diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | .gitattributes | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 132-0.txt | 6761 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 132-h/132-h.htm | 8456 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | LICENSE.txt | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/132-0.txt | 6767 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/132-h/132-h.htm | 8456 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/old/132.txt | 6982 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/old/132.zip | bin | 0 -> 130802 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/old/2012-01-14_132.zip | bin | 0 -> 130802 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-0.txt | 7140 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-0.zip | bin | 0 -> 130415 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-h.zip | bin | 0 -> 133962 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-h/132-h.htm | 8916 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/old/suntx10.txt | 1941 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/old/sunzu10.txt | 6806 |
16 files changed, 62241 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/132-0.txt b/132-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd840c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/132-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6761 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 *** +Sun Tzŭ +on +The Art of War + +THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD +Translated from the Chinese with Introduction and Critical Notes + +BY +LIONEL GILES, M.A. + +Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. +in the British Museum + + + + +1910 + + + +To my brother +Captain Valentine Giles, R.G. +in the hope that +a work 2400 years old +may yet contain lessons worth consideration +by the soldier of today +this translation +is affectionately dedicated. + + + +Contents + + + Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext + Preface by Lionel Giles + INTRODUCTION + Sun Wu and his Book + The Text of Sun Tzŭ + The Commentators + Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ + Apologies for War + Bibliography + Chapter I. Laying plans + Chapter II. Waging War + Chapter III. Attack by Stratagem + Chapter IV. Tactical Dispositions + Chapter V. Energy + Chapter VI. Weak Points and Strong + Chapter VII Manœuvring + Chapter VIII. Variation of Tactics + Chapter IX. The Army on the March + Chapter X. Terrain + Chapter XI. The Nine Situations + Chapter XII. The Attack by Fire + Chapter XIII. The Use of Spies + + + +Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext + +When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_, the +work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to Europe began +in 1782 when a French Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph Amiot, +acquired a copy of it, and translated it into French. It was not a good +translation because, according to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great +deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, and very little indeed of what he +did." + +The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by +Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words +of Dr. Giles, "excessively bad." He goes further in this criticism: "It +is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which none can +hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages were +willfully distorted or slurred over. Such offenses are less pardonable. +They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Latin or Greek classic, +and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in +translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt. Calthrop’s +translation was published in London. It was an improvement on the +first—omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected—but new +errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his +translation, wrote: "It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate +of my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a +better fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I +could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors." + +Clearly, Dr. Giles’ work established much of the groundwork for the +work of later translators who published their own editions. Of the +later editions of the _Art of War_ I have examined; two feature Giles’ +edited translation and notes, the other two present the same basic +information from the ancient Chinese commentators found in the Giles +edition. Of these four, Giles’ 1910 edition is the most scholarly and +presents the reader an incredible amount of information concerning Sun +Tzŭ’s text, much more than any other translation. + +The Giles’ edition of the _Art of War_, as stated above, was a +scholarly work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time and an +assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts +in the British Museum. Apparently he wanted to produce a definitive +edition, superior to anything else that existed and perhaps something +that would become a standard translation. It was the best translation +available for 50 years. But apparently there was not much interest in +Sun Tzŭ in English-speaking countries since it took the start of the +Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several people +published unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzŭ. In 1944, Dr. +Giles’ translation was edited and published in the United States in a +series of military science books. But it wasn’t until 1963 that a good +English translation (by Samuel B. Griffith and still in print) was +published that was an equal to Giles’ translation. While this +translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles’ translation, it lacks his +copious notes that make his so interesting. + +Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the +Chinese civilization and language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun +Tzŭ, the English translation, and voluminous notes along with numerous +footnotes. Unfortunately, some of his notes and footnotes contain +Chinese characters; some are completely Chinese. Thus, a conversion to +a Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the conversion in complete +ignorance of Chinese (except for what I learned while doing the +conversion). Thus, I faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it while +retaining as much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase +represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the +text as possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, +I was able to transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the +risk of making the text more obscure. However, the text, on the whole, +is quite satisfactory for the casual reader, a transformation made +possible by conversion to an etext. However, I come away from this task +with the feeling of loss because I know that someone with a background +in Chinese can do a better job than I did; any such attempt would be +welcomed. + +Bob Sutton + + + +Preface by Lionel Giles + +The seventh volume of _Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, +les arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois_ is devoted to the +Art of War, and contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles +de Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph +Amiot. Père Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a +sinologue in his day, and the field of his labours was certainly +extensive. But his so-called translation of the Sun Tzŭ, if placed side +by side with the original, is seen at once to be little better than an +imposture. It contains a great deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, and +very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair specimen, taken from +the opening sentences of chapter 5:— + +_De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes._ Sun-tse dit : Ayez +les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que subalternes; +inscrivez-les dans un catalogue à part, avec la note des talents & de +la capacité de chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage +lorsque l’occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que +vous devez commander soient persuadés que votre principale attention +est de les préserver de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez +avancer contre l’ennemi doivent être comme des pierres que vous +lanceriez contre des œufs. De vous à l’ennemi il ne doit y avoir +d’autre différence que celle du fort au faible, du vide au plein. +Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret. Voilà en peu de +mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute la perfection même du +gouvernement des troupes. + + +Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development in +the study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun +Tzŭ, although his work was known to be highly valued in China as by far +the oldest and best compendium of military science. It was not until +the year 1905 that the first English translation, by Capt. E.F. +Calthrop. R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under the title “Sonshi”(the +Japanese form of Sun Tzŭ). Unfortunately, it was evident that the +translator’s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty to fit him to +grapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzŭ. He himself plainly +acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the +accompanying translation would have been impossible.” We can only +wonder, then, that with their help it should have been so excessively +bad. It is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which none +can hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages +were wilfully distorted or slurred over. Such offences are less +pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Greek or +Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted +upon in translations from Chinese. + +From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present +translation is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate +of my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a +better fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I +could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors. Towards +the end of 1908, a new and revised edition of Capt. Calthrop’s +translation was published in London, this time, however, without any +allusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three chapters were +then already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms of Capt. +Calthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to his +earlier edition. This is on the whole an improvement on the other, +thought there still remains much that cannot pass muster. Some of the +grosser blunders have been rectified and lacunae filled up, but on the +other hand a certain number of new mistakes appear. The very first +sentence of the introduction is startlingly inaccurate; and later on, +while mention is made of “an army of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzŭ +(who are these, by the way?), not a word is vouchsafed about the +Chinese commentators, who nevertheless, I venture to assert, form a +much more numerous and infinitely more important “army.” + +A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In the +first place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in +order to facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of students +generally. The division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen’s +edition; but I have sometimes found it desirable to join two or more of +his paragraphs into one. In quoting from other works, Chinese writers +seldom give more than the bare title by way of reference, and the task +of research is apt to be seriously hampered in consequence. With a view +to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzŭ is concerned, I have +also appended a complete concordance of Chinese characters, following +in this the admirable example of Legge, though an alphabetical +arrangement has been preferred to the distribution under radicals which +he adopted. Another feature borrowed from “The Chinese Classics” is the +printing of text, translation and notes on the same page; the notes, +however, are inserted, according to the Chinese method, immediately +after the passages to which they refer. From the mass of native +commentary my aim has been to extract the cream only, adding the +Chinese text here and there when it seemed to present points of +literary interest. Though constituting in itself an important branch of +Chinese literature, very little commentary of this kind has hitherto +been made directly accessible by translation. + +I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my sheets as +they were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a final +revision. On a review of the whole, without modifying the substance of +my criticisms, I might have been inclined in a few instances to temper +their asperity. Having chosen to wield a bludgeon, however, I shall not +cry out if in return I am visited with more than a rap over the +knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to put a sword into the +hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either text or +reference for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from +the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere translations,” would +not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome. For, after all, the worst +fate I shall have to dread is that which befell the ingenious paradoxes +of George in _The Vicar of Wakefield_. + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Sun Wu and his Book + +Ssu-ma Ch’ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzŭ: [1] + + +Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch’i State. His _Art of War_ brought him +to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him: + +"I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of +managing soldiers to a slight test?" + +Sun Tzŭ replied: "You may." + +Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" + +The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to +bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ divided them into two +companies, and placed one of the King’s favourite concubines at the head +of each. He then bade them all take spears in their hands, and +addressed them thus: "I presume you know the difference between front +and back, right hand and left hand?" + +The girls replied: Yes. + +Sun Tzŭ went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight +ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. +When I say "Right turn," you must face towards your right hand. When I +say "About turn," you must face right round towards your back." + +Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus +explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the +drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But +the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzŭ said: "If words of command +are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, +then the general is to blame." + +So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left +turn," whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun +Tzŭ: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not +thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders _are_ +clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of +their officers." + +So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. +Now the king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised +pavilion; and when he saw that his favourite concubines were about to be +executed, he was greatly alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following +message: "We are now quite satisfied as to our general’s ability to +handle troops. If we are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and +drink will lose their savor. It is our wish that they shall not be +beheaded." + +Sun Tzŭ replied: "Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be +the general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty +which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept." + +Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed +the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been +done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went +through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, +marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect +accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ +sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your soldiers, Sire, are now +properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your majesty’s +inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire; +bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey." + +But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to +camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops." + +Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot +translate them into deeds." + +After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was one who knew how to handle an +army, and finally appointed him general. In the west, he defeated the +Ch’u State and forced his way into Ying, the capital; to the north he +put fear into the States of Ch’i and Chin, and spread his fame abroad +amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzŭ shared in the might of the +King. + +About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has to tell us in +this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, +Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death, +and also the outstanding military genius of his time. The historian +speaks of him too as Sun Tzŭ, and in his preface we read: "Sun Tzŭ had +his feet cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It +seems likely, then, that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his +mutilation, unless the story was invented in order to account for the +name. The crowning incident of his career, the crushing defeat of his +treacherous rival P’ang Chuan, will be found briefly related in Chapter +V. § 19, note. + +To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in two other passages +of the _Shih Chi:_— + +In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the +field with Tzŭ-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P’ei, and attacked Ch’u. He +captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince’s sons who had +formerly been generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying +[the capital]; but the general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It +is not yet possible. We must wait"…. [After further successful +fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu addressed Wu +Tzŭ-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared that it was not yet +possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The two men +replied: "Ch’u’s general Tzŭ-ch’ang, [4] is grasping and covetous, and +the princes of T’ang and Ts’ai both have a grudge against him. If Your +Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win over T’ang +and Ts’ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed this advice, [beat +Ch’u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying.] [5] + + +This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He +does not appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects +of a wound in 496. In another chapter there occurs this passage:[6] + +From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the +other: Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] +in the service of Ch’i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men +developed and threw light upon the principles of war. + + +It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch’ien at least had no doubt about the +reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, +to be noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on +the period in question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say +much of such a work as the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu_, which is supposed to +have been written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution +is somewhat doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would +be of little value, based as it is on the _Shih Chi_ and expanded with +romantic details. The story of Sun Tzŭ will be found, for what it is +worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth noting are: (1) +Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzŭ-hsu. (2) He is called +a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired life, and his +contemporaries were unaware of his ability. + +The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzŭ: "When sovereign and +ministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ +to encounter the foe." Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto +no doubt has been cast upon it), we have here the earliest direct +reference for Sun Tzŭ, for Huai-nan Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many years +before the _Shih Chi_ was given to the world. + +Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzŭ at the head of +30,000 men beat Ch’u with 200,000 is that the latter were +undisciplined." + +Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun +Wu’s grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch’i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father +Sun P’ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch’i, and Sun Wu himself, +whose style was Ch’ang-ch’ing, fled to Wu on account of the rebellion +which was being fomented by the kindred of T’ien Pao. He had three +sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. +According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, +considering that Sun Pin’s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may +be dismissed as chronologically impossible. Whence these data were +obtained by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course no reliance +whatever can be placed in them. + +An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han +period is the short preface written by the Great Ts’ao Ts’ao, or Wei Wu +Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in full:— + + +I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage. +[10] The _Lun Yu_ says: “There must be a sufficiency of military +strength.” The _Shu Ching_ mentions "the army" among the "eight objects +of government." The _I Ching_ says: "‘army’ indicates firmness and +justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune." The _Shih +Ching_ says: "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his +troops." The Yellow Emperor, T’ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used +spears and battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The _Ssu-ma +Fa_ says: "If one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may +rightfully be slain." He who relies solely on warlike measures shall be +exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish. +Instances of this are Fu Ch’ai [11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the +other. [12] In military matters, the Sage’s rule is normally to keep +the peace, and to move his forces only when occasion requires. He will +not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. + +Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work +composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzŭ was a +native of the Ch’i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the _Art +of War_ in 13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were +tested on women, and he was subsequently made a general. He led an army +westwards, crushed the Ch’u state and entered Ying the capital. In the +north, he kept Ch’i and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his +time, Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment +of deliberation and planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the +field, [14] clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun Tzŭ +stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries, +however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and +while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work +abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive +which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. + +One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the +13 chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported +by the internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some +ruler is addressed. + +In the bibliographic section of the _Han Shu_, there is an entry which +has given rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 +_p’ien_ (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 _chuan_." It is evident that +this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch’ien, or those +we possess today. Chang Shou-chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s +_Art of War_ of which the "13 chapters" formed the first _chuan_, +adding that there were two other _chuan_ besides. This has brought +forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other +writings of Sun Tzŭ—we should call them apocryphal—similar to the _Wen +Ta_, of which a specimen dealing with the Nine Situations [15] is +preserved in the _T’ung Tien_, and another in Ho Shin’s commentary. It +is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzŭ had only +written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of exegesis in +the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pi +I-hsun, the author of the _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, backs this up with a +quotation from the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu:_ "The King of Wu summoned Sun +Tzŭ, and asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set +forth a chapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to +praise him." As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the +same scale as in the above-mentioned fragments, the total number of +chapters could not fail to be considerable. Then the numerous other +treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ might be included. The fact that the +_Han Chih_ mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82 _p’ien_, whereas +the Sui and T’ang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition +to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that all of +these were contained in the 82 _p’ien_. Without pinning our faith to +the accuracy of details supplied by the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu_, or +admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, +we may see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between +Ssu-ma Ch’ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop +of forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzŭ, and the +82 _p’ien_ may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped +together with the original work. It is also possible, though less +likely, that some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian +and were purposely ignored by him. [16] + +Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu +Ti strung together Sun Wu’s _Art of War_," which in turn may have +resulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of Ts’ao King’s +preface. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of +saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote +a commentary on it. On the whole, this theory has met with very little +acceptance. Thus, the _Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu_ says: "The mention of the 13 +chapters in the _Shih Chi_ shows that they were in existence before the +_Han Chih_, and that latter accretions are not to be considered part of +the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can certainly not be taken as +proof." + +There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in +the time of Ssu-ma Ch’ien practically as we have them now. That the +work was then well known he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzŭ’s _13 +Chapters_ and Wu Ch’i’s _Art of War_ are the two books that people +commonly refer to on the subject of military matters. Both of them are +widely distributed, so I will not discuss them here." But as we go +further back, serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact +which has to be faced is that the _Tso Chuan_, the greatest +contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as a +general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward +circumstance, that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the +story of Sun Wu as given in the _Shih Chi_, but even show themselves +frankly skeptical as to the existence of the man at all. The most +powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in the +following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17]— + + +It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native of the +Ch’i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he +crushed Ch’u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso’s +Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s Commentary +need not contain absolutely everything that other histories contain. +But Tso has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling +ruffians such as Ying K’ao-shu, [18] Ts’ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and +Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements +were so brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again, details +are given, in their due order, about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the +Minister P’ei. [21] Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been +passed over? + +In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same school +as _Kuan Tzŭ_, [22] _Liu T’ao_, [23] and the _Yüeh Yu_ [24] and may +have been the production of some private scholar living towards the end +of the "Spring and Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" +period. [25] The story that his precepts were actually applied by the +Wu State, is merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his +followers. + +From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time +of the "Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as +well, and the class of professional generals, for conducting external +campaigns, did not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six +States" [27] that this custom changed. Now although Wu was an +uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso should have left +unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet held no +civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu [28] and Sun +Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing +pundits. The story of Ho Lu’s experiment on the women, in particular, +is utterly preposterous and incredible. + +Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch’ien as having said that Sun Wu +crushed Ch’u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the +impression left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in +these exploits. The fact may or may not be significant; but it is +nowhere explicitly stated in the _Shih Chi_ either that Sun Tzŭ was +general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went +there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po P’ei both took +part in the expedition, and also that its success was largely due to +the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it is not +easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent +part in the same campaign. + +Ch’en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:— + +Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the +fact that he does not appear in the _Tso Chuan_, although he is said to +have served under Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he +really belonged to. + + +He also says:— + +The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch’i may be of genuine antiquity. + + +It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch’en Chen-sun, while +rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s +history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the +work which passes under his name. The author of the _Hsu Lu_ fails to +appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on +Ch’en Chen-sun really misses its mark. He makes one of two points, +however, which certainly tell in favour of the high antiquity of our "13 +chapters." "Sun Tzŭ," he says, "must have lived in the age of Ching +Wang [519-476], because he is frequently plagiarized in subsequent +works of the Chou, Ch’in and Han dynasties." The two most shameless +offenders in this respect are Wu Ch’i and Huai-nan Tzŭ, both of them +important historical personages in their day. The former lived only a +century after the alleged date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is known to +have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, +that Tseng Shen delivered the _Tso Chuan_, which had been entrusted to +him by its author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the _Art of +War_, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of +different epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all,—in +other words, that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards +the end of the 5th century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzŭ’s antiquity is +furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a +number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps be +extended, is given in the _Hsu Lu;_ and though some of the +interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected +thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar +and critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the +13 chapters to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing +that he is actually engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of +Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he would not have hesitated to +assign the work to a later date had he not honestly believed the +contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that the judgment of an +educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal evidence is +not far to seek. Thus in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable allusion +to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already passed away by +the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified +form. [30] The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that carried on between +the various feudal princes, in which armored chariots play a large +part. Their use seems to have entirely died out before the end of the +Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a state which ceased to exist +as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch presently. + +But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances +of its being other than a _bonâ fide_ production are sensibly +diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come until long after. +That it should have been forged in the period immediately following 473 +is particularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to identify +himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin’s theory, that the +author was a literary recluse, that seems to me quite untenable. If one +thing is more apparent than another after reading the maxims of Sun +Tzŭ, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large store of +personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of +a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but +also of a practical soldier closely acquainted with the military +conditions of his time. To say nothing of the fact that these sayings +have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest captains of Chinese +history, they offer a combination of freshness and sincerity, acuteness +and common sense, which quite excludes the idea that they were +artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, that the 13 +chapters were the genuine production of a military man living towards +the end of the "_Ch’un Ch’iu_" period, are we not bound, in spite of +the silence of the _Tso Chuan_, to accept Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account in +its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we +not hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu’s +biography were false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in +the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the +chronology involved in the story as told in the _Shih Chi_, which, so +far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed out. There are two passages +in Sun Tzŭ in which he alludes to contemporary affairs. The first in in +VI. § 21:— + +Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in +number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I +say then that victory can be achieved. + + +The other is in XI. § 30:— + +Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, I should +answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; yet if +they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, +they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps +the right. + + +These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of +composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between +Wu and Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has +hitherto escaped notice is that they also seriously impair the +credibility of Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the +first positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is +then spoken of as a general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, +so that his alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken +place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier +still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the +capture of Ying in 506, Ch’u and not Yüeh, was the great hereditary +enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch’u and Wu, had been constantly at war +for over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh +was waged only in 510, [32] and even then was no more than a short +interlude sandwiched in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch’u. Now +Ch’u is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference +is that they were written at a time when Yüeh had become the prime +antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch’u had suffered the great +humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found +useful. + + +B.C. +514 Accession of Ho Lu. +512 Ho Lu attacks Ch’u, but is dissuaded from entering Ying, +the capital. Shih Chi mentions Sun Wu as general. +511 Another attack on Ch’u. +510 Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This is the first +war between the two states. +509 or 508 Ch’u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at Yu-chang. +506 Ho Lu attacks Ch’u with the aid of T’ang and Ts’ai. +Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last +mention of Sun Wu in Shih Chi. +505 Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu +is beaten by Ch’in and evacuates Ying. +504 Ho Lu sends Fu Ch’ai to attack Ch’u. +497 Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh. +496 Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at Tsui-li. +Ho Lu is killed. +494 Fu Ch’ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of Fu- +chaio, and enters the capital of Yüeh. +485 or 484 Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzŭ-hsu. +482 Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch’ai. +478 to 476 Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu. +475 Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu. +473 Final defeat and extinction of Wu. + + +The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that +could have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather +to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, +and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may +conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which +date Yüeh does not appear to have scored any notable success against +Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was written for him, it must +have been during the period 505-496, when there was a lull in the +hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort +against Ch’u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the +tradition connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well +have seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period +482-473, when Yüeh was once again becoming a very serious menace. [33] +We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may have been, +was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. On this point the +negative testimony of the _Tso Chuan_ far outweighs any shred of +authority still attaching to the _Shih Chi_, if once its other facts +are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to +explain the omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu +Tzŭ-hsu, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because +the latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the +State. + +How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may be that the growing +celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown +to its author. It was felt to be only right and proper that one so well +versed in the science of war should have solid achievements to his +credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest +feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep and lasting impression on +all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of +her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than that the +acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly identified +with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his brain +conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out +by him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po P’ei and Fu Kai? + +It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun +Tzŭ’s life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this +necessary proviso, I should say that he probably entered the service of +Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s accession, and gathered experience, though +only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the intense +military activity which marked the first half of the prince’s reign. +[35] If he rose to be a general at all, he certainly was never on an +equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless present +at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s sudden +collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical +juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have +convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against +whom every effort would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus +a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his famous book, +which according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the end, +rather than the beginning of Ho Lu’s reign. The story of the women may +possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about the same +time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is +hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the +death-struggle with Yüeh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li. + +If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony +in the fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man of peace +should be contemporary with her greatest writer on war. + + + +The Text of Sun Tzŭ + +I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s +text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the +"13 chapters" of which Ssu-ma Ch’ien speaks were essentially the same +as those now extant. We have his word for it that they were widely +circulated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained from +discussing them on that account. Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface:— + +During the Ch’in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_ was in +general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated +it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for +the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first +to write a commentary on it. + + +As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that +Ts’ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so +obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time +onward so great, especially during the T’ang and Sung dynasties, that +it would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep +in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief +commentaries on Sun Tzŭ were in existence, a certain Chi T’ien-pao +published a work in 15 _chuan_ entitled "Sun Tzŭ with the collected +commentaries of ten writers." There was another text, with variant +readings put forward by Chu Fu of Ta-hsing, which also had supporters +among the scholars of that period; but in the Ming editions, Sun +Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason or other no +longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th century, +the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi +T’ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was +known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzŭ which +appears in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed +in 1726, the _Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng_. Another copy at my disposal +of what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that +contained in the "Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch’in dynasties" +[1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition is +evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese +channels. So things remained until Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a +distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, who claimed to be an +actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered a copy of Chi +T’ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library of the +Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the _I Shuo_ of Cheng Yu-Hsien, +mentioned in the _T’ung Chih_, and also believed to have perished. This +is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or text)"—a +rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set before +us the text of Sun Tzŭ in its pristine purity. Chi T’ien-pao was a +careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the +somewhat debased version current in his day, without troubling to +collate it with the earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two +versions of Sun Tzŭ, even older than the newly discovered work, were +still extant, one buried in the _T’ung Tien_, Tu Yu’s great treatise on +the Constitution, the other similarly enshrined in the _T’ai P’ing Yu +Lan_ encyclopedia. In both the complete text is to be found, though +split up into fragments, intermixed with other matter, and scattered +piecemeal over a number of different sections. Considering that the _Yu +Lan_ takes us back to the year 983, and the _T’ung Tien_ about 200 +years further still, to the middle of the T’ang dynasty, the value of +these early transcripts of Sun Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the +idea of utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to anyone until +Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government instructions, undertook a +thorough recension of the text. This is his own account:— + +Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ which his +editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient +edition [of Chi T’ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be +revised and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the +Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all +devoted themselves to this study, probably surpassing me therein. +Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for +military men. + + +The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on +the text of Sun Tzŭ prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are +left in doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the +new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun +Hsing-yen and only one co-editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original +edition" as their basis, and by careful comparison with older versions, +as well as the extant commentaries and other sources of information +such as the _I Shuo_, succeeded in restoring a very large number of +doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be accepted +as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzŭ’s +original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard +text." + +The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. It is in 6 +_pen_, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical +works in 83 _pen_. [38] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen +(largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating the traditional view +of Sun Tzŭ’s life and performances, and summing up in remarkably +concise fashion the evidence in its favour. This is followed by Ts’ao +Kung’s preface to his edition, and the biography of Sun Tzŭ from the +_Shih Chi_, both translated above. Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien’s +_I Shuo_, [39] with author’s preface, and next, a short miscellany of +historical and bibliographical information entitled _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, +compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate +sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by +the various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological +order. These we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one. + + + +The Commentators + +Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of +commentators, which would do honour to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks +on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather +ingeniously explains it by saying that the artifices of war, being +inexhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment in a great +variety of ways. + +1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti [A.D. +155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest +commentary on Sun Tzŭ actually came from the pen of this extraordinary +man, whose biography in the _San Kuo Chih_ reads like a romance. One of +the greatest military geniuses that the world has seen, and Napoleonic +in the scale of his operations, he was especially famed for the +marvelous rapidity of his marches, which has found expression in the +line "Talk of Ts’ao Ts’ao, and Ts’ao Ts’ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu +says of him that he was a great captain who "measured his strength +against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two Yuan, father and son, and +vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire of Han with Wu and +Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a council of +war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all +his calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not +lose one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any particular +saw their armies incontinently beaten and put to flight." Ts’ao Kung’s +notes on Sun Tzŭ, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly +characteristic of the stern commander known to history, that it is hard +indeed to conceive of them as the work of a mere _littérateur_. +Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely +intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than the text +itself. [40] + +2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name +is comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even +his personal name has not been recorded. Chi T’ien-pao’s edition places +him after Chia Lin, and Ch’ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T’ang +dynasty, [41] but this is a mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he +appears as Meng Shih of the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would +identify him with Meng K’ang of the 3rd century. He is named in one +work as the last of the "Five Commentators," the others being Wei Wu +Ti, Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao and Chia Lin. + +3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military +tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the present +day. The _T’ung Chih_ mentions "Lives of famous generals from the Chou +to the T’ang dynasty" as written by him. [42] According to Ch’ao +Kung-wu and the _T’ien-i-ko_ catalogue, he followed a variant of the +text of Sun Tzŭ which differs considerably from those now extant. His +notes are mostly short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates +his remarks by anecdotes from Chinese history. + +4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ, +his notes being taken from the _T’ung Tien_, the encyclopedic treatise +on the Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely +repetitions of Ts’ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed +that he drew on the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing +to the peculiar arrangement of _T’ung Tien_, he has to explain each +passage on its merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his own +explanation does not agree with that of Ts’ao Kung, whom he always +quotes first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the "Ten +Commentators," he was added to their number by Chi T’ien-pao, being +wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. + +5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star +even in the glorious galaxy of the T’ang period. We learn from Ch’ao +Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was +extremely fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read in +the military history of the _Ch’un Ch’iu_ and _Chan Kuo_ eras. His +notes, therefore, are well worth attention. They are very copious, and +replete with historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzŭ’s work is thus +summarized by him: "Practice benevolence and justice, but on the other +hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency." He further +declared that all the military triumphs and disasters of the thousand +years which had elapsed since Sun Tzŭ’s death would, upon examination, +be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the maxims +contained in his book. Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful charge against Ts’ao +Kung has already been considered elsewhere. + +6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao +Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ +because Ts’ao Kung’s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and +that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, +writing in the middle of the 11th century, calls Ts’ao Kung, Tu Mu and +Ch’en Hao the three chief commentators on Sun Tzŭ, and observes that +Ch’en Hao is continually attacking Tu Mu’s shortcomings. His +commentary, though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of his +predecessors. + +7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his +commentary on Sun Tzŭ is mentioned in the _T’ang Shu_ and was +afterwards republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with +those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in +point of quality, too, perhaps the least valuable of the eleven. + +8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei +Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was +published with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from +which we may cull the following:— + +Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and trying to +make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though +commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the +task. My friend Sheng-yu has not fallen into this mistake. In +attempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun Tzŭ’s work, he does +not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states +engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not concerned with +the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the three +ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed +to the Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, +but his meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an +army, or handling soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the +forces of victory, it is always systematically treated; the sayings are +bound together in strict logical sequence, though this has been +obscured by commentators who have probably failed to grasp their +meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the +obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out the +true meaning of Sun Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion +have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the +present work deserves to be handed down side by side with the three +great commentaries; and for a great deal that they find in the sayings, +coming generations will have constant reason to thank my friend +Sheng-yu. + + +Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined +to endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him above +Ch’en Hao in order of merit. + +9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of +his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch’en, and on +the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own +commentary with that of Ts’ao Kung, but the comparison is not often +flattering to him. We learn from Ch’ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised +the ancient text of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae and correcting +mistakes. [45] + +10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this +commentator is given as above by Cheng Ch’iao in the _Tung Chih_, +written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply +as Ho Shih in the _Yu Hai_, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch’ao Kung-wu as +saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no reason +to doubt Cheng Ch’iao’s statement, otherwise I should have been +inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one Ho Ch’u-fei, the +author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the latter part of the +11th century. Ho Shih’s commentary, in the words of the _T’ien-i-ko_ +catalogue, "contains helpful additions" here and there, but is chiefly +remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the +dynastic histories and other sources. + +11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great +originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid +exposition. His commentator is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse +sentences he contrives to expand and develop in masterly fashion. +Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much of Ts’ao Kung’s +commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and +therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sung history, the +_T’ung K’ao_, or the _Yu Hai_, but it finds a niche in the _T’ung +Chih_, which also names him as the author of the "Lives of Famous +Generals." [46] + +It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have +flourished within so short a space of time. Ch’ao Kung-wu accounts for +it by saying: "During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire +enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased to practice the art of +war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao’s rebellion came [1038-42] and the +frontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court made +strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became +the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the +commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that period. +[47] + +Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work +has not come down to us. The _Sui Shu_ mentions four, namely Wang Ling +(often quoted by Tu Yu as Wang Tzŭ); Chang Tzŭ-shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; +[48] and Shen Yu of Wu. The _T’ang Shu_ adds Sun Hao, and the _T’ung +Chih_ Hsiao Chi, while the _T’u Shu_ mentions a Ming commentator, Huang +Jun-yu. It is possible that some of these may have been merely +collectors and editors of other commentaries, like Chi T’ien-pao and +Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. + + + +Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ + +Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of +China’s greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have +studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (_d_. 196 +B.C.), [49] Feng I (_d_. 34 A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (_d_. 219), [51] and Yo +Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of Ts’ao Kung, who disputes with Han +Hsin the highest place in Chinese military annals, has already been +recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of +purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of Su Tung-p’o), who +wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief +inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is preserved +in the _Yu Hai:_ [54]— + +Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, +[55] is very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu +Ch’i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on +war, and they are linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." +But Wu Ch’i’s remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher +and more crudely stated, and there is not the same unity of plan as in +Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the style is terse, but the meaning fully brought +out. + + +The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the Garden +of Literature" by Cheng Hou:— + +Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military +men’s training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars +and men of letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet +profound, perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the _Lun +Yu_, the _I Ching_ and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the +writings of Mencius, Hsun K’uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level +of Sun Tzŭ. + + +Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the +criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the +venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages +a ruler’s bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." + + + +Apologies for War + +Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving +nation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her +experience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern +State can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point at +which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great Wall +and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier centuries +before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the +perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts +with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of +government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of +so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor +disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it +is hardly too much to say that the clash of arms has never ceased to +resound in one portion or another of the Empire. + +No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom +China can point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond +of emerging at the most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch’i +stands out conspicuous in the period when Ch’in was entering upon her +final struggle with the remaining independent states. The stormy years +which followed the break-up of the Ch’in dynasty are illuminated by the +transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is +tottering to its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts’ao Ts’ao +dominates the scene. And in the establishment of the T’ang dynasty, one +of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li +Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T’ai Tsung) was seconded by the +brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear +comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe. + +In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ +downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of +Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to +militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the +literati defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth +while to collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox +view is upheld. The following, by Ssu-ma Ch’ien, shows that for all his +ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any +price:— + +Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and +cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and +dangers, and to succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood +in its veins and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How +much more so will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of love +and hatred, joy and anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection +springs up within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into +play. That is the natural law which governs his being…. What then shall +be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and +without any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out +their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilization," condemning the +use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to +impotence and dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at +the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice +of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to +modify the position they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in +the family the teacher must not spare the rod, and punishments cannot +be dispensed with in the State, so military chastisement can never be +allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one can say is that +this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and +that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others +rebellious. [58] + + +The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun +Tzŭ:— + + +War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of +government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch’iu, both +disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of +litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their execution by +flogging in the market-place, are all done by officials. But the +wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the +hauling of women and children into captivity, and the beheading of +traitors—this is also work which is done by officials. The objects of +the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is no +intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off +heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt +with, only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the use of +military weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, +the end in view is to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and +relief to the good…. + +Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired your military +aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been +acquired by study." [59] "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing +that you are a disciple of Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; +"I was taught by Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should +exercise both civil and military functions, though to be sure my +instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very far." + +Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" +and the "military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of +action, or in what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is +more than I can say. But, at any rate, it has come about that the +members of the governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on +military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are bold +enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set down as eccentric +individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary +instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose +sight of fundamental principles. + +When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch’eng Wang, he regulated +ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and +learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60] he +sallied forth and chastised them. When Confucius held office under the +Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If +pacific negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should have +been made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Ch’i, who +cowered under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can it be said +that these two great Sages had no knowledge of military matters? + +We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He +also appeals to the authority of the Classics:— + +Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never +studied matters connected with armies and battalions." [62] Replying to +K’ung Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and +weapons." But if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he +used armed force against the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch’i +was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi revolted; he ordered +his officers to attack them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in +confusion. He once uttered the words: "If I fight, I conquer." [63] And +Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil and military +functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or +received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not +specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the +subject of his teaching. + + +Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:— + + +Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He also said: +"If I fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated +music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, +[66] and must not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, +the words "I am unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are +things which even an inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have to +lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if +one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, who was +employed by Wu Tzŭ-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the +remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." + +The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of +Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on +the art of war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they +adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over his father’s books to no +purpose, [67] as a proof that all military theory is useless. Again, +seeing that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism in +designing plans, and the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is +immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the +studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials +also require steady application and practice before efficiency is +reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices +to botch their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting +perilous; and useless unless a general is in constant practice, he +ought not to hazard other men’s lives in battle. [70] Hence it is +essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should be studied. + +Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of war. +Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not +pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the consequence being that +he was finally defeated and overthrown. He did not realize that the +tricks and artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang +of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to destruction by their +misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature of war +necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. +There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an +extorted oath, [72] and also of his having left the Sung State in +disguise. [73] Can we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding +truth and honesty? + + + +Bibliography + +The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ. +The notes on each have been drawn principally from the _Ssu k’u ch’uan +shu chien ming mu lu_, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. + +1. _Wu Tzŭ_, in 1 _chuan_ or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (_d_. 381 B.C.). A +genuine work. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 65. + +2. _Ssu-ma Fa_, in 1 _chuan_ or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to +Ssu-ma Jang-chu of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be +early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are constantly to +be met within its pages. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64. + +The _Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu_ (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three +treatises on war, _Sun Tzŭ_, _Wu Tzŭ_ and _Ssu-ma Fa_, are, generally +speaking, only concerned with things strictly military—the art of +producing, collecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct +theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, transport +of goods and the handling of soldiers—in strong contrast to later +works, in which the science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, +divination and magical arts in general. + +3. _Liu T’ao_, in 6 _chuan_, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or +Lu Shang, also known as T’ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C. [74] But +its style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-ming +(550-625 A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the +six sections so that the forgery cannot have been later than Sui +dynasty. + +4. _Wei Liao Tzŭ_, in 5 _chuan_. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. +B.C.), who studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The work appears to +have been originally in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess +contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main, though the +strategical devices differ considerably from those of the Warring +States period. It is been furnished with a commentary by the well-known +Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. + +5. _San Lueh_ in 3 _chuan_. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary +personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (_d_. 187 +B.C.) in an interview on a bridge. But here again, the style is not +that of works dating from the Ch’in or Han period. The Han Emperor +Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently quotes from it in one of his +proclamations; but the passage in question may have been inserted later +on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not be far +out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], or +somewhat earlier. + +6. _Li Wei Kung Wen Tui_, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a +dialogue between T’ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is +usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a +forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art of war. + +7. _Li Ching Ping Fa_ (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a +short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the T’ung Tien, but not +published separately. This fact explains its omission from the _Ssu K’u +Ch’uan Shu_. + +8. _Wu Ch’i Ching_, in 1 _chuan_. Attributed to the legendary minister +Feng Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty +(_d_. 121 B.C.), and said to have been eulogized by the celebrated +general Ma Lung (_d_. 300 A.D.). Yet the earliest mention of it is in +the _Sung Chih_. Although a forgery, the work is well put together. + +Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has +always been held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on +war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the _Shih Liu Ts’e_ (1 _chuan_), +preserved in the _Yung Lo Ta Tien;_ (2) _Chiang Yuan_ (1 _chuan_); and +(3) _Hsin Shu_ (1 _chuan_), which steals wholesale from Sun Tzŭ. None +of these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine. + +Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections +devoted to the literature of war. The following references may be found +useful:— + +_T’ung Tien_ (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162. +_T’ai P’ing Yu Lan_ (983), ch. 270-359. +_Wen Hsien Tung K’ao_ (13th cent.), ch. 221. +_Yu Hai_ (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141. +_San Ts’ai T’u Hui_ (16th cent). +_Kuang Po Wu Chih_ (1607), ch. 31, 32. +_Ch’ien Ch’io Lei Shu_ (1632), ch. 75. +_Yuan Chien Lei Han_ (1710), ch. 206-229. +_Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng_ (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81-90. +_Hsu Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao_ (1784), ch. 121-134. +_Huang Ch’ao Ching Shih Wen Pien_ (1826), ch. 76, 77. + +The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve +mention:— + +_Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 30. +_Sui Shu_, ch. 32-35. +_Chiu T’ang Shu_, ch. 46, 47. +_Hsin T’ang Shu_, ch. 57,60. +_Sung Shih_, ch. 202-209. +_T’ung Chih_ (circa 1150), ch. 68. + +To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial +Library:— + +_Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu Tsung Mu T’i Yao_ (1790), ch. 99, 100. + +Footnotes + +1. _Shih Chi_, ch. 65. + +2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. + +3. _Shih Chi_, ch. 130. + +4. The appellation of Nang Wa. + +5. _Shih Chi_, ch. 31. + +6. _Shih Chi_, ch. 25. + +7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year 637. + +8. Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. + +9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the +Han dynasty, which says: "Ten _li_ outside the _Wu_ gate [of the city +of Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to +commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch’i, who excelled in the +art of war, by the King of Wu." + +10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to +make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe." + +11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and +overthrown by Kou chien, King of Yüeh, in 473 B.C. See post. + +12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in +his preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction." + +13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the _T’u Shu_, and +may be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang Shou-chieh of +the T’ang dynasty, and appears in the _T’ai P’ing Yu Lan_. + +14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, +perhaps especially of § 8. + +15. See chap. XI. + +16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that _Wu Tzŭ_, which is not in +6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the _Han Chih_. Likewise, the +_Chung Yung_ is credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one only. +In the case of very short works, one is tempted to think that _p’ien_ +might simply mean "leaves." + +17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. + +18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. + +19. See Chapter 7, § 27 and Chapter 11, § 28. + +20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his +name. + +21. I.e. Po P’ei. See ante. + +22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large +additions have been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 B.C. + +23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. + +24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of +another work. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not +clear. + +25. About 480 B.C. + +26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. + +27. In the 3rd century B.C. + +28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter +half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have written a +work on war. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of the +INTRODUCTION. + +29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that +the _Tso Chuan_ must have been written in the 5th century, but not +before 424 B.C. + +30. See _Mencius_ III. 1. iii. 13-20. + +31. When Wu first appears in the _Ch’un Ch’iu_ in 584, it is already at +variance with its powerful neighbour. The _Ch’un Ch’iu_ first mentions +Yüeh in 537, the _Tso Chuan_ in 601. + +32. This is explicitly stated in the _Tso Chuan_, XXXII, 2. + +33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would +tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully +justify the language used in XI. § 30. + +34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious +treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great +general. Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the +other hand, cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century. + +35. From _Tso Chuan:_ "From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] +there was no year in which Ch’u was not attacked by Wu." + +36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really +descended from Sun Tzŭ. I am ashamed to say that I only read my +ancestor’s work from a literary point of view, without comprehending +the military technique. So long have we been enjoying the blessings of +peace!" + +37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of +Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the +ascent of the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as +being "situated five _li_ east of the district city of Hua-yin. The +temple contains the Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the T’ang Emperor +Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." + +38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40. + +39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzŭ. + +40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His +commentary is frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not +fully develop the meaning." + +41. _Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao_, ch. 221. + +42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered +chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand +Buddhas." See B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. 525. + +43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was +nominally existent in Sun Tzŭ’s day, it retained hardly a vestige of +power, and the old military organization had practically gone by the +board. I can suggest no other explanation of the passage. + +44. See _Chou Li_, xxix. 6-10. + +45. _T’ung K’ao_, ch. 221. + +46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s "Notes," p. 91 (new +edition). + +47. _T’ung K’ao_, loc. cit. + +48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the _San Kuo +Chih_, ch. 10. + +49. See XI. § 58, note. + +50. _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 17 ad init. + +51. _San Kuo Chih_, ch. 54. + +52. _Sung Shih_, ch. 365 ad init. + +53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting +themselves with Sun Tzŭ are not behindhand in their praise. In this +connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from +Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the present work were submitted +previous to publication: "Many of Sun Wu’s maxims are perfectly +applicable to the present day, and no. 11 [in Chapter VIII] is one that +the people of this country would do well to take to heart." + +54. Ch. 140. + +55. See IV. § 3. + +56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. + +57. The _Tso Chuan_. + +58. _Shih Chi_, ch. 25, fol. I. + +59. Cf. _Shih Chi_, ch 47. + +60. See _Shu Ching_, preface § 55. + +61. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 47. + +62. _Lun Yu_, XV. 1. + +63. I failed to trace this utterance. + +64. Supra. + +65. Supra. + +66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, +and festive rites. See _Shu Ching_, ii. 1. III. 8, and _Chou Li_, IX. +fol. 49. + +67. See XIII. § 11, note. + +68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the _Tso Chuan_, where +Tzŭ-ch’an says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not +employ a mere learner to make it up." + +69. Cf. _Tao Te Ching_, ch. 31. + +70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See _Lun Yu_, +XIII. 29, 30. + +71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. + +72. _Shih Chi_, ch. 47. + +73. _Shih Chi_, ch. 38. + +74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in +the _Shih Chi_, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a +former minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there +given, according to which he would appear to have been first raised +from a humble private station by Wen Wang. + + + +Chapter I. LAYING PLANS + +[Ts’ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of +this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple +selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in +his tent. See. § 26.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. + +2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to +ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be +neglected. + +3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be +taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine +the conditions obtaining in the field. + +4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The +Commander; (5) Method and discipline. + +[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by "Moral Law" a +principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral +aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale," were it not +considered as an attribute of the _ruler_ in § 13.] + + +5, 6. _The Moral Law_ causes the people to be in complete accord with +their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, +undismayed by any danger. + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the +officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; +without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute +when the crisis is at hand."] + + +7. _Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. + +[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words +here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of +Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying that what is meant is +"the general economy of Heaven," including the five elements, the four +seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.] + + +8. _Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; +open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. + +9. _The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, +benevolence, courage and strictness. + +[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or +benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control, +or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here +"wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or benevolence," and +the two military virtues of "courage" and "strictness" substituted for +"uprightness of mind" and "self-respect, self-control, or ‘proper +feeling.’"] + + +10. By _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of +the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the +officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the +army, and the control of military expenditure. + +11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows +them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. + +12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the +military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in +this wise:— + +13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? + + +[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.] + + + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? + +[See §§ 7, 8] + + +(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? + +[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D. 155-220), +who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his +own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned +himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of +corn! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy +his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts’ao Ts’ao’s own comment +on the present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a +law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must +be put to death."] + + +(5) Which army is the stronger? + +[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch’en puts it, freely +rendered, "_esprit de corps_ and ‘big battalions.’"] + + +(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the +officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; +without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute +when the crisis is at hand."] + + +(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and +punishment? + +[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be +properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] + + +14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or +defeat. + +15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will +conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that +hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let +such a one be dismissed! + +[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was +composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu +State.] + + +16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any +helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. + +17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s +plans. + +[Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish +theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract +principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of +strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and +sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to +secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of the +battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the +Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations +were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find +himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a +critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will +attack the first tomorrow—I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord +Uxbridge. "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any +idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you +expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ] + + +18. All warfare is based on deception. + +[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every +soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many +military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary +skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend +and foe."] + + +19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our +forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy +believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are +near. + +20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. + +[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder, crush +him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating +the uses of deception in war.] + + +21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in +superior strength, evade him. + +22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. +Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. + +[Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his +adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and +immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.] + + +23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. + +[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch’en has the note: "while +we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The +_Yu Lan_ has "Lure him on and tire him out."] + + +If his forces are united, separate them. + +[Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the +commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division +between them."] + + +24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not +expected. + +25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged +beforehand. + +26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his +temple ere the battle is fought. + +[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple +to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the +field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] + + +The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. +Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to +defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this +point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose. + +[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. + + + +Chapter II. WAGING WAR + +[Ts’ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the +cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the +chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a +consideration of ways and means.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field +a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred +thousand mail-clad soldiers, + +[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, +used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed +for purposes of defence. Li Ch’uan, it is true, says that the latter +were light, but this seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note +the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric +Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming +as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of +foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed +that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy +chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into +a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred +men.] + + +with provisions enough to carry them a thousand _li_, + +[2.78 modern _li_ go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly +since Sun Tzŭ’s time.] + + +the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of +guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots +and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per +day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. + +2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, +the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If +you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. + +3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State +will not be equal to the strain. + +4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength +exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to +take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be +able to avert the consequences that must ensue. + +5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has +never been seen associated with long delays. + +[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of +the commentators. Ts’ao Kung, Li Ch’uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and +Mei Yao-ch’en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally +stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho +Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure +of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but +they bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by +remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being +expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true +cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yu +says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable +to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, except +possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than +ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much +more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, +tardiness can never be anything but foolish—if only because it means +impoverishment to the nation. In considering the point raised here by +Sun Tzŭ, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur +to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome +against that of Hannibals’s isolated army, because it seemed to him +that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a +strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics +would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal it is +true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption +in their favour.] + + +6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged +warfare. + +7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war +that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. + +[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a +long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it +to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, +but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, +"He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," +is distinctly pointless.] + + +8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his +supply-waggons loaded more than twice. + +[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for +reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, +but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an +audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from +Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a +little ahead of your opponent—has counted for more than either +numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to +commissariat.] + + +9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus +the army will have food enough for its needs. + +[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means +"things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all +the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.] + + +10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by +contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a +distance causes the people to be impoverished. + +[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the +next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is +so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. +It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may +be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them there. The +Chinese words Sun Tzŭ used to indicate the cause of the people’s +impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by which the +husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why +should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because +the State or Government is too poor to do so?] + + +11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; +and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away. + +[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own +territory. Ts’ao Kung understands it of an army that has already +crossed the frontier.] + + +12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be +afflicted by heavy exactions. + +13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the +homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their +incomes will be dissipated; + +[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, +but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from +our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The _people_ being +regarded as the essential part of the State, and _food_ as the people’s +heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and be +careful of both?"] + + +while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, +breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, +protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to +four-tenths of its total revenue. + +15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One +cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s +own, and likewise a single _picul_ of his provender is equivalent to +twenty from one’s own store. + +[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of +transporting one cartload to the front. A _picul_ is a unit of measure +equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).] + + +16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; +that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have +their rewards. + +[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see +the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from +the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have +a keen desire to fight, each on his own account."] + + +17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been +taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags +should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled +and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be +kindly treated and kept. + +18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own +strength. + +19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy +campaigns. + +[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzŭ +here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to +enforce."] + + +20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of +the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall +be in peace or in peril. + + + +Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is +to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it +is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than +to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire +than to destroy them. + +[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted +nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts’ao Kung, the equivalent of a +regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists +from any number between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company +contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives +the exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.] + + +2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme +excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s +resistance without fighting. + +[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old +Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the +huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.] + + +3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; + +[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of +the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one +might be content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but +an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in +his note: "When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must +anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."] + + +the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; + +[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in +speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or +principalities into which the China of his day was split up.] + + +the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; + +[When he is already at full strength.] + + +and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. + +4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be +avoided. + +[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in +1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, +Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would +have been masters of the situation before the British were ready +seriously to oppose them.] + + +The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements +of war, will take up three whole months; + +[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as +"mantlets", described. Ts’ao Kung simply defines them as "large +shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch’uan, who says +they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city +walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman +_testudo_, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles used in +repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch’en Hao. See _supra_ II. 14. +The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable +shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. +They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled +from within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey +parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the +encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden +donkeys."] + + +and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three +months more. + +[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of +the enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, +and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding +note.] + + +5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men +to the assault like swarming ants, + +[This vivid simile of Ts’ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army +of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing +patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the +place before his engines of war are ready.] + + +with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town +still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. + +[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port +Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.] + + +6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any +fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he +overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. + +[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no +harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after +having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother +of the people."] + + +7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, +and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. + +[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of +the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, +the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."] + + +This is the method of attacking by stratagem. + +8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to +surround him; if five to one, to attack him; + +[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] + + +if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. + +[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it +appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however, +gives a clue to Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: "Being two to the enemy’s one, we +may use one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some +special diversion." Chang Yu thus further elucidates the point: "If our +force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up +into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall +upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed +from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front." +This is what is meant by saying that ‘one part may be used in the +regular way, and the other for some special diversion.’ Tu Mu does not +understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as +concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too +hasty in calling this a mistake."] + + +9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; + +[Li Ch’uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If +attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able +general will fight."] + + +if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; + +[The meaning, "we can _watch_ the enemy," is certainly a great +improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very +good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying +only applies if the other factors are equal; a small difference in +numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and +discipline.] + + +if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. + +10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in +the end it must be captured by the larger force. + +11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is +complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is +defective, the State will be weak. + +[As Li Ch’uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the +general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed +in his profession), his army will lack strength."] + + +12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his +army:— + +13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant +of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. + +[Li Ch’uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a +thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally +think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to +direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators +understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of T’ai Kung: "A +kingdom should not be governed from without, and army should not be +directed from within." Of course it is true that, during an engagement, +or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the +thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he +will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong +orders.] + + +14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he +administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in +an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the +civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid +gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on +which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, +on the other hand, are military rather than civil virtues to assimilate +the governing of an army"—to that of a State, understood.] + + +15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, + +[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.] + + +through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to +circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. + +[I follow Mei Yao-ch’en here. The other commentators refer not to the +ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu +says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he +must not be entrusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The +skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the +covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in +establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in +action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid +man has no fear of death."] + + +16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to +come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy +into the army, and flinging victory away. + +17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He +will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. + +[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; +if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will +invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive +or the defensive.] + + +(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior +forces. + +[This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers +correctly, as Li Ch’uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the +saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible +with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and _vice versa_. The secret +lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. +Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an +inferior one, make for difficult ground.’"] + + +(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout +all its ranks. + +(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy +unprepared. + +(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by +the sovereign. + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "It is the sovereign’s function to +give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of +the general." It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which +have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on +the part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his +extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by central +authority.] + +Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points. + +[Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of +victory.”] + +18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need +not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not +the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. + +[Li Ch’uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch’in, who in 383 A.D. +marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to +despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An +and Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight +provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one +million; why, they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely +throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" +Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei +River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.] + + +If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every +battle. + +[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, +knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: +"Attack is the secret of defence; defence is the planning of an +attack." It would be hard to find a better epitome of the +root-principle of war.] + + + +Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS + +[Ts’ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of +this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two +armies with a view to discovering each other’s condition." Tu Mu says: +"It is through the dispositions of an army that its condition may be +discovered. Conceal your dispositions, and your condition will remain +secret, which leads to victory; show your dispositions, and your +condition will become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks +that the good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to +meet those of the enemy."] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond +the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of +defeating the enemy. + +2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the +opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. + +[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.] + + +3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, + +[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his +troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."] + + +but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. + +4. Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able +to _do_ it. + +5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat +the enemy means taking the offensive. + +[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in §§ 1-3, in spite of +the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they +give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible +enough.] + + +6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; +attacking, a superabundance of strength. + +7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret +recesses of the earth; + +[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor +indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may +not know his whereabouts."] + + +he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of +heaven. + +[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a +thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the +opinion of most of the commentators.] + + +Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the +other, a victory that is complete. + +8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is +not the acme of excellence. + +[As Ts’ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has +germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li +Ch’uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the +vastly superior army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city +of Ch’eng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to +annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The officers +hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But +Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever +stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and +inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] + + +9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and +the whole Empire says, "Well done!" + +[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move +surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his schemes, +so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." +Sun Tzŭ reserves his approbation for things that + + +"the world’s coarse thumb +And finger fail to plumb." + + +10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; + +["Autumn hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in +autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one +in Chinese writers.] + + +to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of +thunder is no sign of a quick ear. + +[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick +hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, +who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a +mustard seed; and Shih K’uang, a blind musician who could hear the +footsteps of a mosquito.] + + +11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, +but excels in winning with ease. + +[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy +conquering." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins +his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, +wins with ease."] + + +12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor +credit for courage. + +[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained +over circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large +knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch +as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he +receives no credit for courage."] + + +13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. + +[Ch’en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile +attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One +who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at +winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; +whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are +not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably +win."] + + +Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it +means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. + +14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes +defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the +enemy. + +[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not +be confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes +all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to +increase the safety of his army.] + + +15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle +after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat +first fights and afterwards looks for victory. + +[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which +will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not +begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no +longer be assured."] + + +16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly +adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control +success. + +17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; +secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, +Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. + +18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to +Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of +chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. + +[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the +Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, +which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to +make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to a +general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy’s chances with our own; +if the latter turn the scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty +lies in third term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a +calculation of _numbers_, thereby making it nearly synonymous with the +second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as a +consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition, while the +third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other +hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative strength having been +settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play." Ho +Shih seconds this interpretation, but weakens it. However, it points to +the third term as being a calculation of numbers.] + + +19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight +placed in the scale against a single grain. + +[Literally, "a victorious army is like an _i_ (20 oz.) weighed against +a _shu_ (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a _shu_ weighed against an _i_." +The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, +flushed with victory, has over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his +note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the _i_ to be 24 Chinese ounces, +and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li +Ch’uan of the T’ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.] + + +20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up +waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical +dispositions. + + + + +Chapter V. ENERGY + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as +the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their +numbers. + +[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with +subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s +famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large +an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your +Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more +the better."] + + +2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different +from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting +signs and signals. + +3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the +enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct +and indirect. + +[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzŭ’s +treatise, the discussion of the _cheng_ and the _ch’i_." As it is by no +means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to +render them consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well +to tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks on the subject before +proceeding further. Li Ch’uan: "Facing the enemy is _cheng_, making +lateral diversion is _ch’i_. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your +troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure +victory abnormal manœuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-ch’en: "_Ch’i_ is +active, _cheng_ is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, +activity brings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy +to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, +and vice versa; thus _cheng_ may also be _ch’i_, and _ch’i_ may also be +_cheng_." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when +marching ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly +threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly +disconcerting his opponent. [Ch’ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, +the march on Lin-chin was _cheng_, and the surprise manœuver was +_ch’i_." Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: +"Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of _ch’i_ and +_cheng_. Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: ‘Direct warfare favours +frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts’ao Kung +says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; +appearing on the enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuver.’ Li Wei-kung +[6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is +_cheng_; turning movements, on the other hand, are _ch’i_.’ These +writers simply regard _cheng_ as _cheng_, and _ch’i_ as _ch’i_; they do +not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each +other like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment on +the T’ang Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A _ch’i_ +manœuver may be _cheng_, if we make the enemy look upon it as _cheng_; +then our real attack will be _ch’i_, and vice versa. The whole secret +lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real +intent.’" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other +operation is _cheng_, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; +whereas that is _ch’i_," which takes him by surprise or comes from an +unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to +be _ch’i_," it immediately becomes _cheng_."] + + +4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against +an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. + +5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, +but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. + +[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding +the enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of +"indirect tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord +Roberts’ night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. +[1] + + +6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven +and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and +moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away +but to return once more. + +[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of _ch’i_ and +_cheng_. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of _cheng_ at all, +unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating +to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been +pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military +operations, that they cannot really be considered apart. Here we simply +have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite +resource of a great leader.] + + +7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of +these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. + +8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, +white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can +ever be seen. + +9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, +sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can +ever be tasted. + +10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct +and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless +series of manœuvers. + +11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is +like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the +possibilities of their combination? + +12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even +roll stones along in its course. + +13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon +which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. + +[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is +used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word +as "the measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does +not quite fit the illustrative simile in §. 15. Applying this +definition to the falcon, it seems to me to denote that instinct of +_self-restraint_ which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until +the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right +moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly +important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very +instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went +into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for +several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying +with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close +range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on +the enemy’s nearest ships.] + + +14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and +prompt in his decision. + +[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of +distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking. +But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzŭ meant to use the word in a +figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. +Wang Hsi’s note, which after describing the falcon’s mode of attack, +proceeds: "This is just how the ‘psychological moment’ should be seized +in war."] + + +15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to +the releasing of the trigger. + +[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of +energy and the force stored up in the bent cross-bow until released by +the finger on the trigger.] + + +16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming +disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, +your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against +defeat. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been +previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating +and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the +course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real +disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your +dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out +of the question."] + + +17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear +postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. + +[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone +down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts’ao Kung throws +out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to +destroy formation and conceal one’s condition." But Tu Mu is the first +to put it quite plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to +lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish +to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme +courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy +over-confident, you must have exceeding strength."] + + +18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of +subdivision; + +[See _supra_, § 1.] + + +concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of +latent energy; + +[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here +differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: +"seeing that we are favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the +enemy will believe that we are really afraid."] + + +masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical +dispositions. + +[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han +Emperor: “Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report +on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed +all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm +soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one +and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone +opposed them, saying: ‘When two countries go to war, they are naturally +inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our +spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some +_ruse_ on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to +attack.’ The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the +trap and found himself surrounded at Po-teng.”] + + +19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains +deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu +says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may +be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led +to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, +all the enemy’s movements should be determined by the signs that we +choose to give him." Note the following anecdote of Sun Pin, a +descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the Ch’i State being at war with +Wei, sent T’ien Chi and Sun Pin against the general P’ang Chuan, who +happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The +Ch’i State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary +despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account." Accordingly, +when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders +to show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the +night after only 20,000. P’ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to +himself: "I knew these men of Ch’i were cowards: their numbers have +already fallen away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to +a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach +after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon +it the words: "Under this tree shall P’ang Chuan die." Then, as night +began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, +with orders to shoot directly if they saw a light. Later on, P’ang +Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in +order to read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled +by a volley of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The +above is Tu Mu’s version of the story; the _Shih Chi_, less +dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes P’ang Chuan +cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of +his army.] ] + + +He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. + +20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body +of picked men he lies in wait for him. + +[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He lies in +wait with the main body of his troops."] + + +21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and +does not require too much from individuals. + +[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the +bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each +men according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from +the untalented."] + + +Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined +energy. + +22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it +were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or +stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a +slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, +to go rolling down. + +[Ts’au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."] + + +23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum +of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So +much on the subject of energy. + +[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount +importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great +results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."] + + +[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. + + + +Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG + +[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: +"Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the +defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect +methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of +attack and defence, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect +methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two methods +before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong points. For the use +of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the +perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above +methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter +on Energy."] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of +the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field +and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted. + +2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but +does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him. + +[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or +fights not at all. [1] ] + + +3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach +of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible +for the enemy to draw near. + +[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he +will strike at some important point which the enemy will have to +defend.] + + +4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; + +[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch’en’s +interpretation of I. § 23.] + + +if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, +he can force him to move. + +5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march +swiftly to places where you are not expected. + +6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches +through country where the enemy is not. + +[Ts’ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt +from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are +defended, attack in unexpected quarters."] + + +7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack +places which are undefended. + +[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, +where the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; +where the walls are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict +enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or +the defenders are variance amongst themselves."] + + +You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions +that cannot be attacked. + +[_I.e._, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There +is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later +clause. Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch’en assume the meaning to be: +"In order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend _even_ those +places that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much +more, then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the +clause balances less well with the preceding—always a consideration in +the highly antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang +Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: "He who is +skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see +IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This +being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the +enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in defence hides in the most +secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to +estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold +are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."] + + +8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not +know what to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does +not know what to attack. + +[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] + + +9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be +invisible, through you inaudible; + +[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with +reference to the enemy.] + + +and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands. + +10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the +enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your +movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. + +11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even +though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we +need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. + +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line +of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; +if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign +himself." It is clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike certain generals in the late +Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.] + + +12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging +us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the +ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in +his way. + +[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia +Lin: "even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li +Ch’uan says: "we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and +Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes—one +of Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying Yang-p’ing and about to be attacked +by Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of the +drums, and flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in +sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had the +intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off +his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating here, therefore, is +nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff."] + + +13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible +ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must +be divided. + +[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei +Yao-ch’en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy’s dispositions are +visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions +being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in +order to guard against attack from every quarter."] + + +14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up +into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate +parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few. + +15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior +one, our opponents will be in dire straits. + +16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then +the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several +different points; + +[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by +saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering +what he was going to do, _he_ was thinking most of what he was going to +do himself."] + + +and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers +we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. + +17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; +should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he +strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his +right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, +he will everywhere be weak. + +[In Frederick the Great’s _Instructions to his Generals_ we read: "A +defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those +generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every +point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, +having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, +and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater."] + + +18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible +attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make +these preparations against us. + +[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is "to compel the +enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force +against each fraction in turn."] + + +19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may +concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. + +[What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of +distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a +general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march, +and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and the +right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength. +Among many such successful junctions which military history records, +one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Blucher +just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.] + + +20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be +impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the +left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the +van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything +under a hundred _li_ apart, and even the nearest are separated by +several _li_! + +[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, +but the mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an +army advancing towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of +which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the +various detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise +instructions as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be +able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yu’s note may be worth +quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to +concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will +be forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we +hold will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall +be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support +will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there +is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions of +the army."] + + +21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own +in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. +I say then that victory can be achieved. + +[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended +in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its +incorporation in Yüeh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s death. +With his present assertion compare IV. § 4. Chang Yu is the only one to +point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes on to explain: +"In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, ‘One may _know_ +how to conquer without being able to _do_ it,’ whereas here we have the +statement that ‘victory’ can be achieved.’ The explanation is, that in +the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under +discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot +make certain of beating him. But the present passage refers +particularly to the soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s +calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the +impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be +achieved."] + + +22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from +fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of +their success. + +[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all +plans conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure." + + +23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. + +[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy +on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his +policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku +Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssu-ma +I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.] + + +Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. + +24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may +know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. + +[Cf. IV. § 6.] + + +25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain +is to conceal them; + +[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is +perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see _supra_ § 9) as "showing +no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your +brain.] + + +conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the +subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. + +[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable +officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."] + + +26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own +tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. + +27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can +see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. + +[_I.e._, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they +cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has +preceded the battle.] + + +28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but +let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. + +[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-principle +underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in +number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are +few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by +familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no +more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of +grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."] + + +29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural +course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. + +30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what +is weak. + +[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] + + +31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over +which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the +foe whom he is facing. + +32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare +there are no constant conditions. + +33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and +thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. + +34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always +equally predominant; + +[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."] + + +the four seasons make way for each other in turn. + +[Literally, "have no invariable seat."] + + +There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and +waxing. + +[Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the +want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. +The comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of +the phenomena which Sun Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] + + +[1] See Col. Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. +II, p. 490. + + + +Chapter VII. MANŒUVERING + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the +sovereign. + +2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend +and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. + +["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between +the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he +quotes a saying of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without harmony in the +State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the +army, no battle array can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzŭ +is represented as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are +waging war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before +proceeding to attack the external foe."] + + +3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing +more difficult. + +[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts’ao +Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign’s +instructions until our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics +to be pursued are most difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or +manœuvers can hardly be said to begin until the army has sallied forth +and encamped, and Ch’ien Hao’s note gives color to this view: "For +levying, concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there are +plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes when we +engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that "the great +difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing favourable +position."] + + +The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious +into the direct, and misfortune into gain. + +[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat +enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is +explained by Ts’ao Kung: "Make it appear that you are a long way off, +then cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your +opponent." Tu Mu says: "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss +and leisurely while you are dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih +gives a slightly different turn: "Although you may have difficult +ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a +drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of +movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two +famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at +his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which +resulted in the great victory of Marengo.] + + +4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy +out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the +goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of _deviation_. + +[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the +town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch’in army. The King of +Chao first consulted Lien P’o on the advisability of attempting a +relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the +intervening country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned +to Chao She, who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but +finally said: "We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole—and the +pluckier one will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had +only gone a distance of 30 _li_ when he stopped and began throwing up +entrenchments. For 28 days he continued strengthening his +fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the intelligence +to the enemy. The Ch’in general was overjoyed, and attributed his +adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the +Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies +had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for +two days and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such +astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding position +on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his movements. A +crushing defeat followed for the Ch’in forces, who were obliged to +raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat across the border.] + + +5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined +multitude, most dangerous. + +[I adopt the reading of the _T’ung Tien_, Cheng Yu-hsien and the _T’u +Shu_, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to +make sense. The commentators using the standard text take this line to +mean that manœuvers may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all +depends on the ability of the general.] + + +6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an +advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other +hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice +of its baggage and stores. + +[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese +commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering +without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is some deep-seated +corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that Sun Tzŭ does not +approve of a lengthy march being undertaken without supplies. Cf. +infra, § 11.] + + +7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make +forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual +distance at a stretch, + +[The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 _li_; but on one +occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts’ao Ts’ao is said to have covered +the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within twenty-four hours.] + + +doing a hundred _li_ in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all +your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. + +8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, +and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its +destination. + +[The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a +hundred _li_ to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without +impedimenta. Manœuvers of this description should be confined to short +distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are +often more painful than the dangers of battle." He did not often call +upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only when he +intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he +sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ] + + +9. If you march fifty _li_ in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will +lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will +reach the goal. + +[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be _torn away_."] + + +10. If you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your +army will arrive. + +[In the _T’ung Tien_ is added: "From this we may know the difficulty of +manœuvering."] + + +11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; +without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. + +[I think Sun Tzŭ meant "stores accumulated in dépôts." But Tu Yu says +"fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi +says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."] + + +12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the +designs of our neighbours. + +13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar +with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls +and precipices, its marshes and swamps. + +14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we +make use of local guides. + +[§§. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.] + + +15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. + +[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to +the numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. +[2] ] + +Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained. + +16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by +circumstances. + +17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, + +[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift +but, as Mei Yao-ch’en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."] + + +your compactness that of the forest. + +[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly marching, +order and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard against surprise +attacks. But natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do +generally possess the quality of density or compactness.] + + +18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, + +[Cf. _Shih Ching_, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man +can check."] + + +in immovability like a mountain. + +[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to +dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice +you into a trap.] + + +19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you +move, fall like a thunderbolt. + +[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T’ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: +"You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the +lighting—so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so +quickly that it cannot be parried.] + + +20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst +your men; + +[Sun Tzŭ wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by +insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may +afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.] + + +when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the +benefit of the soldiery. + +[Ch’en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow +and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the +lands they invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out +some of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that +of Pan Ch’ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, +those of Fu-k’ang-an and Tso Tsung-t’ang.] + + +21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. + +[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzŭ as saying that we must not break camp +until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the +cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. § +13.] + + +22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. + +[See _supra_, §§ 3, 4.] + + +Such is the art of manœuvering. + +[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But +there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an +earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when +Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different +from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to +its genuineness.] + + +23. The Book of Army Management says: + +[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give +us any information about this work. Mei Yao- Ch’en calls it "an ancient +military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the +enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun +Tzŭ’s time between the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it +is not in itself improbable that a collection of military maxims should +have been made and written down at some earlier period.] + + +On the field of battle, + +[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] + + +the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of +gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence +the institution of banners and flags. + +24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and +eyes of the host may be focussed on one particular point. + +[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the +same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be +like those of a single man."!] + + +25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either +for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. + +[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance +against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a +story in this connection of Wu Ch’i, when he was fighting against the +Ch’in State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of +matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the +enemy, and returned to camp. Wu Ch’i had the man instantly executed, +whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a +good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch’i replied: "I +fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he +acted without orders."] + + +This is the art of handling large masses of men. + +26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, +and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing +the ears and eyes of your army. + +[Ch’en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to Ho-yang at the head +of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches, +that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not +dare to dispute their passage.] + + +27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; + +["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade +all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be +irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest +when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue +not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have +worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of +their keen spirit." Li Ch’uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found +in the _Tso Chuan_, year 10, § 1) of Ts’ao Kuei, a protege of Duke +Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch’i, and the duke was +about to join battle at Ch’ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy’s +drums, when Ts’ao said: "Not just yet." Only after their drums had +beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then they +fought, and the men of Ch’i were utterly defeated. Questioned +afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts’ao Kuei +replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first +roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is +already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I +attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence +our victory." Wu Tzŭ (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four +important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a whole +army—a mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man alone: such +is the influence of spirit!"] + + +a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. + +[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general’s most important +asset. It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and +to inspire courage into the panic-stricken." The great general Li Ching +(A.D. 571-649) has a saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in +assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it +must include the art of assailing the enemy’s mental equilibrium."] + + +28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; + +[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle +of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, +whereas Hannibal’s men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, +liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.] + + +by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent +only on returning to camp. + +29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is +keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This +is the art of studying moods. + +30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and +hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. + +31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait +at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while +the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength. + +32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect +order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident +array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. + +33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor +to oppose him when he comes downhill. + +34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers +whose temper is keen. + +35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. + +[Li Ch’uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, +take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been +poisoned by the enemy. Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that +the saying has a wider application.] + + +Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. + +[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by +saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to +the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too +dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han +Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth +homewards." A marvelous tale is told of Ts’ao Ts’ao’s courage and +resource in ch. 1 of the _San Kuo Chi_, In 198 A.D., he was besieging +Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to +cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his +troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were +guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. +In this desperate plight Ts’ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a +tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the +whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear, while +Ts’ao himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were +thrown into confusion and annihilated. Ts’ao Ts’ao said afterwards: +"The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to +battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] + + +36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. + +[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The +object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road +to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair." +Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."] + + +Do not press a desperate foe too hard. + +[Ch’en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay +will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has +burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake +all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho +Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of +Yen-ch’ing. That general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was +surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. +The country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force was +soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, +and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the +moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch’ing +exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our country +than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A strong gale happened +to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense +clouds of sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had +abated before deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer, +Li Shou-cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: +"They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm our +numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the strenuous +fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, Fu +Yen-ch’ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his +cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to +safety.] + + +37. Such is the art of warfare. + +[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. + +[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" +(Longmans, 1907), p. 29. + + + +Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS + +[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzŭ does +not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us +(V §§ 6-11) that such deflections from the ordinary course are +practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, +who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it +means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost +degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out +to be, but it has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine +Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yu. The +only other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost—a +supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some +weight.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the +sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces. + +[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may +have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to +the chapter.] + + +2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high +roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in +dangerously isolated positions. + +[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the +beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu +defines this situation as being situated across the frontier, in +hostile territory. Li Ch’uan says it is "country in which there are no +springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, +"one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to +advance."] + + +In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate +position, you must fight. + +3. There are roads which must not be followed, + +["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch’uan, +"where an ambush is to be feared."] + + +armies which must be not attacked, + +[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be +attacked." Ch’en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival +advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from +attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strength."] + + +towns which must not be besieged, + +[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own +experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the +city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the +heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the +subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. +Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be +held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." Hsun Ying, when +urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and +well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great feat +of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In +the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. +It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, +countermarches and manœuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste +men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a +province." [1] ] + + +positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which +must not be obeyed. + +[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for +authority, and Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: +"Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a +military commander is the negation of civil order!" The unpalatable +fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated +to military necessity.] + + +4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany +variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. + +5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted +with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn +his knowledge to practical account. + +[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only +securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in +every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is +characterized by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a +certain variability of plan. How it is possible to turn these natural +features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by +versatility of mind?"] + + +6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying +his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will +fail to make the best use of his men. + +[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally +advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it +must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a +town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can +be stormed, it must be attempted; and if consistent with military +operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed." But there are +circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages. +For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if +he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has +laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may +be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely +to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.] + + +7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of +disadvantage will be blended together. + +["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says +Ts’ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your +mind."] + + +8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may +succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. + +[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must +not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the +enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into +our calculations."] + + +9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always +ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from +misfortune. + +[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, +I must consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my +own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels +these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in +liberating myself…. For instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and +only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will +incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to +encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the +advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils." See the +story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.] + + +10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; + +[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of +which would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the enemy’s +best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. +Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be +rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension +between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful +contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his +treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into +excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely +women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of +Sun Tzŭ here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer +injury, and he will submit of his own accord."] + + +and make trouble for them, + +[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble +should be made for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we +might say, "assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich +exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of +commands." These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.] + + +and keep them constantly engaged; + +[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent them from +having any rest."] + + +hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. + +[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use +of: "cause them to forget _pien_ (the reasons for acting otherwise than +on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction."] + + +11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the +enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the +chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made +our position unassailable. + +12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) +Recklessness, which leads to destruction; + +["Bravery without forethought," as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes +a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an +opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but +may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.: +"In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay +exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one +out of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave +man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without +any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, +too, makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one’s death does not +bring about victory."] + + +(2) cowardice, which leads to capture; + +[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as +being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an +advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of +danger." Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on +returning alive," this is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as +Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing +to take risks. T’ai Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will +subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu +pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle +with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered only a +few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan +Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be +overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so +that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural +result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly +quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with +fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in the fray, +Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled +for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat +similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who during +a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness +for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get +across.] + + +(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; + +[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, +Teng Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to +fight. Teng Ch’iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and +easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, +then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to +battle, it is doomed to be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao +Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s +pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.] + + +(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame; + +This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect +in a general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated +sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung +by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though +somewhat paradoxically: "The seeker after glory should be careless of +public opinion."] + + +(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and +trouble. + +[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless +of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger +of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate +comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long +run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the +prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken +feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered +city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his +military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated +efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many +strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, +relief came through the very man who started out with the distinct +resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to +sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who +failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to +defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his men." +By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of +Sun Tzŭ’s mouth.] + + +13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the +conduct of war. + +14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will +surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a +subject of meditation. + +[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50. + + + +Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH + +[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1 +than by this heading.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and +observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in +the neighbourhood of valleys. + +[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to +supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural +ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following +anecdote: Wu-tu Ch’iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later +Han, and Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch’iang having found +a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but +seized all the favourable positions commanding supplies of water and +forage. Ch’iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of +provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not +know the advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood of valleys."] + + +2. Camp in high places, + +[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the +surrounding country.] + + +facing the sun. + +[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch’en Hao "facing east." +Cf. infra, §§ 11, 13. + + +Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. + +3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. + +["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts’ao +Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your +evolutions." The _T’ung Tien_ reads, "If _the enemy_ crosses a river," +etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly an +interpolation.] + + +4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not +advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army +get across, and then deliver your attack. + +[Li Ch’uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu +at the Wei River. Turning to the _Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 34, fol. 6 +verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were +drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered +his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct +a dam higher up. Then, leading half his army across, he attacked Lung +Chu; but after a time, pretending to have failed in his attempt, he +hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this +unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was +really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his +turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus +releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the +greater portion of Lung Chu’s army from getting across. He then turned +upon the force which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu +himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further +bank, also scattered and fled in all directions.] + + +5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader +near a river which he has to cross. + +[For fear of preventing his crossing.] + + +6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. + +[See _supra_, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with +water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops +marshalled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; +in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing +the sun." The other commentators are not at all explicit.] + + +Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. + +[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on +the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the +sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that +‘in river warfare we must not advance against the stream,’ which is as +much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the +enemy, for then they would be able to take advantage of the current and +make short work of us." There is also the danger, noted by other +commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be +carried down to us.] + + +So much for river warfare. + +7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over +them quickly, without any delay. + +[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, +and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to +attack.] + + +8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass +near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. + +[Li Ch’uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous +where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect +the rear.] + + +So much for operations in salt-marshes. + +9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with +rising ground to your right and on your rear, + +[Tu Mu quotes T’ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a +marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."] + + +so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for +campaigning in flat country. + +10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge + +[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, +and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon’s "Military Maxims," no. 1.] + + +which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. + +[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch’en asks, with some +plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known +of Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The _Shih Chi_ (ch. 1 +ad init.) speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch’ih Yu. In the +_Liu T’ao_ it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified +the Empire." Ts’ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was +the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of +whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li +Ch’uan tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who +received it from his Minister Feng Hou.] + + +11. All armies prefer high ground to low, + +["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch’en, "is not only more agreeable and +salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low +ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for +fighting."] + + +and sunny places to dark. + +12. If you are careful of your men, + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn +out your animals to graze."] + + +and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every +kind, + +[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak +of illness."] + + +and this will spell victory. + +13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the +slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of +your soldiers and utilise the natural advantages of the ground. + +14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you +wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it +subsides. + +15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running +between, deep natural hollows, + +The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, +with pools of water at the bottom."] + + +confined places, + +[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by +precipices on three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."] + + +tangled thickets, + +[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears +cannot be used."] + + +quagmires + +[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable +for chariots and horsemen."] + + +and crevasses, + +[Defined by Mei Yao-ch’en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling +cliffs." Tu Mu’s note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and +intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but +Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and +Chang Yu takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the +commentators certainly inclines to the rendering "defile." But the +ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a crack or fissure" +and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence +indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun +Tzŭ is here speaking of crevasses.] + + +should be left with all possible speed and not approached. + +16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to +approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on +his rear. + +17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly +country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with +reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed +out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious +spies are likely to be lurking. + +[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors +who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and +overhearing our instructions."] + + +18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on +the natural strength of his position. + +[Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is +so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. +Baden-Powell’s "Aids to Scouting."] + + +19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious +for the other side to advance. + +[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to +dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to +force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less +probability of our responding to the challenge."] + + +20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a +bait. + +21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is +advancing. + +[Ts’ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and +Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and +observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are +moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to clear a +passage for the enemy’s march."] + + +The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means +that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. + +[Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts’ao Kung’s, is as follows: "The +presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick +vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, +has constructed these hiding-places in order to make us suspect an +ambush." It appears that these "screens" were hastily knotted together +out of any long grass which the retreating enemy happened to come +across.] + + +22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. + +[Chang Yu’s explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying +along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers +are in ambush at the spot beneath."] + + +Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. + +23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of +chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, +it betokens the approach of infantry. + +["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat +exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon +by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more +dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-track, whereas +foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many abreast. According to +Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have scouts some way in +advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will gallop back and +report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you +move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar +for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting +up, glitter of arms, etc." [1] ] + + +When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties +have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and +fro signify that the army is encamping. + +[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light +horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak +and strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity +of dust and its motion."] + + +24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is +about to advance. + +["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object +is to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack +us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of T’ien Tan of the Ch’i-mo against +the Yen forces, led by Ch’i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the _Shih Chi_ we read: +"T’ien Tan openly said: ‘My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off +the noses of their Ch’i prisoners and place them in the front rank to +fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other +side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; +but those within the city were enraged at seeing their +fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should +fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend themselves more +obstinately than ever. Once again T’ien Tan sent back converted spies +who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is that the +men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by +inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become +faint-hearted.’ Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and +burned the corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, +witnessing the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were +all impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased tenfold. +T’ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise. +But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in his hands, and +ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, while the +ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served +out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The +regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were +manned with the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys +were dispatched to the enemy’s camp to arrange terms of surrender, +whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T’ien Tan also collected +20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the wealthy citizens +of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the prayer that, when the +town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be plundered or +their women to be maltreated. Ch’i Chieh, in high good humor, granted +their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and careless. +Meanwhile, T’ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them with +pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored +stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased +rushes on their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the +rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had +pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked +warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the +enemy’s camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for +their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their +bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom +they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up +with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At +the same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those +that remained behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums +and hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed +by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly +pursued by the men of Ch’i, who succeeded in slaying their general Ch’i +Chien…. The result of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some +seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch’i State."] + + +Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that +he will retreat. + +25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on +the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. + +26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. + +[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch’uan indicates "a treaty confirmed +by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand, +simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."] + + +27. When there is much running about + +[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental +banner.] + + +and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has +come. + +28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. + +29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint +from want of food. + +30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, +the army is suffering from thirst. + +[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from the +behavior of a single man."] + + +31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to +secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. + +32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. + +[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch’en Hao says, +the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] + + +Clamour by night betokens nervousness. + +33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is +weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If +the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary. + +[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an +army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with +fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them.] + + +34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for +food, + +[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and +the horses chiefly on grass.] + + +and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, +showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that +they are determined to fight to the death. + +[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. +71, given in abbreviated form by the _P’ei Wen Yun Fu:_ "The rebel Wang +Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch’en- ts’ang, and Huang-fu +Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out against +him. The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear +to his counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to +throw down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was not advancing to +the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a principle of war not to pursue +desperate men and not to press a retreating host.’ Sung answered: ‘That +does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not a +retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganized +multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advances to the +attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo +being slain."] + + +35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in +subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. + +36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his +resources; + +[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always +a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good +temper.] + + +too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. + +[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity +is necessary to keep the men to their duty.] + + +37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s +numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. + +[I follow the interpretation of Ts’ao Kung, also adopted by Li Ch’uan, +Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, Chia +Lin, Mei Tao-ch’en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first +tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, +etc." This would connect the sentence with what went before about +rewards and punishments.] + + +38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign +that the enemy wishes for a truce. + +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages, +it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because +their strength is exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly +needs a Sun Tzŭ to draw such an obvious inference.] + + +39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a +long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, +the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. + +[Ts’ao Kung says a manœuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain +time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.] + + +40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply +sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. + +[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, _cheng_ tactics and +frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.] + + +What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, +keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. + +[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in +squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch’uan, who appears to +offer the simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will +win." Fortunately we have Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in +language which is lucidity itself: "When the numbers are even, and no +favourable opening presents itself, although we may not be strong enough +to deliver a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst +our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces and +keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But +we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." He then quotes +from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary troops may +be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that +figure."] + + +41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is +sure to be captured by them. + +[Ch’en Hao, quoting from the _Tso Chuan_, says: "If bees and scorpions +carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, +then, should not be treated with contempt."] + + +42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, +they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be +practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, +punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless. + +43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with +humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. + +[Yen Tzŭ [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues +endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in +awe." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander unites culture with +a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination of +hardness and tenderness."] + + +This is a certain road to victory. + +44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army +will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. + +45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his +orders being obeyed, + +[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly +confidence in his men and also make his authority respected, so that +when they come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline +maintained, because they all trust and look up to him." What Sun Tzŭ +has said in § 44, however, would lead one rather to expect something +like this: "If a general is always confident that his orders will be +carried out," etc."] + + +the gain will be mutual. + +[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his +command, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the +gain is mutual." He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. +4: "The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders +and not to be swayed by petty doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are +the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army.] + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26. + + + +Chapter X. TERRAIN + +[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with +"terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six +calamities" are discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is +again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, +perhaps, on that account.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) +Accessible ground; + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of +communications."] + + +(2) entangling ground; + +[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you +become entangled."] + + +(3) temporising ground; + +[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] + + +(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great +distance from the enemy. + +[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this +classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the +Chinaman’s unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as +the above.] + + +2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called +_accessible_. + +3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in +occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of +supplies. + +[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, +"not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of +Napoleon’s dictum, "the secret of war lies in the communications," [1] +we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had done more than skirt the edge of this +important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: +"The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an +army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who +finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, and his +own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, +and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander +whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false +position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his +plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, +and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time +to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will +entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army." [2] + + +Then you will be able to fight with advantage. + +4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called +_entangling_. + +5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may +sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your +coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, +disaster will ensue. + +6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the +first move, it is called _temporising_ ground. + +[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the +situation remains at a deadlock."] + + +7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an +attractive bait, + +[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But +this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our +position.] + + +it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus +enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come +out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. + +8. With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first, let +them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. + +[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and +by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our +mercy."] + + +9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after +him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly +garrisoned. + +10. With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with +your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there +wait for him to come up. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and +defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." +[For the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. +Chang Yu tells the following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. +619-682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic +tribes. "At night he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been +completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders +that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was +highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the +extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien, +however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as +quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which +flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve +feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned +that they had been in the wrong. ‘How did you know what was going to +happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward +be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ From +this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places +are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are +immune from disastrous floods."] + + +11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but +retreat and try to entice him away. + +[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D. against the +two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of +Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou +Chien-te persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was +defeated and taken prisoner. See _Chiu T’ang Shu_, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, +and also ch. 54.] + + +12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the +strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a +battle, + +[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and +wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be +exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."] + + +and fighting will be to your disadvantage. + +13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. + +[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § +8.] + + +The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to +study them. + +14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from +natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. +These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) +disorganisation; (6) rout. + +15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against +another ten times its size, the result will be the _flight_ of the +former. + +16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too +weak, the result is _insubordination_. + +[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [_Hsin T’ang Shu_, ch. 148], +who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against +Wang T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers +treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority +by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien +Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some +months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops +turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the +unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.] + + +When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the +result is _collapse_. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the +common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] + + +17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on +meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of +resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is +in a position to fight, the result is _ruin_. + +[Wang Hsi’s note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause, +and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate +officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of +ruin upon his head."] + + +18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are +not clear and distinct; + +[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with +decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves +are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds +about doing their duty." General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the +words: "The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men +lies in one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they +receive." [3] Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a +military leader is difference; the worst calamities that befall an army +arise from hesitation."] + + +when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, + +[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."] + + +and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is +utter _disorganisation_. + +19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an +inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment +against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the +front rank, the result must be a _rout_. + +[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues: +"Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be +appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the +resolution of our own men and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi +ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).] + + +20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully +noted by the general who has attained a responsible post. + +[See _supra_, § 13.] + + +21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; + +[Ch’en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to +those connected with ground."] + + +but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of +victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and +distances, constitutes the test of a great general. + +22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into +practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises +them, will surely be defeated. + +23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even +though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, +then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding. + +[Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, who is said +to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the _San +Lueh_, has these words attributed to him: "The responsibility of +setting an army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance +and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will +hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened +monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country’s +cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that +"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military +commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees +from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."] + + +24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without +fearing disgrace, + +[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for +a soldier is to retreat.] + + +whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for +his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. + +[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." +Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would +not regret his conduct."] + + +25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you +into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and +they will stand by you even unto death. + +[Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture +of the famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have +frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the +same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a +horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations +wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his +soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch’i himself sucked out +the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, began wailing and +lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your son is +only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has +sucked the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago, +Lord Wu performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him +afterwards, and finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And +now that he has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I +know not where.’" Li Ch’uan mentions the Viscount of Ch’u, who invaded +the small state of Hsiao during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to +him: "Many of the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he +made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and +straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with +floss silk.] + + +26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority +felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, +moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to +spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose. + +[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, +they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of +stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was +occupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his +army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by +force. Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who +happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat +belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation +helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that the +fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be allowed to +palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his +summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did +so. This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from +that time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked +up.] + + +27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are +unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway +towards victory. + +[That is, Ts’ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."] + + +28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that +our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway +towards victory. + +[Cf. III. § 13 (1).] + + +29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our +men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of +the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only +halfway towards victory. + +30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; +once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. + +[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures +so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move +recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no +mistakes."] + + +31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your +victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you +may make your victory complete. + +[Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three things—the +affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of +earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."] + + +[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. + +[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. + +[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii. + + + +Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: +(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) +open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; +(7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. + +2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive +ground. + +[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious +to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity +afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their +advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack the valor of desperation, and +when they retreat, they will find harbors of refuge."] + + +3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great +distance, it is facile ground. + +[Li Ch’uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating," +and the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: +"When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and +bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no +hankering after home."] + + +4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either +side, is contentious ground. + +[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung +says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the +strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus, +Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, +even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in +check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.: +"For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is +nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning from +his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far +as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou, +taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, plotted +against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, +governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from +his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and +mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we +shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. +Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, +thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are +prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or +if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we could make a +stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and +resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the +enormous strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act +on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.] + + +5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. + +[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this +type of ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network +of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which +intercommunication is easy."] + + +6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, + +[Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a +third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small +principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on +the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.] + + +so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, + +[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most +of them to become his allies.] + + +is ground of intersecting highways. + +7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, +leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. + +[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached +such a point, its situation is serious."] + + +8. Mountain forests, + +[Or simply "forests."] + + +rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: +this is difficult ground. + +9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can +only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy +would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in +ground. + +10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting +without delay, is desperate ground. + +[The situation, as pictured by Ts’ao Kung, is very similar to the +"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible: "A +lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, +retreat blocked." Ch’en Hao says: "to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like +sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu +quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus +entrapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid +of local guides:—it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy’s +mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so +perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots +carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no +choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to +range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming +strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take +a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a +pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none of us +has a moment’s respite. If we simply maintain our ground, whole days +and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain +the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, destitute +of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of life, +the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of +strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man +defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offense +in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by +ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant +soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with +the slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of the +awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians +under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].] + + +11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt +not. On contentious ground, attack not. + +[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous +position first. So Ts’ao Kung. Li Ch’uan and others, however, suppose +the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that +it would be sheer madness to attack. In the _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, when the +King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: +"The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession +have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is +secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by +pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash +for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and +raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best +troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will +sally forth to the rescue."] + + +12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. + +[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking +force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available +here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s +brief note: "Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own +army is not cut off.] + + +On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. + +[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states."] + + +13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. + +[On this, Li Ch’uan has the following delicious note: "When an army +penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to +alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han +Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch’in territory was marked by no +violation of women or looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 +B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies that +entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the +present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not +‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’" Alas, I fear that in this instance +the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, +has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ +there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility +of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by +bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the +enemy."] + + +In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. + +[Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, "do not encamp.] + + +14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. + +[Ts’au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu +amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be +devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in +deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what +happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the +mountains on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by +the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his +foes was remarkably like that which T’ien Tan had also employed with +success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, note.] When night came +on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and +set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the +mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The +strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and +discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and +Hannibal’s army passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. +93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.] + + +On desperate ground, fight. + +[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is +a chance of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your +corner."] + + +15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a +wedge between the enemy’s front and rear; + +[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each +other."] + + +to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to +hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from +rallying their men. + +16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from +concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep +them in disorder. + +17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when +otherwise, they stopped still. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded in +thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure +any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, +they would remain where they were."] + + +18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly +array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin +by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be +amenable to your will." + +[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts’ao Kung thinks it +is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu +says: "The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the +accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our +favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard +his own communications." Our object then must be to thwart his plans in +these three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] By +boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other +side on the defensive.] + + +19. Rapidity is the essence of war: + +[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in +warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military +science, and the chief business of the general." The following +anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the importance attached to speed by +two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor of +Hsin-ch’eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to +the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko +Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then +military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta’s treachery, he +at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having +previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import. +Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued himself +with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we +make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we +ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and +before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of forced +marches, be brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’eng with in a +space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to +Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 _li_ from here. When the news of my revolt +reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it +will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time +my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come +himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth +troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled with +consternation: "Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my +allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What miraculous +rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- ch’eng had fallen and Meng +Ta had lost his head. [See _Chin Shu_, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li +Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the successful +rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou +Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, Hsiao +Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down +through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching +embarked his army without loss of time, and was just about to start +when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until +the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation. Li Ching +replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount +importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to +strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army +together. If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we +shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the +thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against +it. [See VII. § 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if +he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in +such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full +fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, and +Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people +should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.] + + +take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected +routes, and attack unguarded spots. + +20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading +force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be +the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail +against you. + +21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with +food. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 13. Li Ch’uan does not venture on a note here.] + + +22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, + +[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give them +plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally."] + + +and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your +strength. + +[Ch’en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous +general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the +success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch’u State, where a +universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the +temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remained +strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch’u general try to force a +battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not +come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the +affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be +well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for +bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them +into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he told +off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. +The answer was, that they were contending with one another in putting +the weight and long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard that they were +engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been +strung up to the required pitch and that they were now ready for +fighting. By this time the Ch’u army, after repeating their challenge +again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch’in +general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the +battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly +afterwards, the whole of Ch’u was conquered by Ch’in, and the king +Fu-ch’u led into captivity.] + + +Keep your army continually on the move, + +[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has +struck me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army +together."] + + +and devise unfathomable plans. + +23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and +they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is +nothing they may not achieve. + +[Chang Yu quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): "If one man were to +run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to +get our of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage +and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a +desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even +terms."] + + +Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. + +[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will +surely exert their united strength to get out of it."] + + +24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there +is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart +of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no +help for it, they will fight hard. + +25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be +constantly on the _qui vive;_ without waiting to be asked, they will do +your will; + +[Literally, "without asking, you will get."] + + +without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, +they can be trusted. + +26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious +doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. + +[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate +into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes +Huang Shih-kung: "‘Spells and incantations should be strictly +forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the +fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers’ minds should be seriously +perturbed.’ The meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and +scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution +until they die."] + + +27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because +they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it +is not because they are disinclined to longevity. + +[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are +things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they +burn or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not +that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzŭ +is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the +general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not +thrown in their way.] + + +28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, + +[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate more +genuine grief than tears alone.] + + +those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting +the tears run down their cheeks. + +[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts’ao Kung says, "all +have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that +the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their +emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the I River +between Ching K’o and his friends, when the former was sent to attempt +the life of the King of Ch’in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. +The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and +uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the +burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ] + + +But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage +of a Chu or a Kuei. + +[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and +contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang, +better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with +a dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a +banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was immediately hacked to +pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero +referred to, Ts’ao Kuei (or Ts’ao Mo), performed the exploit which has +made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice +defeated by Ch’i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering +a large slice of territory, when Ts’ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan Kung, +the Duke of Ch’i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger +against his chest. None of the duke’s retainers dared to move a muscle, +and Ts’ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring the Lu +was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker +state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, +whereupon Ts’ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his +place amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed +color. As was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate +the bargain, but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him +the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold +stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched +battles.] + + +29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the +_shuai-jan_ is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains. + +["_Shuai-jan_" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question +was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through +this passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the +sense of "military manœuvers."] + + +Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its +tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and +you will be attacked by head and tail both. + +30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, + +[That is, as Mei Yao-ch’en says, "Is it possible to make the front and +rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as +though they were part of a single living body?"] + + +I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are +enemies; + +[Cf. VI. § 21.] + + +yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a +storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand +helps the right. + +[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of +common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound +together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet +it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of +cooperation, especially in the case of allied armies.] + + +31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of +horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground. + +[These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall +the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the +battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one +spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to +render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed +unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a +spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be +learned from the _shuai-jan_.] + + +32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard +of courage which all must reach. + +[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] +one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it +follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be +of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain +standard. Wellington’s seemingly ungrateful description of his army at +Waterloo as "the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that +it was deficient in this important particular—unity of spirit and +courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept +those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the +day.] + + +33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question +involving the proper use of ground. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en’s paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences +of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize +accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in +strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more +exposed terrain. The advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority +in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the +text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to +think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no +means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions… +and to the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are +defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural +features." [2] ] + + +34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were +leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. + +[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does +it."] + + +35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure +secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. + +36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports +and appearances, + +[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] + + +and thus keep them in total ignorance. + +[Ts’ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops must +not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only +rejoice with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and +surprise the enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been +frequently pointed out. But how about the other process—the +mystification of one’s own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is +over-emphatic on this point would do well to read Col. Henderson’s +remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," +he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most +trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his +thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced useless"—etc. +etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the _Hou Han +Shu_, "Pan Ch’ao took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other +Central Asian states with the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of +Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commander to succour the place +with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t’ou, +totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch’ao summoned his officers and also the King +of Khotan to a council of war, and said: ‘Our forces are now +outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, +then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different +direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, +and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the +evening drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch’ao now secretly +released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha +was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set +off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch’ao’s retreat +in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in +order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch’ao knew that +the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them +well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, +as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, +and were closely pursued by Pan Ch’ao. Over 5000 heads were brought +back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and +cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, +Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From +that time forward, Pan Ch’ao’s prestige completely overawed the +countries of the west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general +not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but +actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive +the enemy.] + + +37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, + +[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice.] + + +he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. + +[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that war +is based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy. +You must deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but +without letting them know why."] + + +By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the +enemy from anticipating his purpose. + +38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has +climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He +carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. + +[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. § 15), that is, takes some +decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like +Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch’en Hao, +followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as "puts forth +every artifice at his command."] + + +39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd +driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and +none knows whither he is going. + +[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or +retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and +conquering."] + + +40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the +business of the general. + +[Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilization there should be no delay in +aiming a blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again +to this point. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was +no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the +armies of today.] + + +41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; + +[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules +for the nine varieties of ground."] + + +the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental +laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be +studied. + +42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that +penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means +dispersion. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 20.] + + +43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across +neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. + +[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not +figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X. +One’s first impulse would be to translate it distant ground," but this, +if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. +Mei Yao-ch’en says it is "a position not far enough advanced to be +called ‘facile,’ and not near enough to home to be ‘dispersive,’ but +something between the two." Wang Hsi says: "It is ground separated from +home by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to cross in +order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business +there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which +is the reason why it is not included among the Nine Situations.] + + +When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is +one of intersecting highways. + +44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. +When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. + +45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow +passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of +refuge at all, it is desperate ground. + +46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity +of purpose. + +[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the +defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. _supra_, § 11.] + + +On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between +all parts of my army. + +[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible +contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden +attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. § 17. Mei Yao-ch’en says: +"On the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an +encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications."] + + +47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. + +[This is Ts’ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We +must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach +the goal." That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way +apart. Mei Yao-ch’en offers another equally plausible explanation: +"Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we +are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute +its possession." Ch’en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy +has had time to select his own ground, quotes VI. § 1, where Sun Tzŭ +warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the +situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a favourable +position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to +occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make +a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, +and victory will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao She beat +the army of Ch’in. (See p. 57.)] + + +48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On +ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. + +49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of +supplies. + +[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as +one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.] + + +On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. + +50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. + +[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position, +whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s +lines." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with +desperation." Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run +away." Tu Mu points out that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where +it is the enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards +Emperor and canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under +Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small, +consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. The +lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps +being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to +escape, actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets +himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped +together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing +for it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary +pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that +the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught.] + + +On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness +of saving their lives. + +Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores +and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and +make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to +the death." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving +up all hope of it." This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about +"grounds" and the "variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the +passages which bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be +struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is +treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § 2 to enumerate "variations" +before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, namely +nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is not included +in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion +of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six +variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though +the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next +chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par +excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down +to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, +8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed +in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once +more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and 7, +being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to +account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts +maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, +should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is +an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. +Several of these are defined twice over, besides which there are two +distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the +chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. +I do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the +general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work cannot have come down to us in +the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective +and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain matter that has +either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.] + + +51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate +resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, +and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger. + +[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch’ao’s devoted followers in 73 +A.D. The story runs thus in the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47: "When Pan Ch’ao +arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at +first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his +behavior underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. +Pan Ch’ao spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you +noticed,’ he said, ‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? +This must signify that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, +and that consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with +which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly +wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have come to +pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ Thereupon +he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, and +set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu +who arrived some day ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between +surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch’ao, +keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a +general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began +drinking with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a +little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them +thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated region, +anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now it +happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom +only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy +extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this +envoy prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the +Hsiung-no, our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert. +What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers replied: ‘Standing as +we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life +and death.’ For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1, +note.] + + +52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are +acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the +march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains +and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We +shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make +use of local guides. + +[These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12-14—in order to +emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to +regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the +following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have added +that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their +treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): +Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the +neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be +occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of +Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of +Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that +direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost +arrived.] + + +53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles +does not befit a warlike prince. + +54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship +shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He +overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining +against him. + +[Mei Tao-ch’en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so +much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you +can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you +have a superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you +overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will be frightened; and if +the neighbouring states are frightened, the enemy’s allies will be +prevented from joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning: +"If the great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to +summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and refrain +from massing their forces." Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu take the sentence in +quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may be, +if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, +and must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with +this, and with overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries +to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his +view thus: "If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will +be discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our +display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the +other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us."] + + +55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor +does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret +designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. + +[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch’uan, appears to be this: Secure +against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject +entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his +prestige enable him to dispense with external friendships."] + + +Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. + +[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State +became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which +the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final +triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up his previous note, +thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded +selfishness and haughty isolation.] + + +56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, + +[Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and +retreat be heavily punished."] + + +issue orders + +[Literally, "hang" or post up."] + + +without regard to previous arrangements; + +["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is +made clear by Ts’ao Kung’s quotation from the _Ssu-ma Fa:_ "Give +instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see +deserving deeds." Ts’ao Kung’s paraphrase: "The final instructions you +give to your army should not correspond with those that have been +previously posted up." Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements +should not be divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says: "there should be +no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not only is there danger in +letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the entire +reversal of them at the last moment.] + + +and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do +with but a single man. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 34.] + + +57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know +your design. + +[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for +any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no +reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a +general than to a judge.] + + +When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them +nothing when the situation is gloomy. + +58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it +into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. + +[These words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of +the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already +alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, +and halted ten miles from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the +enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body +of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red +flag. Their instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles +and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me in +full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their fortifications +and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck down +the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their stead." +Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a +strong position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he +sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I +should turn back and escape through the mountains." So saying, he first +of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them +to form in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this +manœuver, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By this time +it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo’s +flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately +engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time; +until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and +banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where +another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them +and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but +the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was +fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the +2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao +following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, +tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the +Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags +struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and +overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of +their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on +them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a number and +capturing the rest, amongst whom was King Ya himself…. After the +battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and said: "In the _Art +of War_ we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a +river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun +Tzŭ and T’ai Kung. See IX § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, ordered +us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these +conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general +replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with +sufficient care. Is it not written there: ‘Plunge your army into +desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly +peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the usual course, I should +never have been able to bring my colleague round. What says the +Military Classic—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off +to fight.’ [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun +Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were +obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow +his own discretion, there would have been a general _débandade_, and it +would have been impossible to do anything with them." The officers +admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These are higher tactics +than we should have been capable of." [See _Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 34, +ff. 4, 5.] ] + + +59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is +capable of striking a blow for victory. + +[Danger has a bracing effect.] + + +60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves +to the enemy’s purpose. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"—by an appearance of yielding and +falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yu’s note makes the meaning +clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do +so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out +his intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous +before we deliver our attack.] + + +61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, + +[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in +one direction." Ts’ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the +enemy." But such a violent displacement of characters is quite +indefensible.] + + +we shall succeed in the long run + +[Literally, "after a thousand _li_."] + + +in killing the commander-in-chief. + +[Always a great point with the Chinese.] + + +62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. + +63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier +passes, destroy the official tallies, + +[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as +a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the +"border-warden" of _Lun Yu_ III. 24, who may have had similar duties. +When this half was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was +authorized to open the gate and let the traveler through.] + + +and stop the passage of all emissaries. + +[Either to or from the enemy’s country.] + + +64. Be stern in the council-chamber, + +[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the +sovereign.] + + +so that you may control the situation. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the +strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.] + + +65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. + +66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, + +[Cf. _supra_, § 18.] + + +and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. + +[Ch’en Hao’s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favourable position, +but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus obtained +cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore, to +occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an +artful appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him +into going there as well." Mei Yao-ch’en explains that this "artful +appointment" is to be made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies, +who will carry back just the amount of information that we choose to +give them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our intentions, "we must +manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. § +4). We must start after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we +must arrive before him in order to capture the place without trouble. +Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch’en’s +interpretation of § 47.] + + +67. Walk in the path defined by rule, + +[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this +cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is +unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the +sense yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we +know, according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won +his battles by violating every accepted canon of warfare.] + + +and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive +battle. + +[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable +opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall +prove decisive."] + + +68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy +gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running +hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you. + +[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly +appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzŭ was thinking only of its +speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy +as quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] + + +[1] Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. + +[2] "The Science of War," p. 333. + +[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. + + + +Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE + +[Rather more than half the chapter (§§ 1-13) is devoted to the subject +of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first +is to burn soldiers in their camp; + +[So Tu Mu. Li Ch’uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the +soldiers" (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on +a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note], +found himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an +envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In +consultation with his officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never +win! [1] The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire +on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will not be able to +discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate +them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover us with +glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all +replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the +Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is today,’ he cried, +‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum +civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and +everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy +fate for valiant warriors.’ All then agreed to do as he wished. +Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly +made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the +time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind +the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot +up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The +rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade +at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the +windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose +on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in +frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao slew three of them with his own hand, while +his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. +The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On +the following day, Pan Ch’ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted +hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think, +Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied Kuo Hsun, +and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the +head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and +trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public +proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostage, he returned to +make his report to Tou Ku." _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ] + + +the second is to burn stores; + +[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the +rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the +Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a +policy which in the long run proved entirely successful.] + + +the third is to burn baggage-trains; + +[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao’s wagons and +impedimenta by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.] + + +the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; + +[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines" are +the same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and +clothing. Cf. VII. § 11.] + + +the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. + +[Tu Yu says in the _T’ung Tien:_ "To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. +The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows +alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from +powerful crossbows into the enemy’s lines."] + + +2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. + +[T’sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy’s camp" are referred to. +But Ch’en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have +favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us." +Chia Lin says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."] + + +the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. + +[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter, +reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material +cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting +fires."] + + +3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special +days for starting a conflagration. + +4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days +are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the +Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; + +[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the +Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, +Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.] + + +for these four are all days of rising wind. + +5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible +developments: + +6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once +with an attack from without. + +7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain +quiet, bide your time and do not attack. + +[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into +confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is +ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.] + + +8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it +up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find +the difficulties too great, retire."] + + +9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do +not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a +favourable moment. + +[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire +breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of +incendiaries) inside the enemy’s camp. "But," he continues, "if the +enemy is settled in a waste place littered with quantities of grass, or +if he has pitched his camp in a position which can be burnt out, we +must carry our fire against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not +await on in hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our +opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and +thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once +baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking +advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese +general’s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in +the neighbourhood had already been burnt down. On the other hand, +Po-ts’ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in +184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple precaution. "At the head of +a large army he was besieging Ch’ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu +Sung. The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness +pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and +said: "In war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and +numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here quotes Sun +Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the +midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we +set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can +make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the +achievement of T’ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong +breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind +reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after +which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way +through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. +Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and +Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the +rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." [_Hou Han Shu_, +ch. 71.] +] +] +] +] +] +10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from +the leeward. + +[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will +retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he +will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A +rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in +the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the +attack yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side, +and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your +enemy."] + + +11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze +soon falls. + +[Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a +morning." (_Tao Te Ching_, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch’en and Wang Hsi say: +"A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. +This is what happens as a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be +correct enough, but how this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.] + + +12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be +known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the +proper days. + +[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, +and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before making our +attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: +"We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also +be on our guard against similar attacks from them."] + + +13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; +those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of +strength. + +14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of +all his belongings. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy’s road or +divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water +can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of +fire. This is the reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is +dismissed in a couple of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is +discussed in detail. Wu Tzŭ (ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements: +"If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy ground, from which the +water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, it may be +submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands +thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent +gales, it may be exterminated by fire."] + + +15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed +in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the +result is waste of time and general stagnation. + +[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. Ts’ao Kung +says: "Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day." +And Tu Mu: "If you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the +deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and +disaster will ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the +formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the +interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch’en alone, whose words I will +quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their battles and +assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come and not shrink +on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort to +such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What they must not +do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to the +advantages they have got."] + + +16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; +the good general cultivates his resources. + +[Tu Mu quotes the following from the _San Lueh_, ch. 2: "The warlike +prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by +good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, +there will be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not +be respected."] + + +17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless +there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is +critical. + +[Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so +far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the _Tao Te Ching_, +ch. 69. "I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the +defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."] + + +18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own +spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. + +19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where +you are. + +[This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an +interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately +on § 18.] + + +20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by +content. + +21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again +into being; + +[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.] + + +nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. + +22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full +of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army +intact. + +[1] "Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the +tiger’s cubs." + + + +Chapter XIII. THE USE OF SPIES + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching +them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on +the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a +thousand ounces of silver. + +[Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.] + + +There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down +exhausted on the highways. + +[Cf. _Tao Te Ching_, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered, +brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be +reminded of the saying: ‘On serious ground, gather in plunder.’ Why +then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the +highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of +munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the +injunction to ‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is +deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided +against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, +we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of +supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where +provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed +with."] + + +As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their +labor. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-tail." The +allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each +consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated +on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here +also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well +sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II. § 12, note.] In time of +war, one of the families had to serve in the army, while the other +seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men +(reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of +700,000 families would be affected.] + + +2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the +victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in +ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the +outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments, + +["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect +of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned +at this point.] + + +is the height of inhumanity. + +[Sun Tzŭ’s agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to +the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which +war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of +the enemy’s condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a +war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to +employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless +they are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false +economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, +when every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. +This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun +Tzŭ concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a +crime against humanity.] + + +3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his +sovereign, no master of victory. + +[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the +national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., +these memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch’u State: +"The [Chinese] character for ‘prowess’ is made up of [the characters +for] ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear’ (cessation of hostilities). Military +prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of +weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm +establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, +putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."] + + +4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike +and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is +_foreknowledge_. + +[That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means to +do.] + + +5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be +obtained inductively from experience, + +[Tu Mu’s note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by +reasoning from other analogous cases."] + + +nor by any deductive calculation. + +[Li Ch’uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and +magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human +actions cannot be so calculated."] + + +6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from +other men. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the +spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural +science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe +can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an +enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone."] + + +7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local +spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) +surviving spies. + +8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the +secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It +is the sovereign’s most precious faculty. + +[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry +leaders, had officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it was to +collect all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts +and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was traceable to the +previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves thus gained." [1] ] + + +9. Having _local spies_ means employing the services of the inhabitants +of a district. + +[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind +treatment, and use them as spies."] + + +10. Having _inward spies_, making use of officials of the enemy. + +[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in +this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals +who have undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy +for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or +who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are +anxious that their side should be defeated in order that they may have +a chance of displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who +always want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several +kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to one’s +interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able to +find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, ascertain the +plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the +harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." +The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward +spies," appears from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo +Shang, Governor of I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel +Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold at P’i. After each side had +experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse +to the services of a certain P’o-t’ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to +have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo +Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him from +inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right moment for +making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, march +out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head +with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’s bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung’s +general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; +and P’o-t’ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city +walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the +signal and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while +others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred +of Lo Shang’s soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom +was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces, +both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely." +[This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho Shih got the story +from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that of his +father Li T’e, _Chin Shu_, ch. 120, 121.] + + +11. Having _converted spies_, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and +using them for our own purposes. + +[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the +enemy’s service, and inducing them to carry back false information as +well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, +Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we pretend not to have detected him, but +contrive to let him carry away a false impression of what is going on. +Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative definition; +but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively proved by his +subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§ 21 +sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used +with conspicuous success: (1) by T’ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo +(see _supra_, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); +and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P’o was conducting a +defensive campaign against Ch’in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved +of Lien P’o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to +avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to +the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and +were already in Fan Chu’s pay. They said: "The only thing which causes +Ch’in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. Lien P’o they +consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in the long +run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao She. From his +boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war and military +matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no commander +in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much +disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he +spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if +ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of +Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own +mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed +Lien P’o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po +Ch’i and the great military power of Ch’in. He fell into a trap by +which his army was divided into two and his communications cut; and +after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished +soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and +his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put +to the sword.] + + +12. Having _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of +deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them +to the enemy. + +[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do +things calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe +that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are +captured in the enemy’s lines, they will make an entirely false report, +and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only to find that we do +something quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." +As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released +by Pan Ch’ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also +refers to T’ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T’ai Tsung to lull +the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was +able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang Yu says that the +Turks revenged themselves by killing T’ang Chien, but this is a +mistake, for we read in both the old and the New T’ang History (ch. 58, +fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on +until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when +sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch’i. He has +certainly more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of +Ch’i, being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and +infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the +unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.] + + +13. _Surviving spies_, finally, are those who bring back news from the +enemy’s camp. + +[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a +regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man +of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby +exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed +with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts +of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with shame +and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the following story of Ta’hsi Wu of the +Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of Eastern Ch’in, Shen-wu of Ch’i +made a hostile movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T’ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] +sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other +men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy’s uniform. When it +was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy’s camp +and stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching the +passwords used in the army. Then they got on their horses again and +boldly passed through the camp under the guise of night-watchmen; and +more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was committing +some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a +sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible +information about the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm +commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was +able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."] + + +14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate +relations to be maintained than with spies. + +[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch’en point out that the spy is privileged to enter +even the general’s private sleeping-tent.] + + +None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should +greater secrecy be preserved. + +[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be +carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted +from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any previous +commander: "Spies are attached to those who give them most, he who pays +them ill is never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor +should they know one another. When they propose anything very material, +secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives and +children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to +them but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. [2] ] + + +15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive +sagacity. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from +falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and +double-dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more +along the lines of "intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." +Tu Mu strangely refers these attributes to the spies themselves: +"Before using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity of +character and the extent of their experience and skill." But he +continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous +than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." +So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the +passage."] + + +16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and +straightforwardness. + +[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, +you must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for +you with all their might."] + + +17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the +truth of their reports. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies +going over to the service of the enemy."] + + +18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of +business. + +[Cf. VI. § 9.] + + +19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is +ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret +was told. + +[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard +before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzŭ’s main point in this +passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for +letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only, +as Ch’en Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any +further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would +not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzŭ lays himself open to the charge of +inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man +deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told +the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him."] + + +20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to +assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding +out the names of the attendants, the aides-de- camp, + +[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose +duty it is to keep the general supplied with information," which +naturally necessitates frequent interviews with him.] + + +the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must +be commissioned to ascertain these. + +[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these +important functionaries can be won over by bribery.] + + +21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, +tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will +become converted spies and available for our service. + +22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we +are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. + +[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy’s spies we learn the +enemy’s condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy +into our service, because it is he that knows which of the local +inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are open to +corruption."] + + +23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed +spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. + +[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best +be deceived."] + + +24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used +on appointed occasions. + +25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of +the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first +instance, from the converted spy. + +[As explained in §§ 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but +makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.] + + +Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost +liberality. + +26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty + +[Sun Tzŭ means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was +changed to Yin by P’an Keng in 1401. + + +was due to I Chih + +[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part +in Ch’eng T’ang’s campaign against Chieh Kuei.] + + +who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty +was due to Lü Ya + +[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he +afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T’ai Kung, a title +bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on +war, erroneously identified with the _Liu T’ao_.] + + +who had served under the Yin. + +[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to +introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are +by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly +doubt that Sun Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious +examples of the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His +suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the +intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcoming which these +former ministers were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch’en +appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin +and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. Hsia +could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could not +employ the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great achievements +were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant: "How +should two divinely inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common +spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of them simply means that the proper use of +the five classes of spies is a matter which requires men of the highest +mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them +for the task. The above words only emphasize this point." Ho Shih +believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their +supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] + + +27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who +will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying +and thereby they achieve great results. + +[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a +boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so +reliance on spies, while production of great results, is oft-times the +cause of utter destruction."] + + +Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an +army’s ability to move. + +[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man without ears or +eyes.] + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2. + +[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311. +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 *** diff --git a/132-h/132-h.htm b/132-h/132-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13b3c7f --- /dev/null +++ b/132-h/132-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,8456 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Art of War | Project Gutenberg</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + +body { margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%; + text-align: justify;} + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 175%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} +h3 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +hr {width: 80%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: 0.25em; + margin-bottom: 0.25em; } + +.p1 {margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + font-size: 90%;} + +.p2 {margin-top: 0em; + margin-bottom: 0em; + font-size: 90%;} + +.p3 {margin-top: 2em;} + +p.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: 90%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.noindent {text-indent: 0% } + +p.center {text-align: center; + text-indent: 0em; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> + +</head> + +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 ***</div> + +<h1>Sun Tzŭ<br/> +on<br/> +The Art of War</h1> + +<h4>THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD</h4> +<h4>Translated from the Chinese with Introduction and Critical Notes</h4> + +<h5>BY</h5> + +<h3>LIONEL GILES, M.A.</h3> + +<p class="center"> +Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. +in the British Museum +</p> + +<p class="center"> +1910 +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p class="center"> +To my brother<br/> +Captain Valentine Giles, R.G.<br/> +in the hope that<br/> +a work 2400 years old<br/> +may yet contain lessons worth consideration<br/> +by the soldier of today<br/> +this translation<br/> +is affectionately dedicated. +</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto"> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref01">Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">Preface by Lionel Giles</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap03">Sun Wu and his Book</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap04">The Text of Sun Tzŭ</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap05">The Commentators</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap06">Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap07">Apologies for War</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap08">Bibliography</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap09">Chapter I. Laying plans</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap10">Chapter II. Waging War</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap11">Chapter III. Attack by Stratagem</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap12">Chapter IV. Tactical Dispositions</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap13">Chapter V. Energy</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap14">Chapter VI. Weak Points and Strong</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap15">Chapter VII Manœuvring</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap16">Chapter VIII. Variation of Tactics</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap17">Chapter IX. The Army on the March</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap18">Chapter X. Terrain</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap19">Chapter XI. The Nine Situations</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap20">Chapter XII. The Attack by Fire</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap21">Chapter XIII. The Use of Spies</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref01"></a>Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext</h2> + +<p> +When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i>, the +work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to Europe began in 1782 +when a French Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph Amiot, acquired a copy of +it, and translated it into French. It was not a good translation because, +according to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, +and very little indeed of what he did." +</p> + +<p> +The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by Capt. E. +F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words of Dr. Giles, +"excessively bad." He goes further in this criticism: "It is not merely a +question of downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly exempt. +Omissions were frequent; hard passages were willfully distorted or slurred +over. Such offenses are less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any +edition of a Latin or Greek classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to +be insisted upon in translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt. +Calthrop’s translation was published in London. It was an improvement on the +first—omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected—but new +errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his translation, +wrote: "It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; +but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a better fate than had +befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on +the work of my predecessors." +</p> + +<p> +Clearly, Dr. Giles’ work established much of the groundwork for the work of +later translators who published their own editions. Of the later editions of +the <i>Art of War</i> I have examined; two feature Giles’ edited translation +and notes, the other two present the same basic information from the ancient +Chinese commentators found in the Giles edition. Of these four, Giles’ 1910 +edition is the most scholarly and presents the reader an incredible amount of +information concerning Sun Tzŭ’s text, much more than any other translation. +</p> + +<p> +The Giles’ edition of the <i>Art of War</i>, as stated above, was a scholarly +work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time and an assistant in the +Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts in the British Museum. +Apparently he wanted to produce a definitive edition, superior to anything else +that existed and perhaps something that would become a standard translation. It +was the best translation available for 50 years. But apparently there was not +much interest in Sun Tzŭ in English-speaking countries since it took the start +of the Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several people published +unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzŭ. In 1944, Dr. Giles’ translation +was edited and published in the United States in a series of military science +books. But it wasn’t until 1963 that a good English translation (by Samuel B. +Griffith and still in print) was published that was an equal to Giles’ +translation. While this translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles’ translation, +it lacks his copious notes that make his so interesting. +</p> + +<p> +Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the Chinese +civilization and language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun Tzŭ, the English +translation, and voluminous notes along with numerous footnotes. Unfortunately, +some of his notes and footnotes contain Chinese characters; some are completely +Chinese. Thus, a conversion to a Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the +conversion in complete ignorance of Chinese (except for what I learned while +doing the conversion). Thus, I faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it +while retaining as much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase +represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the text as +possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, I was able to +transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the risk of making the text +more obscure. However, the text, on the whole, is quite satisfactory for the +casual reader, a transformation made possible by conversion to an etext. +However, I come away from this task with the feeling of loss because I know +that someone with a background in Chinese can do a better job than I did; any +such attempt would be welcomed. +</p> + +<p> +Bob Sutton +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>Preface by Lionel Giles</h2> + +<p> +The seventh volume of <i>Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, les +arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois</i> is devoted to the Art of +War, and contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles de +Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph Amiot. +Père Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a sinologue in his +day, and the field of his labours was certainly extensive. But his so-called +translation of the Sun Tzŭ, if placed side by side with the original, is seen +at once to be little better than an imposture. It contains a great deal that +Sun Tzŭ did not write, and very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair +specimen, taken from the opening sentences of chapter 5:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +<i>De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes.</i> Sun-tse dit : Ayez +les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que subalternes; inscrivez-les +dans un catalogue à part, avec la note des talents & de la capacité de +chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage lorsque +l’occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que vous devez +commander soient persuadés que votre principale attention est de les préserver +de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez avancer contre l’ennemi +doivent être comme des pierres que vous lanceriez contre des œufs. De vous à +l’ennemi il ne doit y avoir d’autre différence que celle du fort au +faible, du vide au plein. Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret. +Voilà en peu de mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute la +perfection même du gouvernement des troupes. +</p> + +<p> +Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development in the +study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun Tzŭ, although +his work was known to be highly valued in China as by far the oldest and best +compendium of military science. It was not until the year 1905 that the first +English translation, by Capt. E.F. Calthrop. R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under +the title “Sonshi”(the Japanese form of Sun Tzŭ). Unfortunately, it +was evident that the translator’s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty +to fit him to grapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzŭ. He himself +plainly acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the +accompanying translation would have been impossible.” We can only wonder, +then, that with their help it should have been so excessively bad. It is not +merely a question of downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly +exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages were wilfully distorted or +slurred over. Such offences are less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in +any edition of a Greek or Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty +ought to be insisted upon in translations from Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present translation +is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; +but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a better fate than had +befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on +the work of my predecessors. Towards the end of 1908, a new and revised edition +of Capt. Calthrop’s translation was published in London, this time, +however, without any allusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three +chapters were then already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms +of Capt. Calthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to his +earlier edition. This is on the whole an improvement on the other, thought +there still remains much that cannot pass muster. Some of the grosser blunders +have been rectified and lacunae filled up, but on the other hand a certain +number of new mistakes appear. The very first sentence of the introduction is +startlingly inaccurate; and later on, while mention is made of “an army +of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzŭ (who are these, by the way?), not a +word is vouchsafed about the Chinese commentators, who nevertheless, I venture +to assert, form a much more numerous and infinitely more important +“army.” +</p> + +<p> +A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In the first +place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in order to +facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of students generally. The +division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen’s edition; but I have +sometimes found it desirable to join two or more of his paragraphs into one. In +quoting from other works, Chinese writers seldom give more than the bare title +by way of reference, and the task of research is apt to be seriously hampered +in consequence. With a view to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzŭ is +concerned, I have also appended a complete concordance of Chinese characters, +following in this the admirable example of Legge, though an alphabetical +arrangement has been preferred to the distribution under radicals which he +adopted. Another feature borrowed from “The Chinese Classics” is +the printing of text, translation and notes on the same page; the notes, +however, are inserted, according to the Chinese method, immediately after the +passages to which they refer. From the mass of native commentary my aim has +been to extract the cream only, adding the Chinese text here and there when it +seemed to present points of literary interest. Though constituting in itself an +important branch of Chinese literature, very little commentary of this kind has +hitherto been made directly accessible by translation. +</p> + +<p> +I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my sheets as they +were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a final revision. On a +review of the whole, without modifying the substance of my criticisms, I might +have been inclined in a few instances to temper their asperity. Having chosen +to wield a bludgeon, however, I shall not cry out if in return I am visited +with more than a rap over the knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to +put a sword into the hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either +text or reference for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from +the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere translations,” +would not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome. For, after all, the worst +fate I shall have to dread is that which befell the ingenious paradoxes of +George in <i>The Vicar of Wakefield</i>. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<h2><a name="chap03"></a>Sun Wu and his Book</h2> + +<p> +Ssu-ma Ch’ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzŭ: [1]<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch’i State. His <i>Art of War</i> brought +him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him: +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +"I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of +managing soldiers to a slight test?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ replied: "You may." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180 +ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ divided them into two companies, and placed +one of the King’s favourite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them +all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: "I presume you know +the difference between front and back, right hand and left hand?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The girls replied: Yes. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight ahead. When I +say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. When I say "Right turn," +you must face towards your right hand. When I say "About turn," you must face +right round towards your back." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus explained, he +set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill. Then, to the +sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But the girls only burst out +laughing. Sun Tzŭ said: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if +orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left turn," +whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun Tzŭ: "If words +of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, +the general is to blame. But if his orders <i>are</i> clear, and the soldiers +nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. Now the +king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised pavilion; and when +he saw that his favourite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly +alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: "We are now quite +satisfied as to our general’s ability to handle troops. If we are bereft of +these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish +that they shall not be beheaded." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ replied: "Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be the +general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty which, acting +in that capacity, I am unable to accept." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed the +pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been done, the drum +was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went through all the +evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling +back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing +to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your +soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your +majesty’s inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may +desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As +for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot translate +them into deeds." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was +one who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the +west, he defeated the Ch’u State and forced his way into Ying, the +capital; to the north he put fear into the States of Ch’i and Chin, and +spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzŭ shared in the +might of the King. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has to tell us in +this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, Sun Pin, +born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death, and also the +outstanding military genius of his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun +Tzŭ, and in his preface we read: "Sun Tzŭ had his feet cut off and yet +continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It seems likely, then, that "Pin" was +a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless the story was invented +in order to account for the name. The crowning incident of his career, the +crushing defeat of his treacherous rival P’ang Chuan, will be found +briefly related in Chapter V. § 19, note. +</p> + +<p> +To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in two other passages of the +<i>Shih Chi:</i>— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the field +with Tzŭ-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P’ei, and attacked Ch’u. He +captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince’s sons who had formerly been +generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying [the capital]; but the +general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It is not yet possible. We must +wait"…. [After further successful fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], +King Ho Lu addressed Wu Tzŭ-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared +that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The +two men replied: "Ch’u’s general Tzŭ-ch’ang, [4] is grasping and +covetous, and the princes of T’ang and Ts’ai both have a grudge +against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win +over T’ang and Ts’ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed +this advice, [beat Ch’u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying.] +[5] +</p> + +<p> +This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He does not +appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects of a wound in +496. In another chapter there occurs this passage:[6] +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the other: +Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] in the service +of Ch’i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men developed and threw +light upon the principles of war. +</p> + +<p> +It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch’ien at least had no doubt about the +reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, to be +noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on the period in +question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as +the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu</i>, which is supposed to have been +written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution is somewhat +doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of little value, +based as it is on the <i>Shih Chi</i> and expanded with romantic details. The story of +Sun Tzŭ will be found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points +in it worth noting are: (1) Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu +Tzŭ-hsu. (2) He is called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired +life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability. +</p> + +<p> +The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzŭ: "When sovereign and ministers +show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ to encounter the +foe." Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast +upon it), we have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzŭ, for Huai-nan +Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many years before the <i>Shih Chi</i> was given to the world. +</p> + +<p> +Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzŭ at the head of 30,000 men +beat Ch’u with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined." +</p> + +<p> +Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun Wu’s +grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch’i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father Sun +P’ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch’i, and Sun Wu himself, +whose style was Ch’ang-ch’ing, fled to Wu on account of the +rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred of T’ien Pao. He had +three sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. +According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering +that Sun Pin’s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as +chronologically impossible. Whence these data were obtained by Teng Ming-shih I +do not know, but of course no reliance whatever can be placed in them. +</p> + +<p> +An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han period is +the short preface written by the Great Ts’ao Ts’ao, or Wei Wu Ti, +for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in full:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage. [10] +The <i>Lun Yu</i> says: “There must be a sufficiency of military +strength.” The <i>Shu Ching</i> mentions "the army" among the "eight +objects of government." The <i>I Ching</i> says: "‘army’ indicates firmness and +justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune." The <i>Shih Ching</i> +says: "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his troops." The +Yellow Emperor, T’ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears and +battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i> says: "If +one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may rightfully be slain." He +who relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies +solely on peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch’ai +[11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the other. [12] In military matters, the +Sage’s rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only when +occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work +composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzŭ was a native of the +Ch’i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the <i>Art of War</i> in +13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were tested on women, and he +was subsequently made a general. He led an army westwards, crushed the +Ch’u state and entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Ch’i +and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was +a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment of deliberation and planning, the +importance of rapidity in taking the field, [14] clearness of conception, and +depth of design, Sun Tzŭ stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My +contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his +instructions, and while putting into practice the smaller details in which his +work abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive +which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the 13 +chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported by the +internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some ruler is +addressed. +</p> + +<p> +In the bibliographic section of the <i>Han Shu</i>, there is an entry which has given +rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 <i>p’ien</i> (or +chapters), with diagrams in 9 <i>chuan</i>." It is evident that this cannot be merely +the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch’ien, or those we possess today. Chang +Shou-chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i> of which the "13 +chapters" formed the first <i>chuan</i>, adding that there were two other <i>chuan</i> +besides. This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters +consisted of other writings of Sun Tzŭ—we should call them +apocryphal—similar to the <i>Wen Ta</i>, of which a specimen dealing with the +Nine Situations [15] is preserved in the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, and another in Ho +Shin’s commentary. It is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun +Tzŭ had only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of +exegesis in the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pi +I-hsun, the author of the <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu</i>, backs this up with a quotation from +the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu:</i> "The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzŭ, and +asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth a chapter of +his work, the King could not find words enough to praise him." As he points +out, if the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the +above-mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail to be +considerable. Then the numerous other treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ might be +included. The fact that the <i>Han Chih</i> mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82 +<i>p’ien</i>, whereas the Sui and T’ang bibliographies give the titles of +others in addition to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that +all of these were contained in the 82 <i>p’ien</i>. Without pinning our faith to +the accuracy of details supplied by the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu</i>, or +admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, we may +see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between Ssu-ma +Ch’ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of +forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzŭ, and the 82 +<i>p’ien</i> may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped +together with the original work. It is also possible, though less likely, that +some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely +ignored by him. [16] +</p> + +<p> +Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu Ti +strung together Sun Wu’s <i>Art of War</i>," which in turn may have resulted from a +misunderstanding of the final words of Ts’ao King’s preface. This, as Sun +Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of saying that he made an +explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the +whole, this theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, the <i>Ssu K’u +Ch’uan Shu</i> says: "The mention of the 13 chapters in the <i>Shih Chi</i> shows +that they were in existence before the <i>Han Chih</i>, and that latter accretions are +not to be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can certainly +not be taken as proof." +</p> + +<p> +There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in the +time of Ssu-ma Ch’ien practically as we have them now. That the work was +then well known he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzŭ’s <i>13 Chapters</i> and Wu +Ch’i’s <i>Art of War</i> are the two books that people commonly refer to on the +subject of military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I will not +discuss them here." But as we go further back, serious difficulties begin to +arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is that the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, the +greatest contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as +a general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, +that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given +in the <i>Shih Chi</i>, but even show themselves frankly skeptical as to the existence +of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of this side of the case is to +be found in the following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17]—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native of the +Ch’i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he crushed +Ch’u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso’s Commentary no +Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s Commentary need not contain +absolutely everything that other histories contain. But Tso has not omitted to +mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K’ao-shu, +[18] Ts’ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of +Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much +more glaring. Again, details are given, in their due order, about his +contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P’ei. [21] Is it credible that +Sun Wu alone should have been passed over? +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same school as <i>Kuan +Tzŭ</i>, [22] <i>Liu T’ao</i>, [23] and the <i>Yüeh Yu</i> [24] and may have been the +production of some private scholar living towards the end of the "Spring and +Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" period. [25] The story that +his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of +big talk on the part of his followers. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time of the +"Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as well, and the +class of professional generals, for conducting external campaigns, did not then +exist. It was not until the period of the "Six States" [27] that this custom +changed. Now although Wu was an uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso +should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet +held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu [28] and Sun +Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing +pundits. The story of Ho Lu’s experiment on the women, in particular, is +utterly preposterous and incredible. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch’ien as having said that Sun Wu crushed +Ch’u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the impression +left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in these exploits. The +fact may or may not be significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the +<i>Shih Chi</i> either that Sun Tzŭ was general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, +or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po +P’ei both took part in the expedition, and also that its success was +largely due to the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it +is not easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent +part in the same campaign. +</p> + +<p> +Ch’en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the fact that +he does not appear in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, although he is said to have served under +Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to. +</p> + +<p> +He also says:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch’i may be of genuine antiquity. +</p> + +<p> +It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch’en Chen-sun, while +rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s +history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the work +which passes under his name. The author of the <i>Hsu Lu</i> fails to appreciate this +distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on Ch’en Chen-sun really +misses its mark. He makes one of two points, however, which certainly tell in +favour of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters." "Sun Tzŭ," he says, "must +have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519-476], because he is frequently +plagiarized in subsequent works of the Chou, Ch’in and Han dynasties." +The two most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Ch’i and Huai-nan +Tzŭ, both of them important historical personages in their day. The former +lived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is known +to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, that +Tseng Shen delivered the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, which had been entrusted to him by its +author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the <i>Art of War</i>, +acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of different +epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all,—in other words, +that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards the end of the 5th +century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzŭ’s antiquity is furnished by the archaic +or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the words he uses. A list +of these, which might perhaps be extended, is given in the <i>Hsu Lu;</i> and though +some of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected +thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar and +critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the 13 chapters +to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually +engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be +sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he +not honestly believed the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that +the judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal +evidence is not far to seek. Thus in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable +allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already passed away by +the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified form. [30] +The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that carried on between the various feudal +princes, in which armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have +entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, +a state which ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch +presently. +</p> + +<p> +But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances of its +being other than a <i>bonâ fide</i> production are sensibly diminished. The +great age of forgeries did not come until long after. That it should have been +forged in the period immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no +one, as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh +Shui-hsin’s theory, that the author was a literary recluse, that seems to me +quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent than another after reading the +maxims of Sun Tzŭ, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large +store of personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of +a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but also of a +practical soldier closely acquainted with the military conditions of his time. +To say nothing of the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed +by all the greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination of +freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite excludes the +idea that they were artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, +that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of a military man living +towards the end of the "<i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i>" period, are we not bound, in +spite of the silence of the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, to accept Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account +in its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not +hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu’s biography were +false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is +still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the chronology involved in the +story as told in the <i>Shih Chi</i>, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet +pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzŭ in which he alludes to +contemporary affairs. The first in in VI. § 21:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in number, +that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that +victory can be achieved. +</p> + +<p> +The other is in XI. § 30:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Asked if an army can be made to imitate the <i>shuai-jan</i>, I should answer, +Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; yet if they are +crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to +each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right. +</p> + +<p> +These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of +composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between Wu and +Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped +notice is that they also seriously impair the credibility of Ssu-ma +Ch’ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive date given +in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken of as a general, acting +as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his alleged introduction to that +monarch had already taken place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been +written earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to +the capture of Ying in 506, Ch’u and not Yüeh, was the great hereditary +enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch’u and Wu, had been constantly at war for +over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh was waged +only in 510, [32] and even then was no more than a short interlude sandwiched +in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch’u. Now Ch’u is not +mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were +written at a time when Yüeh had become the prime antagonist of Wu, that is, +after Ch’u had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a +table of dates may be found useful.<br/><br/> +</p> + +<table summary="" > + +<tr> <td>B.C.</td><td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>514</td><td>Accession of Ho Lu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>512</td><td>Ho Lu attacks Ch’u, but is dissuaded from entering +Ying,<br/> +the capital. <i>Shih Chi</i> mentions Sun Wu as general.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>511</td><td>Another attack on Ch’u.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>510</td><td>Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This is the +first<br/> +war between the two states.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>509 or 508</td><td>Ch’u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at +Yu-chang.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>506</td><td>Ho Lu attacks Ch’u with the aid of T’ang and +Ts’ai.<br/> +Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last<br/> +mention of Sun Wu in <i>Shih Chi</i>.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>505</td><td>Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. +Wu<br/> +is beaten by Ch’in and evacuates Ying.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>504</td><td>Ho Lu sends Fu Ch’ai to attack Ch’u.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>497</td><td>Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>496</td><td>Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at +Tsui-li.<br/> +Ho Lu is killed.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>494</td><td>Fu Ch’ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of +Fu-<br/> +chaio, and enters the capital of Yüeh.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>485 or 484</td><td>Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu +Tzŭ-hsu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>482</td><td>Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu +Ch’ai.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>478 to 476</td><td>Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>475</td><td>Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>473</td><td>Final defeat and extinction of Wu.</td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<p class="p3"> +The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that could +have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather to imply that, +for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, and that she was +getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was +not in existence in 505, before which date Yüeh does not appear to have scored +any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was +written for him, it must have been during the period 505-496, when there was a +lull in the hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort +against Ch’u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition +connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the light +between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482-473, when Yüeh was once +again becoming a very serious menace. [33] We may feel fairly certain that the +author, whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his +own day. On this point the negative testimony of the <i>Tso Chuan</i> far outweighs +any shred of authority still attaching to the <i>Shih Chi</i>, if once its other facts +are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the +omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu Tzŭ-hsu, he says, who +got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because the latter (being an alien) +was not rewarded with an office in the State. +</p> + +<p> +How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may be that the growing celebrity +of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It +was felt to be only right and proper that one so well versed in the science of +war should have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture of +Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep +and lasting impression on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the +short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, +than that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly +identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his +brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out by +him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po P’ei and Fu Kai? +</p> + +<p> +It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun Tzŭ’s +life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I +should say that he probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s +accession, and gathered experience, though only in the capacity of a +subordinate officer, during the intense military activity which marked the +first half of the prince’s reign. [35] If he rose to be a general at all, he +certainly was never on an equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was +doubtless present at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s +sudden collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical juncture, +when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced him that +this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort would +henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he +sat down to write his famous book, which according to my reckoning must have +appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning of Ho Lu’s reign. The story +of the women may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about +the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is +hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the +death-struggle with Yüeh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li. +</p> + +<p> +If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony in the +fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man of peace should be +contemporary with her greatest writer on war. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap04"></a>The Text of Sun Tzŭ</h2> + +<p> +I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s text. +The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the "13 chapters" of +which Ssu-ma Ch’ien speaks were essentially the same as those now extant. +We have his word for it that they were widely circulated in his day, and can +only regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account. Sun +Hsing-yen says in his preface:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +During the Ch’in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i> was in +general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated it as a +work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for the benefit of +posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary +on it. +</p> + +<p> +As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that +Ts’ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so +obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time onward so +great, especially during the T’ang and Sung dynasties, that it would be +surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep in. Towards the +middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief commentaries on Sun Tzŭ +were in existence, a certain Chi T’ien-pao published a work in 15 +<i>chuan</i> entitled "Sun Tzŭ with the collected commentaries of ten writers." +There was another text, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of +Ta-hsing, which also had supporters among the scholars of that period; but in +the Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason +or other no longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th +century, the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi +T’ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was +known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzŭ which appears +in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the +<i>Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng</i>. Another copy at my disposal of +what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that contained in +the "Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch’in dynasties" [1758]. And the +Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition is evidently a similar +version which has filtered through Japanese channels. So things remained until +Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, +who claimed to be an actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered +a copy of Chi T’ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library +of the Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the <i>I Shuo</i> of Cheng +Yu-Hsien, mentioned in the <i>T’ung Chih</i>, and also believed to have +perished. This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or +text)"—a rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set +before us the text of Sun Tzŭ in its pristine purity. Chi T’ien-pao was a +careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat +debased version current in his day, without troubling to collate it with the +earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzŭ, even +older than the newly discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the +<i>T’ung Tien</i>, Tu Yu’s great treatise on the Constitution, the other +similarly enshrined in the <i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i> encyclopedia. +In both the complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments, +intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of +different sections. Considering that the <i>Yu Lan</i> takes us back to the +year 983, and the <i>T’ung Tien</i> about 200 years further still, to the +middle of the T’ang dynasty, the value of these early transcripts of Sun +Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem +to have occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government +instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his own +account:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ which his editors had +handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient edition [of Chi +T’ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be revised and +corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and +Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to this study, +probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on +blocks as a textbook for military men. +</p> + +<p> +The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on the text +of Sun Tzŭ prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are left in doubt as to +the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when +ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one +co-editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original edition" as their basis, and by +careful comparison with older versions, as well as the extant commentaries and +other sources of information such as the <i>I Shuo</i>, succeeded in restoring a very +large number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be +accepted as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzŭ’s +original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard text." +</p> + +<p> +The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. It is in 6 <i>pen</i>, +forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 <i>pen</i>. +[38] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this +introduction), vindicating the traditional view of Sun Tzŭ’s life and +performances, and summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its +favour. This is followed by Ts’ao Kung’s preface to his edition, and the +biography of Sun Tzŭ from the <i>Shih Chi</i>, both translated above. Then come, +firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien’s <i>I Shuo</i>, [39] with author’s preface, and next, a short +miscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu +Lu</i>, compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate +sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by the +various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological order. These +we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap05"></a>The Commentators</h2> + +<p> +Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of commentators, +which would do honour to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks on this fact, though +he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by +saying that the artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be +susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways. +</p> + +<p> +1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti +[A.D. 155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest commentary +on Sun Tzŭ actually came from the pen of this extraordinary man, whose +biography in the <i>San Kuo Chih</i> reads like a romance. One of the greatest +military geniuses that the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his +operations, he was especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches, +which has found expression in the line "Talk of Ts’ao Ts’ao, and +Ts’ao Ts’ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a +great captain who "measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two +Yuan, father and son, and vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire +of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a +council of war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had +all his calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not lose +one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any particular saw their +armies incontinently beaten and put to flight." Ts’ao Kung’s notes on Sun +Tzŭ, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic of the stern +commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as the +work of a mere <i>littérateur</i>. Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme compression, +they are scarcely intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than +the text itself. [40] +</p> + +<p> +2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name is +comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even his personal +name has not been recorded. Chi T’ien-pao’s edition places him after Chia +Lin, and Ch’ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T’ang dynasty, [41] +but this is a mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he appears as Meng Shih of +the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would identify him with Meng K’ang of +the 3rd century. He is named in one work as the last of the "Five +Commentators," the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao and Chia Lin. +</p> + +<p> +3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military +tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the present day. The +<i>T’ung Chih</i> mentions "Lives of famous generals from the Chou to the +T’ang dynasty" as written by him. [42] According to Ch’ao Kung-wu +and the <i>T’ien-i-ko</i> catalogue, he followed a variant of the text of Sun +Tzŭ which differs considerably from those now extant. His notes are mostly +short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes +from Chinese history. +</p> + +<p> +4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ, his notes +being taken from the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, the encyclopedic treatise on the +Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely repetitions of +Ts’ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed that he drew on +the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar +arrangement of <i>T’ung Tien</i>, he has to explain each passage on its merits, +apart from the context, and sometimes his own explanation does not agree with +that of Ts’ao Kung, whom he always quotes first. Though not strictly to +be reckoned as one of the "Ten Commentators," he was added to their number by +Chi T’ien-pao, being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. +</p> + +<p> +5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star even +in the glorious galaxy of the T’ang period. We learn from Ch’ao +Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was extremely +fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read in the military +history of the <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> and <i>Chan Kuo</i> eras. His notes, therefore, +are well worth attention. They are very copious, and replete with historical +parallels. The gist of Sun Tzŭ’s work is thus summarized by him: "Practice +benevolence and justice, but on the other hand make full use of artifice and +measures of expediency." He further declared that all the military triumphs and +disasters of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Tzŭ’s death would, +upon examination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the +maxims contained in his book. Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful charge against +Ts’ao Kung has already been considered elsewhere. +</p> + +<p> +6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao +Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ because +Ts’ao Kung’s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and that of Tu +Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the +middle of the 11th century, calls Ts’ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch’en Hao +the three chief commentators on Sun Tzŭ, and observes that Ch’en Hao is +continually attacking Tu Mu’s shortcomings. His commentary, though not lacking +in merit, must rank below those of his predecessors. +</p> + +<p> +7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his +commentary on Sun Tzŭ is mentioned in the <i>T’ang Shu</i> and was afterwards +republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those of Meng Shih +and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in point of quality, too, +perhaps the least valuable of the eleven. +</p> + +<p> +8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei +Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was published +with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the +following:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and trying to make +them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though commentators have not +been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the task. My friend Sheng-yu has +not fallen into this mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary +for Sun Tzŭ’s work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were +intended for states engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not +concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the +three ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to +the Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his +meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling +soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it is +always systematically treated; the sayings are bound together in strict logical +sequence, though this has been obscured by commentators who have probably +failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed +aside all the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out +the true meaning of Sun Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion have +been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the present work +deserves to be handed down side by side with the three great commentaries; and +for a great deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations will have +constant reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu. +</p> + +<p> +Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined to +endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him above +Ch’en Hao in order of merit. +</p> + +<p> +9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of his +interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch’en, and on the +whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary +with that of Ts’ao Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to +him. We learn from Ch’ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text +of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes. [45] +</p> + +<p> +10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this commentator is +given as above by Cheng Ch’iao in the <i>Tung Chih</i>, written about the middle +of the twelfth century, but he appears simply as Ho Shih in the <i>Yu Hai</i>, and Ma +Tuan-lin quotes Ch’ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is +unknown. There seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch’iao’s statement, +otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with +one Ho Ch’u-fei, the author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the +latter part of the 11th century. Ho Shih’s commentary, in the words of the +<i>T’ien-i-ko</i> catalogue, "contains helpful additions" here and there, but is +chiefly remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the +dynastic histories and other sources. +</p> + +<p> +11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great originality +perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentator +is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to +expand and develop in masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say +that much of Ts’ao Kung’s commentary would have remained cloaked in its +pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the +Sung history, the <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, or the <i>Yu Hai</i>, but it finds a niche +in the <i>T’ung Chih</i>, which also names him as the author of the "Lives of +Famous Generals." [46] +</p> + +<p> +It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have flourished +within so short a space of time. Ch’ao Kung-wu accounts for it by saying: +"During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of +peace, and men ceased to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao’s +rebellion came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after +time, the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military +topics became the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the +commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that period. [47] +</p> + +<p> +Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work has not +come down to us. The <i>Sui Shu</i> mentions four, namely Wang Ling (often quoted by +Tu Yu as Wang Tzŭ); Chang Tzŭ-shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; [48] and Shen Yu of Wu. +The <i>T’ang Shu</i> adds Sun Hao, and the <i>T’ung Chih</i> Hsiao Chi, while the +<i>T’u Shu</i> mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that +some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other +commentaries, like Chi T’ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap06"></a>Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ</h2> + +<p> +Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of China’s +greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have studied his pages +with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (<i>d</i>. 196 B.C.), [49] Feng I (<i>d</i>. 34 +A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (<i>d</i>. 219), [51] and Yo Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of +Ts’ao Kung, who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese +military annals, has already been recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one +way, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of Su +Tung-p’o), who wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe +their chief inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is +preserved in the <i>Yu Hai:</i> [54]— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, [55] is +very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu Ch’i was a +man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and they are +linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu Ch’i’s remarks +on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and +there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the style is +terse, but the meaning fully brought out. +</p> + +<p> +The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the Garden of +Literature" by Cheng Hou:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military men’s +training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and men of +letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous +and eminently practical. Such works as the <i>Lun Yu</i>, the <i>I Ching</i> +and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsun +K’uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzŭ. +</p> + +<p> +Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism, +although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated classical +works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages a ruler’s bent towards +unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap07"></a>Apologies for War</h2> + +<p> +Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving nation on +earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her experience of war in all +its phases has also been such as no modern State can parallel. Her long +military annals stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of +time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army +along her frontier centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the +Danube. What with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the +grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of +government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of so many +dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have +flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that +the clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the +Empire. +</p> + +<p> +No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom China can +point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond of emerging at the +most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch’i stands out conspicuous +in the period when Ch’in was entering upon her final struggle with the +remaining independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up of +the Ch’in dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. +When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great and baleful +figure of Ts’ao Ts’ao dominates the scene. And in the establishment +of the T’ang dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the +superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T’ai Tsung) was +seconded by the brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need +fear comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe. +</p> + +<p> +In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ +downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of +Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to militarism +in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending +warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to collect and +translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following, +by Ssu-ma Ch’ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of Confucius, +he was yet no advocate of peace at any price:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and cruelty, +to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and dangers, and to +succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins and horns +on its head will fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who +carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger! When he +is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him; when angry, his +poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the natural law which governs his +being…. What then shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all +great issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who can only +bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilization," condemning the +use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to impotence and +dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, they +will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and general +enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to modify the position they have +taken up. The truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare +the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so military +chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one +can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by +others, and that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others +rebellious. [58] +</p> + +<p> +The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun +Tzŭ:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of government. +It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch’iu, both disciples of +Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the +imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market-place, +are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down +of fortified cities, the hauling of women and children into captivity, and the +beheading of traitors—this is also work which is done by officials. The +objects of the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is +no intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off +heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, +only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the use of military +weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is +to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good…. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired your military aptitude +by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been acquired by study." +[59] "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a disciple of +Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by Confucius. It is +fitting that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military functions, +though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very +far." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" and the +"military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or in +what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say. +But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the governing class are +quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced +manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set +down as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an +extraordinary instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily +lose sight of fundamental principles. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch’eng Wang, he regulated +ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and learning; +yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60] he sallied forth and +chastised them. When Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting +was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If pacific negotiations are in +progress, warlike preparations should have been made beforehand." He rebuked +and shamed the Marquis of Ch’i, who cowered under him and dared not +proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great Sages had no +knowledge of military matters? +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He also +appeals to the authority of the Classics:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never studied +matters connected with armies and battalions." [62] Replying to K’ung +Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and weapons." But +if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he used armed force against +the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch’i was overawed. Again, when the +inhabitants of Pi revolted; he ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon +they were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered the words: "If I +fight, I conquer." [63] And Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil +and military functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or +received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not +specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the subject +of his teaching. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He also said: "If I +fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated music. Now war +constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, [66] and must not be +treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the words "I am unversed in" +must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired Teacher does +not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the +art of war. But if one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, +who was employed by Wu Tzŭ-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the +remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of +Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on the art of +war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they adduce the example of +Chao Kua, who pored over his father’s books to no purpose, [67] as a proof that +all military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have to do with +such things as opportunism in designing plans, and the conversion of spies, +they hold that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore +the fact that the studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our +officials also require steady application and practice before efficiency is +reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to botch +their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting perilous; and useless +unless a general is in constant practice, he ought not to hazard other men’s +lives in battle. [70] Hence it is essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should +be studied. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of war. Chi got a +rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not pursue his studies +to their proper outcome, the consequence being that he was finally defeated and +overthrown. He did not realize that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond +verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to +destruction by their misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature +of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. +There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted +oath, [72] and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. [73] Can we +then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding truth and honesty? +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap08"></a>Bibliography</h2> + +<p> +The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ. The notes +on each have been drawn principally from the <i>Ssu k’u ch’uan shu +chien ming mu lu</i>, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. +</p> + +<p> +1. <i>Wu Tzŭ</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i> or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (<i>d</i>. 381 B.C.). A genuine +work. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 65. +</p> + +<p> +2. <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i> or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to Ssu-ma Jang-chu +of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early, as the customs of the +three ancient dynasties are constantly to be met within its pages. See <i>Shih +Chi</i>, ch. 64. +</p> + +<p> +The <i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu</i> (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three +treatises on war, <i>Sun Tzŭ</i>, <i>Wu Tzŭ</i> and <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i>, are, generally speaking, only +concerned with things strictly military—the art of producing, collecting, +training and drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures of +expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the handling of +soldiers—in strong contrast to later works, in which the science of war +is usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in general. +</p> + +<p> +3. <i>Liu T’ao</i>, in 6 <i>chuan</i>, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or Lu +Shang, also known as T’ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C. [74] But its +style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-ming (550-625 +A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the six sections so +that the forgery cannot have been later than Sui dynasty. +</p> + +<p> +4. <i>Wei Liao Tzŭ</i>, in 5 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. B.C.), who +studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The work appears to have been originally +in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is +sound enough in the main, though the strategical devices differ considerably +from those of the Warring States period. It is been furnished with a commentary +by the well-known Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. +</p> + +<p> +5. <i>San Lueh</i> in 3 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage +who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (<i>d</i>. 187 B.C.) in an interview on +a bridge. But here again, the style is not that of works dating from the +Ch’in or Han period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently +quotes from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question may +have been inserted later on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We +shall not be far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], +or somewhat earlier. +</p> + +<p> +6. <i>Li Wei Kung Wen Tui</i>, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a dialogue +between T’ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is usually ascribed +to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a forgery, though the author +was evidently well versed in the art of war. +</p> + +<p> +7. <i>Li Ching Ping Fa</i> (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a short +treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the T’ung Tien, but not published +separately. This fact explains its omission from the <i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan +Shu</i>. +</p> + +<p> +8. <i>Wu Ch’i Ching</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to the legendary minister Feng +Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty (<i>d</i>. 121 B.C.), +and said to have been eulogized by the celebrated general Ma Lung (<i>d</i>. 300 +A.D.). Yet the earliest mention of it is in the <i>Sung Chih</i>. Although a forgery, +the work is well put together. +</p> + +<p> +Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has always been +held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on war ascribed to his +pen. Such are (1) the <i>Shih Liu Ts’e</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>), preserved in the <i>Yung Lo +Ta Tien;</i> (2) <i>Chiang Yuan</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>); and (3) <i>Hsin Shu</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>), which steals +wholesale from Sun Tzŭ. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered +genuine. +</p> + +<p> +Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections devoted to +the literature of war. The following references may be found useful:— +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +<i>T’ung Tien</i> (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162.<br/> +<i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i> (983), ch. 270-359.<br/> +<i>Wen Hsien Tung K’ao</i> (13th cent.), ch. 221.<br/> +<i>Yu Hai</i> (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.<br/> +<i>San Ts’ai T’u Hui</i> (16th cent).<br/> +<i>Kuang Po Wu Chih</i> (1607), ch. 31, 32.<br/> +<i>Ch’ien Ch’io Lei Shu</i> (1632), ch. 75.<br/> +<i>Yuan Chien Lei Han</i> (1710), ch. 206-229.<br/> +<i>Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng</i> (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. +81-90.<br/> +<i>Hsu Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao</i> (1784), ch. 121-134.<br/> +<i>Huang Ch’ao Ching Shih Wen Pien</i> (1826), ch. 76, 77.<br/></p> + +<p> +The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve +mention:— +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +<i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 30.<br/> +<i>Sui Shu</i>, ch. 32-35.<br/> +<i>Chiu T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 46, 47.<br/> +<i>Hsin T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 57,60.<br/> +<i>Sung Shih</i>, ch. 202-209.<br/> +<i>T’ung Chih</i> (circa 1150), ch. 68.<br/></p> + +<p> +To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial +Library:— +</p> + +<p> +<i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu Tsung Mu T’i Yao</i> (1790), ch. 99, 100. +</p> + +<h2>Footnotes</h2> + +<p> +1. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 65. +</p> + +<p> +2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +3. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 130. +</p> + +<p> +4. The appellation of Nang Wa. +</p> + +<p> +5. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 31. +</p> + +<p> +6. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 25. +</p> + +<p> +7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year 637. +</p> + +<p> +8. Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. +</p> + +<p> +9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the Han +dynasty, which says: "Ten <i>li</i> outside the <i>Wu</i> gate [of the city of +Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to commemorate the +entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch’i, who excelled in the art of war, by the +King of Wu." +</p> + +<p> +10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to make +arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe." +</p> + +<p> +11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and overthrown by +Kou chien, King of Yüeh, in 473 B.C. See post. +</p> + +<p> +12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in his +preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction." +</p> + +<p> +13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the <i>T’u Shu</i>, and may +be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang Shou-chieh of the +T’ang dynasty, and appears in the <i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i>. +</p> + +<p> +14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, +perhaps especially of § 8. +</p> + +<p> +15. See chap. XI. +</p> + +<p> +16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that <i>Wu Tzŭ</i>, which is not in 6 +chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the <i>Han Chih</i>. Likewise, the <i>Chung Yung</i> is +credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one only. In the case of very +short works, one is tempted to think that <i>p’ien</i> might simply mean +"leaves." +</p> + +<p> +17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. +</p> + +<p> +18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. +</p> + +<p> +19. See Chapter 7, § 27 and Chapter 11, § 28. +</p> + +<p> +20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his name. +</p> + +<p> +21. I.e. Po P’ei. See ante. +</p> + +<p> +22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large additions have +been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. +</p> + +<p> +24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of another +work. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not clear. +</p> + +<p> +25. About 480 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. +</p> + +<p> +27. In the 3rd century B.C. +</p> + +<p> +28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter +half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have written a work on +war. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of the INTRODUCTION. +</p> + +<p> +29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that the +<i>Tso Chuan</i> must have been written in the 5th century, but not before 424 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +30. See <i>Mencius</i> III. 1. iii. 13-20. +</p> + +<p> +31. When Wu first appears in the <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> in 584, it is already +at variance with its powerful neighbour. The <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> first +mentions Yüeh in 537, the <i>Tso Chuan</i> in 601. +</p> + +<p> +32. This is explicitly stated in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, XXXII, 2. +</p> + +<p> +33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would tend to +grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully justify the language +used in XI. § 30. +</p> + +<p> +34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious +treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great general. +Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, +cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century. +</p> + +<p> +35. From <i>Tso Chuan:</i> "From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] there was no +year in which Ch’u was not attacked by Wu." +</p> + +<p> +36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really descended +from Sun Tzŭ. I am ashamed to say that I only read my ancestor’s work from a +literary point of view, without comprehending the military technique. So long +have we been enjoying the blessings of peace!" +</p> + +<p> +37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of +Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the ascent of +the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as being "situated five +<i>li</i> east of the district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the +Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the T’ang Emperor Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." +</p> + +<p> +38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40. +</p> + +<p> +39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzŭ. +</p> + +<p> +40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His commentary is +frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not fully develop the +meaning." +</p> + +<p> +41. <i>Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao</i>, ch. 221. +</p> + +<p> +42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered chapters +1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand Buddhas." See +B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. 525. +</p> + +<p> +43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was nominally +existent in Sun Tzŭ’s day, it retained hardly a vestige of power, and the old +military organization had practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other +explanation of the passage. +</p> + +<p> +44. See <i>Chou Li</i>, xxix. 6-10. +</p> + +<p> +45. <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, ch. 221. +</p> + +<p> +46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s "Notes," p. 91 (new edition). +</p> + +<p> +47. <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, loc. cit. +</p> + +<p> +48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the <i>San Kuo Chih</i>, +ch. 10. +</p> + +<p> +49. See XI. § 58, note. +</p> + +<p> +50. <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 17 ad init. +</p> + +<p> +51. <i>San Kuo Chih</i>, ch. 54. +</p> + +<p> +52. <i>Sung Shih</i>, ch. 365 ad init. +</p> + +<p> +53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting themselves +with Sun Tzŭ are not behindhand in their praise. In this connection, I may +perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the +sheets of the present work were submitted previous to publication: "Many of Sun +Wu’s maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and no. 11 [in Chapter +VIII] is one that the people of this country would do well to take to heart." +</p> + +<p> +54. Ch. 140. +</p> + +<p> +55. See IV. § 3. +</p> + +<p> +56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. +</p> + +<p> +57. The <i>Tso Chuan</i>. +</p> + +<p> +58. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 25, fol. I. +</p> + +<p> +59. Cf. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch 47. +</p> + +<p> +60. See <i>Shu Ching</i>, preface § 55. +</p> + +<p> +61. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 47. +</p> + +<p> +62. <i>Lun Yu</i>, XV. 1. +</p> + +<p> +63. I failed to trace this utterance. +</p> + +<p> +64. Supra. +</p> + +<p> +65. Supra. +</p> + +<p> +66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, and +festive rites. See <i>Shu Ching</i>, ii. 1. III. 8, and <i>Chou Li</i>, IX. fol. 49. +</p> + +<p> +67. See XIII. § 11, note. +</p> + +<p> +68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, where Tzŭ-ch’an +says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere +learner to make it up." +</p> + +<p> +69. Cf. <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 31. +</p> + +<p> +70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See <i>Lun Yu</i>, XIII. 29, 30. +</p> + +<p> +71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. +</p> + +<p> +72. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 47. +</p> + +<p> +73. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 38. +</p> + +<p> +74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in +the <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a former +minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there given, according to +which he would appear to have been first raised from a humble private station +by Wen Wang. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap09"></a>Chapter I. LAYING PLANS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of this +chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the +general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. See. § 26.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. +</p> + +<p> +2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence +it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. +</p> + +<p> +3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into +account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions +obtaining in the field. +</p> + +<p> +4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) +Method and discipline. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by "Moral Law" a principle of +harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral aspect. One might be +tempted to render it by "morale," were it not considered as an attribute of the +<i>ruler</i> in § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +5, 6. <i>The Moral Law</i> causes the people to be in complete accord with their +ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by +any danger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the officers will +be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, +the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] +</p> + +<p> +7. <i>Heaven</i> signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words here. Meng +Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi, +however, may be right in saying that what is meant is "the general economy of +Heaven," including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and +other phenomena.] +</p> + +<p> +8. <i>Earth</i> comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground +and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. +</p> + +<p> +9. <i>The Commander</i> stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, +courage and strictness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or benevolence; (2) +uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control, or "proper feeling;" (4) +wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put +before "humanity or benevolence," and the two military virtues of "courage" and +"strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self-respect, +self-control, or ‘proper feeling.’"] +</p> + +<p> +10. By <i>Method and discipline</i> are to be understood the marshalling of the +army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, +the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control +of military expenditure. +</p> + +<p> +11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them +will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. +</p> + +<p> +12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military +conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:— +</p> + +<p> +13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?<br/> +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.]<br/> +</p> + +<p> + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability?<br/> + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See §§ 7, 8] +</p> + +<p> +(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D. +155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with +his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned +himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn! +However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of +justice by cutting off his hair. Ts’ao Ts’ao’s own comment on the +present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a law, see that +it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must be put to death."] +</p> + +<p> +(5) Which army is the stronger? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch’en puts it, freely +rendered, "<i>esprit de corps</i> and ‘big battalions.’"] +</p> + +<p> +(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the officers will +be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, +the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] +</p> + +<p> +(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly +rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] +</p> + +<p> +14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. +</p> + +<p> +15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will +conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens +not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be +dismissed! +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was composed +expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu State.] +</p> + +<p> +16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful +circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. +</p> + +<p> +17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s plans. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric." He +cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; "for," as Chang +Yu puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for +the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy +in attempting to secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of +the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke +of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the +morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself +Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. +The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first +tomorrow—I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well," +continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and +as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine +are?" [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +18. All warfare is based on deception. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier. +Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many military qualities, +was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he +concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."] +</p> + +<p> +19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we +must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far +away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. +</p> + +<p> +20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder, crush him." +It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating the uses of +deception in war.] +</p> + +<p> +21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior +strength, evade him. +</p> + +<p> +22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be +weak, that he may grow arrogant. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his +adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, +and then suddenly pouncing upon him.] +</p> + +<p> +23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch’en has the note: "while +we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The <i>Yu Lan</i> has +"Lure him on and tire him out."] +</p> + +<p> +If his forces are united, separate them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the commentators: "If +sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. +</p> + +<p> +25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged +beforehand. +</p> + +<p> +26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere +the battle is fought. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be +set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order +that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] +</p> + +<p> +The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do +many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much +more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee +who is likely to win or lose. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap10"></a>Chapter II. WAGING WAR</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the +cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is +not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of +ways and means.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a +thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand +mail-clad soldiers, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used for +the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed for purposes of +defence. Li Ch’uan, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this +seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note the analogies between early +Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot +was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped +a certain number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we +are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each +heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a +thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.] +</p> + +<p> +with provisions enough to carry them a thousand <i>li</i>, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[2.78 modern <i>li</i> go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since +Sun Tzŭ’s time.] +</p> + +<p> +the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, +small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will +reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of +raising an army of 100,000 men. +</p> + +<p> +2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s +weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If you lay siege to a +town, you will exhaust your strength. +</p> + +<p> +3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be +equal to the strain. +</p> + +<p> +4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength +exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take +advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert +the consequences that must ensue. +</p> + +<p> +5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been +seen associated with long delays. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the +commentators. Ts’ao Kung, Li Ch’uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and +Mei Yao-ch’en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally +stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: +"Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and +treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in +their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: "Lengthy operations +mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and +distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of +such calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid +haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, +except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than +ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much more +guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can +never be anything but foolish—if only because it means impoverishment to +the nation. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzŭ, the classic +example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That general +deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibals’s +isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to +suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot +question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. +Their reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative +presumption in their favour.] +</p> + +<p> +6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. +</p> + +<p> +7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can +thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long +war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. +Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, but it fits well into +the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know the +evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly pointless.] +</p> + +<p> +8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his +supply-waggons loaded more than twice. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for +reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but +crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy +to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon +Bonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a little ahead of your +opponent—has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the +nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.] +</p> + +<p> +9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the +army will have food enough for its needs. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means "things to +be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all the impedimenta of +an army, apart from provisions.] +</p> + +<p> +10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by +contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance +causes the people to be impoverished. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though +obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I +cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to +Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense, and we +get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sun Tzŭ used to indicate the +cause of the people’s impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by +which the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But +why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because the +State or Government is too poor to do so?] +</p> + +<p> +11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and +high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own territory. +Ts’ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the +frontier.] +</p> + +<p> +12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by +heavy exactions. +</p> + +<p> +13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of +the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be +dissipated; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, but of +7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from our text. Ho +Shih has a characteristic tag: "The <i>people</i> being regarded as the essential part +of the State, and <i>food</i> as the people’s heaven, is it not right that those in +authority should value and be careful of both?"] +</p> + +<p> +while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates +and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, +draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. +</p> + +<p> +15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload +of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a +single <i>picul</i> of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one +cartload to the front. A <i>picul</i> is a unit of measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 +kilograms).] +</p> + +<p> +16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there +may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the +advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, +they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to +fight, each on his own account."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, +those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be +substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in +conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. +</p> + +<p> +18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength. +</p> + +<p> +19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzŭ here +reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce."] +</p> + +<p> +20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the +people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace +or in peril. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap11"></a>Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take +the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. +So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to +capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally +of 12500 men; according to Ts’ao Kung, the equivalent of a regiment +contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists from any number +between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 +men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 +respectively.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; +supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without +fighting. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old Chinese +general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge French army at +Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.] +</p> + +<p> +3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of the +Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might be +content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but an active policy +of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the enemy +has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delivering our +own attack first."] +</p> + +<p> +the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in speaking of +hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or principalities into +which the China of his day was split up.] +</p> + +<p> +the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[When he is already at full strength.] +</p> + +<p> +and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. +</p> + +<p> +4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in 1899, +and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or +even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would have been masters of +the situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose them.] +</p> + +<p> +The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, +will take up three whole months; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as "mantlets", +described. Ts’ao Kung simply defines them as "large shields," but we get +a better idea of them from Li Ch’uan, who says they were to protect the +heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems +to suggest a sort of Roman <i>testudo</i>, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled +vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch’en Hao. See +<i>supra</i> II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the +"movable shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. +They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from +within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of +men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat +with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden donkeys."] +</p> + +<p> +and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the +enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, and also to +destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note.] +</p> + +<p> +5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the +assault like swarming ants, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This vivid simile of Ts’ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army +of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at +the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his +engines of war are ready.] +</p> + +<p> +with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still +remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port Arthur, in +the most recent siege which history has to record.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any +fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows +their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no harm to +individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to +the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother of the people."] +</p> + +<p> +7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, +without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of the +sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, the weapon not +being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."] +</p> + +<p> +This is the method of attacking by stratagem. +</p> + +<p> +8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround +him; if five to one, to attack him; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] +</p> + +<p> +if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears to +violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however, gives a clue to +Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: "Being two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our +army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu +thus further elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as numerous as that +of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy +in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, +he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in +front." This is what is meant by saying that ‘one part may be used in the +regular way, and the other for some special diversion.’ Tu Mu does not +understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as +concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty in +calling this a mistake."] +</p> + +<p> +9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If +attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able general +will fight."] +</p> + +<p> +if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The meaning, "we can <i>watch</i> the enemy," is certainly a great improvement +on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for +the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying only applies if the other +factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more than +counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.] +</p> + +<p> +if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. +</p> + +<p> +10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end +it must be captured by the larger force. +</p> + +<p> +11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at +all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State +will be weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Li Ch’uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the +general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his +profession), his army will lack strength."] +</p> + +<p> +12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his +army:— +</p> + +<p> +13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the +fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a +thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally think of +"the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the +movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand just the +reverse, and quote the saying of T’ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be +governed from without, and army should not be directed from within." Of course +it is true that, during an engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy, +the general should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance +apart. Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and +give wrong orders.] +</p> + +<p> +14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a +kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes +restlessness in the soldier’s minds. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the +civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid gloves." And +Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern a +state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are +military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of an +army"—to that of a State, understood.] +</p> + +<p> +15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.] +</p> + +<p> +through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. +This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I follow Mei Yao-ch’en here. The other commentators refer not to the +ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu says: "If a +general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted +with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skilful employer of men will +employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the stupid man. For +the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show +his courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the +stupid man has no fear of death."] +</p> + +<p> +16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from +the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and +flinging victory away. +</p> + +<p> +17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will +win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he +cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invariably +conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the defensive.] +</p> + +<p> +(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers correctly, as Li +Ch’uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the saying more +satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force +to defeat a greater, and <i>vice versa</i>. The secret lies in an eye for locality, +and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior +force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult +ground.’"] +</p> + +<p> +(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its +ranks. +</p> + +<p> +(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. +</p> + +<p> +(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the +sovereign. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "It is the sovereign’s function to give broad +instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of the general." It is +needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue +interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government. +Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he +was not hampered by central authority.] +</p> + +<p> +Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of +victory.”] +</p> + +<p> +18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not +fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, +for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch’in, who in 383 +A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to +despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An and +Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight +provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, +they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into +the stream. What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were soon +after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty +retreat.] +</p> + +<p> +If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing +yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret +of defence; defence is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a +better epitome of the root-principle of war.] +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap12"></a>Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of +this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two armies with +a view to discovering each other’s condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the +dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your +dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory; +show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads to +defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can "secure success by +modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the +possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the +enemy. +</p> + +<p> +2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the +opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.] +</p> + +<p> +3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his troops, +covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."] +</p> + +<p> +but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +4. Hence the saying: One may <i>know</i> how to conquer without being able to +<i>do</i> it. +</p> + +<p> +5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the +enemy means taking the offensive. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in §§ 1-3, in spite of the fact +that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they give, "He who cannot +conquer takes the defensive," is plausible enough.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a +superabundance of strength. +</p> + +<p> +7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of +the earth; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor indicating the +utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know his +whereabouts."] +</p> + +<p> +he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunderbolt, +against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion of most of the +commentators.] +</p> + +<p> +Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a +victory that is complete. +</p> + +<p> +8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the +acme of excellence. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Ts’ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has +germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch’uan +alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior +army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of Ch’eng-an, +said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and +shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words seriously, and +gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the +details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture +the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] +</p> + +<p> +9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole +Empire says, "Well done!" +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move +surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his schemes, so that +at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzŭ reserves +his approbation for things that +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"the world’s coarse thumb<br/> +And finger fail to plumb." +</p> + +<p> +10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Autumn hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, +when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese +writers.] +</p> + +<p> +to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is +no sign of a quick ear. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing: Wu +Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, who at a distance of a +hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih +K’uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.] +</p> + +<p> +11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but +excels in winning with ease. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering." +Mei Yao-ch’en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with +difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease."] +</p> + +<p> +12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for +courage. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained over +circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large knows nothing of +them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state +submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for +courage."] +</p> + +<p> +13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile +attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One who seeks +to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched +battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look +into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never +make a blunder and therefore invariably win."] +</p> + +<p> +Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means +conquering an enemy that is already defeated. +</p> + +<p> +14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat +impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not be +confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the +arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the +safety of his army.] +</p> + +<p> +15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after +the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and +afterwards looks for victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which will +ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with +stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be +assured."] +</p> + +<p> +16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to +method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. +</p> + +<p> +17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, +Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; +fifthly, Victory. +</p> + +<p> +18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to +Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to +Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese. The +first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable us to +form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to make calculations based on the +data thus obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or comparison of +the enemy’s chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then victory +ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third term, which in the Chinese some +commentators take as a calculation of <i>numbers</i>, thereby making it nearly +synonymous with the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of +as a consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition, while the +third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu +says: "The question of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the +varied resources of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, +but weakens it. However, it points to the third term as being a calculation of +numbers.] +</p> + +<p> +19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in +the scale against a single grain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "a victorious army is like an <i>i</i> (20 oz.) weighed against a <i>shu</i> +(1/24 oz.); a routed army is a <i>shu</i> weighed against an <i>i</i>." The point is simply +the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has +over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, +makes the <i>i</i> to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it +equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch’uan of the T’ang dynasty here gives +the same figure as Chu Hsi.] +</p> + +<p> +20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters +into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap13"></a>Chapter V. ENERGY</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the +control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate +officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s famous reply to the +first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large an army do you think I +could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the +Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more the better."] +</p> + +<p> +2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from +fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and +signals. +</p> + +<p> +3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack +and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct and indirect. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzŭ’s treatise, the +discussion of the <i>cheng</i> and the <i>ch’i</i>." As it is by no means +easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them +consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of +the commentators’ remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li +Ch’uan: "Facing the enemy is <i>cheng</i>, making lateral diversion is +<i>ch’i</i>. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your troops should be +arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal manœuvers +must be employed." Mei Yao-ch’en: "<i>Ch’i</i> is active, +<i>cheng</i> is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity +brings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy to regard our +straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus +<i>cheng</i> may also be <i>ch’i</i>, and <i>ch’i</i> may also be +<i>cheng</i>." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching +ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large +force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his +opponent. [Ch’ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, the march on +Lin-chin was <i>cheng</i>, and the surprise manœuver was <i>ch’i</i>." +Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: "Military +writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of <i>ch’i</i> and +<i>cheng</i>. Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: ‘Direct warfare favours +frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts’ao Kung +says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on +the enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuver.’ Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] +says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is <i>cheng</i>; turning movements, on +the other hand, are <i>ch’i</i>.’ These writers simply regard +<i>cheng</i> as <i>cheng</i>, and <i>ch’i</i> as <i>ch’i</i>; they +do not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other +like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment on the T’ang +Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A <i>ch’i</i> +manœuver may be <i>cheng</i>, if we make the enemy look upon it as +<i>cheng</i>; then our real attack will be <i>ch’i</i>, and vice versa. +The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real +intent.’" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other +operation is <i>cheng</i>, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; +whereas that is <i>ch’i</i>," which takes him by surprise or comes from +an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be +<i>ch’i</i>," it immediately becomes <i>cheng</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an +egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. +</p> + +<p> +5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but +indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the +enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of "indirect +tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march +round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. [1] +</p> + +<p> +6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and Earth, +unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but +to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of <i>ch’i</i> +and <i>cheng</i>. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of <i>cheng</i> at +all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating to +it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed out, the +two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot +really be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in figurative +language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.] +</p> + +<p> +7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these +five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. +</p> + +<p> +8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, white, and +black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen. +</p> + +<p> +9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, +bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted. +</p> + +<p> +10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct +and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series +of manœuvers. +</p> + +<p> +11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like +moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the +possibilities of their combination? +</p> + +<p> +12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll +stones along in its course. +</p> + +<p> +13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which +enables it to strike and destroy its victim. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is used +defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word as "the +measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the +illustrative simile in §. 15. Applying this definition to the falcon, it seems +to me to denote that instinct of <i>self-restraint</i> which keeps the bird +from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together with the power of +judging when the right moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is +the highly important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very +instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went into action +at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several minutes +exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun. Nelson +coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside he brought to +bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy’s nearest ships.] +</p> + +<p> +14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his +decision. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of distance +mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking. But I cannot help +thinking that Sun Tzŭ meant to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to +our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. Wang Hsi’s note, which after describing +the falcon’s mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just how the ‘psychological +moment’ should be seized in war."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the +releasing of the trigger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of energy +and the force stored up in the bent cross-bow until released by the finger on +the trigger.] +</p> + +<p> +16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and +yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be +without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been previously +fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the +dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle, may +give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your +formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and +yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates +courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone down +the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts’ao Kung throws out a +hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to destroy +formation and conceal one’s condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite +plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you +must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display timidity in order to +entrap the enemy, you must have extreme courage; if you wish to parade your +weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding +strength."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of +subdivision; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 1.] +</p> + +<p> +concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent +energy; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here differently +than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: "seeing that we are +favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the enemy will believe that we +are really afraid."] +</p> + +<p> +masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han Emperor: +“Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on their +condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed all their +able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and +emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one and all recommended +the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone opposed them, saying: +‘When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make an +ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old +age and infirmity. This is surely some <i>ruse</i> on the part of the enemy, and it +would be unwise for us to attack.’ The Emperor, however, disregarding +this advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at +Po-teng.”] +</p> + +<p> +19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains +deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu says: +"If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may be simulated +in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led to believe that we are +strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy’s movements +should be determined by the signs that we choose to give him." Note the +following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the +Ch’i State being at war with Wei, sent T’ien Chi and Sun Pin +against the general P’ang Chuan, who happened to be a deadly personal +enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The Ch’i State has a reputation for +cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us. Let us turn this +circumstance to account." Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border +into Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night, +50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. P’ang Chuan pursued +them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these men of Ch’i were cowards: +their numbers have already fallen away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun +Pin came to a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach +after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the +words: "Under this tree shall P’ang Chuan die." Then, as night began to +fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to +shoot directly if they saw a light. Later on, P’ang Chuan arrived at the +spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written +on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his whole +army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu’s version of the story; the +<i>Shih Chi</i>, less dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes +P’ang Chuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the +rout of his army.] ] +</p> + +<p> +He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. +</p> + +<p> +20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked +men he lies in wait for him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He lies in wait +with the main body of his troops."] +</p> + +<p> +21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not +require too much from individuals. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the bulk; +afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each men according +to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from the untalented."] +</p> + +<p> +Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined energy. +</p> + +<p> +22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like +unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain +motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to +come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."] +</p> + +<p> +23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a +round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the +subject of energy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount +importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great results," he +adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap14"></a>Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: "Chapter IV, +on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the defensive; chapter +V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect methods. The good general +acquaints himself first with the theory of attack and defence, and then turns +his attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and +combining these two methods before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong +points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and +defence, and the perception of weak and strong points depends again on the +above methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on +Energy."] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the +enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to +hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted. +</p> + +<p> +2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not +allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or fights not at +all. [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his +own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy +to draw near. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will +strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.] +</p> + +<p> +4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch’en’s +interpretation of I. § 23.] +</p> + +<p> +if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can +force him to move. +</p> + +<p> +5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to +places where you are not expected. +</p> + +<p> +6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through +country where the enemy is not. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt +from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, +attack in unexpected quarters."] +</p> + +<p> +7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places +which are undefended. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, where +the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; where the walls +are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict enough; where relief comes +too late, or provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst +themselves."] +</p> + +<p> +You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions that +cannot be attacked. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[<i>I.e.</i>, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There is +rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later clause. Tu Mu, +Ch’en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch’en assume the meaning to be: "In order to +make your defence quite safe, you must defend <i>even</i> those places that are not +likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, then, those that will +be attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause balances less well with the +preceding—always a consideration in the highly antithetical style which +is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark +in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights +of heaven [see IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against +him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the +enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret +recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his +whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those +that the enemy cannot attack."] +</p> + +<p> +8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know what +to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not know what to +attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] +</p> + +<p> +9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, +through you inaudible; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with reference to +the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands. +</p> + +<p> +10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s +weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more +rapid than those of the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though +he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is +attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of +communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; if we are +the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign himself." It is +clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no +believer in frontal attacks.] +</p> + +<p> +12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even +though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we +need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia Lin: +"even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch’uan says: +"we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches +the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes—one of Chu-ko Liang, who when +occupying Yang-p’ing and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I, suddenly +struck his colors, stopped the beating of the drums, and flung open the city +gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping and sprinkling the ground. +This unexpected proceeding had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an +ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating +here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff."] +</p> + +<p> +13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, +we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei +Yao-ch’en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy’s dispositions are +visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions being +kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard +against attack from every quarter."] +</p> + +<p> +14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into +fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a +whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few. +</p> + +<p> +15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, +our opponents will be in dire straits. +</p> + +<p> +16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the +enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different +points; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by saying that +"while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering what he was going to +do, <i>he</i> was thinking most of what he was going to do himself."] +</p> + +<p> +and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall +have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. +</p> + +<p> +17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he +strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he +will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. +If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In Frederick the Great’s <i>Instructions to his Generals</i> we read: "A +defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those generals +who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those +who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object +in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small misfortunes to +avoid greater."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; +numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations +against us. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is "to compel the enemy to +disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction +in turn."] +</p> + +<p> +19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate +from the greatest distances in order to fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances and +that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to divide his army +for the purpose of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction +at precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy +in overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions which military +history records, one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of +Blucher just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.] +</p> + +<p> +20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent +to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the left, the van +unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if +the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred <i>li</i> apart, +and even the nearest are separated by several <i>li</i>! +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but the +mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army advancing +towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of which has orders to be +there on a fixed date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed +at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and place of meeting, +the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yu’s note may be +worth quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to +concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will be +forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we hold will +be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to +battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support will be possible between +wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there is any great distance between the +foremost and hindmost divisions of the army."] +</p> + +<p> +21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in +number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then +that victory can be achieved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended in 473 +B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its incorporation in Yüeh. +This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s death. With his present assertion +compare IV. § 4. Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, +which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it +is said, ‘One may <i>know</i> how to conquer without being able to <i>do</i> it,’ whereas +here we have the statement that ‘victory’ can be achieved.’ The explanation is, +that in the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under +discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make +certain of beating him. But the present passage refers particularly to the +soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s calculations, will be kept in +ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle. That is why he says +here that victory can be achieved."] +</p> + +<p> +22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. +Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all plans +conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure." +</p> + +<p> +23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy on being +thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low +or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku Liang, who sent the scornful +present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his +Fabian tactics.] +</p> + +<p> +Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. +</p> + +<p> +24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know +where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. IV. § 6.] +</p> + +<p> +25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to +conceal them; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is perhaps +not so much actual invisibility (see <i>supra</i> § 9) as "showing no sign" of +what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.] +</p> + +<p> +conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest +spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable officers, they +will not be able to lay any plans against us."] +</p> + +<p> +26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own +tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. +</p> + +<p> +27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the +strategy out of which victory is evolved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[<i>I.e.</i>, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they +cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has preceded the +battle.] +</p> + +<p> +28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your +methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-principle underlying +victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in number." With this +compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be +learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen +diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like +Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."] +</p> + +<p> +29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs +away from high places and hastens downwards. +</p> + +<p> +30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is +weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] +</p> + +<p> +31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it +flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is +facing. +</p> + +<p> +32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are +no constant conditions. +</p> + +<p> +33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby +succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. +</p> + +<p> +34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally +predominant; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."] +</p> + +<p> +the four seasons make way for each other in turn. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "have no invariable seat."] +</p> + +<p> +There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the want of +fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. The comparison +is not very happy, however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun +Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] See Col. Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. II, p. +490. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap15"></a>Chapter VII. MANŒUVERING</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. +</p> + +<p> +2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and +harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between the +higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he quotes a saying +of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without harmony in the State, no military +expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle array can +be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzŭ is represented as saying to Wu +Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all the +domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe."] +</p> + +<p> +3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing more +difficult. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts’ao +Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign’s instructions until +our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most +difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or manœuvers can hardly be said to +begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and Ch’ien Hao’s +note gives color to this view: "For levying, concentrating, harmonizing and +entrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules which will serve. The real +difficulty comes when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes +that "the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing +favourable position."] +</p> + +<p> +The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious into the +direct, and misfortune into gain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat enigmatical +expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is explained by +Ts’ao Kung: "Make it appear that you are a long way off, then cover the +distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your opponent." Tu Mu says: +"Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while you are +dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a slightly different turn: +"Although you may have difficult ground to traverse and natural obstacles to +encounter this is a drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by +celerity of movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two +famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at his +mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which resulted in the +great victory of Marengo.] +</p> + +<p> +4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of +the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before +him, shows knowledge of the artifice of <i>deviation</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of +O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch’in army. The King of Chao first +consulted Lien P’o on the advisability of attempting a relief, but the +latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening country too rugged +and difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully admitted the +hazardous nature of the march, but finally said: "We shall be like two rats +fighting in a whole—and the pluckier one will win!" So he left the +capital with his army, but had only gone a distance of 30 <i>li</i> when he +stopped and began throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he continued +strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the +intelligence to the enemy. The Ch’in general was overjoyed, and +attributed his adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was +in the Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies +had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days +and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity +that he was able to occupy a commanding position on the "North hill" before the +enemy had got wind of his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the +Ch’in forces, who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste +and retreat across the border.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, +most dangerous. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I adopt the reading of the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, Cheng Yu-hsien and the <i>T’u +Shu</i>, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to make +sense. The commentators using the standard text take this line to mean that +manœuvers may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all depends on the +ability of the general.] +</p> + +<p> +6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, +the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a +flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who +paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering without much enthusiasm, +being convinced that there is some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the +whole, it is clear that Sun Tzŭ does not approve of a lengthy march being +undertaken without supplies. Cf. infra, § 11.] +</p> + +<p> +7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced +marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a +stretch, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 <i>li</i>; but on one +occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts’ao Ts’ao is said to have +covered the incredible distance of 300 <i>li</i> within twenty-four hours.] +</p> + +<p> +doing a hundred <i>li</i> in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all +your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on +this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a hundred +<i>li</i> to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without impedimenta. +Manœuvers of this description should be confined to short distances. Stonewall +Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the +dangers of battle." He did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary +exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was +imperative, that he sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +9. If you march fifty <i>li</i> in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will +lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the +goal. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be <i>torn away</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +10. If you march thirty <i>li</i> with the same object, two-thirds of your army +will arrive. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the <i>T’ung Tien</i> is added: "From this we may know the difficulty of +manœuvering."] +</p> + +<p> +11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without +provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I think Sun Tzŭ meant "stores accumulated in dépôts." But Tu Yu says "fodder +and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, +foodstuffs, etc."] +</p> + +<p> +12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of +our neighbours. +</p> + +<p> +13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the +face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and +precipices, its marshes and swamps. +</p> + +<p> +14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use +of local guides. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[§§. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.] +</p> + +<p> +15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the +numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained. +</p> + +<p> +16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by +circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift but, as +Mei Yao-ch’en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."] +</p> + +<p> +your compactness that of the forest. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly marching, order +and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard against surprise attacks. But +natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the +quality of density or compactness.] +</p> + +<p> +18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>Shih Ching</i>, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man +can check."] +</p> + +<p> +in immovability like a mountain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to dislodge +you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice you into a trap.] +</p> + +<p> +19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall +like a thunderbolt. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T’ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: "You +cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the lighting—so +rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot +be parried.] +</p> + +<p> +20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting +that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may afterwards be +fairly divided amongst all.] +</p> + +<p> +when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of +the soldiery. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and +plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they +invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their most +memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch’ao who +penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of Fu-k’ang-an +and Tso Tsung-t’ang.] +</p> + +<p> +21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzŭ as saying that we must not break camp until we +have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness of the opposing +general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, §§ 3, 4.] +</p> + +<p> +Such is the art of manœuvering. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But there now +follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an earlier book on War, +now lost, but apparently extant at the time when Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of +this fragment is not noticeably different from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no +commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness.] +</p> + +<p> +23. The Book of Army Management says: +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us any +information about this work. Mei Yao- Ch’en calls it "an ancient military +classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the enormous amount +of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzŭ’s time between the +various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable +that a collection of military maxims should have been made and written down at +some earlier period.] +</p> + +<p> +On the field of battle, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] +</p> + +<p> +the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and +drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution +of banners and flags. +</p> + +<p> +24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of +the host may be focussed on one particular point. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the same +object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be like those of a +single man."!] +</p> + +<p> +25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the +brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance against +orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a story in this +connection of Wu Ch’i, when he was fighting against the Ch’in +State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless +daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and +returned to camp. Wu Ch’i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an +officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a good soldier, and +ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch’i replied: "I fully believe he +was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders."] +</p> + +<p> +This is the art of handling large masses of men. +</p> + +<p> +26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in +fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and +eyes of your army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to Ho-yang at the head of +500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches, that though +the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute +their passage.] +</p> + +<p> +27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all +ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible. Now +the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived +on the scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to wait +until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. It is in this +way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit." Li Ch’uan and others +tell an anecdote (to be found in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, year 10, § 1) of Ts’ao +Kuei, a protege of Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by +Ch’i, and the duke was about to join battle at Ch’ang-cho, after +the first roll of the enemy’s drums, when Ts’ao said: "Not just yet." +Only after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word for +attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch’i were utterly defeated. +Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts’ao +Kuei replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll +of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on +the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked when their +spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our victory." Wu Tzŭ (chap. +4) puts "spirit" first among the "four important influences" in war, and +continues: "The value of a whole army—a mighty host of a million +men—is dependent on one man alone: such is the influence of spirit!"] +</p> + +<p> +a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general’s most important asset. It is +the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage +into the panic-stricken." The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571-649) has a +saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or +striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of assailing the +enemy’s mental equilibrium."] +</p> + +<p> +28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle of the +Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, whereas Hannibal’s +men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.] +</p> + +<p> +by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on +returning to camp. +</p> + +<p> +29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but +attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of +studying moods. +</p> + +<p> +30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub +amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. +</p> + +<p> +31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease +while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is +famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength. +</p> + +<p> +32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, +to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident +array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to +oppose him when he comes downhill. +</p> + +<p> +34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose +temper is keen. +</p> + +<p> +35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, +take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been poisoned by +the enemy. Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that the saying has +a wider application.] +</p> + +<p> +Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying that a +man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the death against any +attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be +tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who +hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvelous tale is told of +Ts’ao Ts’ao’s courage and resource in ch. 1 of the <i>San Kuo Chi</i>, In +198 A.D., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent +reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was +obliged to draw off his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two +enemies, who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged +himself. In this desperate plight Ts’ao waited until nightfall, when he +bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the +whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear, while Ts’ao +himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into +confusion and annihilated. Ts’ao Ts’ao said afterwards: "The +brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a +desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] +</p> + +<p> +36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The object, as +Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road to safety, and thus +prevent his fighting with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly: +"After that, you may crush him."] +</p> + +<p> +Do not press a desperate foe too hard. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay will +use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has burned his +boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of +a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the +meaning by a story taken from the life of Yen-ch’ing. That general, +together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded by a vastly superior +army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and desert-like, and +the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells +they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and +sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu +Yen-ch’ing exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our +country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A strong gale happened +to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of +sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had abated before deciding +on a final attack; but luckily another officer, Li Shou-cheng by name, was +quicker to see an opportunity, and said: "They are many and we are few, but in +the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory will +go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, +Fu Yen-ch’ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his +cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to safety.] +</p> + +<p> +37. Such is the art of warfare. +</p> + +<p> +[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. +</p> + +<p> +[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" (Longmans, +1907), p. 29. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap16"></a>Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzŭ does not +appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us (V §§ 6-11) +that such deflections from the ordinary course are practically innumerable, we +have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an +indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare we ought to vary +our tactics to the utmost degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes +these Nine Variations out to be, but it has been suggested that they are +connected with the Nine Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by +Chang Yu. The only other alternative is to suppose that something has been +lost—a supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends +some weight.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, +collects his army and concentrates his forces. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may have been +interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the chapter.] +</p> + +<p> +2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads +intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated +positions. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning +of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu defines this +situation as being situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li +Ch’uan says it is "country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks +or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and +precipices, without a road by which to advance."] +</p> + +<p> +In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate position, +you must fight. +</p> + +<p> +3. There are roads which must not be followed, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch’uan, +"where an ambush is to be feared."] +</p> + +<p> +armies which must be not attacked, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be attacked." +Ch’en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival advantage, but +are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of +overtaxing your men’s strength."] +</p> + +<p> +towns which must not be besieged, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own +experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of +Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the +country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no +fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: "No town should +be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause +any trouble." Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is +small and well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great +feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In the +seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was +Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and +manœuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when +the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not +be obeyed. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, and +Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: "Weapons are baleful +instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the +negation of civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even +Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.] +</p> + +<p> +4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany +variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. +</p> + +<p> +5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the +configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to +practical account. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only securing +good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in every possible +way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is characterized by certain natural +features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How it is +possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical +knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"] +</p> + +<p> +6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his +plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make +the best use of his men. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally advantageous +lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it must be followed; if +an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, +it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and if +consistent with military operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed." But +there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these +advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but +if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an +ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to +attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with +desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.] +</p> + +<p> +7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of +disadvantage will be blended together. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says +Ts’ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your mind."] +</p> + +<p> +8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in +accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix +our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing +some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our calculations."] +</p> + +<p> +9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to +seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I must +consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my own ability to +gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations +are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself…. For instance; if I +am surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the +nervelessness of my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it +would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and +use the advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils." See the +story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.] +</p> + +<p> +10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which +would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the enemy’s best and +wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. Introduce traitors into +his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue +and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By +means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and +waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into +excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." +Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun Tzŭ here: +"Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit +of his own accord."] +</p> + +<p> +and make trouble for them, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble should be +made for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we might say, +"assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony +amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands." These give us a +whip-hand over the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +and keep them constantly engaged; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent them from having any +rest."] +</p> + +<p> +hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of: "cause +them to forget <i>pien</i> (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first +impulse), and hasten in our direction."] +</p> + +<p> +11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not +coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not +attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable. +</p> + +<p> +12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) +Recklessness, which leads to destruction; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Bravery without forethought," as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes a +man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says +Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but may be lured into an +ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character +of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, +forgetting that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general +should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who +fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be +condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, too, makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one’s +death does not bring about victory."] +</p> + +<p> +(2) cowardice, which leads to capture; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as +being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an advantage," +and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih +gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive," this is, the +man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved +in war unless you are willing to take risks. T’ai Kung said: "He who lets +an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 +A.D., Liu Yu pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval +battle with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered +only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan +Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be overcome, had a +light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if +necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural result was that the fighting +spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an +attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be +first in the fray, Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their +baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a +somewhat similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who +during a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in +readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to +get across.] +</p> + +<p> +(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, Teng +Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. +Teng Ch’iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and easily +provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will +grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to +be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured +as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s pretended flight, and finally attacked and +slain.] +</p> + +<p> +(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect in a +general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to +slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however +undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: +"The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion."] +</p> + +<p> +(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless of the +welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger of sacrificing +any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a +shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from +the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be the +consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve +a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his +military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to +relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical blunders +which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through the very +man who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the +interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one +of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I +remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his +men." By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun +Tzŭ’s mouth.] +</p> + +<p> +13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of +war. +</p> + +<p> +14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be +found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap17"></a>Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1 than by +this heading.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and +observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the +neighbourhood of valleys. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies +of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural ovens," i.e. "the +openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu +Ch’iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan +was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch’iang having found a refuge in the +hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all the favourable +positions commanding supplies of water and forage. Ch’iang was soon in +such a desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced to make a +total surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood +of valleys."] +</p> + +<p> +2. Camp in high places, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the surrounding +country.] +</p> + +<p> +facing the sun. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch’en Hao "facing east." +Cf. infra, §§ 11, 13. +</p> + +<p> +Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. +</p> + +<p> +3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts’ao +Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your evolutions." +The <i>T’ung Tien</i> reads, "If <i>the enemy</i> crosses a river," etc. But in view of +the next sentence, this is almost certainly an interpolation.] +</p> + +<p> +4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance +to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and +then deliver your attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu at +the Wei River. Turning to the <i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 34, fol. 6 verso, we +find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were drawn up on opposite +sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten +thousand sacks filled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading +half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time, pretending to +have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was +much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han +Hsin was really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his +turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a +great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion of +Lung Chu’s army from getting across. He then turned upon the force which had +been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The +rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in all +directions.] +</p> + +<p> +5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a +river which he has to cross. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For fear of preventing his crossing.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with water is very +awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops marshalled on the +river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is +essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other +commentators are not at all explicit.] +</p> + +<p> +Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on the lower +reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the sluices and sweep us +away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that ‘in river warfare we must not +advance against the stream,’ which is as much as to say that our fleet must not +be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would be able to take +advantage of the current and make short work of us." There is also the danger, +noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be +carried down to us.] +</p> + +<p> +So much for river warfare. +</p> + +<p> +7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them +quickly, without any delay. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and last +but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.] +</p> + +<p> +8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near +you, and get your back to a clump of trees. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where +there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect the rear.] +</p> + +<p> +So much for operations in salt-marshes. +</p> + +<p> +9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising +ground to your right and on your rear, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu quotes T’ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a +marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."] +</p> + +<p> +so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for +campaigning in flat country. +</p> + +<p> +10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, and (4) +plains. Compare Napoleon’s "Military Maxims," no. 1.] +</p> + +<p> +which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch’en asks, with some +plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known of +Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The <i>Shih Chi</i> (ch. 1 ad init.) +speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch’ih Yu. In the <i>Liu +T’ao</i> it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the +Empire." Ts’ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the +first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of whom (to the +number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Ch’uan tells us +that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his +Minister Feng Hou.] +</p> + +<p> +11. All armies prefer high ground to low, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch’en, "is not only more agreeable and +salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low ground is +not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for fighting."] +</p> + +<p> +and sunny places to dark. +</p> + +<p> +12. If you are careful of your men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn +out your animals to graze."] +</p> + +<p> +and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak of +illness."] +</p> + +<p> +and this will spell victory. +</p> + +<p> +13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on +your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and +utilise the natural advantages of the ground. +</p> + +<p> +14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to +ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides. +</p> + +<p> +15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running +between, deep natural hollows, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, with pools +of water at the bottom."] +</p> + +<p> +confined places, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by precipices on +three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."] +</p> + +<p> +tangled thickets, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears cannot be +used."] +</p> + +<p> +quagmires +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable for +chariots and horsemen."] +</p> + +<p> +and crevasses, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined by Mei Yao-ch’en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling +cliffs." Tu Mu’s note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and intersected +by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it +clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same +view. On the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to the +rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a +crack or fissure" and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the +sentence indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun +Tzŭ is here speaking of crevasses.] +</p> + +<p> +should be left with all possible speed and not approached. +</p> + +<p> +16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach +them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear. +</p> + +<p> +17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, +ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods +with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for +these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be +lurking. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors who may +lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and overhearing our +instructions."] +</p> + +<p> +18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the +natural strength of his position. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is so good +that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. Baden-Powell’s +"Aids to Scouting."] +</p> + +<p> +19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the +other side to advance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to dislodge +us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to force a battle, he +would seem to despise us, and there would be less probability of our responding +to the challenge."] +</p> + +<p> +20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait. +</p> + +<p> +21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and +Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and observe the +enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he +may know that they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy’s +march."] +</p> + +<p> +The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that +the enemy wants to make us suspicious. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts’ao Kung’s, is as follows: "The +presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation is a +sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these +hiding-places in order to make us suspect an ambush." It appears that these +"screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the +retreating enemy happened to come across.] +</p> + +<p> +22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu’s explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying along +in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers are in ambush +at the spot beneath."] +</p> + +<p> +Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. +</p> + +<p> +23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots +advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the +approach of infantry. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat exaggerated as +applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon by saying that horses +and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one +another in the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in +ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have +scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will +gallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: +"As you move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar +for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting up, +glitter of arms, etc." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been +sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that +the army is encamping. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light horse +will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and strong +points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust and its +motion."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about +to advance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object is to +make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack us." Chang Yu +alludes to the story of T’ien Tan of the Ch’i-mo against the Yen +forces, led by Ch’i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the <i>Shih Chi</i> we read: +"T’ien Tan openly said: ‘My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off +the noses of their Ch’i prisoners and place them in the front rank to +fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other side being +informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; but those within the +city were enraged at seeing their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing +only lest they should fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend +themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T’ien Tan sent back +converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is +that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by +inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.’ +Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses lying in +them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from the +city-walls, wept passionately and were all impatient to go out and fight, their +fury being increased tenfold. T’ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were +ready for any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in +his hands, and ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, +while the ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served +out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular +soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with the old +and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were dispatched to the enemy’s +camp to arrange terms of surrender, whereupon the Yen army began shouting for +joy. T’ien Tan also collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, +and got the wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the +prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be +plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch’i Chieh, in high good +humor, granted their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and +careless. Meanwhile, T’ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them +with pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored +stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on +their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and drove +the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in the walls, backing +them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, +dashed furiously into the enemy’s camp where they caused the utmost confusion +and dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on +their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom +they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with +gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment +a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind making +as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels, +until heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen +army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men of Ch’i, who succeeded in +slaying their general Ch’i Chien…. The result of the battle was the +ultimate recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch’i +State."] +</p> + +<p> +Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will +retreat. +</p> + +<p> +25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, +it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. +</p> + +<p> +26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch’uan indicates "a treaty confirmed +by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand, simply say +"without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."] +</p> + +<p> +27. When there is much running about +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental banner.] +</p> + +<p> +and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. +</p> + +<p> +28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. +</p> + +<p> +29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want +of food. +</p> + +<p> +30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army +is suffering from thirst. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from the +behavior of a single man."] +</p> + +<p> +31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure +it, the soldiers are exhausted. +</p> + +<p> +32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch’en Hao says, the +enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] +</p> + +<p> +Clamour by night betokens nervousness. +</p> + +<p> +33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is weak. If +the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are +angry, it means that the men are weary. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an army +are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue" owing +to the exertions which he has demanded from them.] +</p> + +<p> +34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and the horses +chiefly on grass.] +</p> + +<p> +and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing +that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined +to fight to the death. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 71, given +in abbreviated form by the <i>P’ei Wen Yun Fu:</i> "The rebel Wang Kuo of Liang +was besieging the town of Ch’en- ts’ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was +in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out against him. The latter pressed +for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At last the +rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw down their weapons of their +own accord. Sung was not advancing to the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a +principle of war not to pursue desperate men and not to press a retreating +host.’ Sung answered: ‘That does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a +jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a +disorganized multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advances to +the attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being +slain."] +</p> + +<p> +35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued +tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. +</p> + +<p> +36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always a fear +of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good temper.] +</p> + +<p> +too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity is +necessary to keep the men to their duty.] +</p> + +<p> +37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s numbers, +shows a supreme lack of intelligence. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I follow the interpretation of Ts’ao Kung, also adopted by Li +Ch’uan, Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, +Chia Lin, Mei Tao-ch’en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first +tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, etc." +This would connect the sentence with what went before about rewards and +punishments.] +</p> + +<p> +38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that +the enemy wishes for a truce. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages, it is a +sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength is +exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzŭ to draw such +an obvious inference.] +</p> + +<p> +39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long +time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the +situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says a manœuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain time +for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.] +</p> + +<p> +40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply +sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, <i>cheng</i> tactics and frontal +attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.] +</p> + +<p> +What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a +close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in squeezing +very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch’uan, who appears to offer the +simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will win." Fortunately +we have Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity +itself: "When the numbers are even, and no favourable opening presents itself, +although we may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find +additional recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, +concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to +snatch the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." +He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary +troops may be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that +figure."] +</p> + +<p> +41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to +be captured by them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao, quoting from the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, says: "If bees and scorpions +carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, then, +should not be treated with contempt."] +</p> + +<p> +42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will +not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless. +If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not +enforced, they will still be useless. +</p> + +<p> +43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but +kept under control by means of iron discipline. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Yen Tzŭ [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues endeared him to +the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 +init.: "The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the +profession of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness."] +</p> + +<p> +This is a certain road to victory. +</p> + +<p> +44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be +well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. +</p> + +<p> +45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders +being obeyed, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his +men and also make his authority respected, so that when they come to face the +enemy, orders may be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust +and look up to him." What Sun Tzŭ has said in § 44, however, would lead one +rather to expect something like this: "If a general is always confident that +his orders will be carried out," etc."] +</p> + +<p> +the gain will be mutual. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his command, and +the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual." He +quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 4: "The art of giving orders +is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty doubts." +Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an +army.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap18"></a>Chapter X. TERRAIN</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with "terrain," +the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six calamities" are +discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of +desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) +Accessible ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of +communications."] +</p> + +<p> +(2) entangling ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you become +entangled."] +</p> + +<p> +(3) temporising ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] +</p> + +<p> +(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance +from the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A +strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman’s unquestioning +acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called +<i>accessible</i>. +</p> + +<p> +3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the +raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, "not to +allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of Napoleon’s dictum, "the +secret of war lies in the communications," [1] we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had +done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10, +VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of supply may be said to be as vital +to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as +the duelist who finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, +and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, +and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose +communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and +he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his +force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior +numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will +not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole +army." [2] +</p> + +<p> +Then you will be able to fight with advantage. +</p> + +<p> +4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called <i>entangling</i>. +</p> + +<p> +5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally +forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you +fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. +</p> + +<p> +6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first +move, it is called <i>temporising</i> ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation +remains at a deadlock."] +</p> + +<p> +7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an +attractive bait, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But this is +only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position.] +</p> + +<p> +it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing +the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver +our attack with advantage. +</p> + +<p> +8. With regard to <i>narrow passes</i>, if you can occupy them first, let them be +strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and by +making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy."] +</p> + +<p> +9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if +the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. +</p> + +<p> +10. With regard to <i>precipitous heights</i>, if you are beforehand with your +adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him +to come up. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and +defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." [For the +enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yu tells the +following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a +punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At night he pitched his camp as +usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch, when +suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near +by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against +the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien, +however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly +as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their +former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant +officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. +‘How did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien +replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking +unnecessary questions.’ From this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that +high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because +they are immune from disastrous floods."] +</p> + +<p> +11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat +and try to entice him away. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D. against the two +rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of +Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-te +persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken +prisoner. See <i>Chiu T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.] +</p> + +<p> +12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of +the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, +at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be exhausted and our adversary +fresh and keen."] +</p> + +<p> +and fighting will be to your disadvantage. +</p> + +<p> +13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § 8.] +</p> + +<p> +The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them. +</p> + +<p> +14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural +causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1) +Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) +rout. +</p> + +<p> +15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten +times its size, the result will be the <i>flight</i> of the former. +</p> + +<p> +16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the +result is <i>insubordination</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [<i>Hsin T’ang Shu</i>, ch. +148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against Wang +T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers +treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by +riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien Pu +was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had +passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and +dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide +by cutting his throat.] +</p> + +<p> +When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result +is <i>collapse</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the +common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] +</p> + +<p> +17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the +enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the +commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the +result is <i>ruin</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi’s note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause, and +at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; +thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his +head."] +</p> + +<p> +18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not +clear and distinct; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with decision, +the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without +vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty." +General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the words: "The secret of getting +successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell—in the +clearness of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: "the +most fatal defect in a military leader is difference; the worst calamities that +befall an army arise from hesitation."] +</p> + +<p> +when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."] +</p> + +<p> +and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter +<i>disorganisation</i>. +</p> + +<p> +19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior +force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful +one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must +be a <i>rout</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues: "Whenever +there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve +in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men +and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De Bello +Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).] +</p> + +<p> +20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the +general who has attained a responsible post. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to +those connected with ground."] +</p> + +<p> +but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, +and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes +the test of a great general. +</p> + +<p> +22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into +practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises them, will +surely be defeated. +</p> + +<p> +23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though +the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not +fight even at the ruler’s bidding. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, who is said to +have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the <i>San Lueh</i>, has these +words attributed to him: "The responsibility of setting an army in motion must +devolve on the general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the +Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and +the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their +country’s cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that +"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander +must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees from the Son of +Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."] +</p> + +<p> +24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing +disgrace, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a +soldier is to retreat.] +</p> + +<p> +whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his +sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." Such a +man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would not regret his +conduct."] +</p> + +<p> +25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the +deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand +by you even unto death. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture of the +famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have frequently had +occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the +meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to +sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every +hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and +Wu Ch’i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, +began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your +son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked +the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago, Lord Wu +performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and +finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the +same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.’" Li Ch’uan +mentions the Viscount of Ch’u, who invaded the small state of Hsiao +during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of the soldiers are +suffering severely from the cold." So he made a round of the whole army, +comforting and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if they were +clothed in garments lined with floss silk.] +</p> + +<p> +26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; +kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of +quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they +are useless for any practical purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, they +would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military +discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of +Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the +inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a certain +officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow-townsman, +ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging to one of the people, in order +to wear it over his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng +considered that the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be +allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered +his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so. +This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time +forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up.] +</p> + +<p> +27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware +that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards +victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, Ts’ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."] +</p> + +<p> +28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own +men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards +victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. III. § 13 (1).] +</p> + +<p> +29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are +in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes +fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory. +</p> + +<p> +30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he +has broken camp, he is never at a loss. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so +thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move recklessly," says +Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no mistakes."] +</p> + +<p> +31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory +will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your +victory complete. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three +things—the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural +advantages of earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."] +</p> + +<p> +[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. +</p> + +<p> +[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap19"></a>Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) +Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; +(5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; +(8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. +</p> + +<p> +2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious to see +their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a +battle and scatter in every direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, +"they will lack the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find +harbors of refuge."] +</p> + +<p> +3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it +is facile ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating," and +the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: "When your +army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order +to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home."] +</p> + +<p> +4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is +contentious ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung +says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the +strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus, +Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, even for a +few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining +invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.: "For those who have to fight in +the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu +Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., +and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of +Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, +plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, +governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from +his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we +oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, +and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile +at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, +and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms +without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we +could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning +and resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous +strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, +was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this type of +ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network of +roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which +intercommunication is easy."] +</p> + +<p> +6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a +third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small +principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on +the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.] +</p> + +<p> +so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them +to become his allies.] +</p> + +<p> +is ground of intersecting highways. +</p> + +<p> +7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a +number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached such a +point, its situation is serious."] +</p> + +<p> +8. Mountain forests, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or simply "forests."] +</p> + +<p> +rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: +this is difficult ground. +</p> + +<p> +9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only +retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to +crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. +</p> + +<p> +10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without +delay, is desperate ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The situation, as pictured by Ts’ao Kung, is very similar to the +"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible: "A lofty +mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked." +Ch’en Hao says: "to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like sitting in a leaking +boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid +description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an army invading +hostile territory without the aid of local guides:—it falls into a fatal +snare and is at the enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the +right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the +chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, +no choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to range +our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly +appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; +retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; +yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment’s respite. If we simply +maintain our ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a +move, we have to sustain the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is +wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of +life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of strength +and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man defending it can +check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offense in the hands of the +enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:—in this +terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest +of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest effect?" Students of +Greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, +and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, +VII. 78 sqq.].] +</p> + +<p> +11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On +contentious ground, attack not. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous +position first. So Ts’ao Kung. Li Ch’uan and others, however, +suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that +it would be sheer madness to attack. In the <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu</i>, when the King of Wu +inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: "The rule with +regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage +over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, +beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your +banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other places that he cannot +afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a dust—confound his ears +and eyes—detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in +ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."] +</p> + +<p> +12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking force +itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available here. I follow +that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s brief note: +"Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not +cut off.] +</p> + +<p> +On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states."] +</p> + +<p> +13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[On this, Li Ch’uan has the following delicious note: "When an army +penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to alienate the +people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, +whose march into Ch’in territory was marked by no violation of women or +looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause us +to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won +the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think that the true reading +must be, not ‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’" Alas, I fear that in this +instance the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at +least, has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ +there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility of +retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by bringing in +provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, "do not encamp.] +</p> + +<p> +14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu +amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be devised +which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, +the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the famous occasion +when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum, and +to all appearances entrapped by the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which +Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which T’ien +Tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, +note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some +2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven +along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The +strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the +Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal’s army passed +safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.] +</p> + +<p> +On desperate ground, fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is a chance +of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your corner."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge +between the enemy’s front and rear; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other."] +</p> + +<p> +to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the +good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. +</p> + +<p> +16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from +concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in +disorder. +</p> + +<p> +17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, +they stopped still. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded in +thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure any +advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they would +remain where they were."] +</p> + +<p> +18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on +the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something +which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts’ao Kung thinks it is +"some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu says: "The +three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of +which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our favourable positions; (2) to +ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications." Our object +then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render him +helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at +once throw the other side on the defensive.] +</p> + +<p> +19. Rapidity is the essence of war: +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in warfare," and +he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military science, and the chief +business of the general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the +importance attached to speed by two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., +Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch’eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was +meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence +with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was +then military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta’s treachery, he at +once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled +him by a specious message of friendly import. Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and +said: "If Meng Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be +thoroughly investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is +an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is +still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of +forced marches, be brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’eng with +in a space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko +Liang: "Wan is 1200 <i>li</i> from here. When the news of my revolt reaches +Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will be a whole +month before any steps can be taken, and by that time my city will be well +fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that +will be sent against us are not worth troubling about." The next letter, +however, was filled with consternation: "Though only eight days have passed +since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What +miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- ch’eng had fallen +and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See <i>Chin Shu</i>, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li +Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the +successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern +Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, +Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down through +the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his +army without loss of time, and was just about to start when the other generals +implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous +state for navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is +of paramount importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time +to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together. If +we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before +his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before +you have time to stop your ears against it. [See VII. § 19, note.] This is the +great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he will have +to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. +Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, +and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people +should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.] +</p> + +<p> +take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, +and attack unguarded spots. +</p> + +<p> +20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The +further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of +your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. +</p> + +<p> +21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 13. Li Ch’uan does not venture on a note here.] +</p> + +<p> +22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give them plenty of +food and drink, and look after them generally."] +</p> + +<p> +and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous +general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the success of +the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch’u State, where a universal levy +was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he +declined all invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In +vain did the Ch’u general try to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien +kept inside his walls and would not come out, but devoted his whole time and +energy to winning the affection and confidence of his men. He took care that +they should be well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities +for bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them +into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he told off +certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. The answer +was, that they were contending with one another in putting the weight and +long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic +pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch +and that they were now ready for fighting. By this time the Ch’u army, +after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in +disgust. The Ch’in general immediately broke up his camp and followed +them, and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. +Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch’u was conquered by Ch’in, and +the king Fu-ch’u led into captivity.] +</p> + +<p> +Keep your army continually on the move, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has struck +me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army together."] +</p> + +<p> +and devise unfathomable plans. +</p> + +<p> +23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will +prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not +achieve. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): "If one man were to run +amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to get our of +his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage and that all the +rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man who +sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."] +</p> + +<p> +Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will surely +exert their united strength to get out of it."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no +place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart of a hostile +country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will +fight hard. +</p> + +<p> +25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be constantly on +the <i>qui vive;</i> without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "without asking, you will get."] +</p> + +<p> +without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be +trusted. +</p> + +<p> +26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, +until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate into +cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: +"‘Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed +to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers’ +minds should be seriously perturbed.’ The meaning is," he continues, "that if +all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their +resolution until they die."] +</p> + +<p> +27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they +have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not +because they are disinclined to longevity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are things +for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away +valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but +simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzŭ is slyly insinuating that, as +soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see that temptations to shirk +fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their way.] +</p> + +<p> +28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate more genuine +grief than tears alone.] +</p> + +<p> +those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the +tears run down their cheeks. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts’ao Kung says, "all have +embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that the heroes of +the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to +the mournful parting at the I River between Ching K’o and his friends, +when the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch’in +(afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain +as he bade them farewell and uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is +blowing, Chilly the burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu +or a Kuei. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and +contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang, better +known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which +he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his +attempt, but was immediately hacked to pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was +in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Ts’ao Kuei (or Ts’ao Mo), +performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 +B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by Ch’i, and was just about to conclude +a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory, when Ts’ao Kuei +suddenly seized Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch’i, as he stood on the altar +steps and held a dagger against his chest. None of the duke’s retainers dared +to move a muscle, and Ts’ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, +declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a +weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, +whereupon Ts’ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place +amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed color. As was +to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, but his +wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the impolicy of breaking his +word, and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of +what she had lost in three pitched battles.] +</p> + +<p> +29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the <i>shuai-jan</i>. Now the <i>shuai-jan</i> +is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["<i>Shuai-jan</i>" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question was +doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through this +passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the sense of +"military manœuvers."] +</p> + +<p> +Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, +and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be +attacked by head and tail both. +</p> + +<p> +30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the <i>shuai-jan</i>, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, as Mei Yao-ch’en says, "Is it possible to make the front and +rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as though +they were part of a single living body?"] +</p> + +<p> +I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VI. § 21.] +</p> + +<p> +yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, +they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the +right. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of common peril, +how much more should two parts of the same army, bound together as they are by +every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a +campaign has been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case of +allied armies.] +</p> + +<p> +31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of horses, and +the burying of chariot wheels in the ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall the +Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the battle of +Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot. [See +Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to render flight impossible +by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity +and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This +is the lesson which can be learned from the <i>shuai-jan</i>.] +</p> + +<p> +32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of +courage which all must reach. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one." If +the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the +resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality, or at +any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington’s seemingly +ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he had ever +commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in this important +particular—unity of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian +defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost +certainly have lost the day.] +</p> + +<p> +33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question +involving the proper use of ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en’s paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences of +strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize accidental features +of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold +out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position +neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With +all respect to the text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am +inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no +means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions… and to +the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or +attacking, from the proper utilization of natural features." [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were leading +a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does it."] +</p> + +<p> +35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; +upright and just, and thus maintain order. +</p> + +<p> +36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and +appearances, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] +</p> + +<p> +and thus keep them in total ignorance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops must +not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only rejoice +with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the +enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been frequently pointed +out. But how about the other process—the mystification of one’s own men? +Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is over-emphatic on this point would do well +to read Col. Henderson’s remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley campaign: "The +infinite pains," he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his +most trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a +commander less thorough would have pronounced useless"—etc. etc. [3] In +the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, "Pan Ch’ao +took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other Central Asian states with +the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his +chief commander to succour the place with an army drawn from the kingdoms of +Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t’ou, totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch’ao +summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and +said: ‘Our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the +enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a +different direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, +and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the evening +drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch’ao now secretly released the +prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of +his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set off at once at the head of +10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch’ao’s retreat in the west, while the King of +Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of Khotan. +As soon as Pan Ch’ao knew that the two chieftains had gone, he called his +divisions together, got them well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against +the army of Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled +in confusion, and were closely pursued by Pan Ch’ao. Over 5000 heads were +brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and +cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, Kutcha +and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From that time +forward, Pan Ch’ao’s prestige completely overawed the countries of the +west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general not only kept his own +officers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of +dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice.] +</p> + +<p> +he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that war is +based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy. You must +deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but without letting them +know why."] +</p> + +<p> +By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from +anticipating his purpose. +</p> + +<p> +38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed +up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep +into hostile territory before he shows his hand. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. § 15), that is, takes some decisive +step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like Hsiang Yu, who +sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch’en Hao, followed by Chia Lin, +understands the words less well as "puts forth every artifice at his command."] +</p> + +<p> +39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a +flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and none knows whither he +is going. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or retreat; it is +ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and conquering."] +</p> + +<p> +40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the +business of the general. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilization there should be no delay in aiming a +blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again to this point. +Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more +present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.] +</p> + +<p> +41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules for the +nine varieties of ground."] +</p> + +<p> +the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of +human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. +</p> + +<p> +42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating +deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 20.] +</p> + +<p> +43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across +neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not figure +among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X. One’s first impulse +would be to translate it distant ground," but this, if we can trust the +commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch’en says it +is "a position not far enough advanced to be called ‘facile,’ and not near +enough to home to be ‘dispersive,’ but something between the two." Wang Hsi +says: "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, whose +territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on +us to settle our business there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare +occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine +Situations.] +</p> + +<p> +When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of +intersecting highways. +</p> + +<p> +44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you +penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. +</p> + +<p> +45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in +front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is +desperate ground. +</p> + +<p> +46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of +purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the defensive, +and avoiding battle. Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 11.] +</p> + +<p> +On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts +of my army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible contingencies: "(1) +the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack on the part of the enemy." +Cf. VII. § 17. Mei Yao-ch’en says: "On the march, the regiments should be +in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the +fortifications."] +</p> + +<p> +47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is Ts’ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We +must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach the goal." +That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei +Yao-ch’en offers another equally plausible explanation: "Supposing the +enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we +should advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession." Ch’en +Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had time to select his own +ground, quotes VI. § 1, where Sun Tzŭ warns us against coming exhausted to the +attack. His own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is +a favourable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to +occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make a fight +for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, and victory +will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao She beat the army of +Ch’in. (See p. 57.)] +</p> + +<p> +48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On ground of +intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. +</p> + +<p> +49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as one +might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.] +</p> + +<p> +On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. +</p> + +<p> +50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position, whereas +my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s lines." Mei +Yao-ch’en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with desperation." +Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run away." Tu Mu points out +that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where it is the enemy who is +surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and canonized as Shen-wu, +was surrounded by a great army under Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was +comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 +foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps +being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to escape, +actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets himself by driving +into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers +and men saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their spirits +rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such +desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their +onslaught.] +</p> + +<p> +On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving +their lives. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and +provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain +to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death." Mei +Yao-ch’en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of +it." This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about "grounds" and the +"variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which bear on this +important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and +unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § +2 to enumerate "variations" before touching on "grounds" at all, but only +mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that +is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier +portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six +variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first +is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, +in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately followed +by the variations. This takes us down to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions +are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the +tenth ground noticed in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are +enumerated once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and +7, being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to +account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts maybe +brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal +with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short +chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are +defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the +corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate, +being double that of any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any +inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work +cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII +is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain +matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear +elsewhere.] +</p> + +<p> +51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when +surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly +when he has fallen into danger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch’ao’s devoted followers in 73 +A.D. The story runs thus in the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 47: "When Pan Ch’ao +arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at first +with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his behavior +underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch’ao +spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you noticed,’ he said, +‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys +have come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in a state +of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his lot. That surely is +the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they +have come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ +Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, +and set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who +arrived some day ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between surprise and +fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch’ao, keeping his +informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of +his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them. When the wine +had mounted into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still +further by addressing them thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an +isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now +it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom only a +few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards +us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to +seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will become food +for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers +replied: ‘Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander +through life and death.’ For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1, +note.] +</p> + +<p> +52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are +acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march +unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and +forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be +unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local +guides. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12-14—in order to +emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to regard +them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the following +words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have added that there is +always the risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or some +misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told, +ordered a guide to lead him into the neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was +an important pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the +pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead +of Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that +direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost arrived.] +</p> + +<p> +53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not +befit a warlike prince. +</p> + +<p> +54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows +itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He overawes his +opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Tao-ch’en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much +affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you can divide her +forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in +strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the neighbouring +states will be frightened; and if the neighbouring states are frightened, the +enemy’s allies will be prevented from joining her." The following gives a +stronger meaning: "If the great state has once been defeated (before she has +had time to summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and +refrain from massing their forces." Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu take the +sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may +be, if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, and +must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with +overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the +enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus: "If we +recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be discontented and hang +back. But if (as will then be the case) our display of military force is +inferior by half to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will take fright +and refuse to join us."] +</p> + +<p> +55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he +foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, +keeping his antagonists in awe. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch’uan, appears to be this: Secure +against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject entangling +alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enable him to +dispense with external friendships."] +</p> + +<p> +Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State became +a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous Six +Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. +Chang Yu, following up his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning +this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.] +</p> + +<p> +56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and retreat +be heavily punished."] +</p> + +<p> +issue orders +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "hang" or post up."] +</p> + +<p> +without regard to previous arrangements; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is made +clear by Ts’ao Kung’s quotation from the <i>Ssu-ma Fa:</i> "Give instructions +only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see deserving deeds." +Ts’ao Kung’s paraphrase: "The final instructions you give to your army +should not correspond with those that have been previously posted up." Chang Yu +simplifies this into "your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand." And +Chia Lin says: "there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not +only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates +the entire reversal of them at the last moment.] +</p> + +<p> +and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a +single man. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 34.] +</p> + +<p> +57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your +design. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for any +order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no reasons" for his +decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a general than to a judge.] +</p> + +<p> +When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing +when the situation is gloomy. +</p> + +<p> +58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into +desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of the +tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already alluded to on +p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles +from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in full +force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man +of which was furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their +way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men +of Chao see me in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their +fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck +down the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their stead." +Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong +position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he sees the +standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and +escape through the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent out a division +consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form in line of battle with their +backs to the River Ti. Seeing this manœuver, the whole army of Chao broke into +loud laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the +generalissimo’s flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was +immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some +time; until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and +banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where another +fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure the +trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two generals succeeded +in joining the other army, which was fighting with the utmost desperation. The +time had now come for the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw +the men of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted +walls, tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the +Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags struck +them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and overpowered their +king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the +panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and +completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was +King Ya himself…. After the battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and +said: "In the <i>Art of War</i> we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the +right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend +of Sun Tzŭ and T’ai Kung. See IX § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, +ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these +conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general replied: "I +fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it +not written there: ‘Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come +off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the +usual course, I should never have been able to bring my colleague round. What +says the Military Classic—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the +men off to fight.’ [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun +Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to +fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, +there would have been a general <i>débandade</i>, and it would have been +impossible to do anything with them." The officers admitted the force of his +argument, and said: "These are higher tactics than we should have been capable +of." [See <i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ] +</p> + +<p> +59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is capable +of striking a blow for victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Danger has a bracing effect.] +</p> + +<p> +60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the +enemy’s purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"—by an appearance of yielding +and falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yu’s note makes the meaning +clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do so; if +he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out his +intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver +our attack.] +</p> + +<p> +61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in one +direction." Ts’ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the enemy." +But such a violent displacement of characters is quite indefensible.] +</p> + +<p> +we shall succeed in the long run +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "after a thousand <i>li</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +in killing the commander-in-chief. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Always a great point with the Chinese.] +</p> + +<p> +62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. +</p> + +<p> +63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, +destroy the official tallies, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as a permit +or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the "border-warden" of <i>Lun +Yu</i> III. 24, who may have had similar duties. When this half was returned to +him, within a fixed period, he was authorized to open the gate and let the +traveler through.] +</p> + +<p> +and stop the passage of all emissaries. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Either to or from the enemy’s country.] +</p> + +<p> +64. Be stern in the council-chamber, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the sovereign.] +</p> + +<p> +so that you may control the situation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the strictest +precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.] +</p> + +<p> +65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. +</p> + +<p> +66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 18.] +</p> + +<p> +and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao’s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favourable +position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus +obtained cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore, +to occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful +appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into going there +as well." Mei Yao-ch’en explains that this "artful appointment" is to be +made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies, who will carry back just the +amount of information that we choose to give them. Then, having cunningly +disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting after the enemy, to +arrive before him (VII. § 4). We must start after him in order to ensure his +marching thither; we must arrive before him in order to capture the place +without trouble. Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei +Yao-ch’en’s interpretation of § 47.] +</p> + +<p> +67. Walk in the path defined by rule, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot be +achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is unfortunate that this +variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much +more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of the old +school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating every accepted canon of +warfare.] +</p> + +<p> +and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable opportunity +offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove decisive."] +</p> + +<p> +68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you +an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be +too late for the enemy to oppose you. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly appears +felicitous. But of course Sun Tzŭ was thinking only of its speed. The words +have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping +hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "The Science of War," p. 333. +</p> + +<p> +[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap20"></a>Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Rather more than half the chapter (§§ 1-13) is devoted to the subject of fire, +after which the author branches off into other topics.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to +burn soldiers in their camp; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[So Tu Mu. Li Ch’uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers" +(when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on a +diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note], found himself +placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the +Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his +officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! [1] The only course open to +us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under cover of night, +when they will not be able to discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we +shall exterminate them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover +us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all +replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the +Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is today,’ he cried, +‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, +who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything will be +brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate for valiant warriors.’ +All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he +and his little band quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale +was blowing at the time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums +and hide behind the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw +flames shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. +The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at +the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, +whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the front and rear +of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao +slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads of +the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, +perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan Ch’ao, divining his +thoughts, said with uplifted hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, +I should not think, Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied +Kuo Hsun, and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed +him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and +trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public +proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostage, he returned to make his +report to Tou Ku." <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ] +</p> + +<p> +the second is to burn stores; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the rebellious +population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make +periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run +proved entirely successful.] +</p> + +<p> +the third is to burn baggage-trains; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao’s wagons and +impedimenta by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.] +</p> + +<p> +the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines" are the +same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and clothing. Cf. VII. +§ 11.] +</p> + +<p> +the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says in the <i>T’ung Tien:</i> "To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. The +method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by dipping +them into a brazier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the +enemy’s lines."] +</p> + +<p> +2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[T’sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy’s camp" are referred to. +But Ch’en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have +favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us." Chia Lin +says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."] +</p> + +<p> +the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter, reeds, +brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material cause. Chang Yu +says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires."] +</p> + +<p> +3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for +starting a conflagration. +</p> + +<p> +4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are +those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing +or the Cross-bar; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the Twenty-eight +Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and +Corvus.] +</p> + +<p> +for these four are all days of rising wind. +</p> + +<p> +5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible +developments: +</p> + +<p> +6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once with an +attack from without. +</p> + +<p> +7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain quiet, +bide your time and do not attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. +If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. +Hence the necessity for caution.] +</p> + +<p> +8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with +an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find +the difficulties too great, retire."] +</p> + +<p> +9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait +for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favourable moment. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire breaking out +(either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of incendiaries) inside +the enemy’s camp. "But," he continues, "if the enemy is settled in a waste +place littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a +position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against him at any +seasonable opportunity, and not await on in hopes of an outbreak occurring +within, for fear our opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding +vegetation, and thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling +once baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking +advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese general’s camp, +but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in the neighbourhood had +already been burnt down. On the other hand, Po-ts’ai, a general of the +Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of +this simple precaution. "At the head of a large army he was besieging +Ch’ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very small, +and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung +called his officers together and said: "In war, there are various indirect +methods of attack, and numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator +here quotes Sun Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp +in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we +set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a +sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of +T’ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so +Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and +mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men, +who stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with loud +shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, +and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the +rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." [<i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 71.] +] +</p> + +<p> +10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the +leeward. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will retreat +away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight +desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A rather more obvious +explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the east, begin burning to +the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from that side. If you +start the fire on the east side, and then attack from the west, you will suffer +in the same way as your enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a morning." +(<i>Tao Te Ching</i>, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch’en and Wang Hsi say: "A day breeze +dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as +a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this +sense is to be obtained is not apparent.] +</p> + +<p> +12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the +movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, and watch +for the days on which wind will rise, before making our attack with fire." +Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: "We must not only know how to +assail our opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar +attacks from them."] +</p> + +<p> +13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those +who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. +</p> + +<p> +14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his +belongings. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy’s road or divide +his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water can do useful +service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is the +reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of +sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzŭ (ch. 4) +speaks thus of the two elements: "If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy +ground, from which the water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, +it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands +thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it +may be exterminated by fire."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his +attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste +of time and general stagnation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. Ts’ao Kung says: +"Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day." And Tu Mu: "If +you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, your +subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will ensue." For +several reasons, however, and in spite of the formidable array of scholars on +the other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch’en +alone, whose words I will quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in +their battles and assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come and +not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort +to such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What they must not do, and +what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to the advantages they +have got."] +</p> + +<p> +16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good +general cultivates his resources. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu quotes the following from the <i>San Lueh</i>, ch. 2: "The warlike prince +controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by good faith, and +by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will be disruption; +if rewards are deficient, commands will not be respected."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is +something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so far in +that direction as the remarkable passage in the <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 69. "I dare +not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance +an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."] +</p> + +<p> +18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; +no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. +</p> + +<p> +19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you +are. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an +interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately on § +18.] +</p> + +<p> +20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. +</p> + +<p> +21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.] +</p> + +<p> +nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. +</p> + +<p> +22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of +caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger’s +cubs." +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap21"></a>Chapter XIII. THE USE OF SPIES</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them +great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources +of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.] +</p> + +<p> +There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on +the highways. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered, brambles and +thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be reminded of the saying: ‘On +serious ground, gather in plunder.’ Why then should carriage and transportation +cause exhaustion on the highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, +but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the +injunction to ‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is deeply +engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided against. Hence, +without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order +that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, again, there are +places like salt deserts where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from +home cannot be dispensed with."] +</p> + +<p> +As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-tail." The +allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each consisting of +about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on behalf of the State +by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that +their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. [See +II. § 12, note.] In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army, +while the other seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 +men (reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 +families would be affected.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which +is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the +enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of +silver in honours and emoluments, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of this +curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned at this point.] +</p> + +<p> +is the height of inhumanity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ’s agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to the +frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war always +brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy’s +condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for +years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is +impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their +services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling +amount for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up an +incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the +poor, and hence Sun Tzŭ concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing +less than a crime against humanity.] +</p> + +<p> +3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no +master of victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the national +temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these memorable words +were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch’u State: "The [Chinese] character +for ‘prowess’ is made up of [the characters for] ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear’ +(cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the repression of +cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the appointment of +Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the +people, putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."] +</p> + +<p> +4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and +conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is <i>foreknowledge</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means to do.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be +obtained inductively from experience, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu’s note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from +other analogous cases."] +</p> + +<p> +nor by any deductive calculation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and +magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human actions +cannot be so calculated."] +</p> + +<p> +6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the +spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural science +may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified +by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable +through spies and spies alone."] +</p> + +<p> +7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) +inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. +</p> + +<p> +8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret +system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the +sovereign’s most precious faculty. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders, had +officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it was to collect all possible +information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of +his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves +thus gained." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +9. Having <i>local spies</i> means employing the services of the inhabitants of a +district. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind treatment, and +use them as spies."] +</p> + +<p> +10. Having <i>inward spies</i>, making use of officials of the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in this +respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have +undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy for gold, men +who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed +over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side +should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of displaying their +ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each +boat. Officials of these several kinds," he continues, "should be secretly +approached and bound to one’s interests by means of rich presents. In this way +you will be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, +ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the +harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." The +necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears +from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou, +sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold +at P’i. After each side had experienced a number of victories and +defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain +P’o-t’ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to have him whipped until the +blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by +offering to cooperate with him from inside the city, and to give a fire signal +at the right moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these +promises, march out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their +head with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’s bidding. Meanwhile, Li +Hsiung’s general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; +and P’o-t’ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city +walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the signal +and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were drawn +up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang’s soldiers +entered the city in this way, every one of whom was forthwith beheaded. Li +Hsiung then charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and +routed the enemy completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho +Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that +of his father Li T’e, <i>Chin Shu</i>, ch. 120, 121.] +</p> + +<p> +11. Having <i>converted spies</i>, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them +for our own purposes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the enemy’s +service, and inducing them to carry back false information as well as to spy in +turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we +pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false +impression of what is going on. Several of the commentators accept this as an +alternative definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively +proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§ +21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used with +conspicuous success: (1) by T’ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo (see +<i>supra</i>, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the +wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P’o was conducting a defensive +campaign against Ch’in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien +P’o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a +series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of his +spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan Chu’s +pay. They said: "The only thing which causes Ch’in anxiety is lest Chao +Kua should be made general. Lien P’o they consider an easy opponent, who +is sure to be vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the +famous Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of +war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no +commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much +disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke +of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua was +appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man +who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran statesman +Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien P’o. Needless to say, he +proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch’i and the great military power +of Ch’in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and +his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, +during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed +by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, +ruthlessly put to the sword.] +</p> + +<p> +12. Having <i>doomed spies</i>, doing certain things openly for purposes of +deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the +enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do things +calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe that they have +been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy’s +lines, they will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take +measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite different. The +spies will thereupon be put to death." As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih +mentions the prisoners released by Pan Ch’ao in his campaign against +Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to T’ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was +sent by T’ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied +security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang +Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T’ang Chien, but +this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the New T’ang History +(ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on +until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when sent by +the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch’i. He has certainly +more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of Ch’i, being +subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he +considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be +boiled alive.] +</p> + +<p> +13. <i>Surviving spies</i>, finally, are those who bring back news from the +enemy’s camp. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a regular +part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man of keen +intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a +will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed with physical strength and +courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure +hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the +following story of Ta’hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of +Eastern Ch’in, Shen-wu of Ch’i made a hostile movement upon +Sha-yuan. The Emperor T’ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the +enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three were on horseback and +wore the enemy’s uniform. When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet +away from the enemy’s camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they +succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army. Then they got on their +horses again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of +night-watchmen; and more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was +committing some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit +a sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible +information about the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm commendation from +the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was able to inflict a severe +defeat on his adversary."] +</p> + +<p> +14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate relations +to be maintained than with spies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch’en point out that the spy is privileged to enter +even the general’s private sleeping-tent.] +</p> + +<p> +None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater +secrecy be preserved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be carried +"mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted from Turenne, who +made perhaps larger use of them than any previous commander: "Spies are +attached to those who give them most, he who pays them ill is never served. +They should never be known to anybody; nor should they know one another. When +they propose anything very material, secure their persons, or have in your +possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never +communicate anything to them but what is absolutely necessary that they should +know. [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from +falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and double-dealing." +Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more along the lines of +"intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers +these attributes to the spies themselves: "Before using spies we must assure +ourselves as to their integrity of character and the extent of their experience +and skill." But he continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more +dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate +such." So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the +passage."] +</p> + +<p> +16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and +straightforwardness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, you must +treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for you with all their +might."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of +their reports. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies +going over to the service of the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VI. § 9.] +</p> + +<p> +19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he +must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard before [our +plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzŭ’s main point in this passage is: Whereas +you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for letting out the secret," the +object of killing the other man is only, as Ch’en Hao puts it, "to stop +his mouth" and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already been +repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzŭ lays +himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by +saying that the man deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly +not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of +him."] +</p> + +<p> +20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate +an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the +attendants, the aides-de- camp, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose duty it is +to keep the general supplied with information," which naturally necessitates +frequent interviews with him.] +</p> + +<p> +the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be +commissioned to ascertain these. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these important +functionaries can be won over by bribery.] +</p> + +<p> +21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted +with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted +spies and available for our service. +</p> + +<p> +22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able +to acquire and employ local and inward spies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy’s spies we learn the enemy’s +condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy into our +service, because it is he that knows which of the local inhabitants are greedy +of gain, and which of the officials are open to corruption."] +</p> + +<p> +23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to +carry false tidings to the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be +deceived."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on +appointed occasions. +</p> + +<p> +25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the +enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the +converted spy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As explained in §§ 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but makes it +possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.] +</p> + +<p> +Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost +liberality. +</p> + +<p> +26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was changed to +Yin by P’an Keng in 1401. +</p> + +<p> +was due to I Chih +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part in +Ch’eng T’ang’s campaign against Chieh Kuei.] +</p> + +<p> +who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due +to Lü Ya +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards +helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T’ai Kung, a title bestowed on +him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously +identified with the <i>Liu T’ao</i>.] +</p> + +<p> +who had served under the Yin. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to +introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are by no +means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly doubt that Sun +Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted +spy, or something closely analogous. His suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin +dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and +shortcoming which these former ministers were able to impart to the other side. +Mei Yao-ch’en appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic +names: "I Yin and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. +Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could not employ +the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great achievements were all for the +good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant: "How should two divinely +inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of +them simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a matter +which requires men of the highest mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom +and capacity qualified them for the task. The above words only emphasize this +point." Ho Shih believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of +their supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] +</p> + +<p> +27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use +the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they +achieve great results. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a boat from +bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on spies, while +production of great results, is oft-times the cause of utter destruction."] +</p> + +<p> +Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army’s +ability to move. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man without ears or eyes.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 ***</div> +</body> + +</html> + diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e2e1d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #132 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/132) diff --git a/old/132-0.txt b/old/132-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31ee7f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/132-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6767 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 *** + + + + +Sun Tzŭ +on +The Art of War + +THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD +Translated from the Chinese with Introduction and Critical Notes + +BY +LIONEL GILES, M.A. + +Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. +in the British Museum + + + + +1910 + + + +To my brother +Captain Valentine Giles, R.G. +in the hope that +a work 2400 years old +may yet contain lessons worth consideration +by the soldier of today +this translation +is affectionately dedicated. + + + +Contents + + + Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext + Preface by Lionel Giles + INTRODUCTION + Sun Wu and his Book + The Text of Sun Tzŭ + The Commentators + Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ + Apologies for War + Bibliography + Chapter I. Laying plans + Chapter II. Waging War + Chapter III. Attack by Stratagem + Chapter IV. Tactical Dispositions + Chapter V. Energy + Chapter VI. Weak Points and Strong + Chapter VII Manœuvring + Chapter VIII. Variation of Tactics + Chapter IX. The Army on the March + Chapter X. Terrain + Chapter XI. The Nine Situations + Chapter XII. The Attack by Fire + Chapter XIII. The Use of Spies + + + +Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext + +When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_, the +work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to Europe began +in 1782 when a French Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph Amiot, +acquired a copy of it, and translated it into French. It was not a good +translation because, according to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great +deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, and very little indeed of what he +did." + +The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by +Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words +of Dr. Giles, "excessively bad." He goes further in this criticism: "It +is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which none can +hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages were +willfully distorted or slurred over. Such offenses are less pardonable. +They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Latin or Greek classic, +and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in +translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt. Calthrop’s +translation was published in London. It was an improvement on the +first—omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected—but new +errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his +translation, wrote: "It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate +of my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a +better fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I +could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors." + +Clearly, Dr. Giles’ work established much of the groundwork for the +work of later translators who published their own editions. Of the +later editions of the _Art of War_ I have examined; two feature Giles’ +edited translation and notes, the other two present the same basic +information from the ancient Chinese commentators found in the Giles +edition. Of these four, Giles’ 1910 edition is the most scholarly and +presents the reader an incredible amount of information concerning Sun +Tzŭ’s text, much more than any other translation. + +The Giles’ edition of the _Art of War_, as stated above, was a +scholarly work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time and an +assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts +in the British Museum. Apparently he wanted to produce a definitive +edition, superior to anything else that existed and perhaps something +that would become a standard translation. It was the best translation +available for 50 years. But apparently there was not much interest in +Sun Tzŭ in English-speaking countries since it took the start of the +Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several people +published unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzŭ. In 1944, Dr. +Giles’ translation was edited and published in the United States in a +series of military science books. But it wasn’t until 1963 that a good +English translation (by Samuel B. Griffith and still in print) was +published that was an equal to Giles’ translation. While this +translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles’ translation, it lacks his +copious notes that make his so interesting. + +Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the +Chinese civilization and language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun +Tzŭ, the English translation, and voluminous notes along with numerous +footnotes. Unfortunately, some of his notes and footnotes contain +Chinese characters; some are completely Chinese. Thus, a conversion to +a Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the conversion in complete +ignorance of Chinese (except for what I learned while doing the +conversion). Thus, I faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it while +retaining as much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase +represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the +text as possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, +I was able to transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the +risk of making the text more obscure. However, the text, on the whole, +is quite satisfactory for the casual reader, a transformation made +possible by conversion to an etext. However, I come away from this task +with the feeling of loss because I know that someone with a background +in Chinese can do a better job than I did; any such attempt would be +welcomed. + +Bob Sutton + + + +Preface by Lionel Giles + +The seventh volume of _Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, +les arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois_ is devoted to the +Art of War, and contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles +de Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph +Amiot. Père Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a +sinologue in his day, and the field of his labours was certainly +extensive. But his so-called translation of the Sun Tzŭ, if placed side +by side with the original, is seen at once to be little better than an +imposture. It contains a great deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, and +very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair specimen, taken from +the opening sentences of chapter 5:— + +_De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes._ Sun-tse dit : Ayez +les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que subalternes; +inscrivez-les dans un catalogue à part, avec la note des talents & de +la capacité de chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage +lorsque l’occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que +vous devez commander soient persuadés que votre principale attention +est de les préserver de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez +avancer contre l’ennemi doivent être comme des pierres que vous +lanceriez contre des œufs. De vous à l’ennemi il ne doit y avoir +d’autre différence que celle du fort au faible, du vide au plein. +Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret. Voilà en peu de +mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute la perfection même du +gouvernement des troupes. + + +Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development in +the study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun +Tzŭ, although his work was known to be highly valued in China as by far +the oldest and best compendium of military science. It was not until +the year 1905 that the first English translation, by Capt. E.F. +Calthrop. R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under the title “Sonshi”(the +Japanese form of Sun Tzŭ). Unfortunately, it was evident that the +translator’s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty to fit him to +grapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzŭ. He himself plainly +acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the +accompanying translation would have been impossible.” We can only +wonder, then, that with their help it should have been so excessively +bad. It is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which none +can hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages +were wilfully distorted or slurred over. Such offences are less +pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Greek or +Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted +upon in translations from Chinese. + +From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present +translation is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate +of my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a +better fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I +could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors. Towards +the end of 1908, a new and revised edition of Capt. Calthrop’s +translation was published in London, this time, however, without any +allusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three chapters were +then already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms of Capt. +Calthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to his +earlier edition. This is on the whole an improvement on the other, +thought there still remains much that cannot pass muster. Some of the +grosser blunders have been rectified and lacunae filled up, but on the +other hand a certain number of new mistakes appear. The very first +sentence of the introduction is startlingly inaccurate; and later on, +while mention is made of “an army of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzŭ +(who are these, by the way?), not a word is vouchsafed about the +Chinese commentators, who nevertheless, I venture to assert, form a +much more numerous and infinitely more important “army.” + +A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In the +first place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in +order to facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of students +generally. The division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen’s +edition; but I have sometimes found it desirable to join two or more of +his paragraphs into one. In quoting from other works, Chinese writers +seldom give more than the bare title by way of reference, and the task +of research is apt to be seriously hampered in consequence. With a view +to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzŭ is concerned, I have +also appended a complete concordance of Chinese characters, following +in this the admirable example of Legge, though an alphabetical +arrangement has been preferred to the distribution under radicals which +he adopted. Another feature borrowed from “The Chinese Classics” is the +printing of text, translation and notes on the same page; the notes, +however, are inserted, according to the Chinese method, immediately +after the passages to which they refer. From the mass of native +commentary my aim has been to extract the cream only, adding the +Chinese text here and there when it seemed to present points of +literary interest. Though constituting in itself an important branch of +Chinese literature, very little commentary of this kind has hitherto +been made directly accessible by translation. + +I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my sheets as +they were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a final +revision. On a review of the whole, without modifying the substance of +my criticisms, I might have been inclined in a few instances to temper +their asperity. Having chosen to wield a bludgeon, however, I shall not +cry out if in return I am visited with more than a rap over the +knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to put a sword into the +hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either text or +reference for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from +the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere translations,” would +not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome. For, after all, the worst +fate I shall have to dread is that which befell the ingenious paradoxes +of George in _The Vicar of Wakefield_. + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Sun Wu and his Book + +Ssu-ma Ch’ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzŭ: [1] + + +Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch’i State. His _Art of War_ brought him +to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him: + +"I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of +managing soldiers to a slight test?" + +Sun Tzŭ replied: "You may." + +Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" + +The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to +bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ divided them into two +companies, and placed one of the King’s favourite concubines at the head +of each. He then bade them all take spears in their hands, and +addressed them thus: "I presume you know the difference between front +and back, right hand and left hand?" + +The girls replied: Yes. + +Sun Tzŭ went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight +ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. +When I say "Right turn," you must face towards your right hand. When I +say "About turn," you must face right round towards your back." + +Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus +explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the +drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But +the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzŭ said: "If words of command +are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, +then the general is to blame." + +So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left +turn," whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun +Tzŭ: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not +thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders _are_ +clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of +their officers." + +So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. +Now the king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised +pavilion; and when he saw that his favourite concubines were about to be +executed, he was greatly alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following +message: "We are now quite satisfied as to our general’s ability to +handle troops. If we are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and +drink will lose their savor. It is our wish that they shall not be +beheaded." + +Sun Tzŭ replied: "Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be +the general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty +which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept." + +Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed +the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been +done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went +through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, +marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect +accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ +sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your soldiers, Sire, are now +properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your majesty’s +inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire; +bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey." + +But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to +camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops." + +Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot +translate them into deeds." + +After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was one who knew how to handle an +army, and finally appointed him general. In the west, he defeated the +Ch’u State and forced his way into Ying, the capital; to the north he +put fear into the States of Ch’i and Chin, and spread his fame abroad +amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzŭ shared in the might of the +King. + +About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has to tell us in +this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, +Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death, +and also the outstanding military genius of his time. The historian +speaks of him too as Sun Tzŭ, and in his preface we read: "Sun Tzŭ had +his feet cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It +seems likely, then, that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his +mutilation, unless the story was invented in order to account for the +name. The crowning incident of his career, the crushing defeat of his +treacherous rival P’ang Chuan, will be found briefly related in Chapter +V. § 19, note. + +To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in two other passages +of the _Shih Chi:_— + +In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the +field with Tzŭ-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P’ei, and attacked Ch’u. He +captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince’s sons who had +formerly been generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying +[the capital]; but the general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It +is not yet possible. We must wait"…. [After further successful +fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu addressed Wu +Tzŭ-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared that it was not yet +possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The two men +replied: "Ch’u’s general Tzŭ-ch’ang, [4] is grasping and covetous, and +the princes of T’ang and Ts’ai both have a grudge against him. If Your +Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win over T’ang +and Ts’ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed this advice, [beat +Ch’u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying.] [5] + + +This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He +does not appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects +of a wound in 496. In another chapter there occurs this passage:[6] + +From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the +other: Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] +in the service of Ch’i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men +developed and threw light upon the principles of war. + + +It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch’ien at least had no doubt about the +reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, +to be noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on +the period in question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say +much of such a work as the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu_, which is supposed to +have been written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution +is somewhat doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would +be of little value, based as it is on the _Shih Chi_ and expanded with +romantic details. The story of Sun Tzŭ will be found, for what it is +worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth noting are: (1) +Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzŭ-hsu. (2) He is called +a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired life, and his +contemporaries were unaware of his ability. + +The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzŭ: "When sovereign and +ministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ +to encounter the foe." Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto +no doubt has been cast upon it), we have here the earliest direct +reference for Sun Tzŭ, for Huai-nan Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many years +before the _Shih Chi_ was given to the world. + +Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzŭ at the head of +30,000 men beat Ch’u with 200,000 is that the latter were +undisciplined." + +Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun +Wu’s grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch’i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father +Sun P’ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch’i, and Sun Wu himself, +whose style was Ch’ang-ch’ing, fled to Wu on account of the rebellion +which was being fomented by the kindred of T’ien Pao. He had three +sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. +According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, +considering that Sun Pin’s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may +be dismissed as chronologically impossible. Whence these data were +obtained by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course no reliance +whatever can be placed in them. + +An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han +period is the short preface written by the Great Ts’ao Ts’ao, or Wei Wu +Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in full:— + + +I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage. +[10] The _Lun Yu_ says: “There must be a sufficiency of military +strength.” The _Shu Ching_ mentions "the army" among the "eight objects +of government." The _I Ching_ says: "‘army’ indicates firmness and +justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune." The _Shih +Ching_ says: "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his +troops." The Yellow Emperor, T’ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used +spears and battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The _Ssu-ma +Fa_ says: "If one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may +rightfully be slain." He who relies solely on warlike measures shall be +exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish. +Instances of this are Fu Ch’ai [11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the +other. [12] In military matters, the Sage’s rule is normally to keep +the peace, and to move his forces only when occasion requires. He will +not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. + +Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work +composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzŭ was a +native of the Ch’i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the _Art +of War_ in 13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were +tested on women, and he was subsequently made a general. He led an army +westwards, crushed the Ch’u state and entered Ying the capital. In the +north, he kept Ch’i and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his +time, Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment +of deliberation and planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the +field, [14] clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun Tzŭ +stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries, +however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and +while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work +abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive +which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. + +One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the +13 chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported +by the internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some +ruler is addressed. + +In the bibliographic section of the _Han Shu_, there is an entry which +has given rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 +_p’ien_ (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 _chuan_." It is evident that +this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch’ien, or those +we possess today. Chang Shou-chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s +_Art of War_ of which the "13 chapters" formed the first _chuan_, +adding that there were two other _chuan_ besides. This has brought +forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other +writings of Sun Tzŭ—we should call them apocryphal—similar to the _Wen +Ta_, of which a specimen dealing with the Nine Situations [15] is +preserved in the _T’ung Tien_, and another in Ho Shin’s commentary. It +is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzŭ had only +written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of exegesis in +the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pi +I-hsun, the author of the _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, backs this up with a +quotation from the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu:_ "The King of Wu summoned Sun +Tzŭ, and asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set +forth a chapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to +praise him." As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the +same scale as in the above-mentioned fragments, the total number of +chapters could not fail to be considerable. Then the numerous other +treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ might be included. The fact that the +_Han Chih_ mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82 _p’ien_, whereas +the Sui and T’ang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition +to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that all of +these were contained in the 82 _p’ien_. Without pinning our faith to +the accuracy of details supplied by the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu_, or +admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, +we may see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between +Ssu-ma Ch’ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop +of forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzŭ, and the +82 _p’ien_ may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped +together with the original work. It is also possible, though less +likely, that some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian +and were purposely ignored by him. [16] + +Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu +Ti strung together Sun Wu’s _Art of War_," which in turn may have +resulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of Ts’ao King’s +preface. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of +saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote +a commentary on it. On the whole, this theory has met with very little +acceptance. Thus, the _Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu_ says: "The mention of the 13 +chapters in the _Shih Chi_ shows that they were in existence before the +_Han Chih_, and that latter accretions are not to be considered part of +the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can certainly not be taken as +proof." + +There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in +the time of Ssu-ma Ch’ien practically as we have them now. That the +work was then well known he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzŭ’s _13 +Chapters_ and Wu Ch’i’s _Art of War_ are the two books that people +commonly refer to on the subject of military matters. Both of them are +widely distributed, so I will not discuss them here." But as we go +further back, serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact +which has to be faced is that the _Tso Chuan_, the greatest +contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as a +general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward +circumstance, that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the +story of Sun Wu as given in the _Shih Chi_, but even show themselves +frankly skeptical as to the existence of the man at all. The most +powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in the +following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17]— + + +It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native of the +Ch’i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he +crushed Ch’u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso’s +Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s Commentary +need not contain absolutely everything that other histories contain. +But Tso has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling +ruffians such as Ying K’ao-shu, [18] Ts’ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and +Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements +were so brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again, details +are given, in their due order, about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the +Minister P’ei. [21] Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been +passed over? + +In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same school +as _Kuan Tzŭ_, [22] _Liu T’ao_, [23] and the _Yüeh Yu_ [24] and may +have been the production of some private scholar living towards the end +of the "Spring and Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" +period. [25] The story that his precepts were actually applied by the +Wu State, is merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his +followers. + +From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time +of the "Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as +well, and the class of professional generals, for conducting external +campaigns, did not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six +States" [27] that this custom changed. Now although Wu was an +uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso should have left +unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet held no +civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu [28] and Sun +Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing +pundits. The story of Ho Lu’s experiment on the women, in particular, +is utterly preposterous and incredible. + +Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch’ien as having said that Sun Wu +crushed Ch’u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the +impression left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in +these exploits. The fact may or may not be significant; but it is +nowhere explicitly stated in the _Shih Chi_ either that Sun Tzŭ was +general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went +there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po P’ei both took +part in the expedition, and also that its success was largely due to +the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it is not +easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent +part in the same campaign. + +Ch’en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:— + +Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the +fact that he does not appear in the _Tso Chuan_, although he is said to +have served under Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he +really belonged to. + + +He also says:— + +The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch’i may be of genuine antiquity. + + +It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch’en Chen-sun, while +rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s +history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the +work which passes under his name. The author of the _Hsu Lu_ fails to +appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on +Ch’en Chen-sun really misses its mark. He makes one of two points, +however, which certainly tell in favour of the high antiquity of our "13 +chapters." "Sun Tzŭ," he says, "must have lived in the age of Ching +Wang [519-476], because he is frequently plagiarized in subsequent +works of the Chou, Ch’in and Han dynasties." The two most shameless +offenders in this respect are Wu Ch’i and Huai-nan Tzŭ, both of them +important historical personages in their day. The former lived only a +century after the alleged date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is known to +have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, +that Tseng Shen delivered the _Tso Chuan_, which had been entrusted to +him by its author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the _Art of +War_, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of +different epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all,—in +other words, that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards +the end of the 5th century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzŭ’s antiquity is +furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a +number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps be +extended, is given in the _Hsu Lu;_ and though some of the +interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected +thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar +and critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the +13 chapters to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing +that he is actually engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of +Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he would not have hesitated to +assign the work to a later date had he not honestly believed the +contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that the judgment of an +educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal evidence is +not far to seek. Thus in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable allusion +to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already passed away by +the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified +form. [30] The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that carried on between +the various feudal princes, in which armored chariots play a large +part. Their use seems to have entirely died out before the end of the +Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a state which ceased to exist +as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch presently. + +But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances +of its being other than a _bonâ fide_ production are sensibly +diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come until long after. +That it should have been forged in the period immediately following 473 +is particularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to identify +himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin’s theory, that the +author was a literary recluse, that seems to me quite untenable. If one +thing is more apparent than another after reading the maxims of Sun +Tzŭ, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large store of +personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of +a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but +also of a practical soldier closely acquainted with the military +conditions of his time. To say nothing of the fact that these sayings +have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest captains of Chinese +history, they offer a combination of freshness and sincerity, acuteness +and common sense, which quite excludes the idea that they were +artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, that the 13 +chapters were the genuine production of a military man living towards +the end of the "_Ch’un Ch’iu_" period, are we not bound, in spite of +the silence of the _Tso Chuan_, to accept Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account in +its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we +not hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu’s +biography were false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in +the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the +chronology involved in the story as told in the _Shih Chi_, which, so +far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed out. There are two passages +in Sun Tzŭ in which he alludes to contemporary affairs. The first in in +VI. § 21:— + +Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in +number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I +say then that victory can be achieved. + + +The other is in XI. § 30:— + +Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, I should +answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; yet if +they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, +they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps +the right. + + +These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of +composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between +Wu and Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has +hitherto escaped notice is that they also seriously impair the +credibility of Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the +first positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is +then spoken of as a general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, +so that his alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken +place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier +still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the +capture of Ying in 506, Ch’u and not Yüeh, was the great hereditary +enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch’u and Wu, had been constantly at war +for over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh +was waged only in 510, [32] and even then was no more than a short +interlude sandwiched in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch’u. Now +Ch’u is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference +is that they were written at a time when Yüeh had become the prime +antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch’u had suffered the great +humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found +useful. + + +B.C. +514 Accession of Ho Lu. +512 Ho Lu attacks Ch’u, but is dissuaded from entering Ying, +the capital. Shih Chi mentions Sun Wu as general. +511 Another attack on Ch’u. +510 Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This is the first +war between the two states. +509 or 508 Ch’u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at Yu-chang. +506 Ho Lu attacks Ch’u with the aid of T’ang and Ts’ai. +Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last +mention of Sun Wu in Shih Chi. +505 Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu +is beaten by Ch’in and evacuates Ying. +504 Ho Lu sends Fu Ch’ai to attack Ch’u. +497 Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh. +496 Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at Tsui-li. +Ho Lu is killed. +494 Fu Ch’ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of Fu- +chaio, and enters the capital of Yüeh. +485 or 484 Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzŭ-hsu. +482 Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch’ai. +478 to 476 Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu. +475 Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu. +473 Final defeat and extinction of Wu. + + +The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that +could have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather +to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, +and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may +conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which +date Yüeh does not appear to have scored any notable success against +Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was written for him, it must +have been during the period 505-496, when there was a lull in the +hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort +against Ch’u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the +tradition connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well +have seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period +482-473, when Yüeh was once again becoming a very serious menace. [33] +We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may have been, +was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. On this point the +negative testimony of the _Tso Chuan_ far outweighs any shred of +authority still attaching to the _Shih Chi_, if once its other facts +are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to +explain the omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu +Tzŭ-hsu, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because +the latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the +State. + +How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may be that the growing +celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown +to its author. It was felt to be only right and proper that one so well +versed in the science of war should have solid achievements to his +credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest +feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep and lasting impression on +all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of +her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than that the +acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly identified +with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his brain +conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out +by him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po P’ei and Fu Kai? + +It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun +Tzŭ’s life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this +necessary proviso, I should say that he probably entered the service of +Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s accession, and gathered experience, though +only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the intense +military activity which marked the first half of the prince’s reign. +[35] If he rose to be a general at all, he certainly was never on an +equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless present +at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s sudden +collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical +juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have +convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against +whom every effort would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus +a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his famous book, +which according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the end, +rather than the beginning of Ho Lu’s reign. The story of the women may +possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about the same +time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is +hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the +death-struggle with Yüeh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li. + +If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony +in the fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man of peace +should be contemporary with her greatest writer on war. + + + +The Text of Sun Tzŭ + +I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s +text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the +"13 chapters" of which Ssu-ma Ch’ien speaks were essentially the same +as those now extant. We have his word for it that they were widely +circulated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained from +discussing them on that account. Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface:— + +During the Ch’in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_ was in +general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated +it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for +the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first +to write a commentary on it. + + +As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that +Ts’ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so +obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time +onward so great, especially during the T’ang and Sung dynasties, that +it would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep +in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief +commentaries on Sun Tzŭ were in existence, a certain Chi T’ien-pao +published a work in 15 _chuan_ entitled "Sun Tzŭ with the collected +commentaries of ten writers." There was another text, with variant +readings put forward by Chu Fu of Ta-hsing, which also had supporters +among the scholars of that period; but in the Ming editions, Sun +Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason or other no +longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th century, +the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi +T’ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was +known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzŭ which +appears in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed +in 1726, the _Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng_. Another copy at my disposal +of what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that +contained in the "Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch’in dynasties" +[1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition is +evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese +channels. So things remained until Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a +distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, who claimed to be an +actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered a copy of Chi +T’ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library of the +Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the _I Shuo_ of Cheng Yu-Hsien, +mentioned in the _T’ung Chih_, and also believed to have perished. This +is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or text)"—a +rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set before +us the text of Sun Tzŭ in its pristine purity. Chi T’ien-pao was a +careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the +somewhat debased version current in his day, without troubling to +collate it with the earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two +versions of Sun Tzŭ, even older than the newly discovered work, were +still extant, one buried in the _T’ung Tien_, Tu Yu’s great treatise on +the Constitution, the other similarly enshrined in the _T’ai P’ing Yu +Lan_ encyclopedia. In both the complete text is to be found, though +split up into fragments, intermixed with other matter, and scattered +piecemeal over a number of different sections. Considering that the _Yu +Lan_ takes us back to the year 983, and the _T’ung Tien_ about 200 +years further still, to the middle of the T’ang dynasty, the value of +these early transcripts of Sun Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the +idea of utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to anyone until +Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government instructions, undertook a +thorough recension of the text. This is his own account:— + +Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ which his +editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient +edition [of Chi T’ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be +revised and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the +Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all +devoted themselves to this study, probably surpassing me therein. +Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for +military men. + + +The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on +the text of Sun Tzŭ prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are +left in doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the +new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun +Hsing-yen and only one co-editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original +edition" as their basis, and by careful comparison with older versions, +as well as the extant commentaries and other sources of information +such as the _I Shuo_, succeeded in restoring a very large number of +doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be accepted +as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzŭ’s +original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard +text." + +The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. It is in 6 +_pen_, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical +works in 83 _pen_. [38] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen +(largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating the traditional view +of Sun Tzŭ’s life and performances, and summing up in remarkably +concise fashion the evidence in its favour. This is followed by Ts’ao +Kung’s preface to his edition, and the biography of Sun Tzŭ from the +_Shih Chi_, both translated above. Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien’s +_I Shuo_, [39] with author’s preface, and next, a short miscellany of +historical and bibliographical information entitled _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, +compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate +sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by +the various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological +order. These we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one. + + + +The Commentators + +Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of +commentators, which would do honour to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks +on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather +ingeniously explains it by saying that the artifices of war, being +inexhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment in a great +variety of ways. + +1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti [A.D. +155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest +commentary on Sun Tzŭ actually came from the pen of this extraordinary +man, whose biography in the _San Kuo Chih_ reads like a romance. One of +the greatest military geniuses that the world has seen, and Napoleonic +in the scale of his operations, he was especially famed for the +marvelous rapidity of his marches, which has found expression in the +line "Talk of Ts’ao Ts’ao, and Ts’ao Ts’ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu +says of him that he was a great captain who "measured his strength +against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two Yuan, father and son, and +vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire of Han with Wu and +Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a council of +war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all +his calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not +lose one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any particular +saw their armies incontinently beaten and put to flight." Ts’ao Kung’s +notes on Sun Tzŭ, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly +characteristic of the stern commander known to history, that it is hard +indeed to conceive of them as the work of a mere _littérateur_. +Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely +intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than the text +itself. [40] + +2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name +is comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even +his personal name has not been recorded. Chi T’ien-pao’s edition places +him after Chia Lin, and Ch’ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T’ang +dynasty, [41] but this is a mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he +appears as Meng Shih of the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would +identify him with Meng K’ang of the 3rd century. He is named in one +work as the last of the "Five Commentators," the others being Wei Wu +Ti, Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao and Chia Lin. + +3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military +tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the present +day. The _T’ung Chih_ mentions "Lives of famous generals from the Chou +to the T’ang dynasty" as written by him. [42] According to Ch’ao +Kung-wu and the _T’ien-i-ko_ catalogue, he followed a variant of the +text of Sun Tzŭ which differs considerably from those now extant. His +notes are mostly short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates +his remarks by anecdotes from Chinese history. + +4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ, +his notes being taken from the _T’ung Tien_, the encyclopedic treatise +on the Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely +repetitions of Ts’ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed +that he drew on the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing +to the peculiar arrangement of _T’ung Tien_, he has to explain each +passage on its merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his own +explanation does not agree with that of Ts’ao Kung, whom he always +quotes first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the "Ten +Commentators," he was added to their number by Chi T’ien-pao, being +wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. + +5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star +even in the glorious galaxy of the T’ang period. We learn from Ch’ao +Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was +extremely fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read in +the military history of the _Ch’un Ch’iu_ and _Chan Kuo_ eras. His +notes, therefore, are well worth attention. They are very copious, and +replete with historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzŭ’s work is thus +summarized by him: "Practice benevolence and justice, but on the other +hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency." He further +declared that all the military triumphs and disasters of the thousand +years which had elapsed since Sun Tzŭ’s death would, upon examination, +be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the maxims +contained in his book. Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful charge against Ts’ao +Kung has already been considered elsewhere. + +6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao +Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ +because Ts’ao Kung’s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and +that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, +writing in the middle of the 11th century, calls Ts’ao Kung, Tu Mu and +Ch’en Hao the three chief commentators on Sun Tzŭ, and observes that +Ch’en Hao is continually attacking Tu Mu’s shortcomings. His +commentary, though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of his +predecessors. + +7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his +commentary on Sun Tzŭ is mentioned in the _T’ang Shu_ and was +afterwards republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with +those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in +point of quality, too, perhaps the least valuable of the eleven. + +8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei +Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was +published with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from +which we may cull the following:— + +Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and trying to +make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though +commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the +task. My friend Sheng-yu has not fallen into this mistake. In +attempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun Tzŭ’s work, he does +not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states +engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not concerned with +the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the three +ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed +to the Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, +but his meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an +army, or handling soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the +forces of victory, it is always systematically treated; the sayings are +bound together in strict logical sequence, though this has been +obscured by commentators who have probably failed to grasp their +meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the +obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out the +true meaning of Sun Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion +have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the +present work deserves to be handed down side by side with the three +great commentaries; and for a great deal that they find in the sayings, +coming generations will have constant reason to thank my friend +Sheng-yu. + + +Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined +to endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him above +Ch’en Hao in order of merit. + +9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of +his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch’en, and on +the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own +commentary with that of Ts’ao Kung, but the comparison is not often +flattering to him. We learn from Ch’ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised +the ancient text of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae and correcting +mistakes. [45] + +10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this +commentator is given as above by Cheng Ch’iao in the _Tung Chih_, +written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply +as Ho Shih in the _Yu Hai_, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch’ao Kung-wu as +saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no reason +to doubt Cheng Ch’iao’s statement, otherwise I should have been +inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one Ho Ch’u-fei, the +author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the latter part of the +11th century. Ho Shih’s commentary, in the words of the _T’ien-i-ko_ +catalogue, "contains helpful additions" here and there, but is chiefly +remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the +dynastic histories and other sources. + +11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great +originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid +exposition. His commentator is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse +sentences he contrives to expand and develop in masterly fashion. +Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much of Ts’ao Kung’s +commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and +therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sung history, the +_T’ung K’ao_, or the _Yu Hai_, but it finds a niche in the _T’ung +Chih_, which also names him as the author of the "Lives of Famous +Generals." [46] + +It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have +flourished within so short a space of time. Ch’ao Kung-wu accounts for +it by saying: "During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire +enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased to practice the art of +war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao’s rebellion came [1038-42] and the +frontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court made +strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became +the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the +commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that period. +[47] + +Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work +has not come down to us. The _Sui Shu_ mentions four, namely Wang Ling +(often quoted by Tu Yu as Wang Tzŭ); Chang Tzŭ-shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; +[48] and Shen Yu of Wu. The _T’ang Shu_ adds Sun Hao, and the _T’ung +Chih_ Hsiao Chi, while the _T’u Shu_ mentions a Ming commentator, Huang +Jun-yu. It is possible that some of these may have been merely +collectors and editors of other commentaries, like Chi T’ien-pao and +Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. + + + +Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ + +Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of +China’s greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have +studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (_d_. 196 +B.C.), [49] Feng I (_d_. 34 A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (_d_. 219), [51] and Yo +Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of Ts’ao Kung, who disputes with Han +Hsin the highest place in Chinese military annals, has already been +recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of +purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of Su Tung-p’o), who +wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief +inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is preserved +in the _Yu Hai:_ [54]— + +Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, +[55] is very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu +Ch’i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on +war, and they are linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." +But Wu Ch’i’s remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher +and more crudely stated, and there is not the same unity of plan as in +Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the style is terse, but the meaning fully brought +out. + + +The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the Garden +of Literature" by Cheng Hou:— + +Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military +men’s training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars +and men of letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet +profound, perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the _Lun +Yu_, the _I Ching_ and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the +writings of Mencius, Hsun K’uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level +of Sun Tzŭ. + + +Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the +criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the +venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages +a ruler’s bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." + + + +Apologies for War + +Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving +nation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her +experience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern +State can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point at +which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great Wall +and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier centuries +before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the +perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts +with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of +government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of +so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor +disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it +is hardly too much to say that the clash of arms has never ceased to +resound in one portion or another of the Empire. + +No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom +China can point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond +of emerging at the most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch’i +stands out conspicuous in the period when Ch’in was entering upon her +final struggle with the remaining independent states. The stormy years +which followed the break-up of the Ch’in dynasty are illuminated by the +transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is +tottering to its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts’ao Ts’ao +dominates the scene. And in the establishment of the T’ang dynasty, one +of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li +Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T’ai Tsung) was seconded by the +brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear +comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe. + +In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ +downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of +Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to +militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the +literati defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth +while to collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox +view is upheld. The following, by Ssu-ma Ch’ien, shows that for all his +ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any +price:— + +Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and +cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and +dangers, and to succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood +in its veins and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How +much more so will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of love +and hatred, joy and anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection +springs up within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into +play. That is the natural law which governs his being…. What then shall +be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and +without any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out +their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilization," condemning the +use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to +impotence and dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at +the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice +of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to +modify the position they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in +the family the teacher must not spare the rod, and punishments cannot +be dispensed with in the State, so military chastisement can never be +allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one can say is that +this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and +that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others +rebellious. [58] + + +The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun +Tzŭ:— + + +War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of +government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch’iu, both +disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of +litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their execution by +flogging in the market-place, are all done by officials. But the +wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the +hauling of women and children into captivity, and the beheading of +traitors—this is also work which is done by officials. The objects of +the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is no +intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off +heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt +with, only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the use of +military weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, +the end in view is to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and +relief to the good…. + +Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired your military +aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been +acquired by study." [59] "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing +that you are a disciple of Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; +"I was taught by Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should +exercise both civil and military functions, though to be sure my +instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very far." + +Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" +and the "military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of +action, or in what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is +more than I can say. But, at any rate, it has come about that the +members of the governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on +military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are bold +enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set down as eccentric +individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary +instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose +sight of fundamental principles. + +When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch’eng Wang, he regulated +ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and +learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60] he +sallied forth and chastised them. When Confucius held office under the +Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If +pacific negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should have +been made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Ch’i, who +cowered under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can it be said +that these two great Sages had no knowledge of military matters? + +We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He +also appeals to the authority of the Classics:— + +Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never +studied matters connected with armies and battalions." [62] Replying to +K’ung Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and +weapons." But if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he +used armed force against the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch’i +was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi revolted; he ordered +his officers to attack them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in +confusion. He once uttered the words: "If I fight, I conquer." [63] And +Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil and military +functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or +received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not +specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the +subject of his teaching. + + +Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:— + + +Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He also said: +"If I fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated +music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, +[66] and must not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, +the words "I am unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are +things which even an inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have to +lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if +one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, who was +employed by Wu Tzŭ-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the +remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." + +The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of +Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on +the art of war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they +adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over his father’s books to no +purpose, [67] as a proof that all military theory is useless. Again, +seeing that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism in +designing plans, and the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is +immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the +studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials +also require steady application and practice before efficiency is +reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices +to botch their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting +perilous; and useless unless a general is in constant practice, he +ought not to hazard other men’s lives in battle. [70] Hence it is +essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should be studied. + +Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of war. +Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not +pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the consequence being that +he was finally defeated and overthrown. He did not realize that the +tricks and artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang +of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to destruction by their +misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature of war +necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. +There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an +extorted oath, [72] and also of his having left the Sung State in +disguise. [73] Can we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding +truth and honesty? + + + +Bibliography + +The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ. +The notes on each have been drawn principally from the _Ssu k’u ch’uan +shu chien ming mu lu_, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. + +1. _Wu Tzŭ_, in 1 _chuan_ or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (_d_. 381 B.C.). A +genuine work. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 65. + +2. _Ssu-ma Fa_, in 1 _chuan_ or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to +Ssu-ma Jang-chu of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be +early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are constantly to +be met within its pages. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64. + +The _Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu_ (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three +treatises on war, _Sun Tzŭ_, _Wu Tzŭ_ and _Ssu-ma Fa_, are, generally +speaking, only concerned with things strictly military—the art of +producing, collecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct +theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, transport +of goods and the handling of soldiers—in strong contrast to later +works, in which the science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, +divination and magical arts in general. + +3. _Liu T’ao_, in 6 _chuan_, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or +Lu Shang, also known as T’ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C. [74] But +its style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-ming +(550-625 A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the +six sections so that the forgery cannot have been later than Sui +dynasty. + +4. _Wei Liao Tzŭ_, in 5 _chuan_. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. +B.C.), who studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The work appears to +have been originally in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess +contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main, though the +strategical devices differ considerably from those of the Warring +States period. It is been furnished with a commentary by the well-known +Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. + +5. _San Lueh_ in 3 _chuan_. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary +personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (_d_. 187 +B.C.) in an interview on a bridge. But here again, the style is not +that of works dating from the Ch’in or Han period. The Han Emperor +Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently quotes from it in one of his +proclamations; but the passage in question may have been inserted later +on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not be far +out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], or +somewhat earlier. + +6. _Li Wei Kung Wen Tui_, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a +dialogue between T’ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is +usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a +forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art of war. + +7. _Li Ching Ping Fa_ (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a +short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the T’ung Tien, but not +published separately. This fact explains its omission from the _Ssu K’u +Ch’uan Shu_. + +8. _Wu Ch’i Ching_, in 1 _chuan_. Attributed to the legendary minister +Feng Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty +(_d_. 121 B.C.), and said to have been eulogized by the celebrated +general Ma Lung (_d_. 300 A.D.). Yet the earliest mention of it is in +the _Sung Chih_. Although a forgery, the work is well put together. + +Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has +always been held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on +war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the _Shih Liu Ts’e_ (1 _chuan_), +preserved in the _Yung Lo Ta Tien;_ (2) _Chiang Yuan_ (1 _chuan_); and +(3) _Hsin Shu_ (1 _chuan_), which steals wholesale from Sun Tzŭ. None +of these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine. + +Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections +devoted to the literature of war. The following references may be found +useful:— + +_T’ung Tien_ (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162. +_T’ai P’ing Yu Lan_ (983), ch. 270-359. +_Wen Hsien Tung K’ao_ (13th cent.), ch. 221. +_Yu Hai_ (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141. +_San Ts’ai T’u Hui_ (16th cent). +_Kuang Po Wu Chih_ (1607), ch. 31, 32. +_Ch’ien Ch’io Lei Shu_ (1632), ch. 75. +_Yuan Chien Lei Han_ (1710), ch. 206-229. +_Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng_ (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81-90. +_Hsu Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao_ (1784), ch. 121-134. +_Huang Ch’ao Ching Shih Wen Pien_ (1826), ch. 76, 77. + +The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve +mention:— + +_Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 30. +_Sui Shu_, ch. 32-35. +_Chiu T’ang Shu_, ch. 46, 47. +_Hsin T’ang Shu_, ch. 57,60. +_Sung Shih_, ch. 202-209. +_T’ung Chih_ (circa 1150), ch. 68. + +To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial +Library:— + +_Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu Tsung Mu T’i Yao_ (1790), ch. 99, 100. + +Footnotes + +1. _Shih Chi_, ch. 65. + +2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. + +3. _Shih Chi_, ch. 130. + +4. The appellation of Nang Wa. + +5. _Shih Chi_, ch. 31. + +6. _Shih Chi_, ch. 25. + +7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year 637. + +8. Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. + +9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the +Han dynasty, which says: "Ten _li_ outside the _Wu_ gate [of the city +of Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to +commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch’i, who excelled in the +art of war, by the King of Wu." + +10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to +make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe." + +11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and +overthrown by Kou chien, King of Yüeh, in 473 B.C. See post. + +12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in +his preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction." + +13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the _T’u Shu_, and +may be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang Shou-chieh of +the T’ang dynasty, and appears in the _T’ai P’ing Yu Lan_. + +14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, +perhaps especially of § 8. + +15. See chap. XI. + +16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that _Wu Tzŭ_, which is not in +6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the _Han Chih_. Likewise, the +_Chung Yung_ is credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one only. +In the case of very short works, one is tempted to think that _p’ien_ +might simply mean "leaves." + +17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. + +18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. + +19. See Chapter 7, § 27 and Chapter 11, § 28. + +20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his +name. + +21. I.e. Po P’ei. See ante. + +22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large +additions have been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 B.C. + +23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. + +24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of +another work. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not +clear. + +25. About 480 B.C. + +26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. + +27. In the 3rd century B.C. + +28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter +half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have written a +work on war. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of the +INTRODUCTION. + +29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that +the _Tso Chuan_ must have been written in the 5th century, but not +before 424 B.C. + +30. See _Mencius_ III. 1. iii. 13-20. + +31. When Wu first appears in the _Ch’un Ch’iu_ in 584, it is already at +variance with its powerful neighbour. The _Ch’un Ch’iu_ first mentions +Yüeh in 537, the _Tso Chuan_ in 601. + +32. This is explicitly stated in the _Tso Chuan_, XXXII, 2. + +33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would +tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully +justify the language used in XI. § 30. + +34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious +treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great +general. Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the +other hand, cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century. + +35. From _Tso Chuan:_ "From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] +there was no year in which Ch’u was not attacked by Wu." + +36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really +descended from Sun Tzŭ. I am ashamed to say that I only read my +ancestor’s work from a literary point of view, without comprehending +the military technique. So long have we been enjoying the blessings of +peace!" + +37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of +Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the +ascent of the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as +being "situated five _li_ east of the district city of Hua-yin. The +temple contains the Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the T’ang Emperor +Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." + +38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40. + +39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzŭ. + +40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His +commentary is frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not +fully develop the meaning." + +41. _Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao_, ch. 221. + +42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered +chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand +Buddhas." See B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. 525. + +43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was +nominally existent in Sun Tzŭ’s day, it retained hardly a vestige of +power, and the old military organization had practically gone by the +board. I can suggest no other explanation of the passage. + +44. See _Chou Li_, xxix. 6-10. + +45. _T’ung K’ao_, ch. 221. + +46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s "Notes," p. 91 (new +edition). + +47. _T’ung K’ao_, loc. cit. + +48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the _San Kuo +Chih_, ch. 10. + +49. See XI. § 58, note. + +50. _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 17 ad init. + +51. _San Kuo Chih_, ch. 54. + +52. _Sung Shih_, ch. 365 ad init. + +53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting +themselves with Sun Tzŭ are not behindhand in their praise. In this +connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from +Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the present work were submitted +previous to publication: "Many of Sun Wu’s maxims are perfectly +applicable to the present day, and no. 11 [in Chapter VIII] is one that +the people of this country would do well to take to heart." + +54. Ch. 140. + +55. See IV. § 3. + +56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. + +57. The _Tso Chuan_. + +58. _Shih Chi_, ch. 25, fol. I. + +59. Cf. _Shih Chi_, ch 47. + +60. See _Shu Ching_, preface § 55. + +61. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 47. + +62. _Lun Yu_, XV. 1. + +63. I failed to trace this utterance. + +64. Supra. + +65. Supra. + +66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, +and festive rites. See _Shu Ching_, ii. 1. III. 8, and _Chou Li_, IX. +fol. 49. + +67. See XIII. § 11, note. + +68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the _Tso Chuan_, where +Tzŭ-ch’an says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not +employ a mere learner to make it up." + +69. Cf. _Tao Te Ching_, ch. 31. + +70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See _Lun Yu_, +XIII. 29, 30. + +71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. + +72. _Shih Chi_, ch. 47. + +73. _Shih Chi_, ch. 38. + +74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in +the _Shih Chi_, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a +former minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there +given, according to which he would appear to have been first raised +from a humble private station by Wen Wang. + + + +Chapter I. LAYING PLANS + +[Ts’ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of +this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple +selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in +his tent. See. § 26.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. + +2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to +ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be +neglected. + +3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be +taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine +the conditions obtaining in the field. + +4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The +Commander; (5) Method and discipline. + +[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by "Moral Law" a +principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral +aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale," were it not +considered as an attribute of the _ruler_ in § 13.] + + +5, 6. _The Moral Law_ causes the people to be in complete accord with +their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, +undismayed by any danger. + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the +officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; +without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute +when the crisis is at hand."] + + +7. _Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. + +[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words +here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of +Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying that what is meant is +"the general economy of Heaven," including the five elements, the four +seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.] + + +8. _Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; +open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. + +9. _The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, +benevolence, courage and strictness. + +[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or +benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control, +or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here +"wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or benevolence," and +the two military virtues of "courage" and "strictness" substituted for +"uprightness of mind" and "self-respect, self-control, or ‘proper +feeling.’"] + + +10. By _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of +the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the +officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the +army, and the control of military expenditure. + +11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows +them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. + +12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the +military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in +this wise:— + +13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? + + +[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.] + + + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? + +[See §§ 7, 8] + + +(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? + +[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D. 155-220), +who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his +own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned +himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of +corn! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy +his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts’ao Ts’ao’s own comment +on the present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a +law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must +be put to death."] + + +(5) Which army is the stronger? + +[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch’en puts it, freely +rendered, "_esprit de corps_ and ‘big battalions.’"] + + +(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the +officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; +without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute +when the crisis is at hand."] + + +(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and +punishment? + +[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be +properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] + + +14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or +defeat. + +15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will +conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that +hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let +such a one be dismissed! + +[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was +composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu +State.] + + +16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any +helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. + +17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s +plans. + +[Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish +theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract +principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of +strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and +sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to +secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of the +battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the +Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations +were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find +himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a +critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will +attack the first tomorrow—I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord +Uxbridge. "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any +idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you +expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ] + + +18. All warfare is based on deception. + +[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every +soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many +military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary +skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend +and foe."] + + +19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our +forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy +believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are +near. + +20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. + +[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder, crush +him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating +the uses of deception in war.] + + +21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in +superior strength, evade him. + +22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. +Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. + +[Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his +adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and +immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.] + + +23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. + +[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch’en has the note: "while +we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The +_Yu Lan_ has "Lure him on and tire him out."] + + +If his forces are united, separate them. + +[Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the +commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division +between them."] + + +24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not +expected. + +25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged +beforehand. + +26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his +temple ere the battle is fought. + +[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple +to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the +field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] + + +The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. +Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to +defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this +point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose. + +[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. + + + +Chapter II. WAGING WAR + +[Ts’ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the +cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the +chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a +consideration of ways and means.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field +a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred +thousand mail-clad soldiers, + +[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, +used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed +for purposes of defence. Li Ch’uan, it is true, says that the latter +were light, but this seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note +the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric +Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming +as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of +foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed +that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy +chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into +a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred +men.] + + +with provisions enough to carry them a thousand _li_, + +[2.78 modern _li_ go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly +since Sun Tzŭ’s time.] + + +the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of +guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots +and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per +day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. + +2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, +the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If +you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. + +3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State +will not be equal to the strain. + +4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength +exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to +take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be +able to avert the consequences that must ensue. + +5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has +never been seen associated with long delays. + +[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of +the commentators. Ts’ao Kung, Li Ch’uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and +Mei Yao-ch’en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally +stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho +Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure +of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but +they bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by +remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being +expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true +cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yu +says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable +to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, except +possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than +ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much +more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, +tardiness can never be anything but foolish—if only because it means +impoverishment to the nation. In considering the point raised here by +Sun Tzŭ, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur +to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome +against that of Hannibals’s isolated army, because it seemed to him +that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a +strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics +would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal it is +true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption +in their favour.] + + +6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged +warfare. + +7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war +that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. + +[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a +long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it +to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, +but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, +"He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," +is distinctly pointless.] + + +8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his +supply-waggons loaded more than twice. + +[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for +reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, +but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an +audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from +Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a +little ahead of your opponent—has counted for more than either +numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to +commissariat.] + + +9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus +the army will have food enough for its needs. + +[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means +"things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all +the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.] + + +10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by +contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a +distance causes the people to be impoverished. + +[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the +next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is +so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. +It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may +be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them there. The +Chinese words Sun Tzŭ used to indicate the cause of the people’s +impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by which the +husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why +should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because +the State or Government is too poor to do so?] + + +11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; +and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away. + +[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own +territory. Ts’ao Kung understands it of an army that has already +crossed the frontier.] + + +12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be +afflicted by heavy exactions. + +13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the +homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their +incomes will be dissipated; + +[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, +but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from +our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The _people_ being +regarded as the essential part of the State, and _food_ as the people’s +heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and be +careful of both?"] + + +while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, +breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, +protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to +four-tenths of its total revenue. + +15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One +cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s +own, and likewise a single _picul_ of his provender is equivalent to +twenty from one’s own store. + +[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of +transporting one cartload to the front. A _picul_ is a unit of measure +equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).] + + +16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; +that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have +their rewards. + +[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see +the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from +the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have +a keen desire to fight, each on his own account."] + + +17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been +taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags +should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled +and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be +kindly treated and kept. + +18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own +strength. + +19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy +campaigns. + +[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzŭ +here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to +enforce."] + + +20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of +the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall +be in peace or in peril. + + + +Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is +to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it +is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than +to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire +than to destroy them. + +[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted +nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts’ao Kung, the equivalent of a +regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists +from any number between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company +contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives +the exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.] + + +2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme +excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s +resistance without fighting. + +[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old +Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the +huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.] + + +3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; + +[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of +the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one +might be content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but +an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in +his note: "When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must +anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."] + + +the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; + +[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in +speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or +principalities into which the China of his day was split up.] + + +the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; + +[When he is already at full strength.] + + +and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. + +4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be +avoided. + +[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in +1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, +Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would +have been masters of the situation before the British were ready +seriously to oppose them.] + + +The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements +of war, will take up three whole months; + +[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as +"mantlets", described. Ts’ao Kung simply defines them as "large +shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch’uan, who says +they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city +walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman +_testudo_, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles used in +repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch’en Hao. See _supra_ II. 14. +The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable +shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. +They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled +from within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey +parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the +encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden +donkeys."] + + +and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three +months more. + +[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of +the enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, +and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding +note.] + + +5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men +to the assault like swarming ants, + +[This vivid simile of Ts’ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army +of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing +patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the +place before his engines of war are ready.] + + +with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town +still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. + +[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port +Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.] + + +6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any +fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he +overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. + +[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no +harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after +having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother +of the people."] + + +7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, +and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. + +[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of +the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, +the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."] + + +This is the method of attacking by stratagem. + +8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to +surround him; if five to one, to attack him; + +[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] + + +if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. + +[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it +appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however, +gives a clue to Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: "Being two to the enemy’s one, we +may use one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some +special diversion." Chang Yu thus further elucidates the point: "If our +force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up +into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall +upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed +from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front." +This is what is meant by saying that ‘one part may be used in the +regular way, and the other for some special diversion.’ Tu Mu does not +understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as +concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too +hasty in calling this a mistake."] + + +9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; + +[Li Ch’uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If +attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able +general will fight."] + + +if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; + +[The meaning, "we can _watch_ the enemy," is certainly a great +improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very +good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying +only applies if the other factors are equal; a small difference in +numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and +discipline.] + + +if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. + +10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in +the end it must be captured by the larger force. + +11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is +complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is +defective, the State will be weak. + +[As Li Ch’uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the +general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed +in his profession), his army will lack strength."] + + +12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his +army:— + +13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant +of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. + +[Li Ch’uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a +thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally +think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to +direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators +understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of T’ai Kung: "A +kingdom should not be governed from without, and army should not be +directed from within." Of course it is true that, during an engagement, +or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the +thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he +will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong +orders.] + + +14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he +administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in +an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the +civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid +gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on +which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, +on the other hand, are military rather than civil virtues to assimilate +the governing of an army"—to that of a State, understood.] + + +15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, + +[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.] + + +through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to +circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. + +[I follow Mei Yao-ch’en here. The other commentators refer not to the +ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu +says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he +must not be entrusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The +skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the +covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in +establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in +action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid +man has no fear of death."] + + +16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to +come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy +into the army, and flinging victory away. + +17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He +will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. + +[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; +if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will +invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive +or the defensive.] + + +(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior +forces. + +[This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers +correctly, as Li Ch’uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the +saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible +with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and _vice versa_. The secret +lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. +Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an +inferior one, make for difficult ground.’"] + + +(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout +all its ranks. + +(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy +unprepared. + +(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by +the sovereign. + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "It is the sovereign’s function to +give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of +the general." It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which +have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on +the part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his +extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by central +authority.] + +Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points. + +[Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of +victory.”] + +18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need +not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not +the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. + +[Li Ch’uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch’in, who in 383 A.D. +marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to +despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An +and Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight +provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one +million; why, they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely +throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" +Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei +River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.] + + +If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every +battle. + +[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, +knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: +"Attack is the secret of defence; defence is the planning of an +attack." It would be hard to find a better epitome of the +root-principle of war.] + + + +Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS + +[Ts’ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of +this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two +armies with a view to discovering each other’s condition." Tu Mu says: +"It is through the dispositions of an army that its condition may be +discovered. Conceal your dispositions, and your condition will remain +secret, which leads to victory; show your dispositions, and your +condition will become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks +that the good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to +meet those of the enemy."] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond +the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of +defeating the enemy. + +2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the +opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. + +[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.] + + +3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, + +[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his +troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."] + + +but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. + +4. Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able +to _do_ it. + +5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat +the enemy means taking the offensive. + +[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in §§ 1-3, in spite of +the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they +give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible +enough.] + + +6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; +attacking, a superabundance of strength. + +7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret +recesses of the earth; + +[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor +indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may +not know his whereabouts."] + + +he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of +heaven. + +[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a +thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the +opinion of most of the commentators.] + + +Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the +other, a victory that is complete. + +8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is +not the acme of excellence. + +[As Ts’ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has +germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li +Ch’uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the +vastly superior army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city +of Ch’eng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to +annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The officers +hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But +Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever +stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and +inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] + + +9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and +the whole Empire says, "Well done!" + +[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move +surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his schemes, +so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." +Sun Tzŭ reserves his approbation for things that + + +"the world’s coarse thumb +And finger fail to plumb." + + +10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; + +["Autumn hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in +autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one +in Chinese writers.] + + +to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of +thunder is no sign of a quick ear. + +[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick +hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, +who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a +mustard seed; and Shih K’uang, a blind musician who could hear the +footsteps of a mosquito.] + + +11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, +but excels in winning with ease. + +[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy +conquering." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins +his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, +wins with ease."] + + +12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor +credit for courage. + +[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained +over circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large +knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch +as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he +receives no credit for courage."] + + +13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. + +[Ch’en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile +attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One +who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at +winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; +whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are +not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably +win."] + + +Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it +means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. + +14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes +defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the +enemy. + +[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not +be confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes +all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to +increase the safety of his army.] + + +15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle +after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat +first fights and afterwards looks for victory. + +[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which +will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not +begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no +longer be assured."] + + +16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly +adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control +success. + +17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; +secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, +Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. + +18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to +Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of +chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. + +[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the +Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, +which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to +make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to a +general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy’s chances with our own; +if the latter turn the scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty +lies in third term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a +calculation of _numbers_, thereby making it nearly synonymous with the +second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as a +consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition, while the +third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other +hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative strength having been +settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play." Ho +Shih seconds this interpretation, but weakens it. However, it points to +the third term as being a calculation of numbers.] + + +19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight +placed in the scale against a single grain. + +[Literally, "a victorious army is like an _i_ (20 oz.) weighed against +a _shu_ (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a _shu_ weighed against an _i_." +The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, +flushed with victory, has over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his +note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the _i_ to be 24 Chinese ounces, +and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li +Ch’uan of the T’ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.] + + +20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up +waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical +dispositions. + + + + +Chapter V. ENERGY + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as +the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their +numbers. + +[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with +subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s +famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large +an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your +Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more +the better."] + + +2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different +from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting +signs and signals. + +3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the +enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct +and indirect. + +[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzŭ’s +treatise, the discussion of the _cheng_ and the _ch’i_." As it is by no +means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to +render them consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well +to tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks on the subject before +proceeding further. Li Ch’uan: "Facing the enemy is _cheng_, making +lateral diversion is _ch’i_. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your +troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure +victory abnormal manœuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-ch’en: "_Ch’i_ is +active, _cheng_ is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, +activity brings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy +to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, +and vice versa; thus _cheng_ may also be _ch’i_, and _ch’i_ may also be +_cheng_." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when +marching ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly +threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly +disconcerting his opponent. [Ch’ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, +the march on Lin-chin was _cheng_, and the surprise manœuver was +_ch’i_." Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: +"Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of _ch’i_ and +_cheng_. Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: ‘Direct warfare favours +frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts’ao Kung +says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; +appearing on the enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuver.’ Li Wei-kung +[6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is +_cheng_; turning movements, on the other hand, are _ch’i_.’ These +writers simply regard _cheng_ as _cheng_, and _ch’i_ as _ch’i_; they do +not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each +other like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment on +the T’ang Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A _ch’i_ +manœuver may be _cheng_, if we make the enemy look upon it as _cheng_; +then our real attack will be _ch’i_, and vice versa. The whole secret +lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real +intent.’" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other +operation is _cheng_, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; +whereas that is _ch’i_," which takes him by surprise or comes from an +unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to +be _ch’i_," it immediately becomes _cheng_."] + + +4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against +an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. + +5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, +but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. + +[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding +the enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of +"indirect tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord +Roberts’ night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. +[1] + + +6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven +and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and +moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away +but to return once more. + +[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of _ch’i_ and +_cheng_. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of _cheng_ at all, +unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating +to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been +pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military +operations, that they cannot really be considered apart. Here we simply +have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite +resource of a great leader.] + + +7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of +these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. + +8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, +white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can +ever be seen. + +9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, +sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can +ever be tasted. + +10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct +and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless +series of manœuvers. + +11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is +like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the +possibilities of their combination? + +12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even +roll stones along in its course. + +13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon +which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. + +[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is +used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word +as "the measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does +not quite fit the illustrative simile in §. 15. Applying this +definition to the falcon, it seems to me to denote that instinct of +_self-restraint_ which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until +the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right +moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly +important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very +instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went +into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for +several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying +with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close +range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on +the enemy’s nearest ships.] + + +14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and +prompt in his decision. + +[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of +distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking. +But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzŭ meant to use the word in a +figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. +Wang Hsi’s note, which after describing the falcon’s mode of attack, +proceeds: "This is just how the ‘psychological moment’ should be seized +in war."] + + +15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to +the releasing of the trigger. + +[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of +energy and the force stored up in the bent cross-bow until released by +the finger on the trigger.] + + +16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming +disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, +your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against +defeat. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been +previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating +and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the +course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real +disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your +dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out +of the question."] + + +17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear +postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. + +[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone +down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts’ao Kung throws +out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to +destroy formation and conceal one’s condition." But Tu Mu is the first +to put it quite plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to +lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish +to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme +courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy +over-confident, you must have exceeding strength."] + + +18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of +subdivision; + +[See _supra_, § 1.] + + +concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of +latent energy; + +[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here +differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: +"seeing that we are favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the +enemy will believe that we are really afraid."] + + +masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical +dispositions. + +[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han +Emperor: “Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report +on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed +all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm +soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one +and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone +opposed them, saying: ‘When two countries go to war, they are naturally +inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our +spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some +_ruse_ on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to +attack.’ The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the +trap and found himself surrounded at Po-teng.”] + + +19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains +deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu +says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may +be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led +to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, +all the enemy’s movements should be determined by the signs that we +choose to give him." Note the following anecdote of Sun Pin, a +descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the Ch’i State being at war with +Wei, sent T’ien Chi and Sun Pin against the general P’ang Chuan, who +happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The +Ch’i State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary +despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account." Accordingly, +when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders +to show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the +night after only 20,000. P’ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to +himself: "I knew these men of Ch’i were cowards: their numbers have +already fallen away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to +a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach +after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon +it the words: "Under this tree shall P’ang Chuan die." Then, as night +began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, +with orders to shoot directly if they saw a light. Later on, P’ang +Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in +order to read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled +by a volley of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The +above is Tu Mu’s version of the story; the _Shih Chi_, less +dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes P’ang Chuan +cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of +his army.] ] + + +He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. + +20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body +of picked men he lies in wait for him. + +[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He lies in +wait with the main body of his troops."] + + +21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and +does not require too much from individuals. + +[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the +bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each +men according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from +the untalented."] + + +Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined +energy. + +22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it +were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or +stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a +slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, +to go rolling down. + +[Ts’au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."] + + +23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum +of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So +much on the subject of energy. + +[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount +importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great +results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."] + + +[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. + + + +Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG + +[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: +"Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the +defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect +methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of +attack and defence, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect +methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two methods +before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong points. For the use +of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the +perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above +methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter +on Energy."] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of +the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field +and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted. + +2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but +does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him. + +[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or +fights not at all. [1] ] + + +3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach +of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible +for the enemy to draw near. + +[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he +will strike at some important point which the enemy will have to +defend.] + + +4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; + +[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch’en’s +interpretation of I. § 23.] + + +if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, +he can force him to move. + +5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march +swiftly to places where you are not expected. + +6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches +through country where the enemy is not. + +[Ts’ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt +from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are +defended, attack in unexpected quarters."] + + +7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack +places which are undefended. + +[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, +where the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; +where the walls are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict +enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or +the defenders are variance amongst themselves."] + + +You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions +that cannot be attacked. + +[_I.e._, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There +is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later +clause. Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch’en assume the meaning to be: +"In order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend _even_ those +places that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much +more, then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the +clause balances less well with the preceding—always a consideration in +the highly antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang +Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: "He who is +skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see +IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This +being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the +enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in defence hides in the most +secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to +estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold +are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."] + + +8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not +know what to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does +not know what to attack. + +[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] + + +9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be +invisible, through you inaudible; + +[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with +reference to the enemy.] + + +and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands. + +10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the +enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your +movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. + +11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even +though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we +need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. + +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line +of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; +if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign +himself." It is clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike certain generals in the late +Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.] + + +12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging +us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the +ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in +his way. + +[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia +Lin: "even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li +Ch’uan says: "we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and +Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes—one +of Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying Yang-p’ing and about to be attacked +by Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of the +drums, and flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in +sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had the +intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off +his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating here, therefore, is +nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff."] + + +13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible +ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must +be divided. + +[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei +Yao-ch’en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy’s dispositions are +visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions +being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in +order to guard against attack from every quarter."] + + +14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up +into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate +parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few. + +15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior +one, our opponents will be in dire straits. + +16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then +the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several +different points; + +[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by +saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering +what he was going to do, _he_ was thinking most of what he was going to +do himself."] + + +and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers +we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. + +17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; +should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he +strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his +right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, +he will everywhere be weak. + +[In Frederick the Great’s _Instructions to his Generals_ we read: "A +defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those +generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every +point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, +having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, +and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater."] + + +18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible +attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make +these preparations against us. + +[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is "to compel the +enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force +against each fraction in turn."] + + +19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may +concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. + +[What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of +distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a +general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march, +and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and the +right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength. +Among many such successful junctions which military history records, +one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Blucher +just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.] + + +20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be +impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the +left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the +van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything +under a hundred _li_ apart, and even the nearest are separated by +several _li_! + +[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, +but the mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an +army advancing towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of +which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the +various detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise +instructions as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be +able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yu’s note may be worth +quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to +concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will +be forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we +hold will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall +be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support +will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there +is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions of +the army."] + + +21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own +in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. +I say then that victory can be achieved. + +[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended +in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its +incorporation in Yüeh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s death. +With his present assertion compare IV. § 4. Chang Yu is the only one to +point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes on to explain: +"In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, ‘One may _know_ +how to conquer without being able to _do_ it,’ whereas here we have the +statement that ‘victory’ can be achieved.’ The explanation is, that in +the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under +discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot +make certain of beating him. But the present passage refers +particularly to the soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s +calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the +impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be +achieved."] + + +22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from +fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of +their success. + +[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all +plans conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure." + + +23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. + +[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy +on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his +policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku +Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssu-ma +I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.] + + +Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. + +24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may +know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. + +[Cf. IV. § 6.] + + +25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain +is to conceal them; + +[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is +perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see _supra_ § 9) as "showing +no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your +brain.] + + +conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the +subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. + +[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable +officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."] + + +26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own +tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. + +27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can +see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. + +[_I.e._, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they +cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has +preceded the battle.] + + +28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but +let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. + +[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-principle +underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in +number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are +few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by +familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no +more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of +grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."] + + +29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural +course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. + +30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what +is weak. + +[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] + + +31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over +which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the +foe whom he is facing. + +32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare +there are no constant conditions. + +33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and +thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. + +34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always +equally predominant; + +[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."] + + +the four seasons make way for each other in turn. + +[Literally, "have no invariable seat."] + + +There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and +waxing. + +[Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the +want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. +The comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of +the phenomena which Sun Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] + + +[1] See Col. Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. +II, p. 490. + + + +Chapter VII. MANŒUVERING + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the +sovereign. + +2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend +and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. + +["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between +the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he +quotes a saying of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without harmony in the +State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the +army, no battle array can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzŭ +is represented as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are +waging war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before +proceeding to attack the external foe."] + + +3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing +more difficult. + +[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts’ao +Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign’s +instructions until our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics +to be pursued are most difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or +manœuvers can hardly be said to begin until the army has sallied forth +and encamped, and Ch’ien Hao’s note gives color to this view: "For +levying, concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there are +plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes when we +engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that "the great +difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing favourable +position."] + + +The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious +into the direct, and misfortune into gain. + +[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat +enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is +explained by Ts’ao Kung: "Make it appear that you are a long way off, +then cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your +opponent." Tu Mu says: "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss +and leisurely while you are dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih +gives a slightly different turn: "Although you may have difficult +ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a +drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of +movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two +famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at +his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which +resulted in the great victory of Marengo.] + + +4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy +out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the +goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of _deviation_. + +[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the +town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch’in army. The King of +Chao first consulted Lien P’o on the advisability of attempting a +relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the +intervening country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned +to Chao She, who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but +finally said: "We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole—and the +pluckier one will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had +only gone a distance of 30 _li_ when he stopped and began throwing up +entrenchments. For 28 days he continued strengthening his +fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the intelligence +to the enemy. The Ch’in general was overjoyed, and attributed his +adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the +Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies +had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for +two days and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such +astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding position +on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his movements. A +crushing defeat followed for the Ch’in forces, who were obliged to +raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat across the border.] + + +5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined +multitude, most dangerous. + +[I adopt the reading of the _T’ung Tien_, Cheng Yu-hsien and the _T’u +Shu_, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to +make sense. The commentators using the standard text take this line to +mean that manœuvers may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all +depends on the ability of the general.] + + +6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an +advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other +hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice +of its baggage and stores. + +[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese +commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering +without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is some deep-seated +corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that Sun Tzŭ does not +approve of a lengthy march being undertaken without supplies. Cf. +infra, § 11.] + + +7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make +forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual +distance at a stretch, + +[The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 _li_; but on one +occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts’ao Ts’ao is said to have covered +the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within twenty-four hours.] + + +doing a hundred _li_ in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all +your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. + +8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, +and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its +destination. + +[The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a +hundred _li_ to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without +impedimenta. Manœuvers of this description should be confined to short +distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are +often more painful than the dangers of battle." He did not often call +upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only when he +intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he +sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ] + + +9. If you march fifty _li_ in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will +lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will +reach the goal. + +[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be _torn away_."] + + +10. If you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your +army will arrive. + +[In the _T’ung Tien_ is added: "From this we may know the difficulty of +manœuvering."] + + +11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; +without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. + +[I think Sun Tzŭ meant "stores accumulated in dépôts." But Tu Yu says +"fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi +says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."] + + +12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the +designs of our neighbours. + +13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar +with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls +and precipices, its marshes and swamps. + +14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we +make use of local guides. + +[§§. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.] + + +15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. + +[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to +the numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. +[2] ] + +Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained. + +16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by +circumstances. + +17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, + +[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift +but, as Mei Yao-ch’en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."] + + +your compactness that of the forest. + +[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly marching, +order and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard against surprise +attacks. But natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do +generally possess the quality of density or compactness.] + + +18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, + +[Cf. _Shih Ching_, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man +can check."] + + +in immovability like a mountain. + +[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to +dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice +you into a trap.] + + +19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you +move, fall like a thunderbolt. + +[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T’ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: +"You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the +lighting—so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so +quickly that it cannot be parried.] + + +20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst +your men; + +[Sun Tzŭ wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by +insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may +afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.] + + +when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the +benefit of the soldiery. + +[Ch’en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow +and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the +lands they invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out +some of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that +of Pan Ch’ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, +those of Fu-k’ang-an and Tso Tsung-t’ang.] + + +21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. + +[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzŭ as saying that we must not break camp +until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the +cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. § +13.] + + +22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. + +[See _supra_, §§ 3, 4.] + + +Such is the art of manœuvering. + +[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But +there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an +earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when +Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different +from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to +its genuineness.] + + +23. The Book of Army Management says: + +[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give +us any information about this work. Mei Yao- Ch’en calls it "an ancient +military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the +enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun +Tzŭ’s time between the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it +is not in itself improbable that a collection of military maxims should +have been made and written down at some earlier period.] + + +On the field of battle, + +[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] + + +the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of +gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence +the institution of banners and flags. + +24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and +eyes of the host may be focussed on one particular point. + +[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the +same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be +like those of a single man."!] + + +25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either +for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. + +[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance +against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a +story in this connection of Wu Ch’i, when he was fighting against the +Ch’in State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of +matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the +enemy, and returned to camp. Wu Ch’i had the man instantly executed, +whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a +good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch’i replied: "I +fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he +acted without orders."] + + +This is the art of handling large masses of men. + +26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, +and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing +the ears and eyes of your army. + +[Ch’en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to Ho-yang at the head +of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches, +that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not +dare to dispute their passage.] + + +27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; + +["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade +all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be +irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest +when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue +not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have +worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of +their keen spirit." Li Ch’uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found +in the _Tso Chuan_, year 10, § 1) of Ts’ao Kuei, a protege of Duke +Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch’i, and the duke was +about to join battle at Ch’ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy’s +drums, when Ts’ao said: "Not just yet." Only after their drums had +beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then they +fought, and the men of Ch’i were utterly defeated. Questioned +afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts’ao Kuei +replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first +roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is +already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I +attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence +our victory." Wu Tzŭ (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four +important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a whole +army—a mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man alone: such +is the influence of spirit!"] + + +a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. + +[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general’s most important +asset. It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and +to inspire courage into the panic-stricken." The great general Li Ching +(A.D. 571-649) has a saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in +assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it +must include the art of assailing the enemy’s mental equilibrium."] + + +28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; + +[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle +of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, +whereas Hannibal’s men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, +liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.] + + +by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent +only on returning to camp. + +29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is +keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This +is the art of studying moods. + +30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and +hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. + +31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait +at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while +the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength. + +32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect +order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident +array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. + +33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor +to oppose him when he comes downhill. + +34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers +whose temper is keen. + +35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. + +[Li Ch’uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, +take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been +poisoned by the enemy. Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that +the saying has a wider application.] + + +Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. + +[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by +saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to +the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too +dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han +Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth +homewards." A marvelous tale is told of Ts’ao Ts’ao’s courage and +resource in ch. 1 of the _San Kuo Chi_, In 198 A.D., he was besieging +Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to +cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his +troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were +guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. +In this desperate plight Ts’ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a +tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the +whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear, while +Ts’ao himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were +thrown into confusion and annihilated. Ts’ao Ts’ao said afterwards: +"The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to +battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] + + +36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. + +[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The +object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road +to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair." +Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."] + + +Do not press a desperate foe too hard. + +[Ch’en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay +will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has +burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake +all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho +Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of +Yen-ch’ing. That general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was +surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. +The country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force was +soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, +and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the +moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch’ing +exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our country +than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A strong gale happened +to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense +clouds of sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had +abated before deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer, +Li Shou-cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: +"They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm our +numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the strenuous +fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, Fu +Yen-ch’ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his +cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to +safety.] + + +37. Such is the art of warfare. + +[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. + +[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" +(Longmans, 1907), p. 29. + + + +Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS + +[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzŭ does +not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us +(V §§ 6-11) that such deflections from the ordinary course are +practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, +who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it +means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost +degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out +to be, but it has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine +Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yu. The +only other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost—a +supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some +weight.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the +sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces. + +[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may +have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to +the chapter.] + + +2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high +roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in +dangerously isolated positions. + +[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the +beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu +defines this situation as being situated across the frontier, in +hostile territory. Li Ch’uan says it is "country in which there are no +springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, +"one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to +advance."] + + +In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate +position, you must fight. + +3. There are roads which must not be followed, + +["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch’uan, +"where an ambush is to be feared."] + + +armies which must be not attacked, + +[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be +attacked." Ch’en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival +advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from +attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strength."] + + +towns which must not be besieged, + +[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own +experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the +city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the +heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the +subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. +Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be +held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." Hsun Ying, when +urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and +well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great feat +of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In +the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. +It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, +countermarches and manœuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste +men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a +province." [1] ] + + +positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which +must not be obeyed. + +[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for +authority, and Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: +"Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a +military commander is the negation of civil order!" The unpalatable +fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated +to military necessity.] + + +4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany +variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. + +5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted +with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn +his knowledge to practical account. + +[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only +securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in +every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is +characterized by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a +certain variability of plan. How it is possible to turn these natural +features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by +versatility of mind?"] + + +6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying +his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will +fail to make the best use of his men. + +[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally +advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it +must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a +town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can +be stormed, it must be attempted; and if consistent with military +operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed." But there are +circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages. +For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if +he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has +laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may +be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely +to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.] + + +7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of +disadvantage will be blended together. + +["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says +Ts’ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your +mind."] + + +8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may +succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. + +[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must +not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the +enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into +our calculations."] + + +9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always +ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from +misfortune. + +[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, +I must consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my +own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels +these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in +liberating myself…. For instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and +only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will +incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to +encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the +advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils." See the +story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.] + + +10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; + +[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of +which would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the enemy’s +best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. +Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be +rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension +between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful +contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his +treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into +excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely +women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of +Sun Tzŭ here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer +injury, and he will submit of his own accord."] + + +and make trouble for them, + +[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble +should be made for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we +might say, "assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich +exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of +commands." These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.] + + +and keep them constantly engaged; + +[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent them from +having any rest."] + + +hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. + +[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use +of: "cause them to forget _pien_ (the reasons for acting otherwise than +on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction."] + + +11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the +enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the +chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made +our position unassailable. + +12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) +Recklessness, which leads to destruction; + +["Bravery without forethought," as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes +a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an +opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but +may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.: +"In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay +exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one +out of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave +man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without +any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, +too, makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one’s death does not +bring about victory."] + + +(2) cowardice, which leads to capture; + +[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as +being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an +advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of +danger." Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on +returning alive," this is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as +Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing +to take risks. T’ai Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will +subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu +pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle +with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered only a +few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan +Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be +overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so +that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural +result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly +quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with +fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in the fray, +Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled +for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat +similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who during +a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness +for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get +across.] + + +(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; + +[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, +Teng Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to +fight. Teng Ch’iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and +easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, +then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to +battle, it is doomed to be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao +Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s +pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.] + + +(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame; + +This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect +in a general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated +sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung +by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though +somewhat paradoxically: "The seeker after glory should be careless of +public opinion."] + + +(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and +trouble. + +[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless +of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger +of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate +comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long +run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the +prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken +feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered +city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his +military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated +efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many +strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, +relief came through the very man who started out with the distinct +resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to +sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who +failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to +defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his men." +By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of +Sun Tzŭ’s mouth.] + + +13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the +conduct of war. + +14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will +surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a +subject of meditation. + +[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50. + + + +Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH + +[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1 +than by this heading.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and +observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in +the neighbourhood of valleys. + +[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to +supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural +ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following +anecdote: Wu-tu Ch’iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later +Han, and Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch’iang having found +a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but +seized all the favourable positions commanding supplies of water and +forage. Ch’iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of +provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not +know the advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood of valleys."] + + +2. Camp in high places, + +[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the +surrounding country.] + + +facing the sun. + +[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch’en Hao "facing east." +Cf. infra, §§ 11, 13. + + +Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. + +3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. + +["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts’ao +Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your +evolutions." The _T’ung Tien_ reads, "If _the enemy_ crosses a river," +etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly an +interpolation.] + + +4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not +advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army +get across, and then deliver your attack. + +[Li Ch’uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu +at the Wei River. Turning to the _Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 34, fol. 6 +verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were +drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered +his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct +a dam higher up. Then, leading half his army across, he attacked Lung +Chu; but after a time, pretending to have failed in his attempt, he +hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this +unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was +really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his +turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus +releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the +greater portion of Lung Chu’s army from getting across. He then turned +upon the force which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu +himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further +bank, also scattered and fled in all directions.] + + +5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader +near a river which he has to cross. + +[For fear of preventing his crossing.] + + +6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. + +[See _supra_, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with +water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops +marshalled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; +in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing +the sun." The other commentators are not at all explicit.] + + +Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. + +[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on +the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the +sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that +‘in river warfare we must not advance against the stream,’ which is as +much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the +enemy, for then they would be able to take advantage of the current and +make short work of us." There is also the danger, noted by other +commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be +carried down to us.] + + +So much for river warfare. + +7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over +them quickly, without any delay. + +[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, +and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to +attack.] + + +8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass +near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. + +[Li Ch’uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous +where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect +the rear.] + + +So much for operations in salt-marshes. + +9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with +rising ground to your right and on your rear, + +[Tu Mu quotes T’ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a +marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."] + + +so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for +campaigning in flat country. + +10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge + +[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, +and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon’s "Military Maxims," no. 1.] + + +which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. + +[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch’en asks, with some +plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known +of Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The _Shih Chi_ (ch. 1 +ad init.) speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch’ih Yu. In the +_Liu T’ao_ it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified +the Empire." Ts’ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was +the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of +whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li +Ch’uan tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who +received it from his Minister Feng Hou.] + + +11. All armies prefer high ground to low, + +["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch’en, "is not only more agreeable and +salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low +ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for +fighting."] + + +and sunny places to dark. + +12. If you are careful of your men, + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn +out your animals to graze."] + + +and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every +kind, + +[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak +of illness."] + + +and this will spell victory. + +13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the +slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of +your soldiers and utilise the natural advantages of the ground. + +14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you +wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it +subsides. + +15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running +between, deep natural hollows, + +The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, +with pools of water at the bottom."] + + +confined places, + +[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by +precipices on three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."] + + +tangled thickets, + +[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears +cannot be used."] + + +quagmires + +[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable +for chariots and horsemen."] + + +and crevasses, + +[Defined by Mei Yao-ch’en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling +cliffs." Tu Mu’s note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and +intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but +Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and +Chang Yu takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the +commentators certainly inclines to the rendering "defile." But the +ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a crack or fissure" +and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence +indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun +Tzŭ is here speaking of crevasses.] + + +should be left with all possible speed and not approached. + +16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to +approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on +his rear. + +17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly +country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with +reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed +out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious +spies are likely to be lurking. + +[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors +who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and +overhearing our instructions."] + + +18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on +the natural strength of his position. + +[Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is +so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. +Baden-Powell’s "Aids to Scouting."] + + +19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious +for the other side to advance. + +[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to +dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to +force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less +probability of our responding to the challenge."] + + +20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a +bait. + +21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is +advancing. + +[Ts’ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and +Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and +observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are +moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to clear a +passage for the enemy’s march."] + + +The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means +that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. + +[Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts’ao Kung’s, is as follows: "The +presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick +vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, +has constructed these hiding-places in order to make us suspect an +ambush." It appears that these "screens" were hastily knotted together +out of any long grass which the retreating enemy happened to come +across.] + + +22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. + +[Chang Yu’s explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying +along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers +are in ambush at the spot beneath."] + + +Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. + +23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of +chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, +it betokens the approach of infantry. + +["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat +exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon +by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more +dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-track, whereas +foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many abreast. According to +Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have scouts some way in +advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will gallop back and +report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you +move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar +for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting +up, glitter of arms, etc." [1] ] + + +When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties +have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and +fro signify that the army is encamping. + +[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light +horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak +and strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity +of dust and its motion."] + + +24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is +about to advance. + +["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object +is to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack +us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of T’ien Tan of the Ch’i-mo against +the Yen forces, led by Ch’i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the _Shih Chi_ we read: +"T’ien Tan openly said: ‘My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off +the noses of their Ch’i prisoners and place them in the front rank to +fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other +side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; +but those within the city were enraged at seeing their +fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should +fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend themselves more +obstinately than ever. Once again T’ien Tan sent back converted spies +who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is that the +men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by +inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become +faint-hearted.’ Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and +burned the corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, +witnessing the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were +all impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased tenfold. +T’ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise. +But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in his hands, and +ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, while the +ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served +out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The +regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were +manned with the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys +were dispatched to the enemy’s camp to arrange terms of surrender, +whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T’ien Tan also collected +20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the wealthy citizens +of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the prayer that, when the +town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be plundered or +their women to be maltreated. Ch’i Chieh, in high good humor, granted +their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and careless. +Meanwhile, T’ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them with +pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored +stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased +rushes on their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the +rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had +pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked +warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the +enemy’s camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for +their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their +bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom +they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up +with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At +the same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those +that remained behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums +and hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed +by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly +pursued by the men of Ch’i, who succeeded in slaying their general Ch’i +Chien…. The result of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some +seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch’i State."] + + +Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that +he will retreat. + +25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on +the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. + +26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. + +[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch’uan indicates "a treaty confirmed +by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand, +simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."] + + +27. When there is much running about + +[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental +banner.] + + +and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has +come. + +28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. + +29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint +from want of food. + +30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, +the army is suffering from thirst. + +[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from the +behavior of a single man."] + + +31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to +secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. + +32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. + +[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch’en Hao says, +the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] + + +Clamour by night betokens nervousness. + +33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is +weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If +the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary. + +[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an +army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with +fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them.] + + +34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for +food, + +[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and +the horses chiefly on grass.] + + +and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, +showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that +they are determined to fight to the death. + +[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. +71, given in abbreviated form by the _P’ei Wen Yun Fu:_ "The rebel Wang +Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch’en- ts’ang, and Huang-fu +Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out against +him. The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear +to his counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to +throw down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was not advancing to +the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a principle of war not to pursue +desperate men and not to press a retreating host.’ Sung answered: ‘That +does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not a +retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganized +multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advances to the +attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo +being slain."] + + +35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in +subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. + +36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his +resources; + +[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always +a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good +temper.] + + +too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. + +[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity +is necessary to keep the men to their duty.] + + +37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s +numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. + +[I follow the interpretation of Ts’ao Kung, also adopted by Li Ch’uan, +Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, Chia +Lin, Mei Tao-ch’en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first +tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, +etc." This would connect the sentence with what went before about +rewards and punishments.] + + +38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign +that the enemy wishes for a truce. + +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages, +it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because +their strength is exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly +needs a Sun Tzŭ to draw such an obvious inference.] + + +39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a +long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, +the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. + +[Ts’ao Kung says a manœuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain +time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.] + + +40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply +sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. + +[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, _cheng_ tactics and +frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.] + + +What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, +keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. + +[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in +squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch’uan, who appears to +offer the simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will +win." Fortunately we have Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in +language which is lucidity itself: "When the numbers are even, and no +favourable opening presents itself, although we may not be strong enough +to deliver a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst +our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces and +keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But +we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." He then quotes +from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary troops may +be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that +figure."] + + +41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is +sure to be captured by them. + +[Ch’en Hao, quoting from the _Tso Chuan_, says: "If bees and scorpions +carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, +then, should not be treated with contempt."] + + +42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, +they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be +practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, +punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless. + +43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with +humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. + +[Yen Tzŭ [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues +endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in +awe." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander unites culture with +a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination of +hardness and tenderness."] + + +This is a certain road to victory. + +44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army +will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. + +45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his +orders being obeyed, + +[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly +confidence in his men and also make his authority respected, so that +when they come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline +maintained, because they all trust and look up to him." What Sun Tzŭ +has said in § 44, however, would lead one rather to expect something +like this: "If a general is always confident that his orders will be +carried out," etc."] + + +the gain will be mutual. + +[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his +command, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the +gain is mutual." He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. +4: "The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders +and not to be swayed by petty doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are +the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army.] + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26. + + + +Chapter X. TERRAIN + +[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with +"terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six +calamities" are discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is +again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, +perhaps, on that account.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) +Accessible ground; + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of +communications."] + + +(2) entangling ground; + +[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you +become entangled."] + + +(3) temporising ground; + +[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] + + +(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great +distance from the enemy. + +[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this +classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the +Chinaman’s unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as +the above.] + + +2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called +_accessible_. + +3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in +occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of +supplies. + +[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, +"not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of +Napoleon’s dictum, "the secret of war lies in the communications," [1] +we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had done more than skirt the edge of this +important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: +"The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an +army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who +finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, and his +own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, +and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander +whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false +position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his +plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, +and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time +to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will +entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army." [2] + + +Then you will be able to fight with advantage. + +4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called +_entangling_. + +5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may +sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your +coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, +disaster will ensue. + +6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the +first move, it is called _temporising_ ground. + +[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the +situation remains at a deadlock."] + + +7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an +attractive bait, + +[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But +this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our +position.] + + +it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus +enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come +out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. + +8. With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first, let +them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. + +[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and +by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our +mercy."] + + +9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after +him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly +garrisoned. + +10. With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with +your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there +wait for him to come up. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and +defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." +[For the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. +Chang Yu tells the following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. +619-682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic +tribes. "At night he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been +completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders +that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was +highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the +extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien, +however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as +quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which +flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve +feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned +that they had been in the wrong. ‘How did you know what was going to +happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward +be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ From +this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places +are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are +immune from disastrous floods."] + + +11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but +retreat and try to entice him away. + +[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D. against the +two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of +Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou +Chien-te persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was +defeated and taken prisoner. See _Chiu T’ang Shu_, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, +and also ch. 54.] + + +12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the +strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a +battle, + +[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and +wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be +exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."] + + +and fighting will be to your disadvantage. + +13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. + +[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § +8.] + + +The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to +study them. + +14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from +natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. +These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) +disorganisation; (6) rout. + +15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against +another ten times its size, the result will be the _flight_ of the +former. + +16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too +weak, the result is _insubordination_. + +[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [_Hsin T’ang Shu_, ch. 148], +who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against +Wang T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers +treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority +by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien +Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some +months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops +turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the +unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.] + + +When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the +result is _collapse_. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the +common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] + + +17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on +meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of +resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is +in a position to fight, the result is _ruin_. + +[Wang Hsi’s note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause, +and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate +officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of +ruin upon his head."] + + +18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are +not clear and distinct; + +[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with +decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves +are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds +about doing their duty." General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the +words: "The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men +lies in one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they +receive." [3] Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a +military leader is difference; the worst calamities that befall an army +arise from hesitation."] + + +when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, + +[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."] + + +and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is +utter _disorganisation_. + +19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an +inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment +against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the +front rank, the result must be a _rout_. + +[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues: +"Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be +appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the +resolution of our own men and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi +ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).] + + +20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully +noted by the general who has attained a responsible post. + +[See _supra_, § 13.] + + +21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; + +[Ch’en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to +those connected with ground."] + + +but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of +victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and +distances, constitutes the test of a great general. + +22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into +practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises +them, will surely be defeated. + +23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even +though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, +then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding. + +[Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, who is said +to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the _San +Lueh_, has these words attributed to him: "The responsibility of +setting an army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance +and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will +hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened +monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country’s +cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that +"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military +commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees +from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."] + + +24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without +fearing disgrace, + +[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for +a soldier is to retreat.] + + +whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for +his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. + +[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." +Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would +not regret his conduct."] + + +25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you +into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and +they will stand by you even unto death. + +[Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture +of the famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have +frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the +same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a +horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations +wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his +soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch’i himself sucked out +the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, began wailing and +lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your son is +only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has +sucked the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago, +Lord Wu performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him +afterwards, and finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And +now that he has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I +know not where.’" Li Ch’uan mentions the Viscount of Ch’u, who invaded +the small state of Hsiao during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to +him: "Many of the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he +made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and +straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with +floss silk.] + + +26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority +felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, +moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to +spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose. + +[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, +they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of +stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was +occupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his +army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by +force. Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who +happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat +belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation +helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that the +fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be allowed to +palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his +summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did +so. This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from +that time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked +up.] + + +27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are +unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway +towards victory. + +[That is, Ts’ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."] + + +28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that +our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway +towards victory. + +[Cf. III. § 13 (1).] + + +29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our +men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of +the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only +halfway towards victory. + +30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; +once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. + +[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures +so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move +recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no +mistakes."] + + +31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your +victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you +may make your victory complete. + +[Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three things—the +affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of +earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."] + + +[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. + +[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. + +[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii. + + + +Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: +(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) +open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; +(7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. + +2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive +ground. + +[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious +to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity +afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their +advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack the valor of desperation, and +when they retreat, they will find harbors of refuge."] + + +3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great +distance, it is facile ground. + +[Li Ch’uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating," +and the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: +"When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and +bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no +hankering after home."] + + +4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either +side, is contentious ground. + +[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung +says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the +strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus, +Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, +even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in +check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.: +"For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is +nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning from +his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far +as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou, +taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, plotted +against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, +governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from +his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and +mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we +shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. +Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, +thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are +prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or +if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we could make a +stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and +resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the +enormous strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act +on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.] + + +5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. + +[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this +type of ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network +of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which +intercommunication is easy."] + + +6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, + +[Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a +third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small +principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on +the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.] + + +so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, + +[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most +of them to become his allies.] + + +is ground of intersecting highways. + +7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, +leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. + +[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached +such a point, its situation is serious."] + + +8. Mountain forests, + +[Or simply "forests."] + + +rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: +this is difficult ground. + +9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can +only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy +would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in +ground. + +10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting +without delay, is desperate ground. + +[The situation, as pictured by Ts’ao Kung, is very similar to the +"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible: "A +lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, +retreat blocked." Ch’en Hao says: "to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like +sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu +quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus +entrapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid +of local guides:—it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy’s +mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so +perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots +carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no +choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to +range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming +strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take +a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a +pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none of us +has a moment’s respite. If we simply maintain our ground, whole days +and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain +the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, destitute +of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of life, +the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of +strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man +defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offense +in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by +ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant +soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with +the slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of the +awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians +under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].] + + +11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt +not. On contentious ground, attack not. + +[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous +position first. So Ts’ao Kung. Li Ch’uan and others, however, suppose +the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that +it would be sheer madness to attack. In the _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, when the +King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: +"The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession +have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is +secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by +pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash +for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and +raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best +troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will +sally forth to the rescue."] + + +12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. + +[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking +force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available +here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s +brief note: "Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own +army is not cut off.] + + +On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. + +[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states."] + + +13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. + +[On this, Li Ch’uan has the following delicious note: "When an army +penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to +alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han +Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch’in territory was marked by no +violation of women or looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 +B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies that +entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the +present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not +‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’" Alas, I fear that in this instance +the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, +has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ +there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility +of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by +bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the +enemy."] + + +In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. + +[Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, "do not encamp.] + + +14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. + +[Ts’au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu +amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be +devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in +deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what +happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the +mountains on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by +the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his +foes was remarkably like that which T’ien Tan had also employed with +success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, note.] When night came +on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and +set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the +mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The +strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and +discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and +Hannibal’s army passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. +93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.] + + +On desperate ground, fight. + +[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is +a chance of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your +corner."] + + +15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a +wedge between the enemy’s front and rear; + +[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each +other."] + + +to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to +hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from +rallying their men. + +16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from +concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep +them in disorder. + +17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when +otherwise, they stopped still. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded in +thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure +any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, +they would remain where they were."] + + +18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly +array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin +by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be +amenable to your will." + +[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts’ao Kung thinks it +is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu +says: "The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the +accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our +favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard +his own communications." Our object then must be to thwart his plans in +these three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] By +boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other +side on the defensive.] + + +19. Rapidity is the essence of war: + +[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in +warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military +science, and the chief business of the general." The following +anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the importance attached to speed by +two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor of +Hsin-ch’eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to +the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko +Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then +military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta’s treachery, he +at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having +previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import. +Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued himself +with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we +make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we +ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and +before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of forced +marches, be brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’eng with in a +space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to +Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 _li_ from here. When the news of my revolt +reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it +will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time +my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come +himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth +troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled with +consternation: "Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my +allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What miraculous +rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- ch’eng had fallen and Meng +Ta had lost his head. [See _Chin Shu_, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li +Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the successful +rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou +Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, Hsiao +Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down +through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching +embarked his army without loss of time, and was just about to start +when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until +the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation. Li Ching +replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount +importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to +strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army +together. If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we +shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the +thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against +it. [See VII. § 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if +he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in +such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full +fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, and +Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people +should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.] + + +take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected +routes, and attack unguarded spots. + +20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading +force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be +the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail +against you. + +21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with +food. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 13. Li Ch’uan does not venture on a note here.] + + +22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, + +[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give them +plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally."] + + +and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your +strength. + +[Ch’en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous +general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the +success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch’u State, where a +universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the +temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remained +strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch’u general try to force a +battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not +come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the +affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be +well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for +bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them +into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he told +off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. +The answer was, that they were contending with one another in putting +the weight and long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard that they were +engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been +strung up to the required pitch and that they were now ready for +fighting. By this time the Ch’u army, after repeating their challenge +again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch’in +general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the +battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly +afterwards, the whole of Ch’u was conquered by Ch’in, and the king +Fu-ch’u led into captivity.] + + +Keep your army continually on the move, + +[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has +struck me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army +together."] + + +and devise unfathomable plans. + +23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and +they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is +nothing they may not achieve. + +[Chang Yu quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): "If one man were to +run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to +get our of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage +and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a +desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even +terms."] + + +Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. + +[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will +surely exert their united strength to get out of it."] + + +24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there +is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart +of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no +help for it, they will fight hard. + +25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be +constantly on the _qui vive;_ without waiting to be asked, they will do +your will; + +[Literally, "without asking, you will get."] + + +without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, +they can be trusted. + +26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious +doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. + +[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate +into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes +Huang Shih-kung: "‘Spells and incantations should be strictly +forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the +fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers’ minds should be seriously +perturbed.’ The meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and +scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution +until they die."] + + +27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because +they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it +is not because they are disinclined to longevity. + +[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are +things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they +burn or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not +that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzŭ +is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the +general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not +thrown in their way.] + + +28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, + +[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate more +genuine grief than tears alone.] + + +those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting +the tears run down their cheeks. + +[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts’ao Kung says, "all +have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that +the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their +emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the I River +between Ching K’o and his friends, when the former was sent to attempt +the life of the King of Ch’in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. +The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and +uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the +burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ] + + +But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage +of a Chu or a Kuei. + +[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and +contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang, +better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with +a dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a +banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was immediately hacked to +pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero +referred to, Ts’ao Kuei (or Ts’ao Mo), performed the exploit which has +made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice +defeated by Ch’i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering +a large slice of territory, when Ts’ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan Kung, +the Duke of Ch’i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger +against his chest. None of the duke’s retainers dared to move a muscle, +and Ts’ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring the Lu +was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker +state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, +whereupon Ts’ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his +place amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed +color. As was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate +the bargain, but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him +the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold +stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched +battles.] + + +29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the +_shuai-jan_ is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains. + +["_Shuai-jan_" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question +was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through +this passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the +sense of "military manœuvers."] + + +Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its +tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and +you will be attacked by head and tail both. + +30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, + +[That is, as Mei Yao-ch’en says, "Is it possible to make the front and +rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as +though they were part of a single living body?"] + + +I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are +enemies; + +[Cf. VI. § 21.] + + +yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a +storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand +helps the right. + +[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of +common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound +together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet +it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of +cooperation, especially in the case of allied armies.] + + +31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of +horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground. + +[These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall +the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the +battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one +spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to +render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed +unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a +spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be +learned from the _shuai-jan_.] + + +32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard +of courage which all must reach. + +[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] +one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it +follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be +of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain +standard. Wellington’s seemingly ungrateful description of his army at +Waterloo as "the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that +it was deficient in this important particular—unity of spirit and +courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept +those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the +day.] + + +33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question +involving the proper use of ground. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en’s paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences +of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize +accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in +strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more +exposed terrain. The advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority +in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the +text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to +think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no +means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions… +and to the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are +defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural +features." [2] ] + + +34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were +leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. + +[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does +it."] + + +35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure +secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. + +36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports +and appearances, + +[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] + + +and thus keep them in total ignorance. + +[Ts’ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops must +not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only +rejoice with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and +surprise the enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been +frequently pointed out. But how about the other process—the +mystification of one’s own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is +over-emphatic on this point would do well to read Col. Henderson’s +remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," +he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most +trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his +thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced useless"—etc. +etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the _Hou Han +Shu_, "Pan Ch’ao took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other +Central Asian states with the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of +Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commander to succour the place +with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t’ou, +totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch’ao summoned his officers and also the King +of Khotan to a council of war, and said: ‘Our forces are now +outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, +then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different +direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, +and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the +evening drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch’ao now secretly +released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha +was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set +off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch’ao’s retreat +in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in +order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch’ao knew that +the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them +well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, +as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, +and were closely pursued by Pan Ch’ao. Over 5000 heads were brought +back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and +cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, +Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From +that time forward, Pan Ch’ao’s prestige completely overawed the +countries of the west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general +not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but +actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive +the enemy.] + + +37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, + +[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice.] + + +he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. + +[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that war +is based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy. +You must deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but +without letting them know why."] + + +By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the +enemy from anticipating his purpose. + +38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has +climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He +carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. + +[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. § 15), that is, takes some +decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like +Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch’en Hao, +followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as "puts forth +every artifice at his command."] + + +39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd +driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and +none knows whither he is going. + +[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or +retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and +conquering."] + + +40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the +business of the general. + +[Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilization there should be no delay in +aiming a blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again +to this point. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was +no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the +armies of today.] + + +41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; + +[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules +for the nine varieties of ground."] + + +the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental +laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be +studied. + +42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that +penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means +dispersion. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 20.] + + +43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across +neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. + +[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not +figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X. +One’s first impulse would be to translate it distant ground," but this, +if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. +Mei Yao-ch’en says it is "a position not far enough advanced to be +called ‘facile,’ and not near enough to home to be ‘dispersive,’ but +something between the two." Wang Hsi says: "It is ground separated from +home by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to cross in +order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business +there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which +is the reason why it is not included among the Nine Situations.] + + +When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is +one of intersecting highways. + +44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. +When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. + +45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow +passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of +refuge at all, it is desperate ground. + +46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity +of purpose. + +[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the +defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. _supra_, § 11.] + + +On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between +all parts of my army. + +[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible +contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden +attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. § 17. Mei Yao-ch’en says: +"On the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an +encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications."] + + +47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. + +[This is Ts’ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We +must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach +the goal." That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way +apart. Mei Yao-ch’en offers another equally plausible explanation: +"Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we +are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute +its possession." Ch’en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy +has had time to select his own ground, quotes VI. § 1, where Sun Tzŭ +warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the +situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a favourable +position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to +occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make +a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, +and victory will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao She beat +the army of Ch’in. (See p. 57.)] + + +48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On +ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. + +49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of +supplies. + +[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as +one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.] + + +On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. + +50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. + +[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position, +whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s +lines." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with +desperation." Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run +away." Tu Mu points out that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where +it is the enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards +Emperor and canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under +Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small, +consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. The +lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps +being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to +escape, actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets +himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped +together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing +for it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary +pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that +the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught.] + + +On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness +of saving their lives. + +Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores +and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and +make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to +the death." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving +up all hope of it." This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about +"grounds" and the "variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the +passages which bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be +struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is +treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § 2 to enumerate "variations" +before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, namely +nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is not included +in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion +of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six +variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though +the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next +chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par +excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down +to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, +8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed +in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once +more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and 7, +being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to +account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts +maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, +should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is +an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. +Several of these are defined twice over, besides which there are two +distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the +chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. +I do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the +general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work cannot have come down to us in +the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective +and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain matter that has +either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.] + + +51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate +resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, +and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger. + +[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch’ao’s devoted followers in 73 +A.D. The story runs thus in the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47: "When Pan Ch’ao +arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at +first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his +behavior underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. +Pan Ch’ao spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you +noticed,’ he said, ‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? +This must signify that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, +and that consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with +which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly +wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have come to +pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ Thereupon +he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, and +set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu +who arrived some day ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between +surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch’ao, +keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a +general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began +drinking with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a +little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them +thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated region, +anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now it +happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom +only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy +extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this +envoy prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the +Hsiung-no, our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert. +What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers replied: ‘Standing as +we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life +and death.’ For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1, +note.] + + +52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are +acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the +march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains +and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We +shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make +use of local guides. + +[These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12-14—in order to +emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to +regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the +following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have added +that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their +treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): +Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the +neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be +occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of +Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of +Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that +direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost +arrived.] + + +53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles +does not befit a warlike prince. + +54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship +shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He +overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining +against him. + +[Mei Tao-ch’en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so +much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you +can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you +have a superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you +overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will be frightened; and if +the neighbouring states are frightened, the enemy’s allies will be +prevented from joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning: +"If the great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to +summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and refrain +from massing their forces." Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu take the sentence in +quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may be, +if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, +and must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with +this, and with overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries +to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his +view thus: "If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will +be discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our +display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the +other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us."] + + +55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor +does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret +designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. + +[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch’uan, appears to be this: Secure +against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject +entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his +prestige enable him to dispense with external friendships."] + + +Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. + +[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State +became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which +the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final +triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up his previous note, +thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded +selfishness and haughty isolation.] + + +56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, + +[Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and +retreat be heavily punished."] + + +issue orders + +[Literally, "hang" or post up."] + + +without regard to previous arrangements; + +["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is +made clear by Ts’ao Kung’s quotation from the _Ssu-ma Fa:_ "Give +instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see +deserving deeds." Ts’ao Kung’s paraphrase: "The final instructions you +give to your army should not correspond with those that have been +previously posted up." Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements +should not be divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says: "there should be +no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not only is there danger in +letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the entire +reversal of them at the last moment.] + + +and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do +with but a single man. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 34.] + + +57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know +your design. + +[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for +any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no +reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a +general than to a judge.] + + +When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them +nothing when the situation is gloomy. + +58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it +into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. + +[These words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of +the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already +alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, +and halted ten miles from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the +enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body +of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red +flag. Their instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles +and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me in +full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their fortifications +and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck down +the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their stead." +Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a +strong position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he +sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I +should turn back and escape through the mountains." So saying, he first +of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them +to form in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this +manœuver, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By this time +it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo’s +flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately +engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time; +until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and +banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where +another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them +and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but +the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was +fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the +2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao +following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, +tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the +Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags +struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and +overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of +their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on +them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a number and +capturing the rest, amongst whom was King Ya himself…. After the +battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and said: "In the _Art +of War_ we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a +river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun +Tzŭ and T’ai Kung. See IX § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, ordered +us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these +conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general +replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with +sufficient care. Is it not written there: ‘Plunge your army into +desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly +peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the usual course, I should +never have been able to bring my colleague round. What says the +Military Classic—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off +to fight.’ [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun +Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were +obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow +his own discretion, there would have been a general _débandade_, and it +would have been impossible to do anything with them." The officers +admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These are higher tactics +than we should have been capable of." [See _Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 34, +ff. 4, 5.] ] + + +59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is +capable of striking a blow for victory. + +[Danger has a bracing effect.] + + +60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves +to the enemy’s purpose. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"—by an appearance of yielding and +falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yu’s note makes the meaning +clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do +so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out +his intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous +before we deliver our attack.] + + +61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, + +[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in +one direction." Ts’ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the +enemy." But such a violent displacement of characters is quite +indefensible.] + + +we shall succeed in the long run + +[Literally, "after a thousand _li_."] + + +in killing the commander-in-chief. + +[Always a great point with the Chinese.] + + +62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. + +63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier +passes, destroy the official tallies, + +[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as +a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the +"border-warden" of _Lun Yu_ III. 24, who may have had similar duties. +When this half was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was +authorized to open the gate and let the traveler through.] + + +and stop the passage of all emissaries. + +[Either to or from the enemy’s country.] + + +64. Be stern in the council-chamber, + +[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the +sovereign.] + + +so that you may control the situation. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the +strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.] + + +65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. + +66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, + +[Cf. _supra_, § 18.] + + +and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. + +[Ch’en Hao’s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favourable position, +but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus obtained +cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore, to +occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an +artful appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him +into going there as well." Mei Yao-ch’en explains that this "artful +appointment" is to be made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies, +who will carry back just the amount of information that we choose to +give them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our intentions, "we must +manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. § +4). We must start after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we +must arrive before him in order to capture the place without trouble. +Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch’en’s +interpretation of § 47.] + + +67. Walk in the path defined by rule, + +[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this +cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is +unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the +sense yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we +know, according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won +his battles by violating every accepted canon of warfare.] + + +and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive +battle. + +[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable +opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall +prove decisive."] + + +68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy +gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running +hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you. + +[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly +appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzŭ was thinking only of its +speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy +as quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] + + +[1] Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. + +[2] "The Science of War," p. 333. + +[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. + + + +Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE + +[Rather more than half the chapter (§§ 1-13) is devoted to the subject +of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first +is to burn soldiers in their camp; + +[So Tu Mu. Li Ch’uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the +soldiers" (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on +a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note], +found himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an +envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In +consultation with his officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never +win! [1] The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire +on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will not be able to +discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate +them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover us with +glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all +replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the +Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is today,’ he cried, +‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum +civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and +everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy +fate for valiant warriors.’ All then agreed to do as he wished. +Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly +made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the +time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind +the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot +up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The +rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade +at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the +windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose +on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in +frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao slew three of them with his own hand, while +his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. +The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On +the following day, Pan Ch’ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted +hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think, +Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied Kuo Hsun, +and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the +head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and +trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public +proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostage, he returned to +make his report to Tou Ku." _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ] + + +the second is to burn stores; + +[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the +rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the +Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a +policy which in the long run proved entirely successful.] + + +the third is to burn baggage-trains; + +[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao’s wagons and +impedimenta by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.] + + +the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; + +[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines" are +the same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and +clothing. Cf. VII. § 11.] + + +the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. + +[Tu Yu says in the _T’ung Tien:_ "To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. +The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows +alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from +powerful crossbows into the enemy’s lines."] + + +2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. + +[T’sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy’s camp" are referred to. +But Ch’en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have +favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us." +Chia Lin says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."] + + +the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. + +[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter, +reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material +cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting +fires."] + + +3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special +days for starting a conflagration. + +4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days +are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the +Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; + +[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the +Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, +Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.] + + +for these four are all days of rising wind. + +5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible +developments: + +6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once +with an attack from without. + +7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain +quiet, bide your time and do not attack. + +[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into +confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is +ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.] + + +8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it +up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find +the difficulties too great, retire."] + + +9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do +not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a +favourable moment. + +[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire +breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of +incendiaries) inside the enemy’s camp. "But," he continues, "if the +enemy is settled in a waste place littered with quantities of grass, or +if he has pitched his camp in a position which can be burnt out, we +must carry our fire against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not +await on in hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our +opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and +thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once +baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking +advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese +general’s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in +the neighbourhood had already been burnt down. On the other hand, +Po-ts’ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in +184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple precaution. "At the head of +a large army he was besieging Ch’ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu +Sung. The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness +pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and +said: "In war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and +numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here quotes Sun +Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the +midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we +set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can +make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the +achievement of T’ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong +breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind +reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after +which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way +through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. +Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and +Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the +rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." [_Hou Han Shu_, +ch. 71.] +] +] +] +] +] +10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from +the leeward. + +[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will +retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he +will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A +rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in +the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the +attack yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side, +and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your +enemy."] + + +11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze +soon falls. + +[Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a +morning." (_Tao Te Ching_, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch’en and Wang Hsi say: +"A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. +This is what happens as a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be +correct enough, but how this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.] + + +12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be +known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the +proper days. + +[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, +and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before making our +attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: +"We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also +be on our guard against similar attacks from them."] + + +13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; +those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of +strength. + +14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of +all his belongings. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy’s road or +divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water +can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of +fire. This is the reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is +dismissed in a couple of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is +discussed in detail. Wu Tzŭ (ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements: +"If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy ground, from which the +water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, it may be +submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands +thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent +gales, it may be exterminated by fire."] + + +15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed +in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the +result is waste of time and general stagnation. + +[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. Ts’ao Kung +says: "Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day." +And Tu Mu: "If you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the +deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and +disaster will ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the +formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the +interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch’en alone, whose words I will +quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their battles and +assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come and not shrink +on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort to +such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What they must not +do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to the +advantages they have got."] + + +16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; +the good general cultivates his resources. + +[Tu Mu quotes the following from the _San Lueh_, ch. 2: "The warlike +prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by +good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, +there will be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not +be respected."] + + +17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless +there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is +critical. + +[Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so +far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the _Tao Te Ching_, +ch. 69. "I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the +defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."] + + +18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own +spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. + +19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where +you are. + +[This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an +interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately +on § 18.] + + +20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by +content. + +21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again +into being; + +[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.] + + +nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. + +22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full +of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army +intact. + +[1] "Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the +tiger’s cubs." + + + +Chapter XIII. THE USE OF SPIES + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching +them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on +the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a +thousand ounces of silver. + +[Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.] + + +There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down +exhausted on the highways. + +[Cf. _Tao Te Ching_, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered, +brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be +reminded of the saying: ‘On serious ground, gather in plunder.’ Why +then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the +highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of +munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the +injunction to ‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is +deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided +against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, +we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of +supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where +provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed +with."] + + +As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their +labor. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-tail." The +allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each +consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated +on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here +also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well +sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II. § 12, note.] In time of +war, one of the families had to serve in the army, while the other +seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men +(reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of +700,000 families would be affected.] + + +2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the +victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in +ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the +outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments, + +["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect +of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned +at this point.] + + +is the height of inhumanity. + +[Sun Tzŭ’s agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to +the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which +war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of +the enemy’s condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a +war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to +employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless +they are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false +economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, +when every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. +This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun +Tzŭ concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a +crime against humanity.] + + +3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his +sovereign, no master of victory. + +[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the +national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., +these memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch’u State: +"The [Chinese] character for ‘prowess’ is made up of [the characters +for] ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear’ (cessation of hostilities). Military +prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of +weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm +establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, +putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."] + + +4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike +and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is +_foreknowledge_. + +[That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means to +do.] + + +5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be +obtained inductively from experience, + +[Tu Mu’s note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by +reasoning from other analogous cases."] + + +nor by any deductive calculation. + +[Li Ch’uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and +magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human +actions cannot be so calculated."] + + +6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from +other men. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the +spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural +science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe +can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an +enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone."] + + +7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local +spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) +surviving spies. + +8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the +secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It +is the sovereign’s most precious faculty. + +[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry +leaders, had officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it was to +collect all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts +and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was traceable to the +previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves thus gained." [1] ] + + +9. Having _local spies_ means employing the services of the inhabitants +of a district. + +[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind +treatment, and use them as spies."] + + +10. Having _inward spies_, making use of officials of the enemy. + +[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in +this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals +who have undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy +for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or +who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are +anxious that their side should be defeated in order that they may have +a chance of displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who +always want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several +kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to one’s +interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able to +find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, ascertain the +plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the +harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." +The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward +spies," appears from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo +Shang, Governor of I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel +Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold at P’i. After each side had +experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse +to the services of a certain P’o-t’ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to +have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo +Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him from +inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right moment for +making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, march +out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head +with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’s bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung’s +general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; +and P’o-t’ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city +walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the +signal and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while +others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred +of Lo Shang’s soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom +was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces, +both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely." +[This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho Shih got the story +from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that of his +father Li T’e, _Chin Shu_, ch. 120, 121.] + + +11. Having _converted spies_, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and +using them for our own purposes. + +[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the +enemy’s service, and inducing them to carry back false information as +well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, +Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we pretend not to have detected him, but +contrive to let him carry away a false impression of what is going on. +Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative definition; +but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively proved by his +subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§ 21 +sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used +with conspicuous success: (1) by T’ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo +(see _supra_, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); +and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P’o was conducting a +defensive campaign against Ch’in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved +of Lien P’o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to +avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to +the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and +were already in Fan Chu’s pay. They said: "The only thing which causes +Ch’in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. Lien P’o they +consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in the long +run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao She. From his +boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war and military +matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no commander +in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much +disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he +spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if +ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of +Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own +mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed +Lien P’o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po +Ch’i and the great military power of Ch’in. He fell into a trap by +which his army was divided into two and his communications cut; and +after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished +soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and +his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put +to the sword.] + + +12. Having _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of +deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them +to the enemy. + +[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do +things calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe +that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are +captured in the enemy’s lines, they will make an entirely false report, +and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only to find that we do +something quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." +As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released +by Pan Ch’ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also +refers to T’ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T’ai Tsung to lull +the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was +able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang Yu says that the +Turks revenged themselves by killing T’ang Chien, but this is a +mistake, for we read in both the old and the New T’ang History (ch. 58, +fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on +until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when +sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch’i. He has +certainly more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of +Ch’i, being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and +infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the +unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.] + + +13. _Surviving spies_, finally, are those who bring back news from the +enemy’s camp. + +[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a +regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man +of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby +exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed +with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts +of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with shame +and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the following story of Ta’hsi Wu of the +Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of Eastern Ch’in, Shen-wu of Ch’i +made a hostile movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T’ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] +sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other +men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy’s uniform. When it +was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy’s camp +and stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching the +passwords used in the army. Then they got on their horses again and +boldly passed through the camp under the guise of night-watchmen; and +more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was committing +some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a +sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible +information about the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm +commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was +able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."] + + +14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate +relations to be maintained than with spies. + +[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch’en point out that the spy is privileged to enter +even the general’s private sleeping-tent.] + + +None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should +greater secrecy be preserved. + +[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be +carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted +from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any previous +commander: "Spies are attached to those who give them most, he who pays +them ill is never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor +should they know one another. When they propose anything very material, +secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives and +children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to +them but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. [2] ] + + +15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive +sagacity. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from +falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and +double-dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more +along the lines of "intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." +Tu Mu strangely refers these attributes to the spies themselves: +"Before using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity of +character and the extent of their experience and skill." But he +continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous +than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." +So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the +passage."] + + +16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and +straightforwardness. + +[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, +you must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for +you with all their might."] + + +17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the +truth of their reports. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies +going over to the service of the enemy."] + + +18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of +business. + +[Cf. VI. § 9.] + + +19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is +ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret +was told. + +[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard +before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzŭ’s main point in this +passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for +letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only, +as Ch’en Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any +further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would +not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzŭ lays himself open to the charge of +inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man +deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told +the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him."] + + +20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to +assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding +out the names of the attendants, the aides-de- camp, + +[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose +duty it is to keep the general supplied with information," which +naturally necessitates frequent interviews with him.] + + +the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must +be commissioned to ascertain these. + +[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these +important functionaries can be won over by bribery.] + + +21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, +tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will +become converted spies and available for our service. + +22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we +are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. + +[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy’s spies we learn the +enemy’s condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy +into our service, because it is he that knows which of the local +inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are open to +corruption."] + + +23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed +spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. + +[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best +be deceived."] + + +24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used +on appointed occasions. + +25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of +the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first +instance, from the converted spy. + +[As explained in §§ 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but +makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.] + + +Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost +liberality. + +26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty + +[Sun Tzŭ means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was +changed to Yin by P’an Keng in 1401. + + +was due to I Chih + +[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part +in Ch’eng T’ang’s campaign against Chieh Kuei.] + + +who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty +was due to Lü Ya + +[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he +afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T’ai Kung, a title +bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on +war, erroneously identified with the _Liu T’ao_.] + + +who had served under the Yin. + +[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to +introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are +by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly +doubt that Sun Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious +examples of the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His +suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the +intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcoming which these +former ministers were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch’en +appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin +and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. Hsia +could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could not +employ the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great achievements +were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant: "How +should two divinely inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common +spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of them simply means that the proper use of +the five classes of spies is a matter which requires men of the highest +mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them +for the task. The above words only emphasize this point." Ho Shih +believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their +supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] + + +27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who +will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying +and thereby they achieve great results. + +[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a +boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so +reliance on spies, while production of great results, is oft-times the +cause of utter destruction."] + + +Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an +army’s ability to move. + +[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man without ears or +eyes.] + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2. + +[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311. + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 *** diff --git a/old/132-h/132-h.htm b/old/132-h/132-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13b3c7f --- /dev/null +++ b/old/132-h/132-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,8456 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Art of War | Project Gutenberg</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + +body { margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%; + text-align: justify;} + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 175%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} +h3 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +hr {width: 80%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: 0.25em; + margin-bottom: 0.25em; } + +.p1 {margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + font-size: 90%;} + +.p2 {margin-top: 0em; + margin-bottom: 0em; + font-size: 90%;} + +.p3 {margin-top: 2em;} + +p.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: 90%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.noindent {text-indent: 0% } + +p.center {text-align: center; + text-indent: 0em; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> + +</head> + +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 ***</div> + +<h1>Sun Tzŭ<br/> +on<br/> +The Art of War</h1> + +<h4>THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD</h4> +<h4>Translated from the Chinese with Introduction and Critical Notes</h4> + +<h5>BY</h5> + +<h3>LIONEL GILES, M.A.</h3> + +<p class="center"> +Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. +in the British Museum +</p> + +<p class="center"> +1910 +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p class="center"> +To my brother<br/> +Captain Valentine Giles, R.G.<br/> +in the hope that<br/> +a work 2400 years old<br/> +may yet contain lessons worth consideration<br/> +by the soldier of today<br/> +this translation<br/> +is affectionately dedicated. +</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto"> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref01">Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">Preface by Lionel Giles</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap03">Sun Wu and his Book</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap04">The Text of Sun Tzŭ</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap05">The Commentators</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap06">Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap07">Apologies for War</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap08">Bibliography</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap09">Chapter I. Laying plans</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap10">Chapter II. Waging War</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap11">Chapter III. Attack by Stratagem</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap12">Chapter IV. Tactical Dispositions</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap13">Chapter V. Energy</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap14">Chapter VI. Weak Points and Strong</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap15">Chapter VII Manœuvring</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap16">Chapter VIII. Variation of Tactics</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap17">Chapter IX. The Army on the March</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap18">Chapter X. Terrain</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap19">Chapter XI. The Nine Situations</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap20">Chapter XII. The Attack by Fire</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap21">Chapter XIII. The Use of Spies</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref01"></a>Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext</h2> + +<p> +When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i>, the +work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to Europe began in 1782 +when a French Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph Amiot, acquired a copy of +it, and translated it into French. It was not a good translation because, +according to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, +and very little indeed of what he did." +</p> + +<p> +The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by Capt. E. +F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words of Dr. Giles, +"excessively bad." He goes further in this criticism: "It is not merely a +question of downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly exempt. +Omissions were frequent; hard passages were willfully distorted or slurred +over. Such offenses are less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any +edition of a Latin or Greek classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to +be insisted upon in translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt. +Calthrop’s translation was published in London. It was an improvement on the +first—omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected—but new +errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his translation, +wrote: "It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; +but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a better fate than had +befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on +the work of my predecessors." +</p> + +<p> +Clearly, Dr. Giles’ work established much of the groundwork for the work of +later translators who published their own editions. Of the later editions of +the <i>Art of War</i> I have examined; two feature Giles’ edited translation +and notes, the other two present the same basic information from the ancient +Chinese commentators found in the Giles edition. Of these four, Giles’ 1910 +edition is the most scholarly and presents the reader an incredible amount of +information concerning Sun Tzŭ’s text, much more than any other translation. +</p> + +<p> +The Giles’ edition of the <i>Art of War</i>, as stated above, was a scholarly +work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time and an assistant in the +Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts in the British Museum. +Apparently he wanted to produce a definitive edition, superior to anything else +that existed and perhaps something that would become a standard translation. It +was the best translation available for 50 years. But apparently there was not +much interest in Sun Tzŭ in English-speaking countries since it took the start +of the Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several people published +unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzŭ. In 1944, Dr. Giles’ translation +was edited and published in the United States in a series of military science +books. But it wasn’t until 1963 that a good English translation (by Samuel B. +Griffith and still in print) was published that was an equal to Giles’ +translation. While this translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles’ translation, +it lacks his copious notes that make his so interesting. +</p> + +<p> +Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the Chinese +civilization and language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun Tzŭ, the English +translation, and voluminous notes along with numerous footnotes. Unfortunately, +some of his notes and footnotes contain Chinese characters; some are completely +Chinese. Thus, a conversion to a Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the +conversion in complete ignorance of Chinese (except for what I learned while +doing the conversion). Thus, I faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it +while retaining as much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase +represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the text as +possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, I was able to +transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the risk of making the text +more obscure. However, the text, on the whole, is quite satisfactory for the +casual reader, a transformation made possible by conversion to an etext. +However, I come away from this task with the feeling of loss because I know +that someone with a background in Chinese can do a better job than I did; any +such attempt would be welcomed. +</p> + +<p> +Bob Sutton +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>Preface by Lionel Giles</h2> + +<p> +The seventh volume of <i>Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, les +arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois</i> is devoted to the Art of +War, and contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles de +Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph Amiot. +Père Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a sinologue in his +day, and the field of his labours was certainly extensive. But his so-called +translation of the Sun Tzŭ, if placed side by side with the original, is seen +at once to be little better than an imposture. It contains a great deal that +Sun Tzŭ did not write, and very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair +specimen, taken from the opening sentences of chapter 5:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +<i>De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes.</i> Sun-tse dit : Ayez +les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que subalternes; inscrivez-les +dans un catalogue à part, avec la note des talents & de la capacité de +chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage lorsque +l’occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que vous devez +commander soient persuadés que votre principale attention est de les préserver +de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez avancer contre l’ennemi +doivent être comme des pierres que vous lanceriez contre des œufs. De vous à +l’ennemi il ne doit y avoir d’autre différence que celle du fort au +faible, du vide au plein. Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret. +Voilà en peu de mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute la +perfection même du gouvernement des troupes. +</p> + +<p> +Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development in the +study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun Tzŭ, although +his work was known to be highly valued in China as by far the oldest and best +compendium of military science. It was not until the year 1905 that the first +English translation, by Capt. E.F. Calthrop. R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under +the title “Sonshi”(the Japanese form of Sun Tzŭ). Unfortunately, it +was evident that the translator’s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty +to fit him to grapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzŭ. He himself +plainly acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the +accompanying translation would have been impossible.” We can only wonder, +then, that with their help it should have been so excessively bad. It is not +merely a question of downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly +exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages were wilfully distorted or +slurred over. Such offences are less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in +any edition of a Greek or Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty +ought to be insisted upon in translations from Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present translation +is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; +but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a better fate than had +befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on +the work of my predecessors. Towards the end of 1908, a new and revised edition +of Capt. Calthrop’s translation was published in London, this time, +however, without any allusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three +chapters were then already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms +of Capt. Calthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to his +earlier edition. This is on the whole an improvement on the other, thought +there still remains much that cannot pass muster. Some of the grosser blunders +have been rectified and lacunae filled up, but on the other hand a certain +number of new mistakes appear. The very first sentence of the introduction is +startlingly inaccurate; and later on, while mention is made of “an army +of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzŭ (who are these, by the way?), not a +word is vouchsafed about the Chinese commentators, who nevertheless, I venture +to assert, form a much more numerous and infinitely more important +“army.” +</p> + +<p> +A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In the first +place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in order to +facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of students generally. The +division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen’s edition; but I have +sometimes found it desirable to join two or more of his paragraphs into one. In +quoting from other works, Chinese writers seldom give more than the bare title +by way of reference, and the task of research is apt to be seriously hampered +in consequence. With a view to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzŭ is +concerned, I have also appended a complete concordance of Chinese characters, +following in this the admirable example of Legge, though an alphabetical +arrangement has been preferred to the distribution under radicals which he +adopted. Another feature borrowed from “The Chinese Classics” is +the printing of text, translation and notes on the same page; the notes, +however, are inserted, according to the Chinese method, immediately after the +passages to which they refer. From the mass of native commentary my aim has +been to extract the cream only, adding the Chinese text here and there when it +seemed to present points of literary interest. Though constituting in itself an +important branch of Chinese literature, very little commentary of this kind has +hitherto been made directly accessible by translation. +</p> + +<p> +I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my sheets as they +were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a final revision. On a +review of the whole, without modifying the substance of my criticisms, I might +have been inclined in a few instances to temper their asperity. Having chosen +to wield a bludgeon, however, I shall not cry out if in return I am visited +with more than a rap over the knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to +put a sword into the hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either +text or reference for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from +the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere translations,” +would not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome. For, after all, the worst +fate I shall have to dread is that which befell the ingenious paradoxes of +George in <i>The Vicar of Wakefield</i>. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<h2><a name="chap03"></a>Sun Wu and his Book</h2> + +<p> +Ssu-ma Ch’ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzŭ: [1]<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch’i State. His <i>Art of War</i> brought +him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him: +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +"I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of +managing soldiers to a slight test?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ replied: "You may." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180 +ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ divided them into two companies, and placed +one of the King’s favourite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them +all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: "I presume you know +the difference between front and back, right hand and left hand?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The girls replied: Yes. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight ahead. When I +say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. When I say "Right turn," +you must face towards your right hand. When I say "About turn," you must face +right round towards your back." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus explained, he +set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill. Then, to the +sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But the girls only burst out +laughing. Sun Tzŭ said: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if +orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left turn," +whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun Tzŭ: "If words +of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, +the general is to blame. But if his orders <i>are</i> clear, and the soldiers +nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. Now the +king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised pavilion; and when +he saw that his favourite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly +alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: "We are now quite +satisfied as to our general’s ability to handle troops. If we are bereft of +these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish +that they shall not be beheaded." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ replied: "Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be the +general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty which, acting +in that capacity, I am unable to accept." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed the +pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been done, the drum +was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went through all the +evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling +back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing +to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your +soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your +majesty’s inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may +desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As +for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot translate +them into deeds." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was +one who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the +west, he defeated the Ch’u State and forced his way into Ying, the +capital; to the north he put fear into the States of Ch’i and Chin, and +spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzŭ shared in the +might of the King. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has to tell us in +this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, Sun Pin, +born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death, and also the +outstanding military genius of his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun +Tzŭ, and in his preface we read: "Sun Tzŭ had his feet cut off and yet +continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It seems likely, then, that "Pin" was +a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless the story was invented +in order to account for the name. The crowning incident of his career, the +crushing defeat of his treacherous rival P’ang Chuan, will be found +briefly related in Chapter V. § 19, note. +</p> + +<p> +To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in two other passages of the +<i>Shih Chi:</i>— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the field +with Tzŭ-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P’ei, and attacked Ch’u. He +captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince’s sons who had formerly been +generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying [the capital]; but the +general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It is not yet possible. We must +wait"…. [After further successful fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], +King Ho Lu addressed Wu Tzŭ-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared +that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The +two men replied: "Ch’u’s general Tzŭ-ch’ang, [4] is grasping and +covetous, and the princes of T’ang and Ts’ai both have a grudge +against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win +over T’ang and Ts’ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed +this advice, [beat Ch’u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying.] +[5] +</p> + +<p> +This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He does not +appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects of a wound in +496. In another chapter there occurs this passage:[6] +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the other: +Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] in the service +of Ch’i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men developed and threw +light upon the principles of war. +</p> + +<p> +It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch’ien at least had no doubt about the +reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, to be +noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on the period in +question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as +the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu</i>, which is supposed to have been +written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution is somewhat +doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of little value, +based as it is on the <i>Shih Chi</i> and expanded with romantic details. The story of +Sun Tzŭ will be found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points +in it worth noting are: (1) Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu +Tzŭ-hsu. (2) He is called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired +life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability. +</p> + +<p> +The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzŭ: "When sovereign and ministers +show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ to encounter the +foe." Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast +upon it), we have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzŭ, for Huai-nan +Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many years before the <i>Shih Chi</i> was given to the world. +</p> + +<p> +Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzŭ at the head of 30,000 men +beat Ch’u with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined." +</p> + +<p> +Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun Wu’s +grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch’i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father Sun +P’ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch’i, and Sun Wu himself, +whose style was Ch’ang-ch’ing, fled to Wu on account of the +rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred of T’ien Pao. He had +three sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. +According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering +that Sun Pin’s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as +chronologically impossible. Whence these data were obtained by Teng Ming-shih I +do not know, but of course no reliance whatever can be placed in them. +</p> + +<p> +An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han period is +the short preface written by the Great Ts’ao Ts’ao, or Wei Wu Ti, +for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in full:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage. [10] +The <i>Lun Yu</i> says: “There must be a sufficiency of military +strength.” The <i>Shu Ching</i> mentions "the army" among the "eight +objects of government." The <i>I Ching</i> says: "‘army’ indicates firmness and +justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune." The <i>Shih Ching</i> +says: "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his troops." The +Yellow Emperor, T’ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears and +battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i> says: "If +one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may rightfully be slain." He +who relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies +solely on peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch’ai +[11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the other. [12] In military matters, the +Sage’s rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only when +occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work +composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzŭ was a native of the +Ch’i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the <i>Art of War</i> in +13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were tested on women, and he +was subsequently made a general. He led an army westwards, crushed the +Ch’u state and entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Ch’i +and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was +a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment of deliberation and planning, the +importance of rapidity in taking the field, [14] clearness of conception, and +depth of design, Sun Tzŭ stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My +contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his +instructions, and while putting into practice the smaller details in which his +work abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive +which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the 13 +chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported by the +internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some ruler is +addressed. +</p> + +<p> +In the bibliographic section of the <i>Han Shu</i>, there is an entry which has given +rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 <i>p’ien</i> (or +chapters), with diagrams in 9 <i>chuan</i>." It is evident that this cannot be merely +the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch’ien, or those we possess today. Chang +Shou-chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i> of which the "13 +chapters" formed the first <i>chuan</i>, adding that there were two other <i>chuan</i> +besides. This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters +consisted of other writings of Sun Tzŭ—we should call them +apocryphal—similar to the <i>Wen Ta</i>, of which a specimen dealing with the +Nine Situations [15] is preserved in the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, and another in Ho +Shin’s commentary. It is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun +Tzŭ had only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of +exegesis in the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pi +I-hsun, the author of the <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu</i>, backs this up with a quotation from +the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu:</i> "The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzŭ, and +asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth a chapter of +his work, the King could not find words enough to praise him." As he points +out, if the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the +above-mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail to be +considerable. Then the numerous other treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ might be +included. The fact that the <i>Han Chih</i> mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82 +<i>p’ien</i>, whereas the Sui and T’ang bibliographies give the titles of +others in addition to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that +all of these were contained in the 82 <i>p’ien</i>. Without pinning our faith to +the accuracy of details supplied by the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu</i>, or +admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, we may +see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between Ssu-ma +Ch’ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of +forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzŭ, and the 82 +<i>p’ien</i> may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped +together with the original work. It is also possible, though less likely, that +some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely +ignored by him. [16] +</p> + +<p> +Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu Ti +strung together Sun Wu’s <i>Art of War</i>," which in turn may have resulted from a +misunderstanding of the final words of Ts’ao King’s preface. This, as Sun +Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of saying that he made an +explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the +whole, this theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, the <i>Ssu K’u +Ch’uan Shu</i> says: "The mention of the 13 chapters in the <i>Shih Chi</i> shows +that they were in existence before the <i>Han Chih</i>, and that latter accretions are +not to be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can certainly +not be taken as proof." +</p> + +<p> +There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in the +time of Ssu-ma Ch’ien practically as we have them now. That the work was +then well known he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzŭ’s <i>13 Chapters</i> and Wu +Ch’i’s <i>Art of War</i> are the two books that people commonly refer to on the +subject of military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I will not +discuss them here." But as we go further back, serious difficulties begin to +arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is that the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, the +greatest contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as +a general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, +that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given +in the <i>Shih Chi</i>, but even show themselves frankly skeptical as to the existence +of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of this side of the case is to +be found in the following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17]—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native of the +Ch’i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he crushed +Ch’u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso’s Commentary no +Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s Commentary need not contain +absolutely everything that other histories contain. But Tso has not omitted to +mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K’ao-shu, +[18] Ts’ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of +Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much +more glaring. Again, details are given, in their due order, about his +contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P’ei. [21] Is it credible that +Sun Wu alone should have been passed over? +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same school as <i>Kuan +Tzŭ</i>, [22] <i>Liu T’ao</i>, [23] and the <i>Yüeh Yu</i> [24] and may have been the +production of some private scholar living towards the end of the "Spring and +Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" period. [25] The story that +his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of +big talk on the part of his followers. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time of the +"Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as well, and the +class of professional generals, for conducting external campaigns, did not then +exist. It was not until the period of the "Six States" [27] that this custom +changed. Now although Wu was an uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso +should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet +held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu [28] and Sun +Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing +pundits. The story of Ho Lu’s experiment on the women, in particular, is +utterly preposterous and incredible. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch’ien as having said that Sun Wu crushed +Ch’u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the impression +left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in these exploits. The +fact may or may not be significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the +<i>Shih Chi</i> either that Sun Tzŭ was general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, +or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po +P’ei both took part in the expedition, and also that its success was +largely due to the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it +is not easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent +part in the same campaign. +</p> + +<p> +Ch’en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the fact that +he does not appear in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, although he is said to have served under +Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to. +</p> + +<p> +He also says:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch’i may be of genuine antiquity. +</p> + +<p> +It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch’en Chen-sun, while +rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s +history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the work +which passes under his name. The author of the <i>Hsu Lu</i> fails to appreciate this +distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on Ch’en Chen-sun really +misses its mark. He makes one of two points, however, which certainly tell in +favour of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters." "Sun Tzŭ," he says, "must +have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519-476], because he is frequently +plagiarized in subsequent works of the Chou, Ch’in and Han dynasties." +The two most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Ch’i and Huai-nan +Tzŭ, both of them important historical personages in their day. The former +lived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is known +to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, that +Tseng Shen delivered the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, which had been entrusted to him by its +author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the <i>Art of War</i>, +acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of different +epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all,—in other words, +that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards the end of the 5th +century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzŭ’s antiquity is furnished by the archaic +or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the words he uses. A list +of these, which might perhaps be extended, is given in the <i>Hsu Lu;</i> and though +some of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected +thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar and +critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the 13 chapters +to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually +engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be +sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he +not honestly believed the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that +the judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal +evidence is not far to seek. Thus in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable +allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already passed away by +the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified form. [30] +The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that carried on between the various feudal +princes, in which armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have +entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, +a state which ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch +presently. +</p> + +<p> +But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances of its +being other than a <i>bonâ fide</i> production are sensibly diminished. The +great age of forgeries did not come until long after. That it should have been +forged in the period immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no +one, as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh +Shui-hsin’s theory, that the author was a literary recluse, that seems to me +quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent than another after reading the +maxims of Sun Tzŭ, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large +store of personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of +a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but also of a +practical soldier closely acquainted with the military conditions of his time. +To say nothing of the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed +by all the greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination of +freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite excludes the +idea that they were artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, +that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of a military man living +towards the end of the "<i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i>" period, are we not bound, in +spite of the silence of the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, to accept Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account +in its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not +hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu’s biography were +false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is +still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the chronology involved in the +story as told in the <i>Shih Chi</i>, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet +pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzŭ in which he alludes to +contemporary affairs. The first in in VI. § 21:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in number, +that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that +victory can be achieved. +</p> + +<p> +The other is in XI. § 30:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Asked if an army can be made to imitate the <i>shuai-jan</i>, I should answer, +Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; yet if they are +crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to +each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right. +</p> + +<p> +These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of +composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between Wu and +Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped +notice is that they also seriously impair the credibility of Ssu-ma +Ch’ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive date given +in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken of as a general, acting +as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his alleged introduction to that +monarch had already taken place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been +written earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to +the capture of Ying in 506, Ch’u and not Yüeh, was the great hereditary +enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch’u and Wu, had been constantly at war for +over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh was waged +only in 510, [32] and even then was no more than a short interlude sandwiched +in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch’u. Now Ch’u is not +mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were +written at a time when Yüeh had become the prime antagonist of Wu, that is, +after Ch’u had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a +table of dates may be found useful.<br/><br/> +</p> + +<table summary="" > + +<tr> <td>B.C.</td><td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>514</td><td>Accession of Ho Lu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>512</td><td>Ho Lu attacks Ch’u, but is dissuaded from entering +Ying,<br/> +the capital. <i>Shih Chi</i> mentions Sun Wu as general.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>511</td><td>Another attack on Ch’u.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>510</td><td>Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This is the +first<br/> +war between the two states.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>509 or 508</td><td>Ch’u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at +Yu-chang.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>506</td><td>Ho Lu attacks Ch’u with the aid of T’ang and +Ts’ai.<br/> +Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last<br/> +mention of Sun Wu in <i>Shih Chi</i>.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>505</td><td>Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. +Wu<br/> +is beaten by Ch’in and evacuates Ying.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>504</td><td>Ho Lu sends Fu Ch’ai to attack Ch’u.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>497</td><td>Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>496</td><td>Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at +Tsui-li.<br/> +Ho Lu is killed.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>494</td><td>Fu Ch’ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of +Fu-<br/> +chaio, and enters the capital of Yüeh.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>485 or 484</td><td>Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu +Tzŭ-hsu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>482</td><td>Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu +Ch’ai.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>478 to 476</td><td>Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>475</td><td>Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>473</td><td>Final defeat and extinction of Wu.</td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<p class="p3"> +The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that could +have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather to imply that, +for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, and that she was +getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was +not in existence in 505, before which date Yüeh does not appear to have scored +any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was +written for him, it must have been during the period 505-496, when there was a +lull in the hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort +against Ch’u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition +connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the light +between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482-473, when Yüeh was once +again becoming a very serious menace. [33] We may feel fairly certain that the +author, whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his +own day. On this point the negative testimony of the <i>Tso Chuan</i> far outweighs +any shred of authority still attaching to the <i>Shih Chi</i>, if once its other facts +are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the +omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu Tzŭ-hsu, he says, who +got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because the latter (being an alien) +was not rewarded with an office in the State. +</p> + +<p> +How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may be that the growing celebrity +of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It +was felt to be only right and proper that one so well versed in the science of +war should have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture of +Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep +and lasting impression on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the +short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, +than that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly +identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his +brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out by +him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po P’ei and Fu Kai? +</p> + +<p> +It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun Tzŭ’s +life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I +should say that he probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s +accession, and gathered experience, though only in the capacity of a +subordinate officer, during the intense military activity which marked the +first half of the prince’s reign. [35] If he rose to be a general at all, he +certainly was never on an equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was +doubtless present at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s +sudden collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical juncture, +when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced him that +this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort would +henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he +sat down to write his famous book, which according to my reckoning must have +appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning of Ho Lu’s reign. The story +of the women may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about +the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is +hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the +death-struggle with Yüeh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li. +</p> + +<p> +If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony in the +fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man of peace should be +contemporary with her greatest writer on war. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap04"></a>The Text of Sun Tzŭ</h2> + +<p> +I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s text. +The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the "13 chapters" of +which Ssu-ma Ch’ien speaks were essentially the same as those now extant. +We have his word for it that they were widely circulated in his day, and can +only regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account. Sun +Hsing-yen says in his preface:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +During the Ch’in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i> was in +general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated it as a +work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for the benefit of +posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary +on it. +</p> + +<p> +As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that +Ts’ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so +obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time onward so +great, especially during the T’ang and Sung dynasties, that it would be +surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep in. Towards the +middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief commentaries on Sun Tzŭ +were in existence, a certain Chi T’ien-pao published a work in 15 +<i>chuan</i> entitled "Sun Tzŭ with the collected commentaries of ten writers." +There was another text, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of +Ta-hsing, which also had supporters among the scholars of that period; but in +the Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason +or other no longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th +century, the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi +T’ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was +known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzŭ which appears +in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the +<i>Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng</i>. Another copy at my disposal of +what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that contained in +the "Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch’in dynasties" [1758]. And the +Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition is evidently a similar +version which has filtered through Japanese channels. So things remained until +Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, +who claimed to be an actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered +a copy of Chi T’ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library +of the Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the <i>I Shuo</i> of Cheng +Yu-Hsien, mentioned in the <i>T’ung Chih</i>, and also believed to have +perished. This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or +text)"—a rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set +before us the text of Sun Tzŭ in its pristine purity. Chi T’ien-pao was a +careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat +debased version current in his day, without troubling to collate it with the +earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzŭ, even +older than the newly discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the +<i>T’ung Tien</i>, Tu Yu’s great treatise on the Constitution, the other +similarly enshrined in the <i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i> encyclopedia. +In both the complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments, +intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of +different sections. Considering that the <i>Yu Lan</i> takes us back to the +year 983, and the <i>T’ung Tien</i> about 200 years further still, to the +middle of the T’ang dynasty, the value of these early transcripts of Sun +Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem +to have occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government +instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his own +account:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ which his editors had +handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient edition [of Chi +T’ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be revised and +corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and +Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to this study, +probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on +blocks as a textbook for military men. +</p> + +<p> +The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on the text +of Sun Tzŭ prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are left in doubt as to +the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when +ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one +co-editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original edition" as their basis, and by +careful comparison with older versions, as well as the extant commentaries and +other sources of information such as the <i>I Shuo</i>, succeeded in restoring a very +large number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be +accepted as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzŭ’s +original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard text." +</p> + +<p> +The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. It is in 6 <i>pen</i>, +forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 <i>pen</i>. +[38] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this +introduction), vindicating the traditional view of Sun Tzŭ’s life and +performances, and summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its +favour. This is followed by Ts’ao Kung’s preface to his edition, and the +biography of Sun Tzŭ from the <i>Shih Chi</i>, both translated above. Then come, +firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien’s <i>I Shuo</i>, [39] with author’s preface, and next, a short +miscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu +Lu</i>, compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate +sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by the +various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological order. These +we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap05"></a>The Commentators</h2> + +<p> +Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of commentators, +which would do honour to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks on this fact, though +he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by +saying that the artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be +susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways. +</p> + +<p> +1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti +[A.D. 155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest commentary +on Sun Tzŭ actually came from the pen of this extraordinary man, whose +biography in the <i>San Kuo Chih</i> reads like a romance. One of the greatest +military geniuses that the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his +operations, he was especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches, +which has found expression in the line "Talk of Ts’ao Ts’ao, and +Ts’ao Ts’ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a +great captain who "measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two +Yuan, father and son, and vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire +of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a +council of war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had +all his calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not lose +one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any particular saw their +armies incontinently beaten and put to flight." Ts’ao Kung’s notes on Sun +Tzŭ, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic of the stern +commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as the +work of a mere <i>littérateur</i>. Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme compression, +they are scarcely intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than +the text itself. [40] +</p> + +<p> +2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name is +comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even his personal +name has not been recorded. Chi T’ien-pao’s edition places him after Chia +Lin, and Ch’ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T’ang dynasty, [41] +but this is a mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he appears as Meng Shih of +the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would identify him with Meng K’ang of +the 3rd century. He is named in one work as the last of the "Five +Commentators," the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao and Chia Lin. +</p> + +<p> +3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military +tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the present day. The +<i>T’ung Chih</i> mentions "Lives of famous generals from the Chou to the +T’ang dynasty" as written by him. [42] According to Ch’ao Kung-wu +and the <i>T’ien-i-ko</i> catalogue, he followed a variant of the text of Sun +Tzŭ which differs considerably from those now extant. His notes are mostly +short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes +from Chinese history. +</p> + +<p> +4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ, his notes +being taken from the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, the encyclopedic treatise on the +Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely repetitions of +Ts’ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed that he drew on +the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar +arrangement of <i>T’ung Tien</i>, he has to explain each passage on its merits, +apart from the context, and sometimes his own explanation does not agree with +that of Ts’ao Kung, whom he always quotes first. Though not strictly to +be reckoned as one of the "Ten Commentators," he was added to their number by +Chi T’ien-pao, being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. +</p> + +<p> +5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star even +in the glorious galaxy of the T’ang period. We learn from Ch’ao +Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was extremely +fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read in the military +history of the <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> and <i>Chan Kuo</i> eras. His notes, therefore, +are well worth attention. They are very copious, and replete with historical +parallels. The gist of Sun Tzŭ’s work is thus summarized by him: "Practice +benevolence and justice, but on the other hand make full use of artifice and +measures of expediency." He further declared that all the military triumphs and +disasters of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Tzŭ’s death would, +upon examination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the +maxims contained in his book. Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful charge against +Ts’ao Kung has already been considered elsewhere. +</p> + +<p> +6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao +Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ because +Ts’ao Kung’s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and that of Tu +Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the +middle of the 11th century, calls Ts’ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch’en Hao +the three chief commentators on Sun Tzŭ, and observes that Ch’en Hao is +continually attacking Tu Mu’s shortcomings. His commentary, though not lacking +in merit, must rank below those of his predecessors. +</p> + +<p> +7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his +commentary on Sun Tzŭ is mentioned in the <i>T’ang Shu</i> and was afterwards +republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those of Meng Shih +and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in point of quality, too, +perhaps the least valuable of the eleven. +</p> + +<p> +8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei +Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was published +with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the +following:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and trying to make +them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though commentators have not +been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the task. My friend Sheng-yu has +not fallen into this mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary +for Sun Tzŭ’s work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were +intended for states engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not +concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the +three ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to +the Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his +meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling +soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it is +always systematically treated; the sayings are bound together in strict logical +sequence, though this has been obscured by commentators who have probably +failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed +aside all the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out +the true meaning of Sun Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion have +been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the present work +deserves to be handed down side by side with the three great commentaries; and +for a great deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations will have +constant reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu. +</p> + +<p> +Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined to +endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him above +Ch’en Hao in order of merit. +</p> + +<p> +9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of his +interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch’en, and on the +whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary +with that of Ts’ao Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to +him. We learn from Ch’ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text +of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes. [45] +</p> + +<p> +10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this commentator is +given as above by Cheng Ch’iao in the <i>Tung Chih</i>, written about the middle +of the twelfth century, but he appears simply as Ho Shih in the <i>Yu Hai</i>, and Ma +Tuan-lin quotes Ch’ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is +unknown. There seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch’iao’s statement, +otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with +one Ho Ch’u-fei, the author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the +latter part of the 11th century. Ho Shih’s commentary, in the words of the +<i>T’ien-i-ko</i> catalogue, "contains helpful additions" here and there, but is +chiefly remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the +dynastic histories and other sources. +</p> + +<p> +11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great originality +perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentator +is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to +expand and develop in masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say +that much of Ts’ao Kung’s commentary would have remained cloaked in its +pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the +Sung history, the <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, or the <i>Yu Hai</i>, but it finds a niche +in the <i>T’ung Chih</i>, which also names him as the author of the "Lives of +Famous Generals." [46] +</p> + +<p> +It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have flourished +within so short a space of time. Ch’ao Kung-wu accounts for it by saying: +"During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of +peace, and men ceased to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao’s +rebellion came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after +time, the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military +topics became the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the +commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that period. [47] +</p> + +<p> +Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work has not +come down to us. The <i>Sui Shu</i> mentions four, namely Wang Ling (often quoted by +Tu Yu as Wang Tzŭ); Chang Tzŭ-shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; [48] and Shen Yu of Wu. +The <i>T’ang Shu</i> adds Sun Hao, and the <i>T’ung Chih</i> Hsiao Chi, while the +<i>T’u Shu</i> mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that +some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other +commentaries, like Chi T’ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap06"></a>Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ</h2> + +<p> +Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of China’s +greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have studied his pages +with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (<i>d</i>. 196 B.C.), [49] Feng I (<i>d</i>. 34 +A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (<i>d</i>. 219), [51] and Yo Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of +Ts’ao Kung, who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese +military annals, has already been recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one +way, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of Su +Tung-p’o), who wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe +their chief inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is +preserved in the <i>Yu Hai:</i> [54]— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, [55] is +very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu Ch’i was a +man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and they are +linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu Ch’i’s remarks +on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and +there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the style is +terse, but the meaning fully brought out. +</p> + +<p> +The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the Garden of +Literature" by Cheng Hou:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military men’s +training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and men of +letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous +and eminently practical. Such works as the <i>Lun Yu</i>, the <i>I Ching</i> +and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsun +K’uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzŭ. +</p> + +<p> +Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism, +although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated classical +works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages a ruler’s bent towards +unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap07"></a>Apologies for War</h2> + +<p> +Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving nation on +earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her experience of war in all +its phases has also been such as no modern State can parallel. Her long +military annals stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of +time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army +along her frontier centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the +Danube. What with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the +grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of +government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of so many +dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have +flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that +the clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the +Empire. +</p> + +<p> +No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom China can +point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond of emerging at the +most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch’i stands out conspicuous +in the period when Ch’in was entering upon her final struggle with the +remaining independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up of +the Ch’in dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. +When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great and baleful +figure of Ts’ao Ts’ao dominates the scene. And in the establishment +of the T’ang dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the +superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T’ai Tsung) was +seconded by the brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need +fear comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe. +</p> + +<p> +In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ +downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of +Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to militarism +in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending +warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to collect and +translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following, +by Ssu-ma Ch’ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of Confucius, +he was yet no advocate of peace at any price:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and cruelty, +to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and dangers, and to +succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins and horns +on its head will fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who +carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger! When he +is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him; when angry, his +poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the natural law which governs his +being…. What then shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all +great issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who can only +bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilization," condemning the +use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to impotence and +dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, they +will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and general +enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to modify the position they have +taken up. The truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare +the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so military +chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one +can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by +others, and that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others +rebellious. [58] +</p> + +<p> +The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun +Tzŭ:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of government. +It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch’iu, both disciples of +Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the +imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market-place, +are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down +of fortified cities, the hauling of women and children into captivity, and the +beheading of traitors—this is also work which is done by officials. The +objects of the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is +no intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off +heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, +only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the use of military +weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is +to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good…. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired your military aptitude +by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been acquired by study." +[59] "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a disciple of +Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by Confucius. It is +fitting that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military functions, +though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very +far." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" and the +"military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or in +what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say. +But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the governing class are +quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced +manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set +down as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an +extraordinary instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily +lose sight of fundamental principles. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch’eng Wang, he regulated +ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and learning; +yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60] he sallied forth and +chastised them. When Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting +was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If pacific negotiations are in +progress, warlike preparations should have been made beforehand." He rebuked +and shamed the Marquis of Ch’i, who cowered under him and dared not +proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great Sages had no +knowledge of military matters? +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He also +appeals to the authority of the Classics:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never studied +matters connected with armies and battalions." [62] Replying to K’ung +Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and weapons." But +if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he used armed force against +the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch’i was overawed. Again, when the +inhabitants of Pi revolted; he ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon +they were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered the words: "If I +fight, I conquer." [63] And Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil +and military functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or +received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not +specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the subject +of his teaching. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He also said: "If I +fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated music. Now war +constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, [66] and must not be +treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the words "I am unversed in" +must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired Teacher does +not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the +art of war. But if one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, +who was employed by Wu Tzŭ-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the +remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of +Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on the art of +war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they adduce the example of +Chao Kua, who pored over his father’s books to no purpose, [67] as a proof that +all military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have to do with +such things as opportunism in designing plans, and the conversion of spies, +they hold that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore +the fact that the studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our +officials also require steady application and practice before efficiency is +reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to botch +their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting perilous; and useless +unless a general is in constant practice, he ought not to hazard other men’s +lives in battle. [70] Hence it is essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should +be studied. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of war. Chi got a +rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not pursue his studies +to their proper outcome, the consequence being that he was finally defeated and +overthrown. He did not realize that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond +verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to +destruction by their misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature +of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. +There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted +oath, [72] and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. [73] Can we +then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding truth and honesty? +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap08"></a>Bibliography</h2> + +<p> +The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ. The notes +on each have been drawn principally from the <i>Ssu k’u ch’uan shu +chien ming mu lu</i>, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. +</p> + +<p> +1. <i>Wu Tzŭ</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i> or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (<i>d</i>. 381 B.C.). A genuine +work. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 65. +</p> + +<p> +2. <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i> or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to Ssu-ma Jang-chu +of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early, as the customs of the +three ancient dynasties are constantly to be met within its pages. See <i>Shih +Chi</i>, ch. 64. +</p> + +<p> +The <i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu</i> (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three +treatises on war, <i>Sun Tzŭ</i>, <i>Wu Tzŭ</i> and <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i>, are, generally speaking, only +concerned with things strictly military—the art of producing, collecting, +training and drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures of +expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the handling of +soldiers—in strong contrast to later works, in which the science of war +is usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in general. +</p> + +<p> +3. <i>Liu T’ao</i>, in 6 <i>chuan</i>, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or Lu +Shang, also known as T’ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C. [74] But its +style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-ming (550-625 +A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the six sections so +that the forgery cannot have been later than Sui dynasty. +</p> + +<p> +4. <i>Wei Liao Tzŭ</i>, in 5 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. B.C.), who +studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The work appears to have been originally +in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is +sound enough in the main, though the strategical devices differ considerably +from those of the Warring States period. It is been furnished with a commentary +by the well-known Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. +</p> + +<p> +5. <i>San Lueh</i> in 3 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage +who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (<i>d</i>. 187 B.C.) in an interview on +a bridge. But here again, the style is not that of works dating from the +Ch’in or Han period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently +quotes from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question may +have been inserted later on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We +shall not be far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], +or somewhat earlier. +</p> + +<p> +6. <i>Li Wei Kung Wen Tui</i>, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a dialogue +between T’ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is usually ascribed +to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a forgery, though the author +was evidently well versed in the art of war. +</p> + +<p> +7. <i>Li Ching Ping Fa</i> (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a short +treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the T’ung Tien, but not published +separately. This fact explains its omission from the <i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan +Shu</i>. +</p> + +<p> +8. <i>Wu Ch’i Ching</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to the legendary minister Feng +Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty (<i>d</i>. 121 B.C.), +and said to have been eulogized by the celebrated general Ma Lung (<i>d</i>. 300 +A.D.). Yet the earliest mention of it is in the <i>Sung Chih</i>. Although a forgery, +the work is well put together. +</p> + +<p> +Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has always been +held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on war ascribed to his +pen. Such are (1) the <i>Shih Liu Ts’e</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>), preserved in the <i>Yung Lo +Ta Tien;</i> (2) <i>Chiang Yuan</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>); and (3) <i>Hsin Shu</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>), which steals +wholesale from Sun Tzŭ. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered +genuine. +</p> + +<p> +Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections devoted to +the literature of war. The following references may be found useful:— +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +<i>T’ung Tien</i> (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162.<br/> +<i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i> (983), ch. 270-359.<br/> +<i>Wen Hsien Tung K’ao</i> (13th cent.), ch. 221.<br/> +<i>Yu Hai</i> (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.<br/> +<i>San Ts’ai T’u Hui</i> (16th cent).<br/> +<i>Kuang Po Wu Chih</i> (1607), ch. 31, 32.<br/> +<i>Ch’ien Ch’io Lei Shu</i> (1632), ch. 75.<br/> +<i>Yuan Chien Lei Han</i> (1710), ch. 206-229.<br/> +<i>Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng</i> (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. +81-90.<br/> +<i>Hsu Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao</i> (1784), ch. 121-134.<br/> +<i>Huang Ch’ao Ching Shih Wen Pien</i> (1826), ch. 76, 77.<br/></p> + +<p> +The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve +mention:— +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +<i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 30.<br/> +<i>Sui Shu</i>, ch. 32-35.<br/> +<i>Chiu T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 46, 47.<br/> +<i>Hsin T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 57,60.<br/> +<i>Sung Shih</i>, ch. 202-209.<br/> +<i>T’ung Chih</i> (circa 1150), ch. 68.<br/></p> + +<p> +To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial +Library:— +</p> + +<p> +<i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu Tsung Mu T’i Yao</i> (1790), ch. 99, 100. +</p> + +<h2>Footnotes</h2> + +<p> +1. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 65. +</p> + +<p> +2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +3. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 130. +</p> + +<p> +4. The appellation of Nang Wa. +</p> + +<p> +5. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 31. +</p> + +<p> +6. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 25. +</p> + +<p> +7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year 637. +</p> + +<p> +8. Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. +</p> + +<p> +9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the Han +dynasty, which says: "Ten <i>li</i> outside the <i>Wu</i> gate [of the city of +Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to commemorate the +entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch’i, who excelled in the art of war, by the +King of Wu." +</p> + +<p> +10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to make +arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe." +</p> + +<p> +11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and overthrown by +Kou chien, King of Yüeh, in 473 B.C. See post. +</p> + +<p> +12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in his +preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction." +</p> + +<p> +13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the <i>T’u Shu</i>, and may +be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang Shou-chieh of the +T’ang dynasty, and appears in the <i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i>. +</p> + +<p> +14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, +perhaps especially of § 8. +</p> + +<p> +15. See chap. XI. +</p> + +<p> +16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that <i>Wu Tzŭ</i>, which is not in 6 +chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the <i>Han Chih</i>. Likewise, the <i>Chung Yung</i> is +credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one only. In the case of very +short works, one is tempted to think that <i>p’ien</i> might simply mean +"leaves." +</p> + +<p> +17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. +</p> + +<p> +18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. +</p> + +<p> +19. See Chapter 7, § 27 and Chapter 11, § 28. +</p> + +<p> +20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his name. +</p> + +<p> +21. I.e. Po P’ei. See ante. +</p> + +<p> +22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large additions have +been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. +</p> + +<p> +24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of another +work. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not clear. +</p> + +<p> +25. About 480 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. +</p> + +<p> +27. In the 3rd century B.C. +</p> + +<p> +28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter +half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have written a work on +war. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of the INTRODUCTION. +</p> + +<p> +29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that the +<i>Tso Chuan</i> must have been written in the 5th century, but not before 424 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +30. See <i>Mencius</i> III. 1. iii. 13-20. +</p> + +<p> +31. When Wu first appears in the <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> in 584, it is already +at variance with its powerful neighbour. The <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> first +mentions Yüeh in 537, the <i>Tso Chuan</i> in 601. +</p> + +<p> +32. This is explicitly stated in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, XXXII, 2. +</p> + +<p> +33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would tend to +grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully justify the language +used in XI. § 30. +</p> + +<p> +34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious +treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great general. +Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, +cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century. +</p> + +<p> +35. From <i>Tso Chuan:</i> "From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] there was no +year in which Ch’u was not attacked by Wu." +</p> + +<p> +36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really descended +from Sun Tzŭ. I am ashamed to say that I only read my ancestor’s work from a +literary point of view, without comprehending the military technique. So long +have we been enjoying the blessings of peace!" +</p> + +<p> +37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of +Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the ascent of +the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as being "situated five +<i>li</i> east of the district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the +Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the T’ang Emperor Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." +</p> + +<p> +38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40. +</p> + +<p> +39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzŭ. +</p> + +<p> +40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His commentary is +frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not fully develop the +meaning." +</p> + +<p> +41. <i>Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao</i>, ch. 221. +</p> + +<p> +42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered chapters +1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand Buddhas." See +B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. 525. +</p> + +<p> +43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was nominally +existent in Sun Tzŭ’s day, it retained hardly a vestige of power, and the old +military organization had practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other +explanation of the passage. +</p> + +<p> +44. See <i>Chou Li</i>, xxix. 6-10. +</p> + +<p> +45. <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, ch. 221. +</p> + +<p> +46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s "Notes," p. 91 (new edition). +</p> + +<p> +47. <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, loc. cit. +</p> + +<p> +48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the <i>San Kuo Chih</i>, +ch. 10. +</p> + +<p> +49. See XI. § 58, note. +</p> + +<p> +50. <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 17 ad init. +</p> + +<p> +51. <i>San Kuo Chih</i>, ch. 54. +</p> + +<p> +52. <i>Sung Shih</i>, ch. 365 ad init. +</p> + +<p> +53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting themselves +with Sun Tzŭ are not behindhand in their praise. In this connection, I may +perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the +sheets of the present work were submitted previous to publication: "Many of Sun +Wu’s maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and no. 11 [in Chapter +VIII] is one that the people of this country would do well to take to heart." +</p> + +<p> +54. Ch. 140. +</p> + +<p> +55. See IV. § 3. +</p> + +<p> +56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. +</p> + +<p> +57. The <i>Tso Chuan</i>. +</p> + +<p> +58. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 25, fol. I. +</p> + +<p> +59. Cf. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch 47. +</p> + +<p> +60. See <i>Shu Ching</i>, preface § 55. +</p> + +<p> +61. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 47. +</p> + +<p> +62. <i>Lun Yu</i>, XV. 1. +</p> + +<p> +63. I failed to trace this utterance. +</p> + +<p> +64. Supra. +</p> + +<p> +65. Supra. +</p> + +<p> +66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, and +festive rites. See <i>Shu Ching</i>, ii. 1. III. 8, and <i>Chou Li</i>, IX. fol. 49. +</p> + +<p> +67. See XIII. § 11, note. +</p> + +<p> +68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, where Tzŭ-ch’an +says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere +learner to make it up." +</p> + +<p> +69. Cf. <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 31. +</p> + +<p> +70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See <i>Lun Yu</i>, XIII. 29, 30. +</p> + +<p> +71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. +</p> + +<p> +72. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 47. +</p> + +<p> +73. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 38. +</p> + +<p> +74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in +the <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a former +minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there given, according to +which he would appear to have been first raised from a humble private station +by Wen Wang. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap09"></a>Chapter I. LAYING PLANS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of this +chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the +general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. See. § 26.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. +</p> + +<p> +2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence +it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. +</p> + +<p> +3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into +account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions +obtaining in the field. +</p> + +<p> +4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) +Method and discipline. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by "Moral Law" a principle of +harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral aspect. One might be +tempted to render it by "morale," were it not considered as an attribute of the +<i>ruler</i> in § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +5, 6. <i>The Moral Law</i> causes the people to be in complete accord with their +ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by +any danger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the officers will +be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, +the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] +</p> + +<p> +7. <i>Heaven</i> signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words here. Meng +Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi, +however, may be right in saying that what is meant is "the general economy of +Heaven," including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and +other phenomena.] +</p> + +<p> +8. <i>Earth</i> comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground +and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. +</p> + +<p> +9. <i>The Commander</i> stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, +courage and strictness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or benevolence; (2) +uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control, or "proper feeling;" (4) +wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put +before "humanity or benevolence," and the two military virtues of "courage" and +"strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self-respect, +self-control, or ‘proper feeling.’"] +</p> + +<p> +10. By <i>Method and discipline</i> are to be understood the marshalling of the +army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, +the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control +of military expenditure. +</p> + +<p> +11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them +will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. +</p> + +<p> +12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military +conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:— +</p> + +<p> +13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?<br/> +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.]<br/> +</p> + +<p> + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability?<br/> + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See §§ 7, 8] +</p> + +<p> +(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D. +155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with +his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned +himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn! +However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of +justice by cutting off his hair. Ts’ao Ts’ao’s own comment on the +present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a law, see that +it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must be put to death."] +</p> + +<p> +(5) Which army is the stronger? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch’en puts it, freely +rendered, "<i>esprit de corps</i> and ‘big battalions.’"] +</p> + +<p> +(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the officers will +be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, +the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] +</p> + +<p> +(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly +rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] +</p> + +<p> +14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. +</p> + +<p> +15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will +conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens +not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be +dismissed! +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was composed +expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu State.] +</p> + +<p> +16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful +circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. +</p> + +<p> +17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s plans. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric." He +cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; "for," as Chang +Yu puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for +the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy +in attempting to secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of +the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke +of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the +morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself +Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. +The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first +tomorrow—I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well," +continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and +as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine +are?" [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +18. All warfare is based on deception. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier. +Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many military qualities, +was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he +concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."] +</p> + +<p> +19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we +must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far +away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. +</p> + +<p> +20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder, crush him." +It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating the uses of +deception in war.] +</p> + +<p> +21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior +strength, evade him. +</p> + +<p> +22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be +weak, that he may grow arrogant. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his +adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, +and then suddenly pouncing upon him.] +</p> + +<p> +23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch’en has the note: "while +we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The <i>Yu Lan</i> has +"Lure him on and tire him out."] +</p> + +<p> +If his forces are united, separate them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the commentators: "If +sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. +</p> + +<p> +25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged +beforehand. +</p> + +<p> +26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere +the battle is fought. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be +set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order +that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] +</p> + +<p> +The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do +many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much +more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee +who is likely to win or lose. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap10"></a>Chapter II. WAGING WAR</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the +cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is +not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of +ways and means.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a +thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand +mail-clad soldiers, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used for +the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed for purposes of +defence. Li Ch’uan, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this +seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note the analogies between early +Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot +was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped +a certain number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we +are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each +heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a +thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.] +</p> + +<p> +with provisions enough to carry them a thousand <i>li</i>, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[2.78 modern <i>li</i> go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since +Sun Tzŭ’s time.] +</p> + +<p> +the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, +small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will +reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of +raising an army of 100,000 men. +</p> + +<p> +2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s +weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If you lay siege to a +town, you will exhaust your strength. +</p> + +<p> +3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be +equal to the strain. +</p> + +<p> +4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength +exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take +advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert +the consequences that must ensue. +</p> + +<p> +5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been +seen associated with long delays. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the +commentators. Ts’ao Kung, Li Ch’uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and +Mei Yao-ch’en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally +stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: +"Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and +treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in +their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: "Lengthy operations +mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and +distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of +such calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid +haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, +except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than +ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much more +guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can +never be anything but foolish—if only because it means impoverishment to +the nation. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzŭ, the classic +example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That general +deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibals’s +isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to +suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot +question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. +Their reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative +presumption in their favour.] +</p> + +<p> +6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. +</p> + +<p> +7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can +thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long +war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. +Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, but it fits well into +the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know the +evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly pointless.] +</p> + +<p> +8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his +supply-waggons loaded more than twice. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for +reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but +crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy +to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon +Bonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a little ahead of your +opponent—has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the +nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.] +</p> + +<p> +9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the +army will have food enough for its needs. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means "things to +be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all the impedimenta of +an army, apart from provisions.] +</p> + +<p> +10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by +contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance +causes the people to be impoverished. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though +obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I +cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to +Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense, and we +get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sun Tzŭ used to indicate the +cause of the people’s impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by +which the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But +why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because the +State or Government is too poor to do so?] +</p> + +<p> +11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and +high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own territory. +Ts’ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the +frontier.] +</p> + +<p> +12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by +heavy exactions. +</p> + +<p> +13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of +the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be +dissipated; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, but of +7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from our text. Ho +Shih has a characteristic tag: "The <i>people</i> being regarded as the essential part +of the State, and <i>food</i> as the people’s heaven, is it not right that those in +authority should value and be careful of both?"] +</p> + +<p> +while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates +and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, +draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. +</p> + +<p> +15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload +of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a +single <i>picul</i> of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one +cartload to the front. A <i>picul</i> is a unit of measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 +kilograms).] +</p> + +<p> +16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there +may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the +advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, +they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to +fight, each on his own account."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, +those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be +substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in +conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. +</p> + +<p> +18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength. +</p> + +<p> +19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzŭ here +reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce."] +</p> + +<p> +20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the +people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace +or in peril. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap11"></a>Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take +the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. +So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to +capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally +of 12500 men; according to Ts’ao Kung, the equivalent of a regiment +contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists from any number +between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 +men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 +respectively.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; +supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without +fighting. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old Chinese +general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge French army at +Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.] +</p> + +<p> +3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of the +Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might be +content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but an active policy +of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the enemy +has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delivering our +own attack first."] +</p> + +<p> +the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in speaking of +hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or principalities into +which the China of his day was split up.] +</p> + +<p> +the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[When he is already at full strength.] +</p> + +<p> +and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. +</p> + +<p> +4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in 1899, +and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or +even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would have been masters of +the situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose them.] +</p> + +<p> +The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, +will take up three whole months; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as "mantlets", +described. Ts’ao Kung simply defines them as "large shields," but we get +a better idea of them from Li Ch’uan, who says they were to protect the +heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems +to suggest a sort of Roman <i>testudo</i>, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled +vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch’en Hao. See +<i>supra</i> II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the +"movable shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. +They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from +within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of +men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat +with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden donkeys."] +</p> + +<p> +and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the +enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, and also to +destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note.] +</p> + +<p> +5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the +assault like swarming ants, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This vivid simile of Ts’ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army +of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at +the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his +engines of war are ready.] +</p> + +<p> +with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still +remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port Arthur, in +the most recent siege which history has to record.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any +fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows +their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no harm to +individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to +the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother of the people."] +</p> + +<p> +7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, +without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of the +sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, the weapon not +being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."] +</p> + +<p> +This is the method of attacking by stratagem. +</p> + +<p> +8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround +him; if five to one, to attack him; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] +</p> + +<p> +if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears to +violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however, gives a clue to +Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: "Being two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our +army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu +thus further elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as numerous as that +of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy +in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, +he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in +front." This is what is meant by saying that ‘one part may be used in the +regular way, and the other for some special diversion.’ Tu Mu does not +understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as +concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty in +calling this a mistake."] +</p> + +<p> +9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If +attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able general +will fight."] +</p> + +<p> +if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The meaning, "we can <i>watch</i> the enemy," is certainly a great improvement +on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for +the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying only applies if the other +factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more than +counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.] +</p> + +<p> +if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. +</p> + +<p> +10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end +it must be captured by the larger force. +</p> + +<p> +11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at +all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State +will be weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Li Ch’uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the +general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his +profession), his army will lack strength."] +</p> + +<p> +12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his +army:— +</p> + +<p> +13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the +fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a +thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally think of +"the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the +movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand just the +reverse, and quote the saying of T’ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be +governed from without, and army should not be directed from within." Of course +it is true that, during an engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy, +the general should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance +apart. Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and +give wrong orders.] +</p> + +<p> +14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a +kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes +restlessness in the soldier’s minds. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the +civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid gloves." And +Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern a +state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are +military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of an +army"—to that of a State, understood.] +</p> + +<p> +15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.] +</p> + +<p> +through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. +This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I follow Mei Yao-ch’en here. The other commentators refer not to the +ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu says: "If a +general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted +with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skilful employer of men will +employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the stupid man. For +the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show +his courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the +stupid man has no fear of death."] +</p> + +<p> +16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from +the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and +flinging victory away. +</p> + +<p> +17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will +win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he +cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invariably +conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the defensive.] +</p> + +<p> +(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers correctly, as Li +Ch’uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the saying more +satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force +to defeat a greater, and <i>vice versa</i>. The secret lies in an eye for locality, +and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior +force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult +ground.’"] +</p> + +<p> +(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its +ranks. +</p> + +<p> +(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. +</p> + +<p> +(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the +sovereign. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "It is the sovereign’s function to give broad +instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of the general." It is +needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue +interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government. +Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he +was not hampered by central authority.] +</p> + +<p> +Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of +victory.”] +</p> + +<p> +18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not +fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, +for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch’in, who in 383 +A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to +despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An and +Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight +provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, +they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into +the stream. What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were soon +after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty +retreat.] +</p> + +<p> +If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing +yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret +of defence; defence is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a +better epitome of the root-principle of war.] +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap12"></a>Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of +this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two armies with +a view to discovering each other’s condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the +dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your +dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory; +show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads to +defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can "secure success by +modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the +possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the +enemy. +</p> + +<p> +2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the +opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.] +</p> + +<p> +3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his troops, +covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."] +</p> + +<p> +but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +4. Hence the saying: One may <i>know</i> how to conquer without being able to +<i>do</i> it. +</p> + +<p> +5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the +enemy means taking the offensive. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in §§ 1-3, in spite of the fact +that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they give, "He who cannot +conquer takes the defensive," is plausible enough.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a +superabundance of strength. +</p> + +<p> +7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of +the earth; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor indicating the +utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know his +whereabouts."] +</p> + +<p> +he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunderbolt, +against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion of most of the +commentators.] +</p> + +<p> +Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a +victory that is complete. +</p> + +<p> +8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the +acme of excellence. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Ts’ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has +germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch’uan +alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior +army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of Ch’eng-an, +said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and +shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words seriously, and +gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the +details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture +the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] +</p> + +<p> +9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole +Empire says, "Well done!" +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move +surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his schemes, so that +at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzŭ reserves +his approbation for things that +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"the world’s coarse thumb<br/> +And finger fail to plumb." +</p> + +<p> +10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Autumn hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, +when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese +writers.] +</p> + +<p> +to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is +no sign of a quick ear. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing: Wu +Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, who at a distance of a +hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih +K’uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.] +</p> + +<p> +11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but +excels in winning with ease. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering." +Mei Yao-ch’en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with +difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease."] +</p> + +<p> +12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for +courage. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained over +circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large knows nothing of +them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state +submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for +courage."] +</p> + +<p> +13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile +attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One who seeks +to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched +battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look +into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never +make a blunder and therefore invariably win."] +</p> + +<p> +Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means +conquering an enemy that is already defeated. +</p> + +<p> +14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat +impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not be +confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the +arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the +safety of his army.] +</p> + +<p> +15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after +the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and +afterwards looks for victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which will +ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with +stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be +assured."] +</p> + +<p> +16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to +method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. +</p> + +<p> +17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, +Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; +fifthly, Victory. +</p> + +<p> +18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to +Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to +Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese. The +first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable us to +form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to make calculations based on the +data thus obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or comparison of +the enemy’s chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then victory +ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third term, which in the Chinese some +commentators take as a calculation of <i>numbers</i>, thereby making it nearly +synonymous with the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of +as a consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition, while the +third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu +says: "The question of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the +varied resources of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, +but weakens it. However, it points to the third term as being a calculation of +numbers.] +</p> + +<p> +19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in +the scale against a single grain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "a victorious army is like an <i>i</i> (20 oz.) weighed against a <i>shu</i> +(1/24 oz.); a routed army is a <i>shu</i> weighed against an <i>i</i>." The point is simply +the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has +over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, +makes the <i>i</i> to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it +equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch’uan of the T’ang dynasty here gives +the same figure as Chu Hsi.] +</p> + +<p> +20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters +into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap13"></a>Chapter V. ENERGY</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the +control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate +officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s famous reply to the +first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large an army do you think I +could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the +Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more the better."] +</p> + +<p> +2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from +fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and +signals. +</p> + +<p> +3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack +and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct and indirect. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzŭ’s treatise, the +discussion of the <i>cheng</i> and the <i>ch’i</i>." As it is by no means +easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them +consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of +the commentators’ remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li +Ch’uan: "Facing the enemy is <i>cheng</i>, making lateral diversion is +<i>ch’i</i>. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your troops should be +arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal manœuvers +must be employed." Mei Yao-ch’en: "<i>Ch’i</i> is active, +<i>cheng</i> is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity +brings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy to regard our +straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus +<i>cheng</i> may also be <i>ch’i</i>, and <i>ch’i</i> may also be +<i>cheng</i>." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching +ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large +force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his +opponent. [Ch’ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, the march on +Lin-chin was <i>cheng</i>, and the surprise manœuver was <i>ch’i</i>." +Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: "Military +writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of <i>ch’i</i> and +<i>cheng</i>. Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: ‘Direct warfare favours +frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts’ao Kung +says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on +the enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuver.’ Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] +says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is <i>cheng</i>; turning movements, on +the other hand, are <i>ch’i</i>.’ These writers simply regard +<i>cheng</i> as <i>cheng</i>, and <i>ch’i</i> as <i>ch’i</i>; they +do not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other +like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment on the T’ang +Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A <i>ch’i</i> +manœuver may be <i>cheng</i>, if we make the enemy look upon it as +<i>cheng</i>; then our real attack will be <i>ch’i</i>, and vice versa. +The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real +intent.’" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other +operation is <i>cheng</i>, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; +whereas that is <i>ch’i</i>," which takes him by surprise or comes from +an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be +<i>ch’i</i>," it immediately becomes <i>cheng</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an +egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. +</p> + +<p> +5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but +indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the +enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of "indirect +tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march +round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. [1] +</p> + +<p> +6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and Earth, +unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but +to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of <i>ch’i</i> +and <i>cheng</i>. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of <i>cheng</i> at +all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating to +it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed out, the +two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot +really be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in figurative +language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.] +</p> + +<p> +7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these +five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. +</p> + +<p> +8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, white, and +black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen. +</p> + +<p> +9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, +bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted. +</p> + +<p> +10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct +and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series +of manœuvers. +</p> + +<p> +11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like +moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the +possibilities of their combination? +</p> + +<p> +12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll +stones along in its course. +</p> + +<p> +13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which +enables it to strike and destroy its victim. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is used +defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word as "the +measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the +illustrative simile in §. 15. Applying this definition to the falcon, it seems +to me to denote that instinct of <i>self-restraint</i> which keeps the bird +from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together with the power of +judging when the right moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is +the highly important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very +instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went into action +at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several minutes +exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun. Nelson +coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside he brought to +bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy’s nearest ships.] +</p> + +<p> +14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his +decision. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of distance +mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking. But I cannot help +thinking that Sun Tzŭ meant to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to +our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. Wang Hsi’s note, which after describing +the falcon’s mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just how the ‘psychological +moment’ should be seized in war."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the +releasing of the trigger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of energy +and the force stored up in the bent cross-bow until released by the finger on +the trigger.] +</p> + +<p> +16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and +yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be +without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been previously +fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the +dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle, may +give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your +formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and +yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates +courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone down +the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts’ao Kung throws out a +hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to destroy +formation and conceal one’s condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite +plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you +must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display timidity in order to +entrap the enemy, you must have extreme courage; if you wish to parade your +weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding +strength."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of +subdivision; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 1.] +</p> + +<p> +concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent +energy; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here differently +than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: "seeing that we are +favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the enemy will believe that we +are really afraid."] +</p> + +<p> +masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han Emperor: +“Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on their +condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed all their +able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and +emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one and all recommended +the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone opposed them, saying: +‘When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make an +ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old +age and infirmity. This is surely some <i>ruse</i> on the part of the enemy, and it +would be unwise for us to attack.’ The Emperor, however, disregarding +this advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at +Po-teng.”] +</p> + +<p> +19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains +deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu says: +"If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may be simulated +in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led to believe that we are +strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy’s movements +should be determined by the signs that we choose to give him." Note the +following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the +Ch’i State being at war with Wei, sent T’ien Chi and Sun Pin +against the general P’ang Chuan, who happened to be a deadly personal +enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The Ch’i State has a reputation for +cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us. Let us turn this +circumstance to account." Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border +into Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night, +50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. P’ang Chuan pursued +them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these men of Ch’i were cowards: +their numbers have already fallen away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun +Pin came to a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach +after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the +words: "Under this tree shall P’ang Chuan die." Then, as night began to +fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to +shoot directly if they saw a light. Later on, P’ang Chuan arrived at the +spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written +on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his whole +army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu’s version of the story; the +<i>Shih Chi</i>, less dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes +P’ang Chuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the +rout of his army.] ] +</p> + +<p> +He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. +</p> + +<p> +20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked +men he lies in wait for him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He lies in wait +with the main body of his troops."] +</p> + +<p> +21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not +require too much from individuals. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the bulk; +afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each men according +to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from the untalented."] +</p> + +<p> +Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined energy. +</p> + +<p> +22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like +unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain +motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to +come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."] +</p> + +<p> +23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a +round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the +subject of energy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount +importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great results," he +adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap14"></a>Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: "Chapter IV, +on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the defensive; chapter +V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect methods. The good general +acquaints himself first with the theory of attack and defence, and then turns +his attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and +combining these two methods before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong +points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and +defence, and the perception of weak and strong points depends again on the +above methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on +Energy."] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the +enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to +hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted. +</p> + +<p> +2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not +allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or fights not at +all. [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his +own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy +to draw near. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will +strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.] +</p> + +<p> +4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch’en’s +interpretation of I. § 23.] +</p> + +<p> +if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can +force him to move. +</p> + +<p> +5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to +places where you are not expected. +</p> + +<p> +6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through +country where the enemy is not. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt +from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, +attack in unexpected quarters."] +</p> + +<p> +7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places +which are undefended. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, where +the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; where the walls +are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict enough; where relief comes +too late, or provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst +themselves."] +</p> + +<p> +You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions that +cannot be attacked. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[<i>I.e.</i>, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There is +rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later clause. Tu Mu, +Ch’en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch’en assume the meaning to be: "In order to +make your defence quite safe, you must defend <i>even</i> those places that are not +likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, then, those that will +be attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause balances less well with the +preceding—always a consideration in the highly antithetical style which +is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark +in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights +of heaven [see IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against +him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the +enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret +recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his +whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those +that the enemy cannot attack."] +</p> + +<p> +8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know what +to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not know what to +attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] +</p> + +<p> +9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, +through you inaudible; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with reference to +the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands. +</p> + +<p> +10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s +weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more +rapid than those of the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though +he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is +attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of +communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; if we are +the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign himself." It is +clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no +believer in frontal attacks.] +</p> + +<p> +12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even +though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we +need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia Lin: +"even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch’uan says: +"we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches +the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes—one of Chu-ko Liang, who when +occupying Yang-p’ing and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I, suddenly +struck his colors, stopped the beating of the drums, and flung open the city +gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping and sprinkling the ground. +This unexpected proceeding had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an +ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating +here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff."] +</p> + +<p> +13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, +we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei +Yao-ch’en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy’s dispositions are +visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions being +kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard +against attack from every quarter."] +</p> + +<p> +14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into +fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a +whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few. +</p> + +<p> +15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, +our opponents will be in dire straits. +</p> + +<p> +16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the +enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different +points; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by saying that +"while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering what he was going to +do, <i>he</i> was thinking most of what he was going to do himself."] +</p> + +<p> +and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall +have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. +</p> + +<p> +17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he +strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he +will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. +If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In Frederick the Great’s <i>Instructions to his Generals</i> we read: "A +defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those generals +who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those +who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object +in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small misfortunes to +avoid greater."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; +numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations +against us. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is "to compel the enemy to +disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction +in turn."] +</p> + +<p> +19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate +from the greatest distances in order to fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances and +that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to divide his army +for the purpose of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction +at precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy +in overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions which military +history records, one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of +Blucher just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.] +</p> + +<p> +20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent +to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the left, the van +unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if +the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred <i>li</i> apart, +and even the nearest are separated by several <i>li</i>! +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but the +mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army advancing +towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of which has orders to be +there on a fixed date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed +at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and place of meeting, +the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yu’s note may be +worth quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to +concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will be +forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we hold will +be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to +battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support will be possible between +wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there is any great distance between the +foremost and hindmost divisions of the army."] +</p> + +<p> +21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in +number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then +that victory can be achieved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended in 473 +B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its incorporation in Yüeh. +This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s death. With his present assertion +compare IV. § 4. Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, +which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it +is said, ‘One may <i>know</i> how to conquer without being able to <i>do</i> it,’ whereas +here we have the statement that ‘victory’ can be achieved.’ The explanation is, +that in the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under +discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make +certain of beating him. But the present passage refers particularly to the +soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s calculations, will be kept in +ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle. That is why he says +here that victory can be achieved."] +</p> + +<p> +22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. +Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all plans +conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure." +</p> + +<p> +23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy on being +thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low +or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku Liang, who sent the scornful +present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his +Fabian tactics.] +</p> + +<p> +Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. +</p> + +<p> +24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know +where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. IV. § 6.] +</p> + +<p> +25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to +conceal them; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is perhaps +not so much actual invisibility (see <i>supra</i> § 9) as "showing no sign" of +what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.] +</p> + +<p> +conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest +spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable officers, they +will not be able to lay any plans against us."] +</p> + +<p> +26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own +tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. +</p> + +<p> +27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the +strategy out of which victory is evolved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[<i>I.e.</i>, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they +cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has preceded the +battle.] +</p> + +<p> +28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your +methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-principle underlying +victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in number." With this +compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be +learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen +diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like +Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."] +</p> + +<p> +29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs +away from high places and hastens downwards. +</p> + +<p> +30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is +weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] +</p> + +<p> +31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it +flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is +facing. +</p> + +<p> +32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are +no constant conditions. +</p> + +<p> +33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby +succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. +</p> + +<p> +34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally +predominant; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."] +</p> + +<p> +the four seasons make way for each other in turn. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "have no invariable seat."] +</p> + +<p> +There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the want of +fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. The comparison +is not very happy, however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun +Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] See Col. Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. II, p. +490. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap15"></a>Chapter VII. MANŒUVERING</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. +</p> + +<p> +2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and +harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between the +higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he quotes a saying +of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without harmony in the State, no military +expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle array can +be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzŭ is represented as saying to Wu +Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all the +domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe."] +</p> + +<p> +3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing more +difficult. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts’ao +Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign’s instructions until +our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most +difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or manœuvers can hardly be said to +begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and Ch’ien Hao’s +note gives color to this view: "For levying, concentrating, harmonizing and +entrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules which will serve. The real +difficulty comes when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes +that "the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing +favourable position."] +</p> + +<p> +The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious into the +direct, and misfortune into gain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat enigmatical +expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is explained by +Ts’ao Kung: "Make it appear that you are a long way off, then cover the +distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your opponent." Tu Mu says: +"Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while you are +dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a slightly different turn: +"Although you may have difficult ground to traverse and natural obstacles to +encounter this is a drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by +celerity of movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two +famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at his +mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which resulted in the +great victory of Marengo.] +</p> + +<p> +4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of +the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before +him, shows knowledge of the artifice of <i>deviation</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of +O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch’in army. The King of Chao first +consulted Lien P’o on the advisability of attempting a relief, but the +latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening country too rugged +and difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully admitted the +hazardous nature of the march, but finally said: "We shall be like two rats +fighting in a whole—and the pluckier one will win!" So he left the +capital with his army, but had only gone a distance of 30 <i>li</i> when he +stopped and began throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he continued +strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the +intelligence to the enemy. The Ch’in general was overjoyed, and +attributed his adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was +in the Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies +had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days +and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity +that he was able to occupy a commanding position on the "North hill" before the +enemy had got wind of his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the +Ch’in forces, who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste +and retreat across the border.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, +most dangerous. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I adopt the reading of the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, Cheng Yu-hsien and the <i>T’u +Shu</i>, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to make +sense. The commentators using the standard text take this line to mean that +manœuvers may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all depends on the +ability of the general.] +</p> + +<p> +6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, +the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a +flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who +paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering without much enthusiasm, +being convinced that there is some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the +whole, it is clear that Sun Tzŭ does not approve of a lengthy march being +undertaken without supplies. Cf. infra, § 11.] +</p> + +<p> +7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced +marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a +stretch, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 <i>li</i>; but on one +occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts’ao Ts’ao is said to have +covered the incredible distance of 300 <i>li</i> within twenty-four hours.] +</p> + +<p> +doing a hundred <i>li</i> in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all +your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on +this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a hundred +<i>li</i> to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without impedimenta. +Manœuvers of this description should be confined to short distances. Stonewall +Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the +dangers of battle." He did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary +exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was +imperative, that he sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +9. If you march fifty <i>li</i> in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will +lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the +goal. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be <i>torn away</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +10. If you march thirty <i>li</i> with the same object, two-thirds of your army +will arrive. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the <i>T’ung Tien</i> is added: "From this we may know the difficulty of +manœuvering."] +</p> + +<p> +11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without +provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I think Sun Tzŭ meant "stores accumulated in dépôts." But Tu Yu says "fodder +and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, +foodstuffs, etc."] +</p> + +<p> +12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of +our neighbours. +</p> + +<p> +13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the +face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and +precipices, its marshes and swamps. +</p> + +<p> +14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use +of local guides. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[§§. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.] +</p> + +<p> +15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the +numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained. +</p> + +<p> +16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by +circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift but, as +Mei Yao-ch’en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."] +</p> + +<p> +your compactness that of the forest. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly marching, order +and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard against surprise attacks. But +natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the +quality of density or compactness.] +</p> + +<p> +18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>Shih Ching</i>, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man +can check."] +</p> + +<p> +in immovability like a mountain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to dislodge +you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice you into a trap.] +</p> + +<p> +19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall +like a thunderbolt. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T’ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: "You +cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the lighting—so +rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot +be parried.] +</p> + +<p> +20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting +that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may afterwards be +fairly divided amongst all.] +</p> + +<p> +when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of +the soldiery. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and +plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they +invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their most +memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch’ao who +penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of Fu-k’ang-an +and Tso Tsung-t’ang.] +</p> + +<p> +21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzŭ as saying that we must not break camp until we +have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness of the opposing +general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, §§ 3, 4.] +</p> + +<p> +Such is the art of manœuvering. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But there now +follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an earlier book on War, +now lost, but apparently extant at the time when Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of +this fragment is not noticeably different from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no +commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness.] +</p> + +<p> +23. The Book of Army Management says: +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us any +information about this work. Mei Yao- Ch’en calls it "an ancient military +classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the enormous amount +of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzŭ’s time between the +various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable +that a collection of military maxims should have been made and written down at +some earlier period.] +</p> + +<p> +On the field of battle, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] +</p> + +<p> +the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and +drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution +of banners and flags. +</p> + +<p> +24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of +the host may be focussed on one particular point. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the same +object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be like those of a +single man."!] +</p> + +<p> +25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the +brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance against +orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a story in this +connection of Wu Ch’i, when he was fighting against the Ch’in +State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless +daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and +returned to camp. Wu Ch’i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an +officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a good soldier, and +ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch’i replied: "I fully believe he +was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders."] +</p> + +<p> +This is the art of handling large masses of men. +</p> + +<p> +26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in +fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and +eyes of your army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to Ho-yang at the head of +500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches, that though +the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute +their passage.] +</p> + +<p> +27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all +ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible. Now +the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived +on the scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to wait +until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. It is in this +way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit." Li Ch’uan and others +tell an anecdote (to be found in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, year 10, § 1) of Ts’ao +Kuei, a protege of Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by +Ch’i, and the duke was about to join battle at Ch’ang-cho, after +the first roll of the enemy’s drums, when Ts’ao said: "Not just yet." +Only after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word for +attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch’i were utterly defeated. +Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts’ao +Kuei replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll +of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on +the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked when their +spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our victory." Wu Tzŭ (chap. +4) puts "spirit" first among the "four important influences" in war, and +continues: "The value of a whole army—a mighty host of a million +men—is dependent on one man alone: such is the influence of spirit!"] +</p> + +<p> +a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general’s most important asset. It is +the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage +into the panic-stricken." The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571-649) has a +saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or +striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of assailing the +enemy’s mental equilibrium."] +</p> + +<p> +28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle of the +Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, whereas Hannibal’s +men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.] +</p> + +<p> +by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on +returning to camp. +</p> + +<p> +29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but +attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of +studying moods. +</p> + +<p> +30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub +amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. +</p> + +<p> +31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease +while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is +famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength. +</p> + +<p> +32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, +to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident +array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to +oppose him when he comes downhill. +</p> + +<p> +34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose +temper is keen. +</p> + +<p> +35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, +take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been poisoned by +the enemy. Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that the saying has +a wider application.] +</p> + +<p> +Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying that a +man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the death against any +attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be +tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who +hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvelous tale is told of +Ts’ao Ts’ao’s courage and resource in ch. 1 of the <i>San Kuo Chi</i>, In +198 A.D., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent +reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was +obliged to draw off his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two +enemies, who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged +himself. In this desperate plight Ts’ao waited until nightfall, when he +bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the +whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear, while Ts’ao +himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into +confusion and annihilated. Ts’ao Ts’ao said afterwards: "The +brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a +desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] +</p> + +<p> +36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The object, as +Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road to safety, and thus +prevent his fighting with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly: +"After that, you may crush him."] +</p> + +<p> +Do not press a desperate foe too hard. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay will +use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has burned his +boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of +a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the +meaning by a story taken from the life of Yen-ch’ing. That general, +together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded by a vastly superior +army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and desert-like, and +the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells +they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and +sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu +Yen-ch’ing exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our +country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A strong gale happened +to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of +sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had abated before deciding +on a final attack; but luckily another officer, Li Shou-cheng by name, was +quicker to see an opportunity, and said: "They are many and we are few, but in +the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory will +go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, +Fu Yen-ch’ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his +cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to safety.] +</p> + +<p> +37. Such is the art of warfare. +</p> + +<p> +[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. +</p> + +<p> +[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" (Longmans, +1907), p. 29. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap16"></a>Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzŭ does not +appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us (V §§ 6-11) +that such deflections from the ordinary course are practically innumerable, we +have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an +indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare we ought to vary +our tactics to the utmost degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes +these Nine Variations out to be, but it has been suggested that they are +connected with the Nine Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by +Chang Yu. The only other alternative is to suppose that something has been +lost—a supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends +some weight.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, +collects his army and concentrates his forces. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may have been +interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the chapter.] +</p> + +<p> +2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads +intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated +positions. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning +of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu defines this +situation as being situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li +Ch’uan says it is "country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks +or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and +precipices, without a road by which to advance."] +</p> + +<p> +In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate position, +you must fight. +</p> + +<p> +3. There are roads which must not be followed, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch’uan, +"where an ambush is to be feared."] +</p> + +<p> +armies which must be not attacked, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be attacked." +Ch’en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival advantage, but +are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of +overtaxing your men’s strength."] +</p> + +<p> +towns which must not be besieged, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own +experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of +Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the +country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no +fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: "No town should +be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause +any trouble." Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is +small and well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great +feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In the +seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was +Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and +manœuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when +the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not +be obeyed. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, and +Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: "Weapons are baleful +instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the +negation of civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even +Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.] +</p> + +<p> +4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany +variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. +</p> + +<p> +5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the +configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to +practical account. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only securing +good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in every possible +way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is characterized by certain natural +features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How it is +possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical +knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"] +</p> + +<p> +6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his +plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make +the best use of his men. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally advantageous +lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it must be followed; if +an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, +it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and if +consistent with military operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed." But +there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these +advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but +if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an +ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to +attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with +desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.] +</p> + +<p> +7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of +disadvantage will be blended together. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says +Ts’ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your mind."] +</p> + +<p> +8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in +accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix +our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing +some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our calculations."] +</p> + +<p> +9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to +seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I must +consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my own ability to +gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations +are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself…. For instance; if I +am surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the +nervelessness of my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it +would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and +use the advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils." See the +story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.] +</p> + +<p> +10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which +would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the enemy’s best and +wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. Introduce traitors into +his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue +and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By +means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and +waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into +excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." +Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun Tzŭ here: +"Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit +of his own accord."] +</p> + +<p> +and make trouble for them, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble should be +made for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we might say, +"assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony +amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands." These give us a +whip-hand over the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +and keep them constantly engaged; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent them from having any +rest."] +</p> + +<p> +hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of: "cause +them to forget <i>pien</i> (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first +impulse), and hasten in our direction."] +</p> + +<p> +11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not +coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not +attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable. +</p> + +<p> +12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) +Recklessness, which leads to destruction; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Bravery without forethought," as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes a +man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says +Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but may be lured into an +ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character +of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, +forgetting that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general +should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who +fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be +condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, too, makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one’s +death does not bring about victory."] +</p> + +<p> +(2) cowardice, which leads to capture; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as +being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an advantage," +and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih +gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive," this is, the +man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved +in war unless you are willing to take risks. T’ai Kung said: "He who lets +an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 +A.D., Liu Yu pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval +battle with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered +only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan +Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be overcome, had a +light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if +necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural result was that the fighting +spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an +attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be +first in the fray, Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their +baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a +somewhat similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who +during a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in +readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to +get across.] +</p> + +<p> +(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, Teng +Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. +Teng Ch’iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and easily +provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will +grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to +be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured +as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s pretended flight, and finally attacked and +slain.] +</p> + +<p> +(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect in a +general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to +slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however +undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: +"The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion."] +</p> + +<p> +(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless of the +welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger of sacrificing +any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a +shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from +the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be the +consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve +a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his +military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to +relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical blunders +which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through the very +man who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the +interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one +of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I +remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his +men." By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun +Tzŭ’s mouth.] +</p> + +<p> +13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of +war. +</p> + +<p> +14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be +found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap17"></a>Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1 than by +this heading.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and +observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the +neighbourhood of valleys. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies +of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural ovens," i.e. "the +openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu +Ch’iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan +was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch’iang having found a refuge in the +hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all the favourable +positions commanding supplies of water and forage. Ch’iang was soon in +such a desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced to make a +total surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood +of valleys."] +</p> + +<p> +2. Camp in high places, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the surrounding +country.] +</p> + +<p> +facing the sun. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch’en Hao "facing east." +Cf. infra, §§ 11, 13. +</p> + +<p> +Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. +</p> + +<p> +3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts’ao +Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your evolutions." +The <i>T’ung Tien</i> reads, "If <i>the enemy</i> crosses a river," etc. But in view of +the next sentence, this is almost certainly an interpolation.] +</p> + +<p> +4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance +to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and +then deliver your attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu at +the Wei River. Turning to the <i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 34, fol. 6 verso, we +find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were drawn up on opposite +sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten +thousand sacks filled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading +half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time, pretending to +have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was +much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han +Hsin was really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his +turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a +great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion of +Lung Chu’s army from getting across. He then turned upon the force which had +been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The +rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in all +directions.] +</p> + +<p> +5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a +river which he has to cross. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For fear of preventing his crossing.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with water is very +awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops marshalled on the +river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is +essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other +commentators are not at all explicit.] +</p> + +<p> +Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on the lower +reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the sluices and sweep us +away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that ‘in river warfare we must not +advance against the stream,’ which is as much as to say that our fleet must not +be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would be able to take +advantage of the current and make short work of us." There is also the danger, +noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be +carried down to us.] +</p> + +<p> +So much for river warfare. +</p> + +<p> +7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them +quickly, without any delay. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and last +but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.] +</p> + +<p> +8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near +you, and get your back to a clump of trees. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where +there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect the rear.] +</p> + +<p> +So much for operations in salt-marshes. +</p> + +<p> +9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising +ground to your right and on your rear, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu quotes T’ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a +marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."] +</p> + +<p> +so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for +campaigning in flat country. +</p> + +<p> +10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, and (4) +plains. Compare Napoleon’s "Military Maxims," no. 1.] +</p> + +<p> +which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch’en asks, with some +plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known of +Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The <i>Shih Chi</i> (ch. 1 ad init.) +speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch’ih Yu. In the <i>Liu +T’ao</i> it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the +Empire." Ts’ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the +first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of whom (to the +number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Ch’uan tells us +that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his +Minister Feng Hou.] +</p> + +<p> +11. All armies prefer high ground to low, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch’en, "is not only more agreeable and +salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low ground is +not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for fighting."] +</p> + +<p> +and sunny places to dark. +</p> + +<p> +12. If you are careful of your men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn +out your animals to graze."] +</p> + +<p> +and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak of +illness."] +</p> + +<p> +and this will spell victory. +</p> + +<p> +13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on +your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and +utilise the natural advantages of the ground. +</p> + +<p> +14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to +ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides. +</p> + +<p> +15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running +between, deep natural hollows, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, with pools +of water at the bottom."] +</p> + +<p> +confined places, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by precipices on +three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."] +</p> + +<p> +tangled thickets, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears cannot be +used."] +</p> + +<p> +quagmires +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable for +chariots and horsemen."] +</p> + +<p> +and crevasses, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined by Mei Yao-ch’en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling +cliffs." Tu Mu’s note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and intersected +by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it +clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same +view. On the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to the +rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a +crack or fissure" and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the +sentence indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun +Tzŭ is here speaking of crevasses.] +</p> + +<p> +should be left with all possible speed and not approached. +</p> + +<p> +16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach +them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear. +</p> + +<p> +17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, +ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods +with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for +these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be +lurking. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors who may +lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and overhearing our +instructions."] +</p> + +<p> +18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the +natural strength of his position. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is so good +that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. Baden-Powell’s +"Aids to Scouting."] +</p> + +<p> +19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the +other side to advance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to dislodge +us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to force a battle, he +would seem to despise us, and there would be less probability of our responding +to the challenge."] +</p> + +<p> +20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait. +</p> + +<p> +21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and +Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and observe the +enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he +may know that they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy’s +march."] +</p> + +<p> +The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that +the enemy wants to make us suspicious. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts’ao Kung’s, is as follows: "The +presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation is a +sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these +hiding-places in order to make us suspect an ambush." It appears that these +"screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the +retreating enemy happened to come across.] +</p> + +<p> +22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu’s explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying along +in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers are in ambush +at the spot beneath."] +</p> + +<p> +Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. +</p> + +<p> +23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots +advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the +approach of infantry. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat exaggerated as +applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon by saying that horses +and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one +another in the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in +ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have +scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will +gallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: +"As you move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar +for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting up, +glitter of arms, etc." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been +sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that +the army is encamping. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light horse +will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and strong +points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust and its +motion."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about +to advance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object is to +make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack us." Chang Yu +alludes to the story of T’ien Tan of the Ch’i-mo against the Yen +forces, led by Ch’i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the <i>Shih Chi</i> we read: +"T’ien Tan openly said: ‘My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off +the noses of their Ch’i prisoners and place them in the front rank to +fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other side being +informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; but those within the +city were enraged at seeing their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing +only lest they should fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend +themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T’ien Tan sent back +converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is +that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by +inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.’ +Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses lying in +them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from the +city-walls, wept passionately and were all impatient to go out and fight, their +fury being increased tenfold. T’ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were +ready for any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in +his hands, and ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, +while the ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served +out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular +soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with the old +and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were dispatched to the enemy’s +camp to arrange terms of surrender, whereupon the Yen army began shouting for +joy. T’ien Tan also collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, +and got the wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the +prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be +plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch’i Chieh, in high good +humor, granted their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and +careless. Meanwhile, T’ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them +with pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored +stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on +their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and drove +the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in the walls, backing +them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, +dashed furiously into the enemy’s camp where they caused the utmost confusion +and dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on +their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom +they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with +gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment +a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind making +as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels, +until heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen +army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men of Ch’i, who succeeded in +slaying their general Ch’i Chien…. The result of the battle was the +ultimate recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch’i +State."] +</p> + +<p> +Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will +retreat. +</p> + +<p> +25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, +it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. +</p> + +<p> +26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch’uan indicates "a treaty confirmed +by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand, simply say +"without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."] +</p> + +<p> +27. When there is much running about +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental banner.] +</p> + +<p> +and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. +</p> + +<p> +28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. +</p> + +<p> +29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want +of food. +</p> + +<p> +30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army +is suffering from thirst. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from the +behavior of a single man."] +</p> + +<p> +31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure +it, the soldiers are exhausted. +</p> + +<p> +32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch’en Hao says, the +enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] +</p> + +<p> +Clamour by night betokens nervousness. +</p> + +<p> +33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is weak. If +the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are +angry, it means that the men are weary. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an army +are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue" owing +to the exertions which he has demanded from them.] +</p> + +<p> +34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and the horses +chiefly on grass.] +</p> + +<p> +and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing +that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined +to fight to the death. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 71, given +in abbreviated form by the <i>P’ei Wen Yun Fu:</i> "The rebel Wang Kuo of Liang +was besieging the town of Ch’en- ts’ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was +in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out against him. The latter pressed +for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At last the +rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw down their weapons of their +own accord. Sung was not advancing to the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a +principle of war not to pursue desperate men and not to press a retreating +host.’ Sung answered: ‘That does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a +jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a +disorganized multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advances to +the attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being +slain."] +</p> + +<p> +35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued +tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. +</p> + +<p> +36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always a fear +of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good temper.] +</p> + +<p> +too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity is +necessary to keep the men to their duty.] +</p> + +<p> +37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s numbers, +shows a supreme lack of intelligence. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I follow the interpretation of Ts’ao Kung, also adopted by Li +Ch’uan, Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, +Chia Lin, Mei Tao-ch’en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first +tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, etc." +This would connect the sentence with what went before about rewards and +punishments.] +</p> + +<p> +38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that +the enemy wishes for a truce. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages, it is a +sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength is +exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzŭ to draw such +an obvious inference.] +</p> + +<p> +39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long +time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the +situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says a manœuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain time +for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.] +</p> + +<p> +40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply +sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, <i>cheng</i> tactics and frontal +attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.] +</p> + +<p> +What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a +close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in squeezing +very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch’uan, who appears to offer the +simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will win." Fortunately +we have Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity +itself: "When the numbers are even, and no favourable opening presents itself, +although we may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find +additional recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, +concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to +snatch the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." +He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary +troops may be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that +figure."] +</p> + +<p> +41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to +be captured by them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao, quoting from the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, says: "If bees and scorpions +carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, then, +should not be treated with contempt."] +</p> + +<p> +42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will +not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless. +If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not +enforced, they will still be useless. +</p> + +<p> +43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but +kept under control by means of iron discipline. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Yen Tzŭ [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues endeared him to +the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 +init.: "The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the +profession of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness."] +</p> + +<p> +This is a certain road to victory. +</p> + +<p> +44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be +well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. +</p> + +<p> +45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders +being obeyed, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his +men and also make his authority respected, so that when they come to face the +enemy, orders may be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust +and look up to him." What Sun Tzŭ has said in § 44, however, would lead one +rather to expect something like this: "If a general is always confident that +his orders will be carried out," etc."] +</p> + +<p> +the gain will be mutual. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his command, and +the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual." He +quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 4: "The art of giving orders +is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty doubts." +Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an +army.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap18"></a>Chapter X. TERRAIN</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with "terrain," +the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six calamities" are +discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of +desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) +Accessible ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of +communications."] +</p> + +<p> +(2) entangling ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you become +entangled."] +</p> + +<p> +(3) temporising ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] +</p> + +<p> +(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance +from the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A +strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman’s unquestioning +acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called +<i>accessible</i>. +</p> + +<p> +3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the +raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, "not to +allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of Napoleon’s dictum, "the +secret of war lies in the communications," [1] we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had +done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10, +VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of supply may be said to be as vital +to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as +the duelist who finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, +and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, +and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose +communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and +he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his +force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior +numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will +not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole +army." [2] +</p> + +<p> +Then you will be able to fight with advantage. +</p> + +<p> +4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called <i>entangling</i>. +</p> + +<p> +5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally +forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you +fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. +</p> + +<p> +6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first +move, it is called <i>temporising</i> ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation +remains at a deadlock."] +</p> + +<p> +7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an +attractive bait, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But this is +only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position.] +</p> + +<p> +it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing +the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver +our attack with advantage. +</p> + +<p> +8. With regard to <i>narrow passes</i>, if you can occupy them first, let them be +strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and by +making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy."] +</p> + +<p> +9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if +the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. +</p> + +<p> +10. With regard to <i>precipitous heights</i>, if you are beforehand with your +adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him +to come up. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and +defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." [For the +enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yu tells the +following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a +punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At night he pitched his camp as +usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch, when +suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near +by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against +the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien, +however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly +as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their +former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant +officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. +‘How did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien +replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking +unnecessary questions.’ From this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that +high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because +they are immune from disastrous floods."] +</p> + +<p> +11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat +and try to entice him away. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D. against the two +rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of +Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-te +persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken +prisoner. See <i>Chiu T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.] +</p> + +<p> +12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of +the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, +at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be exhausted and our adversary +fresh and keen."] +</p> + +<p> +and fighting will be to your disadvantage. +</p> + +<p> +13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § 8.] +</p> + +<p> +The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them. +</p> + +<p> +14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural +causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1) +Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) +rout. +</p> + +<p> +15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten +times its size, the result will be the <i>flight</i> of the former. +</p> + +<p> +16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the +result is <i>insubordination</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [<i>Hsin T’ang Shu</i>, ch. +148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against Wang +T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers +treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by +riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien Pu +was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had +passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and +dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide +by cutting his throat.] +</p> + +<p> +When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result +is <i>collapse</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the +common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] +</p> + +<p> +17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the +enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the +commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the +result is <i>ruin</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi’s note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause, and +at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; +thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his +head."] +</p> + +<p> +18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not +clear and distinct; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with decision, +the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without +vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty." +General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the words: "The secret of getting +successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell—in the +clearness of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: "the +most fatal defect in a military leader is difference; the worst calamities that +befall an army arise from hesitation."] +</p> + +<p> +when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."] +</p> + +<p> +and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter +<i>disorganisation</i>. +</p> + +<p> +19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior +force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful +one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must +be a <i>rout</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues: "Whenever +there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve +in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men +and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De Bello +Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).] +</p> + +<p> +20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the +general who has attained a responsible post. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to +those connected with ground."] +</p> + +<p> +but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, +and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes +the test of a great general. +</p> + +<p> +22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into +practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises them, will +surely be defeated. +</p> + +<p> +23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though +the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not +fight even at the ruler’s bidding. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, who is said to +have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the <i>San Lueh</i>, has these +words attributed to him: "The responsibility of setting an army in motion must +devolve on the general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the +Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and +the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their +country’s cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that +"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander +must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees from the Son of +Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."] +</p> + +<p> +24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing +disgrace, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a +soldier is to retreat.] +</p> + +<p> +whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his +sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." Such a +man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would not regret his +conduct."] +</p> + +<p> +25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the +deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand +by you even unto death. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture of the +famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have frequently had +occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the +meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to +sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every +hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and +Wu Ch’i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, +began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your +son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked +the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago, Lord Wu +performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and +finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the +same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.’" Li Ch’uan +mentions the Viscount of Ch’u, who invaded the small state of Hsiao +during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of the soldiers are +suffering severely from the cold." So he made a round of the whole army, +comforting and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if they were +clothed in garments lined with floss silk.] +</p> + +<p> +26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; +kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of +quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they +are useless for any practical purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, they +would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military +discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of +Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the +inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a certain +officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow-townsman, +ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging to one of the people, in order +to wear it over his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng +considered that the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be +allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered +his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so. +This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time +forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up.] +</p> + +<p> +27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware +that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards +victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, Ts’ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."] +</p> + +<p> +28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own +men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards +victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. III. § 13 (1).] +</p> + +<p> +29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are +in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes +fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory. +</p> + +<p> +30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he +has broken camp, he is never at a loss. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so +thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move recklessly," says +Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no mistakes."] +</p> + +<p> +31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory +will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your +victory complete. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three +things—the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural +advantages of earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."] +</p> + +<p> +[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. +</p> + +<p> +[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap19"></a>Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) +Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; +(5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; +(8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. +</p> + +<p> +2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious to see +their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a +battle and scatter in every direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, +"they will lack the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find +harbors of refuge."] +</p> + +<p> +3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it +is facile ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating," and +the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: "When your +army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order +to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home."] +</p> + +<p> +4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is +contentious ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung +says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the +strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus, +Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, even for a +few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining +invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.: "For those who have to fight in +the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu +Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., +and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of +Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, +plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, +governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from +his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we +oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, +and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile +at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, +and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms +without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we +could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning +and resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous +strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, +was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this type of +ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network of +roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which +intercommunication is easy."] +</p> + +<p> +6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a +third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small +principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on +the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.] +</p> + +<p> +so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them +to become his allies.] +</p> + +<p> +is ground of intersecting highways. +</p> + +<p> +7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a +number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached such a +point, its situation is serious."] +</p> + +<p> +8. Mountain forests, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or simply "forests."] +</p> + +<p> +rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: +this is difficult ground. +</p> + +<p> +9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only +retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to +crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. +</p> + +<p> +10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without +delay, is desperate ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The situation, as pictured by Ts’ao Kung, is very similar to the +"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible: "A lofty +mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked." +Ch’en Hao says: "to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like sitting in a leaking +boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid +description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an army invading +hostile territory without the aid of local guides:—it falls into a fatal +snare and is at the enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the +right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the +chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, +no choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to range +our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly +appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; +retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; +yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment’s respite. If we simply +maintain our ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a +move, we have to sustain the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is +wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of +life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of strength +and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man defending it can +check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offense in the hands of the +enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:—in this +terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest +of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest effect?" Students of +Greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, +and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, +VII. 78 sqq.].] +</p> + +<p> +11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On +contentious ground, attack not. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous +position first. So Ts’ao Kung. Li Ch’uan and others, however, +suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that +it would be sheer madness to attack. In the <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu</i>, when the King of Wu +inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: "The rule with +regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage +over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, +beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your +banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other places that he cannot +afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a dust—confound his ears +and eyes—detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in +ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."] +</p> + +<p> +12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking force +itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available here. I follow +that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s brief note: +"Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not +cut off.] +</p> + +<p> +On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states."] +</p> + +<p> +13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[On this, Li Ch’uan has the following delicious note: "When an army +penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to alienate the +people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, +whose march into Ch’in territory was marked by no violation of women or +looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause us +to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won +the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think that the true reading +must be, not ‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’" Alas, I fear that in this +instance the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at +least, has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ +there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility of +retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by bringing in +provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, "do not encamp.] +</p> + +<p> +14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu +amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be devised +which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, +the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the famous occasion +when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum, and +to all appearances entrapped by the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which +Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which T’ien +Tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, +note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some +2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven +along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The +strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the +Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal’s army passed +safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.] +</p> + +<p> +On desperate ground, fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is a chance +of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your corner."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge +between the enemy’s front and rear; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other."] +</p> + +<p> +to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the +good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. +</p> + +<p> +16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from +concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in +disorder. +</p> + +<p> +17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, +they stopped still. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded in +thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure any +advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they would +remain where they were."] +</p> + +<p> +18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on +the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something +which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts’ao Kung thinks it is +"some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu says: "The +three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of +which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our favourable positions; (2) to +ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications." Our object +then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render him +helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at +once throw the other side on the defensive.] +</p> + +<p> +19. Rapidity is the essence of war: +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in warfare," and +he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military science, and the chief +business of the general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the +importance attached to speed by two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., +Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch’eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was +meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence +with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was +then military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta’s treachery, he at +once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled +him by a specious message of friendly import. Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and +said: "If Meng Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be +thoroughly investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is +an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is +still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of +forced marches, be brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’eng with +in a space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko +Liang: "Wan is 1200 <i>li</i> from here. When the news of my revolt reaches +Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will be a whole +month before any steps can be taken, and by that time my city will be well +fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that +will be sent against us are not worth troubling about." The next letter, +however, was filled with consternation: "Though only eight days have passed +since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What +miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- ch’eng had fallen +and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See <i>Chin Shu</i>, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li +Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the +successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern +Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, +Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down through +the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his +army without loss of time, and was just about to start when the other generals +implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous +state for navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is +of paramount importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time +to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together. If +we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before +his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before +you have time to stop your ears against it. [See VII. § 19, note.] This is the +great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he will have +to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. +Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, +and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people +should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.] +</p> + +<p> +take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, +and attack unguarded spots. +</p> + +<p> +20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The +further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of +your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. +</p> + +<p> +21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 13. Li Ch’uan does not venture on a note here.] +</p> + +<p> +22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give them plenty of +food and drink, and look after them generally."] +</p> + +<p> +and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous +general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the success of +the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch’u State, where a universal levy +was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he +declined all invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In +vain did the Ch’u general try to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien +kept inside his walls and would not come out, but devoted his whole time and +energy to winning the affection and confidence of his men. He took care that +they should be well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities +for bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them +into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he told off +certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. The answer +was, that they were contending with one another in putting the weight and +long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic +pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch +and that they were now ready for fighting. By this time the Ch’u army, +after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in +disgust. The Ch’in general immediately broke up his camp and followed +them, and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. +Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch’u was conquered by Ch’in, and +the king Fu-ch’u led into captivity.] +</p> + +<p> +Keep your army continually on the move, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has struck +me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army together."] +</p> + +<p> +and devise unfathomable plans. +</p> + +<p> +23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will +prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not +achieve. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): "If one man were to run +amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to get our of +his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage and that all the +rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man who +sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."] +</p> + +<p> +Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will surely +exert their united strength to get out of it."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no +place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart of a hostile +country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will +fight hard. +</p> + +<p> +25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be constantly on +the <i>qui vive;</i> without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "without asking, you will get."] +</p> + +<p> +without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be +trusted. +</p> + +<p> +26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, +until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate into +cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: +"‘Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed +to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers’ +minds should be seriously perturbed.’ The meaning is," he continues, "that if +all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their +resolution until they die."] +</p> + +<p> +27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they +have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not +because they are disinclined to longevity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are things +for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away +valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but +simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzŭ is slyly insinuating that, as +soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see that temptations to shirk +fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their way.] +</p> + +<p> +28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate more genuine +grief than tears alone.] +</p> + +<p> +those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the +tears run down their cheeks. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts’ao Kung says, "all have +embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that the heroes of +the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to +the mournful parting at the I River between Ching K’o and his friends, +when the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch’in +(afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain +as he bade them farewell and uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is +blowing, Chilly the burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu +or a Kuei. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and +contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang, better +known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which +he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his +attempt, but was immediately hacked to pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was +in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Ts’ao Kuei (or Ts’ao Mo), +performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 +B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by Ch’i, and was just about to conclude +a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory, when Ts’ao Kuei +suddenly seized Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch’i, as he stood on the altar +steps and held a dagger against his chest. None of the duke’s retainers dared +to move a muscle, and Ts’ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, +declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a +weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, +whereupon Ts’ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place +amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed color. As was +to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, but his +wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the impolicy of breaking his +word, and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of +what she had lost in three pitched battles.] +</p> + +<p> +29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the <i>shuai-jan</i>. Now the <i>shuai-jan</i> +is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["<i>Shuai-jan</i>" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question was +doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through this +passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the sense of +"military manœuvers."] +</p> + +<p> +Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, +and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be +attacked by head and tail both. +</p> + +<p> +30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the <i>shuai-jan</i>, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, as Mei Yao-ch’en says, "Is it possible to make the front and +rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as though +they were part of a single living body?"] +</p> + +<p> +I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VI. § 21.] +</p> + +<p> +yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, +they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the +right. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of common peril, +how much more should two parts of the same army, bound together as they are by +every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a +campaign has been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case of +allied armies.] +</p> + +<p> +31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of horses, and +the burying of chariot wheels in the ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall the +Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the battle of +Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot. [See +Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to render flight impossible +by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity +and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This +is the lesson which can be learned from the <i>shuai-jan</i>.] +</p> + +<p> +32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of +courage which all must reach. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one." If +the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the +resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality, or at +any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington’s seemingly +ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he had ever +commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in this important +particular—unity of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian +defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost +certainly have lost the day.] +</p> + +<p> +33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question +involving the proper use of ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en’s paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences of +strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize accidental features +of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold +out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position +neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With +all respect to the text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am +inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no +means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions… and to +the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or +attacking, from the proper utilization of natural features." [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were leading +a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does it."] +</p> + +<p> +35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; +upright and just, and thus maintain order. +</p> + +<p> +36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and +appearances, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] +</p> + +<p> +and thus keep them in total ignorance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops must +not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only rejoice +with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the +enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been frequently pointed +out. But how about the other process—the mystification of one’s own men? +Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is over-emphatic on this point would do well +to read Col. Henderson’s remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley campaign: "The +infinite pains," he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his +most trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a +commander less thorough would have pronounced useless"—etc. etc. [3] In +the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, "Pan Ch’ao +took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other Central Asian states with +the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his +chief commander to succour the place with an army drawn from the kingdoms of +Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t’ou, totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch’ao +summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and +said: ‘Our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the +enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a +different direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, +and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the evening +drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch’ao now secretly released the +prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of +his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set off at once at the head of +10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch’ao’s retreat in the west, while the King of +Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of Khotan. +As soon as Pan Ch’ao knew that the two chieftains had gone, he called his +divisions together, got them well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against +the army of Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled +in confusion, and were closely pursued by Pan Ch’ao. Over 5000 heads were +brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and +cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, Kutcha +and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From that time +forward, Pan Ch’ao’s prestige completely overawed the countries of the +west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general not only kept his own +officers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of +dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice.] +</p> + +<p> +he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that war is +based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy. You must +deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but without letting them +know why."] +</p> + +<p> +By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from +anticipating his purpose. +</p> + +<p> +38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed +up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep +into hostile territory before he shows his hand. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. § 15), that is, takes some decisive +step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like Hsiang Yu, who +sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch’en Hao, followed by Chia Lin, +understands the words less well as "puts forth every artifice at his command."] +</p> + +<p> +39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a +flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and none knows whither he +is going. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or retreat; it is +ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and conquering."] +</p> + +<p> +40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the +business of the general. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilization there should be no delay in aiming a +blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again to this point. +Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more +present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.] +</p> + +<p> +41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules for the +nine varieties of ground."] +</p> + +<p> +the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of +human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. +</p> + +<p> +42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating +deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 20.] +</p> + +<p> +43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across +neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not figure +among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X. One’s first impulse +would be to translate it distant ground," but this, if we can trust the +commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch’en says it +is "a position not far enough advanced to be called ‘facile,’ and not near +enough to home to be ‘dispersive,’ but something between the two." Wang Hsi +says: "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, whose +territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on +us to settle our business there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare +occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine +Situations.] +</p> + +<p> +When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of +intersecting highways. +</p> + +<p> +44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you +penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. +</p> + +<p> +45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in +front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is +desperate ground. +</p> + +<p> +46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of +purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the defensive, +and avoiding battle. Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 11.] +</p> + +<p> +On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts +of my army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible contingencies: "(1) +the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack on the part of the enemy." +Cf. VII. § 17. Mei Yao-ch’en says: "On the march, the regiments should be +in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the +fortifications."] +</p> + +<p> +47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is Ts’ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We +must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach the goal." +That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei +Yao-ch’en offers another equally plausible explanation: "Supposing the +enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we +should advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession." Ch’en +Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had time to select his own +ground, quotes VI. § 1, where Sun Tzŭ warns us against coming exhausted to the +attack. His own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is +a favourable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to +occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make a fight +for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, and victory +will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao She beat the army of +Ch’in. (See p. 57.)] +</p> + +<p> +48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On ground of +intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. +</p> + +<p> +49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as one +might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.] +</p> + +<p> +On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. +</p> + +<p> +50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position, whereas +my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s lines." Mei +Yao-ch’en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with desperation." +Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run away." Tu Mu points out +that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where it is the enemy who is +surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and canonized as Shen-wu, +was surrounded by a great army under Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was +comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 +foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps +being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to escape, +actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets himself by driving +into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers +and men saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their spirits +rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such +desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their +onslaught.] +</p> + +<p> +On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving +their lives. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and +provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain +to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death." Mei +Yao-ch’en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of +it." This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about "grounds" and the +"variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which bear on this +important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and +unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § +2 to enumerate "variations" before touching on "grounds" at all, but only +mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that +is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier +portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six +variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first +is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, +in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately followed +by the variations. This takes us down to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions +are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the +tenth ground noticed in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are +enumerated once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and +7, being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to +account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts maybe +brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal +with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short +chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are +defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the +corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate, +being double that of any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any +inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work +cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII +is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain +matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear +elsewhere.] +</p> + +<p> +51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when +surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly +when he has fallen into danger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch’ao’s devoted followers in 73 +A.D. The story runs thus in the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 47: "When Pan Ch’ao +arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at first +with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his behavior +underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch’ao +spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you noticed,’ he said, +‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys +have come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in a state +of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his lot. That surely is +the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they +have come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ +Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, +and set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who +arrived some day ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between surprise and +fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch’ao, keeping his +informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of +his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them. When the wine +had mounted into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still +further by addressing them thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an +isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now +it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom only a +few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards +us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to +seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will become food +for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers +replied: ‘Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander +through life and death.’ For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1, +note.] +</p> + +<p> +52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are +acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march +unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and +forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be +unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local +guides. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12-14—in order to +emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to regard +them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the following +words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have added that there is +always the risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or some +misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told, +ordered a guide to lead him into the neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was +an important pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the +pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead +of Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that +direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost arrived.] +</p> + +<p> +53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not +befit a warlike prince. +</p> + +<p> +54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows +itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He overawes his +opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Tao-ch’en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much +affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you can divide her +forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in +strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the neighbouring +states will be frightened; and if the neighbouring states are frightened, the +enemy’s allies will be prevented from joining her." The following gives a +stronger meaning: "If the great state has once been defeated (before she has +had time to summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and +refrain from massing their forces." Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu take the +sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may +be, if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, and +must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with +overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the +enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus: "If we +recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be discontented and hang +back. But if (as will then be the case) our display of military force is +inferior by half to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will take fright +and refuse to join us."] +</p> + +<p> +55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he +foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, +keeping his antagonists in awe. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch’uan, appears to be this: Secure +against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject entangling +alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enable him to +dispense with external friendships."] +</p> + +<p> +Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State became +a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous Six +Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. +Chang Yu, following up his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning +this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.] +</p> + +<p> +56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and retreat +be heavily punished."] +</p> + +<p> +issue orders +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "hang" or post up."] +</p> + +<p> +without regard to previous arrangements; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is made +clear by Ts’ao Kung’s quotation from the <i>Ssu-ma Fa:</i> "Give instructions +only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see deserving deeds." +Ts’ao Kung’s paraphrase: "The final instructions you give to your army +should not correspond with those that have been previously posted up." Chang Yu +simplifies this into "your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand." And +Chia Lin says: "there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not +only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates +the entire reversal of them at the last moment.] +</p> + +<p> +and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a +single man. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 34.] +</p> + +<p> +57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your +design. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for any +order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no reasons" for his +decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a general than to a judge.] +</p> + +<p> +When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing +when the situation is gloomy. +</p> + +<p> +58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into +desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of the +tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already alluded to on +p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles +from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in full +force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man +of which was furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their +way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men +of Chao see me in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their +fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck +down the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their stead." +Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong +position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he sees the +standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and +escape through the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent out a division +consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form in line of battle with their +backs to the River Ti. Seeing this manœuver, the whole army of Chao broke into +loud laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the +generalissimo’s flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was +immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some +time; until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and +banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where another +fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure the +trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two generals succeeded +in joining the other army, which was fighting with the utmost desperation. The +time had now come for the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw +the men of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted +walls, tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the +Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags struck +them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and overpowered their +king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the +panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and +completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was +King Ya himself…. After the battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and +said: "In the <i>Art of War</i> we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the +right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend +of Sun Tzŭ and T’ai Kung. See IX § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, +ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these +conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general replied: "I +fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it +not written there: ‘Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come +off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the +usual course, I should never have been able to bring my colleague round. What +says the Military Classic—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the +men off to fight.’ [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun +Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to +fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, +there would have been a general <i>débandade</i>, and it would have been +impossible to do anything with them." The officers admitted the force of his +argument, and said: "These are higher tactics than we should have been capable +of." [See <i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ] +</p> + +<p> +59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is capable +of striking a blow for victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Danger has a bracing effect.] +</p> + +<p> +60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the +enemy’s purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"—by an appearance of yielding +and falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yu’s note makes the meaning +clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do so; if +he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out his +intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver +our attack.] +</p> + +<p> +61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in one +direction." Ts’ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the enemy." +But such a violent displacement of characters is quite indefensible.] +</p> + +<p> +we shall succeed in the long run +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "after a thousand <i>li</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +in killing the commander-in-chief. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Always a great point with the Chinese.] +</p> + +<p> +62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. +</p> + +<p> +63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, +destroy the official tallies, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as a permit +or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the "border-warden" of <i>Lun +Yu</i> III. 24, who may have had similar duties. When this half was returned to +him, within a fixed period, he was authorized to open the gate and let the +traveler through.] +</p> + +<p> +and stop the passage of all emissaries. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Either to or from the enemy’s country.] +</p> + +<p> +64. Be stern in the council-chamber, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the sovereign.] +</p> + +<p> +so that you may control the situation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the strictest +precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.] +</p> + +<p> +65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. +</p> + +<p> +66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 18.] +</p> + +<p> +and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao’s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favourable +position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus +obtained cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore, +to occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful +appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into going there +as well." Mei Yao-ch’en explains that this "artful appointment" is to be +made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies, who will carry back just the +amount of information that we choose to give them. Then, having cunningly +disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting after the enemy, to +arrive before him (VII. § 4). We must start after him in order to ensure his +marching thither; we must arrive before him in order to capture the place +without trouble. Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei +Yao-ch’en’s interpretation of § 47.] +</p> + +<p> +67. Walk in the path defined by rule, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot be +achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is unfortunate that this +variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much +more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of the old +school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating every accepted canon of +warfare.] +</p> + +<p> +and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable opportunity +offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove decisive."] +</p> + +<p> +68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you +an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be +too late for the enemy to oppose you. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly appears +felicitous. But of course Sun Tzŭ was thinking only of its speed. The words +have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping +hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "The Science of War," p. 333. +</p> + +<p> +[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap20"></a>Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Rather more than half the chapter (§§ 1-13) is devoted to the subject of fire, +after which the author branches off into other topics.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to +burn soldiers in their camp; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[So Tu Mu. Li Ch’uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers" +(when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on a +diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note], found himself +placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the +Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his +officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! [1] The only course open to +us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under cover of night, +when they will not be able to discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we +shall exterminate them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover +us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all +replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the +Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is today,’ he cried, +‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, +who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything will be +brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate for valiant warriors.’ +All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he +and his little band quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale +was blowing at the time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums +and hide behind the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw +flames shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. +The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at +the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, +whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the front and rear +of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao +slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads of +the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, +perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan Ch’ao, divining his +thoughts, said with uplifted hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, +I should not think, Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied +Kuo Hsun, and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed +him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and +trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public +proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostage, he returned to make his +report to Tou Ku." <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ] +</p> + +<p> +the second is to burn stores; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the rebellious +population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make +periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run +proved entirely successful.] +</p> + +<p> +the third is to burn baggage-trains; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao’s wagons and +impedimenta by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.] +</p> + +<p> +the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines" are the +same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and clothing. Cf. VII. +§ 11.] +</p> + +<p> +the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says in the <i>T’ung Tien:</i> "To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. The +method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by dipping +them into a brazier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the +enemy’s lines."] +</p> + +<p> +2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[T’sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy’s camp" are referred to. +But Ch’en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have +favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us." Chia Lin +says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."] +</p> + +<p> +the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter, reeds, +brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material cause. Chang Yu +says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires."] +</p> + +<p> +3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for +starting a conflagration. +</p> + +<p> +4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are +those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing +or the Cross-bar; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the Twenty-eight +Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and +Corvus.] +</p> + +<p> +for these four are all days of rising wind. +</p> + +<p> +5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible +developments: +</p> + +<p> +6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once with an +attack from without. +</p> + +<p> +7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain quiet, +bide your time and do not attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. +If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. +Hence the necessity for caution.] +</p> + +<p> +8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with +an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find +the difficulties too great, retire."] +</p> + +<p> +9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait +for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favourable moment. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire breaking out +(either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of incendiaries) inside +the enemy’s camp. "But," he continues, "if the enemy is settled in a waste +place littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a +position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against him at any +seasonable opportunity, and not await on in hopes of an outbreak occurring +within, for fear our opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding +vegetation, and thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling +once baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking +advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese general’s camp, +but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in the neighbourhood had +already been burnt down. On the other hand, Po-ts’ai, a general of the +Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of +this simple precaution. "At the head of a large army he was besieging +Ch’ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very small, +and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung +called his officers together and said: "In war, there are various indirect +methods of attack, and numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator +here quotes Sun Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp +in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we +set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a +sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of +T’ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so +Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and +mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men, +who stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with loud +shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, +and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the +rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." [<i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 71.] +] +</p> + +<p> +10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the +leeward. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will retreat +away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight +desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A rather more obvious +explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the east, begin burning to +the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from that side. If you +start the fire on the east side, and then attack from the west, you will suffer +in the same way as your enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a morning." +(<i>Tao Te Ching</i>, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch’en and Wang Hsi say: "A day breeze +dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as +a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this +sense is to be obtained is not apparent.] +</p> + +<p> +12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the +movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, and watch +for the days on which wind will rise, before making our attack with fire." +Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: "We must not only know how to +assail our opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar +attacks from them."] +</p> + +<p> +13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those +who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. +</p> + +<p> +14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his +belongings. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy’s road or divide +his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water can do useful +service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is the +reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of +sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzŭ (ch. 4) +speaks thus of the two elements: "If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy +ground, from which the water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, +it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands +thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it +may be exterminated by fire."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his +attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste +of time and general stagnation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. Ts’ao Kung says: +"Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day." And Tu Mu: "If +you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, your +subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will ensue." For +several reasons, however, and in spite of the formidable array of scholars on +the other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch’en +alone, whose words I will quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in +their battles and assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come and +not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort +to such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What they must not do, and +what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to the advantages they +have got."] +</p> + +<p> +16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good +general cultivates his resources. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu quotes the following from the <i>San Lueh</i>, ch. 2: "The warlike prince +controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by good faith, and +by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will be disruption; +if rewards are deficient, commands will not be respected."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is +something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so far in +that direction as the remarkable passage in the <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 69. "I dare +not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance +an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."] +</p> + +<p> +18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; +no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. +</p> + +<p> +19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you +are. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an +interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately on § +18.] +</p> + +<p> +20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. +</p> + +<p> +21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.] +</p> + +<p> +nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. +</p> + +<p> +22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of +caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger’s +cubs." +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap21"></a>Chapter XIII. THE USE OF SPIES</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them +great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources +of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.] +</p> + +<p> +There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on +the highways. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered, brambles and +thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be reminded of the saying: ‘On +serious ground, gather in plunder.’ Why then should carriage and transportation +cause exhaustion on the highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, +but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the +injunction to ‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is deeply +engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided against. Hence, +without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order +that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, again, there are +places like salt deserts where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from +home cannot be dispensed with."] +</p> + +<p> +As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-tail." The +allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each consisting of +about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on behalf of the State +by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that +their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. [See +II. § 12, note.] In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army, +while the other seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 +men (reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 +families would be affected.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which +is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the +enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of +silver in honours and emoluments, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of this +curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned at this point.] +</p> + +<p> +is the height of inhumanity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ’s agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to the +frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war always +brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy’s +condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for +years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is +impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their +services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling +amount for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up an +incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the +poor, and hence Sun Tzŭ concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing +less than a crime against humanity.] +</p> + +<p> +3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no +master of victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the national +temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these memorable words +were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch’u State: "The [Chinese] character +for ‘prowess’ is made up of [the characters for] ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear’ +(cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the repression of +cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the appointment of +Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the +people, putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."] +</p> + +<p> +4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and +conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is <i>foreknowledge</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means to do.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be +obtained inductively from experience, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu’s note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from +other analogous cases."] +</p> + +<p> +nor by any deductive calculation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and +magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human actions +cannot be so calculated."] +</p> + +<p> +6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the +spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural science +may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified +by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable +through spies and spies alone."] +</p> + +<p> +7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) +inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. +</p> + +<p> +8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret +system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the +sovereign’s most precious faculty. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders, had +officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it was to collect all possible +information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of +his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves +thus gained." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +9. Having <i>local spies</i> means employing the services of the inhabitants of a +district. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind treatment, and +use them as spies."] +</p> + +<p> +10. Having <i>inward spies</i>, making use of officials of the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in this +respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have +undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy for gold, men +who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed +over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side +should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of displaying their +ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each +boat. Officials of these several kinds," he continues, "should be secretly +approached and bound to one’s interests by means of rich presents. In this way +you will be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, +ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the +harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." The +necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears +from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou, +sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold +at P’i. After each side had experienced a number of victories and +defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain +P’o-t’ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to have him whipped until the +blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by +offering to cooperate with him from inside the city, and to give a fire signal +at the right moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these +promises, march out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their +head with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’s bidding. Meanwhile, Li +Hsiung’s general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; +and P’o-t’ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city +walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the signal +and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were drawn +up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang’s soldiers +entered the city in this way, every one of whom was forthwith beheaded. Li +Hsiung then charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and +routed the enemy completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho +Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that +of his father Li T’e, <i>Chin Shu</i>, ch. 120, 121.] +</p> + +<p> +11. Having <i>converted spies</i>, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them +for our own purposes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the enemy’s +service, and inducing them to carry back false information as well as to spy in +turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we +pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false +impression of what is going on. Several of the commentators accept this as an +alternative definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively +proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§ +21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used with +conspicuous success: (1) by T’ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo (see +<i>supra</i>, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the +wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P’o was conducting a defensive +campaign against Ch’in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien +P’o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a +series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of his +spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan Chu’s +pay. They said: "The only thing which causes Ch’in anxiety is lest Chao +Kua should be made general. Lien P’o they consider an easy opponent, who +is sure to be vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the +famous Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of +war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no +commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much +disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke +of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua was +appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man +who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran statesman +Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien P’o. Needless to say, he +proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch’i and the great military power +of Ch’in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and +his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, +during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed +by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, +ruthlessly put to the sword.] +</p> + +<p> +12. Having <i>doomed spies</i>, doing certain things openly for purposes of +deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the +enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do things +calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe that they have +been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy’s +lines, they will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take +measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite different. The +spies will thereupon be put to death." As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih +mentions the prisoners released by Pan Ch’ao in his campaign against +Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to T’ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was +sent by T’ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied +security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang +Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T’ang Chien, but +this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the New T’ang History +(ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on +until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when sent by +the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch’i. He has certainly +more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of Ch’i, being +subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he +considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be +boiled alive.] +</p> + +<p> +13. <i>Surviving spies</i>, finally, are those who bring back news from the +enemy’s camp. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a regular +part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man of keen +intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a +will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed with physical strength and +courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure +hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the +following story of Ta’hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of +Eastern Ch’in, Shen-wu of Ch’i made a hostile movement upon +Sha-yuan. The Emperor T’ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the +enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three were on horseback and +wore the enemy’s uniform. When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet +away from the enemy’s camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they +succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army. Then they got on their +horses again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of +night-watchmen; and more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was +committing some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit +a sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible +information about the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm commendation from +the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was able to inflict a severe +defeat on his adversary."] +</p> + +<p> +14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate relations +to be maintained than with spies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch’en point out that the spy is privileged to enter +even the general’s private sleeping-tent.] +</p> + +<p> +None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater +secrecy be preserved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be carried +"mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted from Turenne, who +made perhaps larger use of them than any previous commander: "Spies are +attached to those who give them most, he who pays them ill is never served. +They should never be known to anybody; nor should they know one another. When +they propose anything very material, secure their persons, or have in your +possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never +communicate anything to them but what is absolutely necessary that they should +know. [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from +falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and double-dealing." +Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more along the lines of +"intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers +these attributes to the spies themselves: "Before using spies we must assure +ourselves as to their integrity of character and the extent of their experience +and skill." But he continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more +dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate +such." So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the +passage."] +</p> + +<p> +16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and +straightforwardness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, you must +treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for you with all their +might."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of +their reports. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies +going over to the service of the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VI. § 9.] +</p> + +<p> +19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he +must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard before [our +plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzŭ’s main point in this passage is: Whereas +you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for letting out the secret," the +object of killing the other man is only, as Ch’en Hao puts it, "to stop +his mouth" and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already been +repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzŭ lays +himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by +saying that the man deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly +not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of +him."] +</p> + +<p> +20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate +an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the +attendants, the aides-de- camp, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose duty it is +to keep the general supplied with information," which naturally necessitates +frequent interviews with him.] +</p> + +<p> +the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be +commissioned to ascertain these. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these important +functionaries can be won over by bribery.] +</p> + +<p> +21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted +with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted +spies and available for our service. +</p> + +<p> +22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able +to acquire and employ local and inward spies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy’s spies we learn the enemy’s +condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy into our +service, because it is he that knows which of the local inhabitants are greedy +of gain, and which of the officials are open to corruption."] +</p> + +<p> +23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to +carry false tidings to the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be +deceived."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on +appointed occasions. +</p> + +<p> +25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the +enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the +converted spy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As explained in §§ 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but makes it +possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.] +</p> + +<p> +Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost +liberality. +</p> + +<p> +26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was changed to +Yin by P’an Keng in 1401. +</p> + +<p> +was due to I Chih +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part in +Ch’eng T’ang’s campaign against Chieh Kuei.] +</p> + +<p> +who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due +to Lü Ya +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards +helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T’ai Kung, a title bestowed on +him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously +identified with the <i>Liu T’ao</i>.] +</p> + +<p> +who had served under the Yin. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to +introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are by no +means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly doubt that Sun +Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted +spy, or something closely analogous. His suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin +dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and +shortcoming which these former ministers were able to impart to the other side. +Mei Yao-ch’en appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic +names: "I Yin and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. +Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could not employ +the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great achievements were all for the +good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant: "How should two divinely +inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of +them simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a matter +which requires men of the highest mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom +and capacity qualified them for the task. The above words only emphasize this +point." Ho Shih believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of +their supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] +</p> + +<p> +27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use +the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they +achieve great results. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a boat from +bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on spies, while +production of great results, is oft-times the cause of utter destruction."] +</p> + +<p> +Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army’s +ability to move. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man without ears or eyes.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 ***</div> +</body> + +</html> + diff --git a/old/old/132.txt b/old/old/132.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..449db8a --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/132.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6982 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Art of War, by Sun Tzu + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Art of War + +Author: Sun Tzu + +Translator: Lionel Giles + +Release Date: May 1994 [eBook #132] +[Last updated: January 14, 2012] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR *** + +Note: Please see Project Gutenberg's eBook #17405 for a version of +this eBook without the Giles commentary (that is, with only the +Sun Tzu text). + + + + SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR + + THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD + + Translated from the Chinese with Introduction + and Critical Notes + + BY + + LIONEL GILES, M.A. + + Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. + in the British Museum + + First Published in 1910 + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + + To my brother + Captain Valentine Giles, R.G. + in the hope that + a work 2400 years old + may yet contain lessons worth consideration + by the soldier of today + this translation + is affectionately dedicated. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext +-------------------------------------- + + When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF +WAR, the work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction +to Europe began in 1782 when a French Jesuit Father living in +China, Joseph Amiot, acquired a copy of it, and translated it +into French. It was not a good translation because, according to +Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great deal that Sun Tzu did not +write, and very little indeed of what he did." + The first translation into English was published in 1905 in +Tokyo by Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation +is, in the words of Dr. Giles, "excessively bad." He goes +further in this criticism: "It is not merely a question of +downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly exempt. +Omissions were frequent; hard passages were willfully distorted +or slurred over. Such offenses are less pardonable. They would +not be tolerated in any edition of a Latin or Greek classic, and +a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in +translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt. +Calthrop's translation was published in London. It was an +improvement on the first -- omissions filled up and numerous +mistakes corrected -- but new errors were created in the process. +Dr. Giles, in justifying his translation, wrote: "It was not +undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; but I +could not help feeling that Sun Tzu deserved a better fate than +had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly +fail to improve on the work of my predecessors." + Clearly, Dr. Giles' work established much of the groundwork +for the work of later translators who published their own +editions. Of the later editions of the ART OF WAR I have +examined; two feature Giles' edited translation and notes, the +other two present the same basic information from the ancient +Chinese commentators found in the Giles edition. Of these four, +Giles' 1910 edition is the most scholarly and presents the reader +an incredible amount of information concerning Sun Tzu's text, +much more than any other translation. + The Giles' edition of the ART OF WAR, as stated above, was a +scholarly work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time +and an assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and +Manuscripts in the British Museum. Apparently he wanted to +produce a definitive edition, superior to anything else that +existed and perhaps something that would become a standard +translation. It was the best translation available for 50 years. +But apparently there was not much interest in Sun Tzu in English- +speaking countries since it took the start of the Second +World War to renew interest in his work. Several people +published unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzu. In +1944, Dr. Giles' translation was edited and published in the +United States in a series of military science books. But it +wasn't until 1963 that a good English translation (by Samuel B. +Griffith and still in print) was published that was an equal to +Giles' translation. While this translation is more lucid than +Dr. Giles' translation, it lacks his copious notes that make his +so interesting. + Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of +the Chinese civilization and language. It contains the Chinese +text of Sun Tzu, the English translation, and voluminous notes +along with numerous footnotes. Unfortunately, some of his notes +and footnotes contain Chinese characters; some are completely +Chinese. Thus, a conversion to a Latin alphabet etext was +difficult. I did the conversion in complete ignorance of Chinese +(except for what I learned while doing the conversion). Thus, I +faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it while retaining as +much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase +represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of +the text as possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese +concordance, I was able to transliterate proper names, books, and +the like at the risk of making the text more obscure. However, +the text, on the whole, is quite satisfactory for the casual +reader, a transformation made possible by conversion to an etext. +However, I come away from this task with the feeling of loss +because I know that someone with a background in Chinese can do a +better job than I did; any such attempt would be welcomed. + + Bob Sutton + al876@cleveland.freenet.edu + bobs@gnu.ai.mit.edu + +----------------------------------------------------------------- +INTRODUCTION + + +Sun Wu and his Book +------------------- + + + Ssu-ma Ch`ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzu: [1] +-- + + Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Ch`i State. His ART OF + WAR brought him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho + Lu said to him: "I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. + May I submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight + test?" + Sun Tzu replied: "You may." + Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" + The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements + were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzu + divided them into two companies, and placed one of the King's + favorite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them + all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: "I + presume you know the difference between front and back, right + hand and left hand?" + The girls replied: Yes. + Sun Tzu went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must + look straight ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face + towards your left hand. When I say "Right turn," you must + face towards your right hand. When I say "About turn," you + must face right round towards your back." + Again the girls assented. The words of command having + been thus explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes + in order to begin the drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he + gave the order "Right turn." But the girls only burst out + laughing. Sun Tzu said: "If words of command are not clear + and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then + the general is to blame." + So he started drilling them again, and this time gave + the order "Left turn," whereupon the girls once more burst + into fits of laughter. Sun Tzu: "If words of command are + not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly + understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders ARE + clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the + fault of their officers." + So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies + to be beheaded. Now the king of Wu was watching the scene + from the top of a raised pavilion; and when he saw that his + favorite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly + alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: "We + are now quite satisfied as to our general's ability to handle + troops. If We are bereft of these two concubines, our meat + and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish that they + shall not be beheaded." + Sun Tzu replied: "Having once received His Majesty's + commission to be the general of his forces, there are certain + commands of His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am + unable to accept." + Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and + straightway installed the pair next in order as leaders in + their place. When this had been done, the drum was sounded + for the drill once more; and the girls went through all the + evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching + ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect + accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then + Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your soldiers, + Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for + your majesty's inspection. They can be put to any use that + their sovereign may desire; bid them go through fire and + water, and they will not disobey." + But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling + and return to camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down + and inspect the troops." + Thereupon Sun Tzu said: "The King is only fond of + words, and cannot translate them into deeds." + After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzu was one who knew how + to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the + west, he defeated the Ch`u State and forced his way into + Ying, the capital; to the north he put fear into the States + of Ch`i and Chin, and spread his fame abroad amongst the + feudal princes. And Sun Tzu shared in the might of the King. + + About Sun Tzu himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch`ien has to +tell us in this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of +his descendant, Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his +famous ancestor's death, and also the outstanding military genius +of his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzu, and in +his preface we read: "Sun Tzu had his feet cut off and yet +continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It seems likely, then, +that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, +unless the story was invented in order to account for the name. +The crowning incident of his career, the crushing defeat of his +treacherous rival P`ang Chuan, will be found briefly related in +Chapter V. ss. 19, note. + To return to the elder Sun Tzu. He is mentioned in two +other passages of the SHIH CHI: -- + + In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of + Wu, took the field with Tzu-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P`ei, + and attacked Ch`u. He captured the town of Shu and slew the + two prince's sons who had formerly been generals of Wu. He + was then meditating a descent on Ying [the capital]; but the + general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It is not yet + possible. We must wait".... [After further successful + fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu + addressed Wu Tzu-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you + declared that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. + Is the time ripe now?" The two men replied: "Ch`u's general + Tzu-ch`ang, [4] is grasping and covetous, and the princes of + T`ang and Ts`ai both have a grudge against him. If Your + Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win + over T`ang and Ts`ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu + followed this advice, [beat Ch`u in five pitched battles and + marched into Ying.] [5] + + This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun +Wu. He does not appear to have survived his patron, who died +from the effects of a wound in 496. + In another chapter there occurs this passage: [6] + + From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers + arose, one after the other: Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by + the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] in the service of Ch`i; and Sun + Wu, in the service of Wu. These men developed and threw + light upon the principles of war. + + It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch`ien at least had no +doubt about the reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and +with one exception, to be noticed presently, he is by far the +most important authority on the period in question. It will not +be necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as the WU +YUEH CH`UN CH`IU, which is supposed to have been written by Chao +Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution is somewhat +doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of +little value, based as it is on the SHIH CHI and expanded with +romantic details. The story of Sun Tzu will be found, for what +it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth +noting are: (1) Sun Tzu was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu +Tzu-hsu. (2) He is called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously +lived a retired life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his +ability. + The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzu: "When +sovereign and ministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible +even for a Sun Tzu to encounter the foe." Assuming that this +work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast upon it), we +have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzu, for Huai-nan +Tzu died in 122 B.C., many years before the SHIH CHI was given to +the world. + Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzu at the +head of 30,000 men beat Ch`u with 200,000 is that the latter were +undisciplined." + Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was +bestowed on Sun Wu's grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch`i [547-490 +B.C.]. Sun Wu's father Sun P`ing, rose to be a Minister of State +in Ch`i, and Sun Wu himself, whose style was Ch`ang-ch`ing, fled +to Wu on account of the rebellion which was being fomented by the +kindred of T`ien Pao. He had three sons, of whom the second, +named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. According to this account +then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering that Sun +Pin's victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed +as chronological impossible. Whence these data were obtained by +Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course no reliance whatever +can be placed in them. + An interesting document which has survived from the close of +the Han period is the short preface written by the Great Ts`ao +Ts`ao, or Wei Wu Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzu. I shall give it +in full: -- + + I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to + their advantage. [10] The SHU CHU mentions "the army" among + the "eight objects of government." The I CHING says: + "'army' indicates firmness and justice; the experienced + leader will have good fortune." The SHIH CHING says: "The + King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshaled his + troops." The Yellow Emperor, T`ang the Completer and Wu Wang + all used spears and battle-axes in order to succor their + generation. The SSU-MA FA says: "If one man slay another of + set purpose, he himself may rightfully be slain." He who + relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated; he + who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish. + Instances of this are Fu Ch`ai [11] on the one hand and Yen + Wang on the other. [12] In military matters, the Sage's rule + is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only + when occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless + driven to it by necessity. + Many books have I read on the subject of war and + fighting; but the work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest + of them all. [Sun Tzu was a native of the Ch`i state, his + personal name was Wu. He wrote the ART OF WAR in 13 chapters + for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were tested on women, + and he was subsequently made a general. He led an army + westwards, crushed the Ch`u state and entered Ying the + capital. In the north, he kept Ch`i and Chin in awe. A + hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was + a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment of deliberation + and planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the field, + [14] clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun Tzu + stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My + contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full + meaning of his instructions, and while putting into practice + the smaller details in which his work abounds, they have + overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive which + has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. + + One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit +statement that the 13 chapters were specially composed for King +Ho Lu. This is supported by the internal evidence of I. ss. 15, +in which it seems clear that some ruler is addressed. + In the bibliographic section of the HAN SHU, there is an +entry which has given rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun +Tzu of Wu in 82 P`IEN (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 CHUAN." +It is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to +Ssu-ma Ch`ien, or those we possess today. Chang Shou-chieh +refers to an edition of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR of which the "13 +chapters" formed the first CHUAN, adding that there were two +other CHUAN besides. This has brought forth a theory, that the +bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tzu +-- we should call them apocryphal -- similar to the WEN TA, of +which a specimen dealing with the Nine Situations [15] is +preserved in the T`UNG TIEN, and another in Ho Shin's commentary. +It is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzu had +only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of +exegesis in the form of question and answer between himself and +the King. Pi I-hsun, the author of the SUN TZU HSU LU, backs +this up with a quotation from the WU YUEH CH`UN CH`IU: "The King +of Wu summoned Sun Tzu, and asked him questions about the art of +war. Each time he set forth a chapter of his work, the King +could not find words enough to praise him." As he points out, if +the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the above- +mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail +to be considerable. Then the numerous other treatises attributed +to Sun Tzu might be included. The fact that the HAN CHIH +mentions no work of Sun Tzu except the 82 P`IEN, whereas the Sui +and T`ang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition to +the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that all of +these were contained in the 82 P`IEN. Without pinning our faith +to the accuracy of details supplied by the WU YUEH CH`UN CH`IU, +or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi +I-hsun, we may see in this theory a probable solution of the +mystery. Between Ssu-ma Ch`ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of +time for a luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up under the +magic name of Sun Tzu, and the 82 P`IEN may very well represent a +collected edition of these lumped together with the original +work. It is also possible, though less likely, that some of them +existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely +ignored by him. [16] + Tu Mu's conjecture seems to be based on a passage which +states: "Wei Wu Ti strung together Sun Wu's Art of War," which +in turn may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the final +words of Ts`ao King's preface. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points +out, is only a modest way of saying that he made an explanatory +paraphrase, or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the +whole, this theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, +the SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU says: "The mention of the 13 chapters in +the SHIH CHI shows that they were in existence before the HAN +CHIH, and that latter accretions are not to be considered part of +the original work. Tu Mu's assertion can certainly not be taken +as proof." + There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters +existed in the time of Ssu-ma Ch`ien practically as we have them +now. That the work was then well known he tells us in so many +words. "Sun Tzu's 13 Chapters and Wu Ch`i's Art of War are the +two books that people commonly refer to on the subject of +military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I will +not discuss them here." But as we go further back, serious +difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact which has to be +faced is that the TSO CHUAN, the greatest contemporary record, +makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as a general or as +a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, +that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun +Wu as given in the SHIH CHI, but even show themselves frankly +skeptical as to the existence of the man at all. The most +powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in +the following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17] -- + + It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch`ien's history that Sun Wu was + a native of the Ch`i State, and employed by Wu; and that in + the reign of Ho Lu he crushed Ch`u, entered Ying, and was a + great general. But in Tso's Commentary no Sun Wu appears at + all. It is true that Tso's Commentary need not contain + absolutely everything that other histories contain. But Tso + has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling + ruffians such as Ying K`ao-shu, [18] Ts`ao Kuei, [19], Chu + Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of Sun Wu, whose + fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much + more glaring. Again, details are given, in their due order, + about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P`ei. [21] + Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been passed + over? + In point of literary style, Sun Tzu's work belongs to + the same school as KUAN TZU, [22] LIU T`AO, [23] and the YUEH + YU [24] and may have been the production of some private + scholar living towards the end of the "Spring and Autumn" or + the beginning of the "Warring States" period. [25] The story + that his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is + merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his followers. + From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] + down to the time of the "Spring and Autumn," all military + commanders were statesmen as well, and the class of + professional generals, for conducting external campaigns, did + not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six + States" [27] that this custom changed. Now although Wu was + an uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso should have + left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and + yet held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about + Jang-chu [28] and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the + reckless fabrication of theorizing pundits. The story of Ho + Lu's experiment on the women, in particular, is utterly + preposterous and incredible. + + Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch`ien as having said that +Sun Wu crushed Ch`u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. +No doubt the impression left on the reader's mind is that he at +least shared in these exploits. The fact may or may not be +significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the SHIH CHI +either that Sun Tzu was general on the occasion of the taking of +Ying, or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know +that Wu Yuan and Po P`ei both took part in the expedition, and +also that its success was largely due to the dash and enterprise +of Fu Kai, Ho Lu's younger brother, it is not easy to see how yet +another general could have played a very prominent part in the +same campaign. + Ch`en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note: -- + + Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their + art. But the fact that he does not appear in the TSO CHUAN, + although he is said to have served under Ho Lu King of Wu, + makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to. + +He also says: -- + + The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch`i may be of genuine + antiquity. + + It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch`en Chen-sun, +while rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma +Ch`ien's history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally +assigned to the work which passes under his name. The author of +the HSU LU fails to appreciate this distinction, and consequently +his bitter attack on Ch`en Chen-sun really misses its mark. He +makes one of two points, however, which certainly tell in favor +of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters." "Sun Tzu," he says, +"must have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519-476], because he +is frequently plagiarized in subsequent works of the Chou, Ch`in +and Han dynasties." The two most shameless offenders in this +respect are Wu Ch`i and Huai-nan Tzu, both of them important +historical personages in their day. The former lived only a +century after the alleged date of Sun Tzu, and his death is known +to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu +Hsiang, that Tseng Shen delivered the TSO CHUAN, which had been +entrusted to him by its author. [29] Now the fact that +quotations from the ART OF WAR, acknowledged or otherwise, are to +be found in so many authors of different epochs, establishes a +very strong anterior to them all, -- in other words, that Sun +Tzu's treatise was already in existence towards the end of the +5th century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzu's antiquity is +furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to +a number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might +perhaps be extended, is given in the HSU LU; and though some of +the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly +affected thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui- +hsin, a scholar and critic of the first rank, deliberately +pronounces the style of the 13 chapters to belong to the early +part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually engaged in +an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be +sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a +later date had he not honestly believed the contrary. And it is +precisely on such a point that the judgment of an educated +Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal evidence is not +far to seek. Thus in XIII. ss. 1, there is an unmistakable +allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already +passed away by the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it +revived in a modified form. [30] The only warfare Sun Tzu knows +is that carried on between the various feudal princes, in which +armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have +entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks +as a man of Wu, a state which ceased to exist as early as 473 +B.C. On this I shall touch presently. + + But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and +the chances of its being other than a bona fide production are +sensibly diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come +until long after. That it should have been forged in the period +immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no one, +as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for +Yeh Shui-hsin's theory, that the author was a literary recluse, +that seems to me quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent +than another after reading the maxims of Sun Tzu, it is that +their essence has been distilled from a large store of personal +observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of a +born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, +but also of a practical soldier closely acquainted with the +military conditions of his time. To say nothing of the fact that +these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest +captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination of +freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite +excludes the idea that they were artificially concocted in the +study. If we admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine +production of a military man living towards the end of the "CH`UN +CH`IU" period, are we not bound, in spite of the silence of the +TSO CHUAN, to accept Ssu-ma Ch`ien's account in its entirety? In +view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not +hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu's +biography were false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must +be in the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, +objection to the chronology involved in the story as told in the +SHIH CHI, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed +out. There are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he alludes to +contemporary affairs. The first in in VI. ss. 21: -- + + Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh + exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing + in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be + achieved. + +The other is in XI. ss. 30: -- + + Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN, I + should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh + are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same + boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each + other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. + + These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of +the date of composition. They assign the work to the period of +the struggle between Wu and Yueh. So much has been observed by +Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped notice is that they +also seriously impair the credibility of Ssu-ma Ch`ien's +narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive date given +in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken of as a +general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his +alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken place, and +of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier still. +But at that time, and for several years after, down to the +capture of Ying in 506, Ch`u and not Yueh, was the great +hereditary enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch`u and Wu, had been +constantly at war for over half a century, [31] whereas the first +war between Wu and Yueh was waged only in 510, [32] and even then +was no more than a short interlude sandwiched in the midst of the +fierce struggle with Ch`u. Now Ch`u is not mentioned in the 13 +chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were written +at a time when Yueh had become the prime antagonist of Wu, that +is, after Ch`u had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At +this point, a table of dates may be found useful. + +B.C. | + | +514 | Accession of Ho Lu. +512 | Ho Lu attacks Ch`u, but is dissuaded from entering Ying, + | the capital. SHI CHI mentions Sun Wu as general. +511 | Another attack on Ch`u. +510 | Wu makes a successful attack on Yueh. This is the first + | war between the two states. +509 | + or | Ch`u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at Yu-chang. +508 | +506 | Ho Lu attacks Ch`u with the aid of T`ang and Ts`ai. + | Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last + | mention of Sun Wu in SHIH CHI. +505 | Yueh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu + | is beaten by Ch`in and evacuates Ying. +504 | Ho Lu sends Fu Ch`ai to attack Ch`u. +497 | Kou Chien becomes King of Yueh. +496 | Wu attacks Yueh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at Tsui-li. + | Ho Lu is killed. +494 | Fu Ch`ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of Fu- + | chaio, and enters the capital of Yueh. +485 | + or | Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzu-hsu. +484 | +482 | Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch`ai. +478 | + to | Further attacks by Yueh on Wu. +476 | +475 | Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu. +473 | Final defeat and extinction of Wu. + + The sentence quoted above from VI. ss. 21 hardly strikes me +as one that could have been written in the full flush of victory. +It seems rather to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide +had turned against Wu, and that she was getting the worst of the +struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was not in +existence in 505, before which date Yueh does not appear to have +scored any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so +that if the book was written for him, it must have been during +the period 505-496, when there was a lull in the hostilities, Wu +having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort against Ch`u. +On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition +connecting Sun Wu's name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have +seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period +482-473, when Yueh was once again becoming a very serious menace. +[33] We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may +have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. +On this point the negative testimony of the TSO CHUAN far +outweighs any shred of authority still attaching to the SHIH CHI, +if once its other facts are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, +makes a feeble attempt to explain the omission of his name from +the great commentary. It was Wu Tzu-hsu, he says, who got all +the credit of Sun Wu's exploits, because the latter (being an +alien) was not rewarded with an office in the State. + How then did the Sun Tzu legend originate? It may be that +the growing celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of +factitious renown to its author. It was felt to be only right +and proper that one so well versed in the science of war should +have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture +of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu's +reign; it made a deep and lasting impression on all the +surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of +her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than that +the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly +identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense +that his brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was +actually carried out by him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po +P`ei and Fu Kai? + It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the +outline of Sun Tzu's life must be based almost wholly on +conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I should say that he +probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu's +accession, and gathered experience, though only in the capacity +of a subordinate officer, during the intense military activity +which marked the first half of the prince's reign. [35] If he +rose to be a general at all, he certainly was never on an equal +footing with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless present +at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu's +sudden collapse in the following year. Yueh's attack at this +critical juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, +seems to have convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the +great enemy against whom every effort would henceforth have to be +directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he sat +down to write his famous book, which according to my reckoning +must have appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning of +Ho Lu's reign. The story of the women may possibly have grown +out of some real incident occurring about the same time. As we +hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is hardly +likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the +death-struggle with Yueh, which began with the disaster at Tsui- +li. + If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a +certain irony in the fate which decreed that China's most +illustrious man of peace should be contemporary with her greatest +writer on war. + + +The Text of Sun Tzu +------------------- + + + I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of +Sun Tzu's text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to +show that the "13 chapters" of which Ssu-ma Ch`ien speaks were +essentially the same as those now extant. We have his word for +it that they were widely circulated in his day, and can only +regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account. +Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface: -- + + During the Ch`in and Han dynasties Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR + was in general use amongst military commanders, but they seem + to have treated it as a work of mysterious import, and were + unwilling to expound it for the benefit of posterity. Thus + it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary + on it. + + As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to +suppose that Ts`ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text +itself is often so obscure, and the number of editions which +appeared from that time onward so great, especially during the +T`ang and Sung dynasties, that it would be surprising if numerous +corruptions had not managed to creep in. Towards the middle of +the Sung period, by which time all the chief commentaries on Sun +Tzu were in existence, a certain Chi T`ien-pao published a work +in 15 CHUAN entitled "Sun Tzu with the collected commentaries of +ten writers." There was another text, with variant readings put +forward by Chu Fu of Ta-hsing, which also had supporters among +the scholars of that period; but in the Ming editions, Sun Hsing- +yen tells us, these readings were for some reason or other no +longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th +century, the text in sole possession of the field was one derived +from Chi T`ien-pao's edition, although no actual copy of that +important work was known to have survived. That, therefore, is +the text of Sun Tzu which appears in the War section of the great +Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the KU CHIN T`U SHU CHI +CH`ENG. Another copy at my disposal of what is practically the +same text, with slight variations, is that contained in the +"Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch`in dynasties" [1758]. +And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop's first edition is +evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese +channels. So things remained until Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a +distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, who claimed to +be an actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered a +copy of Chi T`ien-pao's long-lost work, when on a visit to the +library of the Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the I +SHUO of Cheng Yu-Hsien, mentioned in the T`UNG CHIH, and also +believed to have perished. This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates +as the "original edition (or text)" -- a rather misleading name, +for it cannot by any means claim to set before us the text of Sun +Tzu in its pristine purity. Chi T`ien-pao was a careless +compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the +somewhat debased version current in his day, without troubling to +collate it with the earliest editions then available. +Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzu, even older than the newly +discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the T`UNG TIEN, +Tu Yu's great treatise on the Constitution, the other similarly +enshrined in the T`AI P`ING YU LAN encyclopedia. In both the +complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments, +intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a +number of different sections. Considering that the YU LAN takes +us back to the year 983, and the T`UNG TIEN about 200 years +further still, to the middle of the T`ang dynasty, the value of +these early transcripts of Sun Tzu can hardly be overestimated. +Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to +anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government instructions, +undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his own +account: -- + + Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu + which his editors had handed down, the Government ordered + that the ancient edition [of Chi T`ien-pao] should be used, + and that the text should be revised and corrected throughout. + It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a + graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to + this study, probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I + have had the whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for + military men. + + The three individuals here referred to had evidently been +occupied on the text of Sun Tzu prior to Sun Hsing-yen's +commission, but we are left in doubt as to the work they really +accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when ultimately +produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one co- +editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original edition" as their +basis, and by careful comparison with older versions, as well as +the extant commentaries and other sources of information such as +the I SHUO, succeeded in restoring a very large number of +doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be +accepted as the closes approximation we are ever likely to get to +Sun Tzu's original work. This is what will hereafter be +denominated the "standard text." + The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. +it is in 6 PEN, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early +philosophical works in 83 PEN. [38] It opens with a preface by +Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating +the traditional view of Sun Tzu's life and performances, and +summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its +favor. This is followed by Ts`ao Kung's preface to his edition, +and the biography of Sun Tzu from the SHIH CHI, both translated +above. Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien's I SHUO, [39] with +author's preface, and next, a short miscellany of historical and +bibliographical information entitled SUN TZU HSU LU, compiled by +Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate +sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then +by the various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in +chronological order. These we shall now proceed to discuss +briefly, one by one. + + +The Commentators +---------------- + + + Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll +of commentators, which would do honor to any classic. Ou-yang +Hsiu remarks on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was +complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by saying that the +artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be +susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways. + + 1. TS`AO TS`AO or Ts`ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti +[A.D. 155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the +earliest commentary on Sun Tzu actually came from the pen of this +extraordinary man, whose biography in the SAN KUO CHIH reads like +a romance. One of the greatest military geniuses that the world +has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his operations, he was +especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches, which +has found expression in the line "Talk of Ts`ao Ts`ao, and Ts`ao +Ts`ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a great +captain who "measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and +the two Yuan, father and son, and vanquished them all; whereupon +he divided the Empire of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself +king. It is recorded that whenever a council of war was held by +Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all his +calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not +lose one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any +particular saw their armies incontinently beaten and put to +flight." Ts`ao Kung's notes on Sun Tzu, models of austere +brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic of the stern commander +known to history, that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as +the work of a mere LITTERATEUR. Sometimes, indeed, owing to +extreme compression, they are scarcely intelligible and stand no +less in need of a commentary than the text itself. [40] + + 2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us +under this name is comparatively meager, and nothing about the +author is known. Even his personal name has not been recorded. +Chi T`ien-pao's edition places him after Chia Lin,and Ch`ao Kung- +wu also assigns him to the T`ang dynasty, [41] but this is a +mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen's preface, he appears as Meng Shih of +the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would identify him with Meng +K`ang of the 3rd century. He is named in one work as the last of +the "Five Commentators," the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch`en +Hao and Chia Lin. + + 3. LI CH`UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on +military tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down +to the present day. The T`UNG CHIH mentions "Lives of famous +generals from the Chou to the T`ang dynasty" as written by him. +[42] According to Ch`ao Kung-wu and the T`IEN-I-KO catalogue, he +followed a variant of the text of Sun Tzu which differs +considerably from those now extant. His notes are mostly short +and to the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by +anecdotes from Chinese history. + + 4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary +on Sun Tzu, his notes being taken from the T`UNG TIEN, the +encyclopedic treatise on the Constitution which was his life- +work. They are largely repetitions of Ts`ao Kung and Meng Shih, +besides which it is believed that he drew on the ancient +commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar +arrangement of T`UNG TIEN, he has to explain each passage on its +merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his own explanation +does not agree with that of Ts`ao Kung, whom he always quotes +first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the "Ten +Commentators," he was added to their number by Chi T`ien-pao, +being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. + + 5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet -- a +bright star even in the glorious galaxy of the T`ang period. We +learn from Ch`ao Kung-wu that although he had no practical +experience of war, he was extremely fond of discussing the +subject, and was moreover well read in the military history of +the CH`UN CH`IU and CHAN KUO eras. His notes, therefore, are +well worth attention. They are very copious, and replete with +historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzu's work is thus +summarized by him: "Practice benevolence and justice, but on the +other hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency." +He further declared that all the military triumphs and disasters +of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Tzu's death +would, upon examination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in +every particular, the maxims contained in his book. Tu Mu's +somewhat spiteful charge against Ts`ao Kung has already been +considered elsewhere. + + 6. CH`EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. +Ch`ao Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary +on Sun Tzu because Ts`ao Kung's on the one hand was too obscure +and subtle, and that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and +diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the middle of the 11th +century, calls Ts`ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch`en Hao the three chief +commentators on Sun Tzu, and observes that Ch`en Hao is +continually attacking Tu Mu's shortcomings. His commentary, +though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of his +predecessors. + + 7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T`ang dynasty, +for his commentary on Sun Tzu is mentioned in the T`ang Shu and +was afterwards republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty +together with those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat +scanty texture, and in point of quality, too, perhaps the least +valuable of the eleven. + + 8. MEI YAO-CH`EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" +as Mei Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His +commentary was published with a laudatory preface by the great +Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the following: -- + + Later scholars have misread Sun Tzu, distorting his + words and trying to make them square with their own one-sided + views. Thus, though commentators have not been lacking, only + a few have proved equal to the task. My friend Sheng-yu has + not fallen into this mistake. In attempting to provide a + critical commentary for Sun Tzu's work, he does not lose + sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states + engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not + concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the + sovereigns of the three ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the + nine punitive measures prescribed to the Minister of War. + [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning + is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or + handling soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling + the forces of victory, it is always systematically treated; + the sayings are bound together in strict logical sequence, + though this has been obscured by commentators who have + probably failed to grasp their meaning. In his own + commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the obstinate + prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out the + true meaning of Sun Tzu himself. In this way, the clouds of + confusion have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I + am convinced that the present work deserves to be handed down + side by side with the three great commentaries; and for a + great deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations + will have constant reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu. + + Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am +inclined to endorse this favorable judgment, and would certainly +place him above Ch`en Hao in order of merit. + + 9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly +original in some of his interpretations, but much less judicious +than Mei Yao-ch`en, and on the whole not a very trustworthy +guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary with that of +Ts`ao Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to him. +We learn from Ch`ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient +text of Sun Tzu, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes. [45] + + 10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of +this commentator is given as above by Cheng Ch`iao in the TUNG +CHIH, written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he +appears simply as Ho Shih in the YU HAI, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes +Ch`ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is unknown. There +seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch`iao's statement, +otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and +identify him with one Ho Ch`u-fei, the author of a short treatise +on war, who lived in the latter part of the 11th century. Ho +Shih's commentary, in the words of the T`IEN-I-KO catalogue, +"contains helpful additions" here and there, but is chiefly +remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from +the dynastic histories and other sources. + + 11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no +great originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of +lucid exposition. His commentator is based on that of Ts`ao +Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to expand and develop in +masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much +of Ts`ao Kung's commentary would have remained cloaked in its +pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not +mentioned in the Sung history, the T`UNG K`AO, or the YU HAI, but +it finds a niche in the T`UNG CHIH, which also names him as the +author of the "Lives of Famous Generals." [46] + It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all +have flourished within so short a space of time. Ch`ao Kung-wu +accounts for it by saying: "During the early years of the Sung +dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased +to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao's rebellion +came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after +time, the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, +and military topics became the vogue amongst all the high +officials. Hence it is that the commentators of Sun Tzu in our +dynasty belong mainly to that period. [47] + + Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others +whose work has not come down to us. The SUI SHU mentions four, +namely Wang Ling (often quoted by Tu Yu as Wang Tzu); Chang Tzu- +shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; [48] and Shen Yu of Wu. The T`ANG SHU +adds Sun Hao, and the T`UNG CHIH Hsiao Chi, while the T`U SHU +mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that +some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of +other commentaries, like Chi T`ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned +above. + + +Appreciations of Sun Tzu +------------------------ + + + Sun Tzu has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of +some of China's greatest men. Among the famous generals who are +known to have studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned +Han Hsin (d. 196 B.C.), [49] Feng I (d. 34 A.D.), [50] Lu Meng +(d. 219), [51] and Yo Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of Ts`ao +Kung, who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese +military annals, has already been recorded. [53] Still more +remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of purely literary men, +such as Su Hsun (the father of Su Tung-p`o), who wrote several +essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief +inspiration to Sun Tzu. The following short passage by him is +preserved in the YU HAI: [54] -- + + Sun Wu's saying, that in war one cannot make certain of + conquering, [55] is very different indeed from what other + books tell us. [56] Wu Ch`i was a man of the same stamp as + Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and they are linked + together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu Ch`i's + remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and + more crudely stated, and there is not the same unity of plan + as in Sun Tzu's work, where the style is terse, but the + meaning fully brought out. + + The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in +the Garden of Literature" by Cheng Hou: -- + + Sun Tzu's 13 chapters are not only the staple and base + of all military men's training, but also compel the most + careful attention of scholars and men of letters. His + sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, + perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the LUN + YU, the I CHING and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the + writings of Mencius, Hsun K`uang and Yang Chu, all fall below + the level of Sun Tzu. + + Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of +the criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with +the venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says, +"encourages a ruler's bent towards unrelenting warfare and +reckless militarism." + + +Apologies for War +----------------- + + + Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest +peace-loving nation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting +that her experience of war in all its phases has also been such +as no modern State can parallel. Her long military annals +stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of +time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge +standing army along her frontier centuries before the first Roman +legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the perpetual +collisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts with +Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of +government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the +overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions +and minor disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out +again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that the clash of +arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the +Empire. + No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains +to whom China can point with pride. As in all countries, the +greatest are fond of emerging at the most fateful crises of her +history. Thus, Po Ch`i stands out conspicuous in the period when +Ch`in was entering upon her final struggle with the remaining +independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up +of the Ch`in dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius +of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its +fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts`ao Ts`ao dominates the +scene. And in the establishment of the T`ang dynasty,one of the +mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li +Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T`ai Tsung) was seconded by the +brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear +comparison with the greatest names in the military history of +Europe. + In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, +from Lao Tzu downwards, and especially as reflected in the +standard literature of Confucianism, has been consistently +pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any form. It is +such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending +warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to +collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view +is upheld. The following, by Ssu-ma Ch`ien, shows that for all +his ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of +peace at any price: -- + + Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to + punish violence and cruelty, to give peace to troublous + times, to remove difficulties and dangers, and to succor + those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins + and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How + much more so will man, who carries in his breast the + faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger! When he is + pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him; when + angry, his poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the + natural law which governs his being.... What then shall be + said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great + issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who + can only bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and + "civilization," condemning the use of military weapons? They + will surely bring our country to impotence and dishonor and + the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, + they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of + territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately + refuse to modify the position they have taken up. The truth + is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare the + rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, + so military chastisement can never be allowed to fall into + abeyance in the Empire. All one can say is that this power + will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and + that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others + rebellious. [58] + + The next piece is taken from Tu Mu's preface to his +commentary on Sun Tzu: -- + + War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the + functions of government. It was the profession of Chung Yu + and Jan Ch`iu, both disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the + holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the imprisonment + of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market- + place, are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge + armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the hauling of + women and children into captivity, and the beheading of + traitors -- this is also work which is done by officials. + The objects of the rack and of military weapons are + essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference + between the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in + war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily + dealt with, only a small amount of force need be employed: + hence the use of military weapons and wholesale decapitation. + In both cases, however, the end in view is to get rid of + wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good.... + Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired + your military aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu + replied: "It has been acquired by study." [59] "How can + that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a disciple of + Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by + Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should exercise + both civil and military functions, though to be sure my + instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very + far." + Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction + between the "civil" and the "military," and the limitation of + each to a separate sphere of action, or in what year of which + dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say. + But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the + governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on military + topics, or do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are + bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set down + as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. + This is an extraordinary instance in which, through sheer + lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose sight of fundamental + principles. + When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch`eng Wang, he + regulated ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts + of scholarship and learning; yet when the barbarians of the + River Huai revolted, [60] he sallied forth and chastised + them. When Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a + meeting was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If pacific + negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should + have been made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the + Marquis of Ch`i, who cowered under him and dared not proceed + to violence. How can it be said that these two great Sages + had no knowledge of military matters? + + We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzu in high +esteem. He also appeals to the authority of the Classics: -- + + Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: + "I have never studied matters connected with armies and + battalions." [62] Replying to K`ung Wen-tzu, he said: I + have not been instructed about buff-coats and weapons." But + if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he used + armed force against the men of Lai, so that the marquis of + Ch`i was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi + revolted; he ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon + they were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered + the words: "If I fight, I conquer." [63] And Jan Yu also + said: "The Sage exercises both civil and military + functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never + studied or received instruction in the art of war? We can + only say that he did not specially choose matters connected + with armies and fighting to be the subject of his teaching. + + Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzu, writes in similar +strain: -- + + Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." + [65] He also said: "If I fight, I conquer." Confucius + ordered ceremonies and regulated music. Now war constitutes + one of the five classes of State ceremonial, [66] and must + not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the + words "I am unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are + things which even an inspired Teacher does not know. Those + who have to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn + the art of war. But if one can command the services of a + good general like Sun Tzu, who was employed by Wu Tzu-hsu, + there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the remark added + by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." + The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret + these words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though + he meant that books on the art of war were not worth reading. + With blind persistency, they adduce the example of Chao Kua, + who pored over his father's books to no purpose, [67] as a + proof that all military theory is useless. Again, seeing + that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism + in designing plans, and the conversion of spies, they hold + that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people + ignore the fact that the studies of our scholars and the + civil administration of our officials also require steady + application and practice before efficiency is reached. The + ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to + botch their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting + perilous; and useless unless a general is in constant + practice, he ought not to hazard other men's lives in battle. + [70] Hence it is essential that Sun Tzu's 13 chapters should + be studied. + Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the + art of war. Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general + bearings, but would not pursue his studies to their proper + outcome, the consequence being that he was finally defeated + and overthrown. He did not realize that the tricks and + artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang + of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to destruction by + their misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand + nature of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem + suited to the occasion. There is a case on record of + Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath, [72] and + also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. [73] Can + we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzu for disregarding truth and + honesty? + + +Bibliography +------------ + + + The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after +Sun Tzu. The notes on each have been drawn principally from the +SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU CHIEN MING MU LU, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. + + 1. WU TZU, in 1 CHUAN or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch`i (d. 381 +B.C.). A genuine work. See SHIH CHI, ch. 65. + + 2. SSU-MA FA, in 1 CHUAN or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed +to Ssu-ma Jang-chu of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, +must be early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are +constantly to be met within its pages. See SHIH CHI, ch. 64. + The SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the +oldest three treatises on war, SUN TZU, WU TZU and SSU-MA FA, +are, generally speaking, only concerned with things strictly +military -- the art of producing, collecting, training and +drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures +of expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the handling +of soldiers -- in strong contrast to later works, in which the +science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, divination +and magical arts in general. + + 3. LIU T`AO, in 6 CHUAN, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu +Wang (or Lu Shang, also known as T`ai Kung) of the 12th century +B.C. [74] But its style does not belong to the era of the Three +Dynasties. Lu Te-ming (550-625 A.D.) mentions the work, and +enumerates the headings of the six sections so that the forgery +cannot have been later than Sui dynasty. + + 4. WEI LIAO TZU, in 5 CHUAN. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th +cent. B.C.), who studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzu. The work +appears to have been originally in 31 chapters, whereas the text +we possess contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the +main, though the strategical devices differ considerably from +those of the Warring States period. It is been furnished with a +commentary by the well-known Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. + + 5. SAN LUEH, in 3 CHUAN. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a +legendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang +Liang (d. 187 B.C.) in an interview on a bridge. But here again, +the style is not that of works dating from the Ch`in or Han +period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently quotes +from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question +may have been inserted later on, in order to prove the +genuineness of the work. We shall not be far out if we refer it +to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], or somewhat earlier. + + 6. LI WEI KUNG WEN TUI, in 3 sections. Written in the form +of a dialogue between T`ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, +it is usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities +consider it a forgery, though the author was evidently well +versed in the art of war. + + 7. LI CHING PING FA (not to be confounded with the +foregoing) is a short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the +T`ung Tien, but not published separately. This fact explains its +omission from the SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU. + + 8. WU CH`I CHING, in 1 CHUAN. Attributed to the legendary +minister Feng Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the +Han dynasty (d. 121 B.C.), and said to have been eulogized by the +celebrated general Ma Lung (d. 300 A.D.). Yet the earliest +mention of it is in the SUNG CHIH. Although a forgery, the work +is well put together. + + Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko +Liang has always been held, it is not surprising to find more +than one work on war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the SHIH +LIU TS`E (1 CHUAN), preserved in the YUNG LO TA TIEN; (2) CHIANG +YUAN (1 CHUAN); and (3) HSIN SHU (1 CHUAN), which steals +wholesale from Sun Tzu. None of these has the slightest claim to +be considered genuine. + Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive +sections devoted to the literature of war. The following +references may be found useful: -- + + T`UNG TIEN (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162. + T`AI P`ING YU LAN (983), ch. 270-359. + WEN HSIEN TUNG K`AO (13th cent.), ch. 221. + YU HAI (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141. + SAN TS`AI T`U HUI (16th cent). + KUANG PO WU CHIH (1607), ch. 31, 32. + CH`IEN CH`IO LEI SHU (1632), ch. 75. + YUAN CHIEN LEI HAN (1710), ch. 206-229. + KU CHIN T`U SHU CHI CH`ENG (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81- + 90. + HSU WEN HSIEN T`UNG K`AO (1784), ch. 121-134. + HUANG CH`AO CHING SHIH WEN PIEN (1826), ch. 76, 77. + + The bibliographical sections of certain historical works +also deserve mention: -- + + CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 30. + SUI SHU, ch. 32-35. + CHIU T`ANG SHU, ch. 46, 47. + HSIN T`ANG SHU, ch. 57,60. + SUNG SHIH, ch. 202-209. + T`UNG CHIH (circa 1150), ch. 68. + + To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the +Imperial Library: -- + + SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU TSUNG MU T`I YAO (1790), ch. 99, 100. + + +Footnotes +--------- + + +1. SHI CHI, ch. 65. + +2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. + +3. SHI CHI, ch. 130. + +4. The appellation of Nang Wa. + +5. SHI CHI, ch. 31. + +6. SHI CHI, ch. 25. + +7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year +637. + +8. Wang-tzu Ch`eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. + +9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a +work of the Han dynasty, which says: "Ten LI outside the WU gate +[of the city of Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great +mound, raised to commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch`i, +who excelled in the art of war, by the King of Wu." + +10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened +wood to make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the +Empire in awe." + +11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and +overthrown by Kou chien, King of Yueh, in 473 B.C. See post. + +12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen +says in his preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction." + +13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the T`U +SHU, and may be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang +Shou-chieh of the T`ang dynasty, and appears in the T`AI P`ING YU +LAN. + +14. Ts`ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. +II, perhaps especially of ss. 8. + +15. See chap. XI. + +16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that WU TZU, which is +not in 6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the HAN CHIH. +Likewise, the CHUNG YUNG is credited with 49 chapters, though now +only in one only. In the case of very short works, one is +tempted to think that P`IEN might simply mean "leaves." + +17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. + +18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. + +19. See Chapter 7, ss. 27 and Chapter 11, ss. 28. + +20. See Chapter 11, ss. 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form +of his name. + +21. I.e. Po P`ei. See ante. + +22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large +additions have been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 +B.C. + +23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. + +24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter +of another work. Why that chapter should be singled out, +however, is not clear. + +25. About 480 B.C. + +26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. + +27. In the 3rd century B.C. + +28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T`ien, lived in the +latter half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have +written a work on war. See SHIH CHI, ch. 64, and infra at the +beginning of the INTRODUCTION. + +29. See Legge's Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge +thinks that the TSO CHUAN must have been written in the 5th +century, but not before 424 B.C. + +30. See MENCIUS III. 1. iii. 13-20. + +31. When Wu first appears in the CH`UN CH`IU in 584, it is +already at variance with its powerful neighbor. The CH`UN CH`IU +first mentions Yueh in 537, the TSO CHUAN in 601. + +32. This is explicitly stated in the TSO CHUAN, XXXII, 2. + +33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud +would tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus +more fully justify the language used in XI. ss. 30. + +34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse: -- a +spurious treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because +he was a great general. Here we have an obvious inducement to +forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, cannot have been widely +known to fame in the 5th century. + +35. From TSO CHUAN: "From the date of King Chao's accession +[515] there was no year in which Ch`u was not attacked by Wu." + +36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are +really descended from Sun Tzu. I am ashamed to say that I only +read my ancestor's work from a literary point of view, without +comprehending the military technique. So long have we been +enjoying the blessings of peace!" + +37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T`ung-kuan on the eastern +border of Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by +those about the ascent of the Western Sacred Mountain. It is +mentioned in a text as being "situated five LI east of the +district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the Hua-shan +tablet inscribed by the T`ang Emperor Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." + +38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. +40. + +39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzu. + +40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His +commentary is frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does +not fully develop the meaning." + +41. WEN HSIEN T`UNG K`AO, ch. 221. + +42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently +discovered chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos +of the Thousand Buddhas." See B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. +525. + +43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named +was nominally existent in Sun Tzu's day, it retained hardly a +vestige of power, and the old military organization had +practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other +explanation of the passage. + +44. See CHOU LI, xxix. 6-10. + +45. T`UNG K`AO, ch. 221. + +46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie's "Notes," p. 91 +(new edition). + +47. T`UNG K`AO, loc. cit. + +48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the +SAN KUO CHIH, ch. 10. + +49. See XI. ss. 58, note. + +50. HOU HAN SHU, ch. 17 ad init. + +51. SAN KUO CHIH, ch. 54. + +52. SUNG SHIH, ch. 365 ad init. + +53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of +acquainting themselves with Sun Tzu are not behindhand in their +praise. In this connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting +from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the +present work were submitted previous to publication: "Many of +Sun Wu's maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and +no. 11 [in Chapter VIII] is one that the people of this country +would do well to take to heart." + +54. Ch. 140. + +55. See IV. ss. 3. + +56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. + +57. The TSO CHUAN. + +58. SHIH CHI, ch. 25, fol. I. + +59. Cf. SHIH CHI, ch 47. + +60. See SHU CHING, preface ss. 55. + +61. See SHIH CHI, ch. 47. + +62. Lun Yu, XV. 1. + +63. I failed to trace this utterance. + +64. Supra. + +65. Supra. + +66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of +guests, and festive rites. See SHU CHING, ii. 1. III. 8, and +CHOU LI, IX. fol. 49. + +67. See XIII. ss. 11, note. + +68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the TSO CHUAN, where +Tzu-ch`an says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you +will not employ a mere learner to make it up." + +69. Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 31. + +70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See LUN +YU, XIII. 29, 30. + +71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. + +72. SHIH CHI, ch. 47. + +73. SHIH CHI, ch. 38. + +74. See XIII. ss. 27, note. Further details on T`ai Kung will +be found in the SHIH CHI, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition +which makes him a former minister of Chou Hsin, two other +accounts of him are there given, according to which he would +appear to have been first raised from a humble private station by +Wen Wang. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +I. LAYING PLANS + + [Ts`ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the +title of this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the +temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we +should say, in his tent. See. ss. 26.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to +the State. + 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to +safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on +no account be neglected. + 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant +factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when +seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. + 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; +(4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline. + + [It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu means by "Moral +Law" a principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its +moral aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale," +were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in ss. 13.] + + 5, 6. The MORAL LAW causes the people to be in complete +accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless +of their lives, undismayed by any danger. + + [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant +practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when +mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will +be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] + + 7. HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and +seasons. + + [The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of +two words here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, +waxing and waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in +saying that what is meant is "the general economy of Heaven," +including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, +and other phenomena.] + + 8. EARTH comprises distances, great and small; danger and +security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and +death. + 9. The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of wisdom, +sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness. + + [The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity +or benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self- +control, or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good +faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or +benevolence," and the two military virtues of "courage" and +"strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self- +respect, self-control, or 'proper feeling.'"] + + 10. By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the +marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the +graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads +by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military +expenditure. + 11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: +he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will +fail. + 12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to +determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of +a comparison, in this wise: -- + 13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the +Moral law? + + [I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. ss. 5.] + + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and +Earth? + + [See ss. 7,8] + + (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? + + [Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts`ao Ts`ao (A.D. +155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in +accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to +standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed +his horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of +losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice +by cutting off his hair. Ts`ao Ts`ao's own comment on the +present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a +law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the +offender must be put to death."] + + (5) Which army is stronger? + + [Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch`en puts it, +freely rendered, "ESPIRIT DE CORPS and 'big battalions.'"] + + (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? + + [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant +practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when +mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will +be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] + + (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in +reward and punishment? + + [On which side is there the most absolute certainty that +merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] + + 14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast +victory or defeat. + 15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon +it, will conquer: --let such a one be retained in command! The +general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will +suffer defeat: --let such a one be dismissed! + + [The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's +treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho +Lu, king of the Wu State.] + + 16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself +also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary +rules. + 17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should +modify one's plans. + + [Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the +"bookish theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to +abstract principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main +laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of +all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in +attempting to secure a favorable position in actual warfare." On +the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the +cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what +his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he +explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and +would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The +Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first +tomorrow -- I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. +"Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea +of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can +you expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ] + + 18. All warfare is based on deception. + + [The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be +admitted by every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that +Wellington, great in so many military qualities, was especially +distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he concealed +his movements and deceived both friend and foe."] + + 19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when +using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we +must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we +must make him believe we are near. + 20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, +and crush him. + + [All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in +disorder, crush him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu +is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.] + + 21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If +he is in superior strength, evade him. + 22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to +irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. + + [Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician +plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first +feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon +him.] + + 23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. + + [This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch`en has the +note: "while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire +himself out." The YU LAN has "Lure him on and tire him out."] + +If his forces are united, separate them. + + [Less plausible is the interpretation favored by most of the +commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put +division between them."] + + 24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are +not expected. + 25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be +divulged beforehand. + 26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many +calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. + + [Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary +for a temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was +about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate +his plan of campaign.] + +The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations +beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few +calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It +is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to +win or lose. + + +[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +II. WAGING WAR + + + [Ts`ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must +first count the cost," which prepares us for the discovery that +the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the +title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are +in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, +and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, + + [The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to +Chang Yu, used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, +and designed for purposes of defense. Li Ch`uan, it is true, +says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable. +It is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese +warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war- +chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus +round which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers. With +regard to the numbers given here, we are informed that each swift +chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy chariot by +25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a +thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a +hundred men.] + +with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI, + + [2.78 modern LI go to a mile. The length may have varied +slightly since Sun Tzu's time.] + +the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment +of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on +chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of +silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 +men. + 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long +in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will +be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your +strength. + 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of +the State will not be equal to the strain. + 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, +your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains +will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, +however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must +ensue. + 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, +cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. + + [This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained +by any of the commentators. Ts`ao Kung, Li Ch`uan, Meng Shih, Tu +Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en have notes to the effect that a +general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer +through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be +stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and +treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they +bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty +by remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, +wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the +people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such +calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be +attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness." +Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by +implication, about ill-considered haste being better than +ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something +much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be +injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish -- if +only because it means impoverishment to the nation. In +considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic example +of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That +general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that +of Hannibals's isolated army, because it seemed to him that the +latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a +strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his +tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their +reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a +negative presumption in their favor.] + + 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from +prolonged warfare. + 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the +evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of +carrying it on. + + [That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous +effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of +rapidity in bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem +to favor this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of +the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know the +evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly +pointless.] + + 8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, +neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. + + [Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in +waiting for reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for +fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. +This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all +great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the +value of time -- that is, being a little ahead of your opponent -- +has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the +nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.] + + 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the +enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs. + + [The Chinese word translated here as "war material" +literally means "things to be used", and is meant in the widest +sense. It includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from +provisions.] + + 10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be +maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to +maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be +impoverished. + + [The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly +with the next, though obviously intended to do so. The +arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help +suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur +to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for +the sense, and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words +Sun Tzu used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment +clearly have reference to some system by which the husbandmen +sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why +should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except +because the State or Government is too poor to do so?] + + 11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes +prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to +be drained away. + + [Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left +its own territory. Ts`ao Kung understands it of an army that has +already crossed the frontier.] + + 12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry +will be afflicted by heavy exactions. + 13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of +strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and +three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; + + [Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted +not of 3/10, but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to +be extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: +"The PEOPLE being regarded as the essential part of the State, +and FOOD as the people's heaven, is it not right that those in +authority should value and be careful of both?"] + +while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, +breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, +protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to +four-tenths of its total revenue. + 15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the +enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to +twenty of one's own, and likewise a single PICUL of his provender +is equivalent to twenty from one's own store. + + [Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of +transporting one cartload to the front. A PICUL is a unit of +measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).] + + 16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused +to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, +they must have their rewards. + + [Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the +soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you +capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so +that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his +own account."] + + 17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more +chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the +first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the +enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with +ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. + 18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment +one's own strength. + 19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not +lengthy campaigns. + + [As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled +with." Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this +chapter is intended to enforce."] + + 20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the +arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether +the nation shall be in peace or in peril. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best +thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to +shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to +recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a +regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. + + [The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, +consisted nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts`ao Kung, the +equivalent of a regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a +detachment consists from any number between 100 and 500, and the +equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last +two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 +respectively.] + + 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not +supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the +enemy's resistance without fighting. + + [Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words +of the old Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the +capitulation of the huge French army at Sedan, was won +practically without bloodshed.] + + 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the +enemy's plans; + + [Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full +force of the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of +defense, whereby one might be content to foil the enemy's +stratagems one after another, but an active policy of counter- +attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the +enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate +him by delivering our own attack first."] + +the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; + + [Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun +Tzu, in speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous +states or principalities into which the China of his day was +split up.] + +the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; + + [When he is already at full strength.] + +and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. + + 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can +possibly be avoided. + + [Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers +acted upon it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their +strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is +more than probable that they would have been masters of the +situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose +them.] + + The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various +implements of war, will take up three whole months; + + [It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here +translated as "mantlets", described. Ts`ao Kung simply defines +them as "large shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li +Ch`uan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were +assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to +suggest a sort of Roman TESTUDO, ready made. Tu Mu says they +were wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is +denied by Ch`en Hao. See supra II. 14. The name is also applied +to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable shelters" we get a +fairly clear description from several commentators. They were +wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from +within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey +parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling +up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now +called "wooden donkeys."] + +and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take +three months more. + + [These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to +the level of the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak +points in the defense, and also to destroy the fortified turrets +mentioned in the preceding note.] + + 5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will +launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, + + [This vivid simile of Ts`ao Kung is taken from the spectacle +of an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the +general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature +attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready.] + +with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the +town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a +siege. + + [We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese +before Port Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to +record.] + + 6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops +without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying +siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy +operations in the field. + + [Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but +does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, +who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed +"Father and mother of the people."] + + 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of +the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be +complete. + + [Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the +latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different +meaning: "And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its +keenness remains perfect."] + +This is the method of attacking by stratagem. + 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the +enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; + + [Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] + +if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. + + [Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, +indeed, it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. +Ts'ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning: "Being +two to the enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the +regular way, and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu +thus further elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as +numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two +divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon +his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed +from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in +front." This is what is meant by saying that 'one part may be +used in the regular way, and the other for some special +diversion.' Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one's army +is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is the regular, +strategical method, and he is too hasty in calling this a +mistake."] + + 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; + + [Li Ch`uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following +paraphrase: "If attackers and attacked are equally matched in +strength, only the able general will fight."] + +if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; + + [The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is certainly a great +improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be +no very good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that +the saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a small +difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by +superior energy and discipline.] + +if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. + 10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small +force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force. + 11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the +bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if +the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak. + + [As Li Ch`uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; +if the general's ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not +thoroughly versed in his profession), his army will lack +strength."] + + 12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring +misfortune upon his army:-- + 13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, +being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called +hobbling the army. + + [Li Ch`uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the +legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One +would naturally think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at +home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a +distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse, and +quote the saying of T`ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be +governed from without, and army should not be directed from +within." Of course it is true that, during an engagement, or +when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in +the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. +Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, +and give wrong orders.] + + 14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as +he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which +obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's +minds. + + [Ts`ao Kung's note is, freely translated: "The military +sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle +an army in kid gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and +justice are the principles on which to govern a state, but not an +army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are +military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of +an army"--to that of a State, understood.] + + 15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without +discrimination, + + [That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the +right place.] + +through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to +circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. + + [I follow Mei Yao-ch`en here. The other commentators refer +not to the ruler, as in SS. 13, 14, but to the officers he +employs. Thus Tu Yu says: "If a general is ignorant of the +principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a +position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skillful employer of +men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, +and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing +his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the +covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man +has no fear of death."] + + 16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble +is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply +bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away. + 17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for +victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to +fight. + + [Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the +offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the +defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is +right to take the offensive or the defensive.] + + (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and +inferior forces. + + [This is not merely the general's ability to estimate +numbers correctly, as Li Ch`uan and others make out. Chang Yu +expounds the saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of +war, it is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and +vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not +letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu says: 'With a +superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make +for difficult ground.'"] + + (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit +throughout all its ranks. + (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the +enemy unprepared. + (5) He will win who has military capacity and is not +interfered with by the sovereign. + + [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "It is the sovereign's +function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it +is the function of the general." It is needless to dilate on the +military disasters which have been caused by undue interference +with operations in the field on the part of the home government. +Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to +the fact that he was not hampered by central authority.] + + 18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know +yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If +you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you +will also suffer a defeat. + + [Li Ch`uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch`in, who +in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. +When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the +services of such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch`ung, he boastfully +replied: "I have the population of eight provinces at my back, +infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they +could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their +whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" +Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at +the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.] + +If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in +every battle. + + [Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the +offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the +defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret of defense; defense +is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a better +epitome of the root-principle of war.] + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS + + + [Ts`ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for +the title of this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the +part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's +condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the dispositions of an +army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your +dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads +to victory,; show your dispositions, and your condition will +become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the +good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to meet +those of the enemy."] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put +themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for +an opportunity of defeating the enemy. + 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own +hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by +the enemy himself. + + [That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's part.] + + 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against +defeat, + + [Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition +of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting +precautions."] + +but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. + 4. Hence the saying: One may KNOW how to conquer without +being able to DO it. + 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; +ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. + + [I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1-3, +in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. +The meaning they give, "He who cannot conquer takes the +defensive," is plausible enough.] + + 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient +strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. + 7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most +secret recesses of the earth; + + [Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a +metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that +the enemy may not know his whereabouts."] + +he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost +heights of heaven. + + [Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary +like a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. +This is the opinion of most of the commentators.] + +Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the +other, a victory that is complete. + 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the +common herd is not the acme of excellence. + + [As Ts`ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant +before it has germinated," to foresee the event before the action +has begun. Li Ch`uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when +about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao, which was +strongly entrenched in the city of Ch`eng-an, said to his +officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and +shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words +seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had +already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem, +whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and +inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] + + 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and +conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!" + + [True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, +to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk +his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding +a drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things +that + "the world's coarse thumb + And finger fail to plumb."] + + 10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; + + ["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is +finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a +very common one in Chinese writers.] + +to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the +noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. + + [Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight +and quick hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 +stone; Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see +objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih K`uang, a blind +musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.] + + 11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who +not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. + + [The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in +easy conquering." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "He who only sees the +obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the +surface of things, wins with ease."] + + 12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for +wisdom nor credit for courage. + + [Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories +are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the +world as large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation +for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there +has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."] + + 13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. + + [Ch`en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he +devises no futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus +explained by Chang Yu: "One who seeks to conquer by sheer +strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is +also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look +into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, +will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win."] + +Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, +for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. + 14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position +which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for +defeating the enemy. + + [A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. +"Position" need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by +the troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations +which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his +army.] + + 15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only +seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is +destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory. + + [Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay +plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to +battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute +strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."] + + 16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and +strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his +power to control success. + 17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, +Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, +Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. + 18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of +quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; +Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of +chances. + + [It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly +in the Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement +of the ground, which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's +strength, and to make calculations based on the data thus +obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or comparison +of the enemy's chances with our own; if the latter turn the +scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third +term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a +calculation of NUMBERS, thereby making it nearly synonymous with +the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as +a consideration of the enemy's general position or condition, +while the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. +On the other hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative +strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources +of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, but +weakens it. However, it points to the third term as being a +calculation of numbers.] + + 19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a +pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. + + [Literally, "a victorious army is like an I (20 oz.) weighed +against a SHU (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a SHU weighed against +an I." The point is simply the enormous advantage which a +disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralized +by defeat." Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes +the I to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi's statement +that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch`uan of the T`ang dynasty +here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.] + + 20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting +of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +V. ENERGY + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same +principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question +of dividing up their numbers. + + [That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, +etc., with subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu +reminds us of Han Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor, +who once said to him: "How large an army do you think I could +lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" +asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more the better."] + + 2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise +different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a +question of instituting signs and signals. + 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt +of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken - this is effected by +maneuvers direct and indirect. + + [We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun +Tzu's treatise, the discussion of the CHENG and the CH`I." As it +is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two +terms, or to render them consistently by good English +equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of the +commentators' remarks on the subject before proceeding further. +Li Ch`uan: "Facing the enemy is CHENG, making lateral diversion +is CH`I. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your troops +should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure +victory abnormal maneuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-ch`en: +"CH`I is active, CHENG is passive; passivity means waiting for an +opportunity, activity beings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We +must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one +that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus CHENG may also be +CH`I, and CH`I may also be CHENG." He instances the famous +exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against Lin- +chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across +the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his +opponent. [Ch`ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, the march +on Lin-chin was CHENG, and the surprise maneuver was CH`I." +Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: +"Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of CH`I +and CHENG. Wei Liao Tzu [4th cent. B.C.] says: 'Direct warfare +favors frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.' +Ts`ao Kung says: 'Going straight out to join battle is a direct +operation; appearing on the enemy's rear is an indirect +maneuver.' Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: 'In war, +to march straight ahead is CHENG; turning movements, on the other +hand, are CH`I.' These writers simply regard CHENG as CHENG, and +CH`I as CH`I; they do not note that the two are mutually +interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a +circle [see infra, ss. 11]. A comment on the T`ang Emperor T`ai +Tsung goes to the root of the matter: 'A CH`I maneuver may be +CHENG, if we make the enemy look upon it as CHENG; then our real +attack will be CH`I, and vice versa. The whole secret lies in +confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.'" +To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other +operation is CHENG, on which the enemy has had his attention +fixed; whereas that is CH`I," which takes him by surprise or +comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a +movement which is meant to be CH`I," it immediately becomes +CHENG."] + + 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone +dashed against an egg - this is effected by the science of weak +points and strong. + 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for +joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to +secure victory. + + [Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either +by pounding the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear." A +brilliant example of "indirect tactics" which decided the +fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round the +Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. [1] + + 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible +as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; +like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four +seasons, they pass away to return once more. + + [Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of +CH`I and CHENG." But at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of CHENG +at all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a +clause relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as +has already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably +interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot really be +considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in +figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great +leader.] + + 7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the +combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can +ever be heard. + 8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, +yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce +more hues than can ever been seen. + 9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, +acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more +flavors than can ever be tasted. + 10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of +attack - the direct and the indirect; yet these two in +combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. + 11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in +turn. It is like moving in a circle - you never come to an end. +Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination? + 12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which +will even roll stones along in its course. + 13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of +a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. + + [The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the +context it is used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu +Mu defines this word as "the measurement or estimation of +distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the illustrative +simile in ss. 15. Applying this definition to the falcon, it +seems to me to denote that instinct of SELF RESTRAINT which keeps +the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, +together with the power of judging when the right moment has +arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly +important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very +instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" +went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, +she was for several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell +before replying with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he +was within close range, when the broadside he brought to bear +worked fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships.] + + 14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his +onset, and prompt in his decision. + + [The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement +of distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before +striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use +the word in a figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short +and sharp." Cf. Wang Hsi's note, which after describing the +falcon's mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just how the +'psychological moment' should be seized in war."] + + 15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; +decision, to the releasing of a trigger. + + [None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of +the simile of energy and the force stored up in the bent cross- +bow until released by the finger on the trigger.] + + 16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be +seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion +and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be +proof against defeat. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The subdivisions of the army having +been previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the +separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will +take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance of +disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may +be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and +yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."] + + 17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, +simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates +strength. + + [In order to make the translation intelligible, it is +necessary to tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the +original. Ts`ao Kung throws out a hint of the meaning in his +brief note: "These things all serve to destroy formation and +conceal one's condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite +plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the +enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to +display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have +extreme courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to +make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding +strength."] + + 18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a +question of subdivision; + + [See supra, ss. 1.] + +concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of +latent energy; + + [The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word +here differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu +says: "seeing that we are favorably circumstanced and yet make +no move, the enemy will believe that we are really afraid."] + +masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical +dispositions. + + [Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the +first Han Emperor: "Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out +spies to report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, +forewarned, carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and +well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated +cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one and all +recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone +opposed them, saying: "When two countries go to war, they are +naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their +strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and +infirmity. This is surely some ruse on the part of the enemy, +and it would be unwise for us to attack." The Emperor, however, +disregarding this advice, fell into the trap and found himself +surrounded at Po-teng."] + + 19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the +move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the +enemy will act. + + [Ts`ao Kung's note is "Make a display of weakness and want." +Tu Mu says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy's, +weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if +inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order +that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy's movements should +be determined by the signs that we choose to give him." Note the +following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 +B.C., the Ch`i State being at war with Wei, sent T`ien Chi and +Sun Pin against the general P`ang Chuan, who happened to be a +deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The Ch`i +State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary +despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account." +Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into Wei +territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first +night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. +P`ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these +men of Ch`i were cowards: their numbers have already fallen away +by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow +defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach after +dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed +upon it the words: "Under this tree shall P`ang Chuan die." +Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers +in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly if they saw a +light. Later on, P`ang Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing +the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written on it. +His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his +whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu's version +of the story; the SHIH CHI, less dramatically but probably with +more historical truth, makes P`ang Chuan cut his own throat with +an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.] ] + +He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. + + 20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then +with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. + + [With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, +"He lies in wait with the main body of his troops."] + + 21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined +energy, and does not require too much from individuals. + + [Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his +army in the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into +account, and uses each men according to his capabilities. He +does not demand perfection from the untalented."] + +Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined +energy. + 22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men +become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is +the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level +ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to +a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. + + [Ts`au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent +power."] + + 23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as +the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands +of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy. + + [The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's opinion, is +the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden +rushes. "Great results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with +small forces."] + + +[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG + + + [Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as +follows: "Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the +offensive and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with +direct and indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself +first with the theory of attack and defense, and then turns his +attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of +varying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the +subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or +indirect methods arises out of attack and defense, and the +perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above +methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the +chapter on Energy."] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits +the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is +second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive +exhausted. + 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the +enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. + + [One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own +terms or fights not at all. [1] ] + + 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy +to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can +make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. + + [In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the +second, he will strike at some important point which the enemy +will have to defend.] + + 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; + + [This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- +Ch`en's interpretation of I. ss. 23.] + +if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly +encamped, he can force him to move. + 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; +march swiftly to places where you are not expected. + 6. An army may march great distances without distress, if +it marches through country where the enemy is not. + + [Ts`ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. +like "a bolt from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun +places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters."] + + 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you +only attack places which are undefended. + + [Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that +is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or the +soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the +precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or +provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst +themselves."] + +You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold +positions that cannot be attacked. + + [I.e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned +above. There is rather a nice point involved in the +interpretation of this later clause. Tu Mu, Ch`en Hao, and Mei +Yao-ch`en assume the meaning to be: "In order to make your +defense quite safe, you must defend EVEN those places that are +not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, +then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the +clause balances less well with the preceding--always a +consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural +to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the +mark in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from +the topmost heights of heaven [see IV. ss. 7], making it +impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so, +the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy +cannot defend.... He who is skilled in defense hides in the most +secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy +to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I +shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."] + + 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent +does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose +opponent does not know what to attack. + + [An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] + + 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we +learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; + + [Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of +course with reference to the enemy.] + +and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. + 10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you +make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from +pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. + 11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an +engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and +a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he +will be obliged to relieve. + + [Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can +cut his line of communications and occupy the roads by which he +will have to return; if we are the invaders, we may direct our +attack against the sovereign himself." It is clear that Sun Tzu, +unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in +frontal attacks.] + + 12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy +from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be +merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw +something odd and unaccountable in his way. + + [This extremely concise expression is intelligibly +paraphrased by Chia Lin: "even though we have constructed +neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch`uan says: "we puzzle him by +strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches the +meaning by three illustrative anecdotes--one of Chu-ko Liang, who +when occupying Yang-p`ing and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I, +suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of the drums, and +flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in +sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding +had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, +actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzu is +advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the +timely use of "bluff."] + + 13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining +invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while +the enemy's must be divided. + + [The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu +(after Mei Yao-ch`en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy's +dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body; +whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will +be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack +from every quarter."] + + 14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must +split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted +against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be +many to the enemy's few. + 15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force +with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits. + 16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made +known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible +attack at several different points; + + [Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's +victories by saying that "while his opponents were kept fully +employed wondering what he was going to do, HE was thinking most +of what he was going to do himself."] + +and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the +numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be +proportionately few. + 17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken +his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; +should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should +he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends +reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. + + [In Frederick the Great's INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS we +read: "A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent +detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience +attempt to protect every point, while those who are better +acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object +in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small +misfortunes to avoid greater."] + + 18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against +possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our +adversary to make these preparations against us. + + [The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's words, is "to +compel the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate +superior force against each fraction in turn."] + + 19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we +may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. + + [What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation +of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which +enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and +rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the +right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in +overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions +which military history records, one of the most dramatic and +decisive was the appearance of Blucher just at the critical +moment on the field of Waterloo.] + + 20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left +wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally +impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, +or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest +portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and +even the nearest are separated by several LI! + + [The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in +precision, but the mental picture we are required to draw is +probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous in +separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a fixed +date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed +at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and +place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army +in detail. Chang Yu's note may be worth quoting here: "If we do +not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the +day on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited +through our preparations for defense, and the positions we hold +will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we +shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual +support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, +especially if there is any great distance between the foremost +and hindmost divisions of the army."] + + 21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh +exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in +the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. + + [Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two +states ended in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien +and its incorporation in Yueh. This was doubtless long after Sun +Tzu's death. With his present assertion compare IV. ss. 4. +Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, +which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical +Dispositions it is said, 'One may KNOW how to conquer without +being able to DO it,' whereas here we have the statement that +'victory' can be achieved.' The explanation is, that in the +former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under +discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one +cannot make certain of beating him. But the present passage +refers particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who, according to Sun +Tzu's calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and +place of the impending struggle. That is why he says here that +victory can be achieved."] + + 22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent +him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the +likelihood of their success. + + [An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know +beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's +failure." + + 23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or +inactivity. + + [Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by +the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude +whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances +the action of Cho-ku Liang, who sent the scornful present of a +woman's head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his +Fabian tactics.] + +Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable +spots. + 24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so +that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is +deficient. + + [Cf. IV. ss. 6.] + + 25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you +can attain is to conceal them; + + [The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. +Concealment is perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra +ss. 9) as "showing no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans +that are formed in your brain.] + +conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying +of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest +brains. + + [Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and +capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against +us."] + + 26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's +own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. + 27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what +none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. + + [I.e., everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; +what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations +which has preceded the battle.] + + 28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one +victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite +variety of circumstances. + + [As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root- +principle underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it +are infinite in number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The +rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a +week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen +diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an +army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to +write like Gibbon."] + + 29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its +natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. + 30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to +strike at what is weak. + + [Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] + + 31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the +ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in +relation to the foe whom he is facing. + 32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so +in warfare there are no constant conditions. + 33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his +opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven- +born captain. + 34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are +not always equally predominant; + + [That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate +alternately."] + +the four seasons make way for each other in turn. + + [Literally, "have no invariable seat."] + +There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning +and waxing. + + [Cf. V. ss. 6. The purport of the passage is simply to +illustrate the want of fixity in war by the changes constantly +taking place in Nature. The comparison is not very happy, +however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzu +mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] + + +[1] See Col. Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 +ed., vol. II, p. 490. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +VII. MANEUVERING + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands +from the sovereign. + 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he +must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before +pitching his camp. + + ["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and +confidence between the higher and lower ranks before venturing +into the field;" and he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu (chap. 1 ad +init.): "Without harmony in the State, no military expedition +can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle array +can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzu is represented +as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging +war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before proceeding +to attack the external foe."] + + 3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there +is nothing more difficult. + + [I have departed slightly from the traditional +interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, who says: "From the time of +receiving the sovereign's instructions until our encampment over +against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult." +It seems to me that the tactics or maneuvers can hardly be said +to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and +Ch`ien Hao's note gives color to this view: "For levying, +concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there are +plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes +when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that +"the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in +seizing favorable position."] + +The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the +devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. + + [This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and +somewhat enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond. +This is how it is explained by Ts`ao Kung: "Make it appear that +you are a long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and +arrive on the scene before your opponent." Tu Mu says: +"Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while +you are dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a +slightly different turn: "Although you may have difficult ground +to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a drawback +which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of +movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the +two famous passages across the Alps--that of Hannibal, which laid +Italy at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years +later, which resulted in the great victory of Marengo.] + + 4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after +enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, +to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the +artifice of DEVIATION. + + [Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to +relieve the town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch`in +army. The King of Chao first consulted Lien P`o on the +advisability of attempting a relief, but the latter thought the +distance too great, and the intervening country too rugged and +difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully +admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said: +"We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole--and the pluckier +one will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had +only gone a distance of 30 LI when he stopped and began +throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he continued +strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should +carry the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch`in general was +overjoyed, and attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact +that the beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not +actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner +departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days +and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such +astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding +position on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his +movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch`in forces, who +were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat +across the border.] + + 5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an +undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. + + [I adopt the reading of the T`UNG TIEN, Cheng Yu-hsien and +the T`U SHU, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required +in order to make sense. The commentators using the standard text +take this line to mean that maneuvers may be profitable, or they +may be dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the general.] + + 6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to +snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. +On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose +involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. + + [Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese +commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own +rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is +some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is +clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a lengthy march being +undertaken without supplies. Cf. infra, ss. 11.] + + 7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, +and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering +double the usual distance at a stretch, + + [The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 LI; +but on one occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts`ao Ts`ao is said +to have covered the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within +twenty-four hours.] + +doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of +all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. + 8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will +fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will +reach its destination. + + [The moral is, as Ts`ao Kung and others point out: Don't +march a hundred LI to gain a tactical advantage, either with or +without impedimenta. Maneuvers of this description should be +confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The +hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the +dangers of battle." He did not often call upon his troops for +extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a +surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he +sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ] + + 9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, +you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half +your force will reach the goal. + + [Literally, "the leader of the first division will be +TORN AWAY."] + + 10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds +of your army will arrive. + + [In the T`UNG TIEN is added: "From this we may know the +difficulty of maneuvering."] + + 11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage- +train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of +supply it is lost. + + [I think Sun Tzu meant "stores accumulated in depots." But +Tu Yu says "fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in +general," and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."] + + 12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted +with the designs of our neighbors. + 13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we +are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and +forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. + 14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account +unless we make use of local guides. + + [ss. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. ss. 52.] + + 15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. + + [In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, +especially as to the numerical strength of his troops, took a +very prominent position. [2] ] + + 16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must +be decided by circumstances. + 17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, + + [The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not +only swift but, as Mei Yao-ch`en points out, "invisible and +leaves no tracks."] + +your compactness that of the forest. + + [Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When +slowly marching, order and ranks must be preserved"--so as to +guard against surprise attacks. But natural forest do not grow +in rows, whereas they do generally possess the quality of density +or compactness.] + + 18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, + + [Cf. SHIH CHING, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire +which no man can check."] + +in immovability like a mountain. + + [That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is +trying to dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is +trying to entice you into a trap.] + + 19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and +when you move, fall like a thunderbolt. + + [Tu Yu quotes a saying of T`ai Kung which has passed into a +proverb: "You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes +to the lighting--so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should +be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.] + + 20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be +divided amongst your men; + + [Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate +plundering by insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a +common stock, which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst +all.] + +when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the +benefit of the soldiery. + + [Ch`en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let +them sow and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and +harvesting the lands they invaded, that the Chinese have +succeeded in carrying out some of their most memorable and +triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch`ao who penetrated +to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of Fu-k`ang-an +and Tso Tsung-t`ang.] + + 21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. + + [Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that we must not +break camp until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy +and the cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven +comparisons" in I. ss. 13.] + + 22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of +deviation. + + [See supra, SS. 3, 4.] + +Such is the art of maneuvering. + + [With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an +end. But there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an +extract from an earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently +extant at the time when Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this +fragment is not noticeably different from that of Sun Tzu +himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to its +genuineness.] + + 23. The Book of Army Management says: + + [It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier +commentators give us any information about this work. Mei Yao- +Ch`en calls it "an ancient military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an +old book on war." Considering the enormous amount of fighting +that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzu's time between the +various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself +improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been +made and written down at some earlier period.] + +On the field of battle, + + [Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] + +the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution +of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly +enough: hence the institution of banners and flags. + 24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby +the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular +point. + + [Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge +simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a +million soldiers will be like those of a single man."!] + + 25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it +impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the +cowardly to retreat alone. + + [Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who +advance against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu +Mu tells a story in this connection of Wu Ch`i, when he was +fighting against the Ch`in State. Before the battle had begun, +one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, sallied forth by +himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and returned to camp. +Wu Ch`i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an officer +ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a good soldier, +and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch`i replied: "I fully +believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he +acted without orders."] + +This is the art of handling large masses of men. + 26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires +and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a +means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army. + + [Ch`en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi's night ride to Ho-yang at +the head of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display +with torches, that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a +large army, he did not dare to dispute their passage.] + + 27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; + + ["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made +to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its +onset will be irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy's +soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived on the +scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to +wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then +strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen +spirit." Li Ch`uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found in +the TSO CHUAN, year 10, ss. 1) of Ts`ao Kuei, a protege of Duke +Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch`i, and the +duke was about to join battle at Ch`ang-cho, after the first roll +of the enemy's drums, when Ts`ao said: "Not just yet." Only +after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the +word for attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch`i were +utterly defeated. Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the +meaning of his delay, Ts`ao Kuei replied: "In battle, a +courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll of the drum +tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on +the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked +when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our +victory." Wu Tzu (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four +important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a +whole army--a mighty host of a million men--is dependent on one +man alone: such is the influence of spirit!"] + +a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. + + [Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general's most +important asset. It is the quality which enables him to +discipline disorder and to inspire courage into the panic- +stricken." The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571-649) has a +saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled +cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must include +the art of assailing the enemy's mental equilibrium."] + + 28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; + + [Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At +the battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to +fight fasting, whereas Hannibal's men had breakfasted at +their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.] + +by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is +bent only on returning to camp. + 29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its +spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined +to return. This is the art of studying moods. + 30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of +disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of +retaining self-possession. + 31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from +it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to +be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of +husbanding one's strength. + 32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are +in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in +calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying +circumstances. + 33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against +the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. + 34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not +attack soldiers whose temper is keen. + 35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. + + [Li Ch`uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a +metaphor, take these words quite literally of food and drink that +have been poisoned by the enemy. Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu +carefully point out that the saying has a wider application.] + +Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. + + [The commentators explain this rather singular piece of +advice by saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home +will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and +is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu +quotes the words of Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who +hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvelous tale is +told of Ts`ao Ts`ao's courage and resource in ch. 1 of the SAN +KUO CHI: In 198 A.D., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when +Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts`ao's +retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his troops, only to +find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were guarding +each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. In +this desperate plight Ts`ao waited until nightfall, when he bored +a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As +soon as the whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on +his rear, while Ts`ao himself turned and met his pursuers in +front, so that they were thrown into confusion and annihilated. +Ts`ao Ts`ao said afterwards: "The brigands tried to check my +army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate +position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] + + 36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. + + [This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to +escape. The object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe +that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting +with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After +that, you may crush him."] + +Do not press a desperate foe too hard. + + [Ch`en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when +brought to bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: +"If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his +cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle, +he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the +meaning by a story taken from the life of Yen-ch`ing. That +general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded +by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The +country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force +was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored +ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and +sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at +last Fu Yen-ch`ing exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better +to die for our country than to go with fettered hands into +captivity!" A strong gale happened to be blowing from the +northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust. +To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had abated before +deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer, Li Shou- +cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: +"They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm +our numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the +strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." +Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch`ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected +onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded +in breaking through to safety.] + + 37. Such is the art of warfare. + + +[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. + +[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" +(Longmans, 1907), p. 29. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + + VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS + + + [The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as +Sun Tzu does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he +has already told us (V SS. 6-11) that such deflections from the +ordinary course are practically innumerable, we have little +option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an +indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare we +ought to vary our tactics to the utmost degree.... I do not know +what Ts`ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be, but it has +been suggested that they are connected with the Nine Situations" +- of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yu. The only +other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost--a +supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends +some weight.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his +commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates +his forces. + + [Repeated from VII. ss. 1, where it is certainly more in +place. It may have been interpolated here merely in order to +supply a beginning to the chapter.] + + 2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country +where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not +linger in dangerously isolated positions. + + [The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as +given in the beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. +ss. 43. q.v.). Chang Yu defines this situation as being situated +across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch`uan says it is +"country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds, +vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and +precipices, without a road by which to advance."] + +In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In +desperate position, you must fight. + 3. There are roads which must not be followed, + + ["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li +Ch`uan, "where an ambush is to be feared."] + +armies which must be not attacked, + + [More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must +not be attacked." Ch`en Hao says: "When you see your way to +obtain a rival advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real +defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men's +strength."] + +towns which must not be besieged, + + [Cf. III. ss. 4 Ts`ao Kung gives an interesting +illustration from his own experience. When invading the +territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of Hua-pi, which lay +directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the +country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent +capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. +Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, +cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." +Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is +small and well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will +be no great feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself +a laughing-stock." In the seventeenth century, sieges still +formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne who directed +attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and +maneuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in +taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a +province." [1] ] + +positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign +which must not be obeyed. + + [This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence +for authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to +exclaim: "Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is +antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the negation of +civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even +Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.] + + 4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages +that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his +troops. + 5. The general who does not understand these, may be well +acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not +be able to turn his knowledge to practical account. + + [Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means +not only securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural +advantages in every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of +ground is characterized by certain natural features, and also +gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How it is +possible to turn these natural features to account unless +topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"] + + 6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war +of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five +Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men. + + [Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and +generally advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain +road is short, it must be followed; if an army is isolated, it +must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be +besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and +if consistent with military operations, the ruler's commands must +be obeyed." But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a +general to use these advantages. For instance, "a certain road +may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds +in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, +he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to +attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to +fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so +on.] + + 7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of +advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together. + + ["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous +one," says Ts`ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always +present to your mind."] + + 8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, +we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our +schemes. + + [Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the +enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the +possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this +enter as a factor into our calculations."] + + 9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we +are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate +ourselves from misfortune. + + [Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a +dangerous position, I must consider not only the enemy's ability +to injure me, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over +the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations are +properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself.... For +instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of +effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will incite +my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to +encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the +advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy's toils." +See the story of Ts`ao Ts`ao, VII. ss. 35, note.] + + 10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; + + [Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, +some of which would only occur to the Oriental mind:--"Entice +away the enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left +without counselors. Introduce traitors into his country, that +the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue +and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his +ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause +deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt +his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb +and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." +Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun +Tzu here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer +injury, and he will submit of his own accord."] + +and make trouble for them, + + [Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that +trouble should be made for the enemy affecting their +"possessions," or, as we might say, "assets," which he considers +to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony amongst the +soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands." These give us a +whip-hand over the enemy.] + +and keep them constantly engaged; + + [Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent +the from having any rest."] + +hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given +point. + + [Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the +idiomatic use of: "cause them to forget PIEN (the reasons for +acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in our +direction."] + + 11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood +of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive +him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the +fact that we have made our position unassailable. + 12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a +general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction; + + ["Bravery without forethought," as Ts`ao Kung analyzes it, +which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad +bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered +with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain." +Cf. Wu Tzu, chap. IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character of +a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his +courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many +qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man +is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, +without any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." +Ssu-ma Fa, too, make the incisive remark: "Simply going to one's +death does not bring about victory."] + + (2) cowardice, which leads to capture; + + [Ts`ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as +"cowardice" as being of the man "whom timidity prevents from +advancing to seize an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick +to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih gives the closer +paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive," this is, the man +who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzu knew, nothing is to +be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T`ai +Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently +bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu pursued +the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle +with him at the island of Ch`eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered +only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. +But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him +should be be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of +his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a +moment's notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit +of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made +an attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the +utmost ardor to be first in the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were +routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and +nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat similar story +of Chao Ying-ch`i, a general of the Chin State who during a +battle with the army of Ch`u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in +readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be +the first to get across.] + + (3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; + + [Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by +Huang Mei, Teng Ch`iang and others shut himself up behind his +walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch`iang said: "Our adversary +is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant +sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and +come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to +be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to +fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy's pretended +flight, and finally attacked and slain.] + + (4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame; + + [This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is +really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an +exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned +man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao- +ch`en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: "The seek +after glory should be careless of public opinion."] + + (5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry +and trouble. + + [Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be +careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to +emphasize is the danger of sacrificing any important military +advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a +shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will +suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the +war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity +will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to +reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military +instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated +efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so +many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And +in the end, relief came through the very man who started out with +the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of +the whole to sentiment in favor of a part. An old soldier of one +of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried +once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was +always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he but known it, +he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzu's mouth.] + + 13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous +to the conduct of war. + 14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the +cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. +Let them be a subject of meditation. + + +[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH + + + [The contents of this interesting chapter are better +indicated in ss. 1 than by this heading.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping +the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over +mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys. + + [The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to +keep close to supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3: +"Abide not in natural ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." +Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu Ch`iang was a +robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan was sent +to exterminate his gang. Ch`iang having found a refuge in the +hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all +the favorable positions commanding supplies of water and forage. +Ch`iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of +provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did +not know the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of +valleys."] + + 2. Camp in high places, + + [Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above +the surrounding country.] + +facing the sun. + + [Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch`en Hao +"facing east." Cf. infra, SS. 11, 13. + +Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain +warfare. + 3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. + + ["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according +to Ts`ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be +impeded in your evolutions." The T`UNG TIEN reads, "If THE ENEMY +crosses a river," etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is +almost certainly an interpolation.] + + 4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward +march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best +to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack. + + [Li Ch`uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over +Lung Chu at the Wei River. Turning to the CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. +34, fol. 6 verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The +two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the +night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks +filled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading +half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time, +pretending to have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to +the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this unlooked-for +success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a +coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn. +Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus +releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented +the greater portion of Lung Chu's army from getting across. He +then turned upon the force which had been cut off, and +annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The +rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in +all directions.] + + 5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet +the invader near a river which he has to cross. + + [For fear of preventing his crossing.] + + 6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the +sun. + + [See supra, ss. 2. The repetition of these words in +connection with water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: +"Said either of troops marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats +anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to +be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other +commentators are not at all explicit.] + +Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. + + [Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch +our camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy +should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu- +hou has remarked that 'in river warfare we must not advance +against the stream,' which is as much as to say that our fleet +must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would +be able to take advantage of the current and make short work of +us." There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that +the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to +us.] + +So much for river warfare. + 7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to +get over them quickly, without any delay. + + [Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the +herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and +exposed to attack.] + + 8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have +water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. + + [Li Ch`uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be +treacherous where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they +will serve to protect the rear.] + +So much for operations in salt-marches. + 9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible +position with rising ground to your right and on your rear, + + [Tu Mu quotes T`ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a +stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its +right."] + +so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So +much for campaigning in flat country. + 10. These are the four useful branches of military +knowledge + + [Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, +(3) marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military +Maxims," no. 1.] + +which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several +sovereigns. + + [Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch`en asks, with +some plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as +nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered four other +Emperors. The SHIH CHI (ch. 1 ad init.) speaks only of his +victories over Yen Ti and Ch`ih Yu. In the LIU T`AO it is +mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the +Empire." Ts`ao Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor +was the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, +each of whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of +Emperor. Li Ch`uan tells us that the art of war originated under +Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister Feng Hou.] + + 11. All armies prefer high ground to low. + + ["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch`en, "is not only more +agreeable and salubrious, but more convenient from a military +point of view; low ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but +also disadvantageous for fighting."] + +and sunny places to dark. + 12. If you are careful of your men, + + [Ts`ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where +you can turn out your animals to graze."] + +and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of +every kind, + + [Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent +the outbreak of illness."] + +and this will spell victory. + 13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny +side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once +act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural +advantages of the ground. + 14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river +which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must +wait until it subsides. + 15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with +torrents running between, deep natural hollows, + + [The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by +steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom.] + +confined places, + + [Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded +by precipices on three sides--easy to get into, but hard to get +out of."] + +tangled thickets, + + [Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that +spears cannot be used."] + +quagmires + + [Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be +impassable for chariots and horsemen."] + +and crevasses, + + [Defined by Mei Yao-ch`en as "a narrow difficult way between +beetling cliffs." Tu Mu's note is "ground covered with trees and +rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This +is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a +defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same view. On +the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to +the rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese +in one place is "a crack or fissure" and the fact that the +meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence indicates +something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun Tzu +is here speaking of crevasses.] + +should be left with all possible speed and not approached. + 16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the +enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the +enemy have them on his rear. + 17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any +hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins +filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be +carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men +in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking. + + [Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard +against traitors who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out +our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions."] + + 18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he +is relying on the natural strength of his position. + + [Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much +of which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern +manual like Gen. Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."] + + 19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he +is anxious for the other side to advance. + + [Probably because we are in a strong position from which he +wishes to dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, +"and tried to force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and +there would be less probability of our responding to the +challenge."] + + 20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is +tendering a bait. + 21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the +enemy is advancing. + + [Ts`ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a +passage," and Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to +climb high places and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that +the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he may know that +they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy's +march."] + +The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass +means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. + + [Tu Yu's explanation, borrowed from Ts`ao Kung's, is as +follows: "The presence of a number of screens or sheds in the +midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled +and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places in +order to make us suspect an ambush." It appears that these +"screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass +which the retreating enemy happened to come across.] + + 22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an +ambuscade. + + [Chang Yu's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds +that are flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, +it means that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath."] + +Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. + 23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the +sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over +a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry. + + ["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course +somewhat exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators +explain the phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being +heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in +the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in +ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the +march must have scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust +raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report it to the +commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you move along, +say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar for +the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds +getting up, glitter of arms, etc." [1] ] + +When it branches out in different directions, it shows that +parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust +moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping. + + [Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defenses for a +cantonment, light horse will be sent out to survey the position +and ascertain the weak and strong points all along its +circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust and its +motion."] + + 24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that +the enemy is about to advance. + + ["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. +"Their object is to make us contemptuous and careless, after +which they will attack us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of +T`ien Tan of the Ch`i-mo against the Yen forces, led by Ch`i +Chieh. In ch. 82 of the SHIH CHI we read: "T`ien Tan openly +said: 'My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses +of their Ch`i prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight +against us; that would be the undoing of our city.' The other +side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the +suggestion; but those within the city were enraged at seeing +their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest +they should fall into the enemy's hands, were nerved to defend +themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T`ien Tan sent +back converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: +"What I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up the +ancestral tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this +indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.' +Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the +corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing +the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were all +impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased +tenfold. T`ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for +any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself took a +mattock in his hands, and ordered others to be distributed +amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were filled up with +their wives and concubines. He then served out all the remaining +rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular soldiers +were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with +the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were +dispatched to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of surrender, +whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T`ien Tan also +collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the +wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the +prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would allow their +homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch`i +Chieh, in high good humor, granted their prayer; but his army now +became increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile, T`ien Tan got +together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk, +painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored stripes, and +fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on +their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the +rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had +pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked +warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously +into the enemy's camp where they caused the utmost confusion and +dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous +pattern on their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or +wounded any with whom they came into contact. In the meantime, +the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their mouths, and now +threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment a frightful +din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind +making as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering +on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed by the +uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly +pursued by the men of Ch`i, who succeeded in slaying their +general Ch`i Chien.... The result of the battle was the ultimate +recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch`i +State."] + +Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are +signs that he will retreat. + 25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a +position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for +battle. + 26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant +indicate a plot. + + [The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch`uan indicates "a +treaty confirmed by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, +on the other hand, simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous +pretext."] + + 27. When there is much running about + + [Every man hastening to his proper place under his own +regimental banner.] + +and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical +moment has come. + 28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is +a lure. + 29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they +are faint from want of food. + 30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking +themselves, the army is suffering from thirst. + + [As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole +army from the behavior of a single man."] + + 31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes +no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. + 32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. + + [A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch`en +Hao says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] + +Clamor by night betokens nervousness. + + 33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's +authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, +sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that the +men are weary. + + [Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the +officers of an army are angry with their general, it means that +they are broken with fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has +demanded from them.] + + 34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its +cattle for food, + + [In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on +grain and the horses chiefly on grass.] + +and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp- +fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may +know that they are determined to fight to the death. + + [I may quote here the illustrative passage from the HOU HAN +SHU, ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by the P`EI WEN YUN FU: +"The rebel Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch`en- +ts`ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung +Cho were sent out against him. The latter pressed for hasty +measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At last the +rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw down their +weapons of their own accord. Sung was not advancing to the +attack, but Cho said: 'It is a principle of war not to pursue +desperate men and not to press a retreating host.' Sung +answered: 'That does not apply here. What I am about to attack +is a jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined troops I +am falling on a disorganized multitude, not a band of desperate +men.' Thereupon he advances to the attack unsupported by his +colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being slain."] + + 35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or +speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank +and file. + 36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the +end of his resources; + + [Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there +is always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep +the men in good temper.] + +too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. + + [Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and +unwonted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.] + + 37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at +the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. + + [I follow the interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, also adopted by +Li Ch`uan, Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set +forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Tao-ch`en and Wang Hsi, is: "The +general who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then in +terror lest they should mutiny, etc." This would connect the +sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments.] + + 38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, +it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. + + [Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be +sending hostages, it is a sign that they are anxious for an +armistice, either because their strength is exhausted or for some +other reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzu to draw such an +obvious inference.] + + 39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain +facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or +taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands +great vigilance and circumspection. + + [Ts`ao Kung says a maneuver of this sort may be only a ruse +to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an +ambush.] + + 40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, +that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can +be made. + + [Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, CHENG +tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem +resorted to instead.] + +What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available +strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain +reinforcements. + + [This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators +succeed in squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li +Ch`uan, who appears to offer the simplest explanation: "Only the +side that gets more men will win." Fortunately we have Chang Yu +to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity +itself: "When the numbers are even, and no favorable opening +presents itself, although we may not be strong enough to deliver +a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst our +sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces +and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the +victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help +us." He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 3: "The nominal +strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real value +will be not more than half that figure."] + + 41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his +opponents is sure to be captured by them. + + [Ch`en Hao, quoting from the TSO CHUAN, says: "If bees and +scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even +a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with contempt."] + + 42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown +attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless +submissive, then will be practically useless. If, when the +soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not +enforced, they will still be useless. + 43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first +instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron +discipline. + + [Yen Tzu [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil +virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his +enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander +unites culture with a warlike temper; the profession of arms +requires a combination of hardness and tenderness."] + +This is a certain road to victory. + + 44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually +enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its +discipline will be bad. + 45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always +insists on his orders being obeyed, + + [Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show +kindly confidence in his men and also make his authority +respected, so that when they come to face the enemy, orders may +be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust and +look up to him." What Sun Tzu has said in ss. 44, however, would +lead one rather to expect something like this: "If a general is +always confident that his orders will be carried out," etc."] + +the gain will be mutual. + + [Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men +under his command, and the men are docile, having confidence in +him. Thus the gain is mutual" He quotes a pregnant sentence +from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 4: "The art of giving orders is not to +try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty +doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of +sapping the confidence of an army.] + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +X. TERRAIN + + + [Only about a third of the chapter, comprising ss. ss. 1-13, +deals with "terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. +XI. The "six calamities" are discussed in SS. 14-20, and the +rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks, +though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, +to wit: (1) Accessible ground; + + [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "plentifully provided with roads and +means of communications."] + +(2) entangling ground; + + [The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing +into which you become entangled."] + +(3) temporizing ground; + + [Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] + +(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a +great distance from the enemy. + + [It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this +classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in +the Chinaman's unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross- +divisions such as the above.] + + 2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is +called ACCESSIBLE. + 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the +enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully +guard your line of supplies. + + [The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as +Tu Yu says, "not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." +In view of Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the +communications," [1] we could wish that Sun Tzu had done more +than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. ss. +10, VII. ss. 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of supply may +be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart +to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who finds his +adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and his own +guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's +movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, +so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened +finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he +has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more +or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers +on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat +will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or +surrender of his whole army." [2] + +Then you will be able to fight with advantage. + 4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy +is called ENTANGLING. + 5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is +unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy +is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, +return being impossible, disaster will ensue. + 6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by +making the first move, it is called TEMPORIZING ground. + + [Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and +the situation remains at a deadlock."] + + 7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should +offer us an attractive bait, + + [Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to +flee." But this is only one of the lures which might induce us +to quit our position.] + +it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, +thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army +has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. + 8. With regard to NARROW PASSES, if you can occupy them +first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of +the enemy. + + [Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie +with us, and by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall +have the enemy at our mercy."] + + 9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do +not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it +is weakly garrisoned. + 10. With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS, if you are +beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and +sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. + + [Ts`ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing +heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated +by the enemy." [For the enunciation of the grand principle +alluded to, see VI. ss. 2]. Chang Yu tells the following +anecdote of P`ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a +punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At night he +pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely +fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that +the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was +highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against +the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P`ei Hsing- +chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the +camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific +storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to +the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were +amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. +'How did you know what was going to happen?' they asked. P`ei +Hsing-chien replied: 'From this time forward be content to obey +orders without asking unnecessary questions.' From this it may +be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places are +advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are +immune from disastrous floods."] + + 11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not +follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away. + + [The turning point of Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D. +against the two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang +Shih-ch`ung, Prince of Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of +Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-te persisted in his attempt +to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken prisoner. +See CHIU T`ANG, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.] + + 12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, +and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to +provoke a battle, + + [The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long +and wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we +should be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."] + +and fighting will be to your disadvantage. + + 13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. + + [Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, +however, I. ss. 8.] + +The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful +to study them. + 14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not +arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the +general is responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) +insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6) +rout. + 15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled +against another ten times its size, the result will be the FLIGHT +of the former. + 16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their +officers too weak, the result is INSUBORDINATION. + + [Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T`ien Pu [HSIN T`ANG SHU, +ch. 148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an +army against Wang T`ing-ts`ou. But the whole time he was in +command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and +openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, +several thousands at a time. T`ien Pu was powerless to put a +stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he +made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and +dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man +committed suicide by cutting his throat.] + +When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too +weak, the result is COLLAPSE. + + [Ts`ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to +press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] + + 17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, +and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a +feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell +whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is RUIN. + + [Wang Hsi`s note is: "This means, the general is angry +without cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the +ability of his subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce +resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head."] + + 18. When the general is weak and without authority; when +his orders are not clear and distinct; + + [Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his +orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them +twice; if his moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers +will not be in two minds about doing their duty." General Baden- +Powell says, italicizing the words: "The secret of getting +successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell--in +the clearness of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf. also +Wu Tzu ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a military leader is +difference; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from +hesitation."] + +when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men, + + [Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular +routine."] + +and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the +result is utter DISORGANIZATION. + 19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's +strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or +hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to +place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be ROUT. + + [Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and +continues: "Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest +spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in +order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to +demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De +Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).] + + 20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be +carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible +post. + + [See supra, ss. 13.] + + 21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's +best ally; + + [Ch`en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are +not equal to those connected with ground."] + +but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the +forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, +dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general. + 22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his +knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them +not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated. + 23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must +fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not +result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's +bidding. + + [Cf. VIII. ss. 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch`in dynasty, +who is said to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have +written the SAN LUEH, has these words attributed to him: "The +responsibility of setting an army in motion must devolve on the +general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the +Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the +god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a +humble part in furthering their country's cause [lit., kneel down +to push the chariot wheel]." This means that "in matters lying +outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander must +be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees from the +Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."] + 24. The general who advances without coveting fame and +retreats without fearing disgrace, + + [It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing +of all for a soldier is to retreat.] + +whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service +for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. + + [A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy +warrior." Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer +punishment, would not regret his conduct."] + + 25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will +follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own +beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death. + + [Cf. I. ss. 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an +engaging picture of the famous general Wu Ch`i, from whose +treatise on war I have frequently had occasion to quote: "He +wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his +soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to +sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, +and shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was +suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch`i himself sucked out the +virus. The soldier's mother, hearing this, began wailing and +lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do you cry? Your +son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief +himself has sucked the poison from his sore.' The woman replied, +'Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my +husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death +at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the same for +my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.'" Li Ch`uan +mentions the Viscount of Ch`u, who invaded the small state of +Hsiao during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of +the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he made a +round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and +straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined +with floss silk.] + + 26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your +authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your +commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then +your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are +useless for any practical purpose. + + [Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers +afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu +recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred +in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of Chiang-ling. +He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the +inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, +a certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a +fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging +to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation +helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that +the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be +allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly +he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his +face, however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the +army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles +dropped in the highway were not picked up.] + + 27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to +attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we +have gone only halfway towards victory. + + [That is, Ts`ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is +uncertain."] + + 28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are +unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we +have gone only halfway towards victory. + + [Cf. III. ss. 13 (1).] + + 29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also +know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware +that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we +have still gone only halfway towards victory. + 30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never +bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. + + [The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his +measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does +not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, +he makes no mistakes."] + + 31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know +yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know +Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete. + + [Li Ch`uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three +things--the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural +advantages of earth--, victory will invariably crown your +battles."] + + +[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. + +[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. + +[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties +of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) +contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting +highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in +ground; (9) desperate ground. + 2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is +dispersive ground. + + [So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes +and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize +the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every +direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack +the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find +harbors of refuge."] + + 3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no +great distance, it is facile ground. + + [Li Ch`uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for +retreating," and the other commentators give similar +explanations. Tu Mu remarks: "When your army has crossed the +border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make +it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home."] + + 4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage +to either side, is contentious ground. + + [Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." +Ts`ao Kung says: "ground on which the few and the weak can +defeat the many and the strong," such as "the neck of a pass," +instanced by Li Ch`uan. Thus, Thermopylae was of this +classification because the possession of it, even for a few days +only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus +gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. V. ad init.: "For +those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is +nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning +from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had +got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator +of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of +Ch`in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the +province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch`ang, counseled him, +saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and +his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in +the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, +and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to +occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting +him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are +prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without +moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, +we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is +nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be +expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two +positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was +overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.] + + 5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is +open ground. + + [There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective +for this type of ground. Ts`ao Kung says it means "ground +covered with a network of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih +suggested: "ground on which intercommunication is easy."] + + 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, + + [Ts`au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the +enemy's and a third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih +instances the small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on +the north-east by Ch`i, on the west by Chin, and on the south by +Ch`u.] + +so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his +command, + + [The belligerent who holds this dominating position can +constrain most of them to become his allies.] + +is a ground of intersecting highways. + 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile +country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is +serious ground. + + [Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has +reached such a point, its situation is serious."] + + 8. Mountain forests, + + [Or simply "forests."] + +rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that is hard to +traverse: this is difficult ground. + 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from +which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small +number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our +men: this is hemmed in ground. + 10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction +by fighting without delay, is desperate ground. + + [The situation, as pictured by Ts`ao Kung, is very similar +to the "hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer +possible: "A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, +advance impossible, retreat blocked." Ch`en Hao says: "to be on +'desperate ground' is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching +in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid +description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an +army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides: +-- it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's mercy. A +ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so +perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the +chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut +off behind, no choice but to proceed in single file. Then, +before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle, +the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene. +Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating, we +have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; +yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment's respite. +If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will +crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain the +enemy's attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, +destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the +necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, +all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so +narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten +thousand; all means of offense in the hands of the enemy, all +points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:--in this +terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and +the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the +slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of +the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the +Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. +78 sqq.].] + + 11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile +ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not. + + [But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the +advantageous position first. So Ts`ao Kung. Li Ch`uan and +others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has +already forestalled us, sot that it would be sheer madness to +attack. In the SUN TZU HSU LU, when the King of Wu inquires what +should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies: "The rule with +regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the +advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is +secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him +away by pretending to flee--show your banners and sound your +drums--make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to +lose--trail brushwood and raise a dust--confound his ears and +eyes--detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in +ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."] + + 12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. + + [Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the +blocking force itself to serious risks. There are two +interpretations available here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The +other is indicated in Ts`ao Kung's brief note: "Draw closer +together"--i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut +off.] + +On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your +allies. + + [Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighboring states."] + + 13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. + + [On this, Li Ch`uan has the following delicious note: "When +an army penetrates far into the enemy's country, care must be +taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the +example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch`in +territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of +valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause +us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 +A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, +then, I think that the true reading must be, not 'plunder,' but +'do not plunder.'" Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy +commentator's feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, has +no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on 'serious ground,' +there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no +possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a +protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, +and keep a close watch on the enemy."] + +In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. + + [Or, in the words of VIII. ss. 2, "do not encamp.] + + 14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. + + [Ts`au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual +artifice;" and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: "In such a +position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the +circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the +peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the +famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains +on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the +dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle +his foes was remarkably like that which T`ien Tan had also +employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. ss. 24, +note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the +horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals +being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the +passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of +these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans +that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army +passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; +Livy, XXII. 16 17.] + +On desperate ground, fight. + + [For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your +might, there is a chance of life; where as death is certain if +you cling to your corner."] + + 15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how +to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear; + + [More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch +with each other."] + +to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to +hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from +rallying their men. + 16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep +them in disorder. + 17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward +move; when otherwise, they stopped still. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en connects this with the foregoing: "Having +succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward +in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no +advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were."] + + 18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in +orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I +should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent +holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." + + [Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in mind. Ts`ao Kung +thinks it is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is +depending." Tu Mu says: "The three things which an enemy is +anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of which his success +depends, are: (1) to capture our favorable positions; (2) to +ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications." +Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three +directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. ss. 3.] By +boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the +other side on the defensive.] + + 19. Rapidity is the essence of war: + + [According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading +principles in warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest +truths of military science, and the chief business of the +general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the +importance attached to speed by two of China's greatest generals. +In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch`eng under the Wei +Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and +had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister +of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then military +governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he at +once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having +previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import. +Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued +himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly +investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta +is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at +once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the +mask." Then, by a series of forced marches, be brought his army +under the walls of Hsin-ch`eng with in a space of eight days. +Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang: +"Wan is 1200 LI from here. When the news of my revolt reaches +Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will +be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time +my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to +come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are +not worth troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled +with consternation: "Though only eight days have passed since I +threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. +What miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- +ch`eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See +CHIN SHU, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from +K`uei-chou in Ssu-ch`uan to reduce the successful rebel Hsiao +Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou Fu in +Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, +Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come +down through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. +But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and was just +about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone +his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for +navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming +speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss +opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien +even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the +present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before +his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is +heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [See +VII. ss. 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if +he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his +soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. +Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as +he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly +stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer +the penalty of death.] + +take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by +unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. + 20. The following are the principles to be observed by an +invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the +greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the +defenders will not prevail against you. + 21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your +army with food. + + [Cf. supra, ss. 13. Li Ch`uan does not venture on a note +here.] + + 22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, + + [For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, +give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them +generally."] + +and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your +strength. + + [Ch`en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the +famous general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely +contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded +the Ch`u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him. +But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all +invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In +vain did the Ch`u general try to force a battle: day after day +Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but +devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and +confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well +fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for +bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to +weld them into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had +elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were +amusing themselves. The answer was, that they were contending +with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping. When +Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic +pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the +required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By +this time the Ch`u army, after repeating their challenge again +and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch`in +general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in +the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. +Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch`u was conquered by Ch`in, and +the king Fu-ch`u led into captivity.] + +Keep your army continually on the move, + + [In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you +are. It has struck me, however, that the true reading might be +"link your army together."] + +and devise unfathomable plans. + 23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no +escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face +death, there is nothing they may not achieve. + + [Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3): "If one +man were to run amok with a sword in the market-place, and +everybody else tried to get our of his way, I should not allow +that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were +contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man +who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."] + +Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. + + [Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, +they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it."] + + 24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of +fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If +they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If +there is no help for it, they will fight hard. + 25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers +will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, +they will do your will; + + [Literally, "without asking, you will get."] + +without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving +orders, they can be trusted. + 26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with +superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no +calamity need be feared. + + [The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," +degenerate into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." +Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: "'Spells and incantations should +be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by +divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers' +minds should be seriously perturbed.' The meaning is," he +continues, "that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your +men will never falter in their resolution until they die."] + + 27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is +not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are +not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to +longevity. + + [Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and +long life are things for which all men have a natural +inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away valuables, and +sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but +simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating +that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see +that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown +in their way.] + + 28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your +soldiers may weep, + + [The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to +indicate more genuine grief than tears alone.] + +those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down +letting the tears run down their cheeks. + + [Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts`ao Kung +says, "all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We +may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike +in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful +parting at the I River between Ching K`o and his friends, when +the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch`in +(afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed +down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following +lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the burn; Your +champion is going--Not to return." [1] ] + +But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the +courage of a Chu or a Kuei. + + [Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu +State and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by +Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his +sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly +of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, +but was immediately hacked to pieced by the king's bodyguard. +This was in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Ts`ao Kuei (or +Ts`ao Mo), performed the exploit which has made his name famous +166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by +Ch`i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a +large slice of territory, when Ts`ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan +Kung, the Duke of Ch`i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a +dagger against his chest. None of the duke's retainers dared to +move a muscle, and Ts`ao Kuei proceeded to demand full +restitution, declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because +she was a smaller and a weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his +life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts`ao Kuei flung away his +dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the terrified +assemblage without having so much as changed color. As was to be +expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, +but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the +impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold +stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three +pitched battles.] + + 29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the SHUAI-JAN. +Now the SHUAI-JAN is a snake that is found in the Ch`ang +mountains. + + ["Shuai-jan" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in +question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its +movements. Through this passage, the term in the Chinese has now +come to be used in the sense of "military maneuvers."] + +Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike +at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its +middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both. + 30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN, + + [That is, as Mei Yao-ch`en says, "Is it possible to make the +front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on +the other, just as though they were part of a single living +body?"] + +I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are +enemies; + + [Cf. VI. ss. 21.] + +yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught +by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the +left hand helps the right. + + [The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a +time of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same +army, bound together as they are by every tie of interest and +fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has +been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case +of allied armies.] + + 31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the +tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the +ground. + + [These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running +away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor +with him at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened +himself firmly to one spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not +enough, says Sun Tzu, to render flight impossible by such +mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have +tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of +sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be learned +from the SHUAI-JAN.] + + 32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up +one standard of courage which all must reach. + + [Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were +that of] one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic +whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its +component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate must +not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's seemingly +ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he +had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in +this important particular--unity of spirit and courage. Had he +not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those +troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the +day.] + + 33. How to make the best of both strong and weak--that is a +question involving the proper use of ground. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en's paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the +differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to +utilize accidental features of the ground." Less reliable +troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as +better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position +neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. +Henderson says: "With all respect to the text books, and to the +ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study +of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient +importance is attached to the selection of positions... and to +the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are +defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural +features." [2] ] + + 34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as +though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. + + [Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with +which he does it."] + + 35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus +ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. + 36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by +false reports and appearances, + + [Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] + +and thus keep them in total ignorance. + + [Ts`ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The +troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the +beginning; they may only rejoice with you over their happy +outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy," is one +of the first principles in war, as had been frequently pointed +out. But how about the other process--the mystification of one's +own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzu is over-emphatic on +this point would do well to read Col. Henderson's remarks on +Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," he +says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most +trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his +thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced +useless"--etc. etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. +47 of the HOU HAN SHU, "Pan Ch`ao took the field with 25,000 men +from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of +crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his +chief commander to succor the place with an army drawn from the +kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t`ou, totaling 50,000 men. +Pan Ch`ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a +council of war, and said: 'Our forces are now outnumbered and +unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is +for us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. +The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I +will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the +evening drum has sounded and then start.' Pan Ch`ao now secretly +released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of +Kutcha was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, +the latter set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar +Pan Ch`ao's retreat in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode +eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of +Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch`ao knew that the two chieftains had +gone, he called his divisions together, got them well in hand, +and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it +lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, +and were closely pursued by Pan Ch`ao. Over 5000 heads were +brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of +horses and cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand +then capitulating, Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their +respective forces. From that time forward, Pan Ch`ao's prestige +completely overawed the countries of the west." In this case, we +see that the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in +ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of +dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.] + + 37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, + + [Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same +stratagem twice.] + +he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. + + [Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The +axiom, that war is based on deception, does not apply only to +deception of the enemy. You must deceive even your own soldiers. +Make them follow you, but without letting them know why."] + +By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents +the enemy from anticipating his purpose. + 38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like +one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder +behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory +before he shows his hand. + + [Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. ss. 15), that is, +takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army +to return--like Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a +river. Ch`en Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words +less well as "puts forth every artifice at his command."] + + 39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a +shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and +that, and nothing knows whither he is going. + + [Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to +advance or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of +attacking and conquering."] + + 40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this may +be termed the business of the general. + + [Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there should be no +delay in aiming a blow at the enemy's heart. Note how he returns +again and again to this point. Among the warring states of +ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear +and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.] + + 41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of +ground; + + [Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting +the rules for the nine varieties of ground.] + +the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the +fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must +most certainly be studied. + 42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle +is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a +short way means dispersion. + + [Cf. supra, ss. 20.] + + 43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your +army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical +ground. + + [This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. ss. 2, but it +does not figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities +in chap. X. One's first impulse would be to translate it distant +ground," but this, if we can trust the commentators, is precisely +what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch`en says it is "a position not +far enough advanced to be called 'facile,' and not near enough to +home to be 'dispersive,' but something between the two." Wang Hsi +says: "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, +whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. +Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business there +quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, +which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine +Situations.] + +When there are means of communication on all four sides, the +ground is one of intersecting highways. + 44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious +ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile +ground. + 45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and +narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no +place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. + 46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men +with unity of purpose. + + [This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining +on the defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. supra, ss. 11.] + +On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection +between all parts of my army. + + [As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible +contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a +sudden attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. ss. 17. Mei +Yao-ch`en says: "On the march, the regiments should be in close +touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the +fortifications."] + + 47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. + + [This is Ts`ao Kung's interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, +saying: "We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and +tail may both reach the goal." That is, they must not be allowed +to straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch`en offers another +equally plausible explanation: "Supposing the enemy has not yet +reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we should +advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession." +Ch`en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had +time to select his own ground, quotes VI. ss. 1, where Sun Tzu +warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of +the situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a +favorable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of +troops to occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, +come up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their +rear with your main body, and victory will be assured." It was +thus, he adds, that Chao She beat the army of Ch`in. (See p. +57.)] + + 48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my +defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, I would +consolidate my alliances. + 49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous +stream of supplies. + + [The commentators take this as referring to forage and +plunder, not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication +with a home base.] + +On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. + 50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. + + [Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend +the position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly +through the enemy's lines." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "in order to +make my soldiers fight with desperation." Wang Hsi says, +"fearing lest my men be tempted to run away." Tu Mu points out +that this is the converse of VII. ss. 36, where it is the enemy +who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and +canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under Erh- +chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small, +consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. +The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, +gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of +trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all the +remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen +and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men saw +that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their +spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they +charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks +broke and crumbled under their onslaught.] + +On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the +hopelessness of saving their lives. + + Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away +your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your +cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot +survive, but must fight to the death." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The +only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it." This +concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about "grounds" and the +"variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which +bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by +the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. +Sun Tzu begins abruptly in VIII. ss. 2 to enumerate "variations" +before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, +namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is +not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in +the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six +new grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these +is mentioned again, though the first is hardly to be +distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, in +chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately +followed by the variations. This takes us down to ss. 14. In +SS. 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and +9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed +in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated +once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 +and 7, being different from those previously given. Though it is +impossible to account for the present state of Sun Tzu's text, a +few suggestive facts maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap. +VIII, according to the title, should deal with nine variations, +whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short chapter. +(3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are +defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of +the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is +disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. I do +not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the +general conclusion that Sun Tzu's work cannot have come down to +us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is +obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to +contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or +ought to appear elsewhere.] + + 51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an +obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he +cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into +danger. + + [Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch`ao's devoted +followers in 73 A.D. The story runs thus in the HOU HAN SHU, ch. +47: "When Pan Ch`ao arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the +country, received him at first with great politeness and respect; +but shortly afterwards his behavior underwent a sudden change, +and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch`ao spoke about this +to the officers of his suite: 'Have you noticed,' he said, 'that +Kuang's polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify +that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, and that +consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with +which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The +truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have +come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already +manifest!' Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been +assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: 'Where +are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some day ago?' +The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he +presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch`ao, keeping his +informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general +gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking +with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a little, +he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them +thus: 'Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated +region, anxious to achieve riches and honor by some great +exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no +arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the result is +that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal +host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to +seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will +become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?' +With one accord, the officers replied: 'Standing as we do in +peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life and +death.' For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. ss. 1, +note.] + + 52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes +until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to +lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of +the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and +precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn +natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides. + + [These three sentences are repeated from VII. SS. 12-14 -- +in order to emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to +think. I prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to +form an antecedent to the following words. With regard to local +guides, Sun Tzu might have added that there is always the risk of +going wrong, either through their treachery or some +misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we +are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of +Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied; but +his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin +names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of +Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in +that direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had +almost arrived.] + + 53. To be ignored of any one of the following four or five +principles does not befit a warlike prince. + 54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his +generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the +enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are +prevented from joining against him. + + [Mei Tao-ch`en constructs one of the chains of reasoning +that are so much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a +powerful state, if you can divide her forces, you will have a +superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in strength, +you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the +neighboring states will be frightened; and if the neighboring +states are frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from +joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning: "If the +great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to +summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and +refrain from massing their forces." Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu take +the sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful +though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be +unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on +external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening +confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the +enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus: +"If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be +discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) +our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the +enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join +us."] + + 55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and +sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries +out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. + + [The train of thought, as said by Li Ch`uan, appears to be +this: Secure against a combination of his enemies, "he can +afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own +secret designs, his prestige enable him to dispense with external +friendships."] + +Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their +kingdoms. + + [This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch`in +State became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy +by which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for +her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up +his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning this +attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.] + + 56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, + + [Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly +rewarded and retreat be heavily punished."] + +issue orders + + [Literally, "hang" or post up."] + +without regard to previous arrangements; + + ["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The +general meaning is made clear by Ts`ao Kung's quotation from the +SSU-MA FA: "Give instructions only on sighting the enemy; give +rewards when you see deserving deeds." Ts`ao Kung's paraphrase: +"The final instructions you give to your army should not +correspond with those that have been previously posted up." +Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements should not be +divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says: "there should be no +fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not only is there danger +in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the +entire reversal of them at the last moment.] + +and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to +do with but a single man. + + [Cf. supra, ss. 34.] + + 57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let +them know your design. + + [Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your +reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior +colleague to "give no reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim +is even more applicable to a general than to a judge.] + +When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell +them nothing when the situation is gloomy. + 58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; +plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. + + [These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in +explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most +brilliant battles, already alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he +was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles from the +mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in +full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light +cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red flag. Their +instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles and +keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me +in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their +fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to +rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set up the red banners +of Han in their stead." Turning then to his other officers, he +remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong position, and is not +likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and +drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and +escape through the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent +out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form +in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this +maneuver, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By +this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the +generalissimo's flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, +and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle +followed, lasting for some time; until at length Han Hsin and his +colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on the field, fled +to the division on the river bank, where another fierce battle +was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure +the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two +generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting +with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the 2000 +horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao +following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted +walls, tore up the enemy's flags and replaced them by those of +Han. When the Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight +of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the +Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild +disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in +vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and +completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest, +amongst whom was King Ya himself.... After the battle, some of +Han Hsin's officers came to him and said: "In the ART OF WAR we +are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river +or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun +Tzu and T`ai Kung. See IX ss. 9, and note.] You, on the +contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our +back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the +victory?" The general replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not +studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written +there: 'Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come +off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive'? +Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to +bring my colleague round. What says the Military Classic--'Swoop +down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight.' [This +passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzu.] If I had +not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to +fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own +discretion, there would have been a general debandade, and it +would have been impossible to do anything with them." The +officers admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These +are higher tactics than we should have been capable of." [See +CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ] + + 59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's +way that is capable of striking a blow for victory. + + [Danger has a bracing effect.] + + 60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating +ourselves to the enemy's purpose. + + [Ts`ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"--by an appearance of +yielding and falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chang Yu's note +makes the meaning clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to +advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay +on purpose that he may carry out his intention." The object is +to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our +attack.] + + 61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, + + [I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the +enemy in one direction." Ts`ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers +and make for the enemy." But such a violent displacement of +characters is quite indefensible.] + +we shall succeed in the long run + + [Literally, "after a thousand LI."] + +in killing the commander-in-chief. + + [Always a great point with the Chinese.] + + 62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer +cunning. + 63. On the day that you take up your command, block the +frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, + + [These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was +issued as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a +gate. Cf. the "border-warden" of LUN YU III. 24, who may have +had similar duties. When this half was returned to him, within a +fixed period, he was authorized to open the gate and let the +traveler through.] + +and stop the passage of all emissaries. + + [Either to or from the enemy's country.] + + 64. Be stern in the council-chamber, + + [Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified +by the sovereign.] + +so that you may control the situation. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take +the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your +deliberations.] + + 65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. + 66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, + + [Cf. supra, ss. 18.] + +and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. + + [Ch`en Hao`s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favorable +position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the +advantage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical +account. He who intends therefore, to occupy a position of +importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful +appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him +into going there as well." Mei Yao-ch`en explains that this +"artful appointment" is to be made through the medium of the +enemy's own spies, who will carry back just the amount of +information that we choose to give them. Then, having cunningly +disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting after +the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. ss. 4). We must start +after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we must arrive +before him in order to capture the place without trouble. Taken +thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch`en's +interpretation of ss. 47.] + + 67. Walk in the path defined by rule, + + [Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, +and this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." +It is unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight +authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much more +satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of +the old school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating +every accepted canon of warfare.] + +and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a +decisive battle. + + [Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy's tactics until a +favorable opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a +battle that shall prove decisive."] + + 68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until +the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity +of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to +oppose you. + + [As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the +comparison hardly appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was +thinking only of its speed. The words have been taken to mean: +You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare; but +this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] + + +[1] Giles' Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. + +[2] "The Science of War," p. 333. + +[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE + + + [Rather more than half the chapter (SS. 1-13) is devoted to +the subject of fire, after which the author branches off into +other topics.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with +fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; + + [So Tu Mu. Li Ch`uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill +the soldiers" (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan +Ch`ao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see +XI. ss. 51, note], found himself placed in extreme peril by the +unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal +enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his officers, he +exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! [1] The only course open +to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under +cover of night, when they will not be able to discern our +numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them +completely; this will cool the King's courage and cover us with +glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.' the +officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the +matter first with the Intendant. Pan Ch`ao then fell into a +passion: 'It is today,' he cried, 'that our fortunes must be +decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, who on +hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything +will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate +for valiant warriors.' All then agreed to do as he wished. +Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band +quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was +blowing at the time. Pan Ch`ao ordered ten of the party to take +drums and hide behind the enemy's barracks, it being arranged +that when they saw flames shoot up, they should begin drumming +and yelling with all their might. The rest of his men, armed +with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the gate of +the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, +whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the +front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in +frantic disorder. Pan Ch`ao slew three of them with his own +hand, while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and +thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, +perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan Ch`ao, +divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand: 'Although you +did not go with us last night, I should not think, Sir, of taking +sole credit for our exploit.' This satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan +Ch`ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the +head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with +fear and trembling, which Pan Ch`ao took steps to allay by +issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king's sons as +hostage, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku." HOU HAN SHU, +ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ] + +the second is to burn stores; + + [Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to +subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng +recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids +and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run +proved entirely successful.] + +the third is to burn baggage trains; + + [An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao`s wagons +and impedimenta by Ts`ao Ts`ao in 200 A.D.] + +the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; + + [Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and +"magazines" are the same. He specifies weapons and other +implements, bullion and clothing. Cf. VII. ss. 11.] + +the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. + + [Tu Yu says in the T`UNG TIEN: "To drop fire into the +enemy's camp. The method by which this may be done is to set the +tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then +shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy's lines."] + + 2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means +available. + + [T`sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy's camp" are +referred to. But Ch`en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: +"We must have favorable circumstances in general, not merely +traitors to help us." Chia Lin says: "We must avail ourselves +of wind and dry weather."] + +the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. + + [Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable +matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have +the material cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, +stuff for lighting fires."] + + 3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, +and special days for starting a conflagration. + 4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the +special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of +the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; + + [These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of +the Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to +Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.] + +for these four are all days of rising wind. + 5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet +five possible developments: + 6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, respond +at once with an attack from without. + 7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's +soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack. + + [The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the +enemy into confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means +that the enemy is ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for +caution.] + + 8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, +follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay +where you are. + + [Ts`ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but +if you find the difficulties too great, retire."] + + 9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from +without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your +attack at a favorable moment. + + [Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to +the fire breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by +the agency of incendiaries) inside the enemy's camp. "But," he +continues, "if the enemy is settled in a waste place littered +with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a +position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against +him at any seasonable opportunity, and not await on in hopes of +an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents should +themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and thus render +our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once baffled the +leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking +advantage of a favorable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese +general's camp, but found that every scrap of combustible +vegetation in the neighborhood had already been burnt down. On +the other hand, Po-ts`ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, +was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple +precaution. "At the head of a large army he was besieging +Ch`ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was +very small, and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the +ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and said: +"In war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and +numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here +quotes Sun Tzu, V. SS. 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched +their camp in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn +when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will be +thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on +all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of T`ien Tan.' +[See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so +Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into +torches and mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent +out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way through +the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. +Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and +Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which +threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." +[HOU HAN SHU, ch. 71.] ] + + 10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do +not attack from the leeward. + + [Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, +the enemy will retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat +and attack him then, he will fight desperately, which will not +conduce to your success." A rather more obvious explanation is +given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the east, begin burning to +the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from +that side. If you start the fire on the east side, and then +attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your +enemy."] + + 11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a +night breeze soon falls. + + [Cf. Lao Tzu's saying: "A violent wind does not last the +space of a morning." (TAO TE CHING, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch`en +and Wang Hsi say: "A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a +night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general +rule." The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how +this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.] + + 12. In every army, the five developments connected with +fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a +watch kept for the proper days. + + [Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of +the stars, and watch for the days on which wind will rise, +before making our attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret +the text differently: "We must not only know how to assail our +opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar +attacks from them."] + + 13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show +intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an +accession of strength. + 14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not +robbed of all his belongings. + + [Ts`ao Kung's note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy's +road or divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated +stores." Water can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible +destructive power of fire. This is the reason, Chang Yu +concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of sentences, +whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzu (ch. +4) speaks thus of the two elements: "If an army is encamped on +low-lying marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and +where the rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If +an army is encamped in wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with +weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it may be +exterminated by fire."] + + 15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles +and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of +enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general +stagnation. + + [This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzu. +Ts`ao Kung says: "Rewards for good service should not be +deferred a single day." And Tu Mu: "If you do not take +opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, your +subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will +ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the +formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the +interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch`en alone, whose words I +will quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their +battles and assaults must seize the favorable moments when they +come and not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that is to +say, they must resort to such means of attack of fire, water and +the like. What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is +to sit still and simply hold to the advantages they have got."] + + 16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans +well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources. + + [Tu Mu quotes the following from the SAN LUEH, ch. 2: "The +warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them +together by good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. +If faith decays, there will be disruption; if rewards are +deficient, commands will not be respected."] + + 17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your +troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless +the position is critical. + + [Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he +never goes so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in +the TAO TE CHING, ch. 69. "I dare not take the initiative, but +prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but +prefer to retreat a foot."] + + 18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to +gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply +out of pique. + 19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if +not, stay where you are. + + [This is repeated from XI. ss. 17. Here I feel convinced +that it is an interpolation, for it is evident that ss. 20 ought +to follow immediately on ss. 18.] + + 20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be +succeeded by content. + 21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never +come again into being; + + [The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of +this saying.] + +nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. + 22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good +general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at +peace and an army intact. + + +[1] "Unless you enter the tiger's lair, you cannot get hold of +the tiger's cubs." + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +XIII. THE USE OF SPIES + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men +and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the +people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily +expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. + + [Cf. II. ss. ss. 1, 13, 14.] + +There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop +down exhausted on the highways. + + [Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 30: "Where troops have been +quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: +"We may be reminded of the saying: 'On serious ground, gather in +plunder.' Why then should carriage and transportation cause +exhaustion on the highways?--The answer is, that not victuals +alone, but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to +the army. Besides, the injunction to 'forage on the enemy' only +means that when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory, +scarcity of food must be provided against. Hence, without being +solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order +that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, +again, there are places like salt deserts where provisions being +unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed with."] + +As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in +their labor. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough- +tail." The allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine +parts, each consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center +being cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the +other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their +cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. +[See II. ss. 12, note.] In time of war, one of the families had +to serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its +support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able- +bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 families +would be affected.] + + 2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving +for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, +to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because +one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors +and emoluments, + + ["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil +the effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were +actually mentioned at this point.] + +is the height of inhumanity. + + [Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by +adverting to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood +and treasure which war always brings in its train. Now, unless +you are kept informed of the enemy's condition, and are ready to +strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for years. The +only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is +impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly +paid for their services. But it is surely false economy to +grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, when +every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. +This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and +hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is +nothing less than a crime against humanity.] + + 3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help +to his sovereign, no master of victory. + + [This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its +root in the national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far +back as 597 B.C., these memorable words were uttered by Prince +Chuang of the Ch`u State: "The [Chinese] character for 'prowess' +is made up of [the characters for] 'to stay' and 'a spear' +(cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the +repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the +preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment +of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, putting +harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."] + + 4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good +general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the +reach of ordinary men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE. + + [That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he +means to do.] + + 5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; +it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, + + [Tu Mu's note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be +gained by reasoning from other analogous cases."] + +nor by any deductive calculation. + + [Li Ch`uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, +distance and magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical +determination; human actions cannot be so calculated."] + + 6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be +obtained from other men. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge +of the spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information +in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws +of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but +the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and +spies alone."] + + 7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: +(1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) +doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. + 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can +discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation +of the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty. + + [Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all +cavalry leaders, had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose +business it was to collect all possible information regarding the +enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of his success in +war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy's moves +thus gained." [1] ] + + 9. Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of the +inhabitants of a district. + + [Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by +kind treatment, and use them as spies."] + + 10. Having INWARD SPIES, making use of officials of the +enemy. + + [Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good +service in this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from +office, criminals who have undergone punishment; also, favorite +concubines who are greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at +being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed over in +the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side +should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of +displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always +want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several +kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to +one's interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will +be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy's country, +ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, and +moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach between the +sovereign and his ministers." The necessity for extreme caution, +however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears from an +historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of +I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of +Shu in his stronghold at P`i. After each side had experienced a +number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the +services of a certain P`o-t`ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to +have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to +Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him +from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right +moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in +these promises, march out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po +and others at their head with orders to attack at P`o-t`ai's +bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, Li Hsiang, had prepared +an ambuscade on their line of march; and P`o-t`ai, having reared +long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the +beacon-fire. Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the signal and +began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others +were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred +of Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of +whom was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his +forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy +completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho +Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li +Hsiung or that of his father Li T`e, CHIN SHU, ch. 120, 121.] + + 11. Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of the enemy's +spies and using them for our own purposes. + + [By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching +them from the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back +false information as well as to spy in turn on their own +countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we +pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry +away a false impression of what is going on. Several of the +commentators accept this as an alternative definition; but that +it is not what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his +subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously +(ss. 21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted +spies were used with conspicuous success: (1) by T`ien Tan in +his defense of Chi-mo (see supra, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his +march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., +when Lien P`o was conducting a defensive campaign against Ch`in. +The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P`o's cautious and +dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a series of +minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of +his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were +already in Fan Chu's pay. They said: "The only thing which +causes Ch`in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. +Lien P`o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be +vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the +famous Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed +in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came +to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who +could stand against him. His father was much disquieted by this +overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of +such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever +Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of +Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from +his own mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now +sent to succeed Lien P`o. Needless to say, he proved no match +for the redoubtable Po Ch`i and the great military power of +Ch`in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into +two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance +lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one +another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, +amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the +sword.] + + 12. Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain things openly for +purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and +report them to the enemy. + + [Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We +ostentatiously do thing calculated to deceive our own spies, who +must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed. +Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy's lines, they +will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take +measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite +different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." As an +example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released +by Pan Ch`ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He +also refers to T`ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T`ai +Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied security, +until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. +Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T`ang +Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the +New T`ang History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 +respectively) that he escaped and lived on until 656. Li I-chi +played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when sent by the King +of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch`i. He has certainly +more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of Ch`i, +being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and +infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, +ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.] + + 13. SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who bring back news +from the enemy's camp. + + [This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, +forming a regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving +spy must be a man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance +a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be +active, robust, endowed with physical strength and courage; +thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure +hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho Shih +tells the following story of Ta`hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When +he was governor of Eastern Ch`in, Shen-wu of Ch`i made a hostile +movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T`ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent +Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other +men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy's uniform. +When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from +the enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they +succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army. Then they +got on their horses again and boldly passed through the camp +under the guise of night-watchmen; and more than once, happening +to come across a soldier who was committing some breach of +discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound +cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible +information about the enemy's dispositions, and received warm +commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report +was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."] + + 14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more +intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. + + [Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en point out that the spy is +privileged to enter even the general's private sleeping-tent.] + +None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business +should greater secrecy be preserved. + + [Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies +should be carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies +may be quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them +than any previous commander: "Spies are attached to those who +give them most, he who pays them ill is never served. They +should never be known to anybody; nor should they know one +another. When they propose anything very material, secure their +persons, or have in your possession their wives and children as +hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to them +but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. [2] ] + + 15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain +intuitive sagacity. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "In order to use them, one must know +fact from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty +and double-dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation +thinks more along the lines of "intuitive perception" and +"practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers these +attributes to the spies themselves: "Before using spies we must +assure ourselves as to their integrity of character and the +extent of their experience and skill." But he continues: "A +brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than +mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." +So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the +passage."] + + 16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and +straightforwardness. + + [Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by +substantial offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity; +then they will work for you with all their might."] + + 17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make +certain of the truth of their reports. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Be on your guard against the +possibility of spies going over to the service of the enemy."] + + 18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind +of business. + + [Cf. VI. ss. 9.] + + 19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before +the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man +to whom the secret was told. + + [Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters +are heard before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzu's +main point in this passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself +"as a punishment for letting out the secret," the object of +killing the other man is only, as Ch`en Hao puts it, "to stop his +mouth" and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already +been repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either +way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, +though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves +to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told the +secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of +him."] + + 20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a +city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to +begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de- +camp, + + [Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to +"those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with +information," which naturally necessitates frequent interviews +with him.] + +and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our +spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. + + [As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of +these important functionaries can be won over by bribery.] + + 21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be +sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. +Thus they will become converted spies and available for our +service. + 22. It is through the information brought by the converted +spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward +spies. + + [Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy's spies we +learn the enemy's condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt +the converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows +which of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of +the officials are open to corruption."] + + 23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can +cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. + + [Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the +enemy can best be deceived."] + + 24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy +can be used on appointed occasions. + 25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is +knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, +in the first instance, from the converted spy. + + [As explained in ss. 22-24. He not only brings information +himself, but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to +advantage.] + +Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the +utmost liberality. + 26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty + + [Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its +name was changed to Yin by P`an Keng in 1401. + +was due to I Chih + + [Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman +who took part in Ch`eng T`ang's campaign against Chieh Kuei.] + +who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou +dynasty was due to Lu Ya + + [Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, +whom he afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T`ai +Kung, a title bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have +composed a treatise on war, erroneously identified with the +LIU T`AO.] + +who had served under the Yin. + + [There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought +it well to introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on +the passage are by no means explicit. But, having regard to the +context, we can hardly doubt that Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih +and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted spy, or +something closely analogous. His suggestion is, that the Hsia +and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of +their weaknesses and shortcoming which these former ministers +were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch`en appears to +resent any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin and Lu +Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. Hsia +could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could +not employ the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great +achievements were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is +also indignant: "How should two divinely inspired men such as I +and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzu's mention of them +simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is +a matter which requires men of the highest mental caliber like I +and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task. +The above words only emphasize this point." Ho Shih believes +then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their +supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] + + 27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise +general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for +purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. + + [Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which +carries a boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of +sinking it, so reliance on spies, while production of great +results, is oft-times the cause of utter destruction."] + +Spies are a most important element in war, because on them +depends an army's ability to move. + + [Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man with +ears or eyes.] + + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2. + +[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311. + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR *** + + +******* This file should be named 132.txt or 132.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/3/132 + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://www.gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. +This particular work is one of the few copyrighted individual works +included with the permission of the copyright holder. Information on +the copyright owner for this particular work and the terms of use +imposed by the copyright holder on this work are set forth at the +beginning of this work. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS,' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including including checks, online payments and credit card +donations. To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Each eBook is in a subdirectory of the same number as the eBook's +eBook number, often in several formats including plain vanilla ASCII, +compressed (zipped), HTML and others. + +Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks replace the old file and take over +the old filename and etext number. The replaced older file is renamed. +VERSIONS based on separate sources are treated as new eBooks receiving +new filenames and etext numbers. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + +http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + +EBooks posted prior to November 2003, with eBook numbers BELOW #10000, +are filed in directories based on their release date. If you want to +download any of these eBooks directly, rather than using the regular +search system you may utilize the following addresses and just +download by the etext year. + +http://www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/etext06 + + (Or /etext 05, 04, 03, 02, 01, 00, 99, + 98, 97, 96, 95, 94, 93, 92, 92, 91 or 90) + +EBooks posted since November 2003, with etext numbers OVER #10000, are +filed in a different way. The year of a release date is no longer part +of the directory path. The path is based on the etext number (which is +identical to the filename). The path to the file is made up of single +digits corresponding to all but the last digit in the filename. For +example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at: + +http://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/3/10234 + +or filename 24689 would be found at: +http://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/6/8/24689 + +An alternative method of locating eBooks: +http://www.gutenberg.org/GUTINDEX.ALL + +*** END: FULL LICENSE *** diff --git a/old/old/132.zip b/old/old/132.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..390757d --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/132.zip diff --git a/old/old/2012-01-14_132.zip b/old/old/2012-01-14_132.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..390757d --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/2012-01-14_132.zip diff --git a/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-0.txt b/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02a1c7a --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7140 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Art of War, by Sun Tzŭ + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you +will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before +using this eBook. + +Title: The Art of War + +Author: Sun Tzŭ + +Translator: Lionel Giles + +Release Date: May 1994 [eBook #132] +[Most recently updated: October 16, 2021] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR *** + + + + +Sun Tzŭ +on +The Art of War + +THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD +Translated from the Chinese with Introduction and Critical Notes + +BY +LIONEL GILES, M.A. + +Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. +in the British Museum + + + + +1910 + + + +To my brother +Captain Valentine Giles, R.G. +in the hope that +a work 2400 years old +may yet contain lessons worth consideration +by the soldier of today +this translation +is affectionately dedicated. + + + +Contents + + + Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext + Preface by Lionel Giles + INTRODUCTION + Sun Wu and his Book + The Text of Sun Tzŭ + The Commentators + Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ + Apologies for War + Bibliography + Chapter I. Laying plans + Chapter II. Waging War + Chapter III. Attack by Stratagem + Chapter IV. Tactical Dispositions + Chapter V. Energy + Chapter VI. Weak Points and Strong + Chapter VII Manœuvring + Chapter VIII. Variation of Tactics + Chapter IX. The Army on the March + Chapter X. Terrain + Chapter XI. The Nine Situations + Chapter XII. The Attack by Fire + Chapter XIII. The Use of Spies + + + +Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext + +When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_, the +work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to Europe began +in 1782 when a French Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph Amiot, +acquired a copy of it, and translated it into French. It was not a good +translation because, according to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great +deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, and very little indeed of what he +did." + +The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by +Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words +of Dr. Giles, "excessively bad." He goes further in this criticism: "It +is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which none can +hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages were +willfully distorted or slurred over. Such offenses are less pardonable. +They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Latin or Greek classic, +and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in +translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt. Calthrop’s +translation was published in London. It was an improvement on the +first—omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected—but new +errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his +translation, wrote: "It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate +of my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a +better fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I +could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors." + +Clearly, Dr. Giles’ work established much of the groundwork for the +work of later translators who published their own editions. Of the +later editions of the _Art of War_ I have examined; two feature Giles’ +edited translation and notes, the other two present the same basic +information from the ancient Chinese commentators found in the Giles +edition. Of these four, Giles’ 1910 edition is the most scholarly and +presents the reader an incredible amount of information concerning Sun +Tzŭ’s text, much more than any other translation. + +The Giles’ edition of the _Art of War_, as stated above, was a +scholarly work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time and an +assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts +in the British Museum. Apparently he wanted to produce a definitive +edition, superior to anything else that existed and perhaps something +that would become a standard translation. It was the best translation +available for 50 years. But apparently there was not much interest in +Sun Tzŭ in English-speaking countries since it took the start of the +Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several people +published unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzŭ. In 1944, Dr. +Giles’ translation was edited and published in the United States in a +series of military science books. But it wasn’t until 1963 that a good +English translation (by Samuel B. Griffith and still in print) was +published that was an equal to Giles’ translation. While this +translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles’ translation, it lacks his +copious notes that make his so interesting. + +Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the +Chinese civilization and language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun +Tzŭ, the English translation, and voluminous notes along with numerous +footnotes. Unfortunately, some of his notes and footnotes contain +Chinese characters; some are completely Chinese. Thus, a conversion to +a Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the conversion in complete +ignorance of Chinese (except for what I learned while doing the +conversion). Thus, I faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it while +retaining as much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase +represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the +text as possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, +I was able to transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the +risk of making the text more obscure. However, the text, on the whole, +is quite satisfactory for the casual reader, a transformation made +possible by conversion to an etext. However, I come away from this task +with the feeling of loss because I know that someone with a background +in Chinese can do a better job than I did; any such attempt would be +welcomed. + +Bob Sutton + + + +Preface by Lionel Giles + +The seventh volume of _Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, +les arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois_ is devoted to the +Art of War, and contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles +de Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph +Amiot. Père Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a +sinologue in his day, and the field of his labours was certainly +extensive. But his so-called translation of the Sun Tzŭ, if placed side +by side with the original, is seen at once to be little better than an +imposture. It contains a great deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, and +very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair specimen, taken from +the opening sentences of chapter 5:— + +_De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes._ Sun-tse dit : Ayez +les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que subalternes; +inscrivez-les dans un catalogue à part, avec la note des talents & de +la capacité de chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage +lorsque l’occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que +vous devez commander soient persuadés que votre principale attention +est de les préserver de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez +avancer contre l’ennemi doivent être comme des pierres que vous +lanceriez contre des œufs. De vous à l’ennemi il ne doit y avoir +d’autre différence que celle du fort au faible, du vide au plein. +Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret. Voilà en peu de +mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute la perfection même du +gouvernement des troupes. + + +Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development in +the study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun +Tzŭ, although his work was known to be highly valued in China as by far +the oldest and best compendium of military science. It was not until +the year 1905 that the first English translation, by Capt. E.F. +Calthrop. R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under the title “Sonshi”(the +Japanese form of Sun Tzŭ). Unfortunately, it was evident that the +translator’s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty to fit him to +grapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzŭ. He himself plainly +acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the +accompanying translation would have been impossible.” We can only +wonder, then, that with their help it should have been so excessively +bad. It is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which none +can hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages +were wilfully distorted or slurred over. Such offences are less +pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Greek or +Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted +upon in translations from Chinese. + +From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present +translation is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate +of my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a +better fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I +could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors. Towards +the end of 1908, a new and revised edition of Capt. Calthrop’s +translation was published in London, this time, however, without any +allusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three chapters were +then already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms of Capt. +Calthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to his +earlier edition. This is on the whole an improvement on the other, +thought there still remains much that cannot pass muster. Some of the +grosser blunders have been rectified and lacunae filled up, but on the +other hand a certain number of new mistakes appear. The very first +sentence of the introduction is startlingly inaccurate; and later on, +while mention is made of “an army of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzŭ +(who are these, by the way?), not a word is vouchsafed about the +Chinese commentators, who nevertheless, I venture to assert, form a +much more numerous and infinitely more important “army.” + +A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In the +first place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in +order to facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of students +generally. The division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen’s +edition; but I have sometimes found it desirable to join two or more of +his paragraphs into one. In quoting from other works, Chinese writers +seldom give more than the bare title by way of reference, and the task +of research is apt to be seriously hampered in consequence. With a view +to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzŭ is concerned, I have +also appended a complete concordance of Chinese characters, following +in this the admirable example of Legge, though an alphabetical +arrangement has been preferred to the distribution under radicals which +he adopted. Another feature borrowed from “The Chinese Classics” is the +printing of text, translation and notes on the same page; the notes, +however, are inserted, according to the Chinese method, immediately +after the passages to which they refer. From the mass of native +commentary my aim has been to extract the cream only, adding the +Chinese text here and there when it seemed to present points of +literary interest. Though constituting in itself an important branch of +Chinese literature, very little commentary of this kind has hitherto +been made directly accessible by translation. + +I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my sheets as +they were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a final +revision. On a review of the whole, without modifying the substance of +my criticisms, I might have been inclined in a few instances to temper +their asperity. Having chosen to wield a bludgeon, however, I shall not +cry out if in return I am visited with more than a rap over the +knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to put a sword into the +hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either text or +reference for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from +the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere translations,” would +not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome. For, after all, the worst +fate I shall have to dread is that which befell the ingenious paradoxes +of George in _The Vicar of Wakefield_. + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Sun Wu and his Book + +Ssu-ma Ch’ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzŭ: [1] + + +Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch’i State. His _Art of War_ brought him +to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him: + +"I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of +managing soldiers to a slight test?" + +Sun Tzŭ replied: "You may." + +Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" + +The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to +bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ divided them into two +companies, and placed one of the King’s favourite concubines at the head +of each. He then bade them all take spears in their hands, and +addressed them thus: "I presume you know the difference between front +and back, right hand and left hand?" + +The girls replied: Yes. + +Sun Tzŭ went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight +ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. +When I say "Right turn," you must face towards your right hand. When I +say "About turn," you must face right round towards your back." + +Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus +explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the +drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But +the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzŭ said: "If words of command +are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, +then the general is to blame." + +So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left +turn," whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun +Tzŭ: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not +thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders _are_ +clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of +their officers." + +So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. +Now the king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised +pavilion; and when he saw that his favourite concubines were about to be +executed, he was greatly alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following +message: "We are now quite satisfied as to our general’s ability to +handle troops. If we are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and +drink will lose their savor. It is our wish that they shall not be +beheaded." + +Sun Tzŭ replied: "Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be +the general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty +which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept." + +Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed +the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been +done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went +through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, +marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect +accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ +sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your soldiers, Sire, are now +properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your majesty’s +inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire; +bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey." + +But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to +camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops." + +Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot +translate them into deeds." + +After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was one who knew how to handle an +army, and finally appointed him general. In the west, he defeated the +Ch’u State and forced his way into Ying, the capital; to the north he +put fear into the States of Ch’i and Chin, and spread his fame abroad +amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzŭ shared in the might of the +King. + +About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has to tell us in +this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, +Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death, +and also the outstanding military genius of his time. The historian +speaks of him too as Sun Tzŭ, and in his preface we read: "Sun Tzŭ had +his feet cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It +seems likely, then, that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his +mutilation, unless the story was invented in order to account for the +name. The crowning incident of his career, the crushing defeat of his +treacherous rival P’ang Chuan, will be found briefly related in Chapter +V. § 19, note. + +To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in two other passages +of the _Shih Chi:_— + +In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the +field with Tzŭ-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P’ei, and attacked Ch’u. He +captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince’s sons who had +formerly been generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying +[the capital]; but the general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It +is not yet possible. We must wait"…. [After further successful +fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu addressed Wu +Tzŭ-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared that it was not yet +possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The two men +replied: "Ch’u’s general Tzŭ-ch’ang, [4] is grasping and covetous, and +the princes of T’ang and Ts’ai both have a grudge against him. If Your +Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win over T’ang +and Ts’ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed this advice, [beat +Ch’u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying.] [5] + + +This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He +does not appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects +of a wound in 496. In another chapter there occurs this passage:[6] + +From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the +other: Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] +in the service of Ch’i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men +developed and threw light upon the principles of war. + + +It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch’ien at least had no doubt about the +reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, +to be noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on +the period in question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say +much of such a work as the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu_, which is supposed to +have been written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution +is somewhat doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would +be of little value, based as it is on the _Shih Chi_ and expanded with +romantic details. The story of Sun Tzŭ will be found, for what it is +worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth noting are: (1) +Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzŭ-hsu. (2) He is called +a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired life, and his +contemporaries were unaware of his ability. + +The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzŭ: "When sovereign and +ministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ +to encounter the foe." Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto +no doubt has been cast upon it), we have here the earliest direct +reference for Sun Tzŭ, for Huai-nan Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many years +before the _Shih Chi_ was given to the world. + +Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzŭ at the head of +30,000 men beat Ch’u with 200,000 is that the latter were +undisciplined." + +Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun +Wu’s grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch’i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father +Sun P’ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch’i, and Sun Wu himself, +whose style was Ch’ang-ch’ing, fled to Wu on account of the rebellion +which was being fomented by the kindred of T’ien Pao. He had three +sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. +According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, +considering that Sun Pin’s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may +be dismissed as chronologically impossible. Whence these data were +obtained by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course no reliance +whatever can be placed in them. + +An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han +period is the short preface written by the Great Ts’ao Ts’ao, or Wei Wu +Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in full:— + + +I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage. +[10] The _Lun Yu_ says: “There must be a sufficiency of military +strength.” The _Shu Ching_ mentions "the army" among the "eight objects +of government." The _I Ching_ says: "‘army’ indicates firmness and +justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune." The _Shih +Ching_ says: "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his +troops." The Yellow Emperor, T’ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used +spears and battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The _Ssu-ma +Fa_ says: "If one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may +rightfully be slain." He who relies solely on warlike measures shall be +exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish. +Instances of this are Fu Ch’ai [11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the +other. [12] In military matters, the Sage’s rule is normally to keep +the peace, and to move his forces only when occasion requires. He will +not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. + +Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work +composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzŭ was a +native of the Ch’i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the _Art +of War_ in 13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were +tested on women, and he was subsequently made a general. He led an army +westwards, crushed the Ch’u state and entered Ying the capital. In the +north, he kept Ch’i and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his +time, Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment +of deliberation and planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the +field, [14] clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun Tzŭ +stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries, +however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and +while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work +abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive +which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. + +One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the +13 chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported +by the internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some +ruler is addressed. + +In the bibliographic section of the _Han Shu_, there is an entry which +has given rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 +_p’ien_ (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 _chuan_." It is evident that +this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch’ien, or those +we possess today. Chang Shou-chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s +_Art of War_ of which the "13 chapters" formed the first _chuan_, +adding that there were two other _chuan_ besides. This has brought +forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other +writings of Sun Tzŭ—we should call them apocryphal—similar to the _Wen +Ta_, of which a specimen dealing with the Nine Situations [15] is +preserved in the _T’ung Tien_, and another in Ho Shin’s commentary. It +is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzŭ had only +written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of exegesis in +the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pi +I-hsun, the author of the _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, backs this up with a +quotation from the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu:_ "The King of Wu summoned Sun +Tzŭ, and asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set +forth a chapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to +praise him." As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the +same scale as in the above-mentioned fragments, the total number of +chapters could not fail to be considerable. Then the numerous other +treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ might be included. The fact that the +_Han Chih_ mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82 _p’ien_, whereas +the Sui and T’ang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition +to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that all of +these were contained in the 82 _p’ien_. Without pinning our faith to +the accuracy of details supplied by the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu_, or +admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, +we may see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between +Ssu-ma Ch’ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop +of forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzŭ, and the +82 _p’ien_ may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped +together with the original work. It is also possible, though less +likely, that some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian +and were purposely ignored by him. [16] + +Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu +Ti strung together Sun Wu’s _Art of War_," which in turn may have +resulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of Ts’ao King’s +preface. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of +saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote +a commentary on it. On the whole, this theory has met with very little +acceptance. Thus, the _Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu_ says: "The mention of the 13 +chapters in the _Shih Chi_ shows that they were in existence before the +_Han Chih_, and that latter accretions are not to be considered part of +the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can certainly not be taken as +proof." + +There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in +the time of Ssu-ma Ch’ien practically as we have them now. That the +work was then well known he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzŭ’s _13 +Chapters_ and Wu Ch’i’s _Art of War_ are the two books that people +commonly refer to on the subject of military matters. Both of them are +widely distributed, so I will not discuss them here." But as we go +further back, serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact +which has to be faced is that the _Tso Chuan_, the greatest +contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as a +general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward +circumstance, that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the +story of Sun Wu as given in the _Shih Chi_, but even show themselves +frankly skeptical as to the existence of the man at all. The most +powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in the +following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17]— + + +It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native of the +Ch’i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he +crushed Ch’u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso’s +Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s Commentary +need not contain absolutely everything that other histories contain. +But Tso has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling +ruffians such as Ying K’ao-shu, [18] Ts’ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and +Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements +were so brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again, details +are given, in their due order, about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the +Minister P’ei. [21] Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been +passed over? + +In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same school +as _Kuan Tzŭ_, [22] _Liu T’ao_, [23] and the _Yüeh Yu_ [24] and may +have been the production of some private scholar living towards the end +of the "Spring and Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" +period. [25] The story that his precepts were actually applied by the +Wu State, is merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his +followers. + +From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time +of the "Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as +well, and the class of professional generals, for conducting external +campaigns, did not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six +States" [27] that this custom changed. Now although Wu was an +uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso should have left +unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet held no +civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu [28] and Sun +Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing +pundits. The story of Ho Lu’s experiment on the women, in particular, +is utterly preposterous and incredible. + +Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch’ien as having said that Sun Wu +crushed Ch’u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the +impression left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in +these exploits. The fact may or may not be significant; but it is +nowhere explicitly stated in the _Shih Chi_ either that Sun Tzŭ was +general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went +there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po P’ei both took +part in the expedition, and also that its success was largely due to +the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it is not +easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent +part in the same campaign. + +Ch’en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:— + +Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the +fact that he does not appear in the _Tso Chuan_, although he is said to +have served under Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he +really belonged to. + + +He also says:— + +The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch’i may be of genuine antiquity. + + +It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch’en Chen-sun, while +rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s +history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the +work which passes under his name. The author of the _Hsu Lu_ fails to +appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on +Ch’en Chen-sun really misses its mark. He makes one of two points, +however, which certainly tell in favour of the high antiquity of our "13 +chapters." "Sun Tzŭ," he says, "must have lived in the age of Ching +Wang [519-476], because he is frequently plagiarized in subsequent +works of the Chou, Ch’in and Han dynasties." The two most shameless +offenders in this respect are Wu Ch’i and Huai-nan Tzŭ, both of them +important historical personages in their day. The former lived only a +century after the alleged date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is known to +have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, +that Tseng Shen delivered the _Tso Chuan_, which had been entrusted to +him by its author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the _Art of +War_, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of +different epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all,—in +other words, that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards +the end of the 5th century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzŭ’s antiquity is +furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a +number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps be +extended, is given in the _Hsu Lu;_ and though some of the +interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected +thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar +and critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the +13 chapters to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing +that he is actually engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of +Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he would not have hesitated to +assign the work to a later date had he not honestly believed the +contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that the judgment of an +educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal evidence is +not far to seek. Thus in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable allusion +to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already passed away by +the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified +form. [30] The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that carried on between +the various feudal princes, in which armored chariots play a large +part. Their use seems to have entirely died out before the end of the +Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a state which ceased to exist +as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch presently. + +But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances +of its being other than a _bonâ fide_ production are sensibly +diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come until long after. +That it should have been forged in the period immediately following 473 +is particularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to identify +himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin’s theory, that the +author was a literary recluse, that seems to me quite untenable. If one +thing is more apparent than another after reading the maxims of Sun +Tzŭ, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large store of +personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of +a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but +also of a practical soldier closely acquainted with the military +conditions of his time. To say nothing of the fact that these sayings +have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest captains of Chinese +history, they offer a combination of freshness and sincerity, acuteness +and common sense, which quite excludes the idea that they were +artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, that the 13 +chapters were the genuine production of a military man living towards +the end of the "_Ch’un Ch’iu_" period, are we not bound, in spite of +the silence of the _Tso Chuan_, to accept Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account in +its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we +not hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu’s +biography were false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in +the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the +chronology involved in the story as told in the _Shih Chi_, which, so +far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed out. There are two passages +in Sun Tzŭ in which he alludes to contemporary affairs. The first in in +VI. § 21:— + +Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in +number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I +say then that victory can be achieved. + + +The other is in XI. § 30:— + +Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, I should +answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; yet if +they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, +they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps +the right. + + +These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of +composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between +Wu and Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has +hitherto escaped notice is that they also seriously impair the +credibility of Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the +first positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is +then spoken of as a general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, +so that his alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken +place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier +still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the +capture of Ying in 506, Ch’u and not Yüeh, was the great hereditary +enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch’u and Wu, had been constantly at war +for over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh +was waged only in 510, [32] and even then was no more than a short +interlude sandwiched in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch’u. Now +Ch’u is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference +is that they were written at a time when Yüeh had become the prime +antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch’u had suffered the great +humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found +useful. + + +B.C. +514 Accession of Ho Lu. +512 Ho Lu attacks Ch’u, but is dissuaded from entering Ying, +the capital. Shih Chi mentions Sun Wu as general. +511 Another attack on Ch’u. +510 Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This is the first +war between the two states. +509 or 508 Ch’u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at Yu-chang. +506 Ho Lu attacks Ch’u with the aid of T’ang and Ts’ai. +Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last +mention of Sun Wu in Shih Chi. +505 Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu +is beaten by Ch’in and evacuates Ying. +504 Ho Lu sends Fu Ch’ai to attack Ch’u. +497 Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh. +496 Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at Tsui-li. +Ho Lu is killed. +494 Fu Ch’ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of Fu- +chaio, and enters the capital of Yüeh. +485 or 484 Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzŭ-hsu. +482 Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch’ai. +478 to 476 Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu. +475 Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu. +473 Final defeat and extinction of Wu. + + +The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that +could have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather +to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, +and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may +conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which +date Yüeh does not appear to have scored any notable success against +Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was written for him, it must +have been during the period 505-496, when there was a lull in the +hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort +against Ch’u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the +tradition connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well +have seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period +482-473, when Yüeh was once again becoming a very serious menace. [33] +We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may have been, +was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. On this point the +negative testimony of the _Tso Chuan_ far outweighs any shred of +authority still attaching to the _Shih Chi_, if once its other facts +are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to +explain the omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu +Tzŭ-hsu, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because +the latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the +State. + +How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may be that the growing +celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown +to its author. It was felt to be only right and proper that one so well +versed in the science of war should have solid achievements to his +credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest +feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep and lasting impression on +all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of +her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than that the +acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly identified +with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his brain +conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out +by him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po P’ei and Fu Kai? + +It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun +Tzŭ’s life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this +necessary proviso, I should say that he probably entered the service of +Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s accession, and gathered experience, though +only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the intense +military activity which marked the first half of the prince’s reign. +[35] If he rose to be a general at all, he certainly was never on an +equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless present +at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s sudden +collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical +juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have +convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against +whom every effort would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus +a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his famous book, +which according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the end, +rather than the beginning of Ho Lu’s reign. The story of the women may +possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about the same +time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is +hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the +death-struggle with Yüeh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li. + +If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony +in the fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man of peace +should be contemporary with her greatest writer on war. + + + +The Text of Sun Tzŭ + +I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s +text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the +"13 chapters" of which Ssu-ma Ch’ien speaks were essentially the same +as those now extant. We have his word for it that they were widely +circulated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained from +discussing them on that account. Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface:— + +During the Ch’in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_ was in +general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated +it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for +the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first +to write a commentary on it. + + +As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that +Ts’ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so +obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time +onward so great, especially during the T’ang and Sung dynasties, that +it would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep +in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief +commentaries on Sun Tzŭ were in existence, a certain Chi T’ien-pao +published a work in 15 _chuan_ entitled "Sun Tzŭ with the collected +commentaries of ten writers." There was another text, with variant +readings put forward by Chu Fu of Ta-hsing, which also had supporters +among the scholars of that period; but in the Ming editions, Sun +Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason or other no +longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th century, +the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi +T’ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was +known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzŭ which +appears in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed +in 1726, the _Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng_. Another copy at my disposal +of what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that +contained in the "Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch’in dynasties" +[1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition is +evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese +channels. So things remained until Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a +distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, who claimed to be an +actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered a copy of Chi +T’ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library of the +Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the _I Shuo_ of Cheng Yu-Hsien, +mentioned in the _T’ung Chih_, and also believed to have perished. This +is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or text)"—a +rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set before +us the text of Sun Tzŭ in its pristine purity. Chi T’ien-pao was a +careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the +somewhat debased version current in his day, without troubling to +collate it with the earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two +versions of Sun Tzŭ, even older than the newly discovered work, were +still extant, one buried in the _T’ung Tien_, Tu Yu’s great treatise on +the Constitution, the other similarly enshrined in the _T’ai P’ing Yu +Lan_ encyclopedia. In both the complete text is to be found, though +split up into fragments, intermixed with other matter, and scattered +piecemeal over a number of different sections. Considering that the _Yu +Lan_ takes us back to the year 983, and the _T’ung Tien_ about 200 +years further still, to the middle of the T’ang dynasty, the value of +these early transcripts of Sun Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the +idea of utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to anyone until +Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government instructions, undertook a +thorough recension of the text. This is his own account:— + +Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ which his +editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient +edition [of Chi T’ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be +revised and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the +Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all +devoted themselves to this study, probably surpassing me therein. +Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for +military men. + + +The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on +the text of Sun Tzŭ prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are +left in doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the +new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun +Hsing-yen and only one co-editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original +edition" as their basis, and by careful comparison with older versions, +as well as the extant commentaries and other sources of information +such as the _I Shuo_, succeeded in restoring a very large number of +doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be accepted +as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzŭ’s +original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard +text." + +The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. It is in 6 +_pen_, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical +works in 83 _pen_. [38] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen +(largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating the traditional view +of Sun Tzŭ’s life and performances, and summing up in remarkably +concise fashion the evidence in its favour. This is followed by Ts’ao +Kung’s preface to his edition, and the biography of Sun Tzŭ from the +_Shih Chi_, both translated above. Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien’s +_I Shuo_, [39] with author’s preface, and next, a short miscellany of +historical and bibliographical information entitled _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, +compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate +sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by +the various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological +order. These we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one. + + + +The Commentators + +Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of +commentators, which would do honour to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks +on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather +ingeniously explains it by saying that the artifices of war, being +inexhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment in a great +variety of ways. + +1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti [A.D. +155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest +commentary on Sun Tzŭ actually came from the pen of this extraordinary +man, whose biography in the _San Kuo Chih_ reads like a romance. One of +the greatest military geniuses that the world has seen, and Napoleonic +in the scale of his operations, he was especially famed for the +marvelous rapidity of his marches, which has found expression in the +line "Talk of Ts’ao Ts’ao, and Ts’ao Ts’ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu +says of him that he was a great captain who "measured his strength +against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two Yuan, father and son, and +vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire of Han with Wu and +Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a council of +war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all +his calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not +lose one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any particular +saw their armies incontinently beaten and put to flight." Ts’ao Kung’s +notes on Sun Tzŭ, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly +characteristic of the stern commander known to history, that it is hard +indeed to conceive of them as the work of a mere _littérateur_. +Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely +intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than the text +itself. [40] + +2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name +is comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even +his personal name has not been recorded. Chi T’ien-pao’s edition places +him after Chia Lin, and Ch’ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T’ang +dynasty, [41] but this is a mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he +appears as Meng Shih of the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would +identify him with Meng K’ang of the 3rd century. He is named in one +work as the last of the "Five Commentators," the others being Wei Wu +Ti, Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao and Chia Lin. + +3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military +tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the present +day. The _T’ung Chih_ mentions "Lives of famous generals from the Chou +to the T’ang dynasty" as written by him. [42] According to Ch’ao +Kung-wu and the _T’ien-i-ko_ catalogue, he followed a variant of the +text of Sun Tzŭ which differs considerably from those now extant. His +notes are mostly short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates +his remarks by anecdotes from Chinese history. + +4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ, +his notes being taken from the _T’ung Tien_, the encyclopedic treatise +on the Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely +repetitions of Ts’ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed +that he drew on the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing +to the peculiar arrangement of _T’ung Tien_, he has to explain each +passage on its merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his own +explanation does not agree with that of Ts’ao Kung, whom he always +quotes first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the "Ten +Commentators," he was added to their number by Chi T’ien-pao, being +wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. + +5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star +even in the glorious galaxy of the T’ang period. We learn from Ch’ao +Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was +extremely fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read in +the military history of the _Ch’un Ch’iu_ and _Chan Kuo_ eras. His +notes, therefore, are well worth attention. They are very copious, and +replete with historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzŭ’s work is thus +summarized by him: "Practice benevolence and justice, but on the other +hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency." He further +declared that all the military triumphs and disasters of the thousand +years which had elapsed since Sun Tzŭ’s death would, upon examination, +be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the maxims +contained in his book. Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful charge against Ts’ao +Kung has already been considered elsewhere. + +6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao +Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ +because Ts’ao Kung’s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and +that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, +writing in the middle of the 11th century, calls Ts’ao Kung, Tu Mu and +Ch’en Hao the three chief commentators on Sun Tzŭ, and observes that +Ch’en Hao is continually attacking Tu Mu’s shortcomings. His +commentary, though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of his +predecessors. + +7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his +commentary on Sun Tzŭ is mentioned in the _T’ang Shu_ and was +afterwards republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with +those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in +point of quality, too, perhaps the least valuable of the eleven. + +8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei +Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was +published with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from +which we may cull the following:— + +Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and trying to +make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though +commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the +task. My friend Sheng-yu has not fallen into this mistake. In +attempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun Tzŭ’s work, he does +not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states +engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not concerned with +the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the three +ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed +to the Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, +but his meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an +army, or handling soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the +forces of victory, it is always systematically treated; the sayings are +bound together in strict logical sequence, though this has been +obscured by commentators who have probably failed to grasp their +meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the +obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out the +true meaning of Sun Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion +have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the +present work deserves to be handed down side by side with the three +great commentaries; and for a great deal that they find in the sayings, +coming generations will have constant reason to thank my friend +Sheng-yu. + + +Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined +to endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him above +Ch’en Hao in order of merit. + +9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of +his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch’en, and on +the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own +commentary with that of Ts’ao Kung, but the comparison is not often +flattering to him. We learn from Ch’ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised +the ancient text of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae and correcting +mistakes. [45] + +10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this +commentator is given as above by Cheng Ch’iao in the _Tung Chih_, +written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply +as Ho Shih in the _Yu Hai_, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch’ao Kung-wu as +saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no reason +to doubt Cheng Ch’iao’s statement, otherwise I should have been +inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one Ho Ch’u-fei, the +author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the latter part of the +11th century. Ho Shih’s commentary, in the words of the _T’ien-i-ko_ +catalogue, "contains helpful additions" here and there, but is chiefly +remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the +dynastic histories and other sources. + +11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great +originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid +exposition. His commentator is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse +sentences he contrives to expand and develop in masterly fashion. +Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much of Ts’ao Kung’s +commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and +therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sung history, the +_T’ung K’ao_, or the _Yu Hai_, but it finds a niche in the _T’ung +Chih_, which also names him as the author of the "Lives of Famous +Generals." [46] + +It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have +flourished within so short a space of time. Ch’ao Kung-wu accounts for +it by saying: "During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire +enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased to practice the art of +war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao’s rebellion came [1038-42] and the +frontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court made +strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became +the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the +commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that period. +[47] + +Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work +has not come down to us. The _Sui Shu_ mentions four, namely Wang Ling +(often quoted by Tu Yu as Wang Tzŭ); Chang Tzŭ-shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; +[48] and Shen Yu of Wu. The _T’ang Shu_ adds Sun Hao, and the _T’ung +Chih_ Hsiao Chi, while the _T’u Shu_ mentions a Ming commentator, Huang +Jun-yu. It is possible that some of these may have been merely +collectors and editors of other commentaries, like Chi T’ien-pao and +Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. + + + +Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ + +Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of +China’s greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have +studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (_d_. 196 +B.C.), [49] Feng I (_d_. 34 A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (_d_. 219), [51] and Yo +Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of Ts’ao Kung, who disputes with Han +Hsin the highest place in Chinese military annals, has already been +recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of +purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of Su Tung-p’o), who +wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief +inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is preserved +in the _Yu Hai:_ [54]— + +Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, +[55] is very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu +Ch’i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on +war, and they are linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." +But Wu Ch’i’s remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher +and more crudely stated, and there is not the same unity of plan as in +Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the style is terse, but the meaning fully brought +out. + + +The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the Garden +of Literature" by Cheng Hou:— + +Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military +men’s training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars +and men of letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet +profound, perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the _Lun +Yu_, the _I Ching_ and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the +writings of Mencius, Hsun K’uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level +of Sun Tzŭ. + + +Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the +criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the +venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages +a ruler’s bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." + + + +Apologies for War + +Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving +nation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her +experience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern +State can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point at +which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great Wall +and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier centuries +before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the +perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts +with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of +government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of +so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor +disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it +is hardly too much to say that the clash of arms has never ceased to +resound in one portion or another of the Empire. + +No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom +China can point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond +of emerging at the most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch’i +stands out conspicuous in the period when Ch’in was entering upon her +final struggle with the remaining independent states. The stormy years +which followed the break-up of the Ch’in dynasty are illuminated by the +transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is +tottering to its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts’ao Ts’ao +dominates the scene. And in the establishment of the T’ang dynasty, one +of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li +Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T’ai Tsung) was seconded by the +brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear +comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe. + +In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ +downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of +Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to +militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the +literati defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth +while to collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox +view is upheld. The following, by Ssu-ma Ch’ien, shows that for all his +ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any +price:— + +Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and +cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and +dangers, and to succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood +in its veins and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How +much more so will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of love +and hatred, joy and anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection +springs up within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into +play. That is the natural law which governs his being…. What then shall +be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and +without any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out +their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilization," condemning the +use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to +impotence and dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at +the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice +of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to +modify the position they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in +the family the teacher must not spare the rod, and punishments cannot +be dispensed with in the State, so military chastisement can never be +allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one can say is that +this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and +that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others +rebellious. [58] + + +The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun +Tzŭ:— + + +War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of +government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch’iu, both +disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of +litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their execution by +flogging in the market-place, are all done by officials. But the +wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the +hauling of women and children into captivity, and the beheading of +traitors—this is also work which is done by officials. The objects of +the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is no +intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off +heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt +with, only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the use of +military weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, +the end in view is to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and +relief to the good…. + +Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired your military +aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been +acquired by study." [59] "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing +that you are a disciple of Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; +"I was taught by Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should +exercise both civil and military functions, though to be sure my +instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very far." + +Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" +and the "military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of +action, or in what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is +more than I can say. But, at any rate, it has come about that the +members of the governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on +military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are bold +enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set down as eccentric +individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary +instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose +sight of fundamental principles. + +When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch’eng Wang, he regulated +ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and +learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60] he +sallied forth and chastised them. When Confucius held office under the +Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If +pacific negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should have +been made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Ch’i, who +cowered under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can it be said +that these two great Sages had no knowledge of military matters? + +We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He +also appeals to the authority of the Classics:— + +Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never +studied matters connected with armies and battalions." [62] Replying to +K’ung Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and +weapons." But if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he +used armed force against the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch’i +was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi revolted; he ordered +his officers to attack them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in +confusion. He once uttered the words: "If I fight, I conquer." [63] And +Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil and military +functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or +received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not +specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the +subject of his teaching. + + +Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:— + + +Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He also said: +"If I fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated +music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, +[66] and must not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, +the words "I am unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are +things which even an inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have to +lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if +one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, who was +employed by Wu Tzŭ-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the +remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." + +The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of +Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on +the art of war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they +adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over his father’s books to no +purpose, [67] as a proof that all military theory is useless. Again, +seeing that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism in +designing plans, and the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is +immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the +studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials +also require steady application and practice before efficiency is +reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices +to botch their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting +perilous; and useless unless a general is in constant practice, he +ought not to hazard other men’s lives in battle. [70] Hence it is +essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should be studied. + +Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of war. +Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not +pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the consequence being that +he was finally defeated and overthrown. He did not realize that the +tricks and artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang +of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to destruction by their +misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature of war +necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. +There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an +extorted oath, [72] and also of his having left the Sung State in +disguise. [73] Can we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding +truth and honesty? + + + +Bibliography + +The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ. +The notes on each have been drawn principally from the _Ssu k’u ch’uan +shu chien ming mu lu_, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. + +1. _Wu Tzŭ_, in 1 _chuan_ or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (_d_. 381 B.C.). A +genuine work. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 65. + +2. _Ssu-ma Fa_, in 1 _chuan_ or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to +Ssu-ma Jang-chu of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be +early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are constantly to +be met within its pages. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64. + +The _Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu_ (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three +treatises on war, _Sun Tzŭ_, _Wu Tzŭ_ and _Ssu-ma Fa_, are, generally +speaking, only concerned with things strictly military—the art of +producing, collecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct +theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, transport +of goods and the handling of soldiers—in strong contrast to later +works, in which the science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, +divination and magical arts in general. + +3. _Liu T’ao_, in 6 _chuan_, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or +Lu Shang, also known as T’ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C. [74] But +its style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-ming +(550-625 A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the +six sections so that the forgery cannot have been later than Sui +dynasty. + +4. _Wei Liao Tzŭ_, in 5 _chuan_. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. +B.C.), who studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The work appears to +have been originally in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess +contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main, though the +strategical devices differ considerably from those of the Warring +States period. It is been furnished with a commentary by the well-known +Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. + +5. _San Lueh_ in 3 _chuan_. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary +personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (_d_. 187 +B.C.) in an interview on a bridge. But here again, the style is not +that of works dating from the Ch’in or Han period. The Han Emperor +Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently quotes from it in one of his +proclamations; but the passage in question may have been inserted later +on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not be far +out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], or +somewhat earlier. + +6. _Li Wei Kung Wen Tui_, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a +dialogue between T’ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is +usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a +forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art of war. + +7. _Li Ching Ping Fa_ (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a +short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the T’ung Tien, but not +published separately. This fact explains its omission from the _Ssu K’u +Ch’uan Shu_. + +8. _Wu Ch’i Ching_, in 1 _chuan_. Attributed to the legendary minister +Feng Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty +(_d_. 121 B.C.), and said to have been eulogized by the celebrated +general Ma Lung (_d_. 300 A.D.). Yet the earliest mention of it is in +the _Sung Chih_. Although a forgery, the work is well put together. + +Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has +always been held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on +war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the _Shih Liu Ts’e_ (1 _chuan_), +preserved in the _Yung Lo Ta Tien;_ (2) _Chiang Yuan_ (1 _chuan_); and +(3) _Hsin Shu_ (1 _chuan_), which steals wholesale from Sun Tzŭ. None +of these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine. + +Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections +devoted to the literature of war. The following references may be found +useful:— + +_T’ung Tien_ (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162. +_T’ai P’ing Yu Lan_ (983), ch. 270-359. +_Wen Hsien Tung K’ao_ (13th cent.), ch. 221. +_Yu Hai_ (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141. +_San Ts’ai T’u Hui_ (16th cent). +_Kuang Po Wu Chih_ (1607), ch. 31, 32. +_Ch’ien Ch’io Lei Shu_ (1632), ch. 75. +_Yuan Chien Lei Han_ (1710), ch. 206-229. +_Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng_ (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81-90. +_Hsu Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao_ (1784), ch. 121-134. +_Huang Ch’ao Ching Shih Wen Pien_ (1826), ch. 76, 77. + +The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve +mention:— + +_Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 30. +_Sui Shu_, ch. 32-35. +_Chiu T’ang Shu_, ch. 46, 47. +_Hsin T’ang Shu_, ch. 57,60. +_Sung Shih_, ch. 202-209. +_T’ung Chih_ (circa 1150), ch. 68. + +To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial +Library:— + +_Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu Tsung Mu T’i Yao_ (1790), ch. 99, 100. + +Footnotes + +1. _Shih Chi_, ch. 65. + +2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. + +3. _Shih Chi_, ch. 130. + +4. The appellation of Nang Wa. + +5. _Shih Chi_, ch. 31. + +6. _Shih Chi_, ch. 25. + +7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year 637. + +8. Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. + +9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the +Han dynasty, which says: "Ten _li_ outside the _Wu_ gate [of the city +of Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to +commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch’i, who excelled in the +art of war, by the King of Wu." + +10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to +make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe." + +11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and +overthrown by Kou chien, King of Yüeh, in 473 B.C. See post. + +12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in +his preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction." + +13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the _T’u Shu_, and +may be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang Shou-chieh of +the T’ang dynasty, and appears in the _T’ai P’ing Yu Lan_. + +14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, +perhaps especially of § 8. + +15. See chap. XI. + +16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that _Wu Tzŭ_, which is not in +6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the _Han Chih_. Likewise, the +_Chung Yung_ is credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one only. +In the case of very short works, one is tempted to think that _p’ien_ +might simply mean "leaves." + +17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. + +18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. + +19. See Chapter 7, § 27 and Chapter 11, § 28. + +20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his +name. + +21. I.e. Po P’ei. See ante. + +22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large +additions have been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 B.C. + +23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. + +24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of +another work. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not +clear. + +25. About 480 B.C. + +26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. + +27. In the 3rd century B.C. + +28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter +half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have written a +work on war. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of the +INTRODUCTION. + +29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that +the _Tso Chuan_ must have been written in the 5th century, but not +before 424 B.C. + +30. See _Mencius_ III. 1. iii. 13-20. + +31. When Wu first appears in the _Ch’un Ch’iu_ in 584, it is already at +variance with its powerful neighbour. The _Ch’un Ch’iu_ first mentions +Yüeh in 537, the _Tso Chuan_ in 601. + +32. This is explicitly stated in the _Tso Chuan_, XXXII, 2. + +33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would +tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully +justify the language used in XI. § 30. + +34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious +treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great +general. Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the +other hand, cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century. + +35. From _Tso Chuan:_ "From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] +there was no year in which Ch’u was not attacked by Wu." + +36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really +descended from Sun Tzŭ. I am ashamed to say that I only read my +ancestor’s work from a literary point of view, without comprehending +the military technique. So long have we been enjoying the blessings of +peace!" + +37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of +Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the +ascent of the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as +being "situated five _li_ east of the district city of Hua-yin. The +temple contains the Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the T’ang Emperor +Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." + +38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40. + +39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzŭ. + +40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His +commentary is frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not +fully develop the meaning." + +41. _Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao_, ch. 221. + +42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered +chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand +Buddhas." See B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. 525. + +43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was +nominally existent in Sun Tzŭ’s day, it retained hardly a vestige of +power, and the old military organization had practically gone by the +board. I can suggest no other explanation of the passage. + +44. See _Chou Li_, xxix. 6-10. + +45. _T’ung K’ao_, ch. 221. + +46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s "Notes," p. 91 (new +edition). + +47. _T’ung K’ao_, loc. cit. + +48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the _San Kuo +Chih_, ch. 10. + +49. See XI. § 58, note. + +50. _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 17 ad init. + +51. _San Kuo Chih_, ch. 54. + +52. _Sung Shih_, ch. 365 ad init. + +53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting +themselves with Sun Tzŭ are not behindhand in their praise. In this +connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from +Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the present work were submitted +previous to publication: "Many of Sun Wu’s maxims are perfectly +applicable to the present day, and no. 11 [in Chapter VIII] is one that +the people of this country would do well to take to heart." + +54. Ch. 140. + +55. See IV. § 3. + +56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. + +57. The _Tso Chuan_. + +58. _Shih Chi_, ch. 25, fol. I. + +59. Cf. _Shih Chi_, ch 47. + +60. See _Shu Ching_, preface § 55. + +61. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 47. + +62. _Lun Yu_, XV. 1. + +63. I failed to trace this utterance. + +64. Supra. + +65. Supra. + +66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, +and festive rites. See _Shu Ching_, ii. 1. III. 8, and _Chou Li_, IX. +fol. 49. + +67. See XIII. § 11, note. + +68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the _Tso Chuan_, where +Tzŭ-ch’an says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not +employ a mere learner to make it up." + +69. Cf. _Tao Te Ching_, ch. 31. + +70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See _Lun Yu_, +XIII. 29, 30. + +71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. + +72. _Shih Chi_, ch. 47. + +73. _Shih Chi_, ch. 38. + +74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in +the _Shih Chi_, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a +former minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there +given, according to which he would appear to have been first raised +from a humble private station by Wen Wang. + + + +Chapter I. LAYING PLANS + +[Ts’ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of +this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple +selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in +his tent. See. § 26.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. + +2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to +ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be +neglected. + +3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be +taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine +the conditions obtaining in the field. + +4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The +Commander; (5) Method and discipline. + +[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by "Moral Law" a +principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral +aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale," were it not +considered as an attribute of the _ruler_ in § 13.] + + +5, 6. _The Moral Law_ causes the people to be in complete accord with +their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, +undismayed by any danger. + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the +officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; +without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute +when the crisis is at hand."] + + +7. _Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. + +[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words +here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of +Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying that what is meant is +"the general economy of Heaven," including the five elements, the four +seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.] + + +8. _Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; +open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. + +9. _The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, +benevolence, courage and strictness. + +[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or +benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control, +or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here +"wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or benevolence," and +the two military virtues of "courage" and "strictness" substituted for +"uprightness of mind" and "self-respect, self-control, or ‘proper +feeling.’"] + + +10. By _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of +the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the +officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the +army, and the control of military expenditure. + +11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows +them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. + +12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the +military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in +this wise:— + +13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? + + +[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.] + + + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? + +[See §§ 7, 8] + + +(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? + +[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D. 155-220), +who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his +own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned +himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of +corn! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy +his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts’ao Ts’ao’s own comment +on the present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a +law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must +be put to death."] + + +(5) Which army is the stronger? + +[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch’en puts it, freely +rendered, "_esprit de corps_ and ‘big battalions.’"] + + +(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the +officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; +without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute +when the crisis is at hand."] + + +(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and +punishment? + +[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be +properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] + + +14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or +defeat. + +15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will +conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that +hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let +such a one be dismissed! + +[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was +composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu +State.] + + +16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any +helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. + +17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s +plans. + +[Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish +theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract +principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of +strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and +sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to +secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of the +battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the +Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations +were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find +himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a +critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will +attack the first tomorrow—I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord +Uxbridge. "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any +idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you +expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ] + + +18. All warfare is based on deception. + +[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every +soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many +military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary +skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend +and foe."] + + +19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our +forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy +believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are +near. + +20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. + +[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder, crush +him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating +the uses of deception in war.] + + +21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in +superior strength, evade him. + +22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. +Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. + +[Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his +adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and +immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.] + + +23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. + +[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch’en has the note: "while +we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The +_Yu Lan_ has "Lure him on and tire him out."] + + +If his forces are united, separate them. + +[Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the +commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division +between them."] + + +24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not +expected. + +25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged +beforehand. + +26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his +temple ere the battle is fought. + +[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple +to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the +field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] + + +The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. +Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to +defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this +point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose. + +[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. + + + +Chapter II. WAGING WAR + +[Ts’ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the +cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the +chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a +consideration of ways and means.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field +a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred +thousand mail-clad soldiers, + +[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, +used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed +for purposes of defence. Li Ch’uan, it is true, says that the latter +were light, but this seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note +the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric +Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming +as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of +foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed +that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy +chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into +a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred +men.] + + +with provisions enough to carry them a thousand _li_, + +[2.78 modern _li_ go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly +since Sun Tzŭ’s time.] + + +the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of +guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots +and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per +day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. + +2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, +the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If +you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. + +3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State +will not be equal to the strain. + +4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength +exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to +take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be +able to avert the consequences that must ensue. + +5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has +never been seen associated with long delays. + +[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of +the commentators. Ts’ao Kung, Li Ch’uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and +Mei Yao-ch’en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally +stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho +Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure +of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but +they bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by +remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being +expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true +cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yu +says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable +to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, except +possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than +ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much +more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, +tardiness can never be anything but foolish—if only because it means +impoverishment to the nation. In considering the point raised here by +Sun Tzŭ, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur +to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome +against that of Hannibals’s isolated army, because it seemed to him +that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a +strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics +would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal it is +true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption +in their favour.] + + +6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged +warfare. + +7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war +that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. + +[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a +long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it +to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, +but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, +"He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," +is distinctly pointless.] + + +8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his +supply-waggons loaded more than twice. + +[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for +reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, +but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an +audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from +Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a +little ahead of your opponent—has counted for more than either +numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to +commissariat.] + + +9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus +the army will have food enough for its needs. + +[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means +"things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all +the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.] + + +10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by +contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a +distance causes the people to be impoverished. + +[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the +next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is +so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. +It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may +be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them there. The +Chinese words Sun Tzŭ used to indicate the cause of the people’s +impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by which the +husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why +should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because +the State or Government is too poor to do so?] + + +11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; +and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away. + +[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own +territory. Ts’ao Kung understands it of an army that has already +crossed the frontier.] + + +12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be +afflicted by heavy exactions. + +13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the +homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their +incomes will be dissipated; + +[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, +but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from +our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The _people_ being +regarded as the essential part of the State, and _food_ as the people’s +heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and be +careful of both?"] + + +while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, +breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, +protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to +four-tenths of its total revenue. + +15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One +cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s +own, and likewise a single _picul_ of his provender is equivalent to +twenty from one’s own store. + +[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of +transporting one cartload to the front. A _picul_ is a unit of measure +equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).] + + +16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; +that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have +their rewards. + +[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see +the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from +the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have +a keen desire to fight, each on his own account."] + + +17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been +taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags +should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled +and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be +kindly treated and kept. + +18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own +strength. + +19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy +campaigns. + +[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzŭ +here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to +enforce."] + + +20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of +the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall +be in peace or in peril. + + + +Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is +to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it +is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than +to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire +than to destroy them. + +[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted +nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts’ao Kung, the equivalent of a +regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists +from any number between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company +contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives +the exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.] + + +2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme +excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s +resistance without fighting. + +[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old +Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the +huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.] + + +3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; + +[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of +the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one +might be content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but +an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in +his note: "When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must +anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."] + + +the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; + +[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in +speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or +principalities into which the China of his day was split up.] + + +the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; + +[When he is already at full strength.] + + +and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. + +4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be +avoided. + +[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in +1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, +Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would +have been masters of the situation before the British were ready +seriously to oppose them.] + + +The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements +of war, will take up three whole months; + +[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as +"mantlets", described. Ts’ao Kung simply defines them as "large +shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch’uan, who says +they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city +walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman +_testudo_, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles used in +repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch’en Hao. See _supra_ II. 14. +The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable +shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. +They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled +from within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey +parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the +encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden +donkeys."] + + +and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three +months more. + +[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of +the enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, +and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding +note.] + + +5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men +to the assault like swarming ants, + +[This vivid simile of Ts’ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army +of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing +patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the +place before his engines of war are ready.] + + +with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town +still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. + +[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port +Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.] + + +6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any +fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he +overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. + +[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no +harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after +having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother +of the people."] + + +7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, +and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. + +[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of +the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, +the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."] + + +This is the method of attacking by stratagem. + +8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to +surround him; if five to one, to attack him; + +[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] + + +if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. + +[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it +appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however, +gives a clue to Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: "Being two to the enemy’s one, we +may use one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some +special diversion." Chang Yu thus further elucidates the point: "If our +force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up +into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall +upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed +from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front." +This is what is meant by saying that ‘one part may be used in the +regular way, and the other for some special diversion.’ Tu Mu does not +understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as +concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too +hasty in calling this a mistake."] + + +9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; + +[Li Ch’uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If +attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able +general will fight."] + + +if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; + +[The meaning, "we can _watch_ the enemy," is certainly a great +improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very +good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying +only applies if the other factors are equal; a small difference in +numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and +discipline.] + + +if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. + +10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in +the end it must be captured by the larger force. + +11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is +complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is +defective, the State will be weak. + +[As Li Ch’uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the +general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed +in his profession), his army will lack strength."] + + +12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his +army:— + +13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant +of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. + +[Li Ch’uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a +thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally +think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to +direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators +understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of T’ai Kung: "A +kingdom should not be governed from without, and army should not be +directed from within." Of course it is true that, during an engagement, +or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the +thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he +will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong +orders.] + + +14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he +administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in +an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the +civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid +gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on +which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, +on the other hand, are military rather than civil virtues to assimilate +the governing of an army"—to that of a State, understood.] + + +15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, + +[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.] + + +through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to +circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. + +[I follow Mei Yao-ch’en here. The other commentators refer not to the +ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu +says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he +must not be entrusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The +skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the +covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in +establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in +action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid +man has no fear of death."] + + +16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to +come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy +into the army, and flinging victory away. + +17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He +will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. + +[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; +if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will +invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive +or the defensive.] + + +(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior +forces. + +[This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers +correctly, as Li Ch’uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the +saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible +with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and _vice versa_. The secret +lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. +Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an +inferior one, make for difficult ground.’"] + + +(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout +all its ranks. + +(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy +unprepared. + +(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by +the sovereign. + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "It is the sovereign’s function to +give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of +the general." It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which +have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on +the part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his +extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by central +authority.] + +Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points. + +[Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of +victory.”] + +18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need +not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not +the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. + +[Li Ch’uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch’in, who in 383 A.D. +marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to +despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An +and Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight +provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one +million; why, they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely +throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" +Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei +River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.] + + +If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every +battle. + +[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, +knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: +"Attack is the secret of defence; defence is the planning of an +attack." It would be hard to find a better epitome of the +root-principle of war.] + + + +Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS + +[Ts’ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of +this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two +armies with a view to discovering each other’s condition." Tu Mu says: +"It is through the dispositions of an army that its condition may be +discovered. Conceal your dispositions, and your condition will remain +secret, which leads to victory; show your dispositions, and your +condition will become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks +that the good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to +meet those of the enemy."] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond +the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of +defeating the enemy. + +2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the +opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. + +[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.] + + +3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, + +[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his +troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."] + + +but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. + +4. Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able +to _do_ it. + +5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat +the enemy means taking the offensive. + +[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in §§ 1-3, in spite of +the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they +give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible +enough.] + + +6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; +attacking, a superabundance of strength. + +7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret +recesses of the earth; + +[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor +indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may +not know his whereabouts."] + + +he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of +heaven. + +[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a +thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the +opinion of most of the commentators.] + + +Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the +other, a victory that is complete. + +8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is +not the acme of excellence. + +[As Ts’ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has +germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li +Ch’uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the +vastly superior army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city +of Ch’eng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to +annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The officers +hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But +Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever +stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and +inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] + + +9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and +the whole Empire says, "Well done!" + +[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move +surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his schemes, +so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." +Sun Tzŭ reserves his approbation for things that + + +"the world’s coarse thumb +And finger fail to plumb." + + +10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; + +["Autumn hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in +autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one +in Chinese writers.] + + +to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of +thunder is no sign of a quick ear. + +[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick +hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, +who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a +mustard seed; and Shih K’uang, a blind musician who could hear the +footsteps of a mosquito.] + + +11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, +but excels in winning with ease. + +[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy +conquering." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins +his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, +wins with ease."] + + +12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor +credit for courage. + +[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained +over circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large +knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch +as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he +receives no credit for courage."] + + +13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. + +[Ch’en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile +attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One +who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at +winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; +whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are +not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably +win."] + + +Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it +means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. + +14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes +defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the +enemy. + +[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not +be confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes +all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to +increase the safety of his army.] + + +15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle +after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat +first fights and afterwards looks for victory. + +[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which +will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not +begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no +longer be assured."] + + +16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly +adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control +success. + +17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; +secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, +Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. + +18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to +Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of +chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. + +[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the +Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, +which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to +make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to a +general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy’s chances with our own; +if the latter turn the scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty +lies in third term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a +calculation of _numbers_, thereby making it nearly synonymous with the +second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as a +consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition, while the +third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other +hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative strength having been +settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play." Ho +Shih seconds this interpretation, but weakens it. However, it points to +the third term as being a calculation of numbers.] + + +19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight +placed in the scale against a single grain. + +[Literally, "a victorious army is like an _i_ (20 oz.) weighed against +a _shu_ (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a _shu_ weighed against an _i_." +The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, +flushed with victory, has over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his +note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the _i_ to be 24 Chinese ounces, +and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li +Ch’uan of the T’ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.] + + +20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up +waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical +dispositions. + + + + +Chapter V. ENERGY + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as +the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their +numbers. + +[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with +subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s +famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large +an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your +Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more +the better."] + + +2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different +from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting +signs and signals. + +3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the +enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct +and indirect. + +[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzŭ’s +treatise, the discussion of the _cheng_ and the _ch’i_." As it is by no +means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to +render them consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well +to tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks on the subject before +proceeding further. Li Ch’uan: "Facing the enemy is _cheng_, making +lateral diversion is _ch’i_. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your +troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure +victory abnormal manœuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-ch’en: "_Ch’i_ is +active, _cheng_ is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, +activity brings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy +to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, +and vice versa; thus _cheng_ may also be _ch’i_, and _ch’i_ may also be +_cheng_." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when +marching ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly +threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly +disconcerting his opponent. [Ch’ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, +the march on Lin-chin was _cheng_, and the surprise manœuver was +_ch’i_." Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: +"Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of _ch’i_ and +_cheng_. Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: ‘Direct warfare favours +frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts’ao Kung +says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; +appearing on the enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuver.’ Li Wei-kung +[6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is +_cheng_; turning movements, on the other hand, are _ch’i_.’ These +writers simply regard _cheng_ as _cheng_, and _ch’i_ as _ch’i_; they do +not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each +other like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment on +the T’ang Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A _ch’i_ +manœuver may be _cheng_, if we make the enemy look upon it as _cheng_; +then our real attack will be _ch’i_, and vice versa. The whole secret +lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real +intent.’" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other +operation is _cheng_, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; +whereas that is _ch’i_," which takes him by surprise or comes from an +unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to +be _ch’i_," it immediately becomes _cheng_."] + + +4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against +an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. + +5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, +but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. + +[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding +the enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of +"indirect tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord +Roberts’ night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. +[1] + + +6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven +and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and +moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away +but to return once more. + +[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of _ch’i_ and +_cheng_. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of _cheng_ at all, +unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating +to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been +pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military +operations, that they cannot really be considered apart. Here we simply +have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite +resource of a great leader.] + + +7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of +these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. + +8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, +white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can +ever be seen. + +9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, +sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can +ever be tasted. + +10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct +and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless +series of manœuvers. + +11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is +like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the +possibilities of their combination? + +12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even +roll stones along in its course. + +13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon +which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. + +[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is +used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word +as "the measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does +not quite fit the illustrative simile in §. 15. Applying this +definition to the falcon, it seems to me to denote that instinct of +_self-restraint_ which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until +the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right +moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly +important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very +instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went +into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for +several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying +with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close +range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on +the enemy’s nearest ships.] + + +14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and +prompt in his decision. + +[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of +distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking. +But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzŭ meant to use the word in a +figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. +Wang Hsi’s note, which after describing the falcon’s mode of attack, +proceeds: "This is just how the ‘psychological moment’ should be seized +in war."] + + +15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to +the releasing of the trigger. + +[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of +energy and the force stored up in the bent cross-bow until released by +the finger on the trigger.] + + +16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming +disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, +your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against +defeat. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been +previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating +and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the +course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real +disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your +dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out +of the question."] + + +17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear +postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. + +[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone +down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts’ao Kung throws +out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to +destroy formation and conceal one’s condition." But Tu Mu is the first +to put it quite plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to +lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish +to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme +courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy +over-confident, you must have exceeding strength."] + + +18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of +subdivision; + +[See _supra_, § 1.] + + +concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of +latent energy; + +[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here +differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: +"seeing that we are favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the +enemy will believe that we are really afraid."] + + +masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical +dispositions. + +[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han +Emperor: “Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report +on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed +all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm +soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one +and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone +opposed them, saying: ‘When two countries go to war, they are naturally +inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our +spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some +_ruse_ on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to +attack.’ The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the +trap and found himself surrounded at Po-teng.”] + + +19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains +deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu +says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may +be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led +to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, +all the enemy’s movements should be determined by the signs that we +choose to give him." Note the following anecdote of Sun Pin, a +descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the Ch’i State being at war with +Wei, sent T’ien Chi and Sun Pin against the general P’ang Chuan, who +happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The +Ch’i State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary +despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account." Accordingly, +when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders +to show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the +night after only 20,000. P’ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to +himself: "I knew these men of Ch’i were cowards: their numbers have +already fallen away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to +a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach +after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon +it the words: "Under this tree shall P’ang Chuan die." Then, as night +began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, +with orders to shoot directly if they saw a light. Later on, P’ang +Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in +order to read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled +by a volley of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The +above is Tu Mu’s version of the story; the _Shih Chi_, less +dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes P’ang Chuan +cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of +his army.] ] + + +He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. + +20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body +of picked men he lies in wait for him. + +[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He lies in +wait with the main body of his troops."] + + +21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and +does not require too much from individuals. + +[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the +bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each +men according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from +the untalented."] + + +Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined +energy. + +22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it +were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or +stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a +slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, +to go rolling down. + +[Ts’au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."] + + +23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum +of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So +much on the subject of energy. + +[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount +importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great +results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."] + + +[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. + + + +Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG + +[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: +"Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the +defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect +methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of +attack and defence, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect +methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two methods +before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong points. For the use +of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the +perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above +methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter +on Energy."] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of +the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field +and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted. + +2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but +does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him. + +[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or +fights not at all. [1] ] + + +3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach +of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible +for the enemy to draw near. + +[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he +will strike at some important point which the enemy will have to +defend.] + + +4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; + +[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch’en’s +interpretation of I. § 23.] + + +if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, +he can force him to move. + +5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march +swiftly to places where you are not expected. + +6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches +through country where the enemy is not. + +[Ts’ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt +from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are +defended, attack in unexpected quarters."] + + +7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack +places which are undefended. + +[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, +where the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; +where the walls are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict +enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or +the defenders are variance amongst themselves."] + + +You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions +that cannot be attacked. + +[_I.e._, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There +is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later +clause. Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch’en assume the meaning to be: +"In order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend _even_ those +places that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much +more, then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the +clause balances less well with the preceding—always a consideration in +the highly antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang +Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: "He who is +skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see +IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This +being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the +enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in defence hides in the most +secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to +estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold +are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."] + + +8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not +know what to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does +not know what to attack. + +[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] + + +9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be +invisible, through you inaudible; + +[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with +reference to the enemy.] + + +and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands. + +10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the +enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your +movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. + +11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even +though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we +need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. + +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line +of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; +if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign +himself." It is clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike certain generals in the late +Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.] + + +12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging +us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the +ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in +his way. + +[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia +Lin: "even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li +Ch’uan says: "we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and +Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes—one +of Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying Yang-p’ing and about to be attacked +by Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of the +drums, and flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in +sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had the +intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off +his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating here, therefore, is +nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff."] + + +13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible +ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must +be divided. + +[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei +Yao-ch’en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy’s dispositions are +visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions +being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in +order to guard against attack from every quarter."] + + +14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up +into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate +parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few. + +15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior +one, our opponents will be in dire straits. + +16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then +the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several +different points; + +[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by +saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering +what he was going to do, _he_ was thinking most of what he was going to +do himself."] + + +and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers +we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. + +17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; +should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he +strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his +right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, +he will everywhere be weak. + +[In Frederick the Great’s _Instructions to his Generals_ we read: "A +defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those +generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every +point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, +having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, +and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater."] + + +18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible +attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make +these preparations against us. + +[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is "to compel the +enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force +against each fraction in turn."] + + +19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may +concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. + +[What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of +distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a +general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march, +and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and the +right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength. +Among many such successful junctions which military history records, +one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Blucher +just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.] + + +20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be +impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the +left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the +van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything +under a hundred _li_ apart, and even the nearest are separated by +several _li_! + +[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, +but the mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an +army advancing towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of +which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the +various detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise +instructions as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be +able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yu’s note may be worth +quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to +concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will +be forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we +hold will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall +be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support +will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there +is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions of +the army."] + + +21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own +in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. +I say then that victory can be achieved. + +[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended +in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its +incorporation in Yüeh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s death. +With his present assertion compare IV. § 4. Chang Yu is the only one to +point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes on to explain: +"In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, ‘One may _know_ +how to conquer without being able to _do_ it,’ whereas here we have the +statement that ‘victory’ can be achieved.’ The explanation is, that in +the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under +discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot +make certain of beating him. But the present passage refers +particularly to the soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s +calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the +impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be +achieved."] + + +22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from +fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of +their success. + +[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all +plans conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure." + + +23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. + +[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy +on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his +policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku +Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssu-ma +I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.] + + +Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. + +24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may +know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. + +[Cf. IV. § 6.] + + +25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain +is to conceal them; + +[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is +perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see _supra_ § 9) as "showing +no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your +brain.] + + +conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the +subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. + +[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable +officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."] + + +26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own +tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. + +27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can +see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. + +[_I.e._, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they +cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has +preceded the battle.] + + +28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but +let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. + +[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-principle +underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in +number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are +few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by +familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no +more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of +grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."] + + +29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural +course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. + +30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what +is weak. + +[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] + + +31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over +which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the +foe whom he is facing. + +32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare +there are no constant conditions. + +33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and +thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. + +34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always +equally predominant; + +[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."] + + +the four seasons make way for each other in turn. + +[Literally, "have no invariable seat."] + + +There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and +waxing. + +[Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the +want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. +The comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of +the phenomena which Sun Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] + + +[1] See Col. Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. +II, p. 490. + + + +Chapter VII. MANŒUVERING + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the +sovereign. + +2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend +and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. + +["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between +the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he +quotes a saying of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without harmony in the +State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the +army, no battle array can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzŭ +is represented as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are +waging war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before +proceeding to attack the external foe."] + + +3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing +more difficult. + +[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts’ao +Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign’s +instructions until our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics +to be pursued are most difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or +manœuvers can hardly be said to begin until the army has sallied forth +and encamped, and Ch’ien Hao’s note gives color to this view: "For +levying, concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there are +plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes when we +engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that "the great +difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing favourable +position."] + + +The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious +into the direct, and misfortune into gain. + +[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat +enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is +explained by Ts’ao Kung: "Make it appear that you are a long way off, +then cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your +opponent." Tu Mu says: "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss +and leisurely while you are dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih +gives a slightly different turn: "Although you may have difficult +ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a +drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of +movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two +famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at +his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which +resulted in the great victory of Marengo.] + + +4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy +out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the +goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of _deviation_. + +[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the +town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch’in army. The King of +Chao first consulted Lien P’o on the advisability of attempting a +relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the +intervening country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned +to Chao She, who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but +finally said: "We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole—and the +pluckier one will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had +only gone a distance of 30 _li_ when he stopped and began throwing up +entrenchments. For 28 days he continued strengthening his +fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the intelligence +to the enemy. The Ch’in general was overjoyed, and attributed his +adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the +Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies +had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for +two days and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such +astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding position +on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his movements. A +crushing defeat followed for the Ch’in forces, who were obliged to +raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat across the border.] + + +5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined +multitude, most dangerous. + +[I adopt the reading of the _T’ung Tien_, Cheng Yu-hsien and the _T’u +Shu_, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to +make sense. The commentators using the standard text take this line to +mean that manœuvers may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all +depends on the ability of the general.] + + +6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an +advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other +hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice +of its baggage and stores. + +[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese +commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering +without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is some deep-seated +corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that Sun Tzŭ does not +approve of a lengthy march being undertaken without supplies. Cf. +infra, § 11.] + + +7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make +forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual +distance at a stretch, + +[The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 _li_; but on one +occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts’ao Ts’ao is said to have covered +the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within twenty-four hours.] + + +doing a hundred _li_ in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all +your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. + +8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, +and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its +destination. + +[The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a +hundred _li_ to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without +impedimenta. Manœuvers of this description should be confined to short +distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are +often more painful than the dangers of battle." He did not often call +upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only when he +intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he +sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ] + + +9. If you march fifty _li_ in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will +lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will +reach the goal. + +[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be _torn away_."] + + +10. If you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your +army will arrive. + +[In the _T’ung Tien_ is added: "From this we may know the difficulty of +manœuvering."] + + +11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; +without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. + +[I think Sun Tzŭ meant "stores accumulated in dépôts." But Tu Yu says +"fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi +says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."] + + +12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the +designs of our neighbours. + +13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar +with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls +and precipices, its marshes and swamps. + +14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we +make use of local guides. + +[§§. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.] + + +15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. + +[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to +the numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. +[2] ] + +Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained. + +16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by +circumstances. + +17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, + +[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift +but, as Mei Yao-ch’en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."] + + +your compactness that of the forest. + +[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly marching, +order and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard against surprise +attacks. But natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do +generally possess the quality of density or compactness.] + + +18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, + +[Cf. _Shih Ching_, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man +can check."] + + +in immovability like a mountain. + +[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to +dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice +you into a trap.] + + +19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you +move, fall like a thunderbolt. + +[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T’ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: +"You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the +lighting—so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so +quickly that it cannot be parried.] + + +20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst +your men; + +[Sun Tzŭ wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by +insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may +afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.] + + +when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the +benefit of the soldiery. + +[Ch’en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow +and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the +lands they invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out +some of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that +of Pan Ch’ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, +those of Fu-k’ang-an and Tso Tsung-t’ang.] + + +21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. + +[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzŭ as saying that we must not break camp +until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the +cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. § +13.] + + +22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. + +[See _supra_, §§ 3, 4.] + + +Such is the art of manœuvering. + +[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But +there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an +earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when +Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different +from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to +its genuineness.] + + +23. The Book of Army Management says: + +[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give +us any information about this work. Mei Yao- Ch’en calls it "an ancient +military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the +enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun +Tzŭ’s time between the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it +is not in itself improbable that a collection of military maxims should +have been made and written down at some earlier period.] + + +On the field of battle, + +[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] + + +the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of +gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence +the institution of banners and flags. + +24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and +eyes of the host may be focussed on one particular point. + +[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the +same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be +like those of a single man."!] + + +25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either +for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. + +[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance +against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a +story in this connection of Wu Ch’i, when he was fighting against the +Ch’in State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of +matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the +enemy, and returned to camp. Wu Ch’i had the man instantly executed, +whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a +good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch’i replied: "I +fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he +acted without orders."] + + +This is the art of handling large masses of men. + +26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, +and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing +the ears and eyes of your army. + +[Ch’en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to Ho-yang at the head +of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches, +that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not +dare to dispute their passage.] + + +27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; + +["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade +all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be +irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest +when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue +not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have +worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of +their keen spirit." Li Ch’uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found +in the _Tso Chuan_, year 10, § 1) of Ts’ao Kuei, a protege of Duke +Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch’i, and the duke was +about to join battle at Ch’ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy’s +drums, when Ts’ao said: "Not just yet." Only after their drums had +beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then they +fought, and the men of Ch’i were utterly defeated. Questioned +afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts’ao Kuei +replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first +roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is +already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I +attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence +our victory." Wu Tzŭ (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four +important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a whole +army—a mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man alone: such +is the influence of spirit!"] + + +a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. + +[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general’s most important +asset. It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and +to inspire courage into the panic-stricken." The great general Li Ching +(A.D. 571-649) has a saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in +assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it +must include the art of assailing the enemy’s mental equilibrium."] + + +28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; + +[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle +of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, +whereas Hannibal’s men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, +liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.] + + +by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent +only on returning to camp. + +29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is +keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This +is the art of studying moods. + +30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and +hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. + +31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait +at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while +the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength. + +32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect +order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident +array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. + +33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor +to oppose him when he comes downhill. + +34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers +whose temper is keen. + +35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. + +[Li Ch’uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, +take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been +poisoned by the enemy. Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that +the saying has a wider application.] + + +Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. + +[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by +saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to +the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too +dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han +Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth +homewards." A marvelous tale is told of Ts’ao Ts’ao’s courage and +resource in ch. 1 of the _San Kuo Chi_, In 198 A.D., he was besieging +Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to +cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his +troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were +guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. +In this desperate plight Ts’ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a +tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the +whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear, while +Ts’ao himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were +thrown into confusion and annihilated. Ts’ao Ts’ao said afterwards: +"The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to +battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] + + +36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. + +[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The +object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road +to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair." +Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."] + + +Do not press a desperate foe too hard. + +[Ch’en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay +will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has +burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake +all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho +Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of +Yen-ch’ing. That general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was +surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. +The country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force was +soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, +and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the +moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch’ing +exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our country +than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A strong gale happened +to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense +clouds of sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had +abated before deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer, +Li Shou-cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: +"They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm our +numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the strenuous +fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, Fu +Yen-ch’ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his +cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to +safety.] + + +37. Such is the art of warfare. + +[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. + +[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" +(Longmans, 1907), p. 29. + + + +Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS + +[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzŭ does +not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us +(V §§ 6-11) that such deflections from the ordinary course are +practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, +who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it +means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost +degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out +to be, but it has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine +Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yu. The +only other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost—a +supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some +weight.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the +sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces. + +[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may +have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to +the chapter.] + + +2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high +roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in +dangerously isolated positions. + +[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the +beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu +defines this situation as being situated across the frontier, in +hostile territory. Li Ch’uan says it is "country in which there are no +springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, +"one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to +advance."] + + +In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate +position, you must fight. + +3. There are roads which must not be followed, + +["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch’uan, +"where an ambush is to be feared."] + + +armies which must be not attacked, + +[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be +attacked." Ch’en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival +advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from +attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strength."] + + +towns which must not be besieged, + +[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own +experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the +city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the +heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the +subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. +Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be +held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." Hsun Ying, when +urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and +well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great feat +of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In +the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. +It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, +countermarches and manœuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste +men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a +province." [1] ] + + +positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which +must not be obeyed. + +[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for +authority, and Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: +"Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a +military commander is the negation of civil order!" The unpalatable +fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated +to military necessity.] + + +4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany +variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. + +5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted +with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn +his knowledge to practical account. + +[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only +securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in +every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is +characterized by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a +certain variability of plan. How it is possible to turn these natural +features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by +versatility of mind?"] + + +6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying +his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will +fail to make the best use of his men. + +[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally +advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it +must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a +town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can +be stormed, it must be attempted; and if consistent with military +operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed." But there are +circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages. +For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if +he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has +laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may +be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely +to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.] + + +7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of +disadvantage will be blended together. + +["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says +Ts’ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your +mind."] + + +8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may +succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. + +[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must +not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the +enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into +our calculations."] + + +9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always +ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from +misfortune. + +[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, +I must consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my +own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels +these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in +liberating myself…. For instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and +only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will +incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to +encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the +advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils." See the +story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.] + + +10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; + +[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of +which would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the enemy’s +best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. +Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be +rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension +between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful +contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his +treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into +excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely +women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of +Sun Tzŭ here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer +injury, and he will submit of his own accord."] + + +and make trouble for them, + +[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble +should be made for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we +might say, "assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich +exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of +commands." These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.] + + +and keep them constantly engaged; + +[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent them from +having any rest."] + + +hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. + +[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use +of: "cause them to forget _pien_ (the reasons for acting otherwise than +on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction."] + + +11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the +enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the +chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made +our position unassailable. + +12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) +Recklessness, which leads to destruction; + +["Bravery without forethought," as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes +a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an +opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but +may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.: +"In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay +exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one +out of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave +man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without +any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, +too, makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one’s death does not +bring about victory."] + + +(2) cowardice, which leads to capture; + +[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as +being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an +advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of +danger." Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on +returning alive," this is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as +Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing +to take risks. T’ai Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will +subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu +pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle +with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered only a +few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan +Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be +overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so +that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural +result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly +quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with +fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in the fray, +Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled +for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat +similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who during +a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness +for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get +across.] + + +(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; + +[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, +Teng Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to +fight. Teng Ch’iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and +easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, +then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to +battle, it is doomed to be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao +Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s +pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.] + + +(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame; + +This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect +in a general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated +sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung +by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though +somewhat paradoxically: "The seeker after glory should be careless of +public opinion."] + + +(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and +trouble. + +[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless +of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger +of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate +comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long +run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the +prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken +feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered +city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his +military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated +efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many +strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, +relief came through the very man who started out with the distinct +resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to +sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who +failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to +defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his men." +By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of +Sun Tzŭ’s mouth.] + + +13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the +conduct of war. + +14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will +surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a +subject of meditation. + +[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50. + + + +Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH + +[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1 +than by this heading.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and +observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in +the neighbourhood of valleys. + +[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to +supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural +ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following +anecdote: Wu-tu Ch’iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later +Han, and Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch’iang having found +a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but +seized all the favourable positions commanding supplies of water and +forage. Ch’iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of +provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not +know the advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood of valleys."] + + +2. Camp in high places, + +[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the +surrounding country.] + + +facing the sun. + +[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch’en Hao "facing east." +Cf. infra, §§ 11, 13. + + +Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. + +3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. + +["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts’ao +Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your +evolutions." The _T’ung Tien_ reads, "If _the enemy_ crosses a river," +etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly an +interpolation.] + + +4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not +advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army +get across, and then deliver your attack. + +[Li Ch’uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu +at the Wei River. Turning to the _Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 34, fol. 6 +verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were +drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered +his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct +a dam higher up. Then, leading half his army across, he attacked Lung +Chu; but after a time, pretending to have failed in his attempt, he +hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this +unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was +really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his +turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus +releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the +greater portion of Lung Chu’s army from getting across. He then turned +upon the force which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu +himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further +bank, also scattered and fled in all directions.] + + +5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader +near a river which he has to cross. + +[For fear of preventing his crossing.] + + +6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. + +[See _supra_, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with +water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops +marshalled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; +in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing +the sun." The other commentators are not at all explicit.] + + +Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. + +[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on +the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the +sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that +‘in river warfare we must not advance against the stream,’ which is as +much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the +enemy, for then they would be able to take advantage of the current and +make short work of us." There is also the danger, noted by other +commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be +carried down to us.] + + +So much for river warfare. + +7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over +them quickly, without any delay. + +[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, +and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to +attack.] + + +8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass +near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. + +[Li Ch’uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous +where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect +the rear.] + + +So much for operations in salt-marshes. + +9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with +rising ground to your right and on your rear, + +[Tu Mu quotes T’ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a +marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."] + + +so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for +campaigning in flat country. + +10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge + +[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, +and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon’s "Military Maxims," no. 1.] + + +which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. + +[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch’en asks, with some +plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known +of Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The _Shih Chi_ (ch. 1 +ad init.) speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch’ih Yu. In the +_Liu T’ao_ it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified +the Empire." Ts’ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was +the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of +whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li +Ch’uan tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who +received it from his Minister Feng Hou.] + + +11. All armies prefer high ground to low, + +["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch’en, "is not only more agreeable and +salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low +ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for +fighting."] + + +and sunny places to dark. + +12. If you are careful of your men, + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn +out your animals to graze."] + + +and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every +kind, + +[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak +of illness."] + + +and this will spell victory. + +13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the +slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of +your soldiers and utilise the natural advantages of the ground. + +14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you +wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it +subsides. + +15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running +between, deep natural hollows, + +The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, +with pools of water at the bottom."] + + +confined places, + +[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by +precipices on three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."] + + +tangled thickets, + +[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears +cannot be used."] + + +quagmires + +[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable +for chariots and horsemen."] + + +and crevasses, + +[Defined by Mei Yao-ch’en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling +cliffs." Tu Mu’s note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and +intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but +Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and +Chang Yu takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the +commentators certainly inclines to the rendering "defile." But the +ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a crack or fissure" +and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence +indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun +Tzŭ is here speaking of crevasses.] + + +should be left with all possible speed and not approached. + +16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to +approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on +his rear. + +17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly +country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with +reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed +out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious +spies are likely to be lurking. + +[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors +who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and +overhearing our instructions."] + + +18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on +the natural strength of his position. + +[Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is +so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. +Baden-Powell’s "Aids to Scouting."] + + +19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious +for the other side to advance. + +[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to +dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to +force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less +probability of our responding to the challenge."] + + +20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a +bait. + +21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is +advancing. + +[Ts’ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and +Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and +observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are +moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to clear a +passage for the enemy’s march."] + + +The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means +that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. + +[Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts’ao Kung’s, is as follows: "The +presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick +vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, +has constructed these hiding-places in order to make us suspect an +ambush." It appears that these "screens" were hastily knotted together +out of any long grass which the retreating enemy happened to come +across.] + + +22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. + +[Chang Yu’s explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying +along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers +are in ambush at the spot beneath."] + + +Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. + +23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of +chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, +it betokens the approach of infantry. + +["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat +exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon +by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more +dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-track, whereas +foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many abreast. According to +Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have scouts some way in +advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will gallop back and +report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you +move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar +for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting +up, glitter of arms, etc." [1] ] + + +When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties +have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and +fro signify that the army is encamping. + +[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light +horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak +and strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity +of dust and its motion."] + + +24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is +about to advance. + +["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object +is to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack +us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of T’ien Tan of the Ch’i-mo against +the Yen forces, led by Ch’i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the _Shih Chi_ we read: +"T’ien Tan openly said: ‘My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off +the noses of their Ch’i prisoners and place them in the front rank to +fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other +side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; +but those within the city were enraged at seeing their +fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should +fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend themselves more +obstinately than ever. Once again T’ien Tan sent back converted spies +who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is that the +men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by +inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become +faint-hearted.’ Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and +burned the corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, +witnessing the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were +all impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased tenfold. +T’ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise. +But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in his hands, and +ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, while the +ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served +out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The +regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were +manned with the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys +were dispatched to the enemy’s camp to arrange terms of surrender, +whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T’ien Tan also collected +20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the wealthy citizens +of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the prayer that, when the +town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be plundered or +their women to be maltreated. Ch’i Chieh, in high good humor, granted +their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and careless. +Meanwhile, T’ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them with +pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored +stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased +rushes on their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the +rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had +pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked +warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the +enemy’s camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for +their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their +bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom +they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up +with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At +the same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those +that remained behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums +and hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed +by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly +pursued by the men of Ch’i, who succeeded in slaying their general Ch’i +Chien…. The result of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some +seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch’i State."] + + +Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that +he will retreat. + +25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on +the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. + +26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. + +[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch’uan indicates "a treaty confirmed +by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand, +simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."] + + +27. When there is much running about + +[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental +banner.] + + +and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has +come. + +28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. + +29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint +from want of food. + +30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, +the army is suffering from thirst. + +[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from the +behavior of a single man."] + + +31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to +secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. + +32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. + +[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch’en Hao says, +the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] + + +Clamour by night betokens nervousness. + +33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is +weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If +the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary. + +[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an +army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with +fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them.] + + +34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for +food, + +[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and +the horses chiefly on grass.] + + +and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, +showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that +they are determined to fight to the death. + +[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. +71, given in abbreviated form by the _P’ei Wen Yun Fu:_ "The rebel Wang +Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch’en- ts’ang, and Huang-fu +Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out against +him. The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear +to his counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to +throw down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was not advancing to +the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a principle of war not to pursue +desperate men and not to press a retreating host.’ Sung answered: ‘That +does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not a +retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganized +multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advances to the +attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo +being slain."] + + +35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in +subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. + +36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his +resources; + +[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always +a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good +temper.] + + +too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. + +[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity +is necessary to keep the men to their duty.] + + +37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s +numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. + +[I follow the interpretation of Ts’ao Kung, also adopted by Li Ch’uan, +Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, Chia +Lin, Mei Tao-ch’en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first +tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, +etc." This would connect the sentence with what went before about +rewards and punishments.] + + +38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign +that the enemy wishes for a truce. + +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages, +it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because +their strength is exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly +needs a Sun Tzŭ to draw such an obvious inference.] + + +39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a +long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, +the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. + +[Ts’ao Kung says a manœuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain +time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.] + + +40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply +sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. + +[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, _cheng_ tactics and +frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.] + + +What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, +keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. + +[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in +squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch’uan, who appears to +offer the simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will +win." Fortunately we have Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in +language which is lucidity itself: "When the numbers are even, and no +favourable opening presents itself, although we may not be strong enough +to deliver a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst +our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces and +keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But +we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." He then quotes +from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary troops may +be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that +figure."] + + +41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is +sure to be captured by them. + +[Ch’en Hao, quoting from the _Tso Chuan_, says: "If bees and scorpions +carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, +then, should not be treated with contempt."] + + +42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, +they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be +practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, +punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless. + +43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with +humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. + +[Yen Tzŭ [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues +endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in +awe." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander unites culture with +a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination of +hardness and tenderness."] + + +This is a certain road to victory. + +44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army +will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. + +45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his +orders being obeyed, + +[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly +confidence in his men and also make his authority respected, so that +when they come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline +maintained, because they all trust and look up to him." What Sun Tzŭ +has said in § 44, however, would lead one rather to expect something +like this: "If a general is always confident that his orders will be +carried out," etc."] + + +the gain will be mutual. + +[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his +command, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the +gain is mutual." He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. +4: "The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders +and not to be swayed by petty doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are +the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army.] + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26. + + + +Chapter X. TERRAIN + +[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with +"terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six +calamities" are discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is +again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, +perhaps, on that account.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) +Accessible ground; + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of +communications."] + + +(2) entangling ground; + +[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you +become entangled."] + + +(3) temporising ground; + +[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] + + +(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great +distance from the enemy. + +[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this +classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the +Chinaman’s unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as +the above.] + + +2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called +_accessible_. + +3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in +occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of +supplies. + +[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, +"not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of +Napoleon’s dictum, "the secret of war lies in the communications," [1] +we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had done more than skirt the edge of this +important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: +"The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an +army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who +finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, and his +own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, +and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander +whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false +position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his +plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, +and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time +to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will +entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army." [2] + + +Then you will be able to fight with advantage. + +4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called +_entangling_. + +5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may +sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your +coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, +disaster will ensue. + +6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the +first move, it is called _temporising_ ground. + +[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the +situation remains at a deadlock."] + + +7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an +attractive bait, + +[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But +this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our +position.] + + +it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus +enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come +out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. + +8. With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first, let +them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. + +[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and +by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our +mercy."] + + +9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after +him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly +garrisoned. + +10. With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with +your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there +wait for him to come up. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and +defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." +[For the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. +Chang Yu tells the following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. +619-682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic +tribes. "At night he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been +completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders +that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was +highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the +extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien, +however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as +quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which +flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve +feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned +that they had been in the wrong. ‘How did you know what was going to +happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward +be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ From +this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places +are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are +immune from disastrous floods."] + + +11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but +retreat and try to entice him away. + +[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D. against the +two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of +Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou +Chien-te persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was +defeated and taken prisoner. See _Chiu T’ang Shu_, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, +and also ch. 54.] + + +12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the +strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a +battle, + +[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and +wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be +exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."] + + +and fighting will be to your disadvantage. + +13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. + +[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § +8.] + + +The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to +study them. + +14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from +natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. +These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) +disorganisation; (6) rout. + +15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against +another ten times its size, the result will be the _flight_ of the +former. + +16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too +weak, the result is _insubordination_. + +[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [_Hsin T’ang Shu_, ch. 148], +who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against +Wang T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers +treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority +by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien +Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some +months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops +turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the +unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.] + + +When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the +result is _collapse_. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the +common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] + + +17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on +meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of +resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is +in a position to fight, the result is _ruin_. + +[Wang Hsi’s note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause, +and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate +officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of +ruin upon his head."] + + +18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are +not clear and distinct; + +[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with +decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves +are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds +about doing their duty." General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the +words: "The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men +lies in one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they +receive." [3] Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a +military leader is difference; the worst calamities that befall an army +arise from hesitation."] + + +when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, + +[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."] + + +and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is +utter _disorganisation_. + +19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an +inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment +against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the +front rank, the result must be a _rout_. + +[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues: +"Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be +appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the +resolution of our own men and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi +ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).] + + +20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully +noted by the general who has attained a responsible post. + +[See _supra_, § 13.] + + +21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; + +[Ch’en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to +those connected with ground."] + + +but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of +victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and +distances, constitutes the test of a great general. + +22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into +practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises +them, will surely be defeated. + +23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even +though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, +then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding. + +[Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, who is said +to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the _San +Lueh_, has these words attributed to him: "The responsibility of +setting an army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance +and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will +hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened +monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country’s +cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that +"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military +commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees +from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."] + + +24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without +fearing disgrace, + +[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for +a soldier is to retreat.] + + +whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for +his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. + +[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." +Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would +not regret his conduct."] + + +25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you +into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and +they will stand by you even unto death. + +[Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture +of the famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have +frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the +same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a +horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations +wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his +soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch’i himself sucked out +the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, began wailing and +lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your son is +only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has +sucked the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago, +Lord Wu performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him +afterwards, and finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And +now that he has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I +know not where.’" Li Ch’uan mentions the Viscount of Ch’u, who invaded +the small state of Hsiao during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to +him: "Many of the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he +made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and +straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with +floss silk.] + + +26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority +felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, +moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to +spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose. + +[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, +they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of +stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was +occupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his +army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by +force. Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who +happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat +belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation +helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that the +fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be allowed to +palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his +summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did +so. This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from +that time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked +up.] + + +27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are +unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway +towards victory. + +[That is, Ts’ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."] + + +28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that +our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway +towards victory. + +[Cf. III. § 13 (1).] + + +29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our +men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of +the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only +halfway towards victory. + +30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; +once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. + +[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures +so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move +recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no +mistakes."] + + +31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your +victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you +may make your victory complete. + +[Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three things—the +affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of +earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."] + + +[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. + +[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. + +[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii. + + + +Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: +(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) +open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; +(7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. + +2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive +ground. + +[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious +to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity +afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their +advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack the valor of desperation, and +when they retreat, they will find harbors of refuge."] + + +3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great +distance, it is facile ground. + +[Li Ch’uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating," +and the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: +"When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and +bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no +hankering after home."] + + +4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either +side, is contentious ground. + +[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung +says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the +strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus, +Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, +even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in +check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.: +"For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is +nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning from +his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far +as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou, +taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, plotted +against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, +governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from +his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and +mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we +shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. +Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, +thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are +prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or +if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we could make a +stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and +resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the +enormous strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act +on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.] + + +5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. + +[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this +type of ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network +of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which +intercommunication is easy."] + + +6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, + +[Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a +third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small +principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on +the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.] + + +so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, + +[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most +of them to become his allies.] + + +is ground of intersecting highways. + +7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, +leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. + +[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached +such a point, its situation is serious."] + + +8. Mountain forests, + +[Or simply "forests."] + + +rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: +this is difficult ground. + +9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can +only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy +would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in +ground. + +10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting +without delay, is desperate ground. + +[The situation, as pictured by Ts’ao Kung, is very similar to the +"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible: "A +lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, +retreat blocked." Ch’en Hao says: "to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like +sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu +quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus +entrapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid +of local guides:—it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy’s +mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so +perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots +carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no +choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to +range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming +strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take +a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a +pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none of us +has a moment’s respite. If we simply maintain our ground, whole days +and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain +the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, destitute +of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of life, +the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of +strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man +defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offense +in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by +ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant +soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with +the slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of the +awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians +under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].] + + +11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt +not. On contentious ground, attack not. + +[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous +position first. So Ts’ao Kung. Li Ch’uan and others, however, suppose +the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that +it would be sheer madness to attack. In the _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, when the +King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: +"The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession +have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is +secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by +pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash +for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and +raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best +troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will +sally forth to the rescue."] + + +12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. + +[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking +force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available +here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s +brief note: "Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own +army is not cut off.] + + +On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. + +[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states."] + + +13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. + +[On this, Li Ch’uan has the following delicious note: "When an army +penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to +alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han +Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch’in territory was marked by no +violation of women or looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 +B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies that +entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the +present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not +‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’" Alas, I fear that in this instance +the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, +has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ +there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility +of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by +bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the +enemy."] + + +In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. + +[Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, "do not encamp.] + + +14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. + +[Ts’au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu +amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be +devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in +deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what +happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the +mountains on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by +the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his +foes was remarkably like that which T’ien Tan had also employed with +success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, note.] When night came +on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and +set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the +mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The +strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and +discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and +Hannibal’s army passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. +93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.] + + +On desperate ground, fight. + +[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is +a chance of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your +corner."] + + +15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a +wedge between the enemy’s front and rear; + +[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each +other."] + + +to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to +hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from +rallying their men. + +16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from +concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep +them in disorder. + +17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when +otherwise, they stopped still. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded in +thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure +any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, +they would remain where they were."] + + +18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly +array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin +by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be +amenable to your will." + +[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts’ao Kung thinks it +is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu +says: "The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the +accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our +favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard +his own communications." Our object then must be to thwart his plans in +these three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] By +boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other +side on the defensive.] + + +19. Rapidity is the essence of war: + +[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in +warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military +science, and the chief business of the general." The following +anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the importance attached to speed by +two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor of +Hsin-ch’eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to +the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko +Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then +military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta’s treachery, he +at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having +previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import. +Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued himself +with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we +make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we +ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and +before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of forced +marches, be brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’eng with in a +space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to +Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 _li_ from here. When the news of my revolt +reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it +will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time +my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come +himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth +troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled with +consternation: "Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my +allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What miraculous +rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- ch’eng had fallen and Meng +Ta had lost his head. [See _Chin Shu_, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li +Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the successful +rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou +Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, Hsiao +Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down +through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching +embarked his army without loss of time, and was just about to start +when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until +the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation. Li Ching +replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount +importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to +strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army +together. If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we +shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the +thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against +it. [See VII. § 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if +he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in +such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full +fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, and +Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people +should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.] + + +take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected +routes, and attack unguarded spots. + +20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading +force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be +the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail +against you. + +21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with +food. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 13. Li Ch’uan does not venture on a note here.] + + +22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, + +[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give them +plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally."] + + +and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your +strength. + +[Ch’en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous +general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the +success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch’u State, where a +universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the +temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remained +strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch’u general try to force a +battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not +come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the +affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be +well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for +bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them +into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he told +off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. +The answer was, that they were contending with one another in putting +the weight and long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard that they were +engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been +strung up to the required pitch and that they were now ready for +fighting. By this time the Ch’u army, after repeating their challenge +again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch’in +general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the +battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly +afterwards, the whole of Ch’u was conquered by Ch’in, and the king +Fu-ch’u led into captivity.] + + +Keep your army continually on the move, + +[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has +struck me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army +together."] + + +and devise unfathomable plans. + +23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and +they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is +nothing they may not achieve. + +[Chang Yu quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): "If one man were to +run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to +get our of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage +and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a +desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even +terms."] + + +Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. + +[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will +surely exert their united strength to get out of it."] + + +24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there +is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart +of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no +help for it, they will fight hard. + +25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be +constantly on the _qui vive;_ without waiting to be asked, they will do +your will; + +[Literally, "without asking, you will get."] + + +without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, +they can be trusted. + +26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious +doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. + +[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate +into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes +Huang Shih-kung: "‘Spells and incantations should be strictly +forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the +fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers’ minds should be seriously +perturbed.’ The meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and +scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution +until they die."] + + +27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because +they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it +is not because they are disinclined to longevity. + +[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are +things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they +burn or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not +that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzŭ +is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the +general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not +thrown in their way.] + + +28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, + +[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate more +genuine grief than tears alone.] + + +those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting +the tears run down their cheeks. + +[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts’ao Kung says, "all +have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that +the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their +emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the I River +between Ching K’o and his friends, when the former was sent to attempt +the life of the King of Ch’in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. +The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and +uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the +burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ] + + +But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage +of a Chu or a Kuei. + +[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and +contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang, +better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with +a dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a +banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was immediately hacked to +pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero +referred to, Ts’ao Kuei (or Ts’ao Mo), performed the exploit which has +made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice +defeated by Ch’i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering +a large slice of territory, when Ts’ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan Kung, +the Duke of Ch’i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger +against his chest. None of the duke’s retainers dared to move a muscle, +and Ts’ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring the Lu +was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker +state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, +whereupon Ts’ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his +place amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed +color. As was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate +the bargain, but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him +the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold +stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched +battles.] + + +29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the +_shuai-jan_ is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains. + +["_Shuai-jan_" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question +was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through +this passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the +sense of "military manœuvers."] + + +Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its +tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and +you will be attacked by head and tail both. + +30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, + +[That is, as Mei Yao-ch’en says, "Is it possible to make the front and +rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as +though they were part of a single living body?"] + + +I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are +enemies; + +[Cf. VI. § 21.] + + +yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a +storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand +helps the right. + +[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of +common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound +together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet +it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of +cooperation, especially in the case of allied armies.] + + +31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of +horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground. + +[These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall +the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the +battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one +spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to +render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed +unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a +spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be +learned from the _shuai-jan_.] + + +32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard +of courage which all must reach. + +[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] +one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it +follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be +of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain +standard. Wellington’s seemingly ungrateful description of his army at +Waterloo as "the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that +it was deficient in this important particular—unity of spirit and +courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept +those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the +day.] + + +33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question +involving the proper use of ground. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en’s paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences +of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize +accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in +strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more +exposed terrain. The advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority +in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the +text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to +think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no +means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions… +and to the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are +defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural +features." [2] ] + + +34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were +leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. + +[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does +it."] + + +35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure +secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. + +36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports +and appearances, + +[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] + + +and thus keep them in total ignorance. + +[Ts’ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops must +not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only +rejoice with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and +surprise the enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been +frequently pointed out. But how about the other process—the +mystification of one’s own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is +over-emphatic on this point would do well to read Col. Henderson’s +remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," +he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most +trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his +thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced useless"—etc. +etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the _Hou Han +Shu_, "Pan Ch’ao took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other +Central Asian states with the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of +Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commander to succour the place +with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t’ou, +totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch’ao summoned his officers and also the King +of Khotan to a council of war, and said: ‘Our forces are now +outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, +then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different +direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, +and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the +evening drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch’ao now secretly +released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha +was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set +off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch’ao’s retreat +in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in +order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch’ao knew that +the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them +well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, +as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, +and were closely pursued by Pan Ch’ao. Over 5000 heads were brought +back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and +cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, +Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From +that time forward, Pan Ch’ao’s prestige completely overawed the +countries of the west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general +not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but +actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive +the enemy.] + + +37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, + +[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice.] + + +he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. + +[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that war +is based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy. +You must deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but +without letting them know why."] + + +By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the +enemy from anticipating his purpose. + +38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has +climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He +carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. + +[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. § 15), that is, takes some +decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like +Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch’en Hao, +followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as "puts forth +every artifice at his command."] + + +39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd +driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and +none knows whither he is going. + +[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or +retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and +conquering."] + + +40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the +business of the general. + +[Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilization there should be no delay in +aiming a blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again +to this point. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was +no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the +armies of today.] + + +41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; + +[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules +for the nine varieties of ground."] + + +the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental +laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be +studied. + +42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that +penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means +dispersion. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 20.] + + +43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across +neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. + +[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not +figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X. +One’s first impulse would be to translate it distant ground," but this, +if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. +Mei Yao-ch’en says it is "a position not far enough advanced to be +called ‘facile,’ and not near enough to home to be ‘dispersive,’ but +something between the two." Wang Hsi says: "It is ground separated from +home by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to cross in +order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business +there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which +is the reason why it is not included among the Nine Situations.] + + +When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is +one of intersecting highways. + +44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. +When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. + +45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow +passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of +refuge at all, it is desperate ground. + +46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity +of purpose. + +[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the +defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. _supra_, § 11.] + + +On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between +all parts of my army. + +[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible +contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden +attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. § 17. Mei Yao-ch’en says: +"On the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an +encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications."] + + +47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. + +[This is Ts’ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We +must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach +the goal." That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way +apart. Mei Yao-ch’en offers another equally plausible explanation: +"Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we +are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute +its possession." Ch’en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy +has had time to select his own ground, quotes VI. § 1, where Sun Tzŭ +warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the +situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a favourable +position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to +occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make +a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, +and victory will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao She beat +the army of Ch’in. (See p. 57.)] + + +48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On +ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. + +49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of +supplies. + +[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as +one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.] + + +On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. + +50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. + +[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position, +whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s +lines." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with +desperation." Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run +away." Tu Mu points out that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where +it is the enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards +Emperor and canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under +Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small, +consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. The +lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps +being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to +escape, actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets +himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped +together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing +for it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary +pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that +the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught.] + + +On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness +of saving their lives. + +Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores +and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and +make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to +the death." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving +up all hope of it." This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about +"grounds" and the "variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the +passages which bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be +struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is +treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § 2 to enumerate "variations" +before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, namely +nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is not included +in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion +of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six +variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though +the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next +chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par +excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down +to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, +8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed +in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once +more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and 7, +being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to +account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts +maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, +should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is +an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. +Several of these are defined twice over, besides which there are two +distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the +chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. +I do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the +general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work cannot have come down to us in +the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective +and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain matter that has +either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.] + + +51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate +resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, +and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger. + +[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch’ao’s devoted followers in 73 +A.D. The story runs thus in the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47: "When Pan Ch’ao +arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at +first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his +behavior underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. +Pan Ch’ao spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you +noticed,’ he said, ‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? +This must signify that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, +and that consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with +which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly +wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have come to +pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ Thereupon +he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, and +set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu +who arrived some day ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between +surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch’ao, +keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a +general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began +drinking with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a +little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them +thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated region, +anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now it +happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom +only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy +extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this +envoy prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the +Hsiung-no, our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert. +What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers replied: ‘Standing as +we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life +and death.’ For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1, +note.] + + +52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are +acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the +march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains +and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We +shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make +use of local guides. + +[These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12-14—in order to +emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to +regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the +following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have added +that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their +treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): +Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the +neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be +occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of +Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of +Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that +direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost +arrived.] + + +53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles +does not befit a warlike prince. + +54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship +shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He +overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining +against him. + +[Mei Tao-ch’en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so +much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you +can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you +have a superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you +overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will be frightened; and if +the neighbouring states are frightened, the enemy’s allies will be +prevented from joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning: +"If the great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to +summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and refrain +from massing their forces." Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu take the sentence in +quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may be, +if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, +and must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with +this, and with overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries +to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his +view thus: "If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will +be discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our +display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the +other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us."] + + +55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor +does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret +designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. + +[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch’uan, appears to be this: Secure +against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject +entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his +prestige enable him to dispense with external friendships."] + + +Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. + +[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State +became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which +the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final +triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up his previous note, +thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded +selfishness and haughty isolation.] + + +56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, + +[Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and +retreat be heavily punished."] + + +issue orders + +[Literally, "hang" or post up."] + + +without regard to previous arrangements; + +["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is +made clear by Ts’ao Kung’s quotation from the _Ssu-ma Fa:_ "Give +instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see +deserving deeds." Ts’ao Kung’s paraphrase: "The final instructions you +give to your army should not correspond with those that have been +previously posted up." Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements +should not be divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says: "there should be +no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not only is there danger in +letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the entire +reversal of them at the last moment.] + + +and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do +with but a single man. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 34.] + + +57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know +your design. + +[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for +any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no +reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a +general than to a judge.] + + +When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them +nothing when the situation is gloomy. + +58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it +into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. + +[These words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of +the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already +alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, +and halted ten miles from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the +enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body +of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red +flag. Their instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles +and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me in +full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their fortifications +and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck down +the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their stead." +Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a +strong position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he +sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I +should turn back and escape through the mountains." So saying, he first +of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them +to form in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this +manœuver, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By this time +it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo’s +flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately +engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time; +until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and +banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where +another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them +and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but +the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was +fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the +2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao +following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, +tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the +Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags +struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and +overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of +their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on +them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a number and +capturing the rest, amongst whom was King Ya himself…. After the +battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and said: "In the _Art +of War_ we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a +river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun +Tzŭ and T’ai Kung. See IX § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, ordered +us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these +conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general +replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with +sufficient care. Is it not written there: ‘Plunge your army into +desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly +peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the usual course, I should +never have been able to bring my colleague round. What says the +Military Classic—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off +to fight.’ [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun +Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were +obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow +his own discretion, there would have been a general _débandade_, and it +would have been impossible to do anything with them." The officers +admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These are higher tactics +than we should have been capable of." [See _Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 34, +ff. 4, 5.] ] + + +59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is +capable of striking a blow for victory. + +[Danger has a bracing effect.] + + +60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves +to the enemy’s purpose. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"—by an appearance of yielding and +falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yu’s note makes the meaning +clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do +so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out +his intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous +before we deliver our attack.] + + +61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, + +[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in +one direction." Ts’ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the +enemy." But such a violent displacement of characters is quite +indefensible.] + + +we shall succeed in the long run + +[Literally, "after a thousand _li_."] + + +in killing the commander-in-chief. + +[Always a great point with the Chinese.] + + +62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. + +63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier +passes, destroy the official tallies, + +[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as +a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the +"border-warden" of _Lun Yu_ III. 24, who may have had similar duties. +When this half was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was +authorized to open the gate and let the traveler through.] + + +and stop the passage of all emissaries. + +[Either to or from the enemy’s country.] + + +64. Be stern in the council-chamber, + +[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the +sovereign.] + + +so that you may control the situation. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the +strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.] + + +65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. + +66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, + +[Cf. _supra_, § 18.] + + +and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. + +[Ch’en Hao’s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favourable position, +but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus obtained +cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore, to +occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an +artful appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him +into going there as well." Mei Yao-ch’en explains that this "artful +appointment" is to be made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies, +who will carry back just the amount of information that we choose to +give them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our intentions, "we must +manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. § +4). We must start after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we +must arrive before him in order to capture the place without trouble. +Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch’en’s +interpretation of § 47.] + + +67. Walk in the path defined by rule, + +[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this +cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is +unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the +sense yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we +know, according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won +his battles by violating every accepted canon of warfare.] + + +and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive +battle. + +[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable +opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall +prove decisive."] + + +68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy +gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running +hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you. + +[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly +appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzŭ was thinking only of its +speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy +as quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] + + +[1] Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. + +[2] "The Science of War," p. 333. + +[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. + + + +Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE + +[Rather more than half the chapter (§§ 1-13) is devoted to the subject +of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first +is to burn soldiers in their camp; + +[So Tu Mu. Li Ch’uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the +soldiers" (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on +a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note], +found himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an +envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In +consultation with his officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never +win! [1] The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire +on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will not be able to +discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate +them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover us with +glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all +replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the +Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is today,’ he cried, +‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum +civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and +everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy +fate for valiant warriors.’ All then agreed to do as he wished. +Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly +made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the +time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind +the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot +up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The +rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade +at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the +windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose +on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in +frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao slew three of them with his own hand, while +his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. +The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On +the following day, Pan Ch’ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted +hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think, +Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied Kuo Hsun, +and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the +head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and +trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public +proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostage, he returned to +make his report to Tou Ku." _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ] + + +the second is to burn stores; + +[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the +rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the +Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a +policy which in the long run proved entirely successful.] + + +the third is to burn baggage-trains; + +[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao’s wagons and +impedimenta by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.] + + +the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; + +[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines" are +the same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and +clothing. Cf. VII. § 11.] + + +the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. + +[Tu Yu says in the _T’ung Tien:_ "To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. +The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows +alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from +powerful crossbows into the enemy’s lines."] + + +2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. + +[T’sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy’s camp" are referred to. +But Ch’en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have +favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us." +Chia Lin says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."] + + +the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. + +[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter, +reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material +cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting +fires."] + + +3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special +days for starting a conflagration. + +4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days +are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the +Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; + +[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the +Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, +Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.] + + +for these four are all days of rising wind. + +5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible +developments: + +6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once +with an attack from without. + +7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain +quiet, bide your time and do not attack. + +[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into +confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is +ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.] + + +8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it +up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find +the difficulties too great, retire."] + + +9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do +not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a +favourable moment. + +[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire +breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of +incendiaries) inside the enemy’s camp. "But," he continues, "if the +enemy is settled in a waste place littered with quantities of grass, or +if he has pitched his camp in a position which can be burnt out, we +must carry our fire against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not +await on in hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our +opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and +thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once +baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking +advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese +general’s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in +the neighbourhood had already been burnt down. On the other hand, +Po-ts’ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in +184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple precaution. "At the head of +a large army he was besieging Ch’ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu +Sung. The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness +pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and +said: "In war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and +numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here quotes Sun +Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the +midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we +set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can +make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the +achievement of T’ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong +breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind +reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after +which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way +through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. +Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and +Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the +rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." [_Hou Han Shu_, +ch. 71.] +] +] +] +] +] +10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from +the leeward. + +[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will +retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he +will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A +rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in +the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the +attack yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side, +and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your +enemy."] + + +11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze +soon falls. + +[Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a +morning." (_Tao Te Ching_, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch’en and Wang Hsi say: +"A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. +This is what happens as a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be +correct enough, but how this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.] + + +12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be +known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the +proper days. + +[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, +and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before making our +attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: +"We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also +be on our guard against similar attacks from them."] + + +13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; +those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of +strength. + +14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of +all his belongings. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy’s road or +divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water +can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of +fire. This is the reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is +dismissed in a couple of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is +discussed in detail. Wu Tzŭ (ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements: +"If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy ground, from which the +water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, it may be +submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands +thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent +gales, it may be exterminated by fire."] + + +15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed +in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the +result is waste of time and general stagnation. + +[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. Ts’ao Kung +says: "Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day." +And Tu Mu: "If you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the +deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and +disaster will ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the +formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the +interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch’en alone, whose words I will +quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their battles and +assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come and not shrink +on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort to +such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What they must not +do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to the +advantages they have got."] + + +16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; +the good general cultivates his resources. + +[Tu Mu quotes the following from the _San Lueh_, ch. 2: "The warlike +prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by +good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, +there will be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not +be respected."] + + +17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless +there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is +critical. + +[Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so +far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the _Tao Te Ching_, +ch. 69. "I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the +defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."] + + +18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own +spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. + +19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where +you are. + +[This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an +interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately +on § 18.] + + +20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by +content. + +21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again +into being; + +[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.] + + +nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. + +22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full +of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army +intact. + +[1] "Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the +tiger’s cubs." + + + +Chapter XIII. THE USE OF SPIES + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching +them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on +the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a +thousand ounces of silver. + +[Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.] + + +There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down +exhausted on the highways. + +[Cf. _Tao Te Ching_, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered, +brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be +reminded of the saying: ‘On serious ground, gather in plunder.’ Why +then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the +highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of +munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the +injunction to ‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is +deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided +against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, +we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of +supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where +provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed +with."] + + +As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their +labor. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-tail." The +allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each +consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated +on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here +also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well +sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II. § 12, note.] In time of +war, one of the families had to serve in the army, while the other +seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men +(reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of +700,000 families would be affected.] + + +2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the +victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in +ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the +outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments, + +["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect +of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned +at this point.] + + +is the height of inhumanity. + +[Sun Tzŭ’s agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to +the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which +war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of +the enemy’s condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a +war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to +employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless +they are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false +economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, +when every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. +This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun +Tzŭ concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a +crime against humanity.] + + +3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his +sovereign, no master of victory. + +[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the +national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., +these memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch’u State: +"The [Chinese] character for ‘prowess’ is made up of [the characters +for] ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear’ (cessation of hostilities). Military +prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of +weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm +establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, +putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."] + + +4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike +and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is +_foreknowledge_. + +[That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means to +do.] + + +5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be +obtained inductively from experience, + +[Tu Mu’s note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by +reasoning from other analogous cases."] + + +nor by any deductive calculation. + +[Li Ch’uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and +magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human +actions cannot be so calculated."] + + +6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from +other men. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the +spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural +science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe +can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an +enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone."] + + +7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local +spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) +surviving spies. + +8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the +secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It +is the sovereign’s most precious faculty. + +[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry +leaders, had officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it was to +collect all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts +and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was traceable to the +previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves thus gained." [1] ] + + +9. Having _local spies_ means employing the services of the inhabitants +of a district. + +[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind +treatment, and use them as spies."] + + +10. Having _inward spies_, making use of officials of the enemy. + +[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in +this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals +who have undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy +for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or +who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are +anxious that their side should be defeated in order that they may have +a chance of displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who +always want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several +kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to one’s +interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able to +find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, ascertain the +plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the +harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." +The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward +spies," appears from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo +Shang, Governor of I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel +Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold at P’i. After each side had +experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse +to the services of a certain P’o-t’ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to +have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo +Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him from +inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right moment for +making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, march +out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head +with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’s bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung’s +general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; +and P’o-t’ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city +walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the +signal and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while +others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred +of Lo Shang’s soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom +was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces, +both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely." +[This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho Shih got the story +from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that of his +father Li T’e, _Chin Shu_, ch. 120, 121.] + + +11. Having _converted spies_, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and +using them for our own purposes. + +[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the +enemy’s service, and inducing them to carry back false information as +well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, +Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we pretend not to have detected him, but +contrive to let him carry away a false impression of what is going on. +Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative definition; +but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively proved by his +subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§ 21 +sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used +with conspicuous success: (1) by T’ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo +(see _supra_, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); +and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P’o was conducting a +defensive campaign against Ch’in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved +of Lien P’o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to +avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to +the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and +were already in Fan Chu’s pay. They said: "The only thing which causes +Ch’in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. Lien P’o they +consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in the long +run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao She. From his +boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war and military +matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no commander +in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much +disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he +spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if +ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of +Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own +mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed +Lien P’o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po +Ch’i and the great military power of Ch’in. He fell into a trap by +which his army was divided into two and his communications cut; and +after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished +soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and +his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put +to the sword.] + + +12. Having _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of +deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them +to the enemy. + +[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do +things calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe +that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are +captured in the enemy’s lines, they will make an entirely false report, +and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only to find that we do +something quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." +As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released +by Pan Ch’ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also +refers to T’ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T’ai Tsung to lull +the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was +able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang Yu says that the +Turks revenged themselves by killing T’ang Chien, but this is a +mistake, for we read in both the old and the New T’ang History (ch. 58, +fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on +until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when +sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch’i. He has +certainly more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of +Ch’i, being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and +infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the +unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.] + + +13. _Surviving spies_, finally, are those who bring back news from the +enemy’s camp. + +[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a +regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man +of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby +exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed +with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts +of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with shame +and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the following story of Ta’hsi Wu of the +Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of Eastern Ch’in, Shen-wu of Ch’i +made a hostile movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T’ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] +sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other +men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy’s uniform. When it +was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy’s camp +and stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching the +passwords used in the army. Then they got on their horses again and +boldly passed through the camp under the guise of night-watchmen; and +more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was committing +some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a +sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible +information about the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm +commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was +able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."] + + +14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate +relations to be maintained than with spies. + +[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch’en point out that the spy is privileged to enter +even the general’s private sleeping-tent.] + + +None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should +greater secrecy be preserved. + +[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be +carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted +from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any previous +commander: "Spies are attached to those who give them most, he who pays +them ill is never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor +should they know one another. When they propose anything very material, +secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives and +children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to +them but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. [2] ] + + +15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive +sagacity. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from +falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and +double-dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more +along the lines of "intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." +Tu Mu strangely refers these attributes to the spies themselves: +"Before using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity of +character and the extent of their experience and skill." But he +continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous +than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." +So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the +passage."] + + +16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and +straightforwardness. + +[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, +you must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for +you with all their might."] + + +17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the +truth of their reports. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies +going over to the service of the enemy."] + + +18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of +business. + +[Cf. VI. § 9.] + + +19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is +ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret +was told. + +[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard +before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzŭ’s main point in this +passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for +letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only, +as Ch’en Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any +further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would +not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzŭ lays himself open to the charge of +inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man +deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told +the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him."] + + +20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to +assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding +out the names of the attendants, the aides-de- camp, + +[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose +duty it is to keep the general supplied with information," which +naturally necessitates frequent interviews with him.] + + +the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must +be commissioned to ascertain these. + +[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these +important functionaries can be won over by bribery.] + + +21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, +tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will +become converted spies and available for our service. + +22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we +are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. + +[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy’s spies we learn the +enemy’s condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy +into our service, because it is he that knows which of the local +inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are open to +corruption."] + + +23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed +spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. + +[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best +be deceived."] + + +24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used +on appointed occasions. + +25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of +the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first +instance, from the converted spy. + +[As explained in §§ 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but +makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.] + + +Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost +liberality. + +26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty + +[Sun Tzŭ means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was +changed to Yin by P’an Keng in 1401. + + +was due to I Chih + +[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part +in Ch’eng T’ang’s campaign against Chieh Kuei.] + + +who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty +was due to Lü Ya + +[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he +afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T’ai Kung, a title +bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on +war, erroneously identified with the _Liu T’ao_.] + + +who had served under the Yin. + +[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to +introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are +by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly +doubt that Sun Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious +examples of the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His +suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the +intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcoming which these +former ministers were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch’en +appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin +and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. Hsia +could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could not +employ the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great achievements +were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant: "How +should two divinely inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common +spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of them simply means that the proper use of +the five classes of spies is a matter which requires men of the highest +mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them +for the task. The above words only emphasize this point." Ho Shih +believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their +supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] + + +27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who +will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying +and thereby they achieve great results. + +[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a +boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so +reliance on spies, while production of great results, is oft-times the +cause of utter destruction."] + + +Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an +army’s ability to move. + +[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man with ears or +eyes.] + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2. + +[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311. + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR *** + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the +United States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part +of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm +concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, +and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following +the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use +of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for +copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very +easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation +of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project +Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away--you may +do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected +by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark +license, especially commercial redistribution. + +START: FULL LICENSE + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full +Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at +www.gutenberg.org/license. + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or +destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your +possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a +Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound +by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the +person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph +1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this +agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the +Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection +of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual +works in the collection are in the public domain in the United +States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the +United States and you are located in the United States, we do not +claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, +displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as +all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope +that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting +free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm +works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the +Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily +comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the +same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when +you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are +in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, +check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this +agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, +distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any +other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no +representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any +country other than the United States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other +immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear +prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work +on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, +performed, viewed, copied or distributed: + + This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and + most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no + restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it + under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this + eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the + United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where + you are located before using this eBook. + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is +derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not +contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the +copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in +the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are +redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply +either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or +obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm +trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any +additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms +will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works +posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the +beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including +any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access +to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format +other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official +version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm website +(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense +to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means +of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain +Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the +full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +provided that: + +* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed + to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has + agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project + Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid + within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are + legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty + payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project + Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in + Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg + Literary Archive Foundation." + +* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all + copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue + all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm + works. + +* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of + any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of + receipt of the work. + +* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than +are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing +from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of +the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the Foundation as set +forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project +Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may +contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate +or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other +intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or +other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or +cannot be read by your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium +with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you +with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in +lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person +or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second +opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If +the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing +without further opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO +OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT +LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of +damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement +violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the +agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or +limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or +unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the +remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in +accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the +production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, +including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of +the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this +or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or +additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any +Defect you cause. + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of +computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It +exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations +from people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future +generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see +Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at +www.gutenberg.org + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by +U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, +Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up +to date contact information can be found at the Foundation's website +and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without +widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND +DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular +state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To +donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works + +Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project +Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be +freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and +distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of +volunteer support. + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in +the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not +necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper +edition. + +Most people start at our website which has the main PG search +facility: www.gutenberg.org + +This website includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + + diff --git a/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-0.zip b/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-0.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d45e18 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-0.zip diff --git a/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-h.zip b/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c58ba2 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-h.zip diff --git a/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-h/132-h.htm b/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-h/132-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..531f21e --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/old-2024-08-16/132-h/132-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,8916 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Art of War, by Sun Tzu</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + +body { margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%; + text-align: justify;} + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 175%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} +h3 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +hr {width: 80%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: 0.25em; + margin-bottom: 0.25em; } + +.p1 {margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + font-size: 90%;} + +.p2 {margin-top: 0em; + margin-bottom: 0em; + font-size: 90%;} + +.p3 {margin-top: 2em;} + +p.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: 90%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.noindent {text-indent: 0% } + +p.center {text-align: center; + text-indent: 0em; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> + +</head> + +<body> + +<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Art of War, by Sun Tzŭ</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: The Art of War</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Sun Tzŭ</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: Lionel Giles</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: May 1994 [eBook #132]<br /> +[Most recently updated: October 16, 2021]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR ***</div> + +<h1>Sun Tzŭ<br/> +on<br/> +The Art of War</h1> + +<h4>THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD</h4> +<h4>Translated from the Chinese with Introduction and Critical Notes</h4> + +<h5>BY</h5> + +<h3>LIONEL GILES, M.A.</h3> + +<p class="center"> +Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. +in the British Museum +</p> + +<p class="center"> +1910 +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p class="center"> +To my brother<br/> +Captain Valentine Giles, R.G.<br/> +in the hope that<br/> +a work 2400 years old<br/> +may yet contain lessons worth consideration<br/> +by the soldier of today<br/> +this translation<br/> +is affectionately dedicated. +</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto"> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref01">Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">Preface by Lionel Giles</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap03">Sun Wu and his Book</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap04">The Text of Sun Tzŭ</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap05">The Commentators</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap06">Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap07">Apologies for War</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap08">Bibliography</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap09">Chapter I. Laying plans</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap10">Chapter II. Waging War</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap11">Chapter III. Attack by Stratagem</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap12">Chapter IV. Tactical Dispositions</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap13">Chapter V. Energy</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap14">Chapter VI. Weak Points and Strong</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap15">Chapter VII Manœuvring</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap16">Chapter VIII. Variation of Tactics</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap17">Chapter IX. The Army on the March</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap18">Chapter X. Terrain</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap19">Chapter XI. The Nine Situations</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap20">Chapter XII. The Attack by Fire</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap21">Chapter XIII. The Use of Spies</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref01"></a>Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext</h2> + +<p> +When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i>, the +work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to Europe began in 1782 +when a French Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph Amiot, acquired a copy of +it, and translated it into French. It was not a good translation because, +according to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, +and very little indeed of what he did." +</p> + +<p> +The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by Capt. E. +F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words of Dr. Giles, +"excessively bad." He goes further in this criticism: "It is not merely a +question of downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly exempt. +Omissions were frequent; hard passages were willfully distorted or slurred +over. Such offenses are less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any +edition of a Latin or Greek classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to +be insisted upon in translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt. +Calthrop’s translation was published in London. It was an improvement on the +first—omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected—but new +errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his translation, +wrote: "It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; +but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a better fate than had +befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on +the work of my predecessors." +</p> + +<p> +Clearly, Dr. Giles’ work established much of the groundwork for the work of +later translators who published their own editions. Of the later editions of +the <i>Art of War</i> I have examined; two feature Giles’ edited translation +and notes, the other two present the same basic information from the ancient +Chinese commentators found in the Giles edition. Of these four, Giles’ 1910 +edition is the most scholarly and presents the reader an incredible amount of +information concerning Sun Tzŭ’s text, much more than any other translation. +</p> + +<p> +The Giles’ edition of the <i>Art of War</i>, as stated above, was a scholarly +work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time and an assistant in the +Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts in the British Museum. +Apparently he wanted to produce a definitive edition, superior to anything else +that existed and perhaps something that would become a standard translation. It +was the best translation available for 50 years. But apparently there was not +much interest in Sun Tzŭ in English-speaking countries since it took the start +of the Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several people published +unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzŭ. In 1944, Dr. Giles’ translation +was edited and published in the United States in a series of military science +books. But it wasn’t until 1963 that a good English translation (by Samuel B. +Griffith and still in print) was published that was an equal to Giles’ +translation. While this translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles’ translation, +it lacks his copious notes that make his so interesting. +</p> + +<p> +Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the Chinese +civilization and language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun Tzŭ, the English +translation, and voluminous notes along with numerous footnotes. Unfortunately, +some of his notes and footnotes contain Chinese characters; some are completely +Chinese. Thus, a conversion to a Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the +conversion in complete ignorance of Chinese (except for what I learned while +doing the conversion). Thus, I faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it +while retaining as much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase +represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the text as +possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, I was able to +transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the risk of making the text +more obscure. However, the text, on the whole, is quite satisfactory for the +casual reader, a transformation made possible by conversion to an etext. +However, I come away from this task with the feeling of loss because I know +that someone with a background in Chinese can do a better job than I did; any +such attempt would be welcomed. +</p> + +<p> +Bob Sutton +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>Preface by Lionel Giles</h2> + +<p> +The seventh volume of <i>Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, les +arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois</i> is devoted to the Art of +War, and contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles de +Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph Amiot. +Père Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a sinologue in his +day, and the field of his labours was certainly extensive. But his so-called +translation of the Sun Tzŭ, if placed side by side with the original, is seen +at once to be little better than an imposture. It contains a great deal that +Sun Tzŭ did not write, and very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair +specimen, taken from the opening sentences of chapter 5:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +<i>De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes.</i> Sun-tse dit : Ayez +les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que subalternes; inscrivez-les +dans un catalogue à part, avec la note des talents & de la capacité de +chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage lorsque +l’occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que vous devez +commander soient persuadés que votre principale attention est de les préserver +de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez avancer contre l’ennemi +doivent être comme des pierres que vous lanceriez contre des œufs. De vous à +l’ennemi il ne doit y avoir d’autre différence que celle du fort au +faible, du vide au plein. Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret. +Voilà en peu de mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute la +perfection même du gouvernement des troupes. +</p> + +<p> +Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development in the +study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun Tzŭ, although +his work was known to be highly valued in China as by far the oldest and best +compendium of military science. It was not until the year 1905 that the first +English translation, by Capt. E.F. Calthrop. R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under +the title “Sonshi”(the Japanese form of Sun Tzŭ). Unfortunately, it +was evident that the translator’s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty +to fit him to grapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzŭ. He himself +plainly acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the +accompanying translation would have been impossible.” We can only wonder, +then, that with their help it should have been so excessively bad. It is not +merely a question of downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly +exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages were wilfully distorted or +slurred over. Such offences are less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in +any edition of a Greek or Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty +ought to be insisted upon in translations from Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present translation +is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; +but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a better fate than had +befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on +the work of my predecessors. Towards the end of 1908, a new and revised edition +of Capt. Calthrop’s translation was published in London, this time, +however, without any allusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three +chapters were then already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms +of Capt. Calthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to his +earlier edition. This is on the whole an improvement on the other, thought +there still remains much that cannot pass muster. Some of the grosser blunders +have been rectified and lacunae filled up, but on the other hand a certain +number of new mistakes appear. The very first sentence of the introduction is +startlingly inaccurate; and later on, while mention is made of “an army +of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzŭ (who are these, by the way?), not a +word is vouchsafed about the Chinese commentators, who nevertheless, I venture +to assert, form a much more numerous and infinitely more important +“army.” +</p> + +<p> +A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In the first +place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in order to +facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of students generally. The +division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen’s edition; but I have +sometimes found it desirable to join two or more of his paragraphs into one. In +quoting from other works, Chinese writers seldom give more than the bare title +by way of reference, and the task of research is apt to be seriously hampered +in consequence. With a view to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzŭ is +concerned, I have also appended a complete concordance of Chinese characters, +following in this the admirable example of Legge, though an alphabetical +arrangement has been preferred to the distribution under radicals which he +adopted. Another feature borrowed from “The Chinese Classics” is +the printing of text, translation and notes on the same page; the notes, +however, are inserted, according to the Chinese method, immediately after the +passages to which they refer. From the mass of native commentary my aim has +been to extract the cream only, adding the Chinese text here and there when it +seemed to present points of literary interest. Though constituting in itself an +important branch of Chinese literature, very little commentary of this kind has +hitherto been made directly accessible by translation. +</p> + +<p> +I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my sheets as they +were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a final revision. On a +review of the whole, without modifying the substance of my criticisms, I might +have been inclined in a few instances to temper their asperity. Having chosen +to wield a bludgeon, however, I shall not cry out if in return I am visited +with more than a rap over the knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to +put a sword into the hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either +text or reference for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from +the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere translations,” +would not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome. For, after all, the worst +fate I shall have to dread is that which befell the ingenious paradoxes of +George in <i>The Vicar of Wakefield</i>. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<h2><a name="chap03"></a>Sun Wu and his Book</h2> + +<p> +Ssu-ma Ch’ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzŭ: [1]<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch’i State. His <i>Art of War</i> brought +him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him: +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +"I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of +managing soldiers to a slight test?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ replied: "You may." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180 +ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ divided them into two companies, and placed +one of the King’s favourite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them +all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: "I presume you know +the difference between front and back, right hand and left hand?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The girls replied: Yes. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight ahead. When I +say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. When I say "Right turn," +you must face towards your right hand. When I say "About turn," you must face +right round towards your back." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus explained, he +set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill. Then, to the +sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But the girls only burst out +laughing. Sun Tzŭ said: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if +orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left turn," +whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun Tzŭ: "If words +of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, +the general is to blame. But if his orders <i>are</i> clear, and the soldiers +nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. Now the +king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised pavilion; and when +he saw that his favourite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly +alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: "We are now quite +satisfied as to our general’s ability to handle troops. If we are bereft of +these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish +that they shall not be beheaded." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ replied: "Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be the +general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty which, acting +in that capacity, I am unable to accept." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed the +pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been done, the drum +was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went through all the +evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling +back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing +to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your +soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your +majesty’s inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may +desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As +for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot translate +them into deeds." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was +one who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the +west, he defeated the Ch’u State and forced his way into Ying, the +capital; to the north he put fear into the States of Ch’i and Chin, and +spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzŭ shared in the +might of the King. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has to tell us in +this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, Sun Pin, +born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death, and also the +outstanding military genius of his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun +Tzŭ, and in his preface we read: "Sun Tzŭ had his feet cut off and yet +continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It seems likely, then, that "Pin" was +a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless the story was invented +in order to account for the name. The crowning incident of his career, the +crushing defeat of his treacherous rival P’ang Chuan, will be found +briefly related in Chapter V. § 19, note. +</p> + +<p> +To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in two other passages of the +<i>Shih Chi:</i>— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the field +with Tzŭ-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P’ei, and attacked Ch’u. He +captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince’s sons who had formerly been +generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying [the capital]; but the +general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It is not yet possible. We must +wait"…. [After further successful fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], +King Ho Lu addressed Wu Tzŭ-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared +that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The +two men replied: "Ch’u’s general Tzŭ-ch’ang, [4] is grasping and +covetous, and the princes of T’ang and Ts’ai both have a grudge +against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win +over T’ang and Ts’ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed +this advice, [beat Ch’u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying.] +[5] +</p> + +<p> +This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He does not +appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects of a wound in +496. In another chapter there occurs this passage:[6] +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the other: +Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] in the service +of Ch’i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men developed and threw +light upon the principles of war. +</p> + +<p> +It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch’ien at least had no doubt about the +reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, to be +noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on the period in +question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as +the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu</i>, which is supposed to have been +written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution is somewhat +doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of little value, +based as it is on the <i>Shih Chi</i> and expanded with romantic details. The story of +Sun Tzŭ will be found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points +in it worth noting are: (1) Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu +Tzŭ-hsu. (2) He is called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired +life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability. +</p> + +<p> +The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzŭ: "When sovereign and ministers +show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ to encounter the +foe." Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast +upon it), we have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzŭ, for Huai-nan +Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many years before the <i>Shih Chi</i> was given to the world. +</p> + +<p> +Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzŭ at the head of 30,000 men +beat Ch’u with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined." +</p> + +<p> +Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun Wu’s +grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch’i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father Sun +P’ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch’i, and Sun Wu himself, +whose style was Ch’ang-ch’ing, fled to Wu on account of the +rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred of T’ien Pao. He had +three sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. +According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering +that Sun Pin’s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as +chronologically impossible. Whence these data were obtained by Teng Ming-shih I +do not know, but of course no reliance whatever can be placed in them. +</p> + +<p> +An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han period is +the short preface written by the Great Ts’ao Ts’ao, or Wei Wu Ti, +for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in full:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage. [10] +The <i>Lun Yu</i> says: “There must be a sufficiency of military +strength.” The <i>Shu Ching</i> mentions "the army" among the "eight +objects of government." The <i>I Ching</i> says: "‘army’ indicates firmness and +justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune." The <i>Shih Ching</i> +says: "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his troops." The +Yellow Emperor, T’ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears and +battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i> says: "If +one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may rightfully be slain." He +who relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies +solely on peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch’ai +[11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the other. [12] In military matters, the +Sage’s rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only when +occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work +composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzŭ was a native of the +Ch’i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the <i>Art of War</i> in +13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were tested on women, and he +was subsequently made a general. He led an army westwards, crushed the +Ch’u state and entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Ch’i +and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was +a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment of deliberation and planning, the +importance of rapidity in taking the field, [14] clearness of conception, and +depth of design, Sun Tzŭ stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My +contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his +instructions, and while putting into practice the smaller details in which his +work abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive +which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the 13 +chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported by the +internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some ruler is +addressed. +</p> + +<p> +In the bibliographic section of the <i>Han Shu</i>, there is an entry which has given +rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 <i>p’ien</i> (or +chapters), with diagrams in 9 <i>chuan</i>." It is evident that this cannot be merely +the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch’ien, or those we possess today. Chang +Shou-chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i> of which the "13 +chapters" formed the first <i>chuan</i>, adding that there were two other <i>chuan</i> +besides. This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters +consisted of other writings of Sun Tzŭ—we should call them +apocryphal—similar to the <i>Wen Ta</i>, of which a specimen dealing with the +Nine Situations [15] is preserved in the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, and another in Ho +Shin’s commentary. It is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun +Tzŭ had only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of +exegesis in the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pi +I-hsun, the author of the <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu</i>, backs this up with a quotation from +the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu:</i> "The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzŭ, and +asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth a chapter of +his work, the King could not find words enough to praise him." As he points +out, if the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the +above-mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail to be +considerable. Then the numerous other treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ might be +included. The fact that the <i>Han Chih</i> mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82 +<i>p’ien</i>, whereas the Sui and T’ang bibliographies give the titles of +others in addition to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that +all of these were contained in the 82 <i>p’ien</i>. Without pinning our faith to +the accuracy of details supplied by the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu</i>, or +admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, we may +see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between Ssu-ma +Ch’ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of +forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzŭ, and the 82 +<i>p’ien</i> may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped +together with the original work. It is also possible, though less likely, that +some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely +ignored by him. [16] +</p> + +<p> +Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu Ti +strung together Sun Wu’s <i>Art of War</i>," which in turn may have resulted from a +misunderstanding of the final words of Ts’ao King’s preface. This, as Sun +Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of saying that he made an +explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the +whole, this theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, the <i>Ssu K’u +Ch’uan Shu</i> says: "The mention of the 13 chapters in the <i>Shih Chi</i> shows +that they were in existence before the <i>Han Chih</i>, and that latter accretions are +not to be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can certainly +not be taken as proof." +</p> + +<p> +There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in the +time of Ssu-ma Ch’ien practically as we have them now. That the work was +then well known he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzŭ’s <i>13 Chapters</i> and Wu +Ch’i’s <i>Art of War</i> are the two books that people commonly refer to on the +subject of military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I will not +discuss them here." But as we go further back, serious difficulties begin to +arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is that the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, the +greatest contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as +a general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, +that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given +in the <i>Shih Chi</i>, but even show themselves frankly skeptical as to the existence +of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of this side of the case is to +be found in the following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17]—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native of the +Ch’i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he crushed +Ch’u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso’s Commentary no +Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s Commentary need not contain +absolutely everything that other histories contain. But Tso has not omitted to +mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K’ao-shu, +[18] Ts’ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of +Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much +more glaring. Again, details are given, in their due order, about his +contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P’ei. [21] Is it credible that +Sun Wu alone should have been passed over? +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same school as <i>Kuan +Tzŭ</i>, [22] <i>Liu T’ao</i>, [23] and the <i>Yüeh Yu</i> [24] and may have been the +production of some private scholar living towards the end of the "Spring and +Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" period. [25] The story that +his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of +big talk on the part of his followers. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time of the +"Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as well, and the +class of professional generals, for conducting external campaigns, did not then +exist. It was not until the period of the "Six States" [27] that this custom +changed. Now although Wu was an uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso +should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet +held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu [28] and Sun +Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing +pundits. The story of Ho Lu’s experiment on the women, in particular, is +utterly preposterous and incredible. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch’ien as having said that Sun Wu crushed +Ch’u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the impression +left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in these exploits. The +fact may or may not be significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the +<i>Shih Chi</i> either that Sun Tzŭ was general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, +or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po +P’ei both took part in the expedition, and also that its success was +largely due to the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it +is not easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent +part in the same campaign. +</p> + +<p> +Ch’en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the fact that +he does not appear in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, although he is said to have served under +Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to. +</p> + +<p> +He also says:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch’i may be of genuine antiquity. +</p> + +<p> +It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch’en Chen-sun, while +rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s +history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the work +which passes under his name. The author of the <i>Hsu Lu</i> fails to appreciate this +distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on Ch’en Chen-sun really +misses its mark. He makes one of two points, however, which certainly tell in +favour of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters." "Sun Tzŭ," he says, "must +have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519-476], because he is frequently +plagiarized in subsequent works of the Chou, Ch’in and Han dynasties." +The two most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Ch’i and Huai-nan +Tzŭ, both of them important historical personages in their day. The former +lived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is known +to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, that +Tseng Shen delivered the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, which had been entrusted to him by its +author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the <i>Art of War</i>, +acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of different +epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all,—in other words, +that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards the end of the 5th +century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzŭ’s antiquity is furnished by the archaic +or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the words he uses. A list +of these, which might perhaps be extended, is given in the <i>Hsu Lu;</i> and though +some of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected +thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar and +critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the 13 chapters +to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually +engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be +sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he +not honestly believed the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that +the judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal +evidence is not far to seek. Thus in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable +allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already passed away by +the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified form. [30] +The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that carried on between the various feudal +princes, in which armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have +entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, +a state which ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch +presently. +</p> + +<p> +But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances of its +being other than a <i>bonâ fide</i> production are sensibly diminished. The +great age of forgeries did not come until long after. That it should have been +forged in the period immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no +one, as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh +Shui-hsin’s theory, that the author was a literary recluse, that seems to me +quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent than another after reading the +maxims of Sun Tzŭ, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large +store of personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of +a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but also of a +practical soldier closely acquainted with the military conditions of his time. +To say nothing of the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed +by all the greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination of +freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite excludes the +idea that they were artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, +that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of a military man living +towards the end of the "<i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i>" period, are we not bound, in +spite of the silence of the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, to accept Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account +in its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not +hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu’s biography were +false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is +still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the chronology involved in the +story as told in the <i>Shih Chi</i>, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet +pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzŭ in which he alludes to +contemporary affairs. The first in in VI. § 21:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in number, +that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that +victory can be achieved. +</p> + +<p> +The other is in XI. § 30:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Asked if an army can be made to imitate the <i>shuai-jan</i>, I should answer, +Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; yet if they are +crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to +each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right. +</p> + +<p> +These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of +composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between Wu and +Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped +notice is that they also seriously impair the credibility of Ssu-ma +Ch’ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive date given +in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken of as a general, acting +as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his alleged introduction to that +monarch had already taken place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been +written earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to +the capture of Ying in 506, Ch’u and not Yüeh, was the great hereditary +enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch’u and Wu, had been constantly at war for +over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh was waged +only in 510, [32] and even then was no more than a short interlude sandwiched +in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch’u. Now Ch’u is not +mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were +written at a time when Yüeh had become the prime antagonist of Wu, that is, +after Ch’u had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a +table of dates may be found useful.<br/><br/> +</p> + +<table summary="" > + +<tr> <td>B.C.</td><td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>514</td><td>Accession of Ho Lu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>512</td><td>Ho Lu attacks Ch’u, but is dissuaded from entering +Ying,<br/> +the capital. <i>Shih Chi</i> mentions Sun Wu as general.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>511</td><td>Another attack on Ch’u.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>510</td><td>Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This is the +first<br/> +war between the two states.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>509 or 508</td><td>Ch’u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at +Yu-chang.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>506</td><td>Ho Lu attacks Ch’u with the aid of T’ang and +Ts’ai.<br/> +Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last<br/> +mention of Sun Wu in <i>Shih Chi</i>.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>505</td><td>Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. +Wu<br/> +is beaten by Ch’in and evacuates Ying.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>504</td><td>Ho Lu sends Fu Ch’ai to attack Ch’u.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>497</td><td>Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>496</td><td>Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at +Tsui-li.<br/> +Ho Lu is killed.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>494</td><td>Fu Ch’ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of +Fu-<br/> +chaio, and enters the capital of Yüeh.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>485 or 484</td><td>Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu +Tzŭ-hsu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>482</td><td>Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu +Ch’ai.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>478 to 476</td><td>Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>475</td><td>Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>473</td><td>Final defeat and extinction of Wu.</td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<p class="p3"> +The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that could +have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather to imply that, +for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, and that she was +getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was +not in existence in 505, before which date Yüeh does not appear to have scored +any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was +written for him, it must have been during the period 505-496, when there was a +lull in the hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort +against Ch’u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition +connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the light +between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482-473, when Yüeh was once +again becoming a very serious menace. [33] We may feel fairly certain that the +author, whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his +own day. On this point the negative testimony of the <i>Tso Chuan</i> far outweighs +any shred of authority still attaching to the <i>Shih Chi</i>, if once its other facts +are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the +omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu Tzŭ-hsu, he says, who +got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because the latter (being an alien) +was not rewarded with an office in the State. +</p> + +<p> +How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may be that the growing celebrity +of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It +was felt to be only right and proper that one so well versed in the science of +war should have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture of +Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep +and lasting impression on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the +short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, +than that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly +identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his +brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out by +him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po P’ei and Fu Kai? +</p> + +<p> +It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun Tzŭ’s +life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I +should say that he probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s +accession, and gathered experience, though only in the capacity of a +subordinate officer, during the intense military activity which marked the +first half of the prince’s reign. [35] If he rose to be a general at all, he +certainly was never on an equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was +doubtless present at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s +sudden collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical juncture, +when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced him that +this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort would +henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he +sat down to write his famous book, which according to my reckoning must have +appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning of Ho Lu’s reign. The story +of the women may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about +the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is +hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the +death-struggle with Yüeh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li. +</p> + +<p> +If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony in the +fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man of peace should be +contemporary with her greatest writer on war. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap04"></a>The Text of Sun Tzŭ</h2> + +<p> +I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s text. +The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the "13 chapters" of +which Ssu-ma Ch’ien speaks were essentially the same as those now extant. +We have his word for it that they were widely circulated in his day, and can +only regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account. Sun +Hsing-yen says in his preface:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +During the Ch’in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i> was in +general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated it as a +work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for the benefit of +posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary +on it. +</p> + +<p> +As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that +Ts’ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so +obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time onward so +great, especially during the T’ang and Sung dynasties, that it would be +surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep in. Towards the +middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief commentaries on Sun Tzŭ +were in existence, a certain Chi T’ien-pao published a work in 15 +<i>chuan</i> entitled "Sun Tzŭ with the collected commentaries of ten writers." +There was another text, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of +Ta-hsing, which also had supporters among the scholars of that period; but in +the Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason +or other no longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th +century, the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi +T’ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was +known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzŭ which appears +in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the +<i>Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng</i>. Another copy at my disposal of +what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that contained in +the "Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch’in dynasties" [1758]. And the +Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition is evidently a similar +version which has filtered through Japanese channels. So things remained until +Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, +who claimed to be an actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered +a copy of Chi T’ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library +of the Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the <i>I Shuo</i> of Cheng +Yu-Hsien, mentioned in the <i>T’ung Chih</i>, and also believed to have +perished. This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or +text)"—a rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set +before us the text of Sun Tzŭ in its pristine purity. Chi T’ien-pao was a +careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat +debased version current in his day, without troubling to collate it with the +earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzŭ, even +older than the newly discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the +<i>T’ung Tien</i>, Tu Yu’s great treatise on the Constitution, the other +similarly enshrined in the <i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i> encyclopedia. +In both the complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments, +intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of +different sections. Considering that the <i>Yu Lan</i> takes us back to the +year 983, and the <i>T’ung Tien</i> about 200 years further still, to the +middle of the T’ang dynasty, the value of these early transcripts of Sun +Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem +to have occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government +instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his own +account:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ which his editors had +handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient edition [of Chi +T’ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be revised and +corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and +Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to this study, +probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on +blocks as a textbook for military men. +</p> + +<p> +The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on the text +of Sun Tzŭ prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are left in doubt as to +the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when +ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one +co-editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original edition" as their basis, and by +careful comparison with older versions, as well as the extant commentaries and +other sources of information such as the <i>I Shuo</i>, succeeded in restoring a very +large number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be +accepted as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzŭ’s +original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard text." +</p> + +<p> +The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. It is in 6 <i>pen</i>, +forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 <i>pen</i>. +[38] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this +introduction), vindicating the traditional view of Sun Tzŭ’s life and +performances, and summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its +favour. This is followed by Ts’ao Kung’s preface to his edition, and the +biography of Sun Tzŭ from the <i>Shih Chi</i>, both translated above. Then come, +firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien’s <i>I Shuo</i>, [39] with author’s preface, and next, a short +miscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu +Lu</i>, compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate +sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by the +various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological order. These +we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap05"></a>The Commentators</h2> + +<p> +Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of commentators, +which would do honour to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks on this fact, though +he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by +saying that the artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be +susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways. +</p> + +<p> +1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti +[A.D. 155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest commentary +on Sun Tzŭ actually came from the pen of this extraordinary man, whose +biography in the <i>San Kuo Chih</i> reads like a romance. One of the greatest +military geniuses that the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his +operations, he was especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches, +which has found expression in the line "Talk of Ts’ao Ts’ao, and +Ts’ao Ts’ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a +great captain who "measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two +Yuan, father and son, and vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire +of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a +council of war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had +all his calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not lose +one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any particular saw their +armies incontinently beaten and put to flight." Ts’ao Kung’s notes on Sun +Tzŭ, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic of the stern +commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as the +work of a mere <i>littérateur</i>. Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme compression, +they are scarcely intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than +the text itself. [40] +</p> + +<p> +2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name is +comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even his personal +name has not been recorded. Chi T’ien-pao’s edition places him after Chia +Lin, and Ch’ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T’ang dynasty, [41] +but this is a mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he appears as Meng Shih of +the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would identify him with Meng K’ang of +the 3rd century. He is named in one work as the last of the "Five +Commentators," the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao and Chia Lin. +</p> + +<p> +3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military +tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the present day. The +<i>T’ung Chih</i> mentions "Lives of famous generals from the Chou to the +T’ang dynasty" as written by him. [42] According to Ch’ao Kung-wu +and the <i>T’ien-i-ko</i> catalogue, he followed a variant of the text of Sun +Tzŭ which differs considerably from those now extant. His notes are mostly +short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes +from Chinese history. +</p> + +<p> +4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ, his notes +being taken from the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, the encyclopedic treatise on the +Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely repetitions of +Ts’ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed that he drew on +the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar +arrangement of <i>T’ung Tien</i>, he has to explain each passage on its merits, +apart from the context, and sometimes his own explanation does not agree with +that of Ts’ao Kung, whom he always quotes first. Though not strictly to +be reckoned as one of the "Ten Commentators," he was added to their number by +Chi T’ien-pao, being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. +</p> + +<p> +5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star even +in the glorious galaxy of the T’ang period. We learn from Ch’ao +Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was extremely +fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read in the military +history of the <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> and <i>Chan Kuo</i> eras. His notes, therefore, +are well worth attention. They are very copious, and replete with historical +parallels. The gist of Sun Tzŭ’s work is thus summarized by him: "Practice +benevolence and justice, but on the other hand make full use of artifice and +measures of expediency." He further declared that all the military triumphs and +disasters of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Tzŭ’s death would, +upon examination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the +maxims contained in his book. Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful charge against +Ts’ao Kung has already been considered elsewhere. +</p> + +<p> +6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao +Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ because +Ts’ao Kung’s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and that of Tu +Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the +middle of the 11th century, calls Ts’ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch’en Hao +the three chief commentators on Sun Tzŭ, and observes that Ch’en Hao is +continually attacking Tu Mu’s shortcomings. His commentary, though not lacking +in merit, must rank below those of his predecessors. +</p> + +<p> +7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his +commentary on Sun Tzŭ is mentioned in the <i>T’ang Shu</i> and was afterwards +republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those of Meng Shih +and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in point of quality, too, +perhaps the least valuable of the eleven. +</p> + +<p> +8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei +Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was published +with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the +following:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and trying to make +them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though commentators have not +been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the task. My friend Sheng-yu has +not fallen into this mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary +for Sun Tzŭ’s work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were +intended for states engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not +concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the +three ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to +the Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his +meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling +soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it is +always systematically treated; the sayings are bound together in strict logical +sequence, though this has been obscured by commentators who have probably +failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed +aside all the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out +the true meaning of Sun Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion have +been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the present work +deserves to be handed down side by side with the three great commentaries; and +for a great deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations will have +constant reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu. +</p> + +<p> +Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined to +endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him above +Ch’en Hao in order of merit. +</p> + +<p> +9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of his +interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch’en, and on the +whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary +with that of Ts’ao Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to +him. We learn from Ch’ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text +of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes. [45] +</p> + +<p> +10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this commentator is +given as above by Cheng Ch’iao in the <i>Tung Chih</i>, written about the middle +of the twelfth century, but he appears simply as Ho Shih in the <i>Yu Hai</i>, and Ma +Tuan-lin quotes Ch’ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is +unknown. There seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch’iao’s statement, +otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with +one Ho Ch’u-fei, the author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the +latter part of the 11th century. Ho Shih’s commentary, in the words of the +<i>T’ien-i-ko</i> catalogue, "contains helpful additions" here and there, but is +chiefly remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the +dynastic histories and other sources. +</p> + +<p> +11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great originality +perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentator +is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to +expand and develop in masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say +that much of Ts’ao Kung’s commentary would have remained cloaked in its +pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the +Sung history, the <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, or the <i>Yu Hai</i>, but it finds a niche +in the <i>T’ung Chih</i>, which also names him as the author of the "Lives of +Famous Generals." [46] +</p> + +<p> +It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have flourished +within so short a space of time. Ch’ao Kung-wu accounts for it by saying: +"During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of +peace, and men ceased to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao’s +rebellion came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after +time, the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military +topics became the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the +commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that period. [47] +</p> + +<p> +Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work has not +come down to us. The <i>Sui Shu</i> mentions four, namely Wang Ling (often quoted by +Tu Yu as Wang Tzŭ); Chang Tzŭ-shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; [48] and Shen Yu of Wu. +The <i>T’ang Shu</i> adds Sun Hao, and the <i>T’ung Chih</i> Hsiao Chi, while the +<i>T’u Shu</i> mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that +some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other +commentaries, like Chi T’ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap06"></a>Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ</h2> + +<p> +Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of China’s +greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have studied his pages +with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (<i>d</i>. 196 B.C.), [49] Feng I (<i>d</i>. 34 +A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (<i>d</i>. 219), [51] and Yo Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of +Ts’ao Kung, who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese +military annals, has already been recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one +way, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of Su +Tung-p’o), who wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe +their chief inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is +preserved in the <i>Yu Hai:</i> [54]— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, [55] is +very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu Ch’i was a +man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and they are +linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu Ch’i’s remarks +on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and +there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the style is +terse, but the meaning fully brought out. +</p> + +<p> +The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the Garden of +Literature" by Cheng Hou:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military men’s +training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and men of +letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous +and eminently practical. Such works as the <i>Lun Yu</i>, the <i>I Ching</i> +and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsun +K’uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzŭ. +</p> + +<p> +Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism, +although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated classical +works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages a ruler’s bent towards +unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap07"></a>Apologies for War</h2> + +<p> +Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving nation on +earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her experience of war in all +its phases has also been such as no modern State can parallel. Her long +military annals stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of +time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army +along her frontier centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the +Danube. What with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the +grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of +government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of so many +dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have +flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that +the clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the +Empire. +</p> + +<p> +No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom China can +point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond of emerging at the +most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch’i stands out conspicuous +in the period when Ch’in was entering upon her final struggle with the +remaining independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up of +the Ch’in dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. +When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great and baleful +figure of Ts’ao Ts’ao dominates the scene. And in the establishment +of the T’ang dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the +superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T’ai Tsung) was +seconded by the brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need +fear comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe. +</p> + +<p> +In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ +downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of +Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to militarism +in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending +warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to collect and +translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following, +by Ssu-ma Ch’ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of Confucius, +he was yet no advocate of peace at any price:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and cruelty, +to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and dangers, and to +succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins and horns +on its head will fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who +carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger! When he +is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him; when angry, his +poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the natural law which governs his +being…. What then shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all +great issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who can only +bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilization," condemning the +use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to impotence and +dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, they +will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and general +enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to modify the position they have +taken up. The truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare +the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so military +chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one +can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by +others, and that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others +rebellious. [58] +</p> + +<p> +The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun +Tzŭ:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of government. +It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch’iu, both disciples of +Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the +imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market-place, +are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down +of fortified cities, the hauling of women and children into captivity, and the +beheading of traitors—this is also work which is done by officials. The +objects of the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is +no intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off +heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, +only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the use of military +weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is +to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good…. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired your military aptitude +by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been acquired by study." +[59] "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a disciple of +Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by Confucius. It is +fitting that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military functions, +though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very +far." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" and the +"military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or in +what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say. +But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the governing class are +quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced +manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set +down as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an +extraordinary instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily +lose sight of fundamental principles. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch’eng Wang, he regulated +ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and learning; +yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60] he sallied forth and +chastised them. When Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting +was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If pacific negotiations are in +progress, warlike preparations should have been made beforehand." He rebuked +and shamed the Marquis of Ch’i, who cowered under him and dared not +proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great Sages had no +knowledge of military matters? +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He also +appeals to the authority of the Classics:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never studied +matters connected with armies and battalions." [62] Replying to K’ung +Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and weapons." But +if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he used armed force against +the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch’i was overawed. Again, when the +inhabitants of Pi revolted; he ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon +they were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered the words: "If I +fight, I conquer." [63] And Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil +and military functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or +received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not +specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the subject +of his teaching. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He also said: "If I +fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated music. Now war +constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, [66] and must not be +treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the words "I am unversed in" +must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired Teacher does +not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the +art of war. But if one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, +who was employed by Wu Tzŭ-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the +remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of +Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on the art of +war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they adduce the example of +Chao Kua, who pored over his father’s books to no purpose, [67] as a proof that +all military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have to do with +such things as opportunism in designing plans, and the conversion of spies, +they hold that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore +the fact that the studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our +officials also require steady application and practice before efficiency is +reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to botch +their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting perilous; and useless +unless a general is in constant practice, he ought not to hazard other men’s +lives in battle. [70] Hence it is essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should +be studied. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of war. Chi got a +rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not pursue his studies +to their proper outcome, the consequence being that he was finally defeated and +overthrown. He did not realize that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond +verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to +destruction by their misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature +of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. +There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted +oath, [72] and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. [73] Can we +then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding truth and honesty? +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap08"></a>Bibliography</h2> + +<p> +The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ. The notes +on each have been drawn principally from the <i>Ssu k’u ch’uan shu +chien ming mu lu</i>, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. +</p> + +<p> +1. <i>Wu Tzŭ</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i> or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (<i>d</i>. 381 B.C.). A genuine +work. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 65. +</p> + +<p> +2. <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i> or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to Ssu-ma Jang-chu +of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early, as the customs of the +three ancient dynasties are constantly to be met within its pages. See <i>Shih +Chi</i>, ch. 64. +</p> + +<p> +The <i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu</i> (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three +treatises on war, <i>Sun Tzŭ</i>, <i>Wu Tzŭ</i> and <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i>, are, generally speaking, only +concerned with things strictly military—the art of producing, collecting, +training and drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures of +expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the handling of +soldiers—in strong contrast to later works, in which the science of war +is usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in general. +</p> + +<p> +3. <i>Liu T’ao</i>, in 6 <i>chuan</i>, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or Lu +Shang, also known as T’ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C. [74] But its +style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-ming (550-625 +A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the six sections so +that the forgery cannot have been later than Sui dynasty. +</p> + +<p> +4. <i>Wei Liao Tzŭ</i>, in 5 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. B.C.), who +studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The work appears to have been originally +in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is +sound enough in the main, though the strategical devices differ considerably +from those of the Warring States period. It is been furnished with a commentary +by the well-known Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. +</p> + +<p> +5. <i>San Lueh</i> in 3 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage +who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (<i>d</i>. 187 B.C.) in an interview on +a bridge. But here again, the style is not that of works dating from the +Ch’in or Han period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently +quotes from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question may +have been inserted later on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We +shall not be far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], +or somewhat earlier. +</p> + +<p> +6. <i>Li Wei Kung Wen Tui</i>, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a dialogue +between T’ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is usually ascribed +to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a forgery, though the author +was evidently well versed in the art of war. +</p> + +<p> +7. <i>Li Ching Ping Fa</i> (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a short +treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the T’ung Tien, but not published +separately. This fact explains its omission from the <i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan +Shu</i>. +</p> + +<p> +8. <i>Wu Ch’i Ching</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to the legendary minister Feng +Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty (<i>d</i>. 121 B.C.), +and said to have been eulogized by the celebrated general Ma Lung (<i>d</i>. 300 +A.D.). Yet the earliest mention of it is in the <i>Sung Chih</i>. Although a forgery, +the work is well put together. +</p> + +<p> +Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has always been +held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on war ascribed to his +pen. Such are (1) the <i>Shih Liu Ts’e</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>), preserved in the <i>Yung Lo +Ta Tien;</i> (2) <i>Chiang Yuan</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>); and (3) <i>Hsin Shu</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>), which steals +wholesale from Sun Tzŭ. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered +genuine. +</p> + +<p> +Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections devoted to +the literature of war. The following references may be found useful:— +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +<i>T’ung Tien</i> (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162.<br/> +<i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i> (983), ch. 270-359.<br/> +<i>Wen Hsien Tung K’ao</i> (13th cent.), ch. 221.<br/> +<i>Yu Hai</i> (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.<br/> +<i>San Ts’ai T’u Hui</i> (16th cent).<br/> +<i>Kuang Po Wu Chih</i> (1607), ch. 31, 32.<br/> +<i>Ch’ien Ch’io Lei Shu</i> (1632), ch. 75.<br/> +<i>Yuan Chien Lei Han</i> (1710), ch. 206-229.<br/> +<i>Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng</i> (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. +81-90.<br/> +<i>Hsu Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao</i> (1784), ch. 121-134.<br/> +<i>Huang Ch’ao Ching Shih Wen Pien</i> (1826), ch. 76, 77.<br/></p> + +<p> +The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve +mention:— +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +<i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 30.<br/> +<i>Sui Shu</i>, ch. 32-35.<br/> +<i>Chiu T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 46, 47.<br/> +<i>Hsin T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 57,60.<br/> +<i>Sung Shih</i>, ch. 202-209.<br/> +<i>T’ung Chih</i> (circa 1150), ch. 68.<br/></p> + +<p> +To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial +Library:— +</p> + +<p> +<i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu Tsung Mu T’i Yao</i> (1790), ch. 99, 100. +</p> + +<h2>Footnotes</h2> + +<p> +1. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 65. +</p> + +<p> +2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +3. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 130. +</p> + +<p> +4. The appellation of Nang Wa. +</p> + +<p> +5. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 31. +</p> + +<p> +6. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 25. +</p> + +<p> +7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year 637. +</p> + +<p> +8. Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. +</p> + +<p> +9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the Han +dynasty, which says: "Ten <i>li</i> outside the <i>Wu</i> gate [of the city of +Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to commemorate the +entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch’i, who excelled in the art of war, by the +King of Wu." +</p> + +<p> +10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to make +arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe." +</p> + +<p> +11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and overthrown by +Kou chien, King of Yüeh, in 473 B.C. See post. +</p> + +<p> +12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in his +preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction." +</p> + +<p> +13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the <i>T’u Shu</i>, and may +be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang Shou-chieh of the +T’ang dynasty, and appears in the <i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i>. +</p> + +<p> +14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, +perhaps especially of § 8. +</p> + +<p> +15. See chap. XI. +</p> + +<p> +16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that <i>Wu Tzŭ</i>, which is not in 6 +chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the <i>Han Chih</i>. Likewise, the <i>Chung Yung</i> is +credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one only. In the case of very +short works, one is tempted to think that <i>p’ien</i> might simply mean +"leaves." +</p> + +<p> +17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. +</p> + +<p> +18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. +</p> + +<p> +19. See Chapter 7, § 27 and Chapter 11, § 28. +</p> + +<p> +20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his name. +</p> + +<p> +21. I.e. Po P’ei. See ante. +</p> + +<p> +22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large additions have +been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. +</p> + +<p> +24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of another +work. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not clear. +</p> + +<p> +25. About 480 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. +</p> + +<p> +27. In the 3rd century B.C. +</p> + +<p> +28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter +half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have written a work on +war. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of the INTRODUCTION. +</p> + +<p> +29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that the +<i>Tso Chuan</i> must have been written in the 5th century, but not before 424 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +30. See <i>Mencius</i> III. 1. iii. 13-20. +</p> + +<p> +31. When Wu first appears in the <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> in 584, it is already +at variance with its powerful neighbour. The <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> first +mentions Yüeh in 537, the <i>Tso Chuan</i> in 601. +</p> + +<p> +32. This is explicitly stated in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, XXXII, 2. +</p> + +<p> +33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would tend to +grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully justify the language +used in XI. § 30. +</p> + +<p> +34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious +treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great general. +Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, +cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century. +</p> + +<p> +35. From <i>Tso Chuan:</i> "From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] there was no +year in which Ch’u was not attacked by Wu." +</p> + +<p> +36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really descended +from Sun Tzŭ. I am ashamed to say that I only read my ancestor’s work from a +literary point of view, without comprehending the military technique. So long +have we been enjoying the blessings of peace!" +</p> + +<p> +37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of +Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the ascent of +the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as being "situated five +<i>li</i> east of the district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the +Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the T’ang Emperor Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." +</p> + +<p> +38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40. +</p> + +<p> +39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzŭ. +</p> + +<p> +40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His commentary is +frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not fully develop the +meaning." +</p> + +<p> +41. <i>Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao</i>, ch. 221. +</p> + +<p> +42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered chapters +1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand Buddhas." See +B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. 525. +</p> + +<p> +43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was nominally +existent in Sun Tzŭ’s day, it retained hardly a vestige of power, and the old +military organization had practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other +explanation of the passage. +</p> + +<p> +44. See <i>Chou Li</i>, xxix. 6-10. +</p> + +<p> +45. <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, ch. 221. +</p> + +<p> +46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s "Notes," p. 91 (new edition). +</p> + +<p> +47. <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, loc. cit. +</p> + +<p> +48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the <i>San Kuo Chih</i>, +ch. 10. +</p> + +<p> +49. See XI. § 58, note. +</p> + +<p> +50. <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 17 ad init. +</p> + +<p> +51. <i>San Kuo Chih</i>, ch. 54. +</p> + +<p> +52. <i>Sung Shih</i>, ch. 365 ad init. +</p> + +<p> +53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting themselves +with Sun Tzŭ are not behindhand in their praise. In this connection, I may +perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the +sheets of the present work were submitted previous to publication: "Many of Sun +Wu’s maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and no. 11 [in Chapter +VIII] is one that the people of this country would do well to take to heart." +</p> + +<p> +54. Ch. 140. +</p> + +<p> +55. See IV. § 3. +</p> + +<p> +56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. +</p> + +<p> +57. The <i>Tso Chuan</i>. +</p> + +<p> +58. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 25, fol. I. +</p> + +<p> +59. Cf. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch 47. +</p> + +<p> +60. See <i>Shu Ching</i>, preface § 55. +</p> + +<p> +61. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 47. +</p> + +<p> +62. <i>Lun Yu</i>, XV. 1. +</p> + +<p> +63. I failed to trace this utterance. +</p> + +<p> +64. Supra. +</p> + +<p> +65. Supra. +</p> + +<p> +66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, and +festive rites. See <i>Shu Ching</i>, ii. 1. III. 8, and <i>Chou Li</i>, IX. fol. 49. +</p> + +<p> +67. See XIII. § 11, note. +</p> + +<p> +68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, where Tzŭ-ch’an +says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere +learner to make it up." +</p> + +<p> +69. Cf. <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 31. +</p> + +<p> +70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See <i>Lun Yu</i>, XIII. 29, 30. +</p> + +<p> +71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. +</p> + +<p> +72. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 47. +</p> + +<p> +73. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 38. +</p> + +<p> +74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in +the <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a former +minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there given, according to +which he would appear to have been first raised from a humble private station +by Wen Wang. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap09"></a>Chapter I. LAYING PLANS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of this +chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the +general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. See. § 26.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. +</p> + +<p> +2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence +it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. +</p> + +<p> +3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into +account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions +obtaining in the field. +</p> + +<p> +4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) +Method and discipline. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by "Moral Law" a principle of +harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral aspect. One might be +tempted to render it by "morale," were it not considered as an attribute of the +<i>ruler</i> in § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +5, 6. <i>The Moral Law</i> causes the people to be in complete accord with their +ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by +any danger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the officers will +be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, +the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] +</p> + +<p> +7. <i>Heaven</i> signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words here. Meng +Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi, +however, may be right in saying that what is meant is "the general economy of +Heaven," including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and +other phenomena.] +</p> + +<p> +8. <i>Earth</i> comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground +and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. +</p> + +<p> +9. <i>The Commander</i> stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, +courage and strictness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or benevolence; (2) +uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control, or "proper feeling;" (4) +wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put +before "humanity or benevolence," and the two military virtues of "courage" and +"strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self-respect, +self-control, or ‘proper feeling.’"] +</p> + +<p> +10. By <i>Method and discipline</i> are to be understood the marshalling of the +army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, +the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control +of military expenditure. +</p> + +<p> +11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them +will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. +</p> + +<p> +12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military +conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:— +</p> + +<p> +13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?<br/> +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.]<br/> +</p> + +<p> + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability?<br/> + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See §§ 7, 8] +</p> + +<p> +(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D. +155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with +his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned +himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn! +However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of +justice by cutting off his hair. Ts’ao Ts’ao’s own comment on the +present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a law, see that +it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must be put to death."] +</p> + +<p> +(5) Which army is the stronger? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch’en puts it, freely +rendered, "<i>esprit de corps</i> and ‘big battalions.’"] +</p> + +<p> +(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the officers will +be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, +the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] +</p> + +<p> +(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly +rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] +</p> + +<p> +14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. +</p> + +<p> +15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will +conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens +not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be +dismissed! +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was composed +expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu State.] +</p> + +<p> +16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful +circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. +</p> + +<p> +17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s plans. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric." He +cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; "for," as Chang +Yu puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for +the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy +in attempting to secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of +the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke +of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the +morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself +Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. +The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first +tomorrow—I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well," +continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and +as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine +are?" [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +18. All warfare is based on deception. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier. +Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many military qualities, +was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he +concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."] +</p> + +<p> +19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we +must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far +away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. +</p> + +<p> +20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder, crush him." +It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating the uses of +deception in war.] +</p> + +<p> +21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior +strength, evade him. +</p> + +<p> +22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be +weak, that he may grow arrogant. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his +adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, +and then suddenly pouncing upon him.] +</p> + +<p> +23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch’en has the note: "while +we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The <i>Yu Lan</i> has +"Lure him on and tire him out."] +</p> + +<p> +If his forces are united, separate them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the commentators: "If +sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. +</p> + +<p> +25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged +beforehand. +</p> + +<p> +26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere +the battle is fought. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be +set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order +that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] +</p> + +<p> +The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do +many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much +more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee +who is likely to win or lose. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap10"></a>Chapter II. WAGING WAR</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the +cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is +not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of +ways and means.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a +thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand +mail-clad soldiers, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used for +the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed for purposes of +defence. Li Ch’uan, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this +seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note the analogies between early +Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot +was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped +a certain number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we +are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each +heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a +thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.] +</p> + +<p> +with provisions enough to carry them a thousand <i>li</i>, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[2.78 modern <i>li</i> go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since +Sun Tzŭ’s time.] +</p> + +<p> +the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, +small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will +reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of +raising an army of 100,000 men. +</p> + +<p> +2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s +weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If you lay siege to a +town, you will exhaust your strength. +</p> + +<p> +3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be +equal to the strain. +</p> + +<p> +4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength +exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take +advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert +the consequences that must ensue. +</p> + +<p> +5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been +seen associated with long delays. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the +commentators. Ts’ao Kung, Li Ch’uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and +Mei Yao-ch’en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally +stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: +"Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and +treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in +their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: "Lengthy operations +mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and +distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of +such calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid +haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, +except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than +ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much more +guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can +never be anything but foolish—if only because it means impoverishment to +the nation. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzŭ, the classic +example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That general +deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibals’s +isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to +suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot +question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. +Their reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative +presumption in their favour.] +</p> + +<p> +6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. +</p> + +<p> +7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can +thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long +war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. +Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, but it fits well into +the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know the +evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly pointless.] +</p> + +<p> +8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his +supply-waggons loaded more than twice. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for +reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but +crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy +to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon +Bonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a little ahead of your +opponent—has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the +nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.] +</p> + +<p> +9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the +army will have food enough for its needs. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means "things to +be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all the impedimenta of +an army, apart from provisions.] +</p> + +<p> +10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by +contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance +causes the people to be impoverished. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though +obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I +cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to +Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense, and we +get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sun Tzŭ used to indicate the +cause of the people’s impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by +which the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But +why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because the +State or Government is too poor to do so?] +</p> + +<p> +11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and +high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own territory. +Ts’ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the +frontier.] +</p> + +<p> +12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by +heavy exactions. +</p> + +<p> +13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of +the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be +dissipated; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, but of +7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from our text. Ho +Shih has a characteristic tag: "The <i>people</i> being regarded as the essential part +of the State, and <i>food</i> as the people’s heaven, is it not right that those in +authority should value and be careful of both?"] +</p> + +<p> +while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates +and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, +draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. +</p> + +<p> +15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload +of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a +single <i>picul</i> of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one +cartload to the front. A <i>picul</i> is a unit of measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 +kilograms).] +</p> + +<p> +16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there +may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the +advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, +they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to +fight, each on his own account."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, +those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be +substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in +conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. +</p> + +<p> +18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength. +</p> + +<p> +19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzŭ here +reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce."] +</p> + +<p> +20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the +people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace +or in peril. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap11"></a>Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take +the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. +So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to +capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally +of 12500 men; according to Ts’ao Kung, the equivalent of a regiment +contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists from any number +between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 +men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 +respectively.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; +supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without +fighting. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old Chinese +general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge French army at +Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.] +</p> + +<p> +3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of the +Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might be +content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but an active policy +of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the enemy +has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delivering our +own attack first."] +</p> + +<p> +the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in speaking of +hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or principalities into +which the China of his day was split up.] +</p> + +<p> +the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[When he is already at full strength.] +</p> + +<p> +and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. +</p> + +<p> +4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in 1899, +and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or +even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would have been masters of +the situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose them.] +</p> + +<p> +The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, +will take up three whole months; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as "mantlets", +described. Ts’ao Kung simply defines them as "large shields," but we get +a better idea of them from Li Ch’uan, who says they were to protect the +heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems +to suggest a sort of Roman <i>testudo</i>, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled +vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch’en Hao. See +<i>supra</i> II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the +"movable shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. +They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from +within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of +men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat +with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden donkeys."] +</p> + +<p> +and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the +enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, and also to +destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note.] +</p> + +<p> +5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the +assault like swarming ants, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This vivid simile of Ts’ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army +of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at +the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his +engines of war are ready.] +</p> + +<p> +with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still +remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port Arthur, in +the most recent siege which history has to record.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any +fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows +their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no harm to +individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to +the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother of the people."] +</p> + +<p> +7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, +without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of the +sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, the weapon not +being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."] +</p> + +<p> +This is the method of attacking by stratagem. +</p> + +<p> +8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround +him; if five to one, to attack him; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] +</p> + +<p> +if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears to +violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however, gives a clue to +Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: "Being two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our +army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu +thus further elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as numerous as that +of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy +in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, +he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in +front." This is what is meant by saying that ‘one part may be used in the +regular way, and the other for some special diversion.’ Tu Mu does not +understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as +concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty in +calling this a mistake."] +</p> + +<p> +9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If +attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able general +will fight."] +</p> + +<p> +if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The meaning, "we can <i>watch</i> the enemy," is certainly a great improvement +on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for +the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying only applies if the other +factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more than +counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.] +</p> + +<p> +if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. +</p> + +<p> +10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end +it must be captured by the larger force. +</p> + +<p> +11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at +all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State +will be weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Li Ch’uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the +general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his +profession), his army will lack strength."] +</p> + +<p> +12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his +army:— +</p> + +<p> +13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the +fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a +thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally think of +"the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the +movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand just the +reverse, and quote the saying of T’ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be +governed from without, and army should not be directed from within." Of course +it is true that, during an engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy, +the general should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance +apart. Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and +give wrong orders.] +</p> + +<p> +14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a +kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes +restlessness in the soldier’s minds. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the +civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid gloves." And +Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern a +state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are +military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of an +army"—to that of a State, understood.] +</p> + +<p> +15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.] +</p> + +<p> +through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. +This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I follow Mei Yao-ch’en here. The other commentators refer not to the +ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu says: "If a +general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted +with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skilful employer of men will +employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the stupid man. For +the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show +his courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the +stupid man has no fear of death."] +</p> + +<p> +16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from +the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and +flinging victory away. +</p> + +<p> +17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will +win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he +cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invariably +conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the defensive.] +</p> + +<p> +(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers correctly, as Li +Ch’uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the saying more +satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force +to defeat a greater, and <i>vice versa</i>. The secret lies in an eye for locality, +and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior +force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult +ground.’"] +</p> + +<p> +(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its +ranks. +</p> + +<p> +(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. +</p> + +<p> +(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the +sovereign. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "It is the sovereign’s function to give broad +instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of the general." It is +needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue +interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government. +Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he +was not hampered by central authority.] +</p> + +<p> +Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of +victory.”] +</p> + +<p> +18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not +fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, +for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch’in, who in 383 +A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to +despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An and +Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight +provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, +they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into +the stream. What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were soon +after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty +retreat.] +</p> + +<p> +If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing +yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret +of defence; defence is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a +better epitome of the root-principle of war.] +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap12"></a>Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of +this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two armies with +a view to discovering each other’s condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the +dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your +dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory; +show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads to +defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can "secure success by +modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the +possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the +enemy. +</p> + +<p> +2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the +opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.] +</p> + +<p> +3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his troops, +covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."] +</p> + +<p> +but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +4. Hence the saying: One may <i>know</i> how to conquer without being able to +<i>do</i> it. +</p> + +<p> +5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the +enemy means taking the offensive. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in §§ 1-3, in spite of the fact +that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they give, "He who cannot +conquer takes the defensive," is plausible enough.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a +superabundance of strength. +</p> + +<p> +7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of +the earth; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor indicating the +utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know his +whereabouts."] +</p> + +<p> +he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunderbolt, +against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion of most of the +commentators.] +</p> + +<p> +Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a +victory that is complete. +</p> + +<p> +8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the +acme of excellence. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Ts’ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has +germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch’uan +alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior +army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of Ch’eng-an, +said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and +shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words seriously, and +gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the +details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture +the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] +</p> + +<p> +9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole +Empire says, "Well done!" +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move +surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his schemes, so that +at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzŭ reserves +his approbation for things that +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"the world’s coarse thumb<br/> +And finger fail to plumb." +</p> + +<p> +10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Autumn hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, +when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese +writers.] +</p> + +<p> +to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is +no sign of a quick ear. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing: Wu +Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, who at a distance of a +hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih +K’uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.] +</p> + +<p> +11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but +excels in winning with ease. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering." +Mei Yao-ch’en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with +difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease."] +</p> + +<p> +12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for +courage. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained over +circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large knows nothing of +them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state +submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for +courage."] +</p> + +<p> +13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile +attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One who seeks +to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched +battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look +into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never +make a blunder and therefore invariably win."] +</p> + +<p> +Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means +conquering an enemy that is already defeated. +</p> + +<p> +14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat +impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not be +confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the +arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the +safety of his army.] +</p> + +<p> +15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after +the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and +afterwards looks for victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which will +ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with +stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be +assured."] +</p> + +<p> +16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to +method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. +</p> + +<p> +17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, +Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; +fifthly, Victory. +</p> + +<p> +18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to +Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to +Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese. The +first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable us to +form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to make calculations based on the +data thus obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or comparison of +the enemy’s chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then victory +ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third term, which in the Chinese some +commentators take as a calculation of <i>numbers</i>, thereby making it nearly +synonymous with the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of +as a consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition, while the +third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu +says: "The question of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the +varied resources of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, +but weakens it. However, it points to the third term as being a calculation of +numbers.] +</p> + +<p> +19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in +the scale against a single grain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "a victorious army is like an <i>i</i> (20 oz.) weighed against a <i>shu</i> +(1/24 oz.); a routed army is a <i>shu</i> weighed against an <i>i</i>." The point is simply +the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has +over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, +makes the <i>i</i> to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it +equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch’uan of the T’ang dynasty here gives +the same figure as Chu Hsi.] +</p> + +<p> +20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters +into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap13"></a>Chapter V. ENERGY</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the +control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate +officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s famous reply to the +first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large an army do you think I +could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the +Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more the better."] +</p> + +<p> +2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from +fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and +signals. +</p> + +<p> +3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack +and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct and indirect. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzŭ’s treatise, the +discussion of the <i>cheng</i> and the <i>ch’i</i>." As it is by no means +easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them +consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of +the commentators’ remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li +Ch’uan: "Facing the enemy is <i>cheng</i>, making lateral diversion is +<i>ch’i</i>. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your troops should be +arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal manœuvers +must be employed." Mei Yao-ch’en: "<i>Ch’i</i> is active, +<i>cheng</i> is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity +brings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy to regard our +straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus +<i>cheng</i> may also be <i>ch’i</i>, and <i>ch’i</i> may also be +<i>cheng</i>." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching +ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large +force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his +opponent. [Ch’ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, the march on +Lin-chin was <i>cheng</i>, and the surprise manœuver was <i>ch’i</i>." +Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: "Military +writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of <i>ch’i</i> and +<i>cheng</i>. Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: ‘Direct warfare favours +frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts’ao Kung +says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on +the enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuver.’ Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] +says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is <i>cheng</i>; turning movements, on +the other hand, are <i>ch’i</i>.’ These writers simply regard +<i>cheng</i> as <i>cheng</i>, and <i>ch’i</i> as <i>ch’i</i>; they +do not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other +like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment on the T’ang +Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A <i>ch’i</i> +manœuver may be <i>cheng</i>, if we make the enemy look upon it as +<i>cheng</i>; then our real attack will be <i>ch’i</i>, and vice versa. +The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real +intent.’" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other +operation is <i>cheng</i>, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; +whereas that is <i>ch’i</i>," which takes him by surprise or comes from +an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be +<i>ch’i</i>," it immediately becomes <i>cheng</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an +egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. +</p> + +<p> +5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but +indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the +enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of "indirect +tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march +round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. [1] +</p> + +<p> +6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and Earth, +unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but +to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of <i>ch’i</i> +and <i>cheng</i>. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of <i>cheng</i> at +all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating to +it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed out, the +two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot +really be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in figurative +language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.] +</p> + +<p> +7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these +five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. +</p> + +<p> +8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, white, and +black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen. +</p> + +<p> +9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, +bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted. +</p> + +<p> +10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct +and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series +of manœuvers. +</p> + +<p> +11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like +moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the +possibilities of their combination? +</p> + +<p> +12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll +stones along in its course. +</p> + +<p> +13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which +enables it to strike and destroy its victim. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is used +defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word as "the +measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the +illustrative simile in §. 15. Applying this definition to the falcon, it seems +to me to denote that instinct of <i>self-restraint</i> which keeps the bird +from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together with the power of +judging when the right moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is +the highly important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very +instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went into action +at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several minutes +exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun. Nelson +coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside he brought to +bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy’s nearest ships.] +</p> + +<p> +14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his +decision. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of distance +mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking. But I cannot help +thinking that Sun Tzŭ meant to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to +our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. Wang Hsi’s note, which after describing +the falcon’s mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just how the ‘psychological +moment’ should be seized in war."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the +releasing of the trigger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of energy +and the force stored up in the bent cross-bow until released by the finger on +the trigger.] +</p> + +<p> +16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and +yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be +without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been previously +fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the +dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle, may +give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your +formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and +yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates +courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone down +the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts’ao Kung throws out a +hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to destroy +formation and conceal one’s condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite +plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you +must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display timidity in order to +entrap the enemy, you must have extreme courage; if you wish to parade your +weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding +strength."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of +subdivision; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 1.] +</p> + +<p> +concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent +energy; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here differently +than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: "seeing that we are +favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the enemy will believe that we +are really afraid."] +</p> + +<p> +masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han Emperor: +“Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on their +condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed all their +able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and +emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one and all recommended +the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone opposed them, saying: +‘When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make an +ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old +age and infirmity. This is surely some <i>ruse</i> on the part of the enemy, and it +would be unwise for us to attack.’ The Emperor, however, disregarding +this advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at +Po-teng.”] +</p> + +<p> +19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains +deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu says: +"If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may be simulated +in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led to believe that we are +strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy’s movements +should be determined by the signs that we choose to give him." Note the +following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the +Ch’i State being at war with Wei, sent T’ien Chi and Sun Pin +against the general P’ang Chuan, who happened to be a deadly personal +enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The Ch’i State has a reputation for +cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us. Let us turn this +circumstance to account." Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border +into Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night, +50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. P’ang Chuan pursued +them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these men of Ch’i were cowards: +their numbers have already fallen away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun +Pin came to a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach +after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the +words: "Under this tree shall P’ang Chuan die." Then, as night began to +fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to +shoot directly if they saw a light. Later on, P’ang Chuan arrived at the +spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written +on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his whole +army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu’s version of the story; the +<i>Shih Chi</i>, less dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes +P’ang Chuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the +rout of his army.] ] +</p> + +<p> +He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. +</p> + +<p> +20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked +men he lies in wait for him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He lies in wait +with the main body of his troops."] +</p> + +<p> +21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not +require too much from individuals. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the bulk; +afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each men according +to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from the untalented."] +</p> + +<p> +Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined energy. +</p> + +<p> +22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like +unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain +motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to +come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."] +</p> + +<p> +23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a +round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the +subject of energy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount +importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great results," he +adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap14"></a>Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: "Chapter IV, +on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the defensive; chapter +V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect methods. The good general +acquaints himself first with the theory of attack and defence, and then turns +his attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and +combining these two methods before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong +points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and +defence, and the perception of weak and strong points depends again on the +above methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on +Energy."] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the +enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to +hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted. +</p> + +<p> +2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not +allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or fights not at +all. [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his +own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy +to draw near. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will +strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.] +</p> + +<p> +4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch’en’s +interpretation of I. § 23.] +</p> + +<p> +if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can +force him to move. +</p> + +<p> +5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to +places where you are not expected. +</p> + +<p> +6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through +country where the enemy is not. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt +from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, +attack in unexpected quarters."] +</p> + +<p> +7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places +which are undefended. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, where +the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; where the walls +are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict enough; where relief comes +too late, or provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst +themselves."] +</p> + +<p> +You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions that +cannot be attacked. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[<i>I.e.</i>, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There is +rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later clause. Tu Mu, +Ch’en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch’en assume the meaning to be: "In order to +make your defence quite safe, you must defend <i>even</i> those places that are not +likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, then, those that will +be attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause balances less well with the +preceding—always a consideration in the highly antithetical style which +is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark +in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights +of heaven [see IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against +him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the +enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret +recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his +whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those +that the enemy cannot attack."] +</p> + +<p> +8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know what +to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not know what to +attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] +</p> + +<p> +9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, +through you inaudible; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with reference to +the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands. +</p> + +<p> +10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s +weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more +rapid than those of the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though +he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is +attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of +communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; if we are +the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign himself." It is +clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no +believer in frontal attacks.] +</p> + +<p> +12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even +though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we +need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia Lin: +"even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch’uan says: +"we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches +the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes—one of Chu-ko Liang, who when +occupying Yang-p’ing and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I, suddenly +struck his colors, stopped the beating of the drums, and flung open the city +gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping and sprinkling the ground. +This unexpected proceeding had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an +ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating +here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff."] +</p> + +<p> +13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, +we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei +Yao-ch’en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy’s dispositions are +visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions being +kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard +against attack from every quarter."] +</p> + +<p> +14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into +fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a +whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few. +</p> + +<p> +15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, +our opponents will be in dire straits. +</p> + +<p> +16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the +enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different +points; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by saying that +"while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering what he was going to +do, <i>he</i> was thinking most of what he was going to do himself."] +</p> + +<p> +and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall +have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. +</p> + +<p> +17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he +strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he +will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. +If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In Frederick the Great’s <i>Instructions to his Generals</i> we read: "A +defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those generals +who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those +who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object +in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small misfortunes to +avoid greater."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; +numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations +against us. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is "to compel the enemy to +disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction +in turn."] +</p> + +<p> +19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate +from the greatest distances in order to fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances and +that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to divide his army +for the purpose of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction +at precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy +in overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions which military +history records, one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of +Blucher just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.] +</p> + +<p> +20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent +to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the left, the van +unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if +the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred <i>li</i> apart, +and even the nearest are separated by several <i>li</i>! +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but the +mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army advancing +towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of which has orders to be +there on a fixed date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed +at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and place of meeting, +the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yu’s note may be +worth quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to +concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will be +forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we hold will +be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to +battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support will be possible between +wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there is any great distance between the +foremost and hindmost divisions of the army."] +</p> + +<p> +21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in +number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then +that victory can be achieved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended in 473 +B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its incorporation in Yüeh. +This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s death. With his present assertion +compare IV. § 4. Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, +which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it +is said, ‘One may <i>know</i> how to conquer without being able to <i>do</i> it,’ whereas +here we have the statement that ‘victory’ can be achieved.’ The explanation is, +that in the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under +discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make +certain of beating him. But the present passage refers particularly to the +soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s calculations, will be kept in +ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle. That is why he says +here that victory can be achieved."] +</p> + +<p> +22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. +Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all plans +conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure." +</p> + +<p> +23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy on being +thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low +or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku Liang, who sent the scornful +present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his +Fabian tactics.] +</p> + +<p> +Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. +</p> + +<p> +24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know +where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. IV. § 6.] +</p> + +<p> +25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to +conceal them; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is perhaps +not so much actual invisibility (see <i>supra</i> § 9) as "showing no sign" of +what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.] +</p> + +<p> +conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest +spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable officers, they +will not be able to lay any plans against us."] +</p> + +<p> +26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own +tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. +</p> + +<p> +27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the +strategy out of which victory is evolved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[<i>I.e.</i>, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they +cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has preceded the +battle.] +</p> + +<p> +28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your +methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-principle underlying +victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in number." With this +compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be +learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen +diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like +Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."] +</p> + +<p> +29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs +away from high places and hastens downwards. +</p> + +<p> +30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is +weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] +</p> + +<p> +31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it +flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is +facing. +</p> + +<p> +32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are +no constant conditions. +</p> + +<p> +33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby +succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. +</p> + +<p> +34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally +predominant; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."] +</p> + +<p> +the four seasons make way for each other in turn. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "have no invariable seat."] +</p> + +<p> +There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the want of +fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. The comparison +is not very happy, however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun +Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] See Col. Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. II, p. +490. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap15"></a>Chapter VII. MANŒUVERING</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. +</p> + +<p> +2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and +harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between the +higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he quotes a saying +of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without harmony in the State, no military +expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle array can +be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzŭ is represented as saying to Wu +Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all the +domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe."] +</p> + +<p> +3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing more +difficult. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts’ao +Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign’s instructions until +our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most +difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or manœuvers can hardly be said to +begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and Ch’ien Hao’s +note gives color to this view: "For levying, concentrating, harmonizing and +entrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules which will serve. The real +difficulty comes when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes +that "the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing +favourable position."] +</p> + +<p> +The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious into the +direct, and misfortune into gain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat enigmatical +expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is explained by +Ts’ao Kung: "Make it appear that you are a long way off, then cover the +distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your opponent." Tu Mu says: +"Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while you are +dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a slightly different turn: +"Although you may have difficult ground to traverse and natural obstacles to +encounter this is a drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by +celerity of movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two +famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at his +mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which resulted in the +great victory of Marengo.] +</p> + +<p> +4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of +the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before +him, shows knowledge of the artifice of <i>deviation</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of +O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch’in army. The King of Chao first +consulted Lien P’o on the advisability of attempting a relief, but the +latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening country too rugged +and difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully admitted the +hazardous nature of the march, but finally said: "We shall be like two rats +fighting in a whole—and the pluckier one will win!" So he left the +capital with his army, but had only gone a distance of 30 <i>li</i> when he +stopped and began throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he continued +strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the +intelligence to the enemy. The Ch’in general was overjoyed, and +attributed his adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was +in the Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies +had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days +and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity +that he was able to occupy a commanding position on the "North hill" before the +enemy had got wind of his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the +Ch’in forces, who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste +and retreat across the border.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, +most dangerous. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I adopt the reading of the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, Cheng Yu-hsien and the <i>T’u +Shu</i>, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to make +sense. The commentators using the standard text take this line to mean that +manœuvers may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all depends on the +ability of the general.] +</p> + +<p> +6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, +the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a +flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who +paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering without much enthusiasm, +being convinced that there is some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the +whole, it is clear that Sun Tzŭ does not approve of a lengthy march being +undertaken without supplies. Cf. infra, § 11.] +</p> + +<p> +7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced +marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a +stretch, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 <i>li</i>; but on one +occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts’ao Ts’ao is said to have +covered the incredible distance of 300 <i>li</i> within twenty-four hours.] +</p> + +<p> +doing a hundred <i>li</i> in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all +your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on +this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a hundred +<i>li</i> to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without impedimenta. +Manœuvers of this description should be confined to short distances. Stonewall +Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the +dangers of battle." He did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary +exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was +imperative, that he sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +9. If you march fifty <i>li</i> in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will +lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the +goal. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be <i>torn away</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +10. If you march thirty <i>li</i> with the same object, two-thirds of your army +will arrive. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the <i>T’ung Tien</i> is added: "From this we may know the difficulty of +manœuvering."] +</p> + +<p> +11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without +provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I think Sun Tzŭ meant "stores accumulated in dépôts." But Tu Yu says "fodder +and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, +foodstuffs, etc."] +</p> + +<p> +12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of +our neighbours. +</p> + +<p> +13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the +face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and +precipices, its marshes and swamps. +</p> + +<p> +14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use +of local guides. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[§§. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.] +</p> + +<p> +15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the +numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained. +</p> + +<p> +16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by +circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift but, as +Mei Yao-ch’en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."] +</p> + +<p> +your compactness that of the forest. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly marching, order +and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard against surprise attacks. But +natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the +quality of density or compactness.] +</p> + +<p> +18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>Shih Ching</i>, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man +can check."] +</p> + +<p> +in immovability like a mountain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to dislodge +you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice you into a trap.] +</p> + +<p> +19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall +like a thunderbolt. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T’ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: "You +cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the lighting—so +rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot +be parried.] +</p> + +<p> +20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting +that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may afterwards be +fairly divided amongst all.] +</p> + +<p> +when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of +the soldiery. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and +plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they +invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their most +memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch’ao who +penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of Fu-k’ang-an +and Tso Tsung-t’ang.] +</p> + +<p> +21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzŭ as saying that we must not break camp until we +have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness of the opposing +general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, §§ 3, 4.] +</p> + +<p> +Such is the art of manœuvering. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But there now +follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an earlier book on War, +now lost, but apparently extant at the time when Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of +this fragment is not noticeably different from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no +commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness.] +</p> + +<p> +23. The Book of Army Management says: +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us any +information about this work. Mei Yao- Ch’en calls it "an ancient military +classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the enormous amount +of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzŭ’s time between the +various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable +that a collection of military maxims should have been made and written down at +some earlier period.] +</p> + +<p> +On the field of battle, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] +</p> + +<p> +the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and +drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution +of banners and flags. +</p> + +<p> +24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of +the host may be focussed on one particular point. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the same +object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be like those of a +single man."!] +</p> + +<p> +25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the +brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance against +orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a story in this +connection of Wu Ch’i, when he was fighting against the Ch’in +State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless +daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and +returned to camp. Wu Ch’i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an +officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a good soldier, and +ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch’i replied: "I fully believe he +was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders."] +</p> + +<p> +This is the art of handling large masses of men. +</p> + +<p> +26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in +fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and +eyes of your army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to Ho-yang at the head of +500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches, that though +the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute +their passage.] +</p> + +<p> +27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all +ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible. Now +the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived +on the scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to wait +until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. It is in this +way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit." Li Ch’uan and others +tell an anecdote (to be found in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, year 10, § 1) of Ts’ao +Kuei, a protege of Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by +Ch’i, and the duke was about to join battle at Ch’ang-cho, after +the first roll of the enemy’s drums, when Ts’ao said: "Not just yet." +Only after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word for +attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch’i were utterly defeated. +Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts’ao +Kuei replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll +of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on +the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked when their +spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our victory." Wu Tzŭ (chap. +4) puts "spirit" first among the "four important influences" in war, and +continues: "The value of a whole army—a mighty host of a million +men—is dependent on one man alone: such is the influence of spirit!"] +</p> + +<p> +a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general’s most important asset. It is +the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage +into the panic-stricken." The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571-649) has a +saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or +striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of assailing the +enemy’s mental equilibrium."] +</p> + +<p> +28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle of the +Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, whereas Hannibal’s +men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.] +</p> + +<p> +by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on +returning to camp. +</p> + +<p> +29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but +attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of +studying moods. +</p> + +<p> +30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub +amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. +</p> + +<p> +31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease +while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is +famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength. +</p> + +<p> +32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, +to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident +array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to +oppose him when he comes downhill. +</p> + +<p> +34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose +temper is keen. +</p> + +<p> +35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, +take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been poisoned by +the enemy. Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that the saying has +a wider application.] +</p> + +<p> +Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying that a +man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the death against any +attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be +tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who +hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvelous tale is told of +Ts’ao Ts’ao’s courage and resource in ch. 1 of the <i>San Kuo Chi</i>, In +198 A.D., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent +reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was +obliged to draw off his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two +enemies, who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged +himself. In this desperate plight Ts’ao waited until nightfall, when he +bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the +whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear, while Ts’ao +himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into +confusion and annihilated. Ts’ao Ts’ao said afterwards: "The +brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a +desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] +</p> + +<p> +36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The object, as +Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road to safety, and thus +prevent his fighting with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly: +"After that, you may crush him."] +</p> + +<p> +Do not press a desperate foe too hard. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay will +use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has burned his +boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of +a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the +meaning by a story taken from the life of Yen-ch’ing. That general, +together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded by a vastly superior +army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and desert-like, and +the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells +they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and +sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu +Yen-ch’ing exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our +country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A strong gale happened +to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of +sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had abated before deciding +on a final attack; but luckily another officer, Li Shou-cheng by name, was +quicker to see an opportunity, and said: "They are many and we are few, but in +the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory will +go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, +Fu Yen-ch’ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his +cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to safety.] +</p> + +<p> +37. Such is the art of warfare. +</p> + +<p> +[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. +</p> + +<p> +[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" (Longmans, +1907), p. 29. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap16"></a>Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzŭ does not +appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us (V §§ 6-11) +that such deflections from the ordinary course are practically innumerable, we +have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an +indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare we ought to vary +our tactics to the utmost degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes +these Nine Variations out to be, but it has been suggested that they are +connected with the Nine Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by +Chang Yu. The only other alternative is to suppose that something has been +lost—a supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends +some weight.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, +collects his army and concentrates his forces. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may have been +interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the chapter.] +</p> + +<p> +2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads +intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated +positions. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning +of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu defines this +situation as being situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li +Ch’uan says it is "country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks +or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and +precipices, without a road by which to advance."] +</p> + +<p> +In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate position, +you must fight. +</p> + +<p> +3. There are roads which must not be followed, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch’uan, +"where an ambush is to be feared."] +</p> + +<p> +armies which must be not attacked, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be attacked." +Ch’en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival advantage, but +are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of +overtaxing your men’s strength."] +</p> + +<p> +towns which must not be besieged, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own +experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of +Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the +country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no +fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: "No town should +be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause +any trouble." Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is +small and well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great +feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In the +seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was +Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and +manœuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when +the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not +be obeyed. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, and +Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: "Weapons are baleful +instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the +negation of civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even +Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.] +</p> + +<p> +4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany +variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. +</p> + +<p> +5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the +configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to +practical account. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only securing +good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in every possible +way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is characterized by certain natural +features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How it is +possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical +knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"] +</p> + +<p> +6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his +plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make +the best use of his men. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally advantageous +lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it must be followed; if +an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, +it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and if +consistent with military operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed." But +there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these +advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but +if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an +ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to +attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with +desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.] +</p> + +<p> +7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of +disadvantage will be blended together. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says +Ts’ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your mind."] +</p> + +<p> +8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in +accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix +our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing +some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our calculations."] +</p> + +<p> +9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to +seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I must +consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my own ability to +gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations +are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself…. For instance; if I +am surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the +nervelessness of my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it +would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and +use the advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils." See the +story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.] +</p> + +<p> +10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which +would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the enemy’s best and +wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. Introduce traitors into +his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue +and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By +means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and +waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into +excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." +Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun Tzŭ here: +"Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit +of his own accord."] +</p> + +<p> +and make trouble for them, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble should be +made for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we might say, +"assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony +amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands." These give us a +whip-hand over the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +and keep them constantly engaged; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent them from having any +rest."] +</p> + +<p> +hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of: "cause +them to forget <i>pien</i> (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first +impulse), and hasten in our direction."] +</p> + +<p> +11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not +coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not +attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable. +</p> + +<p> +12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) +Recklessness, which leads to destruction; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Bravery without forethought," as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes a +man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says +Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but may be lured into an +ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character +of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, +forgetting that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general +should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who +fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be +condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, too, makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one’s +death does not bring about victory."] +</p> + +<p> +(2) cowardice, which leads to capture; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as +being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an advantage," +and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih +gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive," this is, the +man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved +in war unless you are willing to take risks. T’ai Kung said: "He who lets +an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 +A.D., Liu Yu pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval +battle with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered +only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan +Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be overcome, had a +light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if +necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural result was that the fighting +spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an +attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be +first in the fray, Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their +baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a +somewhat similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who +during a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in +readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to +get across.] +</p> + +<p> +(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, Teng +Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. +Teng Ch’iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and easily +provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will +grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to +be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured +as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s pretended flight, and finally attacked and +slain.] +</p> + +<p> +(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect in a +general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to +slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however +undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: +"The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion."] +</p> + +<p> +(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless of the +welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger of sacrificing +any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a +shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from +the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be the +consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve +a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his +military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to +relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical blunders +which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through the very +man who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the +interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one +of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I +remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his +men." By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun +Tzŭ’s mouth.] +</p> + +<p> +13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of +war. +</p> + +<p> +14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be +found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap17"></a>Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1 than by +this heading.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and +observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the +neighbourhood of valleys. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies +of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural ovens," i.e. "the +openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu +Ch’iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan +was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch’iang having found a refuge in the +hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all the favourable +positions commanding supplies of water and forage. Ch’iang was soon in +such a desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced to make a +total surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood +of valleys."] +</p> + +<p> +2. Camp in high places, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the surrounding +country.] +</p> + +<p> +facing the sun. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch’en Hao "facing east." +Cf. infra, §§ 11, 13. +</p> + +<p> +Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. +</p> + +<p> +3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts’ao +Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your evolutions." +The <i>T’ung Tien</i> reads, "If <i>the enemy</i> crosses a river," etc. But in view of +the next sentence, this is almost certainly an interpolation.] +</p> + +<p> +4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance +to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and +then deliver your attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu at +the Wei River. Turning to the <i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 34, fol. 6 verso, we +find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were drawn up on opposite +sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten +thousand sacks filled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading +half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time, pretending to +have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was +much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han +Hsin was really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his +turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a +great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion of +Lung Chu’s army from getting across. He then turned upon the force which had +been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The +rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in all +directions.] +</p> + +<p> +5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a +river which he has to cross. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For fear of preventing his crossing.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with water is very +awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops marshalled on the +river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is +essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other +commentators are not at all explicit.] +</p> + +<p> +Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on the lower +reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the sluices and sweep us +away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that ‘in river warfare we must not +advance against the stream,’ which is as much as to say that our fleet must not +be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would be able to take +advantage of the current and make short work of us." There is also the danger, +noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be +carried down to us.] +</p> + +<p> +So much for river warfare. +</p> + +<p> +7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them +quickly, without any delay. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and last +but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.] +</p> + +<p> +8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near +you, and get your back to a clump of trees. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where +there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect the rear.] +</p> + +<p> +So much for operations in salt-marshes. +</p> + +<p> +9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising +ground to your right and on your rear, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu quotes T’ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a +marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."] +</p> + +<p> +so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for +campaigning in flat country. +</p> + +<p> +10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, and (4) +plains. Compare Napoleon’s "Military Maxims," no. 1.] +</p> + +<p> +which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch’en asks, with some +plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known of +Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The <i>Shih Chi</i> (ch. 1 ad init.) +speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch’ih Yu. In the <i>Liu +T’ao</i> it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the +Empire." Ts’ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the +first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of whom (to the +number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Ch’uan tells us +that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his +Minister Feng Hou.] +</p> + +<p> +11. All armies prefer high ground to low, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch’en, "is not only more agreeable and +salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low ground is +not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for fighting."] +</p> + +<p> +and sunny places to dark. +</p> + +<p> +12. If you are careful of your men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn +out your animals to graze."] +</p> + +<p> +and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak of +illness."] +</p> + +<p> +and this will spell victory. +</p> + +<p> +13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on +your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and +utilise the natural advantages of the ground. +</p> + +<p> +14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to +ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides. +</p> + +<p> +15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running +between, deep natural hollows, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, with pools +of water at the bottom."] +</p> + +<p> +confined places, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by precipices on +three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."] +</p> + +<p> +tangled thickets, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears cannot be +used."] +</p> + +<p> +quagmires +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable for +chariots and horsemen."] +</p> + +<p> +and crevasses, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined by Mei Yao-ch’en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling +cliffs." Tu Mu’s note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and intersected +by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it +clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same +view. On the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to the +rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a +crack or fissure" and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the +sentence indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun +Tzŭ is here speaking of crevasses.] +</p> + +<p> +should be left with all possible speed and not approached. +</p> + +<p> +16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach +them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear. +</p> + +<p> +17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, +ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods +with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for +these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be +lurking. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors who may +lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and overhearing our +instructions."] +</p> + +<p> +18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the +natural strength of his position. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is so good +that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. Baden-Powell’s +"Aids to Scouting."] +</p> + +<p> +19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the +other side to advance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to dislodge +us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to force a battle, he +would seem to despise us, and there would be less probability of our responding +to the challenge."] +</p> + +<p> +20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait. +</p> + +<p> +21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and +Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and observe the +enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he +may know that they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy’s +march."] +</p> + +<p> +The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that +the enemy wants to make us suspicious. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts’ao Kung’s, is as follows: "The +presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation is a +sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these +hiding-places in order to make us suspect an ambush." It appears that these +"screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the +retreating enemy happened to come across.] +</p> + +<p> +22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu’s explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying along +in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers are in ambush +at the spot beneath."] +</p> + +<p> +Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. +</p> + +<p> +23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots +advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the +approach of infantry. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat exaggerated as +applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon by saying that horses +and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one +another in the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in +ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have +scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will +gallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: +"As you move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar +for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting up, +glitter of arms, etc." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been +sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that +the army is encamping. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light horse +will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and strong +points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust and its +motion."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about +to advance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object is to +make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack us." Chang Yu +alludes to the story of T’ien Tan of the Ch’i-mo against the Yen +forces, led by Ch’i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the <i>Shih Chi</i> we read: +"T’ien Tan openly said: ‘My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off +the noses of their Ch’i prisoners and place them in the front rank to +fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other side being +informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; but those within the +city were enraged at seeing their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing +only lest they should fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend +themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T’ien Tan sent back +converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is +that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by +inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.’ +Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses lying in +them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from the +city-walls, wept passionately and were all impatient to go out and fight, their +fury being increased tenfold. T’ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were +ready for any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in +his hands, and ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, +while the ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served +out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular +soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with the old +and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were dispatched to the enemy’s +camp to arrange terms of surrender, whereupon the Yen army began shouting for +joy. T’ien Tan also collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, +and got the wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the +prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be +plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch’i Chieh, in high good +humor, granted their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and +careless. Meanwhile, T’ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them +with pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored +stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on +their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and drove +the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in the walls, backing +them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, +dashed furiously into the enemy’s camp where they caused the utmost confusion +and dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on +their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom +they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with +gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment +a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind making +as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels, +until heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen +army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men of Ch’i, who succeeded in +slaying their general Ch’i Chien…. The result of the battle was the +ultimate recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch’i +State."] +</p> + +<p> +Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will +retreat. +</p> + +<p> +25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, +it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. +</p> + +<p> +26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch’uan indicates "a treaty confirmed +by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand, simply say +"without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."] +</p> + +<p> +27. When there is much running about +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental banner.] +</p> + +<p> +and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. +</p> + +<p> +28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. +</p> + +<p> +29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want +of food. +</p> + +<p> +30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army +is suffering from thirst. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from the +behavior of a single man."] +</p> + +<p> +31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure +it, the soldiers are exhausted. +</p> + +<p> +32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch’en Hao says, the +enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] +</p> + +<p> +Clamour by night betokens nervousness. +</p> + +<p> +33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is weak. If +the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are +angry, it means that the men are weary. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an army +are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue" owing +to the exertions which he has demanded from them.] +</p> + +<p> +34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and the horses +chiefly on grass.] +</p> + +<p> +and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing +that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined +to fight to the death. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 71, given +in abbreviated form by the <i>P’ei Wen Yun Fu:</i> "The rebel Wang Kuo of Liang +was besieging the town of Ch’en- ts’ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was +in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out against him. The latter pressed +for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At last the +rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw down their weapons of their +own accord. Sung was not advancing to the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a +principle of war not to pursue desperate men and not to press a retreating +host.’ Sung answered: ‘That does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a +jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a +disorganized multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advances to +the attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being +slain."] +</p> + +<p> +35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued +tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. +</p> + +<p> +36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always a fear +of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good temper.] +</p> + +<p> +too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity is +necessary to keep the men to their duty.] +</p> + +<p> +37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s numbers, +shows a supreme lack of intelligence. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I follow the interpretation of Ts’ao Kung, also adopted by Li +Ch’uan, Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, +Chia Lin, Mei Tao-ch’en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first +tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, etc." +This would connect the sentence with what went before about rewards and +punishments.] +</p> + +<p> +38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that +the enemy wishes for a truce. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages, it is a +sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength is +exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzŭ to draw such +an obvious inference.] +</p> + +<p> +39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long +time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the +situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says a manœuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain time +for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.] +</p> + +<p> +40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply +sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, <i>cheng</i> tactics and frontal +attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.] +</p> + +<p> +What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a +close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in squeezing +very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch’uan, who appears to offer the +simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will win." Fortunately +we have Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity +itself: "When the numbers are even, and no favourable opening presents itself, +although we may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find +additional recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, +concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to +snatch the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." +He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary +troops may be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that +figure."] +</p> + +<p> +41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to +be captured by them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao, quoting from the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, says: "If bees and scorpions +carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, then, +should not be treated with contempt."] +</p> + +<p> +42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will +not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless. +If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not +enforced, they will still be useless. +</p> + +<p> +43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but +kept under control by means of iron discipline. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Yen Tzŭ [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues endeared him to +the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 +init.: "The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the +profession of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness."] +</p> + +<p> +This is a certain road to victory. +</p> + +<p> +44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be +well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. +</p> + +<p> +45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders +being obeyed, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his +men and also make his authority respected, so that when they come to face the +enemy, orders may be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust +and look up to him." What Sun Tzŭ has said in § 44, however, would lead one +rather to expect something like this: "If a general is always confident that +his orders will be carried out," etc."] +</p> + +<p> +the gain will be mutual. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his command, and +the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual." He +quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 4: "The art of giving orders +is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty doubts." +Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an +army.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap18"></a>Chapter X. TERRAIN</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with "terrain," +the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six calamities" are +discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of +desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) +Accessible ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of +communications."] +</p> + +<p> +(2) entangling ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you become +entangled."] +</p> + +<p> +(3) temporising ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] +</p> + +<p> +(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance +from the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A +strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman’s unquestioning +acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called +<i>accessible</i>. +</p> + +<p> +3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the +raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, "not to +allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of Napoleon’s dictum, "the +secret of war lies in the communications," [1] we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had +done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10, +VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of supply may be said to be as vital +to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as +the duelist who finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, +and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, +and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose +communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and +he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his +force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior +numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will +not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole +army." [2] +</p> + +<p> +Then you will be able to fight with advantage. +</p> + +<p> +4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called <i>entangling</i>. +</p> + +<p> +5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally +forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you +fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. +</p> + +<p> +6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first +move, it is called <i>temporising</i> ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation +remains at a deadlock."] +</p> + +<p> +7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an +attractive bait, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But this is +only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position.] +</p> + +<p> +it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing +the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver +our attack with advantage. +</p> + +<p> +8. With regard to <i>narrow passes</i>, if you can occupy them first, let them be +strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and by +making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy."] +</p> + +<p> +9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if +the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. +</p> + +<p> +10. With regard to <i>precipitous heights</i>, if you are beforehand with your +adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him +to come up. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and +defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." [For the +enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yu tells the +following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a +punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At night he pitched his camp as +usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch, when +suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near +by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against +the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien, +however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly +as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their +former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant +officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. +‘How did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien +replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking +unnecessary questions.’ From this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that +high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because +they are immune from disastrous floods."] +</p> + +<p> +11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat +and try to entice him away. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D. against the two +rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of +Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-te +persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken +prisoner. See <i>Chiu T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.] +</p> + +<p> +12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of +the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, +at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be exhausted and our adversary +fresh and keen."] +</p> + +<p> +and fighting will be to your disadvantage. +</p> + +<p> +13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § 8.] +</p> + +<p> +The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them. +</p> + +<p> +14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural +causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1) +Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) +rout. +</p> + +<p> +15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten +times its size, the result will be the <i>flight</i> of the former. +</p> + +<p> +16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the +result is <i>insubordination</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [<i>Hsin T’ang Shu</i>, ch. +148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against Wang +T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers +treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by +riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien Pu +was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had +passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and +dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide +by cutting his throat.] +</p> + +<p> +When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result +is <i>collapse</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the +common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] +</p> + +<p> +17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the +enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the +commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the +result is <i>ruin</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi’s note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause, and +at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; +thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his +head."] +</p> + +<p> +18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not +clear and distinct; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with decision, +the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without +vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty." +General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the words: "The secret of getting +successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell—in the +clearness of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: "the +most fatal defect in a military leader is difference; the worst calamities that +befall an army arise from hesitation."] +</p> + +<p> +when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."] +</p> + +<p> +and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter +<i>disorganisation</i>. +</p> + +<p> +19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior +force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful +one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must +be a <i>rout</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues: "Whenever +there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve +in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men +and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De Bello +Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).] +</p> + +<p> +20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the +general who has attained a responsible post. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to +those connected with ground."] +</p> + +<p> +but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, +and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes +the test of a great general. +</p> + +<p> +22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into +practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises them, will +surely be defeated. +</p> + +<p> +23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though +the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not +fight even at the ruler’s bidding. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, who is said to +have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the <i>San Lueh</i>, has these +words attributed to him: "The responsibility of setting an army in motion must +devolve on the general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the +Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and +the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their +country’s cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that +"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander +must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees from the Son of +Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."] +</p> + +<p> +24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing +disgrace, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a +soldier is to retreat.] +</p> + +<p> +whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his +sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." Such a +man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would not regret his +conduct."] +</p> + +<p> +25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the +deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand +by you even unto death. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture of the +famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have frequently had +occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the +meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to +sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every +hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and +Wu Ch’i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, +began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your +son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked +the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago, Lord Wu +performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and +finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the +same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.’" Li Ch’uan +mentions the Viscount of Ch’u, who invaded the small state of Hsiao +during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of the soldiers are +suffering severely from the cold." So he made a round of the whole army, +comforting and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if they were +clothed in garments lined with floss silk.] +</p> + +<p> +26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; +kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of +quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they +are useless for any practical purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, they +would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military +discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of +Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the +inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a certain +officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow-townsman, +ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging to one of the people, in order +to wear it over his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng +considered that the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be +allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered +his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so. +This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time +forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up.] +</p> + +<p> +27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware +that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards +victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, Ts’ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."] +</p> + +<p> +28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own +men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards +victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. III. § 13 (1).] +</p> + +<p> +29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are +in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes +fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory. +</p> + +<p> +30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he +has broken camp, he is never at a loss. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so +thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move recklessly," says +Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no mistakes."] +</p> + +<p> +31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory +will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your +victory complete. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three +things—the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural +advantages of earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."] +</p> + +<p> +[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. +</p> + +<p> +[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap19"></a>Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) +Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; +(5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; +(8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. +</p> + +<p> +2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious to see +their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a +battle and scatter in every direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, +"they will lack the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find +harbors of refuge."] +</p> + +<p> +3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it +is facile ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating," and +the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: "When your +army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order +to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home."] +</p> + +<p> +4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is +contentious ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung +says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the +strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus, +Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, even for a +few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining +invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.: "For those who have to fight in +the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu +Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., +and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of +Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, +plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, +governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from +his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we +oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, +and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile +at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, +and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms +without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we +could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning +and resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous +strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, +was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this type of +ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network of +roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which +intercommunication is easy."] +</p> + +<p> +6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a +third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small +principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on +the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.] +</p> + +<p> +so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them +to become his allies.] +</p> + +<p> +is ground of intersecting highways. +</p> + +<p> +7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a +number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached such a +point, its situation is serious."] +</p> + +<p> +8. Mountain forests, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or simply "forests."] +</p> + +<p> +rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: +this is difficult ground. +</p> + +<p> +9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only +retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to +crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. +</p> + +<p> +10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without +delay, is desperate ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The situation, as pictured by Ts’ao Kung, is very similar to the +"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible: "A lofty +mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked." +Ch’en Hao says: "to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like sitting in a leaking +boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid +description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an army invading +hostile territory without the aid of local guides:—it falls into a fatal +snare and is at the enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the +right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the +chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, +no choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to range +our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly +appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; +retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; +yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment’s respite. If we simply +maintain our ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a +move, we have to sustain the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is +wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of +life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of strength +and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man defending it can +check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offense in the hands of the +enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:—in this +terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest +of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest effect?" Students of +Greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, +and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, +VII. 78 sqq.].] +</p> + +<p> +11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On +contentious ground, attack not. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous +position first. So Ts’ao Kung. Li Ch’uan and others, however, +suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that +it would be sheer madness to attack. In the <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu</i>, when the King of Wu +inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: "The rule with +regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage +over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, +beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your +banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other places that he cannot +afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a dust—confound his ears +and eyes—detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in +ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."] +</p> + +<p> +12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking force +itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available here. I follow +that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s brief note: +"Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not +cut off.] +</p> + +<p> +On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states."] +</p> + +<p> +13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[On this, Li Ch’uan has the following delicious note: "When an army +penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to alienate the +people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, +whose march into Ch’in territory was marked by no violation of women or +looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause us +to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won +the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think that the true reading +must be, not ‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’" Alas, I fear that in this +instance the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at +least, has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ +there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility of +retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by bringing in +provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, "do not encamp.] +</p> + +<p> +14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu +amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be devised +which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, +the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the famous occasion +when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum, and +to all appearances entrapped by the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which +Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which T’ien +Tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, +note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some +2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven +along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The +strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the +Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal’s army passed +safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.] +</p> + +<p> +On desperate ground, fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is a chance +of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your corner."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge +between the enemy’s front and rear; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other."] +</p> + +<p> +to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the +good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. +</p> + +<p> +16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from +concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in +disorder. +</p> + +<p> +17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, +they stopped still. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded in +thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure any +advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they would +remain where they were."] +</p> + +<p> +18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on +the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something +which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts’ao Kung thinks it is +"some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu says: "The +three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of +which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our favourable positions; (2) to +ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications." Our object +then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render him +helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at +once throw the other side on the defensive.] +</p> + +<p> +19. Rapidity is the essence of war: +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in warfare," and +he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military science, and the chief +business of the general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the +importance attached to speed by two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., +Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch’eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was +meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence +with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was +then military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta’s treachery, he at +once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled +him by a specious message of friendly import. Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and +said: "If Meng Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be +thoroughly investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is +an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is +still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of +forced marches, be brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’eng with +in a space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko +Liang: "Wan is 1200 <i>li</i> from here. When the news of my revolt reaches +Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will be a whole +month before any steps can be taken, and by that time my city will be well +fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that +will be sent against us are not worth troubling about." The next letter, +however, was filled with consternation: "Though only eight days have passed +since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What +miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- ch’eng had fallen +and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See <i>Chin Shu</i>, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li +Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the +successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern +Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, +Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down through +the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his +army without loss of time, and was just about to start when the other generals +implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous +state for navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is +of paramount importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time +to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together. If +we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before +his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before +you have time to stop your ears against it. [See VII. § 19, note.] This is the +great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he will have +to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. +Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, +and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people +should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.] +</p> + +<p> +take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, +and attack unguarded spots. +</p> + +<p> +20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The +further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of +your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. +</p> + +<p> +21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 13. Li Ch’uan does not venture on a note here.] +</p> + +<p> +22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give them plenty of +food and drink, and look after them generally."] +</p> + +<p> +and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous +general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the success of +the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch’u State, where a universal levy +was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he +declined all invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In +vain did the Ch’u general try to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien +kept inside his walls and would not come out, but devoted his whole time and +energy to winning the affection and confidence of his men. He took care that +they should be well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities +for bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them +into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he told off +certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. The answer +was, that they were contending with one another in putting the weight and +long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic +pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch +and that they were now ready for fighting. By this time the Ch’u army, +after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in +disgust. The Ch’in general immediately broke up his camp and followed +them, and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. +Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch’u was conquered by Ch’in, and +the king Fu-ch’u led into captivity.] +</p> + +<p> +Keep your army continually on the move, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has struck +me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army together."] +</p> + +<p> +and devise unfathomable plans. +</p> + +<p> +23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will +prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not +achieve. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): "If one man were to run +amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to get our of +his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage and that all the +rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man who +sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."] +</p> + +<p> +Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will surely +exert their united strength to get out of it."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no +place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart of a hostile +country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will +fight hard. +</p> + +<p> +25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be constantly on +the <i>qui vive;</i> without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "without asking, you will get."] +</p> + +<p> +without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be +trusted. +</p> + +<p> +26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, +until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate into +cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: +"‘Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed +to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers’ +minds should be seriously perturbed.’ The meaning is," he continues, "that if +all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their +resolution until they die."] +</p> + +<p> +27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they +have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not +because they are disinclined to longevity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are things +for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away +valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but +simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzŭ is slyly insinuating that, as +soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see that temptations to shirk +fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their way.] +</p> + +<p> +28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate more genuine +grief than tears alone.] +</p> + +<p> +those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the +tears run down their cheeks. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts’ao Kung says, "all have +embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that the heroes of +the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to +the mournful parting at the I River between Ching K’o and his friends, +when the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch’in +(afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain +as he bade them farewell and uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is +blowing, Chilly the burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu +or a Kuei. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and +contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang, better +known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which +he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his +attempt, but was immediately hacked to pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was +in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Ts’ao Kuei (or Ts’ao Mo), +performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 +B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by Ch’i, and was just about to conclude +a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory, when Ts’ao Kuei +suddenly seized Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch’i, as he stood on the altar +steps and held a dagger against his chest. None of the duke’s retainers dared +to move a muscle, and Ts’ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, +declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a +weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, +whereupon Ts’ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place +amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed color. As was +to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, but his +wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the impolicy of breaking his +word, and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of +what she had lost in three pitched battles.] +</p> + +<p> +29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the <i>shuai-jan</i>. Now the <i>shuai-jan</i> +is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["<i>Shuai-jan</i>" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question was +doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through this +passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the sense of +"military manœuvers."] +</p> + +<p> +Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, +and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be +attacked by head and tail both. +</p> + +<p> +30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the <i>shuai-jan</i>, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, as Mei Yao-ch’en says, "Is it possible to make the front and +rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as though +they were part of a single living body?"] +</p> + +<p> +I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VI. § 21.] +</p> + +<p> +yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, +they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the +right. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of common peril, +how much more should two parts of the same army, bound together as they are by +every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a +campaign has been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case of +allied armies.] +</p> + +<p> +31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of horses, and +the burying of chariot wheels in the ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall the +Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the battle of +Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot. [See +Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to render flight impossible +by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity +and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This +is the lesson which can be learned from the <i>shuai-jan</i>.] +</p> + +<p> +32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of +courage which all must reach. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one." If +the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the +resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality, or at +any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington’s seemingly +ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he had ever +commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in this important +particular—unity of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian +defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost +certainly have lost the day.] +</p> + +<p> +33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question +involving the proper use of ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en’s paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences of +strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize accidental features +of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold +out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position +neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With +all respect to the text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am +inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no +means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions… and to +the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or +attacking, from the proper utilization of natural features." [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were leading +a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does it."] +</p> + +<p> +35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; +upright and just, and thus maintain order. +</p> + +<p> +36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and +appearances, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] +</p> + +<p> +and thus keep them in total ignorance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops must +not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only rejoice +with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the +enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been frequently pointed +out. But how about the other process—the mystification of one’s own men? +Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is over-emphatic on this point would do well +to read Col. Henderson’s remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley campaign: "The +infinite pains," he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his +most trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a +commander less thorough would have pronounced useless"—etc. etc. [3] In +the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, "Pan Ch’ao +took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other Central Asian states with +the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his +chief commander to succour the place with an army drawn from the kingdoms of +Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t’ou, totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch’ao +summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and +said: ‘Our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the +enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a +different direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, +and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the evening +drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch’ao now secretly released the +prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of +his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set off at once at the head of +10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch’ao’s retreat in the west, while the King of +Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of Khotan. +As soon as Pan Ch’ao knew that the two chieftains had gone, he called his +divisions together, got them well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against +the army of Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled +in confusion, and were closely pursued by Pan Ch’ao. Over 5000 heads were +brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and +cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, Kutcha +and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From that time +forward, Pan Ch’ao’s prestige completely overawed the countries of the +west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general not only kept his own +officers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of +dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice.] +</p> + +<p> +he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that war is +based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy. You must +deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but without letting them +know why."] +</p> + +<p> +By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from +anticipating his purpose. +</p> + +<p> +38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed +up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep +into hostile territory before he shows his hand. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. § 15), that is, takes some decisive +step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like Hsiang Yu, who +sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch’en Hao, followed by Chia Lin, +understands the words less well as "puts forth every artifice at his command."] +</p> + +<p> +39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a +flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and none knows whither he +is going. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or retreat; it is +ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and conquering."] +</p> + +<p> +40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the +business of the general. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilization there should be no delay in aiming a +blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again to this point. +Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more +present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.] +</p> + +<p> +41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules for the +nine varieties of ground."] +</p> + +<p> +the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of +human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. +</p> + +<p> +42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating +deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 20.] +</p> + +<p> +43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across +neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not figure +among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X. One’s first impulse +would be to translate it distant ground," but this, if we can trust the +commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch’en says it +is "a position not far enough advanced to be called ‘facile,’ and not near +enough to home to be ‘dispersive,’ but something between the two." Wang Hsi +says: "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, whose +territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on +us to settle our business there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare +occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine +Situations.] +</p> + +<p> +When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of +intersecting highways. +</p> + +<p> +44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you +penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. +</p> + +<p> +45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in +front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is +desperate ground. +</p> + +<p> +46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of +purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the defensive, +and avoiding battle. Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 11.] +</p> + +<p> +On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts +of my army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible contingencies: "(1) +the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack on the part of the enemy." +Cf. VII. § 17. Mei Yao-ch’en says: "On the march, the regiments should be +in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the +fortifications."] +</p> + +<p> +47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is Ts’ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We +must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach the goal." +That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei +Yao-ch’en offers another equally plausible explanation: "Supposing the +enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we +should advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession." Ch’en +Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had time to select his own +ground, quotes VI. § 1, where Sun Tzŭ warns us against coming exhausted to the +attack. His own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is +a favourable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to +occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make a fight +for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, and victory +will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao She beat the army of +Ch’in. (See p. 57.)] +</p> + +<p> +48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On ground of +intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. +</p> + +<p> +49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as one +might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.] +</p> + +<p> +On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. +</p> + +<p> +50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position, whereas +my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s lines." Mei +Yao-ch’en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with desperation." +Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run away." Tu Mu points out +that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where it is the enemy who is +surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and canonized as Shen-wu, +was surrounded by a great army under Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was +comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 +foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps +being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to escape, +actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets himself by driving +into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers +and men saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their spirits +rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such +desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their +onslaught.] +</p> + +<p> +On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving +their lives. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and +provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain +to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death." Mei +Yao-ch’en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of +it." This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about "grounds" and the +"variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which bear on this +important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and +unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § +2 to enumerate "variations" before touching on "grounds" at all, but only +mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that +is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier +portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six +variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first +is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, +in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately followed +by the variations. This takes us down to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions +are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the +tenth ground noticed in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are +enumerated once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and +7, being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to +account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts maybe +brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal +with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short +chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are +defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the +corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate, +being double that of any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any +inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work +cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII +is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain +matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear +elsewhere.] +</p> + +<p> +51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when +surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly +when he has fallen into danger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch’ao’s devoted followers in 73 +A.D. The story runs thus in the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 47: "When Pan Ch’ao +arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at first +with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his behavior +underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch’ao +spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you noticed,’ he said, +‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys +have come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in a state +of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his lot. That surely is +the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they +have come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ +Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, +and set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who +arrived some day ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between surprise and +fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch’ao, keeping his +informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of +his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them. When the wine +had mounted into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still +further by addressing them thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an +isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now +it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom only a +few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards +us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to +seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will become food +for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers +replied: ‘Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander +through life and death.’ For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1, +note.] +</p> + +<p> +52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are +acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march +unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and +forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be +unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local +guides. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12-14—in order to +emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to regard +them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the following +words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have added that there is +always the risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or some +misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told, +ordered a guide to lead him into the neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was +an important pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the +pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead +of Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that +direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost arrived.] +</p> + +<p> +53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not +befit a warlike prince. +</p> + +<p> +54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows +itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He overawes his +opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Tao-ch’en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much +affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you can divide her +forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in +strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the neighbouring +states will be frightened; and if the neighbouring states are frightened, the +enemy’s allies will be prevented from joining her." The following gives a +stronger meaning: "If the great state has once been defeated (before she has +had time to summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and +refrain from massing their forces." Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu take the +sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may +be, if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, and +must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with +overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the +enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus: "If we +recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be discontented and hang +back. But if (as will then be the case) our display of military force is +inferior by half to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will take fright +and refuse to join us."] +</p> + +<p> +55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he +foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, +keeping his antagonists in awe. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch’uan, appears to be this: Secure +against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject entangling +alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enable him to +dispense with external friendships."] +</p> + +<p> +Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State became +a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous Six +Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. +Chang Yu, following up his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning +this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.] +</p> + +<p> +56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and retreat +be heavily punished."] +</p> + +<p> +issue orders +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "hang" or post up."] +</p> + +<p> +without regard to previous arrangements; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is made +clear by Ts’ao Kung’s quotation from the <i>Ssu-ma Fa:</i> "Give instructions +only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see deserving deeds." +Ts’ao Kung’s paraphrase: "The final instructions you give to your army +should not correspond with those that have been previously posted up." Chang Yu +simplifies this into "your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand." And +Chia Lin says: "there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not +only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates +the entire reversal of them at the last moment.] +</p> + +<p> +and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a +single man. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 34.] +</p> + +<p> +57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your +design. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for any +order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no reasons" for his +decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a general than to a judge.] +</p> + +<p> +When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing +when the situation is gloomy. +</p> + +<p> +58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into +desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of the +tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already alluded to on +p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles +from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in full +force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man +of which was furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their +way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men +of Chao see me in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their +fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck +down the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their stead." +Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong +position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he sees the +standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and +escape through the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent out a division +consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form in line of battle with their +backs to the River Ti. Seeing this manœuver, the whole army of Chao broke into +loud laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the +generalissimo’s flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was +immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some +time; until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and +banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where another +fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure the +trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two generals succeeded +in joining the other army, which was fighting with the utmost desperation. The +time had now come for the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw +the men of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted +walls, tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the +Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags struck +them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and overpowered their +king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the +panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and +completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was +King Ya himself…. After the battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and +said: "In the <i>Art of War</i> we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the +right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend +of Sun Tzŭ and T’ai Kung. See IX § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, +ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these +conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general replied: "I +fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it +not written there: ‘Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come +off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the +usual course, I should never have been able to bring my colleague round. What +says the Military Classic—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the +men off to fight.’ [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun +Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to +fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, +there would have been a general <i>débandade</i>, and it would have been +impossible to do anything with them." The officers admitted the force of his +argument, and said: "These are higher tactics than we should have been capable +of." [See <i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ] +</p> + +<p> +59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is capable +of striking a blow for victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Danger has a bracing effect.] +</p> + +<p> +60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the +enemy’s purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"—by an appearance of yielding +and falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yu’s note makes the meaning +clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do so; if +he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out his +intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver +our attack.] +</p> + +<p> +61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in one +direction." Ts’ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the enemy." +But such a violent displacement of characters is quite indefensible.] +</p> + +<p> +we shall succeed in the long run +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "after a thousand <i>li</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +in killing the commander-in-chief. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Always a great point with the Chinese.] +</p> + +<p> +62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. +</p> + +<p> +63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, +destroy the official tallies, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as a permit +or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the "border-warden" of <i>Lun +Yu</i> III. 24, who may have had similar duties. When this half was returned to +him, within a fixed period, he was authorized to open the gate and let the +traveler through.] +</p> + +<p> +and stop the passage of all emissaries. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Either to or from the enemy’s country.] +</p> + +<p> +64. Be stern in the council-chamber, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the sovereign.] +</p> + +<p> +so that you may control the situation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the strictest +precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.] +</p> + +<p> +65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. +</p> + +<p> +66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 18.] +</p> + +<p> +and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao’s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favourable +position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus +obtained cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore, +to occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful +appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into going there +as well." Mei Yao-ch’en explains that this "artful appointment" is to be +made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies, who will carry back just the +amount of information that we choose to give them. Then, having cunningly +disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting after the enemy, to +arrive before him (VII. § 4). We must start after him in order to ensure his +marching thither; we must arrive before him in order to capture the place +without trouble. Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei +Yao-ch’en’s interpretation of § 47.] +</p> + +<p> +67. Walk in the path defined by rule, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot be +achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is unfortunate that this +variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much +more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of the old +school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating every accepted canon of +warfare.] +</p> + +<p> +and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable opportunity +offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove decisive."] +</p> + +<p> +68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you +an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be +too late for the enemy to oppose you. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly appears +felicitous. But of course Sun Tzŭ was thinking only of its speed. The words +have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping +hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "The Science of War," p. 333. +</p> + +<p> +[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap20"></a>Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Rather more than half the chapter (§§ 1-13) is devoted to the subject of fire, +after which the author branches off into other topics.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to +burn soldiers in their camp; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[So Tu Mu. Li Ch’uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers" +(when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on a +diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note], found himself +placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the +Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his +officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! [1] The only course open to +us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under cover of night, +when they will not be able to discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we +shall exterminate them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover +us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all +replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the +Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is today,’ he cried, +‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, +who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything will be +brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate for valiant warriors.’ +All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he +and his little band quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale +was blowing at the time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums +and hide behind the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw +flames shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. +The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at +the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, +whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the front and rear +of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao +slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads of +the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, +perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan Ch’ao, divining his +thoughts, said with uplifted hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, +I should not think, Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied +Kuo Hsun, and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed +him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and +trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public +proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostage, he returned to make his +report to Tou Ku." <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ] +</p> + +<p> +the second is to burn stores; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the rebellious +population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make +periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run +proved entirely successful.] +</p> + +<p> +the third is to burn baggage-trains; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao’s wagons and +impedimenta by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.] +</p> + +<p> +the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines" are the +same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and clothing. Cf. VII. +§ 11.] +</p> + +<p> +the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says in the <i>T’ung Tien:</i> "To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. The +method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by dipping +them into a brazier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the +enemy’s lines."] +</p> + +<p> +2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[T’sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy’s camp" are referred to. +But Ch’en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have +favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us." Chia Lin +says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."] +</p> + +<p> +the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter, reeds, +brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material cause. Chang Yu +says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires."] +</p> + +<p> +3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for +starting a conflagration. +</p> + +<p> +4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are +those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing +or the Cross-bar; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the Twenty-eight +Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and +Corvus.] +</p> + +<p> +for these four are all days of rising wind. +</p> + +<p> +5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible +developments: +</p> + +<p> +6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once with an +attack from without. +</p> + +<p> +7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain quiet, +bide your time and do not attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. +If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. +Hence the necessity for caution.] +</p> + +<p> +8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with +an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find +the difficulties too great, retire."] +</p> + +<p> +9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait +for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favourable moment. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire breaking out +(either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of incendiaries) inside +the enemy’s camp. "But," he continues, "if the enemy is settled in a waste +place littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a +position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against him at any +seasonable opportunity, and not await on in hopes of an outbreak occurring +within, for fear our opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding +vegetation, and thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling +once baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking +advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese general’s camp, +but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in the neighbourhood had +already been burnt down. On the other hand, Po-ts’ai, a general of the +Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of +this simple precaution. "At the head of a large army he was besieging +Ch’ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very small, +and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung +called his officers together and said: "In war, there are various indirect +methods of attack, and numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator +here quotes Sun Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp +in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we +set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a +sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of +T’ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so +Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and +mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men, +who stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with loud +shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, +and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the +rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." [<i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 71.] +] +</p> + +<p> +10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the +leeward. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will retreat +away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight +desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A rather more obvious +explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the east, begin burning to +the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from that side. If you +start the fire on the east side, and then attack from the west, you will suffer +in the same way as your enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a morning." +(<i>Tao Te Ching</i>, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch’en and Wang Hsi say: "A day breeze +dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as +a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this +sense is to be obtained is not apparent.] +</p> + +<p> +12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the +movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, and watch +for the days on which wind will rise, before making our attack with fire." +Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: "We must not only know how to +assail our opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar +attacks from them."] +</p> + +<p> +13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those +who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. +</p> + +<p> +14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his +belongings. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy’s road or divide +his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water can do useful +service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is the +reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of +sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzŭ (ch. 4) +speaks thus of the two elements: "If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy +ground, from which the water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, +it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands +thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it +may be exterminated by fire."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his +attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste +of time and general stagnation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. Ts’ao Kung says: +"Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day." And Tu Mu: "If +you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, your +subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will ensue." For +several reasons, however, and in spite of the formidable array of scholars on +the other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch’en +alone, whose words I will quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in +their battles and assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come and +not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort +to such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What they must not do, and +what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to the advantages they +have got."] +</p> + +<p> +16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good +general cultivates his resources. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu quotes the following from the <i>San Lueh</i>, ch. 2: "The warlike prince +controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by good faith, and +by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will be disruption; +if rewards are deficient, commands will not be respected."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is +something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so far in +that direction as the remarkable passage in the <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 69. "I dare +not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance +an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."] +</p> + +<p> +18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; +no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. +</p> + +<p> +19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you +are. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an +interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately on § +18.] +</p> + +<p> +20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. +</p> + +<p> +21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.] +</p> + +<p> +nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. +</p> + +<p> +22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of +caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger’s +cubs." +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap21"></a>Chapter XIII. THE USE OF SPIES</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them +great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources +of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.] +</p> + +<p> +There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on +the highways. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered, brambles and +thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be reminded of the saying: ‘On +serious ground, gather in plunder.’ Why then should carriage and transportation +cause exhaustion on the highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, +but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the +injunction to ‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is deeply +engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided against. Hence, +without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order +that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, again, there are +places like salt deserts where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from +home cannot be dispensed with."] +</p> + +<p> +As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-tail." The +allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each consisting of +about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on behalf of the State +by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that +their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. [See +II. § 12, note.] In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army, +while the other seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 +men (reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 +families would be affected.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which +is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the +enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of +silver in honours and emoluments, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of this +curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned at this point.] +</p> + +<p> +is the height of inhumanity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ’s agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to the +frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war always +brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy’s +condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for +years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is +impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their +services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling +amount for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up an +incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the +poor, and hence Sun Tzŭ concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing +less than a crime against humanity.] +</p> + +<p> +3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no +master of victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the national +temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these memorable words +were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch’u State: "The [Chinese] character +for ‘prowess’ is made up of [the characters for] ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear’ +(cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the repression of +cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the appointment of +Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the +people, putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."] +</p> + +<p> +4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and +conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is <i>foreknowledge</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means to do.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be +obtained inductively from experience, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu’s note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from +other analogous cases."] +</p> + +<p> +nor by any deductive calculation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and +magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human actions +cannot be so calculated."] +</p> + +<p> +6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the +spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural science +may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified +by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable +through spies and spies alone."] +</p> + +<p> +7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) +inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. +</p> + +<p> +8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret +system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the +sovereign’s most precious faculty. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders, had +officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it was to collect all possible +information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of +his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves +thus gained." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +9. Having <i>local spies</i> means employing the services of the inhabitants of a +district. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind treatment, and +use them as spies."] +</p> + +<p> +10. Having <i>inward spies</i>, making use of officials of the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in this +respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have +undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy for gold, men +who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed +over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side +should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of displaying their +ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each +boat. Officials of these several kinds," he continues, "should be secretly +approached and bound to one’s interests by means of rich presents. In this way +you will be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, +ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the +harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." The +necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears +from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou, +sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold +at P’i. After each side had experienced a number of victories and +defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain +P’o-t’ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to have him whipped until the +blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by +offering to cooperate with him from inside the city, and to give a fire signal +at the right moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these +promises, march out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their +head with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’s bidding. Meanwhile, Li +Hsiung’s general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; +and P’o-t’ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city +walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the signal +and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were drawn +up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang’s soldiers +entered the city in this way, every one of whom was forthwith beheaded. Li +Hsiung then charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and +routed the enemy completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho +Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that +of his father Li T’e, <i>Chin Shu</i>, ch. 120, 121.] +</p> + +<p> +11. Having <i>converted spies</i>, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them +for our own purposes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the enemy’s +service, and inducing them to carry back false information as well as to spy in +turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we +pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false +impression of what is going on. Several of the commentators accept this as an +alternative definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively +proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§ +21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used with +conspicuous success: (1) by T’ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo (see +<i>supra</i>, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the +wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P’o was conducting a defensive +campaign against Ch’in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien +P’o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a +series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of his +spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan Chu’s +pay. They said: "The only thing which causes Ch’in anxiety is lest Chao +Kua should be made general. Lien P’o they consider an easy opponent, who +is sure to be vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the +famous Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of +war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no +commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much +disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke +of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua was +appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man +who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran statesman +Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien P’o. Needless to say, he +proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch’i and the great military power +of Ch’in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and +his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, +during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed +by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, +ruthlessly put to the sword.] +</p> + +<p> +12. Having <i>doomed spies</i>, doing certain things openly for purposes of +deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the +enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do things +calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe that they have +been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy’s +lines, they will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take +measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite different. The +spies will thereupon be put to death." As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih +mentions the prisoners released by Pan Ch’ao in his campaign against +Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to T’ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was +sent by T’ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied +security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang +Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T’ang Chien, but +this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the New T’ang History +(ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on +until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when sent by +the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch’i. He has certainly +more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of Ch’i, being +subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he +considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be +boiled alive.] +</p> + +<p> +13. <i>Surviving spies</i>, finally, are those who bring back news from the +enemy’s camp. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a regular +part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man of keen +intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a +will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed with physical strength and +courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure +hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the +following story of Ta’hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of +Eastern Ch’in, Shen-wu of Ch’i made a hostile movement upon +Sha-yuan. The Emperor T’ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the +enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three were on horseback and +wore the enemy’s uniform. When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet +away from the enemy’s camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they +succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army. Then they got on their +horses again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of +night-watchmen; and more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was +committing some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit +a sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible +information about the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm commendation from +the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was able to inflict a severe +defeat on his adversary."] +</p> + +<p> +14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate relations +to be maintained than with spies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch’en point out that the spy is privileged to enter +even the general’s private sleeping-tent.] +</p> + +<p> +None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater +secrecy be preserved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be carried +"mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted from Turenne, who +made perhaps larger use of them than any previous commander: "Spies are +attached to those who give them most, he who pays them ill is never served. +They should never be known to anybody; nor should they know one another. When +they propose anything very material, secure their persons, or have in your +possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never +communicate anything to them but what is absolutely necessary that they should +know. [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from +falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and double-dealing." +Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more along the lines of +"intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers +these attributes to the spies themselves: "Before using spies we must assure +ourselves as to their integrity of character and the extent of their experience +and skill." But he continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more +dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate +such." So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the +passage."] +</p> + +<p> +16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and +straightforwardness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, you must +treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for you with all their +might."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of +their reports. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies +going over to the service of the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VI. § 9.] +</p> + +<p> +19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he +must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard before [our +plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzŭ’s main point in this passage is: Whereas +you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for letting out the secret," the +object of killing the other man is only, as Ch’en Hao puts it, "to stop +his mouth" and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already been +repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzŭ lays +himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by +saying that the man deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly +not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of +him."] +</p> + +<p> +20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate +an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the +attendants, the aides-de- camp, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose duty it is +to keep the general supplied with information," which naturally necessitates +frequent interviews with him.] +</p> + +<p> +the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be +commissioned to ascertain these. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these important +functionaries can be won over by bribery.] +</p> + +<p> +21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted +with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted +spies and available for our service. +</p> + +<p> +22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able +to acquire and employ local and inward spies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy’s spies we learn the enemy’s +condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy into our +service, because it is he that knows which of the local inhabitants are greedy +of gain, and which of the officials are open to corruption."] +</p> + +<p> +23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to +carry false tidings to the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be +deceived."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on +appointed occasions. +</p> + +<p> +25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the +enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the +converted spy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As explained in §§ 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but makes it +possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.] +</p> + +<p> +Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost +liberality. +</p> + +<p> +26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was changed to +Yin by P’an Keng in 1401. +</p> + +<p> +was due to I Chih +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part in +Ch’eng T’ang’s campaign against Chieh Kuei.] +</p> + +<p> +who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due +to Lü Ya +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards +helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T’ai Kung, a title bestowed on +him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously +identified with the <i>Liu T’ao</i>.] +</p> + +<p> +who had served under the Yin. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to +introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are by no +means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly doubt that Sun +Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted +spy, or something closely analogous. His suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin +dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and +shortcoming which these former ministers were able to impart to the other side. +Mei Yao-ch’en appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic +names: "I Yin and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. +Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could not employ +the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great achievements were all for the +good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant: "How should two divinely +inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of +them simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a matter +which requires men of the highest mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom +and capacity qualified them for the task. The above words only emphasize this +point." Ho Shih believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of +their supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] +</p> + +<p> +27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use +the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they +achieve great results. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a boat from +bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on spies, while +production of great results, is oft-times the cause of utter destruction."] +</p> + +<p> +Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army’s +ability to move. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man with ears or eyes.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part +of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project +Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ +concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, +and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following +the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use +of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for +copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very +easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation +of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project +Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away--you may +do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected +by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark +license, especially commercial redistribution. +</div> + +<div style='margin:0.83em 0; font-size:1.1em; text-align:center'>START: FULL LICENSE<br /> +<span style='font-size:smaller'>THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE<br /> +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK</span> +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project +Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full +Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or online at +www.gutenberg.org/license. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; font-size:1.1em; margin:1em 0; font-weight:bold'> +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™ +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or +destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in your +possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a +Project Gutenberg™ electronic work and you do not agree to be bound +by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person +or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg™ electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg™ electronic works if you follow the terms of this +agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™ +electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the +Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection +of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the individual +works in the collection are in the public domain in the United +States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the +United States and you are located in the United States, we do not +claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, +displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as +all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope +that you will support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting +free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg™ +works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the +Project Gutenberg™ name associated with the work. You can easily +comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the +same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when +you share it without charge with others. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are +in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, +check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this +agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, +distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any +other Project Gutenberg™ work. The Foundation makes no +representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any +country other than the United States. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other +immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must appear +prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg™ work (any work +on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the +phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, +performed, viewed, copied or distributed: +</div> + +<blockquote> + <div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> + This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most + other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions + whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms + of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online + at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you + are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws + of the country where you are located before using this eBook. + </div> +</blockquote> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is +derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not +contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the +copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in +the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are +redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project +Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply +either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or +obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg™ +trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any +additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms +will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™ License for all works +posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the +beginning of this work. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg™ +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg™. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg™ License. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including +any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access +to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg™ work in a format +other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official +version posted on the official Project Gutenberg™ website +(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense +to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means +of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain +Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the +full Project Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™ works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works +provided that: +</div> + +<div style='margin-left:0.7em;'> + <div style='text-indent:-0.7em'> + • You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed + to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, but he has + agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project + Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid + within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are + legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty + payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project + Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in + Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg + Literary Archive Foundation.” + </div> + + <div style='text-indent:-0.7em'> + • You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™ + License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all + copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue + all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™ + works. + </div> + + <div style='text-indent:-0.7em'> + • You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of + any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of + receipt of the work. + </div> + + <div style='text-indent:-0.7em'> + • You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works. + </div> +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project +Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than +are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing +from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of +the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set +forth in Section 3 below. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.F. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project +Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ +electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may +contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate +or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other +intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or +other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or +cannot be read by your equipment. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right +of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium +with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you +with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in +lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person +or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second +opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If +the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing +without further opportunities to fix the problem. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO +OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT +LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of +damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement +violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the +agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or +limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or +unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the +remaining provisions. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in +accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the +production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™ +electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, +including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of +the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this +or any Project Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or +additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any +Defect you cause. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; font-size:1.1em; margin:1em 0; font-weight:bold'> +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg™ +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of +computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It +exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations +from people in all walks of life. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg™’s +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™ collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg™ and future +generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see +Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; font-size:1.1em; margin:1em 0; font-weight:bold'> +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by +U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, +Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up +to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website +and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact +</div> + +<div style='display:block; font-size:1.1em; margin:1em 0; font-weight:bold'> +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread +public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND +DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state +visit <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/donate/">www.gutenberg.org/donate</a>. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To +donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate +</div> + +<div style='display:block; font-size:1.1em; margin:1em 0; font-weight:bold'> +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg™ electronic works +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project +Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could be +freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and +distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose network of +volunteer support. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in +the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not +necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper +edition. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Most people start at our website which has the main PG search +facility: <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. +</div> + +</div> + +</body> + +</html> + diff --git a/old/old/suntx10.txt b/old/old/suntx10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a29fe5b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/suntx10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1941 @@ +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. Do not remove this. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations* + +Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and +further information is included below. We need your donations. + + +(Extract from: Sun Tzu on the Art of War (Lionel Giles, trans.) + +May, 1994 [Etext #132] +[Most recently updated: March 15, 2002] + +The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Art of War by Sun Tzu +*****This file should be named suntx10.txt or suntx10.zip***** + +Corrected EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, suntx11.txt. +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, suntx10a.txt. + + +We are now trying to release all our books one month in advance +of the official release dates, for time for better editing. We +have this as a goal to accomplish by the end of the year but we +cannot guarantee to stay that far ahead every month after that. + +Please note: neither this list nor its contents are final till +midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement. +The official release date of all Project Gutenberg Etexts is at +Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month. A +preliminary version may often be posted for suggestion, comment +and editing by those who wish to do so. To be sure you have an +up to date first edition [xxxxx10x.xxx] please check file sizes +in the first week of the next month. Since our ftp program has +a bug in it that scrambles the date [tried to fix and failed] a +look at the file size will have to do, but we will try to see a +new copy has at least one byte more or less. + + +Information about Project Gutenberg (one page) + +We produce about two million dollars for each hour we work. The +fifty hours is one conservative estimate for how long it we take +to get any etext selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright +searched and analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc. This +projected audience is one hundred million readers. If our value +per text is nominally estimated at one dollar then we produce $4 +million dollars per hour this year as we release some eight text +files per month: thus upping our productivity from $2 million. + +The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away One Trillion Etext +Files by the December 31, 2001. [10,000 x 100,000,000=Trillion] +This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million readers, +which is 10% of the expected number of computer users by the end +of the year 2001. + +We need your donations more than ever! + +All donations should be made to "Project Gutenberg/IBC", and are +tax deductible to the extent allowable by law ("IBC" is Illinois +Benedictine College). (Subscriptions to our paper newsletter go +to IBC, too) + +For these and other matters, please mail to: + +Project Gutenberg +P. O. Box 2782 +Champaign, IL 61825 + +When all other email fails try our Michael S. Hart, Executive +Director: +hart@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu (internet) hart@uiucvmd (bitnet) + +We would prefer to send you this information by email +(Internet, Bitnet, Compuserve, ATTMAIL or MCImail). + +****** +If you have an FTP program (or emulator), please +FTP directly to the Project Gutenberg archives: +[Mac users, do NOT point and click. . .type] + +ftp mrcnext.cso.uiuc.edu +login: anonymous +password: your@login +cd etext/etext91 +or cd etext92 +or cd etext93 +or cd etext94 [for new books] +or cd etext/articles [get suggest gut for more information] +dir [to see files] +get or mget [to get files. . .set bin for zip files] +GET 0INDEX.GUT +for a list of books +and +GET NEW GUT for general information +and +MGET GUT* for newsletters. + +**Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor** +(Three Pages) + + +***START**THE SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS**START*** +Why is this "Small Print!" statement here? You know: lawyers. +They tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with +your copy of this etext, even if you got it for free from +someone other than us, and even if what's wrong is not our +fault. So, among other things, this "Small Print!" statement +disclaims most of our liability to you. It also tells you how +you can distribute copies of this etext if you want to. + +*BEFORE!* YOU USE OR READ THIS ETEXT +By using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm +etext, you indicate that you understand, agree to and accept +this "Small Print!" statement. If you do not, you can receive +a refund of the money (if any) you paid for this etext by +sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the person +you got it from. If you received this etext on a physical +medium (such as a disk), you must return it with your request. + +ABOUT PROJECT GUTENBERG-TM ETEXTS +This PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG- +tm etexts, is a "public domain" work distributed by Professor +Michael S. Hart through the Project Gutenberg Association at +Illinois Benedictine College (the "Project"). Among other +things, this means that no one owns a United States copyright +on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and +distribute it in the United States without permission and +without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth +below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this etext +under the Project's "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark. + +To create these etexts, the Project expends considerable +efforts to identify, transcribe and proofread public domain +works. Despite these efforts, the Project's etexts and any +medium they may be on may contain "Defects". Among other +things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other +intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged +disk or other etext medium, a computer virus, or computer +codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment. + +LIMITED WARRANTY; DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES +But for the "Right of Replacement or Refund" described below, +[1] the Project (and any other party you may receive this +etext from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext) disclaims all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including +legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR +UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT, +INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE +OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE +POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. + +If you discover a Defect in this etext within 90 days of +receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) +you paid for it by sending an explanatory note within that +time to the person you received it from. If you received it +on a physical medium, you must return it with your note, and +such person may choose to alternatively give you a replacement +copy. If you received it electronically, such person may +choose to alternatively give you a second opportunity to +receive it electronically. + +THIS ETEXT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU "AS-IS". NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS +TO THE ETEXT OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT +LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A +PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Some states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or +the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, so the +above disclaimers and exclusions may not apply to you, and you +may have other legal rights. + +INDEMNITY +You will indemnify and hold the Project, its directors, +officers, members and agents harmless from all liability, cost +and expense, including legal fees, that arise directly or +indirectly from any of the following that you do or cause: +[1] distribution of this etext, [2] alteration, modification, +or addition to the etext, or [3] any Defect. + +DISTRIBUTION UNDER "PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm" +You may distribute copies of this etext electronically, or by +disk, book or any other medium if you either delete this +"Small Print!" and all other references to Project Gutenberg, +or: + +[1] Only give exact copies of it. Among other things, this + requires that you do not remove, alter or modify the + etext or this "small print!" statement. You may however, + if you wish, distribute this etext in machine readable + binary, compressed, mark-up, or proprietary form, + including any form resulting from conversion by word pro- + cessing or hypertext software, but only so long as + *EITHER*: + + [*] The etext, when displayed, is clearly readable, and + does *not* contain characters other than those + intended by the author of the work, although tilde + (~), asterisk (*) and underline (_) characters may + be used to convey punctuation intended by the + author, and additional characters may be used to + indicate hypertext links; OR + + [*] The etext may be readily converted by the reader at + no expense into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent + form by the program that displays the etext (as is + the case, for instance, with most word processors); + OR + + [*] You provide, or agree to also provide on request at + no additional cost, fee or expense, a copy of the + etext in its original plain ASCII form (or in EBCDIC + or other equivalent proprietary form). + +[2] Honor the etext refund and replacement provisions of this + "Small Print!" statement. + +[3] Pay a trademark license fee to the Project of 20% of the + net profits you derive calculated using the method you + already use to calculate your applicable taxes. If you + don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are + payable to "Project Gutenberg Association / Illinois + Benedictine College" within the 60 days following each + date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare) + your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return. + +WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO? +The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, +scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty +free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution +you can think of. Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg +Association / Illinois Benedictine College". + +This "Small Print!" by Charles B. Kramer, Attorney +Internet (72600.2026@compuserve.com); TEL: (212-254-5093) +*END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR + THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD + + Translated from the Chinese + By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910) + + + +[This is the basic text of Sun Tzu on the Art of War. It was +extracted from Mr. Giles' complete work as titled above. The +commentary itself, which, of course includes this work embedded +within it, has been released as suntzu10.txt (or suntzu10.zip). +This is being released only as an adjunct to that work, which +contains a wealth of commentary upon this text.] + + + + +I. LAYING PLANS + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance + to the State. + + 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either + to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry + which can on no account be neglected. + + 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant + factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, + when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. + + 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; + (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline. + +5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete + accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him + regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger. + + 7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, + times and seasons. + + 8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; + danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; + the chances of life and death. + + 9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, + sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness. + +10. By method and discipline are to be understood + the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, + the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance + of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the + control of military expenditure. + +11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: + he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them + not will fail. + +12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking + to determine the military conditions, let them be made + the basis of a comparison, in this wise:-- + +13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued + with the Moral law? + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven + and Earth? + (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? + (5) Which army is stronger? + (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? + (7) In which army is there the greater constancy + both in reward and punishment? + +14. By means of these seven considerations I can + forecast victory or defeat. + +15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts + upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! + The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, + will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed! + +16. While heading the profit of my counsel, + avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances + over and beyond the ordinary rules. + +17. According as circumstances are favorable, + one should modify one's plans. + +18. All warfare is based on deception. + +19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; + when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we + are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; + when far away, we must make him believe we are near. + +20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, + and crush him. + +21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. + If he is in superior strength, evade him. + +22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to + irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. + +23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. + If his forces are united, separate them. + +24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where + you are not expected. + +25. These military devices, leading to victory, + must not be divulged beforehand. + +26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many + calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. + The general who loses a battle makes but few + calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations + lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: + how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention + to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose. + + +II. WAGING WAR + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, + where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, + as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand + mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them + a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, + including entertainment of guests, small items such as + glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, + will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. + Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. + + 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory + is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and + their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, + you will exhaust your strength. + + 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources + of the State will not be equal to the strain. + + 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, + your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, + other chieftains will spring up to take advantage + of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, + will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. + + 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, + cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. + + 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited + from prolonged warfare. + + 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted + with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand + the profitable way of carrying it on. + + 8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, + neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. + + 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage + on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough + for its needs. + +10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army + to be maintained by contributions from a distance. + Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes + the people to be impoverished. + +11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes + prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's + substance to be drained away. + +12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry + will be afflicted by heavy exactions. + +13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion + of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, + and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; + while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, + breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, + protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, + will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. + +15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging + on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions + is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise + a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty + from one's own store. + +16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must + be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from + defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. + +17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots + have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. + Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, + and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. + The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. + +18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment + one's own strength. + +19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, + not lengthy campaigns. + +20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies + is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it + depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril. + + +III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best + thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; + to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is + better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, + to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire + than to destroy them. + + 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles + is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists + in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. + + 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to + balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent + the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in + order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; + and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. + + 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it + can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, + movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take + up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over + against the walls will take three months more. + + 5. The general, unable to control his irritation, + will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, + with the result that one-third of his men are slain, + while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous + effects of a siege. + + 6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's + troops without any fighting; he captures their cities + without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom + without lengthy operations in the field. + + 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery + of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph + will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem. + + 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten + to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, + to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army + into two. + + 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; + if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; + if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. + +10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made + by a small force, in the end it must be captured + by the larger force. + +11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; + if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will + be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will + be weak. + +12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring + misfortune upon his army:-- + +13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, + being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. + This is called hobbling the army. + +14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the + same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant + of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes + restlessness in the soldier's minds. + +15. (3) By employing the officers of his army + without discrimination, through ignorance of the + military principle of adaptation to circumstances. + This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. + +16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, + trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. + This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging + victory away. + +17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials + for victory: + (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when + not to fight. + (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior + and inferior forces. + (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same + spirit throughout all its ranks. + (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take + the enemy unprepared. + (5) He will win who has military capacity and is + not interfered with by the sovereign. + +18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy + and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a + hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, + for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. + If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will + succumb in every battle. + + +IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put + themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then + waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. + + 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our + own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy + is provided by the enemy himself. + 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, + but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. + + 4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer + without being able to do it. + + 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; + ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. + + 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient + strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. + + 7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the + most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in + attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. + Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; + on the other, a victory that is complete. + + 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken + of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. + + 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight + and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!" + +10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; + to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; + to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. + +11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is + one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. + +12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation + for wisdom nor credit for courage. + +13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. + Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty + of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is + already defeated. + +14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into + a position which makes defeat impossible, and does + not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. + +15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist + only seeks battle after the victory has been won, + whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights + and afterwards looks for victory. + +16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, + and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is + in his power to control success. + +17. In respect of military method, we have, + firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; + thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; + fifthly, Victory. + +18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; + Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to + Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; + and Victory to Balancing of chances. + +19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as + a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. + +20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting + of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. + + +V. ENERGY + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force + is the same principle as the control of a few men: + it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. + + 2. Fighting with a large army under your command + is nowise different from fighting with a small one: + it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. + + 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand + the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- + this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. + + 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone + dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science + of weak points and strong. + + 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used + for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed + in order to secure victory. + + 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible + as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; + like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; + like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more. + + 7. There are not more than five musical notes, + yet the combinations of these five give rise to more + melodies than can ever be heard. + + 8. There are not more than five primary colors + (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination + they produce more hues than can ever been seen. + + 9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes + (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations + of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. + +10. In battle, there are not more than two methods + of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two + in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. + +11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. + It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. + Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination? + +12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent + which will even roll stones along in its course. + +13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed + swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy + its victim. + +14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible + in his onset, and prompt in his decision. + +15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; + decision, to the releasing of a trigger. + +16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may + be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; + amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head + or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. + +17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, + simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness + postulates strength. + +18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is + simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under + a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; + masking strength with weakness is to be effected + by tactical dispositions. + +19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy + on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to + which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, + that the enemy may snatch at it. + +20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; + then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. + +21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined + energy, and does not require too much from individuals. + Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize + combined energy. + +22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting + men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. + For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain + motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; + if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if + round-shaped, to go rolling down. + +23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men + is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain + thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject + of energy. + + +VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and + awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; + whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle + will arrive exhausted. + + 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on + the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. + + 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy + to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, + he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. + + 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; + if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; + if quietly encamped, he can force him to move. + + 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; + march swiftly to places where you are not expected. + + 6. An army may march great distances without distress, + if it marches through country where the enemy is not. + + 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks + if you only attack places which are undefended.You can + ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold + positions that cannot be attacked. + + 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose + opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful + in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack. + + 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you + we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; + and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. + +10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, + if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire + and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid + than those of the enemy. + +11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced + to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high + rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack + some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. + +12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent + the enemy from engaging us even though the lines + of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. + All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable + in his way. + +13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining + invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, + while the enemy's must be divided. + +14. We can form a single united body, while the + enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will + be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, + which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few. + +15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force + with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits. + +16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be + made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare + against a possible attack at several different points; + and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, + the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will + be proportionately few. + +17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, + he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, + he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, + he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, + he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, + he will everywhere be weak. + +18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare + against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling + our adversary to make these preparations against us. + +19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, + we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order + to fight. + +20. But if neither time nor place be known, + then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, + the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van + unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. + How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are + anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest + are separated by several LI! + +21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers + of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage + them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then + that victory can be achieved. + +22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may + prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover + his plans and the likelihood of their success. + +23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his + activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, + so as to find out his vulnerable spots. + +24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, + so that you may know where strength is superabundant + and where it is deficient. + +25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch + you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, + and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, + from the machinations of the wisest brains. + +26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's + own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. + +27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, + but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory + is evolved. + +28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained + you one victory, but let your methods be regulated + by the infinite variety of circumstances. + +29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its + natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. + +30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong + and to strike at what is weak. + +31. Water shapes its course according to the nature + of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works + out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. + +32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, + so in warfare there are no constant conditions. + +33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his + opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called + a heaven-born captain. + +34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) + are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make + way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; + the moon has its periods of waning and waxing. + + +VII. MANEUVERING + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his + commands from the sovereign. + + 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, + he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof + before pitching his camp. + + 3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, + than which there is nothing more difficult. + The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists + in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. + + 4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, + after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting + after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, + shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION. + + 5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; + with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. + + 6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order + to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be + too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column + for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage + and stores. + + 7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their + buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day + or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, + doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, + the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into + the hands of the enemy. + + 8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded + ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth + of your army will reach its destination. + + 9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver + the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, + and only half your force will reach the goal. + +10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, + two-thirds of your army will arrive. + +11. We may take it then that an army without its + baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; + without bases of supply it is lost. + +12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are + acquainted with the designs of our neighbors. + +13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march + unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its + mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, + its marshes and swamps. + +14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage + to account unless we make use of local guides. + +15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. + +16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, + must be decided by circumstances. + +17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, + your compactness that of the forest. + +18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, + is immovability like a mountain. + +19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, + and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt. + +20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be + divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, + cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery. + +21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. + +22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice + of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering. + +23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field + of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: + hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary + objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution + of banners and flags. + +24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means + whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused + on one particular point. + +25. The host thus forming a single united body, + is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, + or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art + of handling large masses of men. + +26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires + and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, + as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army. + +27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; + a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. + +28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; + by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, + his mind is bent only on returning to camp. + +29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when + its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish + and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods. + +30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance + of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art + of retaining self-possession. + +31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still + far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is + toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy + is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength. + +32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose + banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking + an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this + is the art of studying circumstances. + +33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill + against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. + +34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; + do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen. + +35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. + Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. + +36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. + Do not press a desperate foe too hard. + +37. Such is the art of warfare. + + +VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives + his commands from the sovereign, collects his army + and concentrates his forces + + 2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country + where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. + Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. + In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. + In desperate position, you must fight. + + 3. There are roads which must not be followed, + armies which must be not attacked, towns which must + not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, + commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed. + + 4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages + that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle + his troops. + + 5. The general who does not understand these, may be well + acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he + will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account. + + 6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art + of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted + with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use + of his men. + + 7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of + advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together. + + 8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in + this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential + part of our schemes. + + 9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties + we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate + ourselves from misfortune. + +10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage + on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them + constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, + and make them rush to any given point. + +11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the + likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness + to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, + but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable. + +12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect + a general: + (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction; + (2) cowardice, which leads to capture; + (3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; + (4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame; + (5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him + to worry and trouble. + +13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, + ruinous to the conduct of war. + +14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, + the cause will surely be found among these five + dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation. + + +IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of + encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. + Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood + of valleys. + + 2. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb + heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. + + 3. After crossing a river, you should get far away + from it. + + 4. When an invading force crosses a river in its + onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. + It will be best to let half the army get across, + and then deliver your attack. + + 5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go + to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross. + + 6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing + the sun. Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. + So much for river warfare. + + 7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern + should be to get over them quickly, without any delay. + + 8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should + have water and grass near you, and get your back + to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt-marches. + + 9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible + position with rising ground to your right and on your rear, + so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. + So much for campaigning in flat country. + +10. These are the four useful branches of military + knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish + four several sovereigns. + +11. All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny + places to dark. + +12. If you are careful of your men, and camp on hard + ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, + and this will spell victory. + +13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the + sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. + Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers + and utilize the natural advantages of the ground. + +14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, + a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked + with foam, you must wait until it subsides. + +15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs + with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, + confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, + should be left with all possible speed and not approached. + +16. While we keep away from such places, we should + get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, + we should let the enemy have them on his rear. + +17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should + be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, + hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick + undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; + for these are places where men in ambush or insidious + spies are likely to be lurking. + +18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, + he is relying on the natural strength of his position. + +19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, + he is anxious for the other side to advance. + +20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, + he is tendering a bait. + +21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the + enemy is advancing. The appearance of a number of screens + in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to + make us suspicious. + +22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign + of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden + attack is coming. + +23. When there is dust rising in a high column, + it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, + but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach + of infantry. When it branches out in different directions, + it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. + A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army + is encamping. + +24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs + that the enemy is about to advance. Violent language + and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he + will retreat. + +25. When the light chariots come out first and take + up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy + is forming for battle. + +26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant + indicate a plot. + +27. When there is much running about and the soldiers + fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. + +28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, + it is a lure. + +29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, + they are faint from want of food. + +30. If those who are sent to draw water begin + by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst. + +31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and + makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. + +32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. + Clamor by night betokens nervousness. + +33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's + authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted + about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, + it means that the men are weary. + +34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills + its cattle for food, and when the men do not hang their + cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they + will not return to their tents, you may know that they + are determined to fight to the death. + +35. The sight of men whispering together in small + knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection + amongst the rank and file. + +36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is + at the end of his resources; too many punishments betray + a condition of dire distress. + +37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright + at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. + +38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, + it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. + +39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain + facing ours for a long time without either joining + battle or taking themselves off again, the situation + is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. + +40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, + that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack + can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all + our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, + and obtain reinforcements. + +41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light + of his opponents is sure to be captured by them. + +42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown + attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, + unless submissive, then will be practically useless. + If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, + punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless. + +43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first + instance with humanity, but kept under control by means + of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory. + +44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually + enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, + its discipline will be bad. + +45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always + insists on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual. + + +X. TERRAIN + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, + to wit: (1) Accessible ground; (2) entangling ground; + (3) temporizing ground; (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous + heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy. + + 2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides + is called accessible. + + 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before + the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, + and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you + will be able to fight with advantage. + + 4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard + to re-occupy is called entangling. + + 5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy + is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. + But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you + fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, + disaster will ensue. + + 6. When the position is such that neither side will gain + by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground. + + 7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy + should offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable + not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing + the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has + come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. + + 8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy + them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await + the advent of the enemy. + + 9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, + do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, + but only if it is weakly garrisoned. + +10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are + beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the + raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. + +11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, + do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away. + +12. If you are situated at a great distance from + the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, + it is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be + to your disadvantage. + +13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. + The general who has attained a responsible post must be + careful to study them. + +14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, + not arising from natural causes, but from faults + for which the general is responsible. These are: + (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; + (5) disorganization; (6) rout. + +15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is + hurled against another ten times its size, the result + will be the flight of the former. + +16. When the common soldiers are too strong and + their officers too weak, the result is insubordination. + When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers + too weak, the result is collapse. + +17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, + and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account + from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief + can tell whether or not he is in a position to fight, + the result is ruin. + +18. When the general is weak and without authority; + when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there + are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men, + and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, + the result is utter disorganization. + +19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's + strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, + or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, + and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, + the result must be rout. + +20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must + be carefully noted by the general who has attained + a responsible post. + +21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's + best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary, + of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly + calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, + constitutes the test of a great general. + +22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts + his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. + He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely + be defeated. + +23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, + then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; + if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not + fight even at the ruler's bidding. + +24. The general who advances without coveting fame + and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only + thought is to protect his country and do good service + for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. + +25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they + will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them + as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you + even unto death. + +26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make + your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce + your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: + then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; + they are useless for any practical purpose. + +27. If we know that our own men are in a condition + to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open + to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. + +28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, + but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition + to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. + +29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, + and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, + but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes + fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway + towards victory. + +30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, + is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never + at a loss. + +31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and + know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; + if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your + victory complete. + + +XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: + (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; + (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; + (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; + (9) desperate ground. + + 2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, + it is dispersive ground. + + 3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, + but to no great distance, it is facile ground. + + 4. Ground the possession of which imports great + advantage to either side, is contentious ground. + + 5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement + is open ground. + + 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, + so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire + at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways. + + 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a + hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities + in its rear, it is serious ground. + + 8. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all + country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground. + + 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, + and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, + so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush + a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. + +10. Ground on which we can only be saved from + destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground. + +11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. + On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, + attack not. + +12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. + On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands + with your allies. + +13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. + In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. + +14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. + On desperate ground, fight. + +15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew + how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear; + to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; + to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, + the officers from rallying their men. + +16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed + to keep them in disorder. + +17. When it was to their advantage, they made + a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still. + +18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy + in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, + I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your + opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." + +19. Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of + the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, + and attack unguarded spots. + +20. The following are the principles to be observed + by an invading force: The further you penetrate into + a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, + and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. + +21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply + your army with food. + +22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, + and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard + your strength. Keep your army continually on the move, + and devise unfathomable plans. + +23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there + is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. + If they will face death, there is nothing they may + not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth + their uttermost strength. + +24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose + the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, + they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, + they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help + for it, they will fight hard. + +25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers + will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to + be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions, + they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can + be trusted. + +26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with + superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, + no calamity need be feared. + +27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, + it is not because they have a distaste for riches; + if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they + are disinclined to longevity. + +28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, + your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing + their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run + down their cheeks. But let them once be brought to bay, + and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei. + +29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the + shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found + in the ChUng mountains. Strike at its head, and you + will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you + will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, + and you will be attacked by head and tail both. + +30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, + I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men + of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river + in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come + to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. + +31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust + in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot + wheels in the ground + +32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set + up one standard of courage which all must reach. + +33. How to make the best of both strong and weak--that + is a question involving the proper use of ground. + +34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just + as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by + the hand. + +35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus + ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. + +36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men + by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them + in total ignorance. + +37. By altering his arrangements and changing + his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. + By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, + he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose. + +38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army + acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks + away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep + into hostile territory before he shows his hand. + +39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; + like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives + his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he + is going. + +40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this + may be termed the business of the general. + +41. The different measures suited to the nine + varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or + defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: + these are things that must most certainly be studied. + +42. When invading hostile territory, the general + principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; + penetrating but a short way means dispersion. + +43. When you leave your own country behind, and take + your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself + on critical ground. When there are means of communication + on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. + +44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is + serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, + it is facile ground. + +45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, + and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. + When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. + +46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire + my men with unity of purpose. On facile ground, I would + see that there is close connection between all parts + of my army. + +47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. + +48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye + on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, + I would consolidate my alliances. + +49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure + a continuous stream of supplies. On difficult ground, + I would keep pushing on along the road. + +50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way + of retreat. On desperate ground, I would proclaim + to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives. + +51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer + an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard + when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he + has fallen into danger. + +52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring + princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are + not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar + with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, + its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. + We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account + unless we make use of local guides. + +53. To be ignored of any one of the following four + or five principles does not befit a warlike prince. + +54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, + his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration + of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, + and their allies are prevented from joining against him. + +55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all + and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. + He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his + antagonists in awe. Thus he is able to capture their + cities and overthrow their kingdoms. + +56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, + issue orders without regard to previous arrangements; + and you will be able to handle a whole army as though + you had to do with but a single man. + +57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; + never let them know your design. When the outlook is bright, + bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when + the situation is gloomy. + +58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; + plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off + in safety. + +59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into + harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory. + +60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully + accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose. + +61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall + succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief. + +62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing + by sheer cunning. + +63. On the day that you take up your command, + block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, + and stop the passage of all emissaries. + +64. Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you + may control the situation. + +65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. + +66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, + and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. + +67. Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate + yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. + +68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, + until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate + the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late + for the enemy to oppose you. + + +XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking + with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; + the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn + baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; + the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. + + 2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have + means available. The material for raising fire should + always be kept in readiness. + + 3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, + and special days for starting a conflagration. + + 4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; + the special days are those when the moon is in the + constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing + or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind. + + 5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared + to meet five possible developments: + + 6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, + respond at once with an attack from without. + + 7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's + soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack. + + 8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, + follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; + if not, stay where you are. + + 9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire + from without, do not wait for it to break out within, + but deliver your attack at a favorable moment. + +10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. + Do not attack from the leeward. + +11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, + but a night breeze soon falls. + +12. In every army, the five developments connected with + fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, + and a watch kept for the proper days. + +13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; + those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. + +14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, + but not robbed of all his belongings. + +15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his + battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating + the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time + and general stagnation. + +16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his + plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources. + +17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not + your troops unless there is something to be gained; + fight not unless the position is critical. + +18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely + to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight + a battle simply out of pique. + +19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; + if not, stay where you are. + +20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may + be succeeded by content. + +21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can + never come again into being; nor can the dead ever + be brought back to life. + +22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, + and the good general full of caution. This is the way + to keep a country at peace and an army intact. + + +XIII. THE USE OF SPIES + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand + men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss + on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. + The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces + of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad, + and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. + As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded + in their labor. + + 2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, + striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. + This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's + condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred + ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height + of inhumanity. + + 3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present + help to his sovereign, no master of victory. + + 4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good + general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond + the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. + + 5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; + it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, + nor by any deductive calculation. + + 6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only + be obtained from other men. + + 7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: + (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; + (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. + + 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, + none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine + manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's + most precious faculty. + + 9. Having local spies means employing the services + of the inhabitants of a district. + +10. Having inward spies, making use of officials + of the enemy. + +11. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's + spies and using them for our own purposes. + +12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly + for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know + of them and report them to the enemy. + +13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring + back news from the enemy's camp. + +14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are + more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. + None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other + business should greater secrecy be preserved. + +15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain + intuitive sagacity. + +16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence + and straightforwardness. + +17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make + certain of the truth of their reports. + +18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every + kind of business. + +19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy + before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together + with the man to whom the secret was told. + +20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm + a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always + necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, + the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general + in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. + +21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us + must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and + comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted + spies and available for our service. + +22. It is through the information brought by the + converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ + local and inward spies. + +23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can + cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. + +24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving + spy can be used on appointed occasions. + +25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties + is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only + be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy. + Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated + with the utmost liberality. + +26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty was due to I + Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise + of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served + under the Yin. + +27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the + wise general who will use the highest intelligence of + the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve + great results. Spies are a most important element in water, + because on them depends an army's ability to move. + + +[END - Sun Tzu on the Art of War, text-only] + diff --git a/old/old/sunzu10.txt b/old/old/sunzu10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7508a19 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/sunzu10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6806 @@ +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. Do not remove this. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations* + +Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and +further information is included below. We need your donations. + + +Sun Tzu on The Art of War, by Lionel Giles (trans, ed) + +May, 1994 [Etext #132] +[Date last updated: November 22, 2003] + + +The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Art of War by Sun Tzu +*****This file should be named sunzu10.txt or sunzu10.zip***** + +Corrected EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, sunzu11.txt. +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, sunzu10a.txt. + + +We are now trying to release all our books one month in advance +of the official release dates, for time for better editing. We +have this as a goal to accomplish by the end of the year but we +cannot guarantee to stay that far ahead every month after that. + +Please note: neither this list nor its contents are final till +midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement. +The official release date of all Project Gutenberg Etexts is at +Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month. A +preliminary version may often be posted for suggestion, comment +and editing by those who wish to do so. To be sure you have an +up to date first edition [xxxxx10x.xxx] please check file sizes +in the first week of the next month. Since our ftp program has +a bug in it that scrambles the date [tried to fix and failed] a +look at the file size will have to do, but we will try to see a +new copy has at least one byte more or less. + + +Information about Project Gutenberg (one page) + +We produce about two million dollars for each hour we work. The +fifty hours is one conservative estimate for how long it we take +to get any etext selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright +searched and analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc. This +projected audience is one hundred million readers. If our value +per text is nominally estimated at one dollar then we produce $4 +million dollars per hour this year as we release some eight text +files per month: thus upping our productivity from $2 million. + +The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away One Trillion Etext +Files by the December 31, 2001. [10,000 x 100,000,000=Trillion] +This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million readers, +which is 10% of the expected number of computer users by the end +of the year 2001. + +We need your donations more than ever! + +All donations should be made to "Project Gutenberg/IBC", and are +tax deductible to the extent allowable by law ("IBC" is Illinois +Benedictine College). (Subscriptions to our paper newsletter go +to IBC, too) + +For these and other matters, please mail to: + +Project Gutenberg +P. O. Box 2782 +Champaign, IL 61825 + +When all other email fails try our Michael S. Hart, Executive +Director: +hart@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu (internet) hart@uiucvmd (bitnet) + +We would prefer to send you this information by email +(Internet, Bitnet, Compuserve, ATTMAIL or MCImail). + +****** +If you have an FTP program (or emulator), please +FTP directly to the Project Gutenberg archives: +[Mac users, do NOT point and click. . .type] + +ftp mrcnext.cso.uiuc.edu +login: anonymous +password: your@login +cd etext/etext91 +or cd etext92 +or cd etext93 +or cd etext94 [for new books] +or cd etext/articles [get suggest gut for more information] +dir [to see files] +get or mget [to get files. . .set bin for zip files] +GET 0INDEX.GUT +for a list of books +and +GET NEW GUT for general information +and +MGET GUT* for newsletters. + +**Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor** +(Three Pages) + + +***START**THE SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS**START*** +Why is this "Small Print!" statement here? You know: lawyers. +They tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with +your copy of this etext, even if you got it for free from +someone other than us, and even if what's wrong is not our +fault. So, among other things, this "Small Print!" statement +disclaims most of our liability to you. It also tells you how +you can distribute copies of this etext if you want to. + +*BEFORE!* YOU USE OR READ THIS ETEXT +By using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm +etext, you indicate that you understand, agree to and accept +this "Small Print!" statement. If you do not, you can receive +a refund of the money (if any) you paid for this etext by +sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the person +you got it from. If you received this etext on a physical +medium (such as a disk), you must return it with your request. + +ABOUT PROJECT GUTENBERG-TM ETEXTS +This PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG- +tm etexts, is a "public domain" work distributed by Professor +Michael S. Hart through the Project Gutenberg Association at +Illinois Benedictine College (the "Project"). Among other +things, this means that no one owns a United States copyright +on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and +distribute it in the United States without permission and +without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth +below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this etext +under the Project's "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark. + +To create these etexts, the Project expends considerable +efforts to identify, transcribe and proofread public domain +works. Despite these efforts, the Project's etexts and any +medium they may be on may contain "Defects". Among other +things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other +intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged +disk or other etext medium, a computer virus, or computer +codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment. + +LIMITED WARRANTY; DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES +But for the "Right of Replacement or Refund" described below, +[1] the Project (and any other party you may receive this +etext from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext) disclaims all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including +legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR +UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT, +INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE +OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE +POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. + +If you discover a Defect in this etext within 90 days of +receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) +you paid for it by sending an explanatory note within that +time to the person you received it from. If you received it +on a physical medium, you must return it with your note, and +such person may choose to alternatively give you a replacement +copy. If you received it electronically, such person may +choose to alternatively give you a second opportunity to +receive it electronically. + +THIS ETEXT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU "AS-IS". NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS +TO THE ETEXT OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT +LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A +PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Some states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or +the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, so the +above disclaimers and exclusions may not apply to you, and you +may have other legal rights. + +INDEMNITY +You will indemnify and hold the Project, its directors, +officers, members and agents harmless from all liability, cost +and expense, including legal fees, that arise directly or +indirectly from any of the following that you do or cause: +[1] distribution of this etext, [2] alteration, modification, +or addition to the etext, or [3] any Defect. + +DISTRIBUTION UNDER "PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm" +You may distribute copies of this etext electronically, or by +disk, book or any other medium if you either delete this +"Small Print!" and all other references to Project Gutenberg, +or: + +[1] Only give exact copies of it. Among other things, this + requires that you do not remove, alter or modify the + etext or this "small print!" statement. You may however, + if you wish, distribute this etext in machine readable + binary, compressed, mark-up, or proprietary form, + including any form resulting from conversion by word pro- + cessing or hypertext software, but only so long as + *EITHER*: + + [*] The etext, when displayed, is clearly readable, and + does *not* contain characters other than those + intended by the author of the work, although tilde + (~), asterisk (*) and underline (_) characters may + be used to convey punctuation intended by the + author, and additional characters may be used to + indicate hypertext links; OR + + [*] The etext may be readily converted by the reader at + no expense into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent + form by the program that displays the etext (as is + the case, for instance, with most word processors); + OR + + [*] You provide, or agree to also provide on request at + no additional cost, fee or expense, a copy of the + etext in its original plain ASCII form (or in EBCDIC + or other equivalent proprietary form). + +[2] Honor the etext refund and replacement provisions of this + "Small Print!" statement. + +[3] Pay a trademark license fee to the Project of 20% of the + net profits you derive calculated using the method you + already use to calculate your applicable taxes. If you + don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are + payable to "Project Gutenberg Association / Illinois + Benedictine College" within the 60 days following each + date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare) + your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return. + +WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO? +The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, +scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty +free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution +you can think of. Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg +Association / Illinois Benedictine College". + +This "Small Print!" by Charles B. Kramer, Attorney +Internet (72600.2026@compuserve.com); TEL: (212-254-5093) +*END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR + + THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD + + Translated from the Chinese with Introduction + and Critical Notes + + BY + + LIONEL GILES, M.A. + + Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. + in the British Museum + + First Published in 1910 + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + + To my brother + Captain Valentine Giles, R.G. + in the hope that + a work 2400 years old + may yet contain lessons worth consideration + by the soldier of today + this translation + is affectionately dedicated. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +Preface to the Project Gutenburg Etext +-------------------------------------- + + When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF +WAR, the work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction +to Europe began in 1782 when a French Jesuit Father living in +China, Joseph Amiot, acquired a copy of it, and translated it +into French. It was not a good translation because, according to +Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great deal that Sun Tzu did not +write, and very little indeed of what he did." + The first translation into English was published in 1905 in +Tokyo by Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation +is, in the words of Dr. Giles, "excessively bad." He goes +further in this criticism: "It is not merely a question of +downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly exempt. +Omissions were frequent; hard passages were willfully distorted +or slurred over. Such offenses are less pardonable. They would +not be tolerated in any edition of a Latin or Greek classic, and +a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in +translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt. +Calthrop's translation was published in London. It was an +improvement on the first -- omissions filled up and numerous +mistakes corrected -- but new errors were created in the process. +Dr. Giles, in justifying his translation, wrote: "It was not +undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; but I +could not help feeling that Sun Tzu deserved a better fate than +had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly +fail to improve on the work of my predecessors." + Clearly, Dr. Giles' work established much of the groundwork +for the work of later translators who published their own +editions. Of the later editions of the ART OF WAR I have +examined; two feature Giles' edited translation and notes, the +other two present the same basic information from the ancient +Chinese commentators found in the Giles edition. Of these four, +Giles' 1910 edition is the most scholarly and presents the reader +an incredible amount of information concerning Sun Tzu's text, +much more than any other translation. + The Giles' edition of the ART OF WAR, as stated above, was a +scholarly work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time +and an assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and +Manuscripts in the British Museum. Apparently he wanted to +produce a definitive edition, superior to anything else that +existed and perhaps something that would become a standard +translation. It was the best translation available for 50 years. +But apparently there was not much interest in Sun Tzu in English- +speaking countries since it took the start of the Second +World War to renew interest in his work. Several people +published unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzu. In +1944, Dr. Giles' translation was edited and published in the +United States in a series of military science books. But it +wasn't until 1963 that a good English translation (by Samuel B. +Griffith and still in print) was published that was an equal to +Giles' translation. While this translation is more lucid than +Dr. Giles' translation, it lacks his copious notes that make his +so interesting. + Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of +the Chinese civilization and language. It contains the Chinese +text of Sun Tzu, the English translation, and voluminous notes +along with numerous footnotes. Unfortunately, some of his notes +and footnotes contain Chinese characters; some are completely +Chinese. Thus, a conversion to a Latin alphabet etext was +difficult. I did the conversion in complete ignorance of Chinese +(except for what I learned while doing the conversion). Thus, I +faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it while retaining as +much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase +represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of +the text as possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese +concordance, I was able to transliterate proper names, books, and +the like at the risk of making the text more obscure. However, +the text, on the whole, is quite satisfactory for the casual +reader, a transformation made possible by conversion to an etext. +However, I come away from this task with the feeling of loss +because I know that someone with a background in Chinese can do a +better job than I did; any such attempt would be welcomed. + + Bob Sutton + al876@cleveland.freenet.edu + bobs@gnu.ai.mit.edu + +----------------------------------------------------------------- +INTRODUCTION + + +Sun Wu and his Book +------------------- + + + Ssu-ma Ch`ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzu: [1] +-- + + Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Ch`i State. His ART OF + WAR brought him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho + Lu said to him: "I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. + May I submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight + test?" + Sun Tzu replied: "You may." + Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" + The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements + were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzu + divided them into two companies, and placed one of the King's + favorite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them + all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: "I + presume you know the difference between front and back, right + hand and left hand?" + The girls replied: Yes. + Sun Tzu went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must + look straight ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face + towards your left hand. When I say "Right turn," you must + face towards your right hand. When I say "About turn," you + must face right round towards your back." + Again the girls assented. The words of command having + been thus explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes + in order to begin the drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he + gave the order "Right turn." But the girls only burst out + laughing. Sun Tzu said: "If words of command are not clear + and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then + the general is to blame." + So he started drilling them again, and this time gave + the order "Left turn," whereupon the girls once more burst + into fits of laughter. Sun Tzu: "If words of command are + not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly + understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders ARE + clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the + fault of their officers." + So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies + to be beheaded. Now the king of Wu was watching the scene + from the top of a raised pavilion; and when he saw that his + favorite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly + alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: "We + are now quite satisfied as to our general's ability to handle + troops. If We are bereft of these two concubines, our meat + and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish that they + shall not be beheaded." + Sun Tzu replied: "Having once received His Majesty's + commission to be the general of his forces, there are certain + commands of His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am + unable to accept." + Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and + straightway installed the pair next in order as leaders in + their place. When this had been done, the drum was sounded + for the drill once more; and the girls went through all the + evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching + ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect + accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then + Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your soldiers, + Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for + your majesty's inspection. They can be put to any use that + their sovereign may desire; bid them go through fire and + water, and they will not disobey." + But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling + and return to camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down + and inspect the troops." + Thereupon Sun Tzu said: "The King is only fond of + words, and cannot translate them into deeds." + After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzu was one who knew how + to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the + west, he defeated the Ch`u State and forced his way into + Ying, the capital; to the north he put fear into the States + of Ch`i and Chin, and spread his fame abroad amongst the + feudal princes. And Sun Tzu shared in the might of the King. + + About Sun Tzu himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch`ien has to +tell us in this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of +his descendant, Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his +famous ancestor's death, and also the outstanding military genius +of his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzu, and in +his preface we read: "Sun Tzu had his feet cut off and yet +continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It seems likely, then, +that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, +unless the story was invented in order to account for the name. +The crowning incident of his career, the crushing defeat of his +treacherous rival P`ang Chuan, will be found briefly related in +Chapter V. ss. 19, note. + To return to the elder Sun Tzu. He is mentioned in two +other passages of the SHIH CHI: -- + + In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of + Wu, took the field with Tzu-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P`ei, + and attacked Ch`u. He captured the town of Shu and slew the + two prince's sons who had formerly been generals of Wu. He + was then meditating a descent on Ying [the capital]; but the + general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It is not yet + possible. We must wait".... [After further successful + fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu + addressed Wu Tzu-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you + declared that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. + Is the time ripe now?" The two men replied: "Ch`u's general + Tzu-ch`ang, [4] is grasping and covetous, and the princes of + T`ang and Ts`ai both have a grudge against him. If Your + Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win + over T`ang and Ts`ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu + followed this advice, [beat Ch`u in five pitched battles and + marched into Ying.] [5] + + This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun +Wu. He does not appear to have survived his patron, who died +from the effects of a wound in 496. + In another chapter there occurs this passage: [6] + + From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers + arose, one after the other: Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by + the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] in the service of Ch`i; and Sun + Wu, in the service of Wu. These men developed and threw + light upon the principles of war. + + It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch`ien at least had no +doubt about the reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and +with one exception, to be noticed presently, he is by far the +most important authority on the period in question. It will not +be necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as the WU +YUEH CH`UN CH`IU, which is supposed to have been written by Chao +Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution is somewhat +doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of +little value, based as it is on the SHIH CHI and expanded with +romantic details. The story of Sun Tzu will be found, for what +it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth +noting are: (1) Sun Tzu was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu +Tzu-hsu. (2) He is called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously +lived a retired life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his +ability. + The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzu: "When +sovereign and ministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible +even for a Sun Tzu to encounter the foe." Assuming that this +work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast upon it), we +have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzu, for Huai-nan +Tzu died in 122 B.C., many years before the SHIH CHI was given to +the world. + Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzu at the +head of 30,000 men beat Ch`u with 200,000 is that the latter were +undisciplined." + Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was +bestowed on Sun Wu's grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch`i [547-490 +B.C.]. Sun Wu's father Sun P`ing, rose to be a Minister of State +in Ch`i, and Sun Wu himself, whose style was Ch`ang-ch`ing, fled +to Wu on account of the rebellion which was being fomented by the +kindred of T`ien Pao. He had three sons, of whom the second, +named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. According to this account +then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering that Sun +Pin's victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed +as chronological impossible. Whence these data were obtained by +Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course no reliance whatever +can be placed in them. + An interesting document which has survived from the close of +the Han period is the short preface written by the Great Ts`ao +Ts`ao, or Wei Wu Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzu. I shall give it +in full: -- + + I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to + their advantage. [10] The SHU CHU mentions "the army" among + the "eight objects of government." The I CHING says: + "'army' indicates firmness and justice; the experienced + leader will have good fortune." The SHIH CHING says: "The + King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshaled his + troops." The Yellow Emperor, T`ang the Completer and Wu Wang + all used spears and battle-axes in order to succor their + generation. The SSU-MA FA says: "If one man slay another of + set purpose, he himself may rightfully be slain." He who + relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated; he + who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish. + Instances of this are Fu Ch`ai [11] on the one hand and Yen + Wang on the other. [12] In military matters, the Sage's rule + is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only + when occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless + driven to it by necessity. + Many books have I read on the subject of war and + fighting; but the work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest + of them all. [Sun Tzu was a native of the Ch`i state, his + personal name was Wu. He wrote the ART OF WAR in 13 chapters + for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were tested on women, + and he was subsequently made a general. He led an army + westwards, crushed the Ch`u state and entered Ying the + capital. In the north, he kept Ch`i and Chin in awe. A + hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was + a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment of deliberation + and planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the field, + [14] clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun Tzu + stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My + contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full + meaning of his instructions, and while putting into practice + the smaller details in which his work abounds, they have + overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive which + has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. + + One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit +statement that the 13 chapters were specially composed for King +Ho Lu. This is supported by the internal evidence of I. ss. 15, +in which it seems clear that some ruler is addressed. + In the bibliographic section of the HAN SHU, there is an +entry which has given rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun +Tzu of Wu in 82 P`IEN (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 CHUAN." +It is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to +Ssu-ma Ch`ien, or those we possess today. Chang Shou-chieh +refers to an edition of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR of which the "13 +chapters" formed the first CHUAN, adding that there were two +other CHUAN besides. This has brought forth a theory, that the +bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tzu +-- we should call them apocryphal -- similar to the WEN TA, of +which a specimen dealing with the Nine Situations [15] is +preserved in the T`UNG TIEN, and another in Ho Shin's commentary. +It is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzu had +only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of +exegesis in the form of question and answer between himself and +the King. Pi I-hsun, the author of the SUN TZU HSU LU, backs +this up with a quotation from the WU YUEH CH`UN CH`IU: "The King +of Wu summoned Sun Tzu, and asked him questions about the art of +war. Each time he set forth a chapter of his work, the King +could not find words enough to praise him." As he points out, if +the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the above- +mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail +to be considerable. Then the numerous other treatises attributed +to Sun Tzu might be included. The fact that the HAN CHIH +mentions no work of Sun Tzu except the 82 P`IEN, whereas the Sui +and T`ang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition to +the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that all of +these were contained in the 82 P`IEN. Without pinning our faith +to the accuracy of details supplied by the WU YUEH CH`UN CH`IU, +or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi +I-hsun, we may see in this theory a probable solution of the +mystery. Between Ssu-ma Ch`ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of +time for a luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up under the +magic name of Sun Tzu, and the 82 P`IEN may very well represent a +collected edition of these lumped together with the original +work. It is also possible, though less likely, that some of them +existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely +ignored by him. [16] + Tu Mu's conjecture seems to be based on a passage which +states: "Wei Wu Ti strung together Sun Wu's Art of War," which +in turn may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the final +words of Ts`ao King's preface. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points +out, is only a modest way of saying that he made an explanatory +paraphrase, or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the +whole, this theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, +the SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU says: "The mention of the 13 chapters in +the SHIH CHI shows that they were in existence before the HAN +CHIH, and that latter accretions are not to be considered part of +the original work. Tu Mu's assertion can certainly not be taken +as proof." + There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters +existed in the time of Ssu-ma Ch`ien practically as we have them +now. That the work was then well known he tells us in so many +words. "Sun Tzu's 13 Chapters and Wu Ch`i's Art of War are the +two books that people commonly refer to on the subject of +military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I will +not discuss them here." But as we go further back, serious +difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact which has to be +faced is that the TSO CHUAN, the greatest contemporary record, +makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as a general or as +a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, +that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun +Wu as given in the SHIH CHI, but even show themselves frankly +skeptical as to the existence of the man at all. The most +powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in +the following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17] -- + + It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch`ien's history that Sun Wu was + a native of the Ch`i State, and employed by Wu; and that in + the reign of Ho Lu he crushed Ch`u, entered Ying, and was a + great general. But in Tso's Commentary no Sun Wu appears at + all. It is true that Tso's Commentary need not contain + absolutely everything that other histories contain. But Tso + has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling + ruffians such as Ying K`ao-shu, [18] Ts`ao Kuei, [19], Chu + Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of Sun Wu, whose + fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much + more glaring. Again, details are given, in their due order, + about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P`ei. [21] + Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been passed + over? + In point of literary style, Sun Tzu's work belongs to + the same school as KUAN TZU, [22] LIU T`AO, [23] and the YUEH + YU [24] and may have been the production of some private + scholar living towards the end of the "Spring and Autumn" or + the beginning of the "Warring States" period. [25] The story + that his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is + merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his followers. + From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] + down to the time of the "Spring and Autumn," all military + commanders were statesmen as well, and the class of + professional generals, for conducting external campaigns, did + not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six + States" [27] that this custom changed. Now although Wu was + an uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso should have + left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and + yet held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about + Jang-chu [28] and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the + reckless fabrication of theorizing pundits. The story of Ho + Lu's experiment on the women, in particular, is utterly + preposterous and incredible. + + Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch`ien as having said that +Sun Wu crushed Ch`u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. +No doubt the impression left on the reader's mind is that he at +least shared in these exploits. The fact may or may not be +significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the SHIH CHI +either that Sun Tzu was general on the occasion of the taking of +Ying, or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know +that Wu Yuan and Po P`ei both took part in the expedition, and +also that its success was largely due to the dash and enterprise +of Fu Kai, Ho Lu's younger brother, it is not easy to see how yet +another general could have played a very prominent part in the +same campaign. + Ch`en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note: -- + + Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their + art. But the fact that he does not appear in the TSO CHUAN, + although he is said to have served under Ho Lu King of Wu, + makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to. + +He also says: -- + + The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch`i may be of genuine + antiquity. + + It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch`en Chen-sun, +while rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma +Ch`ien's history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally +assigned to the work which passes under his name. The author of +the HSU LU fails to appreciate this distinction, and consequently +his bitter attack on Ch`en Chen-sun really misses its mark. He +makes one of two points, however, which certainly tell in favor +of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters." "Sun Tzu," he says, +"must have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519-476], because he +is frequently plagiarized in subsequent works of the Chou, Ch`in +and Han dynasties." The two most shameless offenders in this +respect are Wu Ch`i and Huai-nan Tzu, both of them important +historical personages in their day. The former lived only a +century after the alleged date of Sun Tzu, and his death is known +to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu +Hsiang, that Tseng Shen delivered the TSO CHUAN, which had been +entrusted to him by its author. [29] Now the fact that +quotations from the ART OF WAR, acknowledged or otherwise, are to +be found in so many authors of different epochs, establishes a +very strong anterior to them all, -- in other words, that Sun +Tzu's treatise was already in existence towards the end of the +5th century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzu's antiquity is +furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to +a number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might +perhaps be extended, is given in the HSU LU; and though some of +the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly +affected thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui- +hsin, a scholar and critic of the first rank, deliberately +pronounces the style of the 13 chapters to belong to the early +part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually engaged in +an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be +sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a +later date had he not honestly believed the contrary. And it is +precisely on such a point that the judgment of an educated +Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal evidence is not +far to seek. Thus in XIII. ss. 1, there is an unmistakable +allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already +passed away by the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it +revived in a modified form. [30] The only warfare Sun Tzu knows +is that carried on between the various feudal princes, in which +armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have +entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks +as a man of Wu, a state which ceased to exist as early as 473 +B.C. On this I shall touch presently. + + But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and +the chances of its being other than a bona fide production are +sensibly diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come +until long after. That it should have been forged in the period +immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no one, +as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for +Yeh Shui-hsin's theory, that the author was a literary recluse, +that seems to me quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent +than another after reading the maxims of Sun Tzu, it is that +their essence has been distilled from a large store of personal +observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of a +born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, +but also of a practical soldier closely acquainted with the +military conditions of his time. To say nothing of the fact that +these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest +captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination of +freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite +excludes the idea that they were artificially concocted in the +study. If we admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine +production of a military man living towards the end of the "CH`UN +CH`IU" period, are we not bound, in spite of the silence of the +TSO CHUAN, to accept Ssu-ma Ch`ien's account in its entirety? In +view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not +hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu's +biography were false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must +be in the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, +objection to the chronology involved in the story as told in the +SHIH CHI, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed +out. There are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he alludes to +contemporary affairs. The first in in VI. ss. 21: -- + + Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh + exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing + in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be + achieved. + +The other is in XI. ss. 30: -- + + Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN, I + should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh + are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same + boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each + other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. + + These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of +the date of composition. They assign the work to the period of +the struggle between Wu and Yueh. So much has been observed by +Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped notice is that they +also seriously impair the credibility of Ssu-ma Ch`ien's +narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive date given +in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken of as a +general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his +alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken place, and +of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier still. +But at that time, and for several years after, down to the +capture of Ying in 506, Ch`u and not Yueh, was the great +hereditary enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch`u and Wu, had been +constantly at war for over half a century, [31] whereas the first +war between Wu and Yueh was waged only in 510, [32] and even then +was no more than a short interlude sandwiched in the midst of the +fierce struggle with Ch`u. Now Ch`u is not mentioned in the 13 +chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were written +at a time when Yueh had become the prime antagonist of Wu, that +is, after Ch`u had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At +this point, a table of dates may be found useful. + +B.C. | + | +514 | Accession of Ho Lu. +512 | Ho Lu attacks Ch`u, but is dissuaded from entering Ying, + | the capital. SHI CHI mentions Sun Wu as general. +511 | Another attack on Ch`u. +510 | Wu makes a successful attack on Yueh. This is the first + | war between the two states. +509 | + or | Ch`u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at Yu-chang. +508 | +506 | Ho Lu attacks Ch`u with the aid of T`ang and Ts`ai. + | Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last + | mention of Sun Wu in SHIH CHI. +505 | Yueh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu + | is beaten by Ch`in and evacuates Ying. +504 | Ho Lu sends Fu Ch`ai to attack Ch`u. +497 | Kou Chien becomes King of Yueh. +496 | Wu attacks Yueh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at Tsui-li. + | Ho Lu is killed. +494 | Fu Ch`ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of Fu- + | chaio, and enters the capital of Yueh. +485 | + or | Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzu-hsu. +484 | +482 | Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch`ai. +478 | + to | Further attacks by Yueh on Wu. +476 | +475 | Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu. +473 | Final defeat and extinction of Wu. + + The sentence quoted above from VI. ss. 21 hardly strikes me +as one that could have been written in the full flush of victory. +It seems rather to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide +had turned against Wu, and that she was getting the worst of the +struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was not in +existence in 505, before which date Yueh does not appear to have +scored any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so +that if the book was written for him, it must have been during +the period 505-496, when there was a lull in the hostilities, Wu +having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort against Ch`u. +On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition +connecting Sun Wu's name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have +seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period +482-473, when Yueh was once again becoming a very serious menace. +[33] We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may +have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. +On this point the negative testimony of the TSO CHUAN far +outweighs any shred of authority still attaching to the SHIH CHI, +if once its other facts are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, +makes a feeble attempt to explain the omission of his name from +the great commentary. It was Wu Tzu-hsu, he says, who got all +the credit of Sun Wu's exploits, because the latter (being an +alien) was not rewarded with an office in the State. + How then did the Sun Tzu legend originate? It may be that +the growing celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of +factitious renown to its author. It was felt to be only right +and proper that one so well versed in the science of war should +have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture +of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu's +reign; it made a deep and lasting impression on all the +surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of +her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than that +the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly +identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense +that his brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was +actually carried out by him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po +P`ei and Fu Kai? + It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the +outline of Sun Tzu's life must be based almost wholly on +conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I should say that he +probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu's +accession, and gathered experience, though only in the capacity +of a subordinate officer, during the intense military activity +which marked the first half of the prince's reign. [35] If he +rose to be a general at all, he certainly was never on an equal +footing with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless present +at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu's +sudden collapse in the following year. Yueh's attack at this +critical juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, +seems to have convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the +great enemy against whom every effort would henceforth have to be +directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he sat +down to write his famous book, which according to my reckoning +must have appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning of +Ho Lu's reign. The story of the women may possibly have grown +out of some real incident occurring about the same time. As we +hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is hardly +likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the +death-struggle with Yueh, which began with the disaster at Tsui- +li. + If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a +certain irony in the fate which decreed that China's most +illustrious man of peace should be contemporary with her greatest +writer on war. + + +The Text of Sun Tzu +------------------- + + + I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of +Sun Tzu's text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to +show that the "13 chapters" of which Ssu-ma Ch`ien speaks were +essentially the same as those now extant. We have his word for +it that they were widely circulated in his day, and can only +regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account. +Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface: -- + + During the Ch`in and Han dynasties Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR + was in general use amongst military commanders, but they seem + to have treated it as a work of mysterious import, and were + unwilling to expound it for the benefit of posterity. Thus + it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary + on it. + + As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to +suppose that Ts`ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text +itself is often so obscure, and the number of editions which +appeared from that time onward so great, especially during the +T`ang and Sung dynasties, that it would be surprising if numerous +corruptions had not managed to creep in. Towards the middle of +the Sung period, by which time all the chief commentaries on Sun +Tzu were in existence, a certain Chi T`ien-pao published a work +in 15 CHUAN entitled "Sun Tzu with the collected commentaries of +ten writers." There was another text, with variant readings put +forward by Chu Fu of Ta-hsing, which also had supporters among +the scholars of that period; but in the Ming editions, Sun Hsing- +yen tells us, these readings were for some reason or other no +longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th +century, the text in sole possession of the field was one derived +from Chi T`ien-pao's edition, although no actual copy of that +important work was known to have survived. That, therefore, is +the text of Sun Tzu which appears in the War section of the great +Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the KU CHIN T`U SHU CHI +CH`ENG. Another copy at my disposal of what is practically the +same text, with slight variations, is that contained in the +"Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch`in dynasties" [1758]. +And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop's first edition is +evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese +channels. So things remained until Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a +distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, who claimed to +be an actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered a +copy of Chi T`ien-pao's long-lost work, when on a visit to the +library of the Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the I +SHUO of Cheng Yu-Hsien, mentioned in the T`UNG CHIH, and also +believed to have perished. This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates +as the "original edition (or text)" -- a rather misleading name, +for it cannot by any means claim to set before us the text of Sun +Tzu in its pristine purity. Chi T`ien-pao was a careless +compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the +somewhat debased version current in his day, without troubling to +collate it with the earliest editions then available. +Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzu, even older than the newly +discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the T`UNG TIEN, +Tu Yu's great treatise on the Constitution, the other similarly +enshrined in the T`AI P`ING YU LAN encyclopedia. In both the +complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments, +intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a +number of different sections. Considering that the YU LAN takes +us back to the year 983, and the T`UNG TIEN about 200 years +further still, to the middle of the T`ang dynasty, the value of +these early transcripts of Sun Tzu can hardly be overestimated. +Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to +anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government instructions, +undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his own +account: -- + + Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu + which his editors had handed down, the Government ordered + that the ancient edition [of Chi T`ien-pao] should be used, + and that the text should be revised and corrected throughout. + It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a + graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to + this study, probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I + have had the whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for + military men. + + The three individuals here referred to had evidently been +occupied on the text of Sun Tzu prior to Sun Hsing-yen's +commission, but we are left in doubt as to the work they really +accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when ultimately +produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one co- +editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original edition" as their +basis, and by careful comparison with older versions, as well as +the extant commentaries and other sources of information such as +the I SHUO, succeeded in restoring a very large number of +doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be +accepted as the closes approximation we are ever likely to get to +Sun Tzu's original work. This is what will hereafter be +denominated the "standard text." + The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. +it is in 6 PEN, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early +philosophical works in 83 PEN. [38] It opens with a preface by +Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating +the traditional view of Sun Tzu's life and performances, and +summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its +favor. This is followed by Ts`ao Kung's preface to his edition, +and the biography of Sun Tzu from the SHIH CHI, both translated +above. Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien's I SHUO, [39] with +author's preface, and next, a short miscellany of historical and +bibliographical information entitled SUN TZU HSU LU, compiled by +Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate +sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then +by the various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in +chronological order. These we shall now proceed to discuss +briefly, one by one. + + +The Commentators +---------------- + + + Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll +of commentators, which would do honor to any classic. Ou-yang +Hsiu remarks on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was +complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by saying that the +artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be +susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways. + + 1. TS`AO TS`AO or Ts`ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti +[A.D. 155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the +earliest commentary on Sun Tzu actually came from the pen of this +extraordinary man, whose biography in the SAN KUO CHIH reads like +a romance. One of the greatest military geniuses that the world +has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his operations, he was +especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches, which +has found expression in the line "Talk of Ts`ao Ts`ao, and Ts`ao +Ts`ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a great +captain who "measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and +the two Yuan, father and son, and vanquished them all; whereupon +he divided the Empire of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself +king. It is recorded that whenever a council of war was held by +Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all his +calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not +lose one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any +particular saw their armies incontinently beaten and put to +flight." Ts`ao Kung's notes on Sun Tzu, models of austere +brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic of the stern commander +known to history, that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as +the work of a mere LITTERATEUR. Sometimes, indeed, owing to +extreme compression, they are scarcely intelligible and stand no +less in need of a commentary than the text itself. [40] + + 2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us +under this name is comparatively meager, and nothing about the +author is known. Even his personal name has not been recorded. +Chi T`ien-pao's edition places him after Chia Lin,and Ch`ao Kung- +wu also assigns him to the T`ang dynasty, [41] but this is a +mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen's preface, he appears as Meng Shih of +the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would identify him with Meng +K`ang of the 3rd century. He is named in one work as the last of +the "Five Commentators," the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch`en +Hao and Chia Lin. + + 3. LI CH`UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on +military tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down +to the present day. The T`UNG CHIH mentions "Lives of famous +generals from the Chou to the T`ang dynasty" as written by him. +[42] According to Ch`ao Kung-wu and the T`IEN-I-KO catalogue, he +followed a variant of the text of Sun Tzu which differs +considerably from those now extant. His notes are mostly short +and to the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by +anecdotes from Chinese history. + + 4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary +on Sun Tzu, his notes being taken from the T`UNG TIEN, the +encyclopedic treatise on the Constitution which was his life- +work. They are largely repetitions of Ts`ao Kung and Meng Shih, +besides which it is believed that he drew on the ancient +commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar +arrangement of T`UNG TIEN, he has to explain each passage on its +merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his own explanation +does not agree with that of Ts`ao Kung, whom he always quotes +first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the "Ten +Commentators," he was added to their number by Chi T`ien-pao, +being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. + + 5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet -- a +bright star even in the glorious galaxy of the T`ang period. We +learn from Ch`ao Kung-wu that although he had no practical +experience of war, he was extremely fond of discussing the +subject, and was moreover well read in the military history of +the CH`UN CH`IU and CHAN KUO eras. His notes, therefore, are +well worth attention. They are very copious, and replete with +historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzu's work is thus +summarized by him: "Practice benevolence and justice, but on the +other hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency." +He further declared that all the military triumphs and disasters +of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Tzu's death +would, upon examination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in +every particular, the maxims contained in his book. Tu Mu's +somewhat spiteful charge against Ts`ao Kung has already been +considered elsewhere. + + 6. CH`EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. +Ch`ao Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary +on Sun Tzu because Ts`ao Kung's on the one hand was too obscure +and subtle, and that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and +diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the middle of the 11th +century, calls Ts`ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch`en Hao the three chief +commentators on Sun Tzu, and observes that Ch`en Hao is +continually attacking Tu Mu's shortcomings. His commentary, +though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of his +predecessors. + + 7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T`ang dynasty, +for his commentary on Sun Tzu is mentioned in the T`ang Shu and +was afterwards republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty +together with those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat +scanty texture, and in point of quality, too, perhaps the least +valuable of the eleven. + + 8. MEI YAO-CH`EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" +as Mei Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His +commentary was published with a laudatory preface by the great +Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the following: -- + + Later scholars have misread Sun Tzu, distorting his + words and trying to make them square with their own one-sided + views. Thus, though commentators have not been lacking, only + a few have proved equal to the task. My friend Sheng-yu has + not fallen into this mistake. In attempting to provide a + critical commentary for Sun Tzu's work, he does not lose + sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states + engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not + concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the + sovereigns of the three ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the + nine punitive measures prescribed to the Minister of War. + [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning + is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or + handling soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling + the forces of victory, it is always systematically treated; + the sayings are bound together in strict logical sequence, + though this has been obscured by commentators who have + probably failed to grasp their meaning. In his own + commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the obstinate + prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out the + true meaning of Sun Tzu himself. In this way, the clouds of + confusion have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I + am convinced that the present work deserves to be handed down + side by side with the three great commentaries; and for a + great deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations + will have constant reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu. + + Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am +inclined to endorse this favorable judgment, and would certainly +place him above Ch`en Hao in order of merit. + + 9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly +original in some of his interpretations, but much less judicious +than Mei Yao-ch`en, and on the whole not a very trustworthy +guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary with that of +Ts`ao Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to him. +We learn from Ch`ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient +text of Sun Tzu, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes. [45] + + 10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of +this commentator is given as above by Cheng Ch`iao in the TUNG +CHIH, written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he +appears simply as Ho Shih in the YU HAI, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes +Ch`ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is unknown. There +seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch`iao's statement, +otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and +identify him with one Ho Ch`u-fei, the author of a short treatise +on war, who lived in the latter part of the 11th century. Ho +Shih's commentary, in the words of the T`IEN-I-KO catalogue, +"contains helpful additions" here and there, but is chiefly +remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from +the dynastic histories and other sources. + + 11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no +great originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of +lucid exposition. His commentator is based on that of Ts`ao +Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to expand and develop in +masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much +of Ts`ao Kung's commentary would have remained cloaked in its +pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not +mentioned in the Sung history, the T`UNG K`AO, or the YU HAI, but +it finds a niche in the T`UNG CHIH, which also names him as the +author of the "Lives of Famous Generals." [46] + It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all +have flourished within so short a space of time. Ch`ao Kung-wu +accounts for it by saying: "During the early years of the Sung +dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased +to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao's rebellion +came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after +time, the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, +and military topics became the vogue amongst all the high +officials. Hence it is that the commentators of Sun Tzu in our +dynasty belong mainly to that period. [47] + + Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others +whose work has not come down to us. The SUI SHU mentions four, +namely Wang Ling (often quoted by Tu Yu as Wang Tzu); Chang Tzu- +shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; [48] and Shen Yu of Wu. The T`ANG SHU +adds Sun Hao, and the T`UNG CHIH Hsiao Chi, while the T`U SHU +mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that +some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of +other commentaries, like Chi T`ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned +above. + + +Appreciations of Sun Tzu +------------------------ + + + Sun Tzu has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of +some of China's greatest men. Among the famous generals who are +known to have studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned +Han Hsin (d. 196 B.C.), [49] Feng I (d. 34 A.D.), [50] Lu Meng +(d. 219), [51] and Yo Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of Ts`ao +Kung, who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese +military annals, has already been recorded. [53] Still more +remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of purely literary men, +such as Su Hsun (the father of Su Tung-p`o), who wrote several +essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief +inspiration to Sun Tzu. The following short passage by him is +preserved in the YU HAI: [54] -- + + Sun Wu's saying, that in war one cannot make certain of + conquering, [55] is very different indeed from what other + books tell us. [56] Wu Ch`i was a man of the same stamp as + Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and they are linked + together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu Ch`i's + remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and + more crudely stated, and there is not the same unity of plan + as in Sun Tzu's work, where the style is terse, but the + meaning fully brought out. + + The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in +the Garden of Literature" by Cheng Hou: -- + + Sun Tzu's 13 chapters are not only the staple and base + of all military men's training, but also compel the most + careful attention of scholars and men of letters. His + sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, + perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the LUN + YU, the I CHING and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the + writings of Mencius, Hsun K`uang and Yang Chu, all fall below + the level of Sun Tzu. + + Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of +the criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with +the venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says, +"encourages a ruler's bent towards unrelenting warfare and +reckless militarism." + + +Apologies for War +----------------- + + + Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest +peace-loving nation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting +that her experience of war in all its phases has also been such +as no modern State can parallel. Her long military annals +stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of +time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge +standing army along her frontier centuries before the first Roman +legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the perpetual +collisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts with +Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of +government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the +overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions +and minor disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out +again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that the clash of +arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the +Empire. + No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains +to whom China can point with pride. As in all countries, the +greatest are fond of emerging at the most fateful crises of her +history. Thus, Po Ch`i stands out conspicuous in the period when +Ch`in was entering upon her final struggle with the remaining +independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up +of the Ch`in dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius +of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its +fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts`ao Ts`ao dominates the +scene. And in the establishment of the T`ang dynasty,one of the +mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li +Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T`ai Tsung) was seconded by the +brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear +comparison with the greatest names in the military history of +Europe. + In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, +from Lao Tzu downwards, and especially as reflected in the +standard literature of Confucianism, has been consistently +pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any form. It is +such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending +warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to +collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view +is upheld. The following, by Ssu-ma Ch`ien, shows that for all +his ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of +peace at any price: -- + + Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to + punish violence and cruelty, to give peace to troublous + times, to remove difficulties and dangers, and to succor + those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins + and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How + much more so will man, who carries in his breast the + faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger! When he is + pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him; when + angry, his poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the + natural law which governs his being.... What then shall be + said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great + issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who + can only bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and + "civilization," condemning the use of military weapons? They + will surely bring our country to impotence and dishonor and + the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, + they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of + territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately + refuse to modify the position they have taken up. The truth + is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare the + rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, + so military chastisement can never be allowed to fall into + abeyance in the Empire. All one can say is that this power + will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and + that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others + rebellious. [58] + + The next piece is taken from Tu Mu's preface to his +commentary on Sun Tzu: -- + + War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the + functions of government. It was the profession of Chung Yu + and Jan Ch`iu, both disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the + holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the imprisonment + of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market- + place, are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge + armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the hauling of + women and children into captivity, and the beheading of + traitors -- this is also work which is done by officials. + The objects of the rack and of military weapons are + essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference + between the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in + war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily + dealt with, only a small amount of force need be employed: + hence the use of military weapons and wholesale decapitation. + In both cases, however, the end in view is to get rid of + wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good.... + Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired + your military aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu + replied: "It has been acquired by study." [59] "How can + that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a disciple of + Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by + Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should exercise + both civil and military functions, though to be sure my + instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very + far." + Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction + between the "civil" and the "military," and the limitation of + each to a separate sphere of action, or in what year of which + dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say. + But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the + governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on military + topics, or do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are + bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set down + as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. + This is an extraordinary instance in which, through sheer + lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose sight of fundamental + principles. + When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch`eng Wang, he + regulated ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts + of scholarship and learning; yet when the barbarians of the + River Huai revolted, [60] he sallied forth and chastised + them. When Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a + meeting was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If pacific + negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should + have been made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the + Marquis of Ch`i, who cowered under him and dared not proceed + to violence. How can it be said that these two great Sages + had no knowledge of military matters? + + We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzu in high +esteem. He also appeals to the authority of the Classics: -- + + Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: + "I have never studied matters connected with armies and + battalions." [62] Replying to K`ung Wen-tzu, he said: I + have not been instructed about buff-coats and weapons." But + if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he used + armed force against the men of Lai, so that the marquis of + Ch`i was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi + revolted, the ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon + they were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered + the words: "If I fight, I conquer." [63] And Jan Yu also + said: "The Sage exercises both civil and military + functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never + studied or received instruction in the art of war? We can + only say that he did not specially choose matters connected + with armies and fighting to be the subject of his teaching. + + Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzu, writes in similar +strain: -- + + Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." + [65] He also said: "If I fight, I conquer." Confucius + ordered ceremonies and regulated music. Now war constitutes + one of the five classes of State ceremonial, [66] and must + not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the + words "I am unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are + things which even an inspired Teacher does not know. Those + who have to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn + the art of war. But if one can command the services of a + good general like Sun Tzu, who was employed by Wu Tzu-hsu, + there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the remark added + by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." + The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret + these words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though + he meant that books on the art of war were not worth reading. + With blind persistency, they adduce the example of Chao Kua, + who pored over his father's books to no purpose, [67] as a + proof that all military theory is useless. Again, seeing + that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism + in designing plans, and the conversion of spies, they hold + that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people + ignore the fact that the studies of our scholars and the + civil administration of our officials also require steady + application and practice before efficiency is reached. The + ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to + botch their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting + perilous; and useless unless a general is in constant + practice, he ought not to hazard other men's lives in battle. + [70] Hence it is essential that Sun Tzu's 13 chapters should + be studied. + Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the + art of war. Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general + bearings, but would not pursue his studies to their proper + outcome, the consequence being that he was finally defeated + and overthrown. He did not realize that the tricks and + artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang + of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to destruction by + their misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand + nature of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem + suited to the occasion. There is a case on record of + Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath, [72] and + also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. [73] Can + we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzu for disregarding truth and + honesty? + + +Bibliography +------------ + + + The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after +Sun Tzu. The notes on each have been drawn principally from the +SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU CHIEN MING MU LU, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. + + 1. WU TZU, in 1 CHUAN or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch`i (d. 381 +B.C.). A genuine work. See SHIH CHI, ch. 65. + + 2. SSU-MA FA, in 1 CHUAN or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed +to Ssu-ma Jang-chu of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, +must be early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are +constantly to be met within its pages. See SHIH CHI, ch. 64. + The SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the +oldest three treatises on war, SUN TZU, WU TZU and SSU-MA FA, +are, generally speaking, only concerned with things strictly +military -- the art of producing, collecting, training and +drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures +of expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the handling +of soldiers -- in strong contrast to later works, in which the +science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, divination +and magical arts in general. + + 3. LIU T`AO, in 6 CHUAN, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu +Wang (or Lu Shang, also known as T`ai Kung) of the 12th century +B.C. [74] But its style does not belong to the era of the Three +Dynasties. Lu Te-ming (550-625 A.D.) mentions the work, and +enumerates the headings of the six sections so that the forgery +cannot have been later than Sui dynasty. + + 4. WEI LIAO TZU, in 5 CHUAN. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th +cent. B.C.), who studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzu. The work +appears to have been originally in 31 chapters, whereas the text +we possess contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the +main, though the strategical devices differ considerably from +those of the Warring States period. It is been furnished with a +commentary by the well-known Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. + + 5. SAN LUEH, in 3 CHUAN. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a +legendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang +Liang (d. 187 B.C.) in an interview on a bridge. But here again, +the style is not that of works dating from the Ch`in or Han +period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently quotes +from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question +may have been inserted later on, in order to prove the +genuineness of the work. We shall not be far out if we refer it +to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], or somewhat earlier. + + 6. LI WEI KUNG WEN TUI, in 3 sections. Written in the form +of a dialogue between T`ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, +it is usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities +consider it a forgery, though the author was evidently well +versed in the art of war. + + 7. LI CHING PING FA (not to be confounded with the +foregoing) is a short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the +T`ung Tien, but not published separately. This fact explains its +omission from the SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU. + + 8. WU CH`I CHING, in 1 CHUAN. Attributed to the legendary +minister Feng Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the +Han dynasty (d. 121 B.C.), and said to have been eulogized by the +celebrated general Ma Lung (d. 300 A.D.). Yet the earliest +mention of it is in the SUNG CHIH. Although a forgery, the work +is well put together. + + Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko +Liang has always been held, it is not surprising to find more +than one work on war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the SHIH +LIU TS`E (1 CHUAN), preserved in the YUNG LO TA TIEN; (2) CHIANG +YUAN (1 CHUAN); and (3) HSIN SHU (1 CHUAN), which steals +wholesale from Sun Tzu. None of these has the slightest claim to +be considered genuine. + Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive +sections devoted to the literature of war. The following +references may be found useful: -- + + T`UNG TIEN (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162. + T`AI P`ING YU LAN (983), ch. 270-359. + WEN HSIEN TUNG K`AO (13th cent.), ch. 221. + YU HAI (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141. + SAN TS`AI T`U HUI (16th cent). + KUANG PO WU CHIH (1607), ch. 31, 32. + CH`IEN CH`IO LEI SHU (1632), ch. 75. + YUAN CHIEN LEI HAN (1710), ch. 206-229. + KU CHIN T`U SHU CHI CH`ENG (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81- + 90. + HSU WEN HSIEN T`UNG K`AO (1784), ch. 121-134. + HUANG CH`AO CHING SHIH WEN PIEN (1826), ch. 76, 77. + + The bibliographical sections of certain historical works +also deserve mention: -- + + CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 30. + SUI SHU, ch. 32-35. + CHIU T`ANG SHU, ch. 46, 47. + HSIN T`ANG SHU, ch. 57,60. + SUNG SHIH, ch. 202-209. + T`UNG CHIH (circa 1150), ch. 68. + + To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the +Imperial Library: -- + + SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU TSUNG MU T`I YAO (1790), ch. 99, 100. + + +Footnotes +--------- + + +1. SHI CHI, ch. 65. + +2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. + +3. SHI CHI, ch. 130. + +4. The appellation of Nang Wa. + +5. SHI CHI, ch. 31. + +6. SHI CHI, ch. 25. + +7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year +637. + +8. Wang-tzu Ch`eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. + +9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a +work of the Han dynasty, which says: "Ten LI outside the WU gate +[of the city of Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great +mound, raised to commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch`i, +who excelled in the art of war, by the King of Wu." + +10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened +wood to make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the +Empire in awe." + +11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and +overthrown by Kou chien, King of Yueh, in 473 B.C. See post. + +12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen +says in his preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction." + +13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the T`U +SHU, and may be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang +Shou-chieh of the T`ang dynasty, and appears in the T`AI P`ING YU +LAN. + +14. Ts`ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. +II, perhaps especially of ss. 8. + +15. See chap. XI. + +16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that WU TZU, which is +not in 6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the HAN CHIH. +Likewise, the CHUNG YUNG is credited with 49 chapters, though now +only in one only. In the case of very short works, one is +tempted to think that P`IEN might simply mean "leaves." + +17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. + +18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. + +19. See Chapter 7, ss. 27 and Chapter 11, ss. 28. + +20. See Chapter 11, ss. 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form +of his name. + +21. I.e. Po P`ei. See ante. + +22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large +additions have been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 +B.C. + +23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. + +24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter +of another work. Why that chapter should be singled out, +however, is not clear. + +25. About 480 B.C. + +26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. + +27. In the 3rd century B.C. + +28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T`ien, lived in the +latter half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have +written a work on war. See SHIH CHI, ch. 64, and infra at the +beginning of the INTRODUCTION. + +29. See Legge's Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge +thinks that the TSO CHUAN must have been written in the 5th +century, but not before 424 B.C. + +30. See MENCIUS III. 1. iii. 13-20. + +31. When Wu first appears in the CH`UN CH`IU in 584, it is +already at variance with its powerful neighbor. The CH`UN CH`IU +first mentions Yueh in 537, the TSO CHUAN in 601. + +32. This is explicitly stated in the TSO CHUAN, XXXII, 2. + +33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud +would tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus +more fully justify the language used in XI. ss. 30. + +34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse: -- a +spurious treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because +he was a great general. Here we have an obvious inducement to +forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, cannot have been widely +known to fame in the 5th century. + +35. From TSO CHUAN: "From the date of King Chao's accession +[515] there was no year in which Ch`u was not attacked by Wu." + +36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are +really descended from Sun Tzu. I am ashamed to say that I only +read my ancestor's work from a literary point of view, without +comprehending the military technique. So long have we been +enjoying the blessings of peace!" + +37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T`ung-kuan on the eastern +border of Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by +those about the ascent of the Western Sacred Mountain. It is +mentioned in a text as being "situated five LI east of the +district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the Hua-shan +tablet inscribed by the T`ang Emperor Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." + +38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. +40. + +39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzu. + +40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His +commentary is frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does +not fully develop the meaning." + +41. WEN HSIEN T`UNG K`AO, ch. 221. + +42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently +discovered chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos +of the Thousand Buddhas." See B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. +525. + +43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named +was nominally existent in Sun Tzu's day, it retained hardly a +vestige of power, and the old military organization had +practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other +explanation of the passage. + +44. See CHOU LI, xxix. 6-10. + +45. T`UNG K`AO, ch. 221. + +46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie's "Notes," p. 91 +(new edition). + +47. T`UNG K`AO, loc. cit. + +48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the +SAN KUO CHIH, ch. 10. + +49. See XI. ss. 58, note. + +50. HOU HAN SHU, ch. 17 ad init. + +51. SAN KUO CHIH, ch. 54. + +52. SUNG SHIH, ch. 365 ad init. + +53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of +acquainting themselves with Sun Tzu are not behindhand in their +praise. In this connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting +from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the +present work were submitted previous to publication: "Many of +Sun Wu's maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and +no. 11 [in Chapter VIII] is one that the people of this country +would do well to take to heart." + +54. Ch. 140. + +55. See IV. ss. 3. + +56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. + +57. The TSO CHUAN. + +58. SHIH CHI, ch. 25, fol. I. + +59. Cf. SHIH CHI, ch 47. + +60. See SHU CHING, preface ss. 55. + +61. See SHIH CHI, ch. 47. + +62. Lun Yu, XV. 1. + +63. I failed to trace this utterance. + +64. Supra. + +65. Supra. + +66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of +guests, and festive rites. See SHU CHING, ii. 1. III. 8, and +CHOU LI, IX. fol. 49. + +67. See XIII. ss. 11, note. + +68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the TSO CHUAN, where +Tzu-ch`an says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you +will not employ a mere learner to make it up." + +69. Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 31. + +70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See LUN +YU, XIII. 29, 30. + +71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. + +72. SHIH CHI, ch. 47. + +73. SHIH CHI, ch. 38. + +74. See XIII. ss. 27, note. Further details on T`ai Kung will +be found in the SHIH CHI, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition +which makes him a former minister of Chou Hsin, two other +accounts of him are there given, according to which he would +appear to have been first raised from a humble private station by +Wen Wang. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +I. LAYING PLANS + + [Ts`ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the +title of this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the +temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we +should say, in his tent. See. ss. 26.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to +the State. + 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to +safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on +no account be neglected. + 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant +factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when +seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. + 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; +(4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline. + + [It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu means by "Moral +Law" a principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its +moral aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale," +were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in ss. 13.] + + 5, 6. The MORAL LAW causes the people to be in complete +accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless +of their lives, undismayed by any danger. + + [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant +practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when +mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will +be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] + + 7. HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and +seasons. + + [The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of +two words here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, +waxing and waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in +saying that what is meant is "the general economy of Heaven," +including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, +and other phenomena.] + + 8. EARTH comprises distances, great and small; danger and +security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and +death. + 9. The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of wisdom, +sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness. + + [The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity +or benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self- +control, or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good +faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or +benevolence," and the two military virtues of "courage" and +"strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self- +respect, self-control, or 'proper feeling.'"] + + 10. By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the +marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the +graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads +by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military +expenditure. + 11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: +he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will +fail. + 12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to +determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of +a comparison, in this wise: -- + 13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the +Moral law? + + [I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. ss. 5.] + + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and +Earth? + + [See ss. 7,8] + + (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? + + [Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts`ao Ts`ao (A.D. +155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in +accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to +standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed +him horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of +losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice +by cutting off his hair. Ts`ao Ts`ao's own comment on the +present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a +law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the +offender must be put to death."] + + (5) Which army is stronger? + + [Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch`en puts it, +freely rendered, "ESPIRIT DE CORPS and 'big battalions.'"] + + (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? + + [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant +practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when +mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will +be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] + + (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in +reward and punishment? + + [On which side is there the most absolute certainty that +merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] + + 14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast +victory or defeat. + 15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon +it, will conquer: --let such a one be retained in command! The +general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will +suffer defeat: --let such a one be dismissed! + + [The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's +treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho +Lu, king of the Wu State.] + + 16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself +also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary +rules. + 17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should +modify one's plans. + + [Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the +"bookish theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to +abstract principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main +laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of +all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in +attempting to secure a favorable position in actual warfare." On +the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the +cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what +his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he +explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and +would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The +Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first +tomorrow -- I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. +"Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea +of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can +you expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ] + + 18. All warfare is based on deception. + + [The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be +admitted by every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that +Wellington, great in so many military qualities, was especially +distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he concealed +his movements and deceived both friend and foe."] + + 19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when +using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we +must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we +must make him believe we are near. + 20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, +and crush him. + + [All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in +disorder, crush him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu +is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.] + + 21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If +he is in superior strength, evade him. + 22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to +irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. + + [Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician +plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first +feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon +him.] + + 23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. + + [This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch`en has the +note: "while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire +himself out." The YU LAN has "Lure him on and tire him out."] + +If his forces are united, separate them. + + [Less plausible is the interpretation favored by most of the +commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put +division between them."] + + 24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are +not expected. + 25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be +divulged beforehand. + 26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many +calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. + + [Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary +for a temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was +about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate +his plan of campaign.] + +The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations +beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few +calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It +is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to +win or lose. + + +[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +II. WAGING WAR + + + [Ts`ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must +first count the cost," which prepares us for the discovery that +the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the +title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are +in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, +and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, + + [The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to +Chang Yu, used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, +and designed for purposes of defense. Li Ch`uan, it is true, +says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable. +It is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese +warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war- +chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus +round which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers. With +regard to the numbers given here, we are informed that each swift +chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy chariot by +25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a +thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a +hundred men.] + +with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI, + + [2.78 modern LI go to a mile. The length may have varied +slightly since Sun Tzu's time.] + +the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment +of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on +chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of +silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 +men. + 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long +in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will +be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your +strength. + 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of +the State will not be equal to the strain. + 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, +your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains +will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, +however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must +ensue. + 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, +cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. + + [This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained +by any of the commentators. Ts`ao Kung, Li Ch`uan, Meng Shih, Tu +Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en have notes to the effect that a +general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer +through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be +stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and +treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they +bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty +by remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, +wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the +people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such +calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be +attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness." +Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by +implication, about ill-considered haste being better than +ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something +much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be +injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish -- if +only because it means impoverishment to the nation. In +considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic example +of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That +general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that +of Hannibals's isolated army, because it seemed to him that the +latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a +strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his +tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their +reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a +negative presumption in their favor.] + + 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from +prolonged warfare. + 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the +evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of +carrying it on. + + [That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous +effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of +rapidity in bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem +to favor this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of +the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know the +evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly +pointless.] + + 8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, +neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. + + [Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in +waiting for reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for +fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. +This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all +great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the +value of time -- that is, being a little ahead of your opponent -- +has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the +nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.] + + 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the +enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs. + + [The Chinese word translated here as "war material" +literally means "things to be used", and is meant in the widest +sense. It includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from +provisions.] + + 10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be +maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to +maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be +impoverished. + + [The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly +with the next, though obviously intended to do so. The +arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help +suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur +to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for +the sense, and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words +Sun Tzu used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment +clearly have reference to some system by which the husbandmen +sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why +should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except +because the State or Government is too poor to do so?] + + 11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes +prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to +be drained away. + + [Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left +its own territory. Ts`ao Kung understands it of an army that has +already crossed the frontier.] + + 12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry +will be afflicted by heavy exactions. + 13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of +strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and +three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; + + [Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted +not of 3/10, but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to +be extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: +"The PEOPLE being regarded as the essential part of the State, +and FOOD as the people's heaven, is it not right that those in +authority should value and be careful of both?"] + +while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, +breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, +protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to +four-tenths of its total revenue. + 15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the +enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to +twenty of one's own, and likewise a single PICUL of his provender +is equivalent to twenty from one's own store. + + [Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of +transporting one cartload to the front. A PICUL is a unit of +measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).] + + 16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused +to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, +they must have their rewards. + + [Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the +soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you +capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so +that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his +own account."] + + 17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more +chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the +first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the +enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with +ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. + 18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment +one's own strength. + 19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not +lengthy campaigns. + + [As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled +with." Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this +chapter is intended to enforce."] + + 20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the +arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether +the nation shall be in peace or in peril. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best +thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to +shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to +recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a +regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. + + [The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, +consisted nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts`ao Kung, the +equivalent of a regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a +detachment consists from any number between 100 and 500, and the +equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last +two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 +respectively.] + + 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not +supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the +enemy's resistance without fighting. + + [Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words +of the old Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the +capitulation of the huge French army at Sedan, was won +practically without bloodshed.] + + 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the +enemy's plans; + + [Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full +force of the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of +defense, whereby one might be content to foil the enemy's +stratagems one after another, but an active policy of counter- +attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the +enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate +him by delivering our own attack first."] + +the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; + + [Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun +Tzu, in speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous +states or principalities into which the China of his day was +split up.] + +the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; + + [When he is already at full strength.] + +and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. + + 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can +possibly be avoided. + + [Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers +acted upon it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their +strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is +more than probable that they would have been masters of the +situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose +them.] + + The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various +implements of war, will take up three whole months; + + [It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here +translated as "mantlets", described. Ts`ao Kung simply defines +them as "large shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li +Ch`uan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were +assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to +suggest a sort of Roman TESTUDO, ready made. Tu Mu says they +were wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is +denied by Ch`en Hao. See supra II. 14. The name is also applied +to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable shelters" we get a +fairly clear description from several commentators. They were +wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from +within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey +parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling +up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now +called "wooden donkeys."] + +and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take +three months more. + + [These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to +the level of the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak +points in the defense, and also to destroy the fortified turrets +mentioned in the preceding note.] + + 5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will +launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, + + [This vivid simile of Ts`ao Kung is taken from the spectacle +of an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the +general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature +attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready.] + +with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the +town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a +siege. + + [We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese +before Port Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to +record.] + + 6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops +without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying +siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy +operations in the field. + + [Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but +does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, +who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed +"Father and mother of the people."] + + 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of +the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be +complete. + + [Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the +latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different +meaning: "And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its +keenness remains perfect."] + +This is the method of attacking by stratagem. + 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the +enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; + + [Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] + +if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. + + [Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, +indeed, it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. +Ts'ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning: "Being +two to the enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the +regular way, and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu +thus further elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as +numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two +divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon +his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed +from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in +front." This is what is meant by saying that 'one part may be +used in the regular way, and the other for some special +diversion.' Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one's army +is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is the regular, +strategical method, and he is too hasty in calling this a +mistake."] + + 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; + + [Li Ch`uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following +paraphrase: "If attackers and attacked are equally matched in +strength, only the able general will fight."] + +if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; + + [The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is certainly a great +improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be +no very good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that +the saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a small +difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by +superior energy and discipline.] + +if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. + 10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small +force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force. + 11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the +bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if +the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak. + + [As Li Ch`uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; +if the general's ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not +thoroughly versed in his profession), his army will lack +strength."] + + 12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring +misfortune upon his army:-- + 13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, +being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called +hobbling the army. + + [Li Ch`uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the +legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One +would naturally think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at +home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a +distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse, and +quote the saying of T`ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be +governed from without, and army should not be directed from +within." Of course it is true that, during an engagement, or +when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in +the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. +Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, +and give wrong orders.] + + 14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as +he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which +obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's +minds. + + [Ts`ao Kung's note is, freely translated: "The military +sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle +an army in kid gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and +justice are the principles on which to govern a state, but not an +army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are +military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of +an army"--to that of a State, understood.] + + 15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without +discrimination, + + [That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the +right place.] + +through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to +circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. + + [I follow Mei Yao-ch`en here. The other commentators refer +not to the ruler, as in SS. 13, 14, but to the officers he +employs. Thus Tu Yu says: "If a general is ignorant of the +principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a +position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skillful employer of +men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, +and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing +his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the +covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man +has no fear of death."] + + 16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble +is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply +bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away. + 17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for +victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to +fight. + + [Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the +offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the +defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is +right to take the offensive or the defensive.] + + (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and +inferior forces. + + [This is not merely the general's ability to estimate +numbers correctly, as Li Ch`uan and others make out. Chang Yu +expounds the saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of +war, it is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and +vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not +letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu says: 'With a +superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make +for difficult ground.'"] + + (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit +throughout all its ranks. + (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the +enemy unprepared. + (5) He will win who has military capacity and is not +interfered with by the sovereign. + + [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "It is the sovereign's +function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it +is the function of the general." It is needless to dilate on the +military disasters which have been caused by undue interference +with operations in the field on the part of the home government. +Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to +the fact that he was not hampered by central authority.] + + 18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know +yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If +you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you +will also suffer a defeat. + + [Li Ch`uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch`in, who +in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. +When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the +services of such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch`ung, he boastfully +replied: "I have the population of eight provinces at my back, +infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they +could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their +whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" +Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at +the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.] + +If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in +every battle. + + [Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the +offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the +defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret of defense; defense +is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a better +epitome of the root-principle of war.] + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS + + + [Ts`ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for +the title of this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the +part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's +condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the dispositions of an +army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your +dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads +to victory,; show your dispositions, and your condition will +become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the +good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to meet +those of the enemy."] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put +themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for +an opportunity of defeating the enemy. + 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own +hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by +the enemy himself. + + [That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's part.] + + 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against +defeat, + + [Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition +of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting +precautions."] + +but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. + 4. Hence the saying: One may KNOW how to conquer without +being able to DO it. + 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; +ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. + + [I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1-3, +in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. +The meaning they give, "He who cannot conquer takes the +defensive," is plausible enough.] + + 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient +strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. + 7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most +secret recesses of the earth; + + [Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a +metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that +the enemy may not know his whereabouts."] + +he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost +heights of heaven. + + [Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary +like a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. +This is the opinion of most of the commentators.] + +Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the +other, a victory that is complete. + 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the +common herd is not the acme of excellence. + + [As Ts`ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant +before it has germinated," to foresee the event before the action +has begun. Li Ch`uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when +about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao, which was +strongly entrenched in the city of Ch`eng-an, said to his +officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and +shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words +seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had +already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem, +whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and +inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] + + 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and +conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!" + + [True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, +to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk +his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding +a drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things +that + "the world's coarse thumb + And finger fail to plumb."] + + 10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; + + ["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is +finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a +very common one in Chinese writers.] + +to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the +noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. + + [Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight +and quick hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 +stone; Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see +objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih K`uang, a blind +musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.] + + 11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who +not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. + + [The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in +easy conquering." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "He who only sees the +obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the +surface of things, wins with ease."] + + 12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for +wisdom nor credit for courage. + + [Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories +are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the +world as large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation +for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there +has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."] + + 13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. + + [Ch`en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he +devises no futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus +explained by Chang Yu: "One who seeks to conquer by sheer +strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is +also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look +into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, +will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win."] + +Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, +for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. + 14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position +which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for +defeating the enemy. + + [A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. +"Position" need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by +the troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations +which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his +army.] + + 15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only +seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is +destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory. + + [Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay +plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to +battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute +strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."] + + 16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and +strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his +power to control success. + 17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, +Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, +Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. + 18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of +quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; +Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of +chances. + + [It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly +in the Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement +of the ground, which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's +strength, and to make calculations based on the data thus +obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or comparison +of the enemy's chances with our own; if the latter turn the +scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third +term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a +calculation of NUMBERS, thereby making it nearly synonymous with +the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as +a consideration of the enemy's general position or condition, +while the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. +On the other hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative +strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources +of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, but +weakens it. However, it points to the third term as being a +calculation of numbers.] + + 19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a +pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. + + [Literally, "a victorious army is like an I (20 oz.) weighed +against a SHU (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a SHU weighed against +an I." The point is simply the enormous advantage which a +disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralized +by defeat." Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes +the I to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi's statement +that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch`uan of the T`ang dynasty +here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.] + + 20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting +of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +V. ENERGY + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same +principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question +of dividing up their numbers. + + [That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, +etc., with subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu +reminds us of Han Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor, +who once said to him: "How large an army do you think I could +lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" +asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more the better."] + + 2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise +different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a +question of instituting signs and signals. + 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt +of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken - this is effected by +maneuvers direct and indirect. + + [We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun +Tzu's treatise, the discussion of the CHENG and the CH`I." As it +is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two +terms, or to render them consistently by good English +equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of the +commentators' remarks on the subject before proceeding further. +Li Ch`uan: "Facing the enemy is CHENG, making lateral diversion +is CH`I. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your troops +should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure +victory abnormal maneuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-ch`en: +"CH`I is active, CHENG is passive; passivity means waiting for an +opportunity, activity beings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We +must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one +that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus CHENG may also be +CH`I, and CH`I may also be CHENG." He instances the famous +exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against Lin- +chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across +the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his +opponent. [Ch`ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, the march +on Lin-chin was CHENG, and the surprise maneuver was CH`I." +Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: +"Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of CH`I +and CHENG. Wei Liao Tzu [4th cent. B.C.] says: 'Direct warfare +favors frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.' +Ts`ao Kung says: 'Going straight out to join battle is a direct +operation; appearing on the enemy's rear is an indirect +maneuver.' Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: 'In war, +to march straight ahead is CHENG; turning movements, on the other +hand, are CH`I.' These writers simply regard CHENG as CHENG, and +CH`I as CH`I; they do not note that the two are mutually +interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a +circle [see infra, ss. 11]. A comment on the T`ang Emperor T`ai +Tsung goes to the root of the matter: 'A CH`I maneuver may be +CHENG, if we make the enemy look upon it as CHENG; then our real +attack will be CH`I, and vice versa. The whole secret lies in +confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.'" +To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other +operation is CHENG, on which the enemy has had his attention +fixed; whereas that is CH`I," which takes him by surprise or +comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a +movement which is meant to be CH`I," it immediately becomes +CHENG."] + + 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone +dashed against an egg - this is effected by the science of weak +points and strong. + 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for +joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to +secure victory. + + [Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either +by pounding the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear." A +brilliant example of "indirect tactics" which decided the +fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round the +Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. [1] + + 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible +as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; +like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four +seasons, they pass away to return once more. + + [Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of +CH`I and CHENG." But at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of CHENG +at all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a +clause relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as +has already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably +interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot really be +considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in +figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great +leader.] + + 7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the +combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can +ever be heard. + 8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, +yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce +more hues than can ever been seen. + 9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, +acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more +flavors than can ever be tasted. + 10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of +attack - the direct and the indirect; yet these two in +combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. + 11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in +turn. It is like moving in a circle - you never come to an end. +Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination? + 12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which +will even roll stones along in its course. + 13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of +a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. + + [The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the +context it is used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu +Mu defines this word as "the measurement or estimation of +distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the illustrative +simile in ss. 15. Applying this definition to the falcon, it +seems to me to denote that instinct of SELF RESTRAINT which keeps +the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, +together with the power of judging when the right moment has +arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly +important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very +instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" +went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, +she was for several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell +before replying with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he +was within close range, when the broadside he brought to bear +worked fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships.] + + 14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his +onset, and prompt in his decision. + + [The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement +of distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before +striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use +the word in a figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short +and sharp." Cf. Wang Hsi's note, which after describing the +falcon's mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just how the +'psychological moment' should be seized in war."] + + 15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; +decision, to the releasing of a trigger. + + [None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of +the simile of energy and the force stored up in the bent cross- +bow until released by the finger on the trigger.] + + 16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be +seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion +and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be +proof against defeat. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The subdivisions of the army having +been previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the +separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will +take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance of +disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may +be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and +yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."] + + 17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, +simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates +strength. + + [In order to make the translation intelligible, it is +necessary to tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the +original. Ts`ao Kung throws out a hint of the meaning in his +brief note: "These things all serve to destroy formation and +conceal one's condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite +plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the +enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to +display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have +extreme courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to +make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding +strength."] + + 18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a +question of subdivision; + + [See supra, ss. 1.] + +concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of +latent energy; + + [The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word +here differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu +says: "seeing that we are favorably circumstanced and yet make +no move, the enemy will believe that we are really afraid."] + +masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical +dispositions. + + [Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the +first Han Emperor: "Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out +spies to report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, +forewarned, carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and +well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated +cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one and all +recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone +opposed them, saying: "When two countries go to war, they are +naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their +strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and +infirmity. This is surely some ruse on the part of the enemy, +and it would be unwise for us to attack." The Emperor, however, +disregarding this advice, fell into the trap and found himself +surrounded at Po-teng."] + + 19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the +move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the +enemy will act. + + [Ts`ao Kung's note is "Make a display of weakness and want." +Tu Mu says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy's, +weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if +inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order +that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy's movements should +be determined by the signs that we choose to give him." Note the +following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 +B.C., the Ch`i State being at war with Wei, sent T`ien Chi and +Sun Pin against the general P`ang Chuan, who happened to be a +deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The Ch`i +State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary +despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account." +Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into Wei +territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first +night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. +P`ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these +men of Ch`i were cowards: their numbers have already fallen away +by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow +defile, with he calculated that his pursuers would reach after +dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed +upon it the words: "Under this tree shall P`ang Chuan die." +Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers +in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they saw a +light. Later on, P`ang Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing +the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written on it. +His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his +whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu's version +of the story; the SHIH CHI, less dramatically but probably with +more historical truth, makes P`ang Chuan cut his own throat with +an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.] ] + +He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. + + 20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then +with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. + + [With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, +"He lies in wait with the main body of his troops."] + + 21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined +energy, and does not require too much from individuals. + + [Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his +army in the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into +account, and uses each men according to his capabilities. He +does not demand perfection from the untalented."] + +Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined +energy. + 22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men +become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is +the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level +ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to +a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. + + [Ts`au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent +power."] + + 23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as +the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands +of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy. + + [The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's opinion, is +the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden +rushes. "Great results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with +small forces."] + + +[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG + + + [Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as +follows: "Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the +offensive and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with +direct and indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself +first with the theory of attack and defense, and then turns his +attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of +varying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the +subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or +indirect methods arises out of attack and defense, and the +perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above +methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the +chapter on Energy."] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits +the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is +second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive +exhausted. + 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the +enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. + + [One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own +terms or fights not at all. [1] ] + + 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy +to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can +make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. + + [In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the +second, he will strike at some important point which the enemy +will have to defend.] + + 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; + + [This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- +Ch`en's interpretation of I. ss. 23.] + +if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly +encamped, he can force him to move. + 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; +march swiftly to places where you are not expected. + 6. An army may march great distances without distress, if +it marches through country where the enemy is not. + + [Ts`ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. +like "a bolt from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun +places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters."] + + 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you +only attack places which are undefended. + + [Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that +is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or the +soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the +precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or +provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst +themselves."] + +You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold +positions that cannot be attacked. + + [I.e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned +above. There is rather a nice point involved in the +interpretation of this later clause. Tu Mu, Ch`en Hao, and Mei +Yao-ch`en assume the meaning to be: "In order to make your +defense quite safe, you must defend EVEN those places that are +not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, +then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the +clause balances less well with the preceding--always a +consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural +to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the +mark in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from +the topmost heights of heaven [see IV. ss. 7], making it +impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so, +the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy +cannot defend.... He who is skilled in defense hides in the most +secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy +to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I +shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."] + + 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent +does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose +opponent does not know what to attack. + + [An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] + + 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we +learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; + + [Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of +course with reference to the enemy.] + +and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. + 10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you +make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from +pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. + 11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an +engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and +a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he +will be obliged to relieve. + + [Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can +cut his line of communications and occupy the roads by which he +will have to return; if we are the invaders, we may direct our +attack against the sovereign himself." It is clear that Sun Tzu, +unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in +frontal attacks.] + + 12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy +from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be +merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw +something odd and unaccountable in his way. + + [This extremely concise expression is intelligibly +paraphrased by Chia Lin: "even though we have constructed +neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch`uan says: "we puzzle him by +strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches the +meaning by three illustrative anecdotes--one of Chu-ko Liang, who +when occupying Yang-p`ing and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I, +suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of the drums, and +flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in +sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding +had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, +actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzu is +advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the +timely use of "bluff."] + + 13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining +invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while +the enemy's must be divided. + + [The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu +(after Mei Yao-ch`en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy's +dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body; +whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will +be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack +from every quarter."] + + 14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must +split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted +against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be +many to the enemy's few. + 15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force +with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits. + 16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made +known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible +attack at several different points; + + [Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's +victories by saying that "while his opponents were kept fully +employed wondering what he was going to do, HE was thinking most +of what he was going to do himself."] + +and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the +numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be +proportionately few. + 17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken +his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; +should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should +he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends +reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. + + [In Frederick the Great's INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS we +read: "A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent +detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience +attempt to protect every point, while those who are better +acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object +in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small +misfortunes to avoid greater."] + + 18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against +possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our +adversary to make these preparations against us. + + [The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's words, is "to +compel the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate +superior force against each fraction in turn."] + + 19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we +may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. + + [What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation +of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which +enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and +rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the +right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in +overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions +which military history records, one of the most dramatic and +decisive was the appearance of Blucher just at the critical +moment on the field of Waterloo.] + + 20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left +wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally +impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, +or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest +portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and +even the nearest are separated by several LI! + + [The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in +precision, but the mental picture we are required to draw is +probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous in +separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a fixed +date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed +at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and +place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army +in detail. Chang Yu's note may be worth quoting here: "If we do +not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the +day on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited +through our preparations for defense, and the positions we hold +will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we +shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual +support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, +especially if there is any great distance between the foremost +and hindmost divisions of the army."] + + 21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh +exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in +the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. + + [Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two +states ended in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien +and its incorporation in Yueh. This was doubtless long after Sun +Tzu's death. With his present assertion compare IV. ss. 4. +Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, +which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical +Dispositions it is said, 'One may KNOW how to conquer without +being able to DO it,' whereas here we have the statement that +'victory' can be achieved.' The explanation is, that in the +former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under +discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one +cannot make certain of beating him. But the present passage +refers particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who, according to Sun +Tzu's calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and +place of the impending struggle. That is why he says here that +victory can be achieved."] + + 22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent +him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the +likelihood of their success. + + [An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know +beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's +failure." + + 23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or +inactivity. + + [Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by +the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude +whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances +the action of Cho-ku Liang, who sent the scornful present of a +woman's head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his +Fabian tactics.] + +Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable +spots. + 24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so +that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is +deficient. + + [Cf. IV. ss. 6.] + + 25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you +can attain is to conceal them; + + [The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. +Concealment is perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra +ss. 9) as "showing no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans +that are formed in your brain.] + +conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying +of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest +brains. + + [Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and +capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against +us."] + + 26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's +own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. + 27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what +none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. + + [I.e., everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; +what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations +which has preceded the battle.] + + 28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one +victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite +variety of circumstances. + + [As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root- +principle underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it +are infinite in number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The +rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a +week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen +diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an +army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to +write like Gibbon."] + + 29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its +natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. + 30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to +strike at what is weak. + + [Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] + + 31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the +ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in +relation to the foe whom he is facing. + 32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so +in warfare there are no constant conditions. + 33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his +opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven- +born captain. + 34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are +not always equally predominant; + + [That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate +alternately."] + +the four seasons make way for each other in turn. + + [Literally, "have no invariable seat."] + +There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning +and waxing. + + [Cf. V. ss. 6. The purport of the passage is simply to +illustrate the want of fixity in war by the changes constantly +taking place in Nature. The comparison is not very happy, +however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzu +mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] + + +[1] See Col. Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 +ed., vol. II, p. 490. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +VII. MANEUVERING + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands +from the sovereign. + 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he +must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before +pitching his camp. + + ["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and +confidence between the higher and lower ranks before venturing +into the field;" and he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu (chap. 1 ad +init.): "Without harmony in the State, no military expedition +can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle array +can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzu is represented +as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging +war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before proceeding +to attack the external foe."] + + 3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there +is nothing more difficult. + + [I have departed slightly from the traditional +interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, who says: "From the time of +receiving the sovereign's instructions until our encampment over +against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult." +It seems to me that the tactics or maneuvers can hardly be said +to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and +Ch`ien Hao's note gives color to this view: "For levying, +concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there are +plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes +when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that +"the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in +seizing favorable position."] + +The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the +devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. + + [This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and +somewhat enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond. +This is how it is explained by Ts`ao Kung: "Make it appear that +you are a long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and +arrive on the scene before your opponent." Tu Mu says: +"Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while +you are dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a +slightly different turn: "Although you may have difficult ground +to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a drawback +which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of +movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the +two famous passages across the Alps--that of Hannibal, which laid +Italy at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years +later, which resulted in the great victory of Marengo.] + + 4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after +enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, +to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the +artifice of DEVIATION. + + [Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to +relieve the town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch`in +army. The King of Chao first consulted Lien P`o on the +advisability of attempting a relief, but the latter thought the +distance too great, and the intervening country too rugged and +difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully +admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said: +"We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole--and the pluckier +one will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had +only gone a distance of 30 LI when he stopped and began +throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he continued +strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should +carry the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch`in general was +overjoyed, and attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact +that the beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not +actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner +departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days +and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such +astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding +position on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his +movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch`in forces, who +were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat +across the border.] + + 5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an +undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. + + [I adopt the reading of the T`UNG TIEN, Cheng Yu-hsien and +the T`U SHU, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required +in order to make sense. The commentators using the standard text +take this line to mean that maneuvers may be profitable, or they +may be dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the general.] + + 6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to +snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. +On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose +involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. + + [Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese +commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own +rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is +some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is +clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a lengthy march being +undertaken without supplies. Cf. infra, ss. 11.] + + 7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, +and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering +double the usual distance at a stretch, + + [The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 LI; +but on one occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts`ao Ts`ao is said +to have covered the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within +twenty-four hours.] + +doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of +all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. + 8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will +fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will +reach its destination. + + [The moral is, as Ts`ao Kung and others point out: Don't +march a hundred LI to gain a tactical advantage, either with or +without impedimenta. Maneuvers of this description should be +confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The +hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the +dangers of battle." He did not often call upon his troops for +extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a +surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he +sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ] + + 9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, +you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half +your force will reach the goal. + + [Literally, "the leader of the first division will be +TORN AWAY."] + + 10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds +of your army will arrive. + + [In the T`UNG TIEN is added: "From this we may know the +difficulty of maneuvering."] + + 11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage- +train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of +supply it is lost. + + [I think Sun Tzu meant "stores accumulated in depots." But +Tu Yu says "fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in +general," and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."] + + 12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted +with the designs of our neighbors. + 13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we +are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and +forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. + 14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account +unless we make use of local guides. + + [ss. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. ss. 52.] + + 15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. + + [In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, +especially as to the numerical strength of his troops, took a +very prominent position. [2] ] + + 16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must +be decided by circumstances. + 17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, + + [The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not +only swift but, as Mei Yao-ch`en points out, "invisible and +leaves no tracks."] + +your compactness that of the forest. + + [Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When +slowly marching, order and ranks must be preserved"--so as to +guard against surprise attacks. But natural forest do not grow +in rows, whereas they do generally possess the quality of density +or compactness.] + + 18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, + + [Cf. SHIH CHING, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire +which no man can check."] + +is immovability like a mountain. + + [That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is +trying to dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is +trying to entice you into a trap.] + + 19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and +when you move, fall like a thunderbolt. + + [Tu Yu quotes a saying of T`ai Kung which has passed into a +proverb: "You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes +to the lighting--so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should +be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.] + + 20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be +divided amongst your men; + + [Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate +plundering by insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a +common stock, which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst +all.] + +when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the +benefit of the soldiery. + + [Ch`en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let +them sow and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and +harvesting the lands they invaded, that the Chinese have +succeeded in carrying out some of their most memorable and +triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch`ao who penetrated +to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of Fu-k`ang-an +and Tso Tsung-t`ang.] + + 21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. + + [Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that we must not +break camp until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy +and the cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven +comparisons" in I. ss. 13.] + + 22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of +deviation. + + [See supra, SS. 3, 4.] + +Such is the art of maneuvering. + + [With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an +end. But there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an +extract from an earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently +extant at the time when Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this +fragment is not noticeable different from that of Sun Tzu +himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to its +genuineness.] + + 23. The Book of Army Management says: + + [It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier +commentators give us any information about this work. Mei Yao- +Ch`en calls it "an ancient military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an +old book on war." Considering the enormous amount of fighting +that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzu's time between the +various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself +improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been +made and written down at some earlier period.] + +On the field of battle, + + [Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] + +the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution +of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly +enough: hence the institution of banners and flags. + 24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby +the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular +point. + + [Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge +simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a +million soldiers will be like those of a single man."!] + + 25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it +impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the +cowardly to retreat alone. + + [Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who +advance against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu +Mu tells a story in this connection of Wu Ch`i, when he was +fighting against the Ch`in State. Before the battle had begun, +one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, sallied forth by +himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and returned to camp. +Wu Ch`i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an officer +ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a good soldier, +and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch`i replied: "I fully +believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he +acted without orders."] + +This is the art of handling large masses of men. + 26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires +and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a +means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army. + + [Ch`en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi's night ride to Ho-yang at +the head of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display +with torches, that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a +large army, he did not dare to dispute their passage.] + + 27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; + + ["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made +to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its +onset will be irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy's +soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived on the +scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to +wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then +strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen +spirit." Li Ch`uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found in +the TSO CHUAN, year 10, ss. 1) of Ts`ao Kuei, a protege of Duke +Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch`i, and the +duke was about to join battle at Ch`ang-cho, after the first roll +of the enemy's drums, when Ts`ao said: "Not just yet." Only +after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the +word for attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch`i were +utterly defeated. Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the +meaning of his delay, Ts`ao Kuei replied: "In battle, a +courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll of the drum +tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on +the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked +when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our +victory." Wu Tzu (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four +important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a +whole army--a mighty host of a million men--is dependent on one +man alone: such is the influence of spirit!"] + +a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. + + [Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general's most +important asset. It is the quality which enables him to +discipline disorder and to inspire courage into the panic- +stricken." The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571-649) has a +saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled +cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must include +the art of assailing the enemy's mental equilibrium."] + + 28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; + + [Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At +the battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to +fight fasting, whereas Hannibal's men had breakfasted at +their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.] + +by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is +bent only on returning to camp. + 29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its +spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined +to return. This is the art of studying moods. + 30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of +disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of +retaining self-possession. + 31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from +it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to +be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of +husbanding one's strength. + 32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are +in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in +calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying +circumstances. + 33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against +the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. + 34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not +attack soldiers whose temper is keen. + 35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. + + [Li Ch`uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a +metaphor, take these words quite literally of food and drink that +have been poisoned by the enemy. Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu +carefully point out that the saying has a wider application.] + +Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. + + [The commentators explain this rather singular piece of +advice by saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home +will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and +is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu +quotes the words of Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who +hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvelous tale is +told of Ts`ao Ts`ao's courage and resource in ch. 1 of the SAN +KUO CHI: In 198 A.D., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when +Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts`ao's +retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his troops, only to +find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were guarding +each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. In +this desperate plight Ts`ao waited until nightfall, when he bored +a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As +soon as the whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on +his rear, while Ts`ao himself turned and met his pursuers in +front, so that they were thrown into confusion and annihilated. +Ts`ao Ts`ao said afterwards: "The brigands tried to check my +army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate +position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] + + 36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. + + [This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to +escape. The object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe +that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting +with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After +that, you may crush him."] + +Do not press a desperate foe too hard. + + [Ch`en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when +brought to bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: +"If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his +cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle, +he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the +meaning by a story taken from the life of Yen-ch`ing. That +general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded +by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The +country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force +was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored +ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and +sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at +last Fu Yen-ch`ing exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better +to die for our country than to go with fettered hands into +captivity!" A strong gale happened to be blowing from the +northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust. +To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had abated before +deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer, Li Shou- +cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: +"They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm +our numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the +strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." +Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch`ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected +onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded +in breaking through to safety.] + + 37. Such is the art of warfare. + + +[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. + +[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" +(Longmans, 1907), p. 29. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + + VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS + + + [The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as +Sun Tzu does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he +has already told us (V SS. 6-11) that such deflections from the +ordinary course are practically innumerable, we have little +option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an +indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare we +ought to very our tactics to the utmost degree.... I do not know +what Ts`ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be, but it has +been suggested that they are connected with the Nine Situations" +- of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yu. The only +other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost--a +supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends +some weight.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his +commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates +his forces. + + [Repeated from VII. ss. 1, where it is certainly more in +place. It may have been interpolated here merely in order to +supply a beginning to the chapter.] + + 2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country +where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not +linger in dangerously isolated positions. + + [The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as +given in the beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. +ss. 43. q.v.). Chang Yu defines this situation as being situated +across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch`uan says it is +"country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds, +vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and +precipices, without a road by which to advance."] + +In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In +desperate position, you must fight. + 3. There are roads which must not be followed, + + ["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li +Ch`uan, "where an ambush is to be feared."] + +armies which must be not attacked, + + [More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must +not be attacked." Ch`en Hao says: "When you see your way to +obtain a rival advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real +defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men's +strength."] + +towns which must not be besieged, + + [Cf. III. ss. 4 Ts`ao Kung gives an interesting +illustration from his own experience. When invading the +territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of Hua-pi, which lay +directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the +country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent +capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. +Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, +cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." +Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is +small and well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will +be no great feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself +a laughing-stock." In the seventeenth century, sieges still +formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne who directed +attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and +maneuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in +taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a +province." [1] ] + +positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign +which must not be obeyed. + + [This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence +for authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to +exclaim: "Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is +antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the negation of +civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even +Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.] + + 4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages +that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his +troops. + 5. The general who does not understand these, may be well +acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not +be able to turn his knowledge to practical account. + + [Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means +not only securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural +advantages in every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of +ground is characterized by certain natural features, and also +gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How it is +possible to turn these natural features to account unless +topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"] + + 6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war +of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five +Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men. + + [Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and +generally advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain +road is short, it must be followed; if an army is isolated, it +must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be +besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and +if consistent with military operations, the ruler's commands must +be obeyed." But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a +general to use these advantages. For instance, "a certain road +may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds +in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, +he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to +attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to +fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so +on.] + + 7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of +advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together. + + ["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous +one," says Ts`ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always +present to your mind."] + + 8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, +we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our +schemes. + + [Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the +enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the +possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this +enter as a factor into our calculations."] + + 9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we +are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate +ourselves from misfortune. + + [Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a +dangerous position, I must consider not only the enemy's ability +to injure me, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over +the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations are +properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself.... For +instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of +effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will incite +my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to +encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the +advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy's toils." +See the story of Ts`ao Ts`ao, VII. ss. 35, note.] + + 10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; + + [Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, +some of which would only occur to the Oriental mind:--"Entice +away the enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left +without counselors. Introduce traitors into his country, that +the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue +and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his +ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause +deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt +his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb +and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." +Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun +Tzu here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer +injury, and he will submit of his own accord."] + +and make trouble for them, + + [Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that +trouble should be make for the enemy affecting their +"possessions," or, as we might say, "assets," which he considers +to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony amongst the +soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands." These give us a +whip-hand over the enemy.] + +and keep them constantly engaged; + + [Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent +the from having any rest."] + +hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given +point. + + [Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the +idiomatic use of: "cause them to forget PIEN (the reasons for +acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in our +direction."] + + 11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood +of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive +him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the +fact that we have made our position unassailable. + 12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a +general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction; + + ["Bravery without forethought," as Ts`ao Kung analyzes it, +which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad +bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered +with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain." +Cf. Wu Tzu, chap. IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character of +a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his +courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many +qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man +is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, +without any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." +Ssu-ma Fa, too, make the incisive remark: "Simply going to one's +death does not bring about victory."] + + (2) cowardice, which leads to capture; + + [Ts`ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as +"cowardice" as being of the man "whom timidity prevents from +advancing to seize an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick +to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih gives the closer +paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive," this is, the man +who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzu knew, nothing is to +be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T`ai +Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently +bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu pursued +the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle +with him at the island of Ch`eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered +only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. +But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him +should be be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of +his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a +moment's notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit +of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made +an attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the +utmost ardor to be first in the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were +routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and +nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat similar story +of Chao Ying-ch`i, a general of the Chin State who during a +battle with the army of Ch`u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in +readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be +the first to get across.] + + (3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; + + [Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by +Huang Mei, Teng Ch`iang and others shut himself up behind his +walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch`iang said: "Our adversary +is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant +sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and +come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to +be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to +fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy's pretended +flight, and finally attacked and slain.] + + (4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame; + + [This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is +really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an +exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned +man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao- +ch`en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: "The seek +after glory should be careless of public opinion."] + + (5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry +and trouble. + + [Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be +careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to +emphasize is the danger of sacrificing any important military +advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a +shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will +suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the +war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity +will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to +reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military +instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated +efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so +many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And +in the end, relief came through the very man who started out with +the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of +the whole to sentiment in favor of a part. An old soldier of one +of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried +once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was +always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he but known it, +he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzu's mouth.] + + 13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous +to the conduct of war. + 14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the +cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. +Let them be a subject of meditation. + + +[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH + + + [The contents of this interesting chapter are better +indicated in ss. 1 than by this heading.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping +the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over +mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys. + + [The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to +keep close to supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3: +"Abide not in natural ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." +Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu Ch`iang was a +robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan was sent +to exterminate his gang. Ch`iang having found a refuge in the +hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all +the favorable positions commanding supplies of water and forage. +Ch`iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of +provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did +not know the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of +valleys."] + + 2. Camp in high places, + + [Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above +the surrounding country.] + +facing the sun. + + [Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch`en Hao +"facing east." Cf. infra, SS. 11, 13. + +Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain +warfare. + 3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. + + ["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according +to Ts`ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be +impeded in your evolutions." The T`UNG TIEN reads, "If THE ENEMY +crosses a river," etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is +almost certainly an interpolation.] + + 4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward +march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best +to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack. + + [Li Ch`uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over +Lung Chu at the Wei River. Turning to the CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. +34, fol. 6 verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The +two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the +night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks +filled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading +half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time, +pretending to have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to +the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this unlooked-for +success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a +coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn. +Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus +releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented +the greater portion of Lung Chu's army from getting across. He +then turned upon the force which had been cut off, and +annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The +rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in +all directions.] + + 5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet +the invader near a river which he has to cross. + + [For fear of preventing his crossing.] + + 6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the +sun. + + [See supra, ss. 2. The repetition of these words in +connection with water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: +"Said either of troops marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats +anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to +be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other +commentators are not at all explicit.] + +Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. + + [Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch +our camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy +should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu- +hou has remarked that 'in river warfare we must not advance +against the stream,' which is as much as to say that our fleet +must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would +be able to take advantage of the current and make short work of +us." There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that +the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to +us.] + +So much for river warfare. + 7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to +get over them quickly, without any delay. + + [Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the +herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and +exposed to attack.] + + 8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have +water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. + + [Li Ch`uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be +treacherous where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they +will serve to protect the rear.] + +So much for operations in salt-marches. + 9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible +position with rising ground to your right and on your rear, + + [Tu Mu quotes T`ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a +stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its +right."] + +so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So +much for campaigning in flat country. + 10. These are the four useful branches of military +knowledge + + [Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, +(3) marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military +Maxims," no. 1.] + +which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several +sovereigns. + + [Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch`en asks, with +some plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as +nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered four other +Emperors. The SHIH CHI (ch. 1 ad init.) speaks only of his +victories over Yen Ti and Ch`ih Yu. In the LIU T`AO it is +mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the +Empire." Ts`ao Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor +was the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, +each of whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of +Emperor. Li Ch`uan tells us that the art of war originated under +Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister Feng Hou.] + + 11. All armies prefer high ground to low. + + ["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch`en, "is not only more +agreement and salubrious, but more convenient from a military +point of view; low ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but +also disadvantageous for fighting."] + +and sunny places to dark. + 12. If you are careful of your men, + + [Ts`ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where +you can turn out your animals to graze."] + +and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of +every kind, + + [Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent +the outbreak of illness."] + +and this will spell victory. + 13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny +side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once +act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural +advantages of the ground. + 14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river +which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must +wait until it subsides. + 15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with +torrents running between, deep natural hollows, + + [The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by +steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom.] + +confined places, + + [Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded +by precipices on three sides--easy to get into, but hard to get +out of."] + +tangled thickets, + + [Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that +spears cannot be used."] + +quagmires + + [Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be +impassable for chariots and horsemen."] + +and crevasses, + + [Defined by Mei Yao-ch`en as "a narrow difficult way between +beetling cliffs." Tu Mu's note is "ground covered with trees and +rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This +is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a +defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same view. On +the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to +the rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese +in one place is "a crack or fissure" and the fact that the +meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence indicates +something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun Tzu +is here speaking of crevasses.] + +should be left with all possible speed and not approached. + 16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the +enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the +enemy have them on his rear. + 17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any +hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins +filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be +carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men +in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking. + + [Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard +against traitors who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out +our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions."] + + 18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he +is relying on the natural strength of his position. + + [Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much +of which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern +manual like Gen. Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."] + + 19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he +is anxious for the other side to advance. + + [Probably because we are in a strong position from which he +wishes to dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, +"and tried to force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and +there would be less probability of our responding to the +challenge."] + + 20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is +tendering a bait. + 21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the +enemy is advancing. + + [Ts`ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a +passage," and Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to +climb high places and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that +the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he may know that +they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy's +march."] + +The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass +means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. + + [Tu Yu's explanation, borrowed from Ts`ao Kung's, is as +follows: "The presence of a number of screens or sheds in the +midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled +and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places in +order to make us suspect an ambush." It appears that these +"screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass +which the retreating enemy happened to come across.] + + 22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an +ambuscade. + + [Chang Yu's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds +that are flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, +it means that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath."] + +Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. + 23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the +sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over +a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry. + + ["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course +somewhat exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators +explain the phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being +heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in +the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in +ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the +march must have scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust +raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report it to the +commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you move along, +say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar for +the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds +getting up, glitter of arms, etc." [1] ] + +When it branches out in different directions, it shows that +parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust +moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping. + + [Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defenses for a +cantonment, light horse will be sent out to survey the position +and ascertain the weak and strong points all along its +circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust and its +motion."] + + 24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that +the enemy is about to advance. + + ["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. +"Their object is to make us contemptuous and careless, after +which they will attack us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of +T`ien Tan of the Ch`i-mo against the Yen forces, led by Ch`i +Chieh. In ch. 82 of the SHIH CHI we read: "T`ien Tan openly +said: 'My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses +of their Ch`i prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight +against us; that would be the undoing of our city.' The other +side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the +suggestion; but those within the city were enraged at seeing +their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest +they should fall into the enemy's hands, were nerved to defend +themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T`ien Tan sent +back converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: +"What I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up the +ancestral tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this +indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.' +Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the +corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing +the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were all +impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased +tenfold. T`ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for +any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself too a +mattock in his hands, and ordered others to be distributed +amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were filled up with +their wives and concubines. He then served out all the remaining +rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular soldiers +were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with +the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were +dispatched to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of surrender, +whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T`ien Tan also +collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the +wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the +prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would allow their +homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch`i +Chieh, in high good humor, granted their prayer; but his army now +became increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile, T`ien Tan got +together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk, +painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored stripes, and +fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on +their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the +rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had +pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked +warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously +into the enemy's camp where they caused the utmost confusion and +dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous +pattern on their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or +wounded any with whom they came into contact. In the meantime, +the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their mouths, and now +threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment a frightful +din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind +making as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering +on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed by the +uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly +pursued by the men of Ch`i, who succeeded in slaying their +general Ch`i Chien.... The result of the battle was the ultimate +recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch`i +State."] + +Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are +signs that he will retreat. + 25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a +position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for +battle. + 26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant +indicate a plot. + + [The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch`uan indicates "a +treaty confirmed by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, +on the other hand, simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous +pretext."] + + 27. When there is much running about + + [Every man hastening to his proper place under his own +regimental banner.] + +and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical +moment has come. + 28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is +a lure. + 29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they +are faint from want of food. + 30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking +themselves, the army is suffering from thirst. + + [As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole +army from the behavior of a single man."] + + 31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes +no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. + 32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. + + [A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch`en +Hao says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] + +Clamor by night betokens nervousness. + + 33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's +authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, +sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that the +men are weary. + + [Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the +officers of an army are angry with their general, it means that +they are broken with fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has +demanded from them.] + + 34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its +cattle for food, + + [In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on +grain and the horses chiefly on grass.] + +and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp- +fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may +know that they are determined to fight to the death. + + [I may quote here the illustrative passage from the HOU HAN +SHU, ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by the P`EI WEN YUN FU: +"The rebel Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch`en- +ts`ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung +Cho were sent out against him. The latter pressed for hasty +measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At last the +rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw down their +weapons of their own accord. Sung was not advancing to the +attack, but Cho said: 'It is a principle of war not to pursue +desperate men and not to press a retreating host.' Sung +answered: 'That does not apply here. What I am about to attack +is a jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined troops I +am falling on a disorganized multitude, not a band of desperate +men.' Thereupon he advances to the attack unsupported by his +colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being slain."] + + 35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or +speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank +and file. + 36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the +end of his resources; + + [Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there +is always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep +the men in good temper.] + +too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. + + [Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and +unwonted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.] + + 37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at +the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. + + [I follow the interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, also adopted by +Li Ch`uan, Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set +forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Tao-ch`en and Wang Hsi, is: "The +general who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then in +terror lest they should mutiny, etc." This would connect the +sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments.] + + 38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, +it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. + + [Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be +sending hostages, it is a sign that they are anxious for an +armistice, either because their strength is exhausted or for some +other reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzu to draw such an +obvious inference.] + + 39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain +facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or +taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands +great vigilance and circumspection. + + [Ts`ao Kung says a maneuver of this sort may be only a ruse +to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an +ambush.] + + 40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, +that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can +be made. + + [Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, CHENG +tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem +resorted to instead.] + +What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available +strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain +reinforcements. + + [This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators +succeed in squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li +Ch`uan, who appears to offer the simplest explanation: "Only the +side that gets more men will win." Fortunately we have Chang Yu +to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity +itself: "When the numbers are even, and no favorable opening +presents itself, although we may not be strong enough to deliver +a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst our +sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces +and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the +victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help +us." He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 3: "The nominal +strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real value +will be not more than half that figure."] + + 41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his +opponents is sure to be captured by them. + + [Ch`en Hao, quoting from the TSO CHUAN, says: "If bees and +scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even +a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with contempt."] + + 42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown +attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless +submissive, then will be practically useless. If, when the +soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not +enforced, they will still be unless. + 43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first +instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron +discipline. + + [Yen Tzu [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil +virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his +enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander +unites culture with a warlike temper; the profession of arms +requires a combination of hardness and tenderness."] + +This is a certain road to victory. + + 44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually +enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its +discipline will be bad. + 45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always +insists on his orders being obeyed, + + [Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show +kindly confidence in his men and also make his authority +respected, so that when they come to face the enemy, orders may +be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust and +look up to him." What Sun Tzu has said in ss. 44, however, would +lead one rather to expect something like this: "If a general is +always confident that his orders will be carried out," etc."] + +the gain will be mutual. + + [Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men +under his command, and the men are docile, having confidence in +him. Thus the gain is mutual" He quotes a pregnant sentence +from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 4: "The art of giving orders is not to +try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty +doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of +sapping the confidence of an army.] + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +X. TERRAIN + + + [Only about a third of the chapter, comprising ss. ss. 1-13, +deals with "terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. +XI. The "six calamities" are discussed in SS. 14-20, and the +rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks, +though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, +to wit: (1) Accessible ground; + + [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "plentifully provided with roads and +means of communications."] + +(2) entangling ground; + + [The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing +into which you become entangled."] + +(3) temporizing ground; + + [Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] + +(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a +great distance from the enemy. + + [It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this +classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in +the Chinaman's unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross- +divisions such as the above.] + + 2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is +called ACCESSIBLE. + 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the +enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully +guard your line of supplies. + + [The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as +Tu Yu says, "not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." +In view of Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the +communications," [1] we could wish that Sun Tzu had done more +than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. ss. +10, VII. ss. 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of supply may +be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart +to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who finds his +adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and his own +guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's +movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, +so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened +finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he +has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more +or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers +on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat +will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or +surrender of his whole army." [2] + +Then you will be able to fight with advantage. + 4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy +is called ENTANGLING. + 5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is +unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy +is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, +return being impossible, disaster will ensue. + 6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by +making the first move, it is called TEMPORIZING ground. + + [Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and +the situation remains at a deadlock."] + + 7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should +offer us an attractive bait, + + [Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to +flee." But this is only one of the lures which might induce us +to quit our position.] + +it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, +thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army +has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. + 8. With regard to NARROW PASSES, if you can occupy them +first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of +the enemy. + + [Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie +with us, and by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall +have the enemy at our mercy."] + + 9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do +not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it +is weakly garrisoned. + 10. With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS, if you are +beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and +sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. + + [Ts`ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing +heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated +by the enemy." [For the enunciation of the grand principle +alluded to, see VI. ss. 2]. Chang Yu tells the following +anecdote of P`ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a +punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At night he +pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely +fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that +the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was +highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against +the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P`ei Hsing- +chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the +camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific +storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to +the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were +amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. +'How did you know what was going to happen?' they asked. P`ei +Hsing-chien replied: 'From this time forward be content to obey +orders without asking unnecessary questions.' From this it may +be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places are +advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are +immune from disastrous floods."] + + 11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not +follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away. + + [The turning point of Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D. +against the two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang +Shih-ch`ung, Prince of Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of +Wu-lao, in spike of which Tou Chien-te persisted in his attempt +to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken prisoner. +See CHIU T`ANG, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.] + + 12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, +and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to +provoke a battle, + + [The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long +and wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we +should be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."] + +and fighting will be to your disadvantage. + + 13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. + + [Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, +however, I. ss. 8.] + +The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful +to study them. + 14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not +arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the +general is responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) +insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6) +rout. + 15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled +against another ten times its size, the result will be the FLIGHT +of the former. + 16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their +officers too weak, the result is INSUBORDINATION. + + [Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T`ien Pu [HSIN T`ANG SHU, +ch. 148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an +army against Wang T`ing-ts`ou. But the whole time he was in +command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and +openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, +several thousands at a time. T`ien Pu was powerless to put a +stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he +made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and +dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man +committed suicide by cutting his throat.] + +When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too +weak, the result is COLLAPSE. + + [Ts`ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to +press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] + + 17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, +and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a +feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell +whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is RUIN. + + [Wang Hsi`s note is: "This means, the general is angry +without cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the +ability of his subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce +resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head."] + + 18. When the general is weak and without authority; when +his orders are not clear and distinct; + + [Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his +orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them +twice; if his moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers +will not be in two minds about doing their duty." General Baden- +Powell says, italicizing the words: "The secret of getting +successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell--in +the clearness of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf. also +Wu Tzu ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a military leader is +difference; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from +hesitation."] + +when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men, + + [Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular +routine."] + +and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the +result is utter DISORGANIZATION. + 19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's +strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or +hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to +place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be ROUT. + + [Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and +continues: "Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest +spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in +order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to +demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De +Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).] + + 20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be +carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible +post. + + [See supra, ss. 13.] + + 21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's +best ally; + + [Ch`en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are +not equal to those connected with ground."] + +but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the +forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, +dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general. + 22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his +knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them +not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated. + 23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must +fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not +result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's +bidding. + + [Cf. VIII. ss. 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch`in dynasty, +who is said to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have +written the SAN LUEH, has these words attributed to him: "The +responsibility of setting an army in motion must devolve on the +general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the +Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the +god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a +humble part in furthering their country's cause [lit., kneel down +to push the chariot wheel]." This means that "in matters lying +outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander must +be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees from the +Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."] + 24. The general who advances without coveting fame and +retreats without fearing disgrace, + + [It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing +of all for a soldier is to retreat.] + +whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service +for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. + + [A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy +warrior." Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer +punishment, would not regret his conduct."] + + 25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will +follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own +beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death. + + [Cf. I. ss. 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an +engaging picture of the famous general Wu Ch`i, from whose +treatise on war I have frequently had occasion to quote: "He +wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his +soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to +sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, +and shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was +suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch`i himself sucked out the +virus. The soldier's mother, hearing this, began wailing and +lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do you cry? Your +son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief +himself has sucked the poison from his sore.' The woman replied, +'Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my +husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death +at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the same for +my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.'" Li Ch`uan +mentions the Viscount of Ch`u, who invaded the small state of +Hsiao during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of +the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he made a +round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and +straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined +with floss silk.] + + 26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your +authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your +commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then +your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are +useless for any practical purpose. + + [Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers +afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu +recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred +in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of Chiang-ling. +He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the +inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, +a certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a +fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging +to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation +helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that +the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be +allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly +he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his +face, however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the +army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles +dropped in the highway were not picked up.] + + 27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to +attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we +have gone only halfway towards victory. + + [That is, Ts`ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is +uncertain."] + + 28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are +unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we +have gone only halfway towards victory. + + [Cf. III. ss. 13 (1).] + + 29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also +know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware +that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we +have still gone only halfway towards victory. + 30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never +bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. + + [The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his +measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does +not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, +he makes no mistakes."] + + 31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know +yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know +Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete. + + [Li Ch`uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three +things--the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural +advantages of earth--, victory will invariably crown your +battles."] + + +[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. + +[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. + +[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties +of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) +contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting +highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in +ground; (9) desperate ground. + 2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is +dispersive ground. + + [So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes +and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize +the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every +direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack +the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find +harbors of refuge."] + + 3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no +great distance, it is facile ground. + + [Li Ch`uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for +retreating," and the other commentators give similar +explanations. Tu Mu remarks: "When your army has crossed the +border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make +it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home."] + + 4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage +to either side, is contentious ground. + + [Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." +Ts`ao Kung says: "ground on which the few and the weak can +defeat the many and the strong," such as "the neck of a pass," +instanced by Li Ch`uan. Thus, Thermopylae was of this +classification because the possession of it, even for a few days +only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus +gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. V. ad init.: "For +those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is +nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning +from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had +got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator +of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of +Ch`in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the +province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch`ang, counseled him, +saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and +his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in +the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, +and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to +occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting +him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are +prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without +moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, +we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is +nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be +expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two +positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was +overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.] + + 5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is +open ground. + + [There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective +for this type of ground. Ts`ao Kung says it means "ground +covered with a network of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih +suggested: "ground on which intercommunication is easy."] + + 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, + + [Ts`au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the +enemy's and a third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih +instances the small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on +the north-east by Ch`i, on the west by Chin, and on the south by +Ch`u.] + +so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his +command, + + [The belligerent who holds this dominating position can +constrain most of them to become his allies.] + +is a ground of intersecting highways. + 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile +country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is +serious ground. + + [Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has +reached such a point, its situation is serious."] + + 8. Mountain forests, + + [Or simply "forests."] + +rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that is hard to +traverse: this is difficult ground. + 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from +which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small +number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our +men: this is hemmed in ground. + 10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction +by fighting without delay, is desperate ground. + + [The situation, as pictured by Ts`ao Kung, is very similar +to the "hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer +possible: "A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, +advance impossible, retreat blocked." Ch`en Hao says: "to be on +'desperate ground' is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching +in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid +description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an +army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides: +-- it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's mercy. A +ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so +perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the +chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut +off behind, no choice but to proceed in single file. Then, +before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle, +the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene. +Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating, we +have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; +yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment's respite. +If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will +crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain the +enemy's attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, +destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the +necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, +all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so +narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten +thousand; all means of offense in the hands of the enemy, all +points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:--in this +terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and +the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the +slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of +the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the +Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. +78 sqq.].] + + 11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile +ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not. + + [But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the +advantageous position first. So Ts`ao Kung. Li Ch`uan and +others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has +already forestalled us, sot that it would be sheer madness to +attack. In the SUN TZU HSU LU, when the King of Wu inquires what +should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies: "The rule with +regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the +advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is +secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him +away by pretending to flee--show your banners and sound your +drums--make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to +lose--trail brushwood and raise a dust--confound his ears and +eyes--detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in +ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."] + + 12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. + + [Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the +blocking force itself to serious risks. There are two +interpretations available here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The +other is indicated in Ts`ao Kung's brief note: "Draw closer +together"--i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut +off.] + +On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your +allies. + + [Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighboring states."] + + 13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. + + [On this, Li Ch`uan has the following delicious note: "When +an army penetrates far into the enemy's country, care must be +taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the +example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch`in +territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of +valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause +us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 +A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, +then, I think that the true reading must be, not 'plunder,' but +'do not plunder.'" Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy +commentator's feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, has +no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on 'serious ground,' +there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no +possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a +protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, +and keep a close watch on the enemy."] + +In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. + + [Or, in the words of VIII. ss. 2, "do not encamp.] + + 14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. + + [Ts`au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual +artifice;" and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: "In such a +position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the +circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the +peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the +famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains +on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the +dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle +his foes was remarkably like that which T`ien Tan had also +employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. ss. 24, +note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the +horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals +being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the +passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of +these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans +that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army +passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; +Livy, XXII. 16 17.] + +On desperate ground, fight. + + [For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your +might, there is a chance of life; where as death is certain if +you cling to your corner."] + + 15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how +to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear; + + [More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch +with each other."] + +to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to +hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from +rallying their men. + 16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep +them in disorder. + 17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward +move; when otherwise, they stopped still. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en connects this with the foregoing: "Having +succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward +in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no +advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were."] + + 18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in +orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I +should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent +holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." + + [Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in mind. Ts`ao Kung +thinks it is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is +depending." Tu Mu says: "The three things which an enemy is +anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of which his success +depends, are: (1) to capture our favorable positions; (2) to +ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications." +Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three +directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. ss. 3.] By +boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the +other side on the defensive.] + + 19. Rapidity is the essence of war: + + [According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading +principles in warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest +truths of military science, and the chief business of the +general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the +importance attached to speed by two of China's greatest generals. +In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch`eng under the Wei +Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and +had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister +of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then military +governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he at +once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having +previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import. +Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued +himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly +investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta +is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at +once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the +mask." Then, by a series of forced marches, be brought his army +under the walls of Hsin-ch`eng with in a space of eight days. +Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang: +"Wan is 1200 LI from here. When the news of my revolt reaches +Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will +be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time +my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to +come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are +not worth troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled +with consternation: "Though only eight days have passed since I +threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. +What miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- +ch`eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See +CHIN SHU, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from +K`uei-chou in Ssu-ch`uan to reduce the successful rebel Hsiao +Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou Fu in +Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, +Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come +down through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. +But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and was just +about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone +his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for +navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming +speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss +opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien +even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the +present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before +his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is +heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [See +VII. ss. 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if +he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his +soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. +Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as +he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly +stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer +the penalty of death.] + +take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by +unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. + 20. The following are the principles to be observed by an +invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the +greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the +defenders will not prevail against you. + 21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your +army with food. + + [Cf. supra, ss. 13. Li Ch`uan does not venture on a note +here.] + + 22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, + + [For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, +give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them +generally."] + +and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your +strength. + + [Ch`en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the +famous general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely +contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded +the Ch`u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him. +But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all +invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In +vain did the Ch`u general try to force a battle: day after day +Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but +devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and +confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well +fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for +bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to +weld them into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had +elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were +amusing themselves. The answer was, that they were contending +with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping. When +Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic +pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the +required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By +this time the Ch`u army, after repeating their challenge again +and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch`in +general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in +the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. +Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch`u was conquered by Ch`in, and +the king Fu-ch`u led into captivity.] + +Keep your army continually on the move, + + [In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you +are. It has struck me, however, that the true reading might be +"link your army together."] + +and devise unfathomable plans. + 23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no +escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face +death, there is nothing they may not achieve. + + [Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3): "If one +man were to run amok with a sword in the market-place, and +everybody else tried to get our of his way, I should not allow +that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were +contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man +who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."] + +Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. + + [Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, +they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it."] + + 24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of +fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If +they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If +there is no help for it, they will fight hard. + 25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers +will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, +they will do your will; + + [Literally, "without asking, you will get."] + +without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving +orders, they can be trusted. + 26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with +superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no +calamity need be feared. + + [The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," +degenerate into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." +Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: "'Spells and incantations should +be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by +divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers' +minds should be seriously perturbed.' The meaning is," he +continues, "that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your +men will never falter in their resolution until they die."] + + 27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is +not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are +not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to +longevity. + + [Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and +long life are things for which all men have a natural +inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away valuables, and +sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but +simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating +that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see +that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown +in their way.] + + 28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your +soldiers may weep, + + [The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to +indicate more genuine grief than tears alone.] + +those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down +letting the tears run down their cheeks. + + [Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts`ao Kung +says, "all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We +may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike +in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful +parting at the I River between Ching K`o and his friends, when +the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch`in +(afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed +down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following +lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the burn; Your +champion is going--Not to return." [1] ] + +But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the +courage of a Chu or a Kuei. + + [Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu +State and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by +Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his +sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly +of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, +but was immediately hacked to pieced by the king's bodyguard. +This was in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Ts`ao Kuei (or +Ts`ao Mo), performed the exploit which has made his name famous +166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by +Ch`i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a +large slice of territory, when Ts`ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan +Kung, the Duke of Ch`i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a +dagger against his chest. None of the duke's retainers dared to +move a muscle, and Ts`ao Kuei proceeded to demand full +restitution, declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because +she was a smaller and a weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his +life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts`ao Kuei flung away his +dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the terrified +assemblage without having so much as changed color. As was to be +expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, +but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the +impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold +stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three +pitched battles.] + + 29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the SHUAI-JAN. +Now the SHUAI-JAN is a snake that is found in the Ch`ang +mountains. + + ["Shuai-jan" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in +question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its +movements. Through this passage, the term in the Chinese has now +come to be used in the sense of "military maneuvers."] + +Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike +at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its +middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both. + 30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN, + + [That is, as Mei Yao-ch`en says, "Is it possible to make the +front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on +the other, just as though they were part of a single living +body?"] + +I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are +enemies; + + [Cf. VI. ss. 21.] + +yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught +by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the +left hand helps the right. + + [The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a +time of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same +army, bound together as they are by every tie of interest and +fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has +been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case +of allied armies.] + + 31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the +tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the +ground + + [These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running +away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor +with him at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened +himself firmly to one spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not +enough, says Sun Tzu, to render flight impossible by such +mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have +tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of +sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be learned +from the SHUAI-JAN.] + + 32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up +one standard of courage which all must reach. + + [Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were +that of] one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic +whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its +component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate must +not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's seemingly +ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he +had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in +this important particular--unity of spirit and courage. Had he +not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those +troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the +day.] + + 33. How to make the best of both strong and weak--that is a +question involving the proper use of ground. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en's paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the +differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to +utilize accidental features of the ground." Less reliable +troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as +better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position +neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. +Henderson says: "With all respect to the text books, and to the +ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study +of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient +importance is attached to the selection of positions... and to +the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are +defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural +features." [2] ] + + 34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as +though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. + + [Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with +which he does it."] + + 35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus +ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. + 36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by +false reports and appearances, + + [Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] + +and thus keep them in total ignorance. + + [Ts`ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The +troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the +beginning; they may only rejoice with you over their happy +outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy," is one +of the first principles in war, as had been frequently pointed +out. But how about the other process--the mystification of one's +own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzu is over-emphatic on +this point would do well to read Col. Henderson's remarks on +Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," he +says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most +trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his +thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced +useless"--etc. etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. +47 of the HOU HAN SHU, "Pan Ch`ao took the field with 25,000 men +from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of +crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his +chief commander to succor the place with an army drawn from the +kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t`ou, totaling 50,000 men. +Pan Ch`ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a +council of war, and said: 'Our forces are now outnumbered and +unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is +for us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. +The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I +will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the +evening drum has sounded and then start.' Pan Ch`ao now secretly +released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of +Kutcha was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, +the latter set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar +Pan Ch`ao's retreat in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode +eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of +Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch`ao knew that the two chieftains had +gone, he called his divisions together, got them well in hand, +and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it +lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, +and were closely pursued by Pan Ch`ao. Over 5000 heads were +brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of +horses and cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand +then capitulating, Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their +respective forces. From that time forward, Pan Ch`ao's prestige +completely overawed the countries of the west." In this case, we +see that the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in +ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of +dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.] + + 37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, + + [Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same +stratagem twice.] + +he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. + + [Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The +axiom, that war is based on deception, does not apply only to +deception of the enemy. You must deceive even your own soldiers. +Make them follow you, but without letting them know why."] + +By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents +the enemy from anticipating his purpose. + 38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like +one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder +behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory +before he shows his hand. + + [Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. ss. 15), that is, +takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army +to return--like Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a +river. Ch`en Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words +less well as "puts forth every artifice at his command."] + + 39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a +shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and +that, and nothing knows whither he is going. + + [Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to +advance or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of +attacking and conquering."] + + 40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this may +be termed the business of the general. + + [Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there should be no +delay in aiming a blow at the enemy's heart. Note how he returns +again and again to this point. Among the warring states of +ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear +and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.] + + 41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of +ground; + + [Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting +the rules for the nine varieties of ground.] + +the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the +fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must +most certainly be studied. + 42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle +is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a +short way means dispersion. + + [Cf. supra, ss. 20.] + + 43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your +army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical +ground. + + [This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. ss. 2, but it +does not figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities +in chap. X. One's first impulse would be to translate it distant +ground," but this, if we can trust the commentators, is precisely +what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch`en says it is "a position not +far enough advanced to be called 'facile,' and not near enough to +home to be 'dispersive,' but something between the two." Wang Hsi +says: "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, +whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. +Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business there +quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, +which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine +Situations.] + +When there are means of communication on all four sides, the +ground is one of intersecting highways. + 44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious +ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile +ground. + 45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and +narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no +place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. + 46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men +with unity of purpose. + + [This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining +on the defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. supra, ss. 11.] + +On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection +between all parts of my army. + + [As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible +contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a +sudden attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. ss. 17. Mei +Yao-ch`en says: "On the march, the regiments should be in close +touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the +fortifications."] + + 47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. + + [This is Ts`ao Kung's interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, +saying: "We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and +tail may both reach the goal." That is, they must not be allowed +to straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch`en offers another +equally plausible explanation: "Supposing the enemy has not yet +reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we should +advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession." +Ch`en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had +time to select his own ground, quotes VI. ss. 1, where Sun Tzu +warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of +the situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a +favorable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of +troops to occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, +come up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their +rear with your main body, and victory will be assured." It was +thus, he adds, that Chao She beat the army of Ch`in. (See p. +57.)] + + 48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my +defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, I would +consolidate my alliances. + 49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous +stream of supplies. + + [The commentators take this as referring to forage and +plunder, not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication +with a home base.] + +On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. + 50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. + + [Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend +the position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly +through the enemy's lines." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "in order to +make my soldiers fight with desperation." Wang Hsi says, +"fearing lest my men be tempted to run away." Tu Mu points out +that this is the converse of VII. ss. 36, where it is the enemy +who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and +canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under Erh- +chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small, +consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. +The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, +gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of +trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all the +remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen +and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men saw +that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their +spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they +charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks +broke and crumbled under their onslaught.] + +On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the +hopelessness of saving their lives. + + Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away +your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your +cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot +survive, but must fight to the death." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The +only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it." This +concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about "grounds" and the +"variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which +bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by +the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. +Sun Tzu begins abruptly in VIII. ss. 2 to enumerate "variations" +before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, +namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is +not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in +the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six +new grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these +is mentioned again, though the first is hardly to be +distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, in +chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately +followed by the variations. This takes us down to ss. 14. In +SS. 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and +9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed +in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated +once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 +and 7, being different from those previously given. Though it is +impossible to account for the present state of Sun Tzu's text, a +few suggestive facts maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap. +VIII, according to the title, should deal with nine variations, +whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short chapter. +(3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are +defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of +the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is +disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. I do +not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the +general conclusion that Sun Tzu's work cannot have come down to +us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is +obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to +contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or +ought to appear elsewhere.] + + 51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an +obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he +cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into +danger. + + [Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch`ao's devoted +followers in 73 A.D. The story runs thus in the HOU HAN SHU, ch. +47: "When Pan Ch`ao arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the +country, received him at first with great politeness and respect; +but shortly afterwards his behavior underwent a sudden change, +and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch`ao spoke about this +to the officers of his suite: 'Have you noticed,' he said, 'that +Kuang's polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify +that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, and that +consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with +which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The +truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have +come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already +manifest!' Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been +assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: 'Where +are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some day ago?' +The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he +presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch`ao, keeping his +informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general +gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking +with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a little, +he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them +thus: 'Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated +region, anxious to achieve riches and honor by some great +exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no +arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the result is +that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal +host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to +seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will +become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?' +With one accord, the officers replied: 'Standing as we do in +peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life and +death.' For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. ss. 1, +note.] + + 52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes +until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to +lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of +the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and +precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn +natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides. + + [These three sentences are repeated from VII. SS. 12-14 -- +in order to emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to +think. I prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to +form an antecedent to the following words. With regard to local +guides, Sun Tzu might have added that there is always the risk of +going wrong, either through their treachery or some +misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we +are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of +Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied; but +his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin +names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of +Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in +that direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had +almost arrived.] + + 53. To be ignored of any one of the following four or five +principles does not befit a warlike prince. + 54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his +generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the +enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are +prevented from joining against him. + + [Mei Tao-ch`en constructs one of the chains of reasoning +that are so much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a +powerful state, if you can divide her forces, you will have a +superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in strength, +you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the +neighboring states will be frightened; and if the neighboring +states are frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from +joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning: "If the +great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to +summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and +refrain from massing their forces." Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu take +the sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful +though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be +unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on +external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening +confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the +enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus: +"If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be +discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) +our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the +enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join +us."] + + 55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and +sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries +out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. + + [The train of thought, as said by Li Ch`uan, appears to be +this: Secure against a combination of his enemies, "he can +afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own +secret designs, his prestige enable him to dispense with external +friendships."] + +Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their +kingdoms. + + [This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch`in +State became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy +by which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for +her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up +his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning this +attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.] + + 56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, + + [Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly +rewarded and retreat be heavily punished."] + +issue orders + + [Literally, "hang" or post up."] + +without regard to previous arrangements; + + ["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The +general meaning is made clear by Ts`ao Kung's quotation from the +SSU-MA FA: "Give instructions only on sighting the enemy; give +rewards when you see deserving deeds." Ts`ao Kung's paraphrase: +"The final instructions you give to your army should not +correspond with those that have been previously posted up." +Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements should not be +divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says: "there should be no +fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not only is there danger +in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the +entire reversal of them at the last moment.] + +and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to +do with but a single man. + + [Cf. supra, ss. 34.] + + 57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let +them know your design. + + [Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your +reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior +colleague to "give no reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim +is even more applicable to a general than to a judge.] + +When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell +them nothing when the situation is gloomy. + 58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; +plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. + + [These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in +explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most +brilliant battles, already alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he +was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles from the +mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in +full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light +cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red flag. Their +instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles and +keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me +in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their +fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to +rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set up the red banners +of Han in their stead." Turning then to his other officers, he +remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong position, and is not +likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and +drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and +escape through the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent +out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form +in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this +maneuver, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By +this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the +generalissimo's flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, +and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle +followed, lasting for some time; until at length Han Hsin and his +colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on the field, fled +to the division on the river bank, where another fierce battle +was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure +the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two +generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting +with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the 2000 +horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao +following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted +walls, tore up the enemy's flags and replaced them by those of +Han. When the Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight +of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the +Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild +disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in +vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and +completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest, +amongst whom was King Ya himself.... After the battle, some of +Han Hsin's officers came to him and said: "In the ART OF WAR we +are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river +or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun +Tzu and T`ai Kung. See IX ss. 9, and note.] You, on the +contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our +back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the +victory?" The general replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not +studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written +there: 'Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come +off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive'? +Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to +bring my colleague round. What says the Military Classic--'Swoop +down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight.' [This +passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzu.] If I had +not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to +fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own +discretion, there would have been a general debandade, and it +would have been impossible to do anything with them." The +officers admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These +are higher tactics than we should have been capable of." [See +CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ] + + 59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's +way that is capable of striking a blow for victory. + + [Danger has a bracing effect.] + + 60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating +ourselves to the enemy's purpose. + + [Ts`ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"--by an appearance of +yielding and falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chang Yu's note +makes the meaning clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to +advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay +on purpose that he may carry out his intention." The object is +to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our +attack.] + + 61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, + + [I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the +enemy in one direction." Ts`ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers +and make for the enemy." But such a violent displacement of +characters is quite indefensible.] + +we shall succeed in the long run + + [Literally, "after a thousand LI."] + +in killing the commander-in-chief. + + [Always a great point with the Chinese.] + + 62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer +cunning. + 63. On the day that you take up your command, block the +frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, + + [These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was +issued as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a +gate. Cf. the "border-warden" of LUN YU III. 24, who may have +had similar duties. When this half was returned to him, within a +fixed period, he was authorized to open the gate and let the +traveler through.] + +and stop the passage of all emissaries. + + [Either to or from the enemy's country.] + + 64. Be stern in the council-chamber, + + [Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified +by the sovereign.] + +so that you may control the situation. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take +the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your +deliberations.] + + 65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. + 66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, + + [Cf. supra, ss. 18.] + +and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. + + [Ch`en Hao`s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favorable +position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the +advantage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical +account. He who intends therefore, to occupy a position of +importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful +appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him +into going there as well." Mei Yao-ch`en explains that this +"artful appointment" is to be made through the medium of the +enemy's own spies, who will carry back just the amount of +information that we choose to give them. Then, having cunningly +disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting after +the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. ss. 4). We must start +after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we must arrive +before him in order to capture the place without trouble. Taken +thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch`en's +interpretation of ss. 47.] + + 67. Walk in the path defined by rule, + + [Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, +and this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." +It is unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight +authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much more +satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of +the old school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating +every accepted canon of warfare.] + +and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a +decisive battle. + + [Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy's tactics until a +favorable opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a +battle that shall prove decisive."] + + 68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until +the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity +of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to +oppose you. + + [As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the +comparison hardly appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was +thinking only of its speed. The words have been taken to mean: +You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare; but +this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] + + +[1] Giles' Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. + +[2] "The Science of War," p. 333. + +[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE + + + [Rather more than half the chapter (SS. 1-13) is devoted to +the subject of fire, after which the author branches off into +other topics.] + + 1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with +fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; + + [So Tu Mu. Li Ch`uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill +the soldiers" (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan +Ch`ao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see +XI. ss. 51, note], found himself placed in extreme peril by the +unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal +enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his officers, he +exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! [1] The only course open +to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under +cover of night, when they will not be able to discern our +numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them +completely; this will cool the King's courage and cover us with +glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.' the +officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the +matter first with the Intendant. Pan Ch`ao then fell into a +passion: 'It is today,' he cried, 'that our fortunes must be +decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, who on +hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything +will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate +for valiant warriors.' All then agreed to do as he wished. +Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band +quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was +blowing at the time. Pan Ch`ao ordered ten of the party to take +drums and hide behind the enemy's barracks, it being arranged +that when they saw flames shoot up, they should begin drumming +and yelling with all their might. The rest of his men, armed +with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the gate of +the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, +whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the +front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in +frantic disorder. Pan Ch`ao slew three of them with his own +hand, while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and +thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, +perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan Ch`ao, +divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand: 'Although you +did not go with us last night, I should not think, Sir, of taking +sole credit for our exploit.' This satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan +Ch`ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the +head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with +fear and trembling, which Pan Ch`ao took steps to allay by +issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king's sons as +hostage, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku." HOU HAN SHU, +ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ] + +the second is to burn stores; + + [Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to +subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng +recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids +and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run +proved entirely successful.] + +the third is to burn baggage trains; + + [An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao`s wagons +and impedimenta by Ts`ao Ts`ao in 200 A.D.] + +the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; + + [Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and +"magazines" are the same. He specifies weapons and other +implements, bullion and clothing. Cf. VII. ss. 11.] + +the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. + + [Tu Yu says in the T`UNG TIEN: "To drop fire into the +enemy's camp. The method by which this may be done is to set the +tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then +shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy's lines."] + + 2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means +available. + + [T`sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy's camp" are +referred to. But Ch`en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: +"We must have favorable circumstances in general, not merely +traitors to help us." Chia Lin says: "We must avail ourselves +of wind and dry weather."] + +the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. + + [Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable +matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have +the material cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, +stuff for lighting fires."] + + 3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, +and special days for starting a conflagration. + 4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the +special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of +the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; + + [These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of +the Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to +Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.] + +for these four are all days of rising wind. + 5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet +five possible developments: + 6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, respond +at once with an attack from without. + 7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's +soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack. + + [The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the +enemy into confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means +that the enemy is ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for +caution.] + + 8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, +follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay +where you are. + + [Ts`ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but +if you find the difficulties too great, retire."] + + 9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from +without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your +attack at a favorable moment. + + [Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to +the fire breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by +the agency of incendiaries) inside the enemy's camp. "But," he +continues, "if the enemy is settled in a waste place littered +with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a +position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against +him at any seasonable opportunity, and not await on in hopes of +an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents should +themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and thus render +our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once baffled the +leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking +advantage of a favorable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese +general's camp, but found that every scrap of combustible +vegetation in the neighborhood had already been burnt down. On +the other hand, Po-ts`ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, +was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple +precaution. "At the head of a large army he was besieging +Ch`ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was +very small, and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the +ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and said: +"In war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and +numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here +quotes Sun Tzu, V. SS. 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched +their camp in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn +when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will be +thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on +all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of T`ien Tan.' +[See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so +Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into +torches and mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent +out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way through +the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. +Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and +Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which +threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." +[HOU HAN SHU, ch. 71.] ] + + 10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do +not attack from the leeward. + + [Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, +the enemy will retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat +and attack him then, he will fight desperately, which will not +conduce to your success." A rather more obvious explanation is +given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the east, begin burning to +the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from +that side. If you start the fire on the east side, and then +attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your +enemy."] + + 11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a +night breeze soon falls. + + [Cf. Lao Tzu's saying: "A violent wind does not last the +space of a morning." (TAO TE CHING, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch`en +and Wang Hsi say: "A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a +night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general +rule." The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how +this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.] + + 12. In every army, the five developments connected with +fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a +watch kept for the proper days. + + [Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of +the stars, and watch for the days on which wind will rise, +before making our attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret +the text differently: "We must not only know how to assail our +opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar +attacks from them."] + + 13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show +intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an +accession of strength. + 14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not +robbed of all his belongings. + + [Ts`ao Kung's note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy's +road or divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated +stores." Water can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible +destructive power of fire. This is the reason, Chang Yu +concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of sentences, +whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzu (ch. +4) speaks thus of the two elements: "If an army is encamped on +low-lying marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and +where the rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If +an army is encamped in wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with +weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it may be +exterminated by fire."] + + 15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles +and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of +enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general +stagnation. + + [This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzu. +Ts`ao Kung says: "Rewards for good service should not be +deferred a single day." And Tu Mu: "If you do not take +opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, your +subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will +ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the +formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the +interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch`en alone, whose words I +will quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their +battles and assaults must seize the favorable moments when they +come and not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that is to +say, they must resort to such means of attack of fire, water and +the like. What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is +to sit still and simply hold to the advantages they have got."] + + 16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans +well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources. + + [Tu Mu quotes the following from the SAN LUEH, ch. 2: "The +warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them +together by good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. +If faith decays, there will be disruption; if rewards are +deficient, commands will not be respected."] + + 17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your +troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless +the position is critical. + + [Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he +never goes so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in +the TAO TE CHING, ch. 69. "I dare not take the initiative, but +prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but +prefer to retreat a foot."] + + 18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to +gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply +out of pique. + 19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if +not, stay where you are. + + [This is repeated from XI. ss. 17. Here I feel convinced +that it is an interpolation, for it is evident that ss. 20 ought +to follow immediately on ss. 18.] + + 20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be +succeeded by content. + 21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never +come again into being; + + [The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of +this saying.] + +nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. + 22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good +general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at +peace and an army intact. + + +[1] "Unless you enter the tiger's lair, you cannot get hold of +the tiger's cubs." + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +XIII. THE USE OF SPIES + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men +and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the +people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily +expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. + + [Cf. II. ss. ss. 1, 13, 14.] + +There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop +down exhausted on the highways. + + [Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 30: "Where troops have been +quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: +"We may be reminded of the saying: 'On serious ground, gather in +plunder.' Why then should carriage and transportation cause +exhaustion on the highways?--The answer is, that not victuals +alone, but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to +the army. Besides, the injunction to 'forage on the enemy' only +means that when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory, +scarcity of food must be provided against. Hence, without being +solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order +that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, +again, there are places like salt deserts where provisions being +unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed with."] + +As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in +their labor. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough- +tail." The allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine +parts, each consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center +being cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the +other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their +cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. +[See II. ss. 12, note.] In time of war, one of the families had +to serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its +support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able- +bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 families +would be affected.] + + 2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving +for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, +to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because +one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors +and emoluments, + + ["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil +the effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were +actually mentioned at this point.] + +is the height of inhumanity. + + [Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by +adverting to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood +and treasure which war always brings in its train. Now, unless +you are kept informed of the enemy's condition, and are ready to +strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for years. The +only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is +impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly +paid for their services. But it is surely false economy to +grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, when +every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. +This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and +hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is +nothing less than a crime against humanity.] + + 3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help +to his sovereign, no master of victory. + + [This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its +root in the national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far +back as 597 B.C., these memorable words were uttered by Prince +Chuang of the Ch`u State: "The [Chinese] character for 'prowess' +is made up of [the characters for] 'to stay' and 'a spear' +(cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the +repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the +preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment +of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, putting +harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."] + + 4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good +general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the +reach of ordinary men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE. + + [That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he +means to do.] + + 5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; +it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, + + [Tu Mu's note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be +gained by reasoning from other analogous cases."] + +nor by any deductive calculation. + + [Li Ch`uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, +distance and magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical +determination; human actions cannot be so calculated."] + + 6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be +obtained from other men. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge +of the spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information +in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws +of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but +the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and +spies alone."] + + 7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: +(1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) +doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. + 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can +discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation +of the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty. + + [Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all +cavalry leaders, had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose +business it was to collect all possible information regarding the +enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of his success in +war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy's moves +thus gained." [1] ] + + 9. Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of the +inhabitants of a district. + + [Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by +kind treatment, and use them as spies."] + + 10. Having INWARD SPIES, making use of officials of the +enemy. + + [Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good +service in this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from +office, criminals who have undergone punishment; also, favorite +concubines who are greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at +being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed over in +the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side +should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of +displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always +want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several +kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to +one's interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will +be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy's country, +ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, and +moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach between the +sovereign and his ministers." The necessity for extreme caution, +however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears from an +historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of +I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of +Shu in his stronghold at P`i. After each side had experienced a +number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the +services of a certain P`o-t`ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to +have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to +Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him +from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right +moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in +these promises, march out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po +and others at their head with orders to attack at P`o-t`ai's +bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, Li Hsiang, had prepared +an ambuscade on their line of march; and P`o-t`ai, having reared +long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the +beacon-fire. Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the signal and +began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others +were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred +of Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of +whom was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his +forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy +completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho +Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li +Hsiung or that of his father Li T`e, CHIN SHU, ch. 120, 121.] + + 11. Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of the enemy's +spies and using them for our own purposes. + + [By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching +them from the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back +false information as well as to spy in turn on their own +countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we +pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry +away a false impression of what is going on. Several of the +commentators accept this as an alternative definition; but that +it is not what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his +subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously +(ss. 21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted +spies were used with conspicuous success: (1) by T`ien Tan in +his defense of Chi-mo (see supra, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his +march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., +when Lien P`o was conducting a defensive campaign against Ch`in. +The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P`o's cautious and +dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a series of +minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of +his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were +already in Fan Chu's pay. They said: "The only thing which +causes Ch`in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. +Lien P`o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be +vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a sun of the +famous Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed +in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came +to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who +could stand against him. His father was much disquieted by this +overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of +such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever +Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of +Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from +his own mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now +sent to succeed Lien P`o. Needless to say, he proved no match +for the redoubtable Po Ch`i and the great military power of +Ch`in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into +two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance +lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one +another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, +amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the +sword.] + + 12. Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain things openly for +purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and +report them to the enemy. + + [Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We +ostentatiously do thing calculated to deceive our own spies, who +must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed. +Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy's lines, they +will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take +measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite +different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." As an +example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released +by Pan Ch`ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He +also refers to T`ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T`ai +Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied security, +until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. +Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T`ang +Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the +New T`ang History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 +respectively) that he escaped and lived on until 656. Li I-chi +played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when sent by the King +of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch`i. He has certainly +more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of Ch`i, +being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and +infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, +ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.] + + 13. SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who bring back news +from the enemy's camp. + + [This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, +forming a regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving +spy must be a man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance +a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be +active, robust, endowed with physical strength and courage; +thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure +hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho Shih +tells the following story of Ta`hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When +he was governor of Eastern Ch`in, Shen-wu of Ch`i made a hostile +movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T`ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent +Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other +men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy's uniform. +When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from +the enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they +succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army. Then they +got on their horses again and boldly passed through the camp +under the guise of night-watchmen; and more than once, happening +to come across a soldier who was committing some breach of +discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound +cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible +information about the enemy's dispositions, and received warm +commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report +was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."] + + 14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more +intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. + + [Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en point out that the spy is +privileged to enter even the general's private sleeping-tent.] + +None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business +should greater secrecy be preserved. + + [Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies +should be carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies +may be quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them +than any previous commander: "Spies are attached to those who +give them most, he who pays them ill is never served. They +should never be known to anybody; nor should they know one +another. When they propose anything very material, secure their +persons, or have in your possession their wives and children as +hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to them +but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. [2] ] + + 15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain +intuitive sagacity. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "In order to use them, one must know +fact from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty +and double-dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation +thinks more along the lines of "intuitive perception" and +"practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers these +attributes to the spies themselves: "Before using spies we must +assure ourselves as to their integrity of character and the +extent of their experience and skill." But he continues: "A +brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than +mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." +So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the +passage."] + + 16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and +straightforwardness. + + [Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by +substantial offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity; +then they will work for you with all their might."] + + 17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make +certain of the truth of their reports. + + [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Be on your guard against the +possibility of spies going over to the service of the enemy."] + + 18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind +of business. + + [Cf. VI. ss. 9.] + + 19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before +the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man +to whom the secret was told. + + [Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters +are heard before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzu's +main point in this passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself +"as a punishment for letting out the secret," the object of +killing the other man is only, as Ch`en Hao puts it, "to stop his +mouth" and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already +been repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either +way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, +though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves +to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told the +secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of +him."] + + 20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a +city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to +begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de- +camp, + + [Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to +"those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with +information," which naturally necessitates frequent interviews +with him.] + +and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our +spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. + + [As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of +these important functionaries can be won over by bribery.] + + 21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be +sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. +Thus they will become converted spies and available for our +service. + 22. It is through the information brought by the converted +spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward +spies. + + [Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy's spies we +learn the enemy's condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt +the converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows +which of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of +the officials are open to corruption."] + + 23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can +cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. + + [Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the +enemy can best be deceived."] + + 24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy +can be used on appointed occasions. + 25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is +knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, +in the first instance, from the converted spy. + + [As explained in ss. 22-24. He not only brings information +himself, but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to +advantage.] + +Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the +utmost liberality. + 26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty + + [Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its +name was changed to Yin by P`an Keng in 1401. + +was due to I Chih + + [Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman +who took part in Ch`eng T`ang's campaign against Chieh Kuei.] + +who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou +dynasty was due to Lu Ya + + [Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, +whom he afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T`ai +Kung, a title bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have +composed a treatise on war, erroneously identified with the +LIU T`AO.] + +who had served under the Yin. + + [There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought +it well to introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on +the passage are by no means explicit. But, having regard to the +context, we can hardly doubt that Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih +and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted spy, or +something closely analogous. His suggestion is, that the Hsia +and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of +their weaknesses and shortcoming which these former ministers +were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch`en appears to +resent any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin and Lu +Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. Hsia +could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could +not employ the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great +achievements were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is +also indignant: "How should two divinely inspired men such as I +and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzu's mention of them +simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is +a matter which requires men of the highest mental caliber like I +and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task. +The above words only emphasize this point." Ho Shih believes +then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their +supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] + + 27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise +general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for +purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. + + [Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which +carries a boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of +sinking it, so reliance on spies, while production of great +results, is oft-times the cause of utter destruction."] + +Spies are a most important element in water, because on them +depends an army's ability to move. + + [Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man with +ears or eyes.] + + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2. + +[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311. + + +End of the Project Gutenberg Etext of Sun Tzu on the Art of War + + + + |