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is thereby +assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or (III. xi. note) to feel +pleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the +distinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own +power of activity. Q.E.D. + +<<<<<Corollary--This pleasure is fostered more and more, in +proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others. +For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more +he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied +by the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.) +himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea +of himself. Q.E.D. + +LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert +its power of activity. + +>>>>>Proof--The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual +essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind obviously +only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not that which it +neither is nor can do; therefore the mind endeavours to conceive +only such things as assert or affirm its power of activity. Q.E.D. + +LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain +thereat. + +>>>>>Proof--The essence of the mind only affirms that which +the mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to +conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last +Prop.). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own +weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting +to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is +checked in its endeavour -- in other words (III. xi. note), it feels +pain. Q.E.D. + +<<<<<Corollary--This pain is more and more fostered, if a man +conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the +same way as the corollary to III. liii. + +*****Note--This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own +weakness, is called "humility;" the pleasure, which springs from +the contemplation of ourselves, is called "self-love" or "self- +complacency." And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as +often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power +of activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own +exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, +and also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one +another. Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. +xxiv. note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings +of their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever +a man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure +(III. liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, +and he conceives them more distinctly -- that is (II. xl. note), +in proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and +regard them as something special. Therefore, a man will take +most pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates +some quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he +affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals +in general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the +contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall +short when compared with those of others. This pain (III. +xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong +construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as +he can, embellishing his own. + +It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and +envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For parents +are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur +of honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple to assent +to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's virtues, +and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such doubts, +I append the following corollary. + +<<<<<Corollary--No one envies the virtue of anyone who is +not his equal. + +>>>>>Proof--Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or +(III. xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby +a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is +checked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything, +which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a man +will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the same +thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to another's +nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot be checked, +nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some one +unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an one. But +he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same nature +as himself. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii., +we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude, +&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be +peculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, +no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, +or lions for being courageous. + +LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, +and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations +of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, +&c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. + +>>>>>Proof--Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions +compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or +passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive +(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so +far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is, we +are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we conceive, +or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by an emotion, +which involves the nature of our own body, and the nature of an +external body. Wherefore the nature of every passive state must +necessarily be so explained, that the nature of the object whereby +we are affected be expressed. Namely, the pleasure, which +arises from, say, the object A, involves the nature of that object +A, and the pleasure, which arises from the object B, involves +the nature of the object B; different, inasmuch as the causes +whence they arise are by nature different. So again the emotion +of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature different from +the pain arising from another object, and, similarly, in the case +of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation, &c. + +Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain, love, +hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are +affected. Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far +as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any +given modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore, according +as a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind +of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words, according +as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so will his desire +be of one kind or another, and the nature of one desire must +necessarily differ from the nature of another desire, as widely +as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose. Thus there +are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of pleasure, +pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown) there +are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects +whereby we are affected. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last +proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are "luxury," +"drunkenness," "lust," "avarice," and "ambition," being merely +species of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions +in a manner varying according to the object, with which they are +concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition, +&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking, +venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so +far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects +wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For +"temperance," "sobriety," and "chastity," which we are wont +to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions +or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which +moderates the last-named emotions. However, I cannot here +explain the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are +as numerous as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it +be necessary. It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to +determine the strength of the emotions, and the mind's power +over them, to have a general definition of each emotion. It is +sufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of the +emotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the quality +and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking +the emotions. Thus, though there is a great difference between +various emotions of love, hatred, or desire, for instance +between love felt towards children, and love felt towards a wife, +there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences, +or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions. + + LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion +of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the one +individual differs from the essence of the other. + +>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which +see after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.). Nevertheless, we will +prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions. + +All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, as +their definitions above given show. But desire is each man's +nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one individual +differs from desire in another individual, only in so far as the +nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence +of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive states or +passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to persist +in his being is increased or diminished, helped or hindered (III. +xi. and note). But by the endeavour to persist in its being, in +so far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction, we +mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note); therefore pleasure and +pain are identical with desire or appetite, in so far as by +external causes they are increased or diminished, helped or +hindered, in other words, they are every man's nature; wherefore +the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure +and pain felt by another man, only in so far as the nature or +essence of the one man differs from the essence of the other; +consequently, any emotion of one individual only differs, &c. +Q.E.D. + +*****Note--Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals +which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of mind +we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's emotions, +to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature. Horse +and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but +the desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human. +So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must +needs very according to the several natures. Thus, although each +individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to +him wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content +and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said +individual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from +the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs +from the essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing +proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy +which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a +philosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I +have treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as +he is passive. It remains to add a few words on those +attributable to him in so far as he is active. + +LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or +passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and +desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active. + +>>>>>Proof--When the mind conceives itself and its power +of activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind necessarily +contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea +(II. xliii). But the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas +(II. xl. note ii.). Therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it is active +(III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and +distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours +to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such an endeavour +we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.); therefore, +desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand, +or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D. + +LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, +there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire. + +>>>>>Proof--All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, +or pain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain +we mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or +checked (III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind +feels pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is +diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions +can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but +only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.) +are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D. + +*****Note--All actions following from emotion, which are +attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set +down to "strength of character" ("fortitudo"), which I divide +into "courage" ("animositas") and "highmindedness" +("generositas"). By "courage" I mean "the desire whereby +every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance +solely with the dictates of reason." By "highmindedness" I +mean "the desire whereby every man endeavours, solely +under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite +them to himself in friendship." Those actions, therefore, +which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set +down to courage, those which aim at the good of others I +set down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, +and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; +courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness. + +I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their primary +causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, which +arise from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit, +desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I have said, +that we are in many ways driven about by external causes, and +that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to +and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I have said, +that I have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions, not all +that might be given. For, by proceeding in the same way as +above, we can easily show that love is united to repentance, +scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from what has +been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with +another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise +therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However, +for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most +important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be +more curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning +love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a +thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment, +acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another +way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind +begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, +when we conceive something which generally delights us with +its flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we +are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is +otherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus +otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present +be stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to +eat it be stimulated also, the new disposition of the body +will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently +the presence of the food which we formerly longed for will +become odious. This revulsion of feeling is called "satiety" +or weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward +modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, +for instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., +for these are attributable to the body only, without any +reference to the mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions +require to be supplemented in a few points; I will therefore +repeat them, interpolating such observations as I think should +here and there be added. + + +DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS + +I. "Desire" is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, +as determined to a particular activity by some given modification +of itself. + +^^^^^Explanation--We have said above, in the note to +Prop. ix. of this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness +thereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far +as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own +persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that, +strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite +and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite +or not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order +to avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from +explaining desire by appetite; but I have taken care to define +it in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all +those endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by +the terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, +have said, that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is +conceived as determined to a particular activity; but from +such a definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the +mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, +in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it was +necessary to add, "in so far as it is determined by some given +modification," &c. For, by a modification of man's essence, +we understand every disposition of the said essence, whether +such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely +under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute +of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously +to both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here +mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions, +which vary according to each man's disposition, and are, +therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according +as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not +where to turn. + +II. "Pleasure" is the transition of a man from a less to a greater +perfection. + +III. "Pain" is the transition of a man from a greater to a less +perfection. + +^^^^^Explanation--I say transition: for pleasure is not +perfection itself. For, if man were born with the perfection +to which he passes, he would possess the same, without the +emotion of pleasure. This appears more clearly from the +consideration of the contrary emotion, pain. No one can +deny, that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection, +and not in the less perfection itself: for a man cannot be +pained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree. +Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a +greater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the +emotion of pain is an activity; wherefore this activity can +only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less +perfection--in other words, it is an activity whereby a man's +power of action is lessened or constrained (cf. III. xi. note). +I pass over the definitions of merriment, stimulation, melancholy, +and grief, because these terms are generally used in reference +to the body, and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain. + +IV. "Wonder" is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, +wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular +concept in question has no connection with other concepts +(cf. III. lii. and note). + +^^^^^Explanation--In the note to II. xviii. we showed the +reason, why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, +straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, +because the images of the two things are so associated and +arranged, that one follows the other. This state of association +is impossible, if the image of the thing be new; the mind will +then be at a stand in the contemplation thereof, until it is +determined by other causes to think of something else. + +Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, +is of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not +include wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I +should so include it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind +arises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from +other objects, but merely from the absence of a cause, +which should determine the mind to pass from the +contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another. + +I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions +(as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure, pain, and +desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is customary +to speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive +ones by different names, when they are referred to the objects +of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a definition +of contempt. + +V. "Contempt" is the conception of anything which touches +the mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine +those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it +(cf. III. lii. note). + +The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for +I am not aware that any emotions are named after them. + +VI. "Love" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external +cause. + +^^^^^Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly +the essence of love; the definition given by those authors who +say that love is "the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved +object" expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and, +as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence, +they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its +properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted +to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I +say that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to +unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by +"wish" consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind +(for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither +do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when +it is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; +for love can be conceived without either of these desires; but +by "wish" I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on +account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the +pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained. + +VII. "Hatred" is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external +cause. + +^^^^^Explanation--These observations are easily grasped +after what has been said in the explanation of the preceding +definition (cf. also III. xiii. note). + +VIII. "Inclination" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of +something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure. + +IX. "Aversion" is pain, accompanied by the idea of something +which is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note). + +X. "Devotion" is love towards one whom we admire. + +^^^^^Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have +shown, III. lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it +happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived +by us, we shall cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the +emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love. + +XI. "Derision" is pleasure arising from our conceiving the +presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which +we hate. + +^^^^^Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we +hate, we deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that +extent rejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hates +that which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question +is not without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note). + +XII. "Hope" is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea +of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent +doubt the issue. + +XIII. "Fear" is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of +something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent +doubt the issue (cf. III. xviii. note). + +^^^^^Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that +there is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled +with hope. For he, who depends on hope and doubts +concerning the issue of anything, is assumed to conceive +something, which excludes the existence of the said thing +in the future; therefore he, to this extent, feels pain (cf. III. +xix.); consequently, while dependent on hope, he fears +for the issue. Contrariwise he, who fears, in other words +doubts, concerning the issue of something which he hates, +also conceives something which excludes the existence of +the thing in question; to this extent he feels pleasure, and +consequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as +he desires (III. xx.). + +XIV. "Confidence" is pleasure arising from the idea of +something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has +been removed. + +XV. "Despair" is pain arising from the idea of something past +or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed. + +^^^^^Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and +despair from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue +of an event has been removed: this comes to pass, because +man conceives something past or future as present and +regards it as such, or else because he conceives other things, +which exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt. For, +although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue +of any particular event (II. xxxi. Cor.), it may nevertheless +happen that we feel no doubt concerning it. For we have +shown, that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the +same as to be quite certain of it (II. xlix. note). Thus it +may happen that we are affected by the same emotion +of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future, as +concerning the conception of a thing present; this I have +already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I refer +the reader. + +XVI. "Joy" is pleasure accompanied by the idea of +something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope. + +XVII. "Disappointment" is pain accompanied by the idea +of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our +hope. + +XVIII. "Pity" is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which +has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like +ourselves (cf. III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note). + +^^^^^Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) +there seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former +term is used in reference to a particular action, and the latter +in reference to a disposition. + +XIX. "Approval" is love towards one who has done good to +another. + +XX. "Indignation" is hatred towards one who has done evil to +another. + +^^^^^Explanation--I am aware that these terms are employed +in senses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But +my purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the +nature of things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may +convey my meaning without any violent departure from their +ordinary signification. One statement of my method will suffice. +As for the cause of the above-named emotions see III. xxvii. +Cor. i., and III. xxii. note. + +XXI. "Partiality" is thinking too highly of anyone because of +the love we bear him. + +^^^^^Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and +disparagement an effect of hatred: so that "partiality" may +also be defined as "love, in so far as it induces a man to +think too highly of a beloved object." Contrariwise, +"disparagement" may be defined as "hatred, in so far as +it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object." +Cf. III. xxvi. note. + +XXIII. "Envy" is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be +pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's +evil fortune. + +^^^^^Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, +which, by doing some violence to the meaning of the word, +may therefore be thus defined: + +XXIV. "Sympathy" (misericordia) is love, in so far as it +induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, +and pain at another's evil fortune. + +^^^^^Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to II. +xxiv. and xxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasure +or pain accompanied by the idea of something external, as +cause either in itself or accidentally. I now pass on to other +emotions, which are accompanied by the idea of something +within as a cause. + +XXV. "Self-approval" is pleasure arising from a man's +contemplation of himself and his own power of action. + +XXVI. "Humility" is pain arising from a man's contemplation +of his own weakness of body or mind. + +^^^^^Explanation--Self-complacency is opposed to +humility, in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from +a contemplation of our own power of action; but, in so far +as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of +any action which we believe we have performed by the free +decision of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we +may thus define: + +XXVII. "Repentance" is pain accompanied by the idea of +some action, which we believe we have performed by the +free decision of our mind. + +^^^^^Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have +set forth in III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note. +Concerning the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note. +This is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is +nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly +called "wrong," are followed by pain, and all those, which are +called "right," are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather +from what has been said, that this depends in great measure +on education. Parents, by reprobating the former class of +actions, and by frequently chiding their children because of +them, and also by persuading to and praising the latter class, +have brought it about, that the former should be associated +with pain and the latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by +experience. For custom and religion are not the same +among all men, but that which some consider sacred others +consider profane, and what some consider honourable others +consider disgraceful. According as each man has been +educated, he feels repentance for a given action or glories +therein. + +XXVIII. "Pride" is thinking too highly of one's self from +self-love. + +^^^^^Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality, +for the latter term is used in reference to an external object, +but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself. +However, as partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the +effect or property of "self-love," which may therefore be +thus defined, "love of self or self-approval, in so far as it +leads a man to think too highly of himself." To this emotion +there is no contrary. For no one thinks too meanly of +himself because of self-hatred; I say that no one thinks too +meanly of himself, in so far as he conceives that he is +incapable of doing this or that. For whatsoever a man +imagines that he is incapable of doing, he imagines this of +necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that he +really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do. +For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long +is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is +it impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider +such matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it +conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself; +for it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding his +own weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all +men, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less +than of despising him. Again, a man may think too meanly +of himself, if he deny of himself in the present something +in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain. As, +for instance, if he should say that he is unable to form any +clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do nothing but +what is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a man +thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive +fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals, +venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride +an emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as from +self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs +self-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define: + +XXIX. "Self-abasement" is thinking too meanly of one's +self by reason of pain. + +^^^^^Explanation--We are nevertheless generally +accustomed to oppose pride to humility, but in that case +we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than +to its nature. We are wont to call "proud" the man who +boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who talks of nothing but +his own virtues and other people's faults, who wishes to +be first; and lastly who goes through life with a style and +pomp suitable to those far above him in station. On the +other hand, we call "humble" the man who too often blushes, +who confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, +and who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of +his attire. However, these emotions, humility and +self-abasement, are extremely rare. For human nature, +considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can +(see III. xiii., liv.); hence those, who are believed to be +most self-abased and humble, are generally in reality the +most ambitious and envious. + +XXX. "Honour" (gloria) is pleasure accompanied by the +idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be +praised by others. + +XXXI. "Shame" is pain accompanied by the idea of +some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed +by others. + +^^^^^Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. xxx. +But we should here remark the difference which exists +between shame and modesty. Shame is the pain following +the deed whereof we are ashamed. Modesty is the fear or +dread of shame, which restrains a man from committing a +base action. Modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness, +but the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show; however, +the names of the emotions (as I have remarked already) +have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature. + +I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions +arising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to +treat of those which I refer to desire. + +XXXII. "Regret" is the desire or appetite to possess +something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, +and at the same time constrained by the remembrance +of other things which exclude the existence of it. + +^^^^^Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are +by that very fact, as I have already said more than once, +disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it +were something present; but this disposition or endeavour, +while we are awake, is generally checked by the images +of things which exclude the existence of that which we +remember. Thus when we remember something which +affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that very fact +endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure +as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once +checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the +existence of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, +strictly speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, +which arises from the absence of something we hate (cf. +III. xlvii. note). But, as the name regret seems to refer +to desire, I set this emotion down, among the emotions +springing from desire. + +XXXIII. "Emulation" is the desire of something, engendered +in us by our conception that others have the same desire. + +^^^^^Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees +others running away, or he who fears, because he sees +others in fear; or again, he who, on seeing that another man +has burnt his hand, draws towards him his own hand, and +moves his body as though his own were burnt; such an one +can be said to imitate another's emotion, but not to emulate +him; not because the causes of emulation and imitation are +different, but because it has become customary to speak +of emulation only in him, who imitates that which we deem +to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the cause of +emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why this +emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from +III. xxxii. and note. + +XXXIV. "Thankfulness" or "Gratitude" is the desire or +zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit +him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit +on us. Cf. III. xxxix. note and xl. + +XXXV. "Benevolence" is the desire of benefiting one whom +we pity. Cf. III. xxvii. note. + +XXXVI. "Anger" is the desire, whereby through hatred we +are induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix. + +XXXVII. "Revenge" is the desire whereby we are induced, +through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar +feelings, has injured us. (See III. xl. Cor. ii. and note.) + +XXXVIII. "Cruelty" or "savageness" is the desire, whereby +a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity. + +^^^^^Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which +is not a passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man +restrains his anger and revenge. + +XXXIX. "Timidity" is the desire to avoid a greater evil, +which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix. +note. + +XL. "Daring" is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do +something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt. + +XLI. "Cowardice" is attributed to one, whose desire is +checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare +to encounter. + +^^^^^Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else +but the fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to +fear; hence I do not reckon it among the emotions springing +from desire. Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it +here, because, in so far as we look to the desire, it is truly +opposed to the emotion of daring. + +XLII. "Consternation" is attributed to one, whose desire of +avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he +fears. + +^^^^^Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species +of cowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from +a double fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a +fear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering, that +he is not able to remove the evil. I say bewildered, in so +far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be +constrained by his amazement. I say wavering, in so far +as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the +fear of another evil, which equally torments him: whence +it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may avert +of the two. On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and III. +lii. note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li. +note. + +XLIII. "Courtesy," or "deference" (Humanitas seu +modestia), is the desire of acting in a way that should +please men, and refraining from that which should +displease them. + +XLIV. "Ambition" is the immoderate desire of power. + +^^^^^Explanation--Ambition is the desire, whereby all the +emotions (cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and +strengthened; therefore this emotion can with difficulty be +overcome. For, so long as a man is bound by any desire, +he is at the same time necessarily bound by this. "The best +men," says Cicero, "are especially led by honour. Even +philosophers, when they write a book contemning honour, +sign their names thereto," and so on. + +XLV. "Luxury" is excessive desire, or even love of living +sumptuously. + +XLVI. "Intemperance" is the excessive desire and love +of drinking. + +XLVII. "Avarice" is the excessive desire and love of riches. + +XLVIII. "Lust" is desire and love in the matter of sexual +intercourse. + +^^^^^Explanation--Whether this desire be excessive or +not, it is still called lust. These last five emotions (as I have +shown in III. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference is a +species of ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note. + +Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety, +and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the +mind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an +ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating, +drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear +are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. +For an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with +food and drink at another man's expense. An ambitious +man will restrain himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his +indulgences are secret; and if he lives among drunkards +and debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of being +ambitious, be more prone to those vices. Lastly, a timid +man does that which he would not. For though an +avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death, +cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain +avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because +he cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of +abstention, cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are +not so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., +as with the appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, +can be opposed to these emotions, but high-mindedness +and valour, whereof I will speak presently. + +The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind +I pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the +compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, +because many of them have no distinctive names, which +shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have +merely a general knowledge of them. However, it is +established from the definitions of the emotions, which we +have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or +pain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three; +wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names +in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens. +If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions, +and to what has been said concerning the nature of the +mind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so +far as they are referred to the mind only. + + +GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS + +Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a +confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its +body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi +vis) greater or less than before, and by the presence of +which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather +than another. + +^^^^^Explanation--I say, first, that emotion or passion +of the soul is "a confused idea." For we have shown that +the mind is only passive, in so far as it has inadequate or +confused ideas. (III. iii.) I say, further, "whereby the mind +affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for +existence greater than before." For all the ideas of bodies, +which we possess, denote rather the actual disposition of +our own body (II. xvi. Cor. ii.) than the nature of an +external body. But the idea which constitutes the reality +of an emotion must denote or express the disposition of +the body, or of some part thereof, because its power of +action or force for existence is increased or diminished, +helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when I +say "a greater or less force for existence than before," I +do not mean that the mind compares the present with +the past disposition of the body, but that the idea which +constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of +the body, which, in fact, involves more or less of reality +than before. + +And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact +(II. xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own +body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the +very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to +greater or less perfection, when it happens to affirm +concerning its own body, or any part thereof, something +involving more or less reality than before. + +When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind +is increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind +had formed of its own body, or of some part thereof, an +idea involving more or less of reality, than it had already +affirmed concerning its own body. For the excellence of +ideas, and the actual power of thinking are measured by +the excellence of the object. Lastly, I have added "by the +presence of which the mind is determined to think of one +thing rather than another," so that, besides the nature of +pleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition +explains, I might also express the nature of desire. + + + + + + +END OF PART III + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Ethics [Part III], by Benedict de Spinoza + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ETHICS [PART III] *** + +***** This file should be named 948.txt or 948.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/9/4/948/ + +Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer. + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at + www.gutenberg.org/license. + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 +North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email +contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the +Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |