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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Academica, by Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Academica
+
+Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+Release Date: February 8, 2005 [EBook #14970]
+
+Language: Latin with English and Greek (ancient)
+
+Character set encoding: UTF-8
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team
+
+
+
+
+
+THE
+
+ACADEMICA OF CICERO.
+
+_THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED_
+
+BY
+
+JAMES S. REID,
+
+M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)
+ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
+ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.
+
+LONDON:
+MACMILLAN AND CO.
+1874
+
+[_All Rights reserved_.]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+TO
+THOSE OF HIS PUPILS
+WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM
+_THE ACADEMICA_,
+THIS EDITION
+IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED
+BY
+THE EDITOR.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+PREFACE.
+
+Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has edited
+the _Academica_. In Germany the last edition with explanatory notes is that
+of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and untrustworthiness of
+Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong evidence; while the work of
+Davies, though in every way far superior to that of Goerenz, is very
+deficient when judged by the criticism of the present time.
+
+This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures given by
+me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work in its
+present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the Universities,
+and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where the
+philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those where an
+attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient Philosophy as
+will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now required in the final
+Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford and Cambridge. My notes
+have been written throughout with a practical reference to the needs of
+junior students. During the last three or four years I have read the
+_Academica_ with a large number of intelligent pupils, and there is
+scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested by some difficulty or
+want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody in an Introduction such
+information concerning Cicero's philosophical views and the literary
+history of the _Academica_ as could not be readily got from existing books;
+next, to provide a good text; then to aid the student in obtaining a higher
+knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity, and lastly, to put it in his power to
+learn thoroughly the philosophy with which Cicero deals.
+
+My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in the
+edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the
+editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second edition
+of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that editor. I
+have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass without carefully
+weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also studied all original
+criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain access. The result is a
+text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than that of Halm. My
+obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently acknowledged in my
+notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled _Emendationes ad
+Ciceronis libros Philosophicos_, published in 1825 at Copenhagen, but
+never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in the edition of
+Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few passages I have
+introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the conjecttires of
+other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the MSS. If any
+apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the notes, questions
+of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from a conviction that
+the very excellence of the texts now in use is depriving a Classical
+training of a great deal of its old educational value. The judgment was
+better cultivated when the student had to fight his way through bad texts
+to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the Latin tongue. The
+acceptance of results without a knowledge of the processes by which they
+are obtained is worthless for the purposes of education, which is thus made
+to rest on memory alone. I have therefore done my best to place before the
+reader the arguments for and against different readings in the most
+important places where the text is doubtful.
+
+My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the students
+for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller acquaintance than they
+ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties of language which the
+best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide them to the best
+teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding editor of Cicero
+must build. His edition of the _De Finibus_ contains more valuable material
+for illustrating, not merely the language, but also the subject-matter of
+the _Academica_, than all the professed editions of the latter work in
+existence. Yet, even after Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be
+done in pointing out what is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have
+therefore added very many references from my own reading, and from other
+sources. Wherever a quotation would not have been given but for its
+appearance in some other work, I have pointed out the authority from whom
+it was taken. I need hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to
+look out all the references given. It was necessary to provide material by
+means of which the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if
+it were new to him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that
+occurred. Want of space has compelled me often to substitute a mere
+reference for an actual quotation.
+
+As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not
+touched upon somewhere in the _Academica_, it is evidently impossible for
+an editor to give information which would be complete for a reader who is
+studying that subject for the first time. I have therefore tried to enable
+readers to find easily for themselves the information they require, and
+have only dwelt in my own language upon such philosophical difficulties as
+were in some special way bound up with the _Academica_. The two books
+chiefly referred to in my notes are the English translation of Zeller's
+_Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics_ (whenever Zeller is quoted without any
+further description this book is meant), and the _Historia Philosophiae_ of
+Ritter and Preller. The _pages_, not the _sections_, of the fourth edition
+of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's _De Finibus_, all
+teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a
+philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have
+constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all
+of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.
+
+Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is
+hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as bringing
+together much scattered information illustrative of the _Academica_, which
+was before difficult of access. The present work will, I hope, prepare the
+way for an exhaustive edition either from my own or some more competent
+hand. It must be regarded as an experiment, for no English scholar of
+recent times has treated any portion of Cicero's philosophical works with
+quite the purpose which I have kept in view and have explained above.
+Should this attempt meet with favour, I propose to edit after the same plan
+some others of the less known and less edited portions of Cicero's
+writings.
+
+In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited I
+cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to
+repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than
+to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a
+great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that intellectual
+disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this University,
+and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of English
+scholarship as compared with that of Germany,
+
+I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and
+omissions from any who are interested in the subject.
+
+JAMES S. REID.
+
+CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, _December, 1873._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.
+
+Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica
+Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De
+Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. =
+Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus;
+Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = De
+Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. =
+Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; Ad
+Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., Verr. =
+In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; In Cat. =
+In Catilinam.
+
+Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia Socratis;
+Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.
+
+Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna
+Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De
+Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. =
+Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.
+
+Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. Rep. =
+De Stoicis Repugnantiis.
+
+Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. =
+Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = Pyrrhoneôn
+Hypotyposeôn Syntagmata.
+
+Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.
+
+Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.
+
+Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et Platonis.
+
+Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.
+
+Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos; De
+Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.
+
+Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.
+
+Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad Helvidium.
+
+Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.
+
+Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. =
+Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv. =
+Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.
+
+Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. =
+Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or
+Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.
+
+Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.
+
+Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie.
+
+Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.
+
+Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.
+
+Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. =
+conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. =
+emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. =
+especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. =
+Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, or
+omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. =
+subjunctive.
+
+R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium locis
+contexta.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+I. _Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of
+Letters:_ 90--45 B.C.
+
+It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his
+father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and spent
+the greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived
+that strong love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son
+throughout his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young
+Cicero to feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a
+corrective for the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2]
+
+Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the
+Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of Athens,
+whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he had assumed
+the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at once to the
+tenets of the master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life a friend
+of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable disposition
+and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, the exception
+of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any literary power.[4]
+Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius
+Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus.
+It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend
+became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the
+Epicurean school.[5]
+
+At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of
+Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively,
+the art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important to the
+orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the monopoly of
+the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days with Diodotus in
+the severest study, but he seems never to have been much attracted by the
+general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between the two lasted till
+the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion set by the Roman Stoic
+circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became an inmate of Cicero's
+house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil heir to a not
+inconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most
+accomplished men of his time, and Cicero's feelings towards him were those
+of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8]
+
+In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the
+Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled
+from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. Philo,
+like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic philosopher,
+he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice of oratory.
+Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for Epicureanism was
+swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, as he tells us, to
+the brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he
+abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the
+conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever,
+and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10]
+
+We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been brought
+into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent
+philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and
+important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become
+thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of each.
+His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his egotism has
+been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. In his later
+works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to philosophy.[11] It would
+be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection which subsisted
+between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; but there
+can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then Rhodian
+ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning the
+ethical part of Greek philosophy.
+
+During the years 88--81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly with the
+study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many ambitious
+works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him at this
+period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the Marian
+party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular course, and
+Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one philosophic orator of
+Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he was busily engaged,
+and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern Hellas. It is usually
+supposed that he came into collision with Sulla through the freedman
+Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of Roscius. The silence of
+Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which rests on no better evidence
+than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even when mentioning his speech in
+defence of Roscius, never assigns any other cause for his departure than
+his health, which was being undermined by his passionate style of
+oratory[13].
+
+The whole two years 79--77 B.C. were spent in the society of Greek
+philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at Athens, and
+were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the exception of
+Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent rhetorical teachers at that time
+resident in the city[14]. By the advice of Philo himself[15], Cicero
+attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as Diogenes calls
+him[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the Epicurean school. In Cicero's
+later works there are several references to his teaching. He was biting and
+sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in spirit, hence in striking contrast to
+Patro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to find that Zeno is numbered by
+Cicero among those pupils and admirers of Carneades whom he had known[18].
+Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along with Atticus who loved him beyond all
+other philosophers[19], Cicero spent much time in listening to his
+instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the two pupils[20]. Patro was
+probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere explicitly stated.
+Cicero must at this time have attained an almost complete familiarity with
+the Epicurean doctrines.
+
+There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school then
+at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures
+Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed Peripatetic,
+was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three notable
+Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of Naples, who
+lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is
+probable, however, from a mention of him in the De Oratore, that Cicero
+knew himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently
+named by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time
+unknown to him.
+
+The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at this
+period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a Stoicised
+Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to treat later,
+when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised over our
+author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point which was in
+controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still continued to think
+with his earlier teacher. His later works, however, make it evident that he
+set a high value on the abilities and the learning of Antiochus, especially
+in dialectic, which was taught after Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him
+as eminent among the philosophers of the time, both for talent and
+acquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a
+pointed style[25]; in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the
+philosophers of the age[26]. A considerable friendship sprang up between
+Antiochus and Cicero[27], which was strengthened by the fact that many
+friends of the latter, such as Piso, Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or
+less adhered to the views of Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at
+this time became acquainted with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in
+the Academica[28] he is mentioned in such a way as to show that he was
+unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.
+
+The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had been to learn philosophy; in
+Asia and at Rhodes he devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the
+guidance of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was his old
+friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian school[29]. Cicero, however,
+formed while at Rhodes one friendship which largely influenced his views of
+philosophy, that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, the most famous
+Stoic of the age. To him Cicero makes reference in his works oftener than
+to any other instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the
+Stoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom Pompey, in the
+midst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble[31]; as a
+minute inquirer[32]. He is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression
+of affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works more than those of
+any other author[33]. Posidonius was at a later time resident at Rome, and
+stayed in Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of Panaetius,
+may have been at Rhodes at this time. Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers
+of Panaetius, belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was well
+acquainted with the works of the former, he does not seem to have known
+either personally.
+
+From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters begins,
+Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political affairs to
+spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed much to
+philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; and we know from his
+letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style by much study
+of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. During the period
+then, about which we have little or no information, we may believe that he
+kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many Roman friends who had a
+bent towards philosophy, as well as with the Greeks who from time to time
+came to Rome and frequented the houses of the Optimates; to this he added
+such reading as his leisure would allow. The letters contained in the first
+book of those addressed to Atticus, which range over the years 68--62 B.C.,
+afford many proofs of the abiding strength of his passion for literary
+employment. In the earlier part of this time we find him entreating Atticus
+to let him have a library which was then for sale; expressing at the same
+time in the strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his
+love for books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the
+midst of his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest
+for the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan
+villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be
+taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all
+things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory
+held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed
+his intellect, but never his heart.
+
+The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to indulge his
+literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his speeches, which
+were crowded, he says, with the maxims of philosophy[35]; the history of
+his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he sent to
+Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the poem on his
+consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two later we find him
+reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and keeping up his
+acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of leisure
+seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at this
+time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he
+presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes
+to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the
+endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even
+slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find
+greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37]."
+At this period of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates
+near Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater
+emphasis on these facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero
+was a mere dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore
+paraphrases of Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for
+every kind of literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each
+department considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his
+age, with the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38]
+will give a fair picture of his life at this time. He especially studied
+the political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and
+Dicaearchus[39]. He also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of
+Theopompus[40].
+
+The years from 59--57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private cares
+overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return from
+exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring literature" with
+a marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that
+nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the
+year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla, the
+son of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us, his solace
+and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which Atticus had,
+beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of office. Towards the
+end of the year, he was busily engaged on the _De Oratore_, a work which
+clearly proves his continued familiarity with Greek philosophy[43]. In the
+following year (54) he writes that politics must cease for him, and that he
+therefore returns unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature,
+that of the student[44]. During this year he was again for the most part at
+those of his country villas where his best collections of books were. At
+this time was written the _De Republica_, a work to which I may appeal for
+evidence that his old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to
+drop[45]. Aristotle is especially mentioned as one of the authors read at
+this time[46]. In the year 52 B.C. came the _De Legibus_, written amid many
+distracting occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older
+philosophers of the Socratic schools.
+
+In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, much
+to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the house of
+Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His acquaintance
+with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the affectionate
+mention in the _Brutus_[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of Xeno, an
+Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. It was at
+this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil of the great
+Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in which Epicurus had
+lived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat disappointed with the state
+of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the only man of merit then resident
+there[49]. On the journey from Athens to his province, he made the
+acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at Athens as head of the
+Peripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at Mitylene, where
+Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the
+greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and
+indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52].
+
+The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's
+thoughts till the end of 50. Yet he yearned for Athens and philosophy. He
+wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful city, and
+anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build a προπυλον
+at the Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis[53]. It
+seems the Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient
+statues to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome
+inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter
+of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in
+the books _De Republica_[54]. His wishes with regard to Athens still kept
+their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke of
+conferring on the city some signal favour[55]. Cicero was anxious to show
+Rhodes, with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus,
+who accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days[56].
+From thence they went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with
+Aristus[57], and renewed his friendship with other philosophers, among them
+Xeno the friend of Atticus[58].
+
+On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical
+condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The letters
+which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times contrasts
+the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn in the _De
+Republica_[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's description of the tyrant
+is present to his mind[60]; when, he deliberates about the course he is
+himself to take, he naturally recals the example of Socrates, who refused
+to leave Athens amid the misrule of the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious
+to find Cicero, in the very midst of civil war, poring over the book of
+Demetrius the Magnesian concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in
+arguing with himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about
+tyranny[63]. Nothing could more clearly show that he was really a man of
+books; by nothing but accident a politician. In these evil days, however,
+nothing was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn
+became unpleasant[64].
+
+As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he
+returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter
+written to Varro in that year[65], he says "I assure you I had no sooner
+returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books."
+These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit
+than in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this
+time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to
+Sulpicius[67]. The _Partitiones Oratoriae_, the _Paradoxa_, the _Orator_,
+and the _Laudatio Catonis_, to which Caesar replied by his _Anticato_, were
+all finished within the year. Before the end of the year the _Hortensius_
+and the _De Finibus_ had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in
+the following year the _Academica_, the history of which I shall trace
+elsewhere, was written.
+
+I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as
+the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his
+life which preceded the writing of the _Academica_. Even the evidence I
+have produced, which does not include such indirect indications of
+philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical
+works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he
+been divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge made
+by some people on the publication of his first book of the later
+period--the _Hortensius_--that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the
+assertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts
+throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life[69]. Did the scope of
+this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in showing from a
+minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with ancient
+authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as accurate
+as it was extensive. So far as the _Academica_ is concerned, I have had in
+my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's substantial accuracy; of the
+success of the defence I must leave the reader to judge. During the
+progress of this work I shall have to expose the groundlessness of many
+feelings and judgments now current which have contributed to produce a low
+estimate of Cicero's philosophical attainments, but there is one piece of
+unfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the
+present. It is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the
+shortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise
+his political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate
+his achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too
+closely into their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance
+the illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the _De Legibus_ as "an oasis in the
+desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political partizanship,
+and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all
+students to free themselves in reading the _Academica_.
+
+II. _The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero_.
+
+In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student of
+philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed historical
+examination of the later Greek schools--the Stoic, Peripatetic, Epicurean
+and new Academic. These it would be necessary to know, not merely as they
+came from the hands of their founders, but as they existed in Cicero's age;
+Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as Posidonius and the other pupils
+of Panaetius propounded it; not merely the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but
+that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum
+by Cratippus; the new Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and
+Carneades; the medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put
+forward by Antiochus in the name of the Old Academy. A systematic attempt
+to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine held by
+these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements concerning
+any particular school are generally tested by comparing them with the
+assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier representatives of
+the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at once concluded that
+Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all probability, he is uttering
+opinions which would have been recognised as genuine by those who were at
+the head of the school in his day. The criticism of Madvig even is not free
+from this error, as will be seen from my notes on several passages of the
+_Academica_[70]. As my space forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I
+have indicated as desirable, I can but describe in rough outline the
+relation in which Cicero stands to the chief schools.
+
+The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often
+insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to
+distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical
+standard[71]. We have in the _Academica_ Cicero's view of the first
+problem: that the attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To
+go more into detail here would be to anticipate the text of the _Lucullus_
+as well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in
+this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, and
+in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine that
+absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against which
+all the other schools were combined[72]. In that which was most
+distinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.
+
+It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. Nothing
+was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he was
+accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both
+sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition with a
+conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One
+requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this
+arrogance[73]. Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most
+opposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from
+all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most
+probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart
+from his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration,
+and repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the
+diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to
+lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In
+positiveness of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and
+disgraceful, unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a
+touch of feeling thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar
+to some put forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to
+Mill, to show that the free conflict of opinion is necessary to the
+progress of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to
+maturity in Greece[77]. Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice,
+says Cicero, there philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a
+warning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often
+depicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires us to find out what can
+be said for every view. It is a positive duty to discuss all aspects of
+every question, after the example of the Old Academy and Aristotle[80].
+Those who demand a dogmatic statement of belief are mere busybodies[81].
+The Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to
+defend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their
+predecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does Cicero carry this freedom,
+that in the fifth book of the _Tusculan Disputations_, he maintains a view
+entirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the _De Finibus_,
+and when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former
+statements, on the score that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. "Modo
+hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur[84]." The Academic sips the best of
+every school[85]. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic
+dares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus[86]. The Academic is
+only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he makes it his
+sole aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and others of the mists of
+error[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus the Antiochean[88]. While
+professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero indignantly
+repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth,
+has no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true.
+
+Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their
+evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that
+eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators,
+politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the
+teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and
+Epicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic
+tenets were those with which the common sense of the world could have most
+sympathy[92]. The Academy also was the school which had the most
+respectable pedigree. Compared with its system, all other philosophies were
+plebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was
+most estimable, _ceteris paribus_, and that man was Carneades[94].
+
+In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard, we
+must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later
+philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first.
+Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of conduct (_ars vivendi_).
+All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely estimable as
+supplying a basis on which this practical art could be reared. This is
+equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the dogmatism of Zeno and
+Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were mere outworks or
+ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school was carried on. These
+were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy; in time of peace ethics
+held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a key to unlock many
+difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may instance one passage
+in the beginning of the _Academica Posteriora_[95], which has given much
+trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro with having deserted
+the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge. How is this to be
+reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he never recanted the
+doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus. Arcesilas, Carneades, and
+Philo had been too busy with their polemic against Zeno and his followers,
+maintained on logical grounds, to deal much with ethics. On the other hand,
+in the works which Cicero had written and published before the _Academica_,
+wherever he had touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The
+works themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and
+Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics
+mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase
+"Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical
+resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical difference, would
+naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus Academia," so
+long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought dialectic to the front,
+and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would naturally regard him as a
+deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This view is confirmed by the
+fact that for many years before Cicero wrote, the Academic dialectic had
+found no eminent expositor. So much was this the case, that when Cicero
+wrote the _Academica_ he was charged with constituting himself the champion
+of an exploded and discredited school[96].
+
+Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the sphere
+of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in the _De
+Legibus_ when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he begs the New
+Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, to be
+silent[97]. Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected,
+is in the _De Legibus_ spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical
+systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an
+attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the
+power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he
+calls them "great and famous philosophers[99]," and he frequently speaks
+with something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands
+of Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they
+should be the only true philosophers after all[100]. There was a kind of
+magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited to a
+superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the
+barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions,
+therefore, we often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism
+than even his teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the
+philosophers of the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The
+Stoics maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero
+agrees with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a
+life enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be
+happy, but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic
+and Peripatetic schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire)
+and to allow that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired
+even if he were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he
+admits the purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104].
+These opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but
+appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an
+ignoble craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is
+Cicero's general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt
+that he caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno,
+ever stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however,
+regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so
+regarded chiefly the dialectic. It is just in this that the difference
+between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To the former Zeno's dialectic was true
+and Socratic, while the latter treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon
+Socrates as the apostle of doubt[106]. On the whole Cicero was more in
+accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in all points, however: for
+while Antiochus accepted without reserve the Stoic paradoxes, Cicero
+hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded that they were
+Socratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic theory that all
+emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in his joys and sorrows,
+refused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some points Cicero
+was inconsistent. In the _De Finibus_ he argued that the difference between
+the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of terms; in the _Tusculan
+Disputations_ he held it to be real. The most Stoic in tone of all his
+works are the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Officiis_.
+
+With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a comparatively
+small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this branch of
+philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient theology was,
+as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical science. The
+religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very strongly to
+sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal operation of
+divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were impossible in any form,
+he thought, if the divine government of the universe were denied[109]. It
+went to Cicero's heart that Carneades should have found it necessary to
+oppose the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defends the great sceptic by
+the plea that his one aim was to arouse men to the investigation of the
+truth[110]. At the same time, while really following the Stoics in physics,
+Cicero often believed himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose
+from the actual adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines,
+which they gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious
+and the genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange
+oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111].
+Still, Cicero contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic
+physics by a study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of
+his notions about physics, the _Timaeus_ of Plato, which he knew well and
+translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that
+the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well
+aware of the fact.
+
+Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's estimate of
+the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not very powerfully
+represented during his lifetime. The philosophical descendants of the
+author of the _Organon_ were notorious for their ignorance of logic[112],
+and in ethics had approximated considerably to the Stoic teaching. While
+not much influenced by the school, Cicero generally treats it tenderly for
+the sake of its great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic
+family. With the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood
+absolutely alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they
+discarded mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing
+but loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors
+by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely
+indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.
+
+III. _The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works_.
+
+It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a philosopher,
+and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is true, but still
+absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of Cicero's purpose in
+writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek speculation. The
+conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite unwarranted. If the later
+philosophy of the Greeks is of any value, Cicero's works are of equal
+value, for it is only from them that we get any full or clear view of it.
+Any one who attempts to reconcile the contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes
+Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and other authorities, will perhaps
+feel little inclination to cry out against the confusion of Ciceros ideas.
+Such outcry, now so common, is due largely to the want, which I have
+already noticed, of any clear exposition of the variations in doctrine
+which the late Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before
+the Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This
+is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works
+(if we except the third book of the _De Officiis_), which he does not
+freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the time
+when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault rather
+than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no one had
+propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had been
+simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing tenets. It
+would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two centuries are
+therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not the substance of
+the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which ultimately exercised
+no unimportant influence on society and on the Christian religion itself.
+
+When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have been
+destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed study to
+those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the best Greek
+speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the education of
+his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at the same time
+to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism throughout Italy. The
+doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin in a shape suited to
+catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a very large Epicurean
+literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty traces is now lost. C.
+Amafinius, mentioned in the _Academica_[113], was the first to write, and
+his books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large
+number of imitators, who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in
+Cicero's strong language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115].
+Rabirius and Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of
+Horace, were two of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various
+reasons for their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean
+physics, the fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and
+the voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in
+one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It is
+exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean literature
+dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics than with the
+ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the
+Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for morality in the legal
+and social constitution of the family, and did not much feel the need of
+any speculative system; while the general decay among the educated classes
+of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied as it was by an increase of
+superstition among the masses, prepared the way for the acceptance of a
+purely mechanical explanation of the universe. But of this subject,
+interesting and important as it is in itself, and neglected though it has
+been, I can treat no farther.
+
+These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached by Cicero for their
+uncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not read
+them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious question
+arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero had for
+omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman Epicureans.
+The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible to include
+the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being unwilling to allow
+that anything good could come from the school of Epicurus, preferred to
+keep silence, which nothing compelled him to break, since Lucretius was an
+obscure man and only slowly won his way to favour with the public.
+
+In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero had a
+patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the reproach
+that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He often tries by
+the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had left its mark on
+the early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that philosophy was
+best left to the Greek language, he replies with indignation, accusing them
+of being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a glorious thing, he
+thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled to resort to
+Greeks[119]. He will not even concede that the Greek is a richer tongue
+than the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the Roman intellect
+to deal with philosophical enquiries, he will not hear of it. It is only,
+he says, because the energy of the nation has been diverted into other
+channels that so little progress has been made. The history of Roman
+oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an impulse
+were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the wane in
+Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of oratory,
+which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122].
+
+There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he
+could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political
+inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one
+service he could render[123]. He is within his right when he claims praise
+for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so many of the most
+prominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and in
+those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125].
+Philosophy took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and
+politics[126]. It is strange to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies
+as he does for devoting himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might
+set them down to egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such
+studies were merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a
+life to them seemed well enough for Greeks, but for Romans unmanly,
+unpractical and unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were
+ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh
+importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were
+received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others, like
+the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy was
+good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that
+Cicero should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging
+the pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.
+
+Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were roused
+by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. The elder
+generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the books, and
+many were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now
+extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as to
+bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were accustomed
+to treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy could not be thoroughly
+understood till the whole subject had been mastered[132]. This design then,
+which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest works which we possess,
+the _Academica_ and the _De Finibus_, required the composition of a sort of
+philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero never claimed to be more than an
+interpreter of Greek philosophy to the Romans. He never pretended to
+present new views of philosophy, or even original criticisms on its
+history. The only thing he proclaims to be his own is his style. Looked at
+in this, the true light, his work cannot be judged a failure. Those who
+contrive to pronounce this judgment must either insist upon trying the work
+by a standard to which it does not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek
+philosophy it copies, or perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed
+worthlessness of the philosophy of his age.
+
+In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his oratorical
+and political writings, all or nearly all published before the
+_Hortensius_, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only
+two works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded
+the _Academica_, were the _De Consolatione_, founded on Crantor's book,
+περι πενθους, and the _Hortensius_, which was introductory to philosophy,
+or, as it was then called, protreptic.
+
+For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of their
+composition, the student must be referred to the _Dict. of Biography_, Art.
+Cicero.
+
+IV. _History of the Academica_.
+
+On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45 B.C.,
+Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was
+pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and Circeii[134].
+Here he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book
+_De Consolatione_ was written. He found the mechanic exercise of
+composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days
+together[135]. At other times he would plunge at early morning into the
+dense woods near his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till
+nightfall[136]. Often exertion failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the
+entreaties of Atticus that he would return to the forum and the senate. A
+grief, which books and solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would
+crush him, he felt, in the busy city[137].
+
+It was amid such surroundings that the _Academica_ was written. The first
+trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a letter of Cicero
+to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks of his
+bereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus very much for
+historical and biographical details, and in the letter in question he asks
+for just the kind of information which would be needed in writing the
+_Academica_. The words with which he introduces his request imply that he
+had determined on some new work to which our _Academica_ would
+correspond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome the embassy which
+Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader of the Epicurean
+school; who were then the most noted πολιτικοι at Athens. The meaning of
+the last question is made clear by a passage in the _De Oratore_[140],
+where Cicero speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under
+that name. It may be with reference to the progress of the _Academica_ that
+in a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the advance he has
+made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of the remainder
+of his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed; but although
+he speaks of various other literary projects, we find no express mention in
+his letters to Atticus of the _Academica_[142]. He declares that however
+much his detractors at Rome may reproach him with inaction, they could not
+read the numerous difficult works on which he has been engaged within the
+same space of time that he has taken to write them[143].
+
+In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near
+Antium[144], where he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he
+afterwards suppressed[145]. From the same place he wrote to Atticus of his
+intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome by way of Lanuvium about the
+middle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately following Tullia's
+death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she died. This he felt
+now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either abandon Tusculum
+altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even ten years would make
+the effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero wrote
+to Atticus that he had finished while at Astura _duo magna_ συνταγματα,
+words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many scholars,
+including Madvig, have understood that the first edition of the
+_Academica_, along with the _De Finibus_, is intended. Against this view
+the reasons adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the
+letters to Atticus that the _De Finibus_ was being worked out book by book
+long after the first edition of the _Academica_ had been placed in the
+hands of Atticus. The _De Finibus_ was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it
+was still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the
+_Academica_[151]. The final arrangement of the characters in the _De
+Finibus_ is announced later still[152]; and even at a later date Cicero
+complains that Balbus had managed to obtain surreptitiously a copy of the
+fifth book before it was properly corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia
+having copied the whole five books while in that state[153]. A passage in
+the _De Divinatione_[154] affords almost direct evidence that the
+_Academica_ was published before the _De Finibus_. On all these grounds I
+hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero describes as having
+been finished simultaneously at Astura.
+
+Another view of the συνταγματα in question is that they are simply the two
+books, entitled _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, of the _Priora Academica_. In my
+opinion the word συνταγμα, the use of which to denote a portion of a work
+Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains its natural meaning. Cicero uses the
+word συνταξις of the whole work[156], while συνταγμα[157], and
+συγγραμμα[158], designate definite portions or divisions of a work. I
+should be quite content, then, to refer the words of Cicero to the
+_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_. Krische, however, without giving reasons, decides
+that this view is unsatisfactory, and prefers to hold that the _Hortensius_
+(or _de Philosophia_) and the _Priora Academica_ are the compositions in
+question. If this conjecture is correct, we have in the disputed passage
+the only reference to the _Hortensius_ which is to be found in the letters
+of Cicero. We are quite certain that the book was written at Astura, and
+published before the _Academica_. This would be clear from the mention in
+the _Academica Posteriora_ alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the _De
+Finibus_[160] place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the
+_Hortensius_ had been published a sufficiently long time before the _De
+Finibus_, to have become known to a tolerably large circle of readers.
+Further, in the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Divinatione_[161] the
+_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ are mentioned together in such a way as to
+show that the former was finished and given to the world before the latter.
+Nothing therefore stands in the way of Krische's conjecture, except the
+doubt I have expressed as to the use of the word συνταγμα, which equally
+affects the old view maintained by Madvig.
+
+Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the
+_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ must have been more closely connected, in
+style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting perhaps the
+_Academica_ and the _De Finibus_. The interlocutors in the _Hortensius_
+were exactly the same as in the _Academica Priora_, for the introduction of
+Balbus into some editions of the fragments of the _Hortensius_ is an
+error[162]. The discussion in the _Academica Priora_ is carried on at
+Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the _Hortensius_ at the villa of Lucullus
+near Cumae. It is rather surprising that under these circumstances there
+should be but one direct reference to the _Hortensius_ in the
+_Lucullus_[163].
+
+While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45, Cicero
+sent Atticus the _Torquatus_, as he calls the first book of the _De
+Finibus_[164]. He had already sent the first edition of the _Academica_ to
+Rome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia had been added to the
+_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, in which the public characters from whom the
+books took their names were extolled. In all probability the extant
+prooemium of the _Lucullus_ is the one which was then affixed. Atticus, who
+visited Cicero at Tusculum, had doubtless pointed out the incongruity
+between the known attainments of Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they
+were made to take in difficult philosophical discussions. It is not
+uncharacteristic of Cicero that his first plan for healing the incongruity
+should be a deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of
+statements concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans
+which he knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I
+may note, as of some interest in connection with the _Academica_, the fact
+that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was one
+from Varro[166].
+
+On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says, to
+arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing attentions of
+Brutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it had been his intention to
+go on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still unsatisfied with his
+choice of interlocutors for the _Academica_, for the first thing he did on
+his arrival was to transfer the parts of Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and
+Brutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on the receipt of a letter
+from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work should be dedicated to
+Varro, or if not the _Academica_, the _De Finibus_[170]. Cicero had never
+been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems to have been
+chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times anxious to draw
+them more closely together. Nine years before he had pressed Cicero to find
+room in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of the works
+on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to comply with
+the request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full two years before the
+_Academica_ was written, to dedicate to Cicero his great work _De Lingua
+Latino_. In answer to the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared
+himself very much dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise.
+From this it is evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude
+of that work. His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years
+without making any progress[173], shows that there could have been little
+of anything like friendship between the two. Apart from these causes for
+grumbling, Cicero thought the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend[174]." Since
+the _De Finibus_ was already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer
+to Varro the _Academica_, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of
+noble birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they
+possess that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had
+been made in the first edition of the _Academica_ to maintain[176]. For
+them another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the
+_Academica_ would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus, and the
+fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It
+happened that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's
+stay at Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his
+_Academica_, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making
+the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position occupied by
+Atticus in the dialogue was quite an inferior one, but he was so pleased
+with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often in the future such
+minor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta should also be
+introduced was found impracticable[180].
+
+Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had
+constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He
+frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus,
+but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his plans.
+Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the work
+contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over again
+before he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for these
+solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was obliged to
+assure him that there were reasons, which he could not disclose in a
+letter[182]. The true reasons, however, did appear in some later letters.
+In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of Varro, and the more so because he
+wishes it, but you know he is
+
+  δεινος ανηρ, ταχα κεν και αναιτιον αιτιοωιτο.
+
+So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, it may
+be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than his; a
+charge which you will perceive to be untrue[183]." Cicero, then, feared
+Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical fastidiousness.
+Before these explanations Atticus had concluded that Cicero was afraid of
+the effect the work might produce on the public. This notion Cicero assured
+him to be wrong; the only cause for his vacillation was his doubt as to how
+Varro would receive the dedication[184]. Atticus would seem to have
+repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured Cicero that there
+was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a general assurance,
+and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the reasons from which it
+proceeded[185]. In order to stimulate his friend, Atticus affirmed that
+Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown more favour[186]. We
+find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it
+Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not
+have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to
+have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed ignorant
+of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of being
+actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently while at
+Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the _De Finibus_, but
+employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the dedication[187].
+
+Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the _Academica_
+is often given in the letters. He tells us that it extended, on the whole,
+to greater length than the first, though much had been omitted; he adds,
+"Unless human self love deceives me, the books have been so finished that
+the Greeks themselves have nothing in the same department of literature to
+approach them.... This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and
+altogether better than the last[188]." Again: "The Antiochean portion has
+all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may
+possess[189]." Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what
+success, but with a care which nothing could surpass[190]." The binding and
+adornment of the presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and
+the letter accompanying it was carefully elaborated[191]. Yet after
+everything had been done and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome,
+Cicero was still uneasy as to the reception it would meet with from Varro.
+He wrote thus to Atticus: "I tell you again and again that the presentation
+will be at your own risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to
+Brutus, who is also a follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou
+wert ever wont, flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part
+"shuddered" at the idea of taking the responsibility[192]. After the work
+had passed into his hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to
+prevent it from getting into circulation until they could meet one another
+in Rome[193]. This warning was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had
+just managed to get access to the _De Finibus_[194]. In a letter, dated
+apparently a day or two later, Cicero declared his intention to meet
+Atticus at Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable
+to do so, after a consultation[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take
+place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to
+approve any course that might be taken[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as
+soon as Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time,
+then," says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal
+step; oh dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my
+letter stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to
+hear how the matter stands[197]." Again, a little later: "You have been
+bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment upon them,
+but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books in the first
+fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work on the _Tusculan
+Disputations_[198]. A copy of the first edition had already got into
+Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which Cicero begs Atticus to
+ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of the _Academica_, at a
+time when the fate of the second edition was still undecided[199]. From
+this fact we may conclude that Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing
+the first edition. If he consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies
+of the first edition, it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of
+course assumes that Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people,
+wishes to have the "Splendidiora, breviora, meliora." Still, on every
+occasion which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised
+edition the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately
+after the _Academica Posteriora_ was completed[200], and often
+subsequently, when he most markedly mentioned the number of the books as
+four[201]. That he wished the work to bear the title _Academica_ is
+clear[202]. The expressions _Academica quaestio_, Ακαδημικη συνταξις, and
+_Academia_, are merely descriptive[203]; so also is the frequent
+appellation _Academici libri_[204]. The title _Academicae Quaestiones_,
+found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the _Tusculanae
+Quaestiones_, which was supported by the false notion, found as early as
+Pliny[205], that Cicero had a villa called Academia, at which the book was
+written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his Tusculan villa, which he called
+his Academia, but we are certain from the letters to Atticus that the work
+was written entirely at Astura, Antium, and Arpinum.
+
+Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well[206], but the
+second edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books
+are expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the
+title _Academica_. Augustine speaks of them only as _Academici libri_, and
+his references show that he knew the second edition only. Lactantius also
+uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks of the _Academica_.
+Plutarch shows only a knowledge of the first edition[207].
+
+I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of the
+genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. That it
+was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding theories which
+old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the two editions. A
+fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of Goerenz. I now proceed
+to examine into the constitution and arrangement of the two editions.
+
+a. _The lost dialogue "Catulus."_
+
+The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the _Lucullus_ are among
+those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party whom Cicero
+so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue was named was
+son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the political career of
+father and son we shall have little to do. I merely inquire what was their
+position with respect to the philosophy of the time, and the nature of
+their connection with Cicero.
+
+Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the
+_Lucullus_[208] that he did little more than put forward opinions he had
+received from his father. Cicero would, doubtless, have preferred to
+introduce the elder man as speaking for himself, but in that case, as in
+the _De Oratore_, the author would have been compelled to exclude himself
+from the conversation[209]. The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of
+the father, just as Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does
+nothing but render literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to
+have heard[210]. For the arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be
+found in their ατριψια with respect to philosophy[211]. This ατριψια did
+not amount to απαιδευσια, or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the
+younger the advocate of philosophy in the _Hortensius_[212]. Though Cicero
+sometimes classes the father and son together as men of literary culture
+and perfect masters of Latin style, it is very evident on a comparison of
+all the passages where the two are mentioned, that no very high value was
+placed on the learning of the son[213]. But however slight were the claims
+of Catulus the younger to be considered a philosopher, he was closely
+linked to Cicero by other ties. During all the most brilliant period of
+Cicero's life, Catulus was one of the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his
+character, life, and influence are often depicted in even extravagant
+language by the orator[214]. He is one of the pillars of the state[215],
+Cicero cries, and deserves to be classed with the ancient worthies of
+Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law, and asks the people on whom
+they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic power concentrated in his
+hands, were to die, the people answer with one voice "On you[217]." He
+alone was bold enough to rebuke the follies, on the one hand, of the mob,
+on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no storm of danger, no favouring
+breeze of fortune, could ever inspire either fear or hope, or cause to
+swerve from his own course[219]. His influence, though he be dead, will
+ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not only glorious in his life,
+but fortunate in his death[221].
+
+Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were
+special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the _viri consulares_
+who had given their unreserved approval to the measures taken for the
+suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the first to confer on
+Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title "Father of his
+country[222]." So closely did Cicero suppose himself to be allied to
+Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for the death of Tullia, by
+bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden times[223]." The statement of
+Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never been so
+unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna
+held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast between the
+zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague Antonius[224].
+Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of
+the two Catuli[225].
+
+We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first
+edition of the _Academica_ from circulation, he affixed a prooemium to each
+book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. From the
+passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit in such
+matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a portion of
+the contents of the lost prooemium to the _Catulus_. The achievements of
+the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as those of his son. The
+philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made to cast its lustre on the
+younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once more lauded, and great
+stress was laid upon the patronage it received from so famous a man as the
+younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in the fervid language which
+Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. Some allusion most likely was
+made to the connection of Archias with the Catuli, and to the poem he had
+written in Cicero's honour. Then the occasion of the dialogue, its supposed
+date, and the place where it was held, were indicated. The place was the
+Cuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned date must fall between the year 60
+B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which
+is alluded to in the _Lucullus_[227]. It is well known that in the
+arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against
+anachronisms.
+
+The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly made
+to the _Hortensius_, in which the same speakers had been engaged; and after
+more compliments had been bandied about, most of which would fall to
+Cicero's share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between
+the dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's
+views, at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy.
+Before we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from
+indications offered by the _Lucullus_, it is necessary to speak of the
+character and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.
+
+In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to mention
+his _sapientia_, which implies a certain knowledge of philosophy. He was,
+says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the wisest, the holiest of
+men[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of surpassing worth, a second
+Laelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the _De Oratore_, in which he
+appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view of his accomplishments.
+Throughout the second and third books he is treated as the lettered man,
+par excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made to him when any
+question is started which touches on Greek literature and philosophy. We
+are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance with Greek, and
+his style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the Greeks from
+the attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the Latin
+historians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek rhetorical
+teaching, while he bestows high commendation on the early sophists[234].
+The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus is most to his
+mind[235]. An account is given by him of the history of Greek speculation
+in Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin style made him seem to
+many the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written a history of his
+own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had imitated[238], and
+was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239].
+
+Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the
+_Academica_ that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In the _De
+Oratore_, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does
+not declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in
+his long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular
+teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the
+poet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded that he
+was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. Cicero
+repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator spring, and
+the whole tone of the _De Oratore_ shows that Catulus could have had no
+leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The probability is that he
+had never placed himself under the instruction of Greek teachers for any
+length of time, but had rather gained his information from books and
+especially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual
+communication with any of the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have
+failed to tell us, as he does in the case of Antonius[243], and
+Crassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any direct intercourse between
+Philo and Catulus can have taken place, although one passage in the
+_Lucullus_ seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo had a brilliant reputation
+during the later years of Catulus, and no one at all conversant with Greek
+literature or society could fail to be well acquainted with his
+opinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus
+undoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the latest development
+of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were probably not known to
+Catulus[248].
+
+I now proceed to draw out from the references in the _Lucullus_ the chief
+features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably introduced
+by a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the speech
+must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon the
+genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated with
+great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of the
+older Academics[250]. The most important part of the speech, however, must
+have consisted of a defence of Carneades and Arcesilas against the dogmatic
+schools[251]. Catulus evidently concerned himself more with the system of
+the later than with that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly
+probable that he touched only very lightly on the negative Academic
+arguments, while he developed fully that positive teaching about the
+πιθανον which was so distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of
+Lucullus which concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to
+be distinctly aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the
+discourse of the day before[252]. On the other hand, those parts of
+Lucullus' speech which deal with the constructive part of Academicism[253]
+seem to be intended for Catulus, to whom the maintenance of the genuine
+Carneadean distinction between αδηλα and ακαταληπτα would be a peculiarly
+congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by Lucullus on the way in
+which the _probabile_ had been handled appertains to Catulus. The
+exposition of the sceptical criticism would naturally be reserved for the
+most brilliant and incisive orator of the party--Cicero himself. These
+conjectures have the advantage of establishing an intimate connection
+between the prooemium, the speech of Catulus, and the succeeding one of
+Hortensius. In the prooemium the innovations of Philo were mentioned;
+Catulus then showed that the only object aimed at by them, a satisfactory
+basis for επιστημη, was already attained by the Carneadean theory of the
+πιθανον; whereupon Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus,
+that such a basis was provided by the older philosophy, which both
+Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central
+point or pivot of the discussion. With this arrangement none of the
+indications in the _Lucullus_ clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius
+upon Catulus[254] need only imply such a bare statement on the part of the
+latter of the negative Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for
+the Carneadean πιθανον. One important opinion maintained by Catulus after
+Carneades, that the wise man would opine[255] (τον σοφον δοξασειν), seems
+another indication of the generally constructive character of his
+exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the
+dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.
+
+Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of
+Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it
+extremely probable that he gave a résumé of the history of philosophy,
+corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the _Academica
+Posteriora_. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty of
+understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the speech
+could have been assigned in the first edition. In the _Academica
+Posteriora_ it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second as
+Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second edition
+of the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate
+only in the mouth of one who was answering a speech already made. On the
+view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the fact that
+Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the lost dialogue
+which bore his name he had argued against philosophy altogether[258], and
+denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a
+historical résumé as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within the
+reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put forward to
+show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old
+Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant for
+stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We
+are thus relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word
+_commoveris_[261], from which Krische infers that the dialogue, entitled
+_Hortensius_, had ended in a conversion to philosophy of the orator from
+whom it was named. To any such conversion we have nowhere else any
+allusion.
+
+The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character and
+attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to have been
+as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it was possible
+for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech of Hortensius
+were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral teaching of
+Antiochus.
+
+The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of the
+preceding speech is correct, it follows that Cicero in his reply pursued
+the same course which he takes in his answer to Varro, part of which is
+preserved in the _Academica Posteriora_[262]. He justified the New Academy
+by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old, and also with
+those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, therefore,
+reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great and ancient
+names like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according to
+Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes,
+Plato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a historical
+summary. He must have dealt with the theory of καταληπτικη φαντασια and
+εννοιαι (which though really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he
+found it necessary to "manufacture" (_fabricari_) Latin terms to represent
+the Greek[265]. He probably also commented on the headlong rashness with
+which the dogmatists gave their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a
+retort is made by Lucullus[266]. That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic
+schools was incomplete may be seen by the fact that he had not had occasion
+to Latinize the terms καταληψις (i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the
+individual καταληπτικη φαντασια), εναργεια, ‛ορμη, αποδειξις, δογμα,
+οικειον, αδηλα, εποχη, nearly all important terms in the Stoic, and to some
+extent in the Antiochean system, all of which Lucullus is obliged to
+translate for himself[267]. The more the matter is examined the more
+clearly does it appear that the main purpose of Cicero in this speech was
+to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the New Academy,
+and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience, which were
+reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he expressly
+tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him in the first
+day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely introduced in
+order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these arguments
+must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, although
+foreign to its main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary
+classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent
+to the truth of each class[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of the
+elaborate speech of Cicero in the _Lucullus_ proves that no general or
+minute demonstration of the impossibility of επιστημη in the dogmatic sense
+had been attempted in his statement of the day before. Cicero's argument in
+the _Catulus_ was allowed by Lucullus to have considerably damaged the
+cause of Antiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus, Hortensius, and
+Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out for the
+discussion[272], but only cursorily, so that there was plenty of room for a
+more minute examination in the _Lucullus_.
+
+One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the attack of
+Catulus? Krische believes that the argument of Catulus was answered point
+by point. In this opinion I cannot concur. Cicero never appears elsewhere
+as the defender of Philo's reactionary doctrines[273]. The expressions of
+Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching had been dismissed by
+all the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his letter of
+dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo (_partes mihi
+sumpsi Philonis_[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to those general
+New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly supported by the pupil
+of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief sources for Cicero's
+speech in the _Catulus_ were, doubtless, Philo himself and Clitomachus.
+
+In that intermediate form of the _Academica_, where Cato and Brutus
+appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no doubt
+that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. Consequently Cato
+must have taken the comparatively inferior part of Hortensius, while Brutus
+took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem strange that a Stoic of the
+Stoics like Cato should be chosen to represent Antiochus, however much that
+philosopher may have borrowed from Zeno. The rôle given to Hortensius,
+however, was in my view such as any cultivated man might sustain who had
+not definitely committed himself to sceptical principles. So eminent an
+Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been reduced to the comparatively
+secondary position assigned to Hortensius in the _Academica Priora_. He
+would naturally occupy the place given to Varro in the second edition[276].
+If this be true, Brutus would not speak at length in the first half of the
+work. Cato is not closely enough connected with the _Academica_ to render
+it necessary to treat of him farther.
+
+b. _The "Lucullus."_
+
+The day after the discussion narrated in the _Catulus_, during which
+Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the Cuman villa
+of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of Hortensius at
+Bauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind favoured, Lucullus was to leave for
+his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his at Pompeii[278]. Bauli was a little
+place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round which so many legends
+lingered[279]. The scenery in view was magnificent[280]. As the party were
+seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines of statues, the
+waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the horizon glistened and
+quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour under the freshening
+breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and Puteoli, thirty stadia
+distant[281].
+
+Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and to keep it perfectly
+free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still living, although
+when the words were written he had been dead for many years[282]. The
+surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom
+of Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private troubles
+which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept carefully
+out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of thoughts and
+plans which were actively employing the author's mind at Astura. His
+intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last section of the
+book, while in the last but one the _De Finibus_, the _De Natura Deorum_
+and other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another passage the design of
+the _Tusculan Disputations_, which was carried out immediately after the
+publication of the _Academica_ and _De Finibus_, is clearly to be
+seen[285].
+
+Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the
+conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially
+acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly
+all that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue,
+and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to have
+dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private citizen, was
+directed to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train when he went to
+Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his residence in the
+East he sought to attach learned men to his person. At Alexandria he was
+found in the company of Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius
+Rogus and the Selii, all men of philosophic tastes[288]. He is several
+times mentioned by Pliny in the _Natural History_ as the patron of Greek
+artists. Yet, as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters
+to Atticus that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like
+Catulus, by the authority of another person. All his arguments are
+explicitly stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard
+Antiochus engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a
+reply to that of Cicero in the _Catulus_. Any closer examination of its
+contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The
+same may be said of Cicero's answer.
+
+In the intermediate form of the _Academica_, the speech of Lucullus was no
+doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a slight connection
+with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much more than call
+attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close relationship in
+which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have had to deal. He
+was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife of Lucullus[289].
+Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while
+Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the
+Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero,
+during the war between Pompey and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both
+friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290].
+
+c. _The Second Edition._
+
+When Cicero dedicated the _Academica_ to Varro, very slight alterations
+were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the piece. Cicero
+had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost within sight of
+Hortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene was now
+laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date
+of the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is
+shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many
+allusions are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the
+Pompeian party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the
+_Hortensius_[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of
+the _Academica_, it can be shown that Varro, Cicero and Atticus could not
+have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore for once admits into his works
+an impossibility in fact. This impossibility would at once occur to Varro,
+and Cicero anticipates his wonder in the letter of dedication[296].
+
+For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the
+ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact
+between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his
+philosophical opinions, are alone needed here. The first mention we have of
+Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself sufficient to show his
+character and the impossibility of anything like friendship between the
+two. Varro had done the orator some service in the trying time which came
+before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had eulogised Varro; and in
+the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to send Varro the eulogy to
+read, adding "_Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti,_ ελικτα και
+ουδεν[297]." All the references to Varro in the letters to Atticus are in
+the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to write Varro a letter of thanks
+for supposed exertions in his behalf, during his exile[298]. Several
+passages show that Cicero refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported
+by Atticus[299]. On Cicero's return from exile, he and Varro remained in
+the same semi-friendly state. About the year 54 B.C., as we have already
+seen, Atticus in vain urged his friend to dedicate some work to the great
+polymath. After the fall of the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to
+have been drawn a little closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in
+the year before the _Academica_ was published, testify to this
+approximation[300]. Still they are all cold, forced and artificial; very
+different from the letters Cicero addressed to his real intimates, such for
+instance as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all
+show a fear of giving offence to the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility
+in presence of his vast learning which is by no means natural to Cicero.
+The negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication
+of the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this
+slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301].
+
+The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable accuracy
+from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro _De
+Philosophia_[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of Antiochus and the
+so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school from, among the 288
+philosophies which he considered possible, by an elaborate and pedantic
+process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious in Augustine. My notes on
+the _Academica Posteriora_ will show that there is no reason for accusing
+Cicero of having mistaken Varro's philosophical views. This supposition
+owes its currency to Müller, who, from Stoic phrases in the _De Lingua
+Latina_, concluded that Varro had passed over to the Stoics before that
+work was written. All that was Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303].
+
+The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the
+subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more
+conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition
+preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the
+contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical exposition
+of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by Varro; then the
+historical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had given
+in the first edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an
+exposition by Cicero of Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same
+as that given by Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that
+foretaste of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had
+formed part of the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech
+of Varro in reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in
+ed. 1. Book IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1.
+Atticus must have been almost a κωφον προσωπον.
+
+I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old
+editions the _Lucullus_ is marked throughout as _Academicorum liber IV_.
+This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of Nonius'
+quotations, which are always from the _second_ edition, and can tell us
+nothing about the constitution of the _first_. One other thing is worth
+remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the _Academica Priora_
+before the _Posteriora_. This seems to me an unnatural arrangement; the
+subject-matter of the _Varro_ is certainly prior, logically, to that of the
+_Lucullus_.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+M. TULLII CICERONIS
+
+ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM
+
+LIBER PRIMUS.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+I. 1. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a
+M. Varrone, venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset,
+continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram
+interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et
+vetustate amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus,
+paulumque cum _ab_ eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus:
+atque ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad
+suam villam reduximus. 2. Hic pauca primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis,
+ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus: Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec
+audire sine molestia possumus, quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse
+novi. Silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum
+cessare, sed celare quae scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille:
+intemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo
+opus magnum in manibus, idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum--me autem
+dicebat--quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me
+politius. 3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam, Varro, iam diu exspectans, non
+audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti
+studium--nihil enim eius modi celare possumus--non te ea intermittere, sed
+accuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante
+hoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam
+sum ingressus res eas, quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis
+philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare,
+quaero quid sit cur, cum multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim
+cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et
+studiis et artibus antecedat.
+
+II. 4. Tum ille: Rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris.
+Itaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu,
+quod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam
+viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de
+nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca
+potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis
+abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca
+intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti
+intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. 5. Vides autem--eadem enim
+ipse didicisti--non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui nulla
+arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone disputant, nihil
+definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam
+denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praeceptis
+dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri
+putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, quae
+docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem
+accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur _labor_. 6. Iam vero physica, si
+Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut
+Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris,
+de corpusculorum--ita enim appellat atomos--concursione fortuita loqui?
+Nostra tu physica nosti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia
+ea, quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam
+quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit
+adducere? _Quid_, haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis
+fugiendisque rebus? Illi enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum
+esse censent: apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas.
+7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intelligat quid
+sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab honestate seiungi:
+quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine voluptatibus sensum
+moventibus ne suspicari _quidem_. Si vero Academiam veterem persequamur,
+quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam
+argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud
+philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum
+possum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est,
+maius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. 8. Sed meos amicos, in quibus
+est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ea a
+fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae autem nemo adhuc
+docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, quantum potui--nihil
+enim magno opere meorum miror--feci ut essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim
+peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et
+tamen in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati,
+quadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa
+dicta dialectice †quae quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate
+quadam ad legendum invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum
+prooemiis †philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.
+
+III. 9. Tum, ego. Sunt, inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe
+peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum
+deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem
+patriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu
+domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium
+divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti,
+plurimumque poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis
+attulisti, atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti
+philosophiamque multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum
+parum. 10. Causam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere
+malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi
+nunc: satisne probas? Immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca
+poterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos
+Graecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat
+Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum
+expresserunt poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi
+Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem,
+Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem
+sint aut Demosthenem imitati. 11. Ego autem--dicam enim, ut res est--dum me
+ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed
+quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat,
+haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum licebat, legendo.
+Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et administratione rei
+publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii
+oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime
+aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, hoc in primis
+consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil utilius aut, si
+haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. 12. Brutus quidem
+noster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris
+persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem
+sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu, cuius
+tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi
+litterarum.
+
+IV. 13. Tum, ille. Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te
+ipso quid est, inquit, quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te
+veterem illam, inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho
+id magis licuerit, nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam
+nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et
+emendata maxime. Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu
+existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas
+Academias esse erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit,
+ut dicis: sed ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra _ea_ Philonis Antiochus
+scripserit. 14. Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum
+iam diu, renovari a te, nisi molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus,
+inquam, si videtur. Sane istud quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus.
+Sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi
+vero, ille: quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita
+recordari? et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum
+essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus [omnes].
+
+15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter
+omnis, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes
+ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam
+communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et
+malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione
+censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum
+_valere_. 16. Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum
+audierunt perscripti varie _et_ copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil
+adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque
+praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil
+scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium
+sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non
+arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea
+sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in virtute laudanda et in
+hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum
+libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi potest. 17. Platonis autem
+auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens
+duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et
+Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum
+Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset,
+duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium
+et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti
+sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis
+instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones
+habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis
+ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam
+quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus
+rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt.
+Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et
+rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut
+dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem
+Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni praestabat, ut mihi quidem
+videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum
+expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.
+
+V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non
+sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus:
+Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque
+ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid me, inquam, putas,
+qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum? Pergamus
+igitur, inquit, quoniam placet. 19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone
+philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et
+rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid
+rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac
+primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse
+dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum
+bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum
+expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et
+corpore et vita. Corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in
+partibus: valetudinem, viris pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem
+sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus
+celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam
+vocum impressionem: 20. animi autem, quae essent ad comprehendendam
+ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et mores dividebantur.
+Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant: quorum utrumque mentis
+esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi
+consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis adsiduitate, partim ratione
+formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod incohatum est neque
+absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum,
+id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum, quas in animis
+ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec animorum. 21. Vitae autem--id enim erat
+tertium--adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus
+animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et _in_ quibusdam quae non tam naturae
+quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem
+quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum
+hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono
+sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum,
+ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis
+inducitur ratio bonorum.
+
+VI. 22. Atque haec illa sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique
+Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum:
+illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios
+Peripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum
+finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese
+expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo
+atque in ipsa virtute versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia
+sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam,
+nisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad
+virtutis usum idonea. 23. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita
+et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat in conservatione earum
+rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae
+voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum
+magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, quae erant congruentes
+cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque
+aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec
+quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis, quam primam posui,
+forma atque descriptio.
+
+24. De natura autem--id enim sequebatur--ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in
+res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens,
+ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, in
+eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen utrumque:
+neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur,
+neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse
+cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam
+nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi
+faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum
+inauditis.
+
+VII. 25. Nos vero, inquit Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum
+voles, si te Latina forte deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine
+loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut
+physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam
+utitur pro Latinis. Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas ποιοτητας Graeci
+vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed philosophorum,
+atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica: suis
+utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut enim nova sunt
+rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. Quod si Graeci
+faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto id magis nobis
+concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur? 26. Tu vero,
+inquam, Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos
+non modo copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum. Audebimus
+ergo, inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur
+qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius
+modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes.
+Itaque aër--utimur enim pro Latino--et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt:
+ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae gignuntur e
+terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa dicuntur: e quibus
+aër et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi
+et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e quo essent astra
+mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, quae supra dixi, dissimile
+Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. 27. Sed subiectam putant omnibus sine
+ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate--faciamus enim tractando
+usitatius hoc verbum et tritius--materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa
+atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari
+atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in nihilum, sed in suas
+partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in
+rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem moveantur, omnia
+intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 28. Et
+cum ita moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro
+citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa
+effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et
+continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla
+pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, quae
+insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit,
+quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat: 29.
+quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque
+perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae,
+quasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris
+ea, quae pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant,
+quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem
+et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem
+fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter
+obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.
+
+VIII. 30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in
+disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus,
+tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse
+iudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id,
+quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi
+ιδεαν appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus
+dicere. 31. Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec
+percipere ullo modo res eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quae
+essent aut ita parvae, ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et
+concitatae, ut nihil umquam unum esset constans, ne idem quidem, quia
+continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum
+opinabilem appellabant. 32. Scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in
+animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa definitiones rerum
+probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. Verborum
+etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa quaeque essent ita
+nominata, quam ετυμολογιαν appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum
+notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari
+volebant: itaque tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis
+ratione conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi
+adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae.
+33. Haec erat illis disciplina a Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim
+mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico
+etiam respondeam.
+
+IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum
+et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus species, quas paulo
+ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis
+quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et
+ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat,
+vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae:
+spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in
+ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 34. Nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam
+fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum
+maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et
+moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in
+ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi
+Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates
+unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, diligenter ea, quae a superioribus
+acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas.
+35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret
+et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. Eam quoque, si
+videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero,
+inquam, videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium.
+
+X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos virtutis
+inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una
+virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret
+honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 36. Cetera
+autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat,
+alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.
+Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione
+dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis relinquebat,
+in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. 37. Sed quae essent sumenda,
+ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea
+praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam
+rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum,
+officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in
+bonis actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem
+servata praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. 38. Cumque superiores non
+omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut
+more perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera
+virtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo
+modo fieri posse disserebat nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed
+ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse
+quin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non
+tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et
+efferri laetitia dicerent, sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent,
+hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. 39. Cumque eas
+perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque
+in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem
+adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque
+iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse
+immoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.
+
+XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum illis
+quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur,
+non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque
+gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo
+modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis,
+cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero
+aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 40.
+Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de
+sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi
+impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille φαντασιαν, nos visum appellemus
+licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone
+saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus, adsensionem
+adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis positam et voluntariam. 41.
+Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam
+haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum
+ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile--feretis hoc? Nos vero, inquit.
+Quonam enim modo καταληπτον diceres?--Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum
+esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu
+prehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo
+tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis--nova enim
+dicebat--usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum
+appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset,
+scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam
+opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. 42. Sed
+inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi,
+collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli
+credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut
+supra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis
+videbatur, non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia
+nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam
+scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis
+imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad
+rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et
+ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent
+aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat.
+Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a
+superioribus.
+
+XII. 43. Quae cum dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est,
+inquam, a te, Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse
+[autem] arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem
+veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc
+Varro: Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis
+et ea, quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa
+discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. 44. Tum
+ego: Cum Zenone, inquam, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen
+instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed
+earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant
+Socratem et iam ante Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis
+paene veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse
+dixerunt: angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut
+Democritus, in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis
+omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa
+esse dixerunt. 45. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri
+posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia
+latere censebat in occulto: neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi
+posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare
+quemquam neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu
+continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita
+res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et
+perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod
+erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam
+plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus
+momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio
+sustineretur. 46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur,
+si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil
+adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur,
+nihil certi dicitur: sed tamen illa, quam exposui_sti_, vetus, haec nova
+nominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit,
+in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae
+partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex
+Epicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter
+ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.
+
+EX LIBRO I.
+
+1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. _Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere,
+dictum a gladiis. Cicero Academicorum lib. I._: quid autem stomachatur
+Menesarchus? quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?
+
+2. Nonius s.v. _concinnare_ p. 43. _Idem in Academicis lib. I._: qui cum
+similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.
+
+EX LIBRO II.
+
+3. Nonius p. 65. _Aequor ab aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II.
+vocabulum accepisse confirmat_: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo
+etiam aequor illud poetae vocant.
+
+4. Nonius p. 69. _Adamare Cicero Academicorum lib. II._: qui enim serius
+honores adamaverunt vix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini
+possunt esse.
+
+5. Nonius p. 104. _Exponere pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis
+lib. II._: frangere avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad
+imitandum iuventuti.
+
+6. Nonius p. 121. _Hebes positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero
+Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere?
+cuius et nascentis et senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur
+cornua.
+
+7. Nonius p. 162. _Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? mare
+nonne caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem
+aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....
+
+8. Nonius p. 162. _Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_
+atqui si id crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non
+regulis.
+
+9. Nonius p. 394. _Siccum dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur
+et sobrium, non madidum ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ alius (_color_)
+adultis, alius adulescentibus, alius aegris, _alius sanis_, alius siccis,
+alius vinulentis ...
+
+10. Nonius p. 474. _Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.:_ si quando enim
+nos demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum
+cernimus.
+
+11. Nonius p. 545. _Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ quibus etiam
+alabaster plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.
+
+EX LIBRO III.
+
+Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. §4. _De gloria librum ad te misi: at in eo_
+prooemium _id est, quod in Academico tertio._
+
+12. Nonius p. 65. _Digladiari ... idem tertio:_ digladiari autem semper,
+depugnare cum facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam
+stultissimum dixerit?
+
+13. Nonius p. 65. _Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib.
+III._: et ut nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus
+...
+
+14. Nonius p. 123. _Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib.
+III._: in tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas
+ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae.
+
+15. Nonius p. 419. _Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum
+lib. III._: aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.
+
+16. Lactantius Inst. div. VI. 24. _Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico
+tertio verba sunt:_ quod si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent,
+sic vitam deviam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset
+emendatio temeritatis.
+
+17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. _Varro ad Ciceronem
+tertio_ fixum _et Cicero Academicorum tertio_ (= _Lucullus_ §27): †malcho
+in opera adfixa.
+
+18. Nonius p. 139. _Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic.
+Academicorum lib. III._: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus,
+abesse dicemus. = _Lucullus_ §51.
+
+19. Nonius p. 117. _Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III._: qui gallinas
+alere permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae
+gallina peperisset dicere solebant. = _Lucullus_ §57.
+
+EX LIBRO IIII.
+
+20. Nonius p. 69, _Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in Academicis
+lib. IIII._: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = _Lucullus_ §67.
+
+21. Nonius p. 65. _Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et
+columna Maenia. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: item ille cum aestuaret,
+veterum ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = _Lucullus_
+§70.
+
+22. Nonius p. 99. _Dolitum, quod dolatum usu dicitur, quod est percaesum
+vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum Academicorum lib. IIII._: non
+enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. = _Lucullus_ §100.
+
+23. Nonius p. 164. _Ravum fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: quia
+nobismet ipsis tum caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole
+conlucet.... = _Lucullus_ §105.
+
+24. Nonius p. 107. _Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic. Academicorum
+lib. IIII._: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi quendam laborem
+exanclatum. = _Lucullus_ §108.
+
+25. Nonius p. 163. _Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic.
+Academicorum lib. IIII._: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = _Lucullus_ §109.
+
+26. Nonius p. 122. _Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: at hoc
+Anaximandro infinitatem. = _Lucullus_ §118.
+
+27. Nonius p. 65. _Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic. Academicorum lib.
+IIII._: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. = _Lucullus_ §120.
+
+28. Nonius p. 189. _Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: nec
+ut ille qui asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse
+dicat. = _Lucullus_ §121.
+
+29. Martianus Capella V. §517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. _Cicero ... in
+Academicis_: latent ista omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa
+tenebris. = _Lucullus_ §122.
+
+30. Nonius p. 102. _E regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum
+lib. IIII._: nec ego non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in
+contraria parte terrae qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia.
+= _Lucullus_ §123.
+
+31. Nonius p. 80. _Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et
+confusione trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: plane, ut supra
+dictus, Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = _Lucullus_ §135.
+
+Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.
+
+32. Lactantius Inst. div. III. 14. _Haec tua verba sunt_ (_sc. Cicero!_):
+mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua
+ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.
+
+33. August. contra Academicos II. §26.: _id probabile vel veri simile
+Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent invitare_. ...
+Talia, _inquit Academicus_, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri
+similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno.
+Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus
+haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem
+decet esse sapientem. [_Proximis post hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat
+Augustinus haec ipsius esse Ciceronis verba_.]
+
+34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §15. _Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius
+causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... _
+Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes
+videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse
+sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo,
+qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.
+
+35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §43. _Ait enim Cicero_ illis (_i.e.
+Academicis_) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, nisi
+qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.
+
+36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei VI. 2. _Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T.
+Varroni) tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi
+versatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone_, homine, _inquit_,
+omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM
+
+LIBER II.
+
+I. 1. Magnum ingenium Luci Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum
+omnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus
+temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut
+enim admodum adolescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito
+paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor
+profectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit;
+deinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor--licebat enim celerius legis
+praemio--, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut
+diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad
+Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium, quae
+de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. 2. Idque eo fuit
+mirabilius, quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui
+adolescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum
+in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni
+magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter
+et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in
+rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma
+profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum,
+verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam
+verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam fuisse in
+Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt: qui
+quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum
+proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere,
+credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali
+ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles
+spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis
+mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. 3. Tantus ergo
+imperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus
+pugnis totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum
+maximus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos
+legisset, fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis
+temperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli
+institutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum
+utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque
+ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum
+victor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio
+tardius quam debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in
+urbem currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum
+in maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod
+hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito testimonio
+quam id cum mea laude communicem.
+
+II. 4. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt
+et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum
+multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim
+studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit
+quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed
+et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei
+militaris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus
+otii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur
+Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et
+post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea
+saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset.
+Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus audiebat.
+
+5. Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam
+etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras,
+plures qui philosophiam, reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum
+rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego
+autem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P.
+autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante
+censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum
+Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. 6. Restat ut iis
+respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam gravis illigari.
+Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut
+ludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro
+vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque
+amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis,
+quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis
+de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo
+operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem
+ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non
+modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis
+prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam augeri
+arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus
+notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. 7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis, qui
+in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus disputatur,
+scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam mortuis invidere.
+
+III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non probatur.
+Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret
+praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere
+quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare:
+quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla
+contentione volumus, idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim
+omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis
+rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa
+antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint,
+tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati
+relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in
+utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut
+verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. 8. Neque inter nos et eos, qui se
+scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea
+vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile,
+adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod
+integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut omnia, quae praescripta et
+quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum
+ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde
+infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius,
+quem primum audierunt, oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad
+quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad
+saxum adhaerescunt. 9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se credere ei, quem iudicent
+fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare
+potuissent--statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse
+sapientis--, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis
+etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem re semel audita atque ad
+unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare
+malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt, pugnacissime defendere quam
+sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere. Quibus de rebus et
+alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa,
+quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie
+venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus,
+quod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in
+Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in
+spatio consedimus.
+
+IV. 10. Hic Catulus: Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene
+explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea,
+quae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem,
+inquit Hortensius, feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram
+servatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in
+promptu erant, dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille:
+Non sane, inquit, Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est
+iis, qui placere volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde
+ea, quae dico, probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec
+ea, in quibus, si non fuerint, _non_ vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed
+mehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata
+est, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus
+agebat: nota enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno
+studio, eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei
+faciam quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum
+animos ereximus. 11. At ille: Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem,
+fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi
+Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat,
+homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus
+et nobilis: cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque
+leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo
+est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant:
+et homo natura lenissimus--nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius--stomachari
+tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante videram. At ille, Heracliti
+memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num
+vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis
+tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei
+familiares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa
+audivisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent
+descripsisse. 12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus
+commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin
+contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur
+et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item
+Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex
+eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque
+compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et
+Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in
+ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae contra Philonem erat,
+praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est adversarius is, qui ista, quae
+sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino dicere. Etsi enim mentitur,
+tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.
+
+V. 13. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini--me
+autem nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod
+seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt,
+quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur.
+Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit,
+commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint, cum
+consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem agrariam
+aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito
+senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium: illi
+quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero
+sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt
+Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam,
+alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium. Et de hoc
+quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum
+expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. 14. Similiter vos, cum
+perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam
+velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem,
+Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum
+inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum illorum nec
+Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti
+physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente
+incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere videatur, abstrusa
+esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse
+reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam
+quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire quam sciant. 15. Quod si illi
+tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot
+saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum
+iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut
+in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui
+constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret,
+qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e numero tollendus
+est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam,
+Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a
+quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates
+autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat
+refellere. Ita, cum aliud agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus
+est ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci ειρωνειαν vocant: quam ait etiam in
+Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non putandum,
+quod idem fuerit in Socrate.
+
+VI. 16. Sed fuerint illa veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est
+igitur actum, quod investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut
+putatur, obtrectans nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores
+immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est
+clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio,
+quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi,
+proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est
+quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, Lacydi
+discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit:
+nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum floruerunt: e
+quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit--declarat multitudo
+librorum--ingeni non minus in [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in
+Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus
+Metrodorus putabatur. 17. Iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos
+dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos
+facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e
+philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant: nec
+vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis, qui nihil probarent,
+Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo fuisset, reprehendebant, nec
+definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si
+verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam καταληψιν illi vocant, eosque,
+qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi posset,
+inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius εναργειαι,
+ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus
+fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi--me appellabat iocans--hoc
+licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant illustriorem ipsa
+evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent, definienda
+censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam priores fuisse
+dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere putabant, ne qui
+fallerentur. 18. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam evidentium
+rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua quaeratur, et homines dignos,
+quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum nova quaedam commovet, quod
+ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur,
+et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit
+Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum enim ita negaret,
+quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset--id enim volumus esse ακαταληπτον--,
+si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum--iam enim hoc pro
+φαντασιαι verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus--visum igitur impressum
+effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non
+esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest
+quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod
+est tale, quale vel falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo,
+iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse
+comprehendi. Ita imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis
+oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem,
+quam Philo voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse
+concedimus.
+
+VII. 19. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa
+sunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat
+contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius
+aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum
+est, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum,
+qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit
+et alia multa. Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et
+sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt.
+Itaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur,
+et intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum
+adspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in
+odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis
+iudicium requirat acrius. 20. Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi
+pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in
+sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos
+non videmus! quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere
+exercitati! qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut
+Andromacham, quum id nos ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu
+et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen.
+Quid de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris
+aut voluptatis? in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia
+sentiatur:--potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, et inter
+eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet non
+apertissime insaniat? 21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi
+dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed
+quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud,
+hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non
+sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde
+sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum
+comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis
+particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec
+intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. 22. Quod si essent falsae
+notitiae--εννοιας enim notitias appellare tu videbare--, si igitur essent
+hae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis discerni non
+possent, quo tandem his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei
+consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae
+non modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime
+continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria
+falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet?
+Ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis
+animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem
+ab inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus,
+sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item.
+Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat,
+aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea
+potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is,
+qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem in
+similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo atque
+agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem
+tractabit, multa perceperit?
+
+VIII. 23. Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi
+multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non
+comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse
+censemus, itemque sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat
+constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti,
+quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui
+statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam
+aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges
+imposuerit, cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi,
+percepti, cogniti, constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam
+tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum
+supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non
+possint. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo
+modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam
+rem aut agere fidenter audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum
+vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia
+referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est,
+constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat,
+sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter
+appetitio--eam enim volumus esse ‛ορμην--, qua ad agendum impellimur, et id
+appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest. 25. Illud autem, quod movet,
+prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest, si id, quod visum
+erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri animus ad
+appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur accommodatumne
+naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit non occurrit animo,
+nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur, numquam
+movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est, necesse est id ei verum,
+quod occurrit, videri. 26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis
+tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate
+perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem,
+cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio
+cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea,
+quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi
+involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium
+quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet_ur_. Itaque
+argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece αποδειξις, ita definitur: 'ratio, quae
+ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit.'
+
+IX. 27. Quod si omnia visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel
+falsa esse possent, neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo
+quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset
+conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi
+debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de
+se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant
+δογματα, quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum
+proditur, lex veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum
+proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari
+quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse
+falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla
+ratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui
+illa visa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis
+interesse. 28. Ex hoc illud est natum, quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id
+ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed
+Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse
+percipi, consentaneum esse unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia
+non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id
+consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam
+esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum
+quidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse.
+29. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id
+haberent Academici decretum,--sentitis enim iam hoc me δογμα dicere--,
+nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus,
+fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim esse regulam
+totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti: quam
+rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis_a_ accipi oporteret
+et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique iudicium
+esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia,
+iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse, qui aut
+cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut unde
+proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere dubia
+neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a sapientia
+plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut hoc unum
+saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia
+totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil
+approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.
+
+X. 30. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior--habet
+enim aliquantum a physicis--, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra
+dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de
+abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat
+subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal
+omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum
+primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut
+sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons
+est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea,
+quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia
+quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus
+construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum εννοιας,
+tum προληψεις vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque
+innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem
+ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit. 31. Ad rerum igitur
+scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur
+maxime cognitionem, et istam καταληψιν, quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo
+exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat--nihil est enim
+ei veritatis luce dulcius--tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus
+utitur et artis efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam
+ipsam corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit.
+Ergo ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel
+instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt
+funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate
+eorum, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere.
+
+32. Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid
+velint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea,
+quae disputentur, vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid
+ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo
+veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius,
+qui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque
+intersit inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur
+eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui
+omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi
+desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim--et hoc quidem vel maxime vos
+animadvertebam moveri--probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque
+se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.
+
+XI. 33. Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi,
+propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus,
+interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si
+nihil interest, nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique
+communis, ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum
+dicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem
+modo falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt
+pueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut
+si quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non
+ademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed
+propria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu
+probabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades
+volebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo
+agimus, tibi erit revertendum. 34. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum
+falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non
+potest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod
+ita mihi videatur verum, ut non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore
+versantur, cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt
+distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud
+quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque
+comprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum
+possit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo
+ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere
+inaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec
+argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. 35. Ex hoc illud
+iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur:
+'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur.
+Non enim urguent, ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque
+adseverare sine aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et
+propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique
+occurrit et primo quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo
+levius? 36. Sin ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod
+visum sit, id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis
+visis, inter quae nihil interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides:
+deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit
+diligentissimeque circumspexerit, exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile
+videatur et absit longissime a vero, ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent
+dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt.
+Ut enim confidant, notum iis esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et
+oppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam
+absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei
+signum aut argumentum et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod
+significatur, aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione
+hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam
+absentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet.
+
+XII. 37. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione
+atque approbatione, quam Graeci συγκαταθεσιν vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo
+non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim,
+quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi
+multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non potest. Deinde
+cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod animal agit
+aliquid--nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit--, aut ei
+sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda
+adsensio. 38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos neque sentire
+neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus
+impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo non potest
+animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam appareat--Graeci
+id οικειον appellant--, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non
+approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil
+attinet de adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur
+statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse
+constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit
+aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit.
+39. Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem
+absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi
+adsensione: hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et
+firmitas ex iis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit,
+omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum
+sit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem
+actionem tollit e vita.
+
+XIII. 40. Nunc ea videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius
+potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt
+igitur primum artem quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et
+genera definiunt, in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit,
+totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant
+omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri
+possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia
+non percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi
+sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti
+conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic
+est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum est,
+id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est, ut
+eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius modi, ut
+in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint,
+alia non possint. 41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae
+autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant
+concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa sint,
+ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis
+non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint:'
+reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum:
+'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: 'omne visum,
+quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit esse.' 42. Haec duo
+proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam
+adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:
+primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni
+consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne
+ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa
+concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis,
+item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt,
+volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta esse falsa,
+quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.
+
+XIV. 43. Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed
+ab eorum causa, qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et
+partitiones et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines
+dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est
+hominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui
+clament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum
+aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam
+rem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa
+vera definitio sit? si_n_ negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera
+definitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur,
+id percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus
+partibus. 44. Si enim dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide
+perspicere nec ulla communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se
+fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui
+poterunt longius progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam
+concludi argumentum non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt,
+ita probatis, ut falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus
+comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse
+comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque
+ipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam
+quod non appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et
+ea, quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse
+quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro
+congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam falsa
+visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem, inter
+falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam
+interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.
+
+45. Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse
+videamur, quaeque ab iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis
+relinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam
+habet vim, ut ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed
+tamen, ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus
+est vel arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese,
+quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit
+subvenire erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem,
+dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil
+profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.
+
+XV. 46. Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus
+adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim
+primum, quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt,
+ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod
+fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti
+quidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet
+igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere,
+de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus
+interrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere
+constitui. 47. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam
+illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri
+esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus
+iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis, quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa
+quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea, quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis,
+auspiciis, extis declarentur--haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra
+disputant--, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere
+possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant, efficere non
+possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae
+perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae
+nihil sit omnino? 48. Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea
+declarant, quae cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel
+furiosis videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut
+non modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis
+nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se
+motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset,
+qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset
+inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae
+falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile
+internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi
+dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in
+visis distinctio appareat.
+
+XVI. 49. Ad has omnis visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat
+et erat de hac una re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum
+puto, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod
+captiosissimo genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in
+philosophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut
+demitur. Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano.
+Vitiosum sane et captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum
+obiectum est a deo dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri
+simile? cur deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne
+internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc si
+perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin ipse
+tua sponte processeris, tuum. 50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum
+posse aut ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid
+cui simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit?
+deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi canibus
+similes _sunt_, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt
+quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa:
+quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia
+quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri
+possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium generum nihil
+interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno. 51.
+Quod fieri qui potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive
+illa cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete
+sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis
+perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim,
+cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse
+commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et
+inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum
+Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba
+ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:
+
+  'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'
+
+Idemque in Epicharmo:
+
+  'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'
+
+Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus,
+ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.
+
+XVII. 52. At enim dum videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum_que_,
+quae vigilantes videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim
+dicimus, non eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium
+nec mente nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione
+faciunt qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae
+videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam
+levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes
+furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum
+relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:
+
+  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum
+  adspectu' ...
+
+53. At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro
+veris. Et alias quidem saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte
+gravitas aut tarditas aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo
+temporis brevitate excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando
+sustinere adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset,
+aut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest
+levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus
+gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis
+somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere
+quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos
+aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter vigilantium
+visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter adfecti, tum nihil
+interesse. 54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod
+nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae αδηλα Graeci. Si enim res se ita habeant, ut
+nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano, cui possit
+exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non mediocris insaniae
+est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis impressorum
+pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum similitudines negat esse, cum
+eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si satis est ad tollendam cognitionem
+similia esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti, praesertim
+concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius contenditis, quod rerum natura non
+patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit tale, quale est, nec sit in duobus
+aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas? ut [sibi] sint et ova
+ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi vis in
+geminis? Conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras: tu
+autem vis eosdem plane esse, non similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest. 55.
+Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in Academia irridentur, a quibus
+ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse
+mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum similis, sed undique
+perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eos
+quidem innumerabiles], itemque homines. Deinde postulas, ut, si mundus ita
+sit par alteri mundo, ut inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur
+tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par, ut nihil
+differat, nihil intersit. Cur enim, inquies, ex illis individuis, unde
+omnia Democritus gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem
+innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse, sed
+etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici?
+
+XVIII. 56. Primum quidem me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior
+potiusque refello propter id, quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis
+singularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos
+Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam
+eosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a
+suis. An non videmus hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis
+internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti
+ne minimum quidem similes viderentur? 57. Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo:
+quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum
+ei res similes occurrant, quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum
+nec umquam ulli viso adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse
+non possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis
+possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater
+geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si
+adsueveris. Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen
+hoc accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere
+permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id gallina
+peperisset dicere solebant. 58. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis
+est ova illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc
+illud esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam,
+ut talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non
+licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri
+enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit
+quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere,
+cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones
+nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi vero non
+specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi
+nota. 59. Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re
+nulla impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non
+distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa
+necessario nata est εποχη, id est adsensionis retentio, in qua melius sibi
+constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli existimant. Si
+enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est, tollendus adsensus est.
+Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare non cognitum? Carneadem
+autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse _eo_ delabi interdum, ut diceret
+opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est
+esse aliquid, quod comprehendi possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo,
+quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est, numquam adsentiri rei vel falsae vel
+incognitae. 60. Restat illud, quod dicunt, veri inveniendi causa contra
+omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo igitur videre quid invenerint. Non
+solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? aut cur
+celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit,
+ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur. Quid, si utroque? num peius est?
+Unum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo
+auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem videtur vel plurimum. Quis enim ista
+tam aperte perspicueque et perversa et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in
+Arcesila, multo etiam maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi vis
+fuisset?
+
+XIX. 61. Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo
+etiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus.
+Sed iam confirmata causa te, hominem amicissimum--me autem appellabat--et
+aliquot annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus
+philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris, eam
+philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio,
+privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis quidem, quibus
+adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat sive eius loci, quem
+incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis uti lumine licebat,
+isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillam quidem
+ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si sequamur, iis vinculis
+simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus. 62. Sublata enim adsensione
+omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo recte
+fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam
+sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas aperueris
+in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse, quod mihi
+quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem ullam quae
+cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam atque etiam ne
+illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur auctoritas. Quae cum
+dixisset ille, finem fecit. 63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod
+quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret,
+nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius, me
+quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens--non enim satis intellegebam--, coepit
+hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli
+oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter, accurate, copiose, taceo neque te
+quo minus, si tibi ita videatur, sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud
+vero non censuerim, ut eius auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo
+monuit, inquit adridens, ut caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis,
+quorum vides quanta copia semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione
+quaereret qui tibi constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse
+reperiri, idem te comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De
+causa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno
+opere mirabor. Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia
+sensisset, simul ac visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset
+Catulus, me omnes intueri.
+
+XX. 64. Tum ego non minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius
+modi quadam oratione sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita
+movit, ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum,
+quae pro illa causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse
+diffiderem. Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses
+non minorem tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero.
+65. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad
+hanc potissimum philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed
+etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus
+pertinacia reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu
+consilioque totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum
+alios tum etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali
+disputatione id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum
+solet, iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri
+reperiendi et ea sentire, quae dicerem. 66. Qui enim possum non cupere
+verum invenire, cum gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc
+pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa
+turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui
+numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero
+ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator--non enim sum sapiens--et meas
+cogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,
+
+  'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'
+
+ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,
+
+  'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'
+
+sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore
+specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non de
+me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter mentem
+sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec percipio
+tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens; itaque visis
+cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse
+maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre. Nihil
+est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de gravitate sapientis, errore,
+levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis?
+quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te
+probatur--ut praepostere tecum agam, mox referam me ad ordinem--haec primum
+conclusio quam habeat vim considera.
+
+XXI. 67. Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam
+opinabitur: numquam autem opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc
+conclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum.
+Carneades non numquam secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita
+sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed
+illud primum, sapientem, si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse
+et Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a
+veris et quae non possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere. 68.
+Nobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo
+adsentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam
+vitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum,
+sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet, si temere
+processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa veris, eaque, quae percipi non
+possunt, _iis quae possunt_--si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus--,
+ut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem
+omnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das,
+accepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus
+omnes cohibiturum, ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum
+esse sapientem. Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse
+percipi: etenim de eo omnis est controversia.
+
+XXII. 69. Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me
+defenduntur, et didicit apud Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius
+didicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non
+acrius accusavit in senectute quam antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur
+fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim
+iste dies illuxerit quaero, qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse
+negitavisset, veri et falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae
+Stoici. Poenituit illa sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime
+ad Stoicos? eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi
+poenitebat? quid? Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum.
+Numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent
+habere. 70. Unde autem subito vetus Academia revocata est? Nominis
+dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod
+erant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii,
+qui se sequerentur, Antiochii vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non
+potuisse sustinere concursum omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt
+inter illos non nulla communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam
+reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub
+Novis solem non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum,
+sic Academicorum umbram secutus est. 71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum,
+cum ei placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille
+Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis
+oportere, illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro
+credidisset, honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea
+defensitavisset, honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum:
+qui ex illius commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis
+nostris a vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit _ut_
+quod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum
+hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.
+
+XXIII. 72. Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a
+nobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros
+viros, sed tamen popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res _non_ bonas
+tractent, similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri,
+quae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras
+nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si
+dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?--sic enim appellabantur
+ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophabantur--: maxima fuit et
+gravitatis et ingeni gloria. 73. Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo
+conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam animi? qui ita sit
+ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil excipit de quo non
+profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa? quis hunc philosophum
+non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis inferioris aetatis? qui mihi
+cum illo collati quintae classis videntur. Atque is non hoc dicit, quod
+nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus; ille verum
+plane negat esse: sensus quidem non obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic
+enim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus
+initio libri, qui est de natura: 'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne
+aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos,
+nec omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit.' 74. Furere tibi Empedocles videtur:
+at mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur, sonum fundere. Num ergo
+is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum magnam vim censet in iis esse
+ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt, iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus
+bonis quamquam versibus, sed tamen illi versibus increpant eorum
+adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire
+dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis
+certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones
+perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum
+sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, 'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius.
+Quid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non
+esset, nisi probavisset. Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla
+fuit ratio persequi.
+
+XXIV. 75. Videorne tibi, non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris
+homines, sed imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam
+molestos vobis, sed minutos, Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt
+contorta et aculeata quaedam σοφισματα; sic enim appellantur fallaces
+conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire
+putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa ille contra sensus, quam multa
+contra omnia, quae in consuetudine probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi
+quidem non videtur: sed dissolverit sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset,
+quae nos fallerent probabilitate magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile
+posse. 76. Quid Cyrenaici _tibi_ videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui
+negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere,
+quae tactu intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid
+colore aut quo sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.
+
+Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post
+illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis tantisque
+studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te ipso quidem
+iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse, sed
+verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. 77. Nemo, inquam, superiorum non
+modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec
+solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum vera
+sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone fortasse quid
+futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari
+sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset, quod percipi
+posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur visum? tum illum ita
+definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et
+effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset visum verum, quale
+vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi
+posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non
+est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum: neque
+enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si esset tale, quale vel falsum.
+Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a
+vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. 78. Haec est una
+contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse
+sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim nihil
+percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum: equidem
+Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab eo
+disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et
+perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, ut, si ostendero
+nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum esse.
+
+XXV. 79. Quid ergo est quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera
+nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle, communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere
+posses, idcirco heri non necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram.
+Tu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur?
+Nam et in remo sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris
+videri colores nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?--Manent
+illa omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.--Igitur
+semper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim rem
+demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam
+esse credendum. 80. Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et
+importune insistere! Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum
+oculum torsisset, duas ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse
+mendacium, non oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed
+hic quidem maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas
+esse, alia falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi
+nobis ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et
+integris sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?--Utinam
+quidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus,
+quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non
+cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies
+longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at
+familiarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem, non
+videmus. 81. At ille nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et
+octingenta stadia quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius.
+Responderem igitur audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse
+contentum. Dicet me acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque
+videntur a nobis et nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere
+possunt. Ergo ut illis aqua, sic nobis aër crassus offunditur. At amplius
+non desideramus. Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam
+quererer cum deo, quod parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem
+illam? Stare nobis videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa.
+Quaere rationem cur ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio
+an non possis, non tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum
+testimonium dicere ostenderis.
+
+XXVI. 82. Quid ego de nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse
+quaeris. Quid potest esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti
+partibus confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi
+quidem quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum
+quam videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum
+esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi
+igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri
+putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta incitatione
+fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem possit, tamen nobis
+stare videatur. 83. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso, quam in
+parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci,
+percipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E quibus primum
+est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id percipi, tertium,
+inter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi
+possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum verum a sensu
+profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo nihil intersit
+quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium
+omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos, quibuscum res est, id quoque
+conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est. 84. Qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum
+videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi visum, quod
+percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso: qua
+distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum Gemino consul
+fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non posset? Negas tantam
+similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum adversario
+facili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet igitur sensum, et si una
+fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit. Sublato enim iudicio illo,
+quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem videris, qui tibi videbitur,
+tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem
+modi falsa. 85. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus videri, quid
+habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non sit, quoniam
+aliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil
+esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum credibile 'nullum
+esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum.'
+Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod agitur, nihil
+interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an internosci non
+possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo tanta esse non
+potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, eadem
+temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros eiusdem
+modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres? 86. Quid? si in
+eius_dem_ modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in
+agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui,
+quoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret?
+
+XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae nos
+non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur. Quid?
+hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad quae
+pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire
+possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros
+mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura! 87. Cur non
+extimescam opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse
+aliquam vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo
+verbo utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi
+adhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur
+etiam eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de
+physicis mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo
+ante dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam,
+res iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris
+solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:--de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose
+omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem
+consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem
+fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.--88. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a
+te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et furiosorum
+visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum, sanorum. Quo
+modo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se vidisse Homerum,
+sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:
+
+  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'
+
+Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit, eum
+somnia re_ri_ et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea vera, quae
+essent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum videbantur, quo
+modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non putamus ita totum illud
+audivisse,
+
+  'O pietas animi ...',
+
+si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit illa
+visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti
+probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:
+
+  'Mater, te appello ...'
+
+nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde enim
+illa:
+
+'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur minorem
+habere visis quam vigilantes fidem?
+
+XXVIII. 89. Quid loquar de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus,
+Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is
+putabat quae videbantur? Quid ille, qui:
+
+  'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,'
+
+nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid? apud
+Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat sagittis,
+cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde movebatur
+falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi
+cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:
+
+  'unde haec flamma oritur?'
+
+et illa deinceps:
+
+  'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, _adsunt_, me expetunt:'
+
+Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat:
+
+  'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam
+      hanc vim, quae me excruciat!
+  Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant
+      cum ardentibus taedis.'
+
+Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:
+
+  'Intendit crinitus Apollo
+  arcum auratum, luna innixus:
+  Diana facem iacit a laeva.'
+
+90. Qui magis haec crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur?
+Apparet enim iam 'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur,
+ut illud efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et
+falsa ad animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa
+falsa vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non
+enim id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti
+sint, aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut
+furentium aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.
+
+91. Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse
+dicitis, veri et falsi quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et
+falsi? et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus
+iudicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia
+igitur. Sol quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut
+queat iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera
+sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? Si
+haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem pollicebatur.
+Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in philosophia multae
+atque magnae, non est satis. 92. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis,
+videte ne contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit
+elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum
+paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod
+tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.
+
+XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam
+nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus quatenus.
+Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re
+minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca,
+magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto
+certum respondeamus [non] habemus.--93. At vitiosi sunt soritae.--Frangite
+igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum
+est, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa,
+tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat
+quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur, ‛ησυχαζειν. Per me vel stertas
+licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit? Sequitur
+enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget. Quo in numero
+conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt? Progrediere
+rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim fateris, neque ultimum te
+paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse. Cuius generis error ita
+manat, ut non videam quo non possit accedere. 94. Nihil me laedit, inquit:
+ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem veniam, equos
+sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi, praeceps erit. Sic
+me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose interroganti respondeo. Si
+habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus es: si non habes, ne tu quidem
+percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed negas te usque ad obscura
+progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si id tantum modo, ut taceas,
+nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te captare volt, utrum tacentem
+irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad novem, verbi gratia, sine
+dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo insistis: etiam a certis et
+illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me in obscuris facere non sinis.
+Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adiuvat, quae nec augentis nec
+minuentis quid aut primum sit aut postremum docet. 95. Quid? quod eadem
+illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora.
+Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est,
+quidquid enuntietur--id autem appellant αξιωμα, quod est quasi effatum--,
+aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an falsa sunt? Si te
+mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris _an_ verum dicis? Haec scilicet
+inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius quam illa, quae nos non
+comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.
+
+XXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec eorum
+ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi
+est illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum sit'? Rebus
+sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias improbandas, quae sint
+in genere contrario. 96. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si
+dicis _nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem_ nunc lucere et verum
+dicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis.
+Itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum traditis. Aut quidquid
+igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars ista nulla est. Vide ergo
+hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis,
+mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui
+potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec
+Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic
+conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet
+scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius
+concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris,
+mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec
+approbare nec improbare. 97. Qui igitur magis illud? Si ars, si ratio, si
+via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in utroque. Sed hoc
+extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec inexplicabilia. Tribunum
+aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem numquam impetrabunt. Etenim
+cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et irridet, non
+impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur, 'aut vivet cras
+Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic statuant, omne, quod ita
+diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non modo verum esse, sed etiam
+necessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti tardum putant. Si enim,
+inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras
+Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis
+necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est, Antiochus et Stoici:
+totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis diiunctio--contraria
+autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa
+potest esse, nulla vera est. 98. Mecum vero quid habent litium, qui ipsorum
+disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades
+solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose, minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab
+eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec autem merces erat dialecticorum.
+Sequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo
+iudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob eam causam, quod ita didici, omne,
+quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris,
+mentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi
+hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.
+
+XXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi
+relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis sententia
+Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam, ut quisquam
+id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum
+Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde studiosus ac diligens.
+Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae
+iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo. 99. Duo placet esse Carneadi genera
+visorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi possint, alia
+quae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse probabilia; alia non
+probabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur,
+ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra posteriorem nihil dici
+oportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum esse, ut perceptio
+consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra naturam esset, si
+probabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam tu, Luculle,
+commemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur
+modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non etiam falsum nihil
+ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit specie probabile, si
+nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens
+ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis
+sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque
+percepta neque adsensa, sed similia veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita
+tollatur. 100. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num comprehensum animo
+habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui potest? Sed si iam
+ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta, probo navigio, bono
+gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur se illuc venturum esse
+salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et agendi et non agendi,
+faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam erat Anaxagoras, qui id
+non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde
+illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri quidem. 101. Et quaecumque
+res eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum,
+movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus, habet corpus,
+habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut ei multa vera videantur,
+neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam: eoque
+sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem modi exsistere falsum aliquod,
+cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui
+multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.
+
+XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur, praesto
+est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis tacentibus ex uno
+Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio tollitur. Quod est
+caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est, nihil percipi potest.'
+Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio
+ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa
+igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem
+certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus, tibi adsentior. 102. Quamquam nihil
+mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem maxime, cui erant
+ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec quivis arbitratu suo
+reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, certe levior reprehensio
+est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, non videtur hoc satis esse
+vobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere, quae a te vel maxime agitata
+sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? nihil tibi est perspicuum?'
+Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret.
+Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C.
+Lucilium scripsit poëtam, cum scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum,
+eum, qui consul cum M. Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis--sunt
+enim mihi nota, propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima
+institutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur--, sed scriptum est
+ita: 103. 'Academicis placere esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut
+aliae probabiles videantur, aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia
+posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia
+sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait
+vehementer errare eos, qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus
+numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit
+disputatum, non inesse in his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et
+certi notam. 104. Quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus
+sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli
+adsentiri: altero, cum se a respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet,
+sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum
+placere, ut numquam adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem,
+ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere
+possit. †Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab
+adsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa, quibus
+ad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque partem
+respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit, dum sine
+adsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea, quae nulla re
+impedirentur. 105. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane, invidiosa
+certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos percipi
+comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri dicimus.
+
+XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem expedito,
+soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle, iacere iam
+illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens, de quo
+loquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, isdem
+sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare illud, quod
+nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, nec
+tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane
+ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et vibrat dissimileque
+est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis rationem reddere cur id
+eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod videbatur oculis, defendere.
+106. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim quaerebas. Quid? meminisse
+visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? Polyaenus, qui magnus
+mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro adsentiens totam
+geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae sciebat, oblitus est?
+Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut vobismet ipsis placet. Si
+igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque rerum est, omnia, quae quisque
+meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil
+potest, et omnia meminit Siron Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc
+omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime
+vis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si
+comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit. 107. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne,
+quae ipsae fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae
+tantum id, quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera
+et falsa diiudicent?
+
+Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum enim
+negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem
+perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum,
+ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam
+putant, vera esse haruspicum [_responsa_], auspicia, oracula, somnia,
+vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is potest facere vel de
+iis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas habuerint, cur id
+sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est aliquid, quod positum
+vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non possit? an tu in soritis
+poteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus non poterit eodem modo
+insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione ipsam veri similitudinem
+non impeditam sequi? 108. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei
+posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim videri
+oportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus
+esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli autem
+omnia, si visa tollantur.
+
+XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, sed
+brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto
+repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere,
+credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a
+Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris
+adsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea
+pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia
+sequitur, nulla re impediente? 109. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod
+statuet, ne id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque
+impediet in navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis
+procreandis plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter
+probabile.
+
+Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater, sed,
+ut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret consentaneum
+esse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum saltem dicere
+posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et sibi ipsum
+contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil comprehendi posse, si
+quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo potius putat urguendum fuisse
+Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum esse possit nisi comprehensum,
+perceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil
+posse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud
+decretum habeat et sine decretis vitam agere possit! 110. Sed ut illa habet
+probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc
+haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non
+habet, utitur probabilibus. Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur
+et incerta reddere. Non enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit,
+stellarum numerus par an impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de
+rebus, in quibus versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis
+enim nihil probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti
+nec quid faciat nec quid respondeat. 111. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti,
+Luculle, reprehensionem Antiochi--nec mirum: in primis enim est nobilis--,
+qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum. Cum enim
+sumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea differre a
+veris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse concessum, quod
+videretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli altero, quo neget
+visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id ita esset, si nos
+verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam falsa cernimus. Sed
+probandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum habemus.
+
+XXXV. 112. Ac mihi videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim
+campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in
+Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui
+id percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet
+illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum
+simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque etiam,
+si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille sapientem
+interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem huic loco
+valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum? 113. Quaero enim quid sit quod
+comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, ne
+Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale
+falsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito nimirum
+adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus Academia
+concedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet, vel quod
+amavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum et
+acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero quo
+tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam alia,
+haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae aut
+Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale, quale
+falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo. Horum
+neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque verum
+puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.
+
+XXXVI. 114. Illud ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes
+idque turpissimum esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi
+adroges, ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas,
+mores fingas, finis bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam
+vitam ingrediar definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium
+dicas te et artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia
+complectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad
+quam me deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si
+dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est. 115. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad
+suam quisque rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus
+cognationem esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam
+saepe rexisse, sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam
+inter se amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi?
+qui mecum vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo?
+qui ista Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola,
+si vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos
+impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint
+scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire.
+Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale
+est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet ipsis,
+de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec quaestio est.
+
+116. In tres igitur partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa
+sapientia est. Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita,
+videamus: at illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se
+illa scire persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura
+pendent, quae disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent
+persuadendi necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non
+persuadere, sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non
+quaero ex his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum
+progredi non possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat:
+extremitatem et quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit:
+liniamentum sine ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero,
+si adigam ius iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante
+rationes omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem
+maiorem esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem
+deum censet esse, contempserit. 117. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est
+crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille
+longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus,
+quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est:
+quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum
+esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget _et_ disciplinam? Etsi quamcumque
+eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e physicis
+potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor quaestiones
+infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia constant, videamus
+quem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio.
+
+XXXVII. 118. Princeps Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse
+primas ferunt, ex aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari
+et sodali suo, non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua
+omnia gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum aëra, sed ea,
+quae ex eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex
+his omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis
+inter se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente
+divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse
+mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata
+figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur:
+Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in
+ceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem:
+Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et fore.
+Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo
+sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis proficisci
+volunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem, credo, quem
+sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo condemnatique discedent.
+119. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam
+habebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit nunc lucere, quam,
+quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quae et se
+et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum
+etiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis, terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam
+animalis intellegentia per omnia ea permanet et transeat, fore tamen
+aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore deflagret.
+
+XXXVIII. Sint ista vera--vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse veri--,
+comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste Stoicus sapiens
+syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens
+Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum,
+quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita
+esse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat motus mutationemque
+moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum exsistere, ut hic ornatus
+umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare, illud autem superius sicut
+caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem
+relinquatur. 120. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium, quanti
+libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est? Cur deus,
+omnia nostra causa cum faceret--sic enim voltis--, tantam vim natricum
+viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa _ac_ perniciosa terra marique
+disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine
+divina aliqua sollertia. Cuius quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad
+apium formicarumque perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis
+minutorum opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur. 121. Negas sine deo posse
+quicquam. Ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo
+immunitatem magni quidem muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem
+habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad
+fabricandum mundum. Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec,
+ut ille, qui asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta
+haec esse dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non
+docentis, sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens,
+quidquid aut sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet
+ponderibus et motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore.
+Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes
+divinum numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit--quod cui non
+accidit?--extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen adsentior,
+nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.
+
+XXXIX. 122. Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa
+tenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum,
+terram intrare possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium,
+quam vim quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum
+intererat ea nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici
+notiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed
+ecquid nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus,
+ut videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an
+media pendeat? 123. Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram
+multarum urbium et montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui
+dixit, iurare posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam
+dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis
+vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos αντιποδας vocatis: cur mihi
+magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis, qui, cum audiunt,
+desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait Theophrastus, caelum,
+solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare censet neque praeter
+terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate
+convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae, si stante terra caelum
+moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam arbitrantur,
+sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure? loquere. Putas solem esse tantulum?
+Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos ab illo irridemini et ipsi illum
+vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali irrisione Socrates, liber Aristo
+Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat posse. 124. Sed redeo ad animum et
+corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura sit, quae
+venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an, ut
+Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis habeat, ut
+Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit? si
+simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus
+nullo corpore--quod intellegi quale sit vix potest--et, quidquid est,
+mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Horum
+aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur, nostro ne quid maxime quidem
+probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum paria
+momenta.
+
+XL. 125. Sin agis verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non
+adsentiar, sed quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem
+potissimum? quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis
+fui. Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes
+esse, cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur
+corporum cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos
+ullas, e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine
+aliqua mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus
+hic tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante
+post, alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc
+simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis
+isdem esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus,
+isdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid
+animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus
+irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus
+adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire. 126. Non ergo id
+agitur, ut aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam
+postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne probabilia
+quidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam esse
+arbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne
+exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud scio
+an ita sit.
+
+XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio? an
+Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et reliquis
+fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia
+regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis
+auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione
+sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri
+serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem--ipse enim hic radiatus me intueri
+videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui--vos ergo huius
+magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis
+architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum
+sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior? 127. Neque tamen istas quaestiones
+physicorum exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale
+quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur,
+elatiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque
+caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum
+cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero
+aliquid occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus
+voluptate. 128. Quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed
+vester, ut adsentiatur, credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere
+opinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile
+quod sit invenerit. Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum
+ante dicendum est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde
+adfirmant, earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur,
+amittere. Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam,
+cum cornix cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis
+adfirmabunt signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem
+metiri non possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam
+terram. Ex quo illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non
+potest, qui ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas
+res non percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id
+approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse percipi
+quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera percipi
+comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis minusve
+comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.
+
+XLII. 129. Sed quod coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis
+explorati? nempe fines constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum
+summa referatur: qua de re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio?
+Omitto illa, quae relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et
+scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum
+ab eo dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis
+disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo
+nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici
+philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a
+quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod esset
+unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A Menedemo
+autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in
+mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli similia, sed,
+opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius. 130. Hos si contemnimus et iam
+abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui cum
+Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum
+nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in mediis ea
+momenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum bonum est in his
+rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae αδιαφορια ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho
+autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae απαθεια nominatur. Has igitur
+tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae diu multumque defensa
+sunt. 131. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt: quorum princeps
+Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post Epicurus, cuius est
+disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de ipsa voluptate
+consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse Callipho censuit:
+vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate Diodorus: ambo hi
+Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini
+natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut indicant scripta Polemonis,
+quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles eiusque amici nunc proxime
+videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut
+opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui rebus iis, quas primas natura
+conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere, quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae,
+Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit.
+
+XLIII. 132. Iam illud perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos
+exposui, malorum finis esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar:
+modo ne quis illud tam ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo
+aliquem.' Nihil potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos.
+Licetne--omitto per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope
+singularem--per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem,
+si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in
+discrimine. Nam aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae.
+Utrumque non potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota
+possessione contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni
+continetur, de qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non
+potest igitur uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed
+alter. Si Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens--nam vos quidem
+nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum--: sin vera sunt Zenonis, eadem
+in veteres Academicos _et_ Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur neutri
+adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? 133. Quid? cum ipse
+Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne
+indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia peccata
+esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat tandem mihi
+considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue aliquando
+quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in utramque
+partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim dicebas esse,
+Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito assentiar: quod
+mihi tecum est dogma commune. 134. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno
+in una virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit,
+beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti,
+homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse,
+partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam
+natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente.
+Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et
+fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat, si
+sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur, et
+tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his
+discrepant.
+
+XLIV. 135. Quid? illa, in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare
+possumus? Sapientis animum numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia
+efferri. Age, haec probabilia sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere,
+numquam dolere? Sapiensne non timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si
+deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est
+in bonis, tibi vero, Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona,
+praeter turpitudinem multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens
+necesse est et venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint _ab_ Academia
+vetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent?
+Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse
+quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu. Est enim
+non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, ad verbum
+ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant
+permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa, misericordiam
+aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse
+dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus. 136. Atrocitas quidem ista tua quo
+modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non possum, non
+quo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum,
+quae παραδοξα nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit?
+hos enim quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos
+reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis
+esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum
+quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum liberum?
+insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta
+Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis quidem
+aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? 137. Haec tibi, Luculle, si es
+adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia: mihi
+autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.
+
+XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad senatum in
+Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M. Marcello coss.
+praetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, doctum sane
+hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem dixisse
+Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia sapiens non
+sum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico non videris.'
+Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, non dubitavisset
+quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas incoleret. Sed ille
+noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens. 138. Vos
+autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et comprobem
+incognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur saepe
+Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de finibus
+bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem esse
+finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id esse, si
+vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed in
+vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum honestate
+coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda
+adiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat probabiliter posse
+defendi. 139. Sit sane ita--quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et
+Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam habeo adhuc
+probabilius--, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas sensibus nostris
+blandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut Aristippo. Revocat virtus
+vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos motus esse dicit, hominem iungit
+deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam Aristippus, quasi animum nullum
+habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno, quasi corporis simus expertes, animum
+solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem sequar, cuius quidem sententiam
+Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur.
+Quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid
+Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et
+gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu, cum honestas in voluptate
+contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate tamquam hominem cum belua
+copulabis?
+
+XLVI. 140. Unum igitur par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum
+honestate. De quo Chrysippo fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio.
+Alteram si sequare, multa ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere,
+caritas, amicitia, iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest,
+nisi erit gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium
+impellitur, ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis.
+Audi contra illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant,
+nisi forte, quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere:
+fontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc
+praescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in
+vita sequeretur habiturum. 141. Nihil igitur me putatis, haec et alia
+innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me
+minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum interest, quod tu, cum es commotus,
+adquiescis, adsentiris, approbas, verum illud certum, comprehensum,
+perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque
+pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror, cui si
+adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam vera a falsis nullo
+discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia ista dialecticae nulla sint.
+
+142. Venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium
+Protagorae est, qui putet id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud
+Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii:
+aliud Epicuri, qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in
+voluptate constituit. Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque
+ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis
+esse voluit. 143. Num quid horum probat noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne
+maiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt
+de ratione loquendi multi et multum probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo
+profecto nihil est acutius, nihil politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.
+
+XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut cur
+cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in elementis
+dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne sit, si quid
+ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta contentio est! Aliter
+Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. Quid? cum Cleanthe
+doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet! quid? duo vel principes
+dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis
+in rebus dissentiunt? 144. Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam
+in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi
+tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud, cum artificia tolli quereris a
+nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui si undique omnes convenerint,
+facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam primum illa invidiosa, quod eos
+omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules, servos, insanos esse dicatis:
+deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos,
+qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos Zeno, negat Antiochus scire
+quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim defendimus etiam insipientem multa
+comprehendere. 145. At scire negatis quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et
+hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum
+ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum
+digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat
+pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine
+etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, καταληψιν imposuit. Cum autem
+laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat,
+scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem.
+Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi quidem solent dicere. Ita tu
+nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu, Hortensi, in tua villa nos esse. 146.
+Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen nimis eleganter: illa
+subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi posset, artificia
+concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile esset, satis magnam
+vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine scientia esse non
+posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut Polyclitus, nihil se scire,
+cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos docuisset aliquis quam vim
+habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: ne nobis quidem suscenserent,
+cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset
+ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem maiorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui
+primum iurare 'ex sui animi sententia' quemque voluerunt, deinde ita teneri
+'si sciens falleret,' quod inscientia multa versaretur in vita, tum, qui
+testimonium diceret, ut 'arbitrari' se diceret etiam quod ipse vidisset,
+quaeque iurati iudices cognovissent, ea non ut esse facta, sed ut 'videri'
+pronuntiarentur.
+
+XLVIII. 147. Verum, quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius
+ipse insusurrat navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis
+multa dixi, est mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius
+de dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate
+naturae deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus
+tanto opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere
+necesse sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque
+reliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra
+se Stoici texuerunt. 148. Tum Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec
+contulisse. Saepius enim congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis
+nostris, si quae videbuntur, requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus
+sentit? quid Hortensius? Tum Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor
+sententiam, quam quidem ille Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil
+putem posse, adsensurum autem non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem
+existimem, sed ita, ut intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod
+comprehendi et percipi possit: qua re εποχην illam omnium rerum non
+probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit, vehementer
+adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum aspernor. Sed
+tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens: Tollendum. Teneo te,
+inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia. Ita sermone confecto
+Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras descendimus.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTES.
+
+BOOK I.
+
+    §§1--14. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae (1). Cic.,
+    after adroitly reminding Varro that the promised dedication of the _De
+    Lingua Latina_ is too long delayed, turns the conversation towards
+    philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves this subject untouched (2,
+    3). Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful
+    purpose, and points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4--6). He
+    greatly believes in philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to
+    Greece for it, while he devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks
+    have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion, but demurs to the
+    theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. Latins may surely
+    imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and orators. He gives
+    reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and instancing the
+    success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy (9--12).
+    Varro putting the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the
+    Old Academy for the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for
+    the statement that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro
+    refers to Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a
+    proposal on the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference
+    between Antiochus and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition
+    of the principles of Antiochus (13, 14).
+
+§1. _Noster_: our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus
+than of Cic., see Introd. p. 37. _Nuntiatum_: the spelling _nunciatum_ is a
+mistake, cf. Corssen, _Ausspr._ I. p. 51. _A M. Varrone_: _from M. Varro's
+house_ news came. _Audissemus_: Cic. uses the contracted forms of such
+subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms like
+_audiissemus_. _Confestim_: note how artfully Cic. uses the dramatic form
+of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for Varro. _Ab eius
+villa_: the prep is absent from the MSS., but Wesenberg (_Em. M.T. Cic.
+Epistolarum_, p. 62) shows that it must be inserted. Cic. writes _abesse
+Roma_ (_Ad Fam._ V. 15, 4), _patria_ (_T.D._ V. 106) etc., but not _abesse
+officio_ (_De Off._ I. 43, where Wes. alters it) or the like. _Satis eum
+longo intervallo_: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after Davies, reads _se
+visentum_ for _satis eum_, quoting _Ad Att._ I. 4, Madv. _tum_ for _eum_
+(Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the repetition
+of pronouns (_illum_, _eum_) is quite Ciceronian. The emphatic _ille_ is
+often repeated by the unemphatic _is_, cf. _T.D._ III. 71, and _M.D.F._ V.
+22. I may note that the separation of _satis_ from _longo_ by the word
+_eum_ is quite in Cicero's style (see my note on 25 _quanta id magis_).
+Some editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking _intervallo_ of distance
+in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly press _satis_,
+which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently." The words _satis
+longo intervallo_ simply = "after a tolerably long halt." For the clause
+_ut mos_, etc., cf. _De Or._ II. 13.
+
+§2. _Hic pauca primo_: for the omission of _locuti_, cf. the very similar
+passages in _D.F._ I. 14, III. 8, also my note on 14. _Atque ea_: Halm
+brackets _ea_, quite needlessly, for its insertion is like Cic. _Ecquid
+forte Roma novi_: _Roma_ is the ablative, and some verb like _attulisset_
+is omitted. (So Turnebus.) To take it as nom., understanding _faciat_, is
+clearly wrong. _Percontari_: the spelling _percunctari_ rests on false
+derivation (Corss. I. 36). _Ecquid ipse novi_: cf. _De Or._ II. 13. The
+MSS. have _et si quid_, bad Latin altered by Manutius. _Istum_: some edd.
+_ipsum_, but Cic. often makes a speaker use _iste_ of a person who is
+present. Goer. qu. _Brut._ 125, _De Or._ II. 228. _Velit_: Walker reads
+_velis_ with St Jerome. For _quod velit_ = _quod quis velit_, cf. _De Or._
+I. 30. _In manibus_: so often, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 38. _Idque_: MSS. have in
+the place of this _quod_ with variants _que_, _quae_, _qui_, _quo_. Dav.
+gave _quia_, which was the vulgate reading down to Halm, who reads _idque_,
+after Christ. _Ad hunc enim ipsum_: MSS. have _eum_ for _enim_ (exc. Halm's
+G). Such a combination of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for
+expressions like _me illum ipsum_ (_Ad Att._ II. 1, 11) are not in point.
+Of course if _quia_ be read above, _eum_ must be ejected altogether.
+_Quaedam institui_: the _De Lingua Latina_; see _Ad. Att_ XIII. 12.
+
+§3. _E Libone_: the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see Cæsar _B. Civ._
+III. 5, 16, 24. _Nihil enim eius modi_ again all MSS. except Halm's G. have
+_eum_ for _enim_. Christ conj. _enim eum_; so Baiter. _Illud ...
+requirere_: i.e. the question which follows; cf. _requiris_ in 4. _Tecum
+simul_: Halm's G om. _tecum_; but cf. _De Or._ III. 330. _Mandare
+monumentis--letteris illustrare_: common phrases in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 1,
+_T.D._ I. 1, _De Div._ II. 4. _Monumentis_: this, and not _monimentis_
+(Halm) or _monementis_, is probably the right spelling; cf. Corss. II. 314.
+_Ortam a_: Cic. _always_ writes the prep. after _ortus_; cf. _M.D.F._ V.
+69. _Genus_: regularly used by Cic. as _opus_ by Quintilian to mean
+"department of literature." _Ea res_: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter
+has _ars_; on the other hand Bentley (if the _amicus_ so often quoted in
+Davies' notes be really he) reads _artibus_ for _rebus_ below. The slight
+variation, however, from _res_ to _artibus_ is such as Cic. loves.
+_Ceteris_: the spelling _caeteris_ (Klotz) is absolutely wrong, cf. Corss.
+I. 325. _Antecedat_: some MSS. give _antecellat_. a frequent variant, cf.
+_De Off._ I. 105
+
+§4. _Deliberatam--agitatam_: Cic. as usual exaggerates the knowledge
+possessed by the _personae_ of the dialogue; cf. Introd. p. 38, _De Or._
+II. 1. _In promptu_: so II. 10. _Quod ista ipsa ... cogitavi_: Goer., who
+half a page back had made merry over the gloss hunters, here himself
+scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo expels the words. Yet
+they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf. _De Div._ II. 1, _Cat. Mai._ 38), and
+moreover nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and
+clauses in slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense
+desire to flatter Varro. _Si qui ... si essent_: the first _si_ has really
+no conditional force, _si qui_ like ειτινες merely means "all who," for a
+strong instance see _Ad Fam._ I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe, _si accusandi sunt, si
+qui pertimuerunt_. _Ea nolui scribere_, etc.: very similar expressions
+occur in the prologue to _D.F._ I., which should be compared with this
+prologue throughout.
+
+§5. _Vides ... didicisti_: MSS. have _vides autem eadem ipse didicisti
+enim_. My reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ,
+has _vides autem ipse--didicisti enim eadem--non posse_, etc. _Similis_:
+Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write _i_ and _e_ indiscriminately
+in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write _i_ everywhere, we shall thus,
+I believe, be far nearer Cicero's real writing. Though I do not presume to
+say that his usage did not vary, he must in the vast majority of instances
+have written _i_, see Corss. I. 738--744. _Amafinii aut Rabirii_: cf.
+Introd. p. 26. _Definiunt ... partiuntur_: n. on 32. _Interrogatione_:
+Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g.
+Bentl. _argumentatione_, Ernesti _ratione_. But the word as it stands has
+exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure.
+_Interrogatio_ is merely the _conclusio_ or syllogism put as a series of
+questions. Cf. _Paradoxa_ 2, with _T.D._ II. 42 which will show that
+_interrogatiuncula_ and _conclusiuncula_ are almost convertible terms. See
+also _M.D.F._ I. 39. _Nec dicendi nec disserendi_: Cic.'s constant mode of
+denoting the Greek ‛ρητορικη and διαλεκτικη; note on 32. _Et oratorum
+etiam_: Man., Lamb. om. _etiam_, needlessly. In _Ad Fam._ IX. 25, 3, the
+two words even occur without any other word to separate them. For
+_oratorum_ Pearce conj. _rhetorum_. _Rhetor_, however is not thus used in
+Cic.'s phil. works. _Utramque vim virtutem_: strange that Baiter (esp.
+after Halm's note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj. _unam_ for
+_virtutem_. Any power or faculty (vis, δυναμις) may be called in Gk. αρετη,
+in Lat _virtus_. Two passages, _D.F._ III. 72, _De Or._ III. 65, will
+remove all suspicion from the text. _Verbis quoque novis_: MSS. have
+_quanquam_ which however is impossible in such a place in Cic. (cf.
+_M.D.F._ V. 68). _Ne a nobis quidem_: so all the MSS., but Orelli (after
+Ernesti) thinking the phrase "_arrogantius dictum_" places _quidem_ after
+_accipient_. The text is quite right, _ne quidem_, as Halm remarks, implies
+no more than the Germ. _auch nicht_, cf. also Gk. ουδε. _Suscipiatur
+labor_: MSS. om. the noun, but it is added by a later hand in G.
+
+§6. _Epicurum, id est si Democritum_: for the charge see _D.F._ I. 17, IV.
+13, _N.D._ I. 73. _Id est_ often introduces in Cic. a clause which
+intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause, exx. in _M.D.F._
+I. 33. _Cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris_: cf. _D.F._ I. 18, the
+same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists, _Met._ A, 2. Many
+editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read _efficientis_, which would then
+govern _rerum_ (cf. _D.F._ V. 81, _De Fato_, 33, also Gk. ποιητικος). But
+the genitive is merely one of definition, the _causae_ are the _res
+efficientes_, for which cf. 24 and _Topica_, 58, _proximus locus est rerum
+efficientium, quae causae appellantur_. So Faber, though less fully.
+_Appellat_: i.e. Amafinius, who first so translated ατομος. _Quae cum
+contineantur_: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it must be
+kept, and _adhibenda etiam_ begins the _apodosis_. Madvig (_Emendationes ad
+Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos_, Hauniae, 1825, p. 108) tacitly reads
+_continentur_ without _cum_, so Orelli and Klotz. Goer. absurdly tries to
+prop up the subj. without _cum_. _Quam quibusnam_: Durand's em. for
+_quoniam quibusnam_ of the MSS., given by Halm and also Baiter. Madv.
+(_Em._ p. 108) made a forced defence of _quoniam_, as marking a rapid
+transition from one subject to another (here from physics to ethics) like
+the Gk. επει, only one parallel instance, however, was adduced (_T.D._ III.
+14) and the usage probably is not Latin. _Adducere?_: The note of
+interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole sentence, so far, explains the
+difficulty of setting forth the true system of physics. If _quoniam_ is
+read and no break made at _adducere_, all after _quoniam_ will refer to
+ethics, in that case there will be a strange change of subject in passing
+from _quisquam_ to _haec ipsa_, both which expressions will be nominatives
+to _poterit_, further, there will be the almost impossible ellipse of
+_ars_, _scientia_, or something of the kind after _haec ipsa_. On every
+ground the reading of Madv. is insupportable. _Quid, haec ipsa_: I have
+added _quid_ to fill up the lacuna left by Halm, who supposes much more to
+have fallen out. [The technical philosophical terms contained in this
+section will be elucidated later. For the Epicurean ignorance of geometry
+see note on II. 123] _Illi enim simpliciter_: "frankly," cf. _Ad Fam._
+VIII. 6, 1 _Pecudis et hominis_: note on II. 139.
+
+§7. _Sive sequare ... magnum est_: for the constr. cf. II. 140. _Magnum
+est_: cf. _quid est magnum_, 6. _Verum et simplex bonum_: cf. 35. _Quod
+bonum ... ne suspicari quidem_ an opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp
+_T.D._ III. 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with the Greek
+preserved by Diog. Laert. X. 6 (qu. Zeller, 451), and less accurately by
+Athenaeus, VII. 279 (qu. R. and P. 353). _Ne suspicari quidem_: for this
+MSS. give _nec suspicari_, but Madv. (_D.F._, Excursus III.) has
+conclusively shown that _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_ is post Augustan Latin.
+Christ supposes some thing like _sentire_ to have fallen out before _nec
+suspicari_; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in _D.F._ II.
+20, 30, _T.D._ III. 46, _N.D._ I. 111, where the same opinion of Epicurus
+is dealt with, we have either _ne suspicari quidem_ or _ne intellegere
+quidem_ (cf. also _In Pisonem_ 69). Further, _ne ... quidem_ is esp
+frequent with _suspicari_ (_D.F._ II. 20), and verbs of the kind
+(_cogitari_ II. 82), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end of
+sentences eg _Verr._ II. 1, 155. Notice _negat ... ne suspicari quidem_
+without _se_, which however Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous
+passages produced from Cic. by Madv. (_Em._ 111), in which not only _se_,
+but _me_, _nos_, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the
+infinitive, after verbs like _negat_. Cf. also the omission of _sibi_ in
+_Paradoxa_ 40. _Si vero_: this, following _sive enim_ above, is a departure
+from Cic.'s rule which is to write _sive--sive_ or _si--sin_, but not
+_si--sive_ or _sive--si_. This and two or three other similar passages in
+Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most important and
+exhaustive excursus to his _D.F._ (p. 785, ed. 2), and are connected with
+other instances of broken sequence. There is no need therefore to read
+_sive_ here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others. _Quam nos ... probamus_:
+cf. Introd. p. 62. _Erit explicanda_: for the separation of these words by
+other words interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see 11, 17. I am
+surprised that Halm and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical
+objection to the phrase _explicare Academiam_, and read _erunt_ against the
+MSS., making _illa_ plural. If _erunt_ is read, _erit_ must be supplied
+from it to go with _disserendum_, which is harsh. _Quam argute, quam
+obscure_: at first sight an oxymoron, but _argute_ need not only imply
+_clearness_, it means merely "acutely". _Quantum possum_: some MSS. have
+_quantam_, which is scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only
+follows _nequeo_, _volo_, _malo_, _possum_, and such verbs when an
+infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For _velle_ see a good
+instance in _D.F._ III. 68, where consult Madv. _Constantiam_: the notions
+of firmness, consistency, and clearness of mind are bound up in this word,
+cf. II. 53. _Apud Platonem_: _Timaeus_, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by
+Cic., cf. _De Leg._ I. 58, _Laelius_ 20, 47, _T.D._ I. 64.
+
+§8. _Id est ... jubeo_: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss.
+But Cicero is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight
+variations in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of
+slightly varied phrases connected by _id est_ in _D.F._ I. 72, II. 6, 90. I
+therefore hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words. _Ea a_:
+Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read
+_e_ for _a_, which Halm would also prefer. _De_, _ab_, and _ex_ follow
+_haurire_ indifferently in Cic. _Rivulos consectentur_: so Wordsworth, "to
+hunt the waterfalls". The metaphor involved in _fontibus--rivulos_ is often
+applied by Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus
+in _N.D._ I. 120. _Nihil enim magno opere_: _magno opere_ should be written
+in two words, not as _magnopere_, cf. the phrases _maximo opere_, _nimio
+opere_, the same holds good of _tanto opere_, _quanto opere_. _L. Aelii_:
+MSS. _Laelii_. The person meant is L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the
+master of Varro, and the earliest systematic grammarian of Rome. See
+Quintil. _Inst. Or._ X. 1, 99, Gellius X. 21, Sueton. _Gramm._ 3.
+_Occasum_: an unusual metaphor. _Menippum_: a Cynic satirist, see _Dict.
+Biogr._ Considerable fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and
+have often been edited--most recently by Riese (published by Teubner).
+_Imitati non interpretati_: Cic. _D.F._ I. 7, gives his opinion as to the
+right use to be made of Greek models. _†Quae quo_: these words are
+evidently wrong. Halm after Faber ejects _quae_, and is followed by Baiter.
+Varro is thus made to say that he stated many things dialectically, _in
+order that_ the populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault
+lies in the word _quo_, for which I should prefer to read _cum_ (=_quom_,
+which would be written _quō_ in the MSS.) The general sense would then be
+"Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature which the
+unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the learned
+read." _Laudationibus_: λογοις επιταφιοις, cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 48 where
+Varro's are mentioned. _†Philosophe scribere_: the MSS. all give
+_philosophie_. Klotz has _philosophiam_, which is demonstrably wrong,
+_physica_, _musica_ etc. _scribere_ may be said, but not _physicam_,
+_musicam_ etc. _scribere_. The one passage formerly quoted to justify the
+phrase _philosophiam scribere_ is now altered in the best texts (_T.D._ V.
+121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads _philosophiae scribere_; his
+explanation is, as Orelli gently says, "vix Latina." I can scarcely think
+Halm's _philosophe_ to be right, the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic.
+almost condemns it by his use of the Greek φιλοσοφως (_Ad Att._ XIII. 20).
+In older Greek the adverb does not appear, nor is φιλοσοφος used as an
+adjective much, yet Cic. uses _philosophus_ adjectivally in _T.D._ V. 121,
+_Cat. Mai._ 22, _N.D._ III. 23, just as he uses _tyrannus_ (_De Rep._ III.
+45), and _anapaestus_ (_T.D._ III. 57) Might we not read _philosophis_, in
+the dative, which only requires the alteration of a single letter from the
+MSS. reading? The meaning would then be "to write _for_ philosophers,"
+which would agree with my emendation _cum_ for _quo_ above. _Philosophice_
+would be a tempting alteration, but that the word φιλοσοφικος is not Greek,
+nor do _philosophicus_, _philosophice_ occur till very late Latin times.
+_Si modo id consecuti sumus_: cf. _Brut._ 316.
+
+§9. _Sunt ista_: = εστι ταυτα, so often, e.g. _Lael._ 6. Some edd. have
+_sint_, which is unlikely to be right. _Nos in nostra_: Augustine (_De Civ.
+Dei_ VI. 2) quotes this with the reading _reduxerunt_ for _deduxerunt_,
+which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with approval Durand's
+remark, "_deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus humanitatis_." The
+words, however, are almost convertible; see _Cat. Mai._ 63. In _Lael._ 12,
+_Brut._ 86, we have _reducere_, where Durand's rule requires _deducere_, on
+the other hand cf. _Ad Herennium_ IV. 64, _hospites domum deducere. Aetatem
+patriae_ etc., August. (_De Civ. Dei_ VI. 3) describes Varro's "_Libri
+Antiquitatum_" (referred to in 8), in which most of the subjects here
+mentioned were treated of. _Descriptiones temporum_: lists of dates, so
+χρονοι is technically used for dates, Thuc. V. 20, etc. _Tu sacerdotum_:
+after this Lamb. inserts _munera_ to keep the balance of the clauses. Cic.
+however is quite as fond of variety as of formal accuracy.
+_Domesticam--bellicam_: opposed like _domi bellique_, cf. _Brut._ 49, _De
+Off._ I. 74. Augustine's reading _publicam_ shows him to have been quoting
+from memory. _Sedem_: so the best MSS. of Aug., some edd. here give
+_sedium_. The argument for _sedem_ is the awkwardness of making the three
+genitives, _sedium_, _regionum_, _locorum_, dependent on the accusatives,
+_nomina_, _genera_, _officia_, _causas_. Cic. is fond of using _sedes_,
+_locus_, _regio_ together, see _Pro Murena_, 85, _Pro Cluentio_, 171,
+quoted by Goer. _Omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum_: from the frequent
+references of Aug. it appears that the "_Libri Antiquitatum_" were divided
+into two parts, one treating of _res humanae_, the other of _res divinae_
+(_De Civ. Dei_, IV. 1, 27, VI. 3). _Et litteris luminis_: for _luminis_,
+cf. _T.D._ I. 5. _Et verbis_: Manut. reads _rebus_ from 26. Varro's
+researches into the Latin tongue are meant. _Multis locis incohasti_:
+Varro's book "_De Philosophia_" had apparently not yet been written.
+
+§10. _Causa_: = προφασις. _Probabilem_: = specious. _Nesciunt_: Halm with
+his one MS. G, which is the work of a clever emendator, gives _nescient_ to
+suit _malent_ above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not necessary to
+force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which Halm himself
+allows to be broken in two similar passages, II. 20, 105. _Sed da mihi
+nunc, satisne probas?_: So all MSS. except G, which has the evident conj.
+_sed ea (eam) mihi non sane probas_. This last Baiter gives, while Halm
+after Durand reads _sed eam mihi non satis probas_, which is too far from
+the MSS. to please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable, though _da
+mihi_ for _dic mihi_ is certainly poetic. _Da te mihi_ (Manut., Goer.,
+Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be supported by 12,
+_Brut._ 306, _Ad Fam._ II. 8, or such like passages. _Attius_: the old
+spelling _Accius_ is wrong. _Si qui ... imitati_: note the collocation, and
+cf. 17. Halm needlessly writes _sint_ for MSS. _sunt_. For this section
+throughout cf. the prologues to _D.F._ I., _T.D._ I. and II.
+
+§11. _Procuratio_: for the proper meaning of _procurator_ and _procuratio_
+see Jordan on _Pro Caecina_ 55. _Implacatum et constrictum_: the
+conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual; cf. 17 _plenam ac
+refertam_, II. 127 _exigua et minima_, so και in Greek. _Inclusa habebam_:
+cf. _T.D._ I. 1. _Obsolescerent_, used of _individual_ memory, is
+noteworthy. _Percussus volnere_: many edd. give the frequent variant
+_perculsus_. The _volnus_, which Goer. finds so mysterious, is the death of
+Tullia, cf. _N.D._ I. 9, _De Consolatione_, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe, and
+Introd. p. 32. _Aut ... aut ... aut ... aut_: This casting about for an
+excuse shows how low philosophy stood in public estimation at Rome. See
+Introd. p. 29. The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the
+exordium of _N.D._ I.
+
+§12. _Brutus_: the same praise often recurs in _D.F._ and the _Brutus
+Graecia desideret_ so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has _Graeca_. Halm
+(and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger, _Graeca
+desideres_. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's _Philologus_ XXIV. 483,
+approves the reading on the curious ground that Brutus was not anxious to
+satisfy Greek requirements, but rather to render it unnecessary for Romans
+to have recourse to Greece for philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for
+Greece with Cicero is the supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if
+she is satisfied the philosophic world is tranquil. Cf. _Ad Att._ I. 20, 6,
+_D.F._ I. 8, _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 16, 5. I just note the em. of Turnebus, _a
+Graecia desideres_, and that of Dav. _Graecia desideretur_. _Eandem
+sententiam_: cf. Introd. p. 56. _Aristum_: cf. II. 11, and _M.D.F._ V. 8.
+
+§13. _Sine te_: = σου διχα. _Relictam_: Cic. very rarely omits _esse_, see
+note on II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p. 20.
+_Veterem illam_: MSS. have _iam_ for _illam_. The position of _iam_ would
+be strange, in the passage which used to be compared, _Pro Cluentio_ 16,
+Classen and Baiter now om. the word. Further, _vetus_ and _nova_ can
+scarcely be so barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The
+reading _illam_ is from Madv. (_Em._ 115), and is supported by _illam
+veterem_ (18), _illa antiqua_ (22), _istius veteris_ (_D.F._ V. 8), and
+similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and Bait.) thinks _iam_ comprises
+the last two syllables of _Academiam_, which he reads. _Correcta et
+emendata_: a fine sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words
+often occur together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of
+expression, cf. _De Leg._ III. 30, _D.F._ IV. 21, also Tac. _Hist._ I. 37.
+_Negat_: MSS. have _negaret_, but Cic. never writes the subj. after
+_quamquam_ in _oratio recta_, as Tac. does, unless there is some
+conditional or potential force in the sentence; see _M.D.F._ III. 70.
+Nothing is commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for
+the pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and _vice versa_. _In libris_:
+see II. 11. _Duas Academias_: for the various modes of dividing the Academy
+refer to R. and P. 404. _Contra ea Philonis_: MSS. have _contra Philonis_
+merely, exc. Halm's V., which gives _Philonem_, as does the ed. Rom.
+(1471). I have added _ea_. Orelli quotes _Ad Att._ XII. 23, 2, _ex
+Apollodori_. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and _libros_ may be supplied
+from _libris_ above, so in _Ad Att._ XIII. 32, 2, _Dicaearchi_ περι ψυχης
+_utrosque_, the word _libros_ has to be supplied from the preceding letter,
+cf. a similar ellipse of _bona_ in 19, 22. Madvig's _Philonia_ is
+improbable from its non-appearance elsewhere, while the companion adjective
+_Antiochius_ is frequent. Halm inserts _sententiam_, a heroic remedy. To
+make _contra_ an adv. and construe _Philonis Antiochus_ together, supplying
+_auditor_, as is done by some unknown commentators who probably only exist
+in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified by _D.F._ V. 13.
+
+§14. _A qua absum iam diu_: MSS. have strangely _aqua absumtam diu_,
+changed by Manut. _Renovari_: the vulg. _revocari_ is a curious instance of
+oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note he
+gave _renovari_. Orelli--who speaks of Goerenz's "_praestantissima
+recensio_," and founds his own text upon it two years after Madvig's
+crushing exposure in his _Em._ often quoted by me--not only reads
+_revocari_, but quotes _renovari_ as an em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536.
+From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no independent value, took it.
+_Renovare_ in Cic. often means "to refresh the memory," e.g. 11, _Brut._
+315. _Nisi molestum est_: like _nisi alienum putas_, a variation on the
+common _si placet, si videtur_. _Adsidamus_: some MSS. have _adsideamus_,
+which would be wrong here. _Sane istud_: Halm _istuc_ from G. _Inquit_: for
+the late position of this word, which is often caused by its affinity for
+_quoniam_, _quidem_, etc., cf. _M.D.F._ III. 20 _Quae cum essent dicta, in
+conspectu consedimus (omnes)_: most edd. since Gulielmus print this without
+_essent_ as a hexameter, and suppose it a quotation. But firstly, a verse
+so commonplace, if familiar, would occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if
+not familiar, would not be given without the name of its author. Secondly,
+most MSS. have _sint_ or _essent_ before _dicta_. It is more probable
+therefore that _omnes_ was added from an involuntary desire to make up the
+hexameter rhythm. Phrases like _quae cum essent dicta consedimus_ often
+occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf. _De Div._ II. 150, and
+Augustine, the imitator of Cic., _Contra Academicos_, I. 25, also
+_consedimus_ at the end of a clause in _Brut._ 24, and _considitur_ in _De
+Or._ III. 18. _Mihi vero_: the omission of _inquit_, which is strange to
+Goer., is well illustrated in _M.D.F._ I. 9. There is an odd ellipse of
+_laudasti_ in _D.F._ V. 81.
+
+    §§15--42. Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. First part of
+    Varro's Exposition, 15--18. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made
+    ethics supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets, his one
+    doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of ignorance.
+    Moral exhortation was his task (16). Plato added to and enriched the
+    teaching of his master, from him sprang two schools which abandoned the
+    negative position of Socrates and adopted definite tenets, yet remained
+    in essential agreement with one another--the Peripatetic and the
+    Academic (17, 18).
+
+§15. _A rebus ... involutis_: physical phenomena are often spoken of in
+these words by Cic., cf. 19, _Timaeus_ c. 1, _D.F._ I. 64, IV. 18, V. 10,
+_N.D._ I. 49. Ursinus rejected _ab_ here, but the insertion or omission of
+_ab_ after the passive verb depends on the degree to which _natura_ is
+personified, if 28 be compared with _Tim._ c. 1, this will be clear.
+_Involutis_ = veiled; cf. _involucrum_. Cic. shows his feeling of the
+metaphor by adding _quasi_ in II. 26, and often. _Avocavisse philosophiam_:
+this, the Xenophontic view of Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's
+time, cf. II. 123, _T.D._ V. 10, _D.F._ V. 87, 88, also Varro in Aug. _De
+Civ. Dei_, VIII. 3. Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were
+curiously answered in _De Rep._ I. 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug. _De Civ.
+Dei_, VIII. 4). The same view is supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the
+passages quoted by R. and P. 141. To form an opinion on this difficult
+question the student should read Schleiermacher's _Essay on the Worth of
+Socrates as a Philosopher_ (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's _Socrates
+and the Socratic Schools_, Eng. Trans., pp. 112--116 [I dissent from his
+view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's _Handbook_, so far as it
+relates to Socrates and Plato. _Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum valere_:
+_valere_ is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm, its use in 21 makes
+it more probable than _conferre_, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius
+vainly tries to justify the MSS. reading by such passages as _D.F._ I. 39,
+_T.D._ I. 70. The strangest ellipse with _nihil ad_ elsewhere in Cic. is in
+_De Leg._ I. 6.
+
+§16. _Hic ... illum_: for this repetition of pronouns see _M.D.F._ IV. 43.
+_Varie et copiose_: MSS. omit _et_, but it may be doubted whether Cic.
+would let two _adverbs_ stand together without _et_, though three may (cf.
+II. 63), and though with pairs of _nouns_ and _adjectives, et_ often is
+left out, as in the passages quoted here by Manut. _Ad Att._ IV. 3, 3, _Ad
+Fam._ XIII. 24, XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg, reprinted
+in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works (1861), on
+_T.D._ III. 6. _Varie et copiose_ is also in _De Or._ II. 240. Cf. the
+omission of _que_ in 23, also II. 63. _Perscripti_: Cic. like Aristotle
+often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were authentic reports of
+Socratic conversations, cf. II. 74. _Nihil adfirmet_: so _T.D._ I. 99.
+"_Eoque praestare ceteris_" this is evidently from Plato _Apol._ p. 21, as
+to the proper understanding of which see note on II. 74. _Ab Apolline_,
+Plato _Apol._ 21 A, _Omnium_: Dav. conj. _hominum_ needlessly. _Dictum_:
+Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads _iudicatum_, it is remarkable that in four
+passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (_Cato Mai._ 78, _Lael._ 7,
+9, 13) he uses the verb _iudicare_. _Una omnis_: Lamb. _hominis_, Baiter
+also. _Omnis eius oratio tamen_: _notwithstanding_ his negative dialectic
+he gave positive teaching in morals. _Tamen_: for MSS. _tam_ or _tum_ is
+due to Gruter, Halm has _tantum_. _Tam_, _tum_ and _tamen_ are often
+confused in MSS., e.g. _In Veri_ (_Act_ II.) I. 3, 65, II. 55, 112, V. 78,
+where see Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that _tum ... et_, _tum
+... que_, _et ... tum_, correspond in Cic. like _tum ... cum_, _tum ...
+tum_. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled by _Ac._ II. 1, 43. _Ad
+virtutis studium cohortandis_: this broad assertion is distinctly untrue;
+see Zeller's _Socrates_ 88, with footnote.
+
+§17. _Varius et multiplex, et copiosus_: these characteristics are named to
+account for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For
+_multiplex_ "many sided," cf. _T.D._ V. 11. _Una et consentiens_: this is
+an opinion of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in
+_D.F._ IV. 5 _De Leg._ I. 38, _De Or._ III. 67. Five ancient philosophers
+are generally included in this supposed harmonious Academico-Peripatetic
+school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo (cf.
+_D.F._ IV. 2), sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have
+been first broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in
+Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1, cf. also 34. Antiochus doubtless rested his
+theory almost entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In
+_D.F._ V. 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus, this appears, as also
+in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as though ethics were the whole
+of philosophy (cf. also _De Off._ III. 20). Antiochus probably made light
+of such dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about
+ιδεαι, which had long ceased. Krische _Uber Cicero's Akademika_ p. 51, has
+some good remarks. _Nominibus_: the same as _vocabulis_ above. Cic. does
+not observe Varro's distinction (_De L. L._ IX. 1) which confines _nomen_
+to proper nouns, _vocabulum_ to common nouns, though he would not use
+_vocabulum_ as Tac. does, for the name of a person (_Annals_ XII. 66,
+etc.). _Quasi heredem ... duos autem_: the conj. of Ciaconus "_ex asse
+heredem, secundos autem_" is as acute as it is absurd. _Duos_: it is
+difficult to decide whether this or _duo_ is right in Cic., he can scarcely
+have been so inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and
+Halm's ed., _Ac._ II. 11, 13 with _De Div._ I. 6). The older inscr. in the
+_Corpus_ vol. I. have _duo_, but only in _duoviros_, two near the time of
+Cic. (_C.I._ vol. I. nos. 571 and 1007) give _duos_, which Cic. probably
+wrote. _Duo_ is in old Latin poets and Virgil. _Chalcedonium_: not
+_Calchedonium_ as Klotz, cf. Gk. Χαλκηδονιον. _Praestantissimos_: Halm
+wrongly, cf. _Brut._ 125. _Stagiritem_: not _Stagiritam_ as Lamb., for
+Cic., exc. in a few nouns like _Persa_, _pirata_, etc., which came down
+from antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in -ης into Latin nouns in _-a_.
+See _M.D.F._ II. 94. _Coetus ... soliti_: cf. 10. _Platonis ubertate_: cf.
+Quintilian's "_illa Livii lactea ubertas_." _Plenum ac refertam_: n. on 11.
+_Dubitationem_: Halm with one MS., G, gives _dubitantem_, Baiter
+_dubitanter_, Why alter? _Ars quaedam philosophiae_: before these words all
+Halm's MSS., exc G, insert _disserendi_, probably from the line above,
+Lipsius keeps it and ejects _philosophiae_, while Lamb., Day read
+_philosophia_ in the nom. Varro, however, would never say that philosophy
+became entirely dialectical in the hands of the old Academics and
+Peripatetics. _Ars_ = τεχνη, a set of definite rules, so Varro in Aug. (as
+above) speaks of the _certa dogmata_ of this old school as opposed to the
+incertitude of the New Academy. _Descriptio_: so Halm here, but often
+_discriptio_. The _Corp. Inscr._, vol. I. nos. 198 and 200, has thrice
+_discriptos_ or _discriptum_, the other spelling never.
+
+§18. _Ut mihi quidem videtur_: MSS. transpose _quidem_ and _videtur_, as in
+44. _Quidem_, however nearly always comes closely after the pronoun, see
+_M.D.F._ IV. 43, cf. also I. 71, III. 28, _Opusc._ I. 406. _Expetendarum
+fugiendarumque_: ‛αιρετων και φευκτων, about which more in n. on 36. The
+Platonic and Aristotelian ethics have indeed an external resemblance, but
+the ultimate bases of the two are quite different. In rejecting the Idea of
+the Good, Aristotle did away with what Plato would have considered most
+valuable in his system. The ideal theory, however, was practically defunct
+in the time of Antiochus, so that the similarity between the two schools
+seemed much greater than it was. _Non sus Minervam_: a Greek proverb, cf.
+Theocr. _Id._ V. 23, _De Or._ II. 233, _Ad Fam._ IX. 18, 3. Binder, in his
+German translation of the _Academica_, also quotes Plutarch _Præc. Polit._
+7. _Inepte ... docet_: elliptic for _inepte docet, quisquis docet_. _Nostra
+atque nostros_: few of the editors have understood this. Atticus affects
+everything Athenian, and speaks as though he were one of them; in Cic.'s
+letters to him the words "_tui cives_," meaning the Athenians, often occur.
+_Quid me putas_: i.e. _velle_. _Exhibiturum_: Halm inserts _me_ before this
+from his one MS. G, evidently emended here by its copyist. For the omission
+of _me_, cf. note on 7.
+
+    §§19--23. Part II. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.
+    The threefold division of philosophy into ηθικη, φυσικη, διαλεκτικη.
+    Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the acquisition of
+    natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and
+    external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental, which fall
+    into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of
+    the acquired (20), then the external, which form with the bodily
+    advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The ethical
+    standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief part, and
+    is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the greatest
+    happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three classes
+    of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible to give
+    an intelligent account of action and duty (23).
+
+§19. _Ratio triplex_: Plato has not this division, either consciously or
+unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's time,
+so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ VIII. 4, and by
+Diog. Laert. III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself cannot be
+traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian Peripatetics,
+to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 16. It was probably
+first brought into strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more
+sharply and decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf.
+esp. _M.D.F._ IV. 3. _Quid verum ... repugnans iudicando_: MSS. exc. G have
+_et_ before _quid falsum_, whence Klotz conj. _sit_ in order to obviate the
+awkwardness of _repugnet_ which MSS. have for _repugnans_. Krische wishes
+to read _consequens_ for _consentiens_, comparing _Orator_ 115, _T.D._ V.
+68, _De Div._ II. 150, to which add _T.D._ V. 21 On the other hand cf. II.
+22, 91. Notice the double translations of the Greek terms, _de vita et
+moribus_ for ηθικη, etc. This is very characteristic of Cic., as we shall
+see later. _Ac primum_: many MSS. and edd. _primam_, cf. 23, 30. _A natura
+petebant_: how Antiochus could have found this in Plato and Aristotle is
+difficult to see; that he did so, however, is indubitable; see _D.F._ V.
+24--27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and Varro in
+Aug. XIX. 3. The root of Plato's system is the ιδεα of the Good, while so
+far is Aristotle from founding his system on the abstract φυσις, that he
+scarcely appeals even incidentally to φυσις in his ethical works. The
+abstract conception of nature in relation to ethics is first strongly
+apparent in Polemo, from whom it passed into Stoic hands and then into
+those of Antiochus. _Adeptum esse omnia_: put rather differently in _D.F._
+V. 24, 26, cf. also _D.F._ II. 33, 34, _Ac._ II. 131. _Et animo et corpore
+et vita_: this is the τριας or τριλογια των αγαθων, which belongs in this
+form to late Peripateticism (cf. _M.D.F._ III. 43), the third division is a
+development from the βιος τελειος of Aristotle. The τριας in this distinct
+shape is foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus, _Ethica_ II. 6,
+4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro seems to merge the two last
+divisions into one in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX 3. This agrees better with
+_D.F._ V. 34--36, cf. also Aug. VIII. 8. On the Antiochean _finis_ see more
+in note on 22. _Corporis alia_: for ellipse of _bona_, see n. on 13.
+_Ponebant esse_: n. on 36. _In toto in partibus_: the same distinction is
+in Stob. _Eth._ II. 6, 7; cf. also _D.F._ V. 35. _Pulchritudinem_: Cic.
+_Orator_ 160, puts the spelling _pulcher_ beyond a doubt; it often appears
+in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only _pulcrai_, _pulcrum_,
+etc., occur in inscr., exc. _pulchre_, which is found once (_Corp. Inscr._
+I. no 1019). _Sepulchrum_, however, is frequent at an early time. On the
+tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see Boscher in Curtius'
+_Studien_ II. 1, p. 145. In the case of _pulcher_ the false derivation from
+πολυχροος may have aided the corruption. Similarly in modern times J.C.
+Scaliger derived it from πολυ χειρ (Curtius' _Grundz_ ed. 3, p. 8) For
+_valetudinem viris pulchritudinem_, cf. the ‛υγιεια ισχυς καλλος of Stob.
+_Eth_. II. 6, 7, and _T.D._ V. 22. _Sensus integros_ ευαισθησια in Stob.,
+cf. also _D.F._ V. 36 (_in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus_).
+_Celeritatem_: so ποδωκεια in Stob., _bene currere_ in Aug. XIX. 3.
+_Claritatem in voce_: cf. _De Off._ I. 133. _Impressionem_: al.
+_expressionem_. For the former cf. _De Or._ III. 185, which will show the
+meaning to be the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter _De Or._
+III. 41, which will disprove Klotz's remark "_imprimit lingua voces, non
+exprimit_." See also _De Off._ I. 133. One old ed. has _pressionem_, which,
+though not itself Ciceronian, recalls _presse loqui_, and _N.D._ II. 149.
+Pliny, _Panegyric_, c. 64, has _expressit explanavitque verba_; he and
+Quintilian often so use _exprimere_.
+
+§20. _Ingeniis_: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. _T.D._ III. 2, and
+_animis_ below and in _N.D._ II. 58. _In naturam et mores_: for _in ea quae
+natura et moribus fiunt_. A similar inaccuracy of expression is found in
+II. 42. The division is practically Aristotle's, who severs αρεται into
+διανοητικαι and ηθικαι (_Nic. Eth._ I. c. 13, _Magna Mor._ I. c. 5). In
+_D.F._ V. 38 the διανοητικαι are called _non voluntariae_, the ηθικαι
+_voluntariae_. _Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam_: cf. the ευμαθεια,
+μνημη of Arist. (who adds αγχινοια σοφια φρονησις), and the _docilitas,
+memoria_ of _D.F._ V. 36. _Quasi consuetudinem_: the _quasi_ marks a
+translation from the Greek, as frequently, here probably of εθισμος (_Nic.
+Eth._ II. c. 1). _Partim ratione formabant_: the relation which reason
+bears to virtue is set forth in _Nic. Eth._ VI. c. 2. _In quibus_: i.e. _in
+moribus_. All the late schools held that ethics formed the sole ultimate
+aim of philosophy. _Erat_: note the change from _oratio obliqua_ to
+_recta_, and cf. the opposite change in II. 40. _Progressio_: this, like
+the whole of the sentence in which it stands, is intensely Stoic. For the
+Stoic προκορη, προκοπτειν εις αρετην, cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 64, 66, R. and P.
+392, sq., Zeller, _Stoics_ 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said to be
+Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised
+Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. _Perfectio naturae_:
+cf. esp. _De Leg._ I. 25. More Stoic still is the definition of virtue as
+the perfection of the _reason_, cf. II. 26, _D.F._ IV. 35, V. 38, and
+Madvig's note on _D.F._ II. 88. Faber quotes Galen _De Decr. Hipp. et
+Plat._ c. 5, ‛η αρετη τελειοτης εστι της ‛εκαστου φυσεος. _Una res optima_:
+the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. XIX. 3, cf. also
+_D.F._ V. 36, 38.
+
+§21. _Virtutis usum_: so the Stoics speak of their αδιαφορα as the
+practising ground for virtue (_D.F._ III. 50), cf. _virtutis usum_ in Aug.
+XIX. 1. _Nam virtus_: most MSS. have _iam_, which is out of place here.
+_Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam_: MSS. omit _et_ between
+_cernitur_ and _in_, exc. Halm's G which has _in_ before _animi_ and also
+before _corporis_. These last insertions are not necessary, as may be seen
+from _Topica_ 80, _causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus
+negotiis cernitur aut_ in _omnibus aut_ in _plerisque_, also _T.D._ V. 22.
+In Stob. II. 6, 8, the τελος of the Peripatetics is stated to be το κατ'
+αρετην ζην εν τοις περι σωμα και τοις εξωθεν αγαθοις, here _quibusdam quae_
+etc., denote the εξωθεν or εκτος αγαθα, the third class in 19. _Hominem ...
+societate_: all this is strongly Stoic, though also attributed to the
+Peripatetics by Stob. II. 6, 7 (κοινη φιλανθρωπια), etc., doubtless the
+humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the φυσει ανθρωπος
+πολιτικον ζωον theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf. _D.F._ III. 66, _De Leg._
+I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293--296. The repetitions _hominem_,
+_humani_, _hominibus_, _humana_ are striking. For the last, Bentley (i.e.
+Davies' anonymous friend) proposed _mundana_ from _T.D._ V. 108, Varro,
+however, has _humana societas_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Cetera autem_: what are
+these _cetera?_ They form portion of the εκτος αγαθα, and although not
+strictly contained within the _summum bonum_ are necessary to enrich it and
+preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob. II. 6, 8, 13, φιλια, φιλοι
+would belong to the _quaedam_ of Cicero, while πλουτος αρχη ευτυχια
+ευγενεια δυναστεια would be included in _cetera_. The same distinction is
+drawn in Aug. VIII. 8. _Tuendum_: most MSS. _tenendum_, but _tuendum_
+corresponds best with the division of αγαθα into ποιητικα and φυλακτικα,
+Stob. II. 6, 13. For the word _pertinere_ see _M.D.F._ III. 54.
+
+§22. _Plerique_: Antiochus believes it also Academic. _Qui tum
+appellarentur_: MSS. _dum_, the subj. is strange, and was felt to be so by
+the writer of Halm's G, which has _appellantur_. _Videbatur_: Goer. and
+Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that it has the strong meaning of
+the Gr. εδοκει, "it was their dogma," so often. _Adipisci_: cf. _adeptum
+esse_, 19. _Quae essent prima natura_: MSS. have _in natura_. For the
+various modes of denoting the πρωτα κατα φυσιν in Latin see Madvig's
+_Fourth Excursus to the D.F._, which the student of Cic.'s philosophy ought
+to know by heart. The phrase _prima natura_ (abl.) could not stand alone,
+for τα πρωτα τη φυσει is one of Goerenz's numerous forgeries. The ablative
+is always conditioned by some verb, see Madv. A comparison of this
+statement of the ethical _finis_ with that in 19 and the passages quoted in
+my note there, will show that Cic. drew little distinction between the
+Stoic τα πρωτα κατα φυσιν and the Peripatetic τριλογια. That this is
+historically absurd Madvig shows in his _Excursus_, but he does not
+sufficiently recognise the fact that Cicero has perfectly correctly
+reported Antiochus. At all events, Varro's report (Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX.
+3) coincides with Cic.'s in every particular. Even the _inexplicabilis
+perversitas_ of which Madv. complains (p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus,
+who, as will be seen from Augustine XIX. 1, 3, included even _virtus_ among
+the _prima naturae_. A little reflection will show that in no other way
+could Antiochus have maintained the practical identity of the Stoic and
+Peripatetic views of the _finis_. I regret that my space does not allow me
+to pursue this difficult subject farther. For the Stoic πρωτα κατα φυσιν
+see Zeller, chap XI. _Ipsa per sese expetenda_: Gk. ‛αιρετα, which is
+applied to all things contained within the _summum bonum_. As the Stoic
+_finis_ was αρετη only, that alone to them was ‛αιρετον, their πρωτα κατα
+φυσιν were not ‛αιρετα, (cf. _D.F._ III. 21). Antiochus' _prima naturae_
+were ‛αιρετα to him, cf. Aug. XIX. 3, _prima illa naturae propter se ipsa
+existimat expetenda_ so Stob., II. 6, 7, demonstrates each branch of the
+τριλογια to be καθ' ‛αυτο ‛αιρετον. _Aut omnia aut maxima_: so frequently
+in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ IV. 27, so Stob. II. 6, 8, τα πλειστα και κυριωτατα.
+_Ea sunt maxima_: so Stob., Varro in Aug. _passim_. _Sensit_: much
+misunderstood by edd., here = _iudicavit_ not _animadvertit_ cf. _M.D.F._
+II. 6. _Reperiebatur_: for change of constr. cf. _D.F._ IV. 26 _Nec tamen
+beatissimam_: the question whether αρετη was αυταρκες προς ευδαιμονιαν was
+one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As to Antiochus,
+consult _M.D.F._ V. 67.
+
+§23. _Agendi aliquid_: Gk. πραξεως, the usual translation, cf. II. 24, 37.
+_Officii ipsius initium_: του καθηκοντος αρχην, Stob. II. 6, 7. This
+sentence is covertly aimed at the New Academics, whose scepticism,
+according to the dogmatists, cut away the ground from action and duty, see
+II. 24. _Recti honestique_: these words are redolent of the Stoa. _Earum
+rerum_: Halm thinks something like _appetitio_ has fallen out, _susceptio_
+however, above, is quite enough for both clauses; a similar use of it is
+found in _D.F._ III. 32. _Descriptione naturae_: Halm with one MS. (G)
+gives _praescriptione_, which is in II. 140, cf. also _praescriberet_
+above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. _prima constitutio naturae_ in _D.F._
+IV. 15. _Aequitas_: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of
+επιεικεια. _Eaeque_: so Halm for MSS. _haeque_, _haecque_. Of course
+_haecque_, like _hicque_, _sicque_, would be un-Ciceronian. _Voluptatibus_:
+a side blow at the Epicureans. _Forma_ see n. on 33.
+
+    §§24--29. Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus' _Physics_.
+    Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which are never
+    actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. When
+    force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed entity
+    (ποιον τι or _quale_)--(24). These formed entities are either _primary_
+    or _secondary_. Air, fire, water, earth are primary, the two first
+    having an active, the two last a passive function. Aristotle added a
+    fifth (26). Underlying all formed entities is the formless matter,
+    matter and space are infinitely subdivisible (27). Force or form acts
+    on the formless matter and so produces the ordered universe, outside
+    which no matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it
+    eternal. This Reason has various names--Soul of the Universe, Mind,
+    Wisdom, Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the
+    same thing (28, 29).
+
+§24. _Natura_: this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a
+translation both of φυσις and ουσια. Here it is ουσια in the broadest
+sense, all that exists. _In res duas_: the distinction between Force and
+Matter, the active and passive agencies in the universe, is of course
+Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however probably apprehended the
+distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this read carefully Zeller, 135
+sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of Aristotle's doctrine is to be
+got from Schwegler, _Handbook_, pp 99--105. R. and P. 273 sq. should be
+consulted for the important coincidence of Force with logical _genus_
+(ειδος), and of Matter (‛υλη) with logical _differentia_ (διαφορα). For the
+_duae res_, cf. _D.F._ I. 18. _Efficiens ... huic se praebens_: an attempt
+to translate το ποιουν and το πασχον of the _Theaetetus_, το οθεν and το
+δεχομενον of the _Timaeus_ (50 D). Cic. in _Tim._ has _efficere_ and
+_pati_, Lucretius I. 440 _facere_ and _fungi_. _Ea quae_: so Gruter, Halm
+for MSS. _eaque._ The meaning is this; passive matter when worked upon by
+an active generative form results in an _aliquid_, a τοδε τι as Aristotle
+calls it. Passive matter ‛υλη is only potentially τοδε τι, passing into
+actual τοδε τι, when affected by the form. (Cf. τοδε, τουτο, Plato _Tim._
+49 E, 50 A, also Arist. _Metaph_ H, 1, R. and P. 270--274). A figurative
+description of the process is given in _Timaeus_, 50 D. _In eo quod
+efficeret ... materiam quandam_: Cic. is hampered by the _patrii sermonis
+egestas_, which compels him to render simple Greek terms by laboured
+periphrases. _Id quod efficit_ is not distinct from, but _equivalent_ to
+_vis_, _id quod efficitur_ to _materia_. _Materiam quandam_: it is
+extraordinary how edd. (esp Goer.) could have so stumbled over _quandam_
+and _quasi_ used in this fashion. Both words (which are joined below)
+simply mark the unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its philosophical use,
+in the Greek ‛υλη the strangeness had had time to wear off. _In utroque_:
+for _in eo quod ex utroque_ (sc. _vi et materia_) _fit_, the meaning is
+clearly given by the next clause, viz. that Force and Matter cannot
+actually exist apart, but only in the compound of the two, the formed
+entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the reff. given above.
+_Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur_: the meaning of this is
+clear, that nothing can _exist_ except in space _(alicubi)_, it is more
+difficult to see why it should be introduced here. Unless _est_ be taken of
+merely phenomenal existence (the only existence the Stoics and Antiochus
+would allow), the sentence does not represent the belief of Aristotle and
+Plato. The ιδεαι for instance, though to Plato in the highest sense
+existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle explicitly says this, _Phys._
+III. 4). Aristotle also recognised much as existent which did not exist in
+space, as in _Phys._ IV. 5 (qu. R. and P. 289). Cic. perhaps translates
+here from _Tim._ 52 B, φαμεν αναγκαιον ειναι που το ‛ον ‛απαν εν τινι τοπω.
+For ancient theories about space the student must be referred to the
+histories of philosophy. A fair summary is given by Stob. _Phys._ περι
+κενου και τοπου και χωρας, ch. XVIII. 1. _Corpus et quasi qualitatem_: note
+that _corpus_ is _formed_, as contrasted with _materia_, _unformed_ matter.
+_Qualitas_ is here wrongly used for _quale_; it ought to be used of Force
+only, not of the product of Force and Matter, cf. 28. The Greeks themselves
+sometimes confuse ποιοτης and ποιον, the confusion is aided by the
+ambiguity of the phrase το ποιον in Greek, which may either denote the τοδε
+τι as ποιον, or the Force which makes it ποιον, hence Arist. calls one of
+his categories το ποιον and ποιοτης indifferently For the Stoic view of
+ποιοτης, see Zeller, 96--103, with footnotes.
+
+§25. _Bene facis_: _passim_ in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. _D.F._
+III. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly like this. _Rhetoricam_:
+Hülsemann conj. _ethicam_, which however is _not_ Latin. The words have no
+philosophical significance here, but are simply specimens of words once
+foreign, now naturalised. _D.F._ III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words make
+it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first declension
+nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in _en_. _Non est vulgi
+verbum_: it first appears in _Theaet._ 182 A, where it is called αλλοκοτον
+ονομα. _Nova ... facienda_: = _imponenda_ in _D.F._ III. 5. _Suis utuntur_:
+so _D.F._ III. 4. _Transferenda_: _transferre_ = μεταφερειν, which is
+technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on metaphor, _De Or._ III.
+153 sq., where _necessitas_ is assigned as one cause of it (159) just as
+here; cf. also _De Or._ III. 149. _Saecula_: the spelling _secula_ is
+wrong; Corss. I. 325, 377. The diphthong bars the old derivations from
+_secare_, and _sequi_. _Quanto id magis_: Cic. is exceedingly fond of
+separating _tam quam ita tantus quantus_, etc., from the words with which
+they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g. _Lael._ 53
+_quam id recte_, _Acad._ II. 125 _tam sit mirabilis_, II. 68 _tam in
+praecipitem_; also _D.F._ III. 5 _quanto id nobis magis est concedendum qui
+ea nunc primum audemus attingere_.
+
+§26. _Non modo rerum sed verborum_: cf. 9. _Igitur_ picks up the broken
+thread of the exposition; so 35, and frequently. _Principes ... ex his
+ortae_: the Greek terms are ‛απλα and συνθετα, see Arist. _De Coelo_, I. 2
+(R. and P. 294). The distinction puzzled Plutarch (quoted in R. and P.
+382). It was both Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics (Zeller, 187 sq.)
+followed partly Heraclitus, and cast aside many refinements of Aristotle
+which will be found in R. and P. 297. _Quasi multiformes_: evidently a
+trans. of πολυειδεις, which is opposed to ‛απλους in Plat. _Phaedr._ 238 A,
+and often. Plato uses also μονοειδης for _unius modi_; cf. Cic. _Tim._ ch.
+VII., a transl. of Plat. _Tim._ 35 A. _Prima sunt_: _primae_ (sc.
+_qualitates_) is the needless em. of Walker, followed by Halm. _Formae_ =
+_genera_, ειδη. The word is applied to the four elements themselves, _N.D._
+I. 19; cf. also _quintum genus_ below, and _Topica_, 11--13. A good view of
+the history of the doctrine of the four elements may be gained from the
+section of Stob. _Phys._, entitled περι αρχων και στοιχειων και του παντος.
+It will be there seen that Cic. is wrong in making _initia_ and _elementa_
+here and in 39 (αρχαι and στοιχεια) convertible terms. The Greeks would
+call the four elements στοιχεια but _not_ αρχαι, which term would be
+reserved for the primary Matter and Force. _Aër et ignis_: this is Stoic
+but _not_ Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary
+properties of matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two
+former as active, the two latter as passive. He then assigns _two_ of these
+properties, _one_ active and _one_ passive, to each of the four elements;
+each therefore is to him _both_ active and passive. The Stoics assign only
+_one_ property to each element; heat to fire, cold to air (cf. _N.D._ II.
+26), moisture to water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows
+at once. Cf. Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq.
+_Accipiendi ... patiendi_: δεχεσθαι often comes in Plat. _Tim._ _Quintum
+genus_: the note on this, referred to in Introd. p. 16, is postponed to 39.
+_Dissimile ... quoddam_: so MSS.; one would expect _quiddam_, which Orelli
+gives. _Rebatur_: an old poetical word revived by Cic. _De Or._ III. 153;
+cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ VIII. 3, 26.
+
+§27. _Subiectam ... materiam_: the ‛υποκειμενη ‛υλη of Aristotle, from
+which our word subject-matter is descended. _Sine ulla specie_: _species_
+here = _forma_ above, the ειδος or μορφη of Arist. _Omnibus_ without
+_rebus_ is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes avoided by the immediate
+succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in 21 in _quibusdam_, _quae_.
+_Expressa_: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf. _expressa effigies_ _De Off_.
+III. 69); _efficta_, moulded as by a potter (see II. 77); the word was
+given by Turnebus for MSS. _effecta_. So Matter is called an εκμαγειον in
+Plat. _Tim._ _Quae tota omnia_: these words have given rise to needless
+doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them. _Tota_ is feminine sing.; cf.
+_materiam totam ipsam_ in 28; "which matter throughout its whole extent can
+suffer all changes." For the word _omnia_ cf. II. 118, and Plat. _Tim._ 50
+B (δεχεται γαρ ηι τα παντα), 51 A (ειδος πανδεχες). The word πανδεχες is
+also quoted from Okellus in Stob. I. 20, 3. Binder is certainly wrong in
+taking _tota_ and _omnia_ both as neut.--"_alles und jedes_." Cic. knew the
+_Tim._ well and imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments
+on the passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between
+Plato's ‛υλη and that of Aristotle. _Eoque interire_: so MSS.; Halm after
+Dav. _eaque_. Faber was right in supposing that Cic. has said loosely of
+the _materia_ what he ought to have said of the _qualia_. Of course the
+προτε ‛υλη, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, is imperishable (cf. _Tim._
+52 A. φθοραν ου προσδεχομενον). _Non in nihilum_: this is aimed at the
+Atomists, who maintained that infinite subdivision logically led to the
+passing of things into nothing and their reparation out of nothing again.
+See Lucr. I. 215--264, and elsewhere. _Infinite secari_: through the
+authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the infinite subdivisibility of
+matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox one that the Atom was scouted
+as a silly absurdity. Cf. _D.F._ I. 20 _ne illud quidem physici credere
+esse minimum_, Arist. _Physica_, I. 1 ουκ εστιν ελαχιστον μεγεθος. The
+history of ancient opinion on this subject is important, but does not lie
+close enough to our author for comment. The student should at least learn
+Plato's opinions from _Tim._ 35 A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates,
+tripping over the old αντιφασις of the One and the Many, denied παν μεγεθος
+διαιρετον ειναι και μερος εχειν (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus followed
+Aristotle very closely (R. and P. 377, 378). _Intervallis moveri_: this is
+the theory of motion without void which Lucr. I. 370 sq. disproves, where
+see Munro. Cf. also Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 214. Aristotle denied the
+existence of void either within or without the universe, Strato allowed its
+possibility within, while denying its existence without (Stob. I. 18, 1),
+the Stoics did the exact opposite affirming its existence without, and
+denying it within the universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). _Quae
+intervalla ... possint_: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is
+no matter atom. As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed
+Aristotle, whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and
+especially from M. Saint Hilaire's explanation of the _Physica_.
+
+§28. _Ultro citroque_: this is the common reading, but I doubt its
+correctness. MSS. have _ultro introque_, whence _ed. Rom._ (1471) has
+_ultro in utroque_. I think that _in utroque_, simply, was the reading, and
+that _ultro_ is a dittographia from _utro_. The meaning would be "since
+force plays this part in the compound," _utroque_ being as in 24 for _eo
+quod ex utroque fit_. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this
+motion and is ever thus on the move." _Ultro citroque_ is an odd expression
+to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with a _quasi_.
+Indeed if it is kept I suggest _quasi_ for _cum sic_. The use of _versetur_
+is also strange. _E quibus in omni natura_: most edd. since Dav. (Halm
+included) eject _in_. It is perfectly sound if _natura_ be taken as ουσια =
+existence substance. The meaning is "out of which _qualia_, themselves
+existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf. _totam
+commutari_ above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was formed."
+For the _in_ cf. _N.D._ II. 35, _in omni natura necesse est absolvi
+aliquid_, also a similar use _ib._ II. 80, and _Ac._ II. 42. If _in
+utroque_ be read above, _in omni natura_ will form an exact contrast,
+substance as a whole being opposed to the individual _quale_. _Cohaerente
+et continuata_: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than any
+other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in _N.D._ II.
+19, 84, 119, _De Div._ II. 33, _De Leg._ fragm. 1. (at the end of Bait. and
+Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if they be got at
+second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. I. 22, 3. The _partes
+mundi_ are spoken of in most of the passages just quoted, also in _N.D._
+II. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic sources. _Effectum
+esse mundum_: Halm adds _unum_ from his favourite MS. (G). _Natura
+sentiente_: a clumsy trans. of αισθητη ουσια = substance which can affect
+the senses. The same expression is in _N.D._ II. 75. It should not be
+forgotten, however, that to the Stoics the universe was itself sentient,
+cf. _N.D._ II. 22, 47, 87. _Teneantur_: for _contineantur_; cf. _N.D._ II.
+29 with II. 31 _In qua ratio perfecta insit_: this is thorough going
+Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are interchangeable terms with the
+Stoics. See Zeller 145--150 By an inevitable inconsistency, while believing
+that Reason _is_ the Universe, they sometimes speak of it as being _in_ the
+Universe, as here (cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 138, _N.D._ II. 34) In a curious
+passage (_N.D._ I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same inconsistency.
+For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life, extends through
+all extent". _Sempiterna_: Aristotle held this: see II. 119 and _N.D._ II.
+118, Stob. I. 21, 6. The Stoics while believing that our world would be
+destroyed by fire (Diog. Laert. VII. 141, R. and P. 378, Stob. I. 20, 1)
+regarded the destruction as merely an absorption into the Universal World
+God, who will recreate the world out of himself, since he is beyond the
+reach of harm (Diog. Laert. VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller 159) Some
+Stoics however denied the εκπυρωσις. _Nihil enim valentius_: this is an
+argument often urged, as in _N.D._ II. 31 (_quid potest esse mundo
+valentius?_), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. _A quo intereat_: _interire_
+here replaces the passive of _perdere_ cf. αναστηναι, εκπιπτειν ‛υπο τινος.
+
+§29. _Quam vim animum_: there is no need to read _animam_, as some edd. do.
+The Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the
+names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance,
+Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. VI. _passim_.
+Nearly all these names occur in _N.D._ II. The whole of this section is
+undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it
+all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics.
+_Sapientiam_: cf. _N.D._ II. 36 with III. 23, in which latter passage the
+Stoic opinion is severely criticised. _Deum_: Cic. in _N.D._ I. 30 remarks
+that Plato in his _Timaeus_ had already made the _mundus_ a God. _Quasi
+prudentium quandam_: the Greek προνοια is translated both by _prudentia_
+and _providentia_ in the same passage, _N.D._ II. 58, also in _N.D._ II.
+77--80. _Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad homines_: the World God is
+perfectly beneficent, see _Ac._ II. 120, _N.D._ I. 23, II. 160 (where there
+is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq. _Necessitatem_: αναγκην,
+which is ειρμος αιτιων, _causarum series sempiterna_ (_De Fato_ 20, cf.
+_N.D._ I. 55, _De Div._ I. 125, 127, Diog. VII. 149, and Zeller as before).
+This is merely the World God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence
+of cause upon cause. When the World God is called Fortune, all that is
+expressed is human inability to see this orderly sequence. Τυχη therefore
+is defined as αιτια αδηλος ανθρωπινωι λογισμωι (Stob. I. 7, 9, where the
+same definition is ascribed to Anaxagoras--see also _Topica_, 58--66). This
+identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and excites
+his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward by
+Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob. I. 5, 15. _Nihil aliter possit_: on
+_posse_ for _posse fieri_ see _M.D.F._ IV. 48, also _Ac._ II. 121. For the
+sense of Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), ουδε τι
+γιγνεται εργον επι χθονι σου διχα δαιμον. _Inter quasi fatalem_: a trans.
+of the Gk. κατηναγκασμενον. I see no reason for suspecting _inter_, as Halm
+does. _Ignorationemque causarum_: the same words in _De Div._ II. 49; cf.
+also August. _Contra Academicos_ I. 1. In addition to studying the reff.
+given above, the student might with advantage read Aristotle's _Physica_
+II. ch. 4--6, with M. Saint Hilaire's explanation, for the views of
+Aristotle about τυχη and το αυτοματον, also ch. 8--9 for αναγκη. Plato's
+doctrine of αναγκη, which is diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics,
+is to be found in _Timaeus_ p. 47, 48, Grote's _Plato_, III. 249--59.
+
+    §§30--32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.
+    Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the
+    senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of truth, but the
+    mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The
+    senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of
+    such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense,
+    or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained
+    constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous
+    flux. Knowledge based _only_ on sense was therefore mere opinion (31).
+    Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they
+    _defined_ everything about which they argued, and also used verbal
+    explanations, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes
+    consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric
+    (32).
+
+§30. _Quae erat_: the Platonic ην, = was, as we said. _In ratione et
+disserendo_: an instance of Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. _D.F._ I.
+22 _quaerendi ac disserendi_. _Quamquam oriretur_: the sentence is inexact,
+it is _knowledge_ which takes its rise in the senses, not the criterion of
+truth, which is the mind itself; cf. however II. 30 and n. _Iudicium_: the
+constant translation of κριτηριον, a word foreign to the older philosophy.
+_Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem_: Halm with his pet MS. writes _esse
+rerum_, thus giving an almost perfect iambic, strongly stopped off before
+and after, so that there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I
+venture to say that no real parallel can be found to this in Cic., it
+stands in glaring contradiction to his own rules about admitting metre in
+prose, _Orator_ 194 sq., _De Or._ III. 182 sq. _Solam censebant ... tale
+quale esset_: probably from Plato's _Tim._ 35 A thus translated by Cic.,
+_Tim._ c. 7 _ex ea materia quae individua est et unius modi_ (αει κατα
+ταυτα εχουσης cf. 28 A. το κατα ταυτα εχον) _et sui simile_, cf. also
+_T.D._ I. 58 _id solum esse quod semper tale sit quale sit, quam_ ιδεαν
+_appellat ille, nos speciem_, and _Ac._ II. 129. _Illi_ ιδεαν, etc.: there
+is more than one difficulty here. The words _iam a Platone ita nom_ seem to
+exclude Plato from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may
+be an oversight, but to say first that the school (_illi_, cf. _sic
+tractabatur ab utrisque_) which included Aristotle held the doctrine of
+ιδεαι, and next, in 33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears
+very absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's
+ιδεαι and Aristotle's τα καθαλου would naturally seem microscopic to
+Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in his time as those of
+Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid at Cicero's door, for
+Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with Plato's must have been
+driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very knowledge of Plato has, however,
+probably led him to intensify what inconsistency there was in Antiochus,
+who would have glided over Plato's opinions with a much more cautious step.
+
+§31. _Sensus omnis hebetes_: this stands in contradiction to the whole
+Antiochean view as given in II. 12--64, cf. esp. 19 _sensibus quorum ita
+clara et certa iudicia sunt_, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his
+agreement with Plato by asserting that though sense is naturally dull,
+reason may sift out the certain from the uncertain. _Res eas ... quae
+essent aut ita_: Halm by following his pet MS. without regard to the
+meaning of Cic. has greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He
+reads _res ullas ... quod aut ita essent_; thus making Antiochus assert
+that _no_ true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall
+see in the _Lucullus_, he really divided sensations into true and false. I
+believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's
+reminiscences of the _Theaetetus_ and of Xenocrates; see below. _Nec
+percipere_: for this see _Lucullus_ passim. Christ's conj. _percipi, quod
+perceptio sit mentis non sensuum_, which Halm seems to approve, is a wanton
+corruption of the text, cf. II. 101 _neget rem ullam percipi posse
+sensibus_, so 21, 119 (just like _ratione percipi_ 91), also I. 41 _sensu
+comprehensum_. _Subiectae sensibus_: cf. II. 74 and Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._
+VIII. 9, τα ‛υποπιπτοντα τη αισθησει. _Aut ita mobiles_, etc.: this
+strongly reminds one of the _Theaetetus_, esp. 160 D sq. For _constans_ cf.
+εστηκος, which so often occurs there and in the _Sophistes_. _Ne idem_:
+Manut. for MSS. _eidem_. In the _Theaetetus_, Heraclitus' theory of flux is
+carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even
+the word εμε is stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent
+subject, whereas the subject is changing from moment to moment; the
+expression therefore ought to be τους εμε. _Continenter_: ουνεχως; cf.
+Simplicius quoted in Grote's Plato, I. p. 37, about Heraclitus, εν μεταβολη
+γαρ συνεχει τα οντα. _Laberentur et fluerent_: cf. the phrases ‛ροη, παντα
+‛ρει, ‛οιον ‛ρευματα κινεισθαι τα παντα, etc., which are scattered thickly
+over the _Theaet._ and the ancient texts about Heraclitus; also a very
+similar passage in _Orator_ 10. _Opinabilem_: δοξαστην, so _opinabile_ =
+δοξαστον in Cic. _Tim_ ch. II. The term was largely used by Xenocrates (R.
+and P. 243--247), Arist. too distinguishes between the δοξαστον and the
+επιστητον, e.g _Analyt. Post._ I. 33 (qu. R. and P. 264).
+
+§32. For this cf. _D.F._ IV. 8--10. _Notionibus_: so one MS. for
+_motionibus_ which the rest have. _Notio_ is Cicero's regular translation
+for εννοια, which is Stoic. This statement might have been made both by
+Aristotle and Plato, though each would put a separate meaning on the word
+_notio_. Επιστημη in Plato is of the ιδεαι only, while in Aristotle it is
+τον καθολου; cf. _Anal. Post._ I. 33 (R. and P. 264), λεγω νουν αρχην
+επιστημης. _Definitiones rerum_: these must be carefully distinguished fiom
+_definitiones nominum_, see the distinction drawn after Aristotle in R. and
+P. 265, note b. The _definitio rei_ really involves the whole of philosophy
+with Plato and Aristotle (one might almost add, with moderns too). Its
+importance to Plato may be seen from the _Politicus_ and _Sophistes_, to
+Aristotle from the passages quoted in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes
+will make the subject as clear as it can be made to any one who has not a
+knowledge of the whole of Aristotle's philosophy. _Verborum explicatio_:
+this is quite a different thing from those _definitiones nominum_ just
+referred to; it is _derivation_, which does not necessitate definition.
+ετυμολογιαν: this is almost entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the
+Classic Greek Prose, as are ετυμος and all its derivatives. (Ετυμως means
+"etymologically" in the _De Mundo_, which however is not Aristotle's). The
+word ετυμολογια is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather
+ονοματων ορθοτης (Diog. Laert. VII. 83), the title of their books on the
+subject preserved by Diog. is generally "περι των ετυμολογικων" The
+systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when it
+became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had given
+the first impulse (_N.D._ III. 63). Specimens of Stoic etymology are given
+in _N.D._ II. and ridiculed in _N.D._ III. (cf. esp. 62 _in enodandis
+nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis_). _Post argumentis et quasi rerum
+notis ducibus_: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove
+something about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in
+_Topica_ 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation
+_veriloquium_ of ετυμολογια and adopts _notatio_, the _rerum nota_ (Greek
+συμβολον) being the name so explained (_Top._ 35). Varro translated
+ετυμολογια by _originatio_ (Quintil. I. 6, 28). Aristotle had already laid
+down rules for this rhetorical use of etymology, and Plato also
+incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be said to belong to the old
+Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer examination of authorities would
+have led Halm to retract his bad em. _notationibus_ for _notas ducibus_,
+the word _notatio_ is used for the whole science of etymology, and not for
+particular derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g. _D.F._ V. 74)
+describes _verba_ or _nomina_ as _rerum notae_. Berkley's _nodis_ for
+_notis_ has no support, (_enodatio nominum_ in _N.D._ III. 62 is quite
+different). One more remark, and I conclude this wearisome note. The
+_quasi_ marks _rerum nota_ as an unfamiliar trans. of συμβολον. Davies
+therefore ought not to have placed it before _ducibus_, which word, strong
+as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance in
+_T.D._ I. 27. _Itaque tradebatur_: so Halm improves on Madvig's _ita_ for
+_in qua_ of the MSS., which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to 30
+_pars_ for an antecedent to _qua_ (_in ea parte in qua_) is violent, while
+Goerenz's resort to _partem rerum opinabilem_ is simply silly. Manut. conj.
+_in quo_, Cic. does often use the neut. pronoun, as in _Orator_ 3, but not
+quite thus. I have sometimes thought that Cic. wrote _haec, inquam_ (cf.
+_huic_ below). _Dialecticae_: as λογικη had not been Latinised, Cic. is
+obliged to use this word to denote λογικη, of which διαλεκτικη is really
+one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, ‛ρητορικη which is mentioned
+in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, 70. _Orationis ratione
+conclusae_: speech drawn up in a syllogistic form which becomes _oratio
+perpetua_ under the influence of ‛ρητορικη. _Quasi ex altera parte_: a
+trans. of Aristotle's αντιστροφος in the beginning of the _Rhetoric_.
+_Oratoria_: Halm brackets this word; cf. however a close parallel in
+_Brut._ 261 _oratorio ornamenta dicendi_. The construction is simply a
+variation of Cic.'s favourite double genitive (_T.D._ III. 39), _oratoria_
+being put for _oratoris_. _Ad persuadendum_: το πιθανον is with Arist. and
+all ancient authorities the one aim of ‛ρητορικη.
+
+    §§33--42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old
+    Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the ιδεαι of
+    Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato abandoned
+    ethics for physics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor
+    faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils
+    of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing but
+    virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name _good_ to
+    nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes, some
+    were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and some
+    were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value, and
+    called them _preferred_ to the second a negative value and called them
+    _rejected_, to the third no value whatever--mere verbal alterations on
+    the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms _right action_ and _sin_
+    belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate
+    action (_officium_) and an inappropriate, which concerned things
+    _preferred_ and things _rejected_ (37). He made _all_ virtue reside in
+    the reason, and considered not the _practice_ but the mere _possession_
+    of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not
+    but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and
+    immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and
+    believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow
+    the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed
+    sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding
+    judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40).
+    Sensations (_visa_) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the
+    examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a
+    sensation he called it _Knowledge_, if otherwise, _Ignorance_ (41).
+    _Perception_, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor
+    wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving
+    assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them
+    of the reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect
+    wisdom (42).
+
+§33. _Haec erat illis forma_: so Madv. _Em._ 118 for MSS. _prima_,
+comparing _formulam_ in 17, also _D.F._ IV. 19, V. 9, _T.D._ III. 38, to
+which add _Ac._ I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the
+MSS. reading and supply _pars_, as usual. His power of _supplying_ is
+unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the difficulties involved
+in the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here. _Immutationes_: so Dav. for
+_disputationes_, approved by Madv. _Em._ 119 who remarks that the phrase
+_disputationes philosophiae_ would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost
+certain by _mutavit_ in 40, _commutatio_ in 42, and _De Leg._ I. 38. Halm's
+odd em. _dissupationes_, so much admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's
+_Philologus_, needs support, which it certainly does not receive from the
+one passage Halm quotes, _De Or._ III. 207. _Et recte_: for the _et_ cf.
+_et merito_, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. _Auctoritas_:
+"system". _Inquit_: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the
+omission of _igitur_ after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin
+here. To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno
+opere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer.
+feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is
+copying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and
+evidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's
+resumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought
+to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded.
+_Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the
+supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact
+that he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the
+strong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi
+nisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of
+the relation in which Plato's ιδεαι stand to his notion of the deity.
+_Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His real
+name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf. _loquendi
+nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf. _Orat._
+161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V. 12 sq.,
+_T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed very
+widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him
+transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of
+him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in
+22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of
+ευδαιμονιαν. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_ but does
+not elsewhere employ them.
+
+§34. _Strato_: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for
+Diog. V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven ethical works, while
+Stob. II. 6, 4 quotes his definition of the αγαθον. _Diligenter ...
+tuebantur_: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic, cf.
+Diog. Laert. IV. 18, _Ac._ II. 131, _D.F._ II. 34, and R. and P.
+_Congregati_: "_all_ in the Academic fold," cf. _Lael._ 69, _in nostro, ut
+ita dicam, grege_. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. _Polemonem ...
+Zeno et Arcesilas_: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many
+teachers (Diog. VII. 2, 3), while he is not mentioned by Diog. at all among
+the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is that we have a mere theory, which
+accounts for the split of Stoicism from Academicism by the rivalry of two
+fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 5, συμφοιτωντες
+παρα Πολεμωνι εφιλο τιμηθησαν. Dates are against the theory, see Zeller
+500.
+
+§35. _Anteiret aetate_: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350,
+though the dates are uncertain. _Dissereret_: was a deep reasoner. Bentl.
+missing the meaning conj. _definiret_. _Peracute moveretur_: Bentl.
+_partiretur_; this with _definiret_ above well illustrates his licence in
+emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted the soundness of the text, the
+words refer not to the emotional, but to the intellectual side of Zeno's
+nature. The very expression occurs _Ad Fam._ XV. 21, 4, see other close
+parallels in n. on II. 37. _Nervos ... inciderit_: same metaphor in
+_Philipp._ XII. 8, cf. also _T.D._ II. 27 _nervos virtutis elidere_, III.
+83 _stirpis aegritudinis elidere_. (In both these passages Madv. _Em. Liv._
+135 reads _elegere_ for _elidere_, I cannot believe that he is right).
+Plato uses νευρα εκτεμνειν metaphorically. Notice _inciderit_ but
+_poneret_. There is no need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the
+sequence is not uncommon in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ III. 33. _Omnia, quae_: MSS.
+_quaeque_, which edd. used to take for _quaecunque_. Cf. Goerenz's
+statement "_negari omnino nequit hac vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri_"
+with Madvig's utter refutation in the sixth Excursus to his _D.F._ _Solum
+et unum bonum_: for the Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R.
+and P. and Zeller for himself. I can only treat such points as are involved
+in the special difficulties of the _Academica_.
+
+§36. _Cetera_: Stoic αδιαφορα, the presence or absence of which cannot
+affect happiness. The Stoics loudly protested against their being called
+either _bona_ or _mala_, and this question was one of the great battle
+grounds of the later Greek philosophy. _Secundum naturam ... contraria_:
+Gr. κατα φυσιν, παρα φυσιν. _His ipsis ... numerabat_: I see no reason for
+placing this sentence after the words _quae minoris_ below (with Christ) or
+for suspecting its genuineness (with Halm). The word _media_ is the Gk.
+μεσα, which word however is not usually applied to _things_, but to
+_actions_. _Sumenda_: Gk. ληπτα. _Aestimatione_: αξια, positive value.
+_Contraque contraria_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ III. 50 feels the need of a
+word to express απαξια (negative value). (Madv. in his note on that passage
+coins the word _inaestimatio._) _Ponebat esse_: cf. 19, _M.D.F._ V. 73.
+
+§37. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section
+the student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller
+and Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it
+would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general
+acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic.
+appears at first sight to have made the αποπροηγμενα a subdivision of the
+ληπτα (_sumenda_), the two being utterly different. I admit, with Madv.
+(_D.F._ III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the text to be
+corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads _media_ in the
+place of _sumenda_, must be rejected. Nor can anything be said for
+Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save Cicero's
+consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could so utterly
+misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of Stoicism, as
+to think even for a moment that the αποπροηγμενα formed a branch of the
+ληπτα. This view of Madvig's is strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in
+36 had explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the αδιαφορα,
+nor is there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the
+theory any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with
+the intention to speak of the _sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his
+thought so as to embrace the whole class of αδιαφορα, which he accordingly
+dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding
+sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the
+present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but
+with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae
+secundum locum obtinent_, προηγμενα _id est producta nominentur, quae vel
+ita appellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely
+pressed, the αποπροηγμενα are made of a subdivision of the προηγμενα,
+though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention. So
+if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are made to include
+both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16 _appeterent_ includes
+_fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata vita_ is abruptly
+introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be construed together, and
+_ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said _coerceri_, the writer's
+thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are opposite to these
+virtues.
+
+I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_
+Cic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to
+talk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and
+_minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the αξια and απαξια of the Greek,
+_not_ different degrees of αξια (positive value). That _minor aestimatio_
+should mean απαξια need not surprise us when we reflect (1) on the
+excessive difficulty there was in expressing this απαξια or negative value
+in Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on 36; (2) on the strong
+negative meaning which _minor_ bears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic.
+means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing
+απαξια. Stobaeus, in a passage closely resembling ours makes ελαττων αξια
+equivalent to πολλη απαξια (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly
+defining αποπροηγμενα as τα ‛ικανην απαξιαν εχοντα (_Adv. Math._ XI.
+62--64) again speaks of them as τα μη ‛ικανην εχοντα αξιαν (_Pyrrhon.
+Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning. Now I
+contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong a
+negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, τα μη ‛ικανην αξιαν εχοντα. I
+therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language
+allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the αδιαφορα, some have
+αξια while others have απαξια. He may fairly claim to have applied to his
+words the rule "_re intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus_"
+(_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and
+Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero.
+There are difficulties connected with the terms ‛ικανη αξια and ‛ικανη
+απαξια which are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of
+information; I regret that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation
+of them. The student will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the
+passages of the _D.F._ quoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_:
+Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the
+clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly
+belonged to the Stoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob.
+speaks II. 6, 6 of τα μεταξυ αρετης και κακιας. (This does not contradict
+his words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, αρετης δε και κακιας ουδεν μεταξυ,
+which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert.,
+however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R. and P.
+393.) _Recte factum_ = κατορθωμα, _peccatum_ = ‛αμαρτημα, _officium_ =
+καθηκον (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller 238--248, 268--272). _Servata
+praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before _servata_, which all edd. since
+Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_ correspond in Cic., the _que_ is always
+an afterthought, added in oblivion of the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives,
+adverbs, or participles, this oblivion is barely possible, but when the
+conjunctions go with separate _clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._
+V. 64.
+
+§38. _Sed quasdam virtutes_: see 20. This passage requires careful
+construing: after _quasdam virtutes_ not the whole phrase _in ratione esse
+dicerent_ must be repeated but _dicerent_ merely, since only the _virtutes
+natura perfectae_, the διανοητικαι αρεται of Arist., could be said to
+belong to the reason, while the _virtutes more perfectae_ are Aristotle's
+ηθικαι αρεται. Trans. "but spoke of certain excellences as perfected by the
+reason, or (as the case might be) by habit." _Ea genera virtutum_: both
+Plato and Arist. roughly divided the nature of man into two parts, the
+intellectual and the emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter
+to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and Arist. το μεν ‛ως λογον εχον, το δε
+επιπειθες λογωι); Zeno however asserted the nature of man to be one and
+indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, to which he gave the name
+‛ηγεμονικον (Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and
+indivisible (Zeller 248, _D.F._ III. _passim_). When the ‛ηγεμονικον was in
+a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice
+or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a
+war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war
+carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the
+description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the
+mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word ‛εξις, a use
+which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the
+_Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a ‛εξις, according to the
+Stoics, but a διαθεσις (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog. VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes
+speaks of virtue loosely as a ‛εξις, VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with
+footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6
+δυο γενη των ανθρωπων ειναι το μεν των σπουδαιων, το δε των φαυλων, και το
+μεν των σπουδαιων δια παντος του βιου χρησθαι ταις αρεταις, το δε των
+φαυλων ταις κακιαις. _Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the
+fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which
+Halm's text of the _Acad._ appears, should read the plural
+_perturbationes_, a conj. of Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the
+abstract; _perturbationes_ below, particular emotions. There is exactly the
+same transition in _T.D._ III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while
+_perturbatio_ is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other
+passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a
+trans. of Stoic παθεσι, which Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit
+carere sapientem_: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the
+reason, and perfect reason being virtue (20), it follows that the Stoic
+sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All emotions are reasonless;
+‛ηδονη or _laetitia_ for instance is αλογος επαρσις. (_T.D._ Books III. and
+IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the
+_T.D._ III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri
+libidine_.
+
+§39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De
+Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the
+Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of
+the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general
+Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion
+arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object;
+cf. Diog. VII. 111. τα παθη κρισεις ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller 233.
+For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15, 18.
+_Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. ακολασια, see Zeller 232.
+_Quintam naturam_: the πεμπτη ουσια or πεμπτον σωμα of Aristotle, who
+proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a curious and recondite
+fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. derived _mind_ from
+this fifth element, though the finest and highest of material substances.
+He always guards himself from assigning a material origin to mind. Cic.
+repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65, _D.F._ IV. 12. On this last
+passage Madv. has an important note, but he fails to recognise the
+essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics
+of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind from αιθηρ, which is the
+very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (σωμα αιθεριον in the
+_De Coelo_), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error
+once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred influences at
+work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange
+oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but
+will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully
+influencing every other sect, and it placed νους εν αιθερι (see Plutarch,
+qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The
+notion that νους or ψυχη came from αιθηρ was also fostered by the language
+of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as αεικινητος in passages which were
+well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his mind One from the
+_Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in _Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._
+VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only thing with Aristotle which is
+αεικινητος in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular
+motion is alone perfect and eternal), is the αιθηρ or πεμπτον σωμα, that
+fiery external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and
+with which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's
+works, to conclude that the αεικινητος ψυχη of Plato came from the
+αεικινητος αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by saying that
+the soul as an αρχη κινησεως must be ακινητος, but Cic. had no means of
+knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls
+at death flying away to the outer circle of the universe, as though to
+their natural home, just where Arist. placed his πεμπτον σωμα Any one who
+will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power
+this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the mind in its
+origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf.
+_Somn. Scip._ 15) These considerations will be enough to show that neither
+Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible for the error, could
+have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by the recovery of
+Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we
+seem here to have a remnant of the distinction drawn by Arist. between
+animal heat and other heat, the former being αναλογον τω των αστρων
+στοιχειω (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made
+no difference, except one of degree, between αιθηρ and πυρ, see Zeller 189,
+190. _Ipsam naturam_: πυρ is κατ' εξοχην στοιχειον (Stob. I. 10, 16), and
+is the first thing generated from the αποιος ‛υλη; from it comes air, from
+air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136, 137) The fire is
+λογικον, from it comes the ‛ηγεμονικον of man, which comprises within it
+all powers of sensation and thought. These notions came from Heraclitus who
+was a great hero of the Stoics (Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view
+of sensation and thought see Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R.
+and P. 21. The Stoics probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P.
+"Heraclitus," and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34 sq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic
+materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a connection between
+the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed from old physical
+principles such as that of Democritus (ου γαρ εγχωρειν τα ‛ετερα και
+διαφεροντα πασχειν ‛υπ' αλληλων, qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7,
+by R. and P. 43), the same is affirmed loosely of all the old φυσικοι,
+(Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines γαιαι μεν
+γαιαν οπωπαμεν, etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though
+in a different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of
+thought. _Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed
+old Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no
+ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see
+Zeller, pp. 134, 135.
+
+§40. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion
+that _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely
+agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an
+anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu
+animorum_, but having to explain φαντασια was obliged to break off and
+resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a very
+similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis
+Ciceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44
+_e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav.
+_punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say.
+Φαντασιαν: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given
+by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus licet_: the same turn
+of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc verbum quidem hoc quidem_
+probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_ = συγκαταθεσιν. _In nobis
+positam_: the usual expression for freedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De
+Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is
+involuntary (ακουσιον Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 397). _Tironum causa_ I
+note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the mind as
+_involuntary,_ while the καταληπτικη φαντασια _compels_ assent (see II.
+38). This is, however, only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may
+refuse assent.
+
+§41. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all
+sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to
+the inner citadel of the καταληπτικη φαντασια. _Declarationem_: εναργειαν,
+a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on II. 17. _Earum
+rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct information of the
+_things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole truth lies in its own
+εναργεια, which requires no corroboration from without. _Comprehendibile_:
+this form has better MSS. authority than the vulg _comprehensibile_.
+Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity
+_Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes _inquam_. Why change? Atticus
+answers as in 14, 25, 33. Καταληπτον: strictly the _thing_ which emits the
+_visum_ is said to be καταληπτον, but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_,
+the sensation and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused.
+_Comprehensionem_: this word properly denotes the process of perception in
+the abstract, not the individual perception. The Greeks, however,
+themselves use καταληψις for καταληπτικη φαντασια very often. _Quae manu
+prehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often
+made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely
+renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the
+term αισθησις to the φαντασια. _Scientiam_: the word επιστημη is used in
+two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or
+systematised perceptions (καταληψεις or καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι) sometimes
+also called τεχνη (cf. Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην δε ειναι συστημα
+εκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμνασμενων); (2) to denote a single perception, which
+use is copied by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller
+80. _Ut convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To
+Zeno all καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι were ασφαλεις, αμεταπτωτοι ‛υπο λογου.
+Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to
+logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every
+καταληπτικη φαντασια, instead of carrying with it its own evidence, had to
+pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it could be believed.
+This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable
+in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret_: I know nothing like
+this in the Stoic texts; αμαθια is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_:
+δοξα, see Zeller and cf. _Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.
+
+§42. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of επιστημην
+και δοξαν και την εν μεθοπιαι τουτων καταληψιν. _Soli_: Halm, I know not
+why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod omnia_: the
+meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate sensations and
+combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_. This will
+appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78 seems to
+take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this
+in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of some Gk.
+word, κριτηριον perhaps, or γνωμων or κανων. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic
+εννοιαι; Zeller 81--84, R. and P. 367, 368. _Quodque natura_: the omission
+of _eam_ is strange; Faber supplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms
+εναπεσφραγισμενη, εναπομεμαγμενη, εντετυπωμενη occur constantly, but
+generally in relation to φαντασιαι, not to εννοιαι. _Non principia solum_:
+there seems to be a ref. to those αρχαι της αποδειξεως of Arist. which,
+induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all proof.
+(See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in Bain's
+_Mental and Moral Science_, now re-published in Grote's _Aristotle._)
+Zeno's εννοιαι were all this and more. _Reperiuntur_: two things vex the
+edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_ to _recta_, which however has
+repeatedly taken place during Varro's exposition, and for which see
+_M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase _reperire viam_, which seems to me
+sound enough. Dav., Halm give _aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant.
+_Aliena_: cf. _alienatos_ _D.F._ III. 18. _A virtute sapientiaque
+removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur in iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The
+_firma adsensia_ is opposed to _imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the
+_sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More information on the subject-matter of this
+section will be found in my notes on the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In
+his constitit_: cf. II. 134.
+
+    §§43--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy.
+    Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory
+    in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the
+    ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet
+    held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of
+    equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of
+    phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely
+    (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were
+    carried on by Carneades (46).
+
+§43. _Breviter_: MSS. _et breviter;_ see 37. _Tunc_: rare before a
+consonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in
+deference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading
+defensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_.
+Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought," etc.
+The edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_.
+This is a total mistake; cf. _ait ... putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15,
+_aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from
+Cic.
+
+§44. _Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi_: for these words see n. on II.
+14. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. 76. _Obscuritate_: a
+side-blow at _declaratio_ 41. _Confessionem ignorationis_: see 16. Socrates
+was far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. 74. _Et iam
+ante Socratem_: MSS. _veluti amantes Socratem;_ Democritus (460--357 B.C.)
+was really very little older than Socrates (468--399) who died nearly sixty
+years before him. _Omnis paene veteres_: the statement is audaciously
+inexact, and is criticised II. 14. None of these were sceptics; for
+Democritus see my note on II. 73, for Empedocles on II. 74, for Anaxagoras
+on II. 72. _Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri_: the verbs are all
+equivalent; cf. _D.F._ III. 15 _equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci ...
+idem pluribus verbis exponere_. _Angustos sensus_: Cic. is thinking of the
+famous lines of Empedocles στεινοποι μεν γαρ παλαμαι κ.τ.λ. R. and P. 107.
+_Brevia curricula vitae_: cf. Empedocles' παυρον δε ζωης αβιου μερος. Is
+there an allusion in _curricula_ to Lucretius' _lampada vitai tradunt_,
+etc.? _In profundo_: Dem. εν βυθω, cf. II. 32. The common trans. "well" is
+weak, "abyss" would suit better. _Institutis_: νομω of Democritus, see R.
+and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance.
+_Deinceps omnia_: παντα εφεξης there is no need to read _denique_ for
+_deinceps_ as Bentl., Halm. _Circumfusa tenebris_: an allusion to the
+σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., see II. 73. _Dixerunt_: Halm brackets this
+because of _dixerunt_ above, parts of the verb _dicere_ are however often
+thus repeated by Cic.
+
+§45. _Ne illud quidem_: cf. 16. _Latere censebat_ Goer. omitted _censebat_
+though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as usual. For the sense II.
+122. _Cohibereque_: Gk. επεχειν, which we shall have to explain in the
+_Lucullus_. _Temeritatem ... turpius_: for these expressions, see II. 66,
+note. _Praecurrere_: as was the case with the dogmatists. _Paria momenta_:
+this is undiluted scepticism, and excludes even the possibility of the
+_probabile_ which Carneades put forward. For the doctrine cf. II. 124, for
+the expression Euseb. _Praep. Evan._ XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of
+Arcesilas, ειναι γαρ παντα ακαταληπτα και τους εις εκατερα λογους
+ισοκρατεις αλληλοις, Sextus _Adv. Math._ IX. 207 ισοσθενεις λογοι; in the
+latter writer the word ισοσθενεια very frequently occurs in the same sense,
+e g _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 8 (add _N.D._ I. 10, _rationis momenta_)
+
+§46. _Platonem_: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, Sextus
+_Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 221 τον Πλατωνα οιν ‛οι μεν δογματικον εφασαν ειναι, ‛οι
+δε απο ητικον, ‛οι δε κατα μεν τι απορητικον, κατα δε τι δογματικον.
+Stobaeus II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the difficulty; Πλατων πολυφωνος ων,
+ουχ ‛ως τινες οιονται πολυδοξος. _Exposuisti_: Durand's necessary em.,
+approved by Krische, Halm, etc. for MSS. _exposui_. _Zenone_: see Introd.
+p. 5.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.
+
+BOOK I.
+
+1. _Mnesarchus_: see II. 69, _De Or._ I. 45, and _Dict. Biogr._
+'Antipater'; cf. II. 143, _De Off._ III. 50. Evidently this fragment
+belongs to that historical justification of the New Academy with which I
+suppose Cicero to have concluded the first book.
+
+2. The word _concinere_ occurs _D.F._ IV. 60, _N.D._ I. 16, in both which
+places it is used of the Stoics, who are said _re concinere, verbis
+discrepare_ with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had
+already mentioned 43, and probably repeated in this fragment. Krische
+remarks that Augustine, _Cont. Acad._ II. 14, 15, seems to have imitated
+that part of Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic.
+must have condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order
+to excuse the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).
+
+BOOK II.
+
+3. This fragm. clearly forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments
+which Cic. in the first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius,
+see Introd. p. 55. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so level as
+the sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not level.
+
+4. On this I have nothing to remark.
+
+5. There is nothing distinctive about this which might enable us to
+determine its connection with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who
+_serius adamavit honores_.
+
+6. The changing aspects of the same thing are pointed to here as
+invalidating the evidence of the senses.
+
+7. This passage has the same aim as the last and closely resembles
+_Lucullus_ 105.
+
+8. The fact that the eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy
+the senses are. A similar argument occurs in _Luc._ 86. _Perpendiculum_ is
+a plumb line, _norma_ a mason's square, the word being probably a
+corruption of the Greek γνωμων (Curt. _Grundz_ p. 169, ed. 3), _regula_, a
+rule.
+
+9. The different colours which the same persons show in different
+conditions, when young and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober
+and when drunken, are brought forward to prove how little of permanence
+there is even in the least fleeting of the objects of sense.
+
+10. _Urinari_ is to dive; for the derivation see Curt. _Grundz_ p. 326. A
+diver would be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in _Luc._ 81,
+which are unable to see that which lies immediately above them and so
+illustrate the narrow limits of the power of vision.
+
+11. Evidently an attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy.
+Different people pass different judgments on one and the same odour. The
+student will observe that the above extracts formed part of an argument
+intended to show the deceptive character of the senses. To these should
+probably be added fragm. 32. Fr. 19 shows that the impossibility of
+distinguishing eggs one from another, which had been brought forward in the
+_Catulus_, was allowed to stand in the second edition, other difficulties
+of the kind, such as those connected with the bent oar, the pigeon's neck,
+the twins, the impressions of seals (_Luc._ 19, 54), would also appear in
+both editions. The result of these assaults on the senses must have been
+summed up in the phrase _cuncta dubitanda esse_ which Augustine quotes from
+the _Academica Posteriora_ (see fragm. 36).
+
+BOOK III.
+
+12. This forms part of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in
+substance to Lucullus' speech in the _Academica Priora_ The drift of this
+extract was most likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the
+battle against criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we
+must cease to fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own
+way. See another view in Krische, p. 62.
+
+13. Krische believes that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show
+that the senses were trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with
+which the fishes were seen leaping from the water was brought up as
+evidence. (In _Luc._ 81, on the other hand, Cic. drew an argument hostile
+to the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The explanation seems to
+me very improbable. The words bear such a striking resemblance to those in
+_Luc._ 125 (_ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic
+innumerabilis paribus in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis_) that I am
+inclined to think that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book IV. and
+not Book III., and that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the
+Lucrine lake, also changed _Puteolosque_ into _pisciculosque exultantes_
+for the sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa
+on the Lucrine.
+
+14. The passion for knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by
+Varro as an argument in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be
+attainable. The same line is taken in _Luc._ 31, _D.F._ III. 17, and
+elsewhere.
+
+15. It is so much easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than
+in that of Lucullus in the _Academica Priora_ that I think the reference in
+Nonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than a
+dogmatist (see _Luc._ 105, 120, and Cic.'s words in 8 of the same). If my
+conjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book IV. Krische gives a
+different opinion, but very hesitatingly, p. 63.
+
+16. This may well have formed part of Varro's explanation of the καταληψις,
+_temeritas_ being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and Stoics as by
+the Academics cf. I. 42.
+
+17. I conjecture _malleo_ (a hammer) for the corrupt _malcho_, and think
+that in the second ed. some comparison from building operations to
+illustrate the fixity of knowledge gained through the καταληψεις was added
+to a passage which would correspond in substance with 27 of the _Lucullus_.
+I note in Vitruvius, quoted by Forc. s.v. _malleolus_, a similar expression
+(_naves malleolis confixae_) and in Pliny _Nat. Hist._ XXXIV. 14 _navis
+fixa malleo_. _Adfixa_ therefore in this passage must have agreed with some
+lost noun either in the neut. plur. or fem. sing.
+
+18. This and fragm. 19 evidently hang very closely together. As Krische
+notes, the Stoic εναργεια had evidently been translated earlier in the book
+by _perspicuitas_ as in _Luc._ 17.
+
+19. See on _Luc._ 57.
+
+BOOK IV.
+
+Further information on all these passages will be found in my notes on the
+parallel passages of the _Lucullus_.
+
+21. _Viam_ evidently a mistake for the _umbram_ of _Luc._ 70.
+
+23. The best MS. of Nonius points to _flavum_ for _ravum_ (_Luc._ 105).
+Most likely an alteration was made in the second edition, as Krische
+supposes, p. 64.
+
+28. _Corpusculis_: _Luc._ 121 has _corporibus_. Krische's opinion that this
+latter word was in the second edition changed into the former may be
+supported from I. 6, which he does not notice. The conj. is confirmed by
+Aug. _Contr. Ac._ III. 23.
+
+29. _Magnis obscurata_: in _Luc._ 122 it is _crassis occultata_, so that we
+have another alteration, see Krische, p. 64.
+
+30. Only slight differences appear in the MSS. of the _Luc._ 123, viz.
+_contraria_, for _in c._, _ad vestigia_ for _contra v._
+
+31. _Luc._ 137 has _dixi_ for _dictus_. As Cic. does not often leave out
+_est_ with the passive verb, Nonius has probably quoted wrongly. It will be
+noted that the fragments of Book III. correspond to the first half of the
+_Luc._, those of Book IV. to the second half. Cic. therefore divided the
+_Luc._ into two portions at or about 63.
+
+UNCERTAIN BOOKS.
+
+32. I have already said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary
+assault on the senses made by Cic. in the second book.
+
+33. In the Introd. p. 55 I have given my opinion that the substance of
+Catulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the _probabile_ was
+incorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To
+that part this fragment must probably be referred.
+
+34. This important fragment clearly belongs to Book II., and is a jocular
+application of the Carneadean _probabile_, as may be seen from the words
+_probabiliter posse confici_.
+
+35. Krische assigns this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book.
+With this opinion I find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the
+_Lucullus_ (60) proves to demonstration that in the first edition this
+allusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have occurred
+either in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no reason whatever
+appears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer to regard it as
+belonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of Academic doctrine in
+the second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the Academic school must not
+be supposed to have no truths to maintain, see _Luc._ 119, also 66 and
+_N.D._ I. 12. Also Aug. _Contra. Ac._ II. 29.
+
+36. It is difficult to see where this passage could have been included if
+not in that prooemium to the third book which is mentioned _Ad. Att._ XVI.
+6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me wrong in holding that the
+whole four books formed one discussion, finished within the limits of a
+single day. Why interrupt the discussion by the insertion of a prologue of
+so general a nature as to be taken from a stock which Cic. kept on hand
+ready made? (Cf. _Ad Att._ as above.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications of its
+contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled _Contra
+Academicos_, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions,
+imitated throughout the second edition of the _Academica_ of Cic. No
+writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture
+and opinions of Augustine as the _Academica_ and the lost _Hortensius_. I
+give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications of the contents of the
+former which are to be gathered from the bishop's works. In Aug. _Contr.
+Ac._ II. 14, 15, we have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of
+Book I. to the following effect. The New Academy must not be regarded as
+having revolted against the Old, all that it did was to discuss that new
+doctrine of καταληψις advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of ακαταληψια though
+present to the minds of the ancients had never taken distinct shape,
+because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was rather enriched
+than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism under the name of
+the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife between it and the
+New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic. must have ended. From
+this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his opinion (_Contra. Ac._ II.
+1) that New Academicism was excusable from the necessities of the age in
+which it appeared. Indications of Book II. in Aug. are scarce, but to it I
+refer _Contra. Ac._ I. 7 _placuit Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui verum
+investigat etiam si ad eius inventionem non valeat pervenire_, also _ibid._
+III. 10 _illis (Academicis) placuit esse posse hominem sapientem, et tamen
+in hominem scientiam cadere non posse_. These I refer to Cicero's
+development of the _probabile_ in Book II., although I ought to say that
+Krische, p. 65, maintains that the substance of Catulus' exposition in the
+_Ac. Priora_ transferred to Book IV. of the _Ac. Posteriora_. As this would
+leave very meagre material for Book II., nothing indeed excepting the
+provisional proof of the deceptiveness of the senses, I cannot accede to
+his arrangement; mine, I may remark, involves a much smaller departure from
+the first edition. Allusions in Aug. to the attack on the senses by Cic. in
+Book II. are difficult to fix, as they apply equally well to the later
+attack in Book IV. As to Books III. and IV., I do not think it necessary
+here to prove from Aug. the points of agreement between them and the
+_Lucullus_, which will find a better place in my notes on the latter, but
+merely give the divergences which appear from other sources. These are the
+translation of σοφισματα by _cavillationes_ in _Luc._ 75 (Seneca _Ep._
+III.), and the insertion in 118 of _essentia_ as a translation of ουσια.
+
+BOOK II.
+
+ENTITLED _LUCULLUS_.
+
+    §§1--12. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was
+    absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to
+    attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great
+    general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory
+    (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander
+    and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my
+    consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now
+    tell (3). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher,
+    having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself (4). Those
+    enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know
+    philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5).
+    Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of
+    the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about
+    trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public
+    duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but
+    enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who
+    hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge
+    show that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics
+    do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow--the Academic.
+    This is natural, but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to
+    inquiry (7). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools
+    are enslaved to authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the
+    authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without
+    hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus,
+    Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the
+    _Catulus_ (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of
+    Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the
+    doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before (10). He
+    spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius
+    the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, and Antiochus. At that very time
+    the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of
+    Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old
+    teacher (11 and 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes
+    between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the
+    latter against Philo (12).
+
+§1. _Luculli_: see Introd. p. 58, and _Dict. Biog._ _Digna homini nobili_:
+a good deal of learning would have been considered _unworthy_ of a man like
+Lucullus, see Introd. p. 30. _Percepta_: "gained," "won;" cf. _percipere
+fruges_, "to reap," _Cat. Mai._ 24. _Caruit_: "was cut off from;" _carere_
+comes from a root _skar_ meaning to divide, see Corss. I. 403. For the
+three nouns with a singular verb see Madv. _Gram._ 213 A, who confines the
+usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common reading
+_dissensit_ in _De Or._ III. 68 is right, the restriction does not hold.
+_Admodum_: "to a degree." _Fratre_: this brother was adopted by a M.
+Terentius Varro, and was a man of distinction also; see _Dict. Biog._
+_Magna cum gloria_: a ref. to _Dict. Biog._ will show that the whole affair
+was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have gained
+greater glory by letting it drop. _Quaestor_: to Sulla, who employed him
+chiefly in the civil administration of Asia. _Continuo_: without any
+interval. _Legis praemio_: this seems to mean "by the favour of a special
+law," passed of course by Sulla, who had restored the old _lex annalis_ in
+all its rigour, and yet excepted his own officers from its operation.
+_Prooemio_, which has been proposed, would not be Latin, see _De Leg._ II.
+16. _Consulatum_: he seems to have been absent during the years 84--74, in
+the East. _Superiorum_: scarcely that of Sulla.
+
+§2. _Laus_: "merit," as often, so _praemium_, Virg. _Aen._ XII. 437, means
+a deed worthy of reward. _Non admodum exspectabatur_: Cic. forgets that
+Luc. had served with distinction in the Social War and the first
+Mithridatic war. _In Asia pace_: three good MSS. have _Asiae_; Baiter
+ejects _Asia_; Guilelmus read _in Asia in pace_ (which Davies conjectures,
+though he prints _Asiae_). _Consumere_ followed by an ablative without _in_
+is excessively rare in Cic. Madv. _D.F._ V. 53 denies the use altogether.
+In addition, however, to our passage, I note _hoc loco consumitur_ in
+_T.D._ IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give no variants.
+_Pace_ here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like _tranqullo_.
+_Indocilem_: this is simply passive, = "untaught," as in Prop. I. 2, 12,
+Ov. _Fast._ III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong in making
+it active. _Factus_: = _perfectus_; cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 5, 33 _homo factus
+ad unguem_, Cic. _De Or._ III. 184, _In Verr._ IV. 126. So _effectus_ in
+silver Latin. _Rebus gestis_: military history, so often. _Divinam quandam
+memoriam_: the same phrase in _De Or._ II. 360. _Rerum, verborum_: same
+distinction in _De Or._ II. 359. _Oblivisci se malle_: the same story is
+told _D.F._ II. 104, _De Or._ II. 299. The ancient art of memory was begun
+by Simonides (who is the person denoted here by _cuidam_) and completed by
+Metrodorus of Scepsis, for whom see _De Or._ II. 360. _Consignamus_: cf.
+_consignatae in animis notiones_ in _T.D._ I. 57. _litteris_ must be an
+ablative of the instrument. _Mandare monum._: cf. I. 3. _Insculptas_: rare
+in the metaphorical use, cf. _N.D._ I. 45.
+
+§3. _Genere_: "department" cf. I. 3. _Navalibus pugnis_: ναυμαχιαις.
+_Instrumento et adparatu_: κατασκευη και παρασκευη. _Rex_: Mithridates.
+_Quos legisset_: = _de quibus l._; cf. the use of the passive verb so
+common in Ovid, e.g. _Trist._ IV. 4, 14. I take of course _rex_ to be nom.
+to _legisset_, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is nom. and that
+_quos legisset_ = _quorum commentarios legisset_ I think improbable.
+_Hodie_: Drakenborch on Livy V. 27 wants to read _hodieque_, which however,
+is not Ciceronian. In passages like _De Or._ I. 103 and _Verr._ V. 64, the
+_que_ connects clauses and does not modify _hodie_. On this subject see
+Madv. _Opuscula_ I. 390. _Etsi_: _M.D.F._ V. 68, shows that in Cic. a
+parenthetic clause with _etsi_ always has a common verb with its principal
+clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same holds of
+_quamquam_, see n. on I. 5. _Calumnia_: properly a fraudulent use of
+litigation, συκοφαντια. The chief enemy was the infamous Memmius who
+prosecuted him. _In urbem_: until his triumph Luc. would remain outside the
+city. _Profuisset_: this ought properly to be _profuerit_, but the
+conditional _dicerem_ changes it. _Potius ... quam ... communicem_: n. on
+23.
+
+§4. _Sunt ... celebrata_: cf. I. 11, 17 for the collocation of the words.
+_Externa ... interiora_: cf. _De Div._ II. 124 _sed haec quoque in promptu,
+nunc interiora videamus_. _Pro quaestore_: for this Faber wrote _quaestor_,
+arguing that as Luc. was Sulla's _quaestor_ and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he
+could not be _pro quaestor_. But surely after the first year he would be
+_pro quaestor_. Dav. reads _quaestor_ here and 11, saying "_veterem
+lectionem iugulavit Faber_". _Ea memoria ... quam_: Bentl., Halm, Baiter
+give _qua_, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor. _Sat._ I. 6, 15. A passage like
+ours is _D.F._ I. 29, _ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis_, where one MS.
+has _qua_. Read Madvig's lucid note there. _De quibus audiebat_: Madv.
+_Em._ 121 makes this equivalent to _de eis rebus de quibus_, the necessity
+of which explanation, though approved by Halm, I fail to see. The form of
+expression is very common in Cic., and the relative always refers to an
+actually expressed antecedent, cf. e.g. _Cat. Mai._ 83. I take _quibus_ as
+simply = _libris_.
+
+§5. _Ac_: strong, as often, = και μην. _Personarum_: public characters,
+προσωπων πολεως (_Ad. Fam._ XV. 17, 2), so _personas_ 6. _Multi ...
+plures_: cf. Introd. p. 30. _Reliqui_: many MSS. insert _qui_ by
+_dittographia_, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains it. On
+the retention or omission of this _qui_ will depend the choice of _putant_
+or _putent_ below. _Earum rerum disputationem_: for _disp._ followed by
+genitive see n. on I. 33. _Non ita decoram_: for this feeling see Introd.
+p. 30. For _non ita_ cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae". _Historiae
+loquantur_: _hist._ means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than "history," which is
+better expressed by _res gestae_. Note that the verb _loqui_ not _dicere_
+is used, and cf. n. on 101. _Legatione_: to the kings in Egypt and the East
+in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C. About the embassy see
+_Dict. Biogr._ art. 'Panactius'. _Auctorem_: one would think this simple
+and sound enough, Bentl. however read _fautorem_, Dav. _auditorem_.
+
+§6. _Illigari_: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use Forc.
+qu. Liv. XXXIII. 21, Tac. _Ann._ XIII. 40. _Aut ludicros sermones_: = _aut
+clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat_. _Rerum leviorum_: a similar
+argument in _D.F._ I. 12. _Quodam in libro_: the _Hortensius_. _Gradu_: so
+the word "degree" was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the
+ballad. _De opera publica detrahamus_: the dative often follows this verb,
+as in _D.F._ III. 7 _nihil operae reipublicae detrahens_, a passage often
+wrongly taken. _Operae_ is the dat. after the verb, not the gen. after
+_nihil_, _reip._ the gen. after _operae_, like _opera publica_ here, not
+the dat. after _detrahens_. _Nisi forensem_: the early oratorical works may
+fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the _De
+Republica_ or the _De Leg._ both of which fall within the period spoken of.
+_Ut plurimis prosimus_: cf. Introd. p. 29. _Non modo non minui, sed_:
+notice _non modo ... sed_ thrice over in two sentences.
+
+§7. _Sunt ... qui negent_: and truly, see Introd. p. 38. In _Cat. Mai._ §3
+Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned than he really was.
+_Mortuis_: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about 57, Hortensius 50. _Contra
+omnis dicere quae videntur_: MSS. mostly insert _qui_ between _dicere_ and
+_quae_, one of the best however has _dicere quae aliis_ as a correction,
+while another has the marginal reading _qui scire sibi videntur_. The
+omission of _qui_, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal.
+2) referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense. _Verum invenire_: cf. 60.
+_Contentione_: = φιλονεικια as usual. _In ... rebus obscuritas_: cf. I. 44
+_rerum obscuritate_. _Infirmitas_: cf. I. 44 _imbecillos animos_.
+_Antiquissimi et doctissimi_: on the other hand _recentissima quaeque sunt
+correcta et emendata maxime_ I. 13. _Diffisi_: one of the best MSS. has
+_diffissi_, which reminds one of the spelling _divisssiones_, asserted to
+be Ciceronian in Quint. _Inst. Or_. I. 7, 20. _In utramque partem_: επ'
+αμφοτερα, cf. I. 45. _Exprimant_: "embody," cf. n. on I. 19.
+
+§8. _Probabilia_: πιθανα, for which see 33. _Sequi_: "act upon," cf.
+99-101. _Liberiores et solutiores_: these two words frequently occur
+together in Cic. and illustrate his love for petty variations; see 105,
+also _T.D._ V. 43, _De Div._ I. 4, _De Rep._ IV. 4, _N.D._ I. 56, _Orat._
+64. _Integra_: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "_non mihi integrum est_"--"I
+have committed my self." _Et quasi_: MSS. have _et quibus et quasi_.
+_Cogimur_: for this Academic freedom see Introd. p. 18. _Amico cuidam_:
+Orelli after Lamb. _cuipiam;_ for the difference see Madv. _Gram._ 493 _b_,
+c.
+
+§9. _Ut potuerint, potuerunt_: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which
+was simply _ut potuerunt_, "granting that they had the ability, they gained
+it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they _did_ decide on a
+single hearing," etc. _Iudicaverunt autem_: so Lamb. for MSS. _aut_.
+Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "_arguta hariolatio_," read _an_ for _aut_
+and put a note of interrogation at _contulerunt_. C.F. Hermann
+(Schneidewin's _Philologus_ VII. 466) introduces by conj. a sad confusion
+into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's remarks in _Em._ 125
+has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed, followed by the faithful
+Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion of _aut_ between _sed_ and
+_ut_ at the beginning; of this Madv. says "_non solum Latina non est, sed
+sanae menti repugnat_." For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf.
+_N.D._ I. 10, _De Leg._ I. 36. _Quam adamaverunt_: "which they have learned
+to love;" the _ad_ has the same force as προ in προμανθανειν, which means
+"to learn _on and on_, to learn by degrees" (cf. προυμαθον στεργειν
+κακοις), not, as the lexica absurdly say, "to learn beforehand, i.e. to
+learn thoroughly." _Constantissime_: "most consistently". _Quae est ad
+Baulos_: cf. Introd. p. 57. _In spatio_: this _xystus_ was a colonnade with
+one side open to the sea, called ξυστος from its polished floor and
+pillars. _Consedimus_: n. on I. 14.
+
+§10. _Servatam oportuit_: a construction very characteristic of Terence,
+found, but rarely, in Cic. and Livy. _In promptu ... reconditiora_: cf. _in
+promptu ... interiora_ in _De Div._ II. 124, also _Ac._ I. 4. _Quae dico_:
+Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and wishes to read
+_dixero_. But the substitution of the pres. for the future is common enough
+in all languages cf. Iuv. IV. 130 with Mayor's copious note. _Si non
+fuerint_: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have _si vera_
+etc. In support of the text, see I. 9 (_sunt ista_) and note.
+_Labefactata_: this is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in
+_Ed. Rom._ (1471); the others have _labefacta_. Orelli's statement (note to
+his separate text of the _Academica_ 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the
+perfect _labefeci_ and the part, _labefactus_ is quite wrong. The former is
+indeed the vulg. reading in _Pro Sestio_ 101, the latter in _De Haruspicum
+Responsis_ 60, but the last of these two passages is doubtful. Cic. as a
+rule prefers long forms like _sustentatus_, which occurs with
+_labefactatus_ in _Cat. Mai._ 20. For the perfect _labefactavit_ cf. I. 33.
+_Agam igitur_: Cic. rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a
+belief in the learning of Lucullus.
+
+§11. _Pro quaestore_: cf. 4. _Essem_: MSS. _issem_, whence Goer. conj.
+_Alexandriam issem_. _Heraclitus Tyrius_: scarcely known except from this
+passage. _Clitomachum_: for this philosopher see Zeller 532. _Quae nunc
+prope dimissa revocatur_: sc. _a Cicerone_. Philo's only notable pupils had
+combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the
+_Academica_ the New Academic dialectic had been without a representative
+for many years. Cf. Introd. p. 21. _Libri duo_: cf. I. 13. _Heri_ for this
+indication of the contents of the lost _Catulus_, see Introd. p. 50.
+_Implorans_: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to with
+tears," see Corss. I. 361. _Philonis_: sc. _esse_. _Scriptum agnoscebat_:
+i.e. it was an actual work of Ph. _Tetrilius_: some MSS. are said to have
+Tetrinius, and the name _Tertinius_ is found on Inscr. One good MS. has
+_Tretilius_, which may be a mistake for _Tertilius_, a name formed like
+_Pompilius_, _Quintilius_, _Sextilius_. Qy, should _Petrilius_, a
+derivative from the word for four, be read? _Petrilius_ and _Pompilius_
+would then agree like _Petronius_ and _Pomponius_, _Petreius_ and
+_Pompeius_. For the formation of these names see Corss. I. 116. _Rogus_: an
+ill omened and unknown name. _Rocus_, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on
+_denarii_ of the _gens Creperia_. _De Philone ... ab eo ipso_: note the
+change of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy." _De_ and _ex_ are
+common in Cic. after _audire_, while _ab_ is rather rarer. See _M.D.F._ I.
+39, and for _describere ab aliquo_ cf. _a te_ in _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, 3.
+
+§12. _Dicta Philoni_: for this see Introd. p. 50. It cannot mean what Goer.
+makes it mean, "_coram Philone_." I think it probable that _Philoni_ is a
+marginal explanation foisted on the text. As to the statements of Catulus
+the elder, they are made clear by 18. _Academicos_: i.e. _novos_, who are
+here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the
+title. _Aristo_: see Introd. p. 11. _Aristone_: Diog. VII. 164 mentions an
+Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems
+unknown. _Negat_: see n. on 18. _Lenior_: some MSS. _levior_, as is usual
+with these two words. In 11 one of the earliest editions has _leviter_ for
+_leniter_.
+
+    §§13--18. Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted like a seditious
+    tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as supporters of
+    scepticism (13), Those very philosophers, with the exception of
+    Empedocles, seem to me, if anything, too dogmatic (14). Even if they
+    were often in doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made
+    during so many centuries by the investigations of so many men of
+    ability? Arcesilas was a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti.
+    Gracchus was a rebel against a good government (15). Has nothing really
+    been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty,
+    though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists think that no
+    argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument can add
+    nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however
+    do allow of discussion with sceptics. Philo in his innovations was
+    induced to state falsehoods, and incurred all the evils he wished to
+    avoid, his rejection of Zeno's definition of the καταληπτικη φαντασια
+    really led him back to that utter scepticism from which he was fleeing.
+    We then must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in to the
+    sceptics (18).
+
+§13. _Rursus exorsus est_: cf. _exorsus_ in 10. _Popularis_: δημοτικους.
+_Ii a_: so Dav. for MSS. _iam_. _Tum ad hos_: so MSS., Dav. _aut hos_. The
+omission of the verb _venire_ is very common in Cic.'s letters. _C.
+Flaminium_: the general at lake Trasimene. _Aliquot annis_: one good MS.
+has _annos_, cf. _T.D._ I. 4, where all the best MSS. have _annos_. The
+ablative is always used to express point of time, and indeed it may be
+doubted whether the best writers _ever_ use any accusative in that sense,
+though they do occasionally use the ablative to express duration (cf. Prop.
+I. 6, 7 and Madv. _Gram._ 235, 2). _L. Cassium_: this is L. Cassius
+Longinus Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot bill (_De
+Leg._ III. 35), he was the author of the _cui bono_ principle and so severe
+a judge as to be called _scopulus reorum_. Pompeium: apparently the man who
+made the disgraceful treaty with Numantia repudiated by home in 139 B.C.
+_P. Africanum_: i.e. the younger, who supported the ballot bill of Cassius,
+but seems to have done nothing else for the democrats. _Fratres_: Lamb.
+_viros_, but cf. _Brut._ 98. _P. Scaevolam_: the pontifex, consul in the
+year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against the
+tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of
+Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about the
+legal effect the bills would have. _Ut videmus ... ut suspicantur_: Halm
+with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that the statement about
+Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but him. Those words need
+not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be allowed the inconsistency.
+
+§14. _Similiter_: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have _simile_.
+_Xenophanem_: so Victorius for the MSS. _Xenoplatonem_. _Ed. Rom._ (1471)
+has _Cenonem_, which would point to _Zenonem_, but Cic. does not often name
+Zeno of Elea. _Saturninus_: of the question why he was an enemy of
+Lucullus, Goer. says _frustra quaeritur_. Saturninus was the persistent
+enemy of Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage.
+_Arcesilae calumnia_: this was a common charge, cf. _Academicorum calumnia_
+in _N.D._ II. 20 and _calumnia_ in 18 and 65 of this book. So August.
+_Contra Acad._ II. 1 speaks of _Academicorum vel calumnia vel pertinacia
+vel pericacia_. _Democriti verecundia_: Cic. always has a kind of
+tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on _D.F._ I. 20 remarks, cf. _De Div._
+II. 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the general _arrogantia_ of
+the _physici_. _Empedocles quidem ... videatur_: cf. 74. The exordium of
+his poem is meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of
+the text, see R. and P. 108. _Quale sit_: the emphasis is on _sit_, the
+sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. _Quasi modo
+nascentes_: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however _T.D._ II. 5 _ut
+oratorum laus ... senescat ... , philosophia nascatur_.
+
+§15. _haesitaverunt_: Goer. cf. _De Or._ I. 40. _Constitutam_: so in 14.
+_Delitisceret_: this is the right spelling, not _delitesceret_, which one
+good MS. has here, see Corssen II. 285. _Negavissent_: "had denied, as they
+said." _Tollendus est_: a statement which is criticised in 74. _Nominibus
+differentis ... dissenserunt_: genuine Antiochean opinions, see the
+_Academica Posteriora_ 17, 43. _De se ipse_: very frequent in Cic. (cf.
+Madv. _Gram._ 487 _b_). _Diceret_: this is omitted by the MSS., but one has
+_agnosceret_ on the margin; see n. on 88. _Fannius_: in his "Annals." The
+same statement is quoted in _De Or._ II. 270, _Brutus_ 299. Brutus had
+written an epitome of this work of Fannius (_Ad Att._ XII. 5, 3).
+
+§16. _Veteribus_: Bentley's em. of MSS. _vetera_: C.F. Hermann (Schneid
+_Philol._ VII. 457), thinking the departure from the MSS. too great, keeps
+_vetera_ and changes _incognita_ into _incondita_, comparing _De Or._ I.
+197, III. 173. A glance, however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the
+word always means merely "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here
+is not one between order and no order, but between knowledge and no
+knowledge, so that _incognita_ is far better. I am not at all certain that
+the MSS. reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us
+suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were not
+_knowledge_, but mere _opinion_." The conj. of Kayser _veri nota_ for
+_vetera_ (cf. 76) and _investigatum_ below, is fanciful and improbable.
+_Quod investigata sunt_: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again
+disturbs the text which since Madv. _Em._ 127 supported it (quoting _T.D._
+V. 15, Liv. XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that _illa_ in the former
+sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects _nihilne est
+igitur actum_ as a dittographia (!) from 15 _nihilne explicatum_, and reads
+_quot_ for _quod_ with Bentl. For the meaning cf. _T.D._ III. 69 and Arist.
+on the progress of philosophy as there quoted. _Arcesilas Zenoni ...
+obtrectans_: see n. on I. 34. These charges were brought by each school
+against the other. In Plutarch _Adv. Colotem_ p. 1121 F, want of novelty is
+charged against Arcesilas, and the charge is at once joyfully accepted by
+Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was often excused by the provocation Zeno
+gave, see Aug. _Contra Acad._ II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm. 2 and 35 of
+the _Academica Posteriora_. _Immutatione verborum_: n. on I. 33. This
+phrase has also technical meanings; it translates the Greek τροποι (_Brut._
+69) and αλληγορια in _De Or._ II. 261, where an ex. is given.
+_Definitiones_: n. on 18. _Tenebras obducere_: such expressions abound in
+Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned, cf. 30 (_lucem eripere_), _N.D._
+I. 6 (_noctem obfundere_) Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 14 (_quasdam nebulas
+obfundere_), also the joke of Aug. II. 29 _tenebrae quae patronae
+Academicorum solent esse_. _Non admodum probata_: cf. the passage of
+Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. _Lacyde_: the most important passages in
+ancient authorities concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is
+important to note that Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became
+the source of information about his teacher's doctrines. _Tenuit_: cf. the
+use of _obtinere_ in _De Or._ I. 45. _In Aeschine_: so Dav. for the
+confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher see Zeller 533. As two MSS.
+have _hac nonne_ Christ conj. _Hagnone_ which Halm, as well as Baiter
+takes; Zeller 533 seems to adopt this and at once confuses the supposed
+philosopher with one Agnon just mentioned in Quint. II. 17, 15. There is
+not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known
+at all, from these two passages only.
+
+§17. _Patrocinium_: for the word cf. _N.D._ I. 6. _Non defuit_: such
+patronage _was_ wanting in the time of Arcesilas (16). _Faciendum omnino
+non putabant_: "Epictetus (Arrian, _Diss._ I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a
+sceptic by saying ουκ αγω σχολην προς ταυτα" (Zeller 85, n.). In another
+passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a sceptic
+than with a corpse. _Ullam rationem disputare_: the same constr. occurs in
+74 and _Pro Caecina_ 15, _Verr. Act._ I. 24. _Antipatrum_: cf. fragm. 1 of
+Book I. _Verbum e verbo_: so 31, _D.F._ III. 15, _T.D._ III. 7, not _verbum
+de verbo_, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form. _Comprehensio_: cf. I.
+41. _Ut Graeci_: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I. 44 _ut Democritus_.
+_Evidentiam_: other translations proposed by Cic. were _illustratio_
+(Quint. VI. 2, 32) and _perspicientia_ (_De Off._ I. 15). _Fabricemur_: cf.
+87, 119, 121. _Me appellabat_: Cic. was the great advocate for the
+Latinisation of Greek terms (_D.F._ III. 15). _Sed tamen_: this often
+resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Ipsa evidentia_:
+note that the verb _evidere_ is not Latin.
+
+§18. _Sustinere_: cf. 70. _Pertinaciam_: the exact meaning of this may be
+seen from _D.F._ II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot
+recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an
+opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf.
+n. on 14, 66, also I. 44 and _D.F._ V. 94, _N.D._ I. 13, in the last of
+which passages the Academy is called _procax_. _Mentitur_: cf. 12. _Ita
+negaret_: this _ita_ corresponds to _si_ below,--a common sequence of
+particles in Cic., cf. 19. Ακαταληπτον: the conj. of Turnebus καταληπτον is
+unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in _negaret_. _Visum_:
+cf. I. 40. _Trivimus_: cf. I. 27. _Visum igitur_: the Greek of this
+definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words _impressum effictumque_
+are equivalent to εναπεσφραγισμενη και εναπομεμαγμενη in the Gk. It must
+not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to be a real alteration
+(‛ετεροιωσις) of the material substance of the soul through the action of
+some external thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does
+on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. _Ex eo unde esset ... unde non
+esset_: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given by
+Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in _Adv.
+Math._ VIII. 86 _Pyrrh. Hypotyp._ III. 242, the definition is clipt), and
+in Diog. Laert. VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in
+the two passages just referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus
+Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of his _Academica_) that Cic.
+omits to represent the words κατ' αυτο το ‛υπαρχον. Sextus _Adv. Math._
+VII. 249 considers them essential to the definition and instances Orestes
+who looking at Electra, mistook her for an Erinys. The φαντασια therefore
+which he had although απο ‛υπαρχοντος (proceeding from an actually existent
+thing) was not κατα το ‛υπαρχον, i.e. did not truly represent that existent
+thing. Aug. _Cont. Acad._ II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses
+it thus; _his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest habere
+quod falsum est_. _Iudicium_: κριτηριον, a test to distinguish between the
+unknown and the known. _Eo, quo minime volt_: several things are clear, (1)
+that Philo headed a reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the
+possibility of knowledge on a ground quite different from the καταληπτικη
+φαντασια, which he pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views
+of Carneades to suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf.
+11, Sextus _Pyrr. Hyp._ I. 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans
+believed all things to be ακαταληπτα, Philo held them to be καταληπτα, and
+Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout
+his notice as a renegade. (2) is evident from the _Academica_ and from
+Sextus as quoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted
+is more difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things
+to be _in their own nature_ καταληπτα (‛οσον δε επι τη φυσει των πραγματων
+αυτων καταλ.). But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have attempted to
+disprove this; they never tried to show that things _in themselves_ were
+incognisable, _but_ that human faculties do not avail to give information
+about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with words, there was
+nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by their καταληπτικη
+φαντασια professed to be able to get at _the thing in itself_, in its real
+being, if then Philo did away with the καταλ. φαντ. and substituted no
+other mode of curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to
+reside in sense, he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the
+text. Numenius treats his polemic against the καταλ. φαντ. as a mere feint
+intended to cover his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position
+is afforded in 112 of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing
+the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It
+would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to be "_quod
+impressum esset e vero_" (φαντασια απο ‛υπαρχοντος εναπομεμαγμενη),
+refusing to add "_quo modo imprimi non posset a falso_ (‛οια ουκ αν γενοιτο
+απο μη ‛υπαρχοντος), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely
+tried to show that the cognisable was equivalent to the δηλον or πιθανον of
+Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter
+that the wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite
+judgments on phenomena. (See 78 of this book.) The scarcity of references
+to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact view of his
+doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or nothing to the
+elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book entitled
+_Academica_ (pp. 313--316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard to (3), it
+it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He denied the
+popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles of doubt,
+to be correct (12). I may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical
+works at the outset of Stobaeus' _Ethica_, he would appear to have
+afterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important
+for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the
+new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as
+genuinely Academic. _Revolvitur_: cf. _De Div._ II. 13, also 148 of this
+book. _Eam definitionem_: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the
+sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single
+sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these
+sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that _all_
+knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on
+the truth of the individual perception of sense.
+
+    §§19--29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give
+    perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain
+    the truth of _every_ sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which
+    impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we
+    always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated
+    senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch!
+    (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions
+    of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since
+    they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at
+    definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic
+    memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22).
+    That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would
+    act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false?
+    (23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her?
+    There must he some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence
+    must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action
+    is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end
+    to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be
+    discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should
+    be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are rendered useless, philosophy
+    too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence the
+    Academics have been urged to allow their _dogma_ that perception is
+    impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades
+    said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the
+    supposition that there can be _any_ true perception (28). Antiochus
+    declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if
+    they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).
+
+§19. _Sensibus_: it is important to observe that the word _sensus_ like
+αισθησις means two things, (1) one of the _five_ senses, (2) an individual
+act of sensation. _Deus_: for the supposed god cf. _T.D._ II. 67. _Non
+videam_: this strong statement is ridiculed in 80. _De remo inflexo et de
+collo columbae_: cf. 79, 82. The κωπη εναλος κεκλασμενη and περιστερας
+τραχηλος are frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of
+the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g. _Pyrrhon. Hypot._ I.
+119-121, _Adv. Math._ VII. 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day
+before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 27.
+_Epicurus hoc viderit_: see 79, 80. Epic. held all sensation, _per se_, to
+be infallible. The chief authorities for this are given in R. and P. 343,
+344, Zeller 403, footnote. _Lumen mutari_: cf. _Brut._ 261. _Intervalla ...
+diducimus_: for this cf. Sext. _Pyrrh_. I. 118 πεμπτος εστι λογος (i.e. the
+5th sceptic τροπος for showing sense to be untrustworthy) ‛ο παρα τας
+θεσεις (_situs_) και τα διαστηματα (_intervalla_) και τους τοπους.
+_Multaque facimus usque eo_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 258 παντα ποιει μεχρις
+αν τρανην και πληκτικην σπαση φαντασιαν. _Sui iudicii_: see for the gen.
+_M.D.F._ II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut. _Persa_ V. 2,
+8, quoted by Goer. _Sui cuiusque_: for this use of _suus quisque_ as a
+single word see _M.D.F._ V. 46.
+
+§20. _Ut oculi ... cantibus_: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on
+the other hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. _Quis est quin
+cernat_: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here (_D.F._ II.
+27). _Umbris ... eminentia_: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses _umbra_ and
+_lumen_, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. σκια and σκιασμα
+are opposed to λαμπρα; cf. also σκιαγραφειν, _adumbrare_, and Aesch.
+_Agam_. 1328. Cic. often applies metaphorically to oratory the two words
+here used, e.g. _De Or._ III. 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g. II. 17,
+21. _Inflatu_: cf. 86 (where an answer is given) and αναβολη. _Antiopam_:
+of Pacuvius. _Andromacham_: of Ennius, often quoted by Cic., as _De Div._
+I. 23. _Interiorem_: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's _Socrates and the
+Socratic Schools_, 296. _Quia sentiatur_: αισθησις being their only
+κριτηριον. Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to
+in R. and P. and Zeller will show) conj. _cui adsentiatur_, comparing 39,
+58; cf. also 76. _Inter eum ... et inter_: for the repetition of _inter_
+cf. _T.D._ IV. 32 and Madv. _Gram._ 470. _Nihil interesse_: if the doctrine
+of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied
+himself in pleasure, and _vice versa_; thus the distinction between
+pleasure and pain would be obscured. _Sentiet ... insaniat_: For the
+sequence cf. _D.F._ I. 62 and Wesenberg's fine note on _T.D._ V. 102.
+
+§21. _Illud est album_: these are αξιωματα, judgments of the mind, in which
+alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in
+Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too
+long to quote entire: αισθησεσι μεν ουν μοναις λαβειν ταληθες (which
+resides only in the αξιωμα) ου δυναται ανθρωπος. ... φυσει γαρ εισιν αλογοι
+... δει δε εις φαντασιαν αχθηναι του τοιουτου πραγματος "τουτο λευκον εστι
+και τουτο γλυκυ εστιν." τωι δε τοιουτωι πραγματι ουκετι της αισθησεως εργον
+εστιν επιβαλλειν ... συνεσεως τε δει και μνημης. _Ille deinceps_:
+_deinceps_ is really out of place; cf. 24 _quomodo primum_ for _pr. quom._
+_Ille equus est_: Cic. seems to consider that the αξιωμα, which affirms the
+existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the
+existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from
+the Greek texts. _Expletam comprehensionem_: full knowledge. Here we rise
+to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. _Adv. Math._ VII.
+ανθρωπος εστι ζωον λογικον θνητον, νου και επιστημης δεκτικον. The Stoic
+‛οροι, and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II.
+208--211. _Notitiae_: this Cic. uses as a translation both of προληψις and
+εννοια, for which see Zeller 79, 89. In I. 40 _notiones rerum_ is given.
+_Sine quibus_: δια γαρ των εννοιων τα πραγματα λαμβανεται Diog. VII. 42.
+
+§22. _Igitur_: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Consentaneum_:
+so Sextus constantly uses ακολουθον. _Repugnaret_: cf. I. 19 and n.
+_Memoriae certe_: n. on 106. _Continet_: cf. _contineant_ in 40. _Quae
+potest esse_: Cic. nearly always writes _putat esse_, _potest esse_ and the
+like, not _esse putat_ etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a
+clause. _Memoria falsorum_: this difficulty is discussed in Plato
+_Sophist._ 238--239. _Ex multis animi perceptionibus_: the same definition
+of an art occurs in _N.D._ II. 148, _D.F._ III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II.
+17, 41, Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην ειναι συστημα εκ καταληψεον
+συγγεγυμνασμενων _ib._ III. 250. _Quam_: for the change from plural to
+singular (_perceptio in universum_) cf. n. on I. 38, Madv. _D.F._ II. 61,
+_Em._ 139. _Qui distingues_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 280 ου διοισει της
+ατεχνιας ‛η τεχνη. Sextus often comments on similar complaints of the
+Stoics. _Aliud eiusmodi genus sit_: this distinction is as old as Plato and
+Arist., and is of constant occurrence in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext.
+_Adv. Math._ XI. 197 who adds a third class of τεχναι called
+αποτελεσματικαι to the usual θεωρητικαι and πρακτικαι, also Quint. II. 18,
+1 and 2, where ποιητικη corresponds to the αποτ. of Sext. _Continget_:
+"will be the natural consequence." The notion that the verb _contingit_
+denotes necessarily _good_ fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer on
+_T.D._ III. 4. _Tractabit_: μελλει μεταχειριζεσθαι.
+
+§23. _Cognitio_: like Germ. _lehre_, the branch of learning which concerns
+the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of καταληψις
+here. _In quibus_: the antecedent is not _virtutum_, as Petrus Valentia (p.
+292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, but _multa_.
+This is shown by _etiam_; not _merely_ the virtues but _also_ all επιστημη
+depends on καταληψεις; cf. I. 40, 41, with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367.
+_Stabilem_: βεβαιον και αμεταπτωτου. _Artem vivendi_: "_tralaticium hoc
+apud omnes philosophos_" _M.D.F._ I. 42. Sextus constantly talks about ‛η
+ονειροπολουμενη περι τον βιον τεχνη (_Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 250) the existence
+of which he disproves to his own satisfaction (_Adv. Math._ XI. 168 sq).
+_Ille vir bonus_: in all ancient systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness
+of the _sapiens_ must be proof against the rack; cf. esp. _D.F._ III. 29,
+75, _T.D._ V. 73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the σοφος in
+Plato's _Gorgias_. _Potius quam aut_: Lamb. _ut_; but I think C.F. Hermann
+is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. _never_ inserts _ut_ after
+_potius quam_ with the subj. Tischer on _T.D._ II. 52 affirms that _ut_ is
+frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. _De Off._ I. 86,
+Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12 who says the _sapiens_ of the Academy must be
+_desertor officiorum omnium_. _Comprehensi ... constituti_: cf. the famous
+_abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit_. _Iis rebus_: note the assumption that
+the _sensation_ corresponds to the _thing_ which causes it. _Adsensus sit
+... possint_: nearly all edd. before Halm read _possunt_, but the subj.
+expresses the possibility as present to the mind of the supposed _vir
+bonus_. Cf. Madv. _Gram._ 368.
+
+§24. _Primum_: out of place, see on 21. _Agere_: the dogmatist always held
+that the sceptic must, if consistent, be ανενεργητος εν βιωι (Sext. _Pyrrh.
+Hyp._ I. 23). _Extremum_: similar attempts to translate τελος are made in
+D.F. I. 11, 29, V. 17. _Cum quid agere_: cf. I. 23 for the phrase _Naturae
+accommodatum_. a purely Stoic expression, ‛ωμοιωμενον τη φυσει; cf. 38 and
+_D.F._ V. 17, also III. 16, Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P. 390.
+_Impellimur_: κινουμεθα, Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 391, as often.
+
+§25. _Oportet videri_: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. 39, 81 and 122
+of this book. _Videri_ at the end of this section has the weak sense, "to
+seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. I.
+262 with I. 270, and Munro's n., also _M.D.F._ II. 52, _Em. Liv._ p. 42.
+_Non poterit_: as the Academics allege. _Naturae ... alienum_: Cic. uses
+this adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by _ab_; I
+doubt whether the phrase _maiestate alienum_ (without the preposition) can
+be right in _De Div._ II. 102, where the best texts still keep it. _Non
+occurrit ... aget_: occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on 127.
+
+§26. _Quid quod si_: Goer., outrageously reads _quid quod si, si_.
+_Tollitur_: the verb _tollere_ occurs as frequently in this sense as
+αναιρειν does in Sextus. _Lux lumenque_: Bentl. _dux_ The expression _dux
+vitae_ is of course frequent (cf. _N.D._ I. 40, _T.D._ V. 5 and Lucretius),
+but there is no need to alter. _Lux_ is properly natural light, _lumen_
+artificial, cf. _Ad Att._ XVI. 13, 1. _lumina dimiseramus, nec satis
+lucebat_, D.F. III. 45 _solis luce ... lumen lucernae_. There is the same
+difference between φως and φεγγος, the latter is used for the former
+(φεγγος ‛ηλιου) just as _lumen_ is for _lux_ (_si te secundo lumine his
+offendere_--_Ad Att._ VII. 26, 1) but not often _vice versa_. Trans. "the
+luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 269 where
+the φαντασια is called φεγγος. _Finis_: so in the beginning of the _Nicom.
+Eth._ Aristot. assumes that the actual existence of human exertion is a
+sufficient proof that there is a τελος. _Aperta_: a reminiscence of the
+frequently recurring Greek terms εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος etc., cf. Sextus
+_passim_, and _D.F._ I. 30. _Initium ... exitus_ = αρχη ... τελος.
+_Tenetur_: MSS. _tenet_, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be _ratio_
+above. Αποδειξις: cf. the definition very often given by Sext. e.g. _Pyrrh.
+Hyp._ II. 143 λογος δι' ‛ομολογουμενων λημματων (premisses) κατα συναγωγην
+επιφοραν (conclusion) εκκαλυπτων αδηλον, also Diog. VII. 45, λογον δια των
+μαλλον καταλαμβανομενων το ‛ηττον καταλαμβανομενον περαινοντα (if the
+reading be right).
+
+§27. _Notio_: another trans. of εννοια. _Conclusisse_: although the Greeks
+used συμπερασμα instead of επιφορα sometimes for the conclusion of the
+syllogism, they did not use the verb συμπεραινειν which has been supposed
+to correspond to _concludere_. It is more likely to be a trans. of
+συναγειν, and _conclusum argumentum_ of συνακτικος λογος, which terms are
+of frequent occurrence. _Rationibus progredi_: to a similar question Sextus
+answers, ουκ εστιν αναγκαιον τας εκεινον (the dogmatists) δογματολογιας
+προβαινειν, πλασματωδεις ‛υπαρχουσας (_Adv. Math._ VIII. 367). _Sapientiae
+... futurum est_: for the dat. with _facio_ and _fio_ see Madv. _Gram._
+241, obs. 5, _Opusc._ I. 370, _D.F._ II. 79, and cf. 96 of this book. _Lex
+veri rectique_: cf. 29; the _constitutio veri_ and the determination of
+what is _rectum_ in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy.
+_Sapientique satis non sit_: so Manut. for the _sapientisque sit_ of the
+MSS. Halm after Dav. reads _sapientis, neque satis sit_, which I think is
+wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run _neque
+dubitari potest quin satis sit_, which gives the exact opposite of the
+sense required. _Ratum_: cf. 141.
+
+§28. _Perceptum_: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are very
+frequent in Sextus, e.g. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues
+that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to
+show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be _provable_. Cf. 109 of
+this book. _Postulanti_: making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. _De
+Leg._ I. 21. _Consentaneum esse_: ακολουθον ειναι. _Ut alia_: _although_
+others. _Tantum abest ut--ut_: cf. Madv. _Gram._ 440 a.
+
+§29. _Pressius_: cf. _De Fato_ 31, 33, _N.D._ II. 20, _T.D._ IV. 14,
+_Hortensius_ fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in 109. _Decretum_: of
+course the Academics would say they did not hold this δογμα as _stabile
+fixum ratum_ but only as _probabile_. Sextus however _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 226
+(and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words they
+professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. _Sentitis enim_: cf. _sentis_ in
+_D.F._ III. 26. _Fluctuare_: "to be at sea," Halm _fluctuari_, but the
+deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. _Summa_: cf. _summa
+philosophiae_ _D.F._ II. 86. _Veri falsi_: cf. n. on 92. _Quae visa_: so
+Halm for MSS. _quaevis_, which edd. had changed to _quae a quovis_.
+_Repudiari_: the selection depended on the _probabile_ of course, with the
+Academics. _Veri falsique_: these words were used in different senses by
+the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them "the undestructibly
+true and false." This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense
+arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. says, ψιλη φασει ισον φερεται
+ψιλη φασις (_A.M._ VII. 315), φασει μεν φασις επισχεθησεται (_ib._ 337).
+_Cognoscendi initium_: cf. 26, "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in
+my _probabile_." _Extremum expetendi_: a rather unusual phrase for the
+ethical _finis_. _Ut moveri non possint_: so κινεισθαι is perpetually used
+in Sext. _Est ut opinor_: so Halm after Ernesti for _sit_ of the MSS. I
+think it very likely that the MSS. reading is right, and that the whole
+expression is an imitation of the Greek ‛ικανος ειοησθω and the like. The
+subj. is supported by _D.F._ III. 20, _De Off._ I. 8, _Ad Att._ XIII. 14,
+3, where _ut opinor_ is thrown in as here, and by _Ac._ II. 17, _D.F._ III.
+21, 24, _N.D._ I. 109, where _si placet_ is appended in a similar way.
+
+    §§30--36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we might urge that
+    nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed
+    for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses
+    the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection
+    of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained
+    through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some
+    sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others distinguish between the
+    absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence.
+    Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on
+    the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the
+    other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between
+    true and false is possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be
+    known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing.
+    How can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility
+    remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be
+    "evident" at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is
+    no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.
+    Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they
+    only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we
+    reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36).
+
+§30. _Physicis_: neuter not masc.; cf. I. 6. _Libertatem et licentiam_:
+_et_ = "and even." _Libertas_ = παρρησια as often in Tacitus. _Abditis
+rebus et obscuris_: cf. n. on I. 15, and the word συνεσκιασμενος Sext.
+_Adv. Math._ VII. 26. _Lucem eripere_: like _tollere_ (n. on 26), cf. 38,
+103 and _N.D._ I. 6. For the sense see n. on 16, also 61. _Artificio_: this
+word is used in Cic. as equivalent to _ars_ in all its senses, cf. 114 and
+_De Or._ II. 83. _Fabricata esset_: the expression is sneered at in 87.
+_Quem ad modum primum_: so Halm rightly for MSS. _prima_ or _primo_, which
+latter is not often followed by _deinde_ in Cicero. _Primum_ is out of
+position, as in 24. _Appetitio pulsa_: = _mota_, set in motion. For ‛ορμη
+see 24. _Intenderemus_: as in the exx. given in 20. _Fons_: "reservoir,"
+rather than "source" here. It will be noted that συγκαταθεσις must take
+place before the ‛ορμη is roused. _Ipse sensus est_: an approach to this
+theory is made in Plat. _Theaet._ 185, 191. Cf. especially Sext. _Adv.
+Math._ VII. 350 και ‛οι μεν διαφερειν αυτην των αισθησεων, ‛ως ‛οι πλειους,
+‛οι δε αυτην ειναι τας αισθησεις ... ‛ης στασεως ηρξε Στρατον. All powers
+of sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included
+in the ‛ηγεμονικον, cf. n. on I. 38. _Alia quasi_: so Faber for _aliqua_.
+"_In vera et aperta partitione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis--alius
+dixit, multo minus alius--aliquis_," _M.D.F._ III. 63. Goer. on the other
+hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he forbears however, to
+produce them. _Recondit_: so the εννοιαι are called αποκειμεναι νοησεις
+(Plut. _De Sto. Repug._ p. 1057 a). In Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 373 μνημη is
+called θησαυρισμος φαντασιων. _Similitudinibus_: καθ' ‛ομοιωσιν Sext.
+_Pyrr. Hyp._ II. 75. Cic. uses this word as including all processes by
+which the mind gets to know things not immediately perceived by sense. In
+_D.F._ III. 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see Madv. there,
+and the passages he quotes, "analogies" will here best translate the word,
+which, is used in the same wide sense in _N.D._ II. 22 38. _Construit_: so
+MSS. Orelli gave _constituit_. _Notitiae_: cf. 22. Cic. fails to
+distinguish between the φυσικαι εννοιαι or κοιναι which are the προληψεις,
+and those εννοιαι which are the conscious product of the reason, in the
+Stoic system. Cf. _M.D.F._ III. 21, V. 60, for this and other inaccuracies
+of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also Zeller 79. _Rerumque_:
+"facts". _Perfecta_: _sapientia_, _virtus_, _perfecta ratio_, are almost
+convertible terms in the expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf. I.
+20.
+
+§31. _Vitaeque constantiam_: which philosophy brings, see 23.
+_Cognitionem_: επιστημην. _Cognitio_ is used to translate καταληψις in
+_D.F._ II. 16, III. 17, cf. n. on I. 41. _Ut dixi ... dicemus_: For the
+repetition cf. 135, 146, and _M.D.F._ I. 41. The future tense is odd and
+unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote _dicimus_, I would rather read _dicamus_; cf. n. on
+29. _Per se_: καθ' αυτην, there is no need to read _propter_, as Lamb. _Ut
+virtutem efficiat_: note that virtue is throughout this exposition treated
+as the result of the exercise of the _reason_. _Evertunt_: cf. _eversio_ in
+99. _Animal ... animo_: Cic. allows _animus_ to all animals, not merely
+_anima_; see Madv. _D.F._ V. 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v. _animans_ is
+therefore wrong. _Temeritate_: προπετεια, which occurs _passim_ in Sext.
+The word, which is constantly hurled at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is
+here put by way of retort. So in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 260, the sceptic
+is called εμβροντητος for rejecting the καταληπτικη φαντασια.
+
+§32. _Incerta_: αδηλα. _Democritus_: cf. I. 44. _Quae ... abstruserit_:
+"_because_ she has hidden." _Alii autem_: note the ellipse of the verb, and
+cf. I. 2. _Etiam queruntur_: "actually complain;" "go so far as to
+complain." _Inter incertum_: cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 7, 12,
+διαφοραν ειναι αδηλου και ακαταληπτου, και παντα μεν ειναι ακαταληπτα ου
+παντα δε αδηλα (quoted as from Carneades), also 54 of this book. _Docere_:
+"to prove," cf. n. on 121. _Qui haec distinguunt_: the followers of
+Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on I. 45. _Stellarum
+numerus_: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in Sext. e.g.
+_P.H_. II. 90, 98, _A.M_. VII. 243, VIII. 147, 317; where it is reckoned
+among things αιωνιον εχοντα αγνωσιαν. So in the Psalms, God only "telleth
+the number of the stars;" cf. 110. _Aliquos_: contemptuous; απονενοημενους
+τινας. Cf. _Parad._ 33 _agrestis aliquos_. _Moveri_: this probably refers
+to the speech of Catulus; see Introd. p. 51. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 15
+refers to this passage, which must have been preserved in the second
+edition.
+
+§33. _Veri et falsi_: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first
+clause, and Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and
+appropriate. "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and
+the false while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether."
+The discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use
+the term "true" to denote the _probably true_, the Academics are not open
+to the criticism here attempted; cf. 111 _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_.
+_Ut inter rectum et pravum_: the sceptic would no more allow the absolute
+certainty of this distinction than of the other. _Communis_: the
+απαραλλακτος of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf.
+κοινη φαντασια αληθους και ψευδους Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410),
+also 175. _Notam_: the σημειον of Sextus; cf. esp. _P.H_. II. 97 sq. _Eodem
+modo falsum_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) ουδεμια εστιν αληθης
+φαντασια ‛οια ουκ αν γενοιτο ψευδης. _Ut si quis_: Madv. in an important n.
+on _D.F._ IV. 30 explains this thus; _ista ratione si quis ... privaverit,
+possit dicere_. I do not think our passage at all analogous to those he
+quotes, and still prefer to construe _quem_ as a strong relative, making a
+pause between _quis_ and _quem_. _Visionem_: Simply another trans. of
+φαντασια. _Ut Carneades_: see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 166 την τε πιθανην
+φαντασιαν και την πιθανην ‛αμα και απερισπαστον και διεξωδευμενην (R. and
+P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 "probable
+undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own explanation.
+The merely πιθανη is that sensation which at first sight, without any
+further inquiry, seems probably true (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 167--175). Now no
+sensation is perceived _alone_; the percipient subject has always other
+synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (περισπαν,
+περιελκειν) from the one which is the immediate object of his attention.
+This last is only called απερισπαστος when examination has shown all the
+concomitant sensations to be in harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175--181.)
+The word "undisputed," therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The
+διεξωδευμενη ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent
+agreement of the concomitant sensations with the principal one.
+Circumstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined;
+the time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition
+of the space within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between
+the person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the
+person's mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext.
+181--189).
+
+§34. _Communitas_: απαραλλαξια or επιμιξια των φαντασιων; Sext. _A.M._ VII.
+403, _P.H._ I. 127. _Proprium_: so Sext. often uses ιδιομα, e.g. _A. M._
+IX. 410. _Signo notari_: _signo_ for _nota_, merely from love of variety.
+The _in_ before _communi_, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is
+perfectly sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after
+_notare_ in _De Or._, III. 186. _Convicio_: so Madv. _Em._ 143 corrected
+the corrupt MSS. readings, comparing _Orator_ 160, _Ad Fam._ XV. 18. A.W.
+Zumpt on _Pro Murena_ 13 rightly defines the Ciceronian use of the word,
+"_Non unum maledictum appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi
+vociferatio_." He is wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word
+_once_ in the plural (_Ad Att._ II. 18, 1), for it occurs _N.D._ II. 20,
+and elsewhere. _Perspicua_: εναργη, a term used with varying signification
+by all the later Greek schools. _Verum illud quidem_: "which is indeed what
+_they_ call 'true'." _Impressum_: n. on 18. _Percipi atque comprehendi_:
+Halm retains the barbarous _ac_ of the MSS. before the guttural. It is
+quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The two verbs are both
+trans. of καταλαμβανεσθαι; Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus
+described in _D.F._ III. 14 _erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum
+vocabulis idem declarantibus_. _Subtiliter_: Cic.'s constant trans. of
+ακριβως or κατ' ακριβειαν (_passim_ in Sext. e.g. _P.H._ II. 123).
+_Inaniterne moveatur_: MSS. agree in _ve_ for _ne_, on which see _M.D.F._
+IV. 76. _Inaniter_ = κενως = ψευδως. Cf. n. on I. 35, also II. 47, _D.F._
+V. 3 (_inaniter moveri_), _T.D._ IV. 13, _De Div._ II. 120, 126, 140 (_per
+se moveri_), Greek κενοπαθειν (Sext. _P.H._ II. 49), κενοπαθεια (= _inanis
+motus_, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 184), κενοπαθηματα και αναπλασματα της διανοιας
+(_ib._ VIII. 354), διακενος ‛ελκυσμος (_ib._ VII. 241), διακενος φαντασια
+(_ib._ VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase κινημα της διανοιας. For the
+meaning see n. on 47. _Relinquitur_: so in Sext. απολειπειν is constantly
+used as the opposite of αναιρειν (_tollere_).
+
+§35. _Neminem_ etc.: they are content to make strong statements without any
+mark of certainty. _Primo quasi adspectu_: the _merely_ πιθανη φαντασια is
+here meant; see 33.
+
+§36. _Ex circumspectione_, etc.: the διεξωδευμενη; see n. on 33. _Primum
+quia ... deinde_: for the slight anacoluthia, cf. _M.D.F_ ed. II. p. 796.
+_Iis visis_, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of _things_, emitting a number
+of _appearances_, and you cannot be sure of uniting each _appearance_ to
+the _thing_ from which it proceeds, then you can have no faith in any
+_appearance_ even if you have gone through the process required by
+Carneades' rules. _Ad verum ipsum_: cf. 40. _Quam proxime_: cf. 47, and
+also 7. _Insigne_: σημειον, the same as _nota_ and _signum_ above. _Quo
+obscurato_: so Lamb. for MSS. _obscuro_ which Halm keeps. Cf. _quam
+obscurari volunt_ in 42 and _quo sublato_ in 33. _Argumentum_: Cic. seems
+to be thinking of the word τεκμηριον, which, however, the Stoics hardly
+use. _Id quod significatur_: το σημειωντον in Sext.
+
+    §§37--40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to act. You must
+    either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to
+    phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a
+    firm assent to be given to some phenomena, he therefore who does away
+    with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39).
+
+§37. _Explicabamus_: 19--21 and 30 (_quae vis esset in sensibus_).
+_Inanimum_: not _inanimatum_, cf. _M.D.F_. IV. 36. _Agit aliquid_: I. 23.
+_Quae est in nostra_: Walker's insertion of _non_ before _est_ is needless,
+cf. n. on I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the
+assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 397 το μεν γαρ
+φαντασιωθηναι αβουλητον ην). For _in potestate_ cf. _De Fato_ 9, _N.D._ I.
+69
+
+§38. _Eripitur_: cf. 30. _Neque sentire_: Christ om. _neque_; but the
+sceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. _Cedere_:
+cf. εικειν, ειξις in Sext. _P.H._ I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51, των δε
+αισθητικων μετα ειξεως και συγκαταθεσεως γινονται [‛αι φαντασια]; also 66
+of this book. Οικειον: cf. 34. _Adsentitur statim_: this really contradicts
+a good deal that has gone before, esp. 20. _Memoriam_: cf. 22. _In nostra
+potestate_: this may throw light on fragm. 15 of the _Ac. Post._, which
+see.
+
+§39. _Virtus_: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral
+action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. _Ante videri
+aliquid_ for the doctrine cf. 25, for the passive use of _videri_, n. on
+25. _Adsentiatur_: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. _Em._ 131, the
+change of construction from infin. to subj. after _necesse est_ on _D.F._
+V. 25. _Tollit e vita_: so _De Fato_ 29.
+
+    §§40--42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give
+    a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different
+    classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong
+    arguments, (1) _things_ which produce _sensations_ such as might have
+    been produced in the same form by other _things_, cannot be partly
+    capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) _sensations_ must
+    be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to
+    distinguish between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly
+    true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real _perceptions_,
+    while the true are always of a form which the false _may_ assume. Now
+    sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly
+    perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also
+    a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1)
+    false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are
+    indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not.
+    The following two assertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are
+    partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a
+    reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an
+    unreality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions
+    into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from
+    sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either
+    class (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a certainly known
+    sensation."]
+
+§40. _Quasi fundamenta_: a trans. probably of θεμελιος or the like; cf.
+‛ωσπερ θεμελιος in Sext. _A.M._ V. 50. _Artem_: method, like τεχνη, cf.
+_M.D.F._ III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. _Vim_: the general character which
+attaches to all φαντασιαι; _genera_ the different classes of φαντασιαι.
+_Totidem verbis_: of course with a view to showing that nothing really
+corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the _reductio ad
+absurdum_ method. _Contineant ... quaestionem_: cf. 22 and _T.D._ IV. 65
+_una res videtur causam continere_. _Quae ita_: it is essential throughout
+this passage to distinguish clearly the _sensation_ (_visum_) from the
+_thing_ which causes it. Here the _things_ are meant; two _things_ are
+supposed to cause two _sensations_ so similar that the person who has one
+of the _sensations_ cannot tell from which of the two _things_ it comes.
+Under these circumstances the sceptics urge that it is absurd to divide
+_things_ into those which can be perceived (known with certainty) and those
+which cannot. _Nihil interesse autem_: the sceptic is not concerned to
+prove the absolute similarity of the two sensations which come from the two
+dissimilar things, it is enough if he can show that human faculties are not
+perfect enough to discern whatever difference may exist, cf. 85. _Alia vera
+sunt_: Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that
+truth and falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of
+_things_, though not of _sensations_. If we could only pierce _through_ a
+sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to
+believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume
+that _sensation_ and _thing_ correspond. Cf. Sext. _P.H._ I. 22 περι μεν
+του φαισθαι τοιον η τοιον το ‛υποκειμενον (i.e. the thing from which the
+appearance proceeds) ουδεις ισως αμφισβητει, περι δε του ει τοιουτον εστιν
+‛οποιον φαινεται ζητειται. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as
+some modern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause
+sensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the
+things, our sensations do not give us correct information about them.
+_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 33 _eodem modo_. _Non posse accidere_: this is a very
+remarkable, and, as Madv. (_D.F._ I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from
+_recta oratio to obliqua_. Halm with Manut. reads _potest_. Cf. 101.
+
+§41. _Neque enim_: a remark of Lucullus' merely. _Quod sit a vero_: cf.
+Munio on Lucr. II. 51 _fulgor ab auro_. _Possit_: for the om. of _esse_ cf.
+n. on I. 29.
+
+§42. _Proposita_: cf. προτασεις _passim_ in Sext. _In sensus_: = _in ea,
+quae ad sensus pertinent_ cf. I. 20. _Omni consuetudine_: "general
+experience" εμπειρια, cf. _N.D._ I. 83. _Quam obscurari volunt_: cf. I. 33.
+_quod explanari volebant_; the em. of Dav. _obscurare_ is against Cic.'s
+usage, that of Christ _quam observari nolunt_ is wanton without being
+ingenious. _De reliquis_: i.e. _iis quae a sensibus ducuntur_. _In
+singulisque rebus_: the word _rebus_ must mean _subjects_, not _things_, to
+which the words _in minima dispertiunt_ would hardly apply. _Adiuncta_:
+Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) πασηι τη δοκουσηι αληθει καθεσταναι
+ευρισκεται τις απαραλλακτος ψευδης, also VII. 438, etc.
+
+    §§43--45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to _define_, for (1) a
+    definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition
+    is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being
+    thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes
+    of reasoning their _probabile_ is not enough. Reasoning can only
+    proceed upon _certain_ premisses. Again to say that there are false
+    sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge
+    therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is
+    none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of
+    _visa_, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).
+
+§43. _Horum_: Lamb. _harum_; the text however is quite right, cf. Madv.
+_Gram._ 214 b. _Luminibus_: cf. 101. _Nihilo magis_: = ουδεν μαλλον, which
+was constantly in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext. _P.H._ I. 14. _Num
+illa definitio ... transferri_: I need hardly point out that the ‛ορος of
+the Academics was merely founded on probability, just as their "truth" was
+(cf. n. on 29). An Academic would say in reply to the question, "probably
+it cannot, but I will not affirm it." _Vel illa vera_: these words seem to
+me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them. _Vel_ = "even" i.e. if
+_even_ the definition is firmly known, the thing, which is more important,
+must also be known. In _illa vera_ we have a pointed mocking repetition
+like that of _veri et falsi_ in 33. _In falsum_: note that _falsum_ =
+_aliam rem_ above. For the sense cf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 209 μοχθηρους ‛ορους
+ειναι τους περιεχοντας τι των μη προσοντων τοις ‛οριστοις, and the
+schoolmen's maxim _definitio non debet latior esse definito suo_. _Minime
+volunt_: cf. 18. _Partibus_: Orelli after Goer. ejected this, but _omnibus_
+hardly ever stands for _omn. rebus_, therefore C.F. Hermann reads _pariter
+rebus_ for _partibus_. A little closer attention to the subject matter
+would have shown emendation to be unnecessary, cf. 42 _dividunt in partis_,
+_T.D._ III. 24, where _genus_ = division, _pars_ = subdivision.
+
+§44. _Impediri ... fatebuntur_: essentially the same argument as in 33 at
+the end. _Occurretur_: not an imitation of εναντιουσθαι as Goer. says, but
+of απανταν, which occurs very frequently in Sext. _Sumpta_: the two
+premisses are in Gk. called together λημματα, separately λημμα and
+προσληψις (_sumptio et adsumptio_ _De Div_ II. 108). _Orationis_: as Faber
+points out, Cic. does sometimes use this word like _ratio_ (συλλογισμος),
+cf. _De Leg._ I. 48 _conclusa oratio_. Fab. refers to Gell. XV. 26.
+_Profiteatur_: so ‛υπισχνεισθαι is often used by Sext. e.g. _A.M._ VIII.
+283. _Patefacturum_: n. on 26, εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος, δηλωτικος (the
+last in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 277) often recur in Greek. _Primum esse ...
+nihil interesse_: there is no inconsistency. Carneades allowed that _visa_,
+_in themselves_, might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties
+were incapable of distinguishing those _visa_ which proceed from real
+things and give a correct representation of the things, from those which
+either are mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly
+represent it. Lucullus confuses _essential_ with _apparent_ difference.
+_Non iungitur_: a supposed case of διαρτησις, which is opposed to
+συναρτησις and explained in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 430.
+
+§45. _Assentati_: here simply = _assensi_. _Praeteritis_: here used in the
+strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed over," cf. _in
+remissis_ _Orat._ 59. _Primum igitur ... sed tamen_: for the slight
+anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Iis qui videntur_: Goer. _is qui
+videtur_, which is severely criticised by Madv. _Em._ 150. For Epicurus'
+view of sensation see n. on 79, 80.
+
+    §§46--48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to the innate
+    clearness of some phenomena (εναργεια) is due to two causes, (1) they
+    do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which these
+    phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic
+    paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom
+    sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is
+    easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be
+    mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom
+    sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The
+    dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom sensations _do_ command
+    assent. Why should they not admit that they command assent when they so
+    closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48)
+
+§46. _Circumfusa sint_: Goer. retains the MSS. _sunt_ on the ground that
+the clause _quanta sint_ is inserted παρενθετικως! Orelli actually follows
+him. For the phrase cf. 122 _circumfusa tenebris_. _Interrogationibus_: cf.
+I. 5 where I showed that the words _interrogatio_ and _conclusio_ are
+convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure syllogisms are very frequently
+called ερωτησεις, and that he often introduces a new argument by ερωταται
+και τουτο, when there is nothing interrogatory about the argument at all.
+_Dissolvere_: απολυεσθαι in Sext. _Occurrere_: cf. 44.
+
+§47. _Confuse loqui_: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus
+in _D.F._ II. 27. _Nulla sunt_: on the use of _nullus_ for _non_ in Cic.
+cf. Madv. _Gram._ 455 obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very
+common in Plaut. and Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the
+Letters. _Inaniter_: cf. 34. There are two ways in which a sensation may be
+false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be supposed by
+the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different thing, (2) it
+may be a mere φαντασμα or αναπλασμα της διανοιας, a phantom behind which
+there is no reality at all. _Quae in somnis videantur_: for the support
+given by Stoics to all forms of divination see Zeller 166, _De Div._ I. 7,
+etc. _Quaerunt_: a slight anacoluthon from _dicatis_ above. _Quonam modo
+... nihil sit omnino_: this difficult passage can only be properly
+explained in connection with 50 and with the general plan of the Academics
+expounded in 41. After long consideration I elucidate it as follows. The
+whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced in 41 and 42 viz.
+_omnibus veris visis adiuncta esse falsa_. The criticism in 50 shows that
+the argument is meant to be based on the assumption known to be Stoic,
+_omnia deum posse_. If the god can manufacture (_efficere_) sensations
+which are false, but probable (as the Stoics say he does in dreams), why
+can he not manufacture false sensations which are so probable as to closely
+resemble true ones, or to be only with difficulty distinguishable from the
+true, or finally to be utterly indistinguishable from the true (this
+meaning of _inter quae nihil sit omnino_ is fixed by 40, where see n.)?
+_Probabilia_, then, denotes false sensations such as have only a slight
+degree of resemblance to the true, by the three succeeding stages the
+resemblance is made complete. The word _probabilia_ is a sort of tertiary
+predicate after _efficere_ ("to manufacture so as to be probable"). It
+_must not be repeated_ after the second _efficere_, or the whole sense will
+be inverted and this section placed out of harmony with 50. _Plane
+proxime_: = _quam proxime_ of 36.
+
+§48. _Ipsa per sese_: simply = _inaniter_ as in 34, 47, i.e. without the
+approach of any external object. _Cogitatione_: the only word in Latin, as
+διανοια is in Greek, to express our "imagination." _Non numquam_: so Madv.
+for MSS. _non inquam_. Goer. after Manut. wrote _non inquiunt_ with an
+interrogation at _omnino_. _Veri simile est_: so Madv. _D.F._ III. 58 for
+_sit_. The argument has the same purpose as that in the last section, viz
+to show that phantom sensations may produce the same effect on the mind as
+those which proceed from realities. _Ut si qui_: the _ut_ here is merely
+"as," "for instance," cf. n. on 33. _Nihil ut esset_: the _ut_ here is a
+repetition of the _ut_ used several times in the early part of the
+sentence, all of them alike depend on _sic_. Lamb. expunged _ut_ before
+_esset_ and before _quicquam_. _Intestinum et oblatum_: cf. Sext. _A.M._
+VII. 241 ητοι των εκτος η των εν ‛ημιν παθων, and the two classes of _falsa
+visa_ mentioned in n. on 47. _Sin autem sunt_, etc.: if there _are_ false
+sensations which are probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not
+be false sensations so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable
+from the true? The rest exactly as in 47.
+
+    §§49--53. Antiochus attacked these arguments as _soritae_, and
+    therefore faulty (49). The admission of a certain amount of similarity
+    between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the
+    impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50). We
+    contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we
+    require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we
+    make light of the sensations we had while in it (51). But, say our
+    opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our
+    waking ones. This we deny (52). "But," say they, "you allow that the
+    wise man in madness withholds his assent." This proves nothing, for he
+    will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about
+    dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention (53).
+
+§49. _Antiochus_: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and
+similar subjects. _Ipsa capita_: αυτα τα κεφαλαια. _Interrogationis_: the
+_sorites_ was always in the form of a series of questions, cf. _De Div._
+II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his
+proposed trans. _acervalis_ is unnecessary), _Hortens._ fragm. 47, and n.
+on 92. _Hoc vocant_: i.e. _hoc genus_, cf. _D.F._ III. 70 _ex eo genere,
+quae prosunt_. _Vitiosum_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 50 _ille sorites, quo nihil
+putatis_ (Stoici) _vitiosius_. Most edd. read _hos_, which indeed in 136 is
+a necessary em. for MSS. _hoc_. _Tale visum_: i.e. _falsum_. _Dormienti_:
+sc. τινι. _Ut probabile sit_, etc.: cf. 47, 48 and notes. _Primum quidque_:
+not _quodque_ as Klotz; cf. _M.D.F._ II. 105, to whose exx. add _De Div._
+II. 112, and an instance of _proximus quisque_ in _De Off._ II. 75.
+_Vitium_: cf. _vitiosum_ above.
+
+§50. _Omnia deum posse_: this was a principle generally admitted among
+Stoics at least, see _De Div._ II. 86. For the line of argument here cf.
+_De Div._ II. 106 _fac dare deos, quod absurdum est_. _Eadem_: this does
+not mean that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when
+one of them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n.
+on 40. _Similes_: after this _sunt_ was added by Madv. _In suo genere
+essent_: substitute _esse viderentur_ for _essent_, and you get the real
+view of the Academic, who would allow that _things in their essence_ are
+divisible into sharply-defined _genera_, but would deny that the
+_sensations_ which proceed from or are caused by the _things_, are so
+divisible.
+
+§51. _Una depulsio_: cf. 128 (_omnium rerum una est definitio
+comprehendendi_), _De Div._ II. 136 (_omnium somniorum una ratio est_). _In
+quiete_: = _in somno_, a rather poetical usage. _Narravit_: Goer., Orelli,
+Klotz alter into _narrat_, most wantonly. _Visus Homerus_, etc.: this
+famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his _Annals_, is referred to by Lucr.
+I. 124, Cic. _De Rep._ VI. 10 (_Somn. Scip._ c. 1), Hor. _Epist._ II. 1,
+50. _Simul ut_: rare in Cic., see Madv. _D.F._ II. 33, who, however, unduly
+restricts the usage. In three out of the five passages where he allows it
+to stand, the _ut_ precedes a vowel; Cic. therefore used it to avoid
+writing _ac_ before a vowel, so that in _D.F._ II. 33 _ut_ should probably
+be written (with Manut. and others) for _et_ which Madv. ejects.
+
+§52. _Eorumque_: MSS. om. _que_. Dav. wrote _ac_ before _eorum_, this
+however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a guttural condemned in n.
+on 34. For the argument see n. on 80 _quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non
+quid videatur_. _Primum interest_: for om. of _deinde_ cf. 45, 46.
+_Imbecillius_: cf. I. 41. _Edormiverunt_: "have slept _off_ the effects,"
+cf. αποβριζειν in Homer. _Relaxentur_: cf. ανιεναι της οργης Aristoph.
+_Ran._ 700, _relaxare_ is used in the neut. sense in _D.F._ II. 94.
+_Alcmaeonis_: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is often quoted by Cic., e.g. _D.F._
+IV. 62.
+
+§53. _Sustinet_: επεχει; see on 94. _Aliquando sustinere_: the point of the
+Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness the εποχη of
+the _sapiens_ becomes _habitual_; he gives up the attempt to distinguish
+between true and false _visa_. Lucullus answers that, did no distinction
+exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it, even in the sane condition.
+_Confundere_: so 58, 110, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 56 (συγχεουσι τα πραγματα),
+_ib._ VIII. 157 (συγχεομεν τον βιον), VIII. 372 (‛ολην συγχεει την
+φιλοσοφον ζητησιν), Plut. _De Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos_ p. 1077 (‛ως
+παντα πραγματα συγχεουσι). _Utimur_: "we have to put up with," so χρησθαι
+is used in Gk. _Ebriosorum_: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than
+_vinolenti_ above. _Illud attendimus_: Goer., and Orelli write _num illud_,
+but the emphatic _ille_ is often thus introduced by itself in questions, a
+good ex. occurs in 136. _Proferremus_: this must apparently be added to the
+exx. qu. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 of the subj. used to denote "_non id
+quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri debuerit_." As such passages are
+often misunderstood, I note that they can be most rationally explained as
+elliptic constructions in which a _condition_ is expressed without its
+_consequence_. We have an exact parallel in English, e.g. "_tu dictis
+Albane maneres_" may fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy
+word, Alban!" Here the condition "_if_ thou hadst kept, etc." stands
+without the consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the
+kind. Such a condition may be expressed without _si_, just as in Eng.
+without "_if_," cf. Iuv. III. 78 and Mayor's n. The use of the Greek
+optative to express a wish (with ει γαρ, etc., and even without ει) is
+susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has many such points
+of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most of the functions
+of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 seems to imply that he
+prefers the hypothesis of a suppressed protasis, but as in his _Gram._ 351
+_b_, obs. 4 he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be certain.]
+
+    §§54--63. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such doctrines do
+    away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and seals is
+    childish (54). They press into their service the old physical
+    philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much ridiculed by them
+    (55). Democritus may say that innumerable worlds exist in every
+    particular similar to ours, but I appeal to more cultivated physicists,
+    who maintain that each thing has its own peculiar marks (55, 56). The
+    Servilii were distinguished from one another by their friends, and
+    Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the appearance of an egg which
+    hen had laid it (56, 57). We however, do not much care whether we are
+    able to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that
+    they say is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between
+    individual sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58).
+    Equally absurd are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they
+    profess to follow. The doctrine that true and false sensations are
+    indistinguishable logically leads to the unqualified εποχη of Arcesilas
+    (59). What nonsense they talk about inquiring after the truth, and
+    about the bad influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero, the
+    panegyrist of philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian darkness?
+    (61) By holding that knowledge is impossible you weaken the force of
+    your famous oath that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus ended
+    Lucullus, amid the continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then
+    Catulus said that he should not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus
+    were to induce me to change my view (63).
+
+§54. _Ne hoc quidem_: the common trans. "not even" for "_ne quidem_" is
+often inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this _either_," cf. n. on
+I. 5. _Habeant_: the slight alteration _habeat_ introduced by Goer. and
+Orelli quite destroys the point of the sentence. _Quod nolunt_: cf. 44. _An
+sano_: Lamb. _an ut sano_, which Halm approves, and Baiter reads.
+_Similitudines_: cf. 84--86. The impossibility of distinguishing between
+twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was a favourite theme with the
+sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no two things were absolutely
+alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the Stoic view, was practically
+refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who took two twins, and made one
+deposit money with Aristo, while the other after a time asked for the money
+back and received it. On this subject cf. Sextus _A.M._ VII. 408--410.
+_Negat esse_: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places _esse_ second,
+especially at the end of a clause. _Cur eo non estis contenti_: Lucullus
+here ignores the question at issue, which concerned the _amount_ of
+similarity. The dogmatists maintained that the similarity between two
+phenomena could never be great enough to render it impossible to guard
+against mistaking the one for the other, the sceptics argued that it could.
+_Quod rerum natura non patitur_: again Lucullus confounds _essential_ with
+_phenomenal_ difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on 50. _Nulla re
+differens_: cf. the _nihil differens_ of 99, the substitution of which here
+would perhaps make the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the
+common Gk. term απαραλλακτος (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 252, etc.). _Ulla
+communitas_: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of
+Lamb. _nulla_ after the fine note of Madv. (_Em._ 154), approved by Halm
+and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the Stoics may be stated
+thus _suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec est in duobus aut
+pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas_ (ουδε ‛υπαρχει επιμιγη
+απαραλλακτος). This opinion is negatived by _non patitur ut_ and it will be
+evident at a glance that the only change required is to put the two verbs
+(_est_) into the subjunctive. The change of _ulla_ into _nulla_ is in no
+way needed. _Ut_ [_sibi_] _sint_: _sibi_ is clearly wrong here. Madv., in a
+note communicated privately to Halm and printed by the latter on p. 854 of
+Bait. and Halm's ed of the philosophical works, proposed to read _nulla re
+differens communitas visi? Sint et ova_ etc. omitting _ulla_ and _ut_ and
+changing _visi_ into _sibi_ (cf. Faber's em. _novas_ for _bonas_ in 72).
+This ingenious but, as I think, improbable conj. Madv. has just repeated in
+the second vol. of his _Adversaria_. Lamb. reads _at tibi sint_, Dav. _at
+si vis, sint_, Christ _ut tibi sint_, Bait. _ut si sint_ after C.F.W.
+Muller, I should prefer _sui_ for _sibi_ (SVI for SIBI). B is very
+frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip in. _Eosdem_:
+once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps intentional misconception
+of the sceptic position; see n. on 50. Before leaving this section, I may
+point out that the επιμιγη or επιμιξια των φαντασιων supplies Sext. with
+one of the sceptic τροποι, see _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 124.
+
+§55. _Irridentur_: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the
+constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. _A.M._ IX. 1. _Absolute ita
+paris_: Halm as well as Bait. after Christ, brackets _ita_; if any change
+be needed, it would be better to place it before _undique_. For this
+opinion of Democr. see R. and P. 45. _Et eo quidem innumerabilis_: this is
+the quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has
+yet been proposed, cf. 125. _Nihil differat, nihil intersit_: these two
+verbs often appear together in Cic., e.g._D.F._ III. 25.
+
+§56. _Potiusque_: this adversative use of _que_ is common with _potius_,
+e.g._D.F._ I. 51. Cf. _T.D._ II. 55 _ingemescere nonnum quam viro concessum
+est, idque raro_, also _ac potius_, _Ad Att._ I. 10, etc. _Proprietates_:
+the ιδιοτητες or ιδιωματα of Sextus, the doctrine of course involves the
+whole question at issue between dogmatism and scepticism. _Cognoscebantur_:
+Dav. _dignoscebantur_, Walker _internoscebantur_. The MSS. reading is
+right, cf. 86. _Consuetudine_: cf. 42, "experience". _Minimum_: an adverb
+like _summum_.
+
+§57. _Dinotatas_: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not
+recognise the word. Most edd. change it into _denotatas_. _Artem_: τεχνην,
+a set of rules. _In proverbio_: so _venire in proverbium_, _in proverbii
+usum venire_, _proverbii locum obtinere_, _proverbii loco dici_ are all
+used. _Salvis rebus_: not an uncommon phrase, e.g. _Ad Fam._ IV. 1.
+_Gallinas_: cf. fragm. 19 of the _Acad. Post._ The similarity of eggs was
+discussed _ad nauseam_ by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras the Stoic
+actually wrote a book entitled, ωι σκοπια (egg investigation) η περι
+σοφιστειας προς Ακαδημαικους, mentioned by Suidas.
+
+§58. _Contra nos_: the sense requires _nos_, but all Halm's MSS. except one
+read _vos_. _Non internoscere_: this is the reading of all the MSS., and is
+correct, though Orelli omits _non_. The sense is, "we are quite content not
+to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we shall not on that account be
+led into a mistake for our rule will prevent us from making any positive
+assertion about the eggs." _Adsentiri_: for the passive use of this verb
+cf. 39. _Par est_: so Dav. for _per_, which most MSS. have. The older edd.
+and Orelli have _potest_, with one MS. _Quasi_: the em. of Madv. for the
+_quam si_ of the MSS. _Transversum digitum_: cf. 116. _Ne confundam omnia_:
+cf. 53, 110. _Natura tolletur_: this of course the sceptics would deny.
+They refused to discuss the nature of _things in themselves_, and kept to
+_phenomena_. _Intersit_: i.e. _inter visa_. _In animos_: Orelli with one
+MS. reads _animis_; if the MSS. are correct the assertion of Krebs and
+Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) "_imprimere_ wird klas sisch verbunden _in
+aliqua re_, nicht _in aliquam rem_," will require modification. _Species et
+quasdam formas_: ειδη και γενη, _quasdam_ marks the fact that _formas_ is a
+trans. I have met with no other passage where any such doctrine is assigned
+to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine is absurd, for surely
+it must always be easier to distinguish between two _genera_ than between
+two individuals. If the _non_ before _vos_ were removed a better sense
+would be given. It has often been inserted by copyists when _sed_, _tamen_,
+or some such word, comes in the following clause, as in the famous passage
+of Cic _Ad Quintum Fratrem_, II. 11, discussed by Munro, Lucr. p. 313, ed.
+3.
+
+§59. _Illud vero perabsurdum_: note the omission of _est_, which often
+takes place after the emphatic pronoun. _Impediamini_: cf. n. on 33. _A
+veris_: if _visis_ be supplied the statement corresponds tolerably with the
+Academic belief, if _rebus_ be meant, it is wide of the mark. _Id est ...
+retentio_: supposed to be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on I. 6,
+8. _Constitit_: from _consto_, not from _consisto_ cf. 63 _qui tibi
+constares_. _Si vera sunt_: cf. 67, 78, 112, 148. The _nonnulli_ are Philo
+and Metrodorus, see 78. _Tollendus est adsensus_: i.e. even that qualified
+assent which the Academics gave to probable phenomena. _Adprobare_: this
+word is ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n.
+on 104. _Id est peccaturum_: "which is equivalent to sinning," cf. I. 42.
+_Iam nimium etiam_: note _iam_ and _etiam_ in the same clause.
+
+§60. _Pro omnibus_: note _omnibus_ for _omnibus rebus_. _Ista mysteria_:
+Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 37, 38 speaks of various doctrines, which were
+_servata et pro mysteriis custodita_ by the New Academics. The notion that
+the Academic scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while
+they had an esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the
+reactionary period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and
+may perhaps from a passage of Augustine, _C. Ac._ III. 41 (whose authority
+must have been Cicero), be attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller
+534, n.). The idea is ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p.
+279), and all succeeding inquirers. _Auctoritate_: cf. 8, 9. _Utroque_:
+this neuter, referring to two fem. nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv.
+_Gram._ 214 c.
+
+§61. _Amicissimum_: "_because_ you are my dear friend". _Commoveris_: a
+military term, cf. _De Div._ II. 26 and Forc., also Introd. p. 53.
+_Sequere_: either this is future, as in 109, or _sequeris_, the constant
+form in Cic. of the pres., must be read. _Approbatione omni_: the word
+_omni_ is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified assent, cf.
+59. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 74, and _D.F._ I. 64, where Madv. is wrong in
+reproving Torquatus for using the phrase _sensus tolli_, on the ground that
+the Academics swept away not _sensus_ but _iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis_.
+Goer. qu. Plin. _N.H._ III. 5, Sil. Ital. XII. 131, Festus, s.v.
+_Cimmerii_, to show that the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to
+Bauli, and probably induced this mention of the legendary people. _Deus
+aliquis_: so the best edd. without comment, although they write _deus
+aliqui_ in 19. It is difficult to distinguish between _aliquis_ and
+_aliqui_, _nescio quis_ and _nescio qui_, _si quis_ and _si qui_ (for the
+latter see n. on 81). As _aliquis_ is substantival, _aliqui_ adjectival,
+_aliquis_ must not be written with impersonal nouns like _terror_ (_T.D._
+IV. 35, V. 62), _dolor_ (_T.D._ I. 82, _Ad Fam._ VII. 1, 1), _casus_ (_De
+Off._ III. 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd. vary, e.g.
+_deus aliqui_ (_T.D._ I. 23, IV. 35), _deus aliquis_ (_Lael._ 87, _Ad Fam._
+XIV. 7, 1), _anularius aliqui_ (86 of this book), _magistratus aliquis_
+(_In Verr._ IV. 146). With a proper name belonging to a real person
+_aliquis_ ought to be written (_Myrmecides_ in 120, see my n.).
+_Dispiciendum_: not _despiciendum_, cf. _M.D.F._ II. 97, IV. 64, also _De
+Div._ II. 81, _verum dispicere_. _Iis vinculis_, etc. this may throw light
+on fragm. 15 of the _Acad. Post._, which see.
+
+§62. _Motum animorum_: n. on 34. _Actio rerum_: here _actio_ is a pure
+verbal noun like πραξις, cf. _De Off._ I. 83, and expressions like _actio
+vitae_ (_N.D._ I. 2), _actio ullius rei_ (108 of this book), and the
+similar use of _actus_ in Quintilian (_Inst. Or._ X. 1, 31, with Mayor's
+n.) _Iuratusque_: Bait. possibly by a mere misprint reads _iratus_.
+_Comperisse_: this expression of Cic., used in the senate in reference to
+Catiline's conspiracy, had become a cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic.
+was often taunted. See _Ad Fam._ V. 5, 2, _Ad Att._ I. 14, 5. _Licebat_:
+this is the reading of the best MSS., not _liquebat_, which Goer., Kl., Or.
+have. For the support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy
+see 3, and the passages quoted in Introd. p. 46 with respect to Catulus, in
+most of which Lucullus is also mentioned.
+
+§63. _Quod ... fecerat, ut_: different from the constr. treated by Madv.
+_Gram._ 481 b. _Quod_ refers simply to the fact of Lucullus' admiration,
+which the clause introduced by _ut_ defines, "which admiration he had shown
+... to such an extent that, etc." _Iocansne an_: this use of _ne ... an_
+implies, Madv. says (on _D.F._ V. 87), more doubt than the use of _ne_
+alone as in _vero falsone_. _Memoriter_: nearly all edd. before Madv. make
+this mean _e memoria_ as opposed to _de scripto_; he says, "_laudem habet
+bonae et copiosae memoriae_" (on _D.F._ I. 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in
+the _Antibarbarus_, ed. 4. _Censuerim_: more modest than _censeo_, see
+Madv. _Gram._ 380. _Tantum enim non te modo monuit_: edd. before Madv.,
+seeing no way of taking _modo_ exc. with _non_, ejected it. Madv. (_Em._
+160) retains it, making it mean _paulo ante_. On the other hand, Halm after
+Christ asserts that _tantum non_ = μονον ου occurs nowhere else in Cic.
+Bait. therefore ejects _non_, taking _tantum_ as _hoc tantum, nihil
+praeterea_. Livy certainly has the suspected use of _tantum non_.
+_Tribunus_: a retort comes in 97, 144. _Antiochum_: cf. I. 13.
+_Destitisse_: on the difference between _memini_ followed by the pres. and
+by the perf. inf. consult Madv. _Gram._ 408 _b_, obs. 2.
+
+    §§64--71. Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The strength of
+    Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it can be
+    answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my
+    character (64). I protest my entire sincerity in all that I say, and
+    would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (65). I am a passionate
+    inquirer after truth, and on that very account hold it disgraceful to
+    assent to what is false. I do not deny that I make slips, but we must
+    deal with the _sapiens_, whose characteristic it is never to err in
+    giving his assent (66). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the _sapiens_ ever
+    gives his assent he will be obliged to _opine_, but he never will
+    _opine_ therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and
+    Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is
+    possible to distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so
+    the mere habit of assenting is full of peril. Still, our whole argument
+    must tend to show that _perception_ in the Stoic sense is impossible
+    (68). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When he was converted,
+    what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long denied? (69) Some
+    think he wished to found a school called by his own name. It is more
+    probable that he could no longer bear the opposition of all other
+    schools to the Academy (70). His conversion gave a splendid opening for
+    an _argumentum ad hominem_ (71).
+
+§64. _Quadam oratione_: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not
+_quandam orationem_ as Lamb., Orelli. _De ipsa re_: cf. _de causa ipsa_
+above. _Respondere posse_: for the om. of _me_ before the infin, which has
+wrongly caused many edd. either to read _respondere_ (as Dav., Bait.) or to
+insert _me_ (as Lamb.), see n. on I. 7.
+
+§65. _Studio certandi_: = φιλονεικια. _Pertinacia ... calumnia_: n. on 14.
+_Iurarem_: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of his
+consulship.
+
+§66. _Turpissimum_: cf. I. 45, _N.D._ I. 1. _Opiner_: _opinio_ or δοξα is
+judgment based on insufficient grounds. _Sed quaerimus de sapiente_: cf.
+115, _T.D._ IV. 55, 59 also _De Or._ III. 75 _non quid ego sed quid
+orator_. _Magnus ... opinator_: Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 31 qu. this
+passage wrongly as from the _Hortensius_. He imitates it, _ibid._ I. 15
+_magnus definitor_. _Qua fidunt_, etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s
+_Aratea_, and are quoted in _N.D._ II. 105, 106. _Phoenices_: the same fact
+is mentioned by Ovid, _Fasti_ III. 107, _Tristia_ IV. 3, 1. _Sed Helicen_:
+the best MSS. om. _ad_, which Orelli places before _Helicen_. _Elimatas_:
+the MSS. are divided between this and _limatas_. _Elimare_, though a very
+rare word occurs _Ad Att._ XVI. 7, 3. _Visis cedo_: cf. n. on 38. _Vim
+maximam_: so _summum munus_ is applied to the same course of action in
+_D.F._ III. 31. _Cogitatione_: "idea". _Temeritate_: cf. I. 42, _De Div._
+I. 7, and the charge of προπετεια constantly brought against the dogmatists
+by Sext. _Praepostere_: in a disorderly fashion, taking the wrong thing
+first.
+
+§67. _Aliquando ... opinabitur_: this of course is only true if you grant
+the Academic doctrine, _nihil posse percipi_. _Secundum illud ... etiam
+opinari_: it seems at first sight as though _adsentiri_ and _opinari_ ought
+to change places in this passage, as Manut. proposes. The difficulty lies
+in the words _secundum illud_, which, it has been supposed, must refer back
+to the second premiss of Arcesilas' argument. But if the passage be
+translated thus, "Carneades sometimes granted _as a second premiss_ the
+following statement, that the wise man sometimes does opine" the difficulty
+vanishes. The argument of Carneades would then run thus, (1) _Si ulli rei_,
+etc. as above, (2) _adsentietur autem aliquando_, (3) _opinabitur igitur_.
+
+§68. _Adsentiri quicquam_: only with neuter pronouns like this could
+_adsentiri_ be followed by an accusative case. _Sustinenda est_: εφεκτεον.
+_Iis quae possunt_: these words MSS. om. _Tam in praecipiti_: for the
+position of _in_ cf. n. on I. 25. The best MSS. have here _tamen in_. Madv.
+altered _tamen_ to _tam_ in n. on _D.F._ V. 26. The two words are often
+confused, as in _T.D._ IV. 7, cf. also n. on I. 16. _Sin autem_, etc.: cf.
+the passage of Lactantius _De Falsa Sapientia_ III. 3, qu. by P. Valentia
+(p. 278 of Orelli's reprint) _si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates
+docuit, neque opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est_.
+_Nitamur ... percipi_: "let us struggle to prove the proposition, etc." The
+construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect _hoc_, or some
+such word, to have fallen out between _igitur_ and _nihil_.
+
+§69. _Non acrius_: one of the early editions omits _non_ while Goer. reads
+_acutius_ and puts a note of interrogation at _defensitaverat_. M. _Em._
+161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the old arguments of
+Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his new arguments
+against it. _Quis enim_: so Lamb. for MSS. _quisquam enim_. _Excogitavit_:
+on interrogations not introduced by a particle of any kind see Madv.
+_Gram._ 450. _Eadem dicit_: on the subject in hand, of course. Taken
+without this limitation the proposition is not strictly true, see n. on
+132. _Sensisse_: = _iudicasse_, n. on I. 22. _Mnesarchi ... Dardani_: see
+_Dict. Biogr._
+
+§70. _Revocata est_: Manut. here wished to read _renovata_, cf. n. on I.
+14. _Nominis dignitatem_, etc.: hence Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 41 calls him
+_foeneus ille Platonicus Antiochus_ (that _tulchan_ Platonist). _Gloriae
+causa_: cf. Aug. _ibid._ II. 15 _Antiochus gloriae cupidior quam
+veritatis_. _Facere dicerent_: so Camerarius for the MSS. _facerent_.
+_Sustinere_: cf. 115 _sustinuero Epicureos_. _Sub Novis_: Faber's brilliant
+em. for the MSS. _sub nubes_. The _Novae Tabernae_ were in the forum, and
+are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy. In _De Or._ II. 266 a story is told
+of Caesar, who, while speaking _sub Veteribus_, points to a "_tabula_"
+which hangs _sub Novis_. The excellence of Faber's em. may be felt by
+comparing that of Manut. _sub nube_, and that of Lamb. _nisi sub nube_. I
+have before remarked that _b_ is frequently written in MSS. for _v_.
+_Maenianorum_: projecting eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were
+probably named from their inventor like _Vitelliana_, _Vatinia_ etc.
+
+§71. _Quoque ... argumento_: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread
+is picked up by _quod argumentum_ near the end. _Utrum_: the neuter
+pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are marked by
+_ne_ and _an_. The same usage is found in _D.F._ II. 60, _T.D._ IV. 9, and
+must be carefully distinguished from the use of _utrum ... ne ... an_,
+which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g _De Invent._ II. 115 _utrum
+copiane sit agri an penuria consideratur_. On this point cf. M. _Em._ 163,
+_Gram._ 452, obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic. _Verr._ IV. 73. _Honesti inane nomen
+esse_: a modern would be inclined to write _honestum_, in apposition to
+_nomen_, cf. _D.F._ V. 18 _voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum_.
+_Voluptatem_ etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called ‛ο μεταθεμενος)
+from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf. _T.D._ II. 60, Diog. Laert. VII. 166--7.
+_A vero_: "coming from a reality," cf. 41, n. _Is curavit_: Goer. reads
+_his_, "_solet V. D. in hoc pronomen saevire_," says Madv. The scribes
+often prefix _h_ to parts of the pronoun _is_, and Goer. generally
+patronises their vulgar error.
+
+    §§72--78. Summary. You accuse me of appealing to ancient names like a
+    revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, philosophers
+    of the highest position, protest against the truth of sense knowledge,
+    and deny the possibility of knowledge altogether (72, 73). Empedocles,
+    Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense knowledge. You
+    said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with these. Why?
+    Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while Plato
+    pursued the same theme in all his works (74). Now do you see that I do
+    not merely name, but take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus
+    stated many difficulties concerning the senses and general experience.
+    You say he solved them, even if he did, which I do not believe, he
+    admitted that it was not easy to escape being ensnared by them (75).
+    The Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to
+    themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (76). Zeno held
+    strongly that the wise man ought to keep clear from _opinion_.
+    Arcesilas agreed but this without _knowledge_ was impossible.
+    _Knowledge_ consists of _perceptions_. Arcesilas therefore demanded a
+    definition of _perception_. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is
+    the controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with _opinion_
+    and _perception_, and the εποχη of Arcesilas follows at once (77, 78).
+
+§72. _De antiquis philosophis_: on account of the somewhat awkward constr.
+Lamb. read _antiquos philosophos_. _Popularis_: cf. 13. _Res non bonas_:
+MSS. om. _non_, which Or. added with two very early editions. Faber
+ingeniously supposed the true reading to be _novas_, which would be written
+_nobas_, and then pass into _bonas_. _Nivem nigram_: this deliverance of
+Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In _P.H._ I. 33 he quotes
+it as an instance of the refutation of φαινομενα by means of νοουμενα,
+"Αναξαγορας τωι λευκην ειναι την χιονα, ανετιθει ‛οτι χιων εστιν ‛υδορ
+πεπηγος το δε ‛υδορ εστι μελαν και ‛η χιων αρα μελαινα." There is an
+obscure joke on this in _Ad Qu. Fratrem_ II. 13, 1 _risi nivem atram ...
+teque hilari animo esse et prompto ad iocandum valde me iuvat_.
+_Sophistes_: here treated as the demagogue of philosophy. _Ostentationis_:
+= επιδειξεος.
+
+§73. _Democrito_: Cic., as Madv. remarks on _D.F._ I. 20, always
+exaggerates the merits of Democr. in order to depreciate the Epicureans,
+cf. _T.D._ I. 22, _De Div._ I. 5, II. 139, _N.D._ I. 120, _De Or._ I. 42.
+_Quintae classis_: a metaphor from the Roman military order. _Qui veri esse
+aliquid_, etc.: cf. _N.D._ I. 12 _non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse
+videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus_. _Non
+obscuros sed tenebricosos_: "not merely dim but darkened." There is a
+reference here to the σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., by which he meant that
+knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things as shown by
+sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also held a γνησιη
+γνωσις, dealing with the realities of material existence, the atoms and the
+void, which exist ετεηι and not merely νομωι as appearances do. See R. and
+P. 51.
+
+§74. _Furere_: cf. 14. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 61, and for the belief of
+Empedocles about the possibility of επιστημη see the remarks of Sextus
+_A.M._ VII. 123--4 qu. R. and P. 107, who say "_patet errare eos qui
+scepticis adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant_." _Sonum fundere_: similar
+expressions occur in _T.D._ III. 42, V. 73, _D.F._ II. 48. _Parmenides,
+Xenophanes_: these are the last men who ought to be charged with
+scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against sense-knowledge, but
+held that real knowledge was attainable by the reason. Cf. Grote, _Plato_
+I. 54, Zeller 501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. _Minus bonis_:
+Dav. qu. Plut. _De Audit._ 45 A, μεμψαιτο δ' αν τις Παρμενιδου την
+στιχοποιιαν. _Quamquam_: on the proper use of _quamquam_ in clauses where
+the verb is not expressed see _M.D.F._ V. 68 and cf. I. 5. _Quasi irati_:
+for the use of _quasi_ = almost cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 22, _Orat._ 41.
+_Aiebas removendum_: for om. of _esse_ see n. on I. 43. _Perscripti sunt_:
+cf. n. on I. 16. _Scire se nihil se scire_: cf. I. 16, 44. The words
+referred to are in Plat. _Apol._ 21 εοικα γουν τουτου σμικρωι τινι αυτωι
+τουτωι σοφωτερος ειναι, ‛οτι α μη οιδα ουδε οιομαι ειδεναι, a very
+different statement from the _nihil sciri posse_ by which Cic. interprets
+it (cf. R. and P. 148). That επιστημη in the strict sense is impossible, is
+a doctrine which Socrates would have left to the Sophists. _De Platone_:
+the doctrine above mentioned is an absurd one to foist upon Plato. The
+dialogues of search as they are called, while exposing sham knowledge, all
+assume that the real επιστημη is attainable. _Ironiam_: the word was given
+in its Greek form in 15. _Nulla fuit ratio persequi_: n. on 17.
+
+§75. _Videorne_: = _nonne videor_, as _videsne_ = _nonne vides_. _Imitari
+numquam nisi_: a strange expression for which Manut. conj. _imitari? num
+quem_, etc., Halm _nullum unquam_ in place of _numquam_. Bait. prints the
+reading of Man., which I think harsher than that of the MSS. _Minutos_: for
+the word cf. _Orat._ 94, also _De Div._ I. 62 _minuti philosophi_, _Brut._
+256 _minuti imperatores_. _Stilponem_, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P.
+177--182. σοφισματα: Cic. in the second edition probably introduced here
+the translation _cavillationes_, to which Seneca _Ep._ 116 refers, cf.
+Krische, p. 65. _Fulcire porticum_: "to be the pillar of the Stoic porch".
+Cf. the anonymous line ει μη γαρ ην Χρυσιππος, ουκ αν ην Στοα. _Quae in
+consuetudine probantur_: n. on 87. _Nisi videret_: for the tense of the
+verb, see Madv. _Gram._ 347 _b_, obs. 2.
+
+§76. _Quid ... philosophi_: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv.
+and followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this
+reading, which only requires the alteration of _Cyrenaei_ into _Cyrenaici_
+(now made by all edd. on the ground that _Cyrenaeus_ is a citizen of
+Cyreno, _Cyrenaicus_ a follower of Aristippus) and the insertion of _tibi_.
+I see no difficulty in the _qui_ before _negant_, at which so many edd.
+take offence. _Tactu intimo_: the word ‛αφη I believe does not occur in
+ancient authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great word was
+παθος. From 143 (_permotiones intimas_) it might appear that Cic. is
+translating either παθος or κινησις. For a clear account of the school see
+Zeller's _Socrates_, for the illustration of the present passage pp
+293--300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R. and P. 162 sq. _Quo quid colore_:
+cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 191 (qu. Zeller _Socrates_ 297, R. and P. 165).
+_Adfici se_: = πασχειν. _Quaesieras_: note the plup. where Eng. idiom
+requires the perfect or aorist. _Tot saeculis_: cf. the same words in 15.
+_Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis_: cf. _summis ingeniis, maximis studiis_ in
+15. _Obtrectandi_: this invidious word had been used by Lucullus in 16; cf.
+also I. 44.
+
+§77. _Expresserat_: "had put into distinct shape". Cf. 7 and I. 19.
+_Exprimere_ and _dicere_ are always sharply distinguished by Cic., the
+latter merely implying the mechanic exercise of utterance, the former the
+moulding and shaping of the utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp. _Orat._
+3, 69, and _Ad Att._ VIII. 11, 1; also _De Or._ I. 32, _De Div._ I. 79, qu.
+by Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav. _exposuerat_ is therefore
+needless. _Fortasse_: "we may suppose". _Nec percipere_, etc.: cf. 68, n.
+_Tum illum_: a change from _ille, credo_ (sc. _respondit_), the _credo_
+being now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after _ita
+definisse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 13 (who quotes exx.); also the construction
+with _ita iudico_ in 113. _Ex eo, quod esset_: cf. 18, n. _Effictum_: so
+Manut. for MSS. _effectum_, cf. 18. _Ab eo, quod non est_: the words _non
+est_ include the two meanings "is non existent," and "is different from
+what it seems to be"--the two meanings of _falsum_ indeed, see n. on 47.
+_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 40, 84. MSS. have _eius modi_, altered by Dav. _Recte
+... additum_: the semicolon at _Arcesilas_ was added by Manutius, who is
+followed by all edd. This involves taking _additum_ = _additum est_, an
+ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv. _Opusc._ I. 448, _D.F._ I.
+43, _Gram._ 479 a. I think it quite possible that _recte consensit additum_
+should be construed together, "agreed that the addition had been rightly
+made." For the omission of _esse_ in that case cf. Madv. _Gram._ 406, and
+such expressions as _dicere solebat perturbatum_ in 111, also _ita
+scribenti exanclatum_ in 108. _Recte_, which with the ordinary stopping
+expresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain in
+point. Qy, should _concessit_ be read, as in 118 _concessisse_ is now read
+for MSS. _consensisse_? _A vero_: cf. 41.
+
+§78. _Quae adhuc permanserit_: note the subj., "which is of such a nature
+as to have lasted". _Nam illud ... pertinebat_: by _illud_ is meant the
+argument in defence of εποχη given in 67; by _nihil ... pertinebat_ nothing
+more is intended than that there was no _immediate_ or _close_ connection.
+Cf. the use of _pertinere_ in _D.F._ III. 55. _Clitomacho_: cf. n. on 59.
+
+    §§79--90. Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding your cause in
+    spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are thus acting
+    like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the sensation
+    can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80). I wish the god of whom
+    you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound
+    senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our
+    vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you,
+    _we_ desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires not
+    the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the god
+    because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (80, 81). If you
+    want something greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the
+    sun? Still he seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a
+    little broader or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed,
+    too, he appears to us to stand still (82). The whole question lies in a
+    nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is
+    disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a
+    false one indistinguishable from it (83). A man who has mistaken P. for
+    Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising Cotta. You say
+    that no such indistinguishable resemblances _exist_. Never mind, they
+    _seem_ to exist and that is enough. One mistaken sensation will throw
+    all the others into uncertainty (84). You say everything belongs to its
+    own _genus_ this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that
+    two sensations _are_ absolutely similar, it is enough that human
+    faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of
+    signet rings? (85) Can you find a ring merchant to rival your chicken
+    rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So we cannot see or
+    hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea this gives us of
+    the art with which nature has constructed the senses! (86) But about
+    physics I will speak afterwards. I am going now to advance against the
+    senses arguments drawn from Chrysippus himself (87). You said that the
+    sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of
+    the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his
+    Alcmaeon, of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides
+    disprove your point (88, 89). In their case at least 'mind and eyes
+    agreed. It is no good to talk about the saner moments of such people;
+    the question is, what was the nature of their sensations at the time
+    they were affected? (90)
+
+§79. _Communi loco_: τοπω, that of blinking facts which cannot be
+disproved, see 19. _Quod ne_ [_id_]: I have bracketed _id_ with most edd.
+since Manut. If, however, _quod_ be taken as the conjunction, and not as
+the pronoun, _id_ is not altogether insupportable. _Heri_: cf. Introd. 55.
+_Infracto remo_: n. on 19. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his "Higher
+Pantheism"--"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool".
+_Manent illa omnia, iacet_: this is my correction of the reading of most
+MSS. _maneant ... lacerat_. Madv. _Em._ 176 in combating the conj. of Goer.
+_si maneant ... laceratis istam causam_, approves _maneant ... iaceat_, a
+reading with some MSS. support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole
+confusion of the passage arises from the mania of the copyists for turning
+indicatives into subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx.
+occur every few pages. If _iacet_ were by error turned into _iaceret_ the
+reading _lacerat_ would arise at once. The nom. to _dicit_ is, I may
+observe, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans. "all my
+arguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his senses are
+true quotha!" (For this use of _dicit_ cf. _inquit_ in 101, 109, 115).
+Hermann approves the odd reading of the ed. Cratandriana of 1528 _latrat_.
+Dav. conjectured comically _blaterat iste tamen et_, Halm _lacera est ista
+causa_. _Habes_: as two good MSS. have _habes et eum_, Madv. _Em._ 176
+conj. _habet_. The change of person, however, (from _dicit_ to _habes_)
+occurs also in 101. _Epicurus_: n. on 19.
+
+§80. _Hoc est verum esse_: Madv. _Em._ 177 took _verum_ as meaning fair,
+candid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical
+epistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed _virum esse_, a very
+strange em. Halm's conj. _certum esse_ is weak and improbable. _Importune_:
+this is in one good MS. but the rest have _importata_, a good em. is
+needed, as _importune_ does not suit the sense of the passage. _Negat ...
+torsisset_: for the tenses cf. 104 _exposuisset, adiungit_. _Cum oculum
+torsisset_: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing upwards
+or sideways. Cf. Aristot. _Eth. Eud._ VII. 13 (qu. by Dav.) οφθαλμους
+διαστρεψαντα ‛ωστε δυο το ‛εν φανηναι. Faber qu. Arist. _Problemata_ XVII.
+31 δια τι εις το πλαγιον κινουσι τον οφθαλμον ου (?) φαινεται δυο το ‛εν.
+Also _ib._ XXXI. 3 inquiring the reason why drunkards see double he says
+ταυτο τουτο γιγνεται και εαν τις κατωθεν πιεση τον οφθαλμον. Sextus refers
+to the same thing _P.H._ I. 47, _A.M._ VII. 192 (‛ο παραπιεσας τον
+οφθαλμον) so Cic. _De Div._ II. 120. Lucretius gives the same answer as
+Timagoras, _propter opinatus animi_ (IV. 465), as does Sext. _A.M._ VII.
+210 on behalf of Epicurus. _Sed hic_: Bait. _sit hic_. _Maiorum_: cf. 143.
+_Quasi quaeratur_: Carneades refused to discuss about things in themselves
+but merely dealt with the appearances they present, το γαρ αληθες και το
+ψευδες εν τοις πραγμασι συνεχωρει (Numen in Euseb. _Pr. Eu._ XIV. 8). Cf.
+also Sext. _P.H._ I. 78, 87, 144, II. 75. _Domi nascuntur_: a proverb used
+like γλαυκ' εσ' Αθηνας and "coals to Newcastle," see Lorenz on Plaut.
+_Miles_ II. 2, 38, and cf. _Ad Att._ X. 14, 2, _Ad Fam._ IX. 3. _Deus_: cf.
+19. _Audiret ... ageret_: MSS. have _audies ... agerent_. As the insertion
+of _n_ in the imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read _ageret_ and alter
+_audies_ to suit it. Halm has _audiret ... ageretur_ with Dav., Bait.
+_audiet, egerit_. _Ex hoc loco video ... cerno_: MSS. have _loco cerno
+regionem video Pompeianum non cerno_ whence Lipsius conj. _ex hoc loco e
+regione video_. Halm ejects the words _regionem video_, I prefer to eject
+_cerno regionem_. We are thus left with the slight change from _video_ to
+_cerno_, which is very often found in Cic., e.g. _Orat._ 18. Cic. sometimes
+however joins the two verbs as in _De Or._ III. 161. _O praeclarum
+prospectum_: the view was a favourite one with Cic., see _Ad Att._ I. 13,
+5.
+
+§81. _Nescio qui_: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that _nescio quis_
+implies contempt, while _nescio qui_ does not, cf. _Div. in qu. Caec._ 47,
+where _nescio qui_ would contradict his rule. It is as difficult to define
+the uses of the two expressions as to define those of _aliquis_ and
+_aliqui_, on which see 61 n. In _Paradoxa_ 12 the best MSS. have _si qui_
+and _si quis_ almost in the same line with identically the same meaning
+Dav. quotes Solinus and Plin. _N.H._ VII. 21, to show that the man
+mentioned here was called Strabo--a misnomer surely. _Octingenta_: so the
+best MSS., not _octoginta_, which however agrees better with Pliny. _Quod
+abesset_: "_whatever_ might be 1800 stadia distant," _aberat_ would have
+implied that Cic. had some _particular_ thing in mind, cf. Madv. _Gram._
+364, obs. 1. _Acrius_: οξυτερον, Lamb. without need read _acutius_ as Goer.
+did in 69. _Illos pisces_: so some MSS., but the best have _ullos_, whence
+Klotz conj. _multos_, Orelli _multos illos_, omitting _pisces_. For the
+allusion to the fish, cf. _Acad. Post._ fragm. 13. _Videntur_: n. on 25.
+_Amplius_: cf. 19 _non video cur quaerat amplius_. _Desideramus_: Halm,
+failing to understand the passage, follows Christ in reading _desiderant_
+(i.e. _pisces_). To paraphrase the sense is this "But say my opponents, the
+Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses than we have." Well you
+are like the mole, which does not yearn for the light because it does not
+know what light is. Of course all the ancients thought the mole blind. A
+glance will show the insipidity of the sense given by Halm's reading.
+_Quererer cum deo_: would enter into an altercation with the god. The
+phrase, like λοιδορεσθαι τινι as opposed to λοιδορειν τινα implies mutual
+recrimination, cf. _Pro Deiotaro_ 9 _querellae cum Deiotaro_. The reading
+_tam quererer_ for the _tamen quaereretur_ of the MSS. is due to Manut.
+_Navem_: Sextus often uses the same illustration, as in _P.H._ I. 107,
+_A.M._ VII. 414. _Non tu verum testem_, etc.: cf. 105. For the om. of _te_
+before _habere_, which has strangely troubled edd. and induced them to
+alter the text, see n. on I. 6.
+
+§82. _Quid ego_: Bait. has _sed quid_ after Ernesti. _Nave_: so the best
+MSS., not _navi_, cf. Madv. _Gram._ 42. _Duodeviginti_: so in 128. Goer.
+and Roeper qu. by Halm wished to read _duodetriginta_. The reff. of Goer.
+at least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the
+sun at 28 times the size of the earth. _Quasi pedalis_: cf. _D.F._ I. 20
+_pedalis fortasse_. For _quasi_ = _circiter_ cf. note on 74. Madv. on
+_D.F._ I. 20 quotes Diog. Laert. X. 91, who preserves the very words of
+Epicurus, in which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr. V. 590,
+who copies Epicurus, and Seneca _Quaest. Nat._ I. 3, 10 (_solem sapientes
+viri pedalem esse contenderunt_). Madv. points out from Plut. _De Plac.
+Phil._ II. 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus asserted the sun to be a foot
+wide, he does not however quote Stob. _Phys._ I. 24, 1 ‛ηλιον μεγεθος εχειν
+ευρος ποδος ανθρωπειου, which is affirmed to be the opinion of Heraclitus
+and Hecataeus. _Ne maiorem quidem_: so the MSS., but Goer. and Orelli read
+_nec_ for _ne_, incurring the reprehension of Madv. _D.F._ p. 814, ed 2.
+_Nihil aut non multum_: so in _D.F._ V. 59, the correction of Orelli,
+therefore, _aut non multum mentiantur aut nihil_, is rash. _Semel_: see 79.
+_Qui ne nunc quidem_: sc. _mentiri sensus putat_. Halm prints _quin_, and
+is followed by Baiter, neither has observed that _quin ne ... quidem_ is
+bad Latin (see _M.D.F._ V. 56). Nor can _quin ne_ go together even without
+_quidem_, cf. Krebs and Allgayer, _Antibarbarus_ ed. 4 on _quin_.
+
+§83. _In parvo lis sit_: Durand's em. for the _in parvulis sitis_ of the
+MSS., which Goer. alone defends. _Quattuor capita_: these were given in 40
+by Lucullus, cf. also 77. _Epicurus_: as above in 19, 79 etc.
+
+§84. _Geminum_: cf. 56. _Nota_: cf. 58 and the speech of Lucullus _passim_.
+_Ne sit ... potest_: cf. 80 _quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur.
+Si ipse erit_ for _ipse_ apparently = _is ipse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 93.
+
+§85. _Quod non est_: = _qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur_. _Sui generis_: cf.
+50, 54, 56. _Nullum esse pilum_, etc.: a strong expression of this belief
+is found in Seneca _Ep._. 113, 13, qu. R. and P. 380. Note the word
+_Stoicum_; Lucullus is of course not Stoic, but Antiochean. _Nihil
+interest_: the same opinion is expressed in 40, where see my note. _Visa
+res_: Halm writes _res a re_, it is not necessary, however, either in Gk.
+or Lat. to express _both_ of two related things when a word is inserted
+like _differat_ here, which shows that they _are_ related. Cf. the elliptic
+constructions in Gk. with ‛ομοιον, μεταξυ, μεσος, and such words. _Eodem
+caelo atque_: a difficult passage. MSS. have _aqua_, an error easy, as Halm
+notes, to a scribe who understood _caelum_ to be the heaven, and not
+γλυφειον, a graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the MSS. reading,
+adducing passages to show that sky and water were important in the making
+of statues. For _aqua_ Orelli conj. _acu_ = _schraffirnadel_, C.F. Hermann
+_caelatura_, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian word. Halm's _aeque_
+introduces a construction with _ceteris omnibus_ which is not only not
+Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I read _atque_, taking _ceteris omnibus_
+to be the abl. neut. "all the other implements." Formerly I conj. _ascra_,
+or _atque in_, which last leading would make _omnibus_ = _om. statuis_.
+_Alexandros_: Lysippus alone was privileged to make statues of Alexander,
+as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the conqueror, cf. _Ad Fam._ V. 12,
+7.
+
+§86. _Anulo_: cf. 54. _Aliqui_: n. on 61. _Gallinarium_: cf. 57. _Adhibes
+artem_: cf. 20 _adhibita arte_. _Pictor ... tibicen_: so in 20. _Simul
+inflavit_: note _simul_ for _simul atque_, cf. _T.D._ IV. 12. _Nostri
+quidem_: i.e. _Romani_. _Admodum_: i.e. _adm. pauci_ cf. _De Leg._ III. 32
+_pauci enim atque admodum pauci_. _Praeclara_: evidently a fem. adj.
+agreeing with _natura_. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and
+understanding _sunt_ interpreted "these arguments I am going to urge are
+grand, viz. _quanto art_. etc."
+
+§87. _Scilicet_: Germ. "natürlich." _Fabricata sit_: cf. 30, 119, 121 and
+N.D. I. 19. _Ne modo_: for _modo ne_, a noticeable use. _Physicis_:
+probably neut. _Contra sensus_: he wrote both for and against συνηθεια; cf.
+R. and P. 360 and 368. _Carneadem_: Plut. _Sto. Rep_. 1036 B relates that
+Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the senses, quoted
+the address of Andromache to Hector: δαιμονιε φθισει σε το σον μενος. From
+Diog. IV. 62 we learn that he thus parodied the line qu. in n. on 75, ει μη
+γαρ ην Χρυσιππος ουκ αν ην εγω.
+
+§88. _Diligentissime_: in 48--53. _Dicebas_: in 52 _imbecillius
+adsentiuntur_. _Siccorum_: cf. Cic. _Contra Rullum_ I. 1 _consilia
+siccorum_. _Madere_ is common with the meaning "to be drunk," as in Plaut.
+_Mostellaria_ I. 4, 6. _Non diceret_: Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit
+the verb, with one MS., cf. 15 and I. 13. The omission of a verb in the
+subjunctive is, Madv. says on _D.F._ I. 9, impossible; for other ellipses
+of the verb see _M.D.F._ V. 63. _Alcmaeo autem_: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon;
+cf. 52. _Somnia reri_: the best MSS. have _somniare_. Goer. reads _somnia_,
+supplying _non fuisse vera_. I have already remarked on his extraordinary
+power of _supplying_. Halm conj. _somnia reprobare_, forgetting that the
+verb _reprobare_ belongs to third century Latinity, also _sua visa putare_,
+which Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from the MSS., I
+read _reri_, which verb occurred in I. 26, 39. Possibly _putare_, a little
+farther on, has got misplaced. _Non id agitur_: these difficulties supply
+Sextus with one of his τροποι, i.e. ‛ο περι τας περιστασεις; cf. _P.H._ I.
+100, also for the treatment of dreams, _ib._ I. 104. _Si modo_, etc.: "if
+only he dreamed it," i.e. "merely because he dreamed it." _Aeque ac
+vigilanti_: = _aeque ac si vigilaret_. Dav. missing the sense, and pointing
+out that _when awake_ Ennius did not assent to his sensations at all, conj.
+_vigilantis_. Two participles used in very different ways not unfrequently
+occur together, see Madv. _Em. Liv._ p. 442. _Ita credit_: MSS. have
+_illa_, which Dav. altered. Halm would prefer _credidit_. _Itera dum_,
+etc.: from the _Iliona_ of Pacuvius; a favourite quotation with Cic.; see
+_Ad Att._ XIV. 14, and _T.D._ II. 44.
+
+§89. _Quisquam_: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences cf.
+Virg. _Aen._ I. 48 with the Notes of Wagner and Conington. _Tam
+certa putat_: so Sextus _A.M._ VII. 61 points out that Protagoras must in
+accordance with his doctrine παντων μετρον ανθρωπος hold that the μεμηνως
+is the κριτηριον των εν μανιαι φαινομενων. _Video, video te_: evidently
+from a tragedy whose subject was Αιας μαινομενος, see Ribbeck _Trag. Lat.
+rel._ p. 205. Cic. in _De Or._ III. 162 thus continues the quotation,
+"_oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape_." So in Soph. _Aiax_ 100 the hero,
+after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae, keeps Odysseus alive awhile in
+order to torture him. _Hercules_: cf. Eur. _Herc. Fur._ 921--1015. The mad
+visions of this hero, like those of Orestes, are often referred to for a
+similar purpose by Sext., e.g. _A.M._ VII. 405 ‛ο γουν ‛Ερακλης μανεις και
+λαβων φαντασιαν απο των ιδιων παιδων ‛ως Ευρυσθεος, την ακολουθον πραξιν
+ταυτηι τη φαντασιαι συνηψεν. ακολουθον δε ην το τους του εχθρου παιδας
+ανελειν, ‛οπερ και εποιησεν. Cf. also _A.M._ VII. 249. _Moveretur_: imperf.
+for plup. as in 90. _Alcmaeo tuus_: cf. 52. _Incitato furore_: Dav. reads
+_incitatus_. Halm qu. from Wesenberg _Observ. Crit. ad Or. p. Sestio_ p. 51
+this explanation, "_cum furor eius initio remissior paulatim incitatior et
+vehementior factus esset_," he also refers to Wopkens _Lect. Tull._ p. 55
+ed. Hand. _Incedunt_ etc.: the MSS. have _incede_, which Lamb. corrected.
+The subject of the verb is evidently _Furiae_. _Adsunt_: is only given once
+by MSS., while Ribbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have
+written it twice. _Caerulea ... angui_: _anguis_ fem is not uncommon in the
+old poetry. MSS. here have _igni_. _Crinitus_: ακερσεκομης, "never shorn,"
+as Milton translates it. _Luna innixus_: the separate mention in the next
+line of _Diana_, usually identified with the moon, has led edd. to emend
+this line. Some old edd. have _lunat_, while Lamb. reads _genu_ for _luna_,
+cf. Ov. _Am._ I. 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.) _lunavitque genu sinuosum fortiter
+arcum_. Wakefield on Lucr. III. 1013 puts a stop at _auratum_, and goes on
+with _Luna innixans_. Taber strangely explains _luna_ as = _arcu ipso
+lunato_, Dav. says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it
+is the utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should
+not regard _luna_ and _Diana_ as distinct.
+
+§90. _Illa falsa_: sc. _visa_, which governs the two genitives. Goer.
+perversely insists on taking _somniantium recordatione ipsorum_ closely
+together. _Non enim id quaeritur_: cf. 80 n. Sext. very often uses very
+similar language, as in _P.H._ I. 22, qu. in n. on 40. _Tum cum
+movebantur_: so Halm for MSS. _tum commovebantur_, the em. is supported by
+88.
+
+    §§91--98. Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable knowledge, its
+    processes are not applicable to a large number of philosophical
+    questions (91). You value the art, but remember that it gave rise to
+    fallacies like the _sorites_, which you say is faulty (92). If it is
+    so, refute it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will
+    avail you nothing (93). If you refrain because you _cannot_ answer,
+    your knowledge fails you, if you _can_ answer and yet refrain, you are
+    unfair (94). The art you admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did
+    her web, witness the _Mentiens_, (95). You assent to arguments which
+    are identical in form with the _Mentiens_, and yet refuse to assent to
+    it Why so? (96) You demand that these sophisms should be made
+    exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go to a tribune for that
+    exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would not allow the very
+    first postulate of your Dialectic (97). In my opinion, and I learned
+    Dialectic from Antiochus, the _Mentiens_ and the arguments identical
+    with it in form must stand or fall together (98).
+
+§91. _Inventam esse_: cf. 26, 27. _In geometriane_: with this inquiry into
+the special function of Dialectic cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato
+_Gorg._ 453 D, 454 C. _Sol quantus sit_: this of course is a problem for
+φυσικη, not for διαλεκτικη. _Quod sit summum bonum_: not διαλεκτικη but
+ηθικη must decide this. _Quae coniunctio_: etc. so Sext. often opposes
+συμπλοκη or συνημμενον to διεζευγμενον, cf. esp _P.H._ II. 201, and Zeller
+109 sq. with footnotes. An instance of a _coniunctio_ (hypothetical
+judgment) is "_si lucet, lucet_" below, of a _disiunctio_ (disjunctive
+judgment) "_aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet_". _Ambigue dictum_:
+αμφιβολον, on which see _P.H._ II. 256, Diog VII. 62. _Quid sequatur_: το
+ακολουθον, cf. I. 19 n. _Quid repugnet_: cf. I. 19, n. _De se ipsa_: the
+_ipsa_, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom. and not abl. Petrus Valentia (p.
+301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an art is not to be condemned as
+useless merely because it is unable to solve every problem presented to it.
+He quotes Plato's remarks (in _Rep._ II.) that the Expert is the man who
+knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot. Very similar
+arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp. _P.H._ II. 175 and the
+words εαυτου εσται εκκαλυπτικον. For the mode in which Carneades dealt with
+Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511. The true ground of attack is that Logic
+always _assumes_ the truth of phenomena, and cannot _prove_ it. This was
+clearly seen by Aristotle alone of the ancients; see Grote's essay on the
+Origin of Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol II. of his _Aristotle_.
+
+§92. _Nata sit_: cf. 28, 59. _Loquendi_: the Stoic λογικη, it must be
+remembered, included ‛ρητορικη. _Concludendi_: του συμπεραινειν or
+συλλογιζεσθαι. _Locum_: τοπον in the philosophical sense. _Vitiosum_: 49,
+n. _Num nostra culpa est_: cf. 32. _Finium_: absolute limits; the fallacy
+of the _sorites_ and other such sophisms lies entirely in the treatment of
+purely _relative_ terms as though they were _absolute_. _Quatenus_: the
+same ellipse occurs in _Orator_ 73. _In acervo tritici_: this is the false
+_sorites_, which may be briefly described thus: A asks B whether one grain
+makes a heap, B answers "No." A goes on asking whether two, three, four,
+etc. grains make a heap. B cannot always reply "No." When he begins to
+answer "Yes," there will be a difference of one grain between heap and no
+heap. One grain therefore _does_ make a heap. The true _sorites_ or chain
+inference is still treated in books on logic, cf. Thomson's _Laws of
+Thought_, pp 201--203, ed 8. _Minutatim_: cf. Heindorf's note on κατα
+σμικρον in _Sophistes_ 217 D. _Interrogati_: cf. 104. In 94 we have
+_interroganti_, which some edd. read here. _Dives pauper_, etc.: it will be
+easily seen that the process of questioning above described can be applied
+to any relative term such as these are. For the omission of any connecting
+particle between the members of each pair, cf. 29, 125, _T.D._ I. 64, V.
+73, 114, Zumpt _Gram._ 782. _Quanto addito aut dempto_: after this there is
+a strange ellipse of some such words as _id efficiatur, quod interrogatur_.
+[_Non_] _habemus_: I bracket _non_ in deference to Halm, Madv. however
+(_Opusc._ I. 508) treats it as a superabundance of negation arising from a
+sort of anacoluthon, comparing _In Vatin._ 3, _Ad Fam._ XII. 24. The
+scribes insert and omit negatives very recklessly, so that the point may
+remain doubtful.
+
+§93. _Frangite_: in later Gk. generally απολυειν. _Erunt ... cavetis_: this
+form of the conditional sentence is illustrated in Madv. _D.F._ III. 70,
+_Em. Liv._ p. 422, _Gram._ 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence _Heaut._ V. 1, 59
+_quot incommoda tibi in hac re capies nisi caves_, cf. also 127, 140 of
+this book. The present is of course required by the instantaneous nature of
+the action. _Chrysippo_: he spent so much time in trying to solve the
+sophism that it is called peculiarly his by Persius VI. 80. _inventus,
+Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi_. The titles of numerous distinct works of
+his on the _Sorites_ and _Mentiens_ are given by Diog. _Tria pauca sint_:
+cf. the instances in Sext. _A.M._ VII. 418 τα πεντηκοντα ολιγα εστιν, τα
+μυρια ολιγα εστιν, also Diog. VII. 82 ‛ησυχαζειν the advice is quoted in
+Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 (δειν ‛ιστασθαι και επεχειν), _A.M._ VII. 416 (‛ο
+σοφος στησεται και ‛ησυχασει). The same terms seem to have been used by the
+Cynics, see Sext. _P.H._ II. 244, III. 66. _Stertas_: imitated by Aug.
+_Contra Ac._ III. 25 _ter terna novem esse ... vel genere humano stertente
+verum sit_, also _ib._ III. 22. _Proficit_: Dav. _proficis_, but Madv.
+rightly understands το ‛ησυχαζειν (_Em._ 184), cf. _N.D._ II. 58. _Ultimum
+... respondere_: "to put in as your answer" cf. the use of _defendere_ with
+an accus. "to put in as a plea". Kayser suggests _paucorum quid sit_.
+
+§94. _Ut agitator_: see the amusing letter to Atticus XIII. 21, in which
+Cic. discusses different translations for the word επεχειν, and quotes a
+line of Lucilius _sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator equosque_,
+adding _semperque Carneades_ προβολην _pugilis et retentionem aurigae
+similem facit_ εποχη. Aug. _Contra Ac._ trans. εποχη by _refrenatio_ cf.
+also _Lael._ 63. _Superbus es_: I have thus corrected the MSS. _responde
+superbe_; Halm writes _facis superbe_, Orelli _superbis_, which verb is
+hardly found in prose. The phrase _superbe resistere_ in Aug. _Contra Ac._
+III. 14 may be a reminiscence. _Illustribus_: Bait. with some probability
+adds _in_, comparing _in decimo_ below, and 107, cf. however Munro on Lucr.
+I. 420. _Irretiat_: parallel expressions occur in _T.D._ V. 76, _De Or._ I.
+43, _De Fato_ 7. _Facere non sinis_: Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 points the moral
+in the same way. _Augentis nec minuentis_: so Halm for MSS. _augendi nec
+minuendi_, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase _primum
+augendi_ to be Latin.
+
+§95. _Tollit ... superiora_: cf. _Hortensius_ fragm. 19 (Orelli) _sed ad
+extremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit
+dialecticorum ratio_. _Vestra an nostra_: Bait. after Christ needlessly
+writes _nostra an vestra_. αξιωμα: "a judgment expressed in language"; cf.
+Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this subject. _Effatum_:
+Halm gives the spelling _ecfatum_. It is probable that this spelling was
+antique in Cic.'s time and only used in connection with religious and legal
+formulae as in _De Div._ I. 81, _De Leg._ II. 20, see Corss. _Ausspr._ I.
+155 For the word cf. Sen. _Ep._ 117 _enuntiativum quiddam de corpore quod
+alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum_, in _T.D._ I. 14
+_pronuntiatum_ is found, in _De Fato_ 26 _pronuntiatio_, in Gellius XVI. 8
+(from Varro) _prologium_. _Aut verum esse aut falsum_: the constant Stoic
+definition of αξιωμα, see Diog. VII. 65 and other passages in Zeller 107.
+_Mentiris an verum dicis_: the _an_ was added by Schutz on a comparison of
+Gellius XVIII. 10 _cum mentior et mentiri me dico, mentior an verum dico?_
+The sophism is given in a more formally complete shape in _De Div._ II. 11
+where the following words are added, _dicis autem te mentiri verumque
+dicis, mentiris igitur_. The fallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p.
+301, ed Orelli), _quis unquam dixit "ego mentior" quum hoc ipsum
+pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare?_ _Inexplicabilia_: απορα in the Greek
+writers. _Odiosius_: this adj. has not the strong meaning of the Eng.
+"hateful," but simply means "tiresome," "annoying." _Non comprehensa_: as
+in 99, the opposite of _comprehendibilia_ III. 1, 41. The past partic. in
+Cic. often has the same meaning as an adj. in _-bilis_. Faber points out
+that in the _Timaeus_ Cic. translates αλυτος by _indissolutus_ and
+_indissolubilis_ indifferently. _Imperceptus_, which one would expect, is
+found in Ovid.
+
+§96. _Si dicis_: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by
+Manut. with the exception of _nunc_ which was added by Dav. The idea of
+Orelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the
+comic writers is untenable. _In docendo_: _docere_ is not to _expound_ but
+to _prove_, cf. n. on 121. _Primum ... modum_: the word _modus_ is
+technical in this sense cf. _Top._ 57. The προτος λογος αναποδεικτος of the
+Stoic logic ran thus ει ‛ημερα εστι, φως εστιν ... αλλα μην ‛ημερα εστιν
+φως αρα εστιν (Sext. _P.H._ II. 157, and other passages qu. Zeller 114).
+This bears a semblance of inference and is not so utterly tautological as
+Cic.'s translation, which merges φως and ‛ημερα into one word, or that of
+Zeller (114, note). These arguments are called μονολημματοι (involving only
+one premise) in Sext. _P.H._ I. 152, 159, II. 167. _Si dicis te mentiri_,
+etc.: it is absurd to assume, as this sophism does, that when a man _truly_
+states that he _has_ told a lie, he establishes against himself not merely
+that he _has_ told a lie, but also that he _is_ telling a lie at the moment
+when he makes the _true_ statement. The root of the sophism lies in the
+confusion of past and present time in the one infinitive _mentiri_.
+_Eiusdem generis_: the phrase _te mentiri_ had been substituted for _nunc
+lucere_. _Chrysippea_: n. on 93. _Conclusioni_: on _facere_ with the dat.
+see n. on 27. _Cederet_: some edd. _crederet_, but the word is a trans. of
+Gk. εικειν; n. on 66. _Conexi_: = συνημμενον, cf. Zeller 109. This was the
+proper term for the hypothetical judgment. _Superius_: the συνημμενον
+consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and the affirmative--called in
+Greek ‛ηγουμενον and ληγον; if one is admitted the other follows of course.
+
+§97. _Excipiantur_: the legal _formula_ of the Romans generally directed
+the _iudex_ to condemn the defendant if certain facts were proved, unless
+certain other facts were proved; the latter portion went by the name of
+_exceptio_. See _Dict. Ant_. _Tribunum ... adeant_: a retort upon Lucullus;
+cf. 13. The MSS. have _videant_ or _adeant_; Halm conj. _adhibeant_,
+comparing 86 and _Pro Rabirio_ 20. _Contemnit_: the usual trans. "to
+despise" for _contemnere_ is too strong; it means, like ολιγωρειν, merely
+to neglect or pass by. _Effabimur_; cf. _effatum_ above. _Hermarchus_: not
+_Hermachus_, as most edd.; see _M.D.F._ II. 96. _Diiunctum_: διεζευγμενον,
+for which see Zeller 112. _Necessarium_: the reason why Epicurus refused to
+admit this is given in _De Fato_ 21 _Epicurus veretur ne si hoc
+concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant_. The context of
+that passage should be carefully read, along with _N.D._ I. 69, 70. Aug.
+_Contra Ac._ III. 29 lays great stress on the necessary truth of
+disjunctive propositions. _Catus_: so Lamb. for MSS. _cautus_. _Tardum_:
+_De Div._ II. 103 _Epicurum quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici_;
+cf. also _ib._ II. 116, and the frequent use of βραδυς in Sext., e.g.
+_A.M._ VII. 325. _Cum hoc igitur_: the word _igitur_, as usual, picks up
+the broken thread of the sentence. _Id est_: n. on I. 8. _Evertit_: for the
+Epicurean view of Dialectic see R. and P. 343. Zeller 399 sq., _M.D.F._ I.
+22. _E contrariis diiunctio_: = διεζευγμενον εξ εναντιων.
+
+§98. _Sequor_: as in 95, 96, where the _Dialectici_ refused to allow the
+consequences of their own principles, according to Cic. _Ludere_: this
+reminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for which
+see Cope in the old _Journal of Philology_. No. 7. _Iudicem ... non
+iudicem_: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by μεν and δε,
+has been a great crux of edd.; Dav. here wished to insert _cum_ before
+_iudicem_, but is conclusively refuted by Madv. _Em._ 31. The same
+construction occurs in 103. _Esse conexum_: with great probability Christ
+supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the copyists.
+
+    §§98--105. Summary. In order to overthrow at once the case of
+    Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of
+    Carneades' system (98). Carneades laid down two divisions of _visa_,
+    one into those capable of being perceived and those not so capable, the
+    other into probable and improbable. Arguments aimed at the senses
+    concern the first division only; the sapiens will follow probability,
+    as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly does (99, 100). Our
+    sapiens is not made of stone; many things _seem_ to him true; yet he
+    always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The
+    Stoics themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this
+    admission together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes
+    impossible (101). It is strange that our _Probables_ do not seem
+    sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (102). He
+    condemns those who say that sensation is swept away by the Academy;
+    nothing is swept away but its _necessary_ certainty (103). There are
+    two modes of withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and
+    withholding it merely so far as to deny the _certainty_ of phenomena.
+    The latter mode leaves all that is required for ordinary life (104).
+
+§98. _Tortuosum_: similar expressions are in _T.D._ II. 42, III. 22, _D.F._
+IV. 7. _Ut Poenus_: "as might be expected from a Carthaginian;" cf. _D.F._
+IV. 56, _tuus ille Poenulus, homo acutus_. A different meaning is given by
+the _ut_ in passages like _De Div._ II. 30 _Democritus non inscite nugatur,
+ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius_; "for a physical philosopher."
+
+§99. _Genera_: here = classifications of, modes of dividing _visa_. This
+way of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong censure of
+Madv. (Pref. to _D.F._ p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted of ignorance, for
+representing Carneades as dividing _visa_ into those which can be perceived
+and those which cannot. Is it possible that any one should read the
+_Academica_ up to this point, and still believe that Cic. is capable of
+supposing, even for a moment, that Carneades in any way upheld καταληψις?
+_Dicantur_: i.e. _ab Academicis_. _Si probabile_: the _si_ is not in MSS.
+Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading _est, probabile nihil esse_.
+_Commemorabas_: in 53, 58. _Eversio_: cf. _D.F._ III. 50 (the same words),
+Plat. _Gorg_. 481 C ‛ημων ‛ο βιος ανατετραμμενος αν ειη, Sext. _A.M._ VIII.
+157 συγχεομεν τον βιον. _Et sensibus_: no second _et_ corresponds to this;
+_sic_ below replaces it. See Madv. _D.F._ p. 790, ed. 2. _Quicquam tale_
+etc.: cf. 40, 41. _Nihil ab eo differens_: n. on 54. _Non comprehensa_: n.
+on 96.
+
+§100. _Si iam_: "if, for example;" so _iam_ is often used in Lucretius.
+_Probo ... bono_: it would have seemed more natural to transpose these
+epithets. _Facilior ... ut probet_: the usual construction is with _ad_ and
+the gerund; cf. _De Div._ II. 107, _Brut_. 180. _Anaxagoras_: he made no
+‛ομοιομερειαι of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and deep, is
+dark in colour. _Concreta_: so Manut. for MSS. _congregata_. In 121 the
+MSS. give _concreta_ without variation, as in _N.D._ II. 101, _De Div._ I.
+130, _T.D._ I. 66, 71.
+
+§101. _Impeditum_: cf. 33, n. _Movebitur_: cf. _moveri_ in 24. _Non enim
+est_: Cic. in the vast majority of cases writes _est enim_, the two words
+falling under one accent like _sed enim, et enim_ (cf. Corss. _Ausspr._ II.
+851); Beier on _De Off._ I. p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read
+_est enim_, but the MSS. both of the _Lucullus_ and of Nonius agree in the
+other form, which Madv. allows to stand in _D.F._ I. 43, and many other
+places (see his note). Cf. fragm. 22 of the _Acad. Post_. _E robore_: so
+Nonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here _ebore_. _Dolatus_: an evident
+imitation of Hom. _Od._ T 163 ου γαρ απο δριος εσσι παλαιφατου ουδ' απο
+πετρης. _Neque tamen habere_: i.e. _se putat_. For the sudden change from
+_oratio recta_ to _obliqua_ cf. 40 with n. _Percipiendi notam_: = χαρακτηρα
+της συγκταθεσεως in Sext. _P.H._ I. 191. For the use of the gerund cf. n.
+on 26, with Madv. _Gram._ 418, Munro on Lucr. I. 313; for _propriam_ 34.
+_Exsistere_. cf. 36. _Qui neget_: see 79. _Caput_: a legal term. _Conclusio
+loquitur_: cf. _historiae loquantur_ (5), _consuetudo loquitur_ (_D.F._ II.
+48), _hominis institutio si loqueretur_ (_ib._ IV. 41), _vites si loqui
+possint_ (_ib._ V. 39), _patria loquitur_ (_In Cat._ I. 18, 27); the last
+use Cic. condemns himself in _Orat._ 85. _Inquit_: "quotha," indefinitely,
+as in 109, 115; cf. also _dicit_ in 79.
+
+§102. _Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis_: Bait. follows Madv. in
+placing a comma after _est_, and a full stop at _probabilia_. _Tamen_ ought
+in that case to follow _dicimus_, and it is noteworthy that in his
+communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait., and Hahn's ed. of the
+philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word _tamen_ altogether, nor
+does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice the omission. _Ista diceret_:
+"stated the opinions you asked for." _Poetam_: this both Halm and Bait.
+treat as a gloss.
+
+§103. For this section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext. _P.H._ I.
+227 sq. _Academia ... quibus_: a number of exx. of this change from sing.
+to plural are given by Madv. on _D.F._ V. 16. _Nullum_: on the favourite
+Ciceronian use of _nullus_ for _non_ see 47, 141, and Madv. _Gram._ 455,
+obs. 5. _Illud sit disputatum_: for the construction cf. 98; _autem_ is
+omitted with the same constr. in _D.F._ V. 79, 80. _Nusquam alibi_: cf. 50.
+
+§104. _Exposuisset adiungit_: Madv. on _D.F._ III. 67 notices a certain
+looseness in the use of tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the
+opinions of philosophers, but no ex. so strong as this is produced. _Ut aut
+approbet quid aut improbet_: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent
+editors of Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced
+by _ut_. Halm brackets a similar clause in 20, and is followed in both
+instances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the most extensive _bracketer_ of
+modern times, rejects very many clauses of the kind in the Oratorical
+works. In our passage, the difficulty vanishes when we reflect that
+_approbare_ and _improbare_ may mean either to render an _absolute_
+approval or disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely
+based on _probability_. For example, in 29 the words have the first
+meaning, in 66 the second. The same is the case with _nego_ and _aio_. I
+trace the whole difficulty of the passage to the absence of terms to
+express distinctly the difference between the two kinds of assent. The
+general sense will be as follows. "There are two kinds of εποχη, one which
+prevents a man from expressing any assent or disagreement (in either of the
+two senses above noticed), another which does not prevent him from giving
+an answer to questions, provided his answer be not taken to imply absolute
+approval or absolute disapproval; the result of which will be that he will
+neither absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but will merely
+give a qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability." My defence of
+the clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann in the
+_Philologus_ (vol. VII.), which I had not read when this note was first
+written. _Alterum placere ... alterum tenere_: "the one is his formal
+dogma, the other is his actual practice." For the force of this see my note
+on _non probans_ in 148, which passage is very similar to this. _Neget ...
+aiat_: cf. 97. _Nec ut placeat_: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the
+wrong sense, for Clitomachus _did_ allow such _visa_ to stand as were
+sufficient to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's _neu cui_ labours
+under the same defect. Various emendations are _nam cum_ (Lamb., accepted
+by Zeller 522), _hic ut_ (Manut.), _et cum_ (Dav. followed by Bait.), _sed
+cum_ (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me that of Manut. I should
+prefer _sic ut_, taking _ut_ in the sense of "although." _Respondere_: "to
+put in as an answer," as in 93 and often. _Approbari_: sc. _putavit_. Such
+changes of construction are common in Cic., and I cannot follow Halm in
+altering the reading to _approbavit_.
+
+§105. _Lucem eripimus_: cf. 30.
+
+    §§105--111. Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this time, that your
+    defence of dogmatism is overthrown (105). You asked how memory was
+    possible on my principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of
+    Epicurus? If nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true,
+    then these will be true (106). Probability is quite sufficient basis
+    for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us to
+    _assent_. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas, and you
+    yourself refuse assent to the _sorites_, why then should not the
+    Academic doubt about other things? (107) Your other strong point is
+    that without assent action is impossible (108). But surely many actions
+    of the dogmatist proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the
+    use of the hackneyed argument of Antiochus (109). Where probability is,
+    there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (110). The argument
+    of Antiochus that the Academics first admit that there are true and
+    false _visa_ and then contradict themselves by denying that there is
+    any difference between true and false, is absurd. We do not deny that
+    the difference _exists_; we do deny that human faculties are capable of
+    perceiving the difference (111).
+
+§105. _Inducto ... prob._: so Aug. _Cont Ac._ II. 12 _Soluto, libero_: cf.
+n. on 8. _Implicato_: = _impedito_ cf. 101. _Iacere_: cf. 79. _Isdem
+oculis_: an answer to the question _nihil cernis?_ in 102. _Purpureum_: cf.
+fragm. 7 of the _Acad. Post_. _Modo caeruleum ... sole_: Nonius (cf. fragm.
+23) quotes _tum caeruleum tum lavum_ (the MSS. in our passage have
+_flavum_) _videtur, quodque nunc a sole_. C.F. Hermann would place _mane
+ravum_ after _quodque_ and take _quod_ as a proper relative pronoun, not as
+= "because." This transposition certainly gives increased clearness.
+Hermann further wishes to remove _a_, quoting exx. of _collucere_ without
+the prep., which are not at all parallel, i.e. _Verr._ I. 58, IV. 71.
+_Vibrat_: with the ανηριθμον γελασμα of Aeschylus. _Dissimileque_: Halm,
+followed by Bait., om. _que_. _Proximo et_: MSS. have _ei_, rightly altered
+by Lamb., cf. e.g. _De Fato_ 44. _Non possis ... defendere_: a similar line
+is taken in 81.
+
+§106. _Memoria_: cf. 22. _Polyaenus_: named _D.F._ I. 20, Diog. X. 18, as
+one of the chief friends of Epicurus. _Falsum quod est_: Greek and Latin do
+not distinguish accurately between the _true_ and the _existent_, the
+_false_ and the _non existent_, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the
+confusion is frequent, notably in the _Sophistes_ and _Theaetetus_. _Si
+igitur_: "if then recollection is recollection only of things perceived and
+known." The dogmatist theory of μνημη and νοησις is dealt with in exactly
+the same way by Sext. _P.H._ II. 5, 10 and elsewhere, cf. also Plat
+_Theaet._ 191 sq. _Siron_: thus Madv. on _D.F._ II. 119 writes the name,
+not _Sciron_, as Halm. _Fateare_: the em. of Dav. for _facile_, _facere_,
+_facias_ of MSS. Christ defends _facere_, thinking that the constr. is
+varied from the subj. to the inf. after _oportet_, as after _necesse est_
+in 39. For _facere_ followed by an inf. cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 8. _Nulla_: for
+_non_, cf. 47, 103.
+
+§107. _Fiet artibus_: n. on 27 for the constr., for the matter see 22.
+_Lumina_: "strong points." Bentl. boldly read _columina_, while Dav.
+proposed _vimina_ or _vincula_. That an em. is not needed may be seen from
+_D.F._ II. 70. _negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum lumen est)_ _N.D._ I. 79,
+and 43 of this book. _Responsa_: added by Ernesti. Faber supplies
+_haruspicia_, Orelli after Ern. _haruspicinam_, but, as Halm says, some
+noun in the plur. is needed. _Quod is non potest_: this is the MSS.
+reading, but most edd. read _si is_, to cure a wrong punctuation, by which
+a colon is placed at _perspicuum est_ above, and a full stop at
+_sustineat_. Halm restored the passage. _Habuerint_: the subj. seems due to
+the attraction exercised by _sustineat_. Bait. after Kayser has
+_habuerunt_. _Positum_: "when laid down" or "assumed."
+
+§108. _Alterum est quod_: this is substituted for _deinde_, which ought to
+correspond to _primum_ above. _Actio ullius rei_: n. on _actio rerum_ in
+62, cf. also 148. _Adsensu comprobet_: almost the same phrase often occurs
+in Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc. _Sit etiam_: the _etiam_ is a little
+strange and was thought spurious by Ernesti. It seems to have the force of
+Eng. "indeed", "in what indeed assent consists." _Sensus ipsos adsensus_:
+so in I. 41 _sensus_ is defined to be _id quod est sensu comprehensum_,
+i.e. καταληψις, cf. also Stobaeus I. 41, 25 αισθητικη γαρ φαντασια
+συγκαταθεσις εστι. _Appetitio_: for all this cf. 30. _Et dicta ... multa_:
+Manut. ejected these words as a gloss, after _multa_ the MSS. curiously add
+_vide superiora_. _Lubricos sustinere_: cf. 68 and 94. _Ita scribenti ...
+exanclatum_: for the om. of _esse_ cf. 77, 113 with notes. _Herculi_: for
+this form of the gen. cf. Madv. on _D.F._ I. 14, who doubts whether Cic.
+ever wrote _-is_ in the gen. of the Greek names in _-es_. When we consider
+how difficult it was for copyists _not_ to change the rarer form into the
+commoner, also that even Priscian (see _M.D.F._ V. 12) made gross blunders
+about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost irresistible.
+_Temeritatem_: προπετειαν, εικαιοτητα.
+
+§109. _In navigando_: cf. 100. _In conserendo_: Guretus interprets "εν τω
+φυτυεσθαι τον αγρον," and is followed by most commentators, though it seems
+at least possible that _manum_ is to be understood. For the suppressed
+accus. _agrum_ cf. n. on _tollendum_ in 148. _Sequere_: the fut. not the
+pres. ind., cf. 61. _Pressius_: cf. 28. _Reprehensum_: sc. _narrasti_. _Id
+ipsum_: = _nihil posse comprehendi_. _Saltem_: so in 29. _Pingue_: cf. _Pro
+Archia_ 10. _Sibi ipsum_: note that Cic. does not generally make _ipse_
+agree in case with the reflexive, but writes _se ipse_, etc.
+_Convenienter_: "consistently". _Esse possit_: Bait. _posset_ on the
+suggestion of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one, not
+throwing it back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of Ant.
+_Ut hoc ipsum_: the _ut_ follows on _illo modo urguendum_ above. _Decretum
+quod_: Halm followed by Bait. gives _quo_, referring to _altero quo neget_
+in 111, which however does not justify the reading. The best MSS. have
+_qui_. _Et sine decretis_: Lamb. gave _nec_ for _et_, but Dav. correctly
+explains, "_multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta sed tantum
+probabilia._"
+
+§110. _Ut illa_: i.e. the _decreta_ implied in the last sentence. Some MSS.
+have _ille_, while Dav. without necessity gives _alia_. _Sic hoc ipsum_:
+Sext. then is wrong is saying (_P.H._ I. 226) that the Academics
+διαβεβαιουνται τα πραγματα ειναι ακαταληπτα, i.e. state the doctrine
+dogmatically, while the sceptics do not. _Cognitionis notam_: like _nota
+percipiendi_, _veri et falsi_, etc. which we have already had. _Ne
+confundere omnia_: a mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf. 58.
+_Incerta reddere_: cf. 54. _Stellarum numerus_: another echo of Lucullus;
+see 32. _Quem ad modum ... item_: see Madv. on _D.F._ III. 48, who quotes
+an exact parallel from _Topica_ 46, and _sicut ... item_ from _N.D._ I. 3,
+noting at the same time that in such exx. neither _ita_ nor _idem_, which
+MSS. sometimes give for _item_, is correct.
+
+§111. _Dicere ... perturbatum_: for om. of _esse_ cf. 108, etc.
+_Antiochus_: this Bait. brackets. _Unum ... alterum_: cf. 44. _Esse quaedam
+in visis_: it was not the _esse_ but the _videri_, not the actual existence
+of a difference, but the possibility of that difference being infallibly
+perceived by human sense, that the Academic denied. _Cernimus_: i.e. the
+_probably_ true and false. _Probandi species_: a phenomenal appearance
+which belongs to, or properly leads to qualified approval.
+
+    §§112--115. Summary. If I had to deal with a Peripatetic, whose
+    definitions are not so exacting, my course would be easier; I should
+    not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise man sometimes
+    _opines_ (112). The definitions of the real Old Academy are more
+    reasonable than those of Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does,
+    can he profess to belong to the Old Academy? (113) I cannot tolerate
+    your assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic
+    system like yours free from mistakes (114). You wish me to join your
+    school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who thinks
+    so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I, but
+    the _sapiens_ is to adopt (115).
+
+§112. _Campis ... exsultare ... oratio_: expressions like this are common
+in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 54, _De Off._ I. 61, _Orat._ 26; cf. also Aug.
+_Cont. Ac._ III. 5 _ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret oratio_. _Cum
+Peripatetico_: nothing that Cic. states here is at discord with what is
+known of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf. esp. Sext. _A.M._ VII.
+216--226. All that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic
+formula, putting upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic
+would have wondered how a sceptic _could_ accept his formulae; but the
+spectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the
+same formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at
+Cicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on 18) that we have here
+a trace of Philo's teaching, as distinct from that of Carneades. I see
+absolutely no reason for the very severe remarks of Madvig on _D.F._ V. 76,
+a passage which very closely resembles ours. _Dumeta_: same use in _N.D._
+I. 68, Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 6; the _spinae_ of the Stoics are often
+mentioned, e.g. _D.F._ IV. 6. _E vero ... a falso_: note the change of
+prep. _Adhiberet_: the MSS. are confused here, and go Halm reads _adderet_,
+and Bait. follows, while Kayser proposes _adhaereret_, which is indeed
+nearer the MSS.; cf. however I. 39 _adhiberet_. _Accessionem_: for this cf.
+18 and 77. _Simpliciter_: the opposite of _subtiliter_; cf.
+_simpliciter--subtilitas_ in I. 6. _Ne Carneade quidem_: cf. 59, 67, 78,
+148.
+
+§113. _Sed qui his minor est_: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for
+MSS. _sed mihi minores_. Guietus gave _sed his minores_, Durand _sed
+minutior_, while Halm suggests _sed minutiores_. I conj. _nimio minares_,
+which would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr. I. 734 _inferiores partibus
+egregie multis multoque minores_. _Tale verum_: _visum_ omitted as in
+_D.F._ V. 76. _Incognito_: cf. 133. _Amavi hominem_: cf. Introd. p. 6. _Ita
+iudico, politissimum_; it is a mistake to suppose this sentence incomplete,
+like Halm, who wishes to add _eum esse_, or like Bait., who with Kayser
+prints _esse_ after _politissimum_. Cf. 108 _ita scribenti, exanclatum_,
+and the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 13. _Horum
+neutrum_: cf. 77 _nemo_. _Utrumque verum_: Cic. of course only accepts the
+propositions as Arcesilas did; see 77.
+
+§114. _Illud ferre_: cf. 136. _Constituas_: this verb is often used in
+connection with the ethical _finis_; cf. 129 and I. 19. _Idemque etiam_:
+Krebs and Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) deny that the expression _idem
+etiam_ is Latin. One good MS. here has _atque etiam_, which Dav. reads; cf.
+however _Orat._ 117. _Artificium_: = _ars_, as in 30. _Nusquam labar_: cf.
+138 _ne labar_. _Subadroganter_: cf. 126.
+
+§115. _Qui sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse_: so Cic. vary often speaks of
+the Peripatetics, as in _D.F._ IV. 5, V. 7. _Sustinuero_: cf. 70. _Tam
+bonos_: Cic. often speaks of them and of Epicurus in this patronising way;
+see e.g. _T.D._ II. 44, III. 50, _D.F._ I. 25, II. 81. For the Epicurean
+friendships cf. esp. _D.F._ I. 65. _Diodoto_: cf. Introd. p. 2. _Nolumus_:
+Halm and Bait., give _nolimus_; so fine a line divides the subjunctive from
+the indicative in clauses like these that the choice often depends on mere
+individual taste. _De sapiente loquamur_: n. on 66.
+
+    §§116--128. Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy take Physics
+    first. Would your _sapiens_ swear to the truth of any geometrical
+    result whatever? (116) Let us see which one of actual physical systems
+    the _sapiens_ we are seeking will select (117). He must choose _one_
+    teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander,
+    Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles,
+    Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers,
+    great men though they be, he must reject (118). Whatever system he
+    selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must believe as
+    strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If he holds
+    this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus, must
+    defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not
+    allow me even to doubt (119). How much better to be free, as I am and
+    not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles of the universe!
+    (120) Nothing can exist, say you, apart from the deity. Strato,
+    however, says he does not need the deity to construct the universe. His
+    mode of construction again differs from that of Democritus. I see some
+    good in Strato, yet I will not assent absolutely either to his system
+    or to yours (121). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We know
+    nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the
+    advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the
+    earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (122).
+    Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell strange things of the
+    heavenly bodies. How much better to side with Socrates and Aristo, who
+    hold that nothing can be known about them! (123) Who knows the nature
+    of mind? Numberless opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato
+    and Xenocrates. Our _sapiens_ will be unable to decide (124). If you
+    say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose
+    Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous
+    falsehoods (125). The Stoics differ among themselves about physical
+    subjects, why will they not allow me to differ from them? (126) Not
+    that I deprecate the study of Physics, for moral good results from it
+    (127). Our _sapiens_ will be delighted if he attains to anything which
+    seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your
+    weakness in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be
+    prepared to asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times
+    as large as the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you
+    admit that all things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than
+    the size of the sun, I am almost content (128).
+
+§116. _Tres partes_: cf. I. 19. _Et a vobismet_: "and especially by you".
+The threefold division was peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools,
+cf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 13 (on the same subject) ‛οι Στωικοι και αλλοι τινες.
+For other modes of dividing philosophy see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 2. _At illud
+ante_: this is my em. for the MSS. _velut illud ante_, which probably arose
+from a marginal variant "_vel ut_" taking the place of _at_; cf. a similar
+break in 40 _sed prius_, also in 128 _at paulum ante_. Such breaks often
+occur in Cic., as in _Orator_ 87 _sed nunc aliud_, also _T.D._ IV. 47
+_repenam fortasse, sed illud ante._ For _velut_ Halm writes _vel_ (which
+Bait. takes), Dav. _verum_. _Inflatus tumore_: cf. _De Off._ I. 91 _inflati
+opinionibus._ Bentl. read _errore_. _Cogere_: this word like αναγκαζειν and
+βιαζεσθαι often means simply to argue irresistibly. _Initia_: as in 118,
+bases of proof, themselves naturally incapable of proof, so αρχαι in Gk.
+_Digitum_: cf. 58, 143. _Punctum esse_ etc.: σημειον εστιν ου μερος ουθεν
+(Sext. _P.H._ III. 39), στιγμη = το αμερες (_A.M._ IX. 283, 377).
+_Extremitatem_: = επιφανειαν. _Libramentum_: so this word is used by Pliny
+(see Forc.) for the slope of a hill. _Nulla crassitudo_: in Sext. the
+επιφανεια is usually described not negatively as here, but positively as
+μηκος μετα πλατους (_P.H._ III. 39), περας (_extremitas_) σοματος δυο εχον
+διαστασεις, μηκος και πλατος (_A.M._ III. 77). _Liniamentum ... carentem_:
+a difficult passage. Note (1) that the line is defined in Greek as μηκος
+απλατες. (Sext. as above), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the
+point and surface negatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against
+the introduction of _longitudinem_ which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and
+others propose by conjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would
+rather add _et crassitudine_ before _carentem_, comparing I. 27 _sine ulla
+specie et carentem omni illa qualitate_. I have merely bracketed
+_carentem_, though I feel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in this
+clause as in the other two, he suggests _quod sit sine_. Hermann takes
+_esse_ after _punctum_ as strongly predicative ("there _is_ a point,"
+etc.), then adds _similiter_ after _liniamentum_ and ejects _sine ulla_.
+Observe the awkwardness of having the _line_ treated of after the
+_superficies_, which has induced some edd. to transpose. For _liniamentum_
+= _lineam_ cf. _De Or._ I. 187. _Si adigam_: the fine em. of Manut. for _si
+adiiciamus_ of MSS. The construction _adigere aliquem ius iurandum_ will be
+found in Caes. _Bell. Civ._ I. 76, II. 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg.
+_Aen._ III. 56 _quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacra fames?_
+_Sapientem nec prius_: this is the "_egregia lectio_" of three of Halm's
+MSS. Before Halm _sapientemne_ was read, thus was destroyed the whole point
+of the sentence, which is _not_ that the _sapiens_ will swear to the size
+of the sun after he has seen Archimedes go through his calculations, _but_
+that the _sapiens_, however true he admits the bases of proof to be which
+Archimedes uses, will _not_ swear to the truth of the elaborate conclusions
+which that geometer rears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in 128 against
+the absurdity of attaching one and the same degree of certainty to the
+simplest and the most complex truths, and tries to condemn the Stoic
+_sapiens_ out of his own mouth, cf. esp. _nec ille iurare posset_ in 123.
+_Multis partibus_: for this expression see Munro on Lucr. I. 734, for the
+sense cf. 82, 123, 126, 128. _Deum_: see 126.
+
+§117. _Vim_: = αναγκην, cf. _cogere_ in 116. _Ne ille_: this asseverative
+_ne_ is thus always closely joined with pronouns in Cic. _Sententiam eliget
+et_: MSS. have (by _dittographia_ of _m_, _eli_) added _melius_ after
+_sententiam_, and have also dropped _et_. Dav. wished to read _elegerit_,
+comparing the beginning of 119. _Insipiens eliget_: cf. 115 _quale est a
+non sapiente explicari sapientiam?_ and 9 _statuere qui sit sapiens vel
+maxime videtur esse sapientis_. _Infinitae quaestiones_: θεσεις, general
+propositions, opposed to _finitae quaestiones_, limited propositions, Gk.
+‛υποθεσεις. Quintal III. 5, 5 gives as an ex. of the former _An uxor
+ducenda_, of the latter _An Catoni ducenda_. These _quaestiones_ are very
+often alluded to by Cic. as in _D.F._ I. 12, IV. 6, _De Or._ I. 138, II.
+65--67, _Topica_ 79, _Orat._ 46, cf. also Quint. X. 5, II. _E quibus omnia
+constant_: this sounds like Lucretius, _omnia_ = το παν.
+
+§118. For these _physici_ the student must in general be referred to R. and
+P., Schwegler, and Grote's _Plato_ Vol. I. A more complete enumeration of
+schools will be found in Sext. _P.H._ III. 30 sq. Our passage is imitated
+by Aug _De Civ. Dei_ XVIII. 37. _Concessisse primas_: Cic. always considers
+Thales to be _sapientissimus e septem_ (_De Leg._ II. 26). Hence Markland
+on Cic. _Ad Brutum_ II. 15, 3 argued that that letter cannot be genuine,
+since in it the supremacy among the seven is assigned to Solon.
+_Infinitatem naturae_: το απειρον, _naturae_ here = ουσιας. _Definita_:
+this is opposed to _infinita_ in _Topica_ 79, so _definire_ is used for
+_finire_ in _Orat._ 65, where Jahn qu. _Verr._ IV. 115. _Similis inter se_:
+an attempt to translate ‛ομοιομερειας. _Eas primum_, etc.: cf. the exordium
+of Anaxagoras given from Diog. II. 6 in R. and P. 29 παντα χρηματα ην ‛ομου
+ειτα νους ελθων αυτα διεκοσμησε. _Xenophanes ... deum_: Eleaticism was in
+the hands of Xenoph. mainly theological. _Neque natum unquam_: cf. _neque
+ortum unquam_ in 119. _Parmenides ignem_: cf. Arist. _Met. A._ 5 qu. R. and
+P. 94. He only hypothetically allowed the existence of the phenomenal
+world, after which he made two αρχαι, θερμον και ψυχρον τουτων δε το μεν
+κατα μεν το ‛ον θερμον ταττει, θατερον δε κατα το μη ον. _Heraclitus_: n.
+on I. 39. _Melissus_: see Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp. το εον
+αιει αρα ην τε και εσται. _Plato_: n. on I. 27. _Discedent_: a word often
+used of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 7, 17.
+
+§119. _Sic animo ... sensibus_: knowledge according to the Stoics was
+homogeneous throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than
+another. _Nunc lucere_: cf. 98, also 128 _non enim magis adsentiuntur_,
+etc. _Mundum sapientem_: for this Stoic doctrine see _N.D._ I. 84, II. 32,
+etc. _Fabricata sit_: see 87 n. _Solem_: 126. _Animalis intellegentia_:
+reason is the essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138--9,
+also 28, 29 of Book I. _Permanet_: the deity is to the Stoic πνευμα
+ενδιηκον δι ‛ολου του κοσμου (Plut. _De Plac. Phil._ I. 7 qu. R. and P.
+375), _spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus._
+(Seneca, _Consol. ad Helvid._ 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147). _Deflagret_: the Stoics
+considered the κοσμος φθαρτος, cf. Diog. VII. 141, Zeller 156--7. _Fateri_:
+cf. _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_ in 111. _Flumen aureum_: Plut. _Vita
+Cic._ 24 alludes to this (‛οτι χρυσιου ποταμος ειη ρεοντος). This is the
+constant judgment of Cic. about Aristotle's style. Grote, _Aristot._ Vol I.
+p. 43, quotes _Topica_ 3, _De Or._ I. 49, _Brut._ 121, _N.D._ II. 93, _De
+Inv._ II. 6, _D.F._ I. 14, _Ad Att._ II. 1, and discusses the difficulty of
+applying this criticism to the works of Aristotle which we possess. _Nulla
+vis_: cf. I. 28. _Exsistere_: Walker conj. _efficere_, "_recte ut videtur_"
+says Halm. Bait. adopts it. _Ornatus_: = κοσμος.
+
+§120. _Libertas ... non esse_: a remarkable construction. For the Academic
+liberty see Introd. p. 18. _Quod tibi est_: after these words Halm puts
+merely a comma, and inserting _respondere_ makes _cur deus_, etc. part of
+the same sentence. Bait. follows. _Nostra causa_: Cic. always writes _mea,
+tua, vestra, nostra causa_, not _mei, tui, nostri, vestri_, just as he
+writes _sua sponte_, but not _sponte alicuius_. For the Stoic opinion that
+men are the chief care of Providence, see _N.D._ I. 23, II. 37, _D.F._ III.
+67, _Ac._ I. 29 etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding the opinion
+are treated of in Zeller 175, _N.D._ II. 91--127. They supply in Sext.
+_P.H._ I. 32, III. 9--12 an example of the refutation of νοουμενα by means
+of νοουμενα. _Tam multa ac_: MSS. om. _ac_, which I insert. Lactantius qu.
+the passage without _perniciosa_. _Myrmecides_: an actual Athenian artist,
+famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for a chariot which a fly
+covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of a bee concealed. See
+Plin. _Nat. Hist._ VII. 21, XXXVI. 5.
+
+§121. _Posse_: n. on I. 29. _Strato_: R. and P. 331. _Sed cum_: _sed_ often
+marks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read _et_, as Halm.
+_Asperis ... corporibus_: cf. fragm. 28 of the _Ac. Post._, also _N.D._ I.
+66. _Somnia_: so _N.D._ I. 18 _miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed
+somniantium_, _ib._ I. 42 _non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium
+somnia_, also _ib._ I. 66 _flagitia Democriti_. _Docentis_: giving _proof_.
+_Optantis_: Guietus humorously conj. _potantis,_ Durand _oscitantis_ (cf.
+_N.D._ I. 72), others _opinantis_. That the text is sound however may be
+seen from _T.D._ II. 30 _optare hoc quidem est non docere_, _De Fato_ 46,
+_N.D._ I. 19 _optata magis quam inventa_, _ib._ III. 12 _doceas oportet nec
+proferas_; cf. also _Orat._ 59 _vocis bonitas optanda est, non est enim in
+nobis_, i.e. a good voice is a thing to be prayed for, and not to be got by
+exertion. There is a similar Greek proverb, ευχη μαλλον η αληθεια, in Sext.
+_P.H._ VIII. 353. _Magno opere_: Hermann wishes to read _onere_. The phrase
+_magnum onus_ is indeed common (cf. _De Or._ I. 116), but _magnum opus_, in
+the sense of "a great task," is equally so, cf. _T.D._ III. 79, 84, _Orat._
+75. _Modo hoc modo illud_: 134.
+
+§122. _Latent ista_: see n. on fragm. 29 of the _Ac. Post._; for _latent_
+cf. I. 45. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12, III. 1 imitates this passage.
+_Circumfusa_: cf. I. 44, and 46 of this book. _Medici_: cf. _T.D._ I. 46
+_Viderentur_: a genuine passive, cf. 25, 39, 81. _Empirici_: a school of
+physicians so called. _Ut ... mutentur_: exactly the same answer was made
+recently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he was said to have
+assumed that the living protoplasm would have the same properties as the
+dead. _Media pendeat_: cf. _N.D._ II. 98, _De Or._ III. 178.
+
+§123. _Habitari ait_: for this edd. qu. Lactant. _Inst._ III. 23, 12.
+_Portenta_: "monstrosities these," cf. _D.F._ IV. 70. _Iurare_: cf. 116.
+_Neque ego_, etc.: see fragm. 30 of _Ac. Post._ Αντιποδας: this doctrine
+appears in Philolaus (see Plut. _Plac. Phil._ III. 11 qu. R. and P. 75),
+who give the name of αντιχθων to the opposite side of the world. Diog.
+VIII. 26 (with which passage cf. Stob. _Phys._ XV. 7) mentions the theory
+as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says that Plato first
+invented the name. The word αντιπους seems to occur first in Plat. _Tim._
+63 A. The existence of αντιποδες; was of course bound up with the doctrine
+that the universe or the world is a globe (which is held by Plat. in the
+_Tim._ and by the Stoics, see Stob. _Phys._ XV. 6, Diog. VII. 140), hence
+the early Christian writers attack the two ideas together as unscriptural.
+Cf. esp Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XVI. 9. _Hicetas_: he was followed by Heraclides
+Ponticus and some Pythagoreans. Sext. _A.M._ X. 174 speaks of the followers
+of Aristarchus the mathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems
+also to be found in Philolaus, see R. and P. 75. _Theophrastus_: who wrote
+much on the history of philosophy, see R. and P. 328. _Platonem_: the words
+of Plato (_Tim._ 40 B) are γην δε τροφον μεν ‛ημετεραν, ειλλομενην δε περι
+τον δια παντος πολον τεταμενον. _Quid tu, Epicure_: the connection is that
+Cic., having given the crotchets of other philosophers about φυσικη,
+proceeds to give the peculiar crotchet of Epic. _Putas solem ... tantum_: a
+hard passage. _Egone? ne bis_ is the em. of Lamb. for MSS. _egone vobis_,
+and is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (_Em._ 185) "_cum
+interrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem 82) solem esse putaret,
+Epic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat quantus videretur vel
+paulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius circumscribit, ne bis quidem
+tantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem et bipedalem_". (_D.F._ I. 20)
+This explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given.
+Epicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the
+outside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's
+size, i.e. twice the apparent size. _Ne ... quidem_ may possibly appear
+strange, cf. however _ne maiorem quidem_ in 82. _Aristo Chius_: for this
+doctrine of his see R. and P. 358.
+
+§124. _Quid sit animus_: an enumeration of the different ancient theories
+is given in _T.D._ I. 18--22, and by Sext. _A.M._ VII. 113, who also speaks
+in _P.H._ II. 31 of the πολλη και ανηνυτος μαχη concerning the soul. In
+_P.H._ II. 57 he says Γοργιας ουδε διανοιαν ειναι φησι. _Dicaearcho_:
+_T.D._ I. 21. _Tres partis_: in Plato's _Republic_. _Ignis_: Zeno's
+opinion, _T.D._ I. 19. _Animam_: _ib._ I. 19. _Sanguis_: Empodocles, as in
+_T.D._ I. 19 where his famous line ‛αιμα γαρ ανθρωποις περικαρδιον εστι
+νοημα is translated, see R. and P. 124. _Ut Xenocrates_: some edd. read
+_Xenocrati_, but cf. I. 44, _D.F._ II. 18, _T.D._ III. 76. _Numerus_: so
+Bentl. for _mens_ of MSS., cf. I. 39, _T.D._ I. 20, 41. An explanation of
+this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and P. 244. _Quod
+intellegi_ etc.: so in _T.D._ I. 41 _quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide
+dicitur_. _Momenta_ n. on I. 45.
+
+§125. _Verecundius_: cf. 114 _subadroganter_. _Vincam animum_: a common
+phrase in Cic., cf. _Philipp._ XII. 21. _Queru potissimum? quem?_: In
+repeated questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of
+_quisnam_, not _quis_, in the second question, as in _Verr._ IV. 5. The
+mutation of Augustine _Contra Ac._ III. 33 makes it probable that _quemnam_
+was the original reading here. Zumpt on _Verr._ qu. Quint. IX. 2, 61, Plin.
+_Epist._ I. 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud it for its
+likeness to impromptu. _Nobilitatis_: this is to be explained by referring
+to 73--75 (_imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem_), where Cic.
+protests against being compared to a demagogue, and claims to follow the
+aristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the commentators to show that
+Democr. was literally an aristocrat have failed. _Convicio_: cf. 34.
+_Completa et conferta_: n. on I. 27. _Quod movebitur ... cedat_: this is
+the theory of motion disproved by Lucr. I. 370 sq., cf. also _N.D._ II. 83.
+Halm writes _quo quid_ for _quod_ (with Christ), and inserts _corpus_
+before _cedat_, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. "whatever
+body is pushed, gives way." _Tam sit mirabilis_: n. on I. 25.
+_Innumerabilis_: 55. _Supra infra_: n. on 92. _Ut nos nunc simus_, etc.: n.
+on fragm. 13 of _Ac. Post._ _Disputantis_: 55. _Animo videre_: cf. 22.
+_Imagines_: ειδωλα, which Catius translated (_Ad Fam._ XV. 16) by
+_spectra_, Zeller 432. _Tu vero_: etc. this is all part of the personal
+_convicium_ supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by the Antiocheans,
+and beginning at _Tune aut inane_ above. _Commenticiis_: a favourite word
+of Cic., cf. _De Div._ II. 113.
+
+§126. _Quae tu_: elliptic for _ut comprobem quae tu comprobas_ cf. 125.
+_Impudenter_: 115. _Atque haud scio_: _atque_ here = καιτοι, "and yet," n.
+on 5 _ac vereor_. _Invidiam_: cf. 144. _Cum his_: i.e. _aliis cum his_.
+_Summus deus_: "the highest form of the deity" who was of course one in the
+Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and πυρ τεχνικον is one of the
+definitions of the Stoic deity, cf. I. 29, Zeller 161 sq. _Solem_: as of
+course being the chief seat of fire. _Solis autem ... nego credere_: Faber
+first gave _ac monet_ for MSS. _admonens_, which Halm retains, Manut. then
+restored to its place _permensi refertis_, which MSS. have after _nego_.
+_Hic_, which MSS. have after _decempeda_, Madv. turns into _hunc_, while
+_hoc_, which stands immediately after _nego_, he ejects (_Em._ 187). _Ergo_
+after _vos_ is of course analeptic. Halm departs somewhat from this
+arrangement. _Leniter_: Halm and Hermann _leviter_; the former reads
+_inverecundior_ after Morgenstern, for what reason it is difficult to see.
+
+§127. _Pabulum_: similar language in _D.F._ II. 46. _Consideratio
+contemplatioque_: Cic. is fond of this combination, as _De Off._ I. 153;
+cf. Wesenberg on _T.D._ V. 9, who qu. similar combinations from _D.F._ V.
+11, 58. _Elatiores_: MSS. mostly have _latiores_. Halm with Lamb. reads
+_altiores_, in support of which reading Dav. qu. _D.F._ II. 51, Val.
+Flaccus _Argon._ II. 547, add Virg. _Aen._ VI. 49, Cic. _Orat._ 119.
+_Exigua et minima_: σμικρα και ελαχιστα. Madv. on _D.F._ V. 78 notes that
+except here Cic. always writes _exigua et paene minima_ or something of the
+kind. _Occultissimarum_: n. on I. 15. _Occurit ... completur_: MSS. have
+_occuret_ mostly, if that is retained _complebitur_ must be read. Madv.
+_Opusc._ II. 282 takes _occurit_, explaining it as a perfect, and giving
+numerous exx. of this sequence of tenses, cf. also Wesenb. on _T.D._ IV.
+35.
+
+§128. _Agi secum_: cf. _nobiscum ageret_ in 80. _Simile veri_: cf. 66.
+_Notionem_: = _cognitionem_, επιστημην. _At paulum_: MSS. _et_ Halm _sed._;
+cf. _at illud ante_ in 116. _Si quae_: Halm and many edd. have _se, quae_.
+But the _se_ comes in very awkwardly, and is not needed before the
+infinitive. Madv. indeed (_Em._ 114), after producing many exx. of the
+reflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts about this passage because
+_considero_ does not belong to the class of verbs with which this usage is
+found, but he produces many instances with _puto_, which surely stands on
+the same level. _Non magis_: so in 119 _nec magis approbabit nunc lucere_,
+etc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely cognisable
+phenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to absolute
+knowledge by refusing τον ‛ηλιον ‛ομολογειν ειναι καταληπτον (Galen _De
+Opt. Gen. Dicendi_ 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.). _Cornix_: for the
+Stoic belief in divination see Zeller 349--358. _Signum illud_: the
+_xystus_ (9) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XXXIV.
+8. _Duodeviginti_: 82, I just note that _octodecim_ is not used by Cic.
+_Sol quantus sit_: 91. _Omnium rerum ... comprehendendi_: not a case of a
+plural noun with a singular gerund like _spe rerum potiendi_, etc., but of
+two genitives depending in different ways on the same word (_definitio_).
+M. _Em._ 197 qu. Plat. _Leg._ 648 E την παντων ‛ητταν φοβουμενος ανθρωπον
+τοι πωματος, _Brut._ 163 _Scaevolae dicendi elegantia_, _De Or._ III. 156.
+Other exx. in _M.D.F._ I. 14. For the turn of expression cf. _T.D._ IV. 62
+_omnium philosophorum una est ratio medendi_, _Lael._ 78 _omnium horum
+vitiorum una cautio est_, also 51 of this book.
+
+    §§129--141. Summary. What contention is there among philosophers about
+    the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems like that of
+    Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes, Parmenides,
+    Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho, Aristippus,
+    Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus, Carneades
+    (129-131). If I desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow
+    me, while if I follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (132). I must be
+    careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both
+    you, Lucullus, and myself (133). Zeno thinks virtue gives happiness.
+    "Yes," says Antiochus, "but not the greatest possible." How am I to
+    choose among such conflicting theories? (134) Nor can I accept those
+    points in which Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard
+    emotion as harmful, which the ancients thought natural and useful
+    (135). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! (136) Albinus joking said to
+    Carneades "You do not think me a praetor because I am not a _sapiens_."
+    "That," said Carneades, "is Diogenes' view, not mine" (137). Chrysippus
+    thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be defended
+    (138). I gravitate then towards one of them, that of pleasure. Virtue
+    calls me back, nor will she even allow me to join pleasure to herself
+    (139). When I hear the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I
+    cannot avoid being moved by both, and so I find it impossible to choose
+    (141, 142).
+
+§129. _Quod coeperam_: in 128 at _veniamus nunc ad boni maique notionem_.
+_Constituendi_: n. on 114. _Bonorum summa_: cf. _D.F._ V. 21 and Madv. _Est
+igitur_: so in _De Div._ II. 8, _igitur_ comes fourth word in the clause;
+this is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius. _Omitto_: MSS. _et omitto_,
+but cf. Madv. _Em._ 201 _certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro
+simplici 'omitto,' in initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae
+exempla subiciuntur per figuram omissionis_. _Relicta_: cf. 130 _abiectos_.
+Cic. generally classes Herillus (or Erillus as Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35
+spells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded
+systems, cf. _D.F._ II. 43, _De Off._ I. 6, _T.D._ V. 85. _Ut Herillum_.
+MSS. have either _Erillum_ or _et illum_, one would expect _ut Herilli_.
+_Cognitione et scientia_: double translation of επιστημη. For the _finis_
+of Herillus see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 43. _Megaricorum_: _Xenophanes_. Cic
+considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so closely related as to
+have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a continuous history.
+The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development of Eleatic doctrine.
+Zeller, _Socrates_ 211. _Unum et simile_: for this see Zell. _Socr._ 222
+sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq. _Simile_ ought perhaps to be _sui
+simile_ as in _Tim._ c. 7, already quoted on I. 30, see my note there and
+cf. I. 35. _Menedemo_: see Zeller _Socr._ 238, R. and P. 182. The
+_Erctrian_ school was closely connected with the Megarian. _Fuit_: = _natus
+est_, as often. _Herilli_: so Madv. for _ulli_ of MSS.
+
+§130. _Aristonem_: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a
+Peripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines of
+Aristo the Chian _ib._ 358, Zeller 58 sq. _In mediis_: cf. I. 36, 37.
+_Momenta_ = _aestimationes_, αξιαι in 36, where _momenti_ is used in a
+different way. _Pyrrho autem_: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav. conj., but
+in 124 there is just the same change from _Pyrrhoni_ to _Xenocrates_.
+Απαθεια: Diog. IX. 108 affirms this as well as πραιοτης to be a name for
+the sceptic τελος, but the name scarcely occurs if at all in Sext. who
+generally uses αταραξια, but occasionally μετριοπαθεια; cf. Zeller 496, R.
+and P. 338. Απαθεια was also a Stoic term. _Diu multumque_: n. on I. 4.
+
+§131. _Nec tamen consentiens_: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences
+between the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448.
+_Callipho_: as the genitive is _Calliphontis_, Cic. ought according to rule
+to write _Calliphon_ in the nom; for this see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 19, who
+also gives the chief authorities concerning this philosopher. _Hieronymus_:
+mentioned _D.F._ II. 19, 35, 41, V. 14, in which last place Cic. says of
+him _quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio_. _Diodorus_: see Madv. on
+_D.F._ II. 19. _Honeste vivere_, etc.: in _D.F._ IV. 14 the _finis_ of
+Polemo is stated to be _secundum naturam vivere_, and three Stoic
+interpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present
+passage--_omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint fruentem
+vivere_. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him it is
+attributed to the _vetus Academia_ in I. 22, where the words _aut omnia aut
+maxima_, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf. Clemens Alex. qu.
+by Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 15. See n. below on Carneades. _Antiochus probat_:
+the germs of many Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in
+Polemo; see I. 34, n. _Eiusque amici_: Bentl. _aemuli_, but Halm refers to
+_D.F._ II. 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree Stoicised.
+_Nunc_: Halm _huc_ after Jo. Scala. _Carneades_: this _finis_ is given in
+_D.F._ II. 35 (_frui principiis naturalibus_), II. 42 (_Carneadeum illud
+quod is non tam ut probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum
+gerebat opponeret_), V. 20 (_fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum
+naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor sed defensor
+disserendi causa fuit_), _T.D._ V. 84 (_naturae primus aut omnibus aut
+maximis frui, ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat_). The _finis_
+therefore, thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is
+clear that Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include
+_virtus_ in it (see _D.F._ II. 38, 42, V. 22) while Polemo did (I. 22). See
+more on 139. _Zeno_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 15 _Inventor et princeps_: same
+expression in _T.D._ I. 48, _De Or._ I. 91, _De Inv._ II. 6; _inv._ =
+οικιστης.
+
+§132. _Quemlibet_: cf. 125, 126. _Prope singularem_: cf. _T.D._ I. 22
+_Aristoteles longe omnibus--Platonem semper excipio--praestans_; also
+_D.F._ V. 7, _De Leg._ I. 15. _Per ipsum Antiochum_: a similar line of
+argument is taken in Sext. _P.H._ I. 88, II. 32, etc. _Terminis ...
+possessione_: there is a similar play on the legal words _finis terminus
+possessio_ in _De Leg._ I. 55, 56, a noteworthy passage. _Omnis ratio_
+etc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf. Aug.
+_De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1 _neque enim existimat_ (Varro) _ullam philosophiae
+sectam esse dicendam, quae non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat
+fines bonorum et malorum_, etc. _Si Polemoneus_: i.e. _sapiens fuerit_.
+_Peccat_: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see I. 37. _Academicos et_:
+MSS. om. _et_ as in I. 16, and _que_ in 52 of this book. _Dicenda_: for the
+omission of the verb with the gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic
+clauses) cf. I. 7, and Madv. on _D.F._ I. 43, who how ever unduly limits
+the usage. _Hic igitur ... prudentior_: MSS. generally have _assentiens_,
+but one good one (Halm's E) has _assentientes_. I venture to read
+_adsentietur_, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt, as in
+26 (_tenetur_) and that then _adsentiet_, under the attraction of the _s_
+following, passed into _adsentiens_, as in 147 _intellegat se_ passed into
+_intelligentes_. _N_, I may remark, is frequently inserted in MSS. (as in
+I. 7 _appellant_, 16 _disputant_, 24 _efficerentur_), and all the changes
+involved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read _sin, inquam_
+(_sc. adsentietur_) for _si numquam_ of MSS. The question _uter est
+prudentior_ is intended to press home the dilemma in which Cicero has
+placed the supposed _sapiens_. All the other emendations I have seen are
+too unsatisfactory to be enumerated.
+
+§133. _Non posse ... esse_: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads
+_non esse illa probanda sap._ after Lamb., who also conj. _non posse illa
+probata esse_. _Paria_: _D.F._ III. 48, _Paradoxa_ 20 sq., Zeller 250.
+_Praecide_: συντομος or συνελων ειπε, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 57, _Ad Att._ VIII.
+4, X. 16. _Inquit_: n. on 79. _Quid quod quae_: so Guietus with the
+approval of Madv. (_Em._ 203) reads for MSS. _quid quae_ or _quid quaeque_,
+Halm and Bait., follow Moser in writing _Quid? si quae_ removing the stop
+at _paria_, and make _in utramque partem_ follow _dicantur_, on Orelli's
+suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS. often
+omit one. _Dicebas_: in 27. _Incognito_: 133.
+
+§134. _Etiam_: = "yes," Madv. _Gram._ 454. _Non beatissimam_: I. 22, n.
+_Deus ille_: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's η θεος η θηριον), if he can
+do without other advantages. For the omission of _est_ after the emphatic
+_ille_ cf. 59, n. _Theophrasto_, etc.: n. on I. 33, 35. _Dicente_: before
+this Halm after Lamb., followed by Bait., inserts _contra_, the need for
+which I fail to see. _Et hic_: i.e. Antiochus. _Ne sibi constet_: Cic.
+argues in _T.D._ V. that there cannot be degrees in happiness. _Tum hoc ...
+tum illud_: cf. 121. _Iacere_: 79. _In his discrepant_: I. 42 _in his
+constitit_.
+
+§135. _Moveri_: κινεισθαι, 29. _Laetitia efferri_: I. 38. _Probabilia_: the
+removal of passion and delight is easier than that of fear and pain.
+_Sapiensne ... deleta sit_: see Madv. _D.F._ p. 806, ed. 2, who is severe
+upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz), _non timeat? nec si
+patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit?_ which involves the use of
+_nec_ for _ne ... quidem_. I have followed the reading of Madv. in his
+_Em._, not the one he gives (after Davies) in _D.F._ _ne patria deleatur_,
+which Halm takes, as does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer the MSS. _Decreta_:
+some MSS. _durata_; Halm conj. _dictata_. _Mediocritates_: μεσοπετες, as in
+Aristotle; cf. _T.D._ III. 11, 22, 74. _Permotione_: κινεσει. _Naturalem
+... modum_: so _T.D._ III. 74. _Crantoris_: sc. _librum_, for the omission
+of which see n. on I. 13; add Quint. IX. 4, 18, where Spalding wished to
+read _in Herodoti_, supplying _libro_. _Aureolus ... libellus_: it is not
+often that two diminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is rather
+colloquial; cf. _T.D._ III. 2, _N.D._ III. 43, also for _aureolus_ 119
+_flumen aureum_. _Panaetius_: he had addressed to Tubero a work _de
+dolore_; see _D.F._ IV. 23. _Cotem_: _T.D._ IV. 43, 48, Seneca _De Ira_
+III. 3, where the saying is attributed to Aristotle (_iram calcar esse
+virtutis_). _Dicebant_: for the repetition of this word cf. 146, I. 33.
+
+§136. _Sunt enim Socratica_: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is
+affirmed in _Parad._ 4, _T.D._ III. 10. _Mirabilia_: Cic. generally
+translates παραδοξα by _admirabilia_ as in _D.F._ IV. 74, or _admiranda_,
+under which title he seems to have published a work different from the
+_Paradoxa_, which we possess: see Bait., and Halm's ed. of the Phil. works
+(1861), p. 994. _Quasi_: = almost, ‛ως επος ειπειν. _Voltis_: cf. the
+Antiochean opinion in I. 18, 22. _Solos reges_: for all this see Zeller 253
+sq. _Solos divites_: ‛οτι μονος ‛ο σοφος πλουσιος, _Parad._ VI. _Liberum_:
+_Parad._ V. ‛οτι μονος ‛ο σοφος ελευθερος και πας αφρον δουλος. _Furiosus_:
+_Parad._ IV. ‛οτι πας αφρον μαινεται.
+
+§137. _Tam sunt defendenda_: cf. 8, 120. _Bono modo_: a colloquial and
+Plautine expression; see Forc. _Ad senatum starent_: "were in waiting on
+the senate;" cf. such phrases as _stare ad cyathum_, etc. _Carneade_: the
+vocative is _Carneades_ in _De Div._ I. 23. _Huic Stoico_: i.e. _Diogeni_;
+cf. _D.F._ II. 24. Halm brackets _Stoico_, and after him Bait. _Sequi
+volebat_: "professed to follow;" cf. _D.F._ V. 13 _Strato physicum se
+voluit_ "gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:" also Madv. on
+_D.F._ II. 102. _Ille noster_: Dav. _vester_, as in 143 _noster Antiochus_.
+But in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf. 113.
+_Balbutiens_: "giving an uncertain sound;" cf. _De Div._ I. 5, _T.D._ V.
+75.
+
+§138. _Mihi veremini_: cf. Caes. _Bell. Gall_. V. 9 _veritus navibus_. Halm
+and Bait. follow Christ's conj. _verenti_, removing the stop at _voltis_.
+_Opinationem_: the οιησιν of Sext., e.g. _P.H._ III. 280. _Quod minime
+voltis_: cf. I. 18. _De finibus_: not "concerning," but "from among" the
+different _fines_; otherwise _fine_ would have been written. Cf. I. 4 _si
+qui de nostris._ _Circumcidit et amputat_: these two verbs often come
+together, as in _D.F._ I. 44; cf. also _D.F._ III. 31. _Si vacemus omni
+molestia_: which Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure. _Cum honestate_:
+Callipho in 131. _Prima naturae commoda_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ IV. 59, V.
+58 confuses the Stoic πρωτα κατα φυσιν with τα του σωματος αγαθα και τα
+εκτος of the Peripatetics, for which see I. 19. More on the subject in
+Madvig's fourth Excursus to the _D.F._ _Relinquit_: Orelli _relinqui_
+against the MSS.
+
+§139. _Polemonis ... finibus_: all these were composite _fines_. _Adhuc_: I
+need scarcely point out that this goes with _habeo_ and not with
+_probabilius_; _adhuc_ for _etiam_ with the comparative does not occur till
+the silver writers. _Labor eo_: cf. Horace's _nunc in Aristippi furtim
+praecepta relabor_, also _D.F._ V. 6 _rapior illuc: revocat autem
+Antiochus_. _Reprehendit manu_: _M.D.F._ II. 3. _Pecudum_: I. 6, _Parad._
+14 _voluptatem esse summum bonum, quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non
+hominum_; similar expressions occur with a reference to Epicurus in _De
+Off._ I. 105, _Lael._ 20, 32. _T.D._ V. 73, _D.F._ II. 18; cf. also
+Aristoph. _Plut._ 922 προβατιου βιον λεγεις and βοσκηματων βιος in
+Aristotle. The meaning of _pecus_ is well shown in _T.D._ I. 69. _Iungit
+deo_: Zeller 176 sq. _Animum solum_: the same criticism is applied to
+Zeno's _finis_ in _D.F._ IV. 17, 25. _Ut ... sequar_: for the repeated _ut_
+see _D.F._ V. 10, Madv. _Gram._ 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second _ut_
+with Lamb. _Carneades ... defensitabat_: this is quite a different view
+from that in 131; yet another of Carneades is given in _T.D._ V. 83. _Istum
+finem_: MSS. _ipsum_; the two words are often confused, as in I. 2. _Ipsa
+veritas_: MSS. _severitas_, a frequent error; cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 3,
+III. 162, _De Leg._ I. 4, also Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 55. _Obversetur_: Halm
+takes the conj. of Lamb., _adversetur_. The MSS. reading gives excellent
+sense; cf. _T.D._ II. 52 _obversentur honestae species viro_. Bait. follows
+Halm. _Tu ... copulabis_: this is the feigned expostulation of _veritas_
+(cf. 34 _convicio veritatis_), for which style see 125.
+
+§140. _Voluptas cum honestate_: this whole expression is in apposition to
+_par_, so that _cum_ must not be taken closely with _depugnet_; cf. Hor.
+_Sat._ I. 7, 19 _Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius_ (sc.
+_par_) _cum Bitho Bacchius_. _Si sequare, ruunt_: for constr. cf. I. 7.
+_Communitas_: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297. _Nulla potest nisi
+erit_: Madv. _D.F._ III. 70 "_in hac coniunctione--hoc fieri non potest
+nisi--fere semper coniunctivus subicitur praesentis--futuri et perfecti
+indicativus ponitur_." _Gratuita_: "disinterested." _Ne intellegi quidem_:
+n. on I. 7, cf. also _T.D._ V. 73, 119. _Gloriosum in vulgus_: cf. _D.F._
+II. 44 _populus cum illis facit_ (i.e. _Epicureis_). _Normam ... regulam_:
+n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 8. _Praescriptionem_: I. 23, n.
+
+§141. _Adquiescis_: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads _adsciscis_,
+comparing 138. Add _D.F._ I. 23 (_sciscat et probet_), III. 17
+(_adsciscendas esse_), III. 70 (_adscisci et probari_) Bait. follows Halm.
+_Ratum ... fixum_: cf. 27 and n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 17. _Falso_: like
+_incognito_ in 133. _Nullo discrimine_: for this see the explanation of
+_nihil interesse_ in 40, n. _Iudicia_: κριτηρια as usual.
+
+    §§142--146. Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how Protagoras, the
+    Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (142). Does Antiochus follow
+    any of these? Why, he never even follows the _vetus Academia_, and
+    never stirs a step from Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot
+    agree about the very elements of their art (143). Why then, Lucullus,
+    do you rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling
+    them I do away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd
+    together, I will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them
+    are slaves, exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being
+    _sapiens_, know nothing whatever (144). This last point Zeno used to
+    illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any actual
+    _sapiens_ (145). Now as there is no knowledge there can be no art. How
+    would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this conclusion? They would prefer
+    mine, to which our ancestors bear testimony.
+
+§142. _Venio iam_: Dialectic had been already dealt with in 91--98 here it
+is merely considered with a view to the choice of the supposed _sapiens_,
+as was Ethical Science in 129--141 and Physics in 116--128. With the
+enumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus gives
+in _A.M._ VII. 48 sq. _Protagorae_: R. and P. 132 sq. _Qui putet_: so MSS.,
+Halm and Bait. _putat_ after Lamb. Trans. "inasmuch as he thinks".
+_Permotiones intimas_: cf. 20 _tactus interior_, also 76. _Epicuri_: nn. on
+19, 79, 80. _Iudicium_: κριτηριον as usual. _Rerum notitiis_: προληψεσι,
+Zeller 403 sq. _Constituit_: note the constr. with _in_, like _ponere in_.
+_Cogitationis_: cf. I. 30. Several MSS. have _cognitionis_, the two words
+are frequently confused. See Wesenberg _Fm._ to _T.D._ III. p. 17, who
+says, _multo tamen saepius "cogitatio" pro "cognitio" substituitur quam
+contra_, also _M.D.F_ III. 21.
+
+§143. _Ne maiorum quidem suorum_: sc. _aliquid probat_. For _maiorum_ cf.
+80. Here Plato is almost excluded from the so-called _vetus Academia_, cf.
+I. 33. _Libri_: titles of some are preserved in Diog. Laert. IV. 11--14.
+_Nihil politius_: cf. 119, n. _Pedem nusquam_: for the ellipse cf. 58, 116,
+_Pro Deiot._ 42 and _pedem latum_ in Plaut. _Abutimur_: this verb in the
+rhetorical writers means to use words in metaphorical or unnatural senses,
+see Quint. X. 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; "do we use the name
+Academic in a non natural fashion?" _Si dies est lucet_: a better trans of
+ει φως εστιν, ‛ημερα εστιν than was given in 96, where see n. _Aliter
+Philoni_: not Philo of Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of Diodorus
+the Megarian, mentioned also in 75. The dispute between Diodorus and Philo
+is mentioned in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 115--117 with the same purpose as here,
+see also Zeller 39. _Antipater_: the Stoic of Tarsus, who succeeded
+Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school. _Archidemus_: several
+times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as VII. 68, 84. _Opiniosissimi_:
+so the MSS. I cannot think that the word is wrong, though all edd. condemn
+it. Halm is certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory epithet such as
+_ingeniosissimi_ is necessary. I believe that the word _opiniosissimi_ (an
+adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was manufactured on the spur of the
+moment, in order to ridicule these two philosophers, who are playfully
+described as men full of _opinio_ or δοξα--just the imputation which, as
+Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's _spinosissimi_ is ingenious, and
+if an em. were needed, would not be so utterly improbable as Halm thinks.
+
+§144. _In contionem vocas_: a retort, having reference to 14, cf. also 63,
+72. For these _contiones_ see Lange, _Romische Alterthumer_ II. 663, ed 2.
+They were called by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of
+whom had the right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under
+fewer restrictions than the right of the others. _Occludi tabernas_ in
+order of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this see
+Liv. III. 27, IV. 31, IX. 7, and compare the cry "to your tents, O Israel"
+in the Bible. _Artificia_: n. on 30. _Tolli_: n. on 26. _Ut opifices
+concitentur_: cf. _Pro Flacc._ 18 _opifices et tabernarios quid neqoti est
+concitare?_ _Expromam_: Cic. was probably thinking of the use to which he
+himself had put these Stoic paradoxes in _Pro Murena_ 61, a use of which he
+half confesses himself ashamed in _D.F._ IV. 74. _Exsules_ etc.: 136.
+
+§145. _Scire negatis_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 153, who says that even
+καταληψις when it arises in the mind of a φαυλος is mere δοξα and not
+επιστημη; also _P.H._ II. 83, where it is said that the φαυλος is capable
+of το αληθες but not of αληθεια, which the σοφος alone has. _Visum ...
+adsensus_: the Stoics as we saw (II. 38, etc.) analysed sensations into two
+parts; with the Academic and other schools each sensation was an ultimate
+unanalysable unit, a ψιλον παθος. For this symbolic action of Zeno cf.
+_D.F._ II. 18, _Orat._ 113, Sextus _A.M._ II. 7, Quint. II. 20, 7, Zeller
+84. _Contraxerat_: so Halm who qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XI. 26, 94 _digitum
+contrahens aut remittens_; Orelli _construxerat_; MSS. mostly _contexerat_.
+_Quod ante non fuerat_: καταλαμβανειν however is frequent in Plato in the
+sense "to seize firmly with the mind." _Adverterat_: the best MSS. give
+merely _adverat_, but on the margin _admoverat_ which Halm takes, and after
+him Bait.; one good MS. has _adverterat_. _Ne ipsi quidem_: even Socrates,
+Antisthenes and Diogenes were not σοφοι according to the Stoics, but merely
+were εν προκοπηι; see Diog. VII. 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut. _Sto. Rep._
+1056 (qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli) εστι δε ουτος (i.e. ‛ο σοφος)
+ουδαμου γης ουδε γεγονε. _Nec tu_: sc. _scis_; Goer. has a strange note
+here.
+
+§146. _Illa_: cf. _illa invidiosa_ above (144). _Dicebas_: in 22. _Refero_:
+"retort," as in Ovid. _Metam._ I. 758 _pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici
+potuisse et non potuisse referri_; cf. also _par pari referre dicto_. _Ne
+nobis quidem_: "_nor_ would they be angry;" cf. n. on. I. 5. _Arbitrari_:
+the original meaning of this was "to be a bystander," or "to be an
+eye-witness," see Corssen I. 238. _Ea non ut_: MSS. have _ut ea non aut_.
+Halm reads _ut ea non_ merely, but I prefer the reading I have given
+because of Cicero's fondness for making the _ut_ follow closely on the
+negative: for this see Madv. _Gram._ 465 _b_, obs.
+
+§147. _Obscuritate_: cf. I. 44, n. on I. 15. _Plus uno_: 115. _Iacere_: cf.
+79. _Plagas_: cf. n. on 112.
+
+§148. _Ad patris revolvor sententiam_: for this see Introd. 50, and for the
+expression 18. _Opinaturum_: see 59, 67, 78, 112. _Intellegat se_: MSS.
+_intellegentes_, cf. n. on 132. _Qua re_: so Manut. for _per_ of MSS.
+Εποχην _illam omnium rerum_: an odd expression; cf. _actio rerum_ in 62.
+_Non probans_: so Madv. _Em._ 204 for MSS. _comprobans_. Dav. conj.
+_improbans_ and is followed by Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is
+wrong. The difficulty is essentially the same as that involved in 104,
+which should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a theoretical
+dogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that _assent_ (meaning absolute
+assent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma Catulus might well
+describe himself as formally approving (_comprobans_). The _practice_ is to
+give assent (meaning modified assent). There is the same contrast in 104
+between _placere_ and _tenere_. I may note that the word _alteri_ (cf.
+_altero_ in 104) need not imply that the dogma and the practice are
+irreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably confirmed
+edd. in their introduction of the negative. _Nec eam admodum_: cf. _non
+repugnarem_ in 112. _Tollendum_: many edd. have gone far astray in
+interpreting this passage. The word is used with a double reference to
+_adsensus_ and _ancora_; in the first way we have had _tollere_ used a
+score of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes.
+_Bell. Gall._ IV. 23, _Bell. Civ._ I. 31, where _tollere_ is used of
+weighing anchor, and Varro _De Re Rust._ III. 17, 1, where it occurs in the
+sense "to get on," "to proceed," without any reference to the sea. (The
+exx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe and this alone is referred to
+in _Ad Att._ XIII. 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried at first
+to manage a joke by using the word _inhibendum_, which had also a nautical
+signification, but finding that he had mistaken the meaning of the word,
+substituted _tollendum_.
+
+[1] _De Leg._ II. §3.
+
+[2] Cf. _De Or._ II. §1 with II. §5.
+
+[3] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut
+philosophus probabatur.
+
+[4] _N.D._ I. §93, Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius.
+
+[5] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1.
+
+[6] _Brutus_, §309.
+
+[7] _Ad Att._ II. 20, §6.
+
+[8] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 16. _T.D._ V. §113. _Acad._ II. §115.
+
+[9] _Brutus_, §306.
+
+[10] _Ibid._
+
+[11] _Rep._ I. §7. _T.D._ V. §5. _De Off._ II. §§3,4. _De Fato_, §2.
+
+[12] Cf. _Brutus_, §§312, 322.
+
+[13] Cf. _Brutus_, §§312, 314, 316.
+
+[14] _Brutus_, §315.
+
+[15] _N.D._ I. §59.
+
+[16] VII. I. §35.
+
+[17] Cf. _N.D._ I. §93 with _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, §1.
+
+[18] _Ac._ I. §46.
+
+[19] _D.F._ V. §3.
+
+[20] _D.F._ I. §16.
+
+[21] _D.F._ V. §6, etc.
+
+[22] _D.F._ V. §8.
+
+[23] _Ac._ II. §4.
+
+[24] _Ib._ §69.
+
+[25] _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, §5.
+
+[26] _Ac._ II. §113.
+
+[27] _Ac._ II. §113. _De Leg._ I. §54.
+
+[28] II. §12.
+
+[29] _Brutus_, §316.
+
+[30] _Hortensius_, fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe.
+
+[31] _T.D._ II. §61.
+
+[32] _De Div._ I. §130.
+
+[33] _D.F._ I. §6.
+
+[34] _Ad Att._ I. 10 and 11.
+
+[35] _Ibid._ II. 1, §3. _N.D._ I. §6.
+
+[36] _Ad Att._ II. 2.
+
+[37] _Ibid._ I. 20. Cf. II. 1, §12.
+
+[38] II. 6.
+
+[39] _Ad Att._ II. 7 and 16.
+
+[40] _Ibid._ II. 6, §2.
+
+[41] Cf. _Ad Att._ IV. 11 with IV. 8 a.
+
+[42] _Ibid._ IV. 10.
+
+[43] _Ibid._ IV. 16, §2.
+
+[44] _Ibid._ IV. 16 c, §10, ed. Nobbe.
+
+[45] _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 14.
+
+[46] _Ad Qu. Fr._ III. 5 and 6.
+
+[47] §332.
+
+[48] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1. _Ad Att._ V. 11, §6.
+
+[49] _Ad Att._ V. 10, §5.
+
+[50] _De Off._ I. §1.
+
+[51] _Tim._ c. 1.
+
+[52] Cf. _Tim._ c. 1 with _De Div._ I. §5. _Brutus_, §250.
+
+[53] _Ad Att._ VI. 1, §26.
+
+[54] _Ibid._ VI. 2, §3.
+
+[55] _Ibid._ VI. 6, §2.
+
+[56] _Ibid._ VI. 7, §2. _Ad Fam._ II. 17, §1.
+
+[57] _T.D._ V. §22.
+
+[58] _Ad Att._ VII. 1, §1.
+
+[59] _Ibid._ VII. 3, VIII. 11.
+
+[60] _Ad Att._ X. 8, §6.
+
+[61] _Ibid._ VIII. 2, §4.
+
+[62] περι ‛ομονοιας, _Ad Att._ IX. 9, §2, etc.
+
+[63] _Ibid._ IX. 4, §2; 9, §1.
+
+[64] _Ibid._ IX. 10, §2.
+
+[65] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1.
+
+[66] _Ibid._ IX. 3.
+
+[67] _Ibid._ IV. 3 and 4.
+
+[68] _De Rep._ I. §7. _T.D._ V. §5, etc.
+
+[69] Cf. _N.D._ I. §6.
+
+[70] Esp. I. §§26, 37.
+
+[71] Cf. _Ac._ II. §29.
+
+[72] _Ac._ II. §70.
+
+[73] _De Div._ II. §1. _Ac._ I. §45, etc.
+
+[74] _N.D._ I. §1.
+
+[75] Cf. esp. _N.D._ I. §5. _T.D._ II. §5.
+
+[76] _De Div._ II. §1. _N.D._ I. §7, etc.
+
+[77] _T.D._ II. §4.
+
+[78] _N.D._ I. §10.
+
+[79] Cf. _Ac._ II. §8. _N.D._ I. §§10, 66.
+
+[80] _T.D._ II. §9.
+
+[81] _N.D._ I. §10.
+
+[82] _Ibid._ I. §17. _Ac._ II. §§120, 137.
+
+[83] _T.D._ V. §33.
+
+[84] _Ac._ II. §121.
+
+[85] _T.D._ V. §82, _libas ex omnibus_.
+
+[86] _Ac._ II. §143.
+
+[87] _T.D._ V. §11.
+
+[88] _Ac._ II. §10.
+
+[89] _N.D._ I. §12.
+
+[90] _Parad._ §2. _De Fato_, §3. _T.D._ I. §7. _De Off._ I. §3.
+
+[91] _D.F._ IV. §5.
+
+[92] _Paradoxa_, §2.
+
+[93] _T.D._ I. §55. _De Div._ II. §62.
+
+[94] _T.D._ V. §11. _D.F._ II. §§1 and 2, etc.
+
+[95] §13.
+
+[96] Cf. esp. _N.D._ i. §6. _Ac._ ii. §§11 and 17.
+
+[97] _De Leg._ I. §39.
+
+[98] _Ibid._ I. §§55, 56.
+
+[99] _N.D._ I. §4.
+
+[100] _T.D._ IV. §53.
+
+[101] Cf. _De Off._ III. §20.
+
+[102] _T.D._ V. §§21-31, esp. §23.
+
+[103] _Ibid._ V. §75.
+
+[104] _De Off._ II. §35.
+
+[105] _T.D._ V. §34.
+
+[106] _Ac._ I. §16.
+
+[107] _Paradoxa_, §4. _Ac._ II. §§136, 137. _T.D._ III. §10.
+
+[108] _Ac._ II. §135.
+
+[109] See esp. _N.D._ I. §§3, 4.
+
+[110] _Ibid._, also _T.D._ V. §83.
+
+[111] Grote's _Aristotle_, vol. I. ch. 11.
+
+[112] _T.D._ IV. §9. _D.F._ III. §41.
+
+[113] I. §6.
+
+[114] _T.D._ IV. §7.
+
+[115] _Ibid._ IV. §7. Cf. _D.F._ II. §44, _populus cum illis facit_.
+
+[116] _Ac._ I. §6. _T.D._ IV. 6, 7; II. §7; III. §33. _D.F._ III. §40.
+
+[117] _T.D._ IV. §3.
+
+[118] _D.F._ I. §§4-6. _Ac._ I. §10. _D.F._ III. §5.
+
+[119] _De Div._ I. §§4, 5.
+
+[120] _D.F._ III. §5. _N.D._ I. §8. _T.D._ III. §§10, 16.
+
+[121] _T.D._ I. §5.
+
+[122] _T.D._ II. §5.
+
+[123] _De Div._ II. §1. _De Off._ II. §4.
+
+[124] _De Div._ II. §6. _De Off._ II. §2.
+
+[125] See esp. _De Consolatione_, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe. _T.D._ V. §5. _Ac._
+I. §11.
+
+[126] _N.D._ I. §6.
+
+[127] _T.D._ II. §§1, 4. _De Off._ II. §3. _D.F._ I. §1.
+
+[128] _T.D._ II. §1. _D.F._ I. §§1, 3.
+
+[129] _D.F._ I. §§1, 11.
+
+[130] _De Div._ II. §5. _De Off._ II. §2. _T.D._ IV. §1.
+
+[131] _De Div._ II. §4.
+
+[132] _N.D._ I. §9. _T.D._ II. §1.
+
+[133] _De Div._ II. §4.
+
+[134] _Ad Att._ XII. 19, §1.
+
+[135] _Ibid._ XII. 14, §3.
+
+[136] _Ibid._ XII. 15, 16.
+
+[137] _Ibid._ XII. 21, §5.
+
+[138] _Ibid._ XII. 23, §2.
+
+[139] _Ut scias me ita dolere ut non iaceam._
+
+[140] _De Or._ III. §109.
+
+[141] _Ad Att._ XII. 28, §2.
+
+[142] Cf. esp. _Ad Att._ XII. 40, §2 with 38, §3.
+
+[143] _Ibid._ XII. 40, §2.
+
+[144] _Ibid._ XII. 40, §5.
+
+[145] _Ibid._ XIII. 26.
+
+[146] _Ibid._ XII. 41, §1, also 42, 43; XIII. 26.
+
+[147] _Ibid._ XII. 46.
+
+[148] _Ad Att._ XII. 45, §1.
+
+[149] _Über Cicero's Akademika_, p. 4.
+
+[150] Cf. _Ad Att._ XII. 12, §2, where there is a distinct mention of the
+first two books.
+
+[151] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, §3.
+
+[152] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §4.
+
+[153] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §§4, 5; 22, §3.
+
+[154] II. §2.
+
+[155] _De Fin._ Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2.
+
+[156] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, §3; 16, §1.
+
+[157] _Ibid._ XVI. 3, §1.
+
+[158] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, §4.
+
+[159] _Ac._ II. §61.
+
+[160] _D.F._ I. §2.
+
+[161] _T.D._ II. §4. _De Div._ II. §1.
+
+[162] Cf. Krische, p. 5.
+
+[163] _Ac._ II. §61.
+
+[164] _Ad Att._ XIII. 5, §1.
+
+[165] _Ibid._ XIII. 32, §3.
+
+[166] _Ad Att._ XIII. 33, §4.
+
+[167] _Ibid_. XIII. II. §1.
+
+[168] _Ibid_. XII. 42.
+
+[169] _Ibid_. XIII. 16, §1.
+
+[170] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3.
+
+[171] _Ibid_. IV. 16a, §2.
+
+[172] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3; also IV. 16a, §2.
+
+[173] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, §3.
+
+[174] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, §4.
+
+[175] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3.
+
+[176] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, §4.
+
+[177] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3; 19, §4; 16, §1.
+
+[178] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, §3.
+
+[179] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, §1.
+
+[180] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §5.
+
+[181] Cf. _Ibid._ XIII. 14, §3; 16, §2; 18; 19, §5.
+
+[182] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §5.
+
+[183] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, §3.
+
+[184] _Ad Att._ XIII. 24.
+
+[185] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, §1; 18.
+
+[186] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, §1; 18; 19, §4.
+
+[187] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, §3. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates
+Schütz assigns to these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition
+of the _Academica_ in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13.
+
+[188] _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, §1.
+
+[189] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §5.
+
+[190] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §3.
+
+[191] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, §3.
+
+[192] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, §3.
+
+[193] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §4.
+
+[194] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §5.
+
+[195] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, §3.
+
+[196] _Ibid._ XIII. 24.
+
+[197] _Ibid._ XIII. 35, 36, §2.
+
+[198] _Ibid._ XIII. 38, §1.
+
+[199] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §§3, 4.
+
+[200] _T.D._ II. §4. Cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ III. 6, §64.
+
+[201] _Ad Att._ XVI. 6, §4. _N.D._ I. §11. _De Div._ II. §1.
+
+[202] _De Off._ II. §8, _Timæus_, c. 1. _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, §1; 19, §5.
+
+[203] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12; 16; 13; 19.
+
+[204] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, §4. _T.D._ II. §4. _N.D._ I. §11. _De Div._ II. §1.
+
+[205] _Nat. Hist._ XXXI. c. 2.
+
+[206] _Inst. Or._ III. 6, §64.
+
+[207] Plut. _Lucullus_, c. 42.
+
+[208] §§12, 18, 148.
+
+[209] Cf. _Att._ XIII. 19, §4.
+
+[210] _Lucullus_, §12.
+
+[211] _Ad Att._ XIII. 16, §1.
+
+[212] Lactant. _Inst._ VI 2.
+
+[213] Cf. esp. _De Off._ I. §133 with _Brutus_, §§133, 134.
+
+[214] Esp. _Pro Lege Manilia_, §51.
+
+[215] _Brutus_, §222.
+
+[216] _In Verrem_, II. 3, §210.
+
+[217] _Pro Lege Manilia_, §59.
+
+[218] _Pro Sestio_, §122.
+
+[219] _Pro Sestio_, §101.
+
+[220] _Philipp._ II. §12.
+
+[221] _Ad Att._ II. 24, §4.
+
+[222] _Pis._ §6. _Pro Sestio_, §121. _Pro Domo_, §113. _Post Reditum in
+Senatu_, §9. _Philipp._ II. §12.
+
+[223] _Ad Fam._ IX. 15, §3.
+
+[224] Cf. _Post Reditum in Senatu_, §9. _Pro Domo_, §113.
+
+[225] _Pro Archia_, §§6, 28.
+
+[226] Cf. _Ac._ II. §9 with §80.
+
+[227] §62.
+
+[228] _Pro Plancio_, §12. _Pro Murena_, §36. _Pro Rabirio_, §26. _Pro
+Cornelia_ II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe.
+
+[229] _T.D._ V. §56. Cf. _De Or._ III. §9. _N.D._ III. §80.
+
+[230] Cf. esp. III. §173.
+
+[231] _Ibid._ II. §28.
+
+[232] _Ibid._ II. §§13, 20, 21.
+
+[233] _Ibid._ II. §51.
+
+[234] Cf. _ibid._ II. §74 with III. §127.
+
+[235] Cf. II. §152 with III. §187.
+
+[236] _Ibid._ II. §154.
+
+[237] _Brutus_, §§132, 133, 134, 259. _De Or._ III. §29.
+
+[238] _Brutus_, §132.
+
+[239] _De Or._ II. §244. _N.D._ I. §79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.
+
+[240] _De Or._ II. §155.
+
+[241] _Ibid._ III. §194.
+
+[242] Cf. _De Or._ II. §68 with III. §§182, 187.
+
+[243] _De Or._ I. §82 sq.; II. §360.
+
+[244] _Ibid._ I. §45; II. §365; III. §§68, 75.
+
+[245] §12, _commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni_.
+
+[246] Cf. _De Or._ III. §110.
+
+[247] _Ac._ II. §148.
+
+[248] Cf. _Ac._ II. §11.
+
+[249] _Ibid._
+
+[250] _Ibid._ §§12, 18, with my notes.
+
+[251] _Ac._ II. §12: _ista quae heri defensa sunt_ compared with the words
+_ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus_.
+
+[252] See below.
+
+[253] _Ac._ II. §§33--36 inclusive; §54.
+
+[254] _Ac._ II. §28.
+
+[255] Cf. _Ac._ II. §§59, 67, 78, 112, 148, with my notes.
+
+[256] _Ibid._ II. §10.
+
+[257] _Ibid._ II. §28.
+
+[258] Cf. II. §61 with the fragments of the _Hortensius_; also _T.D._ II.
+§4; III. §6; _D.F._ I. §2.
+
+[259] Lactant. III. 16.
+
+[260] Cf. _Ac._ II. §10.
+
+[261] _Ib._ II. §61.
+
+[262] §§44--46.
+
+[263] §13.
+
+[264] Cf. II. §14 with I. §44, and II. §§55, 56.
+
+[265] II. §§17, 18, 22.
+
+[266] Cf. II. §31 with I. §45.
+
+[267] II. §§17, 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 54, 59.
+
+[268] II. §79.
+
+[269] Cf. the words _tam multa_ in II. §79.
+
+[270] See II. §42, where there is a reference to the "_hesternus sermo_."
+
+[271] II. §10.
+
+[272] Cf. II. §10: _id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut tota fere
+quaestio tractata videatur_.
+
+[273] What these were will appear from my notes on the _Lucullus_.
+
+[274] II. §12.
+
+[275] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8.
+
+[276] Cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 25, §3: _Ad Brutum transeamus_.
+
+[277] This is not, as Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy
+after Hortensius' death. That lay at Puteoli: see _Ad Att._ VII. 3, §9.
+
+[278] II. §9.
+
+[279] Cf. II. §61.
+
+[280] II. §80: _O praeclarum prospectum_!
+
+[281] Cf. II. §9 with §128 (_signum illud_), also §§80, 81, 100, 105, 125.
+
+[282] II. §115.
+
+[283] II. §63.
+
+[284] II. §§147, 148.
+
+[285] II. §135.
+
+[286] Cf. II. §§11, 12 with the words _quae erant contra_ ακαταληψιαν
+_praeclare collecta ab Antiocho_: _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, §3.
+
+[287] Varro, _De Re Rust._ III. 17.
+
+[288] II. §11.
+
+[289] _Paradoxa_, §1. _D.F._ III. §8. _Brutus_, §119.
+
+[290] _Ac._ I. §12. _D.F._ V. §8.
+
+[291] Cf. II. §80.
+
+[292] Cf. Aug. _Adv. Acad._ III. §35. Nonius, sub v. _exultare_.
+
+[293] Cf. the word _nuper_ in §1.
+
+[294] §11.
+
+[295] §§3, 18.
+
+[296] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8, §1.
+
+[297] _Ad Att._ II. 25, §1.
+
+[298] _Ibid_. III. 8, §3.
+
+[299] _Ibid_. III. 15, §3; 18, §1.
+
+[300] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1--8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro
+preserved in our collections.
+
+[301] Above, pp. xxxvii--xlii.
+
+[302] _De Civ. Dei_, XIX. cc. 1--3.
+
+[303] See Madvig, _De Fin._ ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50.
+Brückner, _Leben des Cicero_, I. p. 655, follows Müller.
+
+[304] Cf. Krische, p. 58.
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Academica, by Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Academica
+
+Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+Release Date: February 8, 2005 [EBook #14970]
+
+Language: Latin with English and Greek (ancient)
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team
+
+
+
+
+
+THE
+
+ACADEMICA OF CICERO.
+
+_THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED_
+
+BY
+
+JAMES S. REID,
+
+M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)
+ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
+ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.
+
+LONDON:
+MACMILLAN AND CO.
+1874
+
+[_All Rights reserved_.]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+TO
+THOSE OF HIS PUPILS
+WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM
+_THE ACADEMICA_,
+THIS EDITION
+IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED
+BY
+THE EDITOR.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+PREFACE.
+
+Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has edited
+the _Academica_. In Germany the last edition with explanatory notes is that
+of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and untrustworthiness of
+Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong evidence; while the work of
+Davies, though in every way far superior to that of Goerenz, is very
+deficient when judged by the criticism of the present time.
+
+This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures given by
+me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work in its
+present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the Universities,
+and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where the
+philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those where an
+attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient Philosophy as
+will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now required in the final
+Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford and Cambridge. My notes
+have been written throughout with a practical reference to the needs of
+junior students. During the last three or four years I have read the
+_Academica_ with a large number of intelligent pupils, and there is
+scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested by some difficulty or
+want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody in an Introduction such
+information concerning Cicero's philosophical views and the literary
+history of the _Academica_ as could not be readily got from existing books;
+next, to provide a good text; then to aid the student in obtaining a higher
+knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity, and lastly, to put it in his power to
+learn thoroughly the philosophy with which Cicero deals.
+
+My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in the
+edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the
+editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second edition
+of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that editor. I
+have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass without carefully
+weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also studied all original
+criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain access. The result is a
+text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than that of Halm. My
+obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently acknowledged in my
+notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled _Emendationes ad
+Ciceronis libros Philosophicos_, published in 1825 at Copenhagen, but
+never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in the edition of
+Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few passages I have
+introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the conjecttires of
+other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the MSS. If any
+apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the notes, questions
+of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from a conviction that
+the very excellence of the texts now in use is depriving a Classical
+training of a great deal of its old educational value. The judgment was
+better cultivated when the student had to fight his way through bad texts
+to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the Latin tongue. The
+acceptance of results without a knowledge of the processes by which they
+are obtained is worthless for the purposes of education, which is thus made
+to rest on memory alone. I have therefore done my best to place before the
+reader the arguments for and against different readings in the most
+important places where the text is doubtful.
+
+My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the students
+for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller acquaintance than they
+ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties of language which the
+best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide them to the best
+teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding editor of Cicero
+must build. His edition of the _De Finibus_ contains more valuable material
+for illustrating, not merely the language, but also the subject-matter of
+the _Academica_, than all the professed editions of the latter work in
+existence. Yet, even after Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be
+done in pointing out what is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have
+therefore added very many references from my own reading, and from other
+sources. Wherever a quotation would not have been given but for its
+appearance in some other work, I have pointed out the authority from whom
+it was taken. I need hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to
+look out all the references given. It was necessary to provide material by
+means of which the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if
+it were new to him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that
+occurred. Want of space has compelled me often to substitute a mere
+reference for an actual quotation.
+
+As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not
+touched upon somewhere in the _Academica_, it is evidently impossible for
+an editor to give information which would be complete for a reader who is
+studying that subject for the first time. I have therefore tried to enable
+readers to find easily for themselves the information they require, and
+have only dwelt in my own language upon such philosophical difficulties as
+were in some special way bound up with the _Academica_. The two books
+chiefly referred to in my notes are the English translation of Zeller's
+_Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics_ (whenever Zeller is quoted without any
+further description this book is meant), and the _Historia Philosophiae_ of
+Ritter and Preller. The _pages_, not the _sections_, of the fourth edition
+of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's _De Finibus_, all
+teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a
+philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have
+constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all
+of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.
+
+Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is
+hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as bringing
+together much scattered information illustrative of the _Academica_, which
+was before difficult of access. The present work will, I hope, prepare the
+way for an exhaustive edition either from my own or some more competent
+hand. It must be regarded as an experiment, for no English scholar of
+recent times has treated any portion of Cicero's philosophical works with
+quite the purpose which I have kept in view and have explained above.
+Should this attempt meet with favour, I propose to edit after the same plan
+some others of the less known and less edited portions of Cicero's
+writings.
+
+In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited I
+cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to
+repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than
+to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a
+great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that intellectual
+disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this University,
+and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of English
+scholarship as compared with that of Germany,
+
+I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and
+omissions from any who are interested in the subject.
+
+JAMES S. REID.
+
+CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, _December, 1873._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.
+
+Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica
+Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De
+Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. =
+Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus;
+Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = De
+Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. =
+Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; Ad
+Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., Verr. =
+In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; In Cat. =
+In Catilinam.
+
+Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia Socratis;
+Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.
+
+Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna
+Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De
+Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. =
+Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.
+
+Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. Rep. =
+De Stoicis Repugnantiis.
+
+Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. =
+Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = Pyrrhone�n
+Hypotypose�n Syntagmata.
+
+Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.
+
+Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.
+
+Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et Platonis.
+
+Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.
+
+Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos; De
+Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.
+
+Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.
+
+Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad Helvidium.
+
+Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.
+
+Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. =
+Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv. =
+Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.
+
+Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. =
+Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or
+Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.
+
+Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.
+
+Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundz�ge der Griechischen Etymologie.
+
+Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.
+
+Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.
+
+Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. =
+conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. =
+emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. =
+especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. =
+Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, or
+omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. =
+subjunctive.
+
+R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium locis
+contexta.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+I. _Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of
+Letters:_ 90--45 B.C.
+
+It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his
+father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and spent
+the greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived
+that strong love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son
+throughout his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young
+Cicero to feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a
+corrective for the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2]
+
+Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the
+Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of Athens,
+whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he had assumed
+the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at once to the
+tenets of the master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life a friend
+of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable disposition
+and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, the exception
+of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any literary power.[4]
+Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius
+Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus.
+It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend
+became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the
+Epicurean school.[5]
+
+At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of
+Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively,
+the art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important to the
+orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the monopoly of
+the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days with Diodotus in
+the severest study, but he seems never to have been much attracted by the
+general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between the two lasted till
+the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion set by the Roman Stoic
+circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became an inmate of Cicero's
+house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil heir to a not
+inconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most
+accomplished men of his time, and Cicero's feelings towards him were those
+of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8]
+
+In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the
+Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled
+from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. Philo,
+like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic philosopher,
+he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice of oratory.
+Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for Epicureanism was
+swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, as he tells us, to
+the brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he
+abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the
+conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever,
+and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10]
+
+We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been brought
+into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent
+philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and
+important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become
+thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of each.
+His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his egotism has
+been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. In his later
+works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to philosophy.[11] It would
+be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection which subsisted
+between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; but there
+can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then Rhodian
+ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning the
+ethical part of Greek philosophy.
+
+During the years 88--81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly with the
+study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many ambitious
+works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him at this
+period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the Marian
+party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular course, and
+Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one philosophic orator of
+Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he was busily engaged,
+and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern Hellas. It is usually
+supposed that he came into collision with Sulla through the freedman
+Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of Roscius. The silence of
+Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which rests on no better evidence
+than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even when mentioning his speech in
+defence of Roscius, never assigns any other cause for his departure than
+his health, which was being undermined by his passionate style of
+oratory[13].
+
+The whole two years 79--77 B.C. were spent in the society of Greek
+philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at Athens, and
+were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the exception of
+Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent rhetorical teachers at that time
+resident in the city[14]. By the advice of Philo himself[15], Cicero
+attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as Diogenes calls
+him[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the Epicurean school. In Cicero's
+later works there are several references to his teaching. He was biting and
+sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in spirit, hence in striking contrast to
+Patro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to find that Zeno is numbered by
+Cicero among those pupils and admirers of Carneades whom he had known[18].
+Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along with Atticus who loved him beyond all
+other philosophers[19], Cicero spent much time in listening to his
+instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the two pupils[20]. Patro was
+probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere explicitly stated.
+Cicero must at this time have attained an almost complete familiarity with
+the Epicurean doctrines.
+
+There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school then
+at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures
+Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed Peripatetic,
+was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three notable
+Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of Naples, who
+lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is
+probable, however, from a mention of him in the De Oratore, that Cicero
+knew himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently
+named by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time
+unknown to him.
+
+The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at this
+period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a Stoicised
+Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to treat later,
+when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised over our
+author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point which was in
+controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still continued to think
+with his earlier teacher. His later works, however, make it evident that he
+set a high value on the abilities and the learning of Antiochus, especially
+in dialectic, which was taught after Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him
+as eminent among the philosophers of the time, both for talent and
+acquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a
+pointed style[25]; in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the
+philosophers of the age[26]. A considerable friendship sprang up between
+Antiochus and Cicero[27], which was strengthened by the fact that many
+friends of the latter, such as Piso, Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or
+less adhered to the views of Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at
+this time became acquainted with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in
+the Academica[28] he is mentioned in such a way as to show that he was
+unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.
+
+The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had been to learn philosophy; in
+Asia and at Rhodes he devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the
+guidance of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was his old
+friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian school[29]. Cicero, however,
+formed while at Rhodes one friendship which largely influenced his views of
+philosophy, that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, the most famous
+Stoic of the age. To him Cicero makes reference in his works oftener than
+to any other instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the
+Stoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom Pompey, in the
+midst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble[31]; as a
+minute inquirer[32]. He is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression
+of affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works more than those of
+any other author[33]. Posidonius was at a later time resident at Rome, and
+stayed in Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of Panaetius,
+may have been at Rhodes at this time. Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers
+of Panaetius, belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was well
+acquainted with the works of the former, he does not seem to have known
+either personally.
+
+From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters begins,
+Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political affairs to
+spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed much to
+philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; and we know from his
+letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style by much study
+of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. During the period
+then, about which we have little or no information, we may believe that he
+kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many Roman friends who had a
+bent towards philosophy, as well as with the Greeks who from time to time
+came to Rome and frequented the houses of the Optimates; to this he added
+such reading as his leisure would allow. The letters contained in the first
+book of those addressed to Atticus, which range over the years 68--62 B.C.,
+afford many proofs of the abiding strength of his passion for literary
+employment. In the earlier part of this time we find him entreating Atticus
+to let him have a library which was then for sale; expressing at the same
+time in the strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his
+love for books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the
+midst of his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest
+for the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan
+villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be
+taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all
+things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory
+held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed
+his intellect, but never his heart.
+
+The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to indulge his
+literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his speeches, which
+were crowded, he says, with the maxims of philosophy[35]; the history of
+his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he sent to
+Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the poem on his
+consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two later we find him
+reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and keeping up his
+acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of leisure
+seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at this
+time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he
+presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes
+to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the
+endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even
+slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find
+greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37]."
+At this period of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates
+near Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater
+emphasis on these facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero
+was a mere dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore
+paraphrases of Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for
+every kind of literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each
+department considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his
+age, with the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38]
+will give a fair picture of his life at this time. He especially studied
+the political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and
+Dicaearchus[39]. He also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of
+Theopompus[40].
+
+The years from 59--57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private cares
+overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return from
+exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring literature" with
+a marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that
+nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the
+year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla, the
+son of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us, his solace
+and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which Atticus had,
+beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of office. Towards the
+end of the year, he was busily engaged on the _De Oratore_, a work which
+clearly proves his continued familiarity with Greek philosophy[43]. In the
+following year (54) he writes that politics must cease for him, and that he
+therefore returns unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature,
+that of the student[44]. During this year he was again for the most part at
+those of his country villas where his best collections of books were. At
+this time was written the _De Republica_, a work to which I may appeal for
+evidence that his old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to
+drop[45]. Aristotle is especially mentioned as one of the authors read at
+this time[46]. In the year 52 B.C. came the _De Legibus_, written amid many
+distracting occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older
+philosophers of the Socratic schools.
+
+In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, much
+to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the house of
+Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His acquaintance
+with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the affectionate
+mention in the _Brutus_[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of Xeno, an
+Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. It was at
+this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil of the great
+Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in which Epicurus had
+lived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat disappointed with the state
+of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the only man of merit then resident
+there[49]. On the journey from Athens to his province, he made the
+acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at Athens as head of the
+Peripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at Mitylene, where
+Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the
+greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and
+indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52].
+
+The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's
+thoughts till the end of 50. Yet he yearned for Athens and philosophy. He
+wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful city, and
+anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build a [Greek:
+propylon] at the Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at
+Eleusis[53]. It seems the Athenians of the time were in the habit of
+adapting their ancient statues to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of
+placing on them fulsome inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with
+loathing. In one letter of this date he carefully discusses the errors
+Atticus had pointed out in the books _De Republica_[54]. His wishes with
+regard to Athens still kept their hold upon his mind, and on his way home
+from Cilicia he spoke of conferring on the city some signal favour[55].
+Cicero was anxious to show Rhodes, with its school of eloquence, to the two
+boys Marcus and Quintus, who accompanied him, and they probably touched
+there for a few days[56]. From thence they went to Athens, where Cicero
+again stayed with Aristus[57], and renewed his friendship with other
+philosophers, among them Xeno the friend of Atticus[58].
+
+On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical
+condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The letters
+which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times contrasts
+the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn in the _De
+Republica_[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's description of the tyrant
+is present to his mind[60]; when, he deliberates about the course he is
+himself to take, he naturally recals the example of Socrates, who refused
+to leave Athens amid the misrule of the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious
+to find Cicero, in the very midst of civil war, poring over the book of
+Demetrius the Magnesian concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in
+arguing with himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about
+tyranny[63]. Nothing could more clearly show that he was really a man of
+books; by nothing but accident a politician. In these evil days, however,
+nothing was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn
+became unpleasant[64].
+
+As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he
+returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter
+written to Varro in that year[65], he says "I assure you I had no sooner
+returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books."
+These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit
+than in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this
+time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to
+Sulpicius[67]. The _Partitiones Oratoriae_, the _Paradoxa_, the _Orator_,
+and the _Laudatio Catonis_, to which Caesar replied by his _Anticato_, were
+all finished within the year. Before the end of the year the _Hortensius_
+and the _De Finibus_ had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in
+the following year the _Academica_, the history of which I shall trace
+elsewhere, was written.
+
+I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as
+the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his
+life which preceded the writing of the _Academica_. Even the evidence I
+have produced, which does not include such indirect indications of
+philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical
+works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he
+been divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge made
+by some people on the publication of his first book of the later
+period--the _Hortensius_--that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the
+assertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts
+throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life[69]. Did the scope of
+this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in showing from a
+minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with ancient
+authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as accurate
+as it was extensive. So far as the _Academica_ is concerned, I have had in
+my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's substantial accuracy; of the
+success of the defence I must leave the reader to judge. During the
+progress of this work I shall have to expose the groundlessness of many
+feelings and judgments now current which have contributed to produce a low
+estimate of Cicero's philosophical attainments, but there is one piece of
+unfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the
+present. It is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the
+shortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise
+his political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate
+his achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too
+closely into their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance
+the illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the _De Legibus_ as "an oasis in the
+desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political partizanship,
+and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all
+students to free themselves in reading the _Academica_.
+
+II. _The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero_.
+
+In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student of
+philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed historical
+examination of the later Greek schools--the Stoic, Peripatetic, Epicurean
+and new Academic. These it would be necessary to know, not merely as they
+came from the hands of their founders, but as they existed in Cicero's age;
+Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as Posidonius and the other pupils
+of Panaetius propounded it; not merely the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but
+that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum
+by Cratippus; the new Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and
+Carneades; the medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put
+forward by Antiochus in the name of the Old Academy. A systematic attempt
+to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine held by
+these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements concerning
+any particular school are generally tested by comparing them with the
+assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier representatives of
+the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at once concluded that
+Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all probability, he is uttering
+opinions which would have been recognised as genuine by those who were at
+the head of the school in his day. The criticism of Madvig even is not free
+from this error, as will be seen from my notes on several passages of the
+_Academica_[70]. As my space forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I
+have indicated as desirable, I can but describe in rough outline the
+relation in which Cicero stands to the chief schools.
+
+The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often
+insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to
+distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical
+standard[71]. We have in the _Academica_ Cicero's view of the first
+problem: that the attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To
+go more into detail here would be to anticipate the text of the _Lucullus_
+as well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in
+this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, and
+in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine that
+absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against which
+all the other schools were combined[72]. In that which was most
+distinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.
+
+It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. Nothing
+was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he was
+accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both
+sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition with a
+conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One
+requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this
+arrogance[73]. Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most
+opposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from
+all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most
+probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart
+from his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration,
+and repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the
+diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to
+lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In
+positiveness of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and
+disgraceful, unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a
+touch of feeling thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar
+to some put forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to
+Mill, to show that the free conflict of opinion is necessary to the
+progress of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to
+maturity in Greece[77]. Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice,
+says Cicero, there philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a
+warning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often
+depicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires us to find out what can
+be said for every view. It is a positive duty to discuss all aspects of
+every question, after the example of the Old Academy and Aristotle[80].
+Those who demand a dogmatic statement of belief are mere busybodies[81].
+The Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to
+defend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their
+predecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does Cicero carry this freedom,
+that in the fifth book of the _Tusculan Disputations_, he maintains a view
+entirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the _De Finibus_,
+and when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former
+statements, on the score that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. "Modo
+hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur[84]." The Academic sips the best of
+every school[85]. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic
+dares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus[86]. The Academic is
+only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he makes it his
+sole aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and others of the mists of
+error[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus the Antiochean[88]. While
+professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero indignantly
+repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth,
+has no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true.
+
+Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their
+evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that
+eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators,
+politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the
+teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and
+Epicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic
+tenets were those with which the common sense of the world could have most
+sympathy[92]. The Academy also was the school which had the most
+respectable pedigree. Compared with its system, all other philosophies were
+plebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was
+most estimable, _ceteris paribus_, and that man was Carneades[94].
+
+In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard, we
+must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later
+philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first.
+Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of conduct (_ars vivendi_).
+All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely estimable as
+supplying a basis on which this practical art could be reared. This is
+equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the dogmatism of Zeno and
+Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were mere outworks or
+ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school was carried on. These
+were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy; in time of peace ethics
+held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a key to unlock many
+difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may instance one passage
+in the beginning of the _Academica Posteriora_[95], which has given much
+trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro with having deserted
+the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge. How is this to be
+reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he never recanted the
+doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus. Arcesilas, Carneades, and
+Philo had been too busy with their polemic against Zeno and his followers,
+maintained on logical grounds, to deal much with ethics. On the other hand,
+in the works which Cicero had written and published before the _Academica_,
+wherever he had touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The
+works themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and
+Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics
+mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase
+"Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical
+resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical difference, would
+naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus Academia," so
+long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought dialectic to the front,
+and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would naturally regard him as a
+deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This view is confirmed by the
+fact that for many years before Cicero wrote, the Academic dialectic had
+found no eminent expositor. So much was this the case, that when Cicero
+wrote the _Academica_ he was charged with constituting himself the champion
+of an exploded and discredited school[96].
+
+Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the sphere
+of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in the _De
+Legibus_ when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he begs the New
+Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, to be
+silent[97]. Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected,
+is in the _De Legibus_ spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical
+systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an
+attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the
+power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he
+calls them "great and famous philosophers[99]," and he frequently speaks
+with something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands
+of Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they
+should be the only true philosophers after all[100]. There was a kind of
+magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited to a
+superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the
+barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions,
+therefore, we often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism
+than even his teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the
+philosophers of the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The
+Stoics maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero
+agrees with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a
+life enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be
+happy, but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic
+and Peripatetic schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire)
+and to allow that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired
+even if he were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he
+admits the purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104].
+These opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but
+appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an
+ignoble craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is
+Cicero's general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt
+that he caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno,
+ever stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however,
+regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so
+regarded chiefly the dialectic. It is just in this that the difference
+between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To the former Zeno's dialectic was true
+and Socratic, while the latter treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon
+Socrates as the apostle of doubt[106]. On the whole Cicero was more in
+accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in all points, however: for
+while Antiochus accepted without reserve the Stoic paradoxes, Cicero
+hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded that they were
+Socratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic theory that all
+emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in his joys and sorrows,
+refused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some points Cicero
+was inconsistent. In the _De Finibus_ he argued that the difference between
+the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of terms; in the _Tusculan
+Disputations_ he held it to be real. The most Stoic in tone of all his
+works are the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Officiis_.
+
+With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a comparatively
+small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this branch of
+philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient theology was,
+as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical science. The
+religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very strongly to
+sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal operation of
+divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were impossible in any form,
+he thought, if the divine government of the universe were denied[109]. It
+went to Cicero's heart that Carneades should have found it necessary to
+oppose the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defends the great sceptic by
+the plea that his one aim was to arouse men to the investigation of the
+truth[110]. At the same time, while really following the Stoics in physics,
+Cicero often believed himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose
+from the actual adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines,
+which they gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious
+and the genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange
+oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111].
+Still, Cicero contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic
+physics by a study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of
+his notions about physics, the _Timaeus_ of Plato, which he knew well and
+translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that
+the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well
+aware of the fact.
+
+Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's estimate of
+the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not very powerfully
+represented during his lifetime. The philosophical descendants of the
+author of the _Organon_ were notorious for their ignorance of logic[112],
+and in ethics had approximated considerably to the Stoic teaching. While
+not much influenced by the school, Cicero generally treats it tenderly for
+the sake of its great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic
+family. With the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood
+absolutely alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they
+discarded mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing
+but loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors
+by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely
+indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.
+
+III. _The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works_.
+
+It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a philosopher,
+and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is true, but still
+absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of Cicero's purpose in
+writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek speculation. The
+conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite unwarranted. If the later
+philosophy of the Greeks is of any value, Cicero's works are of equal
+value, for it is only from them that we get any full or clear view of it.
+Any one who attempts to reconcile the contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes
+Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and other authorities, will perhaps
+feel little inclination to cry out against the confusion of Ciceros ideas.
+Such outcry, now so common, is due largely to the want, which I have
+already noticed, of any clear exposition of the variations in doctrine
+which the late Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before
+the Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This
+is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works
+(if we except the third book of the _De Officiis_), which he does not
+freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the time
+when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault rather
+than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no one had
+propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had been
+simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing tenets. It
+would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two centuries are
+therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not the substance of
+the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which ultimately exercised
+no unimportant influence on society and on the Christian religion itself.
+
+When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have been
+destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed study to
+those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the best Greek
+speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the education of
+his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at the same time
+to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism throughout Italy. The
+doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin in a shape suited to
+catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a very large Epicurean
+literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty traces is now lost. C.
+Amafinius, mentioned in the _Academica_[113], was the first to write, and
+his books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large
+number of imitators, who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in
+Cicero's strong language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115].
+Rabirius and Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of
+Horace, were two of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various
+reasons for their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean
+physics, the fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and
+the voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in
+one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It is
+exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean literature
+dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics than with the
+ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the
+Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for morality in the legal
+and social constitution of the family, and did not much feel the need of
+any speculative system; while the general decay among the educated classes
+of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied as it was by an increase of
+superstition among the masses, prepared the way for the acceptance of a
+purely mechanical explanation of the universe. But of this subject,
+interesting and important as it is in itself, and neglected though it has
+been, I can treat no farther.
+
+These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached by Cicero for their
+uncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not read
+them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious question
+arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero had for
+omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman Epicureans.
+The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible to include
+the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being unwilling to allow
+that anything good could come from the school of Epicurus, preferred to
+keep silence, which nothing compelled him to break, since Lucretius was an
+obscure man and only slowly won his way to favour with the public.
+
+In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero had a
+patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the reproach
+that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He often tries by
+the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had left its mark on
+the early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that philosophy was
+best left to the Greek language, he replies with indignation, accusing them
+of being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a glorious thing, he
+thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled to resort to
+Greeks[119]. He will not even concede that the Greek is a richer tongue
+than the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the Roman intellect
+to deal with philosophical enquiries, he will not hear of it. It is only,
+he says, because the energy of the nation has been diverted into other
+channels that so little progress has been made. The history of Roman
+oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an impulse
+were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the wane in
+Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of oratory,
+which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122].
+
+There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he
+could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political
+inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one
+service he could render[123]. He is within his right when he claims praise
+for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so many of the most
+prominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and in
+those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125].
+Philosophy took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and
+politics[126]. It is strange to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies
+as he does for devoting himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might
+set them down to egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such
+studies were merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a
+life to them seemed well enough for Greeks, but for Romans unmanly,
+unpractical and unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were
+ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh
+importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were
+received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others, like
+the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy was
+good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that
+Cicero should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging
+the pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.
+
+Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were roused
+by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. The elder
+generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the books, and
+many were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now
+extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as to
+bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were accustomed
+to treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy could not be thoroughly
+understood till the whole subject had been mastered[132]. This design then,
+which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest works which we possess,
+the _Academica_ and the _De Finibus_, required the composition of a sort of
+philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero never claimed to be more than an
+interpreter of Greek philosophy to the Romans. He never pretended to
+present new views of philosophy, or even original criticisms on its
+history. The only thing he proclaims to be his own is his style. Looked at
+in this, the true light, his work cannot be judged a failure. Those who
+contrive to pronounce this judgment must either insist upon trying the work
+by a standard to which it does not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek
+philosophy it copies, or perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed
+worthlessness of the philosophy of his age.
+
+In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his oratorical
+and political writings, all or nearly all published before the
+_Hortensius_, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only
+two works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded
+the _Academica_, were the _De Consolatione_, founded on Crantor's book,
+[Greek: peri penthous], and the _Hortensius_, which was introductory to
+philosophy, or, as it was then called, protreptic.
+
+For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of their
+composition, the student must be referred to the _Dict. of Biography_, Art.
+Cicero.
+
+IV. _History of the Academica_.
+
+On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45 B.C.,
+Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was
+pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and Circeii[134].
+Here he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book
+_De Consolatione_ was written. He found the mechanic exercise of
+composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days
+together[135]. At other times he would plunge at early morning into the
+dense woods near his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till
+nightfall[136]. Often exertion failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the
+entreaties of Atticus that he would return to the forum and the senate. A
+grief, which books and solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would
+crush him, he felt, in the busy city[137].
+
+It was amid such surroundings that the _Academica_ was written. The first
+trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a letter of Cicero
+to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks of his
+bereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus very much for
+historical and biographical details, and in the letter in question he asks
+for just the kind of information which would be needed in writing the
+_Academica_. The words with which he introduces his request imply that he
+had determined on some new work to which our _Academica_ would
+correspond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome the embassy which
+Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader of the Epicurean
+school; who were then the most noted [Greek: politikoi] at Athens. The
+meaning of the last question is made clear by a passage in the _De
+Oratore_[140], where Cicero speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic
+schools under that name. It may be with reference to the progress of the
+_Academica_ that in a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the
+advance he has made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of
+the remainder of his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively
+employed; but although he speaks of various other literary projects, we
+find no express mention in his letters to Atticus of the _Academica_[142].
+He declares that however much his detractors at Rome may reproach him with
+inaction, they could not read the numerous difficult works on which he has
+been engaged within the same space of time that he has taken to write
+them[143].
+
+In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near
+Antium[144], where he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he
+afterwards suppressed[145]. From the same place he wrote to Atticus of his
+intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome by way of Lanuvium about the
+middle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately following Tullia's
+death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she died. This he felt
+now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either abandon Tusculum
+altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even ten years would make
+the effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero wrote
+to Atticus that he had finished while at Astura _duo magna_ [Greek:
+syntagmata], words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many
+scholars, including Madvig, have understood that the first edition of the
+_Academica_, along with the _De Finibus_, is intended. Against this view
+the reasons adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the
+letters to Atticus that the _De Finibus_ was being worked out book by book
+long after the first edition of the _Academica_ had been placed in the
+hands of Atticus. The _De Finibus_ was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it
+was still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the
+_Academica_[151]. The final arrangement of the characters in the _De
+Finibus_ is announced later still[152]; and even at a later date Cicero
+complains that Balbus had managed to obtain surreptitiously a copy of the
+fifth book before it was properly corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia
+having copied the whole five books while in that state[153]. A passage in
+the _De Divinatione_[154] affords almost direct evidence that the
+_Academica_ was published before the _De Finibus_. On all these grounds I
+hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero describes as having
+been finished simultaneously at Astura.
+
+Another view of the [Greek: syntagmata] in question is that they are simply
+the two books, entitled _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, of the _Priora
+Academica_. In my opinion the word [Greek: syntagma], the use of which to
+denote a portion of a work Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains its natural
+meaning. Cicero uses the word [Greek: syntaxis] of the whole work[156],
+while [Greek: syntagma][157], and [Greek: syngramma][158], designate
+definite portions or divisions of a work. I should be quite content, then,
+to refer the words of Cicero to the _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_. Krische,
+however, without giving reasons, decides that this view is unsatisfactory,
+and prefers to hold that the _Hortensius_ (or _de Philosophia_) and the
+_Priora Academica_ are the compositions in question. If this conjecture is
+correct, we have in the disputed passage the only reference to the
+_Hortensius_ which is to be found in the letters of Cicero. We are quite
+certain that the book was written at Astura, and published before the
+_Academica_. This would be clear from the mention in the _Academica
+Posteriora_ alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the _De Finibus_[160]
+place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the _Hortensius_ had
+been published a sufficiently long time before the _De Finibus_, to have
+become known to a tolerably large circle of readers. Further, in the
+_Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Divinatione_[161] the _Hortensius_ and
+the _Academica_ are mentioned together in such a way as to show that the
+former was finished and given to the world before the latter. Nothing
+therefore stands in the way of Krische's conjecture, except the doubt I
+have expressed as to the use of the word [Greek: syntagma], which equally
+affects the old view maintained by Madvig.
+
+Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the
+_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ must have been more closely connected, in
+style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting perhaps the
+_Academica_ and the _De Finibus_. The interlocutors in the _Hortensius_
+were exactly the same as in the _Academica Priora_, for the introduction of
+Balbus into some editions of the fragments of the _Hortensius_ is an
+error[162]. The discussion in the _Academica Priora_ is carried on at
+Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the _Hortensius_ at the villa of Lucullus
+near Cumae. It is rather surprising that under these circumstances there
+should be but one direct reference to the _Hortensius_ in the
+_Lucullus_[163].
+
+While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45, Cicero
+sent Atticus the _Torquatus_, as he calls the first book of the _De
+Finibus_[164]. He had already sent the first edition of the _Academica_ to
+Rome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia had been added to the
+_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, in which the public characters from whom the
+books took their names were extolled. In all probability the extant
+prooemium of the _Lucullus_ is the one which was then affixed. Atticus, who
+visited Cicero at Tusculum, had doubtless pointed out the incongruity
+between the known attainments of Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they
+were made to take in difficult philosophical discussions. It is not
+uncharacteristic of Cicero that his first plan for healing the incongruity
+should be a deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of
+statements concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans
+which he knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I
+may note, as of some interest in connection with the _Academica_, the fact
+that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was one
+from Varro[166].
+
+On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says, to
+arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing attentions of
+Brutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it had been his intention to
+go on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still unsatisfied with his
+choice of interlocutors for the _Academica_, for the first thing he did on
+his arrival was to transfer the parts of Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and
+Brutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on the receipt of a letter
+from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work should be dedicated to
+Varro, or if not the _Academica_, the _De Finibus_[170]. Cicero had never
+been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems to have been
+chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times anxious to draw
+them more closely together. Nine years before he had pressed Cicero to find
+room in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of the works
+on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to comply with
+the request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full two years before the
+_Academica_ was written, to dedicate to Cicero his great work _De Lingua
+Latino_. In answer to the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared
+himself very much dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise.
+From this it is evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude
+of that work. His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years
+without making any progress[173], shows that there could have been little
+of anything like friendship between the two. Apart from these causes for
+grumbling, Cicero thought the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend[174]." Since
+the _De Finibus_ was already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer
+to Varro the _Academica_, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of
+noble birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they
+possess that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had
+been made in the first edition of the _Academica_ to maintain[176]. For
+them another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the
+_Academica_ would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus, and the
+fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It
+happened that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's
+stay at Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his
+_Academica_, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making
+the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position occupied by
+Atticus in the dialogue was quite an inferior one, but he was so pleased
+with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often in the future such
+minor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta should also be
+introduced was found impracticable[180].
+
+Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had
+constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He
+frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus,
+but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his plans.
+Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the work
+contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over again
+before he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for these
+solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was obliged to
+assure him that there were reasons, which he could not disclose in a
+letter[182]. The true reasons, however, did appear in some later letters.
+In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of Varro, and the more so because he
+wishes it, but you know he is
+
+  [Greek: deinos an�r, tacha ken kai anaition aitio�ito.]
+
+So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, it may
+be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than his; a
+charge which you will perceive to be untrue[183]." Cicero, then, feared
+Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical fastidiousness.
+Before these explanations Atticus had concluded that Cicero was afraid of
+the effect the work might produce on the public. This notion Cicero assured
+him to be wrong; the only cause for his vacillation was his doubt as to how
+Varro would receive the dedication[184]. Atticus would seem to have
+repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured Cicero that there
+was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a general assurance,
+and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the reasons from which it
+proceeded[185]. In order to stimulate his friend, Atticus affirmed that
+Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown more favour[186]. We
+find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it
+Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not
+have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to
+have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed ignorant
+of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of being
+actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently while at
+Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the _De Finibus_, but
+employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the dedication[187].
+
+Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the _Academica_
+is often given in the letters. He tells us that it extended, on the whole,
+to greater length than the first, though much had been omitted; he adds,
+"Unless human self love deceives me, the books have been so finished that
+the Greeks themselves have nothing in the same department of literature to
+approach them.... This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and
+altogether better than the last[188]." Again: "The Antiochean portion has
+all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may
+possess[189]." Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what
+success, but with a care which nothing could surpass[190]." The binding and
+adornment of the presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and
+the letter accompanying it was carefully elaborated[191]. Yet after
+everything had been done and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome,
+Cicero was still uneasy as to the reception it would meet with from Varro.
+He wrote thus to Atticus: "I tell you again and again that the presentation
+will be at your own risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to
+Brutus, who is also a follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou
+wert ever wont, flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part
+"shuddered" at the idea of taking the responsibility[192]. After the work
+had passed into his hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to
+prevent it from getting into circulation until they could meet one another
+in Rome[193]. This warning was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had
+just managed to get access to the _De Finibus_[194]. In a letter, dated
+apparently a day or two later, Cicero declared his intention to meet
+Atticus at Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable
+to do so, after a consultation[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take
+place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to
+approve any course that might be taken[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as
+soon as Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time,
+then," says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal
+step; oh dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my
+letter stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to
+hear how the matter stands[197]." Again, a little later: "You have been
+bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment upon them,
+but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books in the first
+fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work on the _Tusculan
+Disputations_[198]. A copy of the first edition had already got into
+Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which Cicero begs Atticus to
+ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of the _Academica_, at a
+time when the fate of the second edition was still undecided[199]. From
+this fact we may conclude that Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing
+the first edition. If he consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies
+of the first edition, it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of
+course assumes that Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people,
+wishes to have the "Splendidiora, breviora, meliora." Still, on every
+occasion which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised
+edition the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately
+after the _Academica Posteriora_ was completed[200], and often
+subsequently, when he most markedly mentioned the number of the books as
+four[201]. That he wished the work to bear the title _Academica_ is
+clear[202]. The expressions _Academica quaestio_, [Greek: Akad�mik�
+syntaxis], and _Academia_, are merely descriptive[203]; so also is the
+frequent appellation _Academici libri_[204]. The title _Academicae
+Quaestiones_, found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the
+_Tusculanae Quaestiones_, which was supported by the false notion, found as
+early as Pliny[205], that Cicero had a villa called Academia, at which the
+book was written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his Tusculan villa, which he
+called his Academia, but we are certain from the letters to Atticus that
+the work was written entirely at Astura, Antium, and Arpinum.
+
+Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well[206], but the
+second edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books
+are expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the
+title _Academica_. Augustine speaks of them only as _Academici libri_, and
+his references show that he knew the second edition only. Lactantius also
+uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks of the _Academica_.
+Plutarch shows only a knowledge of the first edition[207].
+
+I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of the
+genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. That it
+was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding theories which
+old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the two editions. A
+fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of Goerenz. I now proceed
+to examine into the constitution and arrangement of the two editions.
+
+a. _The lost dialogue "Catulus."_
+
+The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the _Lucullus_ are among
+those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party whom Cicero
+so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue was named was
+son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the political career of
+father and son we shall have little to do. I merely inquire what was their
+position with respect to the philosophy of the time, and the nature of
+their connection with Cicero.
+
+Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the
+_Lucullus_[208] that he did little more than put forward opinions he had
+received from his father. Cicero would, doubtless, have preferred to
+introduce the elder man as speaking for himself, but in that case, as in
+the _De Oratore_, the author would have been compelled to exclude himself
+from the conversation[209]. The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of
+the father, just as Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does
+nothing but render literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to
+have heard[210]. For the arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be
+found in their [Greek: atripsia] with respect to philosophy[211]. This
+[Greek: atripsia] did not amount to [Greek: apaideusia], or else Cicero
+could not have made Catulus the younger the advocate of philosophy in the
+_Hortensius_[212]. Though Cicero sometimes classes the father and son
+together as men of literary culture and perfect masters of Latin style, it
+is very evident on a comparison of all the passages where the two are
+mentioned, that no very high value was placed on the learning of the
+son[213]. But however slight were the claims of Catulus the younger to be
+considered a philosopher, he was closely linked to Cicero by other ties.
+During all the most brilliant period of Cicero's life, Catulus was one of
+the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his character, life, and influence are
+often depicted in even extravagant language by the orator[214]. He is one
+of the pillars of the state[215], Cicero cries, and deserves to be classed
+with the ancient worthies of Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law,
+and asks the people on whom they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic
+power concentrated in his hands, were to die, the people answer with one
+voice "On you[217]." He alone was bold enough to rebuke the follies, on the
+one hand, of the mob, on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no storm of
+danger, no favouring breeze of fortune, could ever inspire either fear or
+hope, or cause to swerve from his own course[219]. His influence, though he
+be dead, will ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not only glorious
+in his life, but fortunate in his death[221].
+
+Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were
+special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the _viri consulares_
+who had given their unreserved approval to the measures taken for the
+suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the first to confer on
+Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title "Father of his
+country[222]." So closely did Cicero suppose himself to be allied to
+Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for the death of Tullia, by
+bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden times[223]." The statement of
+Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never been so
+unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna
+held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast between the
+zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague Antonius[224].
+Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of
+the two Catuli[225].
+
+We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first
+edition of the _Academica_ from circulation, he affixed a prooemium to each
+book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. From the
+passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit in such
+matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a portion of
+the contents of the lost prooemium to the _Catulus_. The achievements of
+the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as those of his son. The
+philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made to cast its lustre on the
+younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once more lauded, and great
+stress was laid upon the patronage it received from so famous a man as the
+younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in the fervid language which
+Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. Some allusion most likely was
+made to the connection of Archias with the Catuli, and to the poem he had
+written in Cicero's honour. Then the occasion of the dialogue, its supposed
+date, and the place where it was held, were indicated. The place was the
+Cuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned date must fall between the year 60
+B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which
+is alluded to in the _Lucullus_[227]. It is well known that in the
+arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against
+anachronisms.
+
+The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly made
+to the _Hortensius_, in which the same speakers had been engaged; and after
+more compliments had been bandied about, most of which would fall to
+Cicero's share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between
+the dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's
+views, at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy.
+Before we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from
+indications offered by the _Lucullus_, it is necessary to speak of the
+character and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.
+
+In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to mention
+his _sapientia_, which implies a certain knowledge of philosophy. He was,
+says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the wisest, the holiest of
+men[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of surpassing worth, a second
+Laelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the _De Oratore_, in which he
+appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view of his accomplishments.
+Throughout the second and third books he is treated as the lettered man,
+par excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made to him when any
+question is started which touches on Greek literature and philosophy. We
+are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance with Greek, and
+his style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the Greeks from
+the attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the Latin
+historians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek rhetorical
+teaching, while he bestows high commendation on the early sophists[234].
+The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus is most to his
+mind[235]. An account is given by him of the history of Greek speculation
+in Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin style made him seem to
+many the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written a history of his
+own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had imitated[238], and
+was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239].
+
+Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the
+_Academica_ that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In the _De
+Oratore_, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does
+not declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in
+his long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular
+teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the
+poet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded that he
+was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. Cicero
+repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator spring, and
+the whole tone of the _De Oratore_ shows that Catulus could have had no
+leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The probability is that he
+had never placed himself under the instruction of Greek teachers for any
+length of time, but had rather gained his information from books and
+especially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual
+communication with any of the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have
+failed to tell us, as he does in the case of Antonius[243], and
+Crassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any direct intercourse between
+Philo and Catulus can have taken place, although one passage in the
+_Lucullus_ seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo had a brilliant reputation
+during the later years of Catulus, and no one at all conversant with Greek
+literature or society could fail to be well acquainted with his
+opinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus
+undoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the latest development
+of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were probably not known to
+Catulus[248].
+
+I now proceed to draw out from the references in the _Lucullus_ the chief
+features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably introduced
+by a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the speech
+must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon the
+genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated with
+great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of the
+older Academics[250]. The most important part of the speech, however, must
+have consisted of a defence of Carneades and Arcesilas against the dogmatic
+schools[251]. Catulus evidently concerned himself more with the system of
+the later than with that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly
+probable that he touched only very lightly on the negative Academic
+arguments, while he developed fully that positive teaching about the
+[Greek: pithanon] which was so distinctive of Carneades. All the counter
+arguments of Lucullus which concern the destructive side of Academic
+teaching appear to be distinctly aimed at Cicero, who must have represented
+it in the discourse of the day before[252]. On the other hand, those parts
+of Lucullus' speech which deal with the constructive part of
+Academicism[253] seem to be intended for Catulus, to whom the maintenance
+of the genuine Carneadean distinction between [Greek: ad�la] and [Greek:
+akatal�pta] would be a peculiarly congenial task. Thus the commendation
+bestowed by Lucullus on the way in which the _probabile_ had been handled
+appertains to Catulus. The exposition of the sceptical criticism would
+naturally be reserved for the most brilliant and incisive orator of the
+party--Cicero himself. These conjectures have the advantage of establishing
+an intimate connection between the prooemium, the speech of Catulus, and
+the succeeding one of Hortensius. In the prooemium the innovations of Philo
+were mentioned; Catulus then showed that the only object aimed at by them,
+a satisfactory basis for [Greek: epist�m�], was already attained by the
+Carneadean theory of the [Greek: pithanon]; whereupon Hortensius showed,
+after the principles of Antiochus, that such a basis was provided by the
+older philosophy, which both Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned.
+Thus Philo becomes the central point or pivot of the discussion. With this
+arrangement none of the indications in the _Lucullus_ clash. Even the
+demand made by Hortensius upon Catulus[254] need only imply such a bare
+statement on the part of the latter of the negative Arcesilaean doctrines
+as would clear the ground for the Carneadean [Greek: pithanon]. One
+important opinion maintained by Catulus after Carneades, that the wise man
+would opine[255] ([Greek: ton sophon doxasein]), seems another indication
+of the generally constructive character of his exposition. Everything
+points to the conclusion that this part of the dialogue was mainly drawn by
+Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.
+
+Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of
+Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it
+extremely probable that he gave a r�sum� of the history of philosophy,
+corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the _Academica
+Posteriora_. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty of
+understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the speech
+could have been assigned in the first edition. In the _Academica
+Posteriora_ it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second as
+Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second edition
+of the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate
+only in the mouth of one who was answering a speech already made. On the
+view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the fact that
+Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the lost dialogue
+which bore his name he had argued against philosophy altogether[258], and
+denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a
+historical r�sum� as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within the
+reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put forward to
+show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old
+Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant for
+stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We
+are thus relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word
+_commoveris_[261], from which Krische infers that the dialogue, entitled
+_Hortensius_, had ended in a conversion to philosophy of the orator from
+whom it was named. To any such conversion we have nowhere else any
+allusion.
+
+The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character and
+attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to have been
+as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it was possible
+for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech of Hortensius
+were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral teaching of
+Antiochus.
+
+The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of the
+preceding speech is correct, it follows that Cicero in his reply pursued
+the same course which he takes in his answer to Varro, part of which is
+preserved in the _Academica Posteriora_[262]. He justified the New Academy
+by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old, and also with
+those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, therefore,
+reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great and ancient
+names like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according to
+Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes,
+Plato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a historical
+summary. He must have dealt with the theory of [Greek: katal�ptik�
+phantasia] and [Greek: ennoiai] (which though really Stoic had been adopted
+by Antiochus), since he found it necessary to "manufacture" (_fabricari_)
+Latin terms to represent the Greek[265]. He probably also commented on the
+headlong rashness with which the dogmatists gave their assent to the truth
+of phenomena. To this a retort is made by Lucullus[266]. That Cicero's
+criticism of the dogmatic schools was incomplete may be seen by the fact
+that he had not had occasion to Latinize the terms [Greek: katal�psis]
+(i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the individual [Greek: katal�ptik�
+phantasia]), [Greek: enargeia, horm�, apodeixis, dogma, oikeion, ad�la,
+epoch�], nearly all important terms in the Stoic, and to some extent in the
+Antiochean system, all of which Lucullus is obliged to translate for
+himself[267]. The more the matter is examined the more clearly does it
+appear that the main purpose of Cicero in this speech was to justify from
+the history of philosophy the position of the New Academy, and not to
+advance sceptical arguments against experience, which were reserved for his
+answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he expressly tells us that such
+sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him in the first day's discourse
+were really out of place, and were merely introduced in order to disarm
+Lucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these arguments must have
+occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, although foreign to
+its main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary classification of the
+sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent to the truth of each
+class[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of the elaborate speech of
+Cicero in the _Lucullus_ proves that no general or minute demonstration of
+the impossibility of [Greek: epist�m�] in the dogmatic sense had been
+attempted in his statement of the day before. Cicero's argument in the
+_Catulus_ was allowed by Lucullus to have considerably damaged the cause of
+Antiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus, Hortensius, and Cicero had
+gone over nearly the whole ground marked out for the discussion[272], but
+only cursorily, so that there was plenty of room for a more minute
+examination in the _Lucullus_.
+
+One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the attack of
+Catulus? Krische believes that the argument of Catulus was answered point
+by point. In this opinion I cannot concur. Cicero never appears elsewhere
+as the defender of Philo's reactionary doctrines[273]. The expressions of
+Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching had been dismissed by
+all the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his letter of
+dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo (_partes mihi
+sumpsi Philonis_[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to those general
+New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly supported by the pupil
+of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief sources for Cicero's
+speech in the _Catulus_ were, doubtless, Philo himself and Clitomachus.
+
+In that intermediate form of the _Academica_, where Cato and Brutus
+appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no doubt
+that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. Consequently Cato
+must have taken the comparatively inferior part of Hortensius, while Brutus
+took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem strange that a Stoic of the
+Stoics like Cato should be chosen to represent Antiochus, however much that
+philosopher may have borrowed from Zeno. The r�le given to Hortensius,
+however, was in my view such as any cultivated man might sustain who had
+not definitely committed himself to sceptical principles. So eminent an
+Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been reduced to the comparatively
+secondary position assigned to Hortensius in the _Academica Priora_. He
+would naturally occupy the place given to Varro in the second edition[276].
+If this be true, Brutus would not speak at length in the first half of the
+work. Cato is not closely enough connected with the _Academica_ to render
+it necessary to treat of him farther.
+
+b. _The "Lucullus."_
+
+The day after the discussion narrated in the _Catulus_, during which
+Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the Cuman villa
+of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of Hortensius at
+Bauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind favoured, Lucullus was to leave for
+his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his at Pompeii[278]. Bauli was a little
+place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round which so many legends
+lingered[279]. The scenery in view was magnificent[280]. As the party were
+seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines of statues, the
+waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the horizon glistened and
+quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour under the freshening
+breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and Puteoli, thirty stadia
+distant[281].
+
+Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and to keep it perfectly
+free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still living, although
+when the words were written he had been dead for many years[282]. The
+surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom
+of Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private troubles
+which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept carefully
+out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of thoughts and
+plans which were actively employing the author's mind at Astura. His
+intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last section of the
+book, while in the last but one the _De Finibus_, the _De Natura Deorum_
+and other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another passage the design of
+the _Tusculan Disputations_, which was carried out immediately after the
+publication of the _Academica_ and _De Finibus_, is clearly to be
+seen[285].
+
+Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the
+conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially
+acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly
+all that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue,
+and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to have
+dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private citizen, was
+directed to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train when he went to
+Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his residence in the
+East he sought to attach learned men to his person. At Alexandria he was
+found in the company of Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius
+Rogus and the Selii, all men of philosophic tastes[288]. He is several
+times mentioned by Pliny in the _Natural History_ as the patron of Greek
+artists. Yet, as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters
+to Atticus that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like
+Catulus, by the authority of another person. All his arguments are
+explicitly stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard
+Antiochus engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a
+reply to that of Cicero in the _Catulus_. Any closer examination of its
+contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The
+same may be said of Cicero's answer.
+
+In the intermediate form of the _Academica_, the speech of Lucullus was no
+doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a slight connection
+with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much more than call
+attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close relationship in
+which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have had to deal. He
+was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife of Lucullus[289].
+Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while
+Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the
+Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero,
+during the war between Pompey and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both
+friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290].
+
+c. _The Second Edition._
+
+When Cicero dedicated the _Academica_ to Varro, very slight alterations
+were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the piece. Cicero
+had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost within sight of
+Hortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene was now
+laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date
+of the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is
+shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many
+allusions are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the
+Pompeian party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the
+_Hortensius_[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of
+the _Academica_, it can be shown that Varro, Cicero and Atticus could not
+have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore for once admits into his works
+an impossibility in fact. This impossibility would at once occur to Varro,
+and Cicero anticipates his wonder in the letter of dedication[296].
+
+For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the
+ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact
+between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his
+philosophical opinions, are alone needed here. The first mention we have of
+Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself sufficient to show his
+character and the impossibility of anything like friendship between the
+two. Varro had done the orator some service in the trying time which came
+before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had eulogised Varro; and in
+the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to send Varro the eulogy to
+read, adding "_Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti,_ [Greek: elikta kai
+ouden][297]." All the references to Varro in the letters to Atticus are in
+the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to write Varro a letter of thanks
+for supposed exertions in his behalf, during his exile[298]. Several
+passages show that Cicero refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported
+by Atticus[299]. On Cicero's return from exile, he and Varro remained in
+the same semi-friendly state. About the year 54 B.C., as we have already
+seen, Atticus in vain urged his friend to dedicate some work to the great
+polymath. After the fall of the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to
+have been drawn a little closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in
+the year before the _Academica_ was published, testify to this
+approximation[300]. Still they are all cold, forced and artificial; very
+different from the letters Cicero addressed to his real intimates, such for
+instance as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all
+show a fear of giving offence to the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility
+in presence of his vast learning which is by no means natural to Cicero.
+The negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication
+of the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this
+slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301].
+
+The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable accuracy
+from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro _De
+Philosophia_[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of Antiochus and the
+so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school from, among the 288
+philosophies which he considered possible, by an elaborate and pedantic
+process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious in Augustine. My notes on
+the _Academica Posteriora_ will show that there is no reason for accusing
+Cicero of having mistaken Varro's philosophical views. This supposition
+owes its currency to M�ller, who, from Stoic phrases in the _De Lingua
+Latina_, concluded that Varro had passed over to the Stoics before that
+work was written. All that was Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303].
+
+The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the
+subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more
+conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition
+preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the
+contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical exposition
+of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by Varro; then the
+historical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had given
+in the first edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an
+exposition by Cicero of Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same
+as that given by Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that
+foretaste of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had
+formed part of the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech
+of Varro in reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in
+ed. 1. Book IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1.
+Atticus must have been almost a [Greek: k�phon pros�pon].
+
+I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old
+editions the _Lucullus_ is marked throughout as _Academicorum liber IV_.
+This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of Nonius'
+quotations, which are always from the _second_ edition, and can tell us
+nothing about the constitution of the _first_. One other thing is worth
+remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the _Academica Priora_
+before the _Posteriora_. This seems to me an unnatural arrangement; the
+subject-matter of the _Varro_ is certainly prior, logically, to that of the
+_Lucullus_.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+M. TULLII CICERONIS
+
+ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM
+
+LIBER PRIMUS.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+I. 1. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a
+M. Varrone, venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset,
+continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram
+interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et
+vetustate amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus,
+paulumque cum _ab_ eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus:
+atque ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad
+suam villam reduximus. 2. Hic pauca primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis,
+ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus: Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec
+audire sine molestia possumus, quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse
+novi. Silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum
+cessare, sed celare quae scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille:
+intemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo
+opus magnum in manibus, idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum--me autem
+dicebat--quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me
+politius. 3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam, Varro, iam diu exspectans, non
+audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti
+studium--nihil enim eius modi celare possumus--non te ea intermittere, sed
+accuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante
+hoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam
+sum ingressus res eas, quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis
+philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare,
+quaero quid sit cur, cum multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim
+cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et
+studiis et artibus antecedat.
+
+II. 4. Tum ille: Rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris.
+Itaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu,
+quod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam
+viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de
+nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca
+potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis
+abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca
+intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti
+intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. 5. Vides autem--eadem enim
+ipse didicisti--non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui nulla
+arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone disputant, nihil
+definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam
+denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praeceptis
+dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri
+putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, quae
+docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem
+accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur _labor_. 6. Iam vero physica, si
+Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut
+Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris,
+de corpusculorum--ita enim appellat atomos--concursione fortuita loqui?
+Nostra tu physica nosti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia
+ea, quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam
+quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit
+adducere? _Quid_, haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis
+fugiendisque rebus? Illi enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum
+esse censent: apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas.
+7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intelligat quid
+sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab honestate seiungi:
+quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine voluptatibus sensum
+moventibus ne suspicari _quidem_. Si vero Academiam veterem persequamur,
+quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam
+argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud
+philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum
+possum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est,
+maius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. 8. Sed meos amicos, in quibus
+est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ea a
+fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae autem nemo adhuc
+docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, quantum potui--nihil
+enim magno opere meorum miror--feci ut essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim
+peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et
+tamen in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati,
+quadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa
+dicta dialectice +quae quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate
+quadam ad legendum invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum
+prooemiis +philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.
+
+III. 9. Tum, ego. Sunt, inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe
+peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum
+deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem
+patriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu
+domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium
+divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti,
+plurimumque poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis
+attulisti, atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti
+philosophiamque multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum
+parum. 10. Causam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere
+malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi
+nunc: satisne probas? Immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca
+poterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos
+Graecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat
+Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum
+expresserunt poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi
+Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem,
+Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem
+sint aut Demosthenem imitati. 11. Ego autem--dicam enim, ut res est--dum me
+ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed
+quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat,
+haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum licebat, legendo.
+Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et administratione rei
+publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii
+oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime
+aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, hoc in primis
+consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil utilius aut, si
+haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. 12. Brutus quidem
+noster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris
+persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem
+sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu, cuius
+tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi
+litterarum.
+
+IV. 13. Tum, ille. Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te
+ipso quid est, inquit, quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te
+veterem illam, inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho
+id magis licuerit, nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam
+nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et
+emendata maxime. Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu
+existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas
+Academias esse erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit,
+ut dicis: sed ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra _ea_ Philonis Antiochus
+scripserit. 14. Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum
+iam diu, renovari a te, nisi molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus,
+inquam, si videtur. Sane istud quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus.
+Sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi
+vero, ille: quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita
+recordari? et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum
+essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus [omnes].
+
+15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter
+omnis, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes
+ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam
+communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et
+malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione
+censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum
+_valere_. 16. Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum
+audierunt perscripti varie _et_ copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil
+adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque
+praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil
+scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium
+sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non
+arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea
+sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in virtute laudanda et in
+hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum
+libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi potest. 17. Platonis autem
+auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens
+duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et
+Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum
+Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset,
+duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium
+et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti
+sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis
+instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones
+habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis
+ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam
+quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus
+rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt.
+Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et
+rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut
+dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem
+Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni praestabat, ut mihi quidem
+videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum
+expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.
+
+V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non
+sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus:
+Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque
+ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid me, inquam, putas,
+qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum? Pergamus
+igitur, inquit, quoniam placet. 19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone
+philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et
+rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid
+rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac
+primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse
+dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum
+bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum
+expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et
+corpore et vita. Corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in
+partibus: valetudinem, viris pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem
+sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus
+celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam
+vocum impressionem: 20. animi autem, quae essent ad comprehendendam
+ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et mores dividebantur.
+Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant: quorum utrumque mentis
+esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi
+consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis adsiduitate, partim ratione
+formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod incohatum est neque
+absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum,
+id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum, quas in animis
+ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec animorum. 21. Vitae autem--id enim erat
+tertium--adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus
+animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et _in_ quibusdam quae non tam naturae
+quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem
+quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum
+hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono
+sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum,
+ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis
+inducitur ratio bonorum.
+
+VI. 22. Atque haec illa sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique
+Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum:
+illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios
+Peripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum
+finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese
+expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo
+atque in ipsa virtute versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia
+sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam,
+nisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad
+virtutis usum idonea. 23. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita
+et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat in conservatione earum
+rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae
+voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum
+magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, quae erant congruentes
+cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque
+aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec
+quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis, quam primam posui,
+forma atque descriptio.
+
+24. De natura autem--id enim sequebatur--ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in
+res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens,
+ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, in
+eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen utrumque:
+neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur,
+neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse
+cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam
+nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi
+faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum
+inauditis.
+
+VII. 25. Nos vero, inquit Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum
+voles, si te Latina forte deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine
+loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut
+physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam
+utitur pro Latinis. Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas [Greek: poiot�tas]
+Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed
+philosophorum, atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt
+publica: suis utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut
+enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda.
+Quod si Graeci faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto
+id magis nobis concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur? 26.
+Tu vero, inquam, Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus,
+si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum.
+Audebimus ergo, inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum
+igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt
+unius modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi
+multiformes. Itaque a�r--utimur enim pro Latino--et ignis et aqua et terra
+prima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae
+gignuntur e terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa
+dicuntur: e quibus a�r et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae
+partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e
+quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, quae supra dixi,
+dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. 27. Sed subiectam putant
+omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate--faciamus enim
+tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius--materiam quandam, ex qua omnia
+expressa atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque
+modis mutari atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in nihilum, sed
+in suas partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil
+omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem moveantur,
+omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 28.
+Et cum ita moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic
+ultro citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et
+illa effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et
+continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla
+pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, quae
+insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit,
+quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat: 29.
+quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque
+perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae,
+quasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris
+ea, quae pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant,
+quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem
+et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem
+fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter
+obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.
+
+VIII. 30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in
+disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus,
+tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse
+iudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id,
+quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi
+[Greek: idean] appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem
+possumus dicere. 31. Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse
+arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo res eas, quae subiectae sensibus
+viderentur, quae essent aut ita parvae, ut sub sensum cadere non possent,
+aut ita mobiles et concitatae, ut nihil umquam unum esset constans, ne idem
+quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem
+partem rerum opinabilem appellabant. 32. Scientiam autem nusquam esse
+censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa
+definitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur,
+adhibebant. Verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa
+quaeque essent ita nominata, quam [Greek: etymologian] appellabant: post
+argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad
+concludendum id, quod explanari volebant: itaque tradebatur omnis
+dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae. Huic quasi ex
+altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis
+perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. 33. Haec erat illis disciplina a
+Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos
+vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam.
+
+IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum
+et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus species, quas paulo
+ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis
+quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et
+ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat,
+vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae:
+spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in
+ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 34. Nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam
+fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum
+maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et
+moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in
+ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi
+Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates
+unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, diligenter ea, quae a superioribus
+acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas.
+35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret
+et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. Eam quoque, si
+videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero,
+inquam, videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium.
+
+X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos virtutis
+inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una
+virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret
+honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 36. Cetera
+autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat,
+alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.
+Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione
+dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis relinquebat,
+in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. 37. Sed quae essent sumenda,
+ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea
+praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam
+rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum,
+officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in
+bonis actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem
+servata praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. 38. Cumque superiores non
+omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut
+more perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera
+virtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo
+modo fieri posse disserebat nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed
+ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse
+quin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non
+tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et
+efferri laetitia dicerent, sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent,
+hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. 39. Cumque eas
+perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque
+in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem
+adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque
+iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse
+immoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.
+
+XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum illis
+quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur,
+non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque
+gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo
+modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis,
+cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero
+aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 40.
+Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de
+sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi
+impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille [Greek: phantasian], nos visum
+appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim utendum in
+reliquo sermone saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi accepta
+sensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis positam et
+voluntariam. 41. Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae
+propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id
+autem visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile--feretis hoc? Nos
+vero, inquit. Quonam enim modo [Greek: katal�pton] diceres?--Sed, cum
+acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis
+rebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo
+verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis--nova
+enim dicebat--usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum
+appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset,
+scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam
+opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. 42. Sed
+inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi,
+collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli
+credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut
+supra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis
+videbatur, non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia
+nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam
+scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis
+imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad
+rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et
+ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent
+aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat.
+Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a
+superioribus.
+
+XII. 43. Quae cum dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est,
+inquam, a te, Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse
+[autem] arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem
+veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc
+Varro: Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis
+et ea, quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa
+discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. 44. Tum
+ego: Cum Zenone, inquam, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen
+instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed
+earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant
+Socratem et iam ante Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis
+paene veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse
+dixerunt: angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut
+Democritus, in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis
+omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa
+esse dixerunt. 45. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri
+posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia
+latere censebat in occulto: neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi
+posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare
+quemquam neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu
+continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita
+res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et
+perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod
+erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam
+plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus
+momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio
+sustineretur. 46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur,
+si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil
+adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur,
+nihil certi dicitur: sed tamen illa, quam exposui_sti_, vetus, haec nova
+nominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit,
+in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae
+partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex
+Epicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter
+ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.
+
+EX LIBRO I.
+
+1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. _Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere,
+dictum a gladiis. Cicero Academicorum lib. I._: quid autem stomachatur
+Menesarchus? quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?
+
+2. Nonius s.v. _concinnare_ p. 43. _Idem in Academicis lib. I._: qui cum
+similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.
+
+EX LIBRO II.
+
+3. Nonius p. 65. _Aequor ab aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II.
+vocabulum accepisse confirmat_: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo
+etiam aequor illud poetae vocant.
+
+4. Nonius p. 69. _Adamare Cicero Academicorum lib. II._: qui enim serius
+honores adamaverunt vix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini
+possunt esse.
+
+5. Nonius p. 104. _Exponere pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis
+lib. II._: frangere avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad
+imitandum iuventuti.
+
+6. Nonius p. 121. _Hebes positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero
+Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere?
+cuius et nascentis et senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur
+cornua.
+
+7. Nonius p. 162. _Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? mare
+nonne caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem
+aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....
+
+8. Nonius p. 162. _Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_
+atqui si id crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non
+regulis.
+
+9. Nonius p. 394. _Siccum dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur
+et sobrium, non madidum ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ alius (_color_)
+adultis, alius adulescentibus, alius aegris, _alius sanis_, alius siccis,
+alius vinulentis ...
+
+10. Nonius p. 474. _Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.:_ si quando enim
+nos demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum
+cernimus.
+
+11. Nonius p. 545. _Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ quibus etiam
+alabaster plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.
+
+EX LIBRO III.
+
+Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. �4. _De gloria librum ad te misi: at in eo_
+prooemium _id est, quod in Academico tertio._
+
+12. Nonius p. 65. _Digladiari ... idem tertio:_ digladiari autem semper,
+depugnare cum facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam
+stultissimum dixerit?
+
+13. Nonius p. 65. _Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib.
+III._: et ut nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus
+...
+
+14. Nonius p. 123. _Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib.
+III._: in tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas
+ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae.
+
+15. Nonius p. 419. _Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum
+lib. III._: aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.
+
+16. Lactantius Inst. div. VI. 24. _Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico
+tertio verba sunt:_ quod si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent,
+sic vitam deviam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset
+emendatio temeritatis.
+
+17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. _Varro ad Ciceronem
+tertio_ fixum _et Cicero Academicorum tertio_ (= _Lucullus_ �27): +malcho
+in opera adfixa.
+
+18. Nonius p. 139. _Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic.
+Academicorum lib. III._: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus,
+abesse dicemus. = _Lucullus_ �51.
+
+19. Nonius p. 117. _Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III._: qui gallinas
+alere permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae
+gallina peperisset dicere solebant. = _Lucullus_ �57.
+
+EX LIBRO IIII.
+
+20. Nonius p. 69, _Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in Academicis
+lib. IIII._: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = _Lucullus_ �67.
+
+21. Nonius p. 65. _Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et
+columna Maenia. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: item ille cum aestuaret,
+veterum ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = _Lucullus_
+�70.
+
+22. Nonius p. 99. _Dolitum, quod dolatum usu dicitur, quod est percaesum
+vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum Academicorum lib. IIII._: non
+enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. = _Lucullus_ �100.
+
+23. Nonius p. 164. _Ravum fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: quia
+nobismet ipsis tum caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole
+conlucet.... = _Lucullus_ �105.
+
+24. Nonius p. 107. _Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic. Academicorum
+lib. IIII._: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi quendam laborem
+exanclatum. = _Lucullus_ �108.
+
+25. Nonius p. 163. _Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic.
+Academicorum lib. IIII._: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = _Lucullus_ �109.
+
+26. Nonius p. 122. _Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: at hoc
+Anaximandro infinitatem. = _Lucullus_ �118.
+
+27. Nonius p. 65. _Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic. Academicorum lib.
+IIII._: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. = _Lucullus_ �120.
+
+28. Nonius p. 189. _Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: nec
+ut ille qui asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse
+dicat. = _Lucullus_ �121.
+
+29. Martianus Capella V. �517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. _Cicero ... in
+Academicis_: latent ista omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa
+tenebris. = _Lucullus_ �122.
+
+30. Nonius p. 102. _E regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum
+lib. IIII._: nec ego non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in
+contraria parte terrae qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia.
+= _Lucullus_ �123.
+
+31. Nonius p. 80. _Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et
+confusione trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: plane, ut supra
+dictus, Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = _Lucullus_ �135.
+
+Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.
+
+32. Lactantius Inst. div. III. 14. _Haec tua verba sunt_ (_sc. Cicero!_):
+mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua
+ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.
+
+33. August. contra Academicos II. �26.: _id probabile vel veri simile
+Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent invitare_. ...
+Talia, _inquit Academicus_, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri
+similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno.
+Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus
+haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem
+decet esse sapientem. [_Proximis post hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat
+Augustinus haec ipsius esse Ciceronis verba_.]
+
+34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. �15. _Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius
+causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... _
+Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes
+videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse
+sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo,
+qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.
+
+35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. �43. _Ait enim Cicero_ illis (_i.e.
+Academicis_) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, nisi
+qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.
+
+36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei VI. 2. _Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T.
+Varroni) tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi
+versatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone_, homine, _inquit_,
+omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM
+
+LIBER II.
+
+I. 1. Magnum ingenium Luci Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum
+omnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus
+temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut
+enim admodum adolescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito
+paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor
+profectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit;
+deinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor--licebat enim celerius legis
+praemio--, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut
+diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad
+Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium, quae
+de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. 2. Idque eo fuit
+mirabilius, quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui
+adolescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum
+in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni
+magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter
+et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in
+rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma
+profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum,
+verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam
+verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam fuisse in
+Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt: qui
+quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum
+proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere,
+credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali
+ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles
+spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis
+mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. 3. Tantus ergo
+imperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus
+pugnis totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum
+maximus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos
+legisset, fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis
+temperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli
+institutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum
+utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque
+ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum
+victor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio
+tardius quam debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in
+urbem currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum
+in maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod
+hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito testimonio
+quam id cum mea laude communicem.
+
+II. 4. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt
+et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum
+multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim
+studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit
+quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed
+et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei
+militaris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus
+otii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur
+Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et
+post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea
+saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset.
+Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus audiebat.
+
+5. Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam
+etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras,
+plures qui philosophiam, reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum
+rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego
+autem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P.
+autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante
+censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum
+Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. 6. Restat ut iis
+respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam gravis illigari.
+Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut
+ludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro
+vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque
+amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis,
+quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis
+de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo
+operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem
+ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non
+modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis
+prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam augeri
+arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus
+notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. 7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis, qui
+in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus disputatur,
+scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam mortuis invidere.
+
+III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non probatur.
+Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret
+praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere
+quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare:
+quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla
+contentione volumus, idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim
+omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis
+rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa
+antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint,
+tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati
+relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in
+utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut
+verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. 8. Neque inter nos et eos, qui se
+scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea
+vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile,
+adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod
+integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut omnia, quae praescripta et
+quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum
+ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde
+infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius,
+quem primum audierunt, oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad
+quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad
+saxum adhaerescunt. 9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se credere ei, quem iudicent
+fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare
+potuissent--statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse
+sapientis--, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis
+etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem re semel audita atque ad
+unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare
+malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt, pugnacissime defendere quam
+sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere. Quibus de rebus et
+alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa,
+quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie
+venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus,
+quod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in
+Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in
+spatio consedimus.
+
+IV. 10. Hic Catulus: Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene
+explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea,
+quae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem,
+inquit Hortensius, feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram
+servatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in
+promptu erant, dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille:
+Non sane, inquit, Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est
+iis, qui placere volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde
+ea, quae dico, probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec
+ea, in quibus, si non fuerint, _non_ vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed
+mehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata
+est, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus
+agebat: nota enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno
+studio, eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei
+faciam quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum
+animos ereximus. 11. At ille: Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem,
+fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi
+Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat,
+homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus
+et nobilis: cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque
+leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo
+est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant:
+et homo natura lenissimus--nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius--stomachari
+tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante videram. At ille, Heracliti
+memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num
+vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis
+tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei
+familiares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa
+audivisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent
+descripsisse. 12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus
+commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin
+contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur
+et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item
+Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex
+eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque
+compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et
+Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in
+ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae contra Philonem erat,
+praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est adversarius is, qui ista, quae
+sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino dicere. Etsi enim mentitur,
+tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.
+
+V. 13. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini--me
+autem nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod
+seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt,
+quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur.
+Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit,
+commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint, cum
+consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem agrariam
+aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito
+senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium: illi
+quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero
+sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt
+Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam,
+alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium. Et de hoc
+quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum
+expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. 14. Similiter vos, cum
+perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam
+velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem,
+Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum
+inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum illorum nec
+Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti
+physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente
+incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere videatur, abstrusa
+esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse
+reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam
+quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire quam sciant. 15. Quod si illi
+tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot
+saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum
+iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut
+in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui
+constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret,
+qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e numero tollendus
+est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam,
+Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a
+quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates
+autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat
+refellere. Ita, cum aliud agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus
+est ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci [Greek: eir�neian] vocant: quam ait
+etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non
+putandum, quod idem fuerit in Socrate.
+
+VI. 16. Sed fuerint illa veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est
+igitur actum, quod investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut
+putatur, obtrectans nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores
+immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est
+clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio,
+quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi,
+proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est
+quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, Lacydi
+discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit:
+nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum floruerunt: e
+quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit--declarat multitudo
+librorum--ingeni non minus in [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in
+Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus
+Metrodorus putabatur. 17. Iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos
+dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos
+facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e
+philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant: nec
+vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis, qui nihil probarent,
+Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo fuisset, reprehendebant, nec
+definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si
+verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam [Greek: katal�psin] illi vocant,
+eosque, qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi
+posset, inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius
+[Greek: enargeiai], ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si
+placet, nominemus fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi--me
+appellabat iocans--hoc licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam
+putabant illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara
+essent, definienda censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia
+quicquam priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici
+oportere putabant, ne qui fallerentur. 18. Plerique tamen et definitiones
+ipsarum etiam evidentium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua
+quaeratur, et homines dignos, quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem,
+dum nova quaedam commovet, quod ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra
+Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus
+a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod
+timebat. Cum enim ita negaret, quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset--id
+enim volumus esse [Greek: akatal�pton]--, si illud esset, sicut Zeno
+definiret, tale visum--iam enim hoc pro [Greek: phantasiai] verbum satis
+hesterno sermone trivimus--visum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo, unde
+esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non esset, id nos a Zenone
+definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest quicquam comprehendi, ut
+plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod est tale, quale vel
+falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, iudicium tollit
+incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendi. Ita
+imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis oratio contra
+Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem, quam Philo
+voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse concedimus.
+
+VII. 19. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa
+sunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat
+contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius
+aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum
+est, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum,
+qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit
+et alia multa. Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et
+sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt.
+Itaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur,
+et intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum
+adspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in
+odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis
+iudicium requirat acrius. 20. Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi
+pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in
+sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos
+non videmus! quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere
+exercitati! qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut
+Andromacham, quum id nos ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu
+et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen.
+Quid de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris
+aut voluptatis? in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia
+sentiatur:--potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, et inter
+eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet non
+apertissime insaniat? 21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi
+dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed
+quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud,
+hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non
+sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde
+sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum
+comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis
+particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec
+intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. 22. Quod si essent falsae
+notitiae--[Greek: ennoias] enim notitias appellare tu videbare--, si igitur
+essent hae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis
+discerni non possent, quo tandem his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid
+cuique rei consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem
+certe, quae non modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una
+maxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse
+memoria falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et
+tenet? Ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex
+multis animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues
+artificem ab inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum
+negabimus, sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum
+non item. Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem
+cernat, aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres
+cernere ea potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt,
+aut is, qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem
+in similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo
+atque agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem
+tractabit, multa perceperit?
+
+VIII. 23. Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi
+multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non
+comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse
+censemus, itemque sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat
+constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti,
+quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui
+statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam
+aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges
+imposuerit, cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi,
+percepti, cogniti, constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam
+tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum
+supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non
+possint. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo
+modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam
+rem aut agere fidenter audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum
+vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia
+referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est,
+constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat,
+sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter
+appetitio--eam enim volumus esse [Greek: horm�n]--, qua ad agendum
+impellimur, et id appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest. 25. Illud
+autem, quod movet, prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest,
+si id, quod visum erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri
+animus ad appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur
+accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit non
+occurrit animo, nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur,
+numquam movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est, necesse est id ei
+verum, quod occurrit, videri. 26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis
+tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate
+perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem,
+cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio
+cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea,
+quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi
+involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium
+quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet_ur_. Itaque
+argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece [Greek: apodeixis], ita definitur:
+'ratio, quae ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit.'
+
+IX. 27. Quod si omnia visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel
+falsa esse possent, neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo
+quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset
+conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi
+debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de
+se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant
+[Greek: dogmata], quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim
+decretum proditur, lex veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum
+proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari
+quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse
+falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla
+ratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui
+illa visa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis
+interesse. 28. Ex hoc illud est natum, quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id
+ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed
+Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse
+percipi, consentaneum esse unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia
+non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id
+consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam
+esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum
+quidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse.
+29. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id
+haberent Academici decretum,--sentitis enim iam hoc me [Greek: dogma]
+dicere--, nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in
+ceteris rebus, fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim
+esse regulam totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti
+incogniti: quam rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis_a_
+accipi oporteret et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri
+falsique iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec
+maxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse
+esse, qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut
+aut unde proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere
+dubia neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a sapientia
+plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut hoc unum
+saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia
+totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil
+approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.
+
+X. 30. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior--habet
+enim aliquantum a physicis--, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra
+dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de
+abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat
+subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal
+omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum
+primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut
+sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons
+est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea,
+quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia
+quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus
+construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum [Greek:
+ennoias], tum [Greek: prol�pseis] vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio
+argumentique conclusio rerumque innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio
+eorum omnium apparet et eadem ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam
+pervenit. 31. Ad rerum igitur scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum
+sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime cognitionem, et istam [Greek:
+katal�psin], quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem
+dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat--nihil est enim ei veritatis luce
+dulcius--tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et artis
+efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat,
+ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit. Ergo ii, qui
+negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel instrumenta vel
+ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt funditus ipsumque
+animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate eorum, perinde ut causa
+postulat, dicere.
+
+32. Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid
+velint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea,
+quae disputentur, vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid
+ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo
+veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius,
+qui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque
+intersit inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur
+eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui
+omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi
+desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim--et hoc quidem vel maxime vos
+animadvertebam moveri--probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque
+se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.
+
+XI. 33. Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi,
+propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus,
+interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si
+nihil interest, nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique
+communis, ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum
+dicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem
+modo falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt
+pueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut
+si quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non
+ademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed
+propria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu
+probabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades
+volebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo
+agimus, tibi erit revertendum. 34. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum
+falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non
+potest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod
+ita mihi videatur verum, ut non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore
+versantur, cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt
+distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud
+quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque
+comprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum
+possit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo
+ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere
+inaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec
+argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. 35. Ex hoc illud
+iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur:
+'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur.
+Non enim urguent, ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque
+adseverare sine aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et
+propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique
+occurrit et primo quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo
+levius? 36. Sin ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod
+visum sit, id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis
+visis, inter quae nihil interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides:
+deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit
+diligentissimeque circumspexerit, exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile
+videatur et absit longissime a vero, ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent
+dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt.
+Ut enim confidant, notum iis esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et
+oppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam
+absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei
+signum aut argumentum et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod
+significatur, aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione
+hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam
+absentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet.
+
+XII. 37. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione
+atque approbatione, quam Graeci [Greek: synkatathesin] vocant, pauca
+dicemus, non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta.
+Nam cum vim, quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur,
+comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non
+potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod
+animal agit aliquid--nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale
+sit--, aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate
+sita, reddenda adsensio. 38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos
+neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra
+ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo
+non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam
+appareat--Graeci id [Greek: oikeion] appellant--, sic non potest obiectam
+rem perspicuam non approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est,
+vera sunt, nihil attinet de adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid
+percipit, adsentitur statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine
+adsensione posse constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum
+est, ut sit aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur,
+non erit. 39. Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime
+autem absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi
+adsensione: hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et
+firmitas ex iis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit,
+omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum
+sit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem
+actionem tollit e vita.
+
+XIII. 40. Nunc ea videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius
+potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt
+igitur primum artem quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et
+genera definiunt, in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit,
+totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant
+omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri
+possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia
+non percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi
+sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti
+conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic
+est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum est,
+id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est, ut
+eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius modi, ut
+in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint,
+alia non possint. 41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae
+autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant
+concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa sint,
+ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis
+non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint:'
+reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum:
+'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: 'omne visum,
+quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit esse.' 42. Haec duo
+proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam
+adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:
+primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni
+consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne
+ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa
+concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis,
+item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt,
+volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta esse falsa,
+quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.
+
+XIV. 43. Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed
+ab eorum causa, qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et
+partitiones et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines
+dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est
+hominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui
+clament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum
+aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam
+rem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa
+vera definitio sit? si_n_ negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera
+definitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur,
+id percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus
+partibus. 44. Si enim dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide
+perspicere nec ulla communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se
+fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui
+poterunt longius progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam
+concludi argumentum non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt,
+ita probatis, ut falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus
+comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse
+comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque
+ipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam
+quod non appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et
+ea, quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse
+quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro
+congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam falsa
+visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem, inter
+falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam
+interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.
+
+45. Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse
+videamur, quaeque ab iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis
+relinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam
+habet vim, ut ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed
+tamen, ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus
+est vel arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese,
+quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit
+subvenire erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem,
+dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil
+profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.
+
+XV. 46. Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus
+adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim
+primum, quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt,
+ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod
+fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti
+quidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet
+igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere,
+de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus
+interrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere
+constitui. 47. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam
+illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri
+esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus
+iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis, quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa
+quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea, quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis,
+auspiciis, extis declarentur--haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra
+disputant--, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere
+possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant, efficere non
+possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae
+perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae
+nihil sit omnino? 48. Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea
+declarant, quae cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel
+furiosis videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut
+non modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis
+nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se
+motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset,
+qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset
+inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae
+falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile
+internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi
+dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in
+visis distinctio appareat.
+
+XVI. 49. Ad has omnis visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat
+et erat de hac una re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum
+puto, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod
+captiosissimo genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in
+philosophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut
+demitur. Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano.
+Vitiosum sane et captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum
+obiectum est a deo dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri
+simile? cur deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne
+internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc si
+perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin ipse
+tua sponte processeris, tuum. 50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum
+posse aut ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid
+cui simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit?
+deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi canibus
+similes _sunt_, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt
+quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa:
+quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia
+quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri
+possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium generum nihil
+interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno. 51.
+Quod fieri qui potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive
+illa cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete
+sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis
+perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim,
+cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse
+commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et
+inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum
+Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba
+ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:
+
+  'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'
+
+Idemque in Epicharmo:
+
+  'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'
+
+Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus,
+ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.
+
+XVII. 52. At enim dum videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum_que_,
+quae vigilantes videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim
+dicimus, non eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium
+nec mente nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione
+faciunt qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae
+videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam
+levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes
+furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum
+relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:
+
+  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum
+  adspectu' ...
+
+53. At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro
+veris. Et alias quidem saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte
+gravitas aut tarditas aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo
+temporis brevitate excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando
+sustinere adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset,
+aut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest
+levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus
+gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis
+somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere
+quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos
+aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter vigilantium
+visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter adfecti, tum nihil
+interesse. 54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod
+nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae [Greek: ad�la] Graeci. Si enim res se ita
+habeant, ut nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano, cui
+possit exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non mediocris
+insaniae est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis
+impressorum pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum similitudines negat
+esse, cum eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si satis est ad tollendam
+cognitionem similia esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti,
+praesertim concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius contenditis, quod rerum
+natura non patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit tale, quale est, nec sit
+in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas? ut [sibi] sint
+et ova ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi
+vis in geminis? Conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras:
+tu autem vis eosdem plane esse, non similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest.
+55. Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in Academia irridentur, a
+quibus ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais Democritum dicere
+innumerabilis esse mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum
+similis, sed undique perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut inter eos nihil
+prorsus intersit [et eos quidem innumerabiles], itemque homines. Deinde
+postulas, ut, si mundus ita sit par alteri mundo, ut inter eos ne minimum
+quidem intersit, concedatur tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid
+alicui sic sit par, ut nihil differat, nihil intersit. Cur enim, inquies,
+ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni adfirmat, in reliquis
+mundis et in iis quidem innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non
+modo possint esse, sed etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non
+possit effici?
+
+XVIII. 56. Primum quidem me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior
+potiusque refello propter id, quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis
+singularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos
+Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam
+eosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a
+suis. An non videmus hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis
+internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti
+ne minimum quidem similes viderentur? 57. Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo:
+quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum
+ei res similes occurrant, quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum
+nec umquam ulli viso adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse
+non possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis
+possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater
+geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si
+adsueveris. Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen
+hoc accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere
+permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id gallina
+peperisset dicere solebant. 58. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis
+est ova illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc
+illud esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam,
+ut talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non
+licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri
+enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit
+quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere,
+cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones
+nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi vero non
+specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi
+nota. 59. Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re
+nulla impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non
+distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa
+necessario nata est [Greek: epoch�], id est adsensionis retentio, in qua
+melius sibi constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli
+existimant. Si enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est, tollendus
+adsensus est. Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare non
+cognitum? Carneadem autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse _eo_ delabi
+interdum, ut diceret opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse sapientem. Mihi
+porro non tam certum est esse aliquid, quod comprehendi possit, de quo iam
+nimium etiam diu disputo, quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est, numquam
+adsentiri rei vel falsae vel incognitae. 60. Restat illud, quod dicunt,
+veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo
+igitur videre quid invenerint. Non solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt
+tandem ista mysteria? aut cur celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam
+vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit, ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur.
+Quid, si utroque? num peius est? Unum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse
+quod percipi possit. An in eo auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem videtur
+vel plurimum. Quis enim ista tam aperte perspicueque et perversa et falsa
+secutus esset, nisi tanta in Arcesila, multo etiam maior in Carneade et
+copia rerum et dicendi vis fuisset?
+
+XIX. 61. Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo
+etiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus.
+Sed iam confirmata causa te, hominem amicissimum--me autem appellabat--et
+aliquot annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus
+philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris, eam
+philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio,
+privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis quidem, quibus
+adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat sive eius loci, quem
+incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis uti lumine licebat,
+isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillam quidem
+ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si sequamur, iis vinculis
+simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus. 62. Sublata enim adsensione
+omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo recte
+fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam
+sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas aperueris
+in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse, quod mihi
+quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem ullam quae
+cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam atque etiam ne
+illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur auctoritas. Quae cum
+dixisset ille, finem fecit. 63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod
+quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret,
+nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius, me
+quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens--non enim satis intellegebam--, coepit
+hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli
+oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter, accurate, copiose, taceo neque te
+quo minus, si tibi ita videatur, sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud
+vero non censuerim, ut eius auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo
+monuit, inquit adridens, ut caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis,
+quorum vides quanta copia semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione
+quaereret qui tibi constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse
+reperiri, idem te comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De
+causa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno
+opere mirabor. Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia
+sensisset, simul ac visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset
+Catulus, me omnes intueri.
+
+XX. 64. Tum ego non minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius
+modi quadam oratione sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita
+movit, ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum,
+quae pro illa causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse
+diffiderem. Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses
+non minorem tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero.
+65. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad
+hanc potissimum philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed
+etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus
+pertinacia reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu
+consilioque totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum
+alios tum etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali
+disputatione id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum
+solet, iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri
+reperiendi et ea sentire, quae dicerem. 66. Qui enim possum non cupere
+verum invenire, cum gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc
+pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa
+turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui
+numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero
+ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator--non enim sum sapiens--et meas
+cogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,
+
+  'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'
+
+ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,
+
+  'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'
+
+sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore
+specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non de
+me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter mentem
+sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec percipio
+tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens; itaque visis
+cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse
+maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre. Nihil
+est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de gravitate sapientis, errore,
+levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis?
+quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te
+probatur--ut praepostere tecum agam, mox referam me ad ordinem--haec primum
+conclusio quam habeat vim considera.
+
+XXI. 67. Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam
+opinabitur: numquam autem opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc
+conclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum.
+Carneades non numquam secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita
+sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed
+illud primum, sapientem, si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse
+et Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a
+veris et quae non possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere. 68.
+Nobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo
+adsentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam
+vitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum,
+sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet, si temere
+processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa veris, eaque, quae percipi non
+possunt, _iis quae possunt_--si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus--,
+ut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem
+omnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das,
+accepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus
+omnes cohibiturum, ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum
+esse sapientem. Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse
+percipi: etenim de eo omnis est controversia.
+
+XXII. 69. Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me
+defenduntur, et didicit apud Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius
+didicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non
+acrius accusavit in senectute quam antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur
+fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim
+iste dies illuxerit quaero, qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse
+negitavisset, veri et falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae
+Stoici. Poenituit illa sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime
+ad Stoicos? eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi
+poenitebat? quid? Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum.
+Numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent
+habere. 70. Unde autem subito vetus Academia revocata est? Nominis
+dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod
+erant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii,
+qui se sequerentur, Antiochii vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non
+potuisse sustinere concursum omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt
+inter illos non nulla communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam
+reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub
+Novis solem non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum,
+sic Academicorum umbram secutus est. 71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum,
+cum ei placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille
+Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis
+oportere, illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro
+credidisset, honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea
+defensitavisset, honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum:
+qui ex illius commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis
+nostris a vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit _ut_
+quod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum
+hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.
+
+XXIII. 72. Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a
+nobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros
+viros, sed tamen popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res _non_ bonas
+tractent, similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri,
+quae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras
+nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si
+dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?--sic enim appellabantur
+ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophabantur--: maxima fuit et
+gravitatis et ingeni gloria. 73. Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo
+conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam animi? qui ita sit
+ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil excipit de quo non
+profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa? quis hunc philosophum
+non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis inferioris aetatis? qui mihi
+cum illo collati quintae classis videntur. Atque is non hoc dicit, quod
+nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus; ille verum
+plane negat esse: sensus quidem non obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic
+enim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus
+initio libri, qui est de natura: 'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne
+aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos,
+nec omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit.' 74. Furere tibi Empedocles videtur:
+at mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur, sonum fundere. Num ergo
+is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum magnam vim censet in iis esse
+ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt, iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus
+bonis quamquam versibus, sed tamen illi versibus increpant eorum
+adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire
+dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis
+certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones
+perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum
+sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, 'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius.
+Quid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non
+esset, nisi probavisset. Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla
+fuit ratio persequi.
+
+XXIV. 75. Videorne tibi, non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris
+homines, sed imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam
+molestos vobis, sed minutos, Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt
+contorta et aculeata quaedam [Greek: sophismata]; sic enim appellantur
+fallaces conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum habeam Chrysippum, qui
+fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa ille contra sensus, quam
+multa contra omnia, quae in consuetudine probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi
+quidem non videtur: sed dissolverit sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset,
+quae nos fallerent probabilitate magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile
+posse. 76. Quid Cyrenaici _tibi_ videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui
+negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere,
+quae tactu intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid
+colore aut quo sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.
+
+Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post
+illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis tantisque
+studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te ipso quidem
+iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse, sed
+verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. 77. Nemo, inquam, superiorum non
+modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec
+solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum vera
+sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone fortasse quid
+futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari
+sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset, quod percipi
+posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur visum? tum illum ita
+definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et
+effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset visum verum, quale
+vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi
+posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non
+est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum: neque
+enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si esset tale, quale vel falsum.
+Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a
+vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. 78. Haec est una
+contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse
+sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim nihil
+percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum: equidem
+Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab eo
+disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et
+perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, ut, si ostendero
+nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum esse.
+
+XXV. 79. Quid ergo est quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera
+nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle, communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere
+posses, idcirco heri non necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram.
+Tu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur?
+Nam et in remo sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris
+videri colores nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?--Manent
+illa omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.--Igitur
+semper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim rem
+demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam
+esse credendum. 80. Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et
+importune insistere! Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum
+oculum torsisset, duas ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse
+mendacium, non oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed
+hic quidem maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas
+esse, alia falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi
+nobis ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et
+integris sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?--Utinam
+quidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus,
+quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non
+cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies
+longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at
+familiarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem, non
+videmus. 81. At ille nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et
+octingenta stadia quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius.
+Responderem igitur audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse
+contentum. Dicet me acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque
+videntur a nobis et nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere
+possunt. Ergo ut illis aqua, sic nobis a�r crassus offunditur. At amplius
+non desideramus. Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam
+quererer cum deo, quod parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem
+illam? Stare nobis videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa.
+Quaere rationem cur ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio
+an non possis, non tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum
+testimonium dicere ostenderis.
+
+XXVI. 82. Quid ego de nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse
+quaeris. Quid potest esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti
+partibus confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi
+quidem quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum
+quam videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum
+esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi
+igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri
+putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta incitatione
+fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem possit, tamen nobis
+stare videatur. 83. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso, quam in
+parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci,
+percipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E quibus primum
+est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id percipi, tertium,
+inter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi
+possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum verum a sensu
+profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo nihil intersit
+quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium
+omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos, quibuscum res est, id quoque
+conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est. 84. Qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum
+videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi visum, quod
+percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso: qua
+distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum Gemino consul
+fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non posset? Negas tantam
+similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum adversario
+facili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet igitur sensum, et si una
+fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit. Sublato enim iudicio illo,
+quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem videris, qui tibi videbitur,
+tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem
+modi falsa. 85. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus videri, quid
+habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non sit, quoniam
+aliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil
+esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum credibile 'nullum
+esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum.'
+Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod agitur, nihil
+interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an internosci non
+possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo tanta esse non
+potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, eadem
+temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros eiusdem
+modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres? 86. Quid? si in
+eius_dem_ modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in
+agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui,
+quoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret?
+
+XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae nos
+non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur. Quid?
+hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad quae
+pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire
+possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros
+mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura! 87. Cur non
+extimescam opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse
+aliquam vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo
+verbo utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi
+adhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur
+etiam eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de
+physicis mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo
+ante dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam,
+res iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris
+solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:--de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose
+omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem
+consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem
+fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.--88. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a
+te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et furiosorum
+visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum, sanorum. Quo
+modo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se vidisse Homerum,
+sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:
+
+  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'
+
+Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit, eum
+somnia re_ri_ et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea vera, quae
+essent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum videbantur, quo
+modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non putamus ita totum illud
+audivisse,
+
+  'O pietas animi ...',
+
+si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit illa
+visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti
+probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:
+
+  'Mater, te appello ...'
+
+nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde enim
+illa:
+
+'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur minorem
+habere visis quam vigilantes fidem?
+
+XXVIII. 89. Quid loquar de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus,
+Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is
+putabat quae videbantur? Quid ille, qui:
+
+  'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,'
+
+nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid? apud
+Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat sagittis,
+cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde movebatur
+falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi
+cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:
+
+  'unde haec flamma oritur?'
+
+et illa deinceps:
+
+  'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, _adsunt_, me expetunt:'
+
+Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat:
+
+  'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam
+      hanc vim, quae me excruciat!
+  Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant
+      cum ardentibus taedis.'
+
+Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:
+
+  'Intendit crinitus Apollo
+  arcum auratum, luna innixus:
+  Diana facem iacit a laeva.'
+
+90. Qui magis haec crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur?
+Apparet enim iam 'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur,
+ut illud efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et
+falsa ad animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa
+falsa vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non
+enim id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti
+sint, aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut
+furentium aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.
+
+91. Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse
+dicitis, veri et falsi quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et
+falsi? et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus
+iudicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia
+igitur. Sol quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut
+queat iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera
+sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? Si
+haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem pollicebatur.
+Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in philosophia multae
+atque magnae, non est satis. 92. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis,
+videte ne contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit
+elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum
+paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod
+tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.
+
+XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam
+nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus quatenus.
+Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re
+minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca,
+magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto
+certum respondeamus [non] habemus.--93. At vitiosi sunt soritae.--Frangite
+igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum
+est, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa,
+tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat
+quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur, [Greek: h�sychazein]. Per me vel
+stertas licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit?
+Sequitur enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget. Quo in
+numero conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt?
+Progrediere rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim fateris, neque
+ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse. Cuius generis
+error ita manat, ut non videam quo non possit accedere. 94. Nihil me
+laedit, inquit: ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem veniam,
+equos sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi, praeceps
+erit. Sic me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose interroganti
+respondeo. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus es: si non
+habes, ne tu quidem percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed negas te usque
+ad obscura progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si id tantum modo,
+ut taceas, nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te captare volt, utrum
+tacentem irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad novem, verbi gratia,
+sine dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo insistis: etiam a certis
+et illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me in obscuris facere non
+sinis. Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adiuvat, quae nec augentis
+nec minuentis quid aut primum sit aut postremum docet. 95. Quid? quod eadem
+illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora.
+Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est,
+quidquid enuntietur--id autem appellant [Greek: axi�ma], quod est quasi
+effatum--, aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an falsa sunt?
+Si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris _an_ verum dicis? Haec
+scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius quam illa, quae nos
+non comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.
+
+XXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec eorum
+ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi
+est illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum sit'? Rebus
+sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias improbandas, quae sint
+in genere contrario. 96. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si
+dicis _nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem_ nunc lucere et verum
+dicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis.
+Itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum traditis. Aut quidquid
+igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars ista nulla est. Vide ergo
+hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis,
+mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui
+potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec
+Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic
+conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet
+scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius
+concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris,
+mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec
+approbare nec improbare. 97. Qui igitur magis illud? Si ars, si ratio, si
+via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in utroque. Sed hoc
+extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec inexplicabilia. Tribunum
+aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem numquam impetrabunt. Etenim
+cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et irridet, non
+impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur, 'aut vivet cras
+Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic statuant, omne, quod ita
+diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non modo verum esse, sed etiam
+necessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti tardum putant. Si enim,
+inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras
+Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis
+necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est, Antiochus et Stoici:
+totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis diiunctio--contraria
+autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa
+potest esse, nulla vera est. 98. Mecum vero quid habent litium, qui ipsorum
+disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades
+solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose, minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab
+eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec autem merces erat dialecticorum.
+Sequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo
+iudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob eam causam, quod ita didici, omne,
+quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris,
+mentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi
+hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.
+
+XXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi
+relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis sententia
+Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam, ut quisquam
+id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum
+Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde studiosus ac diligens.
+Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae
+iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo. 99. Duo placet esse Carneadi genera
+visorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi possint, alia
+quae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse probabilia; alia non
+probabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur,
+ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra posteriorem nihil dici
+oportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum esse, ut perceptio
+consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra naturam esset, si
+probabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam tu, Luculle,
+commemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur
+modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non etiam falsum nihil
+ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit specie probabile, si
+nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens
+ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis
+sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque
+percepta neque adsensa, sed similia veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita
+tollatur. 100. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num comprehensum animo
+habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui potest? Sed si iam
+ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta, probo navigio, bono
+gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur se illuc venturum esse
+salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et agendi et non agendi,
+faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam erat Anaxagoras, qui id
+non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde
+illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri quidem. 101. Et quaecumque
+res eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum,
+movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus, habet corpus,
+habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut ei multa vera videantur,
+neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam: eoque
+sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem modi exsistere falsum aliquod,
+cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui
+multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.
+
+XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur, praesto
+est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis tacentibus ex uno
+Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio tollitur. Quod est
+caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est, nihil percipi potest.'
+Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio
+ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa
+igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem
+certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus, tibi adsentior. 102. Quamquam nihil
+mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem maxime, cui erant
+ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec quivis arbitratu suo
+reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, certe levior reprehensio
+est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, non videtur hoc satis esse
+vobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere, quae a te vel maxime agitata
+sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? nihil tibi est perspicuum?'
+Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret.
+Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C.
+Lucilium scripsit po�tam, cum scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum,
+eum, qui consul cum M. Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis--sunt
+enim mihi nota, propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima
+institutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur--, sed scriptum est
+ita: 103. 'Academicis placere esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut
+aliae probabiles videantur, aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia
+posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia
+sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait
+vehementer errare eos, qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus
+numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit
+disputatum, non inesse in his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et
+certi notam. 104. Quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus
+sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli
+adsentiri: altero, cum se a respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet,
+sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum
+placere, ut numquam adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem,
+ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere
+possit. +Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab
+adsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa, quibus
+ad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque partem
+respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit, dum sine
+adsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea, quae nulla re
+impedirentur. 105. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane, invidiosa
+certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos percipi
+comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri dicimus.
+
+XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem expedito,
+soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle, iacere iam
+illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens, de quo
+loquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, isdem
+sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare illud, quod
+nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, nec
+tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane
+ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et vibrat dissimileque
+est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis rationem reddere cur id
+eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod videbatur oculis, defendere.
+106. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim quaerebas. Quid? meminisse
+visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? Polyaenus, qui magnus
+mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro adsentiens totam
+geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae sciebat, oblitus est?
+Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut vobismet ipsis placet. Si
+igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque rerum est, omnia, quae quisque
+meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil
+potest, et omnia meminit Siron Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc
+omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime
+vis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si
+comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit. 107. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne,
+quae ipsae fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae
+tantum id, quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera
+et falsa diiudicent?
+
+Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum enim
+negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem
+perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum,
+ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam
+putant, vera esse haruspicum [_responsa_], auspicia, oracula, somnia,
+vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is potest facere vel de
+iis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas habuerint, cur id
+sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est aliquid, quod positum
+vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non possit? an tu in soritis
+poteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus non poterit eodem modo
+insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione ipsam veri similitudinem
+non impeditam sequi? 108. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei
+posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim videri
+oportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus
+esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli autem
+omnia, si visa tollantur.
+
+XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, sed
+brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto
+repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere,
+credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a
+Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris
+adsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea
+pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia
+sequitur, nulla re impediente? 109. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod
+statuet, ne id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque
+impediet in navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis
+procreandis plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter
+probabile.
+
+Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater, sed,
+ut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret consentaneum
+esse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum saltem dicere
+posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et sibi ipsum
+contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil comprehendi posse, si
+quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo potius putat urguendum fuisse
+Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum esse possit nisi comprehensum,
+perceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil
+posse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud
+decretum habeat et sine decretis vitam agere possit! 110. Sed ut illa habet
+probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc
+haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non
+habet, utitur probabilibus. Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur
+et incerta reddere. Non enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit,
+stellarum numerus par an impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de
+rebus, in quibus versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis
+enim nihil probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti
+nec quid faciat nec quid respondeat. 111. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti,
+Luculle, reprehensionem Antiochi--nec mirum: in primis enim est nobilis--,
+qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum. Cum enim
+sumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea differre a
+veris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse concessum, quod
+videretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli altero, quo neget
+visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id ita esset, si nos
+verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam falsa cernimus. Sed
+probandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum habemus.
+
+XXXV. 112. Ac mihi videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim
+campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in
+Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui
+id percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet
+illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum
+simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque etiam,
+si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille sapientem
+interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem huic loco
+valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum? 113. Quaero enim quid sit quod
+comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, ne
+Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale
+falsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito nimirum
+adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus Academia
+concedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet, vel quod
+amavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum et
+acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero quo
+tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam alia,
+haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae aut
+Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale, quale
+falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo. Horum
+neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque verum
+puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.
+
+XXXVI. 114. Illud ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes
+idque turpissimum esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi
+adroges, ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas,
+mores fingas, finis bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam
+vitam ingrediar definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium
+dicas te et artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia
+complectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad
+quam me deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si
+dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est. 115. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad
+suam quisque rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus
+cognationem esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam
+saepe rexisse, sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam
+inter se amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi?
+qui mecum vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo?
+qui ista Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola,
+si vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos
+impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint
+scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire.
+Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale
+est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet ipsis,
+de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec quaestio est.
+
+116. In tres igitur partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa
+sapientia est. Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita,
+videamus: at illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se
+illa scire persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura
+pendent, quae disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent
+persuadendi necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non
+persuadere, sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non
+quaero ex his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum
+progredi non possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat:
+extremitatem et quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit:
+liniamentum sine ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero,
+si adigam ius iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante
+rationes omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem
+maiorem esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem
+deum censet esse, contempserit. 117. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est
+crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille
+longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus,
+quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est:
+quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum
+esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget _et_ disciplinam? Etsi quamcumque
+eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e physicis
+potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor quaestiones
+infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia constant, videamus
+quem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio.
+
+XXXVII. 118. Princeps Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse
+primas ferunt, ex aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari
+et sodali suo, non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua
+omnia gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum a�ra, sed ea,
+quae ex eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex
+his omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis
+inter se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente
+divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse
+mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata
+figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur:
+Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in
+ceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem:
+Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et fore.
+Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo
+sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis proficisci
+volunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem, credo, quem
+sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo condemnatique discedent.
+119. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam
+habebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit nunc lucere, quam,
+quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quae et se
+et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum
+etiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis, terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam
+animalis intellegentia per omnia ea permanet et transeat, fore tamen
+aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore deflagret.
+
+XXXVIII. Sint ista vera--vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse veri--,
+comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste Stoicus sapiens
+syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens
+Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum,
+quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita
+esse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat motus mutationemque
+moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum exsistere, ut hic ornatus
+umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare, illud autem superius sicut
+caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem
+relinquatur. 120. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium, quanti
+libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est? Cur deus,
+omnia nostra causa cum faceret--sic enim voltis--, tantam vim natricum
+viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa _ac_ perniciosa terra marique
+disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine
+divina aliqua sollertia. Cuius quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad
+apium formicarumque perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis
+minutorum opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur. 121. Negas sine deo posse
+quicquam. Ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo
+immunitatem magni quidem muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem
+habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad
+fabricandum mundum. Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec,
+ut ille, qui asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta
+haec esse dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non
+docentis, sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens,
+quidquid aut sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet
+ponderibus et motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore.
+Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes
+divinum numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit--quod cui non
+accidit?--extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen adsentior,
+nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.
+
+XXXIX. 122. Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa
+tenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum,
+terram intrare possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium,
+quam vim quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum
+intererat ea nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici
+notiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed
+ecquid nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus,
+ut videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an
+media pendeat? 123. Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram
+multarum urbium et montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui
+dixit, iurare posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam
+dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis
+vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos [Greek: antipodas] vocatis:
+cur mihi magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis, qui, cum
+audiunt, desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait Theophrastus,
+caelum, solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare censet neque
+praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum axem se summa
+celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae, si stante terra
+caelum moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam
+arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure? loquere. Putas solem
+esse tantulum? Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos ab illo irridemini et
+ipsi illum vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali irrisione Socrates, liber
+Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat posse. 124. Sed redeo ad animum
+et corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura sit,
+quae venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an, ut
+Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis habeat, ut
+Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit? si
+simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus
+nullo corpore--quod intellegi quale sit vix potest--et, quidquid est,
+mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Horum
+aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur, nostro ne quid maxime quidem
+probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum paria
+momenta.
+
+XL. 125. Sin agis verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non
+adsentiar, sed quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem
+potissimum? quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis
+fui. Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes
+esse, cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur
+corporum cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos
+ullas, e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine
+aliqua mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus
+hic tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante
+post, alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc
+simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis
+isdem esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus,
+isdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid
+animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus
+irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus
+adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire. 126. Non ergo id
+agitur, ut aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam
+postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne probabilia
+quidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam esse
+arbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne
+exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud scio
+an ita sit.
+
+XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio? an
+Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et reliquis
+fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia
+regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis
+auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione
+sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri
+serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem--ipse enim hic radiatus me intueri
+videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui--vos ergo huius
+magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis
+architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum
+sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior? 127. Neque tamen istas quaestiones
+physicorum exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale
+quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur,
+elatiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque
+caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum
+cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero
+aliquid occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus
+voluptate. 128. Quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed
+vester, ut adsentiatur, credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere
+opinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile
+quod sit invenerit. Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum
+ante dicendum est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde
+adfirmant, earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur,
+amittere. Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam,
+cum cornix cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis
+adfirmabunt signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem
+metiri non possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam
+terram. Ex quo illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non
+potest, qui ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas
+res non percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id
+approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse percipi
+quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera percipi
+comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis minusve
+comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.
+
+XLII. 129. Sed quod coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis
+explorati? nempe fines constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum
+summa referatur: qua de re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio?
+Omitto illa, quae relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et
+scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum
+ab eo dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis
+disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo
+nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici
+philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a
+quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod esset
+unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A Menedemo
+autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in
+mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli similia, sed,
+opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius. 130. Hos si contemnimus et iam
+abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui cum
+Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum
+nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in mediis ea
+momenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum bonum est in his
+rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae [Greek: adiaphoria] ab ipso dicitur.
+Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae [Greek: apatheia]
+nominatur. Has igitur tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae
+diu multumque defensa sunt. 131. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt:
+quorum princeps Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post
+Epicurus, cuius est disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de
+ipsa voluptate consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse
+Callipho censuit: vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate
+Diodorus: ambo hi Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis,
+quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut indicant
+scripta Polemonis, quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles eiusque
+amici nunc proxime videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo
+probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui rebus iis, quas
+primas natura conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere, quod ducatur a
+conciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inventor et
+princeps Stoicorum fuit.
+
+XLIII. 132. Iam illud perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos
+exposui, malorum finis esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar:
+modo ne quis illud tam ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo
+aliquem.' Nihil potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos.
+Licetne--omitto per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope
+singularem--per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem,
+si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in
+discrimine. Nam aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae.
+Utrumque non potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota
+possessione contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni
+continetur, de qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non
+potest igitur uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed
+alter. Si Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens--nam vos quidem
+nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum--: sin vera sunt Zenonis, eadem
+in veteres Academicos _et_ Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur neutri
+adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? 133. Quid? cum ipse
+Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne
+indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia peccata
+esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat tandem mihi
+considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue aliquando
+quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in utramque
+partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim dicebas esse,
+Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito assentiar: quod
+mihi tecum est dogma commune. 134. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno
+in una virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit,
+beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti,
+homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse,
+partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam
+natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente.
+Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et
+fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat, si
+sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur, et
+tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his
+discrepant.
+
+XLIV. 135. Quid? illa, in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare
+possumus? Sapientis animum numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia
+efferri. Age, haec probabilia sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere,
+numquam dolere? Sapiensne non timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si
+deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est
+in bonis, tibi vero, Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona,
+praeter turpitudinem multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens
+necesse est et venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint _ab_ Academia
+vetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent?
+Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse
+quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu. Est enim
+non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, ad verbum
+ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant
+permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa, misericordiam
+aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse
+dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus. 136. Atrocitas quidem ista tua quo
+modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non possum, non
+quo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum,
+quae [Greek: paradoxa] nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista
+tetigit? hos enim quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis
+solos reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent,
+sapientis esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne
+quinquevirum quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum
+liberum? insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique
+scripta Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis
+quidem aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? 137. Haec tibi, Luculle,
+si es adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia:
+mihi autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.
+
+XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad senatum in
+Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M. Marcello coss.
+praetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, doctum sane
+hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem dixisse
+Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia sapiens non
+sum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico non videris.'
+Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, non dubitavisset
+quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas incoleret. Sed ille
+noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens. 138. Vos
+autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et comprobem
+incognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur saepe
+Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de finibus
+bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem esse
+finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id esse, si
+vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed in
+vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum honestate
+coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda
+adiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat probabiliter posse
+defendi. 139. Sit sane ita--quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et
+Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam habeo adhuc
+probabilius--, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas sensibus nostris
+blandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut Aristippo. Revocat virtus
+vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos motus esse dicit, hominem iungit
+deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam Aristippus, quasi animum nullum
+habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno, quasi corporis simus expertes, animum
+solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem sequar, cuius quidem sententiam
+Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur.
+Quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid
+Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et
+gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu, cum honestas in voluptate
+contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate tamquam hominem cum belua
+copulabis?
+
+XLVI. 140. Unum igitur par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum
+honestate. De quo Chrysippo fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio.
+Alteram si sequare, multa ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere,
+caritas, amicitia, iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest,
+nisi erit gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium
+impellitur, ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis.
+Audi contra illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant,
+nisi forte, quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere:
+fontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc
+praescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in
+vita sequeretur habiturum. 141. Nihil igitur me putatis, haec et alia
+innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me
+minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum interest, quod tu, cum es commotus,
+adquiescis, adsentiris, approbas, verum illud certum, comprehensum,
+perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque
+pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror, cui si
+adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam vera a falsis nullo
+discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia ista dialecticae nulla sint.
+
+142. Venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium
+Protagorae est, qui putet id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud
+Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii:
+aliud Epicuri, qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in
+voluptate constituit. Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque
+ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis
+esse voluit. 143. Num quid horum probat noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne
+maiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt
+de ratione loquendi multi et multum probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo
+profecto nihil est acutius, nihil politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.
+
+XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut cur
+cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in elementis
+dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne sit, si quid
+ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta contentio est! Aliter
+Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. Quid? cum Cleanthe
+doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet! quid? duo vel principes
+dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis
+in rebus dissentiunt? 144. Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam
+in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi
+tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud, cum artificia tolli quereris a
+nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui si undique omnes convenerint,
+facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam primum illa invidiosa, quod eos
+omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules, servos, insanos esse dicatis:
+deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos,
+qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos Zeno, negat Antiochus scire
+quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim defendimus etiam insipientem multa
+comprehendere. 145. At scire negatis quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et
+hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum
+ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum
+digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat
+pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine
+etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, [Greek: katal�psin] imposuit. Cum
+autem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque
+compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem
+esse neminem. Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi quidem solent
+dicere. Ita tu nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu, Hortensi, in tua villa
+nos esse. 146. Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen nimis
+eleganter: illa subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi posset,
+artificia concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile esset,
+satis magnam vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine
+scientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut
+Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos
+docuisset aliquis quam vim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: ne
+nobis quidem suscenserent, cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod nusquam
+esset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem maiorum etiam
+comprobat diligentia, qui primum iurare 'ex sui animi sententia' quemque
+voluerunt, deinde ita teneri 'si sciens falleret,' quod inscientia multa
+versaretur in vita, tum, qui testimonium diceret, ut 'arbitrari' se diceret
+etiam quod ipse vidisset, quaeque iurati iudices cognovissent, ea non ut
+esse facta, sed ut 'videri' pronuntiarentur.
+
+XLVIII. 147. Verum, quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius
+ipse insusurrat navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis
+multa dixi, est mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius
+de dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate
+naturae deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus
+tanto opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere
+necesse sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque
+reliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra
+se Stoici texuerunt. 148. Tum Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec
+contulisse. Saepius enim congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis
+nostris, si quae videbuntur, requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus
+sentit? quid Hortensius? Tum Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor
+sententiam, quam quidem ille Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil
+putem posse, adsensurum autem non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem
+existimem, sed ita, ut intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod
+comprehendi et percipi possit: qua re [Greek: epoch�n] illam omnium rerum
+non probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit,
+vehementer adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum
+aspernor. Sed tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens:
+Tollendum. Teneo te, inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia. Ita
+sermone confecto Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras descendimus.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTES.
+
+BOOK I.
+
+    ��1--14. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae (1). Cic.,
+    after adroitly reminding Varro that the promised dedication of the _De
+    Lingua Latina_ is too long delayed, turns the conversation towards
+    philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves this subject untouched (2,
+    3). Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful
+    purpose, and points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4--6). He
+    greatly believes in philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to
+    Greece for it, while he devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks
+    have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion, but demurs to the
+    theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. Latins may surely
+    imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and orators. He gives
+    reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and instancing the
+    success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy (9--12).
+    Varro putting the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the
+    Old Academy for the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for
+    the statement that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro
+    refers to Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a
+    proposal on the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference
+    between Antiochus and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition
+    of the principles of Antiochus (13, 14).
+
+�1. _Noster_: our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus
+than of Cic., see Introd. p. 37. _Nuntiatum_: the spelling _nunciatum_ is a
+mistake, cf. Corssen, _Ausspr._ I. p. 51. _A M. Varrone_: _from M. Varro's
+house_ news came. _Audissemus_: Cic. uses the contracted forms of such
+subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms like
+_audiissemus_. _Confestim_: note how artfully Cic. uses the dramatic form
+of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for Varro. _Ab eius
+villa_: the prep is absent from the MSS., but Wesenberg (_Em. M.T. Cic.
+Epistolarum_, p. 62) shows that it must be inserted. Cic. writes _abesse
+Roma_ (_Ad Fam._ V. 15, 4), _patria_ (_T.D._ V. 106) etc., but not _abesse
+officio_ (_De Off._ I. 43, where Wes. alters it) or the like. _Satis eum
+longo intervallo_: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after Davies, reads _se
+visentum_ for _satis eum_, quoting _Ad Att._ I. 4, Madv. _tum_ for _eum_
+(Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the repetition
+of pronouns (_illum_, _eum_) is quite Ciceronian. The emphatic _ille_ is
+often repeated by the unemphatic _is_, cf. _T.D._ III. 71, and _M.D.F._ V.
+22. I may note that the separation of _satis_ from _longo_ by the word
+_eum_ is quite in Cicero's style (see my note on 25 _quanta id magis_).
+Some editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking _intervallo_ of distance
+in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly press _satis_,
+which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently." The words _satis
+longo intervallo_ simply = "after a tolerably long halt." For the clause
+_ut mos_, etc., cf. _De Or._ II. 13.
+
+�2. _Hic pauca primo_: for the omission of _locuti_, cf. the very similar
+passages in _D.F._ I. 14, III. 8, also my note on 14. _Atque ea_: Halm
+brackets _ea_, quite needlessly, for its insertion is like Cic. _Ecquid
+forte Roma novi_: _Roma_ is the ablative, and some verb like _attulisset_
+is omitted. (So Turnebus.) To take it as nom., understanding _faciat_, is
+clearly wrong. _Percontari_: the spelling _percunctari_ rests on false
+derivation (Corss. I. 36). _Ecquid ipse novi_: cf. _De Or._ II. 13. The
+MSS. have _et si quid_, bad Latin altered by Manutius. _Istum_: some edd.
+_ipsum_, but Cic. often makes a speaker use _iste_ of a person who is
+present. Goer. qu. _Brut._ 125, _De Or._ II. 228. _Velit_: Walker reads
+_velis_ with St Jerome. For _quod velit_ = _quod quis velit_, cf. _De Or._
+I. 30. _In manibus_: so often, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 38. _Idque_: MSS. have in
+the place of this _quod_ with variants _que_, _quae_, _qui_, _quo_. Dav.
+gave _quia_, which was the vulgate reading down to Halm, who reads _idque_,
+after Christ. _Ad hunc enim ipsum_: MSS. have _eum_ for _enim_ (exc. Halm's
+G). Such a combination of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for
+expressions like _me illum ipsum_ (_Ad Att._ II. 1, 11) are not in point.
+Of course if _quia_ be read above, _eum_ must be ejected altogether.
+_Quaedam institui_: the _De Lingua Latina_; see _Ad. Att_ XIII. 12.
+
+�3. _E Libone_: the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see C�sar _B. Civ._
+III. 5, 16, 24. _Nihil enim eius modi_ again all MSS. except Halm's G. have
+_eum_ for _enim_. Christ conj. _enim eum_; so Baiter. _Illud ...
+requirere_: i.e. the question which follows; cf. _requiris_ in 4. _Tecum
+simul_: Halm's G om. _tecum_; but cf. _De Or._ III. 330. _Mandare
+monumentis--letteris illustrare_: common phrases in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 1,
+_T.D._ I. 1, _De Div._ II. 4. _Monumentis_: this, and not _monimentis_
+(Halm) or _monementis_, is probably the right spelling; cf. Corss. II. 314.
+_Ortam a_: Cic. _always_ writes the prep. after _ortus_; cf. _M.D.F._ V.
+69. _Genus_: regularly used by Cic. as _opus_ by Quintilian to mean
+"department of literature." _Ea res_: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter
+has _ars_; on the other hand Bentley (if the _amicus_ so often quoted in
+Davies' notes be really he) reads _artibus_ for _rebus_ below. The slight
+variation, however, from _res_ to _artibus_ is such as Cic. loves.
+_Ceteris_: the spelling _caeteris_ (Klotz) is absolutely wrong, cf. Corss.
+I. 325. _Antecedat_: some MSS. give _antecellat_. a frequent variant, cf.
+_De Off._ I. 105
+
+�4. _Deliberatam--agitatam_: Cic. as usual exaggerates the knowledge
+possessed by the _personae_ of the dialogue; cf. Introd. p. 38, _De Or._
+II. 1. _In promptu_: so II. 10. _Quod ista ipsa ... cogitavi_: Goer., who
+half a page back had made merry over the gloss hunters, here himself
+scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo expels the words. Yet
+they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf. _De Div._ II. 1, _Cat. Mai._ 38), and
+moreover nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and
+clauses in slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense
+desire to flatter Varro. _Si qui ... si essent_: the first _si_ has really
+no conditional force, _si qui_ like [Greek: eitines] merely means "all
+who," for a strong instance see _Ad Fam._ I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe, _si accusandi
+sunt, si qui pertimuerunt_. _Ea nolui scribere_, etc.: very similar
+expressions occur in the prologue to _D.F._ I., which should be compared
+with this prologue throughout.
+
+�5. _Vides ... didicisti_: MSS. have _vides autem eadem ipse didicisti
+enim_. My reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ,
+has _vides autem ipse--didicisti enim eadem--non posse_, etc. _Similis_:
+Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write _i_ and _e_ indiscriminately
+in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write _i_ everywhere, we shall thus,
+I believe, be far nearer Cicero's real writing. Though I do not presume to
+say that his usage did not vary, he must in the vast majority of instances
+have written _i_, see Corss. I. 738--744. _Amafinii aut Rabirii_: cf.
+Introd. p. 26. _Definiunt ... partiuntur_: n. on 32. _Interrogatione_:
+Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g.
+Bentl. _argumentatione_, Ernesti _ratione_. But the word as it stands has
+exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure.
+_Interrogatio_ is merely the _conclusio_ or syllogism put as a series of
+questions. Cf. _Paradoxa_ 2, with _T.D._ II. 42 which will show that
+_interrogatiuncula_ and _conclusiuncula_ are almost convertible terms. See
+also _M.D.F._ I. 39. _Nec dicendi nec disserendi_: Cic.'s constant mode of
+denoting the Greek [Greek: rh�torik�] and [Greek: dialektik�]; note on 32.
+_Et oratorum etiam_: Man., Lamb. om. _etiam_, needlessly. In _Ad Fam._ IX.
+25, 3, the two words even occur without any other word to separate them.
+For _oratorum_ Pearce conj. _rhetorum_. _Rhetor_, however is not thus used
+in Cic.'s phil. works. _Utramque vim virtutem_: strange that Baiter (esp.
+after Halm's note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj. _unam_ for
+_virtutem_. Any power or faculty (vis, [Greek: dynamis]) may be called in
+Gk. [Greek: aret�], in Lat _virtus_. Two passages, _D.F._ III. 72, _De Or._
+III. 65, will remove all suspicion from the text. _Verbis quoque novis_:
+MSS. have _quanquam_ which however is impossible in such a place in Cic.
+(cf. _M.D.F._ V. 68). _Ne a nobis quidem_: so all the MSS., but Orelli
+(after Ernesti) thinking the phrase "_arrogantius dictum_" places _quidem_
+after _accipient_. The text is quite right, _ne quidem_, as Halm remarks,
+implies no more than the Germ. _auch nicht_, cf. also Gk. [Greek: oude].
+_Suscipiatur labor_: MSS. om. the noun, but it is added by a later hand in
+G.
+
+�6. _Epicurum, id est si Democritum_: for the charge see _D.F._ I. 17, IV.
+13, _N.D._ I. 73. _Id est_ often introduces in Cic. a clause which
+intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause, exx. in _M.D.F._
+I. 33. _Cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris_: cf. _D.F._ I. 18, the
+same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists, _Met._ A, 2. Many
+editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read _efficientis_, which would then
+govern _rerum_ (cf. _D.F._ V. 81, _De Fato_, 33, also Gk. [Greek:
+poi�tikos]). But the genitive is merely one of definition, the _causae_ are
+the _res efficientes_, for which cf. 24 and _Topica_, 58, _proximus locus
+est rerum efficientium, quae causae appellantur_. So Faber, though less
+fully. _Appellat_: i.e. Amafinius, who first so translated [Greek: atomos].
+_Quae cum contineantur_: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it
+must be kept, and _adhibenda etiam_ begins the _apodosis_. Madvig
+(_Emendationes ad Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos_, Hauniae, 1825, p. 108)
+tacitly reads _continentur_ without _cum_, so Orelli and Klotz. Goer.
+absurdly tries to prop up the subj. without _cum_. _Quam quibusnam_:
+Durand's em. for _quoniam quibusnam_ of the MSS., given by Halm and also
+Baiter. Madv. (_Em._ p. 108) made a forced defence of _quoniam_, as marking
+a rapid transition from one subject to another (here from physics to
+ethics) like the Gk. [Greek: epei], only one parallel instance, however,
+was adduced (_T.D._ III. 14) and the usage probably is not Latin.
+_Adducere?_: The note of interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole sentence,
+so far, explains the difficulty of setting forth the true system of
+physics. If _quoniam_ is read and no break made at _adducere_, all after
+_quoniam_ will refer to ethics, in that case there will be a strange change
+of subject in passing from _quisquam_ to _haec ipsa_, both which
+expressions will be nominatives to _poterit_, further, there will be the
+almost impossible ellipse of _ars_, _scientia_, or something of the kind
+after _haec ipsa_. On every ground the reading of Madv. is insupportable.
+_Quid, haec ipsa_: I have added _quid_ to fill up the lacuna left by Halm,
+who supposes much more to have fallen out. [The technical philosophical
+terms contained in this section will be elucidated later. For the Epicurean
+ignorance of geometry see note on II. 123] _Illi enim simpliciter_:
+"frankly," cf. _Ad Fam._ VIII. 6, 1 _Pecudis et hominis_: note on II. 139.
+
+�7. _Sive sequare ... magnum est_: for the constr. cf. II. 140. _Magnum
+est_: cf. _quid est magnum_, 6. _Verum et simplex bonum_: cf. 35. _Quod
+bonum ... ne suspicari quidem_ an opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp
+_T.D._ III. 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with the Greek
+preserved by Diog. Laert. X. 6 (qu. Zeller, 451), and less accurately by
+Athenaeus, VII. 279 (qu. R. and P. 353). _Ne suspicari quidem_: for this
+MSS. give _nec suspicari_, but Madv. (_D.F._, Excursus III.) has
+conclusively shown that _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_ is post Augustan Latin.
+Christ supposes some thing like _sentire_ to have fallen out before _nec
+suspicari_; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in _D.F._ II.
+20, 30, _T.D._ III. 46, _N.D._ I. 111, where the same opinion of Epicurus
+is dealt with, we have either _ne suspicari quidem_ or _ne intellegere
+quidem_ (cf. also _In Pisonem_ 69). Further, _ne ... quidem_ is esp
+frequent with _suspicari_ (_D.F._ II. 20), and verbs of the kind
+(_cogitari_ II. 82), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end of
+sentences eg _Verr._ II. 1, 155. Notice _negat ... ne suspicari quidem_
+without _se_, which however Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous
+passages produced from Cic. by Madv. (_Em._ 111), in which not only _se_,
+but _me_, _nos_, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the
+infinitive, after verbs like _negat_. Cf. also the omission of _sibi_ in
+_Paradoxa_ 40. _Si vero_: this, following _sive enim_ above, is a departure
+from Cic.'s rule which is to write _sive--sive_ or _si--sin_, but not
+_si--sive_ or _sive--si_. This and two or three other similar passages in
+Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most important and
+exhaustive excursus to his _D.F._ (p. 785, ed. 2), and are connected with
+other instances of broken sequence. There is no need therefore to read
+_sive_ here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others. _Quam nos ... probamus_:
+cf. Introd. p. 62. _Erit explicanda_: for the separation of these words by
+other words interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see 11, 17. I am
+surprised that Halm and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical
+objection to the phrase _explicare Academiam_, and read _erunt_ against the
+MSS., making _illa_ plural. If _erunt_ is read, _erit_ must be supplied
+from it to go with _disserendum_, which is harsh. _Quam argute, quam
+obscure_: at first sight an oxymoron, but _argute_ need not only imply
+_clearness_, it means merely "acutely". _Quantum possum_: some MSS. have
+_quantam_, which is scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only
+follows _nequeo_, _volo_, _malo_, _possum_, and such verbs when an
+infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For _velle_ see a good
+instance in _D.F._ III. 68, where consult Madv. _Constantiam_: the notions
+of firmness, consistency, and clearness of mind are bound up in this word,
+cf. II. 53. _Apud Platonem_: _Timaeus_, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by
+Cic., cf. _De Leg._ I. 58, _Laelius_ 20, 47, _T.D._ I. 64.
+
+�8. _Id est ... jubeo_: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss.
+But Cicero is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight
+variations in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of
+slightly varied phrases connected by _id est_ in _D.F._ I. 72, II. 6, 90. I
+therefore hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words. _Ea a_:
+Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read
+_e_ for _a_, which Halm would also prefer. _De_, _ab_, and _ex_ follow
+_haurire_ indifferently in Cic. _Rivulos consectentur_: so Wordsworth, "to
+hunt the waterfalls". The metaphor involved in _fontibus--rivulos_ is often
+applied by Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus
+in _N.D._ I. 120. _Nihil enim magno opere_: _magno opere_ should be written
+in two words, not as _magnopere_, cf. the phrases _maximo opere_, _nimio
+opere_, the same holds good of _tanto opere_, _quanto opere_. _L. Aelii_:
+MSS. _Laelii_. The person meant is L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the
+master of Varro, and the earliest systematic grammarian of Rome. See
+Quintil. _Inst. Or._ X. 1, 99, Gellius X. 21, Sueton. _Gramm._ 3.
+_Occasum_: an unusual metaphor. _Menippum_: a Cynic satirist, see _Dict.
+Biogr._ Considerable fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and
+have often been edited--most recently by Riese (published by Teubner).
+_Imitati non interpretati_: Cic. _D.F._ I. 7, gives his opinion as to the
+right use to be made of Greek models. _+Quae quo_: these words are
+evidently wrong. Halm after Faber ejects _quae_, and is followed by Baiter.
+Varro is thus made to say that he stated many things dialectically, _in
+order that_ the populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault
+lies in the word _quo_, for which I should prefer to read _cum_ (=_quom_,
+which would be written _quo_ in the MSS.) The general sense would then be
+"Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature which the
+unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the learned
+read." _Laudationibus_: [Greek: logois epitaphiois], cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 48
+where Varro's are mentioned. _+Philosophe scribere_: the MSS. all give
+_philosophie_. Klotz has _philosophiam_, which is demonstrably wrong,
+_physica_, _musica_ etc. _scribere_ may be said, but not _physicam_,
+_musicam_ etc. _scribere_. The one passage formerly quoted to justify the
+phrase _philosophiam scribere_ is now altered in the best texts (_T.D._ V.
+121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads _philosophiae scribere_; his
+explanation is, as Orelli gently says, "vix Latina." I can scarcely think
+Halm's _philosophe_ to be right, the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic.
+almost condemns it by his use of the Greek [Greek: philosoph�s] (_Ad Att._
+XIII. 20). In older Greek the adverb does not appear, nor is [Greek:
+philosophos] used as an adjective much, yet Cic. uses _philosophus_
+adjectivally in _T.D._ V. 121, _Cat. Mai._ 22, _N.D._ III. 23, just as he
+uses _tyrannus_ (_De Rep._ III. 45), and _anapaestus_ (_T.D._ III. 57)
+Might we not read _philosophis_, in the dative, which only requires the
+alteration of a single letter from the MSS. reading? The meaning would then
+be "to write _for_ philosophers," which would agree with my emendation
+_cum_ for _quo_ above. _Philosophice_ would be a tempting alteration, but
+that the word [Greek: philosophikos] is not Greek, nor do _philosophicus_,
+_philosophice_ occur till very late Latin times. _Si modo id consecuti
+sumus_: cf. _Brut._ 316.
+
+�9. _Sunt ista_: = [Greek: esti tauta], so often, e.g. _Lael._ 6. Some edd.
+have _sint_, which is unlikely to be right. _Nos in nostra_: Augustine (_De
+Civ. Dei_ VI. 2) quotes this with the reading _reduxerunt_ for
+_deduxerunt_, which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with
+approval Durand's remark, "_deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus
+humanitatis_." The words, however, are almost convertible; see _Cat. Mai._
+63. In _Lael._ 12, _Brut._ 86, we have _reducere_, where Durand's rule
+requires _deducere_, on the other hand cf. _Ad Herennium_ IV. 64, _hospites
+domum deducere. Aetatem patriae_ etc., August. (_De Civ. Dei_ VI. 3)
+describes Varro's "_Libri Antiquitatum_" (referred to in 8), in which most
+of the subjects here mentioned were treated of. _Descriptiones temporum_:
+lists of dates, so [Greek: chronoi] is technically used for dates, Thuc. V.
+20, etc. _Tu sacerdotum_: after this Lamb. inserts _munera_ to keep the
+balance of the clauses. Cic. however is quite as fond of variety as of
+formal accuracy. _Domesticam--bellicam_: opposed like _domi bellique_, cf.
+_Brut._ 49, _De Off._ I. 74. Augustine's reading _publicam_ shows him to
+have been quoting from memory. _Sedem_: so the best MSS. of Aug., some edd.
+here give _sedium_. The argument for _sedem_ is the awkwardness of making
+the three genitives, _sedium_, _regionum_, _locorum_, dependent on the
+accusatives, _nomina_, _genera_, _officia_, _causas_. Cic. is fond of using
+_sedes_, _locus_, _regio_ together, see _Pro Murena_, 85, _Pro Cluentio_,
+171, quoted by Goer. _Omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum_: from the
+frequent references of Aug. it appears that the "_Libri Antiquitatum_" were
+divided into two parts, one treating of _res humanae_, the other of _res
+divinae_ (_De Civ. Dei_, IV. 1, 27, VI. 3). _Et litteris luminis_: for
+_luminis_, cf. _T.D._ I. 5. _Et verbis_: Manut. reads _rebus_ from 26.
+Varro's researches into the Latin tongue are meant. _Multis locis
+incohasti_: Varro's book "_De Philosophia_" had apparently not yet been
+written.
+
+�10. _Causa_: = [Greek: prophasis]. _Probabilem_: = specious. _Nesciunt_:
+Halm with his one MS. G, which is the work of a clever emendator, gives
+_nescient_ to suit _malent_ above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not
+necessary to force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which
+Halm himself allows to be broken in two similar passages, II. 20, 105. _Sed
+da mihi nunc, satisne probas?_: So all MSS. except G, which has the evident
+conj. _sed ea (eam) mihi non sane probas_. This last Baiter gives, while
+Halm after Durand reads _sed eam mihi non satis probas_, which is too far
+from the MSS. to please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable,
+though _da mihi_ for _dic mihi_ is certainly poetic. _Da te mihi_ (Manut.,
+Goer., Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be supported
+by 12, _Brut._ 306, _Ad Fam._ II. 8, or such like passages. _Attius_: the
+old spelling _Accius_ is wrong. _Si qui ... imitati_: note the collocation,
+and cf. 17. Halm needlessly writes _sint_ for MSS. _sunt_. For this section
+throughout cf. the prologues to _D.F._ I., _T.D._ I. and II.
+
+�11. _Procuratio_: for the proper meaning of _procurator_ and _procuratio_
+see Jordan on _Pro Caecina_ 55. _Implacatum et constrictum_: the
+conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual; cf. 17 _plenam ac
+refertam_, II. 127 _exigua et minima_, so [Greek: kai] in Greek. _Inclusa
+habebam_: cf. _T.D._ I. 1. _Obsolescerent_, used of _individual_ memory, is
+noteworthy. _Percussus volnere_: many edd. give the frequent variant
+_perculsus_. The _volnus_, which Goer. finds so mysterious, is the death of
+Tullia, cf. _N.D._ I. 9, _De Consolatione_, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe, and
+Introd. p. 32. _Aut ... aut ... aut ... aut_: This casting about for an
+excuse shows how low philosophy stood in public estimation at Rome. See
+Introd. p. 29. The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the
+exordium of _N.D._ I.
+
+�12. _Brutus_: the same praise often recurs in _D.F._ and the _Brutus
+Graecia desideret_ so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has _Graeca_. Halm
+(and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger, _Graeca
+desideres_. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's _Philologus_ XXIV. 483,
+approves the reading on the curious ground that Brutus was not anxious to
+satisfy Greek requirements, but rather to render it unnecessary for Romans
+to have recourse to Greece for philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for
+Greece with Cicero is the supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if
+she is satisfied the philosophic world is tranquil. Cf. _Ad Att._ I. 20, 6,
+_D.F._ I. 8, _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 16, 5. I just note the em. of Turnebus, _a
+Graecia desideres_, and that of Dav. _Graecia desideretur_. _Eandem
+sententiam_: cf. Introd. p. 56. _Aristum_: cf. II. 11, and _M.D.F._ V. 8.
+
+�13. _Sine te_: = [Greek: sou dicha]. _Relictam_: Cic. very rarely omits
+_esse_, see note on II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p.
+20. _Veterem illam_: MSS. have _iam_ for _illam_. The position of _iam_
+would be strange, in the passage which used to be compared, _Pro Cluentio_
+16, Classen and Baiter now om. the word. Further, _vetus_ and _nova_ can
+scarcely be so barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The
+reading _illam_ is from Madv. (_Em._ 115), and is supported by _illam
+veterem_ (18), _illa antiqua_ (22), _istius veteris_ (_D.F._ V. 8), and
+similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and Bait.) thinks _iam_ comprises
+the last two syllables of _Academiam_, which he reads. _Correcta et
+emendata_: a fine sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words
+often occur together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of
+expression, cf. _De Leg._ III. 30, _D.F._ IV. 21, also Tac. _Hist._ I. 37.
+_Negat_: MSS. have _negaret_, but Cic. never writes the subj. after
+_quamquam_ in _oratio recta_, as Tac. does, unless there is some
+conditional or potential force in the sentence; see _M.D.F._ III. 70.
+Nothing is commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for
+the pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and _vice versa_. _In libris_:
+see II. 11. _Duas Academias_: for the various modes of dividing the Academy
+refer to R. and P. 404. _Contra ea Philonis_: MSS. have _contra Philonis_
+merely, exc. Halm's V., which gives _Philonem_, as does the ed. Rom.
+(1471). I have added _ea_. Orelli quotes _Ad Att._ XII. 23, 2, _ex
+Apollodori_. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and _libros_ may be supplied
+from _libris_ above, so in _Ad Att._ XIII. 32, 2, _Dicaearchi_ [Greek: peri
+psych�s] _utrosque_, the word _libros_ has to be supplied from the
+preceding letter, cf. a similar ellipse of _bona_ in 19, 22. Madvig's
+_Philonia_ is improbable from its non-appearance elsewhere, while the
+companion adjective _Antiochius_ is frequent. Halm inserts _sententiam_, a
+heroic remedy. To make _contra_ an adv. and construe _Philonis Antiochus_
+together, supplying _auditor_, as is done by some unknown commentators who
+probably only exist in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified by
+_D.F._ V. 13.
+
+�14. _A qua absum iam diu_: MSS. have strangely _aqua absumtam diu_,
+changed by Manut. _Renovari_: the vulg. _revocari_ is a curious instance of
+oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note he
+gave _renovari_. Orelli--who speaks of Goerenz's "_praestantissima
+recensio_," and founds his own text upon it two years after Madvig's
+crushing exposure in his _Em._ often quoted by me--not only reads
+_revocari_, but quotes _renovari_ as an em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536.
+From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no independent value, took it.
+_Renovare_ in Cic. often means "to refresh the memory," e.g. 11, _Brut._
+315. _Nisi molestum est_: like _nisi alienum putas_, a variation on the
+common _si placet, si videtur_. _Adsidamus_: some MSS. have _adsideamus_,
+which would be wrong here. _Sane istud_: Halm _istuc_ from G. _Inquit_: for
+the late position of this word, which is often caused by its affinity for
+_quoniam_, _quidem_, etc., cf. _M.D.F._ III. 20 _Quae cum essent dicta, in
+conspectu consedimus (omnes)_: most edd. since Gulielmus print this without
+_essent_ as a hexameter, and suppose it a quotation. But firstly, a verse
+so commonplace, if familiar, would occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if
+not familiar, would not be given without the name of its author. Secondly,
+most MSS. have _sint_ or _essent_ before _dicta_. It is more probable
+therefore that _omnes_ was added from an involuntary desire to make up the
+hexameter rhythm. Phrases like _quae cum essent dicta consedimus_ often
+occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf. _De Div._ II. 150, and
+Augustine, the imitator of Cic., _Contra Academicos_, I. 25, also
+_consedimus_ at the end of a clause in _Brut._ 24, and _considitur_ in _De
+Or._ III. 18. _Mihi vero_: the omission of _inquit_, which is strange to
+Goer., is well illustrated in _M.D.F._ I. 9. There is an odd ellipse of
+_laudasti_ in _D.F._ V. 81.
+
+    ��15--42. Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. First part of
+    Varro's Exposition, 15--18. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made
+    ethics supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets, his one
+    doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of ignorance.
+    Moral exhortation was his task (16). Plato added to and enriched the
+    teaching of his master, from him sprang two schools which abandoned the
+    negative position of Socrates and adopted definite tenets, yet remained
+    in essential agreement with one another--the Peripatetic and the
+    Academic (17, 18).
+
+�15. _A rebus ... involutis_: physical phenomena are often spoken of in
+these words by Cic., cf. 19, _Timaeus_ c. 1, _D.F._ I. 64, IV. 18, V. 10,
+_N.D._ I. 49. Ursinus rejected _ab_ here, but the insertion or omission of
+_ab_ after the passive verb depends on the degree to which _natura_ is
+personified, if 28 be compared with _Tim._ c. 1, this will be clear.
+_Involutis_ = veiled; cf. _involucrum_. Cic. shows his feeling of the
+metaphor by adding _quasi_ in II. 26, and often. _Avocavisse philosophiam_:
+this, the Xenophontic view of Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's
+time, cf. II. 123, _T.D._ V. 10, _D.F._ V. 87, 88, also Varro in Aug. _De
+Civ. Dei_, VIII. 3. Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were
+curiously answered in _De Rep._ I. 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug. _De Civ.
+Dei_, VIII. 4). The same view is supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the
+passages quoted by R. and P. 141. To form an opinion on this difficult
+question the student should read Schleiermacher's _Essay on the Worth of
+Socrates as a Philosopher_ (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's _Socrates
+and the Socratic Schools_, Eng. Trans., pp. 112--116 [I dissent from his
+view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's _Handbook_, so far as it
+relates to Socrates and Plato. _Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum valere_:
+_valere_ is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm, its use in 21 makes
+it more probable than _conferre_, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius
+vainly tries to justify the MSS. reading by such passages as _D.F._ I. 39,
+_T.D._ I. 70. The strangest ellipse with _nihil ad_ elsewhere in Cic. is in
+_De Leg._ I. 6.
+
+�16. _Hic ... illum_: for this repetition of pronouns see _M.D.F._ IV. 43.
+_Varie et copiose_: MSS. omit _et_, but it may be doubted whether Cic.
+would let two _adverbs_ stand together without _et_, though three may (cf.
+II. 63), and though with pairs of _nouns_ and _adjectives, et_ often is
+left out, as in the passages quoted here by Manut. _Ad Att._ IV. 3, 3, _Ad
+Fam._ XIII. 24, XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg, reprinted
+in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works (1861), on
+_T.D._ III. 6. _Varie et copiose_ is also in _De Or._ II. 240. Cf. the
+omission of _que_ in 23, also II. 63. _Perscripti_: Cic. like Aristotle
+often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were authentic reports of
+Socratic conversations, cf. II. 74. _Nihil adfirmet_: so _T.D._ I. 99.
+"_Eoque praestare ceteris_" this is evidently from Plato _Apol._ p. 21, as
+to the proper understanding of which see note on II. 74. _Ab Apolline_,
+Plato _Apol._ 21 A, _Omnium_: Dav. conj. _hominum_ needlessly. _Dictum_:
+Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads _iudicatum_, it is remarkable that in four
+passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (_Cato Mai._ 78, _Lael._ 7,
+9, 13) he uses the verb _iudicare_. _Una omnis_: Lamb. _hominis_, Baiter
+also. _Omnis eius oratio tamen_: _notwithstanding_ his negative dialectic
+he gave positive teaching in morals. _Tamen_: for MSS. _tam_ or _tum_ is
+due to Gruter, Halm has _tantum_. _Tam_, _tum_ and _tamen_ are often
+confused in MSS., e.g. _In Veri_ (_Act_ II.) I. 3, 65, II. 55, 112, V. 78,
+where see Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that _tum ... et_, _tum
+... que_, _et ... tum_, correspond in Cic. like _tum ... cum_, _tum ...
+tum_. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled by _Ac._ II. 1, 43. _Ad
+virtutis studium cohortandis_: this broad assertion is distinctly untrue;
+see Zeller's _Socrates_ 88, with footnote.
+
+�17. _Varius et multiplex, et copiosus_: these characteristics are named to
+account for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For
+_multiplex_ "many sided," cf. _T.D._ V. 11. _Una et consentiens_: this is
+an opinion of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in
+_D.F._ IV. 5 _De Leg._ I. 38, _De Or._ III. 67. Five ancient philosophers
+are generally included in this supposed harmonious Academico-Peripatetic
+school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo (cf.
+_D.F._ IV. 2), sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have
+been first broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in
+Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1, cf. also 34. Antiochus doubtless rested his
+theory almost entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In
+_D.F._ V. 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus, this appears, as also
+in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as though ethics were the whole
+of philosophy (cf. also _De Off._ III. 20). Antiochus probably made light
+of such dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about
+[Greek: ideai], which had long ceased. Krische _Uber Cicero's Akademika_ p.
+51, has some good remarks. _Nominibus_: the same as _vocabulis_ above. Cic.
+does not observe Varro's distinction (_De L. L._ IX. 1) which confines
+_nomen_ to proper nouns, _vocabulum_ to common nouns, though he would not
+use _vocabulum_ as Tac. does, for the name of a person (_Annals_ XII. 66,
+etc.). _Quasi heredem ... duos autem_: the conj. of Ciaconus "_ex asse
+heredem, secundos autem_" is as acute as it is absurd. _Duos_: it is
+difficult to decide whether this or _duo_ is right in Cic., he can scarcely
+have been so inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and
+Halm's ed., _Ac._ II. 11, 13 with _De Div._ I. 6). The older inscr. in the
+_Corpus_ vol. I. have _duo_, but only in _duoviros_, two near the time of
+Cic. (_C.I._ vol. I. nos. 571 and 1007) give _duos_, which Cic. probably
+wrote. _Duo_ is in old Latin poets and Virgil. _Chalcedonium_: not
+_Calchedonium_ as Klotz, cf. Gk. [Greek: Chalk�donion]. _Praestantissimos_:
+Halm wrongly, cf. _Brut._ 125. _Stagiritem_: not _Stagiritam_ as Lamb., for
+Cic., exc. in a few nouns like _Persa_, _pirata_, etc., which came down
+from antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in [Greek: -�s] into Latin nouns
+in _-a_. See _M.D.F._ II. 94. _Coetus ... soliti_: cf. 10. _Platonis
+ubertate_: cf. Quintilian's "_illa Livii lactea ubertas_." _Plenum ac
+refertam_: n. on 11. _Dubitationem_: Halm with one MS., G, gives
+_dubitantem_, Baiter _dubitanter_, Why alter? _Ars quaedam philosophiae_:
+before these words all Halm's MSS., exc G, insert _disserendi_, probably
+from the line above, Lipsius keeps it and ejects _philosophiae_, while
+Lamb., Day read _philosophia_ in the nom. Varro, however, would never say
+that philosophy became entirely dialectical in the hands of the old
+Academics and Peripatetics. _Ars_ = [Greek: techn�], a set of definite
+rules, so Varro in Aug. (as above) speaks of the _certa dogmata_ of this
+old school as opposed to the incertitude of the New Academy. _Descriptio_:
+so Halm here, but often _discriptio_. The _Corp. Inscr._, vol. I. nos. 198
+and 200, has thrice _discriptos_ or _discriptum_, the other spelling never.
+
+�18. _Ut mihi quidem videtur_: MSS. transpose _quidem_ and _videtur_, as in
+44. _Quidem_, however nearly always comes closely after the pronoun, see
+_M.D.F._ IV. 43, cf. also I. 71, III. 28, _Opusc._ I. 406. _Expetendarum
+fugiendarumque_: [Greek: hairet�n kai pheukt�n], about which more in n. on
+36. The Platonic and Aristotelian ethics have indeed an external
+resemblance, but the ultimate bases of the two are quite different. In
+rejecting the Idea of the Good, Aristotle did away with what Plato would
+have considered most valuable in his system. The ideal theory, however, was
+practically defunct in the time of Antiochus, so that the similarity
+between the two schools seemed much greater than it was. _Non sus
+Minervam_: a Greek proverb, cf. Theocr. _Id._ V. 23, _De Or._ II. 233, _Ad
+Fam._ IX. 18, 3. Binder, in his German translation of the _Academica_, also
+quotes Plutarch _Pr�c. Polit._ 7. _Inepte ... docet_: elliptic for _inepte
+docet, quisquis docet_. _Nostra atque nostros_: few of the editors have
+understood this. Atticus affects everything Athenian, and speaks as though
+he were one of them; in Cic.'s letters to him the words "_tui cives_,"
+meaning the Athenians, often occur. _Quid me putas_: i.e. _velle_.
+_Exhibiturum_: Halm inserts _me_ before this from his one MS. G, evidently
+emended here by its copyist. For the omission of _me_, cf. note on 7.
+
+    ��19--23. Part II. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.
+    The threefold division of philosophy into [Greek: �thik�, physik�,
+    dialektik�]. Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the
+    acquisition of natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental,
+    bodily, and external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental,
+    which fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the
+    chief of the acquired (20), then the external, which form with the
+    bodily advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The
+    ethical standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief
+    part, and is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the
+    greatest happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three
+    classes of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible
+    to give an intelligent account of action and duty (23).
+
+�19. _Ratio triplex_: Plato has not this division, either consciously or
+unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's time,
+so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ VIII. 4, and by
+Diog. Laert. III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself cannot be
+traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian Peripatetics,
+to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 16. It was probably
+first brought into strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more
+sharply and decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf.
+esp. _M.D.F._ IV. 3. _Quid verum ... repugnans iudicando_: MSS. exc. G have
+_et_ before _quid falsum_, whence Klotz conj. _sit_ in order to obviate the
+awkwardness of _repugnet_ which MSS. have for _repugnans_. Krische wishes
+to read _consequens_ for _consentiens_, comparing _Orator_ 115, _T.D._ V.
+68, _De Div._ II. 150, to which add _T.D._ V. 21 On the other hand cf. II.
+22, 91. Notice the double translations of the Greek terms, _de vita et
+moribus_ for [Greek: �thik�], etc. This is very characteristic of Cic., as
+we shall see later. _Ac primum_: many MSS. and edd. _primam_, cf. 23, 30.
+_A natura petebant_: how Antiochus could have found this in Plato and
+Aristotle is difficult to see; that he did so, however, is indubitable; see
+_D.F._ V. 24--27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and
+Varro in Aug. XIX. 3. The root of Plato's system is the [Greek: idea] of
+the Good, while so far is Aristotle from founding his system on the
+abstract [Greek: physis], that he scarcely appeals even incidentally to
+[Greek: physis] in his ethical works. The abstract conception of nature in
+relation to ethics is first strongly apparent in Polemo, from whom it
+passed into Stoic hands and then into those of Antiochus. _Adeptum esse
+omnia_: put rather differently in _D.F._ V. 24, 26, cf. also _D.F._ II. 33,
+34, _Ac._ II. 131. _Et animo et corpore et vita_: this is the [Greek:
+trias] or [Greek: trilogia t�n agath�n], which belongs in this form to late
+Peripateticism (cf. _M.D.F._ III. 43), the third division is a development
+from the [Greek: bios teleios] of Aristotle. The [Greek: trias] in this
+distinct shape is foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus,
+_Ethica_ II. 6, 4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro seems to
+merge the two last divisions into one in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX 3. This
+agrees better with _D.F._ V. 34--36, cf. also Aug. VIII. 8. On the
+Antiochean _finis_ see more in note on 22. _Corporis alia_: for ellipse of
+_bona_, see n. on 13. _Ponebant esse_: n. on 36. _In toto in partibus_: the
+same distinction is in Stob. _Eth._ II. 6, 7; cf. also _D.F._ V. 35.
+_Pulchritudinem_: Cic. _Orator_ 160, puts the spelling _pulcher_ beyond a
+doubt; it often appears in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only
+_pulcrai_, _pulcrum_, etc., occur in inscr., exc. _pulchre_, which is found
+once (_Corp. Inscr._ I. no 1019). _Sepulchrum_, however, is frequent at an
+early time. On the tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see Boscher
+in Curtius' _Studien_ II. 1, p. 145. In the case of _pulcher_ the false
+derivation from [Greek: polychroos] may have aided the corruption.
+Similarly in modern times J.C. Scaliger derived it from [Greek: poly cheir]
+(Curtius' _Grundz_ ed. 3, p. 8) For _valetudinem viris pulchritudinem_, cf.
+the [Greek: hygieia ischys kallos] of Stob. _Eth_. II. 6, 7, and _T.D._ V.
+22. _Sensus integros_ [Greek: euaisth�sia] in Stob., cf. also _D.F._ V. 36
+(_in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus_). _Celeritatem_: so [Greek:
+pod�keia] in Stob., _bene currere_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Claritatem in voce_:
+cf. _De Off._ I. 133. _Impressionem_: al. _expressionem_. For the former
+cf. _De Or._ III. 185, which will show the meaning to be the distinct
+marking of each sound; for the latter _De Or._ III. 41, which will disprove
+Klotz's remark "_imprimit lingua voces, non exprimit_." See also _De Off._
+I. 133. One old ed. has _pressionem_, which, though not itself Ciceronian,
+recalls _presse loqui_, and _N.D._ II. 149. Pliny, _Panegyric_, c. 64, has
+_expressit explanavitque verba_; he and Quintilian often so use
+_exprimere_.
+
+�20. _Ingeniis_: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. _T.D._ III. 2, and
+_animis_ below and in _N.D._ II. 58. _In naturam et mores_: for _in ea quae
+natura et moribus fiunt_. A similar inaccuracy of expression is found in
+II. 42. The division is practically Aristotle's, who severs [Greek: aretai]
+into [Greek: diano�tikai] and [Greek: �thikai] (_Nic. Eth._ I. c. 13,
+_Magna Mor._ I. c. 5). In _D.F._ V. 38 the [Greek: diano�tikai] are called
+_non voluntariae_, the [Greek: �thikai] _voluntariae_. _Celeritatem ad
+discendum et memoriam_: cf. the [Greek: eumatheia, mn�m�] of Arist. (who
+adds [Greek: anchinoia sophia phron�sis]), and the _docilitas, memoria_ of
+_D.F._ V. 36. _Quasi consuetudinem_: the _quasi_ marks a translation from
+the Greek, as frequently, here probably of [Greek: ethismos] (_Nic. Eth._
+II. c. 1). _Partim ratione formabant_: the relation which reason bears to
+virtue is set forth in _Nic. Eth._ VI. c. 2. _In quibus_: i.e. _in
+moribus_. All the late schools held that ethics formed the sole ultimate
+aim of philosophy. _Erat_: note the change from _oratio obliqua_ to
+_recta_, and cf. the opposite change in II. 40. _Progressio_: this, like
+the whole of the sentence in which it stands, is intensely Stoic. For the
+Stoic [Greek: prokor�, prokoptein eis aret�n], cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 64, 66, R.
+and P. 392, sq., Zeller, _Stoics_ 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said
+to be Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised
+Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. _Perfectio naturae_:
+cf. esp. _De Leg._ I. 25. More Stoic still is the definition of virtue as
+the perfection of the _reason_, cf. II. 26, _D.F._ IV. 35, V. 38, and
+Madvig's note on _D.F._ II. 88. Faber quotes Galen _De Decr. Hipp. et
+Plat._ c. 5, [Greek: h� aret� teleiot�s esti t�s hekastou physeos]. _Una
+res optima_: the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. XIX.
+3, cf. also _D.F._ V. 36, 38.
+
+�21. _Virtutis usum_: so the Stoics speak of their [Greek: adiaphora] as
+the practising ground for virtue (_D.F._ III. 50), cf. _virtutis usum_ in
+Aug. XIX. 1. _Nam virtus_: most MSS. have _iam_, which is out of place
+here. _Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam_: MSS. omit _et_
+between _cernitur_ and _in_, exc. Halm's G which has _in_ before _animi_
+and also before _corporis_. These last insertions are not necessary, as may
+be seen from _Topica_ 80, _causa certis personis locis temporibus
+actionibus negotiis cernitur aut_ in _omnibus aut_ in _plerisque_, also
+_T.D._ V. 22. In Stob. II. 6, 8, the [Greek: telos] of the Peripatetics is
+stated to be [Greek: to kat' aret�n z�n en tois peri s�ma kai tois ex�then
+agathois], here _quibusdam quae_ etc., denote the [Greek: ex�then] or
+[Greek: ektos agatha], the third class in 19. _Hominem ... societate_: all
+this is strongly Stoic, though also attributed to the Peripatetics by Stob.
+II. 6, 7 ([Greek: koin� philanthr�pia]), etc., doubtless the
+humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the [Greek: physei
+anthr�pos politikon z�on] theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf. _D.F._ III. 66,
+_De Leg._ I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293--296. The repetitions
+_hominem_, _humani_, _hominibus_, _humana_ are striking. For the last,
+Bentley (i.e. Davies' anonymous friend) proposed _mundana_ from _T.D._ V.
+108, Varro, however, has _humana societas_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Cetera autem_:
+what are these _cetera?_ They form portion of the [Greek: ektos agatha],
+and although not strictly contained within the _summum bonum_ are necessary
+to enrich it and preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob. II. 6, 8,
+13, [Greek: philia, philoi] would belong to the _quaedam_ of Cicero, while
+[Greek: ploutos arch� eutychia eugeneia dynasteia] would be included in
+_cetera_. The same distinction is drawn in Aug. VIII. 8. _Tuendum_: most
+MSS. _tenendum_, but _tuendum_ corresponds best with the division of
+[Greek: agatha] into [Greek: poi�tika] and [Greek: phylaktika], Stob. II.
+6, 13. For the word _pertinere_ see _M.D.F._ III. 54.
+
+�22. _Plerique_: Antiochus believes it also Academic. _Qui tum
+appellarentur_: MSS. _dum_, the subj. is strange, and was felt to be so by
+the writer of Halm's G, which has _appellantur_. _Videbatur_: Goer. and
+Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that it has the strong meaning of
+the Gr. [Greek: edokei], "it was their dogma," so often. _Adipisci_: cf.
+_adeptum esse_, 19. _Quae essent prima natura_: MSS. have _in natura_. For
+the various modes of denoting the [Greek: pr�ta kata physin] in Latin see
+Madvig's _Fourth Excursus to the D.F._, which the student of Cic.'s
+philosophy ought to know by heart. The phrase _prima natura_ (abl.) could
+not stand alone, for [Greek: ta pr�ta t� physei] is one of Goerenz's
+numerous forgeries. The ablative is always conditioned by some verb, see
+Madv. A comparison of this statement of the ethical _finis_ with that in 19
+and the passages quoted in my note there, will show that Cic. drew little
+distinction between the Stoic [Greek: ta pr�ta kata physin] and the
+Peripatetic [Greek: trilogia]. That this is historically absurd Madvig
+shows in his _Excursus_, but he does not sufficiently recognise the fact
+that Cicero has perfectly correctly reported Antiochus. At all events,
+Varro's report (Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 3) coincides with Cic.'s in every
+particular. Even the _inexplicabilis perversitas_ of which Madv. complains
+(p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus, who, as will be seen from Augustine
+XIX. 1, 3, included even _virtus_ among the _prima naturae_. A little
+reflection will show that in no other way could Antiochus have maintained
+the practical identity of the Stoic and Peripatetic views of the _finis_. I
+regret that my space does not allow me to pursue this difficult subject
+farther. For the Stoic [Greek: pr�ta kata physin] see Zeller, chap XI.
+_Ipsa per sese expetenda_: Gk. [Greek: haireta], which is applied to all
+things contained within the _summum bonum_. As the Stoic _finis_ was
+[Greek: aret�] only, that alone to them was [Greek: haireton], their
+[Greek: pr�ta kata physin] were not [Greek: haireta], (cf. _D.F._ III. 21).
+Antiochus' _prima naturae_ were [Greek: haireta] to him, cf. Aug. XIX. 3,
+_prima illa naturae propter se ipsa existimat expetenda_ so Stob., II. 6,
+7, demonstrates each branch of the [Greek: trilogia] to be [Greek: kath'
+hauto haireton]. _Aut omnia aut maxima_: so frequently in Cic., e.g. _D.F._
+IV. 27, so Stob. II. 6, 8, [Greek: ta pleista kai kyri�tata]. _Ea sunt
+maxima_: so Stob., Varro in Aug. _passim_. _Sensit_: much misunderstood by
+edd., here = _iudicavit_ not _animadvertit_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 6.
+_Reperiebatur_: for change of constr. cf. _D.F._ IV. 26 _Nec tamen
+beatissimam_: the question whether [Greek: aret�] was [Greek: autarkes pros
+eudaimonian] was one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As
+to Antiochus, consult _M.D.F._ V. 67.
+
+�23. _Agendi aliquid_: Gk. [Greek: praxe�s], the usual translation, cf. II.
+24, 37. _Officii ipsius initium_: [Greek: tou kath�kontos arch�n], Stob.
+II. 6, 7. This sentence is covertly aimed at the New Academics, whose
+scepticism, according to the dogmatists, cut away the ground from action
+and duty, see II. 24. _Recti honestique_: these words are redolent of the
+Stoa. _Earum rerum_: Halm thinks something like _appetitio_ has fallen out,
+_susceptio_ however, above, is quite enough for both clauses; a similar use
+of it is found in _D.F._ III. 32. _Descriptione naturae_: Halm with one MS.
+(G) gives _praescriptione_, which is in II. 140, cf. also _praescriberet_
+above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. _prima constitutio naturae_ in _D.F._
+IV. 15. _Aequitas_: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of
+[Greek: epieikeia]. _Eaeque_: so Halm for MSS. _haeque_, _haecque_. Of
+course _haecque_, like _hicque_, _sicque_, would be un-Ciceronian.
+_Voluptatibus_: a side blow at the Epicureans. _Forma_ see n. on 33.
+
+    ��24--29. Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus' _Physics_.
+    Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which are never
+    actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. When
+    force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed entity
+    ([Greek: poion ti] or _quale_)--(24). These formed entities are either
+    _primary_ or _secondary_. Air, fire, water, earth are primary, the two
+    first having an active, the two last a passive function. Aristotle
+    added a fifth (26). Underlying all formed entities is the formless
+    matter, matter and space are infinitely subdivisible (27). Force or
+    form acts on the formless matter and so produces the ordered universe,
+    outside which no matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes
+    it eternal. This Reason has various names--Soul of the Universe, Mind,
+    Wisdom, Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the
+    same thing (28, 29).
+
+�24. _Natura_: this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a
+translation both of [Greek: physis] and [Greek: ousia]. Here it is [Greek:
+ousia] in the broadest sense, all that exists. _In res duas_: the
+distinction between Force and Matter, the active and passive agencies in
+the universe, is of course Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however
+probably apprehended the distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this
+read carefully Zeller, 135 sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of
+Aristotle's doctrine is to be got from Schwegler, _Handbook_, pp 99--105.
+R. and P. 273 sq. should be consulted for the important coincidence of
+Force with logical _genus_ ([Greek: eidos]), and of Matter ([Greek: hyl�])
+with logical _differentia_ ([Greek: diaphora]). For the _duae res_, cf.
+_D.F._ I. 18. _Efficiens ... huic se praebens_: an attempt to translate
+[Greek: to poioun] and [Greek: to paschon] of the _Theaetetus_, [Greek: to
+othen] and [Greek: to dechomenon] of the _Timaeus_ (50 D). Cic. in _Tim._
+has _efficere_ and _pati_, Lucretius I. 440 _facere_ and _fungi_. _Ea
+quae_: so Gruter, Halm for MSS. _eaque._ The meaning is this; passive
+matter when worked upon by an active generative form results in an
+_aliquid_, a [Greek: tode ti] as Aristotle calls it. Passive matter [Greek:
+hyl�] is only potentially [Greek: tode ti], passing into actual [Greek:
+tode ti], when affected by the form. (Cf. [Greek: tode, touto], Plato
+_Tim._ 49 E, 50 A, also Arist. _Metaph_ H, 1, R. and P. 270--274). A
+figurative description of the process is given in _Timaeus_, 50 D. _In eo
+quod efficeret ... materiam quandam_: Cic. is hampered by the _patrii
+sermonis egestas_, which compels him to render simple Greek terms by
+laboured periphrases. _Id quod efficit_ is not distinct from, but
+_equivalent_ to _vis_, _id quod efficitur_ to _materia_. _Materiam
+quandam_: it is extraordinary how edd. (esp Goer.) could have so stumbled
+over _quandam_ and _quasi_ used in this fashion. Both words (which are
+joined below) simply mark the unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its
+philosophical use, in the Greek [Greek: hyl�] the strangeness had had time
+to wear off. _In utroque_: for _in eo quod ex utroque_ (sc. _vi et
+materia_) _fit_, the meaning is clearly given by the next clause, viz. that
+Force and Matter cannot actually exist apart, but only in the compound of
+the two, the formed entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the
+reff. given above. _Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur_: the
+meaning of this is clear, that nothing can _exist_ except in space
+_(alicubi)_, it is more difficult to see why it should be introduced here.
+Unless _est_ be taken of merely phenomenal existence (the only existence
+the Stoics and Antiochus would allow), the sentence does not represent the
+belief of Aristotle and Plato. The [Greek: ideai] for instance, though to
+Plato in the highest sense existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle
+explicitly says this, _Phys._ III. 4). Aristotle also recognised much as
+existent which did not exist in space, as in _Phys._ IV. 5 (qu. R. and P.
+289). Cic. perhaps translates here from _Tim._ 52 B, [Greek: phamen
+anankaion einai pou to hon hapan en tini top�]. For ancient theories about
+space the student must be referred to the histories of philosophy. A fair
+summary is given by Stob. _Phys._ [Greek: peri kenou kai topou kai ch�ras],
+ch. XVIII. 1. _Corpus et quasi qualitatem_: note that _corpus_ is _formed_,
+as contrasted with _materia_, _unformed_ matter. _Qualitas_ is here wrongly
+used for _quale_; it ought to be used of Force only, not of the product of
+Force and Matter, cf. 28. The Greeks themselves sometimes confuse [Greek:
+poiot�s] and [Greek: poion], the confusion is aided by the ambiguity of the
+phrase [Greek: to poion] in Greek, which may either denote the [Greek: tode
+ti] as [Greek: poion], or the Force which makes it [Greek: poion], hence
+Arist. calls one of his categories [Greek: to poion] and [Greek: poiot�s]
+indifferently For the Stoic view of [Greek: poiot�s], see Zeller, 96--103,
+with footnotes.
+
+�25. _Bene facis_: _passim_ in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. _D.F._
+III. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly like this. _Rhetoricam_:
+H�lsemann conj. _ethicam_, which however is _not_ Latin. The words have no
+philosophical significance here, but are simply specimens of words once
+foreign, now naturalised. _D.F._ III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words make
+it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first declension
+nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in _en_. _Non est vulgi
+verbum_: it first appears in _Theaet._ 182 A, where it is called [Greek:
+allokoton onoma]. _Nova ... facienda_: = _imponenda_ in _D.F._ III. 5.
+_Suis utuntur_: so _D.F._ III. 4. _Transferenda_: _transferre_ = [Greek:
+metapherein], which is technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on
+metaphor, _De Or._ III. 153 sq., where _necessitas_ is assigned as one
+cause of it (159) just as here; cf. also _De Or._ III. 149. _Saecula_: the
+spelling _secula_ is wrong; Corss. I. 325, 377. The diphthong bars the old
+derivations from _secare_, and _sequi_. _Quanto id magis_: Cic. is
+exceedingly fond of separating _tam quam ita tantus quantus_, etc., from
+the words with which they are syntactically connected, by just one small
+word, e.g. _Lael._ 53 _quam id recte_, _Acad._ II. 125 _tam sit mirabilis_,
+II. 68 _tam in praecipitem_; also _D.F._ III. 5 _quanto id nobis magis est
+concedendum qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere_.
+
+�26. _Non modo rerum sed verborum_: cf. 9. _Igitur_ picks up the broken
+thread of the exposition; so 35, and frequently. _Principes ... ex his
+ortae_: the Greek terms are [Greek: hapla] and [Greek: syntheta], see
+Arist. _De Coelo_, I. 2 (R. and P. 294). The distinction puzzled Plutarch
+(quoted in R. and P. 382). It was both Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics
+(Zeller, 187 sq.) followed partly Heraclitus, and cast aside many
+refinements of Aristotle which will be found in R. and P. 297. _Quasi
+multiformes_: evidently a trans. of [Greek: polyeideis], which is opposed
+to [Greek: haplous] in Plat. _Phaedr._ 238 A, and often. Plato uses also
+[Greek: monoeid�s] for _unius modi_; cf. Cic. _Tim._ ch. VII., a transl. of
+Plat. _Tim._ 35 A. _Prima sunt_: _primae_ (sc. _qualitates_) is the
+needless em. of Walker, followed by Halm. _Formae_ = _genera_, [Greek:
+eid�]. The word is applied to the four elements themselves, _N.D._ I. 19;
+cf. also _quintum genus_ below, and _Topica_, 11--13. A good view of the
+history of the doctrine of the four elements may be gained from the section
+of Stob. _Phys._, entitled [Greek: peri arch�n kai stoichei�n kai tou
+pantos]. It will be there seen that Cic. is wrong in making _initia_ and
+_elementa_ here and in 39 ([Greek: archai] and [Greek: stoicheia])
+convertible terms. The Greeks would call the four elements [Greek:
+stoicheia] but _not_ [Greek: archai], which term would be reserved for the
+primary Matter and Force. _A�r et ignis_: this is Stoic but _not_
+Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary properties of
+matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two former as active,
+the two latter as passive. He then assigns _two_ of these properties, _one_
+active and _one_ passive, to each of the four elements; each therefore is
+to him _both_ active and passive. The Stoics assign only _one_ property to
+each element; heat to fire, cold to air (cf. _N.D._ II. 26), moisture to
+water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows at once. Cf.
+Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq. _Accipiendi ...
+patiendi_: [Greek: dechesthai] often comes in Plat. _Tim._ _Quintum genus_:
+the note on this, referred to in Introd. p. 16, is postponed to 39.
+_Dissimile ... quoddam_: so MSS.; one would expect _quiddam_, which Orelli
+gives. _Rebatur_: an old poetical word revived by Cic. _De Or._ III. 153;
+cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ VIII. 3, 26.
+
+�27. _Subiectam ... materiam_: the [Greek: hypokeimen� hyl�] of Aristotle,
+from which our word subject-matter is descended. _Sine ulla specie_:
+_species_ here = _forma_ above, the [Greek: eidos] or [Greek: morph�] of
+Arist. _Omnibus_ without _rebus_ is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes
+avoided by the immediate succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in 21
+in _quibusdam_, _quae_. _Expressa_: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf.
+_expressa effigies_ _De Off_. III. 69); _efficta_, moulded as by a potter
+(see II. 77); the word was given by Turnebus for MSS. _effecta_. So Matter
+is called an [Greek: ekmageion] in Plat. _Tim._ _Quae tota omnia_: these
+words have given rise to needless doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them.
+_Tota_ is feminine sing.; cf. _materiam totam ipsam_ in 28; "which matter
+throughout its whole extent can suffer all changes." For the word _omnia_
+cf. II. 118, and Plat. _Tim._ 50 B ([Greek: dechetai gar �i ta panta]), 51
+A ([Greek: eidos pandeches]). The word [Greek: pandeches] is also quoted
+from Okellus in Stob. I. 20, 3. Binder is certainly wrong in taking _tota_
+and _omnia_ both as neut.--"_alles und jedes_." Cic. knew the _Tim._ well
+and imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments on the
+passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between
+Plato's [Greek: hyl�] and that of Aristotle. _Eoque interire_: so MSS.;
+Halm after Dav. _eaque_. Faber was right in supposing that Cic. has said
+loosely of the _materia_ what he ought to have said of the _qualia_. Of
+course the [Greek: prote hyl�], whether Platonic or Aristotelian, is
+imperishable (cf. _Tim._ 52 A. [Greek: phthoran ou prosdechomenon]). _Non
+in nihilum_: this is aimed at the Atomists, who maintained that infinite
+subdivision logically led to the passing of things into nothing and their
+reparation out of nothing again. See Lucr. I. 215--264, and elsewhere.
+_Infinite secari_: through the authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the
+infinite subdivisibility of matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox
+one that the Atom was scouted as a silly absurdity. Cf. _D.F._ I. 20 _ne
+illud quidem physici credere esse minimum_, Arist. _Physica_, I. 1 [Greek:
+ouk estin elachiston megethos]. The history of ancient opinion on this
+subject is important, but does not lie close enough to our author for
+comment. The student should at least learn Plato's opinions from _Tim._ 35
+A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates, tripping over the old [Greek:
+antiphasis] of the One and the Many, denied [Greek: pan megethos diaireton
+einai kai meros echein] (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus followed Aristotle very
+closely (R. and P. 377, 378). _Intervallis moveri_: this is the theory of
+motion without void which Lucr. I. 370 sq. disproves, where see Munro. Cf.
+also Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 214. Aristotle denied the existence of
+void either within or without the universe, Strato allowed its possibility
+within, while denying its existence without (Stob. I. 18, 1), the Stoics
+did the exact opposite affirming its existence without, and denying it
+within the universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). _Quae intervalla ...
+possint_: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is no matter atom.
+As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed Aristotle,
+whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and especially from M.
+Saint Hilaire's explanation of the _Physica_.
+
+�28. _Ultro citroque_: this is the common reading, but I doubt its
+correctness. MSS. have _ultro introque_, whence _ed. Rom._ (1471) has
+_ultro in utroque_. I think that _in utroque_, simply, was the reading, and
+that _ultro_ is a dittographia from _utro_. The meaning would be "since
+force plays this part in the compound," _utroque_ being as in 24 for _eo
+quod ex utroque fit_. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this
+motion and is ever thus on the move." _Ultro citroque_ is an odd expression
+to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with a _quasi_.
+Indeed if it is kept I suggest _quasi_ for _cum sic_. The use of _versetur_
+is also strange. _E quibus in omni natura_: most edd. since Dav. (Halm
+included) eject _in_. It is perfectly sound if _natura_ be taken as [Greek:
+ousia] = existence substance. The meaning is "out of which _qualia_,
+themselves existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf.
+_totam commutari_ above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was
+formed." For the _in_ cf. _N.D._ II. 35, _in omni natura necesse est
+absolvi aliquid_, also a similar use _ib._ II. 80, and _Ac._ II. 42. If _in
+utroque_ be read above, _in omni natura_ will form an exact contrast,
+substance as a whole being opposed to the individual _quale_. _Cohaerente
+et continuata_: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than any
+other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in _N.D._ II.
+19, 84, 119, _De Div._ II. 33, _De Leg._ fragm. 1. (at the end of Bait. and
+Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if they be got at
+second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. I. 22, 3. The _partes
+mundi_ are spoken of in most of the passages just quoted, also in _N.D._
+II. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic sources. _Effectum
+esse mundum_: Halm adds _unum_ from his favourite MS. (G). _Natura
+sentiente_: a clumsy trans. of [Greek: aisth�t� ousia] = substance which
+can affect the senses. The same expression is in _N.D._ II. 75. It should
+not be forgotten, however, that to the Stoics the universe was itself
+sentient, cf. _N.D._ II. 22, 47, 87. _Teneantur_: for _contineantur_; cf.
+_N.D._ II. 29 with II. 31 _In qua ratio perfecta insit_: this is thorough
+going Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are interchangeable terms
+with the Stoics. See Zeller 145--150 By an inevitable inconsistency, while
+believing that Reason _is_ the Universe, they sometimes speak of it as
+being _in_ the Universe, as here (cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 138, _N.D._ II. 34)
+In a curious passage (_N.D._ I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same
+inconsistency. For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life,
+extends through all extent". _Sempiterna_: Aristotle held this: see II. 119
+and _N.D._ II. 118, Stob. I. 21, 6. The Stoics while believing that our
+world would be destroyed by fire (Diog. Laert. VII. 141, R. and P. 378,
+Stob. I. 20, 1) regarded the destruction as merely an absorption into the
+Universal World God, who will recreate the world out of himself, since he
+is beyond the reach of harm (Diog. Laert. VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller
+159) Some Stoics however denied the [Greek: ekpyr�sis]. _Nihil enim
+valentius_: this is an argument often urged, as in _N.D._ II. 31 (_quid
+potest esse mundo valentius?_), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. _A quo
+intereat_: _interire_ here replaces the passive of _perdere_ cf. [Greek:
+anast�nai, ekpiptein hypo tinos].
+
+�29. _Quam vim animum_: there is no need to read _animam_, as some edd. do.
+The Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the
+names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance,
+Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. VI. _passim_.
+Nearly all these names occur in _N.D._ II. The whole of this section is
+undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it
+all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics.
+_Sapientiam_: cf. _N.D._ II. 36 with III. 23, in which latter passage the
+Stoic opinion is severely criticised. _Deum_: Cic. in _N.D._ I. 30 remarks
+that Plato in his _Timaeus_ had already made the _mundus_ a God. _Quasi
+prudentium quandam_: the Greek [Greek: pronoia] is translated both by
+_prudentia_ and _providentia_ in the same passage, _N.D._ II. 58, also in
+_N.D._ II. 77--80. _Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad homines_: the World
+God is perfectly beneficent, see _Ac._ II. 120, _N.D._ I. 23, II. 160
+(where there is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq.
+_Necessitatem_: [Greek: anank�n], which is [Greek: eirmos aiti�n],
+_causarum series sempiterna_ (_De Fato_ 20, cf. _N.D._ I. 55, _De Div._ I.
+125, 127, Diog. VII. 149, and Zeller as before). This is merely the World
+God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence of cause upon cause.
+When the World God is called Fortune, all that is expressed is human
+inability to see this orderly sequence. [Greek: Tuch�] therefore is defined
+as [Greek: aitia ad�los anthr�pin�i logism�i] (Stob. I. 7, 9, where the
+same definition is ascribed to Anaxagoras--see also _Topica_, 58--66). This
+identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and excites
+his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward by
+Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob. I. 5, 15. _Nihil aliter possit_: on
+_posse_ for _posse fieri_ see _M.D.F._ IV. 48, also _Ac._ II. 121. For the
+sense of Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), [Greek: oude
+ti gignetai ergon epi chthoni sou dicha daimon]. _Inter quasi fatalem_: a
+trans. of the Gk. [Greek: kat�nankasmenon]. I see no reason for suspecting
+_inter_, as Halm does. _Ignorationemque causarum_: the same words in _De
+Div._ II. 49; cf. also August. _Contra Academicos_ I. 1. In addition to
+studying the reff. given above, the student might with advantage read
+Aristotle's _Physica_ II. ch. 4--6, with M. Saint Hilaire's explanation,
+for the views of Aristotle about [Greek: tych�] and [Greek: to automaton],
+also ch. 8--9 for [Greek: anank�]. Plato's doctrine of [Greek: anank�],
+which is diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics, is to be found in
+_Timaeus_ p. 47, 48, Grote's _Plato_, III. 249--59.
+
+    ��30--32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.
+    Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the
+    senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of truth, but the
+    mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The
+    senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of
+    such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense,
+    or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained
+    constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous
+    flux. Knowledge based _only_ on sense was therefore mere opinion (31).
+    Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they
+    _defined_ everything about which they argued, and also used verbal
+    explanations, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes
+    consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric
+    (32).
+
+�30. _Quae erat_: the Platonic [Greek: �n], = was, as we said. _In ratione
+et disserendo_: an instance of Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. _D.F._
+I. 22 _quaerendi ac disserendi_. _Quamquam oriretur_: the sentence is
+inexact, it is _knowledge_ which takes its rise in the senses, not the
+criterion of truth, which is the mind itself; cf. however II. 30 and n.
+_Iudicium_: the constant translation of [Greek: krit�rion], a word foreign
+to the older philosophy. _Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem_: Halm with
+his pet MS. writes _esse rerum_, thus giving an almost perfect iambic,
+strongly stopped off before and after, so that there is no possibility of
+avoiding it in reading. I venture to say that no real parallel can be found
+to this in Cic., it stands in glaring contradiction to his own rules about
+admitting metre in prose, _Orator_ 194 sq., _De Or._ III. 182 sq. _Solam
+censebant ... tale quale esset_: probably from Plato's _Tim._ 35 A thus
+translated by Cic., _Tim._ c. 7 _ex ea materia quae individua est et unius
+modi_ ([Greek: aei kata tauta echous�s] cf. 28 A. [Greek: to kata tauta
+echon]) _et sui simile_, cf. also _T.D._ I. 58 _id solum esse quod semper
+tale sit quale sit, quam_ [Greek: idean] _appellat ille, nos speciem_, and
+_Ac._ II. 129. _Illi_ [Greek: idean], etc.: there is more than one
+difficulty here. The words _iam a Platone ita nom_ seem to exclude Plato
+from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may be an
+oversight, but to say first that the school (_illi_, cf. _sic tractabatur
+ab utrisque_) which included Aristotle held the doctrine of [Greek: ideai],
+and next, in 33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears very
+absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's
+[Greek: ideai] and Aristotle's [Greek: ta kathalou] would naturally seem
+microscopic to Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in his
+time as those of Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid at
+Cicero's door, for Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with Plato's
+must have been driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very knowledge of Plato
+has, however, probably led him to intensify what inconsistency there was in
+Antiochus, who would have glided over Plato's opinions with a much more
+cautious step.
+
+�31. _Sensus omnis hebetes_: this stands in contradiction to the whole
+Antiochean view as given in II. 12--64, cf. esp. 19 _sensibus quorum ita
+clara et certa iudicia sunt_, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his
+agreement with Plato by asserting that though sense is naturally dull,
+reason may sift out the certain from the uncertain. _Res eas ... quae
+essent aut ita_: Halm by following his pet MS. without regard to the
+meaning of Cic. has greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He
+reads _res ullas ... quod aut ita essent_; thus making Antiochus assert
+that _no_ true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall
+see in the _Lucullus_, he really divided sensations into true and false. I
+believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's
+reminiscences of the _Theaetetus_ and of Xenocrates; see below. _Nec
+percipere_: for this see _Lucullus_ passim. Christ's conj. _percipi, quod
+perceptio sit mentis non sensuum_, which Halm seems to approve, is a wanton
+corruption of the text, cf. II. 101 _neget rem ullam percipi posse
+sensibus_, so 21, 119 (just like _ratione percipi_ 91), also I. 41 _sensu
+comprehensum_. _Subiectae sensibus_: cf. II. 74 and Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._
+VIII. 9, [Greek: ta hypopiptonta t� aisth�sei]. _Aut ita mobiles_, etc.:
+this strongly reminds one of the _Theaetetus_, esp. 160 D sq. For
+_constans_ cf. [Greek: est�kos], which so often occurs there and in the
+_Sophistes_. _Ne idem_: Manut. for MSS. _eidem_. In the _Theaetetus_,
+Heraclitus' theory of flux is carried to such an extent as to destroy the
+self-identity of things; even the word [Greek: eme] is stated to be an
+absurdity, since it implies a permanent subject, whereas the subject is
+changing from moment to moment; the expression therefore ought to be
+[Greek: tous eme]. _Continenter_: [Greek: ounech�s]; cf. Simplicius quoted
+in Grote's Plato, I. p. 37, about Heraclitus, [Greek: en metabol� gar
+synechei ta onta]. _Laberentur et fluerent_: cf. the phrases [Greek: rho�,
+panta rhei, hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta], etc., which are scattered
+thickly over the _Theaet._ and the ancient texts about Heraclitus; also a
+very similar passage in _Orator_ 10. _Opinabilem_: [Greek: doxast�n], so
+_opinabile_ = [Greek: doxaston] in Cic. _Tim_ ch. II. The term was largely
+used by Xenocrates (R. and P. 243--247), Arist. too distinguishes between
+the [Greek: doxaston] and the [Greek: epist�ton], e.g _Analyt. Post._ I. 33
+(qu. R. and P. 264).
+
+�32. For this cf. _D.F._ IV. 8--10. _Notionibus_: so one MS. for
+_motionibus_ which the rest have. _Notio_ is Cicero's regular translation
+for [Greek: ennoia], which is Stoic. This statement might have been made
+both by Aristotle and Plato, though each would put a separate meaning on
+the word _notio_. [Greek: Epist�m�] in Plato is of the [Greek: ideai] only,
+while in Aristotle it is [Greek: ton katholou]; cf. _Anal. Post._ I. 33 (R.
+and P. 264), [Greek: leg� noun arch�n epist�m�s]. _Definitiones rerum_:
+these must be carefully distinguished fiom _definitiones nominum_, see the
+distinction drawn after Aristotle in R. and P. 265, note b. The _definitio
+rei_ really involves the whole of philosophy with Plato and Aristotle (one
+might almost add, with moderns too). Its importance to Plato may be seen
+from the _Politicus_ and _Sophistes_, to Aristotle from the passages quoted
+in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes will make the subject as clear as it
+can be made to any one who has not a knowledge of the whole of Aristotle's
+philosophy. _Verborum explicatio_: this is quite a different thing from
+those _definitiones nominum_ just referred to; it is _derivation_, which
+does not necessitate definition. [Greek: etymologian]: this is almost
+entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the Classic Greek Prose, as are
+[Greek: etymos] and all its derivatives. ([Greek: Etym�s] means
+"etymologically" in the _De Mundo_, which however is not Aristotle's). The
+word [Greek: etymologia] is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who
+use rather [Greek: onomat�n orthot�s] (Diog. Laert. VII. 83), the title of
+their books on the subject preserved by Diog. is generally "[Greek: peri
+t�n etymologik�n]" The systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than
+Chrysippus, when it became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and
+Cleanthes had given the first impulse (_N.D._ III. 63). Specimens of Stoic
+etymology are given in _N.D._ II. and ridiculed in _N.D._ III. (cf. esp. 62
+_in enodandis nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis_). _Post argumentis
+et quasi rerum notis ducibus_: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to
+prove something about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in
+_Topica_ 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation
+_veriloquium_ of [Greek: etymologia] and adopts _notatio_, the _rerum nota_
+(Greek [Greek: symbolon]) being the name so explained (_Top._ 35). Varro
+translated [Greek: etymologia] by _originatio_ (Quintil. I. 6, 28).
+Aristotle had already laid down rules for this rhetorical use of etymology,
+and Plato also incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be said to
+belong to the old Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer examination of
+authorities would have led Halm to retract his bad em. _notationibus_ for
+_notas ducibus_, the word _notatio_ is used for the whole science of
+etymology, and not for particular derivations, while Cic. in numerous
+passages (e.g. _D.F._ V. 74) describes _verba_ or _nomina_ as _rerum
+notae_. Berkley's _nodis_ for _notis_ has no support, (_enodatio nominum_
+in _N.D._ III. 62 is quite different). One more remark, and I conclude this
+wearisome note. The _quasi_ marks _rerum nota_ as an unfamiliar trans. of
+[Greek: symbolon]. Davies therefore ought not to have placed it before
+_ducibus_, which word, strong as the metaphor is, requires no
+qualification, see a good instance in _T.D._ I. 27. _Itaque tradebatur_: so
+Halm improves on Madvig's _ita_ for _in qua_ of the MSS., which cannot be
+defended. Orelli's reference to 30 _pars_ for an antecedent to _qua_ (_in
+ea parte in qua_) is violent, while Goerenz's resort to _partem rerum
+opinabilem_ is simply silly. Manut. conj. _in quo_, Cic. does often use the
+neut. pronoun, as in _Orator_ 3, but not quite thus. I have sometimes
+thought that Cic. wrote _haec, inquam_ (cf. _huic_ below). _Dialecticae_:
+as [Greek: logik�] had not been Latinised, Cic. is obliged to use this word
+to denote [Greek: logik�], of which [Greek: dialektik�] is really one
+subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, [Greek: rh�torik�] which is
+mentioned in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, 70.
+_Orationis ratione conclusae_: speech drawn up in a syllogistic form which
+becomes _oratio perpetua_ under the influence of [Greek: rh�torik�]. _Quasi
+ex altera parte_: a trans. of Aristotle's [Greek: antistrophos] in the
+beginning of the _Rhetoric_. _Oratoria_: Halm brackets this word; cf.
+however a close parallel in _Brut._ 261 _oratorio ornamenta dicendi_. The
+construction is simply a variation of Cic.'s favourite double genitive
+(_T.D._ III. 39), _oratoria_ being put for _oratoris_. _Ad persuadendum_:
+[Greek: to pithanon] is with Arist. and all ancient authorities the one aim
+of [Greek: rh�torik�].
+
+    ��33--42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old
+    Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the [Greek:
+    ideai] of Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato
+    abandoned ethics for physics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates,
+    Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas,
+    pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing
+    but virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name _good_
+    to nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes,
+    some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and
+    some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value, and
+    called them _preferred_ to the second a negative value and called them
+    _rejected_, to the third no value whatever--mere verbal alterations on
+    the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms _right action_ and _sin_
+    belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate
+    action (_officium_) and an inappropriate, which concerned things
+    _preferred_ and things _rejected_ (37). He made _all_ virtue reside in
+    the reason, and considered not the _practice_ but the mere _possession_
+    of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not
+    but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and
+    immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and
+    believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow
+    the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed
+    sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding
+    judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40).
+    Sensations (_visa_) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the
+    examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a
+    sensation he called it _Knowledge_, if otherwise, _Ignorance_ (41).
+    _Perception_, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor
+    wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving
+    assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them
+    of the reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect
+    wisdom (42).
+
+�33. _Haec erat illis forma_: so Madv. _Em._ 118 for MSS. _prima_,
+comparing _formulam_ in 17, also _D.F._ IV. 19, V. 9, _T.D._ III. 38, to
+which add _Ac._ I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the
+MSS. reading and supply _pars_, as usual. His power of _supplying_ is
+unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the difficulties involved
+in the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here. _Immutationes_: so Dav. for
+_disputationes_, approved by Madv. _Em._ 119 who remarks that the phrase
+_disputationes philosophiae_ would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost
+certain by _mutavit_ in 40, _commutatio_ in 42, and _De Leg._ I. 38. Halm's
+odd em. _dissupationes_, so much admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's
+_Philologus_, needs support, which it certainly does not receive from the
+one passage Halm quotes, _De Or._ III. 207. _Et recte_: for the _et_ cf.
+_et merito_, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. _Auctoritas_:
+"system". _Inquit_: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the
+omission of _igitur_ after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin
+here. To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno
+opere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer.
+feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is
+copying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and
+evidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's
+resumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought
+to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded.
+_Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the
+supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact
+that he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the
+strong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi
+nisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of
+the relation in which Plato's [Greek: ideai] stand to his notion of the
+deity. _Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His
+real name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf.
+_loquendi nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf.
+_Orat._ 161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V.
+12 sq., _T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed
+very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him
+transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of
+him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in
+22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of
+[Greek: eudaimonian]. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_
+but does not elsewhere employ them.
+
+�34. _Strato_: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for
+Diog. V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven ethical works, while
+Stob. II. 6, 4 quotes his definition of the [Greek: agathon]. _Diligenter
+... tuebantur_: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic,
+cf. Diog. Laert. IV. 18, _Ac._ II. 131, _D.F._ II. 34, and R. and P.
+_Congregati_: "_all_ in the Academic fold," cf. _Lael._ 69, _in nostro, ut
+ita dicam, grege_. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. _Polemonem ...
+Zeno et Arcesilas_: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many
+teachers (Diog. VII. 2, 3), while he is not mentioned by Diog. at all among
+the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is that we have a mere theory, which
+accounts for the split of Stoicism from Academicism by the rivalry of two
+fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 5, [Greek:
+symphoit�ntes para Polem�ni ephilo tim�th�san]. Dates are against the
+theory, see Zeller 500.
+
+�35. _Anteiret aetate_: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350,
+though the dates are uncertain. _Dissereret_: was a deep reasoner. Bentl.
+missing the meaning conj. _definiret_. _Peracute moveretur_: Bentl.
+_partiretur_; this with _definiret_ above well illustrates his licence in
+emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted the soundness of the text, the
+words refer not to the emotional, but to the intellectual side of Zeno's
+nature. The very expression occurs _Ad Fam._ XV. 21, 4, see other close
+parallels in n. on II. 37. _Nervos ... inciderit_: same metaphor in
+_Philipp._ XII. 8, cf. also _T.D._ II. 27 _nervos virtutis elidere_, III.
+83 _stirpis aegritudinis elidere_. (In both these passages Madv. _Em. Liv._
+135 reads _elegere_ for _elidere_, I cannot believe that he is right).
+Plato uses [Greek: neura ektemnein] metaphorically. Notice _inciderit_ but
+_poneret_. There is no need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the
+sequence is not uncommon in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ III. 33. _Omnia, quae_: MSS.
+_quaeque_, which edd. used to take for _quaecunque_. Cf. Goerenz's
+statement "_negari omnino nequit hac vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri_"
+with Madvig's utter refutation in the sixth Excursus to his _D.F._ _Solum
+et unum bonum_: for the Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R.
+and P. and Zeller for himself. I can only treat such points as are involved
+in the special difficulties of the _Academica_.
+
+�36. _Cetera_: Stoic [Greek: adiaphora], the presence or absence of which
+cannot affect happiness. The Stoics loudly protested against their being
+called either _bona_ or _mala_, and this question was one of the great
+battle grounds of the later Greek philosophy. _Secundum naturam ...
+contraria_: Gr. [Greek: kata physin, para physin]. _His ipsis ...
+numerabat_: I see no reason for placing this sentence after the words _quae
+minoris_ below (with Christ) or for suspecting its genuineness (with Halm).
+The word _media_ is the Gk. [Greek: mesa], which word however is not
+usually applied to _things_, but to _actions_. _Sumenda_: Gk. [Greek:
+l�pta]. _Aestimatione_: [Greek: axia], positive value. _Contraque
+contraria_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ III. 50 feels the need of a word to
+express [Greek: apaxia] (negative value). (Madv. in his note on that
+passage coins the word _inaestimatio._) _Ponebat esse_: cf. 19, _M.D.F._ V.
+73.
+
+�37. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section
+the student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller
+and Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it
+would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general
+acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic.
+appears at first sight to have made the [Greek: apopro�gmena] a subdivision
+of the [Greek: l�pta] (_sumenda_), the two being utterly different. I
+admit, with Madv. (_D.F._ III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting
+the text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads
+_media_ in the place of _sumenda_, must be rejected. Nor can anything be
+said for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save
+Cicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could
+so utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of
+Stoicism, as to think even for a moment that the [Greek: apopro�gmena]
+formed a branch of the [Greek: l�pta]. This view of Madvig's is strongly
+opposed to the fact that Cic. in 36 had explained with perfect correctness
+the Stoic theory of the [Greek: adiaphora], nor is there anywhere in the
+numerous passages where he touches on the theory any trace of the same
+error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the intention to speak of the
+_sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his thought so as to embrace the
+whole class of [Greek: adiaphora], which he accordingly dealt with in the
+latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding sentence. (The
+remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the present.) Cic.
+therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but with careless
+writing. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae secundum locum
+obtinent_, [Greek: pro�gmena] _id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita
+appellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely pressed,
+the [Greek: apopro�gmena] are made of a subdivision of the [Greek:
+pro�gmena], though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that
+intention. So if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are
+made to include both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16
+_appeterent_ includes _fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata
+vita_ is abruptly introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be
+construed together, and _ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said
+_coerceri_, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices
+which are opposite to these virtues.
+
+I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_
+Cic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to
+talk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and
+_minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the [Greek: axia] and [Greek: apaxia]
+of the Greek, _not_ different degrees of [Greek: axia] (positive value).
+That _minor aestimatio_ should mean [Greek: apaxia] need not surprise us
+when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing
+this [Greek: apaxia] or negative value in Latin, a difficulty I have
+already observed on 36; (2) on the strong negative meaning which _minor_
+bears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic. means "but if not." Even the
+Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing [Greek: apaxia]. Stobaeus, in
+a passage closely resembling ours makes [Greek: elatt�n axia] equivalent to
+[Greek: poll� apaxia] (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly defining
+[Greek: apopro�gmena] as [Greek: ta hikan�n apaxian echonta] (_Adv. Math._
+XI. 62--64) again speaks of them as [Greek: ta m� hikan�n echonta axian]
+(_Pyrrhon. Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning.
+Now I contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong
+a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, [Greek: ta m� hikan�n axian
+echonta]. I therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin
+language allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the [Greek:
+adiaphora], some have [Greek: axia] while others have [Greek: apaxia]. He
+may fairly claim to have applied to his words the rule "_re intellecta in
+verborum usu faciles esse debemus_" (_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as
+good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics
+as there is for accusing Cicero. There are difficulties connected with the
+terms [Greek: hikan� axia] and [Greek: hikan� apaxia] which are not
+satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret
+that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student
+will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the _D.F._
+quoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_: Cic. frequently
+repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the clothes of the
+Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly belonged to the
+Stoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob. speaks II. 6, 6
+of [Greek: ta metaxy aret�s kai kakias]. (This does not contradict his
+words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, [Greek: aret�s de kai kakias ouden
+metaxy], which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog.
+Laert., however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R.
+and P. 393.) _Recte factum_ = [Greek: katorth�ma], _peccatum_ = [Greek:
+hamart�ma], _officium_ = [Greek: kath�kon] (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller
+238--248, 268--272). _Servata praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before
+_servata_, which all edd. since Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_
+correspond in Cic., the _que_ is always an afterthought, added in oblivion
+of the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this
+oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate
+_clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._ V. 64.
+
+�38. _Sed quasdam virtutes_: see 20. This passage requires careful
+construing: after _quasdam virtutes_ not the whole phrase _in ratione esse
+dicerent_ must be repeated but _dicerent_ merely, since only the _virtutes
+natura perfectae_, the [Greek: diano�tikai aretai] of Arist., could be said
+to belong to the reason, while the _virtutes more perfectae_ are
+Aristotle's [Greek: �thikai aretai]. Trans. "but spoke of certain
+excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be) by
+habit." _Ea genera virtutum_: both Plato and Arist. roughly divided the
+nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the emotional, the
+former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and
+Arist. [Greek: to men h�s logon echon, to de epipeithes log�i]); Zeno
+however asserted the nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist
+solely of Reason, to which he gave the name [Greek: h�gemonikon] (Zeller
+203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller 248,
+_D.F._ III. _passim_). When the [Greek: h�gemonikon] was in a perfect
+state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or
+emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a
+war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war
+carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the
+description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the
+mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word [Greek: hexis],
+a use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the
+_Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a [Greek: hexis],
+according to the Stoics, but a [Greek: diathesis] (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog.
+VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a [Greek: hexis],
+VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse
+... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 [Greek: duo gen� t�n anthr�p�n einai to
+men t�n spoudai�n, to de t�n phaul�n, kai to men t�n spoudai�n dia pantos
+tou biou chr�sthai tais aretais, to de t�n phaul�n tais kakiais].
+_Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of
+Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of the
+_Acad._ appears, should read the plural _perturbationes_, a conj. of
+Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the abstract; _perturbationes_
+below, particular emotions. There is exactly the same transition in _T.D._
+III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while _perturbatio_ is used, in the same
+sense as here, in at least five other passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8,
+11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a trans. of Stoic [Greek: pathesi], which
+Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit carere sapientem_: emotion being a
+disturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue
+(20), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228
+sq.). All emotions are reasonless; [Greek: h�don�] or _laetitia_ for
+instance is [Greek: alogos eparsis]. (_T.D._ Books III. and IV. treat
+largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the _T.D._ III.
+p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri libidine_.
+
+�39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De
+Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the
+Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of
+the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general
+Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion
+arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object;
+cf. Diog. VII. 111. [Greek: ta path� kriseis einai]. Instances of each in
+Zeller 233. For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15,
+18. _Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. [Greek: akolasia], see
+Zeller 232. _Quintam naturam_: the [Greek: pempt� ousia] or [Greek: pempton
+s�ma] of Aristotle, who proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a
+curious and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that
+Arist. derived _mind_ from this fifth element, though the finest and
+highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a
+material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65,
+_D.F._ IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important note, but he
+fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33,
+that the Peripatetics of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind
+from [Greek: aith�r], which is the very name that Aristotle gives to the
+fifth element ([Greek: s�ma aitherion] in the _De Coelo_), and of giving
+this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error once made, no one could
+correct it, for there were a hundred influences at work to confirm it,
+while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange oblivion. I cannot
+here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but will mention a
+few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully influencing every
+other sect, and it placed [Greek: nous en aitheri] (see Plutarch, qu. R.
+and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The notion
+that [Greek: nous] or [Greek: psych�] came from [Greek: aith�r] was also
+fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as [Greek:
+aeikin�tos] in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great
+hold on his mind One from the _Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in
+_Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._ VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only
+thing with Aristotle which is [Greek: aeikin�tos] in eternal perfect
+circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion is alone perfect and
+eternal), is the [Greek: aith�r] or [Greek: pempton s�ma], that fiery
+external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with
+which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works,
+to conclude that the [Greek: aeikin�tos psych�] of Plato came from the
+[Greek: aeikin�tos aith�r] of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by
+saying that the soul as an [Greek: arch� kin�se�s] must be [Greek:
+akin�tos], but Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36).
+Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to the outer
+circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just where Arist.
+placed his [Greek: pempton s�ma] Any one who will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with
+the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power this had over Cicero. Further,
+Cic. would naturally link the mind in its origin with the stars which both
+Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf. _Somn. Scip._ 15) These
+considerations will be enough to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom
+Madv. considers responsible for the error, could have escaped it in any way
+not superhuman except by the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did
+not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we seem here to have a remnant of the
+distinction drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former
+being [Greek: analogon t� t�n astr�n stoichei�] (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu.
+R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made no difference, except one of
+degree, between [Greek: aith�r] and [Greek: pyr], see Zeller 189, 190.
+_Ipsam naturam_: [Greek: pyr] is [Greek: kat' exoch�n stoicheion] (Stob. I.
+10, 16), and is the first thing generated from the [Greek: apoios hyl�];
+from it comes air, from air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136,
+137) The fire is [Greek: logikon], from it comes the [Greek: h�gemonikon]
+of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought.
+These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics
+(Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view of sensation and thought see
+Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics probably
+misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34
+sq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The
+necessity of a connection between the perceiving mind and the things
+perceived followed from old physical principles such as that of Democritus
+([Greek: ou gar ench�rein ta hetera kai diapheronta paschein hyp' all�l�n],
+qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7, by R. and P. 43), the same is
+affirmed loosely of all the old [Greek: physikoi], (Sextus _Adv. Math._
+VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines [Greek: gaiai men gaian
+op�pamen], etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though in a
+different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of thought.
+_Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed old
+Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no ultimate
+difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see Zeller, pp.
+134, 135.
+
+�40. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion
+that _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely
+agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an
+anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu
+animorum_, but having to explain [Greek: phantasia] was obliged to break
+off and resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a
+very similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis
+Ciceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44
+_e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav.
+_punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say.
+[Greek: Phantasian]: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of
+sensation is given by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus
+licet_: the same turn of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc
+verbum quidem hoc quidem_ probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_
+= [Greek: synkatathesin]. _In nobis positam_: the usual expression for
+freedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important
+passage). The actual sensation is involuntary ([Greek: akousion] Sext. Emp.
+_Adv. Math._ VIII. 397). _Tironum causa_ I note that the Stoics sometimes
+speak of the assent of the mind as _involuntary,_ while the [Greek:
+katal�ptik� phantasia] _compels_ assent (see II. 38). This is, however,
+only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.
+
+�41. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all
+sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to
+the inner citadel of the [Greek: katal�ptik� phantasia]. _Declarationem_:
+[Greek: enargeian], a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on
+II. 17. _Earum rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct
+information of the _things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole
+truth lies in its own [Greek: enargeia], which requires no corroboration
+from without. _Comprehendibile_: this form has better MSS. authority than
+the vulg _comprehensibile_. Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading
+as a philological curiosity _Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes
+_inquam_. Why change? Atticus answers as in 14, 25, 33. [Greek:
+Katal�pton]: strictly the _thing_ which emits the _visum_ is said to be
+[Greek: katal�pton], but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_, the sensation
+and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused. _Comprehensionem_:
+this word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not
+the individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use [Greek:
+katal�psis] for [Greek: katal�ptik� phantasia] very often. _Quae manu
+prehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often
+made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely
+renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the
+term [Greek: aisth�sis] to the [Greek: phantasia]. _Scientiam_: the word
+[Greek: epist�m�] is used in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number
+of coordinated or systematised perceptions ([Greek: katal�pseis] or [Greek:
+katal�ptikai phantasiai]) sometimes also called [Greek: techn�] (cf. Sext.
+_Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 [Greek: techn�n de einai syst�ma ek katal�pse�n
+syngegymnasmen�n]); (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied
+by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. _Ut
+convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno
+all [Greek: katal�ptikai phantasiai] were [Greek: asphaleis, ametapt�toi
+hypo logou]. Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not
+impervious to logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller
+88. Thus every [Greek: katal�ptik� phantasia], instead of carrying with it
+its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of sceptical criticism
+before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to
+giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua
+exsisteret_: I know nothing like this in the Stoic texts; [Greek: amathia]
+is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_: [Greek: doxa], see Zeller and cf.
+_Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.
+
+�42. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of [Greek:
+epist�m�n kai doxan kai t�n en methopiai tout�n katal�psin]. _Soli_: Halm,
+I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod
+omnia_: the meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate
+sensations and combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_.
+This will appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78
+seems to take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly
+like this in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of
+some Gk. word, [Greek: krit�rion] perhaps, or [Greek: gn�m�n] or [Greek:
+kan�n]. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic [Greek: ennoiai]; Zeller 81--84, R. and P.
+367, 368. _Quodque natura_: the omission of _eam_ is strange; Faber
+supplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms [Greek: enapesphragismen�,
+enapomemagmen�, entetyp�men�] occur constantly, but generally in relation
+to [Greek: phantasiai], not to [Greek: ennoiai]. _Non principia solum_:
+there seems to be a ref. to those [Greek: archai t�s apodeixe�s] of Arist.
+which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all
+proof. (See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in
+Bain's _Mental and Moral Science_, now re-published in Grote's
+_Aristotle._) Zeno's [Greek: ennoiai] were all this and more.
+_Reperiuntur_: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_
+to _recta_, which however has repeatedly taken place during Varro's
+exposition, and for which see _M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase
+_reperire viam_, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm give
+_aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant. _Aliena_: cf. _alienatos_ _D.F._
+III. 18. _A virtute sapientiaque removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur
+in iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The _firma adsensia_ is opposed to
+_imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the _sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More
+information on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes
+on the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In his constitit_: cf. II. 134.
+
+    ��43--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy.
+    Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory
+    in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the
+    ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet
+    held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of
+    equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of
+    phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely
+    (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were
+    carried on by Carneades (46).
+
+�43. _Breviter_: MSS. _et breviter;_ see 37. _Tunc_: rare before a
+consonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in
+deference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading
+defensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_.
+Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought," etc.
+The edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_.
+This is a total mistake; cf. _ait ... putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15,
+_aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from
+Cic.
+
+�44. _Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi_: for these words see n. on II.
+14. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. 76. _Obscuritate_: a
+side-blow at _declaratio_ 41. _Confessionem ignorationis_: see 16. Socrates
+was far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. 74. _Et iam
+ante Socratem_: MSS. _veluti amantes Socratem;_ Democritus (460--357 B.C.)
+was really very little older than Socrates (468--399) who died nearly sixty
+years before him. _Omnis paene veteres_: the statement is audaciously
+inexact, and is criticised II. 14. None of these were sceptics; for
+Democritus see my note on II. 73, for Empedocles on II. 74, for Anaxagoras
+on II. 72. _Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri_: the verbs are all
+equivalent; cf. _D.F._ III. 15 _equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci ...
+idem pluribus verbis exponere_. _Angustos sensus_: Cic. is thinking of the
+famous lines of Empedocles [Greek: steinopoi men gar palamai k.t.l.] R. and
+P. 107. _Brevia curricula vitae_: cf. Empedocles' [Greek: pauron de z��s
+abiou meros]. Is there an allusion in _curricula_ to Lucretius' _lampada
+vitai tradunt_, etc.? _In profundo_: Dem. [Greek: en byth�], cf. II. 32.
+The common trans. "well" is weak, "abyss" would suit better. _Institutis_:
+[Greek: nom�] of Democritus, see R. and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an
+extraordinary display of ignorance. _Deinceps omnia_: [Greek: panta
+ephex�s] there is no need to read _denique_ for _deinceps_ as Bentl., Halm.
+_Circumfusa tenebris_: an allusion to the [Greek: skoti� gn�sis] of
+Democr., see II. 73. _Dixerunt_: Halm brackets this because of _dixerunt_
+above, parts of the verb _dicere_ are however often thus repeated by Cic.
+
+�45. _Ne illud quidem_: cf. 16. _Latere censebat_ Goer. omitted _censebat_
+though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as usual. For the sense II.
+122. _Cohibereque_: Gk. [Greek: epechein], which we shall have to explain
+in the _Lucullus_. _Temeritatem ... turpius_: for these expressions, see
+II. 66, note. _Praecurrere_: as was the case with the dogmatists. _Paria
+momenta_: this is undiluted scepticism, and excludes even the possibility
+of the _probabile_ which Carneades put forward. For the doctrine cf. II.
+124, for the expression Euseb. _Praep. Evan._ XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of
+Arcesilas, [Greek: einai gar panta akatal�pta kai tous eis ekatera logous
+isokrateis all�lois], Sextus _Adv. Math._ IX. 207 [Greek: isostheneis
+logoi]; in the latter writer the word [Greek: isostheneia] very frequently
+occurs in the same sense, e g _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 8 (add _N.D._ I. 10,
+_rationis momenta_)
+
+�46. _Platonem_: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, Sextus
+_Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 221 [Greek: ton Plat�na oin hoi men dogmatikon ephasan
+einai, hoi de apo �tikon, hoi de kata men ti apor�tikon, kata de ti
+dogmatikon]. Stobaeus II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the difficulty; [Greek:
+Plat�n polyph�nos �n, ouch h�s tines oiontai polydoxos]. _Exposuisti_:
+Durand's necessary em., approved by Krische, Halm, etc. for MSS. _exposui_.
+_Zenone_: see Introd. p. 5.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.
+
+BOOK I.
+
+1. _Mnesarchus_: see II. 69, _De Or._ I. 45, and _Dict. Biogr._
+'Antipater'; cf. II. 143, _De Off._ III. 50. Evidently this fragment
+belongs to that historical justification of the New Academy with which I
+suppose Cicero to have concluded the first book.
+
+2. The word _concinere_ occurs _D.F._ IV. 60, _N.D._ I. 16, in both which
+places it is used of the Stoics, who are said _re concinere, verbis
+discrepare_ with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had
+already mentioned 43, and probably repeated in this fragment. Krische
+remarks that Augustine, _Cont. Acad._ II. 14, 15, seems to have imitated
+that part of Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic.
+must have condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order
+to excuse the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).
+
+BOOK II.
+
+3. This fragm. clearly forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments
+which Cic. in the first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius,
+see Introd. p. 55. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so level as
+the sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not level.
+
+4. On this I have nothing to remark.
+
+5. There is nothing distinctive about this which might enable us to
+determine its connection with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who
+_serius adamavit honores_.
+
+6. The changing aspects of the same thing are pointed to here as
+invalidating the evidence of the senses.
+
+7. This passage has the same aim as the last and closely resembles
+_Lucullus_ 105.
+
+8. The fact that the eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy
+the senses are. A similar argument occurs in _Luc._ 86. _Perpendiculum_ is
+a plumb line, _norma_ a mason's square, the word being probably a
+corruption of the Greek [Greek: gn�m�n] (Curt. _Grundz_ p. 169, ed. 3),
+_regula_, a rule.
+
+9. The different colours which the same persons show in different
+conditions, when young and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober
+and when drunken, are brought forward to prove how little of permanence
+there is even in the least fleeting of the objects of sense.
+
+10. _Urinari_ is to dive; for the derivation see Curt. _Grundz_ p. 326. A
+diver would be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in _Luc._ 81,
+which are unable to see that which lies immediately above them and so
+illustrate the narrow limits of the power of vision.
+
+11. Evidently an attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy.
+Different people pass different judgments on one and the same odour. The
+student will observe that the above extracts formed part of an argument
+intended to show the deceptive character of the senses. To these should
+probably be added fragm. 32. Fr. 19 shows that the impossibility of
+distinguishing eggs one from another, which had been brought forward in the
+_Catulus_, was allowed to stand in the second edition, other difficulties
+of the kind, such as those connected with the bent oar, the pigeon's neck,
+the twins, the impressions of seals (_Luc._ 19, 54), would also appear in
+both editions. The result of these assaults on the senses must have been
+summed up in the phrase _cuncta dubitanda esse_ which Augustine quotes from
+the _Academica Posteriora_ (see fragm. 36).
+
+BOOK III.
+
+12. This forms part of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in
+substance to Lucullus' speech in the _Academica Priora_ The drift of this
+extract was most likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the
+battle against criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we
+must cease to fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own
+way. See another view in Krische, p. 62.
+
+13. Krische believes that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show
+that the senses were trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with
+which the fishes were seen leaping from the water was brought up as
+evidence. (In _Luc._ 81, on the other hand, Cic. drew an argument hostile
+to the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The explanation seems to
+me very improbable. The words bear such a striking resemblance to those in
+_Luc._ 125 (_ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic
+innumerabilis paribus in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis_) that I am
+inclined to think that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book IV. and
+not Book III., and that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the
+Lucrine lake, also changed _Puteolosque_ into _pisciculosque exultantes_
+for the sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa
+on the Lucrine.
+
+14. The passion for knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by
+Varro as an argument in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be
+attainable. The same line is taken in _Luc._ 31, _D.F._ III. 17, and
+elsewhere.
+
+15. It is so much easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than
+in that of Lucullus in the _Academica Priora_ that I think the reference in
+Nonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than a
+dogmatist (see _Luc._ 105, 120, and Cic.'s words in 8 of the same). If my
+conjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book IV. Krische gives a
+different opinion, but very hesitatingly, p. 63.
+
+16. This may well have formed part of Varro's explanation of the [Greek:
+katal�psis], _temeritas_ being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and
+Stoics as by the Academics cf. I. 42.
+
+17. I conjecture _malleo_ (a hammer) for the corrupt _malcho_, and think
+that in the second ed. some comparison from building operations to
+illustrate the fixity of knowledge gained through the [Greek: katal�pseis]
+was added to a passage which would correspond in substance with 27 of the
+_Lucullus_. I note in Vitruvius, quoted by Forc. s.v. _malleolus_, a
+similar expression (_naves malleolis confixae_) and in Pliny _Nat. Hist._
+XXXIV. 14 _navis fixa malleo_. _Adfixa_ therefore in this passage must have
+agreed with some lost noun either in the neut. plur. or fem. sing.
+
+18. This and fragm. 19 evidently hang very closely together. As Krische
+notes, the Stoic [Greek: enargeia] had evidently been translated earlier in
+the book by _perspicuitas_ as in _Luc._ 17.
+
+19. See on _Luc._ 57.
+
+BOOK IV.
+
+Further information on all these passages will be found in my notes on the
+parallel passages of the _Lucullus_.
+
+21. _Viam_ evidently a mistake for the _umbram_ of _Luc._ 70.
+
+23. The best MS. of Nonius points to _flavum_ for _ravum_ (_Luc._ 105).
+Most likely an alteration was made in the second edition, as Krische
+supposes, p. 64.
+
+28. _Corpusculis_: _Luc._ 121 has _corporibus_. Krische's opinion that this
+latter word was in the second edition changed into the former may be
+supported from I. 6, which he does not notice. The conj. is confirmed by
+Aug. _Contr. Ac._ III. 23.
+
+29. _Magnis obscurata_: in _Luc._ 122 it is _crassis occultata_, so that we
+have another alteration, see Krische, p. 64.
+
+30. Only slight differences appear in the MSS. of the _Luc._ 123, viz.
+_contraria_, for _in c._, _ad vestigia_ for _contra v._
+
+31. _Luc._ 137 has _dixi_ for _dictus_. As Cic. does not often leave out
+_est_ with the passive verb, Nonius has probably quoted wrongly. It will be
+noted that the fragments of Book III. correspond to the first half of the
+_Luc._, those of Book IV. to the second half. Cic. therefore divided the
+_Luc._ into two portions at or about 63.
+
+UNCERTAIN BOOKS.
+
+32. I have already said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary
+assault on the senses made by Cic. in the second book.
+
+33. In the Introd. p. 55 I have given my opinion that the substance of
+Catulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the _probabile_ was
+incorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To
+that part this fragment must probably be referred.
+
+34. This important fragment clearly belongs to Book II., and is a jocular
+application of the Carneadean _probabile_, as may be seen from the words
+_probabiliter posse confici_.
+
+35. Krische assigns this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book.
+With this opinion I find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the
+_Lucullus_ (60) proves to demonstration that in the first edition this
+allusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have occurred
+either in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no reason whatever
+appears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer to regard it as
+belonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of Academic doctrine in
+the second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the Academic school must not
+be supposed to have no truths to maintain, see _Luc._ 119, also 66 and
+_N.D._ I. 12. Also Aug. _Contra. Ac._ II. 29.
+
+36. It is difficult to see where this passage could have been included if
+not in that prooemium to the third book which is mentioned _Ad. Att._ XVI.
+6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me wrong in holding that the
+whole four books formed one discussion, finished within the limits of a
+single day. Why interrupt the discussion by the insertion of a prologue of
+so general a nature as to be taken from a stock which Cic. kept on hand
+ready made? (Cf. _Ad Att._ as above.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications of its
+contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled _Contra
+Academicos_, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions,
+imitated throughout the second edition of the _Academica_ of Cic. No
+writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture
+and opinions of Augustine as the _Academica_ and the lost _Hortensius_. I
+give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications of the contents of the
+former which are to be gathered from the bishop's works. In Aug. _Contr.
+Ac._ II. 14, 15, we have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of
+Book I. to the following effect. The New Academy must not be regarded as
+having revolted against the Old, all that it did was to discuss that new
+doctrine of [Greek: katal�psis] advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of [Greek:
+akatal�psia] though present to the minds of the ancients had never taken
+distinct shape, because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was
+rather enriched than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism
+under the name of the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife
+between it and the New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic.
+must have ended. From this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his
+opinion (_Contra. Ac._ II. 1) that New Academicism was excusable from the
+necessities of the age in which it appeared. Indications of Book II. in
+Aug. are scarce, but to it I refer _Contra. Ac._ I. 7 _placuit Ciceroni
+nostro beatum esse qui verum investigat etiam si ad eius inventionem non
+valeat pervenire_, also _ibid._ III. 10 _illis (Academicis) placuit esse
+posse hominem sapientem, et tamen in hominem scientiam cadere non posse_.
+These I refer to Cicero's development of the _probabile_ in Book II.,
+although I ought to say that Krische, p. 65, maintains that the substance
+of Catulus' exposition in the _Ac. Priora_ transferred to Book IV. of the
+_Ac. Posteriora_. As this would leave very meagre material for Book II.,
+nothing indeed excepting the provisional proof of the deceptiveness of the
+senses, I cannot accede to his arrangement; mine, I may remark, involves a
+much smaller departure from the first edition. Allusions in Aug. to the
+attack on the senses by Cic. in Book II. are difficult to fix, as they
+apply equally well to the later attack in Book IV. As to Books III. and
+IV., I do not think it necessary here to prove from Aug. the points of
+agreement between them and the _Lucullus_, which will find a better place
+in my notes on the latter, but merely give the divergences which appear
+from other sources. These are the translation of [Greek: sophismata] by
+_cavillationes_ in _Luc._ 75 (Seneca _Ep._ III.), and the insertion in 118
+of _essentia_ as a translation of [Greek: ousia].
+
+BOOK II.
+
+ENTITLED _LUCULLUS_.
+
+    ��1--12. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was
+    absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to
+    attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great
+    general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory
+    (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander
+    and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my
+    consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now
+    tell (3). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher,
+    having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself (4). Those
+    enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know
+    philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5).
+    Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of
+    the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about
+    trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public
+    duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but
+    enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who
+    hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge
+    show that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics
+    do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow--the Academic.
+    This is natural, but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to
+    inquiry (7). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools
+    are enslaved to authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the
+    authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without
+    hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus,
+    Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the
+    _Catulus_ (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of
+    Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the
+    doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before (10). He
+    spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius
+    the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, and Antiochus. At that very time
+    the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of
+    Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old
+    teacher (11 and 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes
+    between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the
+    latter against Philo (12).
+
+�1. _Luculli_: see Introd. p. 58, and _Dict. Biog._ _Digna homini nobili_:
+a good deal of learning would have been considered _unworthy_ of a man like
+Lucullus, see Introd. p. 30. _Percepta_: "gained," "won;" cf. _percipere
+fruges_, "to reap," _Cat. Mai._ 24. _Caruit_: "was cut off from;" _carere_
+comes from a root _skar_ meaning to divide, see Corss. I. 403. For the
+three nouns with a singular verb see Madv. _Gram._ 213 A, who confines the
+usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common reading
+_dissensit_ in _De Or._ III. 68 is right, the restriction does not hold.
+_Admodum_: "to a degree." _Fratre_: this brother was adopted by a M.
+Terentius Varro, and was a man of distinction also; see _Dict. Biog._
+_Magna cum gloria_: a ref. to _Dict. Biog._ will show that the whole affair
+was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have gained
+greater glory by letting it drop. _Quaestor_: to Sulla, who employed him
+chiefly in the civil administration of Asia. _Continuo_: without any
+interval. _Legis praemio_: this seems to mean "by the favour of a special
+law," passed of course by Sulla, who had restored the old _lex annalis_ in
+all its rigour, and yet excepted his own officers from its operation.
+_Prooemio_, which has been proposed, would not be Latin, see _De Leg._ II.
+16. _Consulatum_: he seems to have been absent during the years 84--74, in
+the East. _Superiorum_: scarcely that of Sulla.
+
+�2. _Laus_: "merit," as often, so _praemium_, Virg. _Aen._ XII. 437, means
+a deed worthy of reward. _Non admodum exspectabatur_: Cic. forgets that
+Luc. had served with distinction in the Social War and the first
+Mithridatic war. _In Asia pace_: three good MSS. have _Asiae_; Baiter
+ejects _Asia_; Guilelmus read _in Asia in pace_ (which Davies conjectures,
+though he prints _Asiae_). _Consumere_ followed by an ablative without _in_
+is excessively rare in Cic. Madv. _D.F._ V. 53 denies the use altogether.
+In addition, however, to our passage, I note _hoc loco consumitur_ in
+_T.D._ IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give no variants.
+_Pace_ here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like _tranqullo_.
+_Indocilem_: this is simply passive, = "untaught," as in Prop. I. 2, 12,
+Ov. _Fast._ III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong in making
+it active. _Factus_: = _perfectus_; cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 5, 33 _homo factus
+ad unguem_, Cic. _De Or._ III. 184, _In Verr._ IV. 126. So _effectus_ in
+silver Latin. _Rebus gestis_: military history, so often. _Divinam quandam
+memoriam_: the same phrase in _De Or._ II. 360. _Rerum, verborum_: same
+distinction in _De Or._ II. 359. _Oblivisci se malle_: the same story is
+told _D.F._ II. 104, _De Or._ II. 299. The ancient art of memory was begun
+by Simonides (who is the person denoted here by _cuidam_) and completed by
+Metrodorus of Scepsis, for whom see _De Or._ II. 360. _Consignamus_: cf.
+_consignatae in animis notiones_ in _T.D._ I. 57. _litteris_ must be an
+ablative of the instrument. _Mandare monum._: cf. I. 3. _Insculptas_: rare
+in the metaphorical use, cf. _N.D._ I. 45.
+
+�3. _Genere_: "department" cf. I. 3. _Navalibus pugnis_: [Greek:
+naumachiais]. _Instrumento et adparatu_: [Greek: kataskeu� kai paraskeu�].
+_Rex_: Mithridates. _Quos legisset_: = _de quibus l._; cf. the use of the
+passive verb so common in Ovid, e.g. _Trist._ IV. 4, 14. I take of course
+_rex_ to be nom. to _legisset_, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is
+nom. and that _quos legisset_ = _quorum commentarios legisset_ I think
+improbable. _Hodie_: Drakenborch on Livy V. 27 wants to read _hodieque_,
+which however, is not Ciceronian. In passages like _De Or._ I. 103 and
+_Verr._ V. 64, the _que_ connects clauses and does not modify _hodie_. On
+this subject see Madv. _Opuscula_ I. 390. _Etsi_: _M.D.F._ V. 68, shows
+that in Cic. a parenthetic clause with _etsi_ always has a common verb with
+its principal clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same
+holds of _quamquam_, see n. on I. 5. _Calumnia_: properly a fraudulent use
+of litigation, [Greek: sykophantia]. The chief enemy was the infamous
+Memmius who prosecuted him. _In urbem_: until his triumph Luc. would remain
+outside the city. _Profuisset_: this ought properly to be _profuerit_, but
+the conditional _dicerem_ changes it. _Potius ... quam ... communicem_: n.
+on 23.
+
+�4. _Sunt ... celebrata_: cf. I. 11, 17 for the collocation of the words.
+_Externa ... interiora_: cf. _De Div._ II. 124 _sed haec quoque in promptu,
+nunc interiora videamus_. _Pro quaestore_: for this Faber wrote _quaestor_,
+arguing that as Luc. was Sulla's _quaestor_ and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he
+could not be _pro quaestor_. But surely after the first year he would be
+_pro quaestor_. Dav. reads _quaestor_ here and 11, saying "_veterem
+lectionem iugulavit Faber_". _Ea memoria ... quam_: Bentl., Halm, Baiter
+give _qua_, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor. _Sat._ I. 6, 15. A passage like
+ours is _D.F._ I. 29, _ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis_, where one MS.
+has _qua_. Read Madvig's lucid note there. _De quibus audiebat_: Madv.
+_Em._ 121 makes this equivalent to _de eis rebus de quibus_, the necessity
+of which explanation, though approved by Halm, I fail to see. The form of
+expression is very common in Cic., and the relative always refers to an
+actually expressed antecedent, cf. e.g. _Cat. Mai._ 83. I take _quibus_ as
+simply = _libris_.
+
+�5. _Ac_: strong, as often, = [Greek: kai m�n]. _Personarum_: public
+characters, [Greek: pros�p�n pole�s] (_Ad. Fam._ XV. 17, 2), so _personas_
+6. _Multi ... plures_: cf. Introd. p. 30. _Reliqui_: many MSS. insert _qui_
+by _dittographia_, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains it.
+On the retention or omission of this _qui_ will depend the choice of
+_putant_ or _putent_ below. _Earum rerum disputationem_: for _disp._
+followed by genitive see n. on I. 33. _Non ita decoram_: for this feeling
+see Introd. p. 30. For _non ita_ cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae".
+_Historiae loquantur_: _hist._ means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than
+"history," which is better expressed by _res gestae_. Note that the verb
+_loqui_ not _dicere_ is used, and cf. n. on 101. _Legatione_: to the kings
+in Egypt and the East in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C.
+About the embassy see _Dict. Biogr._ art. 'Panactius'. _Auctorem_: one
+would think this simple and sound enough, Bentl. however read _fautorem_,
+Dav. _auditorem_.
+
+�6. _Illigari_: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use Forc.
+qu. Liv. XXXIII. 21, Tac. _Ann._ XIII. 40. _Aut ludicros sermones_: = _aut
+clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat_. _Rerum leviorum_: a similar
+argument in _D.F._ I. 12. _Quodam in libro_: the _Hortensius_. _Gradu_: so
+the word "degree" was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the
+ballad. _De opera publica detrahamus_: the dative often follows this verb,
+as in _D.F._ III. 7 _nihil operae reipublicae detrahens_, a passage often
+wrongly taken. _Operae_ is the dat. after the verb, not the gen. after
+_nihil_, _reip._ the gen. after _operae_, like _opera publica_ here, not
+the dat. after _detrahens_. _Nisi forensem_: the early oratorical works may
+fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the _De
+Republica_ or the _De Leg._ both of which fall within the period spoken of.
+_Ut plurimis prosimus_: cf. Introd. p. 29. _Non modo non minui, sed_:
+notice _non modo ... sed_ thrice over in two sentences.
+
+�7. _Sunt ... qui negent_: and truly, see Introd. p. 38. In _Cat. Mai._ �3
+Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned than he really was.
+_Mortuis_: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about 57, Hortensius 50. _Contra
+omnis dicere quae videntur_: MSS. mostly insert _qui_ between _dicere_ and
+_quae_, one of the best however has _dicere quae aliis_ as a correction,
+while another has the marginal reading _qui scire sibi videntur_. The
+omission of _qui_, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal.
+2) referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense. _Verum invenire_: cf. 60.
+_Contentione_: = [Greek: philoneikia] as usual. _In ... rebus obscuritas_:
+cf. I. 44 _rerum obscuritate_. _Infirmitas_: cf. I. 44 _imbecillos animos_.
+_Antiquissimi et doctissimi_: on the other hand _recentissima quaeque sunt
+correcta et emendata maxime_ I. 13. _Diffisi_: one of the best MSS. has
+_diffissi_, which reminds one of the spelling _divisssiones_, asserted to
+be Ciceronian in Quint. _Inst. Or_. I. 7, 20. _In utramque partem_: [Greek:
+ep' amphotera], cf. I. 45. _Exprimant_: "embody," cf. n. on I. 19.
+
+�8. _Probabilia_: [Greek: pithana], for which see 33. _Sequi_: "act upon,"
+cf. 99-101. _Liberiores et solutiores_: these two words frequently occur
+together in Cic. and illustrate his love for petty variations; see 105,
+also _T.D._ V. 43, _De Div._ I. 4, _De Rep._ IV. 4, _N.D._ I. 56, _Orat._
+64. _Integra_: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "_non mihi integrum est_"--"I
+have committed my self." _Et quasi_: MSS. have _et quibus et quasi_.
+_Cogimur_: for this Academic freedom see Introd. p. 18. _Amico cuidam_:
+Orelli after Lamb. _cuipiam;_ for the difference see Madv. _Gram._ 493 _b_,
+c.
+
+�9. _Ut potuerint, potuerunt_: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which
+was simply _ut potuerunt_, "granting that they had the ability, they gained
+it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they _did_ decide on a
+single hearing," etc. _Iudicaverunt autem_: so Lamb. for MSS. _aut_.
+Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "_arguta hariolatio_," read _an_ for _aut_
+and put a note of interrogation at _contulerunt_. C.F. Hermann
+(Schneidewin's _Philologus_ VII. 466) introduces by conj. a sad confusion
+into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's remarks in _Em._ 125
+has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed, followed by the faithful
+Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion of _aut_ between _sed_ and
+_ut_ at the beginning; of this Madv. says "_non solum Latina non est, sed
+sanae menti repugnat_." For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf.
+_N.D._ I. 10, _De Leg._ I. 36. _Quam adamaverunt_: "which they have learned
+to love;" the _ad_ has the same force as [Greek: pro] in [Greek:
+promanthanein], which means "to learn _on and on_, to learn by degrees"
+(cf. [Greek: proumathon stergein kakois]), not, as the lexica absurdly say,
+"to learn beforehand, i.e. to learn thoroughly." _Constantissime_: "most
+consistently". _Quae est ad Baulos_: cf. Introd. p. 57. _In spatio_: this
+_xystus_ was a colonnade with one side open to the sea, called [Greek:
+xystos] from its polished floor and pillars. _Consedimus_: n. on I. 14.
+
+�10. _Servatam oportuit_: a construction very characteristic of Terence,
+found, but rarely, in Cic. and Livy. _In promptu ... reconditiora_: cf. _in
+promptu ... interiora_ in _De Div._ II. 124, also _Ac._ I. 4. _Quae dico_:
+Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and wishes to read
+_dixero_. But the substitution of the pres. for the future is common enough
+in all languages cf. Iuv. IV. 130 with Mayor's copious note. _Si non
+fuerint_: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have _si vera_
+etc. In support of the text, see I. 9 (_sunt ista_) and note.
+_Labefactata_: this is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in
+_Ed. Rom._ (1471); the others have _labefacta_. Orelli's statement (note to
+his separate text of the _Academica_ 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the
+perfect _labefeci_ and the part, _labefactus_ is quite wrong. The former is
+indeed the vulg. reading in _Pro Sestio_ 101, the latter in _De Haruspicum
+Responsis_ 60, but the last of these two passages is doubtful. Cic. as a
+rule prefers long forms like _sustentatus_, which occurs with
+_labefactatus_ in _Cat. Mai._ 20. For the perfect _labefactavit_ cf. I. 33.
+_Agam igitur_: Cic. rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a
+belief in the learning of Lucullus.
+
+�11. _Pro quaestore_: cf. 4. _Essem_: MSS. _issem_, whence Goer. conj.
+_Alexandriam issem_. _Heraclitus Tyrius_: scarcely known except from this
+passage. _Clitomachum_: for this philosopher see Zeller 532. _Quae nunc
+prope dimissa revocatur_: sc. _a Cicerone_. Philo's only notable pupils had
+combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the
+_Academica_ the New Academic dialectic had been without a representative
+for many years. Cf. Introd. p. 21. _Libri duo_: cf. I. 13. _Heri_ for this
+indication of the contents of the lost _Catulus_, see Introd. p. 50.
+_Implorans_: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to with
+tears," see Corss. I. 361. _Philonis_: sc. _esse_. _Scriptum agnoscebat_:
+i.e. it was an actual work of Ph. _Tetrilius_: some MSS. are said to have
+Tetrinius, and the name _Tertinius_ is found on Inscr. One good MS. has
+_Tretilius_, which may be a mistake for _Tertilius_, a name formed like
+_Pompilius_, _Quintilius_, _Sextilius_. Qy, should _Petrilius_, a
+derivative from the word for four, be read? _Petrilius_ and _Pompilius_
+would then agree like _Petronius_ and _Pomponius_, _Petreius_ and
+_Pompeius_. For the formation of these names see Corss. I. 116. _Rogus_: an
+ill omened and unknown name. _Rocus_, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on
+_denarii_ of the _gens Creperia_. _De Philone ... ab eo ipso_: note the
+change of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy." _De_ and _ex_ are
+common in Cic. after _audire_, while _ab_ is rather rarer. See _M.D.F._ I.
+39, and for _describere ab aliquo_ cf. _a te_ in _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, 3.
+
+�12. _Dicta Philoni_: for this see Introd. p. 50. It cannot mean what Goer.
+makes it mean, "_coram Philone_." I think it probable that _Philoni_ is a
+marginal explanation foisted on the text. As to the statements of Catulus
+the elder, they are made clear by 18. _Academicos_: i.e. _novos_, who are
+here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the
+title. _Aristo_: see Introd. p. 11. _Aristone_: Diog. VII. 164 mentions an
+Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems
+unknown. _Negat_: see n. on 18. _Lenior_: some MSS. _levior_, as is usual
+with these two words. In 11 one of the earliest editions has _leviter_ for
+_leniter_.
+
+    ��13--18. Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted like a seditious
+    tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as supporters of
+    scepticism (13), Those very philosophers, with the exception of
+    Empedocles, seem to me, if anything, too dogmatic (14). Even if they
+    were often in doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made
+    during so many centuries by the investigations of so many men of
+    ability? Arcesilas was a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti.
+    Gracchus was a rebel against a good government (15). Has nothing really
+    been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty,
+    though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists think that no
+    argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument can add
+    nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however
+    do allow of discussion with sceptics. Philo in his innovations was
+    induced to state falsehoods, and incurred all the evils he wished to
+    avoid, his rejection of Zeno's definition of the [Greek: katal�ptik�
+    phantasia] really led him back to that utter scepticism from which he
+    was fleeing. We then must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in
+    to the sceptics (18).
+
+�13. _Rursus exorsus est_: cf. _exorsus_ in 10. _Popularis_: [Greek:
+d�motikous]. _Ii a_: so Dav. for MSS. _iam_. _Tum ad hos_: so MSS., Dav.
+_aut hos_. The omission of the verb _venire_ is very common in Cic.'s
+letters. _C. Flaminium_: the general at lake Trasimene. _Aliquot annis_:
+one good MS. has _annos_, cf. _T.D._ I. 4, where all the best MSS. have
+_annos_. The ablative is always used to express point of time, and indeed
+it may be doubted whether the best writers _ever_ use any accusative in
+that sense, though they do occasionally use the ablative to express
+duration (cf. Prop. I. 6, 7 and Madv. _Gram._ 235, 2). _L. Cassium_: this
+is L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot
+bill (_De Leg._ III. 35), he was the author of the _cui bono_ principle and
+so severe a judge as to be called _scopulus reorum_. Pompeium: apparently
+the man who made the disgraceful treaty with Numantia repudiated by home in
+139 B.C. _P. Africanum_: i.e. the younger, who supported the ballot bill of
+Cassius, but seems to have done nothing else for the democrats. _Fratres_:
+Lamb. _viros_, but cf. _Brut._ 98. _P. Scaevolam_: the pontifex, consul in
+the year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against
+the tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of
+Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about the
+legal effect the bills would have. _Ut videmus ... ut suspicantur_: Halm
+with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that the statement about
+Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but him. Those words need
+not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be allowed the inconsistency.
+
+�14. _Similiter_: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have _simile_.
+_Xenophanem_: so Victorius for the MSS. _Xenoplatonem_. _Ed. Rom._ (1471)
+has _Cenonem_, which would point to _Zenonem_, but Cic. does not often name
+Zeno of Elea. _Saturninus_: of the question why he was an enemy of
+Lucullus, Goer. says _frustra quaeritur_. Saturninus was the persistent
+enemy of Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage.
+_Arcesilae calumnia_: this was a common charge, cf. _Academicorum calumnia_
+in _N.D._ II. 20 and _calumnia_ in 18 and 65 of this book. So August.
+_Contra Acad._ II. 1 speaks of _Academicorum vel calumnia vel pertinacia
+vel pericacia_. _Democriti verecundia_: Cic. always has a kind of
+tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on _D.F._ I. 20 remarks, cf. _De Div._
+II. 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the general _arrogantia_ of
+the _physici_. _Empedocles quidem ... videatur_: cf. 74. The exordium of
+his poem is meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of
+the text, see R. and P. 108. _Quale sit_: the emphasis is on _sit_, the
+sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. _Quasi modo
+nascentes_: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however _T.D._ II. 5 _ut
+oratorum laus ... senescat ... , philosophia nascatur_.
+
+�15. _haesitaverunt_: Goer. cf. _De Or._ I. 40. _Constitutam_: so in 14.
+_Delitisceret_: this is the right spelling, not _delitesceret_, which one
+good MS. has here, see Corssen II. 285. _Negavissent_: "had denied, as they
+said." _Tollendus est_: a statement which is criticised in 74. _Nominibus
+differentis ... dissenserunt_: genuine Antiochean opinions, see the
+_Academica Posteriora_ 17, 43. _De se ipse_: very frequent in Cic. (cf.
+Madv. _Gram._ 487 _b_). _Diceret_: this is omitted by the MSS., but one has
+_agnosceret_ on the margin; see n. on 88. _Fannius_: in his "Annals." The
+same statement is quoted in _De Or._ II. 270, _Brutus_ 299. Brutus had
+written an epitome of this work of Fannius (_Ad Att._ XII. 5, 3).
+
+�16. _Veteribus_: Bentley's em. of MSS. _vetera_: C.F. Hermann (Schneid
+_Philol._ VII. 457), thinking the departure from the MSS. too great, keeps
+_vetera_ and changes _incognita_ into _incondita_, comparing _De Or._ I.
+197, III. 173. A glance, however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the
+word always means merely "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here
+is not one between order and no order, but between knowledge and no
+knowledge, so that _incognita_ is far better. I am not at all certain that
+the MSS. reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us
+suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were not
+_knowledge_, but mere _opinion_." The conj. of Kayser _veri nota_ for
+_vetera_ (cf. 76) and _investigatum_ below, is fanciful and improbable.
+_Quod investigata sunt_: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again
+disturbs the text which since Madv. _Em._ 127 supported it (quoting _T.D._
+V. 15, Liv. XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that _illa_ in the former
+sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects _nihilne est
+igitur actum_ as a dittographia (!) from 15 _nihilne explicatum_, and reads
+_quot_ for _quod_ with Bentl. For the meaning cf. _T.D._ III. 69 and Arist.
+on the progress of philosophy as there quoted. _Arcesilas Zenoni ...
+obtrectans_: see n. on I. 34. These charges were brought by each school
+against the other. In Plutarch _Adv. Colotem_ p. 1121 F, want of novelty is
+charged against Arcesilas, and the charge is at once joyfully accepted by
+Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was often excused by the provocation Zeno
+gave, see Aug. _Contra Acad._ II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm. 2 and 35 of
+the _Academica Posteriora_. _Immutatione verborum_: n. on I. 33. This
+phrase has also technical meanings; it translates the Greek [Greek: tropoi]
+(_Brut._ 69) and [Greek: all�goria] in _De Or._ II. 261, where an ex. is
+given. _Definitiones_: n. on 18. _Tenebras obducere_: such expressions
+abound in Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned, cf. 30 (_lucem
+eripere_), _N.D._ I. 6 (_noctem obfundere_) Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 14
+(_quasdam nebulas obfundere_), also the joke of Aug. II. 29 _tenebrae quae
+patronae Academicorum solent esse_. _Non admodum probata_: cf. the passage
+of Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. _Lacyde_: the most important passages in
+ancient authorities concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is
+important to note that Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became
+the source of information about his teacher's doctrines. _Tenuit_: cf. the
+use of _obtinere_ in _De Or._ I. 45. _In Aeschine_: so Dav. for the
+confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher see Zeller 533. As two MSS.
+have _hac nonne_ Christ conj. _Hagnone_ which Halm, as well as Baiter
+takes; Zeller 533 seems to adopt this and at once confuses the supposed
+philosopher with one Agnon just mentioned in Quint. II. 17, 15. There is
+not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known
+at all, from these two passages only.
+
+�17. _Patrocinium_: for the word cf. _N.D._ I. 6. _Non defuit_: such
+patronage _was_ wanting in the time of Arcesilas (16). _Faciendum omnino
+non putabant_: "Epictetus (Arrian, _Diss._ I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a
+sceptic by saying [Greek: ouk ag� schol�n pros tauta]" (Zeller 85, n.). In
+another passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a
+sceptic than with a corpse. _Ullam rationem disputare_: the same constr.
+occurs in 74 and _Pro Caecina_ 15, _Verr. Act._ I. 24. _Antipatrum_: cf.
+fragm. 1 of Book I. _Verbum e verbo_: so 31, _D.F._ III. 15, _T.D._ III. 7,
+not _verbum de verbo_, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form.
+_Comprehensio_: cf. I. 41. _Ut Graeci_: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I.
+44 _ut Democritus_. _Evidentiam_: other translations proposed by Cic. were
+_illustratio_ (Quint. VI. 2, 32) and _perspicientia_ (_De Off._ I. 15).
+_Fabricemur_: cf. 87, 119, 121. _Me appellabat_: Cic. was the great
+advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (_D.F._ III. 15). _Sed tamen_:
+this often resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Ipsa
+evidentia_: note that the verb _evidere_ is not Latin.
+
+�18. _Sustinere_: cf. 70. _Pertinaciam_: the exact meaning of this may be
+seen from _D.F._ II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot
+recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an
+opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf.
+n. on 14, 66, also I. 44 and _D.F._ V. 94, _N.D._ I. 13, in the last of
+which passages the Academy is called _procax_. _Mentitur_: cf. 12. _Ita
+negaret_: this _ita_ corresponds to _si_ below,--a common sequence of
+particles in Cic., cf. 19. [Greek: Akatal�pton]: the conj. of Turnebus
+[Greek: katal�pton] is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in
+_negaret_. _Visum_: cf. I. 40. _Trivimus_: cf. I. 27. _Visum igitur_: the
+Greek of this definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words _impressum
+effictumque_ are equivalent to [Greek: enapesphragismen� kai
+enapomemagmen�] in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a
+sensation to be a real alteration ([Greek: heteroi�sis]) of the material
+substance of the soul through the action of some external thing, which
+impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77
+with footnotes. _Ex eo unde esset ... unde non esset_: this translation
+corresponds closely to the definition given by Sextus in four out of the
+six passages referred to by Zeller (in _Adv. Math._ VIII. 86 _Pyrrh.
+Hypotyp._ III. 242, the definition is clipt), and in Diog. Laert. VII. 50
+(in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just
+referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of
+Orelli's reprint of his _Academica_) that Cic. omits to represent the words
+[Greek: kat' auto to hyparchon]. Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 249 considers
+them essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at
+Electra, mistook her for an Erinys. The [Greek: phantasia] therefore which
+he had although [Greek: apo hyparchontos] (proceeding from an actually
+existent thing) was not [Greek: kata to hyparchon], i.e. did not truly
+represent that existent thing. Aug. _Cont. Acad._ II. 11 quotes Cicero's
+definition and condenses it thus; _his signis verum posse comprehendi quae
+signa non potest habere quod falsum est_. _Iudicium_: [Greek: krit�rion], a
+test to distinguish between the unknown and the known. _Eo, quo minime
+volt_: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a reaction towards
+dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of knowledge on a ground quite
+different from the [Greek: katal�ptik� phantasia], which he pronounced
+impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to suit his own.
+As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. 11, Sextus _Pyrr. Hyp._ I.
+235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans believed all things to be
+[Greek: akatal�pta], Philo held them to be [Greek: katal�pta], and Numenius
+in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice
+as a renegade. (2) is evident from the _Academica_ and from Sextus as
+quoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more
+difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be
+_in their own nature_ [Greek: katal�pta (hoson de epi t� physei t�n
+pragmat�n aut�n katal.)]. But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have
+attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that things _in
+themselves_ were incognisable, _but_ that human faculties do not avail to
+give information about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with
+words, there was nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by
+their [Greek: katal�ptik� phantasia] professed to be able to get at _the
+thing in itself_, in its real being, if then Philo did away with the
+[Greek: katal. phant.] and substituted no other mode of curing the defects
+alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense, he was fairly open
+to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius treats his polemic
+against the [Greek: katal. phant.] as a mere feint intended to cover his
+retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in 112 of
+this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing the views of Philo,
+and not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It would seem from that
+passage that he defined the cognisable to be "_quod impressum esset e
+vero_" ([Greek: phantasia apo hyparchontos enapomemagmen�]), refusing to
+add "_quo modo imprimi non posset a falso_ ([Greek: hoia ouk an genoito apo
+m� hyparchontos]), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely
+tried to show that the cognisable was equivalent to the [Greek: d�lon] or
+[Greek: pithanon] of Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful
+statement of the latter that the wise man would "opine," that is, would
+pronounce definite judgments on phenomena. (See 78 of this book.) The
+scarcity of references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a
+more exact view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little
+or nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book
+entitled _Academica_ (pp. 313--316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard
+to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He
+denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles
+of doubt, to be correct (12). I may add that from the mention of Philo's
+ethical works at the outset of Stobaeus' _Ethica_, he would appear to have
+afterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important
+for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the
+new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as
+genuinely Academic. _Revolvitur_: cf. _De Div._ II. 13, also 148 of this
+book. _Eam definitionem_: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the
+sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single
+sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these
+sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that _all_
+knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on
+the truth of the individual perception of sense.
+
+    ��19--29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give
+    perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain
+    the truth of _every_ sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which
+    impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we
+    always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated
+    senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch!
+    (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions
+    of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since
+    they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at
+    definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic
+    memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22).
+    That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would
+    act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false?
+    (23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her?
+    There must he some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence
+    must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action
+    is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end
+    to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be
+    discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should
+    be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are rendered useless, philosophy
+    too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence the
+    Academics have been urged to allow their _dogma_ that perception is
+    impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades
+    said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the
+    supposition that there can be _any_ true perception (28). Antiochus
+    declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if
+    they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).
+
+�19. _Sensibus_: it is important to observe that the word _sensus_ like
+[Greek: aisth�sis] means two things, (1) one of the _five_ senses, (2) an
+individual act of sensation. _Deus_: for the supposed god cf. _T.D._ II.
+67. _Non videam_: this strong statement is ridiculed in 80. _De remo
+inflexo et de collo columbae_: cf. 79, 82. The [Greek: k�p� enalos
+keklasmen�] and [Greek: peristeras trach�los] are frequently mentioned,
+along with numerous other instances of the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext.
+Emp., e.g. _Pyrrhon. Hypot._ I. 119-121, _Adv. Math._ VII. 244, 414.
+Cicero, in his speech of the day before, had probably added other examples,
+cf. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 27. _Epicurus hoc viderit_: see 79, 80. Epic.
+held all sensation, _per se_, to be infallible. The chief authorities for
+this are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote. _Lumen mutari_:
+cf. _Brut._ 261. _Intervalla ... diducimus_: for this cf. Sext. _Pyrrh_. I.
+118 [Greek: pemptos esti logos] (i.e. the 5th sceptic [Greek: tropos] for
+showing sense to be untrustworthy) [Greek: ho para tas theseis] (_situs_)
+[Greek: kai ta diast�mata] (_intervalla_) [Greek: kai tous topous].
+_Multaque facimus usque eo_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 258 [Greek: panta
+poiei mechris an tran�n kai pl�ktik�n spas� phantasian]. _Sui iudicii_: see
+for the gen. _M.D.F._ II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut.
+_Persa_ V. 2, 8, quoted by Goer. _Sui cuiusque_: for this use of _suus
+quisque_ as a single word see _M.D.F._ V. 46.
+
+�20. _Ut oculi ... cantibus_: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on
+the other hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. _Quis est quin
+cernat_: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here (_D.F._ II.
+27). _Umbris ... eminentia_: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses _umbra_ and
+_lumen_, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. [Greek: skia] and
+[Greek: skiasma] are opposed to [Greek: lampra]; cf. also [Greek:
+skiagraphein], _adumbrare_, and Aesch. _Agam_. 1328. Cic. often applies
+metaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g. _De Or._ III. 101,
+and after him Quintilian, e.g. II. 17, 21. _Inflatu_: cf. 86 (where an
+answer is given) and [Greek: anabol�]. _Antiopam_: of Pacuvius.
+_Andromacham_: of Ennius, often quoted by Cic., as _De Div._ I. 23.
+_Interiorem_: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's _Socrates and the Socratic
+Schools_, 296. _Quia sentiatur_: [Greek: aisth�sis] being their only
+[Greek: krit�rion]. Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages
+referred to in R. and P. and Zeller will show) conj. _cui adsentiatur_,
+comparing 39, 58; cf. also 76. _Inter eum ... et inter_: for the repetition
+of _inter_ cf. _T.D._ IV. 32 and Madv. _Gram._ 470. _Nihil interesse_: if
+the doctrine of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when
+he fancied himself in pleasure, and _vice versa_; thus the distinction
+between pleasure and pain would be obscured. _Sentiet ... insaniat_: For
+the sequence cf. _D.F._ I. 62 and Wesenberg's fine note on _T.D._ V. 102.
+
+�21. _Illud est album_: these are [Greek: axi�mata], judgments of the mind,
+in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq. There is a
+passage in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours;
+it is too long to quote entire: [Greek: aisth�sesi men oun monais labein
+tal�thes] (which resides only in the [Greek: axi�ma]) [Greek: ou dynatai
+anthr�pos. ... physei gar eisin alogoi ... dei de eis phantasian achth�nai
+tou toioutou pragmatos "touto leukon esti kai touto glyky estin." t�i de
+toiout�i pragmati ouketi t�s aisth�se�s ergon estin epiballein ... synese�s
+te dei kai mn�m�s]. _Ille deinceps_: _deinceps_ is really out of place; cf.
+24 _quomodo primum_ for _pr. quom._ _Ille equus est_: Cic. seems to
+consider that the [Greek: axi�ma], which affirms the existence of an
+abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the existence of a
+concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from the Greek texts.
+_Expletam comprehensionem_: full knowledge. Here we rise to a definition.
+This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. _Adv. Math._ VII. [Greek: anthr�pos
+esti z�on logikon thn�ton, nou kai epist�m�s dektikon]. The Stoic [Greek:
+horoi], and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II.
+208--211. _Notitiae_: this Cic. uses as a translation both of [Greek:
+prol�psis] and [Greek: ennoia], for which see Zeller 79, 89. In I. 40
+_notiones rerum_ is given. _Sine quibus_: [Greek: dia gar t�n ennoi�n ta
+pragmata lambanetai] Diog. VII. 42.
+
+�22. _Igitur_: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Consentaneum_:
+so Sextus constantly uses [Greek: akolouthon]. _Repugnaret_: cf. I. 19 and
+n. _Memoriae certe_: n. on 106. _Continet_: cf. _contineant_ in 40. _Quae
+potest esse_: Cic. nearly always writes _putat esse_, _potest esse_ and the
+like, not _esse putat_ etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a
+clause. _Memoria falsorum_: this difficulty is discussed in Plato
+_Sophist._ 238--239. _Ex multis animi perceptionibus_: the same definition
+of an art occurs in _N.D._ II. 148, _D.F._ III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II.
+17, 41, Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 [Greek: techn�n einai syst�ma ek
+katal�pseon syngegymnasmen�n] _ib._ III. 250. _Quam_: for the change from
+plural to singular (_perceptio in universum_) cf. n. on I. 38, Madv. _D.F._
+II. 61, _Em._ 139. _Qui distingues_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 280 [Greek:
+ou dioisei t�s atechnias h� techn�]. Sextus often comments on similar
+complaints of the Stoics. _Aliud eiusmodi genus sit_: this distinction is
+as old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence in the late
+philosophy. Cf. Sext. _Adv. Math._ XI. 197 who adds a third class of
+[Greek: technai] called [Greek: apotelesmatikai] to the usual [Greek:
+the�r�tikai] and [Greek: praktikai], also Quint. II. 18, 1 and 2, where
+[Greek: poi�tik�] corresponds to the [Greek: apot.] of Sext. _Continget_:
+"will be the natural consequence." The notion that the verb _contingit_
+denotes necessarily _good_ fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer on
+_T.D._ III. 4. _Tractabit_: [Greek: mellei metacheirizesthai].
+
+�23. _Cognitio_: like Germ. _lehre_, the branch of learning which concerns
+the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of [Greek:
+katal�psis] here. _In quibus_: the antecedent is not _virtutum_, as Petrus
+Valentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, but
+_multa_. This is shown by _etiam_; not _merely_ the virtues but _also_ all
+[Greek: epist�m�] depends on [Greek: katal�pseis]; cf. I. 40, 41, with
+notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367. _Stabilem_: [Greek: bebaion kai
+ametapt�tou]. _Artem vivendi_: "_tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos_"
+_M.D.F._ I. 42. Sextus constantly talks about [Greek: h� oneiropoloumen�
+peri ton bion techn�] (_Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 250) the existence of which he
+disproves to his own satisfaction (_Adv. Math._ XI. 168 sq). _Ille vir
+bonus_: in all ancient systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness of the
+_sapiens_ must be proof against the rack; cf. esp. _D.F._ III. 29, 75,
+_T.D._ V. 73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the [Greek:
+sophos] in Plato's _Gorgias_. _Potius quam aut_: Lamb. _ut_; but I think
+C.F. Hermann is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. _never_ inserts
+_ut_ after _potius quam_ with the subj. Tischer on _T.D._ II. 52 affirms
+that _ut_ is frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. _De
+Off._ I. 86, Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12 who says the _sapiens_ of the Academy
+must be _desertor officiorum omnium_. _Comprehensi ... constituti_: cf. the
+famous _abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit_. _Iis rebus_: note the assumption
+that the _sensation_ corresponds to the _thing_ which causes it. _Adsensus
+sit ... possint_: nearly all edd. before Halm read _possunt_, but the subj.
+expresses the possibility as present to the mind of the supposed _vir
+bonus_. Cf. Madv. _Gram._ 368.
+
+�24. _Primum_: out of place, see on 21. _Agere_: the dogmatist always held
+that the sceptic must, if consistent, be [Greek: anenerg�tos en bi�i]
+(Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 23). _Extremum_: similar attempts to translate
+[Greek: telos] are made in D.F. I. 11, 29, V. 17. _Cum quid agere_: cf. I.
+23 for the phrase _Naturae accommodatum_. a purely Stoic expression,
+[Greek: h�moi�menon t� physei]; cf. 38 and _D.F._ V. 17, also III. 16,
+Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P. 390. _Impellimur_: [Greek: kinoumetha],
+Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 391, as often.
+
+�25. _Oportet videri_: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. 39, 81 and 122
+of this book. _Videri_ at the end of this section has the weak sense, "to
+seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. I.
+262 with I. 270, and Munro's n., also _M.D.F._ II. 52, _Em. Liv._ p. 42.
+_Non poterit_: as the Academics allege. _Naturae ... alienum_: Cic. uses
+this adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by _ab_; I
+doubt whether the phrase _maiestate alienum_ (without the preposition) can
+be right in _De Div._ II. 102, where the best texts still keep it. _Non
+occurrit ... aget_: occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on 127.
+
+�26. _Quid quod si_: Goer., outrageously reads _quid quod si, si_.
+_Tollitur_: the verb _tollere_ occurs as frequently in this sense as
+[Greek: anairein] does in Sextus. _Lux lumenque_: Bentl. _dux_ The
+expression _dux vitae_ is of course frequent (cf. _N.D._ I. 40, _T.D._ V. 5
+and Lucretius), but there is no need to alter. _Lux_ is properly natural
+light, _lumen_ artificial, cf. _Ad Att._ XVI. 13, 1. _lumina dimiseramus,
+nec satis lucebat_, D.F. III. 45 _solis luce ... lumen lucernae_. There is
+the same difference between [Greek: ph�s] and [Greek: phengos], the latter
+is used for the former ([Greek: phengos h�liou]) just as _lumen_ is for
+_lux_ (_si te secundo lumine his offendere_--_Ad Att._ VII. 26, 1) but not
+often _vice versa_. Trans. "the luminary and the lamp of life," and cf.
+Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 269 where the [Greek: phantasia] is called [Greek:
+phengos]. _Finis_: so in the beginning of the _Nicom. Eth._ Aristot.
+assumes that the actual existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof
+that there is a [Greek: telos]. _Aperta_: a reminiscence of the frequently
+recurring Greek terms [Greek: ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos] etc., cf. Sextus
+_passim_, and _D.F._ I. 30. _Initium ... exitus_ = [Greek: arch� ...
+telos]. _Tenetur_: MSS. _tenet_, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be
+_ratio_ above. [Greek: Apodeixis]: cf. the definition very often given by
+Sext. e.g. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II. 143 [Greek: logos di' homologoumen�n l�mmat�n]
+(premisses) [Greek: kata synag�g�n epiphoran] (conclusion) [Greek:
+ekkalypt�n ad�lon], also Diog. VII. 45, [Greek: logon dia t�n mallon
+katalambanomen�n to h�tton katalambanomenon perainonta] (if the reading be
+right).
+
+�27. _Notio_: another trans. of [Greek: ennoia]. _Conclusisse_: although
+the Greeks used [Greek: symperasma] instead of [Greek: epiphora] sometimes
+for the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb [Greek:
+symperainein] which has been supposed to correspond to _concludere_. It is
+more likely to be a trans. of [Greek: synagein], and _conclusum argumentum_
+of [Greek: synaktikos logos], which terms are of frequent occurrence.
+_Rationibus progredi_: to a similar question Sextus answers, [Greek: ouk
+estin anankaion tas ekeinon] (the dogmatists) [Greek: dogmatologias
+probainein, plasmat�deis hyparchousas] (_Adv. Math._ VIII. 367).
+_Sapientiae ... futurum est_: for the dat. with _facio_ and _fio_ see Madv.
+_Gram._ 241, obs. 5, _Opusc._ I. 370, _D.F._ II. 79, and cf. 96 of this
+book. _Lex veri rectique_: cf. 29; the _constitutio veri_ and the
+determination of what is _rectum_ in morals are the two main tasks of
+philosophy. _Sapientique satis non sit_: so Manut. for the _sapientisque
+sit_ of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads _sapientis, neque satis sit_, which
+I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run
+_neque dubitari potest quin satis sit_, which gives the exact opposite of
+the sense required. _Ratum_: cf. 141.
+
+�28. _Perceptum_: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are very
+frequent in Sextus, e.g. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues
+that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to
+show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be _provable_. Cf. 109 of
+this book. _Postulanti_: making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. _De
+Leg._ I. 21. _Consentaneum esse_: [Greek: akolouthon einai]. _Ut alia_:
+_although_ others. _Tantum abest ut--ut_: cf. Madv. _Gram._ 440 a.
+
+�29. _Pressius_: cf. _De Fato_ 31, 33, _N.D._ II. 20, _T.D._ IV. 14,
+_Hortensius_ fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in 109. _Decretum_: of
+course the Academics would say they did not hold this [Greek: dogma] as
+_stabile fixum ratum_ but only as _probabile_. Sextus however _Pyrrh. Hyp._
+I. 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words
+they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. _Sentitis enim_: cf. _sentis_
+in _D.F._ III. 26. _Fluctuare_: "to be at sea," Halm _fluctuari_, but the
+deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. _Summa_: cf. _summa
+philosophiae_ _D.F._ II. 86. _Veri falsi_: cf. n. on 92. _Quae visa_: so
+Halm for MSS. _quaevis_, which edd. had changed to _quae a quovis_.
+_Repudiari_: the selection depended on the _probabile_ of course, with the
+Academics. _Veri falsique_: these words were used in different senses by
+the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them "the undestructibly
+true and false." This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense
+arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. says, [Greek: psil� phasei
+ison pheretai psil� phasis] (_A.M._ VII. 315), [Greek: phasei men phasis
+epischeth�setai] (_ib._ 337). _Cognoscendi initium_: cf. 26, "This I have,"
+the Academic would reply, "in my _probabile_." _Extremum expetendi_: a
+rather unusual phrase for the ethical _finis_. _Ut moveri non possint_: so
+[Greek: kineisthai] is perpetually used in Sext. _Est ut opinor_: so Halm
+after Ernesti for _sit_ of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS.
+reading is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the
+Greek [Greek: hikanos eio�sth�] and the like. The subj. is supported by
+_D.F._ III. 20, _De Off._ I. 8, _Ad Att._ XIII. 14, 3, where _ut opinor_ is
+thrown in as here, and by _Ac._ II. 17, _D.F._ III. 21, 24, _N.D._ I. 109,
+where _si placet_ is appended in a similar way.
+
+    ��30--36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we might urge that
+    nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed
+    for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses
+    the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection
+    of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained
+    through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some
+    sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others distinguish between the
+    absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence.
+    Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on
+    the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the
+    other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between
+    true and false is possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be
+    known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing.
+    How can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility
+    remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be
+    "evident" at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is
+    no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.
+    Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they
+    only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we
+    reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36).
+
+�30. _Physicis_: neuter not masc.; cf. I. 6. _Libertatem et licentiam_:
+_et_ = "and even." _Libertas_ = [Greek: parr�sia] as often in Tacitus.
+_Abditis rebus et obscuris_: cf. n. on I. 15, and the word [Greek:
+syneskiasmenos] Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 26. _Lucem eripere_: like _tollere_
+(n. on 26), cf. 38, 103 and _N.D._ I. 6. For the sense see n. on 16, also
+61. _Artificio_: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to _ars_ in all
+its senses, cf. 114 and _De Or._ II. 83. _Fabricata esset_: the expression
+is sneered at in 87. _Quem ad modum primum_: so Halm rightly for MSS.
+_prima_ or _primo_, which latter is not often followed by _deinde_ in
+Cicero. _Primum_ is out of position, as in 24. _Appetitio pulsa_: = _mota_,
+set in motion. For [Greek: horm�] see 24. _Intenderemus_: as in the exx.
+given in 20. _Fons_: "reservoir," rather than "source" here. It will be
+noted that [Greek: synkatathesis] must take place before the [Greek: horm�]
+is roused. _Ipse sensus est_: an approach to this theory is made in Plat.
+_Theaet._ 185, 191. Cf. especially Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 350 [Greek: kai
+hoi men diapherein aut�n t�n aisth�se�n, h�s hoi pleious, hoi de aut�n
+einai tas aisth�seis ... h�s stase�s �rxe Straton]. All powers of sensation
+with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included in the
+[Greek: h�gemonikon], cf. n. on I. 38. _Alia quasi_: so Faber for _aliqua_.
+"_In vera et aperta partitione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis--alius
+dixit, multo minus alius--aliquis_," _M.D.F._ III. 63. Goer. on the other
+hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he forbears however, to
+produce them. _Recondit_: so the [Greek: ennoiai] are called [Greek:
+apokeimenai no�seis] (Plut. _De Sto. Repug._ p. 1057 a). In Sext. _Adv.
+Math._ VII. 373 [Greek: mn�m�] is called [Greek: th�saurismos phantasi�n].
+_Similitudinibus_: [Greek: kath' homoi�sin] Sext. _Pyrr. Hyp._ II. 75. Cic.
+uses this word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know
+things not immediately perceived by sense. In _D.F._ III. 33 it receives
+its proper meaning, for which see Madv. there, and the passages he quotes,
+"analogies" will here best translate the word, which, is used in the same
+wide sense in _N.D._ II. 22 38. _Construit_: so MSS. Orelli gave
+_constituit_. _Notitiae_: cf. 22. Cic. fails to distinguish between the
+[Greek: physikai ennoiai] or [Greek: koinai] which are the [Greek:
+prol�pseis], and those [Greek: ennoiai] which are the conscious product of
+the reason, in the Stoic system. Cf. _M.D.F._ III. 21, V. 60, for this and
+other inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also Zeller 79.
+_Rerumque_: "facts". _Perfecta_: _sapientia_, _virtus_, _perfecta ratio_,
+are almost convertible terms in the expositions of Antiocheanism found in
+Cic. Cf. I. 20.
+
+�31. _Vitaeque constantiam_: which philosophy brings, see 23.
+_Cognitionem_: [Greek: epist�m�n]. _Cognitio_ is used to translate [Greek:
+katal�psis] in _D.F._ II. 16, III. 17, cf. n. on I. 41. _Ut dixi ...
+dicemus_: For the repetition cf. 135, 146, and _M.D.F._ I. 41. The future
+tense is odd and unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote _dicimus_, I would rather read
+_dicamus_; cf. n. on 29. _Per se_: [Greek: kath' aut�n], there is no need
+to read _propter_, as Lamb. _Ut virtutem efficiat_: note that virtue is
+throughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the
+_reason_. _Evertunt_: cf. _eversio_ in 99. _Animal ... animo_: Cic. allows
+_animus_ to all animals, not merely _anima_; see Madv. _D.F._ V. 38. The
+rule given by Forc. s.v. _animans_ is therefore wrong. _Temeritate_:
+[Greek: propeteia], which occurs _passim_ in Sext. The word, which is
+constantly hurled at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of
+retort. So in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 260, the sceptic is called [Greek:
+embront�tos] for rejecting the [Greek: katal�ptik� phantasia].
+
+�32. _Incerta_: [Greek: ad�la]. _Democritus_: cf. I. 44. _Quae ...
+abstruserit_: "_because_ she has hidden." _Alii autem_: note the ellipse of
+the verb, and cf. I. 2. _Etiam queruntur_: "actually complain;" "go so far
+as to complain." _Inter incertum_: cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 7,
+12, [Greek: diaphoran einai ad�lou kai akatal�ptou, kai panta men einai
+akatal�pta ou panta de ad�la] (quoted as from Carneades), also 54 of this
+book. _Docere_: "to prove," cf. n. on 121. _Qui haec distinguunt_: the
+followers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on I. 45.
+_Stellarum numerus_: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in
+Sext. e.g. _P.H_. II. 90, 98, _A.M_. VII. 243, VIII. 147, 317; where it is
+reckoned among things [Greek: ai�nion echonta agn�sian]. So in the Psalms,
+God only "telleth the number of the stars;" cf. 110. _Aliquos_:
+contemptuous; [Greek: aponeno�menous tinas]. Cf. _Parad._ 33 _agrestis
+aliquos_. _Moveri_: this probably refers to the speech of Catulus; see
+Introd. p. 51. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 15 refers to this passage, which must
+have been preserved in the second edition.
+
+�33. _Veri et falsi_: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first
+clause, and Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and
+appropriate. "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and
+the false while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether."
+The discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use
+the term "true" to denote the _probably true_, the Academics are not open
+to the criticism here attempted; cf. 111 _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_.
+_Ut inter rectum et pravum_: the sceptic would no more allow the absolute
+certainty of this distinction than of the other. _Communis_: the [Greek:
+aparallaktos] of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf.
+[Greek: koin� phantasia al�thous kai pseudous] Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R.
+and P. 410), also 175. _Notam_: the [Greek: s�meion] of Sextus; cf. esp.
+_P.H_. II. 97 sq. _Eodem modo falsum_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P.
+410) [Greek: oudemia estin al�th�s phantasia hoia ouk an genoito pseud�s].
+_Ut si quis_: Madv. in an important n. on _D.F._ IV. 30 explains this thus;
+_ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, possit dicere_. I do not think our
+passage at all analogous to those he quotes, and still prefer to construe
+_quem_ as a strong relative, making a pause between _quis_ and _quem_.
+_Visionem_: Simply another trans. of [Greek: phantasia]. _Ut Carneades_:
+see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 166 [Greek: t�n te pithan�n phantasian kai t�n
+pithan�n hama kai aperispaston kai diex�deumen�n] (R. and P. 411). As the
+trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 "probable undisputed and tested"
+is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own explanation. The merely [Greek:
+pithan�] is that sensation which at first sight, without any further
+inquiry, seems probably true (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 167--175). Now no sensation
+is perceived _alone_; the percipient subject has always other synchronous
+sensations which are able to turn him aside ([Greek: perispan, perielkein])
+from the one which is the immediate object of his attention. This last is
+only called [Greek: aperispastos] when examination has shown all the
+concomitant sensations to be in harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175--181.)
+The word "undisputed," therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The
+[Greek: diex�deumen�] ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere
+apparent agreement of the concomitant sensations with the principal one.
+Circumstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined;
+the time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition
+of the space within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between
+the person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the
+person's mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext.
+181--189).
+
+�34. _Communitas_: [Greek: aparallaxia] or [Greek: epimixia t�n
+phantasi�n]; Sext. _A.M._ VII. 403, _P.H._ I. 127. _Proprium_: so Sext.
+often uses [Greek: idioma], e.g. _A. M._ IX. 410. _Signo notari_: _signo_
+for _nota_, merely from love of variety. The _in_ before _communi_, though
+bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly sound; it means "within
+the limits of," and is so used after _notare_ in _De Or._, III. 186.
+_Convicio_: so Madv. _Em._ 143 corrected the corrupt MSS. readings,
+comparing _Orator_ 160, _Ad Fam._ XV. 18. A.W. Zumpt on _Pro Murena_ 13
+rightly defines the Ciceronian use of the word, "_Non unum maledictum
+appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio_." He is wrong
+however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word _once_ in the plural (_Ad
+Att._ II. 18, 1), for it occurs _N.D._ II. 20, and elsewhere. _Perspicua_:
+[Greek: enarg�], a term used with varying signification by all the later
+Greek schools. _Verum illud quidem_: "which is indeed what _they_ call
+'true'." _Impressum_: n. on 18. _Percipi atque comprehendi_: Halm retains
+the barbarous _ac_ of the MSS. before the guttural. It is quite impossible
+that Cic. could have written it. The two verbs are both trans. of [Greek:
+katalambanesthai]; Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described
+in _D.F._ III. 14 _erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem
+declarantibus_. _Subtiliter_: Cic.'s constant trans. of [Greek: akrib�s] or
+[Greek: kat' akribeian] (_passim_ in Sext. e.g. _P.H._ II. 123).
+_Inaniterne moveatur_: MSS. agree in _ve_ for _ne_, on which see _M.D.F._
+IV. 76. _Inaniter_ = [Greek: ken�s] = [Greek: pseud�s]. Cf. n. on I. 35,
+also II. 47, _D.F._ V. 3 (_inaniter moveri_), _T.D._ IV. 13, _De Div._ II.
+120, 126, 140 (_per se moveri_), Greek [Greek: kenopathein] (Sext. _P.H._
+II. 49), [Greek: kenopatheia] (= _inanis motus_, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 184),
+[Greek: kenopath�mata kai anaplasmata t�s dianoias] (_ib._ VIII. 354),
+[Greek: diakenos helkysmos] (_ib._ VII. 241), [Greek: diakenos phantasia]
+(_ib._ VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase [Greek: kin�ma t�s dianoias]. For
+the meaning see n. on 47. _Relinquitur_: so in Sext. [Greek: apoleipein] is
+constantly used as the opposite of [Greek: anairein] (_tollere_).
+
+�35. _Neminem_ etc.: they are content to make strong statements without any
+mark of certainty. _Primo quasi adspectu_: the _merely_ [Greek: pithan�
+phantasia] is here meant; see 33.
+
+�36. _Ex circumspectione_, etc.: the [Greek: diex�deumen�]; see n. on 33.
+_Primum quia ... deinde_: for the slight anacoluthia, cf. _M.D.F_ ed. II.
+p. 796. _Iis visis_, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of _things_, emitting
+a number of _appearances_, and you cannot be sure of uniting each
+_appearance_ to the _thing_ from which it proceeds, then you can have no
+faith in any _appearance_ even if you have gone through the process
+required by Carneades' rules. _Ad verum ipsum_: cf. 40. _Quam proxime_: cf.
+47, and also 7. _Insigne_: [Greek: s�meion], the same as _nota_ and
+_signum_ above. _Quo obscurato_: so Lamb. for MSS. _obscuro_ which Halm
+keeps. Cf. _quam obscurari volunt_ in 42 and _quo sublato_ in 33.
+_Argumentum_: Cic. seems to be thinking of the word [Greek: tekm�rion],
+which, however, the Stoics hardly use. _Id quod significatur_: [Greek: to
+s�mei�nton] in Sext.
+
+    ��37--40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to act. You must
+    either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to
+    phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a
+    firm assent to be given to some phenomena, he therefore who does away
+    with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39).
+
+�37. _Explicabamus_: 19--21 and 30 (_quae vis esset in sensibus_).
+_Inanimum_: not _inanimatum_, cf. _M.D.F_. IV. 36. _Agit aliquid_: I. 23.
+_Quae est in nostra_: Walker's insertion of _non_ before _est_ is needless,
+cf. n. on I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the
+assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 397 [Greek: to
+men gar phantasi�th�nai aboul�ton �n]). For _in potestate_ cf. _De Fato_ 9,
+_N.D._ I. 69
+
+�38. _Eripitur_: cf. 30. _Neque sentire_: Christ om. _neque_; but the
+sceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. _Cedere_:
+cf. [Greek: eikein, eixis] in Sext. _P.H._ I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51,
+[Greek: t�n de aisth�tik�n meta eixe�s kai synkatathese�s ginontai [hai
+phantasia]]; also 66 of this book. [Greek: Oikeion]: cf. 34. _Adsentitur
+statim_: this really contradicts a good deal that has gone before, esp. 20.
+_Memoriam_: cf. 22. _In nostra potestate_: this may throw light on fragm.
+15 of the _Ac. Post._, which see.
+
+�39. _Virtus_: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral
+action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. _Ante videri
+aliquid_ for the doctrine cf. 25, for the passive use of _videri_, n. on
+25. _Adsentiatur_: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. _Em._ 131, the
+change of construction from infin. to subj. after _necesse est_ on _D.F._
+V. 25. _Tollit e vita_: so _De Fato_ 29.
+
+    ��40--42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give
+    a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different
+    classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong
+    arguments, (1) _things_ which produce _sensations_ such as might have
+    been produced in the same form by other _things_, cannot be partly
+    capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) _sensations_ must
+    be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to
+    distinguish between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly
+    true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real _perceptions_,
+    while the true are always of a form which the false _may_ assume. Now
+    sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly
+    perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also
+    a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1)
+    false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are
+    indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not.
+    The following two assertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are
+    partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a
+    reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an
+    unreality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions
+    into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from
+    sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either
+    class (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a certainly known
+    sensation."]
+
+�40. _Quasi fundamenta_: a trans. probably of [Greek: themelios] or the
+like; cf. [Greek: h�sper themelios] in Sext. _A.M._ V. 50. _Artem_: method,
+like [Greek: techn�], cf. _M.D.F._ III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. _Vim_:
+the general character which attaches to all [Greek: phantasiai]; _genera_
+the different classes of [Greek: phantasiai]. _Totidem verbis_: of course
+with a view to showing that nothing really corresponded to the definition.
+Carneades largely used the _reductio ad absurdum_ method. _Contineant ...
+quaestionem_: cf. 22 and _T.D._ IV. 65 _una res videtur causam continere_.
+_Quae ita_: it is essential throughout this passage to distinguish clearly
+the _sensation_ (_visum_) from the _thing_ which causes it. Here the
+_things_ are meant; two _things_ are supposed to cause two _sensations_ so
+similar that the person who has one of the _sensations_ cannot tell from
+which of the two _things_ it comes. Under these circumstances the sceptics
+urge that it is absurd to divide _things_ into those which can be perceived
+(known with certainty) and those which cannot. _Nihil interesse autem_: the
+sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity of the two
+sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is enough if he
+can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to discern whatever
+difference may exist, cf. 85. _Alia vera sunt_: Numenius in Euseb. _Pr.
+Ev._ XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and falsehood (or reality
+and unreality) could be affirmed of _things_, though not of _sensations_.
+If we could only pierce _through_ a sensation and arrive at its source, we
+should be able to tell whether to believe the sensation or not. As we
+cannot do this, it is wrong to assume that _sensation_ and _thing_
+correspond. Cf. Sext. _P.H._ I. 22 [Greek: peri men tou phaisthai toion �
+toion to hypokeimenon] (i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds)
+[Greek: oudeis is�s amphisb�tei, peri de tou ei toiouton estin hopoion
+phainetai z�teitai]. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some
+modern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause
+sensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the
+things, our sensations do not give us correct information about them.
+_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 33 _eodem modo_. _Non posse accidere_: this is a very
+remarkable, and, as Madv. (_D.F._ I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from
+_recta oratio to obliqua_. Halm with Manut. reads _potest_. Cf. 101.
+
+�41. _Neque enim_: a remark of Lucullus' merely. _Quod sit a vero_: cf.
+Munio on Lucr. II. 51 _fulgor ab auro_. _Possit_: for the om. of _esse_ cf.
+n. on I. 29.
+
+�42. _Proposita_: cf. [Greek: protaseis] _passim_ in Sext. _In sensus_: =
+_in ea, quae ad sensus pertinent_ cf. I. 20. _Omni consuetudine_: "general
+experience" [Greek: empeiria], cf. _N.D._ I. 83. _Quam obscurari volunt_:
+cf. I. 33. _quod explanari volebant_; the em. of Dav. _obscurare_ is
+against Cic.'s usage, that of Christ _quam observari nolunt_ is wanton
+without being ingenious. _De reliquis_: i.e. _iis quae a sensibus
+ducuntur_. _In singulisque rebus_: the word _rebus_ must mean _subjects_,
+not _things_, to which the words _in minima dispertiunt_ would hardly
+apply. _Adiuncta_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) [Greek: pas�i t�
+dokous�i al�thei kathestanai eurisketai tis aparallaktos pseud�s], also
+VII. 438, etc.
+
+    ��43--45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to _define_, for (1) a
+    definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition
+    is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being
+    thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes
+    of reasoning their _probabile_ is not enough. Reasoning can only
+    proceed upon _certain_ premisses. Again to say that there are false
+    sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge
+    therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is
+    none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of
+    _visa_, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).
+
+�43. _Horum_: Lamb. _harum_; the text however is quite right, cf. Madv.
+_Gram._ 214 b. _Luminibus_: cf. 101. _Nihilo magis_: = [Greek: ouden
+mallon], which was constantly in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext.
+_P.H._ I. 14. _Num illa definitio ... transferri_: I need hardly point out
+that the [Greek: horos] of the Academics was merely founded on probability,
+just as their "truth" was (cf. n. on 29). An Academic would say in reply to
+the question, "probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it." _Vel illa
+vera_: these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack
+them. _Vel_ = "even" i.e. if _even_ the definition is firmly known, the
+thing, which is more important, must also be known. In _illa vera_ we have
+a pointed mocking repetition like that of _veri et falsi_ in 33. _In
+falsum_: note that _falsum_ = _aliam rem_ above. For the sense cf. Sext.
+_P.H._ II. 209 [Greek: mochth�rous horous einai tous periechontas ti t�n m�
+prosont�n tois horistois], and the schoolmen's maxim _definitio non debet
+latior esse definito suo_. _Minime volunt_: cf. 18. _Partibus_: Orelli
+after Goer. ejected this, but _omnibus_ hardly ever stands for _omn.
+rebus_, therefore C.F. Hermann reads _pariter rebus_ for _partibus_. A
+little closer attention to the subject matter would have shown emendation
+to be unnecessary, cf. 42 _dividunt in partis_, _T.D._ III. 24, where
+_genus_ = division, _pars_ = subdivision.
+
+�44. _Impediri ... fatebuntur_: essentially the same argument as in 33 at
+the end. _Occurretur_: not an imitation of [Greek: enantiousthai] as Goer.
+says, but of [Greek: apantan], which occurs very frequently in Sext.
+_Sumpta_: the two premisses are in Gk. called together [Greek: l�mmata],
+separately [Greek: l�mma] and [Greek: prosl�psis] (_sumptio et adsumptio_
+_De Div_ II. 108). _Orationis_: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes
+use this word like _ratio_ ([Greek: syllogismos]), cf. _De Leg._ I. 48
+_conclusa oratio_. Fab. refers to Gell. XV. 26. _Profiteatur_: so [Greek:
+hypischneisthai] is often used by Sext. e.g. _A.M._ VIII. 283.
+_Patefacturum_: n. on 26, [Greek: ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos, d�l�tikos]
+(the last in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 277) often recur in Greek. _Primum esse ...
+nihil interesse_: there is no inconsistency. Carneades allowed that _visa_,
+_in themselves_, might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties
+were incapable of distinguishing those _visa_ which proceed from real
+things and give a correct representation of the things, from those which
+either are mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly
+represent it. Lucullus confuses _essential_ with _apparent_ difference.
+_Non iungitur_: a supposed case of [Greek: diart�sis], which is opposed to
+[Greek: synart�sis] and explained in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 430.
+
+�45. _Assentati_: here simply = _assensi_. _Praeteritis_: here used in the
+strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed over," cf. _in
+remissis_ _Orat._ 59. _Primum igitur ... sed tamen_: for the slight
+anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Iis qui videntur_: Goer. _is qui
+videtur_, which is severely criticised by Madv. _Em._ 150. For Epicurus'
+view of sensation see n. on 79, 80.
+
+    ��46--48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to the innate
+    clearness of some phenomena ([Greek: enargeia]) is due to two causes,
+    (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which
+    these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic
+    paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom
+    sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is
+    easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be
+    mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom
+    sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The
+    dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom sensations _do_ command
+    assent. Why should they not admit that they command assent when they so
+    closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48)
+
+�46. _Circumfusa sint_: Goer. retains the MSS. _sunt_ on the ground that
+the clause _quanta sint_ is inserted [Greek: parenthetik�s]! Orelli
+actually follows him. For the phrase cf. 122 _circumfusa tenebris_.
+_Interrogationibus_: cf. I. 5 where I showed that the words _interrogatio_
+and _conclusio_ are convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure syllogisms
+are very frequently called [Greek: er�t�seis], and that he often introduces
+a new argument by [Greek: er�tatai kai touto], when there is nothing
+interrogatory about the argument at all. _Dissolvere_: [Greek: apolyesthai]
+in Sext. _Occurrere_: cf. 44.
+
+�47. _Confuse loqui_: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus
+in _D.F._ II. 27. _Nulla sunt_: on the use of _nullus_ for _non_ in Cic.
+cf. Madv. _Gram._ 455 obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very
+common in Plaut. and Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the
+Letters. _Inaniter_: cf. 34. There are two ways in which a sensation may be
+false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be supposed by
+the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different thing, (2) it
+may be a mere [Greek: phantasma] or [Greek: anaplasma t�s dianoias], a
+phantom behind which there is no reality at all. _Quae in somnis
+videantur_: for the support given by Stoics to all forms of divination see
+Zeller 166, _De Div._ I. 7, etc. _Quaerunt_: a slight anacoluthon from
+_dicatis_ above. _Quonam modo ... nihil sit omnino_: this difficult passage
+can only be properly explained in connection with 50 and with the general
+plan of the Academics expounded in 41. After long consideration I elucidate
+it as follows. The whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced
+in 41 and 42 viz. _omnibus veris visis adiuncta esse falsa_. The criticism
+in 50 shows that the argument is meant to be based on the assumption known
+to be Stoic, _omnia deum posse_. If the god can manufacture (_efficere_)
+sensations which are false, but probable (as the Stoics say he does in
+dreams), why can he not manufacture false sensations which are so probable
+as to closely resemble true ones, or to be only with difficulty
+distinguishable from the true, or finally to be utterly indistinguishable
+from the true (this meaning of _inter quae nihil sit omnino_ is fixed by
+40, where see n.)? _Probabilia_, then, denotes false sensations such as
+have only a slight degree of resemblance to the true, by the three
+succeeding stages the resemblance is made complete. The word _probabilia_
+is a sort of tertiary predicate after _efficere_ ("to manufacture so as to
+be probable"). It _must not be repeated_ after the second _efficere_, or
+the whole sense will be inverted and this section placed out of harmony
+with 50. _Plane proxime_: = _quam proxime_ of 36.
+
+�48. _Ipsa per sese_: simply = _inaniter_ as in 34, 47, i.e. without the
+approach of any external object. _Cogitatione_: the only word in Latin, as
+[Greek: dianoia] is in Greek, to express our "imagination." _Non numquam_:
+so Madv. for MSS. _non inquam_. Goer. after Manut. wrote _non inquiunt_
+with an interrogation at _omnino_. _Veri simile est_: so Madv. _D.F._ III.
+58 for _sit_. The argument has the same purpose as that in the last
+section, viz to show that phantom sensations may produce the same effect on
+the mind as those which proceed from realities. _Ut si qui_: the _ut_ here
+is merely "as," "for instance," cf. n. on 33. _Nihil ut esset_: the _ut_
+here is a repetition of the _ut_ used several times in the early part of
+the sentence, all of them alike depend on _sic_. Lamb. expunged _ut_ before
+_esset_ and before _quicquam_. _Intestinum et oblatum_: cf. Sext. _A.M._
+VII. 241 [Greek: �toi t�n ektos � t�n en h�min path�n], and the two classes
+of _falsa visa_ mentioned in n. on 47. _Sin autem sunt_, etc.: if there
+_are_ false sensations which are probable (as the Stoics allow), why should
+there not be false sensations so probable as to be with difficulty
+distinguishable from the true? The rest exactly as in 47.
+
+    ��49--53. Antiochus attacked these arguments as _soritae_, and
+    therefore faulty (49). The admission of a certain amount of similarity
+    between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the
+    impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50). We
+    contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we
+    require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we
+    make light of the sensations we had while in it (51). But, say our
+    opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our
+    waking ones. This we deny (52). "But," say they, "you allow that the
+    wise man in madness withholds his assent." This proves nothing, for he
+    will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about
+    dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention (53).
+
+�49. _Antiochus_: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and
+similar subjects. _Ipsa capita_: [Greek: auta ta kephalaia].
+_Interrogationis_: the _sorites_ was always in the form of a series of
+questions, cf. _De Div._ II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already
+naturalised, so that his proposed trans. _acervalis_ is unnecessary),
+_Hortens._ fragm. 47, and n. on 92. _Hoc vocant_: i.e. _hoc genus_, cf.
+_D.F._ III. 70 _ex eo genere, quae prosunt_. _Vitiosum_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 50
+_ille sorites, quo nihil putatis_ (Stoici) _vitiosius_. Most edd. read
+_hos_, which indeed in 136 is a necessary em. for MSS. _hoc_. _Tale visum_:
+i.e. _falsum_. _Dormienti_: sc. [Greek: tini]. _Ut probabile sit_, etc.:
+cf. 47, 48 and notes. _Primum quidque_: not _quodque_ as Klotz; cf.
+_M.D.F._ II. 105, to whose exx. add _De Div._ II. 112, and an instance of
+_proximus quisque_ in _De Off._ II. 75. _Vitium_: cf. _vitiosum_ above.
+
+�50. _Omnia deum posse_: this was a principle generally admitted among
+Stoics at least, see _De Div._ II. 86. For the line of argument here cf.
+_De Div._ II. 106 _fac dare deos, quod absurdum est_. _Eadem_: this does
+not mean that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when
+one of them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n.
+on 40. _Similes_: after this _sunt_ was added by Madv. _In suo genere
+essent_: substitute _esse viderentur_ for _essent_, and you get the real
+view of the Academic, who would allow that _things in their essence_ are
+divisible into sharply-defined _genera_, but would deny that the
+_sensations_ which proceed from or are caused by the _things_, are so
+divisible.
+
+�51. _Una depulsio_: cf. 128 (_omnium rerum una est definitio
+comprehendendi_), _De Div._ II. 136 (_omnium somniorum una ratio est_). _In
+quiete_: = _in somno_, a rather poetical usage. _Narravit_: Goer., Orelli,
+Klotz alter into _narrat_, most wantonly. _Visus Homerus_, etc.: this
+famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his _Annals_, is referred to by Lucr.
+I. 124, Cic. _De Rep._ VI. 10 (_Somn. Scip._ c. 1), Hor. _Epist._ II. 1,
+50. _Simul ut_: rare in Cic., see Madv. _D.F._ II. 33, who, however, unduly
+restricts the usage. In three out of the five passages where he allows it
+to stand, the _ut_ precedes a vowel; Cic. therefore used it to avoid
+writing _ac_ before a vowel, so that in _D.F._ II. 33 _ut_ should probably
+be written (with Manut. and others) for _et_ which Madv. ejects.
+
+�52. _Eorumque_: MSS. om. _que_. Dav. wrote _ac_ before _eorum_, this
+however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a guttural condemned in n.
+on 34. For the argument see n. on 80 _quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non
+quid videatur_. _Primum interest_: for om. of _deinde_ cf. 45, 46.
+_Imbecillius_: cf. I. 41. _Edormiverunt_: "have slept _off_ the effects,"
+cf. [Greek: apobrizein] in Homer. _Relaxentur_: cf. [Greek: anienai t�s
+org�s] Aristoph. _Ran._ 700, _relaxare_ is used in the neut. sense in
+_D.F._ II. 94. _Alcmaeonis_: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is often quoted by
+Cic., e.g. _D.F._ IV. 62.
+
+�53. _Sustinet_: [Greek: epechei]; see on 94. _Aliquando sustinere_: the
+point of the Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness
+the [Greek: epoch�] of the _sapiens_ becomes _habitual_; he gives up the
+attempt to distinguish between true and false _visa_. Lucullus answers
+that, did no distinction exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it,
+even in the sane condition. _Confundere_: so 58, 110, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 56
+([Greek: syncheousi ta pragmata]), _ib._ VIII. 157 ([Greek: syncheomen ton
+bion]), VIII. 372 ([Greek: hol�n syncheei t�n philosophon z�t�sin]), Plut.
+_De Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos_ p. 1077 ([Greek: h�s panta pragmata
+syncheousi]). _Utimur_: "we have to put up with," so [Greek: chr�sthai] is
+used in Gk. _Ebriosorum_: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than
+_vinolenti_ above. _Illud attendimus_: Goer., and Orelli write _num illud_,
+but the emphatic _ille_ is often thus introduced by itself in questions, a
+good ex. occurs in 136. _Proferremus_: this must apparently be added to the
+exx. qu. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 of the subj. used to denote "_non id
+quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri debuerit_." As such passages are
+often misunderstood, I note that they can be most rationally explained as
+elliptic constructions in which a _condition_ is expressed without its
+_consequence_. We have an exact parallel in English, e.g. "_tu dictis
+Albane maneres_" may fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy
+word, Alban!" Here the condition "_if_ thou hadst kept, etc." stands
+without the consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the
+kind. Such a condition may be expressed without _si_, just as in Eng.
+without "_if_," cf. Iuv. III. 78 and Mayor's n. The use of the Greek
+optative to express a wish (with [Greek: ei gar], etc., and even without
+[Greek: ei]) is susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has
+many such points of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most
+of the functions of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 seems
+to imply that he prefers the hypothesis of a suppressed protasis, but as in
+his _Gram._ 351 _b_, obs. 4 he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be
+certain.]
+
+    ��54--63. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such doctrines do
+    away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and seals is
+    childish (54). They press into their service the old physical
+    philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much ridiculed by them
+    (55). Democritus may say that innumerable worlds exist in every
+    particular similar to ours, but I appeal to more cultivated physicists,
+    who maintain that each thing has its own peculiar marks (55, 56). The
+    Servilii were distinguished from one another by their friends, and
+    Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the appearance of an egg which
+    hen had laid it (56, 57). We however, do not much care whether we are
+    able to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that
+    they say is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between
+    individual sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58).
+    Equally absurd are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they
+    profess to follow. The doctrine that true and false sensations are
+    indistinguishable logically leads to the unqualified [Greek: epoch�] of
+    Arcesilas (59). What nonsense they talk about inquiring after the
+    truth, and about the bad influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero,
+    the panegyrist of philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian
+    darkness? (61) By holding that knowledge is impossible you weaken the
+    force of your famous oath that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus
+    ended Lucullus, amid the continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then
+    Catulus said that he should not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus
+    were to induce me to change my view (63).
+
+�54. _Ne hoc quidem_: the common trans. "not even" for "_ne quidem_" is
+often inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this _either_," cf. n. on
+I. 5. _Habeant_: the slight alteration _habeat_ introduced by Goer. and
+Orelli quite destroys the point of the sentence. _Quod nolunt_: cf. 44. _An
+sano_: Lamb. _an ut sano_, which Halm approves, and Baiter reads.
+_Similitudines_: cf. 84--86. The impossibility of distinguishing between
+twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was a favourite theme with the
+sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no two things were absolutely
+alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the Stoic view, was practically
+refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who took two twins, and made one
+deposit money with Aristo, while the other after a time asked for the money
+back and received it. On this subject cf. Sextus _A.M._ VII. 408--410.
+_Negat esse_: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places _esse_ second,
+especially at the end of a clause. _Cur eo non estis contenti_: Lucullus
+here ignores the question at issue, which concerned the _amount_ of
+similarity. The dogmatists maintained that the similarity between two
+phenomena could never be great enough to render it impossible to guard
+against mistaking the one for the other, the sceptics argued that it could.
+_Quod rerum natura non patitur_: again Lucullus confounds _essential_ with
+_phenomenal_ difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on 50. _Nulla re
+differens_: cf. the _nihil differens_ of 99, the substitution of which here
+would perhaps make the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the
+common Gk. term [Greek: aparallaktos] (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 252, etc.). _Ulla
+communitas_: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of
+Lamb. _nulla_ after the fine note of Madv. (_Em._ 154), approved by Halm
+and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the Stoics may be stated
+thus _suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec est in duobus aut
+pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas_ ([Greek: oude hyparchei
+epimig� aparallaktos]). This opinion is negatived by _non patitur ut_ and
+it will be evident at a glance that the only change required is to put the
+two verbs (_est_) into the subjunctive. The change of _ulla_ into _nulla_
+is in no way needed. _Ut_ [_sibi_] _sint_: _sibi_ is clearly wrong here.
+Madv., in a note communicated privately to Halm and printed by the latter
+on p. 854 of Bait. and Halm's ed of the philosophical works, proposed to
+read _nulla re differens communitas visi? Sint et ova_ etc. omitting _ulla_
+and _ut_ and changing _visi_ into _sibi_ (cf. Faber's em. _novas_ for
+_bonas_ in 72). This ingenious but, as I think, improbable conj. Madv. has
+just repeated in the second vol. of his _Adversaria_. Lamb. reads _at tibi
+sint_, Dav. _at si vis, sint_, Christ _ut tibi sint_, Bait. _ut si sint_
+after C.F.W. Muller, I should prefer _sui_ for _sibi_ (SVI for SIBI). B is
+very frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip in.
+_Eosdem_: once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps intentional
+misconception of the sceptic position; see n. on 50. Before leaving this
+section, I may point out that the [Greek: epimig�] or [Greek: epimixia t�n
+phantasi�n] supplies Sext. with one of the sceptic [Greek: tropoi], see
+_Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 124.
+
+�55. _Irridentur_: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the
+constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. _A.M._ IX. 1. _Absolute ita
+paris_: Halm as well as Bait. after Christ, brackets _ita_; if any change
+be needed, it would be better to place it before _undique_. For this
+opinion of Democr. see R. and P. 45. _Et eo quidem innumerabilis_: this is
+the quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has
+yet been proposed, cf. 125. _Nihil differat, nihil intersit_: these two
+verbs often appear together in Cic., e.g._D.F._ III. 25.
+
+�56. _Potiusque_: this adversative use of _que_ is common with _potius_,
+e.g._D.F._ I. 51. Cf. _T.D._ II. 55 _ingemescere nonnum quam viro concessum
+est, idque raro_, also _ac potius_, _Ad Att._ I. 10, etc. _Proprietates_:
+the [Greek: idiot�tes] or [Greek: idi�mata] of Sextus, the doctrine of
+course involves the whole question at issue between dogmatism and
+scepticism. _Cognoscebantur_: Dav. _dignoscebantur_, Walker
+_internoscebantur_. The MSS. reading is right, cf. 86. _Consuetudine_: cf.
+42, "experience". _Minimum_: an adverb like _summum_.
+
+�57. _Dinotatas_: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not
+recognise the word. Most edd. change it into _denotatas_. _Artem_: [Greek:
+techn�n], a set of rules. _In proverbio_: so _venire in proverbium_, _in
+proverbii usum venire_, _proverbii locum obtinere_, _proverbii loco dici_
+are all used. _Salvis rebus_: not an uncommon phrase, e.g. _Ad Fam._ IV. 1.
+_Gallinas_: cf. fragm. 19 of the _Acad. Post._ The similarity of eggs was
+discussed _ad nauseam_ by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras the Stoic
+actually wrote a book entitled, [Greek: �i skopia] (egg investigation)
+[Greek: � peri sophisteias pros Akad�maikous], mentioned by Suidas.
+
+�58. _Contra nos_: the sense requires _nos_, but all Halm's MSS. except one
+read _vos_. _Non internoscere_: this is the reading of all the MSS., and is
+correct, though Orelli omits _non_. The sense is, "we are quite content not
+to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we shall not on that account be
+led into a mistake for our rule will prevent us from making any positive
+assertion about the eggs." _Adsentiri_: for the passive use of this verb
+cf. 39. _Par est_: so Dav. for _per_, which most MSS. have. The older edd.
+and Orelli have _potest_, with one MS. _Quasi_: the em. of Madv. for the
+_quam si_ of the MSS. _Transversum digitum_: cf. 116. _Ne confundam omnia_:
+cf. 53, 110. _Natura tolletur_: this of course the sceptics would deny.
+They refused to discuss the nature of _things in themselves_, and kept to
+_phenomena_. _Intersit_: i.e. _inter visa_. _In animos_: Orelli with one
+MS. reads _animis_; if the MSS. are correct the assertion of Krebs and
+Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) "_imprimere_ wird klas sisch verbunden _in
+aliqua re_, nicht _in aliquam rem_," will require modification. _Species et
+quasdam formas_: [Greek: eid� kai gen�], _quasdam_ marks the fact that
+_formas_ is a trans. I have met with no other passage where any such
+doctrine is assigned to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine is
+absurd, for surely it must always be easier to distinguish between two
+_genera_ than between two individuals. If the _non_ before _vos_ were
+removed a better sense would be given. It has often been inserted by
+copyists when _sed_, _tamen_, or some such word, comes in the following
+clause, as in the famous passage of Cic _Ad Quintum Fratrem_, II. 11,
+discussed by Munro, Lucr. p. 313, ed. 3.
+
+�59. _Illud vero perabsurdum_: note the omission of _est_, which often
+takes place after the emphatic pronoun. _Impediamini_: cf. n. on 33. _A
+veris_: if _visis_ be supplied the statement corresponds tolerably with the
+Academic belief, if _rebus_ be meant, it is wide of the mark. _Id est ...
+retentio_: supposed to be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on I. 6,
+8. _Constitit_: from _consto_, not from _consisto_ cf. 63 _qui tibi
+constares_. _Si vera sunt_: cf. 67, 78, 112, 148. The _nonnulli_ are Philo
+and Metrodorus, see 78. _Tollendus est adsensus_: i.e. even that qualified
+assent which the Academics gave to probable phenomena. _Adprobare_: this
+word is ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n.
+on 104. _Id est peccaturum_: "which is equivalent to sinning," cf. I. 42.
+_Iam nimium etiam_: note _iam_ and _etiam_ in the same clause.
+
+�60. _Pro omnibus_: note _omnibus_ for _omnibus rebus_. _Ista mysteria_:
+Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 37, 38 speaks of various doctrines, which were
+_servata et pro mysteriis custodita_ by the New Academics. The notion that
+the Academic scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while
+they had an esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the
+reactionary period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and
+may perhaps from a passage of Augustine, _C. Ac._ III. 41 (whose authority
+must have been Cicero), be attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller
+534, n.). The idea is ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p.
+279), and all succeeding inquirers. _Auctoritate_: cf. 8, 9. _Utroque_:
+this neuter, referring to two fem. nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv.
+_Gram._ 214 c.
+
+�61. _Amicissimum_: "_because_ you are my dear friend". _Commoveris_: a
+military term, cf. _De Div._ II. 26 and Forc., also Introd. p. 53.
+_Sequere_: either this is future, as in 109, or _sequeris_, the constant
+form in Cic. of the pres., must be read. _Approbatione omni_: the word
+_omni_ is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified assent, cf.
+59. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 74, and _D.F._ I. 64, where Madv. is wrong in
+reproving Torquatus for using the phrase _sensus tolli_, on the ground that
+the Academics swept away not _sensus_ but _iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis_.
+Goer. qu. Plin. _N.H._ III. 5, Sil. Ital. XII. 131, Festus, s.v.
+_Cimmerii_, to show that the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to
+Bauli, and probably induced this mention of the legendary people. _Deus
+aliquis_: so the best edd. without comment, although they write _deus
+aliqui_ in 19. It is difficult to distinguish between _aliquis_ and
+_aliqui_, _nescio quis_ and _nescio qui_, _si quis_ and _si qui_ (for the
+latter see n. on 81). As _aliquis_ is substantival, _aliqui_ adjectival,
+_aliquis_ must not be written with impersonal nouns like _terror_ (_T.D._
+IV. 35, V. 62), _dolor_ (_T.D._ I. 82, _Ad Fam._ VII. 1, 1), _casus_ (_De
+Off._ III. 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd. vary, e.g.
+_deus aliqui_ (_T.D._ I. 23, IV. 35), _deus aliquis_ (_Lael._ 87, _Ad Fam._
+XIV. 7, 1), _anularius aliqui_ (86 of this book), _magistratus aliquis_
+(_In Verr._ IV. 146). With a proper name belonging to a real person
+_aliquis_ ought to be written (_Myrmecides_ in 120, see my n.).
+_Dispiciendum_: not _despiciendum_, cf. _M.D.F._ II. 97, IV. 64, also _De
+Div._ II. 81, _verum dispicere_. _Iis vinculis_, etc. this may throw light
+on fragm. 15 of the _Acad. Post._, which see.
+
+�62. _Motum animorum_: n. on 34. _Actio rerum_: here _actio_ is a pure
+verbal noun like [Greek: praxis], cf. _De Off._ I. 83, and expressions like
+_actio vitae_ (_N.D._ I. 2), _actio ullius rei_ (108 of this book), and the
+similar use of _actus_ in Quintilian (_Inst. Or._ X. 1, 31, with Mayor's
+n.) _Iuratusque_: Bait. possibly by a mere misprint reads _iratus_.
+_Comperisse_: this expression of Cic., used in the senate in reference to
+Catiline's conspiracy, had become a cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic.
+was often taunted. See _Ad Fam._ V. 5, 2, _Ad Att._ I. 14, 5. _Licebat_:
+this is the reading of the best MSS., not _liquebat_, which Goer., Kl., Or.
+have. For the support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy
+see 3, and the passages quoted in Introd. p. 46 with respect to Catulus, in
+most of which Lucullus is also mentioned.
+
+�63. _Quod ... fecerat, ut_: different from the constr. treated by Madv.
+_Gram._ 481 b. _Quod_ refers simply to the fact of Lucullus' admiration,
+which the clause introduced by _ut_ defines, "which admiration he had shown
+... to such an extent that, etc." _Iocansne an_: this use of _ne ... an_
+implies, Madv. says (on _D.F._ V. 87), more doubt than the use of _ne_
+alone as in _vero falsone_. _Memoriter_: nearly all edd. before Madv. make
+this mean _e memoria_ as opposed to _de scripto_; he says, "_laudem habet
+bonae et copiosae memoriae_" (on _D.F._ I. 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in
+the _Antibarbarus_, ed. 4. _Censuerim_: more modest than _censeo_, see
+Madv. _Gram._ 380. _Tantum enim non te modo monuit_: edd. before Madv.,
+seeing no way of taking _modo_ exc. with _non_, ejected it. Madv. (_Em._
+160) retains it, making it mean _paulo ante_. On the other hand, Halm after
+Christ asserts that _tantum non_ = [Greek: monon ou] occurs nowhere else in
+Cic. Bait. therefore ejects _non_, taking _tantum_ as _hoc tantum, nihil
+praeterea_. Livy certainly has the suspected use of _tantum non_.
+_Tribunus_: a retort comes in 97, 144. _Antiochum_: cf. I. 13.
+_Destitisse_: on the difference between _memini_ followed by the pres. and
+by the perf. inf. consult Madv. _Gram._ 408 _b_, obs. 2.
+
+    ��64--71. Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The strength of
+    Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it can be
+    answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my
+    character (64). I protest my entire sincerity in all that I say, and
+    would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (65). I am a passionate
+    inquirer after truth, and on that very account hold it disgraceful to
+    assent to what is false. I do not deny that I make slips, but we must
+    deal with the _sapiens_, whose characteristic it is never to err in
+    giving his assent (66). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the _sapiens_ ever
+    gives his assent he will be obliged to _opine_, but he never will
+    _opine_ therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and
+    Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is
+    possible to distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so
+    the mere habit of assenting is full of peril. Still, our whole argument
+    must tend to show that _perception_ in the Stoic sense is impossible
+    (68). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When he was converted,
+    what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long denied? (69) Some
+    think he wished to found a school called by his own name. It is more
+    probable that he could no longer bear the opposition of all other
+    schools to the Academy (70). His conversion gave a splendid opening for
+    an _argumentum ad hominem_ (71).
+
+�64. _Quadam oratione_: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not
+_quandam orationem_ as Lamb., Orelli. _De ipsa re_: cf. _de causa ipsa_
+above. _Respondere posse_: for the om. of _me_ before the infin, which has
+wrongly caused many edd. either to read _respondere_ (as Dav., Bait.) or to
+insert _me_ (as Lamb.), see n. on I. 7.
+
+�65. _Studio certandi_: = [Greek: philoneikia]. _Pertinacia ... calumnia_:
+n. on 14. _Iurarem_: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of
+his consulship.
+
+�66. _Turpissimum_: cf. I. 45, _N.D._ I. 1. _Opiner_: _opinio_ or [Greek:
+doxa] is judgment based on insufficient grounds. _Sed quaerimus de
+sapiente_: cf. 115, _T.D._ IV. 55, 59 also _De Or._ III. 75 _non quid ego
+sed quid orator_. _Magnus ... opinator_: Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 31 qu.
+this passage wrongly as from the _Hortensius_. He imitates it, _ibid._ I.
+15 _magnus definitor_. _Qua fidunt_, etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s
+_Aratea_, and are quoted in _N.D._ II. 105, 106. _Phoenices_: the same fact
+is mentioned by Ovid, _Fasti_ III. 107, _Tristia_ IV. 3, 1. _Sed Helicen_:
+the best MSS. om. _ad_, which Orelli places before _Helicen_. _Elimatas_:
+the MSS. are divided between this and _limatas_. _Elimare_, though a very
+rare word occurs _Ad Att._ XVI. 7, 3. _Visis cedo_: cf. n. on 38. _Vim
+maximam_: so _summum munus_ is applied to the same course of action in
+_D.F._ III. 31. _Cogitatione_: "idea". _Temeritate_: cf. I. 42, _De Div._
+I. 7, and the charge of [Greek: propeteia] constantly brought against the
+dogmatists by Sext. _Praepostere_: in a disorderly fashion, taking the
+wrong thing first.
+
+�67. _Aliquando ... opinabitur_: this of course is only true if you grant
+the Academic doctrine, _nihil posse percipi_. _Secundum illud ... etiam
+opinari_: it seems at first sight as though _adsentiri_ and _opinari_ ought
+to change places in this passage, as Manut. proposes. The difficulty lies
+in the words _secundum illud_, which, it has been supposed, must refer back
+to the second premiss of Arcesilas' argument. But if the passage be
+translated thus, "Carneades sometimes granted _as a second premiss_ the
+following statement, that the wise man sometimes does opine" the difficulty
+vanishes. The argument of Carneades would then run thus, (1) _Si ulli rei_,
+etc. as above, (2) _adsentietur autem aliquando_, (3) _opinabitur igitur_.
+
+�68. _Adsentiri quicquam_: only with neuter pronouns like this could
+_adsentiri_ be followed by an accusative case. _Sustinenda est_: [Greek:
+ephekteon]. _Iis quae possunt_: these words MSS. om. _Tam in praecipiti_:
+for the position of _in_ cf. n. on I. 25. The best MSS. have here _tamen
+in_. Madv. altered _tamen_ to _tam_ in n. on _D.F._ V. 26. The two words
+are often confused, as in _T.D._ IV. 7, cf. also n. on I. 16. _Sin autem_,
+etc.: cf. the passage of Lactantius _De Falsa Sapientia_ III. 3, qu. by P.
+Valentia (p. 278 of Orelli's reprint) _si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut
+Socrates docuit, neque opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata
+est_. _Nitamur ... percipi_: "let us struggle to prove the proposition,
+etc." The construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect _hoc_,
+or some such word, to have fallen out between _igitur_ and _nihil_.
+
+�69. _Non acrius_: one of the early editions omits _non_ while Goer. reads
+_acutius_ and puts a note of interrogation at _defensitaverat_. M. _Em._
+161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the old arguments of
+Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his new arguments
+against it. _Quis enim_: so Lamb. for MSS. _quisquam enim_. _Excogitavit_:
+on interrogations not introduced by a particle of any kind see Madv.
+_Gram._ 450. _Eadem dicit_: on the subject in hand, of course. Taken
+without this limitation the proposition is not strictly true, see n. on
+132. _Sensisse_: = _iudicasse_, n. on I. 22. _Mnesarchi ... Dardani_: see
+_Dict. Biogr._
+
+�70. _Revocata est_: Manut. here wished to read _renovata_, cf. n. on I.
+14. _Nominis dignitatem_, etc.: hence Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 41 calls him
+_foeneus ille Platonicus Antiochus_ (that _tulchan_ Platonist). _Gloriae
+causa_: cf. Aug. _ibid._ II. 15 _Antiochus gloriae cupidior quam
+veritatis_. _Facere dicerent_: so Camerarius for the MSS. _facerent_.
+_Sustinere_: cf. 115 _sustinuero Epicureos_. _Sub Novis_: Faber's brilliant
+em. for the MSS. _sub nubes_. The _Novae Tabernae_ were in the forum, and
+are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy. In _De Or._ II. 266 a story is told
+of Caesar, who, while speaking _sub Veteribus_, points to a "_tabula_"
+which hangs _sub Novis_. The excellence of Faber's em. may be felt by
+comparing that of Manut. _sub nube_, and that of Lamb. _nisi sub nube_. I
+have before remarked that _b_ is frequently written in MSS. for _v_.
+_Maenianorum_: projecting eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were
+probably named from their inventor like _Vitelliana_, _Vatinia_ etc.
+
+�71. _Quoque ... argumento_: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread
+is picked up by _quod argumentum_ near the end. _Utrum_: the neuter
+pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are marked by
+_ne_ and _an_. The same usage is found in _D.F._ II. 60, _T.D._ IV. 9, and
+must be carefully distinguished from the use of _utrum ... ne ... an_,
+which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g _De Invent._ II. 115 _utrum
+copiane sit agri an penuria consideratur_. On this point cf. M. _Em._ 163,
+_Gram._ 452, obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic. _Verr._ IV. 73. _Honesti inane nomen
+esse_: a modern would be inclined to write _honestum_, in apposition to
+_nomen_, cf. _D.F._ V. 18 _voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum_.
+_Voluptatem_ etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called [Greek: ho
+metathemenos]) from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf. _T.D._ II. 60, Diog.
+Laert. VII. 166--7. _A vero_: "coming from a reality," cf. 41, n. _Is
+curavit_: Goer. reads _his_, "_solet V. D. in hoc pronomen saevire_," says
+Madv. The scribes often prefix _h_ to parts of the pronoun _is_, and Goer.
+generally patronises their vulgar error.
+
+    ��72--78. Summary. You accuse me of appealing to ancient names like a
+    revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, philosophers
+    of the highest position, protest against the truth of sense knowledge,
+    and deny the possibility of knowledge altogether (72, 73). Empedocles,
+    Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense knowledge. You
+    said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with these. Why?
+    Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while Plato
+    pursued the same theme in all his works (74). Now do you see that I do
+    not merely name, but take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus
+    stated many difficulties concerning the senses and general experience.
+    You say he solved them, even if he did, which I do not believe, he
+    admitted that it was not easy to escape being ensnared by them (75).
+    The Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to
+    themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (76). Zeno held
+    strongly that the wise man ought to keep clear from _opinion_.
+    Arcesilas agreed but this without _knowledge_ was impossible.
+    _Knowledge_ consists of _perceptions_. Arcesilas therefore demanded a
+    definition of _perception_. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is
+    the controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with _opinion_
+    and _perception_, and the [Greek: epoch�] of Arcesilas follows at once
+    (77, 78).
+
+�72. _De antiquis philosophis_: on account of the somewhat awkward constr.
+Lamb. read _antiquos philosophos_. _Popularis_: cf. 13. _Res non bonas_:
+MSS. om. _non_, which Or. added with two very early editions. Faber
+ingeniously supposed the true reading to be _novas_, which would be written
+_nobas_, and then pass into _bonas_. _Nivem nigram_: this deliverance of
+Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In _P.H._ I. 33 he quotes
+it as an instance of the refutation of [Greek: phainomena] by means of
+[Greek: nooumena], "[Greek: Anaxagoras t�i leuk�n einai t�n chiona,
+anetithei hoti chi�n estin hydor pep�gos to de hydor esti melan kai h�
+chi�n ara melaina]." There is an obscure joke on this in _Ad Qu. Fratrem_
+II. 13, 1 _risi nivem atram ... teque hilari animo esse et prompto ad
+iocandum valde me iuvat_. _Sophistes_: here treated as the demagogue of
+philosophy. _Ostentationis_: = [Greek: epideixeos].
+
+�73. _Democrito_: Cic., as Madv. remarks on _D.F._ I. 20, always
+exaggerates the merits of Democr. in order to depreciate the Epicureans,
+cf. _T.D._ I. 22, _De Div._ I. 5, II. 139, _N.D._ I. 120, _De Or._ I. 42.
+_Quintae classis_: a metaphor from the Roman military order. _Qui veri esse
+aliquid_, etc.: cf. _N.D._ I. 12 _non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse
+videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus_. _Non
+obscuros sed tenebricosos_: "not merely dim but darkened." There is a
+reference here to the [Greek: skoti� gn�sis] of Democr., by which he meant
+that knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things as
+shown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also held a
+[Greek: gn�si� gn�sis], dealing with the realities of material existence,
+the atoms and the void, which exist [Greek: ete�i] and not merely [Greek:
+nom�i] as appearances do. See R. and P. 51.
+
+�74. _Furere_: cf. 14. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 61, and for the belief of
+Empedocles about the possibility of [Greek: epist�m�] see the remarks of
+Sextus _A.M._ VII. 123--4 qu. R. and P. 107, who say "_patet errare eos qui
+scepticis adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant_." _Sonum fundere_: similar
+expressions occur in _T.D._ III. 42, V. 73, _D.F._ II. 48. _Parmenides,
+Xenophanes_: these are the last men who ought to be charged with
+scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against sense-knowledge, but
+held that real knowledge was attainable by the reason. Cf. Grote, _Plato_
+I. 54, Zeller 501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. _Minus bonis_:
+Dav. qu. Plut. _De Audit._ 45 A, [Greek: mempsaito d' an tis Parmenidou t�n
+stichopoiian]. _Quamquam_: on the proper use of _quamquam_ in clauses where
+the verb is not expressed see _M.D.F._ V. 68 and cf. I. 5. _Quasi irati_:
+for the use of _quasi_ = almost cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 22, _Orat._ 41.
+_Aiebas removendum_: for om. of _esse_ see n. on I. 43. _Perscripti sunt_:
+cf. n. on I. 16. _Scire se nihil se scire_: cf. I. 16, 44. The words
+referred to are in Plat. _Apol._ 21 [Greek: eoika goun toutou smikr�i tini
+aut�i tout�i soph�teros einai, hoti a m� oida oude oiomai eidenai], a very
+different statement from the _nihil sciri posse_ by which Cic. interprets
+it (cf. R. and P. 148). That [Greek: epist�m�] in the strict sense is
+impossible, is a doctrine which Socrates would have left to the Sophists.
+_De Platone_: the doctrine above mentioned is an absurd one to foist upon
+Plato. The dialogues of search as they are called, while exposing sham
+knowledge, all assume that the real [Greek: epist�m�] is attainable.
+_Ironiam_: the word was given in its Greek form in 15. _Nulla fuit ratio
+persequi_: n. on 17.
+
+�75. _Videorne_: = _nonne videor_, as _videsne_ = _nonne vides_. _Imitari
+numquam nisi_: a strange expression for which Manut. conj. _imitari? num
+quem_, etc., Halm _nullum unquam_ in place of _numquam_. Bait. prints the
+reading of Man., which I think harsher than that of the MSS. _Minutos_: for
+the word cf. _Orat._ 94, also _De Div._ I. 62 _minuti philosophi_, _Brut._
+256 _minuti imperatores_. _Stilponem_, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P.
+177--182. [Greek: sophismata]: Cic. in the second edition probably
+introduced here the translation _cavillationes_, to which Seneca _Ep._ 116
+refers, cf. Krische, p. 65. _Fulcire porticum_: "to be the pillar of the
+Stoic porch". Cf. the anonymous line [Greek: ei m� gar �n Chrysippos, ouk
+an �n Stoa]. _Quae in consuetudine probantur_: n. on 87. _Nisi videret_:
+for the tense of the verb, see Madv. _Gram._ 347 _b_, obs. 2.
+
+�76. _Quid ... philosophi_: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv.
+and followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this
+reading, which only requires the alteration of _Cyrenaei_ into _Cyrenaici_
+(now made by all edd. on the ground that _Cyrenaeus_ is a citizen of
+Cyreno, _Cyrenaicus_ a follower of Aristippus) and the insertion of _tibi_.
+I see no difficulty in the _qui_ before _negant_, at which so many edd.
+take offence. _Tactu intimo_: the word [Greek: haph�] I believe does not
+occur in ancient authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great
+word was [Greek: pathos]. From 143 (_permotiones intimas_) it might appear
+that Cic. is translating either [Greek: pathos] or [Greek: kin�sis]. For a
+clear account of the school see Zeller's _Socrates_, for the illustration
+of the present passage pp 293--300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R. and P.
+162 sq. _Quo quid colore_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 191 (qu. Zeller _Socrates_
+297, R. and P. 165). _Adfici se_: = [Greek: paschein]. _Quaesieras_: note
+the plup. where Eng. idiom requires the perfect or aorist. _Tot saeculis_:
+cf. the same words in 15. _Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis_: cf. _summis
+ingeniis, maximis studiis_ in 15. _Obtrectandi_: this invidious word had
+been used by Lucullus in 16; cf. also I. 44.
+
+�77. _Expresserat_: "had put into distinct shape". Cf. 7 and I. 19.
+_Exprimere_ and _dicere_ are always sharply distinguished by Cic., the
+latter merely implying the mechanic exercise of utterance, the former the
+moulding and shaping of the utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp. _Orat._
+3, 69, and _Ad Att._ VIII. 11, 1; also _De Or._ I. 32, _De Div._ I. 79, qu.
+by Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav. _exposuerat_ is therefore
+needless. _Fortasse_: "we may suppose". _Nec percipere_, etc.: cf. 68, n.
+_Tum illum_: a change from _ille, credo_ (sc. _respondit_), the _credo_
+being now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after _ita
+definisse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 13 (who quotes exx.); also the construction
+with _ita iudico_ in 113. _Ex eo, quod esset_: cf. 18, n. _Effictum_: so
+Manut. for MSS. _effectum_, cf. 18. _Ab eo, quod non est_: the words _non
+est_ include the two meanings "is non existent," and "is different from
+what it seems to be"--the two meanings of _falsum_ indeed, see n. on 47.
+_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 40, 84. MSS. have _eius modi_, altered by Dav. _Recte
+... additum_: the semicolon at _Arcesilas_ was added by Manutius, who is
+followed by all edd. This involves taking _additum_ = _additum est_, an
+ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv. _Opusc._ I. 448, _D.F._ I.
+43, _Gram._ 479 a. I think it quite possible that _recte consensit additum_
+should be construed together, "agreed that the addition had been rightly
+made." For the omission of _esse_ in that case cf. Madv. _Gram._ 406, and
+such expressions as _dicere solebat perturbatum_ in 111, also _ita
+scribenti exanclatum_ in 108. _Recte_, which with the ordinary stopping
+expresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain in
+point. Qy, should _concessit_ be read, as in 118 _concessisse_ is now read
+for MSS. _consensisse_? _A vero_: cf. 41.
+
+�78. _Quae adhuc permanserit_: note the subj., "which is of such a nature
+as to have lasted". _Nam illud ... pertinebat_: by _illud_ is meant the
+argument in defence of [Greek: epoch�] given in 67; by _nihil ...
+pertinebat_ nothing more is intended than that there was no _immediate_ or
+_close_ connection. Cf. the use of _pertinere_ in _D.F._ III. 55.
+_Clitomacho_: cf. n. on 59.
+
+    ��79--90. Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding your cause in
+    spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are thus acting
+    like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the sensation
+    can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80). I wish the god of whom
+    you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound
+    senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our
+    vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you,
+    _we_ desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires not
+    the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the god
+    because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (80, 81). If you
+    want something greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the
+    sun? Still he seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a
+    little broader or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed,
+    too, he appears to us to stand still (82). The whole question lies in a
+    nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is
+    disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a
+    false one indistinguishable from it (83). A man who has mistaken P. for
+    Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising Cotta. You say
+    that no such indistinguishable resemblances _exist_. Never mind, they
+    _seem_ to exist and that is enough. One mistaken sensation will throw
+    all the others into uncertainty (84). You say everything belongs to its
+    own _genus_ this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that
+    two sensations _are_ absolutely similar, it is enough that human
+    faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of
+    signet rings? (85) Can you find a ring merchant to rival your chicken
+    rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So we cannot see or
+    hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea this gives us of
+    the art with which nature has constructed the senses! (86) But about
+    physics I will speak afterwards. I am going now to advance against the
+    senses arguments drawn from Chrysippus himself (87). You said that the
+    sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of
+    the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his
+    Alcmaeon, of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides
+    disprove your point (88, 89). In their case at least 'mind and eyes
+    agreed. It is no good to talk about the saner moments of such people;
+    the question is, what was the nature of their sensations at the time
+    they were affected? (90)
+
+�79. _Communi loco_: [Greek: top�], that of blinking facts which cannot be
+disproved, see 19. _Quod ne_ [_id_]: I have bracketed _id_ with most edd.
+since Manut. If, however, _quod_ be taken as the conjunction, and not as
+the pronoun, _id_ is not altogether insupportable. _Heri_: cf. Introd. 55.
+_Infracto remo_: n. on 19. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his "Higher
+Pantheism"--"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool".
+_Manent illa omnia, iacet_: this is my correction of the reading of most
+MSS. _maneant ... lacerat_. Madv. _Em._ 176 in combating the conj. of Goer.
+_si maneant ... laceratis istam causam_, approves _maneant ... iaceat_, a
+reading with some MSS. support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole
+confusion of the passage arises from the mania of the copyists for turning
+indicatives into subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx.
+occur every few pages. If _iacet_ were by error turned into _iaceret_ the
+reading _lacerat_ would arise at once. The nom. to _dicit_ is, I may
+observe, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans. "all my
+arguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his senses are
+true quotha!" (For this use of _dicit_ cf. _inquit_ in 101, 109, 115).
+Hermann approves the odd reading of the ed. Cratandriana of 1528 _latrat_.
+Dav. conjectured comically _blaterat iste tamen et_, Halm _lacera est ista
+causa_. _Habes_: as two good MSS. have _habes et eum_, Madv. _Em._ 176
+conj. _habet_. The change of person, however, (from _dicit_ to _habes_)
+occurs also in 101. _Epicurus_: n. on 19.
+
+�80. _Hoc est verum esse_: Madv. _Em._ 177 took _verum_ as meaning fair,
+candid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical
+epistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed _virum esse_, a very
+strange em. Halm's conj. _certum esse_ is weak and improbable. _Importune_:
+this is in one good MS. but the rest have _importata_, a good em. is
+needed, as _importune_ does not suit the sense of the passage. _Negat ...
+torsisset_: for the tenses cf. 104 _exposuisset, adiungit_. _Cum oculum
+torsisset_: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing upwards
+or sideways. Cf. Aristot. _Eth. Eud._ VII. 13 (qu. by Dav.) [Greek:
+ophthalmous diastrepsanta h�ste duo to hen phan�nai]. Faber qu. Arist.
+_Problemata_ XVII. 31 [Greek: dia ti eis to plagion kinousi ton ophthalmon
+ou (?) phainetai duo to hen]. Also _ib._ XXXI. 3 inquiring the reason why
+drunkards see double he says [Greek: tauto touto gignetai kai ean tis
+kat�then pies� ton ophthalmon]. Sextus refers to the same thing _P.H._ I.
+47, _A.M._ VII. 192 ([Greek: ho parapiesas ton ophthalmon]) so Cic. _De
+Div._ II. 120. Lucretius gives the same answer as Timagoras, _propter
+opinatus animi_ (IV. 465), as does Sext. _A.M._ VII. 210 on behalf of
+Epicurus. _Sed hic_: Bait. _sit hic_. _Maiorum_: cf. 143. _Quasi
+quaeratur_: Carneades refused to discuss about things in themselves but
+merely dealt with the appearances they present, [Greek: to gar al�thes kai
+to pseudes en tois pragmasi synech�rei] (Numen in Euseb. _Pr. Eu._ XIV. 8).
+Cf. also Sext. _P.H._ I. 78, 87, 144, II. 75. _Domi nascuntur_: a proverb
+used like [Greek: glauk' es' Ath�nas] and "coals to Newcastle," see Lorenz
+on Plaut. _Miles_ II. 2, 38, and cf. _Ad Att._ X. 14, 2, _Ad Fam._ IX. 3.
+_Deus_: cf. 19. _Audiret ... ageret_: MSS. have _audies ... agerent_. As
+the insertion of _n_ in the imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read _ageret_
+and alter _audies_ to suit it. Halm has _audiret ... ageretur_ with Dav.,
+Bait. _audiet, egerit_. _Ex hoc loco video ... cerno_: MSS. have _loco
+cerno regionem video Pompeianum non cerno_ whence Lipsius conj. _ex hoc
+loco e regione video_. Halm ejects the words _regionem video_, I prefer to
+eject _cerno regionem_. We are thus left with the slight change from
+_video_ to _cerno_, which is very often found in Cic., e.g. _Orat._ 18.
+Cic. sometimes however joins the two verbs as in _De Or._ III. 161. _O
+praeclarum prospectum_: the view was a favourite one with Cic., see _Ad
+Att._ I. 13, 5.
+
+�81. _Nescio qui_: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that _nescio quis_
+implies contempt, while _nescio qui_ does not, cf. _Div. in qu. Caec._ 47,
+where _nescio qui_ would contradict his rule. It is as difficult to define
+the uses of the two expressions as to define those of _aliquis_ and
+_aliqui_, on which see 61 n. In _Paradoxa_ 12 the best MSS. have _si qui_
+and _si quis_ almost in the same line with identically the same meaning
+Dav. quotes Solinus and Plin. _N.H._ VII. 21, to show that the man
+mentioned here was called Strabo--a misnomer surely. _Octingenta_: so the
+best MSS., not _octoginta_, which however agrees better with Pliny. _Quod
+abesset_: "_whatever_ might be 1800 stadia distant," _aberat_ would have
+implied that Cic. had some _particular_ thing in mind, cf. Madv. _Gram._
+364, obs. 1. _Acrius_: [Greek: oxyteron], Lamb. without need read _acutius_
+as Goer. did in 69. _Illos pisces_: so some MSS., but the best have
+_ullos_, whence Klotz conj. _multos_, Orelli _multos illos_, omitting
+_pisces_. For the allusion to the fish, cf. _Acad. Post._ fragm. 13.
+_Videntur_: n. on 25. _Amplius_: cf. 19 _non video cur quaerat amplius_.
+_Desideramus_: Halm, failing to understand the passage, follows Christ in
+reading _desiderant_ (i.e. _pisces_). To paraphrase the sense is this "But
+say my opponents, the Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses
+than we have." Well you are like the mole, which does not yearn for the
+light because it does not know what light is. Of course all the ancients
+thought the mole blind. A glance will show the insipidity of the sense
+given by Halm's reading. _Quererer cum deo_: would enter into an
+altercation with the god. The phrase, like [Greek: loidoresthai tini] as
+opposed to [Greek: loidorein tina] implies mutual recrimination, cf. _Pro
+Deiotaro_ 9 _querellae cum Deiotaro_. The reading _tam quererer_ for the
+_tamen quaereretur_ of the MSS. is due to Manut. _Navem_: Sextus often uses
+the same illustration, as in _P.H._ I. 107, _A.M._ VII. 414. _Non tu verum
+testem_, etc.: cf. 105. For the om. of _te_ before _habere_, which has
+strangely troubled edd. and induced them to alter the text, see n. on I. 6.
+
+�82. _Quid ego_: Bait. has _sed quid_ after Ernesti. _Nave_: so the best
+MSS., not _navi_, cf. Madv. _Gram._ 42. _Duodeviginti_: so in 128. Goer.
+and Roeper qu. by Halm wished to read _duodetriginta_. The reff. of Goer.
+at least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the
+sun at 28 times the size of the earth. _Quasi pedalis_: cf. _D.F._ I. 20
+_pedalis fortasse_. For _quasi_ = _circiter_ cf. note on 74. Madv. on
+_D.F._ I. 20 quotes Diog. Laert. X. 91, who preserves the very words of
+Epicurus, in which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr. V. 590,
+who copies Epicurus, and Seneca _Quaest. Nat._ I. 3, 10 (_solem sapientes
+viri pedalem esse contenderunt_). Madv. points out from Plut. _De Plac.
+Phil._ II. 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus asserted the sun to be a foot
+wide, he does not however quote Stob. _Phys._ I. 24, 1 [Greek: h�lion
+megethos echein euros podos anthr�peiou], which is affirmed to be the
+opinion of Heraclitus and Hecataeus. _Ne maiorem quidem_: so the MSS., but
+Goer. and Orelli read _nec_ for _ne_, incurring the reprehension of Madv.
+_D.F._ p. 814, ed 2. _Nihil aut non multum_: so in _D.F._ V. 59, the
+correction of Orelli, therefore, _aut non multum mentiantur aut nihil_, is
+rash. _Semel_: see 79. _Qui ne nunc quidem_: sc. _mentiri sensus putat_.
+Halm prints _quin_, and is followed by Baiter, neither has observed that
+_quin ne ... quidem_ is bad Latin (see _M.D.F._ V. 56). Nor can _quin ne_
+go together even without _quidem_, cf. Krebs and Allgayer, _Antibarbarus_
+ed. 4 on _quin_.
+
+�83. _In parvo lis sit_: Durand's em. for the _in parvulis sitis_ of the
+MSS., which Goer. alone defends. _Quattuor capita_: these were given in 40
+by Lucullus, cf. also 77. _Epicurus_: as above in 19, 79 etc.
+
+�84. _Geminum_: cf. 56. _Nota_: cf. 58 and the speech of Lucullus _passim_.
+_Ne sit ... potest_: cf. 80 _quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur.
+Si ipse erit_ for _ipse_ apparently = _is ipse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 93.
+
+�85. _Quod non est_: = _qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur_. _Sui generis_: cf.
+50, 54, 56. _Nullum esse pilum_, etc.: a strong expression of this belief
+is found in Seneca _Ep._. 113, 13, qu. R. and P. 380. Note the word
+_Stoicum_; Lucullus is of course not Stoic, but Antiochean. _Nihil
+interest_: the same opinion is expressed in 40, where see my note. _Visa
+res_: Halm writes _res a re_, it is not necessary, however, either in Gk.
+or Lat. to express _both_ of two related things when a word is inserted
+like _differat_ here, which shows that they _are_ related. Cf. the elliptic
+constructions in Gk. with [Greek: homoion, metaxy, mesos], and such words.
+_Eodem caelo atque_: a difficult passage. MSS. have _aqua_, an error easy,
+as Halm notes, to a scribe who understood _caelum_ to be the heaven, and
+not [Greek: glypheion], a graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the
+MSS. reading, adducing passages to show that sky and water were important
+in the making of statues. For _aqua_ Orelli conj. _acu_ = _schraffirnadel_,
+C.F. Hermann _caelatura_, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian word.
+Halm's _aeque_ introduces a construction with _ceteris omnibus_ which is
+not only not Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I read _atque_, taking
+_ceteris omnibus_ to be the abl. neut. "all the other implements." Formerly
+I conj. _ascra_, or _atque in_, which last leading would make _omnibus_ =
+_om. statuis_. _Alexandros_: Lysippus alone was privileged to make statues
+of Alexander, as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the conqueror, cf. _Ad
+Fam._ V. 12, 7.
+
+�86. _Anulo_: cf. 54. _Aliqui_: n. on 61. _Gallinarium_: cf. 57. _Adhibes
+artem_: cf. 20 _adhibita arte_. _Pictor ... tibicen_: so in 20. _Simul
+inflavit_: note _simul_ for _simul atque_, cf. _T.D._ IV. 12. _Nostri
+quidem_: i.e. _Romani_. _Admodum_: i.e. _adm. pauci_ cf. _De Leg._ III. 32
+_pauci enim atque admodum pauci_. _Praeclara_: evidently a fem. adj.
+agreeing with _natura_. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and
+understanding _sunt_ interpreted "these arguments I am going to urge are
+grand, viz. _quanto art_. etc."
+
+�87. _Scilicet_: Germ. "nat�rlich." _Fabricata sit_: cf. 30, 119, 121 and
+N.D. I. 19. _Ne modo_: for _modo ne_, a noticeable use. _Physicis_:
+probably neut. _Contra sensus_: he wrote both for and against [Greek:
+syn�theia]; cf. R. and P. 360 and 368. _Carneadem_: Plut. _Sto. Rep_. 1036
+B relates that Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the
+senses, quoted the address of Andromache to Hector: [Greek: daimonie
+phthisei se to son menos]. From Diog. IV. 62 we learn that he thus parodied
+the line qu. in n. on 75, [Greek: ei m� gar �n Chrysippos ouk an �n eg�].
+
+�88. _Diligentissime_: in 48--53. _Dicebas_: in 52 _imbecillius
+adsentiuntur_. _Siccorum_: cf. Cic. _Contra Rullum_ I. 1 _consilia
+siccorum_. _Madere_ is common with the meaning "to be drunk," as in Plaut.
+_Mostellaria_ I. 4, 6. _Non diceret_: Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit
+the verb, with one MS., cf. 15 and I. 13. The omission of a verb in the
+subjunctive is, Madv. says on _D.F._ I. 9, impossible; for other ellipses
+of the verb see _M.D.F._ V. 63. _Alcmaeo autem_: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon;
+cf. 52. _Somnia reri_: the best MSS. have _somniare_. Goer. reads _somnia_,
+supplying _non fuisse vera_. I have already remarked on his extraordinary
+power of _supplying_. Halm conj. _somnia reprobare_, forgetting that the
+verb _reprobare_ belongs to third century Latinity, also _sua visa putare_,
+which Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from the MSS., I
+read _reri_, which verb occurred in I. 26, 39. Possibly _putare_, a little
+farther on, has got misplaced. _Non id agitur_: these difficulties supply
+Sextus with one of his [Greek: tropoi], i.e. [Greek: ho peri tas
+peristaseis]; cf. _P.H._ I. 100, also for the treatment of dreams, _ib._ I.
+104. _Si modo_, etc.: "if only he dreamed it," i.e. "merely because he
+dreamed it." _Aeque ac vigilanti_: = _aeque ac si vigilaret_. Dav. missing
+the sense, and pointing out that _when awake_ Ennius did not assent to his
+sensations at all, conj. _vigilantis_. Two participles used in very
+different ways not unfrequently occur together, see Madv. _Em. Liv._ p.
+442. _Ita credit_: MSS. have _illa_, which Dav. altered. Halm would prefer
+_credidit_. _Itera dum_, etc.: from the _Iliona_ of Pacuvius; a favourite
+quotation with Cic.; see _Ad Att._ XIV. 14, and _T.D._ II. 44.
+
+�89. _Quisquam_: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences cf.
+Virg. _Aen._ I. 48 with the Notes of Wagner and Conington. _Tam
+certa putat_: so Sextus _A.M._ VII. 61 points out that Protagoras must in
+accordance with his doctrine [Greek: pant�n metron anthr�pos] hold that the
+[Greek: mem�n�s] is the [Greek: krit�rion t�n en maniai phainomen�n].
+_Video, video te_: evidently from a tragedy whose subject was [Greek: Aias
+mainomenos], see Ribbeck _Trag. Lat. rel._ p. 205. Cic. in _De Or._ III.
+162 thus continues the quotation, "_oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape_."
+So in Soph. _Aiax_ 100 the hero, after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae,
+keeps Odysseus alive awhile in order to torture him. _Hercules_: cf. Eur.
+_Herc. Fur._ 921--1015. The mad visions of this hero, like those of
+Orestes, are often referred to for a similar purpose by Sext., e.g. _A.M._
+VII. 405 [Greek: ho goun Herakl�s maneis kai lab�n phantasian apo t�n idi�n
+paid�n h�s Eurystheos, t�n akolouthon praxin taut�i t� phantasiai syn�psen.
+akolouthon de �n to tous tou echthrou paidas anelein, hoper kai epoi�sen.]
+Cf. also _A.M._ VII. 249. _Moveretur_: imperf. for plup. as in 90. _Alcmaeo
+tuus_: cf. 52. _Incitato furore_: Dav. reads _incitatus_. Halm qu. from
+Wesenberg _Observ. Crit. ad Or. p. Sestio_ p. 51 this explanation, "_cum
+furor eius initio remissior paulatim incitatior et vehementior factus
+esset_," he also refers to Wopkens _Lect. Tull._ p. 55 ed. Hand. _Incedunt_
+etc.: the MSS. have _incede_, which Lamb. corrected. The subject of the
+verb is evidently _Furiae_. _Adsunt_: is only given once by MSS., while
+Ribbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have written it twice.
+_Caerulea ... angui_: _anguis_ fem is not uncommon in the old poetry. MSS.
+here have _igni_. _Crinitus_: [Greek: akersekom�s], "never shorn," as
+Milton translates it. _Luna innixus_: the separate mention in the next line
+of _Diana_, usually identified with the moon, has led edd. to emend this
+line. Some old edd. have _lunat_, while Lamb. reads _genu_ for _luna_, cf.
+Ov. _Am._ I. 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.) _lunavitque genu sinuosum fortiter
+arcum_. Wakefield on Lucr. III. 1013 puts a stop at _auratum_, and goes on
+with _Luna innixans_. Taber strangely explains _luna_ as = _arcu ipso
+lunato_, Dav. says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it
+is the utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should
+not regard _luna_ and _Diana_ as distinct.
+
+�90. _Illa falsa_: sc. _visa_, which governs the two genitives. Goer.
+perversely insists on taking _somniantium recordatione ipsorum_ closely
+together. _Non enim id quaeritur_: cf. 80 n. Sext. very often uses very
+similar language, as in _P.H._ I. 22, qu. in n. on 40. _Tum cum
+movebantur_: so Halm for MSS. _tum commovebantur_, the em. is supported by
+88.
+
+    ��91--98. Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable knowledge, its
+    processes are not applicable to a large number of philosophical
+    questions (91). You value the art, but remember that it gave rise to
+    fallacies like the _sorites_, which you say is faulty (92). If it is
+    so, refute it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will
+    avail you nothing (93). If you refrain because you _cannot_ answer,
+    your knowledge fails you, if you _can_ answer and yet refrain, you are
+    unfair (94). The art you admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did
+    her web, witness the _Mentiens_, (95). You assent to arguments which
+    are identical in form with the _Mentiens_, and yet refuse to assent to
+    it Why so? (96) You demand that these sophisms should be made
+    exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go to a tribune for that
+    exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would not allow the very
+    first postulate of your Dialectic (97). In my opinion, and I learned
+    Dialectic from Antiochus, the _Mentiens_ and the arguments identical
+    with it in form must stand or fall together (98).
+
+�91. _Inventam esse_: cf. 26, 27. _In geometriane_: with this inquiry into
+the special function of Dialectic cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato
+_Gorg._ 453 D, 454 C. _Sol quantus sit_: this of course is a problem for
+[Greek: physik�], not for [Greek: dialektik�]. _Quod sit summum bonum_: not
+[Greek: dialektik�] but [Greek: �thik�] must decide this. _Quae
+coniunctio_: etc. so Sext. often opposes [Greek: symplok�] or [Greek:
+syn�mmenon] to [Greek: diezeugmenon], cf. esp _P.H._ II. 201, and Zeller
+109 sq. with footnotes. An instance of a _coniunctio_ (hypothetical
+judgment) is "_si lucet, lucet_" below, of a _disiunctio_ (disjunctive
+judgment) "_aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet_". _Ambigue dictum_:
+[Greek: amphibolon], on which see _P.H._ II. 256, Diog VII. 62. _Quid
+sequatur_: [Greek: to akolouthon], cf. I. 19 n. _Quid repugnet_: cf. I. 19,
+n. _De se ipsa_: the _ipsa_, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom. and not
+abl. Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an art is not
+to be condemned as useless merely because it is unable to solve every
+problem presented to it. He quotes Plato's remarks (in _Rep._ II.) that the
+Expert is the man who knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot.
+Very similar arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp. _P.H._ II.
+175 and the words [Greek: eautou estai ekkalyptikon]. For the mode in which
+Carneades dealt with Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511. The true ground of
+attack is that Logic always _assumes_ the truth of phenomena, and cannot
+_prove_ it. This was clearly seen by Aristotle alone of the ancients; see
+Grote's essay on the Origin of Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol II. of his
+_Aristotle_.
+
+�92. _Nata sit_: cf. 28, 59. _Loquendi_: the Stoic [Greek: logik�], it must
+be remembered, included [Greek: rh�torik�]. _Concludendi_: [Greek: tou
+symperainein] or [Greek: syllogizesthai]. _Locum_: [Greek: topon] in the
+philosophical sense. _Vitiosum_: 49, n. _Num nostra culpa est_: cf. 32.
+_Finium_: absolute limits; the fallacy of the _sorites_ and other such
+sophisms lies entirely in the treatment of purely _relative_ terms as
+though they were _absolute_. _Quatenus_: the same ellipse occurs in
+_Orator_ 73. _In acervo tritici_: this is the false _sorites_, which may be
+briefly described thus: A asks B whether one grain makes a heap, B answers
+"No." A goes on asking whether two, three, four, etc. grains make a heap. B
+cannot always reply "No." When he begins to answer "Yes," there will be a
+difference of one grain between heap and no heap. One grain therefore
+_does_ make a heap. The true _sorites_ or chain inference is still treated
+in books on logic, cf. Thomson's _Laws of Thought_, pp 201--203, ed 8.
+_Minutatim_: cf. Heindorf's note on [Greek: kata smikron] in _Sophistes_
+217 D. _Interrogati_: cf. 104. In 94 we have _interroganti_, which some
+edd. read here. _Dives pauper_, etc.: it will be easily seen that the
+process of questioning above described can be applied to any relative term
+such as these are. For the omission of any connecting particle between the
+members of each pair, cf. 29, 125, _T.D._ I. 64, V. 73, 114, Zumpt _Gram._
+782. _Quanto addito aut dempto_: after this there is a strange ellipse of
+some such words as _id efficiatur, quod interrogatur_. [_Non_] _habemus_: I
+bracket _non_ in deference to Halm, Madv. however (_Opusc._ I. 508) treats
+it as a superabundance of negation arising from a sort of anacoluthon,
+comparing _In Vatin._ 3, _Ad Fam._ XII. 24. The scribes insert and omit
+negatives very recklessly, so that the point may remain doubtful.
+
+�93. _Frangite_: in later Gk. generally [Greek: apolyein]. _Erunt ...
+cavetis_: this form of the conditional sentence is illustrated in Madv.
+_D.F._ III. 70, _Em. Liv._ p. 422, _Gram._ 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence
+_Heaut._ V. 1, 59 _quot incommoda tibi in hac re capies nisi caves_, cf.
+also 127, 140 of this book. The present is of course required by the
+instantaneous nature of the action. _Chrysippo_: he spent so much time in
+trying to solve the sophism that it is called peculiarly his by Persius VI.
+80. _inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi_. The titles of numerous
+distinct works of his on the _Sorites_ and _Mentiens_ are given by Diog.
+_Tria pauca sint_: cf. the instances in Sext. _A.M._ VII. 418 [Greek: ta
+pent�konta oliga estin, ta myria oliga estin], also Diog. VII. 82 [Greek:
+h�sychazein] the advice is quoted in Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 ([Greek: dein
+histasthai kai epechein]), _A.M._ VII. 416 ([Greek: ho sophos st�setai kai
+h�sychasei]). The same terms seem to have been used by the Cynics, see
+Sext. _P.H._ II. 244, III. 66. _Stertas_: imitated by Aug. _Contra Ac._
+III. 25 _ter terna novem esse ... vel genere humano stertente verum sit_,
+also _ib._ III. 22. _Proficit_: Dav. _proficis_, but Madv. rightly
+understands [Greek: to h�sychazein] (_Em._ 184), cf. _N.D._ II. 58.
+_Ultimum ... respondere_: "to put in as your answer" cf. the use of
+_defendere_ with an accus. "to put in as a plea". Kayser suggests _paucorum
+quid sit_.
+
+�94. _Ut agitator_: see the amusing letter to Atticus XIII. 21, in which
+Cic. discusses different translations for the word [Greek: epechein], and
+quotes a line of Lucilius _sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator
+equosque_, adding _semperque Carneades_ [Greek: probol�n] _pugilis et
+retentionem aurigae similem facit_ [Greek: epoch�]. Aug. _Contra Ac._
+trans. [Greek: epoch�] by _refrenatio_ cf. also _Lael._ 63. _Superbus es_:
+I have thus corrected the MSS. _responde superbe_; Halm writes _facis
+superbe_, Orelli _superbis_, which verb is hardly found in prose. The
+phrase _superbe resistere_ in Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 14 may be a
+reminiscence. _Illustribus_: Bait. with some probability adds _in_,
+comparing _in decimo_ below, and 107, cf. however Munro on Lucr. I. 420.
+_Irretiat_: parallel expressions occur in _T.D._ V. 76, _De Or._ I. 43, _De
+Fato_ 7. _Facere non sinis_: Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 points the moral in the
+same way. _Augentis nec minuentis_: so Halm for MSS. _augendi nec
+minuendi_, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase _primum
+augendi_ to be Latin.
+
+�95. _Tollit ... superiora_: cf. _Hortensius_ fragm. 19 (Orelli) _sed ad
+extremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit
+dialecticorum ratio_. _Vestra an nostra_: Bait. after Christ needlessly
+writes _nostra an vestra_. [Greek: axi�ma]: "a judgment expressed in
+language"; cf. Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this subject.
+_Effatum_: Halm gives the spelling _ecfatum_. It is probable that this
+spelling was antique in Cic.'s time and only used in connection with
+religious and legal formulae as in _De Div._ I. 81, _De Leg._ II. 20, see
+Corss. _Ausspr._ I. 155 For the word cf. Sen. _Ep._ 117 _enuntiativum
+quiddam de corpore quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii
+edictum_, in _T.D._ I. 14 _pronuntiatum_ is found, in _De Fato_ 26
+_pronuntiatio_, in Gellius XVI. 8 (from Varro) _prologium_. _Aut verum esse
+aut falsum_: the constant Stoic definition of [Greek: axi�ma], see Diog.
+VII. 65 and other passages in Zeller 107. _Mentiris an verum dicis_: the
+_an_ was added by Schutz on a comparison of Gellius XVIII. 10 _cum mentior
+et mentiri me dico, mentior an verum dico?_ The sophism is given in a more
+formally complete shape in _De Div._ II. 11 where the following words are
+added, _dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur_. The
+fallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli), _quis unquam
+dixit "ego mentior" quum hoc ipsum pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare?_
+_Inexplicabilia_: [Greek: apora] in the Greek writers. _Odiosius_: this
+adj. has not the strong meaning of the Eng. "hateful," but simply means
+"tiresome," "annoying." _Non comprehensa_: as in 99, the opposite of
+_comprehendibilia_ III. 1, 41. The past partic. in Cic. often has the same
+meaning as an adj. in _-bilis_. Faber points out that in the _Timaeus_ Cic.
+translates [Greek: alytos] by _indissolutus_ and _indissolubilis_
+indifferently. _Imperceptus_, which one would expect, is found in Ovid.
+
+�96. _Si dicis_: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by
+Manut. with the exception of _nunc_ which was added by Dav. The idea of
+Orelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the
+comic writers is untenable. _In docendo_: _docere_ is not to _expound_ but
+to _prove_, cf. n. on 121. _Primum ... modum_: the word _modus_ is
+technical in this sense cf. _Top._ 57. The [Greek: protos logos
+anapodeiktos] of the Stoic logic ran thus [Greek: ei h�mera esti, ph�s
+estin ... alla m�n h�mera estin ph�s ara estin] (Sext. _P.H._ II. 157, and
+other passages qu. Zeller 114). This bears a semblance of inference and is
+not so utterly tautological as Cic.'s translation, which merges [Greek:
+ph�s] and [Greek: h�mera] into one word, or that of Zeller (114, note).
+These arguments are called [Greek: monol�mmatoi] (involving only one
+premise) in Sext. _P.H._ I. 152, 159, II. 167. _Si dicis te mentiri_, etc.:
+it is absurd to assume, as this sophism does, that when a man _truly_
+states that he _has_ told a lie, he establishes against himself not merely
+that he _has_ told a lie, but also that he _is_ telling a lie at the moment
+when he makes the _true_ statement. The root of the sophism lies in the
+confusion of past and present time in the one infinitive _mentiri_.
+_Eiusdem generis_: the phrase _te mentiri_ had been substituted for _nunc
+lucere_. _Chrysippea_: n. on 93. _Conclusioni_: on _facere_ with the dat.
+see n. on 27. _Cederet_: some edd. _crederet_, but the word is a trans. of
+Gk. [Greek: eikein]; n. on 66. _Conexi_: = [Greek: syn�mmenon], cf. Zeller
+109. This was the proper term for the hypothetical judgment. _Superius_:
+the [Greek: syn�mmenon] consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and
+the affirmative--called in Greek [Greek: h�goumenon] and [Greek: l�gon]; if
+one is admitted the other follows of course.
+
+�97. _Excipiantur_: the legal _formula_ of the Romans generally directed
+the _iudex_ to condemn the defendant if certain facts were proved, unless
+certain other facts were proved; the latter portion went by the name of
+_exceptio_. See _Dict. Ant_. _Tribunum ... adeant_: a retort upon Lucullus;
+cf. 13. The MSS. have _videant_ or _adeant_; Halm conj. _adhibeant_,
+comparing 86 and _Pro Rabirio_ 20. _Contemnit_: the usual trans. "to
+despise" for _contemnere_ is too strong; it means, like [Greek: olig�rein],
+merely to neglect or pass by. _Effabimur_; cf. _effatum_ above.
+_Hermarchus_: not _Hermachus_, as most edd.; see _M.D.F._ II. 96.
+_Diiunctum_: [Greek: diezeugmenon], for which see Zeller 112.
+_Necessarium_: the reason why Epicurus refused to admit this is given in
+_De Fato_ 21 _Epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato
+fieri quaecumque fiant_. The context of that passage should be carefully
+read, along with _N.D._ I. 69, 70. Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 29 lays great
+stress on the necessary truth of disjunctive propositions. _Catus_: so
+Lamb. for MSS. _cautus_. _Tardum_: _De Div._ II. 103 _Epicurum quem hebetem
+et rudem dicere solent Stoici_; cf. also _ib._ II. 116, and the frequent
+use of [Greek: bradys] in Sext., e.g. _A.M._ VII. 325. _Cum hoc igitur_:
+the word _igitur_, as usual, picks up the broken thread of the sentence.
+_Id est_: n. on I. 8. _Evertit_: for the Epicurean view of Dialectic see R.
+and P. 343. Zeller 399 sq., _M.D.F._ I. 22. _E contrariis diiunctio_: =
+[Greek: diezeugmenon ex enanti�n].
+
+�98. _Sequor_: as in 95, 96, where the _Dialectici_ refused to allow the
+consequences of their own principles, according to Cic. _Ludere_: this
+reminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for which
+see Cope in the old _Journal of Philology_. No. 7. _Iudicem ... non
+iudicem_: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by [Greek: men]
+and [Greek: de], has been a great crux of edd.; Dav. here wished to insert
+_cum_ before _iudicem_, but is conclusively refuted by Madv. _Em._ 31. The
+same construction occurs in 103. _Esse conexum_: with great probability
+Christ supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the copyists.
+
+    ��98--105. Summary. In order to overthrow at once the case of
+    Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of
+    Carneades' system (98). Carneades laid down two divisions of _visa_,
+    one into those capable of being perceived and those not so capable, the
+    other into probable and improbable. Arguments aimed at the senses
+    concern the first division only; the sapiens will follow probability,
+    as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly does (99, 100). Our
+    sapiens is not made of stone; many things _seem_ to him true; yet he
+    always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The
+    Stoics themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this
+    admission together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes
+    impossible (101). It is strange that our _Probables_ do not seem
+    sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (102). He
+    condemns those who say that sensation is swept away by the Academy;
+    nothing is swept away but its _necessary_ certainty (103). There are
+    two modes of withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and
+    withholding it merely so far as to deny the _certainty_ of phenomena.
+    The latter mode leaves all that is required for ordinary life (104).
+
+�98. _Tortuosum_: similar expressions are in _T.D._ II. 42, III. 22, _D.F._
+IV. 7. _Ut Poenus_: "as might be expected from a Carthaginian;" cf. _D.F._
+IV. 56, _tuus ille Poenulus, homo acutus_. A different meaning is given by
+the _ut_ in passages like _De Div._ II. 30 _Democritus non inscite nugatur,
+ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius_; "for a physical philosopher."
+
+�99. _Genera_: here = classifications of, modes of dividing _visa_. This
+way of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong censure of
+Madv. (Pref. to _D.F._ p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted of ignorance, for
+representing Carneades as dividing _visa_ into those which can be perceived
+and those which cannot. Is it possible that any one should read the
+_Academica_ up to this point, and still believe that Cic. is capable of
+supposing, even for a moment, that Carneades in any way upheld [Greek:
+katal�psis]? _Dicantur_: i.e. _ab Academicis_. _Si probabile_: the _si_ is
+not in MSS. Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading _est, probabile
+nihil esse_. _Commemorabas_: in 53, 58. _Eversio_: cf. _D.F._ III. 50 (the
+same words), Plat. _Gorg_. 481 C [Greek: h�m�n ho bios anatetrammenos an
+ei�], Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 157 [Greek: syncheomen ton bion]. _Et sensibus_:
+no second _et_ corresponds to this; _sic_ below replaces it. See Madv.
+_D.F._ p. 790, ed. 2. _Quicquam tale_ etc.: cf. 40, 41. _Nihil ab eo
+differens_: n. on 54. _Non comprehensa_: n. on 96.
+
+�100. _Si iam_: "if, for example;" so _iam_ is often used in Lucretius.
+_Probo ... bono_: it would have seemed more natural to transpose these
+epithets. _Facilior ... ut probet_: the usual construction is with _ad_ and
+the gerund; cf. _De Div._ II. 107, _Brut_. 180. _Anaxagoras_: he made no
+[Greek: homoiomereiai] of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and
+deep, is dark in colour. _Concreta_: so Manut. for MSS. _congregata_. In
+121 the MSS. give _concreta_ without variation, as in _N.D._ II. 101, _De
+Div._ I. 130, _T.D._ I. 66, 71.
+
+�101. _Impeditum_: cf. 33, n. _Movebitur_: cf. _moveri_ in 24. _Non enim
+est_: Cic. in the vast majority of cases writes _est enim_, the two words
+falling under one accent like _sed enim, et enim_ (cf. Corss. _Ausspr._ II.
+851); Beier on _De Off._ I. p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read
+_est enim_, but the MSS. both of the _Lucullus_ and of Nonius agree in the
+other form, which Madv. allows to stand in _D.F._ I. 43, and many other
+places (see his note). Cf. fragm. 22 of the _Acad. Post_. _E robore_: so
+Nonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here _ebore_. _Dolatus_: an evident
+imitation of Hom. _Od._ T 163 [Greek: ou gar apo drios essi palaiphatou
+oud' apo petr�s]. _Neque tamen habere_: i.e. _se putat_. For the sudden
+change from _oratio recta_ to _obliqua_ cf. 40 with n. _Percipiendi notam_:
+= [Greek: charakt�ra t�s synktathese�s] in Sext. _P.H._ I. 191. For the use
+of the gerund cf. n. on 26, with Madv. _Gram._ 418, Munro on Lucr. I. 313;
+for _propriam_ 34. _Exsistere_. cf. 36. _Qui neget_: see 79. _Caput_: a
+legal term. _Conclusio loquitur_: cf. _historiae loquantur_ (5),
+_consuetudo loquitur_ (_D.F._ II. 48), _hominis institutio si loqueretur_
+(_ib._ IV. 41), _vites si loqui possint_ (_ib._ V. 39), _patria loquitur_
+(_In Cat._ I. 18, 27); the last use Cic. condemns himself in _Orat._ 85.
+_Inquit_: "quotha," indefinitely, as in 109, 115; cf. also _dicit_ in 79.
+
+�102. _Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis_: Bait. follows Madv. in
+placing a comma after _est_, and a full stop at _probabilia_. _Tamen_ ought
+in that case to follow _dicimus_, and it is noteworthy that in his
+communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait., and Hahn's ed. of the
+philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word _tamen_ altogether, nor
+does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice the omission. _Ista diceret_:
+"stated the opinions you asked for." _Poetam_: this both Halm and Bait.
+treat as a gloss.
+
+�103. For this section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext. _P.H._ I.
+227 sq. _Academia ... quibus_: a number of exx. of this change from sing.
+to plural are given by Madv. on _D.F._ V. 16. _Nullum_: on the favourite
+Ciceronian use of _nullus_ for _non_ see 47, 141, and Madv. _Gram._ 455,
+obs. 5. _Illud sit disputatum_: for the construction cf. 98; _autem_ is
+omitted with the same constr. in _D.F._ V. 79, 80. _Nusquam alibi_: cf. 50.
+
+�104. _Exposuisset adiungit_: Madv. on _D.F._ III. 67 notices a certain
+looseness in the use of tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the
+opinions of philosophers, but no ex. so strong as this is produced. _Ut aut
+approbet quid aut improbet_: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent
+editors of Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced
+by _ut_. Halm brackets a similar clause in 20, and is followed in both
+instances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the most extensive _bracketer_ of
+modern times, rejects very many clauses of the kind in the Oratorical
+works. In our passage, the difficulty vanishes when we reflect that
+_approbare_ and _improbare_ may mean either to render an _absolute_
+approval or disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely
+based on _probability_. For example, in 29 the words have the first
+meaning, in 66 the second. The same is the case with _nego_ and _aio_. I
+trace the whole difficulty of the passage to the absence of terms to
+express distinctly the difference between the two kinds of assent. The
+general sense will be as follows. "There are two kinds of [Greek: epoch�],
+one which prevents a man from expressing any assent or disagreement (in
+either of the two senses above noticed), another which does not prevent him
+from giving an answer to questions, provided his answer be not taken to
+imply absolute approval or absolute disapproval; the result of which will
+be that he will neither absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but
+will merely give a qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability." My
+defence of the clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann
+in the _Philologus_ (vol. VII.), which I had not read when this note was
+first written. _Alterum placere ... alterum tenere_: "the one is his formal
+dogma, the other is his actual practice." For the force of this see my note
+on _non probans_ in 148, which passage is very similar to this. _Neget ...
+aiat_: cf. 97. _Nec ut placeat_: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the
+wrong sense, for Clitomachus _did_ allow such _visa_ to stand as were
+sufficient to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's _neu cui_ labours
+under the same defect. Various emendations are _nam cum_ (Lamb., accepted
+by Zeller 522), _hic ut_ (Manut.), _et cum_ (Dav. followed by Bait.), _sed
+cum_ (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me that of Manut. I should
+prefer _sic ut_, taking _ut_ in the sense of "although." _Respondere_: "to
+put in as an answer," as in 93 and often. _Approbari_: sc. _putavit_. Such
+changes of construction are common in Cic., and I cannot follow Halm in
+altering the reading to _approbavit_.
+
+�105. _Lucem eripimus_: cf. 30.
+
+    ��105--111. Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this time, that your
+    defence of dogmatism is overthrown (105). You asked how memory was
+    possible on my principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of
+    Epicurus? If nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true,
+    then these will be true (106). Probability is quite sufficient basis
+    for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us to
+    _assent_. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas, and you
+    yourself refuse assent to the _sorites_, why then should not the
+    Academic doubt about other things? (107) Your other strong point is
+    that without assent action is impossible (108). But surely many actions
+    of the dogmatist proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the
+    use of the hackneyed argument of Antiochus (109). Where probability is,
+    there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (110). The argument
+    of Antiochus that the Academics first admit that there are true and
+    false _visa_ and then contradict themselves by denying that there is
+    any difference between true and false, is absurd. We do not deny that
+    the difference _exists_; we do deny that human faculties are capable of
+    perceiving the difference (111).
+
+�105. _Inducto ... prob._: so Aug. _Cont Ac._ II. 12 _Soluto, libero_: cf.
+n. on 8. _Implicato_: = _impedito_ cf. 101. _Iacere_: cf. 79. _Isdem
+oculis_: an answer to the question _nihil cernis?_ in 102. _Purpureum_: cf.
+fragm. 7 of the _Acad. Post_. _Modo caeruleum ... sole_: Nonius (cf. fragm.
+23) quotes _tum caeruleum tum lavum_ (the MSS. in our passage have
+_flavum_) _videtur, quodque nunc a sole_. C.F. Hermann would place _mane
+ravum_ after _quodque_ and take _quod_ as a proper relative pronoun, not as
+= "because." This transposition certainly gives increased clearness.
+Hermann further wishes to remove _a_, quoting exx. of _collucere_ without
+the prep., which are not at all parallel, i.e. _Verr._ I. 58, IV. 71.
+_Vibrat_: with the [Greek: an�rithmon gelasma] of Aeschylus.
+_Dissimileque_: Halm, followed by Bait., om. _que_. _Proximo et_: MSS. have
+_ei_, rightly altered by Lamb., cf. e.g. _De Fato_ 44. _Non possis ...
+defendere_: a similar line is taken in 81.
+
+�106. _Memoria_: cf. 22. _Polyaenus_: named _D.F._ I. 20, Diog. X. 18, as
+one of the chief friends of Epicurus. _Falsum quod est_: Greek and Latin do
+not distinguish accurately between the _true_ and the _existent_, the
+_false_ and the _non existent_, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the
+confusion is frequent, notably in the _Sophistes_ and _Theaetetus_. _Si
+igitur_: "if then recollection is recollection only of things perceived and
+known." The dogmatist theory of [Greek: mn�m�] and [Greek: no�sis] is dealt
+with in exactly the same way by Sext. _P.H._ II. 5, 10 and elsewhere, cf.
+also Plat _Theaet._ 191 sq. _Siron_: thus Madv. on _D.F._ II. 119 writes
+the name, not _Sciron_, as Halm. _Fateare_: the em. of Dav. for _facile_,
+_facere_, _facias_ of MSS. Christ defends _facere_, thinking that the
+constr. is varied from the subj. to the inf. after _oportet_, as after
+_necesse est_ in 39. For _facere_ followed by an inf. cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 8.
+_Nulla_: for _non_, cf. 47, 103.
+
+�107. _Fiet artibus_: n. on 27 for the constr., for the matter see 22.
+_Lumina_: "strong points." Bentl. boldly read _columina_, while Dav.
+proposed _vimina_ or _vincula_. That an em. is not needed may be seen from
+_D.F._ II. 70. _negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum lumen est)_ _N.D._ I. 79,
+and 43 of this book. _Responsa_: added by Ernesti. Faber supplies
+_haruspicia_, Orelli after Ern. _haruspicinam_, but, as Halm says, some
+noun in the plur. is needed. _Quod is non potest_: this is the MSS.
+reading, but most edd. read _si is_, to cure a wrong punctuation, by which
+a colon is placed at _perspicuum est_ above, and a full stop at
+_sustineat_. Halm restored the passage. _Habuerint_: the subj. seems due to
+the attraction exercised by _sustineat_. Bait. after Kayser has
+_habuerunt_. _Positum_: "when laid down" or "assumed."
+
+�108. _Alterum est quod_: this is substituted for _deinde_, which ought to
+correspond to _primum_ above. _Actio ullius rei_: n. on _actio rerum_ in
+62, cf. also 148. _Adsensu comprobet_: almost the same phrase often occurs
+in Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc. _Sit etiam_: the _etiam_ is a little
+strange and was thought spurious by Ernesti. It seems to have the force of
+Eng. "indeed", "in what indeed assent consists." _Sensus ipsos adsensus_:
+so in I. 41 _sensus_ is defined to be _id quod est sensu comprehensum_,
+i.e. [Greek: katal�psis], cf. also Stobaeus I. 41, 25 [Greek: aisth�tik�
+gar phantasia synkatathesis esti]. _Appetitio_: for all this cf. 30. _Et
+dicta ... multa_: Manut. ejected these words as a gloss, after _multa_ the
+MSS. curiously add _vide superiora_. _Lubricos sustinere_: cf. 68 and 94.
+_Ita scribenti ... exanclatum_: for the om. of _esse_ cf. 77, 113 with
+notes. _Herculi_: for this form of the gen. cf. Madv. on _D.F._ I. 14, who
+doubts whether Cic. ever wrote _-is_ in the gen. of the Greek names in
+_-es_. When we consider how difficult it was for copyists _not_ to change
+the rarer form into the commoner, also that even Priscian (see _M.D.F._ V.
+12) made gross blunders about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost
+irresistible. _Temeritatem_: [Greek: propeteian, eikaiot�ta].
+
+�109. _In navigando_: cf. 100. _In conserendo_: Guretus interprets "[Greek:
+en t� phytyesthai ton agron]," and is followed by most commentators, though
+it seems at least possible that _manum_ is to be understood. For the
+suppressed accus. _agrum_ cf. n. on _tollendum_ in 148. _Sequere_: the fut.
+not the pres. ind., cf. 61. _Pressius_: cf. 28. _Reprehensum_: sc.
+_narrasti_. _Id ipsum_: = _nihil posse comprehendi_. _Saltem_: so in 29.
+_Pingue_: cf. _Pro Archia_ 10. _Sibi ipsum_: note that Cic. does not
+generally make _ipse_ agree in case with the reflexive, but writes _se
+ipse_, etc. _Convenienter_: "consistently". _Esse possit_: Bait. _posset_
+on the suggestion of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one,
+not throwing it back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of
+Ant. _Ut hoc ipsum_: the _ut_ follows on _illo modo urguendum_ above.
+_Decretum quod_: Halm followed by Bait. gives _quo_, referring to _altero
+quo neget_ in 111, which however does not justify the reading. The best
+MSS. have _qui_. _Et sine decretis_: Lamb. gave _nec_ for _et_, but Dav.
+correctly explains, "_multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta
+sed tantum probabilia._"
+
+�110. _Ut illa_: i.e. the _decreta_ implied in the last sentence. Some MSS.
+have _ille_, while Dav. without necessity gives _alia_. _Sic hoc ipsum_:
+Sext. then is wrong is saying (_P.H._ I. 226) that the Academics [Greek:
+diabebaiountai ta pragmata einai akatal�pta], i.e. state the doctrine
+dogmatically, while the sceptics do not. _Cognitionis notam_: like _nota
+percipiendi_, _veri et falsi_, etc. which we have already had. _Ne
+confundere omnia_: a mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf. 58.
+_Incerta reddere_: cf. 54. _Stellarum numerus_: another echo of Lucullus;
+see 32. _Quem ad modum ... item_: see Madv. on _D.F._ III. 48, who quotes
+an exact parallel from _Topica_ 46, and _sicut ... item_ from _N.D._ I. 3,
+noting at the same time that in such exx. neither _ita_ nor _idem_, which
+MSS. sometimes give for _item_, is correct.
+
+�111. _Dicere ... perturbatum_: for om. of _esse_ cf. 108, etc.
+_Antiochus_: this Bait. brackets. _Unum ... alterum_: cf. 44. _Esse quaedam
+in visis_: it was not the _esse_ but the _videri_, not the actual existence
+of a difference, but the possibility of that difference being infallibly
+perceived by human sense, that the Academic denied. _Cernimus_: i.e. the
+_probably_ true and false. _Probandi species_: a phenomenal appearance
+which belongs to, or properly leads to qualified approval.
+
+    ��112--115. Summary. If I had to deal with a Peripatetic, whose
+    definitions are not so exacting, my course would be easier; I should
+    not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise man sometimes
+    _opines_ (112). The definitions of the real Old Academy are more
+    reasonable than those of Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does,
+    can he profess to belong to the Old Academy? (113) I cannot tolerate
+    your assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic
+    system like yours free from mistakes (114). You wish me to join your
+    school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who thinks
+    so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I, but
+    the _sapiens_ is to adopt (115).
+
+�112. _Campis ... exsultare ... oratio_: expressions like this are common
+in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 54, _De Off._ I. 61, _Orat._ 26; cf. also Aug.
+_Cont. Ac._ III. 5 _ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret oratio_. _Cum
+Peripatetico_: nothing that Cic. states here is at discord with what is
+known of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf. esp. Sext. _A.M._ VII.
+216--226. All that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic
+formula, putting upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic
+would have wondered how a sceptic _could_ accept his formulae; but the
+spectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the
+same formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at
+Cicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on 18) that we have here
+a trace of Philo's teaching, as distinct from that of Carneades. I see
+absolutely no reason for the very severe remarks of Madvig on _D.F._ V. 76,
+a passage which very closely resembles ours. _Dumeta_: same use in _N.D._
+I. 68, Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 6; the _spinae_ of the Stoics are often
+mentioned, e.g. _D.F._ IV. 6. _E vero ... a falso_: note the change of
+prep. _Adhiberet_: the MSS. are confused here, and go Halm reads _adderet_,
+and Bait. follows, while Kayser proposes _adhaereret_, which is indeed
+nearer the MSS.; cf. however I. 39 _adhiberet_. _Accessionem_: for this cf.
+18 and 77. _Simpliciter_: the opposite of _subtiliter_; cf.
+_simpliciter--subtilitas_ in I. 6. _Ne Carneade quidem_: cf. 59, 67, 78,
+148.
+
+�113. _Sed qui his minor est_: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for
+MSS. _sed mihi minores_. Guietus gave _sed his minores_, Durand _sed
+minutior_, while Halm suggests _sed minutiores_. I conj. _nimio minares_,
+which would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr. I. 734 _inferiores partibus
+egregie multis multoque minores_. _Tale verum_: _visum_ omitted as in
+_D.F._ V. 76. _Incognito_: cf. 133. _Amavi hominem_: cf. Introd. p. 6. _Ita
+iudico, politissimum_; it is a mistake to suppose this sentence incomplete,
+like Halm, who wishes to add _eum esse_, or like Bait., who with Kayser
+prints _esse_ after _politissimum_. Cf. 108 _ita scribenti, exanclatum_,
+and the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 13. _Horum
+neutrum_: cf. 77 _nemo_. _Utrumque verum_: Cic. of course only accepts the
+propositions as Arcesilas did; see 77.
+
+�114. _Illud ferre_: cf. 136. _Constituas_: this verb is often used in
+connection with the ethical _finis_; cf. 129 and I. 19. _Idemque etiam_:
+Krebs and Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) deny that the expression _idem
+etiam_ is Latin. One good MS. here has _atque etiam_, which Dav. reads; cf.
+however _Orat._ 117. _Artificium_: = _ars_, as in 30. _Nusquam labar_: cf.
+138 _ne labar_. _Subadroganter_: cf. 126.
+
+�115. _Qui sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse_: so Cic. vary often speaks of
+the Peripatetics, as in _D.F._ IV. 5, V. 7. _Sustinuero_: cf. 70. _Tam
+bonos_: Cic. often speaks of them and of Epicurus in this patronising way;
+see e.g. _T.D._ II. 44, III. 50, _D.F._ I. 25, II. 81. For the Epicurean
+friendships cf. esp. _D.F._ I. 65. _Diodoto_: cf. Introd. p. 2. _Nolumus_:
+Halm and Bait., give _nolimus_; so fine a line divides the subjunctive from
+the indicative in clauses like these that the choice often depends on mere
+individual taste. _De sapiente loquamur_: n. on 66.
+
+    ��116--128. Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy take Physics
+    first. Would your _sapiens_ swear to the truth of any geometrical
+    result whatever? (116) Let us see which one of actual physical systems
+    the _sapiens_ we are seeking will select (117). He must choose _one_
+    teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander,
+    Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles,
+    Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers,
+    great men though they be, he must reject (118). Whatever system he
+    selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must believe as
+    strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If he holds
+    this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus, must
+    defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not
+    allow me even to doubt (119). How much better to be free, as I am and
+    not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles of the universe!
+    (120) Nothing can exist, say you, apart from the deity. Strato,
+    however, says he does not need the deity to construct the universe. His
+    mode of construction again differs from that of Democritus. I see some
+    good in Strato, yet I will not assent absolutely either to his system
+    or to yours (121). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We know
+    nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the
+    advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the
+    earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (122).
+    Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell strange things of the
+    heavenly bodies. How much better to side with Socrates and Aristo, who
+    hold that nothing can be known about them! (123) Who knows the nature
+    of mind? Numberless opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato
+    and Xenocrates. Our _sapiens_ will be unable to decide (124). If you
+    say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose
+    Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous
+    falsehoods (125). The Stoics differ among themselves about physical
+    subjects, why will they not allow me to differ from them? (126) Not
+    that I deprecate the study of Physics, for moral good results from it
+    (127). Our _sapiens_ will be delighted if he attains to anything which
+    seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your
+    weakness in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be
+    prepared to asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times
+    as large as the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you
+    admit that all things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than
+    the size of the sun, I am almost content (128).
+
+�116. _Tres partes_: cf. I. 19. _Et a vobismet_: "and especially by you".
+The threefold division was peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools,
+cf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 13 (on the same subject) [Greek: hoi St�ikoi kai alloi
+tines]. For other modes of dividing philosophy see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 2. _At
+illud ante_: this is my em. for the MSS. _velut illud ante_, which probably
+arose from a marginal variant "_vel ut_" taking the place of _at_; cf. a
+similar break in 40 _sed prius_, also in 128 _at paulum ante_. Such breaks
+often occur in Cic., as in _Orator_ 87 _sed nunc aliud_, also _T.D._ IV. 47
+_repenam fortasse, sed illud ante._ For _velut_ Halm writes _vel_ (which
+Bait. takes), Dav. _verum_. _Inflatus tumore_: cf. _De Off._ I. 91 _inflati
+opinionibus._ Bentl. read _errore_. _Cogere_: this word like [Greek:
+anankazein] and [Greek: biazesthai] often means simply to argue
+irresistibly. _Initia_: as in 118, bases of proof, themselves naturally
+incapable of proof, so [Greek: archai] in Gk. _Digitum_: cf. 58, 143.
+_Punctum esse_ etc.: [Greek: s�meion estin ou meros outhen] (Sext. _P.H._
+III. 39), [Greek: stigm�] = [Greek: to ameres] (_A.M._ IX. 283, 377).
+_Extremitatem_: = [Greek: epiphaneian]. _Libramentum_: so this word is used
+by Pliny (see Forc.) for the slope of a hill. _Nulla crassitudo_: in Sext.
+the [Greek: epiphaneia] is usually described not negatively as here, but
+positively as [Greek: m�kos meta platous] (_P.H._ III. 39), [Greek: peras]
+(_extremitas_) [Greek: somatos duo echon diastaseis, m�kos kai platos]
+(_A.M._ III. 77). _Liniamentum ... carentem_: a difficult passage. Note (1)
+that the line is defined in Greek as [Greek: m�kos aplates]. (Sext. as
+above), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the point and surface
+negatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against the introduction of
+_longitudinem_ which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and others propose by
+conjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would rather add _et
+crassitudine_ before _carentem_, comparing I. 27 _sine ulla specie et
+carentem omni illa qualitate_. I have merely bracketed _carentem_, though I
+feel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in this clause as in the other
+two, he suggests _quod sit sine_. Hermann takes _esse_ after _punctum_ as
+strongly predicative ("there _is_ a point," etc.), then adds _similiter_
+after _liniamentum_ and ejects _sine ulla_. Observe the awkwardness of
+having the _line_ treated of after the _superficies_, which has induced
+some edd. to transpose. For _liniamentum_ = _lineam_ cf. _De Or._ I. 187.
+_Si adigam_: the fine em. of Manut. for _si adiiciamus_ of MSS. The
+construction _adigere aliquem ius iurandum_ will be found in Caes. _Bell.
+Civ._ I. 76, II. 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg. _Aen._ III. 56 _quid non
+mortalia pectora cogis auri sacra fames?_ _Sapientem nec prius_: this is
+the "_egregia lectio_" of three of Halm's MSS. Before Halm _sapientemne_
+was read, thus was destroyed the whole point of the sentence, which is
+_not_ that the _sapiens_ will swear to the size of the sun after he has
+seen Archimedes go through his calculations, _but_ that the _sapiens_,
+however true he admits the bases of proof to be which Archimedes uses, will
+_not_ swear to the truth of the elaborate conclusions which that geometer
+rears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in 128 against the absurdity of
+attaching one and the same degree of certainty to the simplest and the most
+complex truths, and tries to condemn the Stoic _sapiens_ out of his own
+mouth, cf. esp. _nec ille iurare posset_ in 123. _Multis partibus_: for
+this expression see Munro on Lucr. I. 734, for the sense cf. 82, 123, 126,
+128. _Deum_: see 126.
+
+�117. _Vim_: = [Greek: anank�n], cf. _cogere_ in 116. _Ne ille_: this
+asseverative _ne_ is thus always closely joined with pronouns in Cic.
+_Sententiam eliget et_: MSS. have (by _dittographia_ of _m_, _eli_) added
+_melius_ after _sententiam_, and have also dropped _et_. Dav. wished to
+read _elegerit_, comparing the beginning of 119. _Insipiens eliget_: cf.
+115 _quale est a non sapiente explicari sapientiam?_ and 9 _statuere qui
+sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis_. _Infinitae quaestiones_:
+[Greek: theseis], general propositions, opposed to _finitae quaestiones_,
+limited propositions, Gk. [Greek: hypotheseis]. Quintal III. 5, 5 gives as
+an ex. of the former _An uxor ducenda_, of the latter _An Catoni ducenda_.
+These _quaestiones_ are very often alluded to by Cic. as in _D.F._ I. 12,
+IV. 6, _De Or._ I. 138, II. 65--67, _Topica_ 79, _Orat._ 46, cf. also
+Quint. X. 5, II. _E quibus omnia constant_: this sounds like Lucretius,
+_omnia_ = [Greek: to pan].
+
+�118. For these _physici_ the student must in general be referred to R. and
+P., Schwegler, and Grote's _Plato_ Vol. I. A more complete enumeration of
+schools will be found in Sext. _P.H._ III. 30 sq. Our passage is imitated
+by Aug _De Civ. Dei_ XVIII. 37. _Concessisse primas_: Cic. always considers
+Thales to be _sapientissimus e septem_ (_De Leg._ II. 26). Hence Markland
+on Cic. _Ad Brutum_ II. 15, 3 argued that that letter cannot be genuine,
+since in it the supremacy among the seven is assigned to Solon.
+_Infinitatem naturae_: [Greek: to apeiron], _naturae_ here = [Greek:
+ousias]. _Definita_: this is opposed to _infinita_ in _Topica_ 79, so
+_definire_ is used for _finire_ in _Orat._ 65, where Jahn qu. _Verr._ IV.
+115. _Similis inter se_: an attempt to translate [Greek: homoiomereias].
+_Eas primum_, etc.: cf. the exordium of Anaxagoras given from Diog. II. 6
+in R. and P. 29 [Greek: panta chr�mata �n homou eita nous elth�n auta
+diekosm�se]. _Xenophanes ... deum_: Eleaticism was in the hands of Xenoph.
+mainly theological. _Neque natum unquam_: cf. _neque ortum unquam_ in 119.
+_Parmenides ignem_: cf. Arist. _Met. A._ 5 qu. R. and P. 94. He only
+hypothetically allowed the existence of the phenomenal world, after which
+he made two [Greek: archai, thermon kai psychron tout�n de to men kata men
+to hon thermon tattei, thateron de kata to m� on]. _Heraclitus_: n. on I.
+39. _Melissus_: see Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp. [Greek: to eon
+aiei ara �n te kai estai]. _Plato_: n. on I. 27. _Discedent_: a word often
+used of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 7, 17.
+
+�119. _Sic animo ... sensibus_: knowledge according to the Stoics was
+homogeneous throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than
+another. _Nunc lucere_: cf. 98, also 128 _non enim magis adsentiuntur_,
+etc. _Mundum sapientem_: for this Stoic doctrine see _N.D._ I. 84, II. 32,
+etc. _Fabricata sit_: see 87 n. _Solem_: 126. _Animalis intellegentia_:
+reason is the essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138--9,
+also 28, 29 of Book I. _Permanet_: the deity is to the Stoic [Greek: pneuma
+endi�kon di holou tou kosmou] (Plut. _De Plac. Phil._ I. 7 qu. R. and P.
+375), _spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus._
+(Seneca, _Consol. ad Helvid._ 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147). _Deflagret_: the Stoics
+considered the [Greek: kosmos phthartos], cf. Diog. VII. 141, Zeller
+156--7. _Fateri_: cf. _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_ in 111. _Flumen
+aureum_: Plut. _Vita Cic._ 24 alludes to this ([Greek: hoti chrysiou
+potamos ei� reontos]). This is the constant judgment of Cic. about
+Aristotle's style. Grote, _Aristot._ Vol I. p. 43, quotes _Topica_ 3, _De
+Or._ I. 49, _Brut._ 121, _N.D._ II. 93, _De Inv._ II. 6, _D.F._ I. 14, _Ad
+Att._ II. 1, and discusses the difficulty of applying this criticism to the
+works of Aristotle which we possess. _Nulla vis_: cf. I. 28. _Exsistere_:
+Walker conj. _efficere_, "_recte ut videtur_" says Halm. Bait. adopts it.
+_Ornatus_: = [Greek: kosmos].
+
+�120. _Libertas ... non esse_: a remarkable construction. For the Academic
+liberty see Introd. p. 18. _Quod tibi est_: after these words Halm puts
+merely a comma, and inserting _respondere_ makes _cur deus_, etc. part of
+the same sentence. Bait. follows. _Nostra causa_: Cic. always writes _mea,
+tua, vestra, nostra causa_, not _mei, tui, nostri, vestri_, just as he
+writes _sua sponte_, but not _sponte alicuius_. For the Stoic opinion that
+men are the chief care of Providence, see _N.D._ I. 23, II. 37, _D.F._ III.
+67, _Ac._ I. 29 etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding the opinion
+are treated of in Zeller 175, _N.D._ II. 91--127. They supply in Sext.
+_P.H._ I. 32, III. 9--12 an example of the refutation of [Greek: nooumena]
+by means of [Greek: nooumena]. _Tam multa ac_: MSS. om. _ac_, which I
+insert. Lactantius qu. the passage without _perniciosa_. _Myrmecides_: an
+actual Athenian artist, famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for
+a chariot which a fly covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of
+a bee concealed. See Plin. _Nat. Hist._ VII. 21, XXXVI. 5.
+
+�121. _Posse_: n. on I. 29. _Strato_: R. and P. 331. _Sed cum_: _sed_ often
+marks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read _et_, as Halm.
+_Asperis ... corporibus_: cf. fragm. 28 of the _Ac. Post._, also _N.D._ I.
+66. _Somnia_: so _N.D._ I. 18 _miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed
+somniantium_, _ib._ I. 42 _non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium
+somnia_, also _ib._ I. 66 _flagitia Democriti_. _Docentis_: giving _proof_.
+_Optantis_: Guietus humorously conj. _potantis,_ Durand _oscitantis_ (cf.
+_N.D._ I. 72), others _opinantis_. That the text is sound however may be
+seen from _T.D._ II. 30 _optare hoc quidem est non docere_, _De Fato_ 46,
+_N.D._ I. 19 _optata magis quam inventa_, _ib._ III. 12 _doceas oportet nec
+proferas_; cf. also _Orat._ 59 _vocis bonitas optanda est, non est enim in
+nobis_, i.e. a good voice is a thing to be prayed for, and not to be got by
+exertion. There is a similar Greek proverb, [Greek: euch� mallon �
+al�theia], in Sext. _P.H._ VIII. 353. _Magno opere_: Hermann wishes to read
+_onere_. The phrase _magnum onus_ is indeed common (cf. _De Or._ I. 116),
+but _magnum opus_, in the sense of "a great task," is equally so, cf.
+_T.D._ III. 79, 84, _Orat._ 75. _Modo hoc modo illud_: 134.
+
+�122. _Latent ista_: see n. on fragm. 29 of the _Ac. Post._; for _latent_
+cf. I. 45. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12, III. 1 imitates this passage.
+_Circumfusa_: cf. I. 44, and 46 of this book. _Medici_: cf. _T.D._ I. 46
+_Viderentur_: a genuine passive, cf. 25, 39, 81. _Empirici_: a school of
+physicians so called. _Ut ... mutentur_: exactly the same answer was made
+recently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he was said to have
+assumed that the living protoplasm would have the same properties as the
+dead. _Media pendeat_: cf. _N.D._ II. 98, _De Or._ III. 178.
+
+�123. _Habitari ait_: for this edd. qu. Lactant. _Inst._ III. 23, 12.
+_Portenta_: "monstrosities these," cf. _D.F._ IV. 70. _Iurare_: cf. 116.
+_Neque ego_, etc.: see fragm. 30 of _Ac. Post._ [Greek: Antipodas]: this
+doctrine appears in Philolaus (see Plut. _Plac. Phil._ III. 11 qu. R. and
+P. 75), who give the name of [Greek: antichth�n] to the opposite side of
+the world. Diog. VIII. 26 (with which passage cf. Stob. _Phys._ XV. 7)
+mentions the theory as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says
+that Plato first invented the name. The word [Greek: antipous] seems to
+occur first in Plat. _Tim._ 63 A. The existence of [Greek: antipodes]; was
+of course bound up with the doctrine that the universe or the world is a
+globe (which is held by Plat. in the _Tim._ and by the Stoics, see Stob.
+_Phys._ XV. 6, Diog. VII. 140), hence the early Christian writers attack
+the two ideas together as unscriptural. Cf. esp Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XVI. 9.
+_Hicetas_: he was followed by Heraclides Ponticus and some Pythagoreans.
+Sext. _A.M._ X. 174 speaks of the followers of Aristarchus the
+mathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems also to be found in
+Philolaus, see R. and P. 75. _Theophrastus_: who wrote much on the history
+of philosophy, see R. and P. 328. _Platonem_: the words of Plato (_Tim._ 40
+B) are [Greek: g�n de trophon men h�meteran, eillomen�n de peri ton dia
+pantos polon tetamenon]. _Quid tu, Epicure_: the connection is that Cic.,
+having given the crotchets of other philosophers about [Greek: physik�],
+proceeds to give the peculiar crotchet of Epic. _Putas solem ... tantum_: a
+hard passage. _Egone? ne bis_ is the em. of Lamb. for MSS. _egone vobis_,
+and is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (_Em._ 185) "_cum
+interrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem 82) solem esse putaret,
+Epic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat quantus videretur vel
+paulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius circumscribit, ne bis quidem
+tantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem et bipedalem_". (_D.F._ I. 20)
+This explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given.
+Epicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the
+outside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's
+size, i.e. twice the apparent size. _Ne ... quidem_ may possibly appear
+strange, cf. however _ne maiorem quidem_ in 82. _Aristo Chius_: for this
+doctrine of his see R. and P. 358.
+
+�124. _Quid sit animus_: an enumeration of the different ancient theories
+is given in _T.D._ I. 18--22, and by Sext. _A.M._ VII. 113, who also speaks
+in _P.H._ II. 31 of the [Greek: poll� kai an�nytos mach�] concerning the
+soul. In _P.H._ II. 57 he says [Greek: Gorgias oude dianoian einai ph�si].
+_Dicaearcho_: _T.D._ I. 21. _Tres partis_: in Plato's _Republic_. _Ignis_:
+Zeno's opinion, _T.D._ I. 19. _Animam_: _ib._ I. 19. _Sanguis_: Empodocles,
+as in _T.D._ I. 19 where his famous line [Greek: haima gar anthr�pois
+perikardion esti no�ma] is translated, see R. and P. 124. _Ut Xenocrates_:
+some edd. read _Xenocrati_, but cf. I. 44, _D.F._ II. 18, _T.D._ III. 76.
+_Numerus_: so Bentl. for _mens_ of MSS., cf. I. 39, _T.D._ I. 20, 41. An
+explanation of this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and
+P. 244. _Quod intellegi_ etc.: so in _T.D._ I. 41 _quod subtiliter magis
+quam dilucide dicitur_. _Momenta_ n. on I. 45.
+
+�125. _Verecundius_: cf. 114 _subadroganter_. _Vincam animum_: a common
+phrase in Cic., cf. _Philipp._ XII. 21. _Queru potissimum? quem?_: In
+repeated questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of
+_quisnam_, not _quis_, in the second question, as in _Verr._ IV. 5. The
+mutation of Augustine _Contra Ac._ III. 33 makes it probable that _quemnam_
+was the original reading here. Zumpt on _Verr._ qu. Quint. IX. 2, 61, Plin.
+_Epist._ I. 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud it for its
+likeness to impromptu. _Nobilitatis_: this is to be explained by referring
+to 73--75 (_imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem_), where Cic.
+protests against being compared to a demagogue, and claims to follow the
+aristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the commentators to show that
+Democr. was literally an aristocrat have failed. _Convicio_: cf. 34.
+_Completa et conferta_: n. on I. 27. _Quod movebitur ... cedat_: this is
+the theory of motion disproved by Lucr. I. 370 sq., cf. also _N.D._ II. 83.
+Halm writes _quo quid_ for _quod_ (with Christ), and inserts _corpus_
+before _cedat_, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. "whatever
+body is pushed, gives way." _Tam sit mirabilis_: n. on I. 25.
+_Innumerabilis_: 55. _Supra infra_: n. on 92. _Ut nos nunc simus_, etc.: n.
+on fragm. 13 of _Ac. Post._ _Disputantis_: 55. _Animo videre_: cf. 22.
+_Imagines_: [Greek: eid�la], which Catius translated (_Ad Fam._ XV. 16) by
+_spectra_, Zeller 432. _Tu vero_: etc. this is all part of the personal
+_convicium_ supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by the Antiocheans,
+and beginning at _Tune aut inane_ above. _Commenticiis_: a favourite word
+of Cic., cf. _De Div._ II. 113.
+
+�126. _Quae tu_: elliptic for _ut comprobem quae tu comprobas_ cf. 125.
+_Impudenter_: 115. _Atque haud scio_: _atque_ here = [Greek: kaitoi], "and
+yet," n. on 5 _ac vereor_. _Invidiam_: cf. 144. _Cum his_: i.e. _aliis cum
+his_. _Summus deus_: "the highest form of the deity" who was of course one
+in the Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and [Greek: pyr technikon]
+is one of the definitions of the Stoic deity, cf. I. 29, Zeller 161 sq.
+_Solem_: as of course being the chief seat of fire. _Solis autem ... nego
+credere_: Faber first gave _ac monet_ for MSS. _admonens_, which Halm
+retains, Manut. then restored to its place _permensi refertis_, which MSS.
+have after _nego_. _Hic_, which MSS. have after _decempeda_, Madv. turns
+into _hunc_, while _hoc_, which stands immediately after _nego_, he ejects
+(_Em._ 187). _Ergo_ after _vos_ is of course analeptic. Halm departs
+somewhat from this arrangement. _Leniter_: Halm and Hermann _leviter_; the
+former reads _inverecundior_ after Morgenstern, for what reason it is
+difficult to see.
+
+�127. _Pabulum_: similar language in _D.F._ II. 46. _Consideratio
+contemplatioque_: Cic. is fond of this combination, as _De Off._ I. 153;
+cf. Wesenberg on _T.D._ V. 9, who qu. similar combinations from _D.F._ V.
+11, 58. _Elatiores_: MSS. mostly have _latiores_. Halm with Lamb. reads
+_altiores_, in support of which reading Dav. qu. _D.F._ II. 51, Val.
+Flaccus _Argon._ II. 547, add Virg. _Aen._ VI. 49, Cic. _Orat._ 119.
+_Exigua et minima_: [Greek: smikra kai elachista]. Madv. on _D.F._ V. 78
+notes that except here Cic. always writes _exigua et paene minima_ or
+something of the kind. _Occultissimarum_: n. on I. 15. _Occurit ...
+completur_: MSS. have _occuret_ mostly, if that is retained _complebitur_
+must be read. Madv. _Opusc._ II. 282 takes _occurit_, explaining it as a
+perfect, and giving numerous exx. of this sequence of tenses, cf. also
+Wesenb. on _T.D._ IV. 35.
+
+�128. _Agi secum_: cf. _nobiscum ageret_ in 80. _Simile veri_: cf. 66.
+_Notionem_: = _cognitionem_, [Greek: epist�m�n]. _At paulum_: MSS. _et_
+Halm _sed._; cf. _at illud ante_ in 116. _Si quae_: Halm and many edd. have
+_se, quae_. But the _se_ comes in very awkwardly, and is not needed before
+the infinitive. Madv. indeed (_Em._ 114), after producing many exx. of the
+reflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts about this passage because
+_considero_ does not belong to the class of verbs with which this usage is
+found, but he produces many instances with _puto_, which surely stands on
+the same level. _Non magis_: so in 119 _nec magis approbabit nunc lucere_,
+etc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely cognisable
+phenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to absolute
+knowledge by refusing [Greek: ton h�lion homologein einai katal�pton]
+(Galen _De Opt. Gen. Dicendi_ 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.). _Cornix_:
+for the Stoic belief in divination see Zeller 349--358. _Signum illud_: the
+_xystus_ (9) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XXXIV.
+8. _Duodeviginti_: 82, I just note that _octodecim_ is not used by Cic.
+_Sol quantus sit_: 91. _Omnium rerum ... comprehendendi_: not a case of a
+plural noun with a singular gerund like _spe rerum potiendi_, etc., but of
+two genitives depending in different ways on the same word (_definitio_).
+M. _Em._ 197 qu. Plat. _Leg._ 648 E [Greek: t�n pant�n h�ttan phoboumenos
+anthr�pon toi p�matos], _Brut._ 163 _Scaevolae dicendi elegantia_, _De Or._
+III. 156. Other exx. in _M.D.F._ I. 14. For the turn of expression cf.
+_T.D._ IV. 62 _omnium philosophorum una est ratio medendi_, _Lael._ 78
+_omnium horum vitiorum una cautio est_, also 51 of this book.
+
+    ��129--141. Summary. What contention is there among philosophers about
+    the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems like that of
+    Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes, Parmenides,
+    Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho, Aristippus,
+    Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus, Carneades
+    (129-131). If I desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow
+    me, while if I follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (132). I must be
+    careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both
+    you, Lucullus, and myself (133). Zeno thinks virtue gives happiness.
+    "Yes," says Antiochus, "but not the greatest possible." How am I to
+    choose among such conflicting theories? (134) Nor can I accept those
+    points in which Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard
+    emotion as harmful, which the ancients thought natural and useful
+    (135). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! (136) Albinus joking said to
+    Carneades "You do not think me a praetor because I am not a _sapiens_."
+    "That," said Carneades, "is Diogenes' view, not mine" (137). Chrysippus
+    thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be defended
+    (138). I gravitate then towards one of them, that of pleasure. Virtue
+    calls me back, nor will she even allow me to join pleasure to herself
+    (139). When I hear the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I
+    cannot avoid being moved by both, and so I find it impossible to choose
+    (141, 142).
+
+�129. _Quod coeperam_: in 128 at _veniamus nunc ad boni maique notionem_.
+_Constituendi_: n. on 114. _Bonorum summa_: cf. _D.F._ V. 21 and Madv. _Est
+igitur_: so in _De Div._ II. 8, _igitur_ comes fourth word in the clause;
+this is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius. _Omitto_: MSS. _et omitto_,
+but cf. Madv. _Em._ 201 _certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro
+simplici 'omitto,' in initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae
+exempla subiciuntur per figuram omissionis_. _Relicta_: cf. 130 _abiectos_.
+Cic. generally classes Herillus (or Erillus as Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35
+spells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded
+systems, cf. _D.F._ II. 43, _De Off._ I. 6, _T.D._ V. 85. _Ut Herillum_.
+MSS. have either _Erillum_ or _et illum_, one would expect _ut Herilli_.
+_Cognitione et scientia_: double translation of [Greek: epist�m�]. For the
+_finis_ of Herillus see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 43. _Megaricorum_:
+_Xenophanes_. Cic considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so
+closely related as to have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a
+continuous history. The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development
+of Eleatic doctrine. Zeller, _Socrates_ 211. _Unum et simile_: for this see
+Zell. _Socr._ 222 sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq. _Simile_ ought
+perhaps to be _sui simile_ as in _Tim._ c. 7, already quoted on I. 30, see
+my note there and cf. I. 35. _Menedemo_: see Zeller _Socr._ 238, R. and P.
+182. The _Erctrian_ school was closely connected with the Megarian. _Fuit_:
+= _natus est_, as often. _Herilli_: so Madv. for _ulli_ of MSS.
+
+�130. _Aristonem_: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a
+Peripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines of
+Aristo the Chian _ib._ 358, Zeller 58 sq. _In mediis_: cf. I. 36, 37.
+_Momenta_ = _aestimationes_, [Greek: axiai] in 36, where _momenti_ is used
+in a different way. _Pyrrho autem_: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav.
+conj., but in 124 there is just the same change from _Pyrrhoni_ to
+_Xenocrates_. [Greek: Apatheia]: Diog. IX. 108 affirms this as well as
+[Greek: praiot�s] to be a name for the sceptic [Greek: telos], but the name
+scarcely occurs if at all in Sext. who generally uses [Greek: ataraxia],
+but occasionally [Greek: metriopatheia]; cf. Zeller 496, R. and P. 338.
+[Greek: Apatheia] was also a Stoic term. _Diu multumque_: n. on I. 4.
+
+�131. _Nec tamen consentiens_: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences
+between the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448.
+_Callipho_: as the genitive is _Calliphontis_, Cic. ought according to rule
+to write _Calliphon_ in the nom; for this see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 19, who
+also gives the chief authorities concerning this philosopher. _Hieronymus_:
+mentioned _D.F._ II. 19, 35, 41, V. 14, in which last place Cic. says of
+him _quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio_. _Diodorus_: see Madv. on
+_D.F._ II. 19. _Honeste vivere_, etc.: in _D.F._ IV. 14 the _finis_ of
+Polemo is stated to be _secundum naturam vivere_, and three Stoic
+interpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present
+passage--_omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint fruentem
+vivere_. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him it is
+attributed to the _vetus Academia_ in I. 22, where the words _aut omnia aut
+maxima_, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf. Clemens Alex. qu.
+by Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 15. See n. below on Carneades. _Antiochus probat_:
+the germs of many Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in
+Polemo; see I. 34, n. _Eiusque amici_: Bentl. _aemuli_, but Halm refers to
+_D.F._ II. 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree Stoicised.
+_Nunc_: Halm _huc_ after Jo. Scala. _Carneades_: this _finis_ is given in
+_D.F._ II. 35 (_frui principiis naturalibus_), II. 42 (_Carneadeum illud
+quod is non tam ut probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum
+gerebat opponeret_), V. 20 (_fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum
+naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor sed defensor
+disserendi causa fuit_), _T.D._ V. 84 (_naturae primus aut omnibus aut
+maximis frui, ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat_). The _finis_
+therefore, thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is
+clear that Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include
+_virtus_ in it (see _D.F._ II. 38, 42, V. 22) while Polemo did (I. 22). See
+more on 139. _Zeno_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 15 _Inventor et princeps_: same
+expression in _T.D._ I. 48, _De Or._ I. 91, _De Inv._ II. 6; _inv._ =
+[Greek: oikist�s].
+
+�132. _Quemlibet_: cf. 125, 126. _Prope singularem_: cf. _T.D._ I. 22
+_Aristoteles longe omnibus--Platonem semper excipio--praestans_; also
+_D.F._ V. 7, _De Leg._ I. 15. _Per ipsum Antiochum_: a similar line of
+argument is taken in Sext. _P.H._ I. 88, II. 32, etc. _Terminis ...
+possessione_: there is a similar play on the legal words _finis terminus
+possessio_ in _De Leg._ I. 55, 56, a noteworthy passage. _Omnis ratio_
+etc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf. Aug.
+_De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1 _neque enim existimat_ (Varro) _ullam philosophiae
+sectam esse dicendam, quae non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat
+fines bonorum et malorum_, etc. _Si Polemoneus_: i.e. _sapiens fuerit_.
+_Peccat_: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see I. 37. _Academicos et_:
+MSS. om. _et_ as in I. 16, and _que_ in 52 of this book. _Dicenda_: for the
+omission of the verb with the gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic
+clauses) cf. I. 7, and Madv. on _D.F._ I. 43, who how ever unduly limits
+the usage. _Hic igitur ... prudentior_: MSS. generally have _assentiens_,
+but one good one (Halm's E) has _assentientes_. I venture to read
+_adsentietur_, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt, as in
+26 (_tenetur_) and that then _adsentiet_, under the attraction of the _s_
+following, passed into _adsentiens_, as in 147 _intellegat se_ passed into
+_intelligentes_. _N_, I may remark, is frequently inserted in MSS. (as in
+I. 7 _appellant_, 16 _disputant_, 24 _efficerentur_), and all the changes
+involved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read _sin, inquam_
+(_sc. adsentietur_) for _si numquam_ of MSS. The question _uter est
+prudentior_ is intended to press home the dilemma in which Cicero has
+placed the supposed _sapiens_. All the other emendations I have seen are
+too unsatisfactory to be enumerated.
+
+�133. _Non posse ... esse_: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads
+_non esse illa probanda sap._ after Lamb., who also conj. _non posse illa
+probata esse_. _Paria_: _D.F._ III. 48, _Paradoxa_ 20 sq., Zeller 250.
+_Praecide_: [Greek: syntomos] or [Greek: synel�n eipe], cf. _Cat. Mai._ 57,
+_Ad Att._ VIII. 4, X. 16. _Inquit_: n. on 79. _Quid quod quae_: so Guietus
+with the approval of Madv. (_Em._ 203) reads for MSS. _quid quae_ or _quid
+quaeque_, Halm and Bait., follow Moser in writing _Quid? si quae_ removing
+the stop at _paria_, and make _in utramque partem_ follow _dicantur_, on
+Orelli's suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS.
+often omit one. _Dicebas_: in 27. _Incognito_: 133.
+
+�134. _Etiam_: = "yes," Madv. _Gram._ 454. _Non beatissimam_: I. 22, n.
+_Deus ille_: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's [Greek: � theos �
+th�rion]), if he can do without other advantages. For the omission of _est_
+after the emphatic _ille_ cf. 59, n. _Theophrasto_, etc.: n. on I. 33, 35.
+_Dicente_: before this Halm after Lamb., followed by Bait., inserts
+_contra_, the need for which I fail to see. _Et hic_: i.e. Antiochus. _Ne
+sibi constet_: Cic. argues in _T.D._ V. that there cannot be degrees in
+happiness. _Tum hoc ... tum illud_: cf. 121. _Iacere_: 79. _In his
+discrepant_: I. 42 _in his constitit_.
+
+�135. _Moveri_: [Greek: kineisthai], 29. _Laetitia efferri_: I. 38.
+_Probabilia_: the removal of passion and delight is easier than that of
+fear and pain. _Sapiensne ... deleta sit_: see Madv. _D.F._ p. 806, ed. 2,
+who is severe upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz), _non
+timeat? nec si patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit?_ which
+involves the use of _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_. I have followed the reading
+of Madv. in his _Em._, not the one he gives (after Davies) in _D.F._ _ne
+patria deleatur_, which Halm takes, as does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer
+the MSS. _Decreta_: some MSS. _durata_; Halm conj. _dictata_.
+_Mediocritates_: [Greek: mesopetes], as in Aristotle; cf. _T.D._ III. 11,
+22, 74. _Permotione_: [Greek: kinesei]. _Naturalem ... modum_: so _T.D._
+III. 74. _Crantoris_: sc. _librum_, for the omission of which see n. on I.
+13; add Quint. IX. 4, 18, where Spalding wished to read _in Herodoti_,
+supplying _libro_. _Aureolus ... libellus_: it is not often that two
+diminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is rather colloquial; cf.
+_T.D._ III. 2, _N.D._ III. 43, also for _aureolus_ 119 _flumen aureum_.
+_Panaetius_: he had addressed to Tubero a work _de dolore_; see _D.F._ IV.
+23. _Cotem_: _T.D._ IV. 43, 48, Seneca _De Ira_ III. 3, where the saying is
+attributed to Aristotle (_iram calcar esse virtutis_). _Dicebant_: for the
+repetition of this word cf. 146, I. 33.
+
+�136. _Sunt enim Socratica_: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is
+affirmed in _Parad._ 4, _T.D._ III. 10. _Mirabilia_: Cic. generally
+translates [Greek: paradoxa] by _admirabilia_ as in _D.F._ IV. 74, or
+_admiranda_, under which title he seems to have published a work different
+from the _Paradoxa_, which we possess: see Bait., and Halm's ed. of the
+Phil. works (1861), p. 994. _Quasi_: = almost, [Greek: h�s epos eipein].
+_Voltis_: cf. the Antiochean opinion in I. 18, 22. _Solos reges_: for all
+this see Zeller 253 sq. _Solos divites_: [Greek: hoti monos ho sophos
+plousios], _Parad._ VI. _Liberum_: _Parad._ V. [Greek: hoti monos ho sophos
+eleutheros kai pas aphron doulos]. _Furiosus_: _Parad._ IV. [Greek: hoti
+pas aphron mainetai].
+
+�137. _Tam sunt defendenda_: cf. 8, 120. _Bono modo_: a colloquial and
+Plautine expression; see Forc. _Ad senatum starent_: "were in waiting on
+the senate;" cf. such phrases as _stare ad cyathum_, etc. _Carneade_: the
+vocative is _Carneades_ in _De Div._ I. 23. _Huic Stoico_: i.e. _Diogeni_;
+cf. _D.F._ II. 24. Halm brackets _Stoico_, and after him Bait. _Sequi
+volebat_: "professed to follow;" cf. _D.F._ V. 13 _Strato physicum se
+voluit_ "gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:" also Madv. on
+_D.F._ II. 102. _Ille noster_: Dav. _vester_, as in 143 _noster Antiochus_.
+But in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf. 113.
+_Balbutiens_: "giving an uncertain sound;" cf. _De Div._ I. 5, _T.D._ V.
+75.
+
+�138. _Mihi veremini_: cf. Caes. _Bell. Gall_. V. 9 _veritus navibus_. Halm
+and Bait. follow Christ's conj. _verenti_, removing the stop at _voltis_.
+_Opinationem_: the [Greek: oi�sin] of Sext., e.g. _P.H._ III. 280. _Quod
+minime voltis_: cf. I. 18. _De finibus_: not "concerning," but "from among"
+the different _fines_; otherwise _fine_ would have been written. Cf. I. 4
+_si qui de nostris._ _Circumcidit et amputat_: these two verbs often come
+together, as in _D.F._ I. 44; cf. also _D.F._ III. 31. _Si vacemus omni
+molestia_: which Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure. _Cum honestate_:
+Callipho in 131. _Prima naturae commoda_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ IV. 59, V.
+58 confuses the Stoic [Greek: pr�ta kata physin] with [Greek: ta tou
+s�matos agatha kai ta ektos] of the Peripatetics, for which see I. 19. More
+on the subject in Madvig's fourth Excursus to the _D.F._ _Relinquit_:
+Orelli _relinqui_ against the MSS.
+
+�139. _Polemonis ... finibus_: all these were composite _fines_. _Adhuc_: I
+need scarcely point out that this goes with _habeo_ and not with
+_probabilius_; _adhuc_ for _etiam_ with the comparative does not occur till
+the silver writers. _Labor eo_: cf. Horace's _nunc in Aristippi furtim
+praecepta relabor_, also _D.F._ V. 6 _rapior illuc: revocat autem
+Antiochus_. _Reprehendit manu_: _M.D.F._ II. 3. _Pecudum_: I. 6, _Parad._
+14 _voluptatem esse summum bonum, quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non
+hominum_; similar expressions occur with a reference to Epicurus in _De
+Off._ I. 105, _Lael._ 20, 32. _T.D._ V. 73, _D.F._ II. 18; cf. also
+Aristoph. _Plut._ 922 [Greek: probatiou bion legeis] and [Greek: bosk�mat�n
+bios] in Aristotle. The meaning of _pecus_ is well shown in _T.D._ I. 69.
+_Iungit deo_: Zeller 176 sq. _Animum solum_: the same criticism is applied
+to Zeno's _finis_ in _D.F._ IV. 17, 25. _Ut ... sequar_: for the repeated
+_ut_ see _D.F._ V. 10, Madv. _Gram._ 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second
+_ut_ with Lamb. _Carneades ... defensitabat_: this is quite a different
+view from that in 131; yet another of Carneades is given in _T.D._ V. 83.
+_Istum finem_: MSS. _ipsum_; the two words are often confused, as in I. 2.
+_Ipsa veritas_: MSS. _severitas_, a frequent error; cf. _In Verr. Act._ I.
+3, III. 162, _De Leg._ I. 4, also Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 55. _Obversetur_:
+Halm takes the conj. of Lamb., _adversetur_. The MSS. reading gives
+excellent sense; cf. _T.D._ II. 52 _obversentur honestae species viro_.
+Bait. follows Halm. _Tu ... copulabis_: this is the feigned expostulation
+of _veritas_ (cf. 34 _convicio veritatis_), for which style see 125.
+
+�140. _Voluptas cum honestate_: this whole expression is in apposition to
+_par_, so that _cum_ must not be taken closely with _depugnet_; cf. Hor.
+_Sat._ I. 7, 19 _Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius_ (sc.
+_par_) _cum Bitho Bacchius_. _Si sequare, ruunt_: for constr. cf. I. 7.
+_Communitas_: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297. _Nulla potest nisi
+erit_: Madv. _D.F._ III. 70 "_in hac coniunctione--hoc fieri non potest
+nisi--fere semper coniunctivus subicitur praesentis--futuri et perfecti
+indicativus ponitur_." _Gratuita_: "disinterested." _Ne intellegi quidem_:
+n. on I. 7, cf. also _T.D._ V. 73, 119. _Gloriosum in vulgus_: cf. _D.F._
+II. 44 _populus cum illis facit_ (i.e. _Epicureis_). _Normam ... regulam_:
+n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 8. _Praescriptionem_: I. 23, n.
+
+�141. _Adquiescis_: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads _adsciscis_,
+comparing 138. Add _D.F._ I. 23 (_sciscat et probet_), III. 17
+(_adsciscendas esse_), III. 70 (_adscisci et probari_) Bait. follows Halm.
+_Ratum ... fixum_: cf. 27 and n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 17. _Falso_: like
+_incognito_ in 133. _Nullo discrimine_: for this see the explanation of
+_nihil interesse_ in 40, n. _Iudicia_: [Greek: krit�ria] as usual.
+
+    ��142--146. Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how Protagoras, the
+    Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (142). Does Antiochus follow
+    any of these? Why, he never even follows the _vetus Academia_, and
+    never stirs a step from Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot
+    agree about the very elements of their art (143). Why then, Lucullus,
+    do you rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling
+    them I do away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd
+    together, I will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them
+    are slaves, exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being
+    _sapiens_, know nothing whatever (144). This last point Zeno used to
+    illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any actual
+    _sapiens_ (145). Now as there is no knowledge there can be no art. How
+    would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this conclusion? They would prefer
+    mine, to which our ancestors bear testimony.
+
+�142. _Venio iam_: Dialectic had been already dealt with in 91--98 here it
+is merely considered with a view to the choice of the supposed _sapiens_,
+as was Ethical Science in 129--141 and Physics in 116--128. With the
+enumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus gives
+in _A.M._ VII. 48 sq. _Protagorae_: R. and P. 132 sq. _Qui putet_: so MSS.,
+Halm and Bait. _putat_ after Lamb. Trans. "inasmuch as he thinks".
+_Permotiones intimas_: cf. 20 _tactus interior_, also 76. _Epicuri_: nn. on
+19, 79, 80. _Iudicium_: [Greek: krit�rion] as usual. _Rerum notitiis_:
+[Greek: prol�psesi], Zeller 403 sq. _Constituit_: note the constr. with
+_in_, like _ponere in_. _Cogitationis_: cf. I. 30. Several MSS. have
+_cognitionis_, the two words are frequently confused. See Wesenberg _Fm._
+to _T.D._ III. p. 17, who says, _multo tamen saepius "cogitatio" pro
+"cognitio" substituitur quam contra_, also _M.D.F_ III. 21.
+
+�143. _Ne maiorum quidem suorum_: sc. _aliquid probat_. For _maiorum_ cf.
+80. Here Plato is almost excluded from the so-called _vetus Academia_, cf.
+I. 33. _Libri_: titles of some are preserved in Diog. Laert. IV. 11--14.
+_Nihil politius_: cf. 119, n. _Pedem nusquam_: for the ellipse cf. 58, 116,
+_Pro Deiot._ 42 and _pedem latum_ in Plaut. _Abutimur_: this verb in the
+rhetorical writers means to use words in metaphorical or unnatural senses,
+see Quint. X. 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; "do we use the name
+Academic in a non natural fashion?" _Si dies est lucet_: a better trans of
+[Greek: ei ph�s estin, h�mera estin] than was given in 96, where see n.
+_Aliter Philoni_: not Philo of Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of
+Diodorus the Megarian, mentioned also in 75. The dispute between Diodorus
+and Philo is mentioned in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 115--117 with the same purpose
+as here, see also Zeller 39. _Antipater_: the Stoic of Tarsus, who
+succeeded Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school. _Archidemus_:
+several times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as VII. 68, 84.
+_Opiniosissimi_: so the MSS. I cannot think that the word is wrong, though
+all edd. condemn it. Halm is certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory
+epithet such as _ingeniosissimi_ is necessary. I believe that the word
+_opiniosissimi_ (an adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was manufactured on
+the spur of the moment, in order to ridicule these two philosophers, who
+are playfully described as men full of _opinio_ or [Greek: doxa]--just the
+imputation which, as Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's
+_spinosissimi_ is ingenious, and if an em. were needed, would not be so
+utterly improbable as Halm thinks.
+
+�144. _In contionem vocas_: a retort, having reference to 14, cf. also 63,
+72. For these _contiones_ see Lange, _Romische Alterthumer_ II. 663, ed 2.
+They were called by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of
+whom had the right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under
+fewer restrictions than the right of the others. _Occludi tabernas_ in
+order of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this see
+Liv. III. 27, IV. 31, IX. 7, and compare the cry "to your tents, O Israel"
+in the Bible. _Artificia_: n. on 30. _Tolli_: n. on 26. _Ut opifices
+concitentur_: cf. _Pro Flacc._ 18 _opifices et tabernarios quid neqoti est
+concitare?_ _Expromam_: Cic. was probably thinking of the use to which he
+himself had put these Stoic paradoxes in _Pro Murena_ 61, a use of which he
+half confesses himself ashamed in _D.F._ IV. 74. _Exsules_ etc.: 136.
+
+�145. _Scire negatis_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 153, who says that even
+[Greek: katal�psis] when it arises in the mind of a [Greek: phaulos] is
+mere [Greek: doxa] and not [Greek: epist�m�]; also _P.H._ II. 83, where it
+is said that the [Greek: phaulos] is capable of [Greek: to al�thes] but not
+of [Greek: al�theia], which the [Greek: sophos] alone has. _Visum ...
+adsensus_: the Stoics as we saw (II. 38, etc.) analysed sensations into two
+parts; with the Academic and other schools each sensation was an ultimate
+unanalysable unit, a [Greek: psilon pathos]. For this symbolic action of
+Zeno cf. _D.F._ II. 18, _Orat._ 113, Sextus _A.M._ II. 7, Quint. II. 20, 7,
+Zeller 84. _Contraxerat_: so Halm who qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XI. 26, 94
+_digitum contrahens aut remittens_; Orelli _construxerat_; MSS. mostly
+_contexerat_. _Quod ante non fuerat_: [Greek: katalambanein] however is
+frequent in Plato in the sense "to seize firmly with the mind."
+_Adverterat_: the best MSS. give merely _adverat_, but on the margin
+_admoverat_ which Halm takes, and after him Bait.; one good MS. has
+_adverterat_. _Ne ipsi quidem_: even Socrates, Antisthenes and Diogenes
+were not [Greek: sophoi] according to the Stoics, but merely were [Greek:
+en prokop�i]; see Diog. VII. 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut. _Sto. Rep._ 1056
+(qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli) [Greek: esti de outos] (i.e. [Greek:
+ho sophos]) [Greek: oudamou g�s oude gegone]. _Nec tu_: sc. _scis_; Goer.
+has a strange note here.
+
+�146. _Illa_: cf. _illa invidiosa_ above (144). _Dicebas_: in 22. _Refero_:
+"retort," as in Ovid. _Metam._ I. 758 _pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici
+potuisse et non potuisse referri_; cf. also _par pari referre dicto_. _Ne
+nobis quidem_: "_nor_ would they be angry;" cf. n. on. I. 5. _Arbitrari_:
+the original meaning of this was "to be a bystander," or "to be an
+eye-witness," see Corssen I. 238. _Ea non ut_: MSS. have _ut ea non aut_.
+Halm reads _ut ea non_ merely, but I prefer the reading I have given
+because of Cicero's fondness for making the _ut_ follow closely on the
+negative: for this see Madv. _Gram._ 465 _b_, obs.
+
+�147. _Obscuritate_: cf. I. 44, n. on I. 15. _Plus uno_: 115. _Iacere_: cf.
+79. _Plagas_: cf. n. on 112.
+
+�148. _Ad patris revolvor sententiam_: for this see Introd. 50, and for the
+expression 18. _Opinaturum_: see 59, 67, 78, 112. _Intellegat se_: MSS.
+_intellegentes_, cf. n. on 132. _Qua re_: so Manut. for _per_ of MSS.
+[Greek: Epoch�n] _illam omnium rerum_: an odd expression; cf. _actio rerum_
+in 62. _Non probans_: so Madv. _Em._ 204 for MSS. _comprobans_. Dav. conj.
+_improbans_ and is followed by Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is
+wrong. The difficulty is essentially the same as that involved in 104,
+which should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a theoretical
+dogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that _assent_ (meaning absolute
+assent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma Catulus might well
+describe himself as formally approving (_comprobans_). The _practice_ is to
+give assent (meaning modified assent). There is the same contrast in 104
+between _placere_ and _tenere_. I may note that the word _alteri_ (cf.
+_altero_ in 104) need not imply that the dogma and the practice are
+irreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably confirmed
+edd. in their introduction of the negative. _Nec eam admodum_: cf. _non
+repugnarem_ in 112. _Tollendum_: many edd. have gone far astray in
+interpreting this passage. The word is used with a double reference to
+_adsensus_ and _ancora_; in the first way we have had _tollere_ used a
+score of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes.
+_Bell. Gall._ IV. 23, _Bell. Civ._ I. 31, where _tollere_ is used of
+weighing anchor, and Varro _De Re Rust._ III. 17, 1, where it occurs in the
+sense "to get on," "to proceed," without any reference to the sea. (The
+exx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe and this alone is referred to
+in _Ad Att._ XIII. 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried at first
+to manage a joke by using the word _inhibendum_, which had also a nautical
+signification, but finding that he had mistaken the meaning of the word,
+substituted _tollendum_.
+
+[1] _De Leg._ II. �3.
+
+[2] Cf. _De Or._ II. �1 with II. �5.
+
+[3] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut
+philosophus probabatur.
+
+[4] _N.D._ I. �93, Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius.
+
+[5] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1.
+
+[6] _Brutus_, �309.
+
+[7] _Ad Att._ II. 20, �6.
+
+[8] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 16. _T.D._ V. �113. _Acad._ II. �115.
+
+[9] _Brutus_, �306.
+
+[10] _Ibid._
+
+[11] _Rep._ I. �7. _T.D._ V. �5. _De Off._ II. ��3,4. _De Fato_, �2.
+
+[12] Cf. _Brutus_, ��312, 322.
+
+[13] Cf. _Brutus_, ��312, 314, 316.
+
+[14] _Brutus_, �315.
+
+[15] _N.D._ I. �59.
+
+[16] VII. I. �35.
+
+[17] Cf. _N.D._ I. �93 with _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, �1.
+
+[18] _Ac._ I. �46.
+
+[19] _D.F._ V. �3.
+
+[20] _D.F._ I. �16.
+
+[21] _D.F._ V. �6, etc.
+
+[22] _D.F._ V. �8.
+
+[23] _Ac._ II. �4.
+
+[24] _Ib._ �69.
+
+[25] _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, �5.
+
+[26] _Ac._ II. �113.
+
+[27] _Ac._ II. �113. _De Leg._ I. �54.
+
+[28] II. �12.
+
+[29] _Brutus_, �316.
+
+[30] _Hortensius_, fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe.
+
+[31] _T.D._ II. �61.
+
+[32] _De Div._ I. �130.
+
+[33] _D.F._ I. �6.
+
+[34] _Ad Att._ I. 10 and 11.
+
+[35] _Ibid._ II. 1, �3. _N.D._ I. �6.
+
+[36] _Ad Att._ II. 2.
+
+[37] _Ibid._ I. 20. Cf. II. 1, �12.
+
+[38] II. 6.
+
+[39] _Ad Att._ II. 7 and 16.
+
+[40] _Ibid._ II. 6, �2.
+
+[41] Cf. _Ad Att._ IV. 11 with IV. 8 a.
+
+[42] _Ibid._ IV. 10.
+
+[43] _Ibid._ IV. 16, �2.
+
+[44] _Ibid._ IV. 16 c, �10, ed. Nobbe.
+
+[45] _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 14.
+
+[46] _Ad Qu. Fr._ III. 5 and 6.
+
+[47] �332.
+
+[48] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1. _Ad Att._ V. 11, �6.
+
+[49] _Ad Att._ V. 10, �5.
+
+[50] _De Off._ I. �1.
+
+[51] _Tim._ c. 1.
+
+[52] Cf. _Tim._ c. 1 with _De Div._ I. �5. _Brutus_, �250.
+
+[53] _Ad Att._ VI. 1, �26.
+
+[54] _Ibid._ VI. 2, �3.
+
+[55] _Ibid._ VI. 6, �2.
+
+[56] _Ibid._ VI. 7, �2. _Ad Fam._ II. 17, �1.
+
+[57] _T.D._ V. �22.
+
+[58] _Ad Att._ VII. 1, �1.
+
+[59] _Ibid._ VII. 3, VIII. 11.
+
+[60] _Ad Att._ X. 8, �6.
+
+[61] _Ibid._ VIII. 2, �4.
+
+[62] [Greek: peri homonoias], _Ad Att._ IX. 9, �2, etc.
+
+[63] _Ibid._ IX. 4, �2; 9, �1.
+
+[64] _Ibid._ IX. 10, �2.
+
+[65] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1.
+
+[66] _Ibid._ IX. 3.
+
+[67] _Ibid._ IV. 3 and 4.
+
+[68] _De Rep._ I. �7. _T.D._ V. �5, etc.
+
+[69] Cf. _N.D._ I. �6.
+
+[70] Esp. I. ��26, 37.
+
+[71] Cf. _Ac._ II. �29.
+
+[72] _Ac._ II. �70.
+
+[73] _De Div._ II. �1. _Ac._ I. �45, etc.
+
+[74] _N.D._ I. �1.
+
+[75] Cf. esp. _N.D._ I. �5. _T.D._ II. �5.
+
+[76] _De Div._ II. �1. _N.D._ I. �7, etc.
+
+[77] _T.D._ II. �4.
+
+[78] _N.D._ I. �10.
+
+[79] Cf. _Ac._ II. �8. _N.D._ I. ��10, 66.
+
+[80] _T.D._ II. �9.
+
+[81] _N.D._ I. �10.
+
+[82] _Ibid._ I. �17. _Ac._ II. ��120, 137.
+
+[83] _T.D._ V. �33.
+
+[84] _Ac._ II. �121.
+
+[85] _T.D._ V. �82, _libas ex omnibus_.
+
+[86] _Ac._ II. �143.
+
+[87] _T.D._ V. �11.
+
+[88] _Ac._ II. �10.
+
+[89] _N.D._ I. �12.
+
+[90] _Parad._ �2. _De Fato_, �3. _T.D._ I. �7. _De Off._ I. �3.
+
+[91] _D.F._ IV. �5.
+
+[92] _Paradoxa_, �2.
+
+[93] _T.D._ I. �55. _De Div._ II. �62.
+
+[94] _T.D._ V. �11. _D.F._ II. ��1 and 2, etc.
+
+[95] �13.
+
+[96] Cf. esp. _N.D._ i. �6. _Ac._ ii. ��11 and 17.
+
+[97] _De Leg._ I. �39.
+
+[98] _Ibid._ I. ��55, 56.
+
+[99] _N.D._ I. �4.
+
+[100] _T.D._ IV. �53.
+
+[101] Cf. _De Off._ III. �20.
+
+[102] _T.D._ V. ��21-31, esp. �23.
+
+[103] _Ibid._ V. �75.
+
+[104] _De Off._ II. �35.
+
+[105] _T.D._ V. �34.
+
+[106] _Ac._ I. �16.
+
+[107] _Paradoxa_, �4. _Ac._ II. ��136, 137. _T.D._ III. �10.
+
+[108] _Ac._ II. �135.
+
+[109] See esp. _N.D._ I. ��3, 4.
+
+[110] _Ibid._, also _T.D._ V. �83.
+
+[111] Grote's _Aristotle_, vol. I. ch. 11.
+
+[112] _T.D._ IV. �9. _D.F._ III. �41.
+
+[113] I. �6.
+
+[114] _T.D._ IV. �7.
+
+[115] _Ibid._ IV. �7. Cf. _D.F._ II. �44, _populus cum illis facit_.
+
+[116] _Ac._ I. �6. _T.D._ IV. 6, 7; II. �7; III. �33. _D.F._ III. �40.
+
+[117] _T.D._ IV. �3.
+
+[118] _D.F._ I. ��4-6. _Ac._ I. �10. _D.F._ III. �5.
+
+[119] _De Div._ I. ��4, 5.
+
+[120] _D.F._ III. �5. _N.D._ I. �8. _T.D._ III. ��10, 16.
+
+[121] _T.D._ I. �5.
+
+[122] _T.D._ II. �5.
+
+[123] _De Div._ II. �1. _De Off._ II. �4.
+
+[124] _De Div._ II. �6. _De Off._ II. �2.
+
+[125] See esp. _De Consolatione_, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe. _T.D._ V. �5. _Ac._
+I. �11.
+
+[126] _N.D._ I. �6.
+
+[127] _T.D._ II. ��1, 4. _De Off._ II. �3. _D.F._ I. �1.
+
+[128] _T.D._ II. �1. _D.F._ I. ��1, 3.
+
+[129] _D.F._ I. ��1, 11.
+
+[130] _De Div._ II. �5. _De Off._ II. �2. _T.D._ IV. �1.
+
+[131] _De Div._ II. �4.
+
+[132] _N.D._ I. �9. _T.D._ II. �1.
+
+[133] _De Div._ II. �4.
+
+[134] _Ad Att._ XII. 19, �1.
+
+[135] _Ibid._ XII. 14, �3.
+
+[136] _Ibid._ XII. 15, 16.
+
+[137] _Ibid._ XII. 21, �5.
+
+[138] _Ibid._ XII. 23, �2.
+
+[139] _Ut scias me ita dolere ut non iaceam._
+
+[140] _De Or._ III. �109.
+
+[141] _Ad Att._ XII. 28, �2.
+
+[142] Cf. esp. _Ad Att._ XII. 40, �2 with 38, �3.
+
+[143] _Ibid._ XII. 40, �2.
+
+[144] _Ibid._ XII. 40, �5.
+
+[145] _Ibid._ XIII. 26.
+
+[146] _Ibid._ XII. 41, �1, also 42, 43; XIII. 26.
+
+[147] _Ibid._ XII. 46.
+
+[148] _Ad Att._ XII. 45, �1.
+
+[149] _�ber Cicero's Akademika_, p. 4.
+
+[150] Cf. _Ad Att._ XII. 12, �2, where there is a distinct mention of the
+first two books.
+
+[151] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, �3.
+
+[152] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, �4.
+
+[153] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, ��4, 5; 22, �3.
+
+[154] II. �2.
+
+[155] _De Fin._ Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2.
+
+[156] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, �3; 16, �1.
+
+[157] _Ibid._ XVI. 3, �1.
+
+[158] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, �4.
+
+[159] _Ac._ II. �61.
+
+[160] _D.F._ I. �2.
+
+[161] _T.D._ II. �4. _De Div._ II. �1.
+
+[162] Cf. Krische, p. 5.
+
+[163] _Ac._ II. �61.
+
+[164] _Ad Att._ XIII. 5, �1.
+
+[165] _Ibid._ XIII. 32, �3.
+
+[166] _Ad Att._ XIII. 33, �4.
+
+[167] _Ibid_. XIII. II. �1.
+
+[168] _Ibid_. XII. 42.
+
+[169] _Ibid_. XIII. 16, �1.
+
+[170] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, �3.
+
+[171] _Ibid_. IV. 16a, �2.
+
+[172] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, �3; also IV. 16a, �2.
+
+[173] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, �3.
+
+[174] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, �4.
+
+[175] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, �3.
+
+[176] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, �4.
+
+[177] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, �3; 19, �4; 16, �1.
+
+[178] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, �3.
+
+[179] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, �1.
+
+[180] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, �5.
+
+[181] Cf. _Ibid._ XIII. 14, �3; 16, �2; 18; 19, �5.
+
+[182] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, �5.
+
+[183] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, �3.
+
+[184] _Ad Att._ XIII. 24.
+
+[185] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, �1; 18.
+
+[186] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, �1; 18; 19, �4.
+
+[187] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, �3. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates
+Sch�tz assigns to these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition
+of the _Academica_ in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13.
+
+[188] _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, �1.
+
+[189] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, �5.
+
+[190] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, �3.
+
+[191] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, �3.
+
+[192] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, �3.
+
+[193] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, �4.
+
+[194] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, �5.
+
+[195] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, �3.
+
+[196] _Ibid._ XIII. 24.
+
+[197] _Ibid._ XIII. 35, 36, �2.
+
+[198] _Ibid._ XIII. 38, �1.
+
+[199] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, ��3, 4.
+
+[200] _T.D._ II. �4. Cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ III. 6, �64.
+
+[201] _Ad Att._ XVI. 6, �4. _N.D._ I. �11. _De Div._ II. �1.
+
+[202] _De Off._ II. �8, _Tim�us_, c. 1. _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, �1; 19, �5.
+
+[203] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12; 16; 13; 19.
+
+[204] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, �4. _T.D._ II. �4. _N.D._ I. �11. _De Div._ II. �1.
+
+[205] _Nat. Hist._ XXXI. c. 2.
+
+[206] _Inst. Or._ III. 6, �64.
+
+[207] Plut. _Lucullus_, c. 42.
+
+[208] ��12, 18, 148.
+
+[209] Cf. _Att._ XIII. 19, �4.
+
+[210] _Lucullus_, �12.
+
+[211] _Ad Att._ XIII. 16, �1.
+
+[212] Lactant. _Inst._ VI 2.
+
+[213] Cf. esp. _De Off._ I. �133 with _Brutus_, ��133, 134.
+
+[214] Esp. _Pro Lege Manilia_, �51.
+
+[215] _Brutus_, �222.
+
+[216] _In Verrem_, II. 3, �210.
+
+[217] _Pro Lege Manilia_, �59.
+
+[218] _Pro Sestio_, �122.
+
+[219] _Pro Sestio_, �101.
+
+[220] _Philipp._ II. �12.
+
+[221] _Ad Att._ II. 24, �4.
+
+[222] _Pis._ �6. _Pro Sestio_, �121. _Pro Domo_, �113. _Post Reditum in
+Senatu_, �9. _Philipp._ II. �12.
+
+[223] _Ad Fam._ IX. 15, �3.
+
+[224] Cf. _Post Reditum in Senatu_, �9. _Pro Domo_, �113.
+
+[225] _Pro Archia_, ��6, 28.
+
+[226] Cf. _Ac._ II. �9 with �80.
+
+[227] �62.
+
+[228] _Pro Plancio_, �12. _Pro Murena_, �36. _Pro Rabirio_, �26. _Pro
+Cornelia_ II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe.
+
+[229] _T.D._ V. �56. Cf. _De Or._ III. �9. _N.D._ III. �80.
+
+[230] Cf. esp. III. �173.
+
+[231] _Ibid._ II. �28.
+
+[232] _Ibid._ II. ��13, 20, 21.
+
+[233] _Ibid._ II. �51.
+
+[234] Cf. _ibid._ II. �74 with III. �127.
+
+[235] Cf. II. �152 with III. �187.
+
+[236] _Ibid._ II. �154.
+
+[237] _Brutus_, ��132, 133, 134, 259. _De Or._ III. �29.
+
+[238] _Brutus_, �132.
+
+[239] _De Or._ II. �244. _N.D._ I. �79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.
+
+[240] _De Or._ II. �155.
+
+[241] _Ibid._ III. �194.
+
+[242] Cf. _De Or._ II. �68 with III. ��182, 187.
+
+[243] _De Or._ I. �82 sq.; II. �360.
+
+[244] _Ibid._ I. �45; II. �365; III. ��68, 75.
+
+[245] �12, _commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni_.
+
+[246] Cf. _De Or._ III. �110.
+
+[247] _Ac._ II. �148.
+
+[248] Cf. _Ac._ II. �11.
+
+[249] _Ibid._
+
+[250] _Ibid._ ��12, 18, with my notes.
+
+[251] _Ac._ II. �12: _ista quae heri defensa sunt_ compared with the words
+_ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus_.
+
+[252] See below.
+
+[253] _Ac._ II. ��33--36 inclusive; �54.
+
+[254] _Ac._ II. �28.
+
+[255] Cf. _Ac._ II. ��59, 67, 78, 112, 148, with my notes.
+
+[256] _Ibid._ II. �10.
+
+[257] _Ibid._ II. �28.
+
+[258] Cf. II. �61 with the fragments of the _Hortensius_; also _T.D._ II.
+�4; III. �6; _D.F._ I. �2.
+
+[259] Lactant. III. 16.
+
+[260] Cf. _Ac._ II. �10.
+
+[261] _Ib._ II. �61.
+
+[262] ��44--46.
+
+[263] �13.
+
+[264] Cf. II. �14 with I. �44, and II. ��55, 56.
+
+[265] II. ��17, 18, 22.
+
+[266] Cf. II. �31 with I. �45.
+
+[267] II. ��17, 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 54, 59.
+
+[268] II. �79.
+
+[269] Cf. the words _tam multa_ in II. �79.
+
+[270] See II. �42, where there is a reference to the "_hesternus sermo_."
+
+[271] II. �10.
+
+[272] Cf. II. �10: _id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut tota fere
+quaestio tractata videatur_.
+
+[273] What these were will appear from my notes on the _Lucullus_.
+
+[274] II. �12.
+
+[275] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8.
+
+[276] Cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 25, �3: _Ad Brutum transeamus_.
+
+[277] This is not, as Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy
+after Hortensius' death. That lay at Puteoli: see _Ad Att._ VII. 3, �9.
+
+[278] II. �9.
+
+[279] Cf. II. �61.
+
+[280] II. �80: _O praeclarum prospectum_!
+
+[281] Cf. II. �9 with �128 (_signum illud_), also ��80, 81, 100, 105, 125.
+
+[282] II. �115.
+
+[283] II. �63.
+
+[284] II. ��147, 148.
+
+[285] II. �135.
+
+[286] Cf. II. ��11, 12 with the words _quae erant contra_ [Greek:
+akatal�psian] _praeclare collecta ab Antiocho_: _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, �3.
+
+[287] Varro, _De Re Rust._ III. 17.
+
+[288] II. �11.
+
+[289] _Paradoxa_, �1. _D.F._ III. �8. _Brutus_, �119.
+
+[290] _Ac._ I. �12. _D.F._ V. �8.
+
+[291] Cf. II. �80.
+
+[292] Cf. Aug. _Adv. Acad._ III. �35. Nonius, sub v. _exultare_.
+
+[293] Cf. the word _nuper_ in �1.
+
+[294] �11.
+
+[295] ��3, 18.
+
+[296] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8, �1.
+
+[297] _Ad Att._ II. 25, �1.
+
+[298] _Ibid_. III. 8, �3.
+
+[299] _Ibid_. III. 15, �3; 18, �1.
+
+[300] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1--8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro
+preserved in our collections.
+
+[301] Above, pp. xxxvii--xlii.
+
+[302] _De Civ. Dei_, XIX. cc. 1--3.
+
+[303] See Madvig, _De Fin._ ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50.
+Br�ckner, _Leben des Cicero_, I. p. 655, follows M�ller.
+
+[304] Cf. Krische, p. 58.
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Academica, by Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Academica
+
+Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+Release Date: February 8, 2005 [EBook #14970]
+
+Language: Latin with English and Greek (ancient)
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+<h3>THE</h3>
+
+<h1>ACADEMICA OF CICERO.</h1>
+
+<h3><i>THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED</i></h3>
+
+<p class="center">BY</p>
+
+<h2>JAMES S. REID,</h2>
+
+<p class="center">M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)<br />
+ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;<br />
+ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.</p>
+
+<h2>LONDON:<br />
+MACMILLAN AND CO.<br />
+1874</h2>
+
+<h3>[<i>All Rights reserved</i>.]</h3>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h3>TO</h3>
+<h3>THOSE OF HIS PUPILS</h3>
+<h3>WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM</h3>
+<h3><i>THE ACADEMICA</i>,</h3>
+<h3>THIS EDITION</h3>
+<h3>IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED</h3>
+<h3>BY</h3>
+<h3>THE EDITOR.</h3>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h2>PREFACE.</h2>
+
+  <p>Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has
+  edited the <i>Academica</i>. In Germany the last edition with explanatory
+  notes is that of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and
+  untrustworthiness of Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong
+  evidence; while the work of Davies, though in every way far superior to
+  that of Goerenz, is very deficient when judged by the criticism of the
+  present time.</p>
+
+  <p>This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures
+  given by me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work
+  in its present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the
+  Universities, and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where
+  the philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those
+  where an attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient
+  Philosophy as will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now
+  required in the final Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford
+  and Cambridge. My notes have been written throughout with a practical
+  reference to the needs of junior students. During the last three or four
+  years I have read the <i>Academica</i> with a large number of intelligent
+  pupils, and there is scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested
+  by some difficulty or want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody
+  in an Introduction such information concerning Cicero's philosophical
+  views and the literary history of the <i>Academica</i> as could not be
+  readily got from existing books; next, to provide a good text; then to
+  aid the student in obtaining a higher knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity,
+  and lastly, to put it in his power to learn thoroughly the philosophy
+  with which Cicero deals.</p>
+
+  <p>My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in
+  the edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the
+  editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second
+  edition of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that
+  editor. I have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass
+  without carefully weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also
+  studied all original criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain
+  access. The result is a text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than
+  that of Halm. My obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently
+  acknowledged in my notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled
+  <i>Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos</i>, published in 1825
+  at Copenhagen, but never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in
+  the edition of Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few
+  passages I have introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the
+  conjecttires of other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the
+  MSS. If any apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the
+  notes, questions of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from
+  a conviction that the very excellence of the texts now in use is
+  depriving a Classical training of a great deal of its old educational
+  value. The judgment was better cultivated when the student had to fight
+  his way through bad texts to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the
+  Latin tongue. The acceptance of results without a knowledge of the
+  processes by which they are obtained is worthless for the purposes of
+  education, which is thus made to rest on memory alone. I have therefore
+  done my best to place before the reader the arguments for and against
+  different readings in the most important places where the text is
+  doubtful.</p>
+
+  <p>My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the
+  students for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller
+  acquaintance than they ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties
+  of language which the best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide
+  them to the best teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding
+  editor of Cicero must build. His edition of the <i>De Finibus</i>
+  contains more valuable material for illustrating, not merely the
+  language, but also the subject-matter of the <i>Academica</i>, than all
+  the professed editions of the latter work in existence. Yet, even after
+  Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be done in pointing out what
+  is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have therefore added very many
+  references from my own reading, and from other sources. Wherever a
+  quotation would not have been given but for its appearance in some other
+  work, I have pointed out the authority from whom it was taken. I need
+  hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to look out all the
+  references given. It was necessary to provide material by means of which
+  the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if it were new to
+  him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that occurred. Want of
+  space has compelled me often to substitute a mere reference for an actual
+  quotation.</p>
+
+  <p>As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not
+  touched upon somewhere in the <i>Academica</i>, it is evidently
+  impossible for an editor to give information which would be complete for
+  a reader who is studying that subject for the first time. I have
+  therefore tried to enable readers to find easily for themselves the
+  information they require, and have only dwelt in my own language upon
+  such philosophical difficulties as were in some special way bound up with
+  the <i>Academica</i>. The two books chiefly referred to in my notes are
+  the English translation of Zeller's <i>Stoics, Epicureans and
+  Sceptics</i> (whenever Zeller is quoted without any further description
+  this book is meant), and the <i>Historia Philosophiae</i> of Ritter and
+  Preller. The <i>pages</i>, not the <i>sections</i>, of the fourth edition
+  of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's <i>De Finibus</i>,
+  all teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a
+  philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have
+  constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all
+  of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.</p>
+
+  <p>Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is
+  hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as
+  bringing together much scattered information illustrative of the
+  <i>Academica</i>, which was before difficult of access. The present work
+  will, I hope, prepare the way for an exhaustive edition either from my
+  own or some more competent hand. It must be regarded as an experiment,
+  for no English scholar of recent times has treated any portion of
+  Cicero's philosophical works with quite the purpose which I have kept in
+  view and have explained above. Should this attempt meet with favour, I
+  propose to edit after the same plan some others of the less known and
+  less edited portions of Cicero's writings.</p>
+
+  <p>In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited
+  I cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to
+  repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than
+  to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a
+  great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that
+  intellectual disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this
+  University, and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of
+  English scholarship as compared with that of Germany,</p>
+
+  <p>I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and
+  omissions from any who are interested in the subject.</p>
+
+  <p>JAMES S. REID.</p>
+
+  <p>CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, <i>December, 1873.</i></p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h3>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.</h3>
+
+  <p>Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica
+  Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De
+  Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. =
+  Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus;
+  Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. =
+  De Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat.
+  = Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum;
+  Ad Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr.,
+  Verr. = In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium;
+  In Cat. = In Catilinam.</p>
+
+  <p>Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia
+  Socratis; Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.</p>
+
+  <p>Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna
+  Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De
+  Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. =
+  Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.</p>
+
+  <p>Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto.
+  Rep. = De Stoicis Repugnantiis.</p>
+
+  <p>Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. =
+  Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. =
+  Pyrrhone�n Hypotypose�n Syntagmata.</p>
+
+  <p>Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.</p>
+
+  <p>Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.</p>
+
+  <p>Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et
+  Platonis.</p>
+
+  <p>Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.</p>
+
+  <p>Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos;
+  De Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.</p>
+
+  <p>Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.</p>
+
+  <p>Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad
+  Helvidium.</p>
+
+  <p>Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.</p>
+
+  <p>Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. =
+  Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv.
+  = Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.</p>
+
+  <p>Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc.
+  = Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or
+  Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.</p>
+
+  <p>Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.</p>
+
+  <p>Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundz�ge der Griechischen Etymologie.</p>
+
+  <p>Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.</p>
+
+  <p>Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.</p>
+
+  <p>Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. =
+  conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. =
+  emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. =
+  especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd.
+  = Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits,
+  or omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. =
+  subjunctive.</p>
+
+  <p>R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium
+  locis contexta.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h2>THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.</h2>
+
+<!-- Page i --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i"></a>[i]</span>
+
+<h3>INTRODUCTION.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">I. <i>Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of
+Letters:</i> 90&mdash;45 B.C.</p>
+
+  <p>It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his
+  father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and
+  spent the greater part of his time in study.<a name="NtA_1"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> From him was probably derived that strong
+  love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son throughout
+  his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young Cicero to
+  feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a corrective for
+  the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.<a
+  name="NtA_2"></a><a href="#Nt_2"><sup>[2]</sup></a></p>
+
+  <p>Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the
+  Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of
+  Athens, whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he
+  had assumed the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at
+  once to the tenets of the <!-- Page ii --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_ii"></a>[ii]</span> master.<a name="NtA_3"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> Phaedrus remained to the end of his life
+  a friend of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable
+  disposition and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps,
+  the exception of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any
+  literary power.<a name="NtA_4"></a><a href="#Nt_4"><sup>[4]</sup></a>
+  Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius
+  Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus.
+  It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend
+  became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the
+  Epicurean school.<a name="NtA_5"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_5"><sup>[5]</sup></a></p>
+
+  <p>At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of
+  Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively,
+  the art of dialectic.<a name="NtA_6"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> This art, which Cicero deems so important
+  to the orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the
+  monopoly of the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days
+  with Diodotus in the severest study, but he seems never to have been much
+  attracted by the general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between
+  the two lasted till the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion
+  set by the Roman Stoic circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became
+  an inmate of Cicero's house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil
+  heir to a not inconsiderable property.<a name="NtA_7"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> He seems to have been one of the most
+  accomplished <!-- Page iii --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_iii"></a>[iii]</span> men of his time, and Cicero's feelings
+  towards him were those of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.<a
+  name="NtA_8"></a><a href="#Nt_8"><sup>[8]</sup></a></p>
+
+  <p>In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the
+  Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled
+  from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war.
+  Philo, like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic
+  philosopher, he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice
+  of oratory. Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for
+  Epicureanism was swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly,
+  as he tells us, to the brilliant Academic.<a name="NtA_9"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he
+  abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the
+  conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever,
+  and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.<a
+  name="NtA_10"></a><a href="#Nt_10"><sup>[10]</sup></a></p>
+
+  <p>We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been
+  brought into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent
+  philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and
+  important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become
+  thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of
+  each. His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his
+  egotism has been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student.
+  In his later works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to
+  philosophy.<a name="NtA_11"></a><a href="#Nt_11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> It
+  would be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection <!--
+  Page iv --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv"></a>[iv]</span> which
+  subsisted between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks;
+  but there can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then
+  Rhodian ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning
+  the ethical part of Greek philosophy.</p>
+
+  <p>During the years 88&mdash;81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly
+  with the study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many
+  ambitious works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him
+  at this period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the
+  Marian party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular
+  course, and Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one
+  philosophic orator of Rome, as he not unjustly boasts<a
+  name="NtA_12"></a><a href="#Nt_12"><sup>[12]</sup></a>. For two years he
+  was busily engaged, and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern
+  Hellas. It is usually supposed that he came into collision with Sulla
+  through the freedman Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of
+  Roscius. The silence of Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which
+  rests on no better evidence than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even
+  when mentioning his speech in defence of Roscius, never assigns any other
+  cause for his departure than his health, which was being undermined by
+  his passionate style of oratory<a name="NtA_13"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_13"><sup>[13]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>The whole two years 79&mdash;77 B.C. were spent in the society of
+  Greek philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at
+  Athens, and were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the
+  exception <!-- Page v --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_v"></a>[v]</span> of Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent
+  rhetorical teachers at that time resident in the city<a
+  name="NtA_14"></a><a href="#Nt_14"><sup>[14]</sup></a>. By the advice of
+  Philo himself<a name="NtA_15"></a><a href="#Nt_15"><sup>[15]</sup></a>,
+  Cicero attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as
+  Diogenes calls him<a name="NtA_16"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_16"><sup>[16]</sup></a>, Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the
+  Epicurean school. In Cicero's later works there are several references to
+  his teaching. He was biting and sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in
+  spirit, hence in striking contrast to Patro and Phaedrus<a
+  name="NtA_17"></a><a href="#Nt_17"><sup>[17]</sup></a>. It is curious to
+  find that Zeno is numbered by Cicero among those pupils and admirers of
+  Carneades whom he had known<a name="NtA_18"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_18"><sup>[18]</sup></a>. Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along
+  with Atticus who loved him beyond all other philosophers<a
+  name="NtA_19"></a><a href="#Nt_19"><sup>[19]</sup></a>, Cicero spent much
+  time in listening to his instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the
+  two pupils<a name="NtA_20"></a><a href="#Nt_20"><sup>[20]</sup></a>.
+  Patro was probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere
+  explicitly stated. Cicero must at this time have attained an almost
+  complete familiarity with the Epicurean doctrines.</p>
+
+  <p>There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school
+  then at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose
+  lectures Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed
+  Peripatetic, was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens<a
+  name="NtA_21"></a><a href="#Nt_21"><sup>[21]</sup></a>. Only three
+  notable Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of
+  Naples, who lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens<a
+  name="NtA_22"></a><a href="#Nt_22"><sup>[22]</sup></a>; it is probable,
+  however, from a mention of <!-- Page vi --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_vi"></a>[vi]</span> him in the De Oratore, that Cicero knew
+  himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently named
+  by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time
+  unknown to him.</p>
+
+  <p>The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at
+  this period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a
+  Stoicised Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to
+  treat later, when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised
+  over our author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point
+  which was in controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still
+  continued to think with his earlier teacher. His later works, however,
+  make it evident that he set a high value on the abilities and the
+  learning of Antiochus, especially in dialectic, which was taught after
+  Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him as eminent among the philosophers
+  of the time, both for talent and acquirement <a name="NtA_23"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_23"><sup>[23]</sup></a>; as a man of acute intellect<a
+  name="NtA_24"></a><a href="#Nt_24"><sup>[24]</sup></a>; as possessed of a
+  pointed style<a name="NtA_25"></a><a href="#Nt_25"><sup>[25]</sup></a>;
+  in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the philosophers of the
+  age<a name="NtA_26"></a><a href="#Nt_26"><sup>[26]</sup></a>. A
+  considerable friendship sprang up between Antiochus and Cicero<a
+  name="NtA_27"></a><a href="#Nt_27"><sup>[27]</sup></a>, which was
+  strengthened by the fact that many friends of the latter, such as Piso,
+  Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or less adhered to the views of
+  Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at this time became acquainted
+  with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in the Academica<a
+  name="NtA_28"></a><a href="#Nt_28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> he is mentioned in
+  such a way as to show that he was unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.</p>
+
+<!-- Page vii --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii"></a>[vii]</span>
+The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had
+been to learn philosophy; in Asia and at Rhodes he
+devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the guidance
+of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was
+his old friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian
+school<a name="NtA_29"></a><a href="#Nt_29"><sup>[29]</sup></a>. Cicero, however, formed while at Rhodes one
+friendship which largely influenced his views of philosophy,
+that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius,
+the most famous Stoic of the age. To him Cicero
+makes reference in his works oftener than to any other
+instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the
+Stoics<a name="NtA_30"></a><a href="#Nt_30"><sup>[30]</sup></a>; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom
+Pompey, in the midst of his eastern campaigns, put
+himself to much trouble<a name="NtA_31"></a><a href="#Nt_31"><sup>[31]</sup></a>; as a minute inquirer<a name="NtA_32"></a><a href="#Nt_32"><sup>[32]</sup></a>. He
+is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression of
+affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works
+more than those of any other author<a name="NtA_33"></a><a href="#Nt_33"><sup>[33]</sup></a>. Posidonius
+was at a later time resident at Rome, and stayed in
+Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of
+Panaetius, may have been at Rhodes at this time.
+Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers of Panaetius,
+belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was
+well acquainted with the works of the former, he does
+not seem to have known either personally.
+
+  <p>From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters
+  begins, Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political
+  affairs to spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed
+  much to philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; <!-- Page viii
+  --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii"></a>[viii]</span> and we
+  know from his letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style
+  by much study of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers.
+  During the period then, about which we have little or no information, we
+  may believe that he kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many
+  Roman friends who had a bent towards philosophy, as well as with the
+  Greeks who from time to time came to Rome and frequented the houses of
+  the Optimates; to this he added such reading as his leisure would allow.
+  The letters contained in the first book of those addressed to Atticus,
+  which range over the years 68&mdash;62 B.C., afford many proofs of the
+  abiding strength of his passion for literary employment. In the earlier
+  part of this time we find him entreating Atticus to let him have a
+  library which was then for sale; expressing at the same time in the
+  strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his love for
+  books, to which he looks as the support of his old age<a
+  name="NtA_34"></a><a href="#Nt_34"><sup>[34]</sup></a>. In the midst of
+  his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest for
+  the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan
+  villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be
+  taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all
+  things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory
+  held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed
+  his intellect, but never his heart.</p>
+
+  <p>The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to
+  indulge his literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his
+  speeches, which were <!-- Page ix --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_ix"></a>[ix]</span> crowded, he says, with the maxims of
+  philosophy<a name="NtA_35"></a><a href="#Nt_35"><sup>[35]</sup></a>; the
+  history of his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he
+  sent to Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the
+  poem on his consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two
+  later we find him reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and
+  keeping up his acquaintance with living Greek philosophers<a
+  name="NtA_36"></a><a href="#Nt_36"><sup>[36]</sup></a>. His long lack of
+  leisure seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at
+  this time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he
+  presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes
+  to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the
+  endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even
+  slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find
+  greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit<a
+  name="NtA_37"></a><a href="#Nt_37"><sup>[37]</sup></a>." At this period
+  of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates near Tusculum,
+  Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater emphasis on these
+  facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero was a mere
+  dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore paraphrases of
+  Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for every kind of
+  literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each department
+  considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his age, with
+  the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus<a
+  name="NtA_38"></a><a href="#Nt_38"><sup>[38]</sup></a> will give a fair
+  picture of his life at this time. He especially studied the political
+  writings of <!-- Page x --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_x"></a>[x]</span> the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and
+  Dicaearchus<a name="NtA_39"></a><a href="#Nt_39"><sup>[39]</sup></a>. He
+  also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of Theopompus<a
+  name="NtA_40"></a><a href="#Nt_40"><sup>[40]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>The years from 59&mdash;57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private
+  cares overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return
+  from exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring
+  literature" with a marvellous man named Dionysius<a name="NtA_41"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_41"><sup>[41]</sup></a>, and laughingly pronouncing that
+  nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the
+  year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla,
+  the son of the Dictator<a name="NtA_42"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_42"><sup>[42]</sup></a>. Literature formed then, he tells us,
+  his solace and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which
+  Atticus had, beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of
+  office. Towards the end of the year, he was busily engaged on the <i>De
+  Oratore</i>, a work which clearly proves his continued familiarity with
+  Greek philosophy<a name="NtA_43"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_43"><sup>[43]</sup></a>. In the following year (54) he writes
+  that politics must cease for him, and that he therefore returns
+  unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature, that of the
+  student<a name="NtA_44"></a><a href="#Nt_44"><sup>[44]</sup></a>. During
+  this year he was again for the most part at those of his country villas
+  where his best collections of books were. At this time was written the
+  <i>De Republica</i>, a work to which I may appeal for evidence that his
+  old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to drop<a
+  name="NtA_45"></a><a href="#Nt_45"><sup>[45]</sup></a>. Aristotle is
+  especially mentioned as one of the authors <!-- Page xi --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi"></a>[xi]</span> read at this time<a
+  name="NtA_46"></a><a href="#Nt_46"><sup>[46]</sup></a>. In the year 52
+  B.C. came the <i>De Legibus</i>, written amid many distracting
+  occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older
+  philosophers of the Socratic schools.</p>
+
+  <p>In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens,
+  much to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the
+  house of Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His
+  acquaintance with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the
+  affectionate mention in the <i>Brutus</i><a name="NtA_47"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_47"><sup>[47]</sup></a>. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of
+  Xeno, an Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens.
+  It was at this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil
+  of the great Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in
+  which Epicurus had lived<a name="NtA_48"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_48"><sup>[48]</sup></a>. Cicero seems to have been somewhat
+  disappointed with the state of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the
+  only man of merit then resident there<a name="NtA_49"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_49"><sup>[49]</sup></a>. On the journey from Athens to his
+  province, he made the acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at
+  Athens as head of the Peripatetic school<a name="NtA_50"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_50"><sup>[50]</sup></a>. At this time he was resident at
+  Mitylene, where Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society<a
+  name="NtA_51"></a><a href="#Nt_51"><sup>[51]</sup></a>. He was by far the
+  greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and
+  indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school<a
+  name="NtA_52"></a><a href="#Nt_52"><sup>[52]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's
+  thoughts till the end of 50. <!-- Page xii --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xii"></a>[xii]</span> Yet he yearned for Athens and
+  philosophy. He wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful
+  city, and anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build
+  a <span lang="el" title="propylon"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> at the
+  Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis<a
+  name="NtA_53"></a><a href="#Nt_53"><sup>[53]</sup></a>. It seems the
+  Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient statues
+  to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome
+  inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter
+  of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in
+  the books <i>De Republica</i><a name="NtA_54"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_54"><sup>[54]</sup></a>. His wishes with regard to Athens still
+  kept their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke
+  of conferring on the city some signal favour<a name="NtA_55"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_55"><sup>[55]</sup></a>. Cicero was anxious to show Rhodes,
+  with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus, who
+  accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days<a
+  name="NtA_56"></a><a href="#Nt_56"><sup>[56]</sup></a>. From thence they
+  went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with Aristus<a
+  name="NtA_57"></a><a href="#Nt_57"><sup>[57]</sup></a>, and renewed his
+  friendship with other philosophers, among them Xeno the friend of
+  Atticus<a name="NtA_58"></a><a href="#Nt_58"><sup>[58]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical
+  condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The
+  letters which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times
+  contrasts the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn
+  in the <i>De Republica</i><a name="NtA_59"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_59"><sup>[59]</sup></a>; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's
+  description of the tyrant is present to <!-- Page xiii --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii"></a>[xiii]</span> his mind<a
+  name="NtA_60"></a><a href="#Nt_60"><sup>[60]</sup></a>; when, he
+  deliberates about the course he is himself to take, he naturally recals
+  the example of Socrates, who refused to leave Athens amid the misrule of
+  the thirty tyrants<a name="NtA_61"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_61"><sup>[61]</sup></a>. It is curious to find Cicero, in the
+  very midst of civil war, poring over the book of Demetrius the Magnesian
+  concerning concord<a name="NtA_62"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_62"><sup>[62]</sup></a>; or employing his days in arguing with
+  himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about tyranny<a
+  name="NtA_63"></a><a href="#Nt_63"><sup>[63]</sup></a>. Nothing could
+  more clearly show that he was really a man of books; by nothing but
+  accident a politician. In these evil days, however, nothing was long to
+  his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn became unpleasant<a
+  name="NtA_64"></a><a href="#Nt_64"><sup>[64]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46
+  he returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a
+  letter written to Varro in that year<a name="NtA_65"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_65"><sup>[65]</sup></a>, he says "I assure you I had no sooner
+  returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my
+  books." These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear
+  richer fruit than in his days of prosperity<a name="NtA_66"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_66"><sup>[66]</sup></a>. The tenor of all his letters at this
+  time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also
+  to Sulpicius<a name="NtA_67"></a><a href="#Nt_67"><sup>[67]</sup></a>.
+  The <i>Partitiones Oratoriae</i>, the <i>Paradoxa</i>, the <i>Orator</i>,
+  and the <i>Laudatio Catonis</i>, to which Caesar replied by his
+  <i>Anticato</i>, were all finished within the year. Before the end of the
+  year the <i>Hortensius</i> and the <i>De Finibus</i> had probably both
+  been planned and commenced. <!-- Page xiv --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xiv"></a>[xiv]</span> Early in the following year the
+  <i>Academica</i>, the history of which I shall trace elsewhere, was
+  written.</p>
+
+  <p>I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero
+  as the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion
+  of his life which preceded the writing of the <i>Academica</i>. Even the
+  evidence I have produced, which does not include such indirect
+  indications of philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual
+  philosophical works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at
+  no time had he been divorced from philosophy<a name="NtA_68"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_68"><sup>[68]</sup></a>. He was entitled to repel the charge
+  made by some people on the publication of his first book of the later
+  period&mdash;the <i>Hortensius</i>&mdash;that he was a mere tiro in
+  philosophy, by the assertion that on the contrary nothing had more
+  occupied his thoughts throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic
+  life<a name="NtA_69"></a><a href="#Nt_69"><sup>[69]</sup></a>. Did the
+  scope of this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in
+  showing from a minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with
+  ancient authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as
+  accurate as it was extensive. So far as the <i>Academica</i> is
+  concerned, I have had in my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's
+  substantial accuracy; of the success of the defence I must leave the
+  reader to judge. During the progress of this work I shall have to expose
+  the groundlessness of many feelings and judgments now current which have
+  contributed to produce a low estimate of Cicero's philosophical
+  attainments, but there is one piece of unfairness which I shall have no
+  better opportunity of mentioning <!-- Page xv --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xv"></a>[xv]</span> than the present. It is this. Cicero, the
+  philosopher, is made to suffer for the shortcomings of Cicero the
+  politician. Scholars who have learned to despise his political weakness,
+  vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate his achievements in
+  philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too closely into
+  their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance the
+  illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the <i>De Legibus</i> as "an oasis in
+  the desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political
+  partizanship, and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in
+  hand, I beg all students to free themselves in reading the
+  <i>Academica</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="center">II. <i>The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero</i>.</p>
+
+  <p>In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student
+  of philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed
+  historical examination of the later Greek schools&mdash;the Stoic,
+  Peripatetic, Epicurean and new Academic. These it would be necessary to
+  know, not merely as they came from the hands of their founders, but as
+  they existed in Cicero's age; Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as
+  Posidonius and the other pupils of Panaetius propounded it; not merely
+  the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and
+  Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum by Cratippus; the new
+  Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and Carneades; the
+  medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put forward by
+  Antiochus in the name of the Old <!-- Page xvi --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi"></a>[xvi]</span> Academy. A systematic
+  attempt to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine
+  held by these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements
+  concerning any particular school are generally tested by comparing them
+  with the assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier
+  representatives of the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at
+  once concluded that Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all
+  probability, he is uttering opinions which would have been recognised as
+  genuine by those who were at the head of the school in his day. The
+  criticism of Madvig even is not free from this error, as will be seen
+  from my notes on several passages of the <i>Academica</i><a
+  name="NtA_70"></a><a href="#Nt_70"><sup>[70]</sup></a>. As my space
+  forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I have indicated as desirable,
+  I can but describe in rough outline the relation in which Cicero stands
+  to the chief schools.</p>
+
+  <p>The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often
+  insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to
+  distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical
+  standard<a name="NtA_71"></a><a href="#Nt_71"><sup>[71]</sup></a>. We
+  have in the <i>Academica</i> Cicero's view of the first problem: that the
+  attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To go more into
+  detail here would be to anticipate the text of the <i>Lucullus</i> as
+  well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in
+  this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school,
+  and in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine
+  that absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against
+  which all the other schools <!-- Page xvii --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xvii"></a>[xvii]</span> were combined<a name="NtA_72"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_72"><sup>[72]</sup></a>. In that which was most distinctively
+  New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.</p>
+
+  <p>It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero.
+  Nothing was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he
+  was accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on
+  both sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition
+  with a conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth.
+  One requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this
+  arrogance<a name="NtA_73"></a><a href="#Nt_73"><sup>[73]</sup></a>.
+  Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most opposite
+  opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from all
+  doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most
+  probable, was the only prudent course<a name="NtA_74"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_74"><sup>[74]</sup></a>. Cicero's temperament also, apart from
+  his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration, and
+  repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the
+  diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to
+  lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness<a
+  name="NtA_75"></a><a href="#Nt_75"><sup>[75]</sup></a>. In positiveness
+  of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and disgraceful,
+  unworthy of a self-controlled character<a name="NtA_76"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_76"><sup>[76]</sup></a>. Here we have a touch of feeling
+  thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar to some put
+  forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to Mill, to show
+  that the free conflict of opinion is necessary <!-- Page xviii --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii"></a>[xviii]</span> to the progress
+  of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to maturity
+  in Greece<a name="NtA_77"></a><a href="#Nt_77"><sup>[77]</sup></a>.
+  Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice, says Cicero, there
+  philosophy has pined. Pythagoras<a name="NtA_78"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_78"><sup>[78]</sup></a> is quoted as a warning example, and the
+  baneful effects of authority are often depicted<a name="NtA_79"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_79"><sup>[79]</sup></a>. The true philosophic spirit requires
+  us to find out what can be said for every view. It is a positive duty to
+  discuss all aspects of every question, after the example of the Old
+  Academy and Aristotle<a name="NtA_80"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_80"><sup>[80]</sup></a>. Those who demand a dogmatic statement
+  of belief are mere busybodies<a name="NtA_81"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_81"><sup>[81]</sup></a>. The Academics glory in their freedom
+  of judgment. They are not compelled to defend an opinion whether they
+  will or no, merely because one of their predecessors has laid it down<a
+  name="NtA_82"></a><a href="#Nt_82"><sup>[82]</sup></a>. So far does
+  Cicero carry this freedom, that in the fifth book of the <i>Tusculan
+  Disputations</i>, he maintains a view entirely at variance with the whole
+  of the fourth book of the <i>De Finibus</i>, and when the discrepancy is
+  pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former statements, on the score
+  that he is an Academic and a freeman<a name="NtA_83"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_83"><sup>[83]</sup></a>. "Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius
+  videtur<a name="NtA_84"></a><a href="#Nt_84"><sup>[84]</sup></a>." The
+  Academic sips the best of every school<a name="NtA_85"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_85"><sup>[85]</sup></a>. He roams in the wide field of
+  philosophy, while the Stoic dares not stir a foot's breadth away from
+  Chrysippus<a name="NtA_86"></a><a href="#Nt_86"><sup>[86]</sup></a>. The
+  Academic is only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he
+  makes it his sole <!-- Page xix --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xix"></a>[xix]</span> aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and
+  others of the mists of error<a name="NtA_87"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_87"><sup>[87]</sup></a>. This spirit is even found in Lucullus
+  the Antiochean<a name="NtA_88"></a><a href="#Nt_88"><sup>[88]</sup></a>.
+  While professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero
+  indignantly repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek
+  for the truth, has no truth to follow<a name="NtA_89"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_89"><sup>[89]</sup></a>. The probable is for it the true.</p>
+
+  <p>Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their
+  evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that
+  eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy<a
+  name="NtA_90"></a><a href="#Nt_90"><sup>[90]</sup></a>. Orators,
+  politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the
+  teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters<a name="NtA_91"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_91"><sup>[91]</sup></a>. The Stoics and Epicureans cared
+  nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic tenets were those
+  with which the common sense of the world could have most sympathy<a
+  name="NtA_92"></a><a href="#Nt_92"><sup>[92]</sup></a>. The Academy also
+  was the school which had the most respectable pedigree. Compared with its
+  system, all other philosophies were plebeian<a name="NtA_93"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_93"><sup>[93]</sup></a>. The philosopher who best preserved the
+  Socratic tradition was most estimable, <i>ceteris paribus</i>, and that
+  man was Carneades<a name="NtA_94"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_94"><sup>[94]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard,
+  we must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later
+  philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first.
+  Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of <!-- Page xx --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx"></a>[xx]</span> conduct (<i>ars
+  vivendi</i>). All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely
+  estimable as supplying a basis on which this practical art could be
+  reared. This is equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the
+  dogmatism of Zeno and Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were
+  mere outworks or ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school
+  was carried on. These were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy;
+  in time of peace ethics held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a
+  key to unlock many difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may
+  instance one passage in the beginning of the <i>Academica
+  Posteriora</i><a name="NtA_95"></a><a href="#Nt_95"><sup>[95]</sup></a>,
+  which has given much trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro
+  with having deserted the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge.
+  How is this to be reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he
+  never recanted the doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus.
+  Arcesilas, Carneades, and Philo had been too busy with their polemic
+  against Zeno and his followers, maintained on logical grounds, to deal
+  much with ethics. On the other hand, in the works which Cicero had
+  written and published before the <i>Academica</i>, wherever he had
+  touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The works
+  themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and
+  Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics
+  mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase
+  "Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical
+  resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical <!-- Page xxi
+  --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxi"></a>[xxi]</span> difference,
+  would naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus
+  Academia," so long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought
+  dialectic to the front, and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would
+  naturally regard him as a deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This
+  view is confirmed by the fact that for many years before Cicero wrote,
+  the Academic dialectic had found no eminent expositor. So much was this
+  the case, that when Cicero wrote the <i>Academica</i> he was charged with
+  constituting himself the champion of an exploded and discredited school<a
+  name="NtA_96"></a><a href="#Nt_96"><sup>[96]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the
+  sphere of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in
+  the <i>De Legibus</i> when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he
+  begs the New Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects,
+  to be silent<a name="NtA_97"></a><a href="#Nt_97"><sup>[97]</sup></a>.
+  Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected, is in the
+  <i>De Legibus</i> spoken of with considerable favour<a
+  name="NtA_98"></a><a href="#Nt_98"><sup>[98]</sup></a>. All ethical
+  systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an
+  attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the
+  power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he
+  calls them "great and famous philosophers<a name="NtA_99"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_99"><sup>[99]</sup></a>," and he frequently speaks with
+  something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands of
+  Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they
+  should be the only true philosophers <!-- Page xxii --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxii"></a>[xxii]</span> after all<a
+  name="NtA_100"></a><a href="#Nt_100"><sup>[100]</sup></a>. There was a
+  kind of magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited
+  to a superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the
+  barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him<a name="NtA_101"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_101"><sup>[101]</sup></a>. On moral questions, therefore, we
+  often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism than even his
+  teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the philosophers of
+  the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The Stoics
+  maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero agrees
+  with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a life
+  enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be happy,
+  but could not be the happiest possible<a name="NtA_102"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_102"><sup>[102]</sup></a>. He begs the Academic and Peripatetic
+  schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire) and to allow
+  that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired even if he
+  were thrust into the bull of Phalaris<a name="NtA_103"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_103"><sup>[103]</sup></a>. In another place he admits the
+  purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible<a
+  name="NtA_104"></a><a href="#Nt_104"><sup>[104]</sup></a>. These
+  opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but
+  appeals to Socrates as his authority for them<a name="NtA_105"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_105"><sup>[105]</sup></a>. Zeno, who is merely an ignoble
+  craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is Cicero's
+  general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt that he
+  caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno, ever
+  stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however,
+  regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so
+  <!-- Page xxiii --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xxiii"></a>[xxiii]</span> regarded chiefly the dialectic. It
+  is just in this that the difference between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To
+  the former Zeno's dialectic was true and Socratic, while the latter
+  treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon Socrates as the apostle of
+  doubt<a name="NtA_106"></a><a href="#Nt_106"><sup>[106]</sup></a>. On the
+  whole Cicero was more in accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in
+  all points, however: for while Antiochus accepted without reserve the
+  Stoic paradoxes, Cicero hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded
+  that they were Socratic<a name="NtA_107"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_107"><sup>[107]</sup></a>. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the
+  Stoic theory that all emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in
+  his joys and sorrows, refused it with horror<a name="NtA_108"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_108"><sup>[108]</sup></a>. It must be admitted that on some
+  points Cicero was inconsistent. In the <i>De Finibus</i> he argued that
+  the difference between the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of
+  terms; in the <i>Tusculan Disputations</i> he held it to be real. The
+  most Stoic in tone of all his works are the <i>Tusculan Disputations</i>
+  and the <i>De Officiis</i>.</p>
+
+  <p>With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a
+  comparatively small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this
+  branch of philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient
+  theology was, as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical
+  science. The religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very
+  strongly to sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal
+  operation of divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were
+  impossible in any form, he thought, if the divine <!-- Page xxiv --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiv"></a>[xxiv]</span> government of the
+  universe were denied<a name="NtA_109"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_109"><sup>[109]</sup></a>. It went to Cicero's heart that
+  Carneades should have found it necessary to oppose the beautiful Stoic
+  theology, and he defends the great sceptic by the plea that his one aim
+  was to arouse men to the investigation of the truth<a
+  name="NtA_110"></a><a href="#Nt_110"><sup>[110]</sup></a>. At the same
+  time, while really following the Stoics in physics, Cicero often believed
+  himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose from the actual
+  adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines, which they
+  gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious and the
+  genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange
+  oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen<a
+  name="NtA_111"></a><a href="#Nt_111"><sup>[111]</sup></a>. Still, Cicero
+  contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic physics by a
+  study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of his notions
+  about physics, the <i>Timaeus</i> of Plato, which he knew well and
+  translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that
+  the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well
+  aware of the fact.</p>
+
+  <p>Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's
+  estimate of the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not
+  very powerfully represented during his lifetime. The philosophical
+  descendants of the author of the <i>Organon</i> were notorious for their
+  ignorance of logic<a name="NtA_112"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_112"><sup>[112]</sup></a>, and in ethics had approximated
+  considerably to the Stoic teaching. While not much influenced by the
+  school, Cicero generally <!-- Page xxv --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xxv"></a>[xxv]</span> treats it tenderly for the sake of its
+  great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic family. With
+  the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood absolutely
+  alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they discarded
+  mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing but
+  loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors
+  by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely
+  indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.</p>
+
+<p class="center">III. <i>The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works</i>.</p>
+
+  <p>It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a
+  philosopher, and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is
+  true, but still absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of
+  Cicero's purpose in writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek
+  speculation. The conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite
+  unwarranted. If the later philosophy of the Greeks is of any value,
+  Cicero's works are of equal value, for it is only from them that we get
+  any full or clear view of it. Any one who attempts to reconcile the
+  contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch
+  and other authorities, will perhaps feel little inclination to cry out
+  against the confusion of Ciceros ideas. Such outcry, now so common, is
+  due largely to the want, which I have already noticed, of any clear
+  exposition of the <!-- Page xxvi --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xxvi"></a>[xxvi]</span> variations in doctrine which the late
+  Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before the
+  Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This
+  is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works
+  (if we except the third book of the <i>De Officiis</i>), which he does
+  not freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the
+  time when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault
+  rather than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no
+  one had propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had
+  been simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing
+  tenets. It would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two
+  centuries are therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not
+  the substance of the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which
+  ultimately exercised no unimportant influence on society and on the
+  Christian religion itself.</p>
+
+  <p>When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have
+  been destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed
+  study to those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the
+  best Greek speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the
+  education of his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at
+  the same time to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism
+  throughout Italy. The doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin
+  in a shape suited to catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a
+  very large Epicurean literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty
+  traces is now lost. C. Amafinius, mentioned in <!-- Page xxvii --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxvii"></a>[xxvii]</span> the
+  <i>Academica</i><a name="NtA_113"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_113"><sup>[113]</sup></a>, was the first to write, and his
+  books seem to have had an enormous circulation<a name="NtA_114"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_114"><sup>[114]</sup></a>. He had a large number of imitators,
+  who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in Cicero's strong
+  language, they took possession of the whole of Italy<a
+  name="NtA_115"></a><a href="#Nt_115"><sup>[115]</sup></a>. Rabirius and
+  Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of Horace, were two
+  of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various reasons for
+  their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean physics, the
+  fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and the
+  voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in
+  one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It
+  is exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean
+  literature dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics
+  than with the ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the
+  fact that the Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for
+  morality in the legal and social constitution of the family, and did not
+  much feel the need of any speculative system; while the general decay
+  among the educated classes of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied
+  as it was by an increase of superstition among the masses, prepared the
+  way for the acceptance of a purely mechanical explanation of the
+  universe. But of this subject, interesting and important as it is in
+  itself, and neglected though it has been, I can treat no farther.</p>
+
+  <p>These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached <!-- Page xxviii
+  --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxviii"></a>[xxviii]</span> by
+  Cicero for their uncouth style of writing<a name="NtA_116"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_116"><sup>[116]</sup></a>. He indeed confesses that he had not
+  read them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious
+  question arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero
+  had for omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman
+  Epicureans. The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible
+  to include the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being
+  unwilling to allow that anything good could come from the school of
+  Epicurus, preferred to keep silence, which nothing compelled him to
+  break, since Lucretius was an obscure man and only slowly won his way to
+  favour with the public.</p>
+
+  <p>In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero
+  had a patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the
+  reproach that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He
+  often tries by the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had
+  left its mark on the early Italian peoples<a name="NtA_117"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_117"><sup>[117]</sup></a>. To those who objected that
+  philosophy was best left to the Greek language, he replies with
+  indignation, accusing them of being untrue to their country<a
+  name="NtA_118"></a><a href="#Nt_118"><sup>[118]</sup></a>. It would be a
+  glorious thing, he thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled
+  to resort to Greeks<a name="NtA_119"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_119"><sup>[119]</sup></a>. He will not even concede that the
+  Greek is a richer tongue than the Latin<a name="NtA_120"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_120"><sup>[120]</sup></a>. As for the alleged incapacity of the
+  Roman intellect to deal with philosophical <!-- Page xxix --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxix"></a>[xxix]</span> enquiries, he will
+  not hear of it. It is only, he says, because the energy of the nation has
+  been diverted into other channels that so little progress has been made.
+  The history of Roman oratory is referred to in support of this opinion<a
+  name="NtA_121"></a><a href="#Nt_121"><sup>[121]</sup></a>. If only an
+  impulse were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the
+  wane in Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of
+  oratory, which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war<a
+  name="NtA_122"></a><a href="#Nt_122"><sup>[122]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he
+  could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political
+  inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one
+  service he could render<a name="NtA_123"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_123"><sup>[123]</sup></a>. He is within his right when he
+  claims praise for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so
+  many of the most prominent men of the time<a name="NtA_124"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_124"><sup>[124]</sup></a>. For Cicero idleness was misery, and
+  in those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow<a
+  name="NtA_125"></a><a href="#Nt_125"><sup>[125]</sup></a>. Philosophy
+  took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and politics<a
+  name="NtA_126"></a><a href="#Nt_126"><sup>[126]</sup></a>. It is strange
+  to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies as he does for devoting
+  himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might set them down to
+  egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such studies were
+  merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a life to them
+  seemed well enough for Greeks, <!-- Page xxx --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xxx"></a>[xxx]</span> but for Romans unmanly, unpractical and
+  unstatesmanlike<a name="NtA_127"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_127"><sup>[127]</sup></a>. There were plenty of Romans who were
+  ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh
+  importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were
+  received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others,
+  like the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy
+  was good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing<a name="NtA_128"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_128"><sup>[128]</sup></a>. Some few preferred that Cicero
+  should write on other subjects<a name="NtA_129"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_129"><sup>[129]</sup></a>. To these he replies by urging the
+  pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.</p>
+
+  <p>Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were
+  roused by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed.
+  The elder generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the
+  books, and many were incited both to read and to write philosophy<a
+  name="NtA_130"></a><a href="#Nt_130"><sup>[130]</sup></a>. Cicero now
+  extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as
+  to bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were
+  accustomed to treat<a name="NtA_131"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_131"><sup>[131]</sup></a>. Individual questions in philosophy
+  could not be thoroughly understood till the whole subject had been
+  mastered<a name="NtA_132"></a><a href="#Nt_132"><sup>[132]</sup></a>.
+  This design then, which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest
+  works which we possess, the <i>Academica</i> and the <i>De Finibus</i>,
+  required the composition of a sort of philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero
+  never claimed to be more than an interpreter of Greek philosophy <!--
+  Page xxxi --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxi"></a>[xxxi]</span>
+  to the Romans. He never pretended to present new views of philosophy, or
+  even original criticisms on its history. The only thing he proclaims to
+  be his own is his style. Looked at in this, the true light, his work
+  cannot be judged a failure. Those who contrive to pronounce this judgment
+  must either insist upon trying the work by a standard to which it does
+  not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek philosophy it copies, or
+  perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed worthlessness of the
+  philosophy of his age.</p>
+
+  <p>In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his
+  oratorical and political writings, all or nearly all published before the
+  <i>Hortensius</i>, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia<a
+  name="NtA_133"></a><a href="#Nt_133"><sup>[133]</sup></a>. The only two
+  works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded
+  the <i>Academica</i>, were the <i>De Consolatione</i>, founded on
+  Crantor's book, <span lang="el" title="peri penthous"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;</span>, and the
+  <i>Hortensius</i>, which was introductory to philosophy, or, as it was
+  then called, protreptic.</p>
+
+  <p>For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of
+  their composition, the student must be referred to the <i>Dict. of
+  Biography</i>, Art. Cicero.</p>
+
+<p class="center">IV. <i>History of the Academica</i>.</p>
+
+  <p>On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45
+  B.C., Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which
+  was pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and <!-- Page
+  xxxii --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxii"></a>[xxxii]</span>
+  Circeii<a name="NtA_134"></a><a href="#Nt_134"><sup>[134]</sup></a>. Here
+  he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book
+  <i>De Consolatione</i> was written. He found the mechanic exercise of
+  composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days
+  together<a name="NtA_135"></a><a href="#Nt_135"><sup>[135]</sup></a>. At
+  other times he would plunge at early morning into the dense woods near
+  his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till nightfall<a
+  name="NtA_136"></a><a href="#Nt_136"><sup>[136]</sup></a>. Often exertion
+  failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the entreaties of Atticus that he
+  would return to the forum and the senate. A grief, which books and
+  solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would crush him, he felt,
+  in the busy city<a name="NtA_137"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_137"><sup>[137]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>It was amid such surroundings that the <i>Academica</i> was written.
+  The first trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a
+  letter of Cicero to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks
+  of his bereavement<a name="NtA_138"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_138"><sup>[138]</sup></a>. It was his wont to depend on Atticus
+  very much for historical and biographical details, and in the letter in
+  question he asks for just the kind of information which would be needed
+  in writing the <i>Academica</i>. The words with which he introduces his
+  request imply that he had determined on some new work to which our
+  <i>Academica</i> would correspond<a name="NtA_139"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_139"><sup>[139]</sup></a>. He asks what reason brought to Rome
+  the embassy which Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader
+  of the Epicurean school; who were then the most noted <span lang="el"
+  title="politikoi"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span>
+  at Athens. The meaning of the last question is made clear by a passage in
+  the <i>De Oratore</i><a name="NtA_140"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_140"><sup>[140]</sup></a>, <!-- Page xxxiii --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxiii"></a>[xxxiii]</span> where Cicero
+  speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under that name.
+  It may be with reference to the progress of the <i>Academica</i> that in
+  a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the advance he has
+  made in his literary undertakings<a name="NtA_141"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_141"><sup>[141]</sup></a>. During the whole of the remainder of
+  his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed; but although
+  he speaks of various other literary projects, we find no express mention
+  in his letters to Atticus of the <i>Academica</i><a name="NtA_142"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_142"><sup>[142]</sup></a>. He declares that however much his
+  detractors at Rome may reproach him with inaction, they could not read
+  the numerous difficult works on which he has been engaged within the same
+  space of time that he has taken to write them<a name="NtA_143"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_143"><sup>[143]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near
+  Antium<a name="NtA_144"></a><a href="#Nt_144"><sup>[144]</sup></a>, where
+  he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he afterwards suppressed<a
+  name="NtA_145"></a><a href="#Nt_145"><sup>[145]</sup></a>. From the same
+  place he wrote to Atticus of his intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome
+  by way of Lanuvium about the middle of June<a name="NtA_146"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_146"><sup>[146]</sup></a>. He had in the time immediately
+  following Tullia's death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she
+  died. This he felt now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either
+  abandon Tusculum altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even
+  ten years would make the effort no less painful<a name="NtA_147"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_147"><sup>[147]</sup></a>. Before setting out for Antium Cicero
+  <!-- Page xxxiv --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xxxiv"></a>[xxxiv]</span> wrote to Atticus that he had
+  finished while at Astura <i>duo magna</i> <span lang="el"
+  title="syntagmata"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  words which have given rise to much controversy<a name="NtA_148"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_148"><sup>[148]</sup></a>. Many scholars, including Madvig,
+  have understood that the first edition of the <i>Academica</i>, along
+  with the <i>De Finibus</i>, is intended. Against this view the reasons
+  adduced by Krische are convincing<a name="NtA_149"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_149"><sup>[149]</sup></a>. It is clear from the letters to
+  Atticus that the <i>De Finibus</i> was being worked out book by book long
+  after the first edition of the <i>Academica</i> had been placed in the
+  hands of Atticus. The <i>De Finibus</i> was indeed begun at Astura<a
+  name="NtA_150"></a><a href="#Nt_150"><sup>[150]</sup></a>, but it was
+  still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the
+  <i>Academica</i><a name="NtA_151"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_151"><sup>[151]</sup></a>. The final arrangement of the
+  characters in the <i>De Finibus</i> is announced later still<a
+  name="NtA_152"></a><a href="#Nt_152"><sup>[152]</sup></a>; and even at a
+  later date Cicero complains that Balbus had managed to obtain
+  surreptitiously a copy of the fifth book before it was properly
+  corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia having copied the whole five books
+  while in that state<a name="NtA_153"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_153"><sup>[153]</sup></a>. A passage in the <i>De
+  Divinatione</i><a name="NtA_154"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_154"><sup>[154]</sup></a> affords almost direct evidence that
+  the <i>Academica</i> was published before the <i>De Finibus</i>. On all
+  these grounds I hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero
+  describes as having been finished simultaneously at Astura.</p>
+
+  <p>Another view of the <span lang="el" title="syntagmata"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>
+  in question is that they are simply the two books, entitled
+  <i>Catulus</i> and <i>Lucullus</i>, of the <i>Priora Academica</i>. In my
+  opinion <!-- Page xxxv --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xxxv"></a>[xxxv]</span> the word <span lang="el"
+  title="syntagma"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>, the use
+  of which to denote a portion of a work Madvig suspects<a
+  name="NtA_155"></a><a href="#Nt_155"><sup>[155]</sup></a>, thus obtains
+  its natural meaning. Cicero uses the word <span lang="el"
+  title="syntaxis"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> of the
+  whole work<a name="NtA_156"></a><a href="#Nt_156"><sup>[156]</sup></a>,
+  while <span lang="el" title="syntagma"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span><a
+  name="NtA_157"></a><a href="#Nt_157"><sup>[157]</sup></a>, and <span
+  lang="el" title="syngramma"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3B3;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span><a
+  name="NtA_158"></a><a href="#Nt_158"><sup>[158]</sup></a>, designate
+  definite portions or divisions of a work. I should be quite content,
+  then, to refer the words of Cicero to the <i>Catulus</i> and
+  <i>Lucullus</i>. Krische, however, without giving reasons, decides that
+  this view is unsatisfactory, and prefers to hold that the
+  <i>Hortensius</i> (or <i>de Philosophia</i>) and the <i>Priora
+  Academica</i> are the compositions in question. If this conjecture is
+  correct, we have in the disputed passage the only reference to the
+  <i>Hortensius</i> which is to be found in the letters of Cicero. We are
+  quite certain that the book was written at Astura, and published before
+  the <i>Academica</i>. This would be clear from the mention in the
+  <i>Academica Posteriora</i> alone<a name="NtA_159"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_159"><sup>[159]</sup></a>, but the words of Cicero in the <i>De
+  Finibus</i><a name="NtA_160"></a><a href="#Nt_160"><sup>[160]</sup></a>
+  place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the <i>Hortensius</i>
+  had been published a sufficiently long time before the <i>De Finibus</i>,
+  to have become known to a tolerably large circle of readers. Further, in
+  the <i>Tusculan Disputations</i> and the <i>De Divinatione</i><a
+  name="NtA_161"></a><a href="#Nt_161"><sup>[161]</sup></a> the
+  <i>Hortensius</i> and the <i>Academica</i> are mentioned together in such
+  a way as to show that the former was finished and given to the world
+  before the latter. Nothing therefore stands in the way of Krische's
+  conjecture, except the doubt I have expressed as to the use of the word
+  <span lang="el" title="syntagma"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>, which
+  equally affects the old view maintained by Madvig.</p>
+
+<!-- Page xxxvi --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxvi"></a>[xxxvi]</span>
+
+  <p>Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the
+  <i>Hortensius</i> and the <i>Academica</i> must have been more closely
+  connected, in style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting
+  perhaps the <i>Academica</i> and the <i>De Finibus</i>. The interlocutors
+  in the <i>Hortensius</i> were exactly the same as in the <i>Academica
+  Priora</i>, for the introduction of Balbus into some editions of the
+  fragments of the <i>Hortensius</i> is an error<a name="NtA_162"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_162"><sup>[162]</sup></a>. The discussion in the <i>Academica
+  Priora</i> is carried on at Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the
+  <i>Hortensius</i> at the villa of Lucullus near Cumae. It is rather
+  surprising that under these circumstances there should be but one direct
+  reference to the <i>Hortensius</i> in the <i>Lucullus</i><a
+  name="NtA_163"></a><a href="#Nt_163"><sup>[163]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45,
+  Cicero sent Atticus the <i>Torquatus</i>, as he calls the first book of
+  the <i>De Finibus</i><a name="NtA_164"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_164"><sup>[164]</sup></a>. He had already sent the first
+  edition of the <i>Academica</i> to Rome<a name="NtA_165"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_165"><sup>[165]</sup></a>. We have a mention that new prooemia
+  had been added to the <i>Catulus</i> and <i>Lucullus</i>, in which the
+  public characters from whom the books took their names were extolled. In
+  all probability the extant prooemium of the <i>Lucullus</i> is the one
+  which was then affixed. Atticus, who visited Cicero at Tusculum, had
+  doubtless pointed out the incongruity between the known attainments of
+  Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they were made to take in difficult
+  philosophical discussions. It is not uncharacteristic of Cicero that his
+  first plan for healing the incongruity should be a <!-- Page xxxvii
+  --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxvii"></a>[xxxvii]</span>
+  deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of statements
+  concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans which he
+  knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I may
+  note, as of some interest in connection with the <i>Academica</i>, the
+  fact that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was
+  one from Varro<a name="NtA_166"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_166"><sup>[166]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says,
+  to arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing
+  attentions of Brutus<a name="NtA_167"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_167"><sup>[167]</sup></a>. Before leaving Astura, however, it
+  had been his intention to go on to Arpinum<a name="NtA_168"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_168"><sup>[168]</sup></a>. He seems to have been still
+  unsatisfied with his choice of interlocutors for the <i>Academica</i>,
+  for the first thing he did on his arrival was to transfer the parts of
+  Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and Brutus<a name="NtA_169"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_169"><sup>[169]</sup></a>. This plan was speedily cast aside on
+  the receipt of a letter from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work
+  should be dedicated to Varro, or if not the <i>Academica</i>, the <i>De
+  Finibus</i><a name="NtA_170"></a><a href="#Nt_170"><sup>[170]</sup></a>.
+  Cicero had never been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems
+  to have been chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times
+  anxious to draw them more closely together. Nine years before he had
+  pressed Cicero to find room in his works for some mention of Varro<a
+  name="NtA_171"></a><a href="#Nt_171"><sup>[171]</sup></a>. The nature of
+  the works on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to
+  comply with the request<a name="NtA_172"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_172"><sup>[172]</sup></a>. Varro had promised on his side, full
+  two years before the <i>Academica</i> was <!-- Page xxxviii --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxviii"></a>[xxxviii]</span> written, to
+  dedicate to Cicero his great work <i>De Lingua Latino</i>. In answer to
+  the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared himself very much
+  dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise. From this it is
+  evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude of that work.
+  His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years without making
+  any progress<a name="NtA_173"></a><a href="#Nt_173"><sup>[173]</sup></a>,
+  shows that there could have been little of anything like friendship
+  between the two. Apart from these causes for grumbling, Cicero thought
+  the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend<a name="NtA_174"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_174"><sup>[174]</sup></a>." Since the <i>De Finibus</i> was
+  already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer to Varro the
+  <i>Academica</i>, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of noble
+  birth, had no claim to learning<a name="NtA_175"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_175"><sup>[175]</sup></a>. So little of it did they possess
+  that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had been
+  made in the first edition of the <i>Academica</i> to maintain<a
+  name="NtA_176"></a><a href="#Nt_176"><sup>[176]</sup></a>. For them
+  another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the
+  <i>Academica</i> would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus,
+  and the fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher<a
+  name="NtA_177"></a><a href="#Nt_177"><sup>[177]</sup></a>. It happened
+  that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's stay at
+  Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his
+  <i>Academica</i>, which he now divided into four books instead of two,
+  making the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus<a
+  name="NtA_178"></a><a href="#Nt_178"><sup>[178]</sup></a>. The position
+  occupied by Atticus in the dialogue was quite an <!-- Page xxxix --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxix"></a>[xxxix]</span> inferior one, but
+  he was so pleased with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often
+  in the future such minor parts<a name="NtA_179"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_179"><sup>[179]</sup></a>. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta
+  should also be introduced was found impracticable<a name="NtA_180"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_180"><sup>[180]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had
+  constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He
+  frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus,
+  but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his
+  plans. Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the
+  work contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over
+  again before he finally decided<a name="NtA_181"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_181"><sup>[181]</sup></a>. As no reasons had been given for
+  these solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was
+  obliged to assure him that there were reasons, which he could not
+  disclose in a letter<a name="NtA_182"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_182"><sup>[182]</sup></a>. The true reasons, however, did
+  appear in some later letters. In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of
+  Varro, and the more so because he wishes it, but you know he is</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p><span lang="el" title="deinos an�r, tacha ken kai anaition aitio�ito." >&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2; &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;, &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C7;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;.</span></p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles,
+  it may be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than
+  his; a charge which you will perceive to be untrue<a
+  name="NtA_183"></a><a href="#Nt_183"><sup>[183]</sup></a>." Cicero, then,
+  feared Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical
+  fastidiousness. Before these explanations Atticus <!-- Page xl --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xl"></a>[xl]</span> had concluded that
+  Cicero was afraid of the effect the work might produce on the public.
+  This notion Cicero assured him to be wrong; the only cause for his
+  vacillation was his doubt as to how Varro would receive the dedication<a
+  name="NtA_184"></a><a href="#Nt_184"><sup>[184]</sup></a>. Atticus would
+  seem to have repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured
+  Cicero that there was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a
+  general assurance, and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the
+  reasons from which it proceeded<a name="NtA_185"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_185"><sup>[185]</sup></a>. In order to stimulate his friend,
+  Atticus affirmed that Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown
+  more favour<a name="NtA_186"></a><a href="#Nt_186"><sup>[186]</sup></a>.
+  We find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it
+  Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not
+  have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to
+  have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed
+  ignorant of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of
+  being actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently
+  while at Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the <i>De
+  Finibus</i>, but employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the
+  dedication<a name="NtA_187"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_187"><sup>[187]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the
+  <i>Academica</i> is often given in the letters. He tells us that it
+  extended, on the whole, to greater length than the first, though much had
+  been omitted; <!-- Page xli --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xli"></a>[xli]</span> he adds, "Unless human self love
+  deceives me, the books have been so finished that the Greeks themselves
+  have nothing in the same department of literature to approach them....
+  This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and altogether better
+  than the last<a name="NtA_188"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_188"><sup>[188]</sup></a>." Again: "The Antiochean portion has
+  all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may
+  possess<a name="NtA_189"></a><a href="#Nt_189"><sup>[189]</sup></a>."
+  Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what success, but with a
+  care which nothing could surpass<a name="NtA_190"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_190"><sup>[190]</sup></a>." The binding and adornment of the
+  presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and the letter
+  accompanying it was carefully elaborated<a name="NtA_191"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_191"><sup>[191]</sup></a>. Yet after everything had been done
+  and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome, Cicero was still uneasy as
+  to the reception it would meet with from Varro. He wrote thus to Atticus:
+  "I tell you again and again that the presentation will be at your own
+  risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to Brutus, who is also a
+  follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou wert ever wont,
+  flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part "shuddered" at the
+  idea of taking the responsibility<a name="NtA_192"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_192"><sup>[192]</sup></a>. After the work had passed into his
+  hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to prevent it from
+  getting into circulation until they could meet one another in Rome<a
+  name="NtA_193"></a><a href="#Nt_193"><sup>[193]</sup></a>. This warning
+  was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had just managed to get
+  access to the <i>De Finibus</i><a name="NtA_194"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_194"><sup>[194]</sup></a>. In a letter, dated apparently a day
+  or two later, Cicero declared his intention <!-- Page xlii --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xlii"></a>[xlii]</span> to meet Atticus at
+  Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable to do so,
+  after a consultation<a name="NtA_195"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_195"><sup>[195]</sup></a>. The meeting ultimately did not take
+  place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to
+  approve any course that might be taken<a name="NtA_196"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_196"><sup>[196]</sup></a>. Atticus wrote to say that as soon as
+  Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time, then,"
+  says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal step; oh
+  dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my letter
+  stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to hear
+  how the matter stands<a name="NtA_197"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_197"><sup>[197]</sup></a>." Again, a little later: "You have
+  been bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment
+  upon them, but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books
+  in the first fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work
+  on the <i>Tusculan Disputations</i><a name="NtA_198"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_198"><sup>[198]</sup></a>. A copy of the first edition had
+  already got into Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which
+  Cicero begs Atticus to ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of
+  the <i>Academica</i>, at a time when the fate of the second edition was
+  still undecided<a name="NtA_199"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_199"><sup>[199]</sup></a>. From this fact we may conclude that
+  Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing the first edition. If he
+  consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies of the first edition,
+  it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of course assumes that
+  Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people, wishes to have the
+  "Splendidiora, breviora, <!-- Page xliii --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xliii"></a>[xliii]</span> meliora." Still, on every occasion
+  which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised edition
+  the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately after
+  the <i>Academica Posteriora</i> was completed<a name="NtA_200"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_200"><sup>[200]</sup></a>, and often subsequently, when he most
+  markedly mentioned the number of the books as four<a
+  name="NtA_201"></a><a href="#Nt_201"><sup>[201]</sup></a>. That he wished
+  the work to bear the title <i>Academica</i> is clear<a
+  name="NtA_202"></a><a href="#Nt_202"><sup>[202]</sup></a>. The
+  expressions <i>Academica quaestio</i>, <span lang="el" title="Akad�mik� syntaxis"
+  >&#x391;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>, and
+  <i>Academia</i>, are merely descriptive<a name="NtA_203"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_203"><sup>[203]</sup></a>; so also is the frequent appellation
+  <i>Academici libri</i><a name="NtA_204"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_204"><sup>[204]</sup></a>. The title <i>Academicae
+  Quaestiones</i>, found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the
+  <i>Tusculanae Quaestiones</i>, which was supported by the false notion,
+  found as early as Pliny<a name="NtA_205"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_205"><sup>[205]</sup></a>, that Cicero had a villa called
+  Academia, at which the book was written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his
+  Tusculan villa, which he called his Academia, but we are certain from the
+  letters to Atticus that the work was written entirely at Astura, Antium,
+  and Arpinum.</p>
+
+  <p>Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well<a
+  name="NtA_206"></a><a href="#Nt_206"><sup>[206]</sup></a>, but the second
+  edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books are
+  expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the
+  title <i>Academica</i>. Augustine speaks of them only as <i>Academici
+  libri</i>, and his references show that he knew the second edition only.
+  Lactantius also uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks
+  of <!-- Page xliv --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xliv"></a>[xliv]</span> the <i>Academica</i>. Plutarch shows
+  only a knowledge of the first edition<a name="NtA_207"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_207"><sup>[207]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of
+  the genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus.
+  That it was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding
+  theories which old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the
+  two editions. A fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of
+  Goerenz. I now proceed to examine into the constitution and arrangement
+  of the two editions.</p>
+
+<p class="center">a. <i>The lost dialogue "Catulus."</i></p>
+
+  <p>The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the <i>Lucullus</i>
+  are among those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party
+  whom Cicero so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue
+  was named was son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the
+  political career of father and son we shall have little to do. I merely
+  inquire what was their position with respect to the philosophy of the
+  time, and the nature of their connection with Cicero.</p>
+
+  <p>Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the
+  <i>Lucullus</i><a name="NtA_208"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_208"><sup>[208]</sup></a> that he did little more than put
+  forward opinions he had received from his father. Cicero would,
+  doubtless, have preferred to introduce the elder man as speaking for
+  himself, but in that case, as in the <i>De Oratore</i>, the author would
+  have been <!-- Page xlv --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xlv"></a>[xlv]</span> compelled to exclude himself from the
+  conversation<a name="NtA_209"></a><a href="#Nt_209"><sup>[209]</sup></a>.
+  The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of the father, just as
+  Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does nothing but render
+  literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to have heard<a
+  name="NtA_210"></a><a href="#Nt_210"><sup>[210]</sup></a>. For the
+  arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be found in their <span
+  lang="el" title="atripsia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> with respect to
+  philosophy<a name="NtA_211"></a><a href="#Nt_211"><sup>[211]</sup></a>.
+  This <span lang="el" title="atripsia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> did not amount
+  to <span lang="el" title="apaideusia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the younger the advocate of
+  philosophy in the <i>Hortensius</i><a name="NtA_212"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_212"><sup>[212]</sup></a>. Though Cicero sometimes classes the
+  father and son together as men of literary culture and perfect masters of
+  Latin style, it is very evident on a comparison of all the passages where
+  the two are mentioned, that no very high value was placed on the learning
+  of the son<a name="NtA_213"></a><a href="#Nt_213"><sup>[213]</sup></a>.
+  But however slight were the claims of Catulus the younger to be
+  considered a philosopher, he was closely linked to Cicero by other ties.
+  During all the most brilliant period of Cicero's life, Catulus was one of
+  the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his character, life, and influence
+  are often depicted in even extravagant language by the orator<a
+  name="NtA_214"></a><a href="#Nt_214"><sup>[214]</sup></a>. He is one of
+  the pillars of the state<a name="NtA_215"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_215"><sup>[215]</sup></a>, Cicero cries, and deserves to be
+  classed with the ancient worthies of Rome<a name="NtA_216"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_216"><sup>[216]</sup></a>. When he opposes the Manilian law,
+  and asks the people on whom they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic
+  power concentrated in his hands, were to die, the people answer with one
+  <!-- Page xlvi --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xlvi"></a>[xlvi]</span> voice "On you<a name="NtA_217"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_217"><sup>[217]</sup></a>." He alone was bold enough to rebuke
+  the follies, on the one hand, of the mob, on the other, of the senate<a
+  name="NtA_218"></a><a href="#Nt_218"><sup>[218]</sup></a>. In him no
+  storm of danger, no favouring breeze of fortune, could ever inspire
+  either fear or hope, or cause to swerve from his own course<a
+  name="NtA_219"></a><a href="#Nt_219"><sup>[219]</sup></a>. His influence,
+  though he be dead, will ever live among his countrymen<a
+  name="NtA_220"></a><a href="#Nt_220"><sup>[220]</sup></a>. He was not
+  only glorious in his life, but fortunate in his death<a
+  name="NtA_221"></a><a href="#Nt_221"><sup>[221]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there
+  were special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the <i>viri
+  consulares</i> who had given their unreserved approval to the measures
+  taken for the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the
+  first to confer on Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title
+  "Father of his country<a name="NtA_222"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_222"><sup>[222]</sup></a>." So closely did Cicero suppose
+  himself to be allied to Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for
+  the death of Tullia, by bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden
+  times<a name="NtA_223"></a><a href="#Nt_223"><sup>[223]</sup></a>." The
+  statement of Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never
+  been so unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except
+  when Cinna held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast
+  between the zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague
+  Antonius<a name="NtA_224"></a><a href="#Nt_224"><sup>[224]</sup></a>.
+  Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house
+  of the two Catuli<a name="NtA_225"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_225"><sup>[225]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+<!-- Page xlvii --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xlvii"></a>[xlvii]</span>
+
+  <p>We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first
+  edition of the <i>Academica</i> from circulation, he affixed a prooemium
+  to each book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second.
+  From the passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit
+  in such matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a
+  portion of the contents of the lost prooemium to the <i>Catulus</i>. The
+  achievements of the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as
+  those of his son. The philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made
+  to cast its lustre on the younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once
+  more lauded, and great stress was laid upon the patronage it received
+  from so famous a man as the younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in
+  the fervid language which Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere.
+  Some allusion most likely was made to the connection of Archias with the
+  Catuli, and to the poem he had written in Cicero's honour. Then the
+  occasion of the dialogue, its supposed date, and the place where it was
+  held, were indicated. The place was the Cuman villa of Catulus<a
+  name="NtA_226"></a><a href="#Nt_226"><sup>[226]</sup></a>. The feigned
+  date must fall between the year 60 B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63,
+  the year of Cicero's consulship, which is alluded to in the
+  <i>Lucullus</i><a name="NtA_227"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_227"><sup>[227]</sup></a>. It is well known that in the
+  arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against
+  anachronisms.</p>
+
+  <p>The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly
+  made to the <i>Hortensius</i>, in which the same speakers had been
+  engaged; and after more compliments had been bandied about, most of <!--
+  Page xlviii --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_xlviii"></a>[xlviii]</span> which would fall to Cicero's
+  share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between the
+  dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's views,
+  at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy. Before
+  we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from indications
+  offered by the <i>Lucullus</i>, it is necessary to speak of the character
+  and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.</p>
+
+  <p>In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to
+  mention his <i>sapientia</i>, which implies a certain knowledge of
+  philosophy. He was, says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the
+  wisest, the holiest of men<a name="NtA_228"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_228"><sup>[228]</sup></a>. He was a man of universal merit, of
+  surpassing worth, a second Laelius<a name="NtA_229"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_229"><sup>[229]</sup></a>. It is easy to gather from the <i>De
+  Oratore</i>, in which he appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view
+  of his accomplishments. Throughout the second and third books he is
+  treated as the lettered man, par excellence, of the company<a
+  name="NtA_230"></a><a href="#Nt_230"><sup>[230]</sup></a>. Appeal is made
+  to him when any question is started which touches on Greek literature and
+  philosophy. We are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance
+  with Greek, and his style of speaking it, won admiration<a
+  name="NtA_231"></a><a href="#Nt_231"><sup>[231]</sup></a>. He defends the
+  Greeks from the attacks of Crassus<a name="NtA_232"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_232"><sup>[232]</sup></a>. He contemptuously contrasts the
+  Latin historians with the Greek<a name="NtA_233"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_233"><sup>[233]</sup></a>. He depreciates the later Greek
+  rhetorical teaching, while he bestows <!-- Page xlix --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xlix"></a>[xlix]</span> high commendation
+  on the early sophists<a name="NtA_234"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_234"><sup>[234]</sup></a>. The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle
+  and Theophrastus is most to his mind<a name="NtA_235"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_235"><sup>[235]</sup></a>. An account is given by him of the
+  history of Greek speculation in Italy<a name="NtA_236"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_236"><sup>[236]</sup></a>. The undefiled purity of his Latin
+  style made him seem to many the only speaker of the language<a
+  name="NtA_237"></a><a href="#Nt_237"><sup>[237]</sup></a>. He had written
+  a history of his own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had
+  imitated<a name="NtA_238"></a><a href="#Nt_238"><sup>[238]</sup></a>, and
+  was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams<a name="NtA_239"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_239"><sup>[239]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the
+  <i>Academica</i> that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In
+  the <i>De Oratore</i>, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome<a
+  name="NtA_240"></a><a href="#Nt_240"><sup>[240]</sup></a>, he does not
+  declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in his
+  long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular
+  teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the
+  poet Antipater of Sidon<a name="NtA_241"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_241"><sup>[241]</sup></a>. Still it might have been concluded
+  that he was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools.
+  Cicero repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator
+  spring, and the whole tone of the <i>De Oratore</i> shows that Catulus
+  could have had no leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans<a
+  name="NtA_242"></a><a href="#Nt_242"><sup>[242]</sup></a>. The
+  probability is that he had never placed himself under the instruction of
+  Greek teachers for any length of time, but had rather gained his
+  information <!-- Page l --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_l"></a>[l]</span> from books and especially from the writings
+  of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual communication with any of
+  the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have failed to tell us, as he
+  does in the case of Antonius<a name="NtA_243"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_243"><sup>[243]</sup></a>, and Crassus<a name="NtA_244"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_244"><sup>[244]</sup></a>. It is scarcely possible that any
+  direct intercourse between Philo and Catulus can have taken place,
+  although one passage in the <i>Lucullus</i> seems to imply it<a
+  name="NtA_245"></a><a href="#Nt_245"><sup>[245]</sup></a>. Still Philo
+  had a brilliant reputation during the later years of Catulus, and no one
+  at all conversant with Greek literature or society could fail to be well
+  acquainted with his opinions<a name="NtA_246"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_246"><sup>[246]</sup></a>. No follower of Carneades and
+  Clitomachus, such as Catulus undoubtedly was<a name="NtA_247"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_247"><sup>[247]</sup></a>, could view with indifference the
+  latest development of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were
+  probably not known to Catulus<a name="NtA_248"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_248"><sup>[248]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>I now proceed to draw out from the references in the <i>Lucullus</i>
+  the chief features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably
+  introduced by a mention of Philo's books<a name="NtA_249"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_249"><sup>[249]</sup></a>. Some considerable portion of the
+  speech must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon
+  the genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated
+  with great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of
+  the older Academics<a name="NtA_250"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_250"><sup>[250]</sup></a>. The most important part of the
+  speech, however, must have consisted of a defence of Carneades and
+  Arcesilas against <!-- Page li --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_li"></a>[li]</span> the dogmatic schools<a
+  name="NtA_251"></a><a href="#Nt_251"><sup>[251]</sup></a>. Catulus
+  evidently concerned himself more with the system of the later than with
+  that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly probable that he
+  touched only very lightly on the negative Academic arguments, while he
+  developed fully that positive teaching about the <span lang="el"
+  title="pithanon"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> which was so
+  distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of Lucullus which
+  concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to be distinctly
+  aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the discourse of the day
+  before<a name="NtA_252"></a><a href="#Nt_252"><sup>[252]</sup></a>. On
+  the other hand, those parts of Lucullus' speech which deal with the
+  constructive part of Academicism<a name="NtA_253"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_253"><sup>[253]</sup></a> seem to be intended for Catulus, to
+  whom the maintenance of the genuine Carneadean distinction between <span
+  lang="el" title="ad�la" >&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;</span> and
+  <span lang="el" title="akatal�pta"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>
+  would be a peculiarly congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by
+  Lucullus on the way in which the <i>probabile</i> had been handled
+  appertains to Catulus. The exposition of the sceptical criticism would
+  naturally be reserved for the most brilliant and incisive orator of the
+  party&mdash;Cicero himself. These conjectures have the advantage of
+  establishing an intimate connection between the prooemium, the speech of
+  Catulus, and the succeeding one of Hortensius. In the prooemium the
+  innovations of Philo were mentioned; Catulus then showed that the only
+  object aimed at by them, a satisfactory basis for <span lang="el"
+  title="epist�m�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span>, was
+  already attained by the Carneadean theory of the <span lang="el"
+  title="pithanon"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>; whereupon
+  Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus, that <!-- Page lii
+  --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_lii"></a>[lii]</span> such a basis
+  was provided by the older philosophy, which both Carneades and Philo had
+  wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central point or pivot of the
+  discussion. With this arrangement none of the indications in the
+  <i>Lucullus</i> clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius upon Catulus<a
+  name="NtA_254"></a><a href="#Nt_254"><sup>[254]</sup></a> need only imply
+  such a bare statement on the part of the latter of the negative
+  Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for the Carneadean <span
+  lang="el" title="pithanon"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. One important
+  opinion maintained by Catulus after Carneades, that the wise man would
+  opine<a name="NtA_255"></a><a href="#Nt_255"><sup>[255]</sup></a> (<span
+  lang="el" title="ton sophon doxasein" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>), seems
+  another indication of the generally constructive character of his
+  exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the
+  dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.</p>
+
+  <p>Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of
+  Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain<a
+  name="NtA_256"></a><a href="#Nt_256"><sup>[256]</sup></a>. I think it
+  extremely probable that he gave a r�sum� of the history of philosophy,
+  corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the <i>Academica
+  Posteriora</i>. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty
+  of understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the
+  speech could have been assigned in the first edition. In the <i>Academica
+  Posteriora</i> it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second
+  as Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second
+  edition of the polemical argument of Hortensius<a name="NtA_257"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_257"><sup>[257]</sup></a>, which would be appropriate only in
+  the mouth of one <!-- Page liii --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_liii"></a>[liii]</span> who was answering a speech already
+  made. On the view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the
+  fact that Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the
+  lost dialogue which bore his name he had argued against philosophy
+  altogether<a name="NtA_258"></a><a href="#Nt_258"><sup>[258]</sup></a>,
+  and denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing<a
+  name="NtA_259"></a><a href="#Nt_259"><sup>[259]</sup></a>. Such a
+  historical r�sum� as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within
+  the reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put
+  forward to show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old
+  Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant
+  for stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial<a
+  name="NtA_260"></a><a href="#Nt_260"><sup>[260]</sup></a>. We are thus
+  relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word
+  <i>commoveris</i><a name="NtA_261"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_261"><sup>[261]</sup></a>, from which Krische infers that the
+  dialogue, entitled <i>Hortensius</i>, had ended in a conversion to
+  philosophy of the orator from whom it was named. To any such conversion
+  we have nowhere else any allusion.</p>
+
+  <p>The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character
+  and attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to
+  have been as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it
+  was possible for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech
+  of Hortensius were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral
+  teaching of Antiochus.</p>
+
+  <p>The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of
+  the preceding speech is correct, <!-- Page liv --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_liv"></a>[liv]</span> it follows that
+  Cicero in his reply pursued the same course which he takes in his answer
+  to Varro, part of which is preserved in the <i>Academica Posteriora</i><a
+  name="NtA_262"></a><a href="#Nt_262"><sup>[262]</sup></a>. He justified
+  the New Academy by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old,
+  and also with those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus,
+  therefore, reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great
+  and ancient names like a seditious tribune<a name="NtA_263"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_263"><sup>[263]</sup></a>. Unfair use had been made, according
+  to Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides,
+  Xenophanes, Plato, and Socrates<a name="NtA_264"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_264"><sup>[264]</sup></a>. But Cicero did not merely give a
+  historical summary. He must have dealt with the theory of <span lang="el"
+  title="katal�ptik� phantasia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> and <span
+  lang="el" title="ennoiai"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> (which though
+  really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he found it necessary
+  to "manufacture" (<i>fabricari</i>) Latin terms to represent the Greek<a
+  name="NtA_265"></a><a href="#Nt_265"><sup>[265]</sup></a>. He probably
+  also commented on the headlong rashness with which the dogmatists gave
+  their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a retort is made by
+  Lucullus<a name="NtA_266"></a><a href="#Nt_266"><sup>[266]</sup></a>.
+  That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic schools was incomplete may be
+  seen by the fact that he had not had occasion to Latinize the terms <span
+  lang="el" title="katal�psis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the individual <span lang="el"
+  title="katal�ptik� phantasia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>), <span
+  lang="el" title="enargeia, horm�, apodeixis, dogma, oikeion, ad�la, epoch�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;,
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;,
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;,
+  &#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;,
+  &#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;,
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span>, nearly all important terms in
+  the Stoic, and to some extent in the Antiochean system, all of which
+  Lucullus is obliged to translate for himself<a name="NtA_267"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_267"><sup>[267]</sup></a>. The more the matter is examined the
+  more clearly does it appear that the main purpose <!-- Page lv --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_lv"></a>[lv]</span> of Cicero in this
+  speech was to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the
+  New Academy, and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience,
+  which were reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he
+  expressly tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him
+  in the first day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely
+  introduced in order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next<a
+  name="NtA_268"></a><a href="#Nt_268"><sup>[268]</sup></a>. Yet these
+  arguments must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech,
+  although foreign to its main intention<a name="NtA_269"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_269"><sup>[269]</sup></a>. He probably gave a summary
+  classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent
+  to the truth of each class<a name="NtA_270"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_270"><sup>[270]</sup></a>. The whole constitution and tenor of
+  the elaborate speech of Cicero in the <i>Lucullus</i> proves that no
+  general or minute demonstration of the impossibility of <span lang="el"
+  title="epist�m�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> in the
+  dogmatic sense had been attempted in his statement of the day before.
+  Cicero's argument in the <i>Catulus</i> was allowed by Lucullus to have
+  considerably damaged the cause of Antiochus<a name="NtA_271"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_271"><sup>[271]</sup></a>. The three speeches of Catulus,
+  Hortensius, and Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out
+  for the discussion<a name="NtA_272"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_272"><sup>[272]</sup></a>, but only cursorily, so that there
+  was plenty of room for a more minute examination in the
+  <i>Lucullus</i>.</p>
+
+  <p>One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the
+  attack of Catulus? Krische believes <!-- Page lvi --><span
+  class="pagenum"><a name="Page_lvi"></a>[lvi]</span> that the argument of
+  Catulus was answered point by point. In this opinion I cannot concur.
+  Cicero never appears elsewhere as the defender of Philo's reactionary
+  doctrines<a name="NtA_273"></a><a href="#Nt_273"><sup>[273]</sup></a>.
+  The expressions of Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching
+  had been dismissed by all the disputants<a name="NtA_274"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_274"><sup>[274]</sup></a>. It follows that when Cicero, in his
+  letter of dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo
+  (<i>partes mihi sumpsi Philonis</i><a name="NtA_275"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_275"><sup>[275]</sup></a>), he merely attaches Philo's name to
+  those general New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly
+  supported by the pupil of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief
+  sources for Cicero's speech in the <i>Catulus</i> were, doubtless, Philo
+  himself and Clitomachus.</p>
+
+  <p>In that intermediate form of the <i>Academica</i>, where Cato and
+  Brutus appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no
+  doubt that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato.
+  Consequently Cato must have taken the comparatively inferior part of
+  Hortensius, while Brutus took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem
+  strange that a Stoic of the Stoics like Cato should be chosen to
+  represent Antiochus, however much that philosopher may have borrowed from
+  Zeno. The r�le given to Hortensius, however, was in my view such as any
+  cultivated man might sustain who had not definitely committed himself to
+  sceptical principles. So eminent an Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been
+  reduced to the comparatively secondary position assigned to Hortensius in
+  the <i>Academica Priora</i>. He would naturally occupy the <!-- Page lvii
+  --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_lvii"></a>[lvii]</span> place
+  given to Varro in the second edition<a name="NtA_276"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_276"><sup>[276]</sup></a>. If this be true, Brutus would not
+  speak at length in the first half of the work. Cato is not closely enough
+  connected with the <i>Academica</i> to render it necessary to treat of
+  him farther.</p>
+
+<p class="center">b. <i>The "Lucullus."</i></p>
+
+  <p>The day after the discussion narrated in the <i>Catulus</i>, during
+  which Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the
+  Cuman villa of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of
+  Hortensius at Bauli<a name="NtA_277"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_277"><sup>[277]</sup></a>. In the evening, if the wind
+  favoured, Lucullus was to leave for his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his
+  at Pompeii<a name="NtA_278"></a><a href="#Nt_278"><sup>[278]</sup></a>.
+  Bauli was a little place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round
+  which so many legends lingered<a name="NtA_279"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_279"><sup>[279]</sup></a>. The scenery in view was
+  magnificent<a name="NtA_280"></a><a href="#Nt_280"><sup>[280]</sup></a>.
+  As the party were seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines
+  of statues, the waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the
+  horizon glistened and quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour
+  under the freshening breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and
+  Puteoli, thirty stadia distant<a name="NtA_281"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_281"><sup>[281]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and <!-- Page lviii
+  --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_lviii"></a>[lviii]</span> to keep
+  it perfectly free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still
+  living, although when the words were written he had been dead for many
+  years<a name="NtA_282"></a><a href="#Nt_282"><sup>[282]</sup></a>. The
+  surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom
+  of Lucullus, is very dramatic<a name="NtA_283"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_283"><sup>[283]</sup></a>. The many political and private
+  troubles which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept
+  carefully out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of
+  thoughts and plans which were actively employing the author's mind at
+  Astura. His intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last
+  section of the book, while in the last but one the <i>De Finibus</i>, the
+  <i>De Natura Deorum</i> and other works are shadowed forth<a
+  name="NtA_284"></a><a href="#Nt_284"><sup>[284]</sup></a>. In another
+  passage the design of the <i>Tusculan Disputations</i>, which was carried
+  out immediately after the publication of the <i>Academica</i> and <i>De
+  Finibus</i>, is clearly to be seen<a name="NtA_285"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_285"><sup>[285]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the
+  conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially
+  acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus<a
+  name="NtA_286"></a><a href="#Nt_286"><sup>[286]</sup></a>. Nearly all
+  that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue,
+  and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to
+  have dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private
+  citizen, was directed to the care of his fish-ponds<a
+  name="NtA_287"></a><a href="#Nt_287"><sup>[287]</sup></a>. In his train
+  when he went to Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his
+  residence in <!-- Page lix --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_lix"></a>[lix]</span> the East he sought to attach learned men
+  to his person. At Alexandria he was found in the company of Antiochus,
+  Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius Rogus and the Selii, all men of
+  philosophic tastes<a name="NtA_288"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_288"><sup>[288]</sup></a>. He is several times mentioned by
+  Pliny in the <i>Natural History</i> as the patron of Greek artists. Yet,
+  as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters to Atticus
+  that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like Catulus,
+  by the authority of another person. All his arguments are explicitly
+  stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard Antiochus
+  engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a reply to
+  that of Cicero in the <i>Catulus</i>. Any closer examination of its
+  contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The
+  same may be said of Cicero's answer.</p>
+
+  <p>In the intermediate form of the <i>Academica</i>, the speech of
+  Lucullus was no doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a
+  slight connection with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much
+  more than call attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close
+  relationship in which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have
+  had to deal. He was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife
+  of Lucullus<a name="NtA_289"></a><a href="#Nt_289"><sup>[289]</sup></a>.
+  Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while
+  Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the
+  Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero,
+  during the war between Pompey <!-- Page lx --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_lx"></a>[lx]</span> and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both
+  friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was<a
+  name="NtA_290"></a><a href="#Nt_290"><sup>[290]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+<p class="center">c. <i>The Second Edition.</i></p>
+
+  <p>When Cicero dedicated the <i>Academica</i> to Varro, very slight
+  alterations were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the
+  piece. Cicero had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost
+  within sight of Hortensius' villa at Bauli<a name="NtA_291"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_291"><sup>[291]</sup></a>. Varro's villa, at which the scene
+  was now laid, was close to the Lucrine lake<a name="NtA_292"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_292"><sup>[292]</sup></a>. With regard to the feigned date of
+  the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is
+  shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition<a
+  name="NtA_293"></a><a href="#Nt_293"><sup>[293]</sup></a>. Many allusions
+  are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the Pompeian
+  party, the death of Tullia<a name="NtA_294"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_294"><sup>[294]</sup></a>, and the publication of the
+  <i>Hortensius</i><a name="NtA_295"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_295"><sup>[295]</sup></a>. Between the date of Tullia's death
+  and the writing of the <i>Academica</i>, it can be shown that Varro,
+  Cicero and Atticus could not have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore
+  for once admits into his works an impossibility in fact. This
+  impossibility would at once occur to Varro, and Cicero anticipates his
+  wonder in the letter of dedication<a name="NtA_296"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_296"><sup>[296]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the
+  ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact
+  between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his
+  philosophical <!-- Page lxi --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_lxi"></a>[lxi]</span> opinions, are alone needed here. The
+  first mention we have of Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself
+  sufficient to show his character and the impossibility of anything like
+  friendship between the two. Varro had done the orator some service in the
+  trying time which came before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had
+  eulogised Varro; and in the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to
+  send Varro the eulogy to read, adding "<i>Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut
+  nosti,</i> <span lang="el" title="elikta kai ouden"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;</span><a name="NtA_297"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_297"><sup>[297]</sup></a>." All the references to Varro in the
+  letters to Atticus are in the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to
+  write Varro a letter of thanks for supposed exertions in his behalf,
+  during his exile<a name="NtA_298"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_298"><sup>[298]</sup></a>. Several passages show that Cicero
+  refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported by Atticus<a
+  name="NtA_299"></a><a href="#Nt_299"><sup>[299]</sup></a>. On Cicero's
+  return from exile, he and Varro remained in the same semi-friendly state.
+  About the year 54 B.C., as we have already seen, Atticus in vain urged
+  his friend to dedicate some work to the great polymath. After the fall of
+  the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to have been drawn a little
+  closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in the year before the
+  <i>Academica</i> was published, testify to this approximation<a
+  name="NtA_300"></a><a href="#Nt_300"><sup>[300]</sup></a>. Still they are
+  all cold, forced and artificial; very different from the letters Cicero
+  addressed to his real intimates, such for instance as Sulpicius, Caelius,
+  Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all show a fear of giving offence to
+  the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility in presence of his vast
+  learning which is by <!-- Page lxii --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_lxii"></a>[lxii]</span> no means natural to Cicero. The
+  negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication of
+  the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this
+  slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship<a
+  name="NtA_301"></a><a href="#Nt_301"><sup>[301]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable
+  accuracy from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro
+  <i>De Philosophia</i><a name="NtA_302"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_302"><sup>[302]</sup></a>. Beyond doubt he was a follower of
+  Antiochus and the so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school
+  from, among the 288 philosophies which he considered possible, by an
+  elaborate and pedantic process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious
+  in Augustine. My notes on the <i>Academica Posteriora</i> will show that
+  there is no reason for accusing Cicero of having mistaken Varro's
+  philosophical views. This supposition owes its currency to M�ller, who,
+  from Stoic phrases in the <i>De Lingua Latina</i>, concluded that Varro
+  had passed over to the Stoics before that work was written. All that was
+  Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus<a name="NtA_303"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_303"><sup>[303]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+  <p>The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the
+  subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more
+  conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition
+  preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the
+  contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical
+  exposition of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by
+  Varro; then the historical justification of the Philonian position, <!--
+  Page lxiii --><span class="pagenum"><a
+  name="Page_lxiii"></a>[lxiii]</span> which Cicero had given in the first
+  edition as an answer to Hortensius<a name="NtA_304"></a><a
+  href="#Nt_304"><sup>[304]</sup></a>. Book II.: an exposition by Cicero of
+  Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same as that given by
+  Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that foretaste of the
+  negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had formed part of
+  the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech of Varro in
+  reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in ed. 1. Book
+  IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1. Atticus must
+  have been almost a <span lang="el" title="k�phon pros�pon"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3C9;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p>I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old
+  editions the <i>Lucullus</i> is marked throughout as <i>Academicorum
+  liber IV</i>. This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of
+  Nonius' quotations, which are always from the <i>second</i> edition, and
+  can tell us nothing about the constitution of the <i>first</i>. One other
+  thing is worth remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the
+  <i>Academica Priora</i> before the <i>Posteriora</i>. This seems to me an
+  unnatural arrangement; the subject-matter of the <i>Varro</i> is
+  certainly prior, logically, to that of the <i>Lucullus</i>.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h2>M. TULLII CICERONIS</h2>
+
+<h2>ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM</h2>
+
+<h3>LIBER PRIMUS.</h3>
+
+<hr />
+
+  <p>I. <a name="BkI_1"></a><a href="#BkIN_1">1</a>. In Cumano nuper cum
+  mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a M. Varrone, venisse eum
+  Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset, continuo ad nos
+  venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram interponendam
+  putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et vetustate
+  amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus, paulumque
+  cum <i>ab</i> eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus: atque
+  ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad suam
+  villam reduximus. <a name="BkI_2"></a><a href="#BkIN_2">2</a>. Hic pauca
+  primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis, ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus:
+  Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec audire sine molestia possumus,
+  quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse novi. Silent enim diutius
+  Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum cessare, sed celare quae
+  scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille: intemperantis enim arbitror
+  esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo opus magnum in manibus,
+  idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum&mdash;me autem dicebat&mdash;quaedam
+  institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me politius. <a
+  name="BkI_3"></a><a href="#BkIN_3">3</a>. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam,
+  Varro, iam diu exspectans, non audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e
+  Libone nostro, cuius nosti studium&mdash;nihil enim eius modi celare
+  possumus&mdash;non te ea intermittere, sed accuratius tractare nec de
+  manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante hoc tempus numquam in
+  mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam sum ingressus res eas,
+  quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis philosophiamque veterem illam
+  a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare, quaero quid sit cur, cum
+  multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim cum et ipse in eo
+  excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et studiis et artibus
+  antecedat.</p>
+
+  <p>II. <a name="BkI_4"></a><a href="#BkIN_4">4</a>. Tum ille: Rem a me
+  saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris. Itaque non haesitans
+  respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu, quod ista ipsa de re
+  multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam viderem
+  diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de nostris
+  eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca
+  potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis
+  abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca
+  intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti
+  intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. <a name="BkI_5"></a><a
+  href="#BkIN_5">5</a>. Vides autem&mdash;eadem enim ipse
+  didicisti&mdash;non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui
+  nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone
+  disputant, nihil definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione
+  concludunt, nullam denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant.
+  Nos autem praeceptis dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque
+  vim virtutem esse nostri putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque
+  novis cogimur uti, quae docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti
+  ne a nobis quidem accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur <i>labor</i>.
+  <a name="BkI_6"></a><a href="#BkIN_6">6</a>. Iam vero physica, si
+  Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut
+  Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium
+  sustuleris, de corpusculorum&mdash;ita enim appellat
+  atomos&mdash;concursione fortuita loqui? Nostra tu physica nosti, quae
+  cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia ea, quam fingit et format
+  effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam quibusnam quisquam
+  enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit adducere? <i>Quid</i>,
+  haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis fugiendisque rebus? Illi
+  enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum esse censent: apud nostros
+  autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas. <a name="BkI_7"></a><a
+  href="#BkIN_7">7</a>. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut
+  quis intelligat quid sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab
+  honestate seiungi: quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine
+  voluptatibus sensum moventibus ne suspicari <i>quidem</i>. Si vero
+  Academiam veterem persequamur, quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit
+  illa acute explicanda nobis! quam argute, quam obscure etiam contra
+  Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud philosophiae studium mihi quidem
+  ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum possum et ad delectationem
+  animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est, maius aut melius a dis
+  datum munus homini. <a name="BkI_8"></a><a href="#BkIN_8">8</a>. Sed meos
+  amicos, in quibus est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire
+  iubeo, ut ea a fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae
+  autem nemo adhuc docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea,
+  quantum potui&mdash;nihil enim magno opere meorum miror&mdash;feci ut
+  essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii
+  nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et tamen in illis veteribus nostris,
+  quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati, quadam hilaritate conspersimus,
+  multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa dicta dialectice &#x2020;quae
+  quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate quadam ad legendum
+  invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum prooemiis
+  &#x2020;philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.</p>
+
+  <p>III. <a name="BkI_9"></a><a href="#BkIN_9">9</a>. Tum, ego. Sunt,
+  inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe peregrinantis errantisque
+  tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando
+  qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem patriae, tu descriptiones
+  temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu domesticam, tu bellicam
+  disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium divinarum humanarumque
+  rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti, plurimumque poetis
+  nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis attulisti, atque
+  ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti philosophiamque
+  multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum. <a
+  name="BkI_10"></a><a href="#BkIN_10">10</a>. Causam autem probabilem tu
+  quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne
+  haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi nunc: satisne probas? Immo
+  vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca poterunt non contemnent
+  sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos Graecis litteris eruditi
+  legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat Ennius, Pacuvius,
+  Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum expresserunt
+  poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi Aeschylum,
+  Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem,
+  Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem
+  sint aut Demosthenem imitati. <a name="BkI_11"></a><a
+  href="#BkIN_11">11</a>. Ego autem&mdash;dicam enim, ut res est&mdash;dum
+  me ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed
+  quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum
+  tenebat, haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum
+  licebat, legendo. Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et
+  administratione rei publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia
+  peto et otii oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic
+  aetati hoc maxime aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus,
+  hoc in primis consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil
+  utilius aut, si haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus.
+  <a name="BkI_12"></a><a href="#BkIN_12">12</a>. Brutus quidem noster,
+  excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris
+  persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem
+  sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu,
+  cuius tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi
+  litterarum.</p>
+
+  <p>IV. <a name="BkI_13"></a><a href="#BkIN_13">13</a>. Tum, ille. Istuc
+  quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te ipso quid est, inquit,
+  quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te veterem illam, inquit,
+  tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho id magis licuerit,
+  nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam nobis in novam e
+  vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime.
+  Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu existimas ipse, negat
+  in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse
+  erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit, ut dicis: sed
+  ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra <i>ea</i> Philonis Antiochus
+  scripserit. <a name="BkI_14"></a><a href="#BkIN_14">14</a>. Immo vero et
+  ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum iam diu, renovari a te, nisi
+  molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus, inquam, si videtur. Sane istud
+  quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus. Sed videamus idemne Attico
+  placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi vero, ille: quid est enim
+  quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita recordari? et simul videre
+  satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum essent dicta, in
+  conspectu consedimus [omnes].</p>
+
+  <p><a name="BkI_15"></a><a href="#BkIN_15">15</a>. Tum Varro ita exorsus
+  est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnis, primus a rebus
+  occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi
+  occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse,
+  ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret,
+  caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si
+  maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum <i>valere</i>. <a
+  name="BkI_16"></a><a href="#BkIN_16">16</a>. Hic in omnibus fere
+  sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum audierunt perscripti varie <i>et</i>
+  copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil
+  se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, quod illi quae
+  nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque
+  rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec
+  esset una omnis sapientia non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum
+  diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen
+  in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis
+  consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi
+  potest. <a name="BkI_17"></a><a href="#BkIN_17">17</a>. Platonis autem
+  auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens
+  duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et
+  Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum
+  Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset,
+  duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium
+  et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti
+  sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis
+  instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et
+  sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique
+  Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam
+  composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam
+  dubitationem de omnibus rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita
+  consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt. Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates
+  probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio
+  disciplinae. <a name="BkI_18"></a><a href="#BkIN_18">18</a>. Quae quidem
+  erat primo duobus, ut dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos
+  et illam veterem Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni
+  praestabat, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat
+  utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.</p>
+
+  <p>V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi
+  non sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum
+  Atticus: Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque
+  nostros, meque ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid
+  me, inquam, putas, qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro
+  exhibiturum? Pergamus igitur, inquit, quoniam placet. <a
+  name="BkI_19"></a><a href="#BkIN_19">19</a>. Fuit ergo iam accepta a
+  Platone philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de
+  natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid
+  falsum, quid rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid
+  repugnans iudicando. Ac primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura
+  petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in
+  natura quaerendum esse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur,
+  constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum
+  adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore et vita. Corporis autem
+  alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in partibus: valetudinem, viris
+  pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam
+  aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus,
+  claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem: <a
+  name="BkI_20"></a><a href="#BkIN_20">20</a>. animi autem, quae essent ad
+  comprehendendam ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et
+  mores dividebantur. Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant:
+  quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant
+  studia esse et quasi consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis
+  adsiduitate, partim ratione formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa.
+  In qua quod incohatum est neque absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem
+  appellatur: quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae
+  omniumque rerum, quas in animis ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec
+  animorum. <a name="BkI_21"></a><a href="#BkIN_21">21</a>. Vitae
+  autem&mdash;id enim erat tertium&mdash;adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad
+  virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et
+  <i>in</i> quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt.
+  Hominem esse censebant quasi partem quandam civitatis et universi generis
+  humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac
+  de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad
+  id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum, ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam,
+  ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis inducitur ratio bonorum.</p>
+
+  <p>VI. <a name="BkI_22"></a><a href="#BkIN_22">22</a>. Atque haec illa
+  sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem
+  non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum: illud imprudenter, si alios
+  esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios Peripateticos arbitrantur.
+  Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum finis videbatur, adipisci
+  quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese expetenda, aut omnia aut
+  maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo atque in ipsa virtute
+  versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute
+  esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam, nisi adiungerentur et
+  corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad virtutis usum idonea. <a
+  name="BkI_23"></a><a href="#BkIN_23">23</a>. Ex hac descriptione agendi
+  quoque aliquid in vita et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat
+  in conservatione earum rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur
+  fuga desidiae voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque
+  susceptio multorum magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum,
+  quae erant congruentes cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia
+  exsistebat et iustitia atque aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis
+  vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio
+  et eius partis, quam primam posui, forma atque descriptio.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="BkI_24"></a><a href="#BkIN_24">24</a>. De natura
+  autem&mdash;id enim sequebatur&mdash;ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in
+  res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens,
+  ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant,
+  in eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen
+  utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi
+  contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non
+  alicubi esse cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi
+  qualitatem quandam nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus
+  inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur,
+  utamur verbis interdum inauditis.</p>
+
+  <p>VII. <a name="BkI_25"></a><a href="#BkIN_25">25</a>. Nos vero, inquit
+  Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum voles, si te Latina forte
+  deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce
+  modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam
+  appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis.
+  Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas <span lang="el" title="poiot�tas"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>
+  Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed
+  philosophorum, atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt
+  publica: suis utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut
+  enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda.
+  Quod si Graeci faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur,
+  quanto id magis nobis concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare
+  conamur? <a name="BkI_26"></a><a href="#BkIN_26">26</a>. Tu vero, inquam,
+  Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo
+  copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum. Audebimus ergo,
+  inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur
+  qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius
+  modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes.
+  Itaque a�r&mdash;utimur enim pro Latino&mdash;et ignis et aqua et terra
+  prima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae
+  gignuntur e terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa
+  dicuntur: e quibus a�r et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi,
+  reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram.
+  Quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor,
+  quae supra dixi, dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. <a
+  name="BkI_27"></a><a href="#BkIN_27">27</a>. Sed subiectam putant omnibus
+  sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate&mdash;faciamus enim
+  tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius&mdash;materiam quandam, ex qua
+  omnia expressa atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit
+  omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in
+  nihilum, sed in suas partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum
+  sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem
+  moveantur, omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi
+  possint. <a name="BkI_28"></a><a href="#BkIN_28">28</a>. Et cum ita
+  moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro
+  citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa
+  effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et
+  continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem
+  nulla pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia,
+  quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta
+  insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo
+  intereat: <a name="BkI_29"></a><a href="#BkIN_29">29</a>. quam vim animum
+  esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem
+  deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae, quasi prudentiam
+  quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea, quae
+  pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia
+  nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem et
+  immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem
+  fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter
+  obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.</p>
+
+  <p>VIII. <a name="BkI_30"></a><a href="#BkIN_30">30</a>. Tertia deinde
+  philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur
+  ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium
+  veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem: solam
+  censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper
+  esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi <span
+  lang="el" title="idean" >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>
+  appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus
+  dicere. <a name="BkI_31"></a><a href="#BkIN_31">31</a>. Sensus autem
+  omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo res
+  eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quae essent aut ita parvae, ut
+  sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae, ut nihil
+  umquam unum esset constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur
+  et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem appellabant.
+  <a name="BkI_32"></a><a href="#BkIN_32">32</a>. Scientiam autem nusquam
+  esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa
+  definitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur,
+  adhibebant. Verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa
+  quaeque essent ita nominata, quam <span lang="el" title="etymologian"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>
+  appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad
+  probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari volebant: itaque
+  tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione
+  conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur,
+  explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. <a
+  name="BkI_33"></a><a href="#BkIN_33">33</a>. Haec erat illis disciplina a
+  Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos
+  vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam.</p>
+
+  <p>IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur
+  Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus
+  species, quas paulo ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat
+  amplexatus, ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem,
+  vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et
+  ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem
+  veteris disciplinae: spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque
+  reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. <a
+  name="BkI_34"></a><a href="#BkIN_34">34</a>. Nam Strato, eius auditor,
+  quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est:
+  qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in
+  virtute et moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae
+  contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et
+  Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et
+  post eos Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati,
+  diligenter ea, quae a superioribus acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem
+  audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas. <a name="BkI_35"></a><a
+  href="#BkIN_35">35</a>. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque
+  subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est
+  disciplinam. Eam quoque, si videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut
+  solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero, inquam, videtur, quod vides idem
+  significare Pomponium.</p>
+
+  <p>X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos
+  virtutis inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam
+  pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis,
+  idque appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum
+  bonum. <a name="BkI_36"></a><a href="#BkIN_36">36</a>. Cetera autem etsi
+  nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia
+  naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.
+  Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione
+  dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis
+  relinquebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. <a
+  name="BkI_37"></a><a href="#BkIN_37">37</a>. Sed quae essent sumenda, ex
+  iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea praeposita
+  appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam rebus quam
+  vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum, officium
+  et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in bonis
+  actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem servata
+  praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. <a name="BkI_38"></a><a
+  href="#BkIN_38">38</a>. Cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione
+  esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas, hic omnis
+  in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera virtutum, quae supra dixi,
+  seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat
+  nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed ipsum habitum per se esse
+  praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse quin ea semper uteretur.
+  Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tollerent, naturaque et
+  condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent,
+  sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi
+  morbis voluit carere sapientem. <a name="BkI_39"></a><a
+  href="#BkIN_39">39</a>. Cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse
+  dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia
+  rationem collocarent, ne his quidem adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes
+  voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium
+  perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quamdam
+  intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.</p>
+
+  <p>XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum
+  illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici
+  rebantur, non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae
+  quidque gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod
+  nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset
+  corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse
+  dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse
+  esse non corpus. <a name="BkI_40"></a><a href="#BkIN_40">40</a>. Plurima
+  autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de
+  sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam
+  quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille <span lang="el"
+  title="phantasian"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  nos visum appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim
+  utendum in reliquo sermone saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi
+  accepta sensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis
+  positam et voluntariam. <a name="BkI_41"></a><a href="#BkIN_41">41</a>.
+  Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam
+  haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum
+  ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile&mdash;feretis hoc? Nos vero,
+  inquit. Quonam enim modo <span lang="el" title="katal�pton"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  diceres?&mdash;Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem
+  appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex quo etiam
+  nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset,
+  plurimisque idem novis verbis&mdash;nova enim dicebat&mdash;usus est.
+  Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita
+  erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam: sin aliter,
+  inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam opinio, quae esset
+  imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. <a name="BkI_42"></a><a
+  href="#BkIN_42">42</a>. Sed inter scientiam et inscientiam
+  comprehensionem illam, quam dixi, collocabat, eamque neque in rectis
+  neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. E quo
+  sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut supra dixi, comprehensio facta
+  sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia, quae
+  essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset
+  relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui
+  dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur, e quibus
+  non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae
+  reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem
+  et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et
+  constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat. Atque in his
+  fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a superioribus.</p>
+
+  <p>XII. <a name="BkI_43"></a><a href="#BkIN_43">43</a>. Quae cum
+  dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est, inquam, a te,
+  Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse [autem]
+  arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem veteris
+  Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc Varro:
+  Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis et ea,
+  quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa
+  discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. <a
+  name="BkI_44"></a><a href="#BkIN_44">44</a>. Tum ego: Cum Zenone, inquam,
+  ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut
+  studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate,
+  quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et iam ante
+  Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis paene veteres: qui
+  nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt: angustos
+  sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut Democritus, in
+  profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri,
+  nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse
+  dixerunt. <a name="BkI_45"></a><a href="#BkIN_45">45</a>. Itaque
+  Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum,
+  quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere censebat in occulto:
+  neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi posset: quibus de causis
+  nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione
+  approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem,
+  quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur,
+  neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni
+  adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod erat
+  consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam
+  plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus
+  momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio
+  sustineretur. <a name="BkI_46"></a><a href="#BkIN_46">46</a>. Hanc
+  Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex
+  illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil adfirmatur et in utramque
+  partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur: sed
+  tamen illa, quam exposui<i>sti</i>, vetus, haec nova nominetur: quae
+  usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem
+  Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis
+  ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex Epicureo
+  Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter ceteros
+  mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h3>ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">EX LIBRO I.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_1"></a><a href="#FrN_1">1</a>. Nonius p. 65 Merc.
+  <i>Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere, dictum a gladiis.
+  Cicero Academicorum lib. I.</i>: quid autem stomachatur Menesarchus? quid
+  Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_2"></a><a href="#FrN_2">2</a>. Nonius s.v.
+  <i>concinnare</i> p. 43. <i>Idem in Academicis lib. I.</i>: qui cum
+  similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.</p>
+
+<p class="center">EX LIBRO II.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_3"></a><a href="#FrN_3">3</a>. Nonius p. 65. <i>Aequor ab
+  aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II. vocabulum accepisse
+  confirmat</i>: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo etiam aequor
+  illud poetae vocant.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_4"></a><a href="#FrN_4">4</a>. Nonius p. 69. <i>Adamare
+  Cicero Academicorum lib. II.</i>: qui enim serius honores adamaverunt vix
+  admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini possunt esse.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_5"></a><a href="#FrN_5">5</a>. Nonius p. 104. <i>Exponere
+  pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis lib. II.</i>: frangere
+  avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad imitandum
+  iuventuti.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_6"></a><a href="#FrN_6">6</a>. Nonius p. 121. <i>Hebes
+  positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:</i> quid?
+  lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere? cuius et nascentis et
+  senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur cornua.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_7"></a><a href="#FrN_7">7</a>. Nonius p. 162.
+  <i>Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:</i> quid? mare nonne
+  caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem
+  aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_8"></a><a href="#FrN_8">8</a>. Nonius p. 162.
+  <i>Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:</i> atqui si id
+  crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non regulis.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_9"></a><a href="#FrN_9">9</a>. Nonius p. 394. <i>Siccum
+  dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur et sobrium, non madidum
+  ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:</i> alius (<i>color</i>) adultis, alius
+  adulescentibus, alius aegris, <i>alius sanis</i>, alius siccis, alius
+  vinulentis ...</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_10"></a><a href="#FrN_10">10</a>. Nonius p. 474.
+  <i>Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.:</i> si quando enim nos
+  demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum
+  cernimus.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_11"></a><a href="#FrN_11">11</a>. Nonius p. 545.
+  <i>Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:</i> quibus etiam alabaster
+  plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.</p>
+
+<p class="center">EX LIBRO III.</p>
+
+  <p>Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. �4. <i>De gloria librum ad te misi: at in
+  eo</i> prooemium <i>id est, quod in Academico tertio.</i></p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_12"></a><a href="#FrN_12">12</a>. Nonius p. 65.
+  <i>Digladiari ... idem tertio:</i> digladiari autem semper, depugnare cum
+  facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam stultissimum
+  dixerit?</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_13"></a><a href="#FrN_13">13</a>. Nonius p. 65.
+  <i>Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.</i>: et ut
+  nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus ...</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_14"></a><a href="#FrN_14">14</a>. Nonius p. 123.
+  <i>Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.</i>: in
+  tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas ingeneraretur
+  cognitionis et scientiae.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_15"></a><a href="#FrN_15">15</a>. Nonius p. 419.
+  <i>Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum lib. III.</i>:
+  aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_16"></a><a href="#FrN_16">16</a>. Lactantius Inst. div.
+  VI. 24. <i>Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico tertio verba sunt:</i> quod
+  si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent, sic vitam deviam secutis
+  corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset emendatio temeritatis.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_17"></a><a href="#FrN_17">17</a>. Diomedes p. 373, ed.
+  Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. <i>Varro ad Ciceronem tertio</i> fixum <i>et
+  Cicero Academicorum tertio</i> (= <i>Lucullus</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_27">�27</a>): &#x2020;malcho in opera adfixa.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_18"></a><a href="#FrN_18">18</a>. Nonius p. 139.
+  <i>Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic. Academicorum
+  lib. III.</i>: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse
+  dicemus. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a href="#BkII_51">�51</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_19"></a><a href="#FrN_19">19</a>. Nonius p. 117.
+  <i>Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.</i>: qui gallinas alere
+  permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae gallina
+  peperisset dicere solebant. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_57">�57</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="center">EX LIBRO IIII.</p>
+
+  <p>20. Nonius p. 69, <i>Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in
+  Academicis lib. IIII.</i>: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = <i>Lucullus</i>
+  <a href="#BkII_67">�67</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_21"></a><a href="#FrN_21">21</a>. Nonius p. 65.
+  <i>Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et columna Maenia.
+  Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: item ille cum aestuaret, veterum ut
+  Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_70">�70</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_22"></a>22. Nonius p. 99. <i>Dolitum, quod dolatum usu
+  dicitur, quod est percaesum vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum
+  Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore
+  dolatus. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a href="#BkII_100">�100</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_23"></a><a href="#FrN_23">23</a>. Nonius p. 164. <i>Ravum
+  fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: quia nobismet ipsis tum
+  caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole conlucet.... =
+  <i>Lucullus</i> <a href="#BkII_105">�105</a>.</p>
+
+  <p>24. Nonius p. 107. <i>Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic.
+  Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi
+  quendam laborem exanclatum. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_108">�108</a>.</p>
+
+  <p>25. Nonius p. 163. <i>Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic.
+  Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = <i>Lucullus</i>
+  <a href="#BkII_109">�109</a>.</p>
+
+  <p>26. Nonius p. 122. <i>Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>:
+  at hoc Anaximandro infinitatem. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_118">�118</a>.</p>
+
+  <p>27. Nonius p. 65. <i>Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic.
+  Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. =
+  <i>Lucullus</i> <a href="#BkII_120">�120</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_28"></a><a href="#FrN_28">28</a>. Nonius p. 189.
+  <i>Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: nec ut ille qui
+  asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse dicat. =
+  <i>Lucullus</i> <a href="#BkII_121">�121</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_29"></a><a href="#FrN_29">29</a>. Martianus Capella V.
+  �517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. <i>Cicero ... in Academicis</i>: latent ista
+  omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa tenebris. = <i>Lucullus</i>
+  <a href="#BkII_122">�122</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_30"></a><a href="#FrN_30">30</a>. Nonius p. 102. <i>E
+  regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: nec ego
+  non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in contraria parte terrae
+  qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_123">�123</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_31"></a><a href="#FrN_31">31</a>. Nonius p. 80.
+  <i>Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et confusione
+  trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: plane, ut supra dictus,
+  Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_135">�135</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="center">Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_32"></a><a href="#FrN_32">32</a>. Lactantius Inst. div.
+  III. 14. <i>Haec tua verba sunt</i> (<i>sc. Cicero!</i>): mihi autem non
+  modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua ex parte
+  cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_33"></a><a href="#FrN_33">33</a>. August. contra
+  Academicos II. <a href="#BkII_26">�26</a>.: <i>id probabile vel veri
+  simile Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent
+  invitare</i>. ... Talia, <i>inquit Academicus</i>, mihi videntur omnia
+  quae probabilia vel veri similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine
+  vis vocare, nihil repugno. Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid
+  dicam, id est, quibus rebus haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum
+  opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem decet esse sapientem. [<i>Proximis post
+  hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat Augustinus haec ipsius esse
+  Ciceronis verba</i>.]</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_34"></a><a href="#FrN_34">34</a>. Augustin. c. Acad. III.
+  <a href="#BkII_15">�15</a>. <i>Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius
+  causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... </i>
+  Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes
+  videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse
+  sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo,
+  qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_35"></a><a href="#FrN_35">35</a>. Augustin. c. Acad. III.
+  <a href="#BkII_43">�43</a>. <i>Ait enim Cicero</i> illis (<i>i.e.
+  Academicis</i>) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam,
+  nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Fr_36"></a><a href="#FrN_36">36</a>. Augustin. De Civit. Dei
+  VI. 2. <i>Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T. Varroni) tale
+  testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi versatur
+  disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone</i>, homine, <i>inquit</i>,
+  omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h2>ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM</h2>
+
+<h3>LIBER II.</h3>
+
+  <p>I. <a name="BkII_1"></a><a href="#BkIIN_1">1</a>. Magnum ingenium Luci
+  Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum omnis liberalis et digna
+  homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus temporibus florere in foro
+  maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut enim admodum adolescens
+  cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito paternas inimicitias magna
+  cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor profectus, ibi permultos
+  annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit; deinde absens factus
+  aedilis, continuo praetor&mdash;licebat enim celerius legis
+  praemio&mdash;, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut
+  diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad
+  Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium,
+  quae de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. <a
+  name="BkII_2"></a><a href="#BkIIN_2">2</a>. Idque eo fuit mirabilius,
+  quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui adolescentiam
+  in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum in Ponto
+  gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni
+  magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum
+  iter et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis,
+  partim in rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum
+  esset Roma profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam
+  memoriam rerum, verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis
+  gerendis res quam verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam
+  fuisse in Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem
+  ferunt: qui quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum
+  primum proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle
+  discere, credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat.
+  Tali ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles
+  spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis
+  mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. <a
+  name="BkII_3"></a><a href="#BkIIN_3">3</a>. Tantus ergo imperator in omni
+  genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus pugnis totiusque
+  belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum maximus hunc a
+  se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos legisset, fateretur.
+  In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis temperandisque
+  civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli institutis
+  servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum utilitate
+  rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque ingeni
+  peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum victor a
+  Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio tardius quam
+  debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in urbem
+  currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum in
+  maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod
+  hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito
+  testimonio quam id cum mea laude communicem.</p>
+
+  <p>II. <a name="BkII_4"></a><a href="#BkIIN_4">4</a>. Sed quae populari
+  gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt et Graecis litteris
+  celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum multis, haec interiora
+  cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim studio Lucullus cum omni
+  litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit quam qui illum ignorabant
+  arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed et pro quaestore
+  aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei militaris esse
+  occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus otii
+  relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur
+  Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et
+  post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea
+  saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse
+  potuisset. Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus
+  audiebat.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="BkII_5"></a><a href="#BkIIN_5">5</a>. Ac vereor interdum ne
+  talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam etiam gloriam. Sunt enim
+  multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plures qui philosophiam,
+  reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum rerum disputationem
+  principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego autem, cum Graecas
+  litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. autem Africani
+  historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante censuram obiit,
+  Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nec
+  philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. <a name="BkII_6"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_6">6</a>. Restat ut iis respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi
+  nolint personas tam gravis illigari. Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut
+  tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut ludicros sermones aut rerum
+  colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro vere est a nobis
+  philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque amplissimo
+  quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, quos
+  populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis de
+  opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo
+  operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem
+  ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo
+  non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut
+  plurimis prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam
+  augeri arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has
+  etiam minus notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. <a
+  name="BkII_7"></a><a href="#BkIIN_7">7</a>. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis,
+  qui in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus
+  disputatur, scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam
+  mortuis invidere.</p>
+
+  <p>III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non
+  probatur. Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam
+  philosophiae probaret praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem,
+  quoniam contra omnis dicere quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii
+  a nobis dissentiant recusare: quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est,
+  qui verum invenire sine ulla contentione volumus, idque summa cura
+  studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa
+  difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis
+  nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire
+  se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos
+  studium exquirendi defetigati relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes
+  quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et
+  tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime
+  accedat. <a name="BkII_8"></a><a href="#BkIIN_8">8</a>. Neque inter nos
+  et eos, qui se scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non
+  dubitant quin ea vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus,
+  quae sequi facile, adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et
+  solutiores sumus, quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut
+  omnia, quae praescripta et quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate
+  ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset
+  optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut
+  obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius, quem primum audierunt, oratione
+  capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad quamcumque sunt disciplinam
+  quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad saxum adhaerescunt. <a
+  name="BkII_9"></a><a href="#BkIIN_9">9</a>. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se
+  credere ei, quem iudicent fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes
+  et indocti iudicare potuissent&mdash;statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel
+  maxime videtur esse sapientis&mdash;, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus
+  rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem
+  re semel audita atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio
+  quo modo plerique errare malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt,
+  pugnacissime defendere quam sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur
+  exquirere. Quibus de rebus et alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata
+  sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa, quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et
+  Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus.
+  Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus, quod erat constitutum, si ventus
+  esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur
+  pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in spatio consedimus.</p>
+
+  <p>IV. <a name="BkII_10"></a><a href="#BkIIN_10">10</a>. Hic Catulus:
+  Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene explicatum est, ut tota
+  fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea, quae te pollicitus
+  es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem, inquit Hortensius,
+  feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram servatam oportuit.
+  Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in promptu erant, dicta
+  sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille: Non sane, inquit,
+  Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est iis, qui placere
+  volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde ea, quae dico,
+  probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec ea, in quibus,
+  si non fuerint, <i>non</i> vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed mehercule, ut
+  quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata est, mihi
+  tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus agebat: nota
+  enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno studio,
+  eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei faciam
+  quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum animos
+  ereximus. <a name="BkII_11"></a><a href="#BkIIN_11">11</a>. At ille: Cum
+  Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem, fuit Antiochus mecum et erat
+  iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et
+  Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista
+  philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus et nobilis: cum
+  quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque leniter. Et quidem
+  isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant
+  adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant: et homo
+  natura lenissimus&mdash;nihil enim poterat fieri illo
+  mitius&mdash;stomachari tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante
+  videram. At ille, Heracliti memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo
+  viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico
+  audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id
+  quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei familiares, docti homines, P. et
+  C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa audivisse Romae de Philone et ab
+  eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent descripsisse. <a name="BkII_12"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_12">12</a>. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus
+  commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin
+  contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum
+  igitur et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et
+  item Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut
+  causam ex eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito
+  doctisque compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea
+  Aristone et Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat,
+  multum temporis in ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae
+  contra Philonem erat, praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est
+  adversarius is, qui ista, quae sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino
+  dicere. Etsi enim mentitur, tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam
+  Carneademque veniamus.</p>
+
+  <p>V. <a name="BkII_13"></a><a href="#BkIIN_13">13</a>. Quae cum
+  dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini&mdash;me autem
+  nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod
+  seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt,
+  quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur.
+  Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit,
+  commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint,
+  cum consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem
+  agrariam aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis
+  tulerit invito senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q.
+  Pompeium: illi quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum
+  solent. Duos vero sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P.
+  Scaevolam, aiunt Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut
+  videmus, palam, alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C.
+  Marium. Et de hoc quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum
+  atque tantorum expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. <a
+  name="BkII_14"></a><a href="#BkIIN_14">14</a>. Similiter vos, cum
+  perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam
+  constitutam velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem,
+  Xenophanem, Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus,
+  ut nostrum inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum
+  illorum nec Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia.
+  Et tamen isti physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant
+  quasi mente incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere
+  videatur, abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil
+  omnino quale sit posse reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes
+  isti videntur nimis etiam quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire
+  quam sciant. <a name="BkII_15"></a><a href="#BkIIN_15">15</a>. Quod si
+  illi tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot
+  saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum
+  iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est
+  ut in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas
+  qui constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate
+  delitisceret, qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e
+  numero tollendus est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit
+  perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus
+  differentis, re congruentis, a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam
+  sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in
+  disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita, cum aliud
+  agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione,
+  quam Graeci <span lang="el" title="eir�neian"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>
+  vocant: quam ait etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea
+  vitiosum in illo non putandum, quod idem fuerit in Socrate.</p>
+
+  <p>VI. <a name="BkII_16"></a><a href="#BkIIN_16">16</a>. Sed fuerint illa
+  veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est igitur actum, quod
+  investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut putatur, obtrectans
+  nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores immutatione verborum, dum
+  huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est clarissimis rebus
+  tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio, quamquam
+  floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi, proxime
+  a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est
+  quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat,
+  Lacydi discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu
+  tenuit: nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum
+  floruerunt: e quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho
+  fuit&mdash;declarat multitudo librorum&mdash;ingeni non minus in
+  [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene
+  autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus Metrodorus putabatur. <a
+  name="BkII_17"></a><a href="#BkIIN_17">17</a>. Iam Clitomacho Philo
+  vester operam multos annos dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium
+  Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra
+  Academicos disseramus, id quidam e philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres
+  faciendum omnino non putabant: nec vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum
+  iis, qui nihil probarent, Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo
+  fuisset, reprehendebant, nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset
+  cognitio aut perceptio aut, si verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam
+  <span lang="el" title="katal�psin"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  illi vocant, eosque, qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod
+  comprehendi et percipi posset, inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod
+  nihil esset clarius <span lang="el" title="enargeiai"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>,
+  ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus
+  fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi&mdash;me appellabat
+  iocans&mdash;hoc licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant
+  illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent,
+  definienda censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam
+  priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere
+  putabant, ne qui fallerentur. <a name="BkII_18"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam
+  evidentium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua quaeratur, et
+  homines dignos, quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum nova
+  quaedam commovet, quod ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra Academicorum
+  pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre
+  Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum
+  enim ita negaret, quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset&mdash;id enim
+  volumus esse <span lang="el" title="akatal�pton"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>&mdash;,
+  si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum&mdash;iam enim hoc pro
+  <span lang="el" title="phantasiai"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus&mdash;visum igitur impressum
+  effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non
+  esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest
+  quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse,
+  quod est tale, quale vel falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque
+  Philo, iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse
+  comprehendi. Ita imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis
+  oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam
+  definitionem, quam Philo voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi
+  nihil posse concedimus.</p>
+
+  <p>VII. <a name="BkII_19"></a><a href="#BkIIN_19">19</a>. Ordiamur igitur
+  a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa sunt, ut, si optio naturae
+  nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat contentane sit suis integris
+  incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius aliquid, non videam quid
+  quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum est, dum de remo inflexo
+  aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum, qui quidquid videtur
+  tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit et alia multa. Meo
+  autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac
+  valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt. Itaque et lumen
+  mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur, et intervalla
+  aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum adspectus
+  ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in
+  sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium
+  requirat acrius. <a name="BkII_20"></a><a href="#BkIIN_20">20</a>.
+  Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi pictura teneantur, aures
+  cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in sensibus? Quam multa
+  vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus! quam
+  multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati! qui
+  primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut Andromacham, quum id nos
+  ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu et odoratu loqui, in
+  quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen. Quid de tactu, et
+  eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis?
+  in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia
+  sentiatur:&mdash;potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat,
+  et inter eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet
+  non apertissime insaniat? <a name="BkII_21"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_21">21</a>. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi
+  dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed
+  quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum
+  illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa,
+  non sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series
+  deinde sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum
+  comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis
+  particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus
+  nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. <a
+  name="BkII_22"></a><a href="#BkIIN_22">22</a>. Quod si essent falsae
+  notitiae&mdash;<span lang="el" title="ennoias"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span> enim notitias
+  appellare tu videbare&mdash;, si igitur essent hae falsae aut eius modi
+  visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis discerni non possent, quo tandem
+  his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei consentaneum esset,
+  quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae non modo
+  philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime continet,
+  nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria falsorum?
+  aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? Ars vero
+  quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi
+  perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem ab
+  inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus,
+  sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item.
+  Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat,
+  aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea
+  potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is,
+  qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem in
+  similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo
+  atque agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem
+  tractabit, multa perceperit?</p>
+
+  <p>VIII. <a name="BkII_23"></a><a href="#BkIIN_23">23</a>. Maxime vero
+  virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi multa posse. In quibus
+  solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non comprehensionem modo
+  rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse censemus, itemque
+  sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat constantiam. Ea autem
+  constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti, quaero unde nata sit aut
+  quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui statuit omnem cruciatum
+  perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam aut officium prodat
+  aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges imposuerit, cum quam ob
+  rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi, percepti, cogniti,
+  constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam tanti aestimet
+  aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum supplicium
+  recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non possint. <a
+  name="BkII_24"></a><a href="#BkIIN_24">24</a>. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se
+  ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo modo primum obtinebit nomen
+  sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam rem aut agere fidenter
+  audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum vero dubitabit quid sit
+  extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia referantur, qui poterit
+  esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse
+  initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, sequatur, idque initium
+  esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter appetitio&mdash;eam enim volumus
+  esse <span lang="el" title="horm�n"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>&mdash;, qua ad
+  agendum impellimur, et id appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest.
+  <a name="BkII_25"></a><a href="#BkIIN_25">25</a>. Illud autem, quod
+  movet, prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest, si id,
+  quod visum erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri
+  animus ad appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur
+  accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit
+  non occurrit animo, nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam
+  impelletur, numquam movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est,
+  necesse est id ei verum, quod occurrit, videri. <a name="BkII_26"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_26">26</a>. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis
+  tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate
+  perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem,
+  cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio
+  cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea,
+  quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi
+  involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium
+  quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet<i>ur</i>. Itaque
+  argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece <span lang="el" title="apodeixis"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  ita definitur: 'ratio, quae ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non
+  percipiebatur, adducit.'</p>
+
+  <p>IX. <a name="BkII_27"></a><a href="#BkIIN_27">27</a>. Quod si omnia
+  visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel falsa esse possent,
+  neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo quemquam aut conclusisse
+  aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset conclusi argumenti fides?
+  Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi debet, quem habebit
+  exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de se ipsa dubitare
+  debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant <span lang="el"
+  title="dogmata"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>, quorum nullum
+  sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum proditur, lex veri rectique
+  proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum proditiones et rerum publicarum
+  nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum
+  possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse falsum, sed etiam stabile,
+  fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla ratio queat. Talia autem
+  neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui illa visa, e quibus
+  omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis interesse. <a
+  name="BkII_28"></a><a href="#BkIIN_28">28</a>. Ex hoc illud est natum,
+  quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente
+  diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum
+  diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse percipi, consentaneum esse unum
+  tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia non possent, Carneades acutius
+  resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id consentaneum esset, ut
+  maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod
+  perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum quidem,
+  quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse. <a
+  name="BkII_29"></a><a href="#BkIIN_29">29</a>. Antiochus ad istum locum
+  pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id haberent Academici
+  decretum,&mdash;sentitis enim iam hoc me <span lang="el" title="dogma"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span> dicere&mdash;, nihil posse
+  percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus,
+  fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim esse regulam
+  totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti: quam
+  rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis<i>a</i> accipi
+  oporteret et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique
+  iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec maxima in
+  philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse,
+  qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut
+  unde proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere
+  dubia neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a
+  sapientia plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut
+  hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de
+  inconstantia totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse
+  potest nihil approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.</p>
+
+  <p>X. <a name="BkII_30"></a><a href="#BkIIN_30">30</a>. Sequitur
+  disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior&mdash;habet enim
+  aliquantum a physicis&mdash;, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra
+  dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de
+  abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari
+  poterat subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum
+  animal omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad
+  modum primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa
+  sequeretur, tum ut sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim
+  ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim
+  habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit,
+  ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur.
+  Cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae
+  rerum, quas Graeci tum <span lang="el" title="ennoias"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>, tum <span
+  lang="el" title="prol�pseis"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque
+  innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem
+  ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit. <a
+  name="BkII_31"></a><a href="#BkIIN_31">31</a>. Ad rerum igitur scientiam
+  vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime
+  cognitionem, et istam <span lang="el" title="katal�psin"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum
+  ipsam per se amat&mdash;nihil est enim ei veritatis luce
+  dulcius&mdash;tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et
+  artis efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam
+  corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit. Ergo
+  ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel
+  instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt
+  funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate
+  eorum, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="BkII_32"></a><a href="#BkIIN_32">32</a>. Nec vero satis
+  constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid velint. Interdum
+  enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea, quae disputentur,
+  vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid ergo istud ad nos?
+  num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo veritatem, ut ait
+  Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius, qui etiam
+  queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque intersit
+  inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur eaque
+  distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui
+  omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi
+  desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim&mdash;et hoc quidem vel
+  maxime vos animadvertebam moveri&mdash;probabile aliquid esse et quasi
+  veri simile, eaque se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac
+  disserendo.</p>
+
+  <p>XI. <a name="BkII_33"></a><a href="#BkIIN_33">33</a>. Quae ista regula
+  est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi, propterea quod ea non
+  possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus, interesse oportet ut
+  inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si nihil interest,
+  nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique communis,
+  ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum dicunt
+  hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo
+  falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt pueriliter.
+  Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut si quis
+  quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non ademisse.
+  Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed propria
+  veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu probabilem
+  visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades volebat,
+  sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo agimus,
+  tibi erit revertendum. <a name="BkII_34"></a><a href="#BkIIN_34">34</a>.
+  In eo autem, si erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia
+  proprium in communi signo notari non potest. Sin autem commune nihil
+  erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod ita mihi videatur verum, ut
+  non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore versantur, cum convicio
+  veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt distinguere et conantur
+  ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud quidem impressum in animo
+  atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque comprehendi posse. Quo enim
+  modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum possit accidere ut id,
+  quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo ista aut perspicua
+  dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere inaniterne
+  moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec argumentum nec
+  sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. <a name="BkII_35"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_35">35</a>. Ex hoc illud iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid
+  dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur: 'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed
+  qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur. Non enim urguent, ut coarguant
+  neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque adseverare sine aliqua eius
+  rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et propria nota. Quod est
+  igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique occurrit et primo
+  quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo levius? <a
+  name="BkII_36"></a><a href="#BkIIN_36">36</a>. Sin ex circumspectione
+  aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod visum sit, id se dicent sequi,
+  tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis visis, inter quae nihil
+  interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides: deinde, cum dicant posse
+  accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit diligentissimeque circumspexerit,
+  exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile videatur et absit longissime a vero,
+  ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam
+  proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt. Ut enim confidant, notum iis
+  esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et oppresso quod tandem verum
+  sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam absurde dici potest quam cum
+  ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei signum aut argumentum et ea re
+  id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod significatur, aut falsum sit aut
+  nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae
+  dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam absentibus nobis veritas se
+  ipsa defendet.</p>
+
+  <p>XII. <a name="BkII_37"></a><a href="#BkIIN_37">37</a>. His satis
+  cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione atque approbatione,
+  quam Graeci <span lang="el" title="synkatathesin"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta
+  sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim, quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul
+  illud aperiebatur, comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine
+  adsensione non potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime
+  intersit, quod animal agit aliquid&mdash;nihil enim agens ne cogitari
+  quidem potest quale sit&mdash;, aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae
+  est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda adsensio. <a name="BkII_38"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_38">38</a>. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos
+  neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra
+  ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo
+  non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam
+  appareat&mdash;Graeci id <span lang="el" title="oikeion"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  appellant&mdash;, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non approbare.
+  Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil attinet de
+  adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur statim. Sed
+  haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse constare nec
+  notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit aliquid in
+  nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit. <a
+  name="BkII_39"></a><a href="#BkIIN_39">39</a>. Ubi igitur virtus, si
+  nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem absurdum vitia in ipsorum
+  esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi adsensione: hoc idem in
+  virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et firmitas ex iis rebus
+  constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit, omninoque ante videri
+  aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum sit, adsentiatur. Qua
+  re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e
+  vita.</p>
+
+  <p>XIII. <a name="BkII_40"></a><a href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>. Nunc ea
+  videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius potestis totius
+  eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt igitur primum artem
+  quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et genera definiunt,
+  in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit, totidem verbis
+  quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant omnem hanc
+  quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri possint
+  nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia non
+  percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi
+  sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti
+  conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic
+  est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum
+  est, id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est,
+  ut eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius
+  modi, ut in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi
+  possint, alia non possint. <a name="BkII_41"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_41">41</a>. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.'
+  Quae autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant
+  concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa
+  sint, ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit,
+  ex iis non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non
+  possint:' reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item
+  duo, unum: 'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum:
+  'omne visum, quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit
+  esse.' <a name="BkII_42"></a><a href="#BkIIN_42">42</a>. Haec duo
+  proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam
+  adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:
+  primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni
+  consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne
+  ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa
+  concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis,
+  item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima
+  dispertiunt, volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta
+  esse falsa, quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse
+  comprehendi.</p>
+
+  <p>XIV. <a name="BkII_43"></a><a href="#BkIIN_43">43</a>. Hanc ego
+  subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed ab eorum causa,
+  qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et partitiones et
+  horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines dissimilitudinesque et
+  earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est hominum illa vera et firma
+  et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui clament nihilo magis vera illa
+  esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum aliquid definierint, roget eos
+  quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam rem transferri quamlubet? Si
+  posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa vera definitio sit?
+  si<i>n</i> negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera definitio
+  transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur, id
+  percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus
+  partibus. <a name="BkII_44"></a><a href="#BkIIN_44">44</a>. Si enim
+  dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide perspicere nec ulla
+  communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se fatebuntur. Sin autem
+  negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui poterunt longius
+  progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam concludi argumentum
+  non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt, ita probatis, ut
+  falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus comprehensis et
+  perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse comprehendi,
+  quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque ipsa natura
+  accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam quod non
+  appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et ea,
+  quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse
+  quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro
+  congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam
+  falsa visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem,
+  inter falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam
+  interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="BkII_45"></a><a href="#BkIIN_45">45</a>. Sed progrediamur
+  longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse videamur, quaeque ab
+  iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis relinquamus.
+  Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim, ut
+  ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed tamen, ut
+  maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus est vel
+  arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese, quasi
+  praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit subvenire
+  erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem,
+  dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil
+  profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.</p>
+
+  <p>XV. <a name="BkII_46"></a><a href="#BkIIN_46">46</a>. Quam ob rem cum
+  duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem
+  sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt
+  animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, ut quanta luce ea
+  circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod fallacibus et
+  captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti quidam, cum eas
+  dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae
+  pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere, de quibus iam
+  diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus eorum
+  captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere constitui. <a
+  name="BkII_47"></a><a href="#BkIIN_47">47</a>. Exponam igitur generatim
+  argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum
+  conantur ostendere multa posse videri esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum
+  animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis,
+  quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea,
+  quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis, auspiciis, extis
+  declarentur&mdash;haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra
+  disputant&mdash;, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus
+  efficere possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant,
+  efficere non possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae
+  perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae
+  nihil sit omnino? <a name="BkII_48"></a><a href="#BkIIN_48">48</a>.
+  Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea declarant, quae
+  cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel furiosis
+  videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut non
+  modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis nihil
+  intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se
+  motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset,
+  qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset
+  inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae
+  falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile
+  internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi
+  dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in
+  visis distinctio appareat.</p>
+
+  <p>XVI. <a name="BkII_49"></a><a href="#BkIIN_49">49</a>. Ad has omnis
+  visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat et erat de hac una
+  re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum puto, sed ipsa
+  capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod captiosissimo
+  genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in philosophia probari
+  solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur. Soritas hoc
+  vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano. Vitiosum sane et
+  captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum obiectum est a deo
+  dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri simile? cur
+  deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne
+  internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc
+  si perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin
+  ipse tua sponte processeris, tuum. <a name="BkII_50"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_50">50</a>. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum posse aut
+  ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid cui
+  simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit?
+  deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi
+  canibus similes <i>sunt</i>, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis
+  similia sunt quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime
+  artificiosa: quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse?
+  Ne repugnantia quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud
+  genus transferri possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium
+  generum nihil interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in
+  alieno. <a name="BkII_51"></a><a href="#BkIIN_51">51</a>. Quod fieri qui
+  potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa
+  cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete
+  sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis
+  perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim,
+  cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse
+  commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et
+  inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum
+  Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba
+  ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>Idemque in Epicharmo:</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita
+  habemus, ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.</p>
+
+  <p>XVII. <a name="BkII_52"></a><a href="#BkIIN_52">52</a>. At enim dum
+  videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum<i>que</i>, quae vigilantes
+  videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim dicimus, non
+  eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium nec mente
+  nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione faciunt
+  qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae
+  videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam
+  levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes
+  furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum
+  relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum</p>
+      <p>adspectu' ...</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p><a name="BkII_53"></a><a href="#BkIIN_53">53</a>. At enim ipse sapiens
+  sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro veris. Et alias quidem
+  saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte gravitas aut tarditas
+  aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo temporis brevitate
+  excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando sustinere
+  adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset, aut
+  semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest
+  levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus
+  gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis
+  somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere
+  quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos
+  aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter
+  vigilantium visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter
+  adfecti, tum nihil interesse. <a name="BkII_54"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_54">54</a>. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta,
+  quod nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae <span lang="el" title="ad�la"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;</span> Graeci. Si enim res se ita
+  habeant, ut nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano,
+  cui possit exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non
+  mediocris insaniae est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum
+  anulis impressorum pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum
+  similitudines negat esse, cum eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si
+  satis est ad tollendam cognitionem similia esse multa multorum, cur eo
+  non estis contenti, praesertim concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius
+  contenditis, quod rerum natura non patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit
+  tale, quale est, nec sit in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla
+  communitas? ut [sibi] sint et ova ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid
+  pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi vis in geminis? Conceditur enim similis
+  esse, quo contentus esse potueras: tu autem vis eosdem plane esse, non
+  similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest. <a name="BkII_55"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_55">55</a>. Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in
+  Academia irridentur, a quibus ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais
+  Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter
+  sese non solum similis, sed undique perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut
+  inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eos quidem innumerabiles], itemque
+  homines. Deinde postulas, ut, si mundus ita sit par alteri mundo, ut
+  inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur tibi ut in hoc quoque
+  nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par, ut nihil differat, nihil
+  intersit. Cur enim, inquies, ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus
+  gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem innumerabilibus
+  innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse, sed etiam sint, in
+  hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici?</p>
+
+  <p>XVIII. <a name="BkII_56"></a><a href="#BkIIN_56">56</a>. Primum quidem
+  me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior potiusque refello propter id,
+  quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis singularum rerum singulas
+  proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt,
+  tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam eosdem fuisse? Non
+  cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a suis. An non videmus
+  hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis internosci posse, eos
+  consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti ne minimum quidem
+  similes viderentur? <a name="BkII_57"></a><a href="#BkIIN_57">57</a>.
+  Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo: quin etiam concedam illum ipsum
+  sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum ei res similes occurrant, quas
+  non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum nec umquam ulli viso
+  adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse non possit. Sed et
+  ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis possit distinguere,
+  et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater geminos
+  internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si adsueveris.
+  Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen hoc
+  accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere
+  permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id
+  gallina peperisset dicere solebant. <a name="BkII_58"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_58">58</a>. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis est ova
+  illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc illud
+  esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam, ut
+  talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non
+  licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri
+  enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit
+  quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere,
+  cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas
+  impressiones nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum.
+  Quasi vero non specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata
+  veri et falsi nota. <a name="BkII_59"></a><a href="#BkIIN_59">59</a>.
+  Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re nulla
+  impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non
+  distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his
+  illa necessario nata est <span lang="el" title="epoch�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span>, id est adsensionis retentio,
+  in qua melius sibi constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non
+  nulli existimant. Si enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est,
+  tollendus adsensus est. Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare
+  non cognitum? Carneadem autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse
+  <i>eo</i> delabi interdum, ut diceret opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse
+  sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est esse aliquid, quod comprehendi
+  possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo, quam sapientem nihil
+  opinari, id est, numquam adsentiri rei vel falsae vel incognitae. <a
+  name="BkII_60"></a><a href="#BkIIN_60">60</a>. Restat illud, quod dicunt,
+  veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo
+  igitur videre quid invenerint. Non solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt
+  tandem ista mysteria? aut cur celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam
+  vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit, ratione potius quam auctoritate
+  ducantur. Quid, si utroque? num peius est? Unum tamen illud non celant,
+  nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi
+  quidem videtur vel plurimum. Quis enim ista tam aperte perspicueque et
+  perversa et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in Arcesila, multo etiam
+  maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi vis fuisset?</p>
+
+  <p>XIX. <a name="BkII_61"></a><a href="#BkIIN_61">61</a>. Haec Antiochus
+  fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo etiam adseverantius,
+  in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus. Sed iam confirmata
+  causa te, hominem amicissimum&mdash;me autem appellabat&mdash;et aliquot
+  annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus
+  philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris,
+  eam philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos
+  iudicio, privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis
+  quidem, quibus adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat
+  sive eius loci, quem incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis
+  uti lumine licebat, isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris
+  ne scintillam quidem ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si
+  sequamur, iis vinculis simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus. <a
+  name="BkII_62"></a><a href="#BkIIN_62">62</a>. Sublata enim adsensione
+  omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo
+  recte fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam
+  sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas
+  aperueris in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse,
+  quod mihi quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem
+  ullam quae cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam
+  atque etiam ne illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur
+  auctoritas. Quae cum dixisset ille, finem fecit. <a name="BkII_63"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_63">63</a>. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod
+  quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret,
+  nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius,
+  me quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens&mdash;non enim satis
+  intellegebam&mdash;, coepit hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi
+  Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter,
+  accurate, copiose, taceo neque te quo minus, si tibi ita videatur,
+  sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud vero non censuerim, ut eius
+  auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo monuit, inquit adridens, ut
+  caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis, quorum vides quanta copia
+  semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione quaereret qui tibi
+  constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse reperiri, idem te
+  comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De causa autem ipsa
+  malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno opere mirabor.
+  Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia sensisset, simul ac
+  visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset Catulus, me omnes
+  intueri.</p>
+
+  <p>XX. <a name="BkII_64"></a><a href="#BkIIN_64">64</a>. Tum ego non
+  minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius modi quadam oratione
+  sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita movit, ut docti
+  hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum, quae pro illa
+  causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse diffiderem.
+  Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses non minorem
+  tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero. <a
+  name="BkII_65"></a><a href="#BkIIN_65">65</a>. Ego enim si aut
+  ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad hanc potissimum
+  philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed etiam mores et
+  naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus pertinacia
+  reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu consilioque
+  totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum alios tum
+  etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatione
+  id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum solet,
+  iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri reperiendi et
+  ea sentire, quae dicerem. <a name="BkII_66"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_66">66</a>. Qui enim possum non cupere verum invenire, cum
+  gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc pulcherrimum esse
+  iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa turpissimum est. Nec
+  tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui numquam adsentiar,
+  qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero ipse et magnus
+  quidem sum opinator&mdash;non enim sum sapiens&mdash;et meas cogitationes
+  sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore
+  specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non
+  de me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter
+  mentem sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec
+  percipio tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens;
+  itaque visis cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet
+  Arcesilas vim esse maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne
+  fallatur videre. Nihil est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de
+  gravitate sapientis, errore, levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur
+  loquar de firmitate sapientis? quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque,
+  Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te probatur&mdash;ut praepostere tecum
+  agam, mox referam me ad ordinem&mdash;haec primum conclusio quam habeat
+  vim considera.</p>
+
+  <p>XXI. <a name="BkII_67"></a><a href="#BkIIN_67">67</a>. Si ulli rei
+  sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur: numquam autem
+  opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc conclusionem Arcesilas
+  probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum. Carneades non numquam
+  secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita sequebatur etiam opinari,
+  quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed illud primum, sapientem,
+  si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse et Stoici dicunt et
+  eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a veris et quae non
+  possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere. <a
+  name="BkII_68"></a><a href="#BkIIN_68">68</a>. Nobis autem primum, etiam
+  si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo adsentiendi periculosa esse
+  videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam vitiosum esse constet adsentiri
+  quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum, sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio,
+  ne praecipitet, si temere processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa
+  veris, eaque, quae percipi non possunt, <i>iis quae possunt</i>&mdash;si
+  modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus&mdash;, ut tam in praecipitem
+  locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem omnino nihil esse quod
+  percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das, accepero, sapientem
+  nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus omnes cohibiturum,
+  ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum esse sapientem.
+  Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse percipi: etenim de
+  eo omnis est controversia.</p>
+
+  <p>XXII. <a name="BkII_69"></a><a href="#BkIIN_69">69</a>. Sed prius
+  pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me defenduntur, et didicit apud
+  Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius didicisse neminem, et scripsit de
+  his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non acrius accusavit in senectute quam
+  antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen
+  inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim iste dies illuxerit quaero,
+  qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse negitavisset, veri et
+  falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae Stoici. Poenituit illa
+  sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime ad Stoicos? eorum enim
+  erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi poenitebat? quid?
+  Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum. Numquam a Philone
+  discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent habere. <a
+  name="BkII_70"></a><a href="#BkIIN_70">70</a>. Unde autem subito vetus
+  Academia revocata est? Nominis dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa
+  descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod erant qui illum gloriae causa facere
+  dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii, qui se sequerentur, Antiochii
+  vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non potuisse sustinere concursum
+  omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt inter illos non nulla
+  communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam reliquorum
+  philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub Novis solem
+  non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum, sic
+  Academicorum umbram secutus est. <a name="BkII_71"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_71">71</a>. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum, cum ei
+  placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille Heracleotes
+  utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis oportere,
+  illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro credidisset,
+  honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea defensitavisset,
+  honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum: qui ex illius
+  commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis nostris a
+  vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit <i>ut</i> quod
+  argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum
+  hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.</p>
+
+  <p>XXIII. <a name="BkII_72"></a><a href="#BkIIN_72">72</a>. Et primum
+  quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a nobis de antiquis
+  philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros viros, sed tamen
+  popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res <i>non</i> bonas tractent,
+  similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri, quae
+  vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras
+  nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si
+  dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?&mdash;sic enim
+  appellabantur ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa
+  philosophabantur&mdash;: maxima fuit et gravitatis et ingeni gloria. <a
+  name="BkII_73"></a><a href="#BkIIN_73">73</a>. Quid loquar de Democrito?
+  Quem cum eo conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam
+  animi? qui ita sit ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil
+  excipit de quo non profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa?
+  quis hunc philosophum non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis
+  inferioris aetatis? qui mihi cum illo collati quintae classis videntur.
+  Atque is non hoc dicit, quod nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus,
+  percipi posse negamus; ille verum plane negat esse: sensus quidem non
+  obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic enim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc
+  maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus initio libri, qui est de natura:
+  'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id
+  ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos, nec omnino sitne aliquid an
+  nihil sit.' <a name="BkII_74"></a><a href="#BkIIN_74">74</a>. Furere tibi
+  Empedocles videtur: at mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur,
+  sonum fundere. Num ergo is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum
+  magnam vim censet in iis esse ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt,
+  iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus bonis quamquam versibus, sed
+  tamen illi versibus increpant eorum adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum
+  sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum
+  Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum
+  iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari
+  non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum,
+  'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius. Quid dicam de Platone? qui
+  certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non esset, nisi probavisset.
+  Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla fuit ratio
+  persequi.</p>
+
+  <p>XXIV. <a name="BkII_75"></a><a href="#BkIIN_75">75</a>. Videorne tibi,
+  non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris homines, sed imitari numquam
+  nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam molestos vobis, sed minutos,
+  Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt contorta et aculeata quaedam
+  <span lang="el" title="sophismata"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>;
+  sic enim appellantur fallaces conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum
+  habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa
+  ille contra sensus, quam multa contra omnia, quae in consuetudine
+  probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi quidem non videtur: sed dissolverit
+  sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset, quae nos fallerent probabilitate
+  magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile posse. <a
+  name="BkII_76"></a><a href="#BkIIN_76">76</a>. Quid Cyrenaici <i>tibi</i>
+  videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui negant esse quicquam quod
+  percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere, quae tactu intimo
+  sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid colore aut quo
+  sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.</p>
+
+  <p>Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem
+  post illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis
+  tantisque studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te
+  ipso quidem iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone
+  pugnavisse, sed verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. <a
+  name="BkII_77"></a><a href="#BkIIN_77">77</a>. Nemo, inquam, superiorum
+  non modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari,
+  nec solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum
+  vera sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone
+  fortasse quid futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec
+  opinari sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset,
+  quod percipi posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur
+  visum? tum illum ita definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum
+  et signatum et effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset
+  visum verum, quale vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse
+  visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem
+  modi ab eo, quod non est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad
+  definitionem additum: neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si
+  esset tale, quale vel falsum. Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut
+  doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso
+  possit esse. <a name="BkII_78"></a><a href="#BkIIN_78">78</a>. Haec est
+  una contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum
+  esse sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim
+  nihil percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum:
+  equidem Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab
+  eo disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe
+  opinatione et perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio,
+  ut, si ostendero nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum
+  esse.</p>
+
+  <p>XXV. <a name="BkII_79"></a><a href="#BkIIN_79">79</a>. Quid ergo est
+  quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle,
+  communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere posses, idcirco heri non
+  necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram. Tu autem te negas
+  infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur? Nam et in remo
+  sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris videri colores
+  nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?&mdash;Manent illa
+  omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.&mdash;Igitur
+  semper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim
+  rem demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli
+  umquam esse credendum. <a name="BkII_80"></a><a href="#BkIIN_80">80</a>.
+  Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et importune insistere!
+  Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum oculum torsisset, duas
+  ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse mendacium, non
+  oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed hic quidem
+  maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas esse, alia
+  falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi nobis
+  ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et integris
+  sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?&mdash;Utinam
+  quidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus,
+  quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non
+  cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies
+  longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at
+  familiarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem,
+  non videmus. <a name="BkII_81"></a><a href="#BkIIN_81">81</a>. At ille
+  nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et octingenta stadia
+  quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius. Responderem igitur
+  audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse contentum. Dicet me
+  acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque videntur a nobis et
+  nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere possunt. Ergo ut
+  illis aqua, sic nobis a�r crassus offunditur. At amplius non desideramus.
+  Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam quererer cum deo, quod
+  parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem illam? Stare nobis
+  videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa. Quaere rationem cur
+  ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio an non possis, non
+  tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum testimonium dicere
+  ostenderis.</p>
+
+  <p>XXVI. <a name="BkII_82"></a><a href="#BkIIN_82">82</a>. Quid ego de
+  nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse quaeris. Quid potest
+  esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti partibus
+  confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi quidem
+  quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum quam
+  videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum
+  esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi
+  igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri
+  putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta
+  incitatione fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem
+  possit, tamen nobis stare videatur. <a name="BkII_83"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_83">83</a>. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso,
+  quam in parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse
+  quod nosci, percipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E
+  quibus primum est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id
+  percipi, tertium, inter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut
+  eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum
+  verum a sensu profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo
+  nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum
+  secundum et tertium omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos,
+  quibuscum res est, id quoque conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est. <a
+  name="BkII_84"></a><a href="#BkIIN_84">84</a>. Qui igitur P. Servilium
+  Geminum videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi
+  visum, quod percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a
+  falso: qua distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum
+  Gemino consul fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non
+  posset? Negas tantam similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino,
+  sed cum adversario facili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet
+  igitur sensum, et si una fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit.
+  Sublato enim iudicio illo, quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem
+  videris, qui tibi videbitur, tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis
+  oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem modi falsa. <a name="BkII_85"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_85">85</a>. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus
+  videri, quid habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non
+  sit, quoniam aliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis
+  esse, nihil esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum
+  credibile 'nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius,
+  nullum granum.' Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod
+  agitur, nihil interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an
+  internosci non possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo
+  tanta esse non potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere,
+  eadem temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros
+  eiusdem modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres? <a
+  name="BkII_86"></a><a href="#BkIIN_86">86</a>. Quid? si in eius<i>dem</i>
+  modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in
+  agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui,
+  quoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret?</p>
+
+  <p>XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae
+  nos non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur.
+  Quid? hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad
+  quae pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire
+  possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros
+  mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura! <a
+  name="BkII_87"></a><a href="#BkIIN_87">87</a>. Cur non extimescam
+  opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse aliquam
+  vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo verbo
+  utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi adhibita?
+  quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur etiam
+  eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de physicis
+  mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo ante
+  dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam, res
+  iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris
+  solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:&mdash;de quo queri solent Stoici, dum
+  studiose omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque
+  omnem consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem
+  inferiorem fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.&mdash;<a
+  name="BkII_88"></a><a href="#BkIIN_88">88</a>. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a
+  te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et
+  furiosorum visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum,
+  sanorum. Quo modo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se
+  vidisse Homerum, sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit,
+  eum somnia re<i>ri</i> et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea
+  vera, quae essent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum
+  videbantur, quo modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non
+  putamus ita totum illud audivisse,</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'O pietas animi ...',</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit
+  illa visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti
+  probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'Mater, te appello ...'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde
+  enim illa:</p>
+
+  <p>'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur
+  minorem habere visis quam vigilantes fidem?</p>
+
+  <p>XXVIII. <a name="BkII_89"></a><a href="#BkIIN_89">89</a>. Quid loquar
+  de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus, Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam
+  sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is putabat quae videbantur?
+  Quid ille, qui:</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid?
+  apud Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat
+  sagittis, cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde
+  movebatur falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat
+  'cor sibi cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'unde haec flamma oritur?'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>et illa deinceps:</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, <i>adsunt</i>, me expetunt:'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat:</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam</p>
+      <p class="i4">hanc vim, quae me excruciat!</p>
+      <p>Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant</p>
+      <p class="i4">cum ardentibus taedis.'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p>Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:</p>
+
+  <div class="poem">
+    <div class="stanza">
+      <p>'Intendit crinitus Apollo</p>
+      <p>arcum auratum, luna innixus:</p>
+      <p>Diana facem iacit a laeva.'</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <p><a name="BkII_90"></a><a href="#BkIIN_90">90</a>. Qui magis haec
+  crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur? Apparet enim iam
+  'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur, ut illud
+  efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et falsa ad
+  animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa falsa
+  vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non enim
+  id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti sint,
+  aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut furentium
+  aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="BkII_91"></a><a href="#BkIIN_91">91</a>. Quid est quod
+  ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse dicitis, veri et falsi
+  quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et falsi? et in qua re? In
+  geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus iudicabit an in
+  litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia igitur. Sol
+  quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut queat
+  iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera
+  sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet?
+  Si haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem
+  pollicebatur. Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in
+  philosophia multae atque magnae, non est satis. <a name="BkII_92"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_92">92</a>. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis, videte ne
+  contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit elementa
+  loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum paucis
+  additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod tu
+  modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.</p>
+
+  <p>XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura
+  nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus
+  quatenus. Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla
+  omnino in re minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit,
+  multa pauca, magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito
+  aut dempto certum respondeamus [non] habemus.&mdash;<a
+  name="BkII_93"></a><a href="#BkIIN_93">93</a>. At vitiosi sunt
+  soritae.&mdash;Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt
+  enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum est, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum
+  gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto
+  prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur,
+  <span lang="el" title="h�sychazein"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  Per me vel stertas licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid
+  proficit? Sequitur enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo
+  interroget. Quo in numero conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero,
+  multane erunt? Progrediere rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim
+  fateris, neque ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere
+  posse. Cuius generis error ita manat, ut non videam quo non possit
+  accedere. <a name="BkII_94"></a><a href="#BkIIN_94">94</a>. Nihil me
+  laedit, inquit: ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem
+  veniam, equos sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi,
+  praeceps erit. Sic me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose
+  interroganti respondeo. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus
+  es: si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed
+  negas te usque ad obscura progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si
+  id tantum modo, ut taceas, nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te
+  captare volt, utrum tacentem irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad
+  novem, verbi gratia, sine dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo
+  insistis: etiam a certis et illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me
+  in obscuris facere non sinis. Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista
+  adiuvat, quae nec augentis nec minuentis quid aut primum sit aut
+  postremum docet. <a name="BkII_95"></a><a href="#BkIIN_95">95</a>. Quid?
+  quod eadem illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum
+  superiora. Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum
+  dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur&mdash;id autem appellant <span
+  lang="el" title="axi�ma"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>, quod est quasi
+  effatum&mdash;, aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an
+  falsa sunt? Si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris <i>an</i>
+  verum dicis? Haec scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius
+  quam illa, quae nos non comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.</p>
+
+  <p>XXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec
+  eorum ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa
+  sint, ubi est illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum
+  sit'? Rebus sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias
+  improbandas, quae sint in genere contrario. <a name="BkII_96"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_96">96</a>. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si
+  dicis <i>nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem</i> nunc lucere
+  et verum dicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime
+  conclusum dicitis. Itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum
+  traditis. Aut quidquid igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars
+  ista nulla est. Vide ergo hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis
+  te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque
+  dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris
+  eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem
+  dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet
+  autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum
+  concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa
+  conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris, mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris
+  igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec approbare nec improbare. <a
+  name="BkII_97"></a><a href="#BkIIN_97">97</a>. Qui igitur magis illud? Si
+  ars, si ratio, si via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in
+  utroque. Sed hoc extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec
+  inexplicabilia. Tribunum aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem
+  numquam impetrabunt. Etenim cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et
+  contemnit et irridet, non impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita
+  effabimur, 'aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic
+  statuant, omne, quod ita diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non
+  modo verum esse, sed etiam necessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti
+  tardum putant. Si enim, inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse,
+  necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est
+  in natura rerum talis necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id
+  est, Antiochus et Stoici: totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e
+  contrariis diiunctio&mdash;contraria autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat,
+  alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa potest esse, nulla vera est. <a
+  name="BkII_98"></a><a href="#BkIIN_98">98</a>. Mecum vero quid habent
+  litium, qui ipsorum disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat,
+  sic ludere Carneades solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose,
+  minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec
+  autem merces erat dialecticorum. Sequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab
+  Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo iudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob
+  eam causam, quod ita didici, omne, quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum
+  esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris, mentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut
+  igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.</p>
+
+  <p>XXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi
+  relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis
+  sententia Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam,
+  ut quisquam id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad
+  senectutem cum Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde
+  studiosus ac diligens. Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis
+  adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo. <a
+  name="BkII_99"></a><a href="#BkIIN_99">99</a>. Duo placet esse Carneadi
+  genera visorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi
+  possint, alia quae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse
+  probabilia; alia non probabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque
+  perspicuitatem dicantur, ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra
+  posteriorem nihil dici oportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum
+  esse, ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra
+  naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam
+  tu, Luculle, commemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa
+  sunt, teneatur modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non
+  etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit
+  specie probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi
+  contrarium, utetur eo sapiens ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur.
+  Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur
+  probabilia, non comprehensa neque percepta neque adsensa, sed similia
+  veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita tollatur. <a name="BkII_100"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_100">100</a>. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num
+  comprehensum animo habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui
+  potest? Sed si iam ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta,
+  probo navigio, bono gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur
+  se illuc venturum esse salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et
+  agendi et non agendi, faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam
+  erat Anaxagoras, qui id non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret
+  aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri
+  quidem. <a name="BkII_101"></a><a href="#BkIIN_101">101</a>. Et
+  quaecumque res eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla
+  re impeditum, movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore
+  dolatus, habet corpus, habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut
+  ei multa vera videantur, neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam
+  percipiendi notam: eoque sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem
+  modi exsistere falsum aliquod, cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra
+  sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque
+  aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.</p>
+
+  <p>XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur,
+  praesto est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis
+  tacentibus ex uno Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio
+  tollitur. Quod est caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est,
+  nihil percipi potest.' Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid
+  sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non
+  concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus
+  est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus,
+  tibi adsentior. <a name="BkII_102"></a><a href="#BkIIN_102">102</a>.
+  Quamquam nihil mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem
+  maxime, cui erant ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec
+  quivis arbitratu suo reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse,
+  certe levior reprehensio est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia,
+  non videtur hoc satis esse vobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere,
+  quae a te vel maxime agitata sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis?
+  nihil tibi est perspicuum?' Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo
+  modo ista Carneades diceret. Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a
+  Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C. Lucilium scripsit po�tam, cum
+  scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum, eum, qui consul cum M.
+  Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis&mdash;sunt enim mihi nota,
+  propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima institutio et
+  quasi disciplina illo libro continetur&mdash;, sed scriptum est ita: <a
+  name="BkII_103"></a><a href="#BkIIN_103">103</a>. 'Academicis placere
+  esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut aliae probabiles videantur,
+  aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dicas, alia
+  non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi
+  perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait vehementer errare eos, qui
+  dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus numquam dictum sit aut colorem
+  aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit disputatum, non inesse in
+  his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam. <a
+  name="BkII_104"></a><a href="#BkIIN_104">104</a>. Quae cum exposuisset,
+  adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc
+  intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli adsentiri: altero, cum se a
+  respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet, sustineat, ut neque neget
+  aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum placere, ut numquam
+  adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem, ubicumque haec
+  aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere possit.
+  &#x2020;Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab
+  adsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa,
+  quibus ad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque
+  partem respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit,
+  dum sine adsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea,
+  quae nulla re impedirentur. <a name="BkII_105"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_105">105</a>. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane,
+  invidiosa certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos
+  percipi comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri
+  dicimus.</p>
+
+  <p>XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem
+  expedito, soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle,
+  iacere iam illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens,
+  de quo loquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur,
+  isdem sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare
+  illud, quod nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro
+  videbitur, nec tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum
+  videbatur, mane ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et
+  vibrat dissimileque est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis
+  rationem reddere cur id eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod
+  videbatur oculis, defendere. <a name="BkII_106"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_106">106</a>. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim
+  quaerebas. Quid? meminisse visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid?
+  Polyaenus, qui magnus mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro
+  adsentiens totam geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae
+  sciebat, oblitus est? Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut
+  vobismet ipsis placet. Si igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque
+  rerum est, omnia, quae quisque meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque
+  percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil potest, et omnia meminit Siron
+  Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed
+  tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime vis, aut memoriam mihi
+  remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si comprehensio
+  perceptioque nulla sit. <a name="BkII_107"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_107">107</a>. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne, quae ipsae
+  fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae tantum id,
+  quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera et falsa
+  diiudicent?</p>
+
+  <p>Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum
+  enim negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem
+  perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio
+  Stoicorum, ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici
+  certissimam putant, vera esse haruspicum [<i>responsa</i>], auspicia,
+  oracula, somnia, vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is
+  potest facere vel de iis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas
+  habuerint, cur id sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est
+  aliquid, quod positum vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non
+  possit? an tu in soritis poteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus
+  non poterit eodem modo insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione
+  ipsam veri similitudinem non impeditam sequi? <a name="BkII_108"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_108">108</a>. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei
+  posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim
+  videri oportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos
+  adsensus esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli
+  autem omnia, si visa tollantur.</p>
+
+  <p>XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa,
+  sed brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto
+  repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere,
+  credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a
+  Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris
+  adsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea
+  pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia
+  sequitur, nulla re impediente? <a name="BkII_109"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_109">109</a>. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod statuet, ne
+  id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque impediet in
+  navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis procreandis
+  plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter probabile.</p>
+
+  <p>Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater,
+  sed, ut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret
+  consentaneum esse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum
+  saltem dicere posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et
+  sibi ipsum contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil
+  comprehendi posse, si quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo
+  potius putat urguendum fuisse Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum
+  esse possit nisi comprehensum, perceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum
+  decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil posse percipi, fateretur esse
+  perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud decretum habeat et sine
+  decretis vitam agere possit! <a name="BkII_110"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_110">110</a>. Sed ut illa habet probabilia non percepta, sic
+  hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc haberet cognitionis notam,
+  eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non habet, utitur probabilibus.
+  Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur et incerta reddere. Non
+  enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit, stellarum numerus par an
+  impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de rebus, in quibus
+  versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis enim nihil
+  probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti nec quid
+  faciat nec quid respondeat. <a name="BkII_111"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_111">111</a>. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti, Luculle,
+  reprehensionem Antiochi&mdash;nec mirum: in primis enim est
+  nobilis&mdash;, qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum.
+  Cum enim sumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea
+  differre a veris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse
+  concessum, quod videretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli
+  altero, quo neget visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id
+  ita esset, si nos verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam
+  falsa cernimus. Sed probandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum
+  habemus.</p>
+
+  <p>XXXV. <a name="BkII_112"></a><a href="#BkIIN_112">112</a>. Ac mihi
+  videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim campus in quo
+  exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in Stoicorum
+  dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui id
+  percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet
+  illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum
+  simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque
+  etiam, si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille
+  sapientem interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem
+  huic loco valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum? <a
+  name="BkII_113"></a><a href="#BkIIN_113">113</a>. Quaero enim quid sit
+  quod comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus,
+  ne Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale
+  falsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito
+  nimirum adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus
+  Academia concedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet,
+  vel quod amavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum
+  et acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero
+  quo tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam
+  alia, haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae
+  aut Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale,
+  quale falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo.
+  Horum neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque
+  verum puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.</p>
+
+  <p>XXXVI. <a name="BkII_114"></a><a href="#BkIIN_114">114</a>. Illud
+  ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes idque turpissimum
+  esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi adroges, ut exponas
+  disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas, mores fingas, finis
+  bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam vitam ingrediar
+  definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium dicas te et
+  artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia complectens
+  nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad quam me
+  deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si
+  dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est. <a name="BkII_115"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_115">115</a>. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad suam quisque
+  rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus cognationem
+  esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam saepe rexisse,
+  sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam inter se
+  amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi? qui mecum
+  vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo? qui ista
+  Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola, si
+  vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos
+  impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint
+  scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire.
+  Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale
+  est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet
+  ipsis, de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec
+  quaestio est.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="BkII_116"></a><a href="#BkIIN_116">116</a>. In tres igitur
+  partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa sapientia est.
+  Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita, videamus: at
+  illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se illa scire
+  persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura pendent, quae
+  disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent persuadendi
+  necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non persuadere,
+  sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non quaero ex
+  his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum progredi non
+  possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat: extremitatem et
+  quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit: liniamentum sine
+  ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero, si adigam ius
+  iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante rationes
+  omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem maiorem
+  esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem deum
+  censet esse, contempserit. <a name="BkII_117"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_117">117</a>. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est
+  crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille
+  longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus,
+  quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est:
+  quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum
+  esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget <i>et</i> disciplinam? Etsi
+  quamcumque eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e
+  physicis potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor
+  quaestiones infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia
+  constant, videamus quem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa
+  dissensio.</p>
+
+  <p>XXXVII. <a name="BkII_118"></a><a href="#BkIIN_118">118</a>. Princeps
+  Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse primas ferunt, ex
+  aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari et sodali suo,
+  non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua omnia
+  gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum a�ra, sed ea, quae ex
+  eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex his
+  omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis inter
+  se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente
+  divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse
+  mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata
+  figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur:
+  Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in
+  ceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem:
+  Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et
+  fore. Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a
+  deo sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis
+  proficisci volunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem,
+  credo, quem sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo
+  condemnatique discedent. <a name="BkII_119"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_119">119</a>. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic
+  animo comprehensam habebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit
+  nunc lucere, quam, quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem,
+  habere mentem, quae et se et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur,
+  moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum etiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis,
+  terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam animalis intellegentia per omnia ea
+  permanet et transeat, fore tamen aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore
+  deflagret.</p>
+
+  <p>XXXVIII. Sint ista vera&mdash;vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse
+  veri&mdash;, comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste
+  Stoicus sapiens syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis
+  aureum fundens Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum
+  esse umquam mundum, quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari
+  operis inceptio, et ita esse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat
+  motus mutationemque moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum
+  exsistere, ut hic ornatus umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare,
+  illud autem superius sicut caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit,
+  cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem relinquatur. <a name="BkII_120"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_120">120</a>. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium,
+  quanti libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est?
+  Cur deus, omnia nostra causa cum faceret&mdash;sic enim voltis&mdash;,
+  tantam vim natricum viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa
+  <i>ac</i> perniciosa terra marique disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite
+  tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine divina aliqua sollertia. Cuius
+  quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad apium formicarumque
+  perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis minutorum
+  opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur. <a name="BkII_121"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_121">121</a>. Negas sine deo posse quicquam. Ecce tibi e
+  transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem magni quidem
+  muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius
+  habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum.
+  Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec, ut ille, qui
+  asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse
+  dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non docentis,
+  sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens, quidquid aut
+  sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et
+  motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore. Quis enim
+  potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes divinum
+  numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit&mdash;quod cui non
+  accidit?&mdash;extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen
+  adsentior, nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.</p>
+
+  <p>XXXIX. <a name="BkII_122"></a><a href="#BkIIN_122">122</a>. Latent
+  ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa tenebris, ut nulla
+  acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum, terram intrare
+  possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium, quam vim
+  quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum intererat ea
+  nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici notiora
+  esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed ecquid
+  nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus, ut
+  videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an
+  media pendeat? <a name="BkII_123"></a><a href="#BkIIN_123">123</a>.
+  Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram multarum urbium et
+  montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui dixit, iurare
+  posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam dicitis esse e
+  regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis vestigiis stent
+  contra nostra vestigia, quos <span lang="el" title="antipodas"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>
+  vocatis: cur mihi magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis,
+  qui, cum audiunt, desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait
+  Theophrastus, caelum, solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare
+  censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum
+  axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae,
+  si stante terra caelum moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo
+  dicere quidam arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure?
+  loquere. Putas solem esse tantulum? Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos
+  ab illo irridemini et ipsi illum vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali
+  irrisione Socrates, liber Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat
+  posse. <a name="BkII_124"></a><a href="#BkIIN_124">124</a>. Sed redeo ad
+  animum et corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura
+  sit, quae venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an,
+  ut Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis
+  habeat, ut Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex
+  unusque sit? si simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut
+  Xenocrates, numerus nullo corpore&mdash;quod intellegi quale sit vix
+  potest&mdash;et, quidquid est, mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in
+  partem multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur,
+  nostro ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in
+  plerisque contrariarum rationum paria momenta.</p>
+
+  <p>XL. <a name="BkII_125"></a><a href="#BkIIN_125">125</a>. Sin agis
+  verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non adsentiar, sed
+  quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem potissimum?
+  quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis fui.
+  Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes esse,
+  cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur corporum
+  cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos ullas,
+  e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine aliqua
+  mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus hic
+  tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante post,
+  alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc simus
+  ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis isdem
+  esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus,
+  isdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid
+  animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus
+  irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus
+  adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire. <a
+  name="BkII_126"></a><a href="#BkIIN_126">126</a>. Non ergo id agitur, ut
+  aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam
+  postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne
+  probabilia quidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam
+  esse arbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne
+  exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud
+  scio an ita sit.</p>
+
+  <p>XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio?
+  an Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et
+  reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua
+  omnia regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis
+  auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione
+  sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri
+  serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem&mdash;ipse enim hic radiatus me
+  intueri videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui&mdash;vos ergo
+  huius magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis
+  architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum
+  sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior? <a name="BkII_127"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_127">127</a>. Neque tamen istas quaestiones physicorum
+  exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam
+  quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur, elatiores
+  fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque caelestia
+  haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum cum
+  maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero aliquid
+  occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus
+  voluptate. <a name="BkII_128"></a><a href="#BkIIN_128">128</a>. Quaeret
+  igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed vester, ut adsentiatur,
+  credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere opinari praeclareque agi
+  secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile quod sit invenerit.
+  Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum ante dicendum
+  est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde adfirmant,
+  earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur, amittere.
+  Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam, cum cornix
+  cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis adfirmabunt
+  signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem metiri non
+  possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam terram. Ex quo
+  illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non potest, qui
+  ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas res non
+  percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id
+  approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse
+  percipi quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera
+  percipi comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis
+  minusve comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio
+  comprehendendi.</p>
+
+  <p>XLII. <a name="BkII_129"></a><a href="#BkIIN_129">129</a>. Sed quod
+  coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis explorati? nempe fines
+  constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum summa referatur: qua de
+  re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio? Omitto illa, quae
+  relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum
+  bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo
+  dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis
+  disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo
+  nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici
+  philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a
+  quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod
+  esset unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A
+  Menedemo autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne
+  bonum in mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli
+  similia, sed, opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius. <a
+  name="BkII_130"></a><a href="#BkIIN_130">130</a>. Hos si contemnimus et
+  iam abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui
+  cum Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse
+  bonum nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in
+  mediis ea momenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum
+  bonum est in his rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae <span lang="el"
+  title="adiaphoria"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae <span
+  lang="el" title="apatheia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> nominatur. Has
+  igitur tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae diu
+  multumque defensa sunt. <a name="BkII_131"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_131">131</a>. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt: quorum
+  princeps Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post
+  Epicurus, cuius est disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de
+  ipsa voluptate consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse
+  Callipho censuit: vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate
+  Diodorus: ambo hi Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis,
+  quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut
+  indicant scripta Polemonis, quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles
+  eiusque amici nunc proxime videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam
+  Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse
+  frui rebus iis, quas primas natura conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere,
+  quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum,
+  qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit.</p>
+
+  <p>XLIII. <a name="BkII_132"></a><a href="#BkIIN_132">132</a>. Iam illud
+  perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos exposui, malorum finis
+  esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar: modo ne quis illud tam
+  ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo aliquem.' Nihil
+  potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos. Licetne&mdash;omitto
+  per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope singularem&mdash;per
+  ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca
+  mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in discrimine. Nam
+  aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae. Utrumque non
+  potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota possessione
+  contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni continetur, de
+  qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non potest igitur
+  uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed alter. Si
+  Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens&mdash;nam vos quidem
+  nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum&mdash;: sin vera sunt Zenonis,
+  eadem in veteres Academicos <i>et</i> Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur
+  neutri adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? <a
+  name="BkII_133"></a><a href="#BkIIN_133">133</a>. Quid? cum ipse
+  Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne
+  indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia
+  peccata esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat
+  tandem mihi considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue
+  aliquando quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in
+  utramque partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim
+  dicebas esse, Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito
+  assentiar: quod mihi tecum est dogma commune. <a name="BkII_134"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_134">134</a>. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno in una
+  virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit,
+  beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti,
+  homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse,
+  partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam
+  natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente.
+  Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis
+  et fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat,
+  si sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur,
+  et tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his
+  discrepant.</p>
+
+  <p>XLIV. <a name="BkII_135"></a><a href="#BkIIN_135">135</a>. Quid? illa,
+  in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare possumus? Sapientis animum
+  numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia efferri. Age, haec probabilia
+  sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere, numquam dolere? Sapiensne non
+  timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni
+  necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est in bonis, tibi vero,
+  Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona, praeter turpitudinem
+  multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens necesse est et
+  venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint <i>ab</i> Academia vetere
+  decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent?
+  Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant
+  esse quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu.
+  Est enim non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit,
+  ad verbum ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura
+  dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa,
+  misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis
+  quasi cotem esse dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus. <a
+  name="BkII_136"></a><a href="#BkIIN_136">136</a>. Atrocitas quidem ista
+  tua quo modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non
+  possum, non quo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia
+  Stoicorum, quae <span lang="el" title="paradoxa"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;</span>
+  nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit? hos enim
+  quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos reges,
+  solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis esse?
+  neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum
+  quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum liberum?
+  insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta
+  Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis
+  quidem aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? <a
+  name="BkII_137"></a><a href="#BkIIN_137">137</a>. Haec tibi, Luculle, si
+  es adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia:
+  mihi autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.</p>
+
+  <p>XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad
+  senatum in Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M.
+  Marcello coss. praetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit,
+  doctum sane hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem
+  dixisse Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia
+  sapiens non sum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico
+  non videris.' Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat,
+  non dubitavisset quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas
+  incoleret. Sed ille noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca
+  balbutiens. <a name="BkII_138"></a><a href="#BkIIN_138">138</a>. Vos
+  autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et
+  comprobem incognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur
+  saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de
+  finibus bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem
+  esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id
+  esse, si vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere,
+  sed in vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum
+  honestate coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima
+  naturae commoda adiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat
+  probabiliter posse defendi. <a name="BkII_139"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_139">139</a>. Sit sane ita&mdash;quamquam a Polemonis et
+  Peripateticorum et Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam
+  habeo adhuc probabilius&mdash;, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas
+  sensibus nostris blandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut
+  Aristippo. Revocat virtus vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos
+  motus esse dicit, hominem iungit deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam
+  Aristippus, quasi animum nullum habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno,
+  quasi corporis simus expertes, animum solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem
+  sequar, cuius quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut
+  eam probare etiam videretur. Quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se
+  intellegere potuisse quid Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim
+  sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu,
+  cum honestas in voluptate contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate
+  tamquam hominem cum belua copulabis?</p>
+
+  <p>XLVI. <a name="BkII_140"></a><a href="#BkIIN_140">140</a>. Unum igitur
+  par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum honestate. De quo Chrysippo
+  fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio. Alteram si sequare, multa
+  ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere, caritas, amicitia,
+  iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest, nisi erit
+  gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium impellitur,
+  ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis. Audi contra
+  illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant, nisi forte,
+  quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere: fontem omnium
+  bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc praescriptionem
+  esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in vita sequeretur
+  habiturum. <a name="BkII_141"></a><a href="#BkIIN_141">141</a>. Nihil
+  igitur me putatis, haec et alia innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam
+  moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum
+  interest, quod tu, cum es commotus, adquiescis, adsentiris, approbas,
+  verum illud certum, comprehensum, perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse
+  vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil
+  eius modi esse arbitror, cui si adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso,
+  quoniam vera a falsis nullo discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia
+  ista dialecticae nulla sint.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="BkII_142"></a><a href="#BkIIN_142">142</a>. Venio enim iam ad
+  tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium Protagorae est, qui putet id
+  cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter
+  permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii: aliud Epicuri, qui omne
+  iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in voluptate constituit.
+  Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam abductam ab
+  opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit. <a
+  name="BkII_143"></a><a href="#BkIIN_143">143</a>. Num quid horum probat
+  noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne maiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut
+  Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt de ratione loquendi multi et multum
+  probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo profecto nihil est acutius, nihil
+  politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.</p>
+
+  <p>XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut
+  cur cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in
+  elementis dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne
+  sit, si quid ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta
+  contentio est! Aliter Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet.
+  Quid? cum Cleanthe doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet!
+  quid? duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus,
+  opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis in rebus dissentiunt? <a
+  name="BkII_144"></a><a href="#BkIIN_144">144</a>. Quid me igitur,
+  Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut
+  seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud,
+  cum artificia tolli quereris a nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui
+  si undique omnes convenerint, facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam
+  primum illa invidiosa, quod eos omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules,
+  servos, insanos esse dicatis: deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad
+  multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos, qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos
+  Zeno, negat Antiochus scire quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim
+  defendimus etiam insipientem multa comprehendere. <a
+  name="BkII_145"></a><a href="#BkIIN_145">145</a>. At scire negatis
+  quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat.
+  Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat,
+  'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius
+  modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem
+  illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non
+  fuerat, <span lang="el" title="katal�psin"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  imposuit. Cum autem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte
+  vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem
+  nisi sapientem esse neminem. Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi
+  quidem solent dicere. Ita tu nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu,
+  Hortensi, in tua villa nos esse. <a name="BkII_146"></a><a
+  href="#BkIIN_146">146</a>. Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen
+  nimis eleganter: illa subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi
+  posset, artificia concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile
+  esset, satis magnam vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem
+  sine scientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut
+  Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos
+  docuisset aliquis quam vim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci:
+  ne nobis quidem suscenserent, cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod
+  nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem
+  maiorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui primum iurare 'ex sui animi
+  sententia' quemque voluerunt, deinde ita teneri 'si sciens falleret,'
+  quod inscientia multa versaretur in vita, tum, qui testimonium diceret,
+  ut 'arbitrari' se diceret etiam quod ipse vidisset, quaeque iurati
+  iudices cognovissent, ea non ut esse facta, sed ut 'videri'
+  pronuntiarentur.</p>
+
+  <p>XLVIII. <a name="BkII_147"></a><a href="#BkIIN_147">147</a>. Verum,
+  quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius ipse insusurrat
+  navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis multa dixi, est
+  mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius de
+  dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate naturae
+  deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus tanto
+  opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere necesse
+  sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque reliquorum
+  mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra se Stoici
+  texuerunt. <a name="BkII_148"></a><a href="#BkIIN_148">148</a>. Tum
+  Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec contulisse. Saepius enim
+  congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis nostris, si quae videbuntur,
+  requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus sentit? quid Hortensius? Tum
+  Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor sententiam, quam quidem ille
+  Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil putem posse, adsensurum autem
+  non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem existimem, sed ita, ut
+  intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod comprehendi et percipi
+  possit: qua re <span lang="el" title="epoch�n"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span> illam omnium rerum non
+  probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit,
+  vehementer adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum
+  aspernor. Sed tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens:
+  Tollendum. Teneo te, inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia.
+  Ita sermone confecto Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras
+  descendimus.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h2>NOTES.</h2>
+
+<h3>BOOK I.</h3>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_1">��1</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkI_14">14</a></b>. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae
+  (<a href="#BkI_1">1</a>). Cic., after adroitly reminding Varro that the
+  promised dedication of the <i>De Lingua Latina</i> is too long delayed,
+  turns the conversation towards philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves
+  this subject untouched (<a href="#BkI_2">2</a>, <a href="#BkI_3">3</a>).
+  Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful purpose, and
+  points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (<a
+  href="#BkI_4">4</a>&mdash;<a href="#BkI_6">6</a>). He greatly believes in
+  philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to Greece for it, while he
+  devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks have not treated (<a
+  href="#BkI_7">7</a>, <a href="#BkI_8">8</a>). Cic. lauds this devotion,
+  but demurs to the theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless.
+  Latins may surely imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and
+  orators. He gives reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and
+  instancing the success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy
+  (<a href="#BkI_9">9</a>&mdash;<a href="#BkI_12">12</a>). Varro putting
+  the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the Old Academy for
+  the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for the statement
+  that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro refers to
+  Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a proposal on
+  the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference between Antiochus
+  and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition of the principles of
+  Antiochus (<a href="#BkI_13">13</a>, <a
+  href="#BkI_14">14</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_1"></a><a href="#BkI_1">�1</a></b>. <i>Noster</i>:
+  our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus than of
+  Cic., see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxxvii">37</a>. <i>Nuntiatum</i>: the
+  spelling <i>nunciatum</i> is a mistake, cf. Corssen, <i>Ausspr.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> p. 51. <i>A M. Varrone</i>: <i>from M. Varro's
+  house</i> news came. <i>Audissemus</i>: Cic. uses the contracted forms of
+  such subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms
+  like <i>audiissemus</i>. <i>Confestim</i>: note how artfully Cic. uses
+  the dramatic form of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for
+  Varro. <i>Ab eius villa</i>: the prep is absent from the MSS., but
+  Wesenberg (<i>Em. M.T. Cic. Epistolarum</i>, p. 62) shows that it must be
+  inserted. Cic. writes <i>abesse Roma</i> (<i>Ad Fam.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 15, 4), <i>patria</i> (<i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 106) etc., but not <i>abesse officio</i> (<i>De
+  Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 43, where Wes. alters it) or the
+  like. <i>Satis eum longo intervallo</i>: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after
+  Davies, reads <i>se visentum</i> for <i>satis eum</i>, quoting <i>Ad
+  Att.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 4, Madv. <i>tum</i> for <i>eum</i>
+  (Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the
+  repetition of pronouns (<i>illum</i>, <i>eum</i>) is quite Ciceronian.
+  The emphatic <i>ille</i> is often repeated by the unemphatic <i>is</i>,
+  cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 71, and <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 22. I may note that the separation of <i>satis</i>
+  from <i>longo</i> by the word <i>eum</i> is quite in Cicero's style (see
+  my note on <a href="#BkIN_25">25</a> <i>quanta id magis</i>). Some
+  editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking <i>intervallo</i> of
+  distance in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly
+  press <i>satis</i>, which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently."
+  The words <i>satis longo intervallo</i> simply = "after a tolerably long
+  halt." For the clause <i>ut mos</i>, etc., cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 13.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_2"></a><a href="#BkI_2">�2</a></b>. <i>Hic pauca
+  primo</i>: for the omission of <i>locuti</i>, cf. the very similar
+  passages in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 14, <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 8, also my note on <a href="#BkIN_14">14</a>.
+  <i>Atque ea</i>: Halm brackets <i>ea</i>, quite needlessly, for its
+  insertion is like Cic. <i>Ecquid forte Roma novi</i>: <i>Roma</i> is the
+  ablative, and some verb like <i>attulisset</i> is omitted. (So Turnebus.)
+  To take it as nom., understanding <i>faciat</i>, is clearly wrong.
+  <i>Percontari</i>: the spelling <i>percunctari</i> rests on false
+  derivation (Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 36). <i>Ecquid ipse
+  novi</i>: cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 13. The MSS.
+  have <i>et si quid</i>, bad Latin altered by Manutius. <i>Istum</i>: some
+  edd. <i>ipsum</i>, but Cic. often makes a speaker use <i>iste</i> of a
+  person who is present. Goer. qu. <i>Brut.</i> 125, <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 228. <i>Velit</i>: Walker reads <i>velis</i> with
+  St Jerome. For <i>quod velit</i> = <i>quod quis velit</i>, cf. <i>De
+  Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 30. <i>In manibus</i>: so often, cf.
+  <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 38. <i>Idque</i>: MSS. have in the place of this
+  <i>quod</i> with variants <i>que</i>, <i>quae</i>, <i>qui</i>,
+  <i>quo</i>. Dav. gave <i>quia</i>, which was the vulgate reading down to
+  Halm, who reads <i>idque</i>, after Christ. <i>Ad hunc enim ipsum</i>:
+  MSS. have <i>eum</i> for <i>enim</i> (exc. Halm's G). Such a combination
+  of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for expressions like <i>me illum
+  ipsum</i> (<i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, 11) are not in
+  point. Of course if <i>quia</i> be read above, <i>eum</i> must be ejected
+  altogether. <i>Quaedam institui</i>: the <i>De Lingua Latina</i>; see
+  <i>Ad. Att</i> <span class="vol">XIII.</span> 12.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_3"></a><a href="#BkI_3">�3</a></b>. <i>E Libone</i>:
+  the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see C�sar <i>B. Civ.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 5, 16, 24. <i>Nihil enim eius modi</i> again all
+  MSS. except Halm's G. have <i>eum</i> for <i>enim</i>. Christ conj.
+  <i>enim eum</i>; so Baiter. <i>Illud ... requirere</i>: i.e. the question
+  which follows; cf. <i>requiris</i> in <a href="#BkI_4">4</a>. <i>Tecum
+  simul</i>: Halm's G om. <i>tecum</i>; but cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 330. <i>Mandare monumentis&mdash;letteris
+  illustrare</i>: common phrases in Cic., e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 1, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 1, <i>De
+  Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 4. <i>Monumentis</i>: this, and not
+  <i>monimentis</i> (Halm) or <i>monementis</i>, is probably the right
+  spelling; cf. Corss. <span class="vol">II.</span> 314. <i>Ortam a</i>:
+  Cic. <i>always</i> writes the prep. after <i>ortus</i>; cf. <i>M.D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">V.</span> 69. <i>Genus</i>: regularly used by Cic. as
+  <i>opus</i> by Quintilian to mean "department of literature." <i>Ea
+  res</i>: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter has <i>ars</i>; on the
+  other hand Bentley (if the <i>amicus</i> so often quoted in Davies' notes
+  be really he) reads <i>artibus</i> for <i>rebus</i> below. The slight
+  variation, however, from <i>res</i> to <i>artibus</i> is such as Cic.
+  loves. <i>Ceteris</i>: the spelling <i>caeteris</i> (Klotz) is absolutely
+  wrong, cf. Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 325. <i>Antecedat</i>: some
+  MSS. give <i>antecellat</i>. a frequent variant, cf. <i>De Off.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 105</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_4"></a><a href="#BkI_4">�4</a>.</b>
+  <i>Deliberatam&mdash;agitatam</i>: Cic. as usual exaggerates the
+  knowledge possessed by the <i>personae</i> of the dialogue; cf. Introd.
+  p. <a href="#Page_xxxviii">38</a>, <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 1. <i>In promptu</i>: so <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_10">10</a>. <i>Quod ista ipsa ...
+  cogitavi</i>: Goer., who half a page back had made merry over the gloss
+  hunters, here himself scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo
+  expels the words. Yet they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf. <i>De Div.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 38), and moreover
+  nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and clauses in
+  slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense desire to
+  flatter Varro. <i>Si qui ... si essent</i>: the first <i>si</i> has
+  really no conditional force, <i>si qui</i> like <span lang="el"
+  title="eitines" >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span>
+  merely means "all who," for a strong instance see <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 9, 13, ed Nobbe, <i>si accusandi sunt, si qui
+  pertimuerunt</i>. <i>Ea nolui scribere</i>, etc.: very similar
+  expressions occur in the prologue to <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span>, which should be compared with this prologue
+  throughout.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_5"></a><a href="#BkI_5">�5</a>.</b> <i>Vides ...
+  didicisti</i>: MSS. have <i>vides autem eadem ipse didicisti enim</i>. My
+  reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ, has
+  <i>vides autem ipse&mdash;didicisti enim eadem&mdash;non posse</i>, etc.
+  <i>Similis</i>: Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write <i>i</i> and
+  <i>e</i> indiscriminately in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write
+  <i>i</i> everywhere, we shall thus, I believe, be far nearer Cicero's
+  real writing. Though I do not presume to say that his usage did not vary,
+  he must in the vast majority of instances have written <i>i</i>, see
+  Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 738&mdash;744. <i>Amafinii aut
+  Rabirii</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxvi">26</a>. <i>Definiunt ...
+  partiuntur</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIN_32">32</a>. <i>Interrogatione</i>:
+  Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g.
+  Bentl. <i>argumentatione</i>, Ernesti <i>ratione</i>. But the word as it
+  stands has exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure.
+  <i>Interrogatio</i> is merely the <i>conclusio</i> or syllogism put as a
+  series of questions. Cf. <i>Paradoxa</i> 2, with <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 42 which will show that <i>interrogatiuncula</i>
+  and <i>conclusiuncula</i> are almost convertible terms. See also
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 39. <i>Nec dicendi nec
+  disserendi</i>: Cic.'s constant mode of denoting the Greek <span
+  lang="el" title="rh�torik�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>
+  and <span lang="el" title="dialektik�"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>;
+  note on <a href="#BkIN_32">32</a>. <i>Et oratorum etiam</i>: Man., Lamb.
+  om. <i>etiam</i>, needlessly. In <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IX.</span> 25, 3, the two words even occur without any other
+  word to separate them. For <i>oratorum</i> Pearce conj. <i>rhetorum</i>.
+  <i>Rhetor</i>, however is not thus used in Cic.'s phil. works.
+  <i>Utramque vim virtutem</i>: strange that Baiter (esp. after Halm's
+  note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj. <i>unam</i> for
+  <i>virtutem</i>. Any power or faculty (vis, <span lang="el"
+  title="dynamis"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>) may be called
+  in Gk. <span lang="el" title="aret�"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;</span>, in Lat <i>virtus</i>. Two
+  passages, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 72, <i>De Or.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 65, will remove all suspicion from the
+  text. <i>Verbis quoque novis</i>: MSS. have <i>quanquam</i> which however
+  is impossible in such a place in Cic. (cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 68). <i>Ne a nobis quidem</i>: so all the MSS., but
+  Orelli (after Ernesti) thinking the phrase "<i>arrogantius dictum</i>"
+  places <i>quidem</i> after <i>accipient</i>. The text is quite right,
+  <i>ne quidem</i>, as Halm remarks, implies no more than the Germ. <i>auch
+  nicht</i>, cf. also Gk. <span lang="el" title="oude"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;</span>. <i>Suscipiatur labor</i>: MSS. om.
+  the noun, but it is added by a later hand in G.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_6"></a><a href="#BkI_6">�6</a>.</b> <i>Epicurum, id
+  est si Democritum</i>: for the charge see <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 17, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 13, <i>N.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 73. <i>Id est</i> often introduces in Cic. a
+  clause which intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause,
+  exx. in <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 33. <i>Cum causas rerum
+  efficientium sustuleris</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  18, the same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists,
+  <i>Met.</i> A, 2. Many editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read
+  <i>efficientis</i>, which would then govern <i>rerum</i> (cf. <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">V.</span> 81, <i>De Fato</i>, 33, also Gk. <span
+  lang="el" title="poi�tikos"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>).
+  But the genitive is merely one of definition, the <i>causae</i> are the
+  <i>res efficientes</i>, for which cf. <a href="#BkI_24">24</a> and
+  <i>Topica</i>, 58, <i>proximus locus est rerum efficientium, quae causae
+  appellantur</i>. So Faber, though less fully. <i>Appellat</i>: i.e.
+  Amafinius, who first so translated <span lang="el" title="atomos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>. <i>Quae cum
+  contineantur</i>: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it must
+  be kept, and <i>adhibenda etiam</i> begins the <i>apodosis</i>. Madvig
+  (<i>Emendationes ad Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos</i>, Hauniae, 1825, p.
+  108) tacitly reads <i>continentur</i> without <i>cum</i>, so Orelli and
+  Klotz. Goer. absurdly tries to prop up the subj. without <i>cum</i>.
+  <i>Quam quibusnam</i>: Durand's em. for <i>quoniam quibusnam</i> of the
+  MSS., given by Halm and also Baiter. Madv. (<i>Em.</i> p. 108) made a
+  forced defence of <i>quoniam</i>, as marking a rapid transition from one
+  subject to another (here from physics to ethics) like the Gk. <span
+  lang="el" title="epei" >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;</span>, only one
+  parallel instance, however, was adduced (<i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 14) and the usage probably is not Latin.
+  <i>Adducere?</i>: The note of interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole
+  sentence, so far, explains the difficulty of setting forth the true
+  system of physics. If <i>quoniam</i> is read and no break made at
+  <i>adducere</i>, all after <i>quoniam</i> will refer to ethics, in that
+  case there will be a strange change of subject in passing from
+  <i>quisquam</i> to <i>haec ipsa</i>, both which expressions will be
+  nominatives to <i>poterit</i>, further, there will be the almost
+  impossible ellipse of <i>ars</i>, <i>scientia</i>, or something of the
+  kind after <i>haec ipsa</i>. On every ground the reading of Madv. is
+  insupportable. <i>Quid, haec ipsa</i>: I have added <i>quid</i> to fill
+  up the lacuna left by Halm, who supposes much more to have fallen out.
+  [The technical philosophical terms contained in this section will be
+  elucidated later. For the Epicurean ignorance of geometry see note on
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_123">123</a>] <i>Illi enim
+  simpliciter</i>: "frankly," cf. <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VIII.</span> 6, 1 <i>Pecudis et hominis</i>: note on <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_139">139</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_7"></a><a href="#BkI_7">�7</a>.</b> <i>Sive sequare
+  ... magnum est</i>: for the constr. cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_140">140</a>. <i>Magnum est</i>: cf. <i>quid est magnum</i>,
+  <a href="#BkI_6">6</a>. <i>Verum et simplex bonum</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkI_35">35</a>. <i>Quod bonum ... ne suspicari quidem</i> an
+  opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with
+  the Greek preserved by Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">X.</span> 6 (qu.
+  Zeller, 451), and less accurately by Athenaeus, <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 279 (qu. R. and P. 353). <i>Ne suspicari
+  quidem</i>: for this MSS. give <i>nec suspicari</i>, but Madv.
+  (<i>D.F.</i>, Excursus <span class="vol">III.</span>) has conclusively
+  shown that <i>nec</i> for <i>ne ... quidem</i> is post Augustan Latin.
+  Christ supposes some thing like <i>sentire</i> to have fallen out before
+  <i>nec suspicari</i>; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 20, 30, <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 46, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 111,
+  where the same opinion of Epicurus is dealt with, we have either <i>ne
+  suspicari quidem</i> or <i>ne intellegere quidem</i> (cf. also <i>In
+  Pisonem</i> 69). Further, <i>ne ... quidem</i> is esp frequent with
+  <i>suspicari</i> (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 20), and verbs
+  of the kind (<i>cogitari</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_82">82</a>), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end
+  of sentences eg <i>Verr.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, 155. Notice
+  <i>negat ... ne suspicari quidem</i> without <i>se</i>, which however
+  Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous passages produced from Cic. by
+  Madv. (<i>Em.</i> 111), in which not only <i>se</i>, but <i>me</i>,
+  <i>nos</i>, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the
+  infinitive, after verbs like <i>negat</i>. Cf. also the omission of
+  <i>sibi</i> in <i>Paradoxa</i> 40. <i>Si vero</i>: this, following
+  <i>sive enim</i> above, is a departure from Cic.'s rule which is to write
+  <i>sive&mdash;sive</i> or <i>si&mdash;sin</i>, but not
+  <i>si&mdash;sive</i> or <i>sive&mdash;si</i>. This and two or three other
+  similar passages in Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most
+  important and exhaustive excursus to his <i>D.F.</i> (p. 785, ed. 2), and
+  are connected with other instances of broken sequence. There is no need
+  therefore to read <i>sive</i> here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others.
+  <i>Quam nos ... probamus</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a href="#Page_lxii">62</a>.
+  <i>Erit explicanda</i>: for the separation of these words by other words
+  interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see <a
+  href="#BkI_11">11</a>, <a href="#BkI_17">17</a>. I am surprised that Halm
+  and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical objection to the
+  phrase <i>explicare Academiam</i>, and read <i>erunt</i> against the
+  MSS., making <i>illa</i> plural. If <i>erunt</i> is read, <i>erit</i>
+  must be supplied from it to go with <i>disserendum</i>, which is harsh.
+  <i>Quam argute, quam obscure</i>: at first sight an oxymoron, but
+  <i>argute</i> need not only imply <i>clearness</i>, it means merely
+  "acutely". <i>Quantum possum</i>: some MSS. have <i>quantam</i>, which is
+  scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only follows <i>nequeo</i>,
+  <i>volo</i>, <i>malo</i>, <i>possum</i>, and such verbs when an
+  infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For <i>velle</i> see a
+  good instance in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 68, where
+  consult Madv. <i>Constantiam</i>: the notions of firmness, consistency,
+  and clearness of mind are bound up in this word, cf. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_53">53</a>. <i>Apud Platonem</i>:
+  <i>Timaeus</i>, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by Cic., cf. <i>De
+  Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 58, <i>Laelius</i> 20, 47,
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 64.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_8"></a><a href="#BkI_8">�8</a>.</b> <i>Id est ...
+  jubeo</i>: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss. But Cicero
+  is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight variations
+  in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of slightly varied
+  phrases connected by <i>id est</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 72, <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 90. I therefore
+  hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words. <i>Ea a</i>:
+  Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read
+  <i>e</i> for <i>a</i>, which Halm would also prefer. <i>De</i>,
+  <i>ab</i>, and <i>ex</i> follow <i>haurire</i> indifferently in Cic.
+  <i>Rivulos consectentur</i>: so Wordsworth, "to hunt the waterfalls". The
+  metaphor involved in <i>fontibus&mdash;rivulos</i> is often applied by
+  Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus in
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 120. <i>Nihil enim magno
+  opere</i>: <i>magno opere</i> should be written in two words, not as
+  <i>magnopere</i>, cf. the phrases <i>maximo opere</i>, <i>nimio
+  opere</i>, the same holds good of <i>tanto opere</i>, <i>quanto
+  opere</i>. <i>L. Aelii</i>: MSS. <i>Laelii</i>. The person meant is L.
+  Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the master of Varro, and the earliest
+  systematic grammarian of Rome. See Quintil. <i>Inst. Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">X.</span> 1, 99, Gellius <span class="vol">X.</span> 21,
+  Sueton. <i>Gramm.</i> 3. <i>Occasum</i>: an unusual metaphor.
+  <i>Menippum</i>: a Cynic satirist, see <i>Dict. Biogr.</i> Considerable
+  fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and have often been
+  edited&mdash;most recently by Riese (published by Teubner). <i>Imitati
+  non interpretati</i>: Cic. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7,
+  gives his opinion as to the right use to be made of Greek models.
+  <i>&#x2020;Quae quo</i>: these words are evidently wrong. Halm after
+  Faber ejects <i>quae</i>, and is followed by Baiter. Varro is thus made
+  to say that he stated many things dialectically, <i>in order that</i> the
+  populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault lies in the word
+  <i>quo</i>, for which I should prefer to read <i>cum</i> (=<i>quom</i>,
+  which would be written <i>qu&#333;</i> in the MSS.) The general sense
+  would then be "Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature
+  which the unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the
+  learned read." <i>Laudationibus</i>: <span lang="el" title="logois epitaphiois"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">XIII.</span> 48 where Varro's are
+  mentioned. <i>&#x2020;Philosophe scribere</i>: the MSS. all give
+  <i>philosophie</i>. Klotz has <i>philosophiam</i>, which is demonstrably
+  wrong, <i>physica</i>, <i>musica</i> etc. <i>scribere</i> may be said,
+  but not <i>physicam</i>, <i>musicam</i> etc. <i>scribere</i>. The one
+  passage formerly quoted to justify the phrase <i>philosophiam
+  scribere</i> is now altered in the best texts (<i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads
+  <i>philosophiae scribere</i>; his explanation is, as Orelli gently says,
+  "vix Latina." I can scarcely think Halm's <i>philosophe</i> to be right,
+  the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic. almost condemns it by his use of
+  the Greek <span lang="el" title="philosoph�s"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (<i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">XIII.</span> 20). In older Greek the
+  adverb does not appear, nor is <span lang="el" title="philosophos"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  used as an adjective much, yet Cic. uses <i>philosophus</i> adjectivally
+  in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 121, <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 22,
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 23, just as he uses
+  <i>tyrannus</i> (<i>De Rep.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 45), and
+  <i>anapaestus</i> (<i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 57) Might we
+  not read <i>philosophis</i>, in the dative, which only requires the
+  alteration of a single letter from the MSS. reading? The meaning would
+  then be "to write <i>for</i> philosophers," which would agree with my
+  emendation <i>cum</i> for <i>quo</i> above. <i>Philosophice</i> would be
+  a tempting alteration, but that the word <span lang="el"
+  title="philosophikos"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  is not Greek, nor do <i>philosophicus</i>, <i>philosophice</i> occur till
+  very late Latin times. <i>Si modo id consecuti sumus</i>: cf.
+  <i>Brut.</i> 316.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_9"></a><a href="#BkI_9">�9</a>.</b> <i>Sunt ista</i>:
+  = <span lang="el" title="esti tauta" >&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>, so often, e.g. <i>Lael.</i>
+  6. Some edd. have <i>sint</i>, which is unlikely to be right. <i>Nos in
+  nostra</i>: Augustine (<i>De Civ. Dei</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span> 2)
+  quotes this with the reading <i>reduxerunt</i> for <i>deduxerunt</i>,
+  which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with approval Durand's
+  remark, "<i>deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus
+  humanitatis</i>." The words, however, are almost convertible; see <i>Cat.
+  Mai.</i> 63. In <i>Lael.</i> 12, <i>Brut.</i> 86, we have
+  <i>reducere</i>, where Durand's rule requires <i>deducere</i>, on the
+  other hand cf. <i>Ad Herennium</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 64,
+  <i>hospites domum deducere. Aetatem patriae</i> etc., August. (<i>De Civ.
+  Dei</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span> 3) describes Varro's "<i>Libri
+  Antiquitatum</i>" (referred to in <a href="#BkI_8">8</a>), in which most
+  of the subjects here mentioned were treated of. <i>Descriptiones
+  temporum</i>: lists of dates, so <span lang="el" title="chronoi"
+  >&#x3C7;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span> is technically used
+  for dates, Thuc. <span class="vol">V.</span> 20, etc. <i>Tu
+  sacerdotum</i>: after this Lamb. inserts <i>munera</i> to keep the
+  balance of the clauses. Cic. however is quite as fond of variety as of
+  formal accuracy. <i>Domesticam&mdash;bellicam</i>: opposed like <i>domi
+  bellique</i>, cf. <i>Brut.</i> 49, <i>De Off.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 74. Augustine's reading <i>publicam</i> shows him
+  to have been quoting from memory. <i>Sedem</i>: so the best MSS. of Aug.,
+  some edd. here give <i>sedium</i>. The argument for <i>sedem</i> is the
+  awkwardness of making the three genitives, <i>sedium</i>,
+  <i>regionum</i>, <i>locorum</i>, dependent on the accusatives,
+  <i>nomina</i>, <i>genera</i>, <i>officia</i>, <i>causas</i>. Cic. is fond
+  of using <i>sedes</i>, <i>locus</i>, <i>regio</i> together, see <i>Pro
+  Murena</i>, 85, <i>Pro Cluentio</i>, 171, quoted by Goer. <i>Omnium
+  divinarum humanarumque rerum</i>: from the frequent references of Aug. it
+  appears that the "<i>Libri Antiquitatum</i>" were divided into two parts,
+  one treating of <i>res humanae</i>, the other of <i>res divinae</i>
+  (<i>De Civ. Dei</i>, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 1, 27, <span
+  class="vol">VI.</span> 3). <i>Et litteris luminis</i>: for
+  <i>luminis</i>, cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 5. <i>Et
+  verbis</i>: Manut. reads <i>rebus</i> from <a href="#BkI_26">26</a>.
+  Varro's researches into the Latin tongue are meant. <i>Multis locis
+  incohasti</i>: Varro's book "<i>De Philosophia</i>" had apparently not
+  yet been written.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_10"></a><a href="#BkI_10">�10</a>.</b> <i>Causa</i>:
+  = <span lang="el" title="prophasis"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  <i>Probabilem</i>: = specious. <i>Nesciunt</i>: Halm with his one MS. G,
+  which is the work of a clever emendator, gives <i>nescient</i> to suit
+  <i>malent</i> above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not necessary to
+  force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which Halm
+  himself allows to be broken in two similar passages, <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_20">20</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_105">105</a>. <i>Sed da mihi nunc, satisne probas?</i>: So
+  all MSS. except G, which has the evident conj. <i>sed ea (eam) mihi non
+  sane probas</i>. This last Baiter gives, while Halm after Durand reads
+  <i>sed eam mihi non satis probas</i>, which is too far from the MSS. to
+  please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable, though <i>da
+  mihi</i> for <i>dic mihi</i> is certainly poetic. <i>Da te mihi</i>
+  (Manut., Goer., Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be
+  supported by <a href="#BkI_12">12</a>, <i>Brut.</i> 306, <i>Ad Fam.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 8, or such like passages. <i>Attius</i>: the
+  old spelling <i>Accius</i> is wrong. <i>Si qui ... imitati</i>: note the
+  collocation, and cf. <a href="#BkI_17">17</a>. Halm needlessly writes
+  <i>sint</i> for MSS. <i>sunt</i>. For this section throughout cf. the
+  prologues to <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>, <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> and <span class="vol">II.</span></p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_11"></a><a href="#BkI_11">�11</a>.</b>
+  <i>Procuratio</i>: for the proper meaning of <i>procurator</i> and
+  <i>procuratio</i> see Jordan on <i>Pro Caecina</i> 55. <i>Implacatum et
+  constrictum</i>: the conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual;
+  cf. <a href="#BkI_17">17</a> <i>plenam ac refertam</i>, <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_127">127</a> <i>exigua et
+  minima</i>, so <span lang="el" title="kai" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  in Greek. <i>Inclusa habebam</i>: cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 1. <i>Obsolescerent</i>, used of <i>individual</i>
+  memory, is noteworthy. <i>Percussus volnere</i>: many edd. give the
+  frequent variant <i>perculsus</i>. The <i>volnus</i>, which Goer. finds
+  so mysterious, is the death of Tullia, cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 9, <i>De Consolatione</i>, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe,
+  and Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxxii">32</a>. <i>Aut ... aut ... aut ...
+  aut</i>: This casting about for an excuse shows how low philosophy stood
+  in public estimation at Rome. See Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxix">29</a>.
+  The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the exordium of
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span></p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_12"></a><a href="#BkI_12">�12</a>.</b> <i>Brutus</i>:
+  the same praise often recurs in <i>D.F.</i> and the <i>Brutus Graecia
+  desideret</i> so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has <i>Graeca</i>. Halm
+  (and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger, <i>Graeca
+  desideres</i>. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's <i>Philologus</i>
+  <span class="vol">XXIV.</span> 483, approves the reading on the curious
+  ground that Brutus was not anxious to satisfy Greek requirements, but
+  rather to render it unnecessary for Romans to have recourse to Greece for
+  philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for Greece with Cicero is the
+  supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if she is satisfied the
+  philosophic world is tranquil. Cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 20, 6, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 8,
+  <i>Ad Qu. Fr.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 16, 5. I just note the em.
+  of Turnebus, <i>a Graecia desideres</i>, and that of Dav. <i>Graecia
+  desideretur</i>. <i>Eandem sententiam</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a
+  href="#Page_lvi">56</a>. <i>Aristum</i>: cf. <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  <a href="#BkII_11">11</a>, and <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  8.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_13"></a><a href="#BkI_13">�13</a>.</b> <i>Sine
+  te</i>: = <span lang="el" title="sou dicha" >&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;</span>. <i>Relictam</i>: Cic. very rarely
+  omits <i>esse</i>, see note on <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIIN_77">77</a>, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p.
+  <a href="#Page_xx">20</a>. <i>Veterem illam</i>: MSS. have <i>iam</i> for
+  <i>illam</i>. The position of <i>iam</i> would be strange, in the passage
+  which used to be compared, <i>Pro Cluentio</i> 16, Classen and Baiter now
+  om. the word. Further, <i>vetus</i> and <i>nova</i> can scarcely be so
+  barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The reading
+  <i>illam</i> is from Madv. (<i>Em.</i> 115), and is supported by <i>illam
+  veterem</i> (<a href="#BkI_18">18</a>), <i>illa antiqua</i> (<a
+  href="#BkI_22">22</a>), <i>istius veteris</i> (<i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 8), and similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and
+  Bait.) thinks <i>iam</i> comprises the last two syllables of
+  <i>Academiam</i>, which he reads. <i>Correcta et emendata</i>: a fine
+  sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words often occur
+  together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of expression,
+  cf. <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 30, <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 21, also Tac. <i>Hist.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 37. <i>Negat</i>: MSS. have <i>negaret</i>, but
+  Cic. never writes the subj. after <i>quamquam</i> in <i>oratio recta</i>,
+  as Tac. does, unless there is some conditional or potential force in the
+  sentence; see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 70. Nothing is
+  commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for the
+  pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and <i>vice versa</i>. <i>In
+  libris</i>: see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_11">11</a>.
+  <i>Duas Academias</i>: for the various modes of dividing the Academy
+  refer to R. and P. 404. <i>Contra ea Philonis</i>: MSS. have <i>contra
+  Philonis</i> merely, exc. Halm's <span class="vol">V.</span>, which gives
+  <i>Philonem</i>, as does the ed. Rom. (1471). I have added <i>ea</i>.
+  Orelli quotes <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">XII.</span> 23, 2, <i>ex
+  Apollodori</i>. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and <i>libros</i> may be
+  supplied from <i>libris</i> above, so in <i>Ad Att.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XIII.</span> 32, 2, <i>Dicaearchi</i> <span lang="el"
+  title="peri psych�s" >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C8;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span> <i>utrosque</i>, the word
+  <i>libros</i> has to be supplied from the preceding letter, cf. a similar
+  ellipse of <i>bona</i> in <a href="#BkI_19">19</a>, <a
+  href="#BkI_22">22</a>. Madvig's <i>Philonia</i> is improbable from its
+  non-appearance elsewhere, while the companion adjective <i>Antiochius</i>
+  is frequent. Halm inserts <i>sententiam</i>, a heroic remedy. To make
+  <i>contra</i> an adv. and construe <i>Philonis Antiochus</i> together,
+  supplying <i>auditor</i>, as is done by some unknown commentators who
+  probably only exist in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified
+  by <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 13.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_14"></a><a href="#BkI_14">�14</a>.</b> <i>A qua absum
+  iam diu</i>: MSS. have strangely <i>aqua absumtam diu</i>, changed by
+  Manut. <i>Renovari</i>: the vulg. <i>revocari</i> is a curious instance
+  of oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note
+  he gave <i>renovari</i>. Orelli&mdash;who speaks of Goerenz's
+  "<i>praestantissima recensio</i>," and founds his own text upon it two
+  years after Madvig's crushing exposure in his <i>Em.</i> often quoted by
+  me&mdash;not only reads <i>revocari</i>, but quotes <i>renovari</i> as an
+  em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536. From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no
+  independent value, took it. <i>Renovare</i> in Cic. often means "to
+  refresh the memory," e.g. <a href="#BkI_11">11</a>, <i>Brut.</i> 315.
+  <i>Nisi molestum est</i>: like <i>nisi alienum putas</i>, a variation on
+  the common <i>si placet, si videtur</i>. <i>Adsidamus</i>: some MSS. have
+  <i>adsideamus</i>, which would be wrong here. <i>Sane istud</i>: Halm
+  <i>istuc</i> from G. <i>Inquit</i>: for the late position of this word,
+  which is often caused by its affinity for <i>quoniam</i>, <i>quidem</i>,
+  etc., cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 20 <i>Quae cum
+  essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus (omnes)</i>: most edd. since
+  Gulielmus print this without <i>essent</i> as a hexameter, and suppose it
+  a quotation. But firstly, a verse so commonplace, if familiar, would
+  occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if not familiar, would not be given
+  without the name of its author. Secondly, most MSS. have <i>sint</i> or
+  <i>essent</i> before <i>dicta</i>. It is more probable therefore that
+  <i>omnes</i> was added from an involuntary desire to make up the
+  hexameter rhythm. Phrases like <i>quae cum essent dicta consedimus</i>
+  often occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf. <i>De Div.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 150, and Augustine, the imitator of Cic.,
+  <i>Contra Academicos</i>, <span class="vol">I.</span> 25, also
+  <i>consedimus</i> at the end of a clause in <i>Brut.</i> 24, and
+  <i>considitur</i> in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 18.
+  <i>Mihi vero</i>: the omission of <i>inquit</i>, which is strange to
+  Goer., is well illustrated in <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  9. There is an odd ellipse of <i>laudasti</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 81.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_15">��15</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkI_42">42</a>.</b> Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy.
+  First part of Varro's Exposition, <a href="#BkI_15">15</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkI_18">18</a>. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made ethics
+  supreme in philosophy (<a href="#BkI_15">15</a>). He had no fixed tenets,
+  his one doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of
+  ignorance. Moral exhortation was his task (<a href="#BkI_16">16</a>).
+  Plato added to and enriched the teaching of his master, from him sprang
+  two schools which abandoned the negative position of Socrates and adopted
+  definite tenets, yet remained in essential agreement with one
+  another&mdash;the Peripatetic and the Academic (<a href="#BkI_17">17</a>,
+  <a href="#BkI_18">18</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_15"></a><a href="#BkI_15">�15</a>.</b> <i>A rebus ...
+  involutis</i>: physical phenomena are often spoken of in these words by
+  Cic., cf. <a href="#BkI_19">19</a>, <i>Timaeus</i> c. 1, <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 64, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 18, <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 10, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 49.
+  Ursinus rejected <i>ab</i> here, but the insertion or omission of
+  <i>ab</i> after the passive verb depends on the degree to which
+  <i>natura</i> is personified, if <a href="#BkI_28">28</a> be compared
+  with <i>Tim.</i> c. 1, this will be clear. <i>Involutis</i> = veiled; cf.
+  <i>involucrum</i>. Cic. shows his feeling of the metaphor by adding
+  <i>quasi</i> in <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_26">26</a>,
+  and often. <i>Avocavisse philosophiam</i>: this, the Xenophontic view of
+  Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's time, cf. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_123">123</a>, <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 10, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 87, 88,
+  also Varro in Aug. <i>De Civ. Dei</i>, <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 3.
+  Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were curiously answered
+  in <i>De Rep.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug.
+  <i>De Civ. Dei</i>, <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 4). The same view is
+  supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the passages quoted by R. and P.
+  141. To form an opinion on this difficult question the student should
+  read Schleiermacher's <i>Essay on the Worth of Socrates as a
+  Philosopher</i> (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's <i>Socrates and the
+  Socratic Schools</i>, Eng. Trans., pp. 112&mdash;116 [I dissent from his
+  view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's <i>Handbook</i>, so far
+  as it relates to Socrates and Plato. <i>Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum
+  valere</i>: <i>valere</i> is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm,
+  its use in <a href="#BkI_21">21</a> makes it more probable than
+  <i>conferre</i>, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius vainly tries to
+  justify the MSS. reading by such passages as <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 39, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 70. The
+  strangest ellipse with <i>nihil ad</i> elsewhere in Cic. is in <i>De
+  Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 6.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_16"></a><a href="#BkI_16">�16</a>.</b> <i>Hic ...
+  illum</i>: for this repetition of pronouns see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 43. <i>Varie et copiose</i>: MSS. omit <i>et</i>,
+  but it may be doubted whether Cic. would let two <i>adverbs</i> stand
+  together without <i>et</i>, though three may (cf. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 63), and though with pairs of <i>nouns</i> and
+  <i>adjectives, et</i> often is left out, as in the passages quoted here
+  by Manut. <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 3, 3, <i>Ad
+  Fam.</i> <span class="vol">XIII.</span> 24, <span
+  class="vol">XIII.</span> 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg,
+  reprinted in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works
+  (1861), on <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 6. <i>Varie et
+  copiose</i> is also in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 240.
+  Cf. the omission of <i>que</i> in <a href="#BkI_23">23</a>, also <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_63">63</a>. <i>Perscripti</i>: Cic.
+  like Aristotle often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were
+  authentic reports of Socratic conversations, cf. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_74">74</a>. <i>Nihil adfirmet</i>:
+  so <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 99. "<i>Eoque praestare
+  ceteris</i>" this is evidently from Plato <i>Apol.</i> p. 21, as to the
+  proper understanding of which see note on <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIIN_74">74</a>. <i>Ab Apolline</i>, Plato <i>Apol.</i> 21 A,
+  <i>Omnium</i>: Dav. conj. <i>hominum</i> needlessly. <i>Dictum</i>:
+  Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads <i>iudicatum</i>, it is remarkable that
+  in four passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (<i>Cato Mai.</i>
+  78, <i>Lael.</i> 7, 9, 13) he uses the verb <i>iudicare</i>. <i>Una
+  omnis</i>: Lamb. <i>hominis</i>, Baiter also. <i>Omnis eius oratio
+  tamen</i>: <i>notwithstanding</i> his negative dialectic he gave positive
+  teaching in morals. <i>Tamen</i>: for MSS. <i>tam</i> or <i>tum</i> is
+  due to Gruter, Halm has <i>tantum</i>. <i>Tam</i>, <i>tum</i> and
+  <i>tamen</i> are often confused in MSS., e.g. <i>In Veri</i> (<i>Act</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span>) <span class="vol">I.</span> 3, 65, <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 55, 112, <span class="vol">V.</span> 78, where see
+  Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that <i>tum ... et</i>, <i>tum
+  ... que</i>, <i>et ... tum</i>, correspond in Cic. like <i>tum ...
+  cum</i>, <i>tum ... tum</i>. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled
+  by <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_1">1</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_43">43</a>. <i>Ad virtutis studium cohortandis</i>: this
+  broad assertion is distinctly untrue; see Zeller's <i>Socrates</i> 88,
+  with footnote.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_17"></a><a href="#BkI_17">�17</a>.</b> <i>Varius et
+  multiplex, et copiosus</i>: these characteristics are named to account
+  for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For
+  <i>multiplex</i> "many sided," cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 11. <i>Una et consentiens</i>: this is an opinion
+  of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">IV.</span> 5 <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  38, <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 67. Five ancient
+  philosophers are generally included in this supposed harmonious
+  Academico-Peripatetic school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus,
+  Xenocrates, Polemo (cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 2),
+  sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have been first
+  broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in Aug. <i>De
+  Civ. Dei</i> <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 1, cf. also <a
+  href="#BkI_34">34</a>. Antiochus doubtless rested his theory almost
+  entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">V.</span> 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus,
+  this appears, as also in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as
+  though ethics were the whole of philosophy (cf. also <i>De Off.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 20). Antiochus probably made light of such
+  dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about <span
+  lang="el" title="ideai" >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>,
+  which had long ceased. Krische <i>Uber Cicero's Akademika</i> p. 51, has
+  some good remarks. <i>Nominibus</i>: the same as <i>vocabulis</i> above.
+  Cic. does not observe Varro's distinction (<i>De L. L.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IX.</span> 1) which confines <i>nomen</i> to proper nouns,
+  <i>vocabulum</i> to common nouns, though he would not use
+  <i>vocabulum</i> as Tac. does, for the name of a person (<i>Annals</i>
+  <span class="vol">XII.</span> 66, etc.). <i>Quasi heredem ... duos
+  autem</i>: the conj. of Ciaconus "<i>ex asse heredem, secundos autem</i>"
+  is as acute as it is absurd. <i>Duos</i>: it is difficult to decide
+  whether this or <i>duo</i> is right in Cic., he can scarcely have been so
+  inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and Halm's ed.,
+  <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_11">11</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_13">13</a> with <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  6). The older inscr. in the <i>Corpus</i> vol. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> have <i>duo</i>, but only in <i>duoviros</i>, two
+  near the time of Cic. (<i>C.I.</i> vol. <span class="vol">I.</span> nos.
+  571 and 1007) give <i>duos</i>, which Cic. probably wrote. <i>Duo</i> is
+  in old Latin poets and Virgil. <i>Chalcedonium</i>: not
+  <i>Calchedonium</i> as Klotz, cf. Gk. <span lang="el"
+  title="Chalk�donion"
+  >&#x3A7;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Praestantissimos</i>: Halm wrongly, cf. <i>Brut.</i> 125.
+  <i>Stagiritem</i>: not <i>Stagiritam</i> as Lamb., for Cic., exc. in a
+  few nouns like <i>Persa</i>, <i>pirata</i>, etc., which came down from
+  antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in <span lang="el" title="-�s"
+  >-&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span> into Latin nouns in <i>-a</i>. See <i>M.D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 94. <i>Coetus ... soliti</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkI_10">10</a>. <i>Platonis ubertate</i>: cf. Quintilian's
+  "<i>illa Livii lactea ubertas</i>." <i>Plenum ac refertam</i>: n. on <a
+  href="#BkIN_11">11</a>. <i>Dubitationem</i>: Halm with one MS., G, gives
+  <i>dubitantem</i>, Baiter <i>dubitanter</i>, Why alter? <i>Ars quaedam
+  philosophiae</i>: before these words all Halm's MSS., exc G, insert
+  <i>disserendi</i>, probably from the line above, Lipsius keeps it and
+  ejects <i>philosophiae</i>, while Lamb., Day read <i>philosophia</i> in
+  the nom. Varro, however, would never say that philosophy became entirely
+  dialectical in the hands of the old Academics and Peripatetics.
+  <i>Ars</i> = <span lang="el" title="techn�"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>, a set of definite rules, so
+  Varro in Aug. (as above) speaks of the <i>certa dogmata</i> of this old
+  school as opposed to the incertitude of the New Academy.
+  <i>Descriptio</i>: so Halm here, but often <i>discriptio</i>. The
+  <i>Corp. Inscr.</i>, vol. <span class="vol">I.</span> nos. 198 and 200,
+  has thrice <i>discriptos</i> or <i>discriptum</i>, the other spelling
+  never.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_18"></a><a href="#BkI_18">�18</a>.</b> <i>Ut mihi
+  quidem videtur</i>: MSS. transpose <i>quidem</i> and <i>videtur</i>, as
+  in <a href="#BkI_44">44</a>. <i>Quidem</i>, however nearly always comes
+  closely after the pronoun, see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span>
+  43, cf. also <span class="vol">I.</span> 71, <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 28, <i>Opusc.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  406. <i>Expetendarum fugiendarumque</i>: <span lang="el" title="hairet�n kai pheukt�n"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>, about which
+  more in n. on <a href="#BkIN_36">36</a>. The Platonic and Aristotelian
+  ethics have indeed an external resemblance, but the ultimate bases of the
+  two are quite different. In rejecting the Idea of the Good, Aristotle did
+  away with what Plato would have considered most valuable in his system.
+  The ideal theory, however, was practically defunct in the time of
+  Antiochus, so that the similarity between the two schools seemed much
+  greater than it was. <i>Non sus Minervam</i>: a Greek proverb, cf.
+  Theocr. <i>Id.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 23, <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 233, <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span class="vol">IX.</span>
+  18, 3. Binder, in his German translation of the <i>Academica</i>, also
+  quotes Plutarch <i>Pr�c. Polit.</i> 7. <i>Inepte ... docet</i>: elliptic
+  for <i>inepte docet, quisquis docet</i>. <i>Nostra atque nostros</i>: few
+  of the editors have understood this. Atticus affects everything Athenian,
+  and speaks as though he were one of them; in Cic.'s letters to him the
+  words "<i>tui cives</i>," meaning the Athenians, often occur. <i>Quid me
+  putas</i>: i.e. <i>velle</i>. <i>Exhibiturum</i>: Halm inserts <i>me</i>
+  before this from his one MS. G, evidently emended here by its copyist.
+  For the omission of <i>me</i>, cf. note on <a href="#BkIN_7">7</a>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_19">��19</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkI_23">23</a>.</b> Part <span class="vol">II.</span> of Varro's
+  Exposition: Antiochus' <i>Ethics</i>. Summary. The threefold division of
+  philosophy into <span lang="el" title="�thik�, physik�, dialektik�"
+  >&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;,
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;,
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>.
+  Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the acquisition of natural
+  advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and external. The
+  bodily are described (<a href="#BkI_19">19</a>); then the mental, which
+  fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of
+  the acquired (<a href="#BkI_20">20</a>), then the external, which form
+  with the bodily advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (<a
+  href="#BkI_21">21</a>). The ethical standard is then succinctly stated,
+  in which virtue has chief part, and is capable in itself of producing
+  happiness, though not the greatest happiness possible, which requires the
+  possession of all three classes of advantages (<a href="#BkI_22">22</a>).
+  With this ethical standard, it is possible to give an intelligent account
+  of action and duty (<a href="#BkI_23">23</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_19"></a><a href="#BkI_19">�19</a>.</b> <i>Ratio
+  triplex</i>: Plato has not this division, either consciously or
+  unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's
+  time, so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. <i>De Civ. Dei</i>
+  <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 4, and by Diog. Laert. <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself
+  cannot be traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian
+  Peripatetics, to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp. <i>Adv. Math.</i>
+  <span class="vol">VII.</span> 16. It was probably first brought into
+  strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more sharply and
+  decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf. esp.
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 3. <i>Quid verum ... repugnans
+  iudicando</i>: MSS. exc. G have <i>et</i> before <i>quid falsum</i>,
+  whence Klotz conj. <i>sit</i> in order to obviate the awkwardness of
+  <i>repugnet</i> which MSS. have for <i>repugnans</i>. Krische wishes to
+  read <i>consequens</i> for <i>consentiens</i>, comparing <i>Orator</i>
+  115, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 68, <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 150, to which add <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 21 On the other hand cf. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_91">91</a>. Notice the double translations of the Greek
+  terms, <i>de vita et moribus</i> for <span lang="el" title="�thik�"
+  >&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>, etc. This is very
+  characteristic of Cic., as we shall see later. <i>Ac primum</i>: many
+  MSS. and edd. <i>primam</i>, cf. <a href="#BkI_23">23</a>, <a
+  href="#BkI_30">30</a>. <i>A natura petebant</i>: how Antiochus could have
+  found this in Plato and Aristotle is difficult to see; that he did so,
+  however, is indubitable; see <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  24&mdash;27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and Varro
+  in Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 3. The root of Plato's system is
+  the <span lang="el" title="idea" >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;</span> of
+  the Good, while so far is Aristotle from founding his system on the
+  abstract <span lang="el" title="physis"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>, that he scarcely appeals
+  even incidentally to <span lang="el" title="physis"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> in his ethical works. The
+  abstract conception of nature in relation to ethics is first strongly
+  apparent in Polemo, from whom it passed into Stoic hands and then into
+  those of Antiochus. <i>Adeptum esse omnia</i>: put rather differently in
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 24, 26, cf. also <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 33, 34, <i>Ac.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_131">131</a>. <i>Et animo et
+  corpore et vita</i>: this is the <span lang="el" title="trias"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span> or <span lang="el"
+  title="trilogia t�n agath�n"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  which belongs in this form to late Peripateticism (cf. <i>M.D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 43), the third division is a development
+  from the <span lang="el" title="bios teleios"
+  >&#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> of Aristotle.
+  The <span lang="el" title="trias"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span> in this distinct shape is
+  foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus, <i>Ethica</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 6, 4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro
+  seems to merge the two last divisions into one in Aug. <i>De Civ. Dei</i>
+  XIX 3. This agrees better with <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  34&mdash;36, cf. also Aug. <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 8. On the
+  Antiochean <i>finis</i> see more in note on <a href="#BkIN_22">22</a>.
+  <i>Corporis alia</i>: for ellipse of <i>bona</i>, see n. on <a
+  href="#BkIN_13">13</a>. <i>Ponebant esse</i>: n. on <a
+  href="#BkIN_36">36</a>. <i>In toto in partibus</i>: the same distinction
+  is in Stob. <i>Eth.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 7; cf. also
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 35. <i>Pulchritudinem</i>: Cic.
+  <i>Orator</i> 160, puts the spelling <i>pulcher</i> beyond a doubt; it
+  often appears in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only
+  <i>pulcrai</i>, <i>pulcrum</i>, etc., occur in inscr., exc.
+  <i>pulchre</i>, which is found once (<i>Corp. Inscr.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> no 1019). <i>Sepulchrum</i>, however, is frequent
+  at an early time. On the tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see
+  Boscher in Curtius' <i>Studien</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, p.
+  145. In the case of <i>pulcher</i> the false derivation from <span
+  lang="el" title="polychroos"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  may have aided the corruption. Similarly in modern times J.C. Scaliger
+  derived it from <span lang="el" title="poly cheir"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3C5; &#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;</span>
+  (Curtius' <i>Grundz</i> ed. 3, p. 8) For <i>valetudinem viris
+  pulchritudinem</i>, cf. the <span lang="el" title="hygieia ischys kallos"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C7;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> of Stob. <i>Eth</i>.
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 7, and <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 22. <i>Sensus integros</i> <span lang="el"
+  title="euaisth�sia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  in Stob., cf. also <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 36 (<i>in
+  sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus</i>). <i>Celeritatem</i>: so <span
+  lang="el" title="pod�keia"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3C9;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> in
+  Stob., <i>bene currere</i> in Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 3.
+  <i>Claritatem in voce</i>: cf. <i>De Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  133. <i>Impressionem</i>: al. <i>expressionem</i>. For the former cf.
+  <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 185, which will show the
+  meaning to be the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter <i>De
+  Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 41, which will disprove Klotz's
+  remark "<i>imprimit lingua voces, non exprimit</i>." See also <i>De
+  Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 133. One old ed. has
+  <i>pressionem</i>, which, though not itself Ciceronian, recalls <i>presse
+  loqui</i>, and <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 149. Pliny,
+  <i>Panegyric</i>, c. 64, has <i>expressit explanavitque verba</i>; he and
+  Quintilian often so use <i>exprimere</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_20"></a><a href="#BkI_20">�20</a>.</b>
+  <i>Ingeniis</i>: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 2, and <i>animis</i> below and in <i>N.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 58. <i>In naturam et mores</i>: for <i>in ea
+  quae natura et moribus fiunt</i>. A similar inaccuracy of expression is
+  found in <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_42">42</a>. The
+  division is practically Aristotle's, who severs <span lang="el"
+  title="aretai" >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> into
+  <span lang="el" title="diano�tikai"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  and <span lang="el" title="�thikai"
+  >&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> (<i>Nic. Eth.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> c. 13, <i>Magna Mor.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> c. 5). In <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  38 the <span lang="el" title="diano�tikai"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  are called <i>non voluntariae</i>, the <span lang="el" title="�thikai"
+  >&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> <i>voluntariae</i>.
+  <i>Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam</i>: cf. the <span lang="el"
+  title="eumatheia, mn�m�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;,
+  &#x3BC;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> of Arist. (who adds <span
+  lang="el" title="anchinoia sophia phron�sis"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3C7;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>), and the
+  <i>docilitas, memoria</i> of <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 36.
+  <i>Quasi consuetudinem</i>: the <i>quasi</i> marks a translation from the
+  Greek, as frequently, here probably of <span lang="el" title="ethismos"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B8;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> (<i>Nic.
+  Eth.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> c. 1). <i>Partim ratione
+  formabant</i>: the relation which reason bears to virtue is set forth in
+  <i>Nic. Eth.</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span> c. 2. <i>In quibus</i>:
+  i.e. <i>in moribus</i>. All the late schools held that ethics formed the
+  sole ultimate aim of philosophy. <i>Erat</i>: note the change from
+  <i>oratio obliqua</i> to <i>recta</i>, and cf. the opposite change in
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_40">40</a>.
+  <i>Progressio</i>: this, like the whole of the sentence in which it
+  stands, is intensely Stoic. For the Stoic <span lang="el" title="prokor�, prokoptein eis aret�n"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;,
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2; &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 64, 66, R. and P. 392,
+  sq., Zeller, <i>Stoics</i> 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said to be
+  Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised
+  Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. <i>Perfectio
+  naturae</i>: cf. esp. <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 25. More
+  Stoic still is the definition of virtue as the perfection of the
+  <i>reason</i>, cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_26">26</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 35,
+  <span class="vol">V.</span> 38, and Madvig's note on <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 88. Faber quotes Galen <i>De Decr. Hipp. et
+  Plat.</i> c. 5, <span lang="el" title="h� aret� teleiot�s esti t�s hekastou physeos"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7; &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>. <i>Una res optima</i>:
+  the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. <span
+  class="vol">XIX.</span> 3, cf. also <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 36, 38.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_21"></a><a href="#BkI_21">�21</a>.</b> <i>Virtutis
+  usum</i>: so the Stoics speak of their <span lang="el" title="adiaphora"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span> as the
+  practising ground for virtue (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span>
+  50), cf. <i>virtutis usum</i> in Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 1.
+  <i>Nam virtus</i>: most MSS. have <i>iam</i>, which is out of place here.
+  <i>Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam</i>: MSS. omit
+  <i>et</i> between <i>cernitur</i> and <i>in</i>, exc. Halm's G which has
+  <i>in</i> before <i>animi</i> and also before <i>corporis</i>. These last
+  insertions are not necessary, as may be seen from <i>Topica</i> 80,
+  <i>causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus negotiis cernitur
+  aut</i> in <i>omnibus aut</i> in <i>plerisque</i>, also <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 22. In Stob. <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 8, the
+  <span lang="el" title="telos" >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  of the Peripatetics is stated to be <span lang="el" title="to kat' aret�n z�n en tois peri s�ma kai tois ex�then agathois"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;'
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3B6;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2; &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2; &#x3B5;&#x3BE;&#x3C9;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>, here
+  <i>quibusdam quae</i> etc., denote the <span lang="el" title="ex�then"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BE;&#x3C9;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;</span> or <span lang="el"
+  title="ektos agatha" >&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;</span>, the third class in <a
+  href="#BkI_19">19</a>. <i>Hominem ... societate</i>: all this is strongly
+  Stoic, though also attributed to the Peripatetics by Stob. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 6, 7 (<span lang="el" title="koin� philanthr�pia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>),
+  etc., doubtless the humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the
+  <span lang="el" title="physei anthr�pos politikon z�on"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B6;&#x3C9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf.
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 66, <i>De Leg.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293&mdash;296. The
+  repetitions <i>hominem</i>, <i>humani</i>, <i>hominibus</i>,
+  <i>humana</i> are striking. For the last, Bentley (i.e. Davies' anonymous
+  friend) proposed <i>mundana</i> from <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 108, Varro, however, has <i>humana societas</i> in
+  Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 3. <i>Cetera autem</i>: what are these
+  <i>cetera?</i> They form portion of the <span lang="el" title="ektos agatha"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;</span>, and although not strictly
+  contained within the <i>summum bonum</i> are necessary to enrich it and
+  preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 6, 8, 13, <span lang="el" title="philia, philoi"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;,
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span> would belong to the
+  <i>quaedam</i> of Cicero, while <span lang="el" title="ploutos arch� eutychia eugeneia dynasteia"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  would be included in <i>cetera</i>. The same distinction is drawn in Aug.
+  <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 8. <i>Tuendum</i>: most MSS.
+  <i>tenendum</i>, but <i>tuendum</i> corresponds best with the division of
+  <span lang="el" title="agatha"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;</span> into <span lang="el"
+  title="poi�tika"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;</span> and
+  <span lang="el" title="phylaktika"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  Stob. <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 13. For the word <i>pertinere</i>
+  see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 54.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_22"></a><a href="#BkI_22">�22</a>.</b>
+  <i>Plerique</i>: Antiochus believes it also Academic. <i>Qui tum
+  appellarentur</i>: MSS. <i>dum</i>, the subj. is strange, and was felt to
+  be so by the writer of Halm's G, which has <i>appellantur</i>.
+  <i>Videbatur</i>: Goer. and Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that
+  it has the strong meaning of the Gr. <span lang="el" title="edokei"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;</span>, "it was their dogma,"
+  so often. <i>Adipisci</i>: cf. <i>adeptum esse</i>, <a
+  href="#BkI_19">19</a>. <i>Quae essent prima natura</i>: MSS. have <i>in
+  natura</i>. For the various modes of denoting the <span lang="el"
+  title="pr�ta kata physin" >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  in Latin see Madvig's <i>Fourth Excursus to the D.F.</i>, which the
+  student of Cic.'s philosophy ought to know by heart. The phrase <i>prima
+  natura</i> (abl.) could not stand alone, for <span lang="el" title="ta pr�ta t� physei"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;</span> is one of Goerenz's numerous
+  forgeries. The ablative is always conditioned by some verb, see Madv. A
+  comparison of this statement of the ethical <i>finis</i> with that in <a
+  href="#BkI_19">19</a> and the passages quoted in my note there, will show
+  that Cic. drew little distinction between the Stoic <span lang="el"
+  title="ta pr�ta kata physin" >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span> and the Peripatetic <span
+  lang="el" title="trilogia"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>. That
+  this is historically absurd Madvig shows in his <i>Excursus</i>, but he
+  does not sufficiently recognise the fact that Cicero has perfectly
+  correctly reported Antiochus. At all events, Varro's report (Aug. <i>De
+  Civ. Dei</i> <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 3) coincides with Cic.'s in
+  every particular. Even the <i>inexplicabilis perversitas</i> of which
+  Madv. complains (p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus, who, as will be seen
+  from Augustine <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 1, 3, included even
+  <i>virtus</i> among the <i>prima naturae</i>. A little reflection will
+  show that in no other way could Antiochus have maintained the practical
+  identity of the Stoic and Peripatetic views of the <i>finis</i>. I regret
+  that my space does not allow me to pursue this difficult subject farther.
+  For the Stoic <span lang="el" title="pr�ta kata physin"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span> see Zeller, chap <span
+  class="vol">XI.</span> <i>Ipsa per sese expetenda</i>: Gk. <span
+  lang="el" title="haireta"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>, which is
+  applied to all things contained within the <i>summum bonum</i>. As the
+  Stoic <i>finis</i> was <span lang="el" title="aret�"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;</span> only, that alone to them was
+  <span lang="el" title="haireton"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, their
+  <span lang="el" title="pr�ta kata physin"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span> were not <span lang="el"
+  title="haireta"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>, (cf.
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 21). Antiochus' <i>prima
+  naturae</i> were <span lang="el" title="haireta"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span> to him, cf.
+  Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 3, <i>prima illa naturae propter se
+  ipsa existimat expetenda</i> so Stob., <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 7,
+  demonstrates each branch of the <span lang="el" title="trilogia"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> to be
+  <span lang="el" title="kath' hauto haireton" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;'
+  &#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. <i>Aut
+  omnia aut maxima</i>: so frequently in Cic., e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 27, so Stob. <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 8,
+  <span lang="el" title="ta pleista kai kyri�tata" >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>.
+  <i>Ea sunt maxima</i>: so Stob., Varro in Aug. <i>passim</i>.
+  <i>Sensit</i>: much misunderstood by edd., here = <i>iudicavit</i> not
+  <i>animadvertit</i> cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 6.
+  <i>Reperiebatur</i>: for change of constr. cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 26 <i>Nec tamen beatissimam</i>: the question
+  whether <span lang="el" title="aret�"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;</span> was <span lang="el"
+  title="autarkes pros eudaimonian"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>
+  was one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As to
+  Antiochus, consult <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 67.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_23"></a><a href="#BkI_23">�23</a>.</b> <i>Agendi
+  aliquid</i>: Gk. <span lang="el" title="praxe�s"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span>, the usual
+  translation, cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_24">24</a>,
+  <a href="#BkII_37">37</a>. <i>Officii ipsius initium</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="tou kath�kontos arch�n" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>, Stob. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 6, 7. This sentence is covertly aimed at the New
+  Academics, whose scepticism, according to the dogmatists, cut away the
+  ground from action and duty, see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_24">24</a>. <i>Recti honestique</i>: these words are redolent
+  of the Stoa. <i>Earum rerum</i>: Halm thinks something like
+  <i>appetitio</i> has fallen out, <i>susceptio</i> however, above, is
+  quite enough for both clauses; a similar use of it is found in
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 32. <i>Descriptione
+  naturae</i>: Halm with one MS. (G) gives <i>praescriptione</i>, which is
+  in <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_140">140</a>, cf. also
+  <i>praescriberet</i> above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. <i>prima
+  constitutio naturae</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 15.
+  <i>Aequitas</i>: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of
+  <span lang="el" title="epieikeia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>.
+  <i>Eaeque</i>: so Halm for MSS. <i>haeque</i>, <i>haecque</i>. Of course
+  <i>haecque</i>, like <i>hicque</i>, <i>sicque</i>, would be
+  un-Ciceronian. <i>Voluptatibus</i>: a side blow at the Epicureans.
+  <i>Forma</i> see n. on <a href="#BkIN_33">33</a>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_24">��24</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkI_29">29</a>.</b> Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus'
+  <i>Physics</i>. Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which
+  are never actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate.
+  When force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed
+  entity (<span lang="el" title="poion ti"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3B9;</span> or
+  <i>quale</i>)&mdash;(<a href="#BkI_24">24</a>). These formed entities are
+  either <i>primary</i> or <i>secondary</i>. Air, fire, water, earth are
+  primary, the two first having an active, the two last a passive function.
+  Aristotle added a fifth (<a href="#BkI_26">26</a>). Underlying all formed
+  entities is the formless matter, matter and space are infinitely
+  subdivisible (<a href="#BkI_27">27</a>). Force or form acts on the
+  formless matter and so produces the ordered universe, outside which no
+  matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it eternal. This
+  Reason has various names&mdash;Soul of the Universe, Mind, Wisdom,
+  Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the same thing
+  (<a href="#BkI_28">28</a>, <a href="#BkI_29">29</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_24"></a><a href="#BkI_24">�24</a>.</b> <i>Natura</i>:
+  this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a translation both
+  of <span lang="el" title="physis"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> and <span lang="el"
+  title="ousia" >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>. Here it is
+  <span lang="el" title="ousia" >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  in the broadest sense, all that exists. <i>In res duas</i>: the
+  distinction between Force and Matter, the active and passive agencies in
+  the universe, is of course Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however
+  probably apprehended the distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this
+  read carefully Zeller, 135 sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of
+  Aristotle's doctrine is to be got from Schwegler, <i>Handbook</i>, pp
+  99&mdash;105. R. and P. 273 sq. should be consulted for the important
+  coincidence of Force with logical <i>genus</i> (<span lang="el"
+  title="eidos" >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>), and of Matter
+  (<span lang="el" title="hyl�" >&#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;</span>) with
+  logical <i>differentia</i> (<span lang="el" title="diaphora"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span>). For the
+  <i>duae res</i>, cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 18.
+  <i>Efficiens ... huic se praebens</i>: an attempt to translate <span
+  lang="el" title="to poioun" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;</span> and <span lang="el"
+  title="to paschon" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> of the
+  <i>Theaetetus</i>, <span lang="el" title="to othen" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;</span> and <span lang="el" title="to dechomenon"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> of
+  the <i>Timaeus</i> (50 D). Cic. in <i>Tim.</i> has <i>efficere</i> and
+  <i>pati</i>, Lucretius <span class="vol">I.</span> 440 <i>facere</i> and
+  <i>fungi</i>. <i>Ea quae</i>: so Gruter, Halm for MSS. <i>eaque.</i> The
+  meaning is this; passive matter when worked upon by an active generative
+  form results in an <i>aliquid</i>, a <span lang="el" title="tode ti"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3C4;&#x3B9;</span> as Aristotle calls
+  it. Passive matter <span lang="el" title="hyl�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;</span> is only potentially <span lang="el"
+  title="tode ti" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3C4;&#x3B9;</span>,
+  passing into actual <span lang="el" title="tode ti"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3C4;&#x3B9;</span>, when affected by the
+  form. (Cf. <span lang="el" title="tode, touto"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;,
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;</span>, Plato <i>Tim.</i> 49 E, 50 A,
+  also Arist. <i>Metaph</i> H, 1, R. and P. 270&mdash;274). A figurative
+  description of the process is given in <i>Timaeus</i>, 50 D. <i>In eo
+  quod efficeret ... materiam quandam</i>: Cic. is hampered by the
+  <i>patrii sermonis egestas</i>, which compels him to render simple Greek
+  terms by laboured periphrases. <i>Id quod efficit</i> is not distinct
+  from, but <i>equivalent</i> to <i>vis</i>, <i>id quod efficitur</i> to
+  <i>materia</i>. <i>Materiam quandam</i>: it is extraordinary how edd.
+  (esp Goer.) could have so stumbled over <i>quandam</i> and <i>quasi</i>
+  used in this fashion. Both words (which are joined below) simply mark the
+  unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its philosophical use, in the Greek
+  <span lang="el" title="hyl�" >&#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;</span> the
+  strangeness had had time to wear off. <i>In utroque</i>: for <i>in eo
+  quod ex utroque</i> (sc. <i>vi et materia</i>) <i>fit</i>, the meaning is
+  clearly given by the next clause, viz. that Force and Matter cannot
+  actually exist apart, but only in the compound of the two, the formed
+  entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the reff. given above.
+  <i>Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur</i>: the meaning of this
+  is clear, that nothing can <i>exist</i> except in space <i>(alicubi)</i>,
+  it is more difficult to see why it should be introduced here. Unless
+  <i>est</i> be taken of merely phenomenal existence (the only existence
+  the Stoics and Antiochus would allow), the sentence does not represent
+  the belief of Aristotle and Plato. The <span lang="el" title="ideai"
+  >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> for instance, though to Plato
+  in the highest sense existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle
+  explicitly says this, <i>Phys.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 4).
+  Aristotle also recognised much as existent which did not exist in space,
+  as in <i>Phys.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 5 (qu. R. and P. 289).
+  Cic. perhaps translates here from <i>Tim.</i> 52 B, <span lang="el"
+  title="phamen anankaion einai pou to hon hapan en tini top�"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3C9;</span>. For ancient theories about space the
+  student must be referred to the histories of philosophy. A fair summary
+  is given by Stob. <i>Phys.</i> <span lang="el" title="peri kenou kai topou kai ch�ras"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9; &#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C7;&#x3C9;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>, ch.
+  <span class="vol">XVIII.</span> 1. <i>Corpus et quasi qualitatem</i>:
+  note that <i>corpus</i> is <i>formed</i>, as contrasted with
+  <i>materia</i>, <i>unformed</i> matter. <i>Qualitas</i> is here wrongly
+  used for <i>quale</i>; it ought to be used of Force only, not of the
+  product of Force and Matter, cf. <a href="#BkI_28">28</a>. The Greeks
+  themselves sometimes confuse <span lang="el" title="poiot�s"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span> and <span
+  lang="el" title="poion" >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, the
+  confusion is aided by the ambiguity of the phrase <span lang="el"
+  title="to poion" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> in Greek, which may either
+  denote the <span lang="el" title="tode ti" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;</span> as <span lang="el" title="poion"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, or the Force which makes it
+  <span lang="el" title="poion"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, hence Arist. calls one of
+  his categories <span lang="el" title="to poion" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> and <span lang="el"
+  title="poiot�s" >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span>
+  indifferently For the Stoic view of <span lang="el" title="poiot�s"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span>, see Zeller,
+  96&mdash;103, with footnotes.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_25"></a><a href="#BkI_25">�25</a>.</b> <i>Bene
+  facis</i>: <i>passim</i> in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly
+  like this. <i>Rhetoricam</i>: H�lsemann conj. <i>ethicam</i>, which
+  however is <i>not</i> Latin. The words have no philosophical significance
+  here, but are simply specimens of words once foreign, now naturalised.
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words
+  make it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first
+  declension nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in
+  <i>en</i>. <i>Non est vulgi verbum</i>: it first appears in
+  <i>Theaet.</i> 182 A, where it is called <span lang="el" title="allokoton onoma"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>. <i>Nova ... facienda</i>: =
+  <i>imponenda</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 5. <i>Suis
+  utuntur</i>: so <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 4.
+  <i>Transferenda</i>: <i>transferre</i> = <span lang="el"
+  title="metapherein"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  which is technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on metaphor,
+  <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 153 sq., where
+  <i>necessitas</i> is assigned as one cause of it (159) just as here; cf.
+  also <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 149. <i>Saecula</i>: the
+  spelling <i>secula</i> is wrong; Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 325,
+  377. The diphthong bars the old derivations from <i>secare</i>, and
+  <i>sequi</i>. <i>Quanto id magis</i>: Cic. is exceedingly fond of
+  separating <i>tam quam ita tantus quantus</i>, etc., from the words with
+  which they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g.
+  <i>Lael.</i> 53 <i>quam id recte</i>, <i>Acad.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 125 <i>tam sit mirabilis</i>, <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 68 <i>tam in praecipitem</i>; also <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 5 <i>quanto id nobis magis est concedendum
+  qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_26"></a><a href="#BkI_26">�26</a>.</b> <i>Non modo
+  rerum sed verborum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkI_9">9</a>. <i>Igitur</i> picks
+  up the broken thread of the exposition; so <a href="#BkI_35">35</a>, and
+  frequently. <i>Principes ... ex his ortae</i>: the Greek terms are <span
+  lang="el" title="hapla" >&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;</span> and
+  <span lang="el" title="syntheta"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>, see Arist.
+  <i>De Coelo</i>, <span class="vol">I.</span> 2 (R. and P. 294). The
+  distinction puzzled Plutarch (quoted in R. and P. 382). It was both
+  Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics (Zeller, 187 sq.) followed partly
+  Heraclitus, and cast aside many refinements of Aristotle which will be
+  found in R. and P. 297. <i>Quasi multiformes</i>: evidently a trans. of
+  <span lang="el" title="polyeideis"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  which is opposed to <span lang="el" title="haplous"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;</span> in Plat.
+  <i>Phaedr.</i> 238 A, and often. Plato uses also <span lang="el"
+  title="monoeid�s"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span>
+  for <i>unius modi</i>; cf. Cic. <i>Tim.</i> ch. <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span>, a transl. of Plat. <i>Tim.</i> 35 A. <i>Prima
+  sunt</i>: <i>primae</i> (sc. <i>qualitates</i>) is the needless em. of
+  Walker, followed by Halm. <i>Formae</i> = <i>genera</i>, <span lang="el"
+  title="eid�" >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;</span>. The word is applied to
+  the four elements themselves, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 19;
+  cf. also <i>quintum genus</i> below, and <i>Topica</i>, 11&mdash;13. A
+  good view of the history of the doctrine of the four elements may be
+  gained from the section of Stob. <i>Phys.</i>, entitled <span lang="el"
+  title="peri arch�n kai stoichei�n kai tou pantos"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9; &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>. It will be there seen
+  that Cic. is wrong in making <i>initia</i> and <i>elementa</i> here and
+  in <a href="#BkI_39">39</a> (<span lang="el" title="archai"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> and <span lang="el"
+  title="stoicheia"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>)
+  convertible terms. The Greeks would call the four elements <span
+  lang="el" title="stoicheia"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> but
+  <i>not</i> <span lang="el" title="archai"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>, which term would be reserved
+  for the primary Matter and Force. <i>A�r et ignis</i>: this is Stoic but
+  <i>not</i> Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary
+  properties of matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two
+  former as active, the two latter as passive. He then assigns <i>two</i>
+  of these properties, <i>one</i> active and <i>one</i> passive, to each of
+  the four elements; each therefore is to him <i>both</i> active and
+  passive. The Stoics assign only <i>one</i> property to each element; heat
+  to fire, cold to air (cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 26),
+  moisture to water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows at
+  once. Cf. Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq.
+  <i>Accipiendi ... patiendi</i>: <span lang="el" title="dechesthai"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> often
+  comes in Plat. <i>Tim.</i> <i>Quintum genus</i>: the note on this,
+  referred to in Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xvi">16</a>, is postponed to <a
+  href="#BkIN_39">39</a>. <i>Dissimile ... quoddam</i>: so MSS.; one would
+  expect <i>quiddam</i>, which Orelli gives. <i>Rebatur</i>: an old
+  poetical word revived by Cic. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span>
+  153; cf. Quintil. <i>Inst. Or.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 3,
+  26.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_27"></a><a href="#BkI_27">�27</a>.</b> <i>Subiectam
+  ... materiam</i>: the <span lang="el" title="hypokeimen� hyl�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;</span> of Aristotle, from which our word
+  subject-matter is descended. <i>Sine ulla specie</i>: <i>species</i> here
+  = <i>forma</i> above, the <span lang="el" title="eidos"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> or <span lang="el"
+  title="morph�" >&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3C6;&#x3B7;</span> of Arist.
+  <i>Omnibus</i> without <i>rebus</i> is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes
+  avoided by the immediate succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in
+  <a href="#BkI_21">21</a> in <i>quibusdam</i>, <i>quae</i>.
+  <i>Expressa</i>: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf. <i>expressa effigies</i>
+  <i>De Off</i>. <span class="vol">III.</span> 69); <i>efficta</i>, moulded
+  as by a potter (see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_77">77</a>); the word was given by Turnebus for MSS.
+  <i>effecta</i>. So Matter is called an <span lang="el" title="ekmageion"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  in Plat. <i>Tim.</i> <i>Quae tota omnia</i>: these words have given rise
+  to needless doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them. <i>Tota</i> is
+  feminine sing.; cf. <i>materiam totam ipsam</i> in <a
+  href="#BkI_28">28</a>; "which matter throughout its whole extent can
+  suffer all changes." For the word <i>omnia</i> cf. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_118">118</a>, and Plat. <i>Tim.</i>
+  50 B (<span lang="el" title="dechetai gar �i ta panta"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3B7;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>), 51 A (<span lang="el"
+  title="eidos pandeches" >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span>). The
+  word <span lang="el" title="pandeches"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span> is also
+  quoted from Okellus in Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 20, 3. Binder is
+  certainly wrong in taking <i>tota</i> and <i>omnia</i> both as
+  neut.&mdash;"<i>alles und jedes</i>." Cic. knew the <i>Tim.</i> well and
+  imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments on the
+  passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between
+  Plato's <span lang="el" title="hyl�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;</span> and that of Aristotle. <i>Eoque
+  interire</i>: so MSS.; Halm after Dav. <i>eaque</i>. Faber was right in
+  supposing that Cic. has said loosely of the <i>materia</i> what he ought
+  to have said of the <i>qualia</i>. Of course the <span lang="el"
+  title="prote hyl�" >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;</span>, whether Platonic or Aristotelian,
+  is imperishable (cf. <i>Tim.</i> 52 A. <span lang="el" title="phthoran ou prosdechomenon"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BD; &#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>).
+  <i>Non in nihilum</i>: this is aimed at the Atomists, who maintained that
+  infinite subdivision logically led to the passing of things into nothing
+  and their reparation out of nothing again. See Lucr. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 215&mdash;264, and elsewhere. <i>Infinite
+  secari</i>: through the authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the
+  infinite subdivisibility of matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox
+  one that the Atom was scouted as a silly absurdity. Cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 20 <i>ne illud quidem physici credere esse
+  minimum</i>, Arist. <i>Physica</i>, <span class="vol">I.</span> 1 <span
+  lang="el" title="ouk estin elachiston megethos" >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BA;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C7;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>. The history of
+  ancient opinion on this subject is important, but does not lie close
+  enough to our author for comment. The student should at least learn
+  Plato's opinions from <i>Tim.</i> 35 A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates,
+  tripping over the old <span lang="el" title="antiphasis"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  of the One and the Many, denied <span lang="el" title="pan megethos diaireton einai kai meros echein"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span> (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus
+  followed Aristotle very closely (R. and P. 377, 378). <i>Intervallis
+  moveri</i>: this is the theory of motion without void which Lucr. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 370 sq. disproves, where see Munro. Cf. also Sext.
+  Emp. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 214. Aristotle
+  denied the existence of void either within or without the universe,
+  Strato allowed its possibility within, while denying its existence
+  without (Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 18, 1), the Stoics did the
+  exact opposite affirming its existence without, and denying it within the
+  universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). <i>Quae intervalla ...
+  possint</i>: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is no matter
+  atom. As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed
+  Aristotle, whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and
+  especially from M. Saint Hilaire's explanation of the <i>Physica</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_28"></a><a href="#BkI_28">�28</a>.</b> <i>Ultro
+  citroque</i>: this is the common reading, but I doubt its correctness.
+  MSS. have <i>ultro introque</i>, whence <i>ed. Rom.</i> (1471) has
+  <i>ultro in utroque</i>. I think that <i>in utroque</i>, simply, was the
+  reading, and that <i>ultro</i> is a dittographia from <i>utro</i>. The
+  meaning would be "since force plays this part in the compound,"
+  <i>utroque</i> being as in <a href="#BkI_24">24</a> for <i>eo quod ex
+  utroque fit</i>. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this
+  motion and is ever thus on the move." <i>Ultro citroque</i> is an odd
+  expression to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with
+  a <i>quasi</i>. Indeed if it is kept I suggest <i>quasi</i> for <i>cum
+  sic</i>. The use of <i>versetur</i> is also strange. <i>E quibus in omni
+  natura</i>: most edd. since Dav. (Halm included) eject <i>in</i>. It is
+  perfectly sound if <i>natura</i> be taken as <span lang="el"
+  title="ousia" >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> = existence
+  substance. The meaning is "out of which <i>qualia</i>, themselves
+  existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf. <i>totam
+  commutari</i> above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was
+  formed." For the <i>in</i> cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  35, <i>in omni natura necesse est absolvi aliquid</i>, also a similar use
+  <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 80, and <i>Ac.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_42">42</a>. If <i>in utroque</i> be
+  read above, <i>in omni natura</i> will form an exact contrast, substance
+  as a whole being opposed to the individual <i>quale</i>. <i>Cohaerente et
+  continuata</i>: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than
+  any other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 19, 84, 119, <i>De Div.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 33, <i>De Leg.</i> fragm. 1. (at the end of
+  Bait. and Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if
+  they be got at second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 22, 3. The <i>partes mundi</i> are spoken of in
+  most of the passages just quoted, also in <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic
+  sources. <i>Effectum esse mundum</i>: Halm adds <i>unum</i> from his
+  favourite MS. (G). <i>Natura sentiente</i>: a clumsy trans. of <span
+  lang="el" title="aisth�t� ousia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> = substance which can affect
+  the senses. The same expression is in <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 75. It should not be forgotten, however, that to
+  the Stoics the universe was itself sentient, cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 22, 47, 87. <i>Teneantur</i>: for
+  <i>contineantur</i>; cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 29 with
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 31 <i>In qua ratio perfecta insit</i>: this
+  is thorough going Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are
+  interchangeable terms with the Stoics. See Zeller 145&mdash;150 By an
+  inevitable inconsistency, while believing that Reason <i>is</i> the
+  Universe, they sometimes speak of it as being <i>in</i> the Universe, as
+  here (cf. Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 138, <i>N.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 34) In a curious passage (<i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same
+  inconsistency. For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life,
+  extends through all extent". <i>Sempiterna</i>: Aristotle held this: see
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_119">119</a> and <i>N.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 118, Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 21,
+  6. The Stoics while believing that our world would be destroyed by fire
+  (Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 141, R. and P. 378, Stob.
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 20, 1) regarded the destruction as merely an
+  absorption into the Universal World God, who will recreate the world out
+  of himself, since he is beyond the reach of harm (Diog. Laert. <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller 159) Some Stoics
+  however denied the <span lang="el" title="ekpyr�sis"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C0;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  <i>Nihil enim valentius</i>: this is an argument often urged, as in
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 31 (<i>quid potest esse mundo
+  valentius?</i>), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. <i>A quo intereat</i>:
+  <i>interire</i> here replaces the passive of <i>perdere</i> cf. <span
+  lang="el" title="anast�nai, ekpiptein hypo tinos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;,
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_29"></a><a href="#BkI_29">�29</a>.</b> <i>Quam vim
+  animum</i>: there is no need to read <i>animam</i>, as some edd. do. The
+  Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the
+  names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance,
+  Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. <span
+  class="vol">VI.</span> <i>passim</i>. Nearly all these names occur in
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> The whole of this section is
+  undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it
+  all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics.
+  <i>Sapientiam</i>: cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 36 with
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 23, in which latter passage the Stoic
+  opinion is severely criticised. <i>Deum</i>: Cic. in <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 30 remarks that Plato in his <i>Timaeus</i> had
+  already made the <i>mundus</i> a God. <i>Quasi prudentium quandam</i>:
+  the Greek <span lang="el" title="pronoia"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> is translated
+  both by <i>prudentia</i> and <i>providentia</i> in the same passage,
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 58, also in <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 77&mdash;80. <i>Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad
+  homines</i>: the World God is perfectly beneficent, see <i>Ac.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_120">120</a>, <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 23, <span class="vol">II.</span> 160 (where there
+  is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq. <i>Necessitatem</i>:
+  <span lang="el" title="anank�n"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>, which is <span
+  lang="el" title="eirmos aiti�n"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>, <i>causarum series
+  sempiterna</i> (<i>De Fato</i> 20, cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 55, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 125,
+  127, Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 149, and Zeller as before). This
+  is merely the World God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence of
+  cause upon cause. When the World God is called Fortune, all that is
+  expressed is human inability to see this orderly sequence. <span
+  lang="el" title="Tuch�" >&#x3A4;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span> therefore is
+  defined as <span lang="el" title="aitia ad�los anthr�pin�i logism�i"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;</span> (Stob.
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, 9, where the same definition is ascribed
+  to Anaxagoras&mdash;see also <i>Topica</i>, 58&mdash;66). This
+  identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and
+  excites his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward
+  by Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 5, 15.
+  <i>Nihil aliter possit</i>: on <i>posse</i> for <i>posse fieri</i> see
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 48, also <i>Ac.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_121">121</a>. For the sense of
+  Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), <span lang="el"
+  title="oude ti gignetai ergon epi chthoni sou dicha daimon"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3C4;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B3;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C7;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B9; &#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. <i>Inter quasi
+  fatalem</i>: a trans. of the Gk. <span lang="el" title="kat�nankasmenon"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  I see no reason for suspecting <i>inter</i>, as Halm does.
+  <i>Ignorationemque causarum</i>: the same words in <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 49; cf. also August. <i>Contra Academicos</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 1. In addition to studying the reff. given
+  above, the student might with advantage read Aristotle's <i>Physica</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> ch. 4&mdash;6, with M. Saint Hilaire's
+  explanation, for the views of Aristotle about <span lang="el"
+  title="tych�" >&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span> and <span lang="el"
+  title="to automaton" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  also ch. 8&mdash;9 for <span lang="el" title="anank�"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>. Plato's doctrine of
+  <span lang="el" title="anank�"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>, which is
+  diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics, is to be found in
+  <i>Timaeus</i> p. 47, 48, Grote's <i>Plato</i>, <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 249&mdash;59.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_30">��30</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkI_32">32</a>.</b> Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus'
+  <i>Ethics</i>. Summary. Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based
+  knowledge on the senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of
+  truth, but the mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true
+  (<a href="#BkI_30">30</a>). The senses they thought heavy and clogged and
+  unable to gain knowledge of such things as were either too small to come
+  into the domain of sense, or so changing and fleeting that no part of
+  their being remained constant or even the same, seeing that all parts
+  were in a continuous flux. Knowledge based <i>only</i> on sense was
+  therefore mere opinion (<a href="#BkI_31">31</a>). Real knowledge only
+  came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they <i>defined</i>
+  everything about which they argued, and also used verbal explanations,
+  from which they drew proofs. In these two processes consisted their
+  dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric (<a
+  href="#BkI_32">32</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_30"></a><a href="#BkI_30">�30</a>.</b> <i>Quae
+  erat</i>: the Platonic <span lang="el" title="�n" >&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  = was, as we said. <i>In ratione et disserendo</i>: an instance of
+  Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 22 <i>quaerendi ac disserendi</i>. <i>Quamquam
+  oriretur</i>: the sentence is inexact, it is <i>knowledge</i> which takes
+  its rise in the senses, not the criterion of truth, which is the mind
+  itself; cf. however <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIIN_30">30</a> and n. <i>Iudicium</i>: the constant translation
+  of <span lang="el" title="krit�rion"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  a word foreign to the older philosophy. <i>Mentem volebant rerum esse
+  iudicem</i>: Halm with his pet MS. writes <i>esse rerum</i>, thus giving
+  an almost perfect iambic, strongly stopped off before and after, so that
+  there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I venture to say that
+  no real parallel can be found to this in Cic., it stands in glaring
+  contradiction to his own rules about admitting metre in prose,
+  <i>Orator</i> 194 sq., <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 182
+  sq. <i>Solam censebant ... tale quale esset</i>: probably from Plato's
+  <i>Tim.</i> 35 A thus translated by Cic., <i>Tim.</i> c. 7 <i>ex ea
+  materia quae individua est et unius modi</i> (<span lang="el" title="aei kata tauta echous�s"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span> cf. 28 A. <span
+  lang="el" title="to kata tauta echon" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>) <i>et sui simile</i>, cf. also
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 58 <i>id solum esse quod semper
+  tale sit quale sit, quam</i> <span lang="el" title="idean"
+  >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span> <i>appellat ille, nos
+  speciem</i>, and <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_129">129</a>. <i>Illi</i> <span lang="el" title="idean"
+  >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>, etc.: there is more than one
+  difficulty here. The words <i>iam a Platone ita nom</i> seem to exclude
+  Plato from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may be an
+  oversight, but to say first that the school (<i>illi</i>, cf. <i>sic
+  tractabatur ab utrisque</i>) which included Aristotle held the doctrine
+  of <span lang="el" title="ideai"
+  >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>, and next, in <a
+  href="#BkI_33">33</a>, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears
+  very absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's
+  <span lang="el" title="ideai" >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  and Aristotle's <span lang="el" title="ta kathalou" >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;</span> would naturally
+  seem microscopic to Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in
+  his time as those of Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid
+  at Cicero's door, for Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with
+  Plato's must have been driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very
+  knowledge of Plato has, however, probably led him to intensify what
+  inconsistency there was in Antiochus, who would have glided over Plato's
+  opinions with a much more cautious step.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_31"></a><a href="#BkI_31">�31</a>.</b> <i>Sensus
+  omnis hebetes</i>: this stands in contradiction to the whole Antiochean
+  view as given in <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_12">12</a>&mdash;<a href="#BkII_64">64</a>, cf. esp. <a
+  href="#BkII_19">19</a> <i>sensibus quorum ita clara et certa iudicia
+  sunt</i>, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his agreement with Plato
+  by asserting that though sense is naturally dull, reason may sift out the
+  certain from the uncertain. <i>Res eas ... quae essent aut ita</i>: Halm
+  by following his pet MS. without regard to the meaning of Cic. has
+  greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He reads <i>res ullas
+  ... quod aut ita essent</i>; thus making Antiochus assert that <i>no</i>
+  true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall see in
+  the <i>Lucullus</i>, he really divided sensations into true and false. I
+  believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's
+  reminiscences of the <i>Theaetetus</i> and of Xenocrates; see below.
+  <i>Nec percipere</i>: for this see <i>Lucullus</i> passim. Christ's conj.
+  <i>percipi, quod perceptio sit mentis non sensuum</i>, which Halm seems
+  to approve, is a wanton corruption of the text, cf. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_101">101</a> <i>neget rem ullam
+  percipi posse sensibus</i>, so <a href="#BkII_21">21</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_119">119</a> (just like <i>ratione percipi</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_91">91</a>), also <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_41">41</a> <i>sensu comprehensum</i>. <i>Subiectae
+  sensibus</i>: cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_74">74</a>
+  and Sext. Emp. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 9, <span
+  lang="el" title="ta hypopiptonta t� aisth�sei" >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;</span>. <i>Aut
+  ita mobiles</i>, etc.: this strongly reminds one of the
+  <i>Theaetetus</i>, esp. 160 D sq. For <i>constans</i> cf. <span lang="el"
+  title="est�kos"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>, which so often
+  occurs there and in the <i>Sophistes</i>. <i>Ne idem</i>: Manut. for MSS.
+  <i>eidem</i>. In the <i>Theaetetus</i>, Heraclitus' theory of flux is
+  carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even
+  the word <span lang="el" title="eme" >&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;</span> is
+  stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent subject, whereas
+  the subject is changing from moment to moment; the expression therefore
+  ought to be <span lang="el" title="tous eme"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2; &#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;</span>.
+  <i>Continenter</i>: <span lang="el" title="ounech�s"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span>; cf. Simplicius
+  quoted in Grote's Plato, <span class="vol">I.</span> p. 37, about
+  Heraclitus, <span lang="el" title="en metabol� gar synechei ta onta"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B2;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1; &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>. <i>Laberentur et
+  fluerent</i>: cf. the phrases <span lang="el" title="rho�, panta rhei, hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;, &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;, &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>, etc., which
+  are scattered thickly over the <i>Theaet.</i> and the ancient texts about
+  Heraclitus; also a very similar passage in <i>Orator</i> 10.
+  <i>Opinabilem</i>: <span lang="el" title="doxast�n"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>, so
+  <i>opinabile</i> = <span lang="el" title="doxaston"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> in Cic.
+  <i>Tim</i> ch. <span class="vol">II.</span> The term was largely used by
+  Xenocrates (R. and P. 243&mdash;247), Arist. too distinguishes between
+  the <span lang="el" title="doxaston"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> and the
+  <span lang="el" title="epist�ton"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  e.g <i>Analyt. Post.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 33 (qu. R. and P.
+  264).</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_32"></a><a href="#BkI_32">�32</a>.</b> For this cf.
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 8&mdash;10. <i>Notionibus</i>:
+  so one MS. for <i>motionibus</i> which the rest have. <i>Notio</i> is
+  Cicero's regular translation for <span lang="el" title="ennoia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, which is Stoic. This
+  statement might have been made both by Aristotle and Plato, though each
+  would put a separate meaning on the word <i>notio</i>. <span lang="el"
+  title="Epist�m�"
+  >&#x395;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> in Plato
+  is of the <span lang="el" title="ideai"
+  >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> only, while in Aristotle it
+  is <span lang="el" title="ton katholou" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;</span>; cf. <i>Anal.
+  Post.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 33 (R. and P. 264), <span lang="el"
+  title="leg� noun arch�n epist�m�s" >&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3C9;
+  &#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BD; &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  <i>Definitiones rerum</i>: these must be carefully distinguished fiom
+  <i>definitiones nominum</i>, see the distinction drawn after Aristotle in
+  R. and P. 265, note b. The <i>definitio rei</i> really involves the whole
+  of philosophy with Plato and Aristotle (one might almost add, with
+  moderns too). Its importance to Plato may be seen from the
+  <i>Politicus</i> and <i>Sophistes</i>, to Aristotle from the passages
+  quoted in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes will make the subject as
+  clear as it can be made to any one who has not a knowledge of the whole
+  of Aristotle's philosophy. <i>Verborum explicatio</i>: this is quite a
+  different thing from those <i>definitiones nominum</i> just referred to;
+  it is <i>derivation</i>, which does not necessitate definition. <span
+  lang="el" title="etymologian"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>:
+  this is almost entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the Classic Greek
+  Prose, as are <span lang="el" title="etymos"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> and all its
+  derivatives. (<span lang="el" title="Etym�s"
+  >&#x395;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span> means "etymologically"
+  in the <i>De Mundo</i>, which however is not Aristotle's). The word <span
+  lang="el" title="etymologia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather <span
+  lang="el" title="onomat�n orthot�s"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span> (Diog. Laert.
+  <span class="vol">VII.</span> 83), the title of their books on the
+  subject preserved by Diog. is generally "<span lang="el" title="peri t�n etymologik�n"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>"
+  The systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when
+  it became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had
+  given the first impulse (<i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 63).
+  Specimens of Stoic etymology are given in <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> and ridiculed in <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> (cf. esp. 62 <i>in enodandis nominibus quod
+  miserandum sit laboratis</i>). <i>Post argumentis et quasi rerum notis
+  ducibus</i>: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove something
+  about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in <i>Topica</i>
+  10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation
+  <i>veriloquium</i> of <span lang="el" title="etymologia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  and adopts <i>notatio</i>, the <i>rerum nota</i> (Greek <span lang="el"
+  title="symbolon"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B2;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>) being
+  the name so explained (<i>Top.</i> 35). Varro translated <span lang="el"
+  title="etymologia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  by <i>originatio</i> (Quintil. <span class="vol">I.</span> 6, 28).
+  Aristotle had already laid down rules for this rhetorical use of
+  etymology, and Plato also incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be
+  said to belong to the old Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer
+  examination of authorities would have led Halm to retract his bad em.
+  <i>notationibus</i> for <i>notas ducibus</i>, the word <i>notatio</i> is
+  used for the whole science of etymology, and not for particular
+  derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 74) describes <i>verba</i> or <i>nomina</i> as
+  <i>rerum notae</i>. Berkley's <i>nodis</i> for <i>notis</i> has no
+  support, (<i>enodatio nominum</i> in <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 62 is quite different). One more remark, and I
+  conclude this wearisome note. The <i>quasi</i> marks <i>rerum nota</i> as
+  an unfamiliar trans. of <span lang="el" title="symbolon"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B2;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. Davies
+  therefore ought not to have placed it before <i>ducibus</i>, which word,
+  strong as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance
+  in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 27. <i>Itaque tradebatur</i>:
+  so Halm improves on Madvig's <i>ita</i> for <i>in qua</i> of the MSS.,
+  which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to <a href="#BkI_30">30</a>
+  <i>pars</i> for an antecedent to <i>qua</i> (<i>in ea parte in qua</i>)
+  is violent, while Goerenz's resort to <i>partem rerum opinabilem</i> is
+  simply silly. Manut. conj. <i>in quo</i>, Cic. does often use the neut.
+  pronoun, as in <i>Orator</i> 3, but not quite thus. I have sometimes
+  thought that Cic. wrote <i>haec, inquam</i> (cf. <i>huic</i> below).
+  <i>Dialecticae</i>: as <span lang="el" title="logik�"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span> had not been
+  Latinised, Cic. is obliged to use this word to denote <span lang="el"
+  title="logik�" >&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>, of
+  which <span lang="el" title="dialektik�"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>
+  is really one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, <span lang="el"
+  title="rh�torik�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>
+  which is mentioned in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69,
+  70. <i>Orationis ratione conclusae</i>: speech drawn up in a syllogistic
+  form which becomes <i>oratio perpetua</i> under the influence of <span
+  lang="el" title="rh�torik�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>.
+  <i>Quasi ex altera parte</i>: a trans. of Aristotle's <span lang="el"
+  title="antistrophos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  in the beginning of the <i>Rhetoric</i>. <i>Oratoria</i>: Halm brackets
+  this word; cf. however a close parallel in <i>Brut.</i> 261 <i>oratorio
+  ornamenta dicendi</i>. The construction is simply a variation of Cic.'s
+  favourite double genitive (<i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 39),
+  <i>oratoria</i> being put for <i>oratoris</i>. <i>Ad persuadendum</i>:
+  <span lang="el" title="to pithanon" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> is with Arist.
+  and all ancient authorities the one aim of <span lang="el"
+  title="rh�torik�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_33">��33</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkI_42">42</a>.</b> Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures
+  from the old Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the
+  <span lang="el" title="ideai" >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  of Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (<a
+  href="#BkI_33">33</a>). Strato abandoned ethics for physics, Speusippus,
+  Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to
+  which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (<a
+  href="#BkI_34">34</a>). Zeno maintained that nothing but virtue could
+  influence happiness, and would allow the name <i>good</i> to nothing else
+  (<a href="#BkI_35">35</a>). All other things he divided into three
+  classes, some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with
+  nature, and some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive
+  value, and called them <i>preferred</i> to the second a negative value
+  and called them <i>rejected</i>, to the third no value
+  whatever&mdash;mere verbal alterations on the old scheme (<a
+  href="#BkI_36">36</a>, <a href="#BkI_37">37</a>). Though the terms
+  <i>right action</i> and <i>sin</i> belong only to virtue and vice, he
+  thought there was an appropriate action (<i>officium</i>) and an
+  inappropriate, which concerned things <i>preferred</i> and things
+  <i>rejected</i> (<a href="#BkI_37">37</a>). He made <i>all</i> virtue
+  reside in the reason, and considered not the <i>practice</i> but the mere
+  <i>possession</i> of virtue to be the important thing, although the
+  possession could not but lead to the practice (<a href="#BkI_38">38</a>).
+  All emotion he regarded as unnatural and immoral (<a
+  href="#BkI_38">38</a>, <a href="#BkI_39">39</a>). In physics he discarded
+  the fifth element, and believed fire to be the universal substance, while
+  he would not allow the existence of anything incorporeal (<a
+  href="#BkI_39">39</a>). In dialectic he analysed sensation into two
+  parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding judgment of the mind, in
+  passing which the will was entirely free (<a href="#BkI_40">40</a>).
+  Sensations (<i>visa</i>) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the
+  examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a
+  sensation he called it <i>Knowledge</i>, if otherwise, <i>Ignorance</i>
+  (<a href="#BkI_41">41</a>). <i>Perception</i>, thus defined, he regarded
+  as morally neither right nor wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of
+  truth. Rashness in giving assent to phenomena, and all other defects in
+  the application to them of the reason he thought could not coexist with
+  virtue and perfect wisdom (<a href="#BkI_42">42</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_33"></a><a href="#BkI_33">�33</a>.</b> <i>Haec erat
+  illis forma</i>: so Madv. <i>Em.</i> 118 for MSS. <i>prima</i>, comparing
+  <i>formulam</i> in 17, also <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 19,
+  <span class="vol">V.</span> 9, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span>
+  38, to which add <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_23">23</a>. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the
+  MSS. reading and supply <i>pars</i>, as usual. His power of
+  <i>supplying</i> is unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the
+  difficulties involved in the MSS. readings in <a href="#BkI_6">6</a>, <a
+  href="#BkI_15">15</a>, <a href="#BkI_32">32</a> and here.
+  <i>Immutationes</i>: so Dav. for <i>disputationes</i>, approved by Madv.
+  <i>Em.</i> 119 who remarks that the phrase <i>disputationes
+  philosophiae</i> would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost certain
+  by <i>mutavit</i> in <a href="#BkI_40">40</a>, <i>commutatio</i> in <a
+  href="#BkI_42">42</a>, and <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 38.
+  Halm's odd em. <i>dissupationes</i>, so much admired by his reviewer in
+  Schneidewin's <i>Philologus</i>, needs support, which it certainly does
+  not receive from the one passage Halm quotes, <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 207. <i>Et recte</i>: for the <i>et</i> cf. <i>et
+  merito</i>, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. <i>Auctoritas</i>:
+  "system". <i>Inquit</i>: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the
+  omission of <i>igitur</i> after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to
+  begin here. To the objection that Varro (who in <a href="#BkI_8">8</a>
+  says <i>nihil enim meorum magno opere miror</i>) would not eulogise
+  himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. feebly replies that the eulogy is
+  meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is copying. <i>Aristoteles</i>: after
+  this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and evidently on his own conjecture,
+  inserts <i>igitur</i>, which H. adopts. Varro's resumption of his
+  exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter <span
+  class="vol">IX.</span> ought to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader
+  would not be much incommoded. <i>Labefactavit</i>, that Antiochus still
+  continued to include Aristotle in the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic
+  school can only be explained by the fact that he considered ethical
+  resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the strong statement of Varro
+  in Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 1 <i>nulla est causa philosophandi
+  nisi finis boni</i>. <i>Divinum</i>: see R. and P. 210 for a full
+  examination of the relation in which Plato's <span lang="el"
+  title="ideai" >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> stand to his
+  notion of the deity. <i>Suavis</i>: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu.
+  R. and P. 327. His real name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from
+  his style (cf. <i>loquendi nitor ille divinus</i>, Quint. <span
+  class="vol">X.</span> 1, 83). For <i>suavis</i> of style cf. <i>Orat.</i>
+  161, <i>Brut.</i> 120. <i>Negavit</i>: for his various offences see
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 12 sq., <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he
+  departed very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic
+  view of him transmitted through Antiochus. In <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_134">134</a> Cic. speaks very
+  differently of him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that
+  of Antiochus in <a href="#BkI_22">22</a> the difference is merely verbal.
+  <i>Beate vivere</i>: the only translation of <span lang="el"
+  title="eudaimonian"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  Cic. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 95 suggests <i>beatitas</i>
+  and <i>beatitudo</i> but does not elsewhere employ them.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_34"></a><a href="#BkI_34">�34</a>.</b> <i>Strato</i>:
+  see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_121">121</a>. The
+  statement in the text is not quite true for Diog. <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven
+  ethical works, while Stob. <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 4 quotes his
+  definition of the <span lang="el" title="agathon"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. <i>Diligenter ...
+  tuebantur</i>: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic,
+  cf. Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">IV.</span> 18, <i>Ac.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_131">131</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 34, and R. and P. <i>Congregati</i>: "<i>all</i>
+  in the Academic fold," cf. <i>Lael.</i> 69, <i>in nostro, ut ita dicam,
+  grege</i>. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. <i>Polemonem ... Zeno
+  et Arcesilas</i>: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many
+  teachers (Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 2, 3), while he is not
+  mentioned by Diog. at all among the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is
+  that we have a mere theory, which accounts for the split of Stoicism from
+  Academicism by the rivalry of two fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb.
+  <i>Praep. Ev.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 5, <span lang="el"
+  title="symphoit�ntes para Polem�ni ephilo tim�th�san"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3A0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  Dates are against the theory, see Zeller 500.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_35"></a><a href="#BkI_35">�35</a>.</b> <i>Anteiret
+  aetate</i>: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350, though the
+  dates are uncertain. <i>Dissereret</i>: was a deep reasoner. Bentl.
+  missing the meaning conj. <i>definiret</i>. <i>Peracute moveretur</i>:
+  Bentl. <i>partiretur</i>; this with <i>definiret</i> above well
+  illustrates his licence in emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted
+  the soundness of the text, the words refer not to the emotional, but to
+  the intellectual side of Zeno's nature. The very expression occurs <i>Ad
+  Fam.</i> <span class="vol">XV.</span> 21, 4, see other close parallels in
+  n. on <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_37">37</a>. <i>Nervos
+  ... inciderit</i>: same metaphor in <i>Philipp.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XII.</span> 8, cf. also <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 27 <i>nervos virtutis elidere</i>, <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 83 <i>stirpis aegritudinis elidere</i>. (In both
+  these passages Madv. <i>Em. Liv.</i> 135 reads <i>elegere</i> for
+  <i>elidere</i>, I cannot believe that he is right). Plato uses <span
+  lang="el" title="neura ektemnein" >&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  metaphorically. Notice <i>inciderit</i> but <i>poneret</i>. There is no
+  need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the sequence is not uncommon
+  in Cic., e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 33. <i>Omnia,
+  quae</i>: MSS. <i>quaeque</i>, which edd. used to take for
+  <i>quaecunque</i>. Cf. Goerenz's statement "<i>negari omnino nequit hac
+  vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri</i>" with Madvig's utter refutation in
+  the sixth Excursus to his <i>D.F.</i> <i>Solum et unum bonum</i>: for the
+  Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R. and P. and Zeller for
+  himself. I can only treat such points as are involved in the special
+  difficulties of the <i>Academica</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_36"></a><a href="#BkI_36">�36</a>.</b> <i>Cetera</i>:
+  Stoic <span lang="el" title="adiaphora"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span>, the
+  presence or absence of which cannot affect happiness. The Stoics loudly
+  protested against their being called either <i>bona</i> or <i>mala</i>,
+  and this question was one of the great battle grounds of the later Greek
+  philosophy. <i>Secundum naturam ... contraria</i>: Gr. <span lang="el"
+  title="kata physin, para physin" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;, &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>. <i>His ipsis ...
+  numerabat</i>: I see no reason for placing this sentence after the words
+  <i>quae minoris</i> below (with Christ) or for suspecting its genuineness
+  (with Halm). The word <i>media</i> is the Gk. <span lang="el"
+  title="mesa" >&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B1;</span>, which word however is
+  not usually applied to <i>things</i>, but to <i>actions</i>.
+  <i>Sumenda</i>: Gk. <span lang="el" title="l�pta"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>. <i>Aestimatione</i>: <span
+  lang="el" title="axia" >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, positive
+  value. <i>Contraque contraria</i>: Cic. here as in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 50 feels the need of a word to express <span
+  lang="el" title="apaxia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> (negative value).
+  (Madv. in his note on that passage coins the word <i>inaestimatio.</i>)
+  <i>Ponebat esse</i>: cf. <a href="#BkI_19">19</a>, <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 73.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_37"></a><a href="#BkI_37">�37</a>.</b> To cope
+  thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section the
+  student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller and
+  Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it
+  would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general
+  acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic.
+  appears at first sight to have made the <span lang="el"
+  title="apopro�gmena"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>
+  a subdivision of the <span lang="el" title="l�pta"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span> (<i>sumenda</i>), the two
+  being utterly different. I admit, with Madv. (<i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the
+  text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads
+  <i>media</i> in the place of <i>sumenda</i>, must be rejected. Nor can
+  anything be said for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in
+  order to save Cicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe
+  that Cic. could so utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best
+  known doctrines of Stoicism, as to think even for a moment that the <span
+  lang="el" title="apopro�gmena"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>
+  formed a branch of the <span lang="el" title="l�pta"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>. This view of Madvig's is
+  strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in <a href="#BkI_36">36</a> had
+  explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the <span
+  lang="el" title="adiaphora"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span>, nor is
+  there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the theory
+  any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the
+  intention to speak of the <i>sumenda</i> only and then rapidly extended
+  his thought so as to embrace the whole class of <span lang="el"
+  title="adiaphora"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span>, which
+  he accordingly dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in
+  the succeeding sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I
+  defer for the present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance
+  of Stoicism but with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 52, <i>quae secundum locum
+  obtinent</i>, <span lang="el" title="pro�gmena"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>
+  <i>id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita appellemus, vel promota et
+  remota</i>. If this language be closely pressed, the <span lang="el"
+  title="apopro�gmena"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>
+  are made of a subdivision of the <span lang="el" title="pro�gmena"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention.
+  So if his words in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 90 be pressed,
+  the <i>sumenda</i> are made to include both <i>producta</i> and
+  <i>reducta</i>, in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 16
+  <i>appeterent</i> includes <i>fugerent</i>, <i>ibid.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 86 the opposite of <i>beata vita</i> is abruptly
+  introduced. So <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 88 <i>frui
+  dolore</i> must be construed together, and <i>ibid.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 73 <i>pudor modestia pudicitia</i> are said
+  <i>coerceri</i>, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the
+  vices which are opposite to these virtues.</p>
+
+  <p>I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by
+  <i>ex iis</i> Cic. means <i>mediis</i>, and not <i>sumendis</i>, about
+  which he had intended to talk when he began the sentence; I believe that
+  <i>pluris aestimanda</i> and <i>minoris aestimanda</i> simply indicate
+  the <span lang="el" title="axia" >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> and
+  <span lang="el" title="apaxia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> of the Greek,
+  <i>not</i> different degrees of <span lang="el" title="axia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> (positive value). That <i>minor
+  aestimatio</i> should mean <span lang="el" title="apaxia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> need not surprise us
+  when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing
+  this <span lang="el" title="apaxia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> or negative value in
+  Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on <a href="#BkIN_36">36</a>;
+  (2) on the strong negative meaning which <i>minor</i> bears in Latin,
+  e.g. <i>sin minus</i> in Cic. means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall
+  victims to the task of expressing <span lang="el" title="apaxia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>. Stobaeus, in a
+  passage closely resembling ours makes <span lang="el" title="elatt�n axia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> equivalent to <span lang="el"
+  title="poll� apaxia" >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> (II. 6, 6), while Sext.
+  Emp. after rightly defining <span lang="el" title="apopro�gmena"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>
+  as <span lang="el" title="ta hikan�n apaxian echonta" >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span> (<i>Adv. Math.</i>
+  <span class="vol">XI.</span> 62&mdash;64) again speaks of them as <span
+  lang="el" title="ta m� hikan�n echonta axian" >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B7; &#x201B;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span> (<i>Pyrrhon. Hypot.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 191) words which usually have an opposite
+  meaning. Now I contend that Cicero's words <i>minoris aestimanda</i> bear
+  quite as strong a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, <span
+  lang="el" title="ta m� hikan�n axian echonta" >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B7; &#x201B;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>. I therefore conclude
+  that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed, to express
+  the Stoic doctrine that, of the <span lang="el" title="adiaphora"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span>, some
+  have <span lang="el" title="axia" >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  while others have <span lang="el" title="apaxia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>. He may fairly claim
+  to have applied to his words the rule "<i>re intellecta in verborum usu
+  faciles esse debemus</i>" (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 52).
+  There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of
+  misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. There are
+  difficulties connected with the terms <span lang="el" title="hikan� axia"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> and <span lang="el" title="hikan� apaxia"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> which are not
+  satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret
+  that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student
+  will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the
+  <i>D.F.</i> quoted in this note. <i>Non tam rebus quam vocabulis</i>:
+  Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen
+  the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never
+  properly belonged to the Stoics at all. <i>Inter recte factum atque
+  peccatum</i>: Stob. speaks <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 6 of <span
+  lang="el" title="ta metaxy aret�s kai kakias" >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>. (This does not
+  contradict his words a little earlier, <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 5,
+  <span lang="el" title="aret�s de kai kakias ouden metaxy"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3C5;</span>, which have regard to
+  divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however, <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see
+  R. and P. 393.) <i>Recte factum</i> = <span lang="el" title="katorth�ma"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B8;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  <i>peccatum</i> = <span lang="el" title="hamart�ma"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  <i>officium</i> = <span lang="el" title="kath�kon"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> (cf. R. and P.
+  388&mdash;394, Zeller 238&mdash;248, 268&mdash;272). <i>Servata
+  praetermissaque</i>: MSS. have <i>et</i> before <i>servata</i>, which all
+  edd. since Lamb. eject. Where <i>et</i> and <i>que</i> correspond in
+  Cic., the <i>que</i> is always an afterthought, added in oblivion of the
+  <i>et</i>. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this
+  oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate
+  <i>clauses</i> it is possible. Cf. <a href="#BkI_43">43</a> and
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 64.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_38"></a><a href="#BkI_38">�38</a>.</b> <i>Sed quasdam
+  virtutes</i>: see <a href="#BkI_20">20</a>. This passage requires careful
+  construing: after <i>quasdam virtutes</i> not the whole phrase <i>in
+  ratione esse dicerent</i> must be repeated but <i>dicerent</i> merely,
+  since only the <i>virtutes natura perfectae</i>, the <span lang="el"
+  title="diano�tikai aretai"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> of Arist., could be
+  said to belong to the reason, while the <i>virtutes more perfectae</i>
+  are Aristotle's <span lang="el" title="�thikai aretai"
+  >&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>. Trans. "but spoke of
+  certain excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be)
+  by habit." <i>Ea genera virtutum</i>: both Plato and Arist. roughly
+  divided the nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the
+  emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf.
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 47, and Arist. <span lang="el"
+  title="to men h�s logon echon, to de epipeithes log�i" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x201B;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;</span>); Zeno however asserted the
+  nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist solely of Reason,
+  to which he gave the name <span lang="el" title="h�gemonikon"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller
+  248, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> <i>passim</i>). When the
+  <span lang="el" title="h�gemonikon"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  was in a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there
+  was vice or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not
+  resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle,
+  but a civil war carried on in one and the same country. <i>Virtutis
+  usum</i>: cf. the description of Aristotle's <i>finis</i> in <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 19. <i>Ipsum habitum</i>: the mere
+  possession. So Plato, <i>Theaetet.</i> 197 B, uses the word <span
+  lang="el" title="hexis" >&#x201B;&#x3B5;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>, a
+  use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the
+  <i>Ethics</i> of Arist. In this sense virtue is <i>not</i> a <span
+  lang="el" title="hexis" >&#x201B;&#x3B5;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  according to the Stoics, but a <span lang="el" title="diathesis"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> (Stob.
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 5, Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span>
+  89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a <span lang="el"
+  title="hexis" >&#x201B;&#x3B5;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>, <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). <i>Nec
+  virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur</i>: cf. Stob. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 6, 6 <span lang="el" title="duo gen� t�n anthr�p�n einai to men t�n spoudai�n, to de t�n phaul�n, kai to men t�n spoudai�n dia pantos tou biou chr�sthai tais aretais, to de t�n phaul�n tais kakiais"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3C5;&#x3BF; &#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;, &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C7;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;, &#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  <i>Perturbationem</i>: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of
+  Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of
+  the <i>Acad.</i> appears, should read the plural <i>perturbationes</i>, a
+  conj. of Walker. <i>Perturbationem</i> means emotion in the abstract;
+  <i>perturbationes</i> below, particular emotions. There is exactly the
+  same transition in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 23, 24,
+  <span class="vol">IV.</span> 59, 65, <span class="vol">V.</span> 43,
+  while <i>perturbatio</i> is used, in the same sense as here, in at least
+  five other passages of the <i>T.D.</i>, i.e. <span class="vol">IV.</span>
+  8, 11, 24, 57, 82. <i>Quasi mortis</i>: a trans. of Stoic <span lang="el"
+  title="pathesi" >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;</span>, which
+  Cic. rejects in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 35. <i>Voluit
+  carere sapientem</i>: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the
+  reason, and perfect reason being virtue (<a href="#BkI_20">20</a>), it
+  follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All
+  emotions are reasonless; <span lang="el" title="h�don�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span> or <i>laetitia</i>
+  for instance is <span lang="el" title="alogos eparsis"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>. (<i>T.D.</i>
+  Books <span class="vol">III.</span> and <span class="vol">IV.</span>
+  treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, <i>Em.</i> to
+  the <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> p. 8, says Cic. always uses
+  <i>efferri laetitia</i> but <i>ferri libidine</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_39"></a><a href="#BkI_39">�39</a>.</b> <i>Aliaque in
+  parte</i>: so Plato, <i>Tim.</i> 69 C, <i>Rep.</i> 436, 441, Arist. <i>De
+  Anima</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 3, etc.; cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 20. <i>Voluntarias</i>: the whole aim of the Stoic
+  theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of the
+  will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general
+  Stoic fatalism we are not told. <i>Opinionisque iudicio suscipi</i>: all
+  emotion arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external
+  object; cf. Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 111. <span lang="el"
+  title="ta path� kriseis einai" >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>. Instances of each in Zeller
+  233. For <i>iudicio</i> cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 35,
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 61, <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 14, 15, 18. <i>Intemperantiam</i>: the same in
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 22, Gk. <span lang="el"
+  title="akolasia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, see
+  Zeller 232. <i>Quintam naturam</i>: the <span lang="el" title="pempt� ousia"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> or <span lang="el"
+  title="pempton s�ma" >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span> of Aristotle, who proves its
+  existence in <i>De Coelo</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 2, in a curious
+  and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist.
+  derived <i>mind</i> from this fifth element, though the finest and
+  highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a
+  material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 22, 41, 65, <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important
+  note, but he fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from
+  Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 41, 33, that the Peripatetics of the
+  time were in the habit of deriving the mind from <span lang="el"
+  title="aith�r" >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;</span>, which is the
+  very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (<span lang="el"
+  title="s�ma aitherion" >&#x3C3;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> in the
+  <i>De Coelo</i>), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The
+  error once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred
+  influences at work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen
+  into a strange oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of
+  these influences, but will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time
+  succeeded in powerfully influencing every other sect, and it placed <span
+  lang="el" title="nous en aitheri" >&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;</span> (see
+  Plutarch, qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial
+  existence The notion that <span lang="el" title="nous"
+  >&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;</span> or <span lang="el" title="psych�"
+  >&#x3C8;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span> came from <span lang="el"
+  title="aith�r" >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;</span> was also
+  fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as <span
+  lang="el" title="aeikin�tos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his
+  mind One from the <i>Phaedrus</i> 245 C is translated twice, in
+  <i>Somnium Scipionis</i> (<i>De Rep.</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span>),
+  and <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 53 sq. Now the only thing
+  with Aristotle which is <span lang="el" title="aeikin�tos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion
+  is alone perfect and eternal), is the <span lang="el" title="aith�r"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;</span> or <span lang="el"
+  title="pempton s�ma" >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>, that fiery external rim of the
+  universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with which they revolve.
+  How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works, to conclude that
+  the <span lang="el" title="aeikin�tos psych�"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C8;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span> of Plato came from the <span
+  lang="el" title="aeikin�tos aith�r"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;</span> of Aristotle! Arist. had
+  guarded himself by saying that the soul as an <span lang="el"
+  title="arch� kin�se�s" >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span> must be
+  <span lang="el" title="akin�tos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>, but
+  Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to
+  the outer circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just
+  where Arist. placed his <span lang="el" title="pempton s�ma"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span> Any one who will compare <i>T.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 43 with the <i>Somn. Scipionis</i> will see
+  what power this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the
+  mind in its origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on
+  as divine (cf. <i>Somn. Scip.</i> 15) These considerations will be enough
+  to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible
+  for the error, could have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by
+  the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too
+  late. <i>Sensus</i>: we seem here to have a remnant of the distinction
+  drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former being
+  <span lang="el" title="analogon t� t�n astr�n stoichei�"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;</span> (<i>De
+  Gen. An.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 3, qu. R. and P. 299).
+  <i>Ignem</i>: the Stoics made no difference, except one of degree,
+  between <span lang="el" title="aith�r"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;</span> and <span lang="el"
+  title="pyr" >&#x3C0;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;</span>, see Zeller 189, 190. <i>Ipsam
+  naturam</i>: <span lang="el" title="pyr" >&#x3C0;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;</span> is
+  <span lang="el" title="kat' exoch�n stoicheion" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;'
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BE;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 10, 16), and is the first thing
+  generated from the <span lang="el" title="apoios hyl�"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;</span>; from it comes air, from air water,
+  from water earth (Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 136, 137)
+  The fire is <span lang="el" title="logikon"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, from it comes
+  the <span lang="el" title="h�gemonikon"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought.
+  These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics
+  (Zeller ch. <span class="vol">VIII.</span> with notes) For his view of
+  sensation and thought see Sextus <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 127&mdash;129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics
+  probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's
+  <i>Plato</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 34 sq. <i>Expers corporis</i>:
+  for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a
+  connection between the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed
+  from old physical principles such as that of Democritus (<span lang="el"
+  title="ou gar ench�rein ta hetera kai diapheronta paschein hyp' all�l�n"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3C7;&#x3C9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD; &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;'
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>, qu. from Arist.
+  <i>De Gen. et Corr.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, by R. and P. 43),
+  the same is affirmed loosely of all the old <span lang="el"
+  title="physikoi"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span>, (Sextus
+  <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 116), and by Empedocles
+  in his lines <span lang="el" title="gaiai men gaian op�pamen"
+  >&#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;</span>, etc.
+  Plato in the <i>Timaeus</i> fosters the same notion, though in a
+  different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of
+  thought. <i>Xenocrates</i>: see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIIN_124">124</a>, n. <i>Superiores</i>: merely the supposed old
+  Academico-Peripatetic school. <i>Posse esse non corpus</i>: there is no
+  ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see
+  Zeller, pp. 134, 135.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_40"></a><a href="#BkI_40">�40</a>.</b>
+  <i>Iunctos</i>: how can anything be a <i>compound</i> of one thing? The
+  notion that <i>iunctos</i> could mean <i>aptos</i> (R. and P. 366) is
+  untenable. I entirely agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his
+  <i>D.F.</i>) that we have here an anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say
+  <i>iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu animorum</i>, but having to
+  explain <span lang="el" title="phantasia"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> was
+  obliged to break off and resume at <i>sed ad haec</i>. The explanation of
+  a Greek term causes a very similar anacoluthon in <i>De Off.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 153. Schuppe, <i>De Anacoluthis Ciceronianis</i> p.
+  9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 44 <i>e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus</i>
+  Ernesti em. <i>cunctos</i>, Dav. <i>punctos</i>, <i>ingeniose ille
+  quidem</i> says Halm, <i>pessime</i> I should say. <span lang="el"
+  title="Phantasian"
+  >&#x3A6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>:
+  a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given by
+  Zeller, ch. <span class="vol">V.</span>, R. and P. 365 sq. <i>Nos
+  appellemus licet</i>: the same turn of expression occurs <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 21, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 74. <i>Hoc
+  verbum quidem hoc quidem</i> probably ought to be read, see <a
+  href="#BkI_18">18</a>. <i>Adsensionem</i> = <span lang="el"
+  title="synkatathesin"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>In nobis positam</i>: the usual expression for freedom of the will,
+  cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_37">37</a>, <i>De
+  Fato</i>, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is
+  involuntary (<span lang="el" title="akousion"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> Sext.
+  Emp. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 397). <i>Tironum
+  causa</i> I note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the
+  mind as <i>involuntary,</i> while the <span lang="el" title="katal�ptik� phantasia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  <i>compels</i> assent (see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_38">38</a>). This is, however, only true of the healthy
+  reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_41"></a><a href="#BkI_41">�41</a>.</b> <i>Visis non
+  omnibus</i>: while Epicurus defended the truth of all sensations, Zeno
+  abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to the inner
+  citadel of the <span lang="el" title="katal�ptik� phantasia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>.
+  <i>Declarationem</i>: <span lang="el" title="enargeian"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_17">17</a>. <i>Earum rerum</i>:
+  only this class of sensations gives correct information of the
+  <i>things</i> lying behind. <i>Ipsum per se</i>: i.e. its whole truth
+  lies in its own <span lang="el" title="enargeia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, which
+  requires no corroboration from without. <i>Comprehendibile</i>: this form
+  has better MSS. authority than the vulg <i>comprehensibile</i>. Goerenz's
+  note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity <i>Nos
+  vero, inquit</i>: Halm with Manut. writes <i>inquam</i>. Why change?
+  Atticus answers as in <a href="#BkI_14">14</a>, <a href="#BkI_25">25</a>,
+  <a href="#BkI_33">33</a>. <span lang="el" title="Katal�pton"
+  >&#x39A;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>:
+  strictly the <i>thing</i> which emits the <i>visum</i> is said to be
+  <span lang="el" title="katal�pton"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  but, as we shall see in the <i>Lucullus</i>, the sensation and the thing
+  from which it proceeds are often confused. <i>Comprehensionem</i>: this
+  word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not the
+  individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use <span
+  lang="el" title="katal�psis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  for <span lang="el" title="katal�ptik� phantasia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> very
+  often. <i>Quae manu prehenderentur</i>: see <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  <a href="#BkII_145">145</a>. <i>Nova enim dicebat</i>: an admission not
+  often made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno
+  merely renamed old doctrines (cf. <a href="#BkI_43">43</a>).
+  <i>Sensum</i>: so Stob., <span class="vol">I.</span> 41, 25 applies the
+  term <span lang="el" title="aisth�sis"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> to the
+  <span lang="el" title="phantasia"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>.
+  <i>Scientiam</i>: the word <span lang="el" title="epist�m�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> is used
+  in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or
+  systematised perceptions (<span lang="el" title="katal�pseis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  or <span lang="el" title="katal�ptikai phantasiai"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>)
+  sometimes also called <span lang="el" title="techn�"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span> (cf. Sext. <i>Pyrrh. Hyp.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 188 <span lang="el" title="techn�n de einai syst�ma ek katal�pse�n syngegymnasmen�n"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B1; &#x3B5;&#x3BA;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>);
+  (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied by Cic. and may be
+  seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. <i>Ut convelli ratione non
+  posset</i>: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno all <span
+  lang="el" title="katal�ptikai phantasiai"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  were <span lang="el" title="asphaleis, ametapt�toi hypo logou"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;,
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF; &#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;</span>.
+  Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to
+  logical tests; see Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span>
+  253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every <span lang="el" title="katal�ptik� phantasia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, instead
+  of carrying with it its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of
+  sceptical criticism before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller
+  remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic
+  theory. <i>Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret</i>: I know nothing like this
+  in the Stoic texts; <span lang="el" title="amathia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> is very seldom talked
+  of there. <i>Opinio</i>: <span lang="el" title="doxa"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;</span>, see Zeller and cf. <i>Ac.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_52">52</a>, <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 52, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 15, 26.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_42"></a><a href="#BkI_42">�42</a>.</b> <i>Inter
+  scientiam</i>: so Sextus <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span>
+  151 speaks of <span lang="el" title="epist�m�n kai doxan kai t�n en methopiai tout�n katal�psin"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Soli</i>: Halm, I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives
+  <i>solum ei</i>. <i>Non quod omnia</i>: the meaning is that the reason
+  must generalize on separate sensations and combine them before we can
+  know thoroughly any one <i>thing</i>. This will appear if the whole
+  sentence be read <i>uno haustu</i>; Zeller p. 78 seems to take the same
+  view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this in the Greek.
+  <i>Quasi</i>: this points out <i>normam</i> as a trans. of some Gk. word,
+  <span lang="el" title="krit�rion"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  perhaps, or <span lang="el" title="gn�m�n"
+  >&#x3B3;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span> or <span lang="el"
+  title="kan�n" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>. <i>Notiones
+  rerum</i>: Stoic <span lang="el" title="ennoiai"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>; Zeller
+  81&mdash;84, R. and P. 367, 368. <i>Quodque natura</i>: the omission of
+  <i>eam</i> is strange; Faber supplies it. <i>Imprimerentur</i>: the terms
+  <span lang="el" title="enapesphragismen�, enapomemagmen�, entetyp�men�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C6;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;,
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;,
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>
+  occur constantly, but generally in relation to <span lang="el"
+  title="phantasiai"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>,
+  not to <span lang="el" title="ennoiai"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>. <i>Non
+  principia solum</i>: there seems to be a ref. to those <span lang="el"
+  title="archai t�s apodeixe�s" >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BE;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  of Arist. which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the
+  bases of all proof. (See Grote's <i>Essay on the Origin of Knowledge</i>,
+  first printed in Bain's <i>Mental and Moral Science</i>, now re-published
+  in Grote's <i>Aristotle.</i>) Zeno's <span lang="el" title="ennoiai"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> were all this
+  and more. <i>Reperiuntur</i>: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from
+  <i>oratio obliqua</i> to <i>recta</i>, which however has repeatedly taken
+  place during Varro's exposition, and for which see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 30, <span class="vol">III.</span> 49; (2) the
+  phrase <i>reperire viam</i>, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm
+  give <i>aperirentur</i>. There is no MSS. variant. <i>Aliena</i>: cf.
+  <i>alienatos</i> <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 18. <i>A
+  virtute sapientiaque removebat</i>: cf. <i>sapiens numquam fallitur in
+  iudicando</i> <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 59. The <i>firma
+  adsensia</i> is opposed to <i>imbecilla</i> <a href="#BkI_41">41</a>. For
+  the <i>adsensio</i> of the <i>sapiens</i> see Zeller 87. More information
+  on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes on the
+  first part of the <i>Lucullus</i>. <i>In his constitit</i>: cf. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_134">134</a>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_43">��43</a>&mdash;end.</b> Cicero's
+  historical justification of the New Academy. Summary. Arcesilas'
+  philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory in argument, but to the
+  obscurity of phenomena, which had led the ancients to despair of
+  knowledge (<a href="#BkI_44">44</a>). He even abandoned the one tenet
+  held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of
+  equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of
+  phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely (<a
+  href="#BkI_45">45</a>). His views were really in harmony with those of
+  Plato, and were carried on by Carneades (<a
+  href="#BkI_46">46</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_43"></a><a href="#BkI_43">�43</a>.</b>
+  <i>Breviter</i>: MSS. <i>et breviter;</i> see <a href="#BkI_37">37</a>.
+  <i>Tunc</i>: rare before a consonant; see Munro on <i>Lucr.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 130. <i>Verum esse [autem] arbitror</i>: in
+  deference to Halm I bracket <i>autem</i>, but I still think the MSS.
+  reading defensible, if <i>verum</i> be taken as the neut. adj. and not as
+  meaning <i>but</i>. Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it
+  is to be thought," etc. The edd. seem to have thought that <i>esse</i>
+  was needed to go with <i>putandam</i>. This is a total mistake; cf.
+  <i>ait ... putandam</i>, without <i>esse</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  <a href="#BkII_15">15</a>, <i>aiebas removendum</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_74">74</a>; a hundred other
+  passages might be quoted from Cic.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_44"></a><a href="#BkI_44">�44</a>.</b> <i>Non
+  pertinacia aut studio vincendi</i>: for these words see n. on <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_14">14</a>. The sincerity of
+  Arcesilas is defended also in <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_76">76</a>. <i>Obscuritate</i>: a side-blow at
+  <i>declaratio</i> <a href="#BkI_41">41</a>. <i>Confessionem
+  ignorationis</i>: see <a href="#BkI_16">16</a>. Socrates was far from
+  being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_74">74</a>. <i>Et iam ante
+  Socratem</i>: MSS. <i>veluti amantes Socratem;</i> Democritus
+  (460&mdash;357 B.C.) was really very little older than Socrates
+  (468&mdash;399) who died nearly sixty years before him. <i>Omnis paene
+  veteres</i>: the statement is audaciously inexact, and is criticised
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_14">14</a>. None of these
+  were sceptics; for Democritus see my note on <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  <a href="#BkIIN_73">73</a>, for Empedocles on <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_74">74</a>, for Anaxagoras on
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_72">72</a>. <i>Nihil
+  cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri</i>: the verbs are all equivalent;
+  cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 15 <i>equidem soleo etiam
+  quod uno Graeci ... idem pluribus verbis exponere</i>. <i>Angustos
+  sensus</i>: Cic. is thinking of the famous lines of Empedocles <span
+  lang="el" title="steinopoi men gar palamai k.t.l."
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BA;.&#x3C4;.&#x3BB;.</span> R. and P. 107. <i>Brevia curricula
+  vitae</i>: cf. Empedocles' <span lang="el" title="pauron de z��s abiou meros"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3B6;&#x3C9;&#x3B7;&#x3C2; &#x3B1;&#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>. Is there an allusion in
+  <i>curricula</i> to Lucretius' <i>lampada vitai tradunt</i>, etc.? <i>In
+  profundo</i>: Dem. <span lang="el" title="en byth�" >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B2;&#x3C5;&#x3B8;&#x3C9;</span>, cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_32">32</a>. The common trans. "well" is weak, "abyss" would
+  suit better. <i>Institutis</i>: <span lang="el" title="nom�"
+  >&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3C9;</span> of Democritus, see R. and P. 50.
+  Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance. <i>Deinceps
+  omnia</i>: <span lang="el" title="panta ephex�s"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3BE;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span> there is no need to
+  read <i>denique</i> for <i>deinceps</i> as Bentl., Halm. <i>Circumfusa
+  tenebris</i>: an allusion to the <span lang="el" title="skoti� gn�sis"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> of Democr., see <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_73">73</a>. <i>Dixerunt</i>: Halm
+  brackets this because of <i>dixerunt</i> above, parts of the verb
+  <i>dicere</i> are however often thus repeated by Cic.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_45"></a><a href="#BkI_45">�45</a>.</b> <i>Ne illud
+  quidem</i>: cf. <a href="#BkI_16">16</a>. <i>Latere censebat</i> Goer.
+  omitted <i>censebat</i> though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as
+  usual. For the sense <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_122">122</a>. <i>Cohibereque</i>: Gk. <span lang="el"
+  title="epechein"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>, which we shall
+  have to explain in the <i>Lucullus</i>. <i>Temeritatem ... turpius</i>:
+  for these expressions, see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIIN_66">66</a>, note. <i>Praecurrere</i>: as was the case with
+  the dogmatists. <i>Paria momenta</i>: this is undiluted scepticism, and
+  excludes even the possibility of the <i>probabile</i> which Carneades put
+  forward. For the doctrine cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_124">124</a>, for the expression Euseb. <i>Praep. Evan.</i>
+  <span class="vol">XIV.</span> c. 4 (from Numenius) of Arcesilas, <span
+  lang="el" title="einai gar panta akatal�pta kai tous eis ekatera logous isokrateis all�lois"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2; &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>, Sextus
+  <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">IX.</span> 207 <span lang="el"
+  title="isostheneis logoi"
+  >&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span>; in the latter writer the word
+  <span lang="el" title="isostheneia"
+  >&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  very frequently occurs in the same sense, e g <i>Pyrrhon. Hyp.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 8 (add <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 10,
+  <i>rationis momenta</i>)</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIN_46"></a><a href="#BkI_46">�46</a>.</b>
+  <i>Platonem</i>: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed,
+  Sextus <i>Pyrrhon. Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 221 <span
+  lang="el" title="ton Plat�na oin hoi men dogmatikon ephasan einai, hoi de apo �tikon, hoi de kata men ti apor�tikon, kata de ti dogmatikon"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3A0;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BD; &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3B9; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;, &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;, &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3C4;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  Stobaeus <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 4 neatly slips out of the
+  difficulty; <span lang="el" title="Plat�n polyph�nos �n, ouch h�s tines oiontai polydoxos"
+  >&#x3A0;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3C6;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C9;&#x3BD;, &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C7; &#x201B;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  <i>Exposuisti</i>: Durand's necessary em., approved by Krische, Halm,
+  etc. for MSS. <i>exposui</i>. <i>Zenone</i>: see Introd. p. <a
+  href="#Page_v">5</a>.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h3>NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">BOOK I.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_1"></a><a href="#Fr_1">1</a>.</b> <i>Mnesarchus</i>:
+  see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_69">69</a>, <i>De Or.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 45, and <i>Dict. Biogr.</i> 'Antipater'; cf.
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_143">143</a>, <i>De Off.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 50. Evidently this fragment belongs to that
+  historical justification of the New Academy with which I suppose Cicero
+  to have concluded the first book.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_2"></a><a href="#Fr_2">2</a>.</b> The word
+  <i>concinere</i> occurs <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 60,
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 16, in both which places it is
+  used of the Stoics, who are said <i>re concinere, verbis discrepare</i>
+  with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had already
+  mentioned <a href="#BkI_43">43</a>, and probably repeated in this
+  fragment. Krische remarks that Augustine, <i>Cont. Acad.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 14, 15, seems to have imitated that part of
+  Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic. must have
+  condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order to excuse
+  the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).</p>
+
+<p class="center">BOOK II.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_3"></a><a href="#Fr_3">3</a>.</b> This fragm. clearly
+  forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments which Cic. in the
+  first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius, see Introd. p. <a
+  href="#Page_lv">55</a>. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so
+  level as the sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not
+  level.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_4"></a><a href="#Fr_4">4</a>.</b> On this I have
+  nothing to remark.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_5"></a><a href="#Fr_5">5</a>.</b> There is nothing
+  distinctive about this which might enable us to determine its connection
+  with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who <i>serius adamavit
+  honores</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_6"></a><a href="#Fr_6">6</a>.</b> The changing aspects
+  of the same thing are pointed to here as invalidating the evidence of the
+  senses.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_7"></a><a href="#Fr_7">7</a>.</b> This passage has the
+  same aim as the last and closely resembles <i>Lucullus</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_105">105</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_8"></a><a href="#Fr_8">8</a>.</b> The fact that the
+  eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy the senses are. A
+  similar argument occurs in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_86">86</a>.
+  <i>Perpendiculum</i> is a plumb line, <i>norma</i> a mason's square, the
+  word being probably a corruption of the Greek <span lang="el"
+  title="gn�m�n" >&#x3B3;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span> (Curt.
+  <i>Grundz</i> p. 169, ed. 3), <i>regula</i>, a rule.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_9"></a><a href="#Fr_9">9</a>.</b> The different
+  colours which the same persons show in different conditions, when young
+  and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober and when drunken,
+  are brought forward to prove how little of permanence there is even in
+  the least fleeting of the objects of sense.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_10"></a><a href="#Fr_10">10</a>.</b> <i>Urinari</i> is
+  to dive; for the derivation see Curt. <i>Grundz</i> p. 326. A diver would
+  be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in <i>Luc.</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_81">81</a>, which are unable to see that which lies
+  immediately above them and so illustrate the narrow limits of the power
+  of vision.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_11"></a><a href="#Fr_11">11</a>.</b> Evidently an
+  attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy. Different people pass
+  different judgments on one and the same odour. The student will observe
+  that the above extracts formed part of an argument intended to show the
+  deceptive character of the senses. To these should probably be added
+  fragm. <a href="#Fr_32">32</a>. Fr. <a href="#Fr_19">19</a> shows that
+  the impossibility of distinguishing eggs one from another, which had been
+  brought forward in the <i>Catulus</i>, was allowed to stand in the second
+  edition, other difficulties of the kind, such as those connected with the
+  bent oar, the pigeon's neck, the twins, the impressions of seals
+  (<i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>, <a href="#BkII_54">54</a>), would
+  also appear in both editions. The result of these assaults on the senses
+  must have been summed up in the phrase <i>cuncta dubitanda esse</i> which
+  Augustine quotes from the <i>Academica Posteriora</i> (see fragm. <a
+  href="#Fr_36">36</a>).</p>
+
+<p class="center">BOOK III.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_12"></a><a href="#Fr_12">12</a>.</b> This forms part
+  of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in substance to Lucullus'
+  speech in the <i>Academica Priora</i> The drift of this extract was most
+  likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the battle against
+  criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we must cease to
+  fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own way. See
+  another view in Krische, p. 62.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_13"></a><a href="#Fr_13">13</a>.</b> Krische believes
+  that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show that the senses were
+  trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with which the fishes
+  were seen leaping from the water was brought up as evidence. (In
+  <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_81">81</a>, on the other hand, Cic. drew an
+  argument hostile to the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The
+  explanation seems to me very improbable. The words bear such a striking
+  resemblance to those in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_125">125</a> (<i>ut
+  nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic innumerabilis paribus
+  in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis</i>) that I am inclined to think
+  that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> and not Book <span class="vol">III.</span>, and
+  that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the Lucrine lake, also
+  changed <i>Puteolosque</i> into <i>pisciculosque exultantes</i> for the
+  sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa on the
+  Lucrine.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_14"></a><a href="#Fr_14">14</a>.</b> The passion for
+  knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by Varro as an argument
+  in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be attainable. The same line
+  is taken in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_31">31</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 17, and elsewhere.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_15"></a><a href="#Fr_15">15</a>.</b> It is so much
+  easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than in that of
+  Lucullus in the <i>Academica Priora</i> that I think the reference in
+  Nonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than
+  a dogmatist (see <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_105">105</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_120">120</a>, and Cic.'s words in <a href="#BkII_8">8</a> of
+  the same). If my conjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> Krische gives a different opinion, but very
+  hesitatingly, p. 63.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_16"></a><a href="#Fr_16">16</a>.</b> This may well
+  have formed part of Varro's explanation of the <span lang="el"
+  title="katal�psis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  <i>temeritas</i> being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and Stoics
+  as by the Academics cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_42">42</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_17"></a><a href="#Fr_17">17</a>.</b> I conjecture
+  <i>malleo</i> (a hammer) for the corrupt <i>malcho</i>, and think that in
+  the second ed. some comparison from building operations to illustrate the
+  fixity of knowledge gained through the <span lang="el"
+  title="katal�pseis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  was added to a passage which would correspond in substance with <a
+  href="#BkII_27">27</a> of the <i>Lucullus</i>. I note in Vitruvius,
+  quoted by Forc. s.v. <i>malleolus</i>, a similar expression (<i>naves
+  malleolis confixae</i>) and in Pliny <i>Nat. Hist.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XXXIV.</span> 14 <i>navis fixa malleo</i>. <i>Adfixa</i>
+  therefore in this passage must have agreed with some lost noun either in
+  the neut. plur. or fem. sing.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_18"></a><a href="#Fr_18">18</a>.</b> This and fragm.
+  <a href="#Fr_19">19</a> evidently hang very closely together. As Krische
+  notes, the Stoic <span lang="el" title="enargeia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> had
+  evidently been translated earlier in the book by <i>perspicuitas</i> as
+  in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_17">17</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_19"></a><a href="#Fr_19">19</a>.</b> See on
+  <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkIIN_57">57</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="center">BOOK IV.</p>
+
+  <p>Further information on all these passages will be found in my notes on
+  the parallel passages of the <i>Lucullus</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_21"></a><a href="#Fr_21">21</a>.</b> <i>Viam</i>
+  evidently a mistake for the <i>umbram</i> of <i>Luc.</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_70">70</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_23"></a><a href="#Fr_23">23</a>.</b> The best MS. of
+  Nonius points to <i>flavum</i> for <i>ravum</i> (<i>Luc.</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_105">105</a>). Most likely an alteration was made in the
+  second edition, as Krische supposes, p. 64.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_28"></a><a href="#Fr_28">28</a>.</b>
+  <i>Corpusculis</i>: <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_121">121</a> has
+  <i>corporibus</i>. Krische's opinion that this latter word was in the
+  second edition changed into the former may be supported from <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_6">6</a>, which he does not notice.
+  The conj. is confirmed by Aug. <i>Contr. Ac.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 23.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_29"></a><a href="#Fr_29">29</a>.</b> <i>Magnis
+  obscurata</i>: in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_122">122</a> it is
+  <i>crassis occultata</i>, so that we have another alteration, see
+  Krische, p. 64.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_30"></a><a href="#Fr_30">30</a>.</b> Only slight
+  differences appear in the MSS. of the <i>Luc.</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_123">123</a>, viz. <i>contraria</i>, for <i>in c.</i>, <i>ad
+  vestigia</i> for <i>contra v.</i></p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_31"></a><a href="#Fr_31">31</a>.</b> <i>Luc.</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_137">137</a> has <i>dixi</i> for <i>dictus</i>. As Cic. does
+  not often leave out <i>est</i> with the passive verb, Nonius has probably
+  quoted wrongly. It will be noted that the fragments of Book <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> correspond to the first half of the <i>Luc.</i>,
+  those of Book <span class="vol">IV.</span> to the second half. Cic.
+  therefore divided the <i>Luc.</i> into two portions at or about <a
+  href="#BkII_63">63</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="center">UNCERTAIN BOOKS.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_32"></a><a href="#Fr_32">32</a>.</b> I have already
+  said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary assault on the
+  senses made by Cic. in the second book.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_33"></a><a href="#Fr_33">33</a>.</b> In the Introd. p.
+  <a href="#Page_lv">55</a> I have given my opinion that the substance of
+  Catulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the <i>probabile</i> was
+  incorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To
+  that part this fragment must probably be referred.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_34"></a><a href="#Fr_34">34</a>.</b> This important
+  fragment clearly belongs to Book <span class="vol">II.</span>, and is a
+  jocular application of the Carneadean <i>probabile</i>, as may be seen
+  from the words <i>probabiliter posse confici</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_35"></a><a href="#Fr_35">35</a>.</b> Krische assigns
+  this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book. With this opinion I
+  find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the <i>Lucullus</i> (<a
+  href="#BkII_60">60</a>) proves to demonstration that in the first edition
+  this allusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have
+  occurred either in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no
+  reason whatever appears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer
+  to regard it as belonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of
+  Academic doctrine in the second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the
+  Academic school must not be supposed to have no truths to maintain, see
+  <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_119">119</a>, also <a href="#BkII_66">66</a>
+  and <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 12. Also Aug. <i>Contra.
+  Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 29.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="FrN_36"></a><a href="#Fr_36">36</a>.</b> It is difficult
+  to see where this passage could have been included if not in that
+  prooemium to the third book which is mentioned <i>Ad. Att.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XVI.</span> 6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me
+  wrong in holding that the whole four books formed one discussion,
+  finished within the limits of a single day. Why interrupt the discussion
+  by the insertion of a prologue of so general a nature as to be taken from
+  a stock which Cic. kept on hand ready made? (Cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> as
+  above.)</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+  <p>Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications
+  of its contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled <i>Contra
+  Academicos</i>, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions,
+  imitated throughout the second edition of the <i>Academica</i> of Cic. No
+  writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture
+  and opinions of Augustine as the <i>Academica</i> and the lost
+  <i>Hortensius</i>. I give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications
+  of the contents of the former which are to be gathered from the bishop's
+  works. In Aug. <i>Contr. Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 14, 15, we
+  have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of Book <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> to the following effect. The New Academy must not
+  be regarded as having revolted against the Old, all that it did was to
+  discuss that new doctrine of <span lang="el" title="katal�psis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of <span lang="el" title="akatal�psia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  though present to the minds of the ancients had never taken distinct
+  shape, because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was rather
+  enriched than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism under
+  the name of the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife
+  between it and the New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic.
+  must have ended. From this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his
+  opinion (<i>Contra. Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1) that New
+  Academicism was excusable from the necessities of the age in which it
+  appeared. Indications of Book <span class="vol">II.</span> in Aug. are
+  scarce, but to it I refer <i>Contra. Ac.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  7 <i>placuit Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui verum investigat etiam si ad
+  eius inventionem non valeat pervenire</i>, also <i>ibid.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 10 <i>illis (Academicis) placuit esse posse
+  hominem sapientem, et tamen in hominem scientiam cadere non posse</i>.
+  These I refer to Cicero's development of the <i>probabile</i> in Book
+  <span class="vol">II.</span>, although I ought to say that Krische, p.
+  65, maintains that the substance of Catulus' exposition in the <i>Ac.
+  Priora</i> transferred to Book <span class="vol">IV.</span> of the <i>Ac.
+  Posteriora</i>. As this would leave very meagre material for Book <span
+  class="vol">II.</span>, nothing indeed excepting the provisional proof of
+  the deceptiveness of the senses, I cannot accede to his arrangement;
+  mine, I may remark, involves a much smaller departure from the first
+  edition. Allusions in Aug. to the attack on the senses by Cic. in Book
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> are difficult to fix, as they apply equally
+  well to the later attack in Book <span class="vol">IV.</span> As to Books
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> and <span class="vol">IV.</span>, I do not
+  think it necessary here to prove from Aug. the points of agreement
+  between them and the <i>Lucullus</i>, which will find a better place in
+  my notes on the latter, but merely give the divergences which appear from
+  other sources. These are the translation of <span lang="el"
+  title="sophismata"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>
+  by <i>cavillationes</i> in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_75">75</a> (Seneca
+  <i>Ep.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span>), and the insertion in <a
+  href="#BkII_118">118</a> of <i>essentia</i> as a translation of <span
+  lang="el" title="ousia" >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>.</p>
+
+<h3>BOOK II.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">ENTITLED <i>LUCULLUS</i>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_1">��1</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_12">12</a>.</b> Summary. Lucullus, though an able and
+  cultivated man, was absent from Rome on public service too long during
+  his earlier years to attain to glory in the forum (<a
+  href="#BkII_1">1</a>). He unexpectedly proved a great general. This was
+  due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory (<a
+  href="#BkII_2">2</a>). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits
+  as a commander and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till
+  just before my consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I
+  cannot now tell (<a href="#BkII_3">3</a>). He was not merely a general;
+  he was also a philosopher, having learned much from Antiochus and read
+  much for himself (<a href="#BkII_4">4</a>). Those enemies of Greek
+  culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know philosophy, must be
+  referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (<a href="#BkII_5">5</a>).
+  Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of
+  the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about
+  trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public
+  duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but
+  enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (<a
+  href="#BkII_6">6</a>). Those who hold that the interlocutors in these
+  dialogues had no such knowledge show that they can make their envy reach
+  beyond the grave. Some critics do not approve the particular philosophy
+  which I follow&mdash;the Academic. This is natural, but they must know
+  that Academicism puts no stop to inquiry (<a href="#BkII_7">7</a>). My
+  school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools are enslaved to
+  authority (<a href="#BkII_8">8</a>). The dogmatists say they bow to the
+  authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without
+  hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus,
+  Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the
+  <i>Catulus</i> (<a href="#BkII_9">9</a>). Catulus called on Lucullus to
+  defend the doctrines of Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to
+  do, although the doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day
+  before (<a href="#BkII_10">10</a>). He spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard
+  discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo,
+  and Antiochus. At that very time the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday
+  came into the hands of Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book
+  against his old teacher (<a href="#BkII_11">11</a> and <a
+  href="#BkII_12">12</a>). I will now give the substance of the disputes
+  between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the latter
+  against Philo (<a href="#BkII_12">12</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_1"></a><a href="#BkII_1">�1</a>.</b> <i>Luculli</i>:
+  see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_lviii">58</a>, and <i>Dict. Biog.</i>
+  <i>Digna homini nobili</i>: a good deal of learning would have been
+  considered <i>unworthy</i> of a man like Lucullus, see Introd. p. <a
+  href="#Page_xxx">30</a>. <i>Percepta</i>: "gained," "won;" cf.
+  <i>percipere fruges</i>, "to reap," <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 24. <i>Caruit</i>:
+  "was cut off from;" <i>carere</i> comes from a root <i>skar</i> meaning
+  to divide, see Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 403. For the three
+  nouns with a singular verb see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 213 A, who confines the
+  usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common
+  reading <i>dissensit</i> in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span>
+  68 is right, the restriction does not hold. <i>Admodum</i>: "to a
+  degree." <i>Fratre</i>: this brother was adopted by a M. Terentius Varro,
+  and was a man of distinction also; see <i>Dict. Biog.</i> <i>Magna cum
+  gloria</i>: a ref. to <i>Dict. Biog.</i> will show that the whole affair
+  was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have
+  gained greater glory by letting it drop. <i>Quaestor</i>: to Sulla, who
+  employed him chiefly in the civil administration of Asia.
+  <i>Continuo</i>: without any interval. <i>Legis praemio</i>: this seems
+  to mean "by the favour of a special law," passed of course by Sulla, who
+  had restored the old <i>lex annalis</i> in all its rigour, and yet
+  excepted his own officers from its operation. <i>Prooemio</i>, which has
+  been proposed, would not be Latin, see <i>De Leg.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 16. <i>Consulatum</i>: he seems to have been
+  absent during the years 84&mdash;74, in the East. <i>Superiorum</i>:
+  scarcely that of Sulla.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_2"></a><a href="#BkII_2">�2</a>.</b> <i>Laus</i>:
+  "merit," as often, so <i>praemium</i>, Virg. <i>Aen.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XII.</span> 437, means a deed worthy of reward. <i>Non
+  admodum exspectabatur</i>: Cic. forgets that Luc. had served with
+  distinction in the Social War and the first Mithridatic war. <i>In Asia
+  pace</i>: three good MSS. have <i>Asiae</i>; Baiter ejects <i>Asia</i>;
+  Guilelmus read <i>in Asia in pace</i> (which Davies conjectures, though
+  he prints <i>Asiae</i>). <i>Consumere</i> followed by an ablative without
+  <i>in</i> is excessively rare in Cic. Madv. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 53 denies the use altogether. In addition, however,
+  to our passage, I note <i>hoc loco consumitur</i> in <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give
+  no variants. <i>Pace</i> here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like
+  <i>tranqullo</i>. <i>Indocilem</i>: this is simply passive, = "untaught,"
+  as in Prop. <span class="vol">I.</span> 2, 12, Ov. <i>Fast.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong
+  in making it active. <i>Factus</i>: = <i>perfectus</i>; cf. Hor.
+  <i>Sat.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 5, 33 <i>homo factus ad
+  unguem</i>, Cic. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 184, <i>In
+  Verr.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 126. So <i>effectus</i> in silver
+  Latin. <i>Rebus gestis</i>: military history, so often. <i>Divinam
+  quandam memoriam</i>: the same phrase in <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 360. <i>Rerum, verborum</i>: same distinction in
+  <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 359. <i>Oblivisci se
+  malle</i>: the same story is told <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 104, <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  299. The ancient art of memory was begun by Simonides (who is the person
+  denoted here by <i>cuidam</i>) and completed by Metrodorus of Scepsis,
+  for whom see <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 360.
+  <i>Consignamus</i>: cf. <i>consignatae in animis notiones</i> in
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 57. <i>litteris</i> must be an
+  ablative of the instrument. <i>Mandare monum.</i>: cf. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_3">3</a>. <i>Insculptas</i>: rare in
+  the metaphorical use, cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 45.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_3"></a><a href="#BkII_3">�3</a>.</b> <i>Genere</i>:
+  "department" cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_3">3</a>.
+  <i>Navalibus pugnis</i>: <span lang="el" title="naumachiais"
+  >&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C7;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  <i>Instrumento et adparatu</i>: <span lang="el" title="kataskeu� kai paraskeu�"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B7;</span>.
+  <i>Rex</i>: Mithridates. <i>Quos legisset</i>: = <i>de quibus l.</i>; cf.
+  the use of the passive verb so common in Ovid, e.g. <i>Trist.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 4, 14. I take of course <i>rex</i> to be nom. to
+  <i>legisset</i>, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is nom. and
+  that <i>quos legisset</i> = <i>quorum commentarios legisset</i> I think
+  improbable. <i>Hodie</i>: Drakenborch on Livy <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  27 wants to read <i>hodieque</i>, which however, is not Ciceronian. In
+  passages like <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 103 and
+  <i>Verr.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 64, the <i>que</i> connects
+  clauses and does not modify <i>hodie</i>. On this subject see Madv.
+  <i>Opuscula</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 390. <i>Etsi</i>:
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 68, shows that in Cic. a
+  parenthetic clause with <i>etsi</i> always has a common verb with its
+  principal clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same
+  holds of <i>quamquam</i>, see n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_5">5</a>. <i>Calumnia</i>: properly a fraudulent use of
+  litigation, <span lang="el" title="sykophantia"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>.
+  The chief enemy was the infamous Memmius who prosecuted him. <i>In
+  urbem</i>: until his triumph Luc. would remain outside the city.
+  <i>Profuisset</i>: this ought properly to be <i>profuerit</i>, but the
+  conditional <i>dicerem</i> changes it. <i>Potius ... quam ...
+  communicem</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_23">23</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_4"></a><a href="#BkII_4">�4</a>.</b> <i>Sunt ...
+  celebrata</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_11">11</a>,
+  <a href="#BkI_17">17</a> for the collocation of the words. <i>Externa ...
+  interiora</i>: cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 124 <i>sed
+  haec quoque in promptu, nunc interiora videamus</i>. <i>Pro
+  quaestore</i>: for this Faber wrote <i>quaestor</i>, arguing that as Luc.
+  was Sulla's <i>quaestor</i> and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he could not be
+  <i>pro quaestor</i>. But surely after the first year he would be <i>pro
+  quaestor</i>. Dav. reads <i>quaestor</i> here and <a
+  href="#BkII_11">11</a>, saying "<i>veterem lectionem iugulavit
+  Faber</i>". <i>Ea memoria ... quam</i>: Bentl., Halm, Baiter give
+  <i>qua</i>, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor. <i>Sat.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 6, 15. A passage like ours is <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 29, <i>ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis</i>, where
+  one MS. has <i>qua</i>. Read Madvig's lucid note there. <i>De quibus
+  audiebat</i>: Madv. <i>Em.</i> 121 makes this equivalent to <i>de eis
+  rebus de quibus</i>, the necessity of which explanation, though approved
+  by Halm, I fail to see. The form of expression is very common in Cic.,
+  and the relative always refers to an actually expressed antecedent, cf.
+  e.g. <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 83. I take <i>quibus</i> as simply =
+  <i>libris</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_5"></a><a href="#BkII_5">�5</a>.</b> <i>Ac</i>:
+  strong, as often, = <span lang="el" title="kai m�n"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>. <i>Personarum</i>:
+  public characters, <span lang="el" title="pros�p�n pole�s"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span> (<i>Ad. Fam.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XV.</span> 17, 2), so <i>personas</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_6">6</a>. <i>Multi ... plures</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a
+  href="#Page_xxx">30</a>. <i>Reliqui</i>: many MSS. insert <i>qui</i> by
+  <i>dittographia</i>, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains
+  it. On the retention or omission of this <i>qui</i> will depend the
+  choice of <i>putant</i> or <i>putent</i> below. <i>Earum rerum
+  disputationem</i>: for <i>disp.</i> followed by genitive see n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_33">33</a>. <i>Non ita decoram</i>:
+  for this feeling see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxx">30</a>. For <i>non
+  ita</i> cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae". <i>Historiae
+  loquantur</i>: <i>hist.</i> means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than
+  "history," which is better expressed by <i>res gestae</i>. Note that the
+  verb <i>loqui</i> not <i>dicere</i> is used, and cf. n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_101">101</a>. <i>Legatione</i>: to the kings in Egypt and
+  the East in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C. About the
+  embassy see <i>Dict. Biogr.</i> art. 'Panactius'. <i>Auctorem</i>: one
+  would think this simple and sound enough, Bentl. however read
+  <i>fautorem</i>, Dav. <i>auditorem</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_6"></a><a href="#BkII_6">�6</a>.</b>
+  <i>Illigari</i>: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use
+  Forc. qu. Liv. <span class="vol">XXXIII.</span> 21, Tac. <i>Ann.</i>
+  <span class="vol">XIII.</span> 40. <i>Aut ludicros sermones</i>: = <i>aut
+  clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat</i>. <i>Rerum leviorum</i>: a
+  similar argument in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 12. <i>Quodam
+  in libro</i>: the <i>Hortensius</i>. <i>Gradu</i>: so the word "degree"
+  was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the ballad. <i>De opera
+  publica detrahamus</i>: the dative often follows this verb, as in
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 7 <i>nihil operae reipublicae
+  detrahens</i>, a passage often wrongly taken. <i>Operae</i> is the dat.
+  after the verb, not the gen. after <i>nihil</i>, <i>reip.</i> the gen.
+  after <i>operae</i>, like <i>opera publica</i> here, not the dat. after
+  <i>detrahens</i>. <i>Nisi forensem</i>: the early oratorical works may
+  fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the <i>De
+  Republica</i> or the <i>De Leg.</i> both of which fall within the period
+  spoken of. <i>Ut plurimis prosimus</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a
+  href="#Page_xxix">29</a>. <i>Non modo non minui, sed</i>: notice <i>non
+  modo ... sed</i> thrice over in two sentences.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_7"></a><a href="#BkII_7">�7</a>.</b> <i>Sunt ... qui
+  negent</i>: and truly, see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxxviii">38</a>. In
+  <i>Cat. Mai.</i> �3 Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned
+  than he really was. <i>Mortuis</i>: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about
+  57, Hortensius 50. <i>Contra omnis dicere quae videntur</i>: MSS. mostly
+  insert <i>qui</i> between <i>dicere</i> and <i>quae</i>, one of the best
+  however has <i>dicere quae aliis</i> as a correction, while another has
+  the marginal reading <i>qui scire sibi videntur</i>. The omission of
+  <i>qui</i>, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal. 2)
+  referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense. <i>Verum invenire</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_60">60</a>. <i>Contentione</i>: = <span lang="el"
+  title="philoneikia"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  as usual. <i>In ... rebus obscuritas</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  <a href="#BkI_44">44</a> <i>rerum obscuritate</i>. <i>Infirmitas</i>: cf.
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_44">44</a> <i>imbecillos
+  animos</i>. <i>Antiquissimi et doctissimi</i>: on the other hand
+  <i>recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_13">13</a>. <i>Diffisi</i>: one of
+  the best MSS. has <i>diffissi</i>, which reminds one of the spelling
+  <i>divisssiones</i>, asserted to be Ciceronian in Quint. <i>Inst. Or</i>.
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, 20. <i>In utramque partem</i>: <span
+  lang="el" title="ep' amphotera" >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;'
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span>, cf.
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_45">45</a>. <i>Exprimant</i>:
+  "embody," cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_19">19</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_8"></a><a href="#BkII_8">�8</a>.</b>
+  <i>Probabilia</i>: <span lang="el" title="pithana"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>, for which see <a
+  href="#BkII_33">33</a>. <i>Sequi</i>: "act upon," cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_99">99</a>-<a href="#BkII_101">101</a>. <i>Liberiores et
+  solutiores</i>: these two words frequently occur together in Cic. and
+  illustrate his love for petty variations; see <a
+  href="#BkII_105">105</a>, also <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  43, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 4, <i>De Rep.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 4, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 56,
+  <i>Orat.</i> 64. <i>Integra</i>: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "<i>non
+  mihi integrum est</i>"&mdash;"I have committed my self." <i>Et quasi</i>:
+  MSS. have <i>et quibus et quasi</i>. <i>Cogimur</i>: for this Academic
+  freedom see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xviii">18</a>. <i>Amico cuidam</i>:
+  Orelli after Lamb. <i>cuipiam;</i> for the difference see Madv.
+  <i>Gram.</i> 493 <i>b</i>, <i>c</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_9"></a><a href="#BkII_9">�9</a>.</b> <i>Ut
+  potuerint, potuerunt</i>: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which was
+  simply <i>ut potuerunt</i>, "granting that they had the ability, they
+  gained it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they <i>did</i>
+  decide on a single hearing," etc. <i>Iudicaverunt autem</i>: so Lamb. for
+  MSS. <i>aut</i>. Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "<i>arguta
+  hariolatio</i>," read <i>an</i> for <i>aut</i> and put a note of
+  interrogation at <i>contulerunt</i>. C.F. Hermann (Schneidewin's
+  <i>Philologus</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 466) introduces by conj.
+  a sad confusion into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's
+  remarks in <i>Em.</i> 125 has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed,
+  followed by the faithful Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion
+  of <i>aut</i> between <i>sed</i> and <i>ut</i> at the beginning; of this
+  Madv. says "<i>non solum Latina non est, sed sanae menti repugnat</i>."
+  For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 10, <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 36.
+  <i>Quam adamaverunt</i>: "which they have learned to love;" the <i>ad</i>
+  has the same force as <span lang="el" title="pro"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;</span> in <span lang="el" title="promanthanein"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  which means "to learn <i>on and on</i>, to learn by degrees" (cf. <span
+  lang="el" title="proumathon stergein kakois"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>), not, as the lexica
+  absurdly say, "to learn beforehand, i.e. to learn thoroughly."
+  <i>Constantissime</i>: "most consistently". <i>Quae est ad Baulos</i>:
+  cf. Introd. p. <a href="#Page_lvii">57</a>. <i>In spatio</i>: this
+  <i>xystus</i> was a colonnade with one side open to the sea, called <span
+  lang="el" title="xystos"
+  >&#x3BE;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> from its polished
+  floor and pillars. <i>Consedimus</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  <a href="#BkIN_14">14</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_10"></a><a href="#BkII_10">�10</a>.</b> <i>Servatam
+  oportuit</i>: a construction very characteristic of Terence, found, but
+  rarely, in Cic. and Livy. <i>In promptu ... reconditiora</i>: cf. <i>in
+  promptu ... interiora</i> in <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  124, also <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_4">4</a>.
+  <i>Quae dico</i>: Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and
+  wishes to read <i>dixero</i>. But the substitution of the pres. for the
+  future is common enough in all languages cf. Iuv. <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 130 with Mayor's copious note. <i>Si non
+  fuerint</i>: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have <i>si
+  vera</i> etc. In support of the text, see <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_9">9</a> (<i>sunt ista</i>) and note. <i>Labefactata</i>: this
+  is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in <i>Ed. Rom.</i>
+  (1471); the others have <i>labefacta</i>. Orelli's statement (note to his
+  separate text of the <i>Academica</i> 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the
+  perfect <i>labefeci</i> and the part, <i>labefactus</i> is quite wrong.
+  The former is indeed the vulg. reading in <i>Pro Sestio</i> 101, the
+  latter in <i>De Haruspicum Responsis</i> 60, but the last of these two
+  passages is doubtful. Cic. as a rule prefers long forms like
+  <i>sustentatus</i>, which occurs with <i>labefactatus</i> in <i>Cat.
+  Mai.</i> 20. For the perfect <i>labefactavit</i> cf. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_33">33</a>. <i>Agam igitur</i>: Cic.
+  rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a belief in the
+  learning of Lucullus.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_11"></a><a href="#BkII_11">�11</a>.</b> <i>Pro
+  quaestore</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_4">4</a>. <i>Essem</i>: MSS.
+  <i>issem</i>, whence Goer. conj. <i>Alexandriam issem</i>. <i>Heraclitus
+  Tyrius</i>: scarcely known except from this passage. <i>Clitomachum</i>:
+  for this philosopher see Zeller 532. <i>Quae nunc prope dimissa
+  revocatur</i>: sc. <i>a Cicerone</i>. Philo's only notable pupils had
+  combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the
+  <i>Academica</i> the New Academic dialectic had been without a
+  representative for many years. Cf. Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxi">21</a>.
+  <i>Libri duo</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_13">13</a>. <i>Heri</i> for this indication of the contents of
+  the lost <i>Catulus</i>, see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_l">50</a>.
+  <i>Implorans</i>: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to
+  with tears," see Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 361. <i>Philonis</i>:
+  sc. <i>esse</i>. <i>Scriptum agnoscebat</i>: i.e. it was an actual work
+  of Ph. <i>Tetrilius</i>: some MSS. are said to have Tetrinius, and the
+  name <i>Tertinius</i> is found on Inscr. One good MS. has
+  <i>Tretilius</i>, which may be a mistake for <i>Tertilius</i>, a name
+  formed like <i>Pompilius</i>, <i>Quintilius</i>, <i>Sextilius</i>. Qy,
+  should <i>Petrilius</i>, a derivative from the word for four, be read?
+  <i>Petrilius</i> and <i>Pompilius</i> would then agree like
+  <i>Petronius</i> and <i>Pomponius</i>, <i>Petreius</i> and
+  <i>Pompeius</i>. For the formation of these names see Corss. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 116. <i>Rogus</i>: an ill omened and unknown name.
+  <i>Rocus</i>, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on <i>denarii</i> of the
+  <i>gens Creperia</i>. <i>De Philone ... ab eo ipso</i>: note the change
+  of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy." <i>De</i> and <i>ex</i>
+  are common in Cic. after <i>audire</i>, while <i>ab</i> is rather rarer.
+  See <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 39, and for <i>describere
+  ab aliquo</i> cf. <i>a te</i> in <i>Ad Att.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XIII.</span> 22, 3.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_12"></a><a href="#BkII_12">�12</a>.</b> <i>Dicta
+  Philoni</i>: for this see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_l">50</a>. It cannot
+  mean what Goer. makes it mean, "<i>coram Philone</i>." I think it
+  probable that <i>Philoni</i> is a marginal explanation foisted on the
+  text. As to the statements of Catulus the elder, they are made clear by
+  <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>. <i>Academicos</i>: i.e. <i>novos</i>, who are
+  here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the
+  title. <i>Aristo</i>: see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xi">11</a>.
+  <i>Aristone</i>: Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 164 mentions an
+  Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems
+  unknown. <i>Negat</i>: see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>.
+  <i>Lenior</i>: some MSS. <i>levior</i>, as is usual with these two words.
+  In <a href="#BkII_11">11</a> one of the earliest editions has
+  <i>leviter</i> for <i>leniter</i>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_13">��13</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_18">18</a>.</b> Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted
+  like a seditious tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as
+  supporters of scepticism (<a href="#BkII_13">13</a>), Those very
+  philosophers, with the exception of Empedocles, seem to me, if anything,
+  too dogmatic (<a href="#BkII_14">14</a>). Even if they were often in
+  doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made during so many
+  centuries by the investigations of so many men of ability? Arcesilas was
+  a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti. Gracchus was a rebel
+  against a good government (<a href="#BkII_15">15</a>). Has nothing really
+  been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty,
+  though brilliant support (<a href="#BkII_16">16</a>). Now many dogmatists
+  think that no argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument
+  can add nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (<a
+  href="#BkII_17">17</a>). Most however do allow of discussion with
+  sceptics. Philo in his innovations was induced to state falsehoods, and
+  incurred all the evils he wished to avoid, his rejection of Zeno's
+  definition of the <span lang="el" title="katal�ptik� phantasia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> really
+  led him back to that utter scepticism from which he was fleeing. We then
+  must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in to the sceptics (<a
+  href="#BkII_18">18</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_13"></a><a href="#BkII_13">�13</a>.</b> <i>Rursus
+  exorsus est</i>: cf. <i>exorsus</i> in <a href="#BkII_10">10</a>.
+  <i>Popularis</i>: <span lang="el" title="d�motikous"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  <i>Ii a</i>: so Dav. for MSS. <i>iam</i>. <i>Tum ad hos</i>: so MSS.,
+  Dav. <i>aut hos</i>. The omission of the verb <i>venire</i> is very
+  common in Cic.'s letters. <i>C. Flaminium</i>: the general at lake
+  Trasimene. <i>Aliquot annis</i>: one good MS. has <i>annos</i>, cf.
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 4, where all the best MSS. have
+  <i>annos</i>. The ablative is always used to express point of time, and
+  indeed it may be doubted whether the best writers <i>ever</i> use any
+  accusative in that sense, though they do occasionally use the ablative to
+  express duration (cf. Prop. <span class="vol">I.</span> 6, 7 and Madv.
+  <i>Gram.</i> 235, 2). <i>L. Cassium</i>: this is L. Cassius Longinus
+  Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot bill (<i>De Leg.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 35), he was the author of the <i>cui
+  bono</i> principle and so severe a judge as to be called <i>scopulus
+  reorum</i>. Pompeium: apparently the man who made the disgraceful treaty
+  with Numantia repudiated by home in 139 B.C. <i>P. Africanum</i>: i.e.
+  the younger, who supported the ballot bill of Cassius, but seems to have
+  done nothing else for the democrats. <i>Fratres</i>: Lamb. <i>viros</i>,
+  but cf. <i>Brut.</i> 98. <i>P. Scaevolam</i>: the pontifex, consul in the
+  year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against
+  the tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of
+  Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about
+  the legal effect the bills would have. <i>Ut videmus ... ut
+  suspicantur</i>: Halm with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that
+  the statement about Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but
+  him. Those words need not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be
+  allowed the inconsistency.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_14"></a><a href="#BkII_14">�14</a>.</b>
+  <i>Similiter</i>: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have
+  <i>simile</i>. <i>Xenophanem</i>: so Victorius for the MSS.
+  <i>Xenoplatonem</i>. <i>Ed. Rom.</i> (1471) has <i>Cenonem</i>, which
+  would point to <i>Zenonem</i>, but Cic. does not often name Zeno of Elea.
+  <i>Saturninus</i>: of the question why he was an enemy of Lucullus, Goer.
+  says <i>frustra quaeritur</i>. Saturninus was the persistent enemy of
+  Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage.
+  <i>Arcesilae calumnia</i>: this was a common charge, cf. <i>Academicorum
+  calumnia</i> in <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 20 and
+  <i>calumnia</i> in <a href="#BkII_18">18</a> and <a
+  href="#BkII_65">65</a> of this book. So August. <i>Contra Acad.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 1 speaks of <i>Academicorum vel calumnia vel
+  pertinacia vel pericacia</i>. <i>Democriti verecundia</i>: Cic. always
+  has a kind of tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 20 remarks, cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the
+  general <i>arrogantia</i> of the <i>physici</i>. <i>Empedocles quidem ...
+  videatur</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_74">74</a>. The exordium of his poem is
+  meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of the text,
+  see R. and P. 108. <i>Quale sit</i>: the emphasis is on <i>sit</i>, the
+  sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. <i>Quasi modo
+  nascentes</i>: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however <i>T.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 5 <i>ut oratorum laus ... senescat ... ,
+  philosophia nascatur</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_15"></a><a href="#BkII_15">�15</a>.</b>
+  <i>haesitaverunt</i>: Goer. cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  40. <i>Constitutam</i>: so in <a href="#BkII_14">14</a>.
+  <i>Delitisceret</i>: this is the right spelling, not <i>delitesceret</i>,
+  which one good MS. has here, see Corssen <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  285. <i>Negavissent</i>: "had denied, as they said." <i>Tollendus
+  est</i>: a statement which is criticised in <a href="#BkII_74">74</a>.
+  <i>Nominibus differentis ... dissenserunt</i>: genuine Antiochean
+  opinions, see the <i>Academica Posteriora</i> <a href="#BkI_17">17</a>,
+  <a href="#BkI_43">43</a>. <i>De se ipse</i>: very frequent in Cic. (cf.
+  Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 487 <i>b</i>). <i>Diceret</i>: this is omitted by the
+  MSS., but one has <i>agnosceret</i> on the margin; see n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_88">88</a>. <i>Fannius</i>: in his "Annals." The same
+  statement is quoted in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 270,
+  <i>Brutus</i> 299. Brutus had written an epitome of this work of Fannius
+  (<i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">XII.</span> 5, 3).</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_16"></a><a href="#BkII_16">�16</a>.</b>
+  <i>Veteribus</i>: Bentley's em. of MSS. <i>vetera</i>: C.F. Hermann
+  (Schneid <i>Philol.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 457), thinking the
+  departure from the MSS. too great, keeps <i>vetera</i> and changes
+  <i>incognita</i> into <i>incondita</i>, comparing <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 197, <span class="vol">III.</span> 173. A glance,
+  however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the word always means merely
+  "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here is not one between
+  order and no order, but between knowledge and no knowledge, so that
+  <i>incognita</i> is far better. I am not at all certain that the MSS.
+  reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us
+  suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were
+  not <i>knowledge</i>, but mere <i>opinion</i>." The conj. of Kayser
+  <i>veri nota</i> for <i>vetera</i> (cf. <a href="#BkII_76">76</a>) and
+  <i>investigatum</i> below, is fanciful and improbable. <i>Quod
+  investigata sunt</i>: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again
+  disturbs the text which since Madv. <i>Em.</i> 127 supported it (quoting
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 15, Liv. <span
+  class="vol">XXXV.</span> 16) had been settled. Holding that <i>illa</i>
+  in the former sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects
+  <i>nihilne est igitur actum</i> as a dittographia (!) from <a
+  href="#BkII_15">15</a> <i>nihilne explicatum</i>, and reads <i>quot</i>
+  for <i>quod</i> with Bentl. For the meaning cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 69 and Arist. on the progress of philosophy as
+  there quoted. <i>Arcesilas Zenoni ... obtrectans</i>: see n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_34">34</a>. These charges were
+  brought by each school against the other. In Plutarch <i>Adv. Colotem</i>
+  p. 1121 F, want of novelty is charged against Arcesilas, and the charge
+  is at once joyfully accepted by Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was
+  often excused by the provocation Zeno gave, see Aug. <i>Contra Acad.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 14, 15 and notes on fragm. <a
+  href="#FrN_2">2</a> and <a href="#FrN_35">35</a> of the <i>Academica
+  Posteriora</i>. <i>Immutatione verborum</i>: n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_33">33</a>. This phrase has also
+  technical meanings; it translates the Greek <span lang="el"
+  title="tropoi" >&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span>
+  (<i>Brut.</i> 69) and <span lang="el" title="all�goria"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 261, where an ex. is given.
+  <i>Definitiones</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>. <i>Tenebras
+  obducere</i>: such expressions abound in Cic. where the New Academy is
+  mentioned, cf. <a href="#BkII_30">30</a> (<i>lucem eripere</i>),
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 6 (<i>noctem obfundere</i>) Aug.
+  <i>Contra Ac.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 14 (<i>quasdam nebulas
+  obfundere</i>), also the joke of Aug. <span class="vol">II.</span> 29
+  <i>tenebrae quae patronae Academicorum solent esse</i>. <i>Non admodum
+  probata</i>: cf. the passage of Polybius qu. by Zeller 533.
+  <i>Lacyde</i>: the most important passages in ancient authorities
+  concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is important to note that
+  Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became the source of
+  information about his teacher's doctrines. <i>Tenuit</i>: cf. the use of
+  <i>obtinere</i> in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 45. <i>In
+  Aeschine</i>: so Dav. for the confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher
+  see Zeller 533. As two MSS. have <i>hac nonne</i> Christ conj.
+  <i>Hagnone</i> which Halm, as well as Baiter takes; Zeller 533 seems to
+  adopt this and at once confuses the supposed philosopher with one Agnon
+  just mentioned in Quint. <span class="vol">II.</span> 17, 15. There is
+  not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known
+  at all, from these two passages only.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_17"></a><a href="#BkII_17">�17</a>.</b>
+  <i>Patrocinium</i>: for the word cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 6. <i>Non defuit</i>: such patronage <i>was</i>
+  wanting in the time of Arcesilas (<a href="#BkII_16">16</a>).
+  <i>Faciendum omnino non putabant</i>: "Epictetus (Arrian, <i>Diss.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 27, 15) quietly suppresses a sceptic by
+  saying <span lang="el" title="ouk ag� schol�n pros tauta"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BA; &#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3C9;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>" (Zeller 85, n.). In another
+  passage (Arrian, <span class="vol">I.</span> 5) Epict. says it is no more
+  use arguing with a sceptic than with a corpse. <i>Ullam rationem
+  disputare</i>: the same constr. occurs in <a href="#BkII_74">74</a> and
+  <i>Pro Caecina</i> 15, <i>Verr. Act.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 24.
+  <i>Antipatrum</i>: cf. fragm. <a href="#Fr_1">1</a> of Book <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <i>Verbum e verbo</i>: so <a
+  href="#BkII_31">31</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 15,
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 7, not <i>verbum de verbo</i>,
+  which Goer. asserts to be the usual form. <i>Comprehensio</i>: cf. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_41">41</a>. <i>Ut Graeci</i>: for the
+  ellipse of the verb cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_44">44</a> <i>ut Democritus</i>. <i>Evidentiam</i>: other
+  translations proposed by Cic. were <i>illustratio</i> (Quint. <span
+  class="vol">VI.</span> 2, 32) and <i>perspicientia</i> (<i>De Off.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 15). <i>Fabricemur</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_87">87</a>, <a href="#BkII_119">119</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_121">121</a>. <i>Me appellabat</i>: Cic. was the great
+  advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (<i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 15). <i>Sed tamen</i>: this often resumes the
+  interrupted narrative, see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 480. <i>Ipsa evidentia</i>:
+  note that the verb <i>evidere</i> is not Latin.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_18"></a><a href="#BkII_18">�18</a>.</b>
+  <i>Sustinere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_70">70</a>. <i>Pertinaciam</i>: the
+  exact meaning of this may be seen from <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 107, <span class="vol">III.</span> 1. It denotes
+  the character which cannot recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to
+  see the force of an opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term
+  to the Academics, cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_14">14</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_66">66</a>, also <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_44">44</a> and <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 94,
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 13, in the last of which passages
+  the Academy is called <i>procax</i>. <i>Mentitur</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_12">12</a>. <i>Ita negaret</i>: this <i>ita</i> corresponds
+  to <i>si</i> below,&mdash;a common sequence of particles in Cic., cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_19">19</a>. <span lang="el" title="Akatal�pton"
+  >&#x391;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>:
+  the conj. of Turnebus <span lang="el" title="katal�pton"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in <i>negaret</i>.
+  <i>Visum</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_40">40</a>.
+  <i>Trivimus</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_27">27</a>. <i>Visum igitur</i>: the Greek of this definition
+  will be found in Zeller 86. The words <i>impressum effictumque</i> are
+  equivalent to <span lang="el" title="enapesphragismen� kai enapomemagmen�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C6;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>
+  in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to
+  be a real alteration (<span lang="el" title="heteroi�sis"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>)
+  of the material substance of the soul through the action of some external
+  thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf.
+  Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. <i>Ex eo unde esset ... unde non
+  esset</i>: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given
+  by Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in
+  <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 86 <i>Pyrrh.
+  Hypotyp.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 242, the definition is clipt),
+  and in Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 50 (in 46 he gives a
+  clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just referred to). It
+  is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of
+  his <i>Academica</i>) that Cic. omits to represent the words <span
+  lang="el" title="kat' auto to hyparchon" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;'
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. Sextus
+  <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 249 considers them
+  essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at Electra,
+  mistook her for an Erinys. The <span lang="el" title="phantasia"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  therefore which he had although <span lang="el" title="apo hyparchontos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (proceeding from an actually existent thing) was not <span lang="el"
+  title="kata to hyparchon" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, i.e.
+  did not truly represent that existent thing. Aug. <i>Cont. Acad.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses
+  it thus; <i>his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest
+  habere quod falsum est</i>. <i>Iudicium</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="krit�rion"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  a test to distinguish between the unknown and the known. <i>Eo, quo
+  minime volt</i>: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a
+  reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of
+  knowledge on a ground quite different from the <span lang="el"
+  title="katal�ptik� phantasia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, which he
+  pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to
+  suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_11">11</a>, Sextus <i>Pyrr. Hyp.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans
+  believed all things to be <span lang="el" title="akatal�pta"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  Philo held them to be <span lang="el" title="katal�pta"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  and Numenius in Euseb. <i>Praep. Ev.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 8,
+  p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice as a renegade. (2) is
+  evident from the <i>Academica</i> and from Sextus as quoted above. The
+  foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more difficult to
+  comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be <i>in their
+  own nature</i> <span lang="el" title="katal�pta (hoson de epi t� physei t�n pragmat�n aut�n katal.)"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  (&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7; &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;.)</span>. But Arcesilas and Carneades
+  would not have attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that
+  things <i>in themselves</i> were incognisable, <i>but</i> that human
+  faculties do not avail to give information about them. Unless therefore
+  Philo deluded himself with words, there was nothing new to him about such
+  a doctrine. The Stoics by their <span lang="el" title="katal�ptik� phantasia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> professed
+  to be able to get at <i>the thing in itself</i>, in its real being, if
+  then Philo did away with the <span lang="el" title="katal. phant."
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;.
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;.</span> and substituted no other mode of
+  curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense,
+  he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius
+  treats his polemic against the <span lang="el" title="katal. phant."
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;.
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;.</span> as a mere feint intended to cover
+  his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in
+  <a href="#BkII_112">112</a> of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be
+  expressing the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually
+  does. It would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to
+  be "<i>quod impressum esset e vero</i>" (<span lang="el" title="phantasia apo hyparchontos enapomemagmen�"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>),
+  refusing to add "<i>quo modo imprimi non posset a falso</i> (<span
+  lang="el" title="hoia ouk an genoito apo m� hyparchontos"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1; &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BA; &#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B7;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>),
+  cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely tried to show that
+  the cognisable was equivalent to the <span lang="el" title="d�lon"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> or <span lang="el"
+  title="pithanon"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> of Carneades,
+  hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter that the
+  wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite judgments on
+  phenomena. (See <a href="#BkII_78">78</a> of this book.) The scarcity of
+  references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact
+  view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or
+  nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book
+  entitled <i>Academica</i> (pp. 313&mdash;316 of the reprint by Orelli).
+  With regard to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie"
+  consisted. He denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that
+  they were apostles of doubt, to be correct (<a href="#BkII_12">12</a>). I
+  may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical works at the outset of
+  Stobaeus' <i>Ethica</i>, he would appear to have afterwards left
+  dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important for us is,
+  that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the new
+  Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as
+  genuinely Academic. <i>Revolvitur</i>: cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 13, also <a href="#BkII_148">148</a> of this book.
+  <i>Eam definitionem</i>: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the
+  sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single
+  sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these
+  sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that
+  <i>all</i> knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility
+  depends on the truth of the individual perception of sense.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_19">��19</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_29">29</a>.</b> Summary. If the senses are healthy and
+  unimpaired, they give perfectly true information about external things.
+  Not that I maintain the truth of <i>every</i> sensation, Epicurus must
+  see to that. Things which impede the action of the senses must always be
+  removed, in practice we always do remove them where we can (<a
+  href="#BkII_19">19</a>). What power the cultivated senses of painters and
+  musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch! (<a
+  href="#BkII_20">20</a>). After the perceptions of sense come the equally
+  clear perceptions of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of
+  sense, since they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we
+  arrive at definitions and ideas (<a href="#BkII_21">21</a>). If these
+  ideas may possibly be false, logic memory, and all kinds of arts are at
+  once rendered impossible (<a href="#BkII_22">22</a>). That true
+  perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would act, if the
+  things on which he takes action might prove to be false? (<a
+  href="#BkII_23">23</a>) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing
+  certain to guide her? There must he some ground on which action can
+  proceed (<a href="#BkII_24">24</a>). Credence must be given to the thing
+  which impels us to action, otherwise action is impossible (<a
+  href="#BkII_25">25</a>). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an
+  end to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never
+  be discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled,
+  should be brought to light (<a href="#BkII_26">26</a>). Syllogisms are
+  rendered useless, philosophy too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a
+  sure basis (<a href="#BkII_27">27</a>). Hence the Academics have been
+  urged to allow their <i>dogma</i> that perception is impossible, to be a
+  certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades said, would be
+  inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the supposition that there
+  can be <i>any</i> true perception (<a href="#BkII_28">28</a>). Antiochus
+  declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if they
+  had not even confidence in their one dogma (<a
+  href="#BkII_29">29</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_19"></a><a href="#BkII_19">�19</a>.</b>
+  <i>Sensibus</i>: it is important to observe that the word <i>sensus</i>
+  like <span lang="el" title="aisth�sis"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> means
+  two things, (1) one of the <i>five</i> senses, (2) an individual act of
+  sensation. <i>Deus</i>: for the supposed god cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 67. <i>Non videam</i>: this strong statement is
+  ridiculed in <a href="#BkII_80">80</a>. <i>De remo inflexo et de collo
+  columbae</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_79">79</a>, <a href="#BkII_82">82</a>.
+  The <span lang="el" title="k�p� enalos keklasmen�"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3B7; &#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>
+  and <span lang="el" title="peristeras trach�los"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> are
+  frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of the
+  deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g. <i>Pyrrhon. Hypot.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 119-121, <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day
+  before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug. <i>Cont. Ac.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 27. <i>Epicurus hoc viderit</i>: see <a
+  href="#BkII_79">79</a>, <a href="#BkII_80">80</a>. Epic. held all
+  sensation, <i>per se</i>, to be infallible. The chief authorities for
+  this are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote. <i>Lumen
+  mutari</i>: cf. <i>Brut.</i> 261. <i>Intervalla ... diducimus</i>: for
+  this cf. Sext. <i>Pyrrh</i>. <span class="vol">I.</span> 118 <span
+  lang="el" title="pemptos esti logos"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (i.e. the 5th sceptic <span lang="el" title="tropos"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> for showing sense to
+  be untrustworthy) <span lang="el" title="ho para tas theseis"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> (<i>situs</i>) <span
+  lang="el" title="kai ta diast�mata" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>
+  (<i>intervalla</i>) <span lang="el" title="kai tous topous"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;</span>. <i>Multaque facimus
+  usque eo</i>: Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 258
+  <span lang="el" title="panta poiei mechris an tran�n kai pl�ktik�n spas� phantasian"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C2; &#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Sui iudicii</i>: see for the gen. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut.
+  <i>Persa</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 2, 8, quoted by Goer. <i>Sui
+  cuiusque</i>: for this use of <i>suus quisque</i> as a single word see
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 46.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_20"></a><a href="#BkII_20">�20</a>.</b> <i>Ut oculi
+  ... cantibus</i>: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on the other
+  hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. <i>Quis est quin
+  cernat</i>: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here
+  (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 27). <i>Umbris ...
+  eminentia</i>: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses <i>umbra</i> and
+  <i>lumen</i>, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. <span
+  lang="el" title="skia" >&#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> and <span
+  lang="el" title="skiasma"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span> are opposed to
+  <span lang="el" title="lampra"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span>; cf. also <span
+  lang="el" title="skiagraphein"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  <i>adumbrare</i>, and Aesch. <i>Agam</i>. 1328. Cic. often applies
+  metaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g. <i>De Or.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 17, 21. <i>Inflatu</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_86">86</a> (where an answer is given) and <span lang="el"
+  title="anabol�"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B2;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;</span>.
+  <i>Antiopam</i>: of Pacuvius. <i>Andromacham</i>: of Ennius, often quoted
+  by Cic., as <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 23.
+  <i>Interiorem</i>: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's <i>Socrates and the
+  Socratic Schools</i>, 296. <i>Quia sentiatur</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="aisth�sis"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> being
+  their only <span lang="el" title="krit�rion"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to in R.
+  and P. and Zeller will show) conj. <i>cui adsentiatur</i>, comparing <a
+  href="#BkII_39">39</a>, <a href="#BkII_58">58</a>; cf. also <a
+  href="#BkII_76">76</a>. <i>Inter eum ... et inter</i>: for the repetition
+  of <i>inter</i> cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 32 and Madv.
+  <i>Gram.</i> 470. <i>Nihil interesse</i>: if the doctrine of the
+  Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied
+  himself in pleasure, and <i>vice versa</i>; thus the distinction between
+  pleasure and pain would be obscured. <i>Sentiet ... insaniat</i>: For the
+  sequence cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 62 and Wesenberg's
+  fine note on <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 102.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_21"></a><a href="#BkII_21">�21</a>.</b> <i>Illud est
+  album</i>: these are <span lang="el" title="axi�mata"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  judgments of the mind, in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see
+  Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too
+  long to quote entire: <span lang="el" title="aisth�sesi men oun monais labein tal�thes"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3B2;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span> (which resides
+  only in the <span lang="el" title="axi�ma"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>) <span lang="el"
+  title="ou dynatai anthr�pos. ... physei gar eisin alogoi ... dei de eis phantasian achth�nai tou toioutou pragmatos 'touto leukon esti kai touto glyky estin.' t�i de toiout�i pragmati ouketi t�s aisth�se�s ergon estin epiballein ... synese�s te dei kai mn�m�s"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3B4;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;. ...
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3B9; ... &#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C7;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  "&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3BA;&#x3C5; &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;."
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3B9; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B2;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  ... &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B5; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span>. <i>Ille deinceps</i>:
+  <i>deinceps</i> is really out of place; cf. <a href="#BkII_24">24</a>
+  <i>quomodo primum</i> for <i>pr. quom.</i> <i>Ille equus est</i>: Cic.
+  seems to consider that the <span lang="el" title="axi�ma"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>, which affirms the
+  existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the
+  existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from
+  the Greek texts. <i>Expletam comprehensionem</i>: full knowledge. Here we
+  rise to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. <i>Adv.
+  Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> <span lang="el" title="anthr�pos esti z�on logikon thn�ton, nou kai epist�m�s dektikon"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3B6;&#x3C9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B8;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;, &#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. The
+  Stoic <span lang="el" title="horoi"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span>, and this among them, are
+  amusingly ridiculed, <i>Pyrrh. Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  208&mdash;211. <i>Notitiae</i>: this Cic. uses as a translation both of
+  <span lang="el" title="prol�psis"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> and
+  <span lang="el" title="ennoia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, for which see Zeller
+  79, 89. In <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_40">40</a>
+  <i>notiones rerum</i> is given. <i>Sine quibus</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="dia gar t�n ennoi�n ta pragmata lambanetai" >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B2;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 42.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_22"></a><a href="#BkII_22">�22</a>.</b>
+  <i>Igitur</i>: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 480.
+  <i>Consentaneum</i>: so Sextus constantly uses <span lang="el"
+  title="akolouthon"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Repugnaret</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_19">19</a> and n. <i>Memoriae certe</i>: n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_106">106</a>. <i>Continet</i>: cf. <i>contineant</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_40">40</a>. <i>Quae potest esse</i>: Cic. nearly always
+  writes <i>putat esse</i>, <i>potest esse</i> and the like, not <i>esse
+  putat</i> etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a clause.
+  <i>Memoria falsorum</i>: this difficulty is discussed in Plato
+  <i>Sophist.</i> 238&mdash;239. <i>Ex multis animi perceptionibus</i>: the
+  same definition of an art occurs in <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 148, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 18
+  (see Madv.), Quint, <span class="vol">II.</span> 17, 41, Sext. <i>Pyrrh.
+  Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 188 <span lang="el" title="techn�n einai syst�ma ek katal�pseon syngegymnasmen�n"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B1; &#x3B5;&#x3BA;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 250. <i>Quam</i>: for the change
+  from plural to singular (<i>perceptio in universum</i>) cf. n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_38">38</a>, Madv. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 61, <i>Em.</i> 139. <i>Qui distingues</i>: Sext.
+  <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 280 <span lang="el"
+  title="ou dioisei t�s atechnias h� techn�" >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2; &#x201B;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>. Sextus often comments on
+  similar complaints of the Stoics. <i>Aliud eiusmodi genus sit</i>: this
+  distinction is as old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence
+  in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XI.</span> 197 who adds a third class of <span lang="el"
+  title="technai" >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> called
+  <span lang="el" title="apotelesmatikai"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  to the usual <span lang="el" title="the�r�tikai"
+  >&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  and <span lang="el" title="praktikai"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>,
+  also Quint. <span class="vol">II.</span> 18, 1 and 2, where <span
+  lang="el" title="poi�tik�"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>
+  corresponds to the <span lang="el" title="apot."
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;.</span> of Sext. <i>Continget</i>: "will be
+  the natural consequence." The notion that the verb <i>contingit</i>
+  denotes necessarily <i>good</i> fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer
+  on <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 4. <i>Tractabit</i>: <span
+  lang="el" title="mellei metacheirizesthai"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_23"></a><a href="#BkII_23">�23</a>.</b>
+  <i>Cognitio</i>: like Germ. <i>lehre</i>, the branch of learning which
+  concerns the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of
+  <span lang="el" title="katal�psis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  here. <i>In quibus</i>: the antecedent is not <i>virtutum</i>, as Petrus
+  Valentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby,
+  but <i>multa</i>. This is shown by <i>etiam</i>; not <i>merely</i> the
+  virtues but <i>also</i> all <span lang="el" title="epist�m�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> depends
+  on <span lang="el" title="katal�pseis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>;
+  cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_40">40</a>, <a
+  href="#BkI_41">41</a>, with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367.
+  <i>Stabilem</i>: <span lang="el" title="bebaion kai ametapt�tou"
+  >&#x3B2;&#x3B5;&#x3B2;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;</span>.
+  <i>Artem vivendi</i>: "<i>tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos</i>"
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 42. Sextus constantly talks
+  about <span lang="el" title="h� oneiropoloumen� peri ton bion techn�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>
+  (<i>Pyrrh. Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 250) the existence of
+  which he disproves to his own satisfaction (<i>Adv. Math.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XI.</span> 168 sq). <i>Ille vir bonus</i>: in all ancient
+  systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness of the <i>sapiens</i> must be
+  proof against the rack; cf. esp. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 29, 75, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the <span lang="el"
+  title="sophos" >&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> in Plato's
+  <i>Gorgias</i>. <i>Potius quam aut</i>: Lamb. <i>ut</i>; but I think C.F.
+  Hermann is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. <i>never</i>
+  inserts <i>ut</i> after <i>potius quam</i> with the subj. Tischer on
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 52 affirms that <i>ut</i> is
+  frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. <i>De Off.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 86, Aug. <i>Cont. Ac.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 12 who says the <i>sapiens</i> of the Academy must
+  be <i>desertor officiorum omnium</i>. <i>Comprehensi ... constituti</i>:
+  cf. the famous <i>abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit</i>. <i>Iis rebus</i>:
+  note the assumption that the <i>sensation</i> corresponds to the
+  <i>thing</i> which causes it. <i>Adsensus sit ... possint</i>: nearly all
+  edd. before Halm read <i>possunt</i>, but the subj. expresses the
+  possibility as present to the mind of the supposed <i>vir bonus</i>. Cf.
+  Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 368.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_24"></a><a href="#BkII_24">�24</a>.</b>
+  <i>Primum</i>: out of place, see on <a href="#BkIIN_21">21</a>.
+  <i>Agere</i>: the dogmatist always held that the sceptic must, if
+  consistent, be <span lang="el" title="anenerg�tos en bi�i"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;</span> (Sext. <i>Pyrrh.
+  Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 23). <i>Extremum</i>: similar
+  attempts to translate <span lang="el" title="telos"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> are made in D.F. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 11, 29, <span class="vol">V.</span> 17. <i>Cum quid
+  agere</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_23">23</a> for
+  the phrase <i>Naturae accommodatum</i>. a purely Stoic expression, <span
+  lang="el" title="h�moi�menon t� physei"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B7; &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;</span>; cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_38">38</a> and <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 17,
+  also <span class="vol">III.</span> 16, Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P.
+  390. <i>Impellimur</i>: <span lang="el" title="kinoumetha"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 391, as often.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_25"></a><a href="#BkII_25">�25</a>.</b> <i>Oportet
+  videri</i>: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_39">39</a>, <a href="#BkII_81">81</a> and <a
+  href="#BkII_122">122</a> of this book. <i>Videri</i> at the end of this
+  section has the weak sense, "to seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly
+  from the one use to the other; cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> 262 with
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 270, and Munro's n., also <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 52, <i>Em. Liv.</i> p. 42. <i>Non poterit</i>: as
+  the Academics allege. <i>Naturae ... alienum</i>: Cic. uses this
+  adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by <i>ab</i>;
+  I doubt whether the phrase <i>maiestate alienum</i> (without the
+  preposition) can be right in <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  102, where the best texts still keep it. <i>Non occurrit ... aget</i>:
+  occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_127">127</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_26"></a><a href="#BkII_26">�26</a>.</b> <i>Quid quod
+  si</i>: Goer., outrageously reads <i>quid quod si, si</i>.
+  <i>Tollitur</i>: the verb <i>tollere</i> occurs as frequently in this
+  sense as <span lang="el" title="anairein"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span> does in
+  Sextus. <i>Lux lumenque</i>: Bentl. <i>dux</i> The expression <i>dux
+  vitae</i> is of course frequent (cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 40, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 5 and
+  Lucretius), but there is no need to alter. <i>Lux</i> is properly natural
+  light, <i>lumen</i> artificial, cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XVI.</span> 13, 1. <i>lumina dimiseramus, nec satis
+  lucebat</i>, D.F. <span class="vol">III.</span> 45 <i>solis luce ...
+  lumen lucernae</i>. There is the same difference between <span lang="el"
+  title="ph�s" >&#x3C6;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span> and <span lang="el"
+  title="phengos" >&#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>, the
+  latter is used for the former (<span lang="el" title="phengos h�liou"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;</span>) just as <i>lumen</i>
+  is for <i>lux</i> (<i>si te secundo lumine his offendere</i>&mdash;<i>Ad
+  Att.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 26, 1) but not often <i>vice
+  versa</i>. Trans. "the luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. Sext.
+  <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 269 where the <span
+  lang="el" title="phantasia"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> is
+  called <span lang="el" title="phengos"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>. <i>Finis</i>: so in
+  the beginning of the <i>Nicom. Eth.</i> Aristot. assumes that the actual
+  existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof that there is a <span
+  lang="el" title="telos" >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  <i>Aperta</i>: a reminiscence of the frequently recurring Greek terms
+  <span lang="el" title="ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  etc., cf. Sextus <i>passim</i>, and <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 30. <i>Initium ... exitus</i> = <span lang="el"
+  title="arch� ... telos" >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B7; ...
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>. <i>Tenetur</i>: MSS.
+  <i>tenet</i>, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be <i>ratio</i> above.
+  <span lang="el" title="Apodeixis"
+  >&#x391;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>:
+  cf. the definition very often given by Sext. e.g. <i>Pyrrh. Hyp.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 143 <span lang="el" title="logos di' homologoumen�n l�mmat�n"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C2; &#x3B4;&#x3B9;'
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (premisses) <span lang="el" title="kata synag�g�n epiphoran"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3C9;&#x3B3;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (conclusion) <span lang="el" title="ekkalypt�n ad�lon"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, also Diog. <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 45, <span lang="el" title="logon dia t�n mallon katalambanomen�n to h�tton katalambanomenon perainonta"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B2;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B2;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>
+  (if the reading be right).</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_27"></a><a href="#BkII_27">�27</a>.</b>
+  <i>Notio</i>: another trans. of <span lang="el" title="ennoia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>. <i>Conclusisse</i>:
+  although the Greeks used <span lang="el" title="symperasma"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>
+  instead of <span lang="el" title="epiphora"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span> sometimes for
+  the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb <span
+  lang="el" title="symperainein"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  which has been supposed to correspond to <i>concludere</i>. It is more
+  likely to be a trans. of <span lang="el" title="synagein"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>, and
+  <i>conclusum argumentum</i> of <span lang="el" title="synaktikos logos"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>, which terms are of frequent
+  occurrence. <i>Rationibus progredi</i>: to a similar question Sextus
+  answers, <span lang="el" title="ouk estin anankaion tas ekeinon"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BA; &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> (the dogmatists)
+  <span lang="el" title="dogmatologias probainein, plasmat�deis hyparchousas"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B2;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (<i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 367). <i>Sapientiae ...
+  futurum est</i>: for the dat. with <i>facio</i> and <i>fio</i> see Madv.
+  <i>Gram.</i> 241, obs. 5, <i>Opusc.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 370,
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 79, and cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_96">96</a> of this book. <i>Lex veri rectique</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_29">29</a>; the <i>constitutio veri</i> and the determination
+  of what is <i>rectum</i> in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy.
+  <i>Sapientique satis non sit</i>: so Manut. for the <i>sapientisque
+  sit</i> of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads <i>sapientis, neque satis
+  sit</i>, which I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the
+  construction will run <i>neque dubitari potest quin satis sit</i>, which
+  gives the exact opposite of the sense required. <i>Ratum</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_141">141</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_28"></a><a href="#BkII_28">�28</a>.</b>
+  <i>Perceptum</i>: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are
+  very frequent in Sextus, e.g. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VIII.</span> 281, where the dogmatist argues that if proof be
+  impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to show it
+  impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be <i>provable</i>. Cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_109">109</a> of this book. <i>Postulanti</i>: making it a
+  necessity for the discussion; cf. <i>De Leg.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 21. <i>Consentaneum esse</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="akolouthon einai"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>. <i>Ut alia</i>:
+  <i>although</i> others. <i>Tantum abest ut&mdash;ut</i>: cf. Madv.
+  <i>Gram.</i> 440 a.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_29"></a><a href="#BkII_29">�29</a>.</b>
+  <i>Pressius</i>: cf. <i>De Fato</i> 31, 33, <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 20, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 14,
+  <i>Hortensius</i> fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in <a
+  href="#BkII_109">109</a>. <i>Decretum</i>: of course the Academics would
+  say they did not hold this <span lang="el" title="dogma"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span> as <i>stabile fixum ratum</i>
+  but only as <i>probabile</i>. Sextus however <i>Pyrrh. Hyp.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in
+  reality what in words they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma.
+  <i>Sentitis enim</i>: cf. <i>sentis</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 26. <i>Fluctuare</i>: "to be at sea," Halm
+  <i>fluctuari</i>, but the deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic.
+  <i>Summa</i>: cf. <i>summa philosophiae</i> <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 86. <i>Veri falsi</i>: cf. n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_92">92</a>. <i>Quae visa</i>: so Halm for MSS.
+  <i>quaevis</i>, which edd. had changed to <i>quae a quovis</i>.
+  <i>Repudiari</i>: the selection depended on the <i>probabile</i> of
+  course, with the Academics. <i>Veri falsique</i>: these words were used
+  in different senses by the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by
+  them "the undestructibly true and false." This being so, the statements
+  in the text are in no sense arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext.
+  says, <span lang="el" title="psil� phasei ison pheretai psil� phasis"
+  >&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3B7; &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3B7; &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (<i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 315), <span lang="el"
+  title="phasei men phasis epischeth�setai"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  (<i>ib.</i> 337). <i>Cognoscendi initium</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_26">26</a>, "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in my
+  <i>probabile</i>." <i>Extremum expetendi</i>: a rather unusual phrase for
+  the ethical <i>finis</i>. <i>Ut moveri non possint</i>: so <span
+  lang="el" title="kineisthai"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  is perpetually used in Sext. <i>Est ut opinor</i>: so Halm after Ernesti
+  for <i>sit</i> of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS. reading
+  is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the Greek
+  <span lang="el" title="hikanos eio�sth�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3C9;</span> and the like.
+  The subj. is supported by <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 20,
+  <i>De Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 8, <i>Ad Att.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XIII.</span> 14, 3, where <i>ut opinor</i> is thrown in as
+  here, and by <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> <a
+  href="#BkII_17">17</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 21, 24,
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 109, where <i>si placet</i> is
+  appended in a similar way.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_30">��30</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_36">36</a>.</b> Summary. With respect to physical science, we
+  might urge that nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is
+  naturally formed for the attainment of knowledge (<a
+  href="#BkII_30">30</a>). For this purpose the mind uses the senses, and
+  so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection of the reason.
+  Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained through the
+  senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (<a
+  href="#BkII_31">31</a>). Some sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others
+  distinguish between the absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of
+  its absolute presence. Let us deal with these rather than with the former
+  (<a href="#BkII_32">32</a>). Now they on the one hand profess to
+  distinguish between true and false, and on the other hold that no
+  absolutely certain method for distinguishing between true and false is
+  possible (<a href="#BkII_33">33</a>). This is absurd, a thing cannot be
+  known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing. How
+  can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility remains
+  that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be "evident" at all
+  if it may be after all a mere phantom (<a href="#BkII_34">34</a>)? There
+  is no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.
+  Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (<a
+  href="#BkII_35">35</a>). Even if they only profess to decide after
+  careful pondering of the circumstances, we reply that a decision which is
+  still possibly false is useless (<a href="#BkII_36">36</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_30"></a><a href="#BkII_30">�30</a>.</b>
+  <i>Physicis</i>: neuter not masc.; cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_6">6</a>. <i>Libertatem et licentiam</i>: <i>et</i> = "and
+  even." <i>Libertas</i> = <span lang="el" title="parr�sia"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> as often
+  in Tacitus. <i>Abditis rebus et obscuris</i>: cf. n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_15">15</a>, and the word <span
+  lang="el" title="syneskiasmenos"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 26. <i>Lucem
+  eripere</i>: like <i>tollere</i> (n. on <a href="#BkIIN_26">26</a>), cf.
+  <a href="#BkII_38">38</a>, <a href="#BkII_103">103</a> and <i>N.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 6. For the sense see n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_16">16</a>, also <a href="#BkII_61">61</a>.
+  <i>Artificio</i>: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to <i>ars</i>
+  in all its senses, cf. <a href="#BkII_114">114</a> and <i>De Or.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 83. <i>Fabricata esset</i>: the expression
+  is sneered at in <a href="#BkII_87">87</a>. <i>Quem ad modum primum</i>:
+  so Halm rightly for MSS. <i>prima</i> or <i>primo</i>, which latter is
+  not often followed by <i>deinde</i> in Cicero. <i>Primum</i> is out of
+  position, as in <a href="#BkII_24">24</a>. <i>Appetitio pulsa</i>: =
+  <i>mota</i>, set in motion. For <span lang="el" title="horm�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> see <a
+  href="#BkII_24">24</a>. <i>Intenderemus</i>: as in the exx. given in <a
+  href="#BkII_20">20</a>. <i>Fons</i>: "reservoir," rather than "source"
+  here. It will be noted that <span lang="el" title="synkatathesis"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  must take place before the <span lang="el" title="horm�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> is roused. <i>Ipse sensus
+  est</i>: an approach to this theory is made in Plat. <i>Theaet.</i> 185,
+  191. Cf. especially Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span>
+  350 <span lang="el" title="kai hoi men diapherein aut�n t�n aisth�se�n, h�s hoi pleious, hoi de aut�n einai tas aisth�seis ... h�s stase�s �rxe Straton"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3B9; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x201B;&#x3C9;&#x3C2; &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;, &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2; ...
+  &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3C2; &#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3BE;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3A3;&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. All powers of
+  sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included
+  in the <span lang="el" title="h�gemonikon"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_38">38</a>. <i>Alia
+  quasi</i>: so Faber for <i>aliqua</i>. "<i>In vera et aperta partitione
+  nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis&mdash;alius dixit, multo minus
+  alius&mdash;aliquis</i>," <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 63.
+  Goer. on the other hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he
+  forbears however, to produce them. <i>Recondit</i>: so the <span
+  lang="el" title="ennoiai"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> are called
+  <span lang="el" title="apokeimenai no�seis"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> (Plut. <i>De
+  Sto. Repug.</i> p. 1057 a). In Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 373 <span lang="el" title="mn�m�"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> is called <span lang="el"
+  title="th�saurismos phantasi�n"
+  >&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Similitudinibus</i>: <span lang="el" title="kath' homoi�sin"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;'
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  Sext. <i>Pyrr. Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 75. Cic. uses this
+  word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know things not
+  immediately perceived by sense. In <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see
+  Madv. there, and the passages he quotes, "analogies" will here best
+  translate the word, which, is used in the same wide sense in <i>N.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 22 38. <i>Construit</i>: so MSS. Orelli gave
+  <i>constituit</i>. <i>Notitiae</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>. Cic.
+  fails to distinguish between the <span lang="el" title="physikai ennoiai"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> or <span
+  lang="el" title="koinai"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> which are the <span
+  lang="el" title="prol�pseis"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  and those <span lang="el" title="ennoiai"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> which are the
+  conscious product of the reason, in the Stoic system. Cf. <i>M.D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 21, <span class="vol">V.</span> 60, for
+  this and other inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also
+  Zeller 79. <i>Rerumque</i>: "facts". <i>Perfecta</i>: <i>sapientia</i>,
+  <i>virtus</i>, <i>perfecta ratio</i>, are almost convertible terms in the
+  expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_20">20</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_31"></a><a href="#BkII_31">�31</a>.</b> <i>Vitaeque
+  constantiam</i>: which philosophy brings, see <a href="#BkII_23">23</a>.
+  <i>Cognitionem</i>: <span lang="el" title="epist�m�n"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Cognitio</i> is used to translate <span lang="el" title="katal�psis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 16, <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 17, cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_41">41</a>. <i>Ut dixi ... dicemus</i>: For the repetition
+  cf. <a href="#BkII_135">135</a>, <a href="#BkII_146">146</a>, and
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 41. The future tense is odd and
+  unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote <i>dicimus</i>, I would rather read
+  <i>dicamus</i>; cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_29">29</a>. <i>Per se</i>:
+  <span lang="el" title="kath' aut�n" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;'
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>, there is no need to read
+  <i>propter</i>, as Lamb. <i>Ut virtutem efficiat</i>: note that virtue is
+  throughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the
+  <i>reason</i>. <i>Evertunt</i>: cf. <i>eversio</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_99">99</a>. <i>Animal ... animo</i>: Cic. allows
+  <i>animus</i> to all animals, not merely <i>anima</i>; see Madv.
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v.
+  <i>animans</i> is therefore wrong. <i>Temeritate</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="propeteia"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  which occurs <i>passim</i> in Sext. The word, which is constantly hurled
+  at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of retort. So in
+  Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 260, the sceptic is
+  called <span lang="el" title="embront�tos"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B2;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  for rejecting the <span lang="el" title="katal�ptik� phantasia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_32"></a><a href="#BkII_32">�32</a>.</b>
+  <i>Incerta</i>: <span lang="el" title="ad�la"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;</span>. <i>Democritus</i>: cf. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_44">44</a>. <i>Quae ...
+  abstruserit</i>: "<i>because</i> she has hidden." <i>Alii autem</i>: note
+  the ellipse of the verb, and cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_2">2</a>. <i>Etiam queruntur</i>: "actually complain;" "go so
+  far as to complain." <i>Inter incertum</i>: cf. Numenius in Euseb. <i>Pr.
+  Ev.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 7, 12, <span lang="el"
+  title="diaphoran einai ad�lou kai akatal�ptou, kai panta men einai akatal�pta ou panta de ad�la"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;,
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;</span> (quoted as from Carneades),
+  also <a href="#BkII_54">54</a> of this book. <i>Docere</i>: "to prove,"
+  cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_121">121</a>. <i>Qui haec distinguunt</i>: the
+  followers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_45">45</a>. <i>Stellarum
+  numerus</i>: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in Sext.
+  e.g. <i>P.H</i>. <span class="vol">II.</span> 90, 98, <i>A.M</i>. <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 243, <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 147, 317;
+  where it is reckoned among things <span lang="el" title="ai�nion echonta agn�sian"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>. So in
+  the Psalms, God only "telleth the number of the stars;" cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_110">110</a>. <i>Aliquos</i>: contemptuous; <span lang="el"
+  title="aponeno�menous tinas"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>. Cf. <i>Parad.</i> 33
+  <i>agrestis aliquos</i>. <i>Moveri</i>: this probably refers to the
+  speech of Catulus; see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_li">51</a>. Aug.
+  <i>Cont. Ac.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 15 refers to this passage,
+  which must have been preserved in the second edition.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_33"></a><a href="#BkII_33">�33</a>.</b> <i>Veri et
+  falsi</i>: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first clause, and
+  Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and appropriate.
+  "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and the false
+  while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether." The
+  discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use
+  the term "true" to denote the <i>probably true</i>, the Academics are not
+  open to the criticism here attempted; cf. <a href="#BkII_111">111</a>
+  <i>tam vera quam falsa cernimus</i>. <i>Ut inter rectum et pravum</i>:
+  the sceptic would no more allow the absolute certainty of this
+  distinction than of the other. <i>Communis</i>: the <span lang="el"
+  title="aparallaktos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf. <span
+  lang="el" title="koin� phantasia al�thous kai pseudous"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;</span> Sext.
+  <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 164 (R. and P. 410), also 175.
+  <i>Notam</i>: the <span lang="el" title="s�meion"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> of Sextus; cf.
+  esp. <i>P.H</i>. <span class="vol">II.</span> 97 sq. <i>Eodem modo
+  falsum</i>: Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 164 (R. and
+  P. 410) <span lang="el" title="oudemia estin al�th�s phantasia hoia ouk an genoito pseud�s"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1; &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BA; &#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span>. <i>Ut si quis</i>:
+  Madv. in an important n. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 30
+  explains this thus; <i>ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, possit
+  dicere</i>. I do not think our passage at all analogous to those he
+  quotes, and still prefer to construe <i>quem</i> as a strong relative,
+  making a pause between <i>quis</i> and <i>quem</i>. <i>Visionem</i>:
+  Simply another trans. of <span lang="el" title="phantasia"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>. <i>Ut
+  Carneades</i>: see Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 166
+  <span lang="el" title="t�n te pithan�n phantasian kai t�n pithan�n hama kai aperispaston kai diex�deumen�n"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3BE;&#x3C9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (R. and P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524
+  "probable undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own
+  explanation. The merely <span lang="el" title="pithan�"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span> is that sensation
+  which at first sight, without any further inquiry, seems probably true
+  (Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 167&mdash;175). Now no
+  sensation is perceived <i>alone</i>; the percipient subject has always
+  other synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (<span
+  lang="el" title="perispan, perielkein"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>)
+  from the one which is the immediate object of his attention. This last is
+  only called <span lang="el" title="aperispastos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  when examination has shown all the concomitant sensations to be in
+  harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175&mdash;181.) The word "undisputed,"
+  therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The <span lang="el"
+  title="diex�deumen�"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3BE;&#x3C9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>
+  ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent agreement of
+  the concomitant sensations with the principal one. Circumstances quite
+  external to the sensations themselves must be examined; the time at which
+  they occur, or during which they continue; the condition of the space
+  within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between the person
+  and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the person's
+  mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext.
+  181&mdash;189).</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_34"></a><a href="#BkII_34">�34</a>.</b>
+  <i>Communitas</i>: <span lang="el" title="aparallaxia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  or <span lang="el" title="epimixia t�n phantasi�n"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>;
+  Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 403, <i>P.H.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 127. <i>Proprium</i>: so Sext. often uses <span
+  lang="el" title="idioma"
+  >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>, e.g. <i>A. M.</i>
+  <span class="vol">IX.</span> 410. <i>Signo notari</i>: <i>signo</i> for
+  <i>nota</i>, merely from love of variety. The <i>in</i> before
+  <i>communi</i>, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly
+  sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after
+  <i>notare</i> in <i>De Or.</i>, <span class="vol">III.</span> 186.
+  <i>Convicio</i>: so Madv. <i>Em.</i> 143 corrected the corrupt MSS.
+  readings, comparing <i>Orator</i> 160, <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XV.</span> 18. A.W. Zumpt on <i>Pro Murena</i> 13 rightly
+  defines the Ciceronian use of the word, "<i>Non unum maledictum
+  appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio</i>." He is
+  wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word <i>once</i> in the
+  plural (<i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 18, 1), for it occurs
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 20, and elsewhere.
+  <i>Perspicua</i>: <span lang="el" title="enarg�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B7;</span>, a term used with
+  varying signification by all the later Greek schools. <i>Verum illud
+  quidem</i>: "which is indeed what <i>they</i> call 'true'."
+  <i>Impressum</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>. <i>Percipi atque
+  comprehendi</i>: Halm retains the barbarous <i>ac</i> of the MSS. before
+  the guttural. It is quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The
+  two verbs are both trans. of <span lang="el" title="katalambanesthai"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B2;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>;
+  Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described in <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 14 <i>erit notius quale sit, pluribus
+  notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus</i>. <i>Subtiliter</i>: Cic.'s
+  constant trans. of <span lang="el" title="akrib�s"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B2;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span> or <span
+  lang="el" title="kat' akribeian" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;'
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B2;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (<i>passim</i> in Sext. e.g. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  123). <i>Inaniterne moveatur</i>: MSS. agree in <i>ve</i> for <i>ne</i>,
+  on which see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 76.
+  <i>Inaniter</i> = <span lang="el" title="ken�s"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span> = <span lang="el"
+  title="pseud�s" >&#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span>. Cf.
+  n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_35">35</a>, also <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_47">47</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 3 (<i>inaniter moveri</i>), <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 13, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  120, 126, 140 (<i>per se moveri</i>), Greek <span lang="el"
+  title="kenopathein"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 49), <span lang="el"
+  title="kenopatheia"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  (= <i>inanis motus</i>, Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span>
+  184), <span lang="el" title="kenopath�mata kai anaplasmata t�s dianoias"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (<i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 354), <span lang="el"
+  title="diakenos helkysmos"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3BA;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (<i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 241), <span lang="el"
+  title="diakenos phantasia"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  (<i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 67), and the frequent phrase
+  <span lang="el" title="kin�ma t�s dianoias"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B1; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>. For the
+  meaning see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_47">47</a>. <i>Relinquitur</i>: so in
+  Sext. <span lang="el" title="apoleipein"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  is constantly used as the opposite of <span lang="el" title="anairein"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (<i>tollere</i>).</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_35"></a><a href="#BkII_35">�35</a>.</b>
+  <i>Neminem</i> etc.: they are content to make strong statements without
+  any mark of certainty. <i>Primo quasi adspectu</i>: the <i>merely</i>
+  <span lang="el" title="pithan� phantasia"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> is here
+  meant; see <a href="#BkII_33">33</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_36"></a><a href="#BkII_36">�36</a>.</b> <i>Ex
+  circumspectione</i>, etc.: the <span lang="el" title="diex�deumen�"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3BE;&#x3C9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>;
+  see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_33">33</a>. <i>Primum quia ... deinde</i>: for
+  the slight anacoluthia, cf. <i>M.D.F</i> ed. <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  p. 796. <i>Iis visis</i>, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of
+  <i>things</i>, emitting a number of <i>appearances</i>, and you cannot be
+  sure of uniting each <i>appearance</i> to the <i>thing</i> from which it
+  proceeds, then you can have no faith in any <i>appearance</i> even if you
+  have gone through the process required by Carneades' rules. <i>Ad verum
+  ipsum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_40">40</a>. <i>Quam proxime</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_47">47</a>, and also <a href="#BkII_7">7</a>. <i>Insigne</i>:
+  <span lang="el" title="s�meion"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, the same as
+  <i>nota</i> and <i>signum</i> above. <i>Quo obscurato</i>: so Lamb. for
+  MSS. <i>obscuro</i> which Halm keeps. Cf. <i>quam obscurari volunt</i> in
+  <a href="#BkII_42">42</a> and <i>quo sublato</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_33">33</a>. <i>Argumentum</i>: Cic. seems to be thinking of
+  the word <span lang="el" title="tekm�rion"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  which, however, the Stoics hardly use. <i>Id quod significatur</i>: <span
+  lang="el" title="to s�mei�nton" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  in Sext.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_37">��37</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_40">40</a>.</b> Summary The distinction of an animal is to
+  act. You must either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to
+  assent to phenomena (<a href="#BkII_37">37</a>). Mind, memory, the arts
+  and virtue itself, require a firm assent to be given to some phenomena,
+  he therefore who does away with assent does away with all action in life
+  (<a href="#BkII_38">38</a>, <a href="#BkII_39">39</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_37"></a><a href="#BkII_37">�37</a>.</b>
+  <i>Explicabamus</i>: <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_21">21</a> and <a href="#BkII_30">30</a> (<i>quae vis esset
+  in sensibus</i>). <i>Inanimum</i>: not <i>inanimatum</i>, cf.
+  <i>M.D.F</i>. <span class="vol">IV.</span> 36. <i>Agit aliquid</i>: <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_23">23</a>. <i>Quae est in
+  nostra</i>: Walker's insertion of <i>non</i> before <i>est</i> is
+  needless, cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_40">40</a>. It is the impact of the sensation from without,
+  not the assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VIII.</span> 397 <span lang="el" title="to men gar phantasi�th�nai aboul�ton �n"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B2;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>). For <i>in potestate</i> cf. <i>De Fato</i> 9,
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 69</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_38"></a><a href="#BkII_38">�38</a>.</b>
+  <i>Eripitur</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_30">30</a>. <i>Neque sentire</i>:
+  Christ om. <i>neque</i>; but the sceptics throughout are supposed to rob
+  people of their senses. <i>Cedere</i>: cf. <span lang="el" title="eikein, eixis"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> in Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 193, 230, Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 51,
+  <span lang="el" title="t�n de aisth�tik�n meta eixe�s kai synkatathese�s ginontai [hai phantasia\]"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BE;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  [&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;]</span>; also <a
+  href="#BkII_66">66</a> of this book. <span lang="el" title="Oikeion"
+  >&#x39F;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_34">34</a>. <i>Adsentitur statim</i>: this really contradicts
+  a good deal that has gone before, esp. <a href="#BkII_20">20</a>.
+  <i>Memoriam</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>. <i>In nostra
+  potestate</i>: this may throw light on fragm. <a href="#Fr_15">15</a> of
+  the <i>Ac. Post.</i>, which see.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_39"></a><a href="#BkII_39">�39</a>.</b>
+  <i>Virtus</i>: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral
+  action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_40">40</a>. <i>Ante videri
+  aliquid</i> for the doctrine cf. <a href="#BkII_25">25</a>, for the
+  passive use of <i>videri</i>, n. on <a href="#BkIIN_25">25</a>.
+  <i>Adsentiatur</i>: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. <i>Em.</i>
+  131, the change of construction from infin. to subj. after <i>necesse
+  est</i> on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 25. <i>Tollit e
+  vita</i>: so <i>De Fato</i> 29.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_40">��40</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_42">42</a>.</b> Summary. The Academics have a regular method.
+  They first give a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the
+  different classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong
+  arguments, (1) <i>things</i> which produce <i>sensations</i> such as
+  might have been produced in the same form by other <i>things</i>, cannot
+  be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2)
+  <i>sensations</i> must be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties
+  do not enable us to distinguish between them. Then they proceed.
+  Sensations are partly true, partly false, the false cannot of course be
+  real <i>perceptions</i>, while the true are always of a form which the
+  false <i>may</i> assume. Now sensations which are indistinguishable from
+  false cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no
+  sensation which is also a perception (<a href="#BkII_40">40</a>). Two
+  admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot
+  be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false,
+  cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. The following two assertions
+  they strive to prove, (1) sensations are partly true, partly false, (2)
+  every sensation which proceeds from a reality, has a form which it might
+  have if it proceeded from an unreality (<a href="#BkII_41">41</a>). To
+  prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are
+  sensations, and those which are deduced from sensations; after which they
+  show that credit cannot be given to either class (<a
+  href="#BkII_42">42</a>). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a
+  certainly known sensation."]</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_40"></a><a href="#BkII_40">�40</a>.</b> <i>Quasi
+  fundamenta</i>: a trans. probably of <span lang="el" title="themelios"
+  >&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> or the
+  like; cf. <span lang="el" title="h�sper themelios"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C9;&#x3C3;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> in Sext.
+  <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 50. <i>Artem</i>: method, like
+  <span lang="el" title="techn�"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>, cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 4, Mayor on Iuv. <span class="vol">VII.</span>
+  177. <i>Vim</i>: the general character which attaches to all <span
+  lang="el" title="phantasiai"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>;
+  <i>genera</i> the different classes of <span lang="el" title="phantasiai"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>.
+  <i>Totidem verbis</i>: of course with a view to showing that nothing
+  really corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the
+  <i>reductio ad absurdum</i> method. <i>Contineant ... quaestionem</i>:
+  cf. <a href="#BkII_22">22</a> and <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 65 <i>una res videtur causam continere</i>.
+  <i>Quae ita</i>: it is essential throughout this passage to distinguish
+  clearly the <i>sensation</i> (<i>visum</i>) from the <i>thing</i> which
+  causes it. Here the <i>things</i> are meant; two <i>things</i> are
+  supposed to cause two <i>sensations</i> so similar that the person who
+  has one of the <i>sensations</i> cannot tell from which of the two
+  <i>things</i> it comes. Under these circumstances the sceptics urge that
+  it is absurd to divide <i>things</i> into those which can be perceived
+  (known with certainty) and those which cannot. <i>Nihil interesse
+  autem</i>: the sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity
+  of the two sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is
+  enough if he can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to
+  discern whatever difference may exist, cf. <a href="#BkII_85">85</a>.
+  <i>Alia vera sunt</i>: Numenius in Euseb. <i>Pr. Ev.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XIV.</span> 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and
+  falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of <i>things</i>,
+  though not of <i>sensations</i>. If we could only pierce <i>through</i> a
+  sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to
+  believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume
+  that <i>sensation</i> and <i>thing</i> correspond. Cf. Sext. <i>P.H.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 22 <span lang="el" title="peri men tou phaisthai toion � toion to hypokeimenon"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B7;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds) <span lang="el"
+  title="oudeis is�s amphisb�tei, peri de tou ei toiouton estin hopoion phainetai z�teitai"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2; &#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B2;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;,
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9; &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B6;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>. Neither
+  Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some modern sceptics have done,
+  the actual existence of things which cause sensations, they simply
+  maintained that, granting the existence of the things, our sensations do
+  not give us correct information about them. <i>Eiusdem modi</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_33">33</a> <i>eodem modo</i>. <i>Non posse accidere</i>: this
+  is a very remarkable, and, as Madv. (<i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 30) thinks, impossible, change from <i>recta oratio
+  to obliqua</i>. Halm with Manut. reads <i>potest</i>. Cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_101">101</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_41"></a><a href="#BkII_41">�41</a>.</b> <i>Neque
+  enim</i>: a remark of Lucullus' merely. <i>Quod sit a vero</i>: cf. Munio
+  on Lucr. <span class="vol">II.</span> 51 <i>fulgor ab auro</i>.
+  <i>Possit</i>: for the om. of <i>esse</i> cf. n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_29">29</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_42"></a><a href="#BkII_42">�42</a>.</b>
+  <i>Proposita</i>: cf. <span lang="el" title="protaseis"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  <i>passim</i> in Sext. <i>In sensus</i>: = <i>in ea, quae ad sensus
+  pertinent</i> cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_20">20</a>.
+  <i>Omni consuetudine</i>: "general experience" <span lang="el"
+  title="empeiria"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, cf.
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 83. <i>Quam obscurari volunt</i>:
+  cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_33">33</a>. <i>quod
+  explanari volebant</i>; the em. of Dav. <i>obscurare</i> is against
+  Cic.'s usage, that of Christ <i>quam observari nolunt</i> is wanton
+  without being ingenious. <i>De reliquis</i>: i.e. <i>iis quae a sensibus
+  ducuntur</i>. <i>In singulisque rebus</i>: the word <i>rebus</i> must
+  mean <i>subjects</i>, not <i>things</i>, to which the words <i>in minima
+  dispertiunt</i> would hardly apply. <i>Adiuncta</i>: Sext. <i>A.M.</i>
+  <span class="vol">VII.</span> 164 (R. and P. 410) <span lang="el"
+  title="pas�i t� dokous�i al�thei kathestanai eurisketai tis aparallaktos pseud�s"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B7;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B7;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span>, also <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 438, etc.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_43">��43</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_45">45</a>.</b> Summary. The sceptics ought not to
+  <i>define</i>, for (1) a definition cannot be a definition of two things,
+  (2) if the definition is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be
+  capable of being thoroughly known and distinguished from others (<a
+  href="#BkII_43">43</a>). For the purposes of reasoning their
+  <i>probabile</i> is not enough. Reasoning can only proceed upon
+  <i>certain</i> premisses. Again to say that there are false sensations is
+  to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge therefore a difference,
+  then you contradict yourselves and say there is none (<a
+  href="#BkII_44">44</a>). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate
+  clearness of <i>visa</i>, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (<a
+  href="#BkII_45">45</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_43"></a><a href="#BkII_43">�43</a>.</b>
+  <i>Horum</i>: Lamb. <i>harum</i>; the text however is quite right, cf.
+  Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 214 <i>b</i>. <i>Luminibus</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_101">101</a>. <i>Nihilo magis</i>: = <span lang="el"
+  title="ouden mallon" >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, which was constantly
+  in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 14. <i>Num illa definitio ... transferri</i>: I
+  need hardly point out that the <span lang="el" title="horos"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> of the Academics was merely
+  founded on probability, just as their "truth" was (cf. n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_29">29</a>). An Academic would say in reply to the question,
+  "probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it." <i>Vel illa vera</i>:
+  these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them.
+  <i>Vel</i> = "even" i.e. if <i>even</i> the definition is firmly known,
+  the thing, which is more important, must also be known. In <i>illa
+  vera</i> we have a pointed mocking repetition like that of <i>veri et
+  falsi</i> in <a href="#BkII_33">33</a>. <i>In falsum</i>: note that
+  <i>falsum</i> = <i>aliam rem</i> above. For the sense cf. Sext.
+  <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 209 <span lang="el"
+  title="mochth�rous horous einai tous periechontas ti t�n m� prosont�n tois horistois"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x3BC;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  and the schoolmen's maxim <i>definitio non debet latior esse definito
+  suo</i>. <i>Minime volunt</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>.
+  <i>Partibus</i>: Orelli after Goer. ejected this, but <i>omnibus</i>
+  hardly ever stands for <i>omn. rebus</i>, therefore C.F. Hermann reads
+  <i>pariter rebus</i> for <i>partibus</i>. A little closer attention to
+  the subject matter would have shown emendation to be unnecessary, cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_42">42</a> <i>dividunt in partis</i>, <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 24, where <i>genus</i> = division, <i>pars</i> =
+  subdivision.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_44"></a><a href="#BkII_44">�44</a>.</b> <i>Impediri
+  ... fatebuntur</i>: essentially the same argument as in <a
+  href="#BkII_33">33</a> at the end. <i>Occurretur</i>: not an imitation of
+  <span lang="el" title="enantiousthai"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  as Goer. says, but of <span lang="el" title="apantan"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>, which occurs
+  very frequently in Sext. <i>Sumpta</i>: the two premisses are in Gk.
+  called together <span lang="el" title="l�mmata"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>, separately
+  <span lang="el" title="l�mma" >&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>
+  and <span lang="el" title="prosl�psis"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (<i>sumptio et adsumptio</i> <i>De Div</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  108). <i>Orationis</i>: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes use this
+  word like <i>ratio</i> (<span lang="el" title="syllogismos"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>),
+  cf. <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 48 <i>conclusa oratio</i>.
+  Fab. refers to Gell. <span class="vol">XV.</span> 26. <i>Profiteatur</i>:
+  so <span lang="el" title="hypischneisthai"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  is often used by Sext. e.g. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span>
+  283. <i>Patefacturum</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_26">26</a>, <span
+  lang="el" title="ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos, d�l�tikos"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;,
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (the last in Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 277) often
+  recur in Greek. <i>Primum esse ... nihil interesse</i>: there is no
+  inconsistency. Carneades allowed that <i>visa</i>, <i>in themselves</i>,
+  might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties were incapable
+  of distinguishing those <i>visa</i> which proceed from real things and
+  give a correct representation of the things, from those which either are
+  mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly represent it.
+  Lucullus confuses <i>essential</i> with <i>apparent</i> difference.
+  <i>Non iungitur</i>: a supposed case of <span lang="el" title="diart�sis"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  which is opposed to <span lang="el" title="synart�sis"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  and explained in Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span>
+  430.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_45"></a><a href="#BkII_45">�45</a>.</b>
+  <i>Assentati</i>: here simply = <i>assensi</i>. <i>Praeteritis</i>: here
+  used in the strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed
+  over," cf. <i>in remissis</i> <i>Orat.</i> 59. <i>Primum igitur ... sed
+  tamen</i>: for the slight anacoluthia cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 480. <i>Iis
+  qui videntur</i>: Goer. <i>is qui videtur</i>, which is severely
+  criticised by Madv. <i>Em.</i> 150. For Epicurus' view of sensation see
+  n. on <a href="#BkIIN_79">79</a>, <a href="#BkIIN_80">80</a>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_46">��46</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_48">48</a></b>. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to
+  the innate clearness of some phenomena (<span lang="el" title="enargeia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>) is due
+  to two causes, (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light
+  by which these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by
+  sceptic paradoxes (<a href="#BkII_46">46</a>). The sceptics argue thus:
+  you allow that mere phantom sensations are often seen in dreams, why then
+  do you not allow what is easier, that two sensations caused by two really
+  existing things may be mistaken the one for the other? (<a
+  href="#BkII_47">47</a>). Further, they urge that a phantom sensation
+  produces very often the same effect as a real one. The dogmatists say
+  they admit that mere phantom sensations <i>do</i> command assent. Why
+  should they not admit that they command assent when they so closely
+  resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (<a
+  href="#BkII_48">48</a>)</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_46"></a><a href="#BkII_46">�46</a></b>.
+  <i>Circumfusa sint</i>: Goer. retains the MSS. <i>sunt</i> on the ground
+  that the clause <i>quanta sint</i> is inserted <span lang="el"
+  title="parenthetik�s"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span>!
+  Orelli actually follows him. For the phrase cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_122">122</a> <i>circumfusa tenebris</i>.
+  <i>Interrogationibus</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_5">5</a> where I showed that the words <i>interrogatio</i> and
+  <i>conclusio</i> are convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure
+  syllogisms are very frequently called <span lang="el" title="er�t�seis"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  and that he often introduces a new argument by <span lang="el"
+  title="er�tatai kai touto"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;</span>, when
+  there is nothing interrogatory about the argument at all.
+  <i>Dissolvere</i>: <span lang="el" title="apolyesthai"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  in Sext. <i>Occurrere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_44">44</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_47"></a><a href="#BkII_47">�47</a></b>. <i>Confuse
+  loqui</i>: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus in
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 27. <i>Nulla sunt</i>: on the
+  use of <i>nullus</i> for <i>non</i> in Cic. cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 455
+  obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very common in Plaut. and
+  Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the Letters. <i>Inaniter</i>:
+  cf. <a href="#BkII_34">34</a>. There are two ways in which a sensation
+  may be false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be
+  supposed by the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different
+  thing, (2) it may be a mere <span lang="el" title="phantasma"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span> or <span
+  lang="el" title="anaplasma t�s dianoias"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>, a
+  phantom behind which there is no reality at all. <i>Quae in somnis
+  videantur</i>: for the support given by Stoics to all forms of divination
+  see Zeller 166, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, etc.
+  <i>Quaerunt</i>: a slight anacoluthon from <i>dicatis</i> above.
+  <i>Quonam modo ... nihil sit omnino</i>: this difficult passage can only
+  be properly explained in connection with <a href="#BkII_50">50</a> and
+  with the general plan of the Academics expounded in <a
+  href="#BkII_41">41</a>. After long consideration I elucidate it as
+  follows. The whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced in <a
+  href="#BkII_41">41</a> and <a href="#BkII_42">42</a> viz. <i>omnibus
+  veris visis adiuncta esse falsa</i>. The criticism in <a
+  href="#BkII_50">50</a> shows that the argument is meant to be based on
+  the assumption known to be Stoic, <i>omnia deum posse</i>. If the god can
+  manufacture (<i>efficere</i>) sensations which are false, but probable
+  (as the Stoics say he does in dreams), why can he not manufacture false
+  sensations which are so probable as to closely resemble true ones, or to
+  be only with difficulty distinguishable from the true, or finally to be
+  utterly indistinguishable from the true (this meaning of <i>inter quae
+  nihil sit omnino</i> is fixed by <a href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>, where see
+  n.)? <i>Probabilia</i>, then, denotes false sensations such as have only
+  a slight degree of resemblance to the true, by the three succeeding
+  stages the resemblance is made complete. The word <i>probabilia</i> is a
+  sort of tertiary predicate after <i>efficere</i> ("to manufacture so as
+  to be probable"). It <i>must not be repeated</i> after the second
+  <i>efficere</i>, or the whole sense will be inverted and this section
+  placed out of harmony with <a href="#BkII_50">50</a>. <i>Plane
+  proxime</i>: = <i>quam proxime</i> of <a href="#BkII_36">36</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_48"></a><a href="#BkII_48">�48</a>.</b> <i>Ipsa per
+  sese</i>: simply = <i>inaniter</i> as in <a href="#BkII_34">34</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_47">47</a>, i.e. without the approach of any external object.
+  <i>Cogitatione</i>: the only word in Latin, as <span lang="el"
+  title="dianoia" >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  is in Greek, to express our "imagination." <i>Non numquam</i>: so Madv.
+  for MSS. <i>non inquam</i>. Goer. after Manut. wrote <i>non inquiunt</i>
+  with an interrogation at <i>omnino</i>. <i>Veri simile est</i>: so Madv.
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 58 for <i>sit</i>. The argument
+  has the same purpose as that in the last section, viz to show that
+  phantom sensations may produce the same effect on the mind as those which
+  proceed from realities. <i>Ut si qui</i>: the <i>ut</i> here is merely
+  "as," "for instance," cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_33">33</a>. <i>Nihil ut
+  esset</i>: the <i>ut</i> here is a repetition of the <i>ut</i> used
+  several times in the early part of the sentence, all of them alike depend
+  on <i>sic</i>. Lamb. expunged <i>ut</i> before <i>esset</i> and before
+  <i>quicquam</i>. <i>Intestinum et oblatum</i>: cf. Sext. <i>A.M.</i>
+  <span class="vol">VII.</span> 241 <span lang="el" title="�toi t�n ektos � t�n en h�min path�n"
+  >&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2; &#x3B7; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>, and the two classes of
+  <i>falsa visa</i> mentioned in n. on <a href="#BkIIN_47">47</a>. <i>Sin
+  autem sunt</i>, etc.: if there <i>are</i> false sensations which are
+  probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not be false sensations
+  so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable from the true? The
+  rest exactly as in <a href="#BkII_47">47</a>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_49">��49</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_53">53</a>.</b> Antiochus attacked these arguments as
+  <i>soritae</i>, and therefore faulty (<a href="#BkII_49">49</a>). The
+  admission of a certain amount of similarity between true and false
+  sensations does not logically lead to the impossibility of distinguishing
+  between the true and the false (<a href="#BkII_50">50</a>). We contend
+  that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we require
+  before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we make light
+  of the sensations we had while in it (<a href="#BkII_51">51</a>). But,
+  say our opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid
+  as our waking ones. This we deny (<a href="#BkII_52">52</a>). "But," say
+  they, "you allow that the wise man in madness withholds his assent." This
+  proves nothing, for he will do so in many other circumstances in life.
+  All this talk about dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our
+  attention (<a href="#BkII_53">53</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_49"></a><a href="#BkII_49">�49</a>.</b>
+  <i>Antiochus</i>: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and
+  similar subjects. <i>Ipsa capita</i>: <span lang="el" title="auta ta kephalaia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>.
+  <i>Interrogationis</i>: the <i>sorites</i> was always in the form of a
+  series of questions, cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 11
+  (where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his
+  proposed trans. <i>acervalis</i> is unnecessary), <i>Hortens.</i> fragm.
+  47, and n. on <a href="#BkIIN_92">92</a>. <i>Hoc vocant</i>: i.e. <i>hoc
+  genus</i>, cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 70 <i>ex eo
+  genere, quae prosunt</i>. <i>Vitiosum</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 50 <i>ille sorites, quo nihil putatis</i> (Stoici)
+  <i>vitiosius</i>. Most edd. read <i>hos</i>, which indeed in <a
+  href="#BkII_136">136</a> is a necessary em. for MSS. <i>hoc</i>. <i>Tale
+  visum</i>: i.e. <i>falsum</i>. <i>Dormienti</i>: sc. <span lang="el"
+  title="tini" >&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;</span>. <i>Ut probabile
+  sit</i>, etc.: cf. <a href="#BkII_47">47</a>, <a href="#BkII_48">48</a>
+  and notes. <i>Primum quidque</i>: not <i>quodque</i> as Klotz; cf.
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 105, to whose exx. add <i>De
+  Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 112, and an instance of <i>proximus
+  quisque</i> in <i>De Off.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 75.
+  <i>Vitium</i>: cf. <i>vitiosum</i> above.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_50"></a><a href="#BkII_50">�50</a>.</b> <i>Omnia
+  deum posse</i>: this was a principle generally admitted among Stoics at
+  least, see <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 86. For the line
+  of argument here cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 106
+  <i>fac dare deos, quod absurdum est</i>. <i>Eadem</i>: this does not mean
+  that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when one of
+  them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>. <i>Similes</i>: after this <i>sunt</i> was added
+  by Madv. <i>In suo genere essent</i>: substitute <i>esse viderentur</i>
+  for <i>essent</i>, and you get the real view of the Academic, who would
+  allow that <i>things in their essence</i> are divisible into
+  sharply-defined <i>genera</i>, but would deny that the <i>sensations</i>
+  which proceed from or are caused by the <i>things</i>, are so
+  divisible.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_51"></a><a href="#BkII_51">�51</a>.</b> <i>Una
+  depulsio</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_128">128</a> (<i>omnium rerum una est
+  definitio comprehendendi</i>), <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 136 (<i>omnium somniorum una ratio est</i>). <i>In
+  quiete</i>: = <i>in somno</i>, a rather poetical usage. <i>Narravit</i>:
+  Goer., Orelli, Klotz alter into <i>narrat</i>, most wantonly. <i>Visus
+  Homerus</i>, etc.: this famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his
+  <i>Annals</i>, is referred to by Lucr. <span class="vol">I.</span> 124,
+  Cic. <i>De Rep.</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span> 10 (<i>Somn. Scip.</i>
+  c. 1), Hor. <i>Epist.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, 50. <i>Simul
+  ut</i>: rare in Cic., see Madv. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  33, who, however, unduly restricts the usage. In three out of the five
+  passages where he allows it to stand, the <i>ut</i> precedes a vowel;
+  Cic. therefore used it to avoid writing <i>ac</i> before a vowel, so that
+  in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 33 <i>ut</i> should probably
+  be written (with Manut. and others) for <i>et</i> which Madv. ejects.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_52"></a><a href="#BkII_52">�52</a>.</b>
+  <i>Eorumque</i>: MSS. om. <i>que</i>. Dav. wrote <i>ac</i> before
+  <i>eorum</i>, this however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a
+  guttural condemned in n. on <a href="#BkIIN_34">34</a>. For the argument
+  see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_80">80</a> <i>quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non
+  quid videatur</i>. <i>Primum interest</i>: for om. of <i>deinde</i> cf.
+  <a href="#BkII_45">45</a>, <a href="#BkII_46">46</a>. <i>Imbecillius</i>:
+  cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_41">41</a>.
+  <i>Edormiverunt</i>: "have slept <i>off</i> the effects," cf. <span
+  lang="el" title="apobrizein"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B2;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  in Homer. <i>Relaxentur</i>: cf. <span lang="el" title="anienai t�s org�s"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span> Aristoph. <i>Ran.</i> 700,
+  <i>relaxare</i> is used in the neut. sense in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 94. <i>Alcmaeonis</i>: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is
+  often quoted by Cic., e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span>
+  62.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_53"></a><a href="#BkII_53">�53</a>.</b>
+  <i>Sustinet</i>: <span lang="el" title="epechei"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;</span>; see on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_94">94</a>. <i>Aliquando sustinere</i>: the point of the
+  Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness the <span
+  lang="el" title="epoch�" >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span> of
+  the <i>sapiens</i> becomes <i>habitual</i>; he gives up the attempt to
+  distinguish between true and false <i>visa</i>. Lucullus answers that,
+  did no distinction exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it, even
+  in the sane condition. <i>Confundere</i>: so <a href="#BkII_58">58</a>,
+  <a href="#BkII_110">110</a>, Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VIII.</span> 56 (<span lang="el" title="syncheousi ta pragmata"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>),
+  <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 157 (<span lang="el"
+  title="syncheomen ton bion"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>), <span
+  class="vol">VIII.</span> 372 (<span lang="el" title="hol�n syncheei t�n philosophon z�t�sin"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B6;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>), Plut. <i>De
+  Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos</i> p. 1077 (<span lang="el" title="h�s panta pragmata syncheousi"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C9;&#x3C2; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;</span>).
+  <i>Utimur</i>: "we have to put up with," so <span lang="el"
+  title="chr�sthai"
+  >&#x3C7;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> is used in Gk.
+  <i>Ebriosorum</i>: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than
+  <i>vinolenti</i> above. <i>Illud attendimus</i>: Goer., and Orelli write
+  <i>num illud</i>, but the emphatic <i>ille</i> is often thus introduced
+  by itself in questions, a good ex. occurs in <a href="#BkII_136">136</a>.
+  <i>Proferremus</i>: this must apparently be added to the exx. qu. by
+  Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 35 of the subj. used to
+  denote "<i>non id quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri
+  debuerit</i>." As such passages are often misunderstood, I note that they
+  can be most rationally explained as elliptic constructions in which a
+  <i>condition</i> is expressed without its <i>consequence</i>. We have an
+  exact parallel in English, e.g. "<i>tu dictis Albane maneres</i>" may
+  fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy word, Alban!" Here the
+  condition "<i>if</i> thou hadst kept, etc." stands without the
+  consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the kind. Such
+  a condition may be expressed without <i>si</i>, just as in Eng. without
+  "<i>if</i>," cf. Iuv. <span class="vol">III.</span> 78 and Mayor's n. The
+  use of the Greek optative to express a wish (with <span lang="el"
+  title="ei gar" >&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;</span>, etc., and
+  even without <span lang="el" title="ei" >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;</span>) is
+  susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has many such points
+  of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most of the
+  functions of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 35 seems to imply that he prefers the hypothesis
+  of a suppressed protasis, but as in his <i>Gram.</i> 351 <i>b</i>, obs. 4
+  he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be certain.]</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_54">��54</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_63">63</a>.</b> Summary. The Academics fail to see that such
+  doctrines do away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and
+  seals is childish (<a href="#BkII_54">54</a>). They press into their
+  service the old physical philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much
+  ridiculed by them (<a href="#BkII_55">55</a>). Democritus may say that
+  innumerable worlds exist in every particular similar to ours, but I
+  appeal to more cultivated physicists, who maintain that each thing has
+  its own peculiar marks (<a href="#BkII_55">55</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_56">56</a>). The Servilii were distinguished from one another
+  by their friends, and Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the
+  appearance of an egg which hen had laid it (<a href="#BkII_56">56</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_57">57</a>). We however, do not much care whether we are able
+  to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that they say
+  is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between individual
+  sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58). Equally absurd
+  are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they profess to follow.
+  The doctrine that true and false sensations are indistinguishable
+  logically leads to the unqualified <span lang="el" title="epoch�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span> of Arcesilas (59). What
+  nonsense they talk about inquiring after the truth, and about the bad
+  influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero, the panegyrist of
+  philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian darkness? (61) By holding
+  that knowledge is impossible you weaken the force of your famous oath
+  that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus ended Lucullus, amid the
+  continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then Catulus said that he should
+  not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus were to induce me to change my
+  view (63).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_54"></a><a href="#BkII_54">�54</a>.</b> <i>Ne hoc
+  quidem</i>: the common trans. "not even" for "<i>ne quidem</i>" is often
+  inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this <i>either</i>," cf. n.
+  on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_5">5</a>. <i>Habeant</i>:
+  the slight alteration <i>habeat</i> introduced by Goer. and Orelli quite
+  destroys the point of the sentence. <i>Quod nolunt</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_44">44</a>. <i>An sano</i>: Lamb. <i>an ut sano</i>, which
+  Halm approves, and Baiter reads. <i>Similitudines</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_84">84</a>&mdash;<a href="#BkII_86">86</a>. The impossibility
+  of distinguishing between twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was
+  a favourite theme with the sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no
+  two things were absolutely alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the
+  Stoic view, was practically refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who
+  took two twins, and made one deposit money with Aristo, while the other
+  after a time asked for the money back and received it. On this subject
+  cf. Sextus <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 408&mdash;410.
+  <i>Negat esse</i>: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places
+  <i>esse</i> second, especially at the end of a clause. <i>Cur eo non
+  estis contenti</i>: Lucullus here ignores the question at issue, which
+  concerned the <i>amount</i> of similarity. The dogmatists maintained that
+  the similarity between two phenomena could never be great enough to
+  render it impossible to guard against mistaking the one for the other,
+  the sceptics argued that it could. <i>Quod rerum natura non patitur</i>:
+  again Lucullus confounds <i>essential</i> with <i>phenomenal</i>
+  difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_50">50</a>.
+  <i>Nulla re differens</i>: cf. the <i>nihil differens</i> of <a
+  href="#BkII_99">99</a>, the substitution of which here would perhaps make
+  the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the common Gk. term <span
+  lang="el" title="aparallaktos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  (Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 252, etc.). <i>Ulla
+  communitas</i>: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of
+  Lamb. <i>nulla</i> after the fine note of Madv. (<i>Em.</i> 154),
+  approved by Halm and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the
+  Stoics may be stated thus <i>suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec
+  est in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas</i> (<span
+  lang="el" title="oude hyparchei epimig� aparallaktos"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3B3;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>).
+  This opinion is negatived by <i>non patitur ut</i> and it will be evident
+  at a glance that the only change required is to put the two verbs
+  (<i>est</i>) into the subjunctive. The change of <i>ulla</i> into
+  <i>nulla</i> is in no way needed. <i>Ut</i> [<i>sibi</i>] <i>sint</i>:
+  <i>sibi</i> is clearly wrong here. Madv., in a note communicated
+  privately to Halm and printed by the latter on p. 854 of Bait. and Halm's
+  ed of the philosophical works, proposed to read <i>nulla re differens
+  communitas visi? Sint et ova</i> etc. omitting <i>ulla</i> and <i>ut</i>
+  and changing <i>visi</i> into <i>sibi</i> (cf. Faber's em. <i>novas</i>
+  for <i>bonas</i> in <a href="#BkIIN_72">72</a>). This ingenious but, as I
+  think, improbable conj. Madv. has just repeated in the second vol. of his
+  <i>Adversaria</i>. Lamb. reads <i>at tibi sint</i>, Dav. <i>at si vis,
+  sint</i>, Christ <i>ut tibi sint</i>, Bait. <i>ut si sint</i> after
+  C.F.W. Muller, I should prefer <i>sui</i> for <i>sibi</i> (SVI for SIBI).
+  B is very frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip
+  in. <i>Eosdem</i>: once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps
+  intentional misconception of the sceptic position; see n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_50">50</a>. Before leaving this section, I may point out
+  that the <span lang="el" title="epimig�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3B3;&#x3B7;</span> or <span
+  lang="el" title="epimixia t�n phantasi�n"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  supplies Sext. with one of the sceptic <span lang="el" title="tropoi"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span>, see <i>Pyrrh.
+  Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 124.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_55"></a><a href="#BkII_55">�55</a>.</b>
+  <i>Irridentur</i>: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the
+  constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IX.</span> 1. <i>Absolute ita paris</i>: Halm as well as
+  Bait. after Christ, brackets <i>ita</i>; if any change be needed, it
+  would be better to place it before <i>undique</i>. For this opinion of
+  Democr. see R. and P. 45. <i>Et eo quidem innumerabilis</i>: this is the
+  quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has
+  yet been proposed, cf. <a href="#BkII_125">125</a>. <i>Nihil differat,
+  nihil intersit</i>: these two verbs often appear together in Cic.,
+  e.g.<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 25.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_56"></a><a href="#BkII_56">�56</a>.</b>
+  <i>Potiusque</i>: this adversative use of <i>que</i> is common with
+  <i>potius</i>, e.g.<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 51. Cf.
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 55 <i>ingemescere nonnum quam
+  viro concessum est, idque raro</i>, also <i>ac potius</i>, <i>Ad Att.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 10, etc. <i>Proprietates</i>: the <span
+  lang="el" title="idiot�tes"
+  >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span>
+  or <span lang="el" title="idi�mata"
+  >&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span> of
+  Sextus, the doctrine of course involves the whole question at issue
+  between dogmatism and scepticism. <i>Cognoscebantur</i>: Dav.
+  <i>dignoscebantur</i>, Walker <i>internoscebantur</i>. The MSS. reading
+  is right, cf. <a href="#BkII_86">86</a>. <i>Consuetudine</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_42">42</a>, "experience". <i>Minimum</i>: an adverb like
+  <i>summum</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_57"></a><a href="#BkII_57">�57</a>.</b>
+  <i>Dinotatas</i>: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not
+  recognise the word. Most edd. change it into <i>denotatas</i>.
+  <i>Artem</i>: <span lang="el" title="techn�n"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>, a set of rules. <i>In
+  proverbio</i>: so <i>venire in proverbium</i>, <i>in proverbii usum
+  venire</i>, <i>proverbii locum obtinere</i>, <i>proverbii loco dici</i>
+  are all used. <i>Salvis rebus</i>: not an uncommon phrase, e.g. <i>Ad
+  Fam.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 1. <i>Gallinas</i>: cf. fragm. <a
+  href="#Fr_19">19</a> of the <i>Acad. Post.</i> The similarity of eggs was
+  discussed <i>ad nauseam</i> by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras
+  the Stoic actually wrote a book entitled, <span lang="el" title="�i skopia"
+  >&#x3C9;&#x3B9; &#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> (egg
+  investigation) <span lang="el" title="� peri sophisteias pros Akad�maikous"
+  >&#x3B7; &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x391;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  mentioned by Suidas.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_58"></a><a href="#BkII_58">�58</a>.</b> <i>Contra
+  nos</i>: the sense requires <i>nos</i>, but all Halm's MSS. except one
+  read <i>vos</i>. <i>Non internoscere</i>: this is the reading of all the
+  MSS., and is correct, though Orelli omits <i>non</i>. The sense is, "we
+  are quite content not to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we
+  shall not on that account be led into a mistake for our rule will prevent
+  us from making any positive assertion about the eggs." <i>Adsentiri</i>:
+  for the passive use of this verb cf. <a href="#BkII_39">39</a>. <i>Par
+  est</i>: so Dav. for <i>per</i>, which most MSS. have. The older edd. and
+  Orelli have <i>potest</i>, with one MS. <i>Quasi</i>: the em. of Madv.
+  for the <i>quam si</i> of the MSS. <i>Transversum digitum</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_116">116</a>. <i>Ne confundam omnia</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_53">53</a>, <a href="#BkII_110">110</a>. <i>Natura
+  tolletur</i>: this of course the sceptics would deny. They refused to
+  discuss the nature of <i>things in themselves</i>, and kept to
+  <i>phenomena</i>. <i>Intersit</i>: i.e. <i>inter visa</i>. <i>In
+  animos</i>: Orelli with one MS. reads <i>animis</i>; if the MSS. are
+  correct the assertion of Krebs and Allgayer (<i>Antibarbarus</i>, ed. 4)
+  "<i>imprimere</i> wird klas sisch verbunden <i>in aliqua re</i>, nicht
+  <i>in aliquam rem</i>," will require modification. <i>Species et quasdam
+  formas</i>: <span lang="el" title="eid� kai gen�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B7; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;</span>, <i>quasdam</i> marks the fact that
+  <i>formas</i> is a trans. I have met with no other passage where any such
+  doctrine is assigned to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine
+  is absurd, for surely it must always be easier to distinguish between two
+  <i>genera</i> than between two individuals. If the <i>non</i> before
+  <i>vos</i> were removed a better sense would be given. It has often been
+  inserted by copyists when <i>sed</i>, <i>tamen</i>, or some such word,
+  comes in the following clause, as in the famous passage of Cic <i>Ad
+  Quintum Fratrem</i>, <span class="vol">II.</span> 11, discussed by Munro,
+  Lucr. p. 313, ed. 3.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_59"></a><a href="#BkII_59">�59</a>.</b> <i>Illud
+  vero perabsurdum</i>: note the omission of <i>est</i>, which often takes
+  place after the emphatic pronoun. <i>Impediamini</i>: cf. n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_33">33</a>. <i>A veris</i>: if <i>visis</i> be supplied the
+  statement corresponds tolerably with the Academic belief, if <i>rebus</i>
+  be meant, it is wide of the mark. <i>Id est ... retentio</i>: supposed to
+  be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  <a href="#BkIN_6">6</a>, <a href="#BkIN_8">8</a>. <i>Constitit</i>: from
+  <i>consto</i>, not from <i>consisto</i> cf. <a href="#BkII_63">63</a>
+  <i>qui tibi constares</i>. <i>Si vera sunt</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_67">67</a>, <a href="#BkII_78">78</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_112">112</a>, <a href="#BkII_148">148</a>. The
+  <i>nonnulli</i> are Philo and Metrodorus, see <a href="#BkII_78">78</a>.
+  <i>Tollendus est adsensus</i>: i.e. even that qualified assent which the
+  Academics gave to probable phenomena. <i>Adprobare</i>: this word is
+  ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_104">104</a>. <i>Id est peccaturum</i>: "which is equivalent
+  to sinning," cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_42">42</a>.
+  <i>Iam nimium etiam</i>: note <i>iam</i> and <i>etiam</i> in the same
+  clause.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_60"></a><a href="#BkII_60">�60</a>.</b> <i>Pro
+  omnibus</i>: note <i>omnibus</i> for <i>omnibus rebus</i>. <i>Ista
+  mysteria</i>: Aug. <i>Contra Ac.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 37, 38
+  speaks of various doctrines, which were <i>servata et pro mysteriis
+  custodita</i> by the New Academics. The notion that the Academic
+  scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while they had an
+  esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the reactionary
+  period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and may
+  perhaps from a passage of Augustine, <i>C. Ac.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 41 (whose authority must have been Cicero), be
+  attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller 534, n.). The idea is
+  ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p. 279), and all
+  succeeding inquirers. <i>Auctoritate</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_8">8</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_9">9</a>. <i>Utroque</i>: this neuter, referring to two fem.
+  nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 214 <i>c</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_61"></a><a href="#BkII_61">�61</a>.</b>
+  <i>Amicissimum</i>: "<i>because</i> you are my dear friend".
+  <i>Commoveris</i>: a military term, cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 26 and Forc., also Introd. p. <a
+  href="#Page_liii">53</a>. <i>Sequere</i>: either this is future, as in <a
+  href="#BkII_109">109</a>, or <i>sequeris</i>, the constant form in Cic.
+  of the pres., must be read. <i>Approbatione omni</i>: the word
+  <i>omni</i> is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified
+  assent, cf. <a href="#BkII_59">59</a>. <i>Orbat sensibus</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_74">74</a>, and <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 64,
+  where Madv. is wrong in reproving Torquatus for using the phrase
+  <i>sensus tolli</i>, on the ground that the Academics swept away not
+  <i>sensus</i> but <i>iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis</i>. Goer. qu. Plin.
+  <i>N.H.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 5, Sil. Ital. <span
+  class="vol">XII.</span> 131, Festus, s.v. <i>Cimmerii</i>, to show that
+  the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to Bauli, and probably induced
+  this mention of the legendary people. <i>Deus aliquis</i>: so the best
+  edd. without comment, although they write <i>deus aliqui</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_19">19</a>. It is difficult to distinguish between
+  <i>aliquis</i> and <i>aliqui</i>, <i>nescio quis</i> and <i>nescio
+  qui</i>, <i>si quis</i> and <i>si qui</i> (for the latter see n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_81">81</a>). As <i>aliquis</i> is substantival,
+  <i>aliqui</i> adjectival, <i>aliquis</i> must not be written with
+  impersonal nouns like <i>terror</i> (<i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 35, <span class="vol">V.</span> 62), <i>dolor</i>
+  (<i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 82, <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 1, 1), <i>casus</i> (<i>De Off.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd.
+  vary, e.g. <i>deus aliqui</i> (<i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  23, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 35), <i>deus aliquis</i> (<i>Lael.</i>
+  87, <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 7, 1), <i>anularius
+  aliqui</i> (<a href="#BkII_86">86</a> of this book), <i>magistratus
+  aliquis</i> (<i>In Verr.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 146). With a
+  proper name belonging to a real person <i>aliquis</i> ought to be written
+  (<i>Myrmecides</i> in <a href="#BkIIN_120">120</a>, see my n.).
+  <i>Dispiciendum</i>: not <i>despiciendum</i>, cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 97, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 64, also <i>De
+  Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 81, <i>verum dispicere</i>. <i>Iis
+  vinculis</i>, etc. this may throw light on fragm. <a href="#Fr_15">15</a>
+  of the <i>Acad. Post.</i>, which see.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_62"></a><a href="#BkII_62">�62</a>.</b> <i>Motum
+  animorum</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_34">34</a>. <i>Actio rerum</i>: here
+  <i>actio</i> is a pure verbal noun like <span lang="el" title="praxis"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>, cf. <i>De Off.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 83, and expressions like <i>actio vitae</i>
+  (<i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 2), <i>actio ullius rei</i> (<a
+  href="#BkII_108">108</a> of this book), and the similar use of
+  <i>actus</i> in Quintilian (<i>Inst. Or.</i> <span class="vol">X.</span>
+  1, 31, with Mayor's n.) <i>Iuratusque</i>: Bait. possibly by a mere
+  misprint reads <i>iratus</i>. <i>Comperisse</i>: this expression of Cic.,
+  used in the senate in reference to Catiline's conspiracy, had become a
+  cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic. was often taunted. See <i>Ad
+  Fam.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 5, 2, <i>Ad Att.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 14, 5. <i>Licebat</i>: this is the reading of the
+  best MSS., not <i>liquebat</i>, which Goer., Kl., Or. have. For the
+  support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy see <a
+  href="#BkII_3">3</a>, and the passages quoted in Introd. p. <a
+  href="#Page_xlvi">46</a> with respect to Catulus, in most of which
+  Lucullus is also mentioned.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_63"></a><a href="#BkII_63">�63</a>.</b> <i>Quod ...
+  fecerat, ut</i>: different from the constr. treated by Madv. <i>Gram.</i>
+  481 <i>b</i>. <i>Quod</i> refers simply to the fact of Lucullus'
+  admiration, which the clause introduced by <i>ut</i> defines, "which
+  admiration he had shown ... to such an extent that, etc." <i>Iocansne
+  an</i>: this use of <i>ne ... an</i> implies, Madv. says (on <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">V.</span> 87), more doubt than the use of <i>ne</i>
+  alone as in <i>vero falsone</i>. <i>Memoriter</i>: nearly all edd. before
+  Madv. make this mean <i>e memoria</i> as opposed to <i>de scripto</i>; he
+  says, "<i>laudem habet bonae et copiosae memoriae</i>" (on <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in the
+  <i>Antibarbarus</i>, ed. 4. <i>Censuerim</i>: more modest than
+  <i>censeo</i>, see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 380. <i>Tantum enim non te modo
+  monuit</i>: edd. before Madv., seeing no way of taking <i>modo</i> exc.
+  with <i>non</i>, ejected it. Madv. (<i>Em.</i> 160) retains it, making it
+  mean <i>paulo ante</i>. On the other hand, Halm after Christ asserts that
+  <i>tantum non</i> = <span lang="el" title="monon ou"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3BF;&#x3C5;</span> occurs nowhere
+  else in Cic. Bait. therefore ejects <i>non</i>, taking <i>tantum</i> as
+  <i>hoc tantum, nihil praeterea</i>. Livy certainly has the suspected use
+  of <i>tantum non</i>. <i>Tribunus</i>: a retort comes in <a
+  href="#BkII_97">97</a>, <a href="#BkII_144">144</a>. <i>Antiochum</i>:
+  cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_13">13</a>.
+  <i>Destitisse</i>: on the difference between <i>memini</i> followed by
+  the pres. and by the perf. inf. consult Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 408 <i>b</i>,
+  obs. 2.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_64">��64</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_71">71</a>.</b> Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The
+  strength of Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it
+  can be answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my
+  character (<a href="#BkII_64">64</a>). I protest my entire sincerity in
+  all that I say, and would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (<a
+  href="#BkII_65">65</a>). I am a passionate inquirer after truth, and on
+  that very account hold it disgraceful to assent to what is false. I do
+  not deny that I make slips, but we must deal with the <i>sapiens</i>,
+  whose characteristic it is never to err in giving his assent (<a
+  href="#BkII_66">66</a>). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the <i>sapiens</i>
+  ever gives his assent he will be obliged to <i>opine</i>, but he never
+  will <i>opine</i> therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and
+  Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is
+  possible to distinguish between true and false (<a
+  href="#BkII_67">67</a>). Even if it be so the mere habit of assenting is
+  full of peril. Still, our whole argument must tend to show that
+  <i>perception</i> in the Stoic sense is impossible (<a
+  href="#BkII_68">68</a>). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When
+  he was converted, what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long
+  denied? (<a href="#BkII_69">69</a>) Some think he wished to found a
+  school called by his own name. It is more probable that he could no
+  longer bear the opposition of all other schools to the Academy (<a
+  href="#BkII_70">70</a>). His conversion gave a splendid opening for an
+  <i>argumentum ad hominem</i> (<a href="#BkII_71">71</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_64"></a><a href="#BkII_64">�64</a>.</b> <i>Quadam
+  oratione</i>: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not <i>quandam
+  orationem</i> as Lamb., Orelli. <i>De ipsa re</i>: cf. <i>de causa
+  ipsa</i> above. <i>Respondere posse</i>: for the om. of <i>me</i> before
+  the infin, which has wrongly caused many edd. either to read
+  <i>respondere</i> (as Dav., Bait.) or to insert <i>me</i> (as Lamb.), see
+  n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_7">7</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_65"></a><a href="#BkII_65">�65</a>.</b> <i>Studio
+  certandi</i>: = <span lang="el" title="philoneikia"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>.
+  <i>Pertinacia ... calumnia</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_14">14</a>.
+  <i>Iurarem</i>: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of
+  his consulship.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_66"></a><a href="#BkII_66">�66</a>.</b>
+  <i>Turpissimum</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_45">45</a>, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 1.
+  <i>Opiner</i>: <i>opinio</i> or <span lang="el" title="doxa"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;</span> is judgment based on insufficient
+  grounds. <i>Sed quaerimus de sapiente</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_115">115</a>, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 55, 59
+  also <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 75 <i>non quid ego sed
+  quid orator</i>. <i>Magnus ... opinator</i>: Aug. <i>Contra Acad.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 31 qu. this passage wrongly as from the
+  <i>Hortensius</i>. He imitates it, <i>ibid.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 15 <i>magnus definitor</i>. <i>Qua fidunt</i>,
+  etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s <i>Aratea</i>, and are quoted in
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 105, 106. <i>Phoenices</i>: the
+  same fact is mentioned by Ovid, <i>Fasti</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 107, <i>Tristia</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span>
+  3, 1. <i>Sed Helicen</i>: the best MSS. om. <i>ad</i>, which Orelli
+  places before <i>Helicen</i>. <i>Elimatas</i>: the MSS. are divided
+  between this and <i>limatas</i>. <i>Elimare</i>, though a very rare word
+  occurs <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">XVI.</span> 7, 3. <i>Visis
+  cedo</i>: cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_38">38</a>. <i>Vim maximam</i>: so
+  <i>summum munus</i> is applied to the same course of action in
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 31. <i>Cogitatione</i>: "idea".
+  <i>Temeritate</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_42">42</a>, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, and
+  the charge of <span lang="el" title="propeteia"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  constantly brought against the dogmatists by Sext. <i>Praepostere</i>: in
+  a disorderly fashion, taking the wrong thing first.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_67"></a><a href="#BkII_67">�67</a>.</b> <i>Aliquando
+  ... opinabitur</i>: this of course is only true if you grant the Academic
+  doctrine, <i>nihil posse percipi</i>. <i>Secundum illud ... etiam
+  opinari</i>: it seems at first sight as though <i>adsentiri</i> and
+  <i>opinari</i> ought to change places in this passage, as Manut.
+  proposes. The difficulty lies in the words <i>secundum illud</i>, which,
+  it has been supposed, must refer back to the second premiss of Arcesilas'
+  argument. But if the passage be translated thus, "Carneades sometimes
+  granted <i>as a second premiss</i> the following statement, that the wise
+  man sometimes does opine" the difficulty vanishes. The argument of
+  Carneades would then run thus, (1) <i>Si ulli rei</i>, etc. as above, (2)
+  <i>adsentietur autem aliquando</i>, (3) <i>opinabitur igitur</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_68"></a><a href="#BkII_68">�68</a>.</b> <i>Adsentiri
+  quicquam</i>: only with neuter pronouns like this could <i>adsentiri</i>
+  be followed by an accusative case. <i>Sustinenda est</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="ephekteon"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. <i>Iis
+  quae possunt</i>: these words MSS. om. <i>Tam in praecipiti</i>: for the
+  position of <i>in</i> cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_25">25</a>. The best MSS. have here <i>tamen in</i>. Madv.
+  altered <i>tamen</i> to <i>tam</i> in n. on <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 26. The two words are often confused, as in
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 7, cf. also n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_16">16</a>. <i>Sin autem</i>, etc.:
+  cf. the passage of Lactantius <i>De Falsa Sapientia</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 3, qu. by P. Valentia (p. 278 of Orelli's
+  reprint) <i>si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates docuit, neque
+  opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est</i>. <i>Nitamur
+  ... percipi</i>: "let us struggle to prove the proposition, etc." The
+  construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect <i>hoc</i>, or
+  some such word, to have fallen out between <i>igitur</i> and
+  <i>nihil</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_69"></a><a href="#BkII_69">�69</a>.</b> <i>Non
+  acrius</i>: one of the early editions omits <i>non</i> while Goer. reads
+  <i>acutius</i> and puts a note of interrogation at <i>defensitaverat</i>.
+  M. <i>Em.</i> 161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the
+  old arguments of Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his
+  new arguments against it. <i>Quis enim</i>: so Lamb. for MSS. <i>quisquam
+  enim</i>. <i>Excogitavit</i>: on interrogations not introduced by a
+  particle of any kind see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 450. <i>Eadem dicit</i>: on
+  the subject in hand, of course. Taken without this limitation the
+  proposition is not strictly true, see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_132">132</a>.
+  <i>Sensisse</i>: = <i>iudicasse</i>, n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_22">22</a>. <i>Mnesarchi ... Dardani</i>: see <i>Dict.
+  Biogr.</i></p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_70"></a><a href="#BkII_70">�70</a>.</b> <i>Revocata
+  est</i>: Manut. here wished to read <i>renovata</i>, cf. n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_14">14</a>. <i>Nominis
+  dignitatem</i>, etc.: hence Aug. <i>Contra Acad.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 41 calls him <i>foeneus ille Platonicus
+  Antiochus</i> (that <i>tulchan</i> Platonist). <i>Gloriae causa</i>: cf.
+  Aug. <i>ibid.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 15 <i>Antiochus gloriae
+  cupidior quam veritatis</i>. <i>Facere dicerent</i>: so Camerarius for
+  the MSS. <i>facerent</i>. <i>Sustinere</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_115">115</a> <i>sustinuero Epicureos</i>. <i>Sub Novis</i>:
+  Faber's brilliant em. for the MSS. <i>sub nubes</i>. The <i>Novae
+  Tabernae</i> were in the forum, and are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy.
+  In <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 266 a story is told of
+  Caesar, who, while speaking <i>sub Veteribus</i>, points to a
+  "<i>tabula</i>" which hangs <i>sub Novis</i>. The excellence of Faber's
+  em. may be felt by comparing that of Manut. <i>sub nube</i>, and that of
+  Lamb. <i>nisi sub nube</i>. I have before remarked that <i>b</i> is
+  frequently written in MSS. for <i>v</i>. <i>Maenianorum</i>: projecting
+  eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were probably named from their
+  inventor like <i>Vitelliana</i>, <i>Vatinia</i> etc.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_71"></a><a href="#BkII_71">�71</a>.</b> <i>Quoque
+  ... argumento</i>: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread is
+  picked up by <i>quod argumentum</i> near the end. <i>Utrum</i>: the
+  neuter pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are
+  marked by <i>ne</i> and <i>an</i>. The same usage is found in <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 60, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span>
+  9, and must be carefully distinguished from the use of <i>utrum ... ne
+  ... an</i>, which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g <i>De Invent.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 115 <i>utrum copiane sit agri an penuria
+  consideratur</i>. On this point cf. M. <i>Em.</i> 163, <i>Gram.</i> 452,
+  obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic. <i>Verr.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 73.
+  <i>Honesti inane nomen esse</i>: a modern would be inclined to write
+  <i>honestum</i>, in apposition to <i>nomen</i>, cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 18 <i>voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum<i>.
+  </i>Voluptatem</i> etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called <span
+  lang="el" title="ho metathemenos" >&#x201B;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>)
+  from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 60, Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">VII.</span>
+  166&mdash;7. <i>A vero</i>: "coming from a reality," cf. <a
+  href="#BkIIN_41">41</a>, n. <i>Is curavit</i>: Goer. reads <i>his</i>,
+  "<i>solet <span class="vol">V.</span> D. in hoc pronomen saevire</i>,"
+  says Madv. The scribes often prefix <i>h</i> to parts of the pronoun
+  <i>is</i>, and Goer. generally patronises their vulgar error.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_72">��72</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_78">78</a>.</b> Summary. You accuse me of appealing to
+  ancient names like a revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and
+  Metrodorus, philosophers of the highest position, protest against the
+  truth of sense knowledge, and deny the possibility of knowledge
+  altogether (<a href="#BkII_72">72</a>, <a href="#BkII_73">73</a>).
+  Empedocles, Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense
+  knowledge. You said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with
+  these. Why? Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while
+  Plato pursued the same theme in all his works (<a
+  href="#BkII_74">74</a>). Now do you see that I do not merely name, but
+  take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus stated many difficulties
+  concerning the senses and general experience. You say he solved them,
+  even if he did, which I do not believe, he admitted that it was not easy
+  to escape being ensnared by them (<a href="#BkII_75">75</a>). The
+  Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to
+  themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (<a
+  href="#BkII_76">76</a>). Zeno held strongly that the wise man ought to
+  keep clear from <i>opinion</i>. Arcesilas agreed but this without
+  <i>knowledge</i> was impossible. <i>Knowledge</i> consists of
+  <i>perceptions</i>. Arcesilas therefore demanded a definition of
+  <i>perception</i>. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is the
+  controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with <i>opinion</i> and
+  <i>perception</i>, and the <span lang="el" title="epoch�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span> of Arcesilas follows at once
+  (<a href="#BkII_77">77</a>, <a href="#BkII_78">78</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_72"></a><a href="#BkII_72">�72</a>.</b> <i>De
+  antiquis philosophis</i>: on account of the somewhat awkward constr.
+  Lamb. read <i>antiquos philosophos</i>. <i>Popularis</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_13">13</a>. <i>Res non bonas</i>: MSS. om. <i>non</i>, which
+  Or. added with two very early editions. Faber ingeniously supposed the
+  true reading to be <i>novas</i>, which would be written <i>nobas</i>, and
+  then pass into <i>bonas</i>. <i>Nivem nigram</i>: this deliverance of
+  Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In <i>P.H.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 33 he quotes it as an instance of the refutation of
+  <span lang="el" title="phainomena"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>
+  by means of <span lang="el" title="nooumena"
+  >&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>, "<span
+  lang="el" title="Anaxagoras t�i leuk�n einai t�n chiona, anetithei hoti chi�n estin hydor pep�gos to de hydor esti melan kai h� chi�n ara melaina"
+  >&#x391;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3B9; &#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C7;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;,
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3C7;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD; &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C2; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x201B;&#x3B7; &#x3C7;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>." There is an
+  obscure joke on this in <i>Ad Qu. Fratrem</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 13, 1 <i>risi nivem atram ... teque hilari animo
+  esse et prompto ad iocandum valde me iuvat</i>. <i>Sophistes</i>: here
+  treated as the demagogue of philosophy. <i>Ostentationis</i>: = <span
+  lang="el" title="epideixeos"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BE;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_73"></a><a href="#BkII_73">�73</a>.</b>
+  <i>Democrito</i>: Cic., as Madv. remarks on <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 20, always exaggerates the merits of Democr. in
+  order to depreciate the Epicureans, cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 22, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 5,
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 139, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  120, <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 42. <i>Quintae
+  classis</i>: a metaphor from the Roman military order. <i>Qui veri esse
+  aliquid</i>, etc.: cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 12 <i>non
+  enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris
+  falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus</i>. <i>Non obscuros sed tenebricosos</i>:
+  "not merely dim but darkened." There is a reference here to the <span
+  lang="el" title="skoti� gn�sis"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> of Democr., by which he
+  meant that knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things
+  as shown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also
+  held a <span lang="el" title="gn�si� gn�sis"
+  >&#x3B3;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>, dealing with the
+  realities of material existence, the atoms and the void, which exist
+  <span lang="el" title="ete�i" >&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B7;&#x3B9;</span>
+  and not merely <span lang="el" title="nom�i"
+  >&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;</span> as appearances do. See R. and
+  P. 51.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_74"></a><a href="#BkII_74">�74</a>.</b>
+  <i>Furere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_14">14</a>. <i>Orbat sensibus</i>: cf.
+  <a href="#BkII_61">61</a>, and for the belief of Empedocles about the
+  possibility of <span lang="el" title="epist�m�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> see the
+  remarks of Sextus <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 123&mdash;4
+  qu. R. and P. 107, who say "<i>patet errare eos qui scepticis
+  adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant</i>." <i>Sonum fundere</i>: similar
+  expressions occur in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 42, <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 73, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 48.
+  <i>Parmenides, Xenophanes</i>: these are the last men who ought to be
+  charged with scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against
+  sense-knowledge, but held that real knowledge was attainable by the
+  reason. Cf. Grote, <i>Plato</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 54, Zeller
+  501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. <i>Minus bonis</i>: Dav. qu.
+  Plut. <i>De Audit.</i> 45 A, <span lang="el" title="mempsaito d' an tis Parmenidou t�n stichopoiian"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3C8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3B4;'
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3A0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Quamquam</i>: on the proper use of <i>quamquam</i> in clauses where
+  the verb is not expressed see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  68 and cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_5">5</a>. <i>Quasi
+  irati</i>: for the use of <i>quasi</i> = almost cf. <i>In Verr. Act.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 22, <i>Orat.</i> 41. <i>Aiebas
+  removendum</i>: for om. of <i>esse</i> see n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_43">43</a>. <i>Perscripti sunt</i>:
+  cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_16">16</a>. <i>Scire
+  se nihil se scire</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_16">16</a>, <a href="#BkI_44">44</a>. The words referred to
+  are in Plat. <i>Apol.</i> 21 <span lang="el" title="eoika goun toutou smikr�i tini aut�i tout�i soph�teros einai, hoti a m� oida oude oiomai eidenai"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1; &#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B9; &#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;, &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1; &#x3BC;&#x3B7; &#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>, a very
+  different statement from the <i>nihil sciri posse</i> by which Cic.
+  interprets it (cf. R. and P. 148). That <span lang="el" title="epist�m�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> in the
+  strict sense is impossible, is a doctrine which Socrates would have left
+  to the Sophists. <i>De Platone</i>: the doctrine above mentioned is an
+  absurd one to foist upon Plato. The dialogues of search as they are
+  called, while exposing sham knowledge, all assume that the real <span
+  lang="el" title="epist�m�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> is
+  attainable. <i>Ironiam</i>: the word was given in its Greek form in <a
+  href="#BkII_15">15</a>. <i>Nulla fuit ratio persequi</i>: n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_17">17</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_75"></a><a href="#BkII_75">�75</a>.</b>
+  <i>Videorne</i>: = <i>nonne videor</i>, as <i>videsne</i> = <i>nonne
+  vides</i>. <i>Imitari numquam nisi</i>: a strange expression for which
+  Manut. conj. <i>imitari? num quem</i>, etc., Halm <i>nullum unquam</i> in
+  place of <i>numquam</i>. Bait. prints the reading of Man., which I think
+  harsher than that of the MSS. <i>Minutos</i>: for the word cf.
+  <i>Orat.</i> 94, also <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 62
+  <i>minuti philosophi</i>, <i>Brut.</i> 256 <i>minuti imperatores</i>.
+  <i>Stilponem</i>, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P. 177&mdash;182. <span
+  lang="el" title="sophismata"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>:
+  Cic. in the second edition probably introduced here the translation
+  <i>cavillationes</i>, to which Seneca <i>Ep.</i> 116 refers, cf. Krische,
+  p. 65. <i>Fulcire porticum</i>: "to be the pillar of the Stoic porch".
+  Cf. the anonymous line <span lang="el" title="ei m� gar �n Chrysippos, ouk an �n Stoa"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3BC;&#x3B7; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1; &#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3A7;&#x3C1;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;,
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BA; &#x3B1;&#x3BD; &#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3A3;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B1;</span>. <i>Quae in consuetudine
+  probantur</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_87">87</a>. <i>Nisi videret</i>: for
+  the tense of the verb, see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 347 <i>b</i>, obs. 2.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_76"></a><a href="#BkII_76">�76</a>.</b> <i>Quid ...
+  philosophi</i>: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv. and
+  followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this reading,
+  which only requires the alteration of <i>Cyrenaei</i> into
+  <i>Cyrenaici</i> (now made by all edd. on the ground that
+  <i>Cyrenaeus</i> is a citizen of Cyreno, <i>Cyrenaicus</i> a follower of
+  Aristippus) and the insertion of <i>tibi</i>. I see no difficulty in the
+  <i>qui</i> before <i>negant</i>, at which so many edd. take offence.
+  <i>Tactu intimo</i>: the word <span lang="el" title="haph�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3B7;</span> I believe does not occur in ancient
+  authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great word was <span
+  lang="el" title="pathos" >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  From <a href="#BkII_143">143</a> (<i>permotiones intimas</i>) it might
+  appear that Cic. is translating either <span lang="el" title="pathos"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> or <span lang="el"
+  title="kin�sis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>. For a clear
+  account of the school see Zeller's <i>Socrates</i>, for the illustration
+  of the present passage pp 293&mdash;300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R.
+  and P. 162 sq. <i>Quo quid colore</i>: cf. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 191 (qu. Zeller <i>Socrates</i> 297, R. and P.
+  165). <i>Adfici se</i>: = <span lang="el" title="paschein"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Quaesieras</i>: note the plup. where Eng. idiom requires the perfect
+  or aorist. <i>Tot saeculis</i>: cf. the same words in <a
+  href="#BkII_15">15</a>. <i>Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis</i>: cf.
+  <i>summis ingeniis, maximis studiis</i> in <a href="#BkII_15">15</a>.
+  <i>Obtrectandi</i>: this invidious word had been used by Lucullus in <a
+  href="#BkII_16">16</a>; cf. also <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_44">44</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_77"></a><a href="#BkII_77">�77</a>.</b>
+  <i>Expresserat</i>: "had put into distinct shape". Cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_7">7</a> and <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_19">19</a>. <i>Exprimere</i> and <i>dicere</i> are always
+  sharply distinguished by Cic., the latter merely implying the mechanic
+  exercise of utterance, the former the moulding and shaping of the
+  utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp. <i>Orat.</i> 3, 69, and <i>Ad
+  Att.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 11, 1; also <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 32, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 79,
+  qu. by Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav. <i>exposuerat</i> is
+  therefore needless. <i>Fortasse</i>: "we may suppose". <i>Nec
+  percipere</i>, etc.: cf. <a href="#BkIIN_68">68</a>, n. <i>Tum illum</i>:
+  a change from <i>ille, credo</i> (sc. <i>respondit</i>), the <i>credo</i>
+  being now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after <i>ita
+  definisse</i> cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 13 (who
+  quotes exx.); also the construction with <i>ita iudico</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_113">113</a>. <i>Ex eo, quod esset</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>, n. <i>Effictum</i>: so Manut. for MSS.
+  <i>effectum</i>, cf. <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>. <i>Ab eo, quod non
+  est</i>: the words <i>non est</i> include the two meanings "is non
+  existent," and "is different from what it seems to be"&mdash;the two
+  meanings of <i>falsum</i> indeed, see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_47">47</a>.
+  <i>Eiusdem modi</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_40">40</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_84">84</a>. MSS. have <i>eius modi</i>, altered by Dav.
+  <i>Recte ... additum</i>: the semicolon at <i>Arcesilas</i> was added by
+  Manutius, who is followed by all edd. This involves taking <i>additum</i>
+  = <i>additum est</i>, an ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv.
+  <i>Opusc.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 448, <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 43, <i>Gram.</i> 479 <i>a</i>. I think it quite
+  possible that <i>recte consensit additum</i> should be construed
+  together, "agreed that the addition had been rightly made." For the
+  omission of <i>esse</i> in that case cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 406, and such
+  expressions as <i>dicere solebat perturbatum</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_111">111</a>, also <i>ita scribenti exanclatum</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_108">108</a>. <i>Recte</i>, which with the ordinary stopping
+  expresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain
+  in point. Qy, should <i>concessit</i> be read, as in <a
+  href="#BkII_118">118</a> <i>concessisse</i> is now read for MSS.
+  <i>consensisse</i>? <i>A vero</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_41">41</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_78"></a><a href="#BkII_78">�78</a>.</b> <i>Quae
+  adhuc permanserit</i>: note the subj., "which is of such a nature as to
+  have lasted". <i>Nam illud ... pertinebat</i>: by <i>illud</i> is meant
+  the argument in defence of <span lang="el" title="epoch�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span> given in <a
+  href="#BkII_67">67</a>; by <i>nihil ... pertinebat</i> nothing more is
+  intended than that there was no <i>immediate</i> or <i>close</i>
+  connection. Cf. the use of <i>pertinere</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 55. <i>Clitomacho</i>: cf. n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_59">59</a>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_79">��79</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_90">90</a>.</b> Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding
+  your cause in spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are
+  thus acting like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the
+  sensation can be false, not the sensation itself (<a
+  href="#BkII_79">79</a>, <a href="#BkII_80">80</a>). I wish the god of
+  whom you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound
+  senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our
+  vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you,
+  <i>we</i> desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires
+  not the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the
+  god because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (<a
+  href="#BkII_80">80</a>, <a href="#BkII_81">81</a>). If you want something
+  greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the sun? Still he
+  seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a little broader
+  or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed, too, he appears
+  to us to stand still (<a href="#BkII_82">82</a>). The whole question lies
+  in a nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is
+  disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a false
+  one indistinguishable from it (<a href="#BkII_83">83</a>). A man who has
+  mistaken P. for Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising
+  Cotta. You say that no such indistinguishable resemblances <i>exist</i>.
+  Never mind, they <i>seem</i> to exist and that is enough. One mistaken
+  sensation will throw all the others into uncertainty (<a
+  href="#BkII_84">84</a>). You say everything belongs to its own
+  <i>genus</i> this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that two
+  sensations <i>are</i> absolutely similar, it is enough that human
+  faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of
+  signet rings? (<a href="#BkII_85">85</a>) Can you find a ring merchant to
+  rival your chicken rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So
+  we cannot see or hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea
+  this gives us of the art with which nature has constructed the senses!
+  (<a href="#BkII_86">86</a>) But about physics I will speak afterwards. I
+  am going now to advance against the senses arguments drawn from
+  Chrysippus himself (<a href="#BkII_87">87</a>). You said that the
+  sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of
+  the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his Alcmaeon,
+  of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides disprove
+  your point (<a href="#BkII_88">88</a>, <a href="#BkII_89">89</a>). In
+  their case at least 'mind and eyes agreed. It is no good to talk about
+  the saner moments of such people; the question is, what was the nature of
+  their sensations at the time they were affected? (<a
+  href="#BkII_90">90</a>)</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_79"></a><a href="#BkII_79">�79</a>.</b> <i>Communi
+  loco</i>: <span lang="el" title="top�"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3C9;</span>, that of blinking facts which cannot
+  be disproved, see <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>. <i>Quod ne</i> [<i>id</i>]:
+  I have bracketed <i>id</i> with most edd. since Manut. If, however,
+  <i>quod</i> be taken as the conjunction, and not as the pronoun,
+  <i>id</i> is not altogether insupportable. <i>Heri</i>: cf. Introd. <a
+  href="#Page_lv">55</a>. <i>Infracto remo</i>: n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_19">19</a>. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his "Higher
+  Pantheism"&mdash;"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a
+  pool". <i>Manent illa omnia, iacet</i>: this is my correction of the
+  reading of most MSS. <i>maneant ... lacerat</i>. Madv. <i>Em.</i> 176 in
+  combating the conj. of Goer. <i>si maneant ... laceratis istam
+  causam</i>, approves <i>maneant ... iaceat</i>, a reading with some MSS.
+  support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole confusion of the passage
+  arises from the mania of the copyists for turning indicatives into
+  subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx. occur every few
+  pages. If <i>iacet</i> were by error turned into <i>iaceret</i> the
+  reading <i>lacerat</i> would arise at once. The nom. to <i>dicit</i> is,
+  I may observe, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans.
+  "all my arguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his
+  senses are true quotha!" (For this use of <i>dicit</i> cf. <i>inquit</i>
+  in <a href="#BkII_101">101</a>, <a href="#BkII_109">109</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_115">115</a>). Hermann approves the odd reading of the ed.
+  Cratandriana of 1528 <i>latrat</i>. Dav. conjectured comically
+  <i>blaterat iste tamen et</i>, Halm <i>lacera est ista causa</i>.
+  <i>Habes</i>: as two good MSS. have <i>habes et eum</i>, Madv. <i>Em.</i>
+  176 conj. <i>habet</i>. The change of person, however, (from <i>dicit</i>
+  to <i>habes</i>) occurs also in <a href="#BkII_101">101</a>.
+  <i>Epicurus</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_19">19</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_80"></a><a href="#BkII_80">�80</a>.</b> <i>Hoc est
+  verum esse</i>: Madv. <i>Em.</i> 177 took <i>verum</i> as meaning fair,
+  candid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical
+  epistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed <i>virum esse</i>, a
+  very strange em. Halm's conj. <i>certum esse</i> is weak and improbable.
+  <i>Importune</i>: this is in one good MS. but the rest have
+  <i>importata</i>, a good em. is needed, as <i>importune</i> does not suit
+  the sense of the passage. <i>Negat ... torsisset</i>: for the tenses cf.
+  <a href="#BkII_104">104</a> <i>exposuisset, adiungit</i>. <i>Cum oculum
+  torsisset</i>: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing
+  upwards or sideways. Cf. Aristot. <i>Eth. Eud.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 13 (qu. by Dav.) <span lang="el"
+  title="ophthalmous diastrepsanta h�ste duo to hen phan�nai"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C8;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x201B;&#x3C9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B5; &#x3B4;&#x3C5;&#x3BF; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>. Faber qu.
+  Arist. <i>Problemata</i> <span class="vol">XVII.</span> 31 <span
+  lang="el" title="dia ti eis to plagion kinousi ton ophthalmon ou (?) phainetai duo to hen"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1; &#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  (?) &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3C5;&#x3BF; &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x201B;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;</span>. Also
+  <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">XXXI.</span> 3 inquiring the reason why
+  drunkards see double he says <span lang="el" title="tauto touto gignetai kai ean tis kat�then pies� ton ophthalmon"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B3;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B7; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. Sextus
+  refers to the same thing <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 47,
+  <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 192 (<span lang="el" title="ho parapiesas ton ophthalmon"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>) so Cic.
+  <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 120. Lucretius gives the same
+  answer as Timagoras, <i>propter opinatus animi</i> (IV. 465), as does
+  Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 210 on behalf of
+  Epicurus. <i>Sed hic</i>: Bait. <i>sit hic</i>. <i>Maiorum</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_143">143</a>. <i>Quasi quaeratur</i>: Carneades refused to
+  discuss about things in themselves but merely dealt with the appearances
+  they present, <span lang="el" title="to gar al�thes kai to pseudes en tois pragmasi synech�rei"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C2; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C2; &#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3C9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;</span>
+  (Numen in Euseb. <i>Pr. Eu.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 8). Cf.
+  also Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 78, 87, 144, <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 75. <i>Domi nascuntur</i>: a proverb used like
+  <span lang="el" title="glauk' es' Ath�nas"
+  >&#x3B3;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3BA;' &#x3B5;&#x3C3;'
+  &#x391;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span> and "coals to
+  Newcastle," see Lorenz on Plaut. <i>Miles</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 2, 38, and cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> <span
+  class="vol">X.</span> 14, 2, <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span class="vol">IX.</span>
+  3. <i>Deus</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>. <i>Audiret ... ageret</i>:
+  MSS. have <i>audies ... agerent</i>. As the insertion of <i>n</i> in the
+  imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read <i>ageret</i> and alter
+  <i>audies</i> to suit it. Halm has <i>audiret ... ageretur</i> with Dav.,
+  Bait. <i>audiet, egerit</i>. <i>Ex hoc loco video ... cerno</i>: MSS.
+  have <i>loco cerno regionem video Pompeianum non cerno</i> whence Lipsius
+  conj. <i>ex hoc loco e regione video</i>. Halm ejects the words
+  <i>regionem video</i>, I prefer to eject <i>cerno regionem</i>. We are
+  thus left with the slight change from <i>video</i> to <i>cerno</i>, which
+  is very often found in Cic., e.g. <i>Orat.</i> 18. Cic. sometimes however
+  joins the two verbs as in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span>
+  161. <i>O praeclarum prospectum</i>: the view was a favourite one with
+  Cic., see <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 13, 5.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_81"></a><a href="#BkII_81">�81</a>.</b> <i>Nescio
+  qui</i>: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that <i>nescio quis</i> implies
+  contempt, while <i>nescio qui</i> does not, cf. <i>Div. in qu. Caec.</i>
+  47, where <i>nescio qui</i> would contradict his rule. It is as difficult
+  to define the uses of the two expressions as to define those of
+  <i>aliquis</i> and <i>aliqui</i>, on which see <a href="#BkIIN_61">61</a>
+  n. In <i>Paradoxa</i> 12 the best MSS. have <i>si qui</i> and <i>si
+  quis</i> almost in the same line with identically the same meaning Dav.
+  quotes Solinus and Plin. <i>N.H.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 21, to
+  show that the man mentioned here was called Strabo&mdash;a misnomer
+  surely. <i>Octingenta</i>: so the best MSS., not <i>octoginta</i>, which
+  however agrees better with Pliny. <i>Quod abesset</i>: "<i>whatever</i>
+  might be 1800 stadia distant," <i>aberat</i> would have implied that Cic.
+  had some <i>particular</i> thing in mind, cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 364,
+  obs. 1. <i>Acrius</i>: <span lang="el" title="oxyteron"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, Lamb.
+  without need read <i>acutius</i> as Goer. did in <a
+  href="#BkII_69">69</a>. <i>Illos pisces</i>: so some MSS., but the best
+  have <i>ullos</i>, whence Klotz conj. <i>multos</i>, Orelli <i>multos
+  illos</i>, omitting <i>pisces</i>. For the allusion to the fish, cf.
+  <i>Acad. Post.</i> fragm. <a href="#Fr_13">13</a>. <i>Videntur</i>: n. on
+  <a href="#BkIIN_25">25</a>. <i>Amplius</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>
+  <i>non video cur quaerat amplius</i>. <i>Desideramus</i>: Halm, failing
+  to understand the passage, follows Christ in reading <i>desiderant</i>
+  (i.e. <i>pisces</i>). To paraphrase the sense is this "But say my
+  opponents, the Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses than we
+  have." Well you are like the mole, which does not yearn for the light
+  because it does not know what light is. Of course all the ancients
+  thought the mole blind. A glance will show the insipidity of the sense
+  given by Halm's reading. <i>Quererer cum deo</i>: would enter into an
+  altercation with the god. The phrase, like <span lang="el"
+  title="loidoresthai tini"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;</span> as opposed to <span lang="el"
+  title="loidorein tina"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span> implies mutual recrimination, cf.
+  <i>Pro Deiotaro</i> 9 <i>querellae cum Deiotaro</i>. The reading <i>tam
+  quererer</i> for the <i>tamen quaereretur</i> of the MSS. is due to
+  Manut. <i>Navem</i>: Sextus often uses the same illustration, as in
+  <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 107, <i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 414. <i>Non tu verum testem</i>, etc.: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_105">105</a>. For the om. of <i>te</i> before <i>habere</i>,
+  which has strangely troubled edd. and induced them to alter the text, see
+  n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_6">6</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_82"></a><a href="#BkII_82">�82</a>.</b> <i>Quid
+  ego</i>: Bait. has <i>sed quid</i> after Ernesti. <i>Nave</i>: so the
+  best MSS., not <i>navi</i>, cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 42.
+  <i>Duodeviginti</i>: so in <a href="#BkII_128">128</a>. Goer. and Roeper
+  qu. by Halm wished to read <i>duodetriginta</i>. The reff. of Goer. at
+  least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the sun
+  at 28 times the size of the earth. <i>Quasi pedalis</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 20 <i>pedalis fortasse</i>. For <i>quasi</i>
+  = <i>circiter</i> cf. note on <a href="#BkIIN_74">74</a>. Madv. on
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 20 quotes Diog. Laert. <span
+  class="vol">X.</span> 91, who preserves the very words of Epicurus, in
+  which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr. <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 590, who copies Epicurus, and Seneca <i>Quaest.
+  Nat.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 3, 10 (<i>solem sapientes viri
+  pedalem esse contenderunt</i>). Madv. points out from Plut. <i>De Plac.
+  Phil.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus
+  asserted the sun to be a foot wide, he does not however quote Stob.
+  <i>Phys.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 24, 1 <span lang="el"
+  title="h�lion megethos echein euros podos anthr�peiou"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD; &#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;</span>,
+  which is affirmed to be the opinion of Heraclitus and Hecataeus. <i>Ne
+  maiorem quidem</i>: so the MSS., but Goer. and Orelli read <i>nec</i> for
+  <i>ne</i>, incurring the reprehension of Madv. <i>D.F.</i> p. 814, ed 2.
+  <i>Nihil aut non multum</i>: so in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 59, the correction of Orelli, therefore, <i>aut non
+  multum mentiantur aut nihil</i>, is rash. <i>Semel</i>: see <a
+  href="#BkII_79">79</a>. <i>Qui ne nunc quidem</i>: sc. <i>mentiri sensus
+  putat</i>. Halm prints <i>quin</i>, and is followed by Baiter, neither
+  has observed that <i>quin ne ... quidem</i> is bad Latin (see
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 56). Nor can <i>quin ne</i> go
+  together even without <i>quidem</i>, cf. Krebs and Allgayer,
+  <i>Antibarbarus</i> ed. 4 on <i>quin</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_83"></a><a href="#BkII_83">�83</a>.</b> <i>In parvo
+  lis sit</i>: Durand's em. for the <i>in parvulis sitis</i> of the MSS.,
+  which Goer. alone defends. <i>Quattuor capita</i>: these were given in <a
+  href="#BkII_40">40</a> by Lucullus, cf. also <a href="#BkII_77">77</a>.
+  <i>Epicurus</i>: as above in <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_79">79</a> etc.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_84"></a><a href="#BkII_84">�84</a>.</b>
+  <i>Geminum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_56">56</a>. <i>Nota</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_58">58</a> and the speech of Lucullus <i>passim</i>. <i>Ne
+  sit ... potest</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_80">80</a> <i>quasi quaeratur quid
+  sit, non quid videatur. Si ipse erit</i> for <i>ipse</i> apparently =
+  <i>is ipse</i> cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 93.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_85"></a><a href="#BkII_85">�85</a>.</b> <i>Quod non
+  est</i>: = <i>qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur</i>. <i>Sui generis</i>: cf.
+  <a href="#BkII_50">50</a>, <a href="#BkII_54">54</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_56">56</a>. <i>Nullum esse pilum</i>, etc.: a strong
+  expression of this belief is found in Seneca <i>Ep.</i>. 113, 13, qu. R.
+  and P. 380. Note the word <i>Stoicum</i>; Lucullus is of course not
+  Stoic, but Antiochean. <i>Nihil interest</i>: the same opinion is
+  expressed in <a href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>, where see my note. <i>Visa
+  res</i>: Halm writes <i>res a re</i>, it is not necessary, however,
+  either in Gk. or Lat. to express <i>both</i> of two related things when a
+  word is inserted like <i>differat</i> here, which shows that they
+  <i>are</i> related. Cf. the elliptic constructions in Gk. with <span
+  lang="el" title="homoion, metaxy, mesos"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3C5;,
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>, and such words. <i>Eodem
+  caelo atque</i>: a difficult passage. MSS. have <i>aqua</i>, an error
+  easy, as Halm notes, to a scribe who understood <i>caelum</i> to be the
+  heaven, and not <span lang="el" title="glypheion"
+  >&#x3B3;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3C6;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, a
+  graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the MSS. reading, adducing
+  passages to show that sky and water were important in the making of
+  statues. For <i>aqua</i> Orelli conj. <i>acu</i> = <i>schraffirnadel</i>,
+  C.F. Hermann <i>caelatura</i>, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian
+  word. Halm's <i>aeque</i> introduces a construction with <i>ceteris
+  omnibus</i> which is not only not Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I
+  read <i>atque</i>, taking <i>ceteris omnibus</i> to be the abl. neut.
+  "all the other implements." Formerly I conj. <i>ascra</i>, or <i>atque
+  in</i>, which last leading would make <i>omnibus</i> = <i>om.
+  statuis</i>. <i>Alexandros</i>: Lysippus alone was privileged to make
+  statues of Alexander, as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the
+  conqueror, cf. <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 12, 7.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_86"></a><a href="#BkII_86">�86</a>.</b>
+  <i>Anulo</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_54">54</a>. <i>Aliqui</i>: n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_61">61</a>. <i>Gallinarium</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_57">57</a>. <i>Adhibes artem</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_20">20</a> <i>adhibita arte</i>. <i>Pictor ... tibicen</i>:
+  so in <a href="#BkII_20">20</a>. <i>Simul inflavit</i>: note <i>simul</i>
+  for <i>simul atque</i>, cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 12.
+  <i>Nostri quidem</i>: i.e. <i>Romani</i>. <i>Admodum</i>: i.e. <i>adm.
+  pauci</i> cf. <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 32 <i>pauci
+  enim atque admodum pauci</i>. <i>Praeclara</i>: evidently a fem. adj.
+  agreeing with <i>natura</i>. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and
+  understanding <i>sunt</i> interpreted "these arguments I am going to urge
+  are grand, viz. <i>quanto art</i>. etc."</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_87"></a><a href="#BkII_87">�87</a>.</b>
+  <i>Scilicet</i>: Germ. "nat�rlich." <i>Fabricata sit</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_30">30</a>, <a href="#BkII_119">119</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_121">121</a> and N.D. <span class="vol">I.</span> 19. <i>Ne
+  modo</i>: for <i>modo ne</i>, a noticeable use. <i>Physicis</i>: probably
+  neut. <i>Contra sensus</i>: he wrote both for and against <span lang="el"
+  title="syn�theia"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>; cf. R.
+  and P. 360 and 368. <i>Carneadem</i>: Plut. <i>Sto. Rep</i>. 1036 B
+  relates that Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the
+  senses, quoted the address of Andromache to Hector: <span lang="el"
+  title="daimonie phthisei se to son menos"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B8;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3C3;&#x3B5; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>. From
+  Diog. <span class="vol">IV.</span> 62 we learn that he thus parodied the
+  line qu. in n. on <a href="#BkIIN_75">75</a>, <span lang="el" title="ei m� gar �n Chrysippos ouk an �n eg�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3BC;&#x3B7; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1; &#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3A7;&#x3C1;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BA; &#x3B1;&#x3BD; &#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3C9;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_88"></a><a href="#BkII_88">�88</a>.</b>
+  <i>Diligentissime</i>: in <a href="#BkII_48">48</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_53">53</a>. <i>Dicebas</i>: in <a href="#BkII_52">52</a>
+  <i>imbecillius adsentiuntur</i>. <i>Siccorum</i>: cf. Cic. <i>Contra
+  Rullum</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 1 <i>consilia siccorum</i>.
+  <i>Madere</i> is common with the meaning "to be drunk," as in Plaut.
+  <i>Mostellaria</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 4, 6. <i>Non diceret</i>:
+  Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit the verb, with one MS., cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_15">15</a> and <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_13">13</a>. The omission of a verb in the subjunctive is,
+  Madv. says on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 9, impossible; for
+  other ellipses of the verb see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  63. <i>Alcmaeo autem</i>: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon; cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_52">52</a>. <i>Somnia reri</i>: the best MSS. have
+  <i>somniare</i>. Goer. reads <i>somnia</i>, supplying <i>non fuisse
+  vera</i>. I have already remarked on his extraordinary power of
+  <i>supplying</i>. Halm conj. <i>somnia reprobare</i>, forgetting that the
+  verb <i>reprobare</i> belongs to third century Latinity, also <i>sua visa
+  putare</i>, which Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from
+  the MSS., I read <i>reri</i>, which verb occurred in <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_26">26</a>, <a href="#BkI_39">39</a>.
+  Possibly <i>putare</i>, a little farther on, has got misplaced. <i>Non id
+  agitur</i>: these difficulties supply Sextus with one of his <span
+  lang="el" title="tropoi"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span>, i.e. <span lang="el"
+  title="ho peri tas peristaseis" >&#x201B;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>;
+  cf. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 100, also for the treatment
+  of dreams, <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 104. <i>Si modo</i>,
+  etc.: "if only he dreamed it," i.e. "merely because he dreamed it."
+  <i>Aeque ac vigilanti</i>: = <i>aeque ac si vigilaret</i>. Dav. missing
+  the sense, and pointing out that <i>when awake</i> Ennius did not assent
+  to his sensations at all, conj. <i>vigilantis</i>. Two participles used
+  in very different ways not unfrequently occur together, see Madv. <i>Em.
+  Liv.</i> p. 442. <i>Ita credit</i>: MSS. have <i>illa</i>, which Dav.
+  altered. Halm would prefer <i>credidit</i>. <i>Itera dum</i>, etc.: from
+  the <i>Iliona</i> of Pacuvius; a favourite quotation with Cic.; see <i>Ad
+  Att.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 14, and <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 44.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_89"></a><a href="#BkII_89">�89</a>.</b>
+  <i>Quisquam</i>: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences
+  cf. Virg. <i>Aen.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 48 with the
+  Notes of Wagner and Conington. <i>Tam certa putat</i>: so
+  Sextus <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 61 points out that
+  Protagoras must in accordance with his doctrine <span lang="el"
+  title="pant�n metron anthr�pos"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> hold that
+  the <span lang="el" title="mem�n�s"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span> is the <span
+  lang="el" title="krit�rion t�n en maniai phainomen�n"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Video, video te</i>: evidently from a tragedy whose subject was <span
+  lang="el" title="Aias mainomenos" >&#x391;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  see Ribbeck <i>Trag. Lat. rel.</i> p. 205. Cic. in <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 162 thus continues the quotation, "<i>oculis
+  postremum lumen radiatum rape</i>." So in Soph. <i>Aiax</i> 100 the hero,
+  after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae, keeps Odysseus alive awhile in
+  order to torture him. <i>Hercules</i>: cf. Eur. <i>Herc. Fur.</i>
+  921&mdash;1015. The mad visions of this hero, like those of Orestes, are
+  often referred to for a similar purpose by Sext., e.g. <i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 405 <span lang="el" title="ho goun Herakl�s maneis kai lab�n phantasian apo t�n idi�n paid�n h�s Eurystheos, t�n akolouthon praxin taut�i t� phantasiai syn�psen. akolouthon de �n to tous tou echthrou paidas anelein, hoper kai epoi�sen."
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF; &#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x201B;&#x395;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3B2;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x201B;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x395;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;,
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;.
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;.</span> Cf. also
+  <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 249. <i>Moveretur</i>: imperf.
+  for plup. as in <a href="#BkII_90">90</a>. <i>Alcmaeo tuus</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_52">52</a>. <i>Incitato furore</i>: Dav. reads
+  <i>incitatus</i>. Halm qu. from Wesenberg <i>Observ. Crit. ad Or. p.
+  Sestio</i> p. 51 this explanation, "<i>cum furor eius initio remissior
+  paulatim incitatior et vehementior factus esset</i>," he also refers to
+  Wopkens <i>Lect. Tull.</i> p. 55 ed. Hand. <i>Incedunt</i> etc.: the MSS.
+  have <i>incede</i>, which Lamb. corrected. The subject of the verb is
+  evidently <i>Furiae</i>. <i>Adsunt</i>: is only given once by MSS., while
+  Ribbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have written it twice.
+  <i>Caerulea ... angui</i>: <i>anguis</i> fem is not uncommon in the old
+  poetry. MSS. here have <i>igni</i>. <i>Crinitus</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="akersekom�s"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  "never shorn," as Milton translates it. <i>Luna innixus</i>: the separate
+  mention in the next line of <i>Diana</i>, usually identified with the
+  moon, has led edd. to emend this line. Some old edd. have <i>lunat</i>,
+  while Lamb. reads <i>genu</i> for <i>luna</i>, cf. Ov. <i>Am.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.) <i>lunavitque genu sinuosum
+  fortiter arcum</i>. Wakefield on Lucr. <span class="vol">III.</span> 1013
+  puts a stop at <i>auratum</i>, and goes on with <i>Luna innixans</i>.
+  Taber strangely explains <i>luna</i> as = <i>arcu ipso lunato</i>, Dav.
+  says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it is the
+  utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should not
+  regard <i>luna</i> and <i>Diana</i> as distinct.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_90"></a><a href="#BkII_90">�90</a>.</b> <i>Illa
+  falsa</i>: sc. <i>visa</i>, which governs the two genitives. Goer.
+  perversely insists on taking <i>somniantium recordatione ipsorum</i>
+  closely together. <i>Non enim id quaeritur</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkIIN_80">80</a> n. Sext. very often uses very similar language,
+  as in <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 22, qu. in n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>. <i>Tum cum movebantur</i>: so Halm for MSS.
+  <i>tum commovebantur</i>, the em. is supported by <a
+  href="#BkII_88">88</a>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_91">��91</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_98">98</a>.</b> Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable
+  knowledge, its processes are not applicable to a large number of
+  philosophical questions (<a href="#BkII_91">91</a>). You value the art,
+  but remember that it gave rise to fallacies like the <i>sorites</i>,
+  which you say is faulty (<a href="#BkII_92">92</a>). If it is so, refute
+  it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will avail you
+  nothing (<a href="#BkII_93">93</a>). If you refrain because you
+  <i>cannot</i> answer, your knowledge fails you, if you <i>can</i> answer
+  and yet refrain, you are unfair (<a href="#BkII_94">94</a>). The art you
+  admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did her web, witness the
+  <i>Mentiens</i>, (<a href="#BkII_95">95</a>). You assent to arguments
+  which are identical in form with the <i>Mentiens</i>, and yet refuse to
+  assent to it Why so? (<a href="#BkII_96">96</a>) You demand that these
+  sophisms should be made exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go
+  to a tribune for that exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would
+  not allow the very first postulate of your Dialectic (<a
+  href="#BkII_97">97</a>). In my opinion, and I learned Dialectic from
+  Antiochus, the <i>Mentiens</i> and the arguments identical with it in
+  form must stand or fall together (<a
+  href="#BkII_98">98</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_91"></a><a href="#BkII_91">�91</a>.</b> <i>Inventam
+  esse</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_26">26</a>, <a href="#BkII_27">27</a>. <i>In
+  geometriane</i>: with this inquiry into the special function of Dialectic
+  cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato <i>Gorg.</i> 453 D, 454 C. <i>Sol
+  quantus sit</i>: this of course is a problem for <span lang="el"
+  title="physik�" >&#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>, not
+  for <span lang="el" title="dialektik�"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>.
+  <i>Quod sit summum bonum</i>: not <span lang="el" title="dialektik�"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>
+  but <span lang="el" title="�thik�"
+  >&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span> must decide this. <i>Quae
+  coniunctio</i>: etc. so Sext. often opposes <span lang="el"
+  title="symplok�"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span> or <span
+  lang="el" title="syn�mmenon"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  to <span lang="el" title="diezeugmenon"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  cf. esp <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 201, and Zeller 109 sq.
+  with footnotes. An instance of a <i>coniunctio</i> (hypothetical
+  judgment) is "<i>si lucet, lucet</i>" below, of a <i>disiunctio</i>
+  (disjunctive judgment) "<i>aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet</i>".
+  <i>Ambigue dictum</i>: <span lang="el" title="amphibolon"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3C6;&#x3B9;&#x3B2;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  on which see <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 256, Diog <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 62. <i>Quid sequatur</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="to akolouthon" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_19">19</a> n. <i>Quid
+  repugnet</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_19">19</a>,
+  n. <i>De se ipsa</i>: the <i>ipsa</i>, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom.
+  and not abl. Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an
+  art is not to be condemned as useless merely because it is unable to
+  solve every problem presented to it. He quotes Plato's remarks (in
+  <i>Rep.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>) that the Expert is the man who
+  knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot. Very similar
+  arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp. <i>P.H.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 175 and the words <span lang="el" title="eautou estai ekkalyptikon"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  For the mode in which Carneades dealt with Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511.
+  The true ground of attack is that Logic always <i>assumes</i> the truth
+  of phenomena, and cannot <i>prove</i> it. This was clearly seen by
+  Aristotle alone of the ancients; see Grote's essay on the Origin of
+  Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol <span class="vol">II.</span> of his
+  <i>Aristotle</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_92"></a><a href="#BkII_92">�92</a>.</b> <i>Nata
+  sit</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_28">28</a>, <a href="#BkII_59">59</a>.
+  <i>Loquendi</i>: the Stoic <span lang="el" title="logik�"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>, it must be
+  remembered, included <span lang="el" title="rh�torik�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>.
+  <i>Concludendi</i>: <span lang="el" title="tou symperainein"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  or <span lang="el" title="syllogizesthai"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>.
+  <i>Locum</i>: <span lang="el" title="topon"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> in the philosophical sense.
+  <i>Vitiosum</i>: <a href="#BkIIN_49">49</a>, n. <i>Num nostra culpa
+  est</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_32">32</a>. <i>Finium</i>: absolute limits;
+  the fallacy of the <i>sorites</i> and other such sophisms lies entirely
+  in the treatment of purely <i>relative</i> terms as though they were
+  <i>absolute</i>. <i>Quatenus</i>: the same ellipse occurs in
+  <i>Orator</i> 73. <i>In acervo tritici</i>: this is the false
+  <i>sorites</i>, which may be briefly described thus: A asks B whether one
+  grain makes a heap, B answers "No." A goes on asking whether two, three,
+  four, etc. grains make a heap. B cannot always reply "No." When he begins
+  to answer "Yes," there will be a difference of one grain between heap and
+  no heap. One grain therefore <i>does</i> make a heap. The true
+  <i>sorites</i> or chain inference is still treated in books on logic, cf.
+  Thomson's <i>Laws of Thought</i>, pp 201&mdash;203, ed 8.
+  <i>Minutatim</i>: cf. Heindorf's note on <span lang="el" title="kata smikron"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> in
+  <i>Sophistes</i> 217 D. <i>Interrogati</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_104">104</a>. In <a href="#BkII_94">94</a> we have
+  <i>interroganti</i>, which some edd. read here. <i>Dives pauper</i>,
+  etc.: it will be easily seen that the process of questioning above
+  described can be applied to any relative term such as these are. For the
+  omission of any connecting particle between the members of each pair, cf.
+  <a href="#BkII_29">29</a>, <a href="#BkII_125">125</a>, <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 64, <span class="vol">V.</span> 73, 114, Zumpt
+  <i>Gram.</i> 782. <i>Quanto addito aut dempto</i>: after this there is a
+  strange ellipse of some such words as <i>id efficiatur, quod
+  interrogatur</i>. [<i>Non</i>] <i>habemus</i>: I bracket <i>non</i> in
+  deference to Halm, Madv. however (<i>Opusc.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 508) treats it as a superabundance of negation
+  arising from a sort of anacoluthon, comparing <i>In Vatin.</i> 3, <i>Ad
+  Fam.</i> <span class="vol">XII.</span> 24. The scribes insert and omit
+  negatives very recklessly, so that the point may remain doubtful.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_93"></a><a href="#BkII_93">�93</a>.</b>
+  <i>Frangite</i>: in later Gk. generally <span lang="el" title="apolyein"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Erunt ... cavetis</i>: this form of the conditional sentence is
+  illustrated in Madv. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 70, <i>Em.
+  Liv.</i> p. 422, <i>Gram.</i> 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence
+  <i>Heaut.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 1, 59 <i>quot incommoda tibi in
+  hac re capies nisi caves</i>, cf. also <a href="#BkII_127">127</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_140">140</a> of this book. The present is of course required
+  by the instantaneous nature of the action. <i>Chrysippo</i>: he spent so
+  much time in trying to solve the sophism that it is called peculiarly his
+  by Persius <span class="vol">VI.</span> 80. <i>inventus, Chrysippe, tui
+  finitor acervi</i>. The titles of numerous distinct works of his on the
+  <i>Sorites</i> and <i>Mentiens</i> are given by Diog. <i>Tria pauca
+  sint</i>: cf. the instances in Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 418 <span lang="el" title="ta pent�konta oliga estin, ta myria oliga estin"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3B3;&#x3B1; &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3BC;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3B3;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>, also Diog. <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 82 <span lang="el" title="h�sychazein"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  the advice is quoted in Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  253 (<span lang="el" title="dein histasthai kai epechein"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>), <i>A.M.</i>
+  <span class="vol">VII.</span> 416 (<span lang="el" title="ho sophos st�setai kai h�sychasei"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF; &#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;</span>).
+  The same terms seem to have been used by the Cynics, see Sext.
+  <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 244, <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 66. <i>Stertas</i>: imitated by Aug. <i>Contra
+  Ac.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 25 <i>ter terna novem esse ... vel
+  genere humano stertente verum sit</i>, also <i>ib.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 22. <i>Proficit</i>: Dav. <i>proficis</i>, but
+  Madv. rightly understands <span lang="el" title="to h�sychazein"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (<i>Em.</i> 184), cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 58.
+  <i>Ultimum ... respondere</i>: "to put in as your answer" cf. the use of
+  <i>defendere</i> with an accus. "to put in as a plea". Kayser suggests
+  <i>paucorum quid sit</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_94"></a><a href="#BkII_94">�94</a>.</b> <i>Ut
+  agitator</i>: see the amusing letter to Atticus <span
+  class="vol">XIII.</span> 21, in which Cic. discusses different
+  translations for the word <span lang="el" title="epechein"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>, and quotes a
+  line of Lucilius <i>sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator
+  equosque</i>, adding <i>semperque Carneades</i> <span lang="el"
+  title="probol�n"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B2;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>
+  <i>pugilis et retentionem aurigae similem facit</i> <span lang="el"
+  title="epoch�" >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span>. Aug.
+  <i>Contra Ac.</i> trans. <span lang="el" title="epoch�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span> by <i>refrenatio</i> cf. also
+  <i>Lael.</i> 63. <i>Superbus es</i>: I have thus corrected the MSS.
+  <i>responde superbe</i>; Halm writes <i>facis superbe</i>, Orelli
+  <i>superbis</i>, which verb is hardly found in prose. The phrase
+  <i>superbe resistere</i> in Aug. <i>Contra Ac.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 14 may be a reminiscence. <i>Illustribus</i>:
+  Bait. with some probability adds <i>in</i>, comparing <i>in decimo</i>
+  below, and <a href="#BkII_107">107</a>, cf. however Munro on Lucr. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 420. <i>Irretiat</i>: parallel expressions occur in
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 76, <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 43, <i>De Fato</i> 7. <i>Facere non sinis</i>:
+  Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 253 points the moral in
+  the same way. <i>Augentis nec minuentis</i>: so Halm for MSS. <i>augendi
+  nec minuendi</i>, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase
+  <i>primum augendi</i> to be Latin.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_95"></a><a href="#BkII_95">�95</a>.</b> <i>Tollit
+  ... superiora</i>: cf. <i>Hortensius</i> fragm. 19 (Orelli) <i>sed ad
+  extremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit
+  dialecticorum ratio</i>. <i>Vestra an nostra</i>: Bait. after Christ
+  needlessly writes <i>nostra an vestra</i>. <span lang="el" title="axi�ma"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>: "a judgment expressed
+  in language"; cf. Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this
+  subject. <i>Effatum</i>: Halm gives the spelling <i>ecfatum</i>. It is
+  probable that this spelling was antique in Cic.'s time and only used in
+  connection with religious and legal formulae as in <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 81, <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 20,
+  see Corss. <i>Ausspr.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 155 For the word
+  cf. Sen. <i>Ep.</i> 117 <i>enuntiativum quiddam de corpore quod alii
+  effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum</i>, in <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 14 <i>pronuntiatum</i> is found, in <i>De Fato</i>
+  26 <i>pronuntiatio</i>, in Gellius <span class="vol">XVI.</span> 8 (from
+  Varro) <i>prologium</i>. <i>Aut verum esse aut falsum</i>: the constant
+  Stoic definition of <span lang="el" title="axi�ma"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>, see Diog. <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 65 and other passages in Zeller 107. <i>Mentiris
+  an verum dicis</i>: the <i>an</i> was added by Schutz on a comparison of
+  Gellius <span class="vol">XVIII.</span> 10 <i>cum mentior et mentiri me
+  dico, mentior an verum dico?</i> The sophism is given in a more formally
+  complete shape in <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 11 where
+  the following words are added, <i>dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis,
+  mentiris igitur</i>. The fallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p. 301,
+  ed Orelli), <i>quis unquam dixit "ego mentior" quum hoc ipsum
+  pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare?</i> <i>Inexplicabilia</i>: <span
+  lang="el" title="apora" >&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span> in
+  the Greek writers. <i>Odiosius</i>: this adj. has not the strong meaning
+  of the Eng. "hateful," but simply means "tiresome," "annoying." <i>Non
+  comprehensa</i>: as in <a href="#BkII_99">99</a>, the opposite of
+  <i>comprehendibilia</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 1, 41. The past
+  partic. in Cic. often has the same meaning as an adj. in <i>-bilis</i>.
+  Faber points out that in the <i>Timaeus</i> Cic. translates <span
+  lang="el" title="alytos"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> by <i>indissolutus</i>
+  and <i>indissolubilis</i> indifferently. <i>Imperceptus</i>, which one
+  would expect, is found in Ovid.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_96"></a><a href="#BkII_96">�96</a>.</b> <i>Si
+  dicis</i>: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by Manut.
+  with the exception of <i>nunc</i> which was added by Dav. The idea of
+  Orelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the
+  comic writers is untenable. <i>In docendo</i>: <i>docere</i> is not to
+  <i>expound</i> but to <i>prove</i>, cf. n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_121">121</a>. <i>Primum ... modum</i>: the word <i>modus</i>
+  is technical in this sense cf. <i>Top.</i> 57. The <span lang="el"
+  title="protos logos anapodeiktos"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>
+  of the Stoic logic ran thus <span lang="el" title="ei h�mera esti, ph�s estin ... alla m�n h�mera estin ph�s ara estin"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;, &#x3C6;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD; ... &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD; &#x3C6;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1; &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span> (Sext.
+  <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 157, and other passages qu.
+  Zeller 114). This bears a semblance of inference and is not so utterly
+  tautological as Cic.'s translation, which merges <span lang="el"
+  title="ph�s" >&#x3C6;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span> and <span lang="el"
+  title="h�mera" >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;</span> into
+  one word, or that of Zeller (<a href="#BkIIN_114">114</a>, note). These
+  arguments are called <span lang="el" title="monol�mmatoi"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span>
+  (involving only one premise) in Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 152, 159, <span class="vol">II.</span> 167. <i>Si
+  dicis te mentiri</i>, etc.: it is absurd to assume, as this sophism does,
+  that when a man <i>truly</i> states that he <i>has</i> told a lie, he
+  establishes against himself not merely that he <i>has</i> told a lie, but
+  also that he <i>is</i> telling a lie at the moment when he makes the
+  <i>true</i> statement. The root of the sophism lies in the confusion of
+  past and present time in the one infinitive <i>mentiri</i>. <i>Eiusdem
+  generis</i>: the phrase <i>te mentiri</i> had been substituted for
+  <i>nunc lucere</i>. <i>Chrysippea</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_93">93</a>.
+  <i>Conclusioni</i>: on <i>facere</i> with the dat. see n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_27">27</a>. <i>Cederet</i>: some edd. <i>crederet</i>, but
+  the word is a trans. of Gk. <span lang="el" title="eikein"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>; n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_66">66</a>. <i>Conexi</i>: = <span lang="el"
+  title="syn�mmenon"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  cf. Zeller 109. This was the proper term for the hypothetical judgment.
+  <i>Superius</i>: the <span lang="el" title="syn�mmenon"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and the
+  affirmative&mdash;called in Greek <span lang="el" title="h�goumenon"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  and <span lang="el" title="l�gon"
+  >&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>; if one is admitted the other
+  follows of course.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_97"></a><a href="#BkII_97">�97</a>.</b>
+  <i>Excipiantur</i>: the legal <i>formula</i> of the Romans generally
+  directed the <i>iudex</i> to condemn the defendant if certain facts were
+  proved, unless certain other facts were proved; the latter portion went
+  by the name of <i>exceptio</i>. See <i>Dict. Ant</i>. <i>Tribunum ...
+  adeant</i>: a retort upon Lucullus; cf. <a href="#BkII_13">13</a>. The
+  MSS. have <i>videant</i> or <i>adeant</i>; Halm conj. <i>adhibeant</i>,
+  comparing <a href="#BkII_86">86</a> and <i>Pro Rabirio</i> 20.
+  <i>Contemnit</i>: the usual trans. "to despise" for <i>contemnere</i> is
+  too strong; it means, like <span lang="el" title="olig�rein"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3B3;&#x3C9;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  merely to neglect or pass by. <i>Effabimur</i>; cf. <i>effatum</i> above.
+  <i>Hermarchus</i>: not <i>Hermachus</i>, as most edd.; see <i>M.D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 96. <i>Diiunctum</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="diezeugmenon"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>,
+  for which see Zeller 112. <i>Necessarium</i>: the reason why Epicurus
+  refused to admit this is given in <i>De Fato</i> 21 <i>Epicurus veretur
+  ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant</i>.
+  The context of that passage should be carefully read, along with
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 69, 70. Aug. <i>Contra Ac.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 29 lays great stress on the necessary truth
+  of disjunctive propositions. <i>Catus</i>: so Lamb. for MSS.
+  <i>cautus</i>. <i>Tardum</i>: <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  103 <i>Epicurum quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici</i>; cf. also
+  <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 116, and the frequent use of
+  <span lang="el" title="bradys"
+  >&#x3B2;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;</span> in Sext., e.g.
+  <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 325. <i>Cum hoc igitur</i>: the
+  word <i>igitur</i>, as usual, picks up the broken thread of the sentence.
+  <i>Id est</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_8">8</a>.
+  <i>Evertit</i>: for the Epicurean view of Dialectic see R. and P. 343.
+  Zeller 399 sq., <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 22. <i>E
+  contrariis diiunctio</i>: = <span lang="el" title="diezeugmenon ex enanti�n"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BE;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_98"></a><a href="#BkII_98">�98</a>.</b>
+  <i>Sequor</i>: as in <a href="#BkII_95">95</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_96">96</a>, where the <i>Dialectici</i> refused to allow the
+  consequences of their own principles, according to Cic. <i>Ludere</i>:
+  this reminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for
+  which see Cope in the old <i>Journal of Philology</i>. No. 7. <i>Iudicem
+  ... non iudicem</i>: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by
+  <span lang="el" title="men" >&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;</span> and <span
+  lang="el" title="de" >&#x3B4;&#x3B5;</span>, has been a great crux of
+  edd.; Dav. here wished to insert <i>cum</i> before <i>iudicem</i>, but is
+  conclusively refuted by Madv. <i>Em.</i> 31. The same construction occurs
+  in <a href="#BkII_103">103</a>. <i>Esse conexum</i>: with great
+  probability Christ supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the
+  copyists.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_98">��98</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_105">105</a>.</b> Summary. In order to overthrow at once the
+  case of Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of
+  Carneades' system (<a href="#BkII_98">98</a>). Carneades laid down two
+  divisions of <i>visa</i>, one into those capable of being perceived and
+  those not so capable, the other into probable and improbable. Arguments
+  aimed at the senses concern the first division only; the sapiens will
+  follow probability, as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly
+  does (<a href="#BkII_99">99</a>, <a href="#BkII_100">100</a>). Our
+  sapiens is not made of stone; many things <i>seem</i> to him true; yet he
+  always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The Stoics
+  themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this admission
+  together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes impossible
+  (<a href="#BkII_101">101</a>). It is strange that our <i>Probables</i> do
+  not seem sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (<a
+  href="#BkII_102">102</a>). He condemns those who say that sensation is
+  swept away by the Academy; nothing is swept away but its <i>necessary</i>
+  certainty (<a href="#BkII_103">103</a>). There are two modes of
+  withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and withholding it merely
+  so far as to deny the <i>certainty</i> of phenomena. The latter mode
+  leaves all that is required for ordinary life (<a
+  href="#BkII_104">104</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a href="#BkII_98">98</a>.</b> <i>Tortuosum</i>: similar
+  expressions are in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 42, <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 22, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 7.
+  <i>Ut Poenus</i>: "as might be expected from a Carthaginian;" cf.
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 56, <i>tuus ille Poenulus, homo
+  acutus</i>. A different meaning is given by the <i>ut</i> in passages
+  like <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 30 <i>Democritus non
+  inscite nugatur, ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius</i>; "for a
+  physical philosopher."</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_99"></a><a href="#BkII_99">�99</a>.</b>
+  <i>Genera</i>: here = classifications of, modes of dividing <i>visa</i>.
+  This way of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong
+  censure of Madv. (Pref. to <i>D.F.</i> p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted
+  of ignorance, for representing Carneades as dividing <i>visa</i> into
+  those which can be perceived and those which cannot. Is it possible that
+  any one should read the <i>Academica</i> up to this point, and still
+  believe that Cic. is capable of supposing, even for a moment, that
+  Carneades in any way upheld <span lang="el" title="katal�psis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>?
+  <i>Dicantur</i>: i.e. <i>ab Academicis</i>. <i>Si probabile</i>: the
+  <i>si</i> is not in MSS. Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading
+  <i>est, probabile nihil esse</i>. <i>Commemorabas</i>: in <a
+  href="#BkII_53">53</a>, <a href="#BkII_58">58</a>. <i>Eversio</i>: cf.
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 50 (the same words), Plat.
+  <i>Gorg</i>. 481 C <span lang="el" title="h�m�n ho bios anatetrammenos an ei�"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x201B;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD; &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;</span>, Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VIII.</span> 157 <span lang="el" title="syncheomen ton bion"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3C7;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. <i>Et
+  sensibus</i>: no second <i>et</i> corresponds to this; <i>sic</i> below
+  replaces it. See Madv. <i>D.F.</i> p. 790, ed. 2. <i>Quicquam tale</i>
+  etc.: cf. <a href="#BkII_40">40</a>, <a href="#BkII_41">41</a>. <i>Nihil
+  ab eo differens</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_54">54</a>. <i>Non
+  comprehensa</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_96">96</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_100"></a><a href="#BkII_100">�100</a>.</b> <i>Si
+  iam</i>: "if, for example;" so <i>iam</i> is often used in Lucretius.
+  <i>Probo ... bono</i>: it would have seemed more natural to transpose
+  these epithets. <i>Facilior ... ut probet</i>: the usual construction is
+  with <i>ad</i> and the gerund; cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 107, <i>Brut</i>. 180. <i>Anaxagoras</i>: he made
+  no <span lang="el" title="homoiomereiai"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and deep, is dark in colour.
+  <i>Concreta</i>: so Manut. for MSS. <i>congregata</i>. In <a
+  href="#BkII_121">121</a> the MSS. give <i>concreta</i> without variation,
+  as in <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 101, <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 130, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 66,
+  71.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_101"></a><a href="#BkII_101">�101</a>.</b>
+  <i>Impeditum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkIIN_33">33</a>, n. <i>Movebitur</i>:
+  cf. <i>moveri</i> in <a href="#BkII_24">24</a>. <i>Non enim est</i>: Cic.
+  in the vast majority of cases writes <i>est enim</i>, the two words
+  falling under one accent like <i>sed enim, et enim</i> (cf. Corss.
+  <i>Ausspr.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 851); Beier on <i>De Off.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read
+  <i>est enim</i>, but the MSS. both of the <i>Lucullus</i> and of Nonius
+  agree in the other form, which Madv. allows to stand in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 43, and many other places (see his note). Cf.
+  fragm. <a href="#Fr_22">22</a> of the <i>Acad. Post</i>. <i>E robore</i>:
+  so Nonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here <i>ebore</i>. <i>Dolatus</i>:
+  an evident imitation of Hom. <i>Od.</i> T 163 <span lang="el" title="ou gar apo drios essi palaiphatou oud' apo petr�s"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1; &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C2; &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;' &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span>. <i>Neque tamen
+  habere</i>: i.e. <i>se putat</i>. For the sudden change from <i>oratio
+  recta</i> to <i>obliqua</i> cf. <a href="#BkIIN_40">40</a> with n.
+  <i>Percipiendi notam</i>: = <span lang="el" title="charakt�ra t�s synktathese�s"
+  >&#x3C7;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  in Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 191. For the use of the
+  gerund cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_26">26</a>, with Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 418,
+  Munro on Lucr. <span class="vol">I.</span> 313; for <i>propriam</i> 34.
+  <i>Exsistere</i>. cf. <a href="#BkII_36">36</a>. <i>Qui neget</i>: see <a
+  href="#BkII_79">79</a>. <i>Caput</i>: a legal term. <i>Conclusio
+  loquitur</i>: cf. <i>historiae loquantur</i> (<a href="#BkII_5">5</a>),
+  <i>consuetudo loquitur</i> (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 48),
+  <i>hominis institutio si loqueretur</i> (<i>ib.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 41), <i>vites si loqui possint</i> (<i>ib.</i>
+  <span class="vol">V.</span> 39), <i>patria loquitur</i> (<i>In Cat.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 18, 27); the last use Cic. condemns himself
+  in <i>Orat.</i> 85. <i>Inquit</i>: "quotha," indefinitely, as in <a
+  href="#BkII_109">109</a>, <a href="#BkII_115">115</a>; cf. also
+  <i>dicit</i> in <a href="#BkII_79">79</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_102"></a><a href="#BkII_102">�102</a>.</b>
+  <i>Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis</i>: Bait. follows Madv. in
+  placing a comma after <i>est</i>, and a full stop at <i>probabilia</i>.
+  <i>Tamen</i> ought in that case to follow <i>dicimus</i>, and it is
+  noteworthy that in his communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait.,
+  and Hahn's ed. of the philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word
+  <i>tamen</i> altogether, nor does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice
+  the omission. <i>Ista diceret</i>: "stated the opinions you asked for."
+  <i>Poetam</i>: this both Halm and Bait. treat as a gloss.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_103"></a><a href="#BkII_103">�103</a>.</b> For this
+  section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 227 sq. <i>Academia ... quibus</i>: a number of
+  exx. of this change from sing. to plural are given by Madv. on
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 16. <i>Nullum</i>: on the
+  favourite Ciceronian use of <i>nullus</i> for <i>non</i> see <a
+  href="#BkII_47">47</a>, <a href="#BkII_141">141</a>, and Madv.
+  <i>Gram.</i> 455, obs. 5. <i>Illud sit disputatum</i>: for the
+  construction cf. <a href="#BkII_98">98</a>; <i>autem</i> is omitted with
+  the same constr. in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 79, 80.
+  <i>Nusquam alibi</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_50">50</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_104"></a><a href="#BkII_104">�104</a>.</b>
+  <i>Exposuisset adiungit</i>: Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 67 notices a certain looseness in the use of
+  tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the opinions of philosophers,
+  but no ex. so strong as this is produced. <i>Ut aut approbet quid aut
+  improbet</i>: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent editors of
+  Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced by
+  <i>ut</i>. Halm brackets a similar clause in <a href="#BkII_20">20</a>,
+  and is followed in both instances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the
+  most extensive <i>bracketer</i> of modern times, rejects very many
+  clauses of the kind in the Oratorical works. In our passage, the
+  difficulty vanishes when we reflect that <i>approbare</i> and
+  <i>improbare</i> may mean either to render an <i>absolute</i> approval or
+  disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely based on
+  <i>probability</i>. For example, in <a href="#BkII_29">29</a> the words
+  have the first meaning, in <a href="#BkII_66">66</a> the second. The same
+  is the case with <i>nego</i> and <i>aio</i>. I trace the whole difficulty
+  of the passage to the absence of terms to express distinctly the
+  difference between the two kinds of assent. The general sense will be as
+  follows. "There are two kinds of <span lang="el" title="epoch�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span>, one which prevents a man
+  from expressing any assent or disagreement (in either of the two senses
+  above noticed), another which does not prevent him from giving an answer
+  to questions, provided his answer be not taken to imply absolute approval
+  or absolute disapproval; the result of which will be that he will neither
+  absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but will merely give a
+  qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability." My defence of the
+  clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann in the
+  <i>Philologus</i> (vol. <span class="vol">VII.</span>), which I had not
+  read when this note was first written. <i>Alterum placere ... alterum
+  tenere</i>: "the one is his formal dogma, the other is his actual
+  practice." For the force of this see my note on <i>non probans</i> in <a
+  href="#BkIIN_148">148</a>, which passage is very similar to this.
+  <i>Neget ... aiat</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_97">97</a>. <i>Nec ut
+  placeat</i>: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the wrong sense, for
+  Clitomachus <i>did</i> allow such <i>visa</i> to stand as were sufficient
+  to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's <i>neu cui</i> labours under
+  the same defect. Various emendations are <i>nam cum</i> (Lamb., accepted
+  by Zeller 522), <i>hic ut</i> (Manut.), <i>et cum</i> (Dav. followed by
+  Bait.), <i>sed cum</i> (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me
+  that of Manut. I should prefer <i>sic ut</i>, taking <i>ut</i> in the
+  sense of "although." <i>Respondere</i>: "to put in as an answer," as in
+  <a href="#BkII_93">93</a> and often. <i>Approbari</i>: sc.
+  <i>putavit</i>. Such changes of construction are common in Cic., and I
+  cannot follow Halm in altering the reading to <i>approbavit</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_105"></a><a href="#BkII_105">�105</a>.</b> <i>Lucem
+  eripimus</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_30">30</a>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_105">��105</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_111">111</a>.</b> Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this
+  time, that your defence of dogmatism is overthrown (<a
+  href="#BkII_105">105</a>). You asked how memory was possible on my
+  principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of Epicurus? If
+  nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true, then these will
+  be true (<a href="#BkII_106">106</a>). Probability is quite sufficient
+  basis for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us
+  to <i>assent</i>. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas,
+  and you yourself refuse assent to the <i>sorites</i>, why then should not
+  the Academic doubt about other things? (<a href="#BkII_107">107</a>) Your
+  other strong point is that without assent action is impossible (<a
+  href="#BkII_108">108</a>). But surely many actions of the dogmatist
+  proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the use of the
+  hackneyed argument of Antiochus (<a href="#BkII_109">109</a>). Where
+  probability is, there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (<a
+  href="#BkII_110">110</a>). The argument of Antiochus that the Academics
+  first admit that there are true and false <i>visa</i> and then contradict
+  themselves by denying that there is any difference between true and
+  false, is absurd. We do not deny that the difference <i>exists</i>; we do
+  deny that human faculties are capable of perceiving the difference (<a
+  href="#BkII_111">111</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a href="#BkII_105">105</a>.</b> <i>Inducto ... prob.</i>: so Aug.
+  <i>Cont Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 12 <i>Soluto, libero</i>:
+  cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_8">8</a>. <i>Implicato</i>: = <i>impedito</i>
+  cf. <a href="#BkII_101">101</a>. <i>Iacere</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_79">79</a>. <i>Isdem oculis</i>: an answer to the question
+  <i>nihil cernis?</i> in <a href="#BkII_102">102</a>. <i>Purpureum</i>:
+  cf. fragm. <a href="#Fr_7">7</a> of the <i>Acad. Post</i>. <i>Modo
+  caeruleum ... sole</i>: Nonius (cf. fragm. <a href="#Fr_23">23</a>)
+  quotes <i>tum caeruleum tum lavum</i> (the MSS. in our passage have
+  <i>flavum</i>) <i>videtur, quodque nunc a sole</i>. C.F. Hermann would
+  place <i>mane ravum</i> after <i>quodque</i> and take <i>quod</i> as a
+  proper relative pronoun, not as = "because." This transposition certainly
+  gives increased clearness. Hermann further wishes to remove <i>a</i>,
+  quoting exx. of <i>collucere</i> without the prep., which are not at all
+  parallel, i.e. <i>Verr.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 58, <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 71. <i>Vibrat</i>: with the <span lang="el"
+  title="an�rithmon gelasma"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B8;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span> of Aeschylus.
+  <i>Dissimileque</i>: Halm, followed by Bait., om. <i>que</i>. <i>Proximo
+  et</i>: MSS. have <i>ei</i>, rightly altered by Lamb., cf. e.g. <i>De
+  Fato</i> 44. <i>Non possis ... defendere</i>: a similar line is taken in
+  <a href="#BkII_81">81</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_106"></a><a href="#BkII_106">�106</a>.</b>
+  <i>Memoria</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>. <i>Polyaenus</i>: named
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 20, Diog. <span
+  class="vol">X.</span> 18, as one of the chief friends of Epicurus.
+  <i>Falsum quod est</i>: Greek and Latin do not distinguish accurately
+  between the <i>true</i> and the <i>existent</i>, the <i>false</i> and the
+  <i>non existent</i>, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the confusion
+  is frequent, notably in the <i>Sophistes</i> and <i>Theaetetus</i>. <i>Si
+  igitur</i>: "if then recollection is recollection only of things
+  perceived and known." The dogmatist theory of <span lang="el"
+  title="mn�m�" >&#x3BC;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> and <span
+  lang="el" title="no�sis"
+  >&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> is dealt with in
+  exactly the same way by Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 5,
+  10 and elsewhere, cf. also Plat <i>Theaet.</i> 191 sq. <i>Siron</i>: thus
+  Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 119 writes the name,
+  not <i>Sciron</i>, as Halm. <i>Fateare</i>: the em. of Dav. for
+  <i>facile</i>, <i>facere</i>, <i>facias</i> of MSS. Christ defends
+  <i>facere</i>, thinking that the constr. is varied from the subj. to the
+  inf. after <i>oportet</i>, as after <i>necesse est</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_39">39</a>. For <i>facere</i> followed by an inf. cf.
+  <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 8. <i>Nulla</i>: for
+  <i>non</i>, cf. <a href="#BkII_47">47</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_103">103</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_107"></a><a href="#BkII_107">�107</a>.</b> <i>Fiet
+  artibus</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_27">27</a> for the constr., for the
+  matter see <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>. <i>Lumina</i>: "strong points."
+  Bentl. boldly read <i>columina</i>, while Dav. proposed <i>vimina</i> or
+  <i>vincula</i>. That an em. is not needed may be seen from <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 70. <i>negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum
+  lumen est)</i> <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 79, and <a
+  href="#BkII_43">43</a> of this book. <i>Responsa</i>: added by Ernesti.
+  Faber supplies <i>haruspicia</i>, Orelli after Ern. <i>haruspicinam</i>,
+  but, as Halm says, some noun in the plur. is needed. <i>Quod is non
+  potest</i>: this is the MSS. reading, but most edd. read <i>si is</i>, to
+  cure a wrong punctuation, by which a colon is placed at <i>perspicuum
+  est</i> above, and a full stop at <i>sustineat</i>. Halm restored the
+  passage. <i>Habuerint</i>: the subj. seems due to the attraction
+  exercised by <i>sustineat</i>. Bait. after Kayser has <i>habuerunt</i>.
+  <i>Positum</i>: "when laid down" or "assumed."</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_108"></a><a href="#BkII_108">�108</a>.</b>
+  <i>Alterum est quod</i>: this is substituted for <i>deinde</i>, which
+  ought to correspond to <i>primum</i> above. <i>Actio ullius rei</i>: n.
+  on <i>actio rerum</i> in <a href="#BkIIN_62">62</a>, cf. also <a
+  href="#BkII_148">148</a>. <i>Adsensu comprobet</i>: almost the same
+  phrase often occurs in Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc. <i>Sit etiam</i>:
+  the <i>etiam</i> is a little strange and was thought spurious by Ernesti.
+  It seems to have the force of Eng. "indeed", "in what indeed assent
+  consists." <i>Sensus ipsos adsensus</i>: so in <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_41">41</a> <i>sensus</i> is defined
+  to be <i>id quod est sensu comprehensum</i>, i.e. <span lang="el"
+  title="katal�psis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  cf. also Stobaeus <span class="vol">I.</span> 41, 25 <span lang="el"
+  title="aisth�tik� gar phantasia synkatathesis esti"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;</span>. <i>Appetitio</i>: for all this cf.
+  <a href="#BkII_30">30</a>. <i>Et dicta ... multa</i>: Manut. ejected
+  these words as a gloss, after <i>multa</i> the MSS. curiously add <i>vide
+  superiora</i>. <i>Lubricos sustinere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_68">68</a>
+  and <a href="#BkII_94">94</a>. <i>Ita scribenti ... exanclatum</i>: for
+  the om. of <i>esse</i> cf. <a href="#BkII_77">77</a>, <a
+  href="#BkIIN_113">113</a> with notes. <i>Herculi</i>: for this form of
+  the gen. cf. Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 14, who
+  doubts whether Cic. ever wrote <i>-is</i> in the gen. of the Greek names
+  in <i>-es</i>. When we consider how difficult it was for copyists
+  <i>not</i> to change the rarer form into the commoner, also that even
+  Priscian (see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 12) made gross
+  blunders about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost
+  irresistible. <i>Temeritatem</i>: <span lang="el" title="propeteian, eikaiot�ta"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_109"></a><a href="#BkII_109">�109</a>.</b> <i>In
+  navigando</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_100">100</a>. <i>In conserendo</i>:
+  Guretus interprets "<span lang="el" title="en t� phytyesthai ton agron"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3C9;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3C5;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>," and is
+  followed by most commentators, though it seems at least possible that
+  <i>manum</i> is to be understood. For the suppressed accus. <i>agrum</i>
+  cf. n. on <i>tollendum</i> in <a href="#BkIIN_148">148</a>.
+  <i>Sequere</i>: the fut. not the pres. ind., cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_61">61</a>. <i>Pressius</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_28">28</a>.
+  <i>Reprehensum</i>: sc. <i>narrasti</i>. <i>Id ipsum</i>: = <i>nihil
+  posse comprehendi</i>. <i>Saltem</i>: so in <a href="#BkII_29">29</a>.
+  <i>Pingue</i>: cf. <i>Pro Archia</i> 10. <i>Sibi ipsum</i>: note that
+  Cic. does not generally make <i>ipse</i> agree in case with the
+  reflexive, but writes <i>se ipse</i>, etc. <i>Convenienter</i>:
+  "consistently". <i>Esse possit</i>: Bait. <i>posset</i> on the suggestion
+  of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one, not throwing it
+  back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of Ant. <i>Ut hoc
+  ipsum</i>: the <i>ut</i> follows on <i>illo modo urguendum</i> above.
+  <i>Decretum quod</i>: Halm followed by Bait. gives <i>quo</i>, referring
+  to <i>altero quo neget</i> in <a href="#BkII_111">111</a>, which however
+  does not justify the reading. The best MSS. have <i>qui</i>. <i>Et sine
+  decretis</i>: Lamb. gave <i>nec</i> for <i>et</i>, but Dav. correctly
+  explains, "<i>multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta sed
+  tantum probabilia.</i>"</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_110"></a><a href="#BkII_110">�110</a>.</b> <i>Ut
+  illa</i>: i.e. the <i>decreta</i> implied in the last sentence. Some MSS.
+  have <i>ille</i>, while Dav. without necessity gives <i>alia</i>. <i>Sic
+  hoc ipsum</i>: Sext. then is wrong is saying (<i>P.H.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 226) that the Academics <span lang="el"
+  title="diabebaiountai ta pragmata einai akatal�pta"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B2;&#x3B5;&#x3B2;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>,
+  i.e. state the doctrine dogmatically, while the sceptics do not.
+  <i>Cognitionis notam</i>: like <i>nota percipiendi</i>, <i>veri et
+  falsi</i>, etc. which we have already had. <i>Ne confundere omnia</i>: a
+  mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf. <a href="#BkII_58">58</a>.
+  <i>Incerta reddere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_54">54</a>. <i>Stellarum
+  numerus</i>: another echo of Lucullus; see <a href="#BkII_32">32</a>.
+  <i>Quem ad modum ... item</i>: see Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 48, who quotes an exact parallel from
+  <i>Topica</i> 46, and <i>sicut ... item</i> from <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 3, noting at the same time that in such exx.
+  neither <i>ita</i> nor <i>idem</i>, which MSS. sometimes give for
+  <i>item</i>, is correct.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_111"></a><a href="#BkII_111">�111</a>.</b> <i>Dicere
+  ... perturbatum</i>: for om. of <i>esse</i> cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_108">108</a>, etc. <i>Antiochus</i>: this Bait. brackets.
+  <i>Unum ... alterum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_44">44</a>. <i>Esse quaedam
+  in visis</i>: it was not the <i>esse</i> but the <i>videri</i>, not the
+  actual existence of a difference, but the possibility of that difference
+  being infallibly perceived by human sense, that the Academic denied.
+  <i>Cernimus</i>: i.e. the <i>probably</i> true and false. <i>Probandi
+  species</i>: a phenomenal appearance which belongs to, or properly leads
+  to qualified approval.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_112">��112</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_115">115</a>.</b> Summary. If I had to deal with a
+  Peripatetic, whose definitions are not so exacting, my course would be
+  easier; I should not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise
+  man sometimes <i>opines</i> (<a href="#BkII_112">112</a>). The
+  definitions of the real Old Academy are more reasonable than those of
+  Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does, can he profess to belong to
+  the Old Academy? (<a href="#BkII_113">113</a>) I cannot tolerate your
+  assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic system like
+  yours free from mistakes (<a href="#BkII_114">114</a>). You wish me to
+  join your school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who
+  thinks so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I,
+  but the <i>sapiens</i> is to adopt (<a
+  href="#BkII_115">115</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_112"></a><a href="#BkII_112">�112</a>.</b> <i>Campis
+  ... exsultare ... oratio</i>: expressions like this are common in Cic.,
+  e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 54, <i>De Off.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 61, <i>Orat.</i> 26; cf. also Aug. <i>Cont. Ac.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 5 <i>ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret
+  oratio</i>. <i>Cum Peripatetico</i>: nothing that Cic. states here is at
+  discord with what is known of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf.
+  esp. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 216&mdash;226. All
+  that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic formula, putting
+  upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic would have
+  wondered how a sceptic <i>could</i> accept his formulae; but the
+  spectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the
+  same formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at
+  Cicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>) that we have here a trace of Philo's teaching,
+  as distinct from that of Carneades. I see absolutely no reason for the
+  very severe remarks of Madvig on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  76, a passage which very closely resembles ours. <i>Dumeta</i>: same use
+  in <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 68, Aug. <i>Cont. Ac.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 6; the <i>spinae</i> of the Stoics are often
+  mentioned, e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 6. <i>E vero ...
+  a falso</i>: note the change of prep. <i>Adhiberet</i>: the MSS. are
+  confused here, and go Halm reads <i>adderet</i>, and Bait. follows, while
+  Kayser proposes <i>adhaereret</i>, which is indeed nearer the MSS.; cf.
+  however <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_39">39</a>
+  <i>adhiberet</i>. <i>Accessionem</i>: for this cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_18">18</a> and <a href="#BkII_77">77</a>. <i>Simpliciter</i>:
+  the opposite of <i>subtiliter</i>; cf.
+  <i>simpliciter&mdash;subtilitas</i> in <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_6">6</a>. <i>Ne Carneade quidem</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_59">59</a>, <a href="#BkII_67">67</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_78">78</a>, <a href="#BkII_148">148</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_113"></a><a href="#BkII_113">�113</a>.</b> <i>Sed
+  qui his minor est</i>: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for MSS.
+  <i>sed mihi minores</i>. Guietus gave <i>sed his minores</i>, Durand
+  <i>sed minutior</i>, while Halm suggests <i>sed minutiores</i>. I conj.
+  <i>nimio minares</i>, which would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr.
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 734 <i>inferiores partibus egregie multis
+  multoque minores</i>. <i>Tale verum</i>: <i>visum</i> omitted as in
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 76. <i>Incognito</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_133">133</a>. <i>Amavi hominem</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a
+  href="#Page_vi">6</a>. <i>Ita iudico, politissimum</i>; it is a mistake
+  to suppose this sentence incomplete, like Halm, who wishes to add <i>eum
+  esse</i>, or like Bait., who with Kayser prints <i>esse</i> after
+  <i>politissimum</i>. Cf. <a href="#BkII_108">108</a> <i>ita scribenti,
+  exanclatum</i>, and the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 13. <i>Horum neutrum</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_77">77</a> <i>nemo</i>. <i>Utrumque verum</i>: Cic. of course
+  only accepts the propositions as Arcesilas did; see <a
+  href="#BkII_77">77</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_114"></a><a href="#BkII_114">�114</a>.</b> <i>Illud
+  ferre</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_136">136</a>. <i>Constituas</i>: this verb
+  is often used in connection with the ethical <i>finis</i>; cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_129">129</a> and <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_19">19</a>. <i>Idemque etiam</i>: Krebs and Allgayer
+  (<i>Antibarbarus</i>, ed. 4) deny that the expression <i>idem etiam</i>
+  is Latin. One good MS. here has <i>atque etiam</i>, which Dav. reads; cf.
+  however <i>Orat.</i> 117. <i>Artificium</i>: = <i>ars</i>, as in <a
+  href="#BkII_30">30</a>. <i>Nusquam labar</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_138">138</a> <i>ne labar</i>. <i>Subadroganter</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_126">126</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_115"></a><a href="#BkII_115">�115</a>.</b> <i>Qui
+  sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse</i>: so Cic. vary often speaks of the
+  Peripatetics, as in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 5, <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 7. <i>Sustinuero</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_70">70</a>. <i>Tam bonos</i>: Cic. often speaks of them and
+  of Epicurus in this patronising way; see e.g. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 44, <span class="vol">III.</span> 50, <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 25, <span class="vol">II.</span> 81. For the
+  Epicurean friendships cf. esp. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  65. <i>Diodoto</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a href="#Page_ii">2</a>.
+  <i>Nolumus</i>: Halm and Bait., give <i>nolimus</i>; so fine a line
+  divides the subjunctive from the indicative in clauses like these that
+  the choice often depends on mere individual taste. <i>De sapiente
+  loquamur</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_66">66</a>.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_116">��116</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_128">128</a>.</b> Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy
+  take Physics first. Would your <i>sapiens</i> swear to the truth of any
+  geometrical result whatever? (<a href="#BkII_116">116</a>) Let us see
+  which one of actual physical systems the <i>sapiens</i> we are seeking
+  will select (<a href="#BkII_117">117</a>). He must choose <i>one</i>
+  teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander,
+  Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles,
+  Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers, great
+  men though they be, he must reject (<a href="#BkII_118">118</a>).
+  Whatever system he selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must
+  believe as strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If
+  he holds this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus,
+  must defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not
+  allow me even to doubt (<a href="#BkII_119">119</a>). How much better to
+  be free, as I am and not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles
+  of the universe! (<a href="#BkII_120">120</a>) Nothing can exist, say
+  you, apart from the deity. Strato, however, says he does not need the
+  deity to construct the universe. His mode of construction again differs
+  from that of Democritus. I see some good in Strato, yet I will not assent
+  absolutely either to his system or to yours (<a
+  href="#BkII_121">121</a>). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We
+  know nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the
+  advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the
+  earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (<a
+  href="#BkII_122">122</a>). Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell
+  strange things of the heavenly bodies. How much better to side with
+  Socrates and Aristo, who hold that nothing can be known about them! (<a
+  href="#BkII_123">123</a>) Who knows the nature of mind? Numberless
+  opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato and Xenocrates. Our
+  <i>sapiens</i> will be unable to decide (<a href="#BkII_124">124</a>). If
+  you say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose
+  Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous
+  falsehoods (<a href="#BkII_125">125</a>). The Stoics differ among
+  themselves about physical subjects, why will they not allow me to differ
+  from them? (<a href="#BkII_126">126</a>) Not that I deprecate the study
+  of Physics, for moral good results from it (<a href="#BkII_127">127</a>).
+  Our <i>sapiens</i> will be delighted if he attains to anything which
+  seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your weakness
+  in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be prepared to
+  asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times as large as
+  the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you admit that all
+  things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than the size of the
+  sun, I am almost content (<a href="#BkII_128">128</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_116"></a><a href="#BkII_116">�116</a>.</b> <i>Tres
+  partes</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_19">19</a>.
+  <i>Et a vobismet</i>: "and especially by you". The threefold division was
+  peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools, cf. Sext. <i>P.H.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 13 (on the same subject) <span lang="el"
+  title="hoi St�ikoi kai alloi tines" >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3A3;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3B9; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span>. For other modes of dividing
+  philosophy see Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 2. <i>At
+  illud ante</i>: this is my em. for the MSS. <i>velut illud ante</i>,
+  which probably arose from a marginal variant "<i>vel ut</i>" taking the
+  place of <i>at</i>; cf. a similar break in <a href="#BkII_40">40</a>
+  <i>sed prius</i>, also in <a href="#BkII_128">128</a> <i>at paulum
+  ante</i>. Such breaks often occur in Cic., as in <i>Orator</i> 87 <i>sed
+  nunc aliud</i>, also <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 47
+  <i>repenam fortasse, sed illud ante.</i> For <i>velut</i> Halm writes
+  <i>vel</i> (which Bait. takes), Dav. <i>verum</i>. <i>Inflatus
+  tumore</i>: cf. <i>De Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 91 <i>inflati
+  opinionibus.</i> Bentl. read <i>errore</i>. <i>Cogere</i>: this word like
+  <span lang="el" title="anankazein"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  and <span lang="el" title="biazesthai"
+  >&#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B6;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>
+  often means simply to argue irresistibly. <i>Initia</i>: as in <a
+  href="#BkII_118">118</a>, bases of proof, themselves naturally incapable
+  of proof, so <span lang="el" title="archai"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> in Gk. <i>Digitum</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_58">58</a>, <a href="#BkII_143">143</a>. <i>Punctum esse</i>
+  etc.: <span lang="el" title="s�meion estin ou meros outhen"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD; &#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;</span> (Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 39), <span lang="el" title="stigm�"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3B3;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span> = <span lang="el"
+  title="to ameres" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span> (<i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IX.</span> 283, 377). <i>Extremitatem</i>: = <span lang="el"
+  title="epiphaneian"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Libramentum</i>: so this word is used by Pliny (see Forc.) for the
+  slope of a hill. <i>Nulla crassitudo</i>: in Sext. the <span lang="el"
+  title="epiphaneia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>
+  is usually described not negatively as here, but positively as <span
+  lang="el" title="m�kos meta platous" >&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;</span> (<i>P.H.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 39), <span lang="el" title="peras"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span> (<i>extremitas</i>) <span
+  lang="el" title="somatos duo echon diastaseis, m�kos kai platos"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2; &#x3B4;&#x3C5;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;,
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C2; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> (<i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 77). <i>Liniamentum ... carentem</i>: a difficult
+  passage. Note (1) that the line is defined in Greek as <span lang="el"
+  title="m�kos aplates" >&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span>. (Sext. as
+  above), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the point and surface
+  negatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against the introduction
+  of <i>longitudinem</i> which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and others
+  propose by conjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would rather
+  add <i>et crassitudine</i> before <i>carentem</i>, comparing <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_27">27</a> <i>sine ulla specie et
+  carentem omni illa qualitate</i>. I have merely bracketed
+  <i>carentem</i>, though I feel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in
+  this clause as in the other two, he suggests <i>quod sit sine</i>.
+  Hermann takes <i>esse</i> after <i>punctum</i> as strongly predicative
+  ("there <i>is</i> a point," etc.), then adds <i>similiter</i> after
+  <i>liniamentum</i> and ejects <i>sine ulla</i>. Observe the awkwardness
+  of having the <i>line</i> treated of after the <i>superficies</i>, which
+  has induced some edd. to transpose. For <i>liniamentum</i> =
+  <i>lineam</i> cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 187. <i>Si
+  adigam</i>: the fine em. of Manut. for <i>si adiiciamus</i> of MSS. The
+  construction <i>adigere aliquem ius iurandum</i> will be found in Caes.
+  <i>Bell. Civ.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 76, <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg. <i>Aen.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 56 <i>quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacra
+  fames?</i> <i>Sapientem nec prius</i>: this is the "<i>egregia
+  lectio</i>" of three of Halm's MSS. Before Halm <i>sapientemne</i> was
+  read, thus was destroyed the whole point of the sentence, which is
+  <i>not</i> that the <i>sapiens</i> will swear to the size of the sun
+  after he has seen Archimedes go through his calculations, <i>but</i> that
+  the <i>sapiens</i>, however true he admits the bases of proof to be which
+  Archimedes uses, will <i>not</i> swear to the truth of the elaborate
+  conclusions which that geometer rears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in
+  <a href="#BkII_128">128</a> against the absurdity of attaching one and
+  the same degree of certainty to the simplest and the most complex truths,
+  and tries to condemn the Stoic <i>sapiens</i> out of his own mouth, cf.
+  esp. <i>nec ille iurare posset</i> in <a href="#BkII_123">123</a>.
+  <i>Multis partibus</i>: for this expression see Munro on Lucr. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 734, for the sense cf. <a href="#BkII_82">82</a>,
+  <a href="#BkII_123">123</a>, <a href="#BkII_126">126</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_128">128</a>. <i>Deum</i>: see <a
+  href="#BkII_126">126</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_117"></a><a href="#BkII_117">�117</a>.</b>
+  <i>Vim</i>: = <span lang="el" title="anank�n"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>, cf.
+  <i>cogere</i> in <a href="#BkII_116">116</a>. <i>Ne ille</i>: this
+  asseverative <i>ne</i> is thus always closely joined with pronouns in
+  Cic. <i>Sententiam eliget et</i>: MSS. have (by <i>dittographia</i> of
+  <i>m</i>, <i>eli</i>) added <i>melius</i> after <i>sententiam</i>, and
+  have also dropped <i>et</i>. Dav. wished to read <i>elegerit</i>,
+  comparing the beginning of <a href="#BkII_119">119</a>. <i>Insipiens
+  eliget</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_115">115</a> <i>quale est a non sapiente
+  explicari sapientiam?</i> and <a href="#BkII_9">9</a> <i>statuere qui sit
+  sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis</i>. <i>Infinitae
+  quaestiones</i>: <span lang="el" title="theseis"
+  >&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>, general propositions,
+  opposed to <i>finitae quaestiones</i>, limited propositions, Gk. <span
+  lang="el" title="hypotheseis"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3C5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  Quintal <span class="vol">III.</span> 5, 5 gives as an ex. of the former
+  <i>An uxor ducenda</i>, of the latter <i>An Catoni ducenda</i>. These
+  <i>quaestiones</i> are very often alluded to by Cic. as in <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 12, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 6, <i>De
+  Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 138, <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  65&mdash;67, <i>Topica</i> 79, <i>Orat.</i> 46, cf. also Quint. <span
+  class="vol">X.</span> 5, <span class="vol">II.</span> <i>E quibus omnia
+  constant</i>: this sounds like Lucretius, <i>omnia</i> = <span lang="el"
+  title="to pan" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_118"></a><a href="#BkII_118">�118</a>.</b> For these
+  <i>physici</i> the student must in general be referred to R. and P.,
+  Schwegler, and Grote's <i>Plato</i> Vol. <span class="vol">I.</span> A
+  more complete enumeration of schools will be found in Sext. <i>P.H.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 30 sq. Our passage is imitated by Aug <i>De
+  Civ. Dei</i> <span class="vol">XVIII.</span> 37. <i>Concessisse
+  primas</i>: Cic. always considers Thales to be <i>sapientissimus e
+  septem</i> (<i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 26). Hence
+  Markland on Cic. <i>Ad Brutum</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 15, 3
+  argued that that letter cannot be genuine, since in it the supremacy
+  among the seven is assigned to Solon. <i>Infinitatem naturae</i>: <span
+  lang="el" title="to apeiron" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>, <i>naturae</i>
+  here = <span lang="el" title="ousias"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>. <i>Definita</i>: this
+  is opposed to <i>infinita</i> in <i>Topica</i> 79, so <i>definire</i> is
+  used for <i>finire</i> in <i>Orat.</i> 65, where Jahn qu. <i>Verr.</i>
+  <span class="vol">IV.</span> 115. <i>Similis inter se</i>: an attempt to
+  translate <span lang="el" title="homoiomereias"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>.
+  <i>Eas primum</i>, etc.: cf. the exordium of Anaxagoras given from Diog.
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 6 in R. and P. 29 <span lang="el"
+  title="panta chr�mata �n homou eita nous elth�n auta diekosm�se"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C7;&#x3C1;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2; &#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B8;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;</span>.
+  <i>Xenophanes ... deum</i>: Eleaticism was in the hands of Xenoph. mainly
+  theological. <i>Neque natum unquam</i>: cf. <i>neque ortum unquam</i> in
+  <a href="#BkII_119">119</a>. <i>Parmenides ignem</i>: cf. Arist. <i>Met.
+  A.</i> 5 qu. R. and P. 94. He only hypothetically allowed the existence
+  of the phenomenal world, after which he made two <span lang="el"
+  title="archai, thermon kai psychron tout�n de to men kata men to hon thermon tattei, thateron de kata to m� on"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C7;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;,
+  &#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C8;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD; &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;,
+  &#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3BC;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>. <i>Heraclitus</i>: n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_39">39</a>. <i>Melissus</i>: see
+  Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp. <span lang="el" title="to eon aiei ara �n te kai estai"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF; &#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1; &#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3C4;&#x3B5; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>. <i>Plato</i>: n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_27">27</a>. <i>Discedent</i>: a word
+  often used of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor. <i>Sat.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 7, 17.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_119"></a><a href="#BkII_119">�119</a>.</b> <i>Sic
+  animo ... sensibus</i>: knowledge according to the Stoics was homogeneous
+  throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than another.
+  <i>Nunc lucere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_98">98</a>, also <a
+  href="#BkII_128">128</a> <i>non enim magis adsentiuntur</i>, etc.
+  <i>Mundum sapientem</i>: for this Stoic doctrine see <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 84, <span class="vol">II.</span> 32, etc.
+  <i>Fabricata sit</i>: see <a href="#BkIIN_87">87</a> n. <i>Solem</i>: <a
+  href="#BkII_126">126</a>. <i>Animalis intellegentia</i>: reason is the
+  essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138&mdash;9, also <a
+  href="#BkI_28">28</a>, <a href="#BkI_29">29</a> of Book <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <i>Permanet</i>: the deity is to the Stoic <span
+  lang="el" title="pneuma endi�kon di holou tou kosmou"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3B4;&#x3B9;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;</span> (Plut. <i>De Plac.
+  Phil.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7 qu. R. and P. 375), <i>spiritus
+  per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus.</i> (Seneca,
+  <i>Consol. ad Helvid.</i> 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147). <i>Deflagret</i>: the
+  Stoics considered the <span lang="el" title="kosmos phthartos"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>, cf. Diog. <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 141, Zeller 156&mdash;7. <i>Fateri</i>: cf.
+  <i>tam vera quam falsa cernimus</i> in <a href="#BkII_111">111</a>.
+  <i>Flumen aureum</i>: Plut. <i>Vita Cic.</i> 24 alludes to this (<span
+  lang="el" title="hoti chrysiou potamos ei� reontos"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C7;&#x3C1;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2; &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3C1;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>). This is the
+  constant judgment of Cic. about Aristotle's style. Grote, <i>Aristot.</i>
+  Vol <span class="vol">I.</span> p. 43, quotes <i>Topica</i> 3, <i>De
+  Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 49, <i>Brut.</i> 121, <i>N.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 93, <i>De Inv.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 6, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 14,
+  <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, and discusses the
+  difficulty of applying this criticism to the works of Aristotle which we
+  possess. <i>Nulla vis</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_28">28</a>. <i>Exsistere</i>: Walker conj. <i>efficere</i>,
+  "<i>recte ut videtur</i>" says Halm. Bait. adopts it. <i>Ornatus</i>: =
+  <span lang="el" title="kosmos"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_120"></a><a href="#BkII_120">�120</a>.</b>
+  <i>Libertas ... non esse</i>: a remarkable construction. For the Academic
+  liberty see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xviii">18</a>. <i>Quod tibi
+  est</i>: after these words Halm puts merely a comma, and inserting
+  <i>respondere</i> makes <i>cur deus</i>, etc. part of the same sentence.
+  Bait. follows. <i>Nostra causa</i>: Cic. always writes <i>mea, tua,
+  vestra, nostra causa</i>, not <i>mei, tui, nostri, vestri</i>, just as he
+  writes <i>sua sponte</i>, but not <i>sponte alicuius</i>. For the Stoic
+  opinion that men are the chief care of Providence, see <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 23, <span class="vol">II.</span> 37, <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> 67, <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  <a href="#BkI_29">29</a> etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding
+  the opinion are treated of in Zeller 175, <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 91&mdash;127. They supply in Sext. <i>P.H.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 32, <span class="vol">III.</span> 9&mdash;12
+  an example of the refutation of <span lang="el" title="nooumena"
+  >&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span> by means
+  of <span lang="el" title="nooumena"
+  >&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;</span>. <i>Tam
+  multa ac</i>: MSS. om. <i>ac</i>, which I insert. Lactantius qu. the
+  passage without <i>perniciosa</i>. <i>Myrmecides</i>: an actual Athenian
+  artist, famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for a chariot
+  which a fly covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of a bee
+  concealed. See Plin. <i>Nat. Hist.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 21,
+  <span class="vol">XXXVI.</span> 5.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_121"></a><a href="#BkII_121">�121</a>.</b>
+  <i>Posse</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_29">29</a>. <i>Strato</i>: R. and P. 331. <i>Sed cum</i>:
+  <i>sed</i> often marks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read
+  <i>et</i>, as Halm. <i>Asperis ... corporibus</i>: cf. fragm. <a
+  href="#Fr_28">28</a> of the <i>Ac. Post.</i>, also <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 66. <i>Somnia</i>: so <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 18 <i>miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed
+  somniantium</i>, <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 42 <i>non
+  philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium somnia</i>, also <i>ib.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 66 <i>flagitia Democriti</i>. <i>Docentis</i>:
+  giving <i>proof</i>. <i>Optantis</i>: Guietus humorously conj.
+  <i>potantis,</i> Durand <i>oscitantis</i> (cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 72), others <i>opinantis</i>. That the text is
+  sound however may be seen from <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  30 <i>optare hoc quidem est non docere</i>, <i>De Fato</i> 46,
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 19 <i>optata magis quam
+  inventa</i>, <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 12 <i>doceas
+  oportet nec proferas</i>; cf. also <i>Orat.</i> 59 <i>vocis bonitas
+  optanda est, non est enim in nobis</i>, i.e. a good voice is a thing to
+  be prayed for, and not to be got by exertion. There is a similar Greek
+  proverb, <span lang="el" title="euch� mallon � al�theia"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3C7;&#x3B7; &#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B7; &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, in
+  Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 353. <i>Magno opere</i>:
+  Hermann wishes to read <i>onere</i>. The phrase <i>magnum onus</i> is
+  indeed common (cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 116), but
+  <i>magnum opus</i>, in the sense of "a great task," is equally so, cf.
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 79, 84, <i>Orat.</i> 75.
+  <i>Modo hoc modo illud</i>: <a href="#BkII_134">134</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_122"></a><a href="#BkII_122">�122</a>.</b> <i>Latent
+  ista</i>: see n. on fragm. <a href="#FrN_29">29</a> of the <i>Ac.
+  Post.</i>; for <i>latent</i> cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_45">45</a>. Aug. <i>Cont. Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  12, <span class="vol">III.</span> 1 imitates this passage.
+  <i>Circumfusa</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_44">44</a>, and <a href="#BkII_46">46</a> of this book.
+  <i>Medici</i>: cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 46
+  <i>Viderentur</i>: a genuine passive, cf. <a href="#BkII_25">25</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_39">39</a>, <a href="#BkII_81">81</a>. <i>Empirici</i>: a
+  school of physicians so called. <i>Ut ... mutentur</i>: exactly the same
+  answer was made recently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he
+  was said to have assumed that the living protoplasm would have the same
+  properties as the dead. <i>Media pendeat</i>: cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 98, <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span>
+  178.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_123"></a><a href="#BkII_123">�123</a>.</b>
+  <i>Habitari ait</i>: for this edd. qu. Lactant. <i>Inst.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 23, 12. <i>Portenta</i>: "monstrosities these,"
+  cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 70. <i>Iurare</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_116">116</a>. <i>Neque ego</i>, etc.: see fragm. <a
+  href="#Fr_30">30</a> of <i>Ac. Post.</i> <span lang="el"
+  title="Antipodas"
+  >&#x391;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>:
+  this doctrine appears in Philolaus (see Plut. <i>Plac. Phil.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 11 qu. R. and P. 75), who give the name of <span
+  lang="el" title="antichth�n"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C7;&#x3B8;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;</span> to the
+  opposite side of the world. Diog. <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 26 (with
+  which passage cf. Stob. <i>Phys.</i> <span class="vol">XV.</span> 7)
+  mentions the theory as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says
+  that Plato first invented the name. The word <span lang="el"
+  title="antipous"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C2;</span> seems to
+  occur first in Plat. <i>Tim.</i> 63 A. The existence of <span lang="el"
+  title="antipodes"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span>;
+  was of course bound up with the doctrine that the universe or the world
+  is a globe (which is held by Plat. in the <i>Tim.</i> and by the Stoics,
+  see Stob. <i>Phys.</i> <span class="vol">XV.</span> 6, Diog. <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 140), hence the early Christian writers attack
+  the two ideas together as unscriptural. Cf. esp Aug. <i>De Civ. Dei</i>
+  <span class="vol">XVI.</span> 9. <i>Hicetas</i>: he was followed by
+  Heraclides Ponticus and some Pythagoreans. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">X.</span> 174 speaks of the followers of Aristarchus the
+  mathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems also to be found in
+  Philolaus, see R. and P. 75. <i>Theophrastus</i>: who wrote much on the
+  history of philosophy, see R. and P. 328. <i>Platonem</i>: the words of
+  Plato (<i>Tim.</i> 40 B) are <span lang="el" title="g�n de trophon men h�meteran, eillomen�n de peri ton dia pantos polon tetamenon"
+  >&#x3B3;&#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B5; &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>Quid tu, Epicure</i>: the connection is that Cic., having given the
+  crotchets of other philosophers about <span lang="el" title="physik�"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;</span>, proceeds to give the
+  peculiar crotchet of Epic. <i>Putas solem ... tantum</i>: a hard passage.
+  <i>Egone? ne bis</i> is the em. of Lamb. for MSS. <i>egone vobis</i>, and
+  is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (<i>Em.</i> 185) "<i>cum
+  interrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem <a href="#BkII_82">82</a>)
+  solem esse putaret, Epic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat
+  quantus videretur vel paulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius
+  circumscribit, ne bis quidem tantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem
+  et bipedalem</i>". (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 20) This
+  explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given.
+  Epicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the
+  outside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's
+  size, i.e. twice the apparent size. <i>Ne ... quidem</i> may possibly
+  appear strange, cf. however <i>ne maiorem quidem</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_82">82</a>. <i>Aristo Chius</i>: for this doctrine of his see
+  R. and P. 358.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_124"></a><a href="#BkII_124">�124</a>.</b> <i>Quid
+  sit animus</i>: an enumeration of the different ancient theories is given
+  in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 18&mdash;22, and by Sext.
+  <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 113, who also speaks in
+  <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 31 of the <span lang="el"
+  title="poll� kai an�nytos mach�" >&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;</span> concerning the soul. In <i>P.H.</i>
+  <span class="vol">II.</span> 57 he says <span lang="el" title="Gorgias oude dianoian einai ph�si"
+  >&#x393;&#x3BF;&#x3C1;&#x3B3;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C6;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;</span>.
+  <i>Dicaearcho</i>: <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 21. <i>Tres
+  partis</i>: in Plato's <i>Republic</i>. <i>Ignis</i>: Zeno's opinion,
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 19. <i>Animam</i>: <i>ib.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 19. <i>Sanguis</i>: Empodocles, as in
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 19 where his famous line <span
+  lang="el" title="haima gar anthr�pois perikardion esti no�ma"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1; &#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B4;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;</span>
+  is translated, see R. and P. 124. <i>Ut Xenocrates</i>: some edd. read
+  <i>Xenocrati</i>, but cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_44">44</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 18,
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 76. <i>Numerus</i>: so Bentl.
+  for <i>mens</i> of MSS., cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_39">39</a>, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 20, 41. An
+  explanation of this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and
+  P. 244. <i>Quod intellegi</i> etc.: so in <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 41 <i>quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide
+  dicitur</i>. <i>Momenta</i> n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_45">45</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_125"></a><a href="#BkII_125">�125</a>.</b>
+  <i>Verecundius</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_114">114</a> <i>subadroganter</i>.
+  <i>Vincam animum</i>: a common phrase in Cic., cf. <i>Philipp.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XII.</span> 21. <i>Queru potissimum? quem?</i>: In repeated
+  questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of
+  <i>quisnam</i>, not <i>quis</i>, in the second question, as in
+  <i>Verr.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 5. The mutation of Augustine
+  <i>Contra Ac.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 33 makes it probable that
+  <i>quemnam</i> was the original reading here. Zumpt on <i>Verr.</i> qu.
+  Quint. <span class="vol">IX.</span> 2, 61, Plin. <i>Epist.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud
+  it for its likeness to impromptu. <i>Nobilitatis</i>: this is to be
+  explained by referring to <a href="#BkII_73">73</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_75">75</a> (<i>imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi
+  nobilem</i>), where Cic. protests against being compared to a demagogue,
+  and claims to follow the aristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the
+  commentators to show that Democr. was literally an aristocrat have
+  failed. <i>Convicio</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_34">34</a>. <i>Completa et
+  conferta</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_27">27</a>. <i>Quod movebitur ... cedat</i>: this is the
+  theory of motion disproved by Lucr. <span class="vol">I.</span> 370 sq.,
+  cf. also <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 83. Halm writes <i>quo
+  quid</i> for <i>quod</i> (with Christ), and inserts <i>corpus</i> before
+  <i>cedat</i>, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. "whatever
+  body is pushed, gives way." <i>Tam sit mirabilis</i>: n. on <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_25">25</a>. <i>Innumerabilis</i>: <a
+  href="#BkII_55">55</a>. <i>Supra infra</i>: n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_92">92</a>. <i>Ut nos nunc simus</i>, etc.: n. on fragm. <a
+  href="#FrN_13">13</a> of <i>Ac. Post.</i> <i>Disputantis</i>: <a
+  href="#BkII_55">55</a>. <i>Animo videre</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_22">22</a>. <i>Imagines</i>: <span lang="el" title="eid�la"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B4;&#x3C9;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;</span>, which Catius
+  translated (<i>Ad Fam.</i> <span class="vol">XV.</span> 16) by
+  <i>spectra</i>, Zeller 432. <i>Tu vero</i>: etc. this is all part of the
+  personal <i>convicium</i> supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by
+  the Antiocheans, and beginning at <i>Tune aut inane</i> above.
+  <i>Commenticiis</i>: a favourite word of Cic., cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 113.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_126"></a><a href="#BkII_126">�126</a>.</b> <i>Quae
+  tu</i>: elliptic for <i>ut comprobem quae tu comprobas</i> cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_125">125</a>. <i>Impudenter</i>: <a href="#BkII_115">115</a>.
+  <i>Atque haud scio</i>: <i>atque</i> here = <span lang="el"
+  title="kaitoi" >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span>, "and
+  yet," n. on <a href="#BkIIN_5">5</a> <i>ac vereor</i>. <i>Invidiam</i>:
+  cf. <a href="#BkII_144">144</a>. <i>Cum his</i>: i.e. <i>aliis cum
+  his</i>. <i>Summus deus</i>: "the highest form of the deity" who was of
+  course one in the Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and <span
+  lang="el" title="pyr technikon" >&#x3C0;&#x3C5;&#x3C1;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C7;&#x3BD;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span> is one of
+  the definitions of the Stoic deity, cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_29">29</a>, Zeller 161 sq. <i>Solem</i>: as of course being
+  the chief seat of fire. <i>Solis autem ... nego credere</i>: Faber first
+  gave <i>ac monet</i> for MSS. <i>admonens</i>, which Halm retains, Manut.
+  then restored to its place <i>permensi refertis</i>, which MSS. have
+  after <i>nego</i>. <i>Hic</i>, which MSS. have after <i>decempeda</i>,
+  Madv. turns into <i>hunc</i>, while <i>hoc</i>, which stands immediately
+  after <i>nego</i>, he ejects (<i>Em.</i> 187). <i>Ergo</i> after
+  <i>vos</i> is of course analeptic. Halm departs somewhat from this
+  arrangement. <i>Leniter</i>: Halm and Hermann <i>leviter</i>; the former
+  reads <i>inverecundior</i> after Morgenstern, for what reason it is
+  difficult to see.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_127"></a><a href="#BkII_127">�127</a>.</b>
+  <i>Pabulum</i>: similar language in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 46. <i>Consideratio contemplatioque</i>: Cic. is
+  fond of this combination, as <i>De Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  153; cf. Wesenberg on <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 9, who qu.
+  similar combinations from <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 11, 58.
+  <i>Elatiores</i>: MSS. mostly have <i>latiores</i>. Halm with Lamb. reads
+  <i>altiores</i>, in support of which reading Dav. qu. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 51, Val. Flaccus <i>Argon.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 547, add Virg. <i>Aen.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VI.</span> 49, Cic. <i>Orat.</i> 119. <i>Exigua et
+  minima</i>: <span lang="el" title="smikra kai elachista"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BC;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3C7;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;</span>. Madv. on
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 78 notes that except here Cic.
+  always writes <i>exigua et paene minima</i> or something of the kind.
+  <i>Occultissimarum</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_15">15</a>. <i>Occurit ... completur</i>: MSS. have
+  <i>occuret</i> mostly, if that is retained <i>complebitur</i> must be
+  read. Madv. <i>Opusc.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 282 takes
+  <i>occurit</i>, explaining it as a perfect, and giving numerous exx. of
+  this sequence of tenses, cf. also Wesenb. on <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 35.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_128"></a><a href="#BkII_128">�128</a>.</b> <i>Agi
+  secum</i>: cf. <i>nobiscum ageret</i> in <a href="#BkII_80">80</a>.
+  <i>Simile veri</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_66">66</a>. <i>Notionem</i>: =
+  <i>cognitionem</i>, <span lang="el" title="epist�m�n"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span>.
+  <i>At paulum</i>: MSS. <i>et</i> Halm <i>sed.</i>; cf. <i>at illud
+  ante</i> in <a href="#BkII_116">116</a>. <i>Si quae</i>: Halm and many
+  edd. have <i>se, quae</i>. But the <i>se</i> comes in very awkwardly, and
+  is not needed before the infinitive. Madv. indeed (<i>Em.</i> 114), after
+  producing many exx. of the reflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts
+  about this passage because <i>considero</i> does not belong to the class
+  of verbs with which this usage is found, but he produces many instances
+  with <i>puto</i>, which surely stands on the same level. <i>Non
+  magis</i>: so in <a href="#BkII_119">119</a> <i>nec magis approbabit nunc
+  lucere</i>, etc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely
+  cognisable phenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to
+  absolute knowledge by refusing <span lang="el" title="ton h�lion homologein einai katal�pton"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD; &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3BB;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C0;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  (Galen <i>De Opt. Gen. Dicendi</i> 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.).
+  <i>Cornix</i>: for the Stoic belief in divination see Zeller
+  349&mdash;358. <i>Signum illud</i>: the <i>xystus</i> (<a
+  href="#BkII_9">9</a>) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin. <i>Nat.
+  Hist.</i> <span class="vol">XXXIV.</span> 8. <i>Duodeviginti</i>: <a
+  href="#BkII_82">82</a>, I just note that <i>octodecim</i> is not used by
+  Cic. <i>Sol quantus sit</i>: <a href="#BkII_91">91</a>. <i>Omnium rerum
+  ... comprehendendi</i>: not a case of a plural noun with a singular
+  gerund like <i>spe rerum potiendi</i>, etc., but of two genitives
+  depending in different ways on the same word (<i>definitio</i>). M.
+  <i>Em.</i> 197 qu. Plat. <i>Leg.</i> 648 E <span lang="el" title="t�n pant�n h�ttan phoboumenos anthr�pon toi p�matos"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BD; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3C4;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3B2;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B8;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>, <i>Brut.</i>
+  163 <i>Scaevolae dicendi elegantia</i>, <i>De Or.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 156. Other exx. in <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 14. For the turn of expression cf. <i>T.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">IV.</span> 62 <i>omnium philosophorum una est ratio
+  medendi</i>, <i>Lael.</i> 78 <i>omnium horum vitiorum una cautio est</i>,
+  also <a href="#BkII_51">51</a> of this book.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_129">��129</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_141">141</a>.</b> Summary. What contention is there among
+  philosophers about the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems
+  like that of Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes,
+  Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho,
+  Aristippus, Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus,
+  Carneades (<a href="#BkII_129">129</a>-<a href="#BkII_131">131</a>). If I
+  desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow me, while if I
+  follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (<a href="#BkII_132">132</a>). I must
+  be careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both
+  you, Lucullus, and myself (<a href="#BkII_133">133</a>). Zeno thinks
+  virtue gives happiness. "Yes," says Antiochus, "but not the greatest
+  possible." How am I to choose among such conflicting theories? (<a
+  href="#BkII_134">134</a>) Nor can I accept those points in which
+  Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard emotion as harmful,
+  which the ancients thought natural and useful (<a
+  href="#BkII_135">135</a>). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! (<a
+  href="#BkII_136">136</a>) Albinus joking said to Carneades "You do not
+  think me a praetor because I am not a <i>sapiens</i>." "That," said
+  Carneades, "is Diogenes' view, not mine" (<a href="#BkII_137">137</a>).
+  Chrysippus thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be
+  defended (<a href="#BkII_138">138</a>). I gravitate then towards one of
+  them, that of pleasure. Virtue calls me back, nor will she even allow me
+  to join pleasure to herself (<a href="#BkII_139">139</a>). When I hear
+  the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I cannot avoid being moved
+  by both, and so I find it impossible to choose (<a
+  href="#BkII_141">141</a>, <a href="#BkII_142">142</a>).</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_129"></a><a href="#BkII_129">�129</a>.</b> <i>Quod
+  coeperam</i>: in <a href="#BkII_128">128</a> at <i>veniamus nunc ad boni
+  maique notionem</i>. <i>Constituendi</i>: n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_114">114</a>. <i>Bonorum summa</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 21 and Madv. <i>Est igitur</i>: so in <i>De
+  Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 8, <i>igitur</i> comes fourth word
+  in the clause; this is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius.
+  <i>Omitto</i>: MSS. <i>et omitto</i>, but cf. Madv. <i>Em.</i> 201
+  <i>certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro simplici 'omitto,' in
+  initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae exempla subiciuntur
+  per figuram omissionis</i>. <i>Relicta</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_130">130</a> <i>abiectos</i>. Cic. generally classes Herillus
+  (or Erillus as Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 35
+  spells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded
+  systems, cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 43, <i>De Off.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 6, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span>
+  85. <i>Ut Herillum</i>. MSS. have either <i>Erillum</i> or <i>et
+  illum</i>, one would expect <i>ut Herilli</i>. <i>Cognitione et
+  scientia</i>: double translation of <span lang="el" title="epist�m�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span>. For the
+  <i>finis</i> of Herillus see Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 43. <i>Megaricorum</i>: <i>Xenophanes</i>. Cic
+  considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so closely related as to
+  have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a continuous history.
+  The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development of Eleatic
+  doctrine. Zeller, <i>Socrates</i> 211. <i>Unum et simile</i>: for this
+  see Zell. <i>Socr.</i> 222 sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq.
+  <i>Simile</i> ought perhaps to be <i>sui simile</i> as in <i>Tim.</i> c.
+  7, already quoted on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_30">30</a>, see my note there and cf. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_35">35</a>. <i>Menedemo</i>: see
+  Zeller <i>Socr.</i> 238, R. and P. 182. The <i>Erctrian</i> school was
+  closely connected with the Megarian. <i>Fuit</i>: = <i>natus est</i>, as
+  often. <i>Herilli</i>: so Madv. for <i>ulli</i> of MSS.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_130"></a><a href="#BkII_130">�130</a>.</b>
+  <i>Aristonem</i>: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a
+  Peripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines
+  of Aristo the Chian <i>ib.</i> 358, Zeller 58 sq. <i>In mediis</i>: cf.
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_36">36</a>, <a
+  href="#BkI_37">37</a>. <i>Momenta</i> = <i>aestimationes</i>, <span
+  lang="el" title="axiai" >&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span> in <a
+  href="#BkII_36">36</a>, where <i>momenti</i> is used in a different way.
+  <i>Pyrrho autem</i>: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav. conj., but in <a
+  href="#BkII_124">124</a> there is just the same change from
+  <i>Pyrrhoni</i> to <i>Xenocrates</i>. <span lang="el" title="Apatheia"
+  >&#x391;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>: Diog. <span
+  class="vol">IX.</span> 108 affirms this as well as <span lang="el"
+  title="praiot�s"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span> to be a
+  name for the sceptic <span lang="el" title="telos"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>, but the name scarcely occurs
+  if at all in Sext. who generally uses <span lang="el" title="ataraxia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3BE;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, but
+  occasionally <span lang="el" title="metriopatheia"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>;
+  cf. Zeller 496, R. and P. 338. <span lang="el" title="Apatheia"
+  >&#x391;&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> was also a
+  Stoic term. <i>Diu multumque</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_4">4</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_131"></a><a href="#BkII_131">�131</a>.</b> <i>Nec
+  tamen consentiens</i>: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences between
+  the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448.
+  <i>Callipho</i>: as the genitive is <i>Calliphontis</i>, Cic. ought
+  according to rule to write <i>Calliphon</i> in the nom; for this see
+  Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 19, who also gives the
+  chief authorities concerning this philosopher. <i>Hieronymus</i>:
+  mentioned <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 19, 35, 41, <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 14, in which last place Cic. says of him <i>quem
+  iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio</i>. <i>Diodorus</i>: see Madv. on
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 19. <i>Honeste vivere</i>, etc.:
+  in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 14 the <i>finis</i> of Polemo
+  is stated to be <i>secundum naturam vivere</i>, and three Stoic
+  interpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present
+  passage&mdash;<i>omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint
+  fruentem vivere</i>. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him
+  it is attributed to the <i>vetus Academia</i> in <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_22">22</a>, where the words <i>aut
+  omnia aut maxima</i>, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf.
+  Clemens Alex. qu. by Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span>
+  15. See n. below on Carneades. <i>Antiochus probat</i>: the germs of many
+  Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in Polemo; see <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_34">34</a>, n. <i>Eiusque amici</i>:
+  Bentl. <i>aemuli</i>, but Halm refers to <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree
+  Stoicised. <i>Nunc</i>: Halm <i>huc</i> after Jo. Scala.
+  <i>Carneades</i>: this <i>finis</i> is given in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 35 (<i>frui principiis naturalibus</i>), <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 42 (<i>Carneadeum illud quod is non tam ut
+  probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum gerebat
+  opponeret</i>), <span class="vol">V.</span> 20 (<i>fruendi rebus iis,
+  quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem
+  auctor sed defensor disserendi causa fuit</i>), <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 84 (<i>naturae primus aut omnibus aut maximis frui,
+  ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat</i>). The <i>finis</i> therefore,
+  thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is clear that
+  Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include
+  <i>virtus</i> in it (see <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 38, 42,
+  <span class="vol">V.</span> 22) while Polemo did (I. <a
+  href="#BkI_22">22</a>). See more on <a href="#BkII_139">139</a>.
+  <i>Zeno</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 15 <i>Inventor
+  et princeps</i>: same expression in <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 48, <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 91,
+  <i>De Inv.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 6; <i>inv.</i> = <span
+  lang="el" title="oikist�s"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_132"></a><a href="#BkII_132">�132</a>.</b>
+  <i>Quemlibet</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_125">125</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_126">126</a>. <i>Prope singularem</i>: cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 22 <i>Aristoteles longe omnibus&mdash;Platonem
+  semper excipio&mdash;praestans</i>; also <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 7, <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 15.
+  <i>Per ipsum Antiochum</i>: a similar line of argument is taken in Sext.
+  <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 88, <span class="vol">II.</span>
+  32, etc. <i>Terminis ... possessione</i>: there is a similar play on the
+  legal words <i>finis terminus possessio</i> in <i>De Leg.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 55, 56, a noteworthy passage. <i>Omnis ratio</i>
+  etc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf.
+  Aug. <i>De Civ. Dei</i> <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 1 <i>neque enim
+  existimat</i> (Varro) <i>ullam philosophiae sectam esse dicendam, quae
+  non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat fines bonorum et
+  malorum</i>, etc. <i>Si Polemoneus</i>: i.e. <i>sapiens fuerit</i>.
+  <i>Peccat</i>: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_37">37</a>. <i>Academicos et</i>:
+  MSS. om. <i>et</i> as in <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_16">16</a>, and <i>que</i> in <a href="#BkII_52">52</a> of
+  this book. <i>Dicenda</i>: for the omission of the verb with the
+  gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic clauses) cf. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_7">7</a>, and Madv. on <i>D.F.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 43, who how ever unduly limits the usage.
+  <i>Hic igitur ... prudentior</i>: MSS. generally have <i>assentiens</i>,
+  but one good one (Halm's E) has <i>assentientes</i>. I venture to read
+  <i>adsentietur</i>, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt,
+  as in <a href="#BkII_26">26</a> (<i>tenetur</i>) and that then
+  <i>adsentiet</i>, under the attraction of the <i>s</i> following, passed
+  into <i>adsentiens</i>, as in <a href="#BkII_147">147</a> <i>intellegat
+  se</i> passed into <i>intelligentes</i>. <i>N</i>, I may remark, is
+  frequently inserted in MSS. (as in <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_7">7</a> <i>appellant</i>, <a href="#BkI_16">16</a>
+  <i>disputant</i>, <a href="#BkI_24">24</a> <i>efficerentur</i>), and all
+  the changes involved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read
+  <i>sin, inquam</i> (<i>sc. adsentietur</i>) for <i>si numquam</i> of MSS.
+  The question <i>uter est prudentior</i> is intended to press home the
+  dilemma in which Cicero has placed the supposed <i>sapiens</i>. All the
+  other emendations I have seen are too unsatisfactory to be
+  enumerated.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_133"></a><a href="#BkII_133">�133</a>.</b> <i>Non
+  posse ... esse</i>: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads <i>non
+  esse illa probanda sap.</i> after Lamb., who also conj. <i>non posse illa
+  probata esse</i>. <i>Paria</i>: <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span>
+  48, <i>Paradoxa</i> 20 sq., Zeller 250. <i>Praecide</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="syntomos"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> or <span
+  lang="el" title="synel�n eipe"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3C5;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;</span>, cf. <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 57, <i>Ad
+  Att.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 4, <span class="vol">X.</span>
+  16. <i>Inquit</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_79">79</a>. <i>Quid quod
+  quae</i>: so Guietus with the approval of Madv. (<i>Em.</i> 203) reads
+  for MSS. <i>quid quae</i> or <i>quid quaeque</i>, Halm and Bait., follow
+  Moser in writing <i>Quid? si quae</i> removing the stop at <i>paria</i>,
+  and make <i>in utramque partem</i> follow <i>dicantur</i>, on Orelli's
+  suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS. often
+  omit one. <i>Dicebas</i>: in <a href="#BkII_27">27</a>. <i>Incognito</i>:
+  <a href="#BkII_133">133</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_134"></a><a href="#BkII_134">�134</a>.</b>
+  <i>Etiam</i>: = "yes," Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 454. <i>Non beatissimam</i>:
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_22">22</a>, n. <i>Deus
+  ille</i>: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's <span lang="el" title="� theos � th�rion"
+  >&#x3B7; &#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3BF;&#x3C2; &#x3B7;
+  &#x3B8;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>), if he can do without
+  other advantages. For the omission of <i>est</i> after the emphatic
+  <i>ille</i> cf. <a href="#BkIIN_59">59</a>, n. <i>Theophrasto</i>, etc.:
+  n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_33">33</a>, <a
+  href="#BkI_35">35</a>. <i>Dicente</i>: before this Halm after Lamb.,
+  followed by Bait., inserts <i>contra</i>, the need for which I fail to
+  see. <i>Et hic</i>: i.e. Antiochus. <i>Ne sibi constet</i>: Cic. argues
+  in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> that there cannot be degrees
+  in happiness. <i>Tum hoc ... tum illud</i>: cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_121">121</a>. <i>Iacere</i>: <a href="#BkII_79">79</a>. <i>In
+  his discrepant</i>: <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_42">42</a>
+  <i>in his constitit</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_135"></a><a href="#BkII_135">�135</a>.</b>
+  <i>Moveri</i>: <span lang="el" title="kineisthai"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3B8;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>,
+  <a href="#BkII_29">29</a>. <i>Laetitia efferri</i>: <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_38">38</a>. <i>Probabilia</i>: the
+  removal of passion and delight is easier than that of fear and pain.
+  <i>Sapiensne ... deleta sit</i>: see Madv. <i>D.F.</i> p. 806, ed. 2, who
+  is severe upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz), <i>non
+  timeat? nec si patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit?</i> which
+  involves the use of <i>nec</i> for <i>ne ... quidem</i>. I have followed
+  the reading of Madv. in his <i>Em.</i>, not the one he gives (after
+  Davies) in <i>D.F.</i> <i>ne patria deleatur</i>, which Halm takes, as
+  does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer the MSS. <i>Decreta</i>: some MSS.
+  <i>durata</i>; Halm conj. <i>dictata</i>. <i>Mediocritates</i>: <span
+  lang="el" title="mesopetes"
+  >&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  as in Aristotle; cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 11, 22,
+  74. <i>Permotione</i>: <span lang="el" title="kinesei"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;</span>. <i>Naturalem
+  ... modum</i>: so <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 74.
+  <i>Crantoris</i>: sc. <i>librum</i>, for the omission of which see n. on
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_13">13</a>; add Quint. <span
+  class="vol">IX.</span> 4, 18, where Spalding wished to read <i>in
+  Herodoti</i>, supplying <i>libro</i>. <i>Aureolus ... libellus</i>: it is
+  not often that two diminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is
+  rather colloquial; cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 2,
+  <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 43, also for <i>aureolus</i> <a
+  href="#BkII_119">119</a> <i>flumen aureum</i>. <i>Panaetius</i>: he had
+  addressed to Tubero a work <i>de dolore</i>; see <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 23. <i>Cotem</i>: <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 43, 48, Seneca <i>De Ira</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 3, where the saying is attributed to Aristotle
+  (<i>iram calcar esse virtutis</i>). <i>Dicebant</i>: for the repetition
+  of this word cf. <a href="#BkII_146">146</a>, <span class="vol">I.</span>
+  <a href="#BkI_33">33</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_136"></a><a href="#BkII_136">�136</a>.</b> <i>Sunt
+  enim Socratica</i>: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is
+  affirmed in <i>Parad.</i> 4, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span>
+  10. <i>Mirabilia</i>: Cic. generally translates <span lang="el"
+  title="paradoxa"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;</span> by
+  <i>admirabilia</i> as in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 74, or
+  <i>admiranda</i>, under which title he seems to have published a work
+  different from the <i>Paradoxa</i>, which we possess: see Bait., and
+  Halm's ed. of the Phil. works (1861), p. 994. <i>Quasi</i>: = almost,
+  <span lang="el" title="h�s epos eipein" >&#x201B;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>. <i>Voltis</i>: cf. the
+  Antiochean opinion in <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_18">18</a>, <a href="#BkI_22">22</a>. <i>Solos reges</i>: for
+  all this see Zeller 253 sq. <i>Solos divites</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="hoti monos ho sophos plousios" >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2; &#x201B;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  <i>Parad.</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span> <i>Liberum</i>: <i>Parad.</i>
+  <span class="vol">V.</span> <span lang="el" title="hoti monos ho sophos eleutheros kai pas aphron doulos"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF; &#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3C5;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>. <i>Furiosus</i>:
+  <i>Parad.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> <span lang="el" title="hoti pas aphron mainetai"
+  >&#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3C6;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3B9;</span>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_137"></a><a href="#BkII_137">�137</a>.</b> <i>Tam
+  sunt defendenda</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_8">8</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_120">120</a>. <i>Bono modo</i>: a colloquial and Plautine
+  expression; see Forc. <i>Ad senatum starent</i>: "were in waiting on the
+  senate;" cf. such phrases as <i>stare ad cyathum</i>, etc.
+  <i>Carneade</i>: the vocative is <i>Carneades</i> in <i>De Div.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 23. <i>Huic Stoico</i>: i.e. <i>Diogeni</i>; cf.
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 24. Halm brackets <i>Stoico</i>,
+  and after him Bait. <i>Sequi volebat</i>: "professed to follow;" cf.
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 13 <i>Strato physicum se
+  voluit</i> "gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:" also Madv. on
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 102. <i>Ille noster</i>: Dav.
+  <i>vester</i>, as in <a href="#BkII_143">143</a> <i>noster Antiochus</i>.
+  But in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_113">113</a>. <i>Balbutiens</i>: "giving an uncertain sound;"
+  cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 5, <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 75.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_138"></a><a href="#BkII_138">�138</a>.</b> <i>Mihi
+  veremini</i>: cf. Caes. <i>Bell. Gall</i>. <span class="vol">V.</span> 9
+  <i>veritus navibus</i>. Halm and Bait. follow Christ's conj.
+  <i>verenti</i>, removing the stop at <i>voltis</i>. <i>Opinationem</i>:
+  the <span lang="el" title="oi�sin"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B7;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span> of Sext., e.g.
+  <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 280. <i>Quod minime voltis</i>:
+  cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_18">18</a>. <i>De
+  finibus</i>: not "concerning," but "from among" the different
+  <i>fines</i>; otherwise <i>fine</i> would have been written. Cf. <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_4">4</a> <i>si qui de nostris.</i>
+  <i>Circumcidit et amputat</i>: these two verbs often come together, as in
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 44; cf. also <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 31. <i>Si vacemus omni molestia</i>: which
+  Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure. <i>Cum honestate</i>: Callipho
+  in <a href="#BkII_131">131</a>. <i>Prima naturae commoda</i>: Cic. here
+  as in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 59, <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 58 confuses the Stoic <span lang="el" title="pr�ta kata physin"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3C9;&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3C6;&#x3C5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span> with <span lang="el" title="ta tou s�matos agatha kai ta ektos"
+  >&#x3C4;&#x3B1; &#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3C9;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3B3;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3B1; &#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3B9; &#x3C4;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3BA;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> of the Peripatetics, for which
+  see <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_19">19</a>. More on the
+  subject in Madvig's fourth Excursus to the <i>D.F.</i> <i>Relinquit</i>:
+  Orelli <i>relinqui</i> against the MSS.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_139"></a><a href="#BkII_139">�139</a>.</b>
+  <i>Polemonis ... finibus</i>: all these were composite <i>fines</i>.
+  <i>Adhuc</i>: I need scarcely point out that this goes with <i>habeo</i>
+  and not with <i>probabilius</i>; <i>adhuc</i> for <i>etiam</i> with the
+  comparative does not occur till the silver writers. <i>Labor eo</i>: cf.
+  Horace's <i>nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor</i>, also
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 6 <i>rapior illuc: revocat autem
+  Antiochus</i>. <i>Reprehendit manu</i>: <i>M.D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 3. <i>Pecudum</i>: <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_6">6</a>, <i>Parad.</i> 14 <i>voluptatem esse summum bonum,
+  quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non hominum</i>; similar expressions
+  occur with a reference to Epicurus in <i>De Off.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 105, <i>Lael.</i> 20, 32. <i>T.D.</i> <span
+  class="vol">V.</span> 73, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 18;
+  cf. also Aristoph. <i>Plut.</i> 922 <span lang="el" title="probatiou bion legeis"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3B2;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C5;
+  &#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3BB;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span> and <span lang="el"
+  title="bosk�mat�n bios"
+  >&#x3B2;&#x3BF;&#x3C3;&#x3BA;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3C9;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3B2;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> in Aristotle. The meaning of
+  <i>pecus</i> is well shown in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 69.
+  <i>Iungit deo</i>: Zeller 176 sq. <i>Animum solum</i>: the same criticism
+  is applied to Zeno's <i>finis</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 17, 25. <i>Ut ... sequar</i>: for the repeated
+  <i>ut</i> see <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 10, Madv.
+  <i>Gram.</i> 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second <i>ut</i> with Lamb.
+  <i>Carneades ... defensitabat</i>: this is quite a different view from
+  that in <a href="#BkII_131">131</a>; yet another of Carneades is given in
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 83. <i>Istum finem</i>: MSS.
+  <i>ipsum</i>; the two words are often confused, as in <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_2">2</a>. <i>Ipsa veritas</i>: MSS.
+  <i>severitas</i>, a frequent error; cf. <i>In Verr. Act.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 3, <span class="vol">III.</span> 162, <i>De
+  Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 4, also Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">IV.</span> 55. <i>Obversetur</i>: Halm takes the conj. of
+  Lamb., <i>adversetur</i>. The MSS. reading gives excellent sense; cf.
+  <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 52 <i>obversentur honestae
+  species viro</i>. Bait. follows Halm. <i>Tu ... copulabis</i>: this is
+  the feigned expostulation of <i>veritas</i> (cf. <a
+  href="#BkII_34">34</a> <i>convicio veritatis</i>), for which style see <a
+  href="#BkII_125">125</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_140"></a><a href="#BkII_140">�140</a>.</b>
+  <i>Voluptas cum honestate</i>: this whole expression is in apposition to
+  <i>par</i>, so that <i>cum</i> must not be taken closely with
+  <i>depugnet</i>; cf. Hor. <i>Sat.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, 19
+  <i>Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius</i> (sc.
+  <i>par</i>) <i>cum Bitho Bacchius</i>. <i>Si sequare, ruunt</i>: for
+  constr. cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_7">7</a>.
+  <i>Communitas</i>: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297. <i>Nulla potest
+  nisi erit</i>: Madv. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 70 "<i>in
+  hac coniunctione&mdash;hoc fieri non potest nisi&mdash;fere semper
+  coniunctivus subicitur praesentis&mdash;futuri et perfecti indicativus
+  ponitur</i>." <i>Gratuita</i>: "disinterested." <i>Ne intellegi
+  quidem</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_7">7</a>,
+  cf. also <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 73, 119. <i>Gloriosum in
+  vulgus</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 44 <i>populus
+  cum illis facit</i> (i.e. <i>Epicureis</i>). <i>Normam ... regulam</i>:
+  n. on <i>Ac. Post.</i> fragm. <a href="#FrN_8">8</a>.
+  <i>Praescriptionem</i>: <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_23">23</a>, n.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_141"></a><a href="#BkII_141">�141</a>.</b>
+  <i>Adquiescis</i>: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads <i>adsciscis</i>,
+  comparing <a href="#BkII_138">138</a>. Add <i>D.F.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 23 (<i>sciscat et probet</i>), <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 17 (<i>adsciscendas esse</i>), <span
+  class="vol">III.</span> 70 (<i>adscisci et probari</i>) Bait. follows
+  Halm. <i>Ratum ... fixum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_27">27</a> and n. on
+  <i>Ac. Post.</i> fragm. <a href="#FrN_17">17</a>. <i>Falso</i>: like
+  <i>incognito</i> in <a href="#BkII_133">133</a>. <i>Nullo discrimine</i>:
+  for this see the explanation of <i>nihil interesse</i> in <a
+  href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>, n. <i>Iudicia</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="krit�ria"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span> as
+  usual.</p>
+
+  <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_142">��142</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_146">146</a>.</b> Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how
+  Protagoras, the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (<a
+  href="#BkII_142">142</a>). Does Antiochus follow any of these? Why, he
+  never even follows the <i>vetus Academia</i>, and never stirs a step from
+  Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot agree about the very elements
+  of their art (<a href="#BkII_143">143</a>). Why then, Lucullus, do you
+  rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling them I do
+  away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd together, I
+  will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them are slaves,
+  exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being <i>sapiens</i>,
+  know nothing whatever (<a href="#BkII_144">144</a>). This last point Zeno
+  used to illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any
+  actual <i>sapiens</i> (<a href="#BkII_145">145</a>). Now as there is no
+  knowledge there can be no art. How would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this
+  conclusion? They would prefer mine, to which our ancestors bear
+  testimony.</blockquote>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_142"></a><a href="#BkII_142">�142</a>.</b> <i>Venio
+  iam</i>: Dialectic had been already dealt with in <a
+  href="#BkII_91">91</a>&mdash;<a href="#BkII_98">98</a> here it is merely
+  considered with a view to the choice of the supposed <i>sapiens</i>, as
+  was Ethical Science in <a href="#BkII_129">129</a>&mdash;<a
+  href="#BkII_141">141</a> and Physics in <a
+  href="#BkII_116">116</a>&mdash;<a href="#BkII_128">128</a>. With the
+  enumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus
+  gives in <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 48 sq.
+  <i>Protagorae</i>: R. and P. 132 sq. <i>Qui putet</i>: so MSS., Halm and
+  Bait. <i>putat</i> after Lamb. Trans. "inasmuch as he thinks".
+  <i>Permotiones intimas</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_20">20</a> <i>tactus
+  interior</i>, also <a href="#BkII_76">76</a>. <i>Epicuri</i>: nn. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_19">19</a>, <a href="#BkIIN_79">79</a>, <a
+  href="#BkIIN_80">80</a>. <i>Iudicium</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="krit�rion"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;</span>
+  as usual. <i>Rerum notitiis</i>: <span lang="el" title="prol�psesi"
+  >&#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3B9;</span>,
+  Zeller 403 sq. <i>Constituit</i>: note the constr. with <i>in</i>, like
+  <i>ponere in</i>. <i>Cogitationis</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_30">30</a>. Several MSS. have <i>cognitionis</i>, the two
+  words are frequently confused. See Wesenberg <i>Fm.</i> to <i>T.D.</i>
+  <span class="vol">III.</span> p. 17, who says, <i>multo tamen saepius
+  "cogitatio" pro "cognitio" substituitur quam contra</i>, also
+  <i>M.D.F</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 21.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_143"></a><a href="#BkII_143">�143</a>.</b> <i>Ne
+  maiorum quidem suorum</i>: sc. <i>aliquid probat</i>. For <i>maiorum</i>
+  cf. <a href="#BkII_80">80</a>. Here Plato is almost excluded from the
+  so-called <i>vetus Academia</i>, cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_33">33</a>. <i>Libri</i>: titles of some are preserved in
+  Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">IV.</span> 11&mdash;14. <i>Nihil
+  politius</i>: cf. <a href="#BkIIN_119">119</a>, n. <i>Pedem nusquam</i>:
+  for the ellipse cf. <a href="#BkII_58">58</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_116">116</a>, <i>Pro Deiot.</i> 42 and <i>pedem latum</i> in
+  Plaut. <i>Abutimur</i>: this verb in the rhetorical writers means to use
+  words in metaphorical or unnatural senses, see Quint. <span
+  class="vol">X.</span> 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; "do we
+  use the name Academic in a non natural fashion?" <i>Si dies est
+  lucet</i>: a better trans of <span lang="el" title="ei ph�s estin, h�mera estin"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3B9; &#x3C6;&#x3C9;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;,
+  &#x201B;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B1;
+  &#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span> than was given in <a
+  href="#BkIIN_96">96</a>, where see n. <i>Aliter Philoni</i>: not Philo of
+  Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of Diodorus the Megarian,
+  mentioned also in <a href="#BkII_75">75</a>. The dispute between Diodorus
+  and Philo is mentioned in Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span
+  class="vol">VIII.</span> 115&mdash;117 with the same purpose as here, see
+  also Zeller 39. <i>Antipater</i>: the Stoic of Tarsus, who succeeded
+  Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school. <i>Archidemus</i>:
+  several times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as <span
+  class="vol">VII.</span> 68, 84. <i>Opiniosissimi</i>: so the MSS. I
+  cannot think that the word is wrong, though all edd. condemn it. Halm is
+  certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory epithet such as
+  <i>ingeniosissimi</i> is necessary. I believe that the word
+  <i>opiniosissimi</i> (an adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was
+  manufactured on the spur of the moment, in order to ridicule these two
+  philosophers, who are playfully described as men full of <i>opinio</i> or
+  <span lang="el" title="doxa"
+  >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;</span>&mdash;just the imputation which, as
+  Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's <i>spinosissimi</i> is
+  ingenious, and if an em. were needed, would not be so utterly improbable
+  as Halm thinks.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_144"></a><a href="#BkII_144">�144</a>.</b> <i>In
+  contionem vocas</i>: a retort, having reference to <a
+  href="#BkII_14">14</a>, cf. also <a href="#BkII_63">63</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_72">72</a>. For these <i>contiones</i> see Lange, <i>Romische
+  Alterthumer</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 663, ed 2. They were called
+  by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of whom had the
+  right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under fewer
+  restrictions than the right of the others. <i>Occludi tabernas</i> in
+  order of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this
+  see Liv. <span class="vol">III.</span> 27, <span class="vol">IV.</span>
+  31, <span class="vol">IX.</span> 7, and compare the cry "to your tents, O
+  Israel" in the Bible. <i>Artificia</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_30">30</a>.
+  <i>Tolli</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_26">26</a>. <i>Ut opifices
+  concitentur</i>: cf. <i>Pro Flacc.</i> 18 <i>opifices et tabernarios quid
+  neqoti est concitare?</i> <i>Expromam</i>: Cic. was probably thinking of
+  the use to which he himself had put these Stoic paradoxes in <i>Pro
+  Murena</i> 61, a use of which he half confesses himself ashamed in
+  <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 74. <i>Exsules</i> etc.: <a
+  href="#BkII_136">136</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_145"></a><a href="#BkII_145">�145</a>.</b> <i>Scire
+  negatis</i>: cf. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 153, who
+  says that even <span lang="el" title="katal�psis"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3C2;</span>
+  when it arises in the mind of a <span lang="el" title="phaulos"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> is mere <span
+  lang="el" title="doxa" >&#x3B4;&#x3BF;&#x3BE;&#x3B1;</span> and not <span
+  lang="el" title="epist�m�"
+  >&#x3B5;&#x3C0;&#x3B9;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B7;&#x3BC;&#x3B7;</span>; also
+  <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 83, where it is said that the
+  <span lang="el" title="phaulos"
+  >&#x3C6;&#x3B1;&#x3C5;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> is capable of <span
+  lang="el" title="to al�thes" >&#x3C4;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3C2;</span> but not of <span
+  lang="el" title="al�theia"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3B8;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;</span>, which the
+  <span lang="el" title="sophos"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> alone has. <i>Visum ...
+  adsensus</i>: the Stoics as we saw (II. <a href="#BkII_38">38</a>, etc.)
+  analysed sensations into two parts; with the Academic and other schools
+  each sensation was an ultimate unanalysable unit, a <span lang="el"
+  title="psilon pathos" >&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3BB;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3B1;&#x3B8;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>. For this symbolic action of
+  Zeno cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 18, <i>Orat.</i> 113,
+  Sextus <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 7, Quint. <span
+  class="vol">II.</span> 20, 7, Zeller 84. <i>Contraxerat</i>: so Halm who
+  qu. Plin. <i>Nat. Hist.</i> <span class="vol">XI.</span> 26, 94
+  <i>digitum contrahens aut remittens</i>; Orelli <i>construxerat</i>; MSS.
+  mostly <i>contexerat</i>. <i>Quod ante non fuerat</i>: <span lang="el"
+  title="katalambanein"
+  >&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3B2;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;&#x3B9;&#x3BD;</span>
+  however is frequent in Plato in the sense "to seize firmly with the
+  mind." <i>Adverterat</i>: the best MSS. give merely <i>adverat</i>, but
+  on the margin <i>admoverat</i> which Halm takes, and after him Bait.; one
+  good MS. has <i>adverterat</i>. <i>Ne ipsi quidem</i>: even Socrates,
+  Antisthenes and Diogenes were not <span lang="el" title="sophoi"
+  >&#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;</span> according to the Stoics, but
+  merely were <span lang="el" title="en prokop�i" >&#x3B5;&#x3BD;
+  &#x3C0;&#x3C1;&#x3BF;&#x3BA;&#x3BF;&#x3C0;&#x3B7;&#x3B9;</span>; see
+  Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut. <i>Sto.
+  Rep.</i> 1056 (qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli) <span lang="el"
+  title="esti de outos" >&#x3B5;&#x3C3;&#x3C4;&#x3B9; &#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3C4;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span> (i.e. <span lang="el"
+  title="ho sophos" >&#x201B;&#x3BF;
+  &#x3C3;&#x3BF;&#x3C6;&#x3BF;&#x3C2;</span>) <span lang="el"
+  title="oudamou g�s oude gegone"
+  >&#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B1;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3C5; &#x3B3;&#x3B7;&#x3C2;
+  &#x3BF;&#x3C5;&#x3B4;&#x3B5;
+  &#x3B3;&#x3B5;&#x3B3;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3B5;</span>. <i>Nec tu</i>: sc.
+  <i>scis</i>; Goer. has a strange note here.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_146"></a><a href="#BkII_146">�146</a>.</b>
+  <i>Illa</i>: cf. <i>illa invidiosa</i> above (<a
+  href="#BkII_144">144</a>). <i>Dicebas</i>: in <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>.
+  <i>Refero</i>: "retort," as in Ovid. <i>Metam.</i> <span
+  class="vol">I.</span> 758 <i>pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici potuisse
+  et non potuisse referri</i>; cf. also <i>par pari referre dicto</i>.
+  <i>Ne nobis quidem</i>: "<i>nor</i> would they be angry;" cf. n. on.
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_5">5</a>. <i>Arbitrari</i>:
+  the original meaning of this was "to be a bystander," or "to be an
+  eye-witness," see Corssen <span class="vol">I.</span> 238. <i>Ea non
+  ut</i>: MSS. have <i>ut ea non aut</i>. Halm reads <i>ut ea non</i>
+  merely, but I prefer the reading I have given because of Cicero's
+  fondness for making the <i>ut</i> follow closely on the negative: for
+  this see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 465 <i>b</i>, obs.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_147"></a><a href="#BkII_147">�147</a>.</b>
+  <i>Obscuritate</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkI_44">44</a>, n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a
+  href="#BkIN_15">15</a>. <i>Plus uno</i>: <a href="#BkII_115">115</a>.
+  <i>Iacere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_79">79</a>. <i>Plagas</i>: cf. n. on <a
+  href="#BkIIN_112">112</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><b><a name="BkIIN_148"></a><a href="#BkII_148">�148</a>.</b> <i>Ad
+  patris revolvor sententiam</i>: for this see Introd. <a
+  href="#Page_l">50</a>, and for the expression <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>.
+  <i>Opinaturum</i>: see <a href="#BkII_59">59</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_67">67</a>, <a href="#BkII_78">78</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_112">112</a>. <i>Intellegat se</i>: MSS.
+  <i>intellegentes</i>, cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_132">132</a>. <i>Qua
+  re</i>: so Manut. for <i>per</i> of MSS. <span lang="el" title="Epoch�n"
+  >&#x395;&#x3C0;&#x3BF;&#x3C7;&#x3B7;&#x3BD;</span> <i>illam omnium
+  rerum</i>: an odd expression; cf. <i>actio rerum</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_62">62</a>. <i>Non probans</i>: so Madv. <i>Em.</i> 204 for
+  MSS. <i>comprobans</i>. Dav. conj. <i>improbans</i> and is followed by
+  Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is wrong. The difficulty is
+  essentially the same as that involved in <a href="#BkII_104">104</a>,
+  which should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a
+  theoretical dogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that <i>assent</i>
+  (meaning absolute assent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma
+  Catulus might well describe himself as formally approving
+  (<i>comprobans</i>). The <i>practice</i> is to give assent (meaning
+  modified assent). There is the same contrast in <a
+  href="#BkII_104">104</a> between <i>placere</i> and <i>tenere</i>. I may
+  note that the word <i>alteri</i> (cf. <i>altero</i> in <a
+  href="#BkII_104">104</a>) need not imply that the dogma and the practice
+  are irreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably
+  confirmed edd. in their introduction of the negative. <i>Nec eam
+  admodum</i>: cf. <i>non repugnarem</i> in <a href="#BkII_112">112</a>.
+  <i>Tollendum</i>: many edd. have gone far astray in interpreting this
+  passage. The word is used with a double reference to <i>adsensus</i> and
+  <i>ancora</i>; in the first way we have had <i>tollere</i> used a score
+  of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes.
+  <i>Bell. Gall.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 23, <i>Bell. Civ.</i>
+  <span class="vol">I.</span> 31, where <i>tollere</i> is used of weighing
+  anchor, and Varro <i>De Re Rust.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 17, 1,
+  where it occurs in the sense "to get on," "to proceed," without any
+  reference to the sea. (The exx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe
+  and this alone is referred to in <i>Ad Att.</i> <span
+  class="vol">XIII.</span> 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried
+  at first to manage a joke by using the word <i>inhibendum</i>, which had
+  also a nautical signification, but finding that he had mistaken the
+  meaning of the word, substituted <i>tollendum</i>.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+  <p><a name="Nt_1"></a><a href="#NtA_1">[1]</a> <i>De Leg.</i> II. �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_2"></a><a href="#NtA_2">[2]</a> Cf. <i>De Or.</i> II. �1
+  with II. �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_3"></a><a href="#NtA_3">[3]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> XIII. 1,
+  Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut philosophus
+  probabatur.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_4"></a><a href="#NtA_4">[4]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. �93,
+  Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_5"></a><a href="#NtA_5">[5]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> XIII.
+  1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_6"></a><a href="#NtA_6">[6]</a> <i>Brutus</i>, �309.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_7"></a><a href="#NtA_7">[7]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> II. 20,
+  �6.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_8"></a><a href="#NtA_8">[8]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> XIII. 16.
+  <i>T.D.</i> V. �113. <i>Acad.</i> II. �<a href="#BkII_115">115</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_9"></a><a href="#NtA_9">[9]</a> <i>Brutus</i>, �306.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_10"></a><a href="#NtA_10">[10]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_11"></a><a href="#NtA_11">[11]</a> <i>Rep.</i> I. �7.
+  <i>T.D.</i> V. �5. <i>De Off.</i> II. ��3,4. <i>De Fato</i>, �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_12"></a><a href="#NtA_12">[12]</a> Cf. <i>Brutus</i>,
+  ��312, 322.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_13"></a><a href="#NtA_13">[13]</a> Cf. <i>Brutus</i>,
+  ��312, 314, 316.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_14"></a><a href="#NtA_14">[14]</a> <i>Brutus</i>,
+  �315.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_15"></a><a href="#NtA_15">[15]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. �59.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_16"></a><a href="#NtA_16">[16]</a> VII. I. �35.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_17"></a><a href="#NtA_17">[17]</a> Cf. <i>N.D.</i> I. �93
+  with <i>Ad Fam.</i> XIII. 1, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_18"></a><a href="#NtA_18">[18]</a> <i>Ac.</i> I. �<a
+  href="#BkI_46">46</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_19"></a><a href="#NtA_19">[19]</a> <i>D.F.</i> V. �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_20"></a><a href="#NtA_20">[20]</a> <i>D.F.</i> I. �16.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_21"></a><a href="#NtA_21">[21]</a> <i>D.F.</i> V. �6,
+  etc.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_22"></a><a href="#NtA_22">[22]</a> <i>D.F.</i> V. �8.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_23"></a><a href="#NtA_23">[23]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_4">4</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_24"></a><a href="#NtA_24">[24]</a> <i>Ib.</i> �<a
+  href="#BkII_69">69</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_25"></a><a href="#NtA_25">[25]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  19, �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_26"></a><a href="#NtA_26">[26]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_113">113</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_27"></a><a href="#NtA_27">[27]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_113">113</a>. <i>De Leg.</i> I. �54.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_28"></a><a href="#NtA_28">[28]</a> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_12">12</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_29"></a><a href="#NtA_29">[29]</a> <i>Brutus</i>,
+  �316.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_30"></a><a href="#NtA_30">[30]</a> <i>Hortensius</i>,
+  fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_31"></a><a href="#NtA_31">[31]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II.
+  �61.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_32"></a><a href="#NtA_32">[32]</a> <i>De Div.</i> I.
+  �130.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_33"></a><a href="#NtA_33">[33]</a> <i>D.F.</i> I. �6.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_34"></a><a href="#NtA_34">[34]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> I. 10
+  and 11.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_35"></a><a href="#NtA_35">[35]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. 1, �3.
+  <i>N.D.</i> I. �6.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_36"></a><a href="#NtA_36">[36]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> II.
+  2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_37"></a><a href="#NtA_37">[37]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> I. 20. Cf.
+  II. 1, �12.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_38"></a><a href="#NtA_38">[38]</a> II. 6.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_39"></a><a href="#NtA_39">[39]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> II. 7
+  and 16.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_40"></a><a href="#NtA_40">[40]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. 6,
+  �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_41"></a><a href="#NtA_41">[41]</a> Cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> IV.
+  11 with IV. 8 a.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_42"></a><a href="#NtA_42">[42]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IV.
+  10.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_43"></a><a href="#NtA_43">[43]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IV. 16,
+  �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_44"></a><a href="#NtA_44">[44]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IV. 16 c,
+  �10, ed. Nobbe.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_45"></a><a href="#NtA_45">[45]</a> <i>Ad Qu. Fr.</i> II.
+  14.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_46"></a><a href="#NtA_46">[46]</a> <i>Ad Qu. Fr.</i> III.
+  5 and 6.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_47"></a><a href="#NtA_47">[47]</a> �332.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_48"></a><a href="#NtA_48">[48]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> XIII. 1.
+  <i>Ad Att.</i> V. 11, �6.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_49"></a><a href="#NtA_49">[49]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> V. 10,
+  �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_50"></a><a href="#NtA_50">[50]</a> <i>De Off.</i> I.
+  �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_51"></a><a href="#NtA_51">[51]</a> <i>Tim.</i> c. 1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_52"></a><a href="#NtA_52">[52]</a> Cf. <i>Tim.</i> c. 1
+  with <i>De Div.</i> I. �5. <i>Brutus</i>, �250.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_53"></a><a href="#NtA_53">[53]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> VI. 1,
+  �26.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_54"></a><a href="#NtA_54">[54]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> VI. 2,
+  �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_55"></a><a href="#NtA_55">[55]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> VI. 6,
+  �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_56"></a><a href="#NtA_56">[56]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> VI. 7, �2.
+  <i>Ad Fam.</i> II. 17, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_57"></a><a href="#NtA_57">[57]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. �22.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_58"></a><a href="#NtA_58">[58]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> VII. 1,
+  �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_59"></a><a href="#NtA_59">[59]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> VII. 3,
+  VIII. 11.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_60"></a><a href="#NtA_60">[60]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> X. 8,
+  �6.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_61"></a><a href="#NtA_61">[61]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> VIII. 2,
+  �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_62"></a><a href="#NtA_62">[62]</a> <span lang="el"
+  title="peri homonoias" >&#x3C0;&#x3B5;&#x3C1;&#x3B9;
+  &#x201B;&#x3BF;&#x3BC;&#x3BF;&#x3BD;&#x3BF;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3C2;</span>,
+  <i>Ad Att.</i> IX. 9, �2, etc.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_63"></a><a href="#NtA_63">[63]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IX. 4, �2;
+  9, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_64"></a><a href="#NtA_64">[64]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IX. 10,
+  �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_65"></a><a href="#NtA_65">[65]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> IX.
+  1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_66"></a><a href="#NtA_66">[66]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IX. 3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_67"></a><a href="#NtA_67">[67]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IV. 3 and
+  4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_68"></a><a href="#NtA_68">[68]</a> <i>De Rep.</i> I. �7.
+  <i>T.D.</i> V. �5, etc.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_69"></a><a href="#NtA_69">[69]</a> Cf. <i>N.D.</i> I.
+  �6.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_70"></a><a href="#NtA_70">[70]</a> Esp. I. ��<a
+  href="#BkI_26">26</a>, <a href="#BkI_37">37</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_71"></a><a href="#NtA_71">[71]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_29">29</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_72"></a><a href="#NtA_72">[72]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_70">70</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_73"></a><a href="#NtA_73">[73]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II. �1.
+  <i>Ac.</i> I. �<a href="#BkI_45">45</a>, etc.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_74"></a><a href="#NtA_74">[74]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_75"></a><a href="#NtA_75">[75]</a> Cf. esp. <i>N.D.</i> I.
+  �5. <i>T.D.</i> II. �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_76"></a><a href="#NtA_76">[76]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II. �1.
+  <i>N.D.</i> I. �7, etc.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_77"></a><a href="#NtA_77">[77]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_78"></a><a href="#NtA_78">[78]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. �10.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_79"></a><a href="#NtA_79">[79]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_8">8</a>. <i>N.D.</i> I. ��10, 66.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_80"></a><a href="#NtA_80">[80]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. �9.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_81"></a><a href="#NtA_81">[81]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. �10.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_82"></a><a href="#NtA_82">[82]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> I. �17.
+  <i>Ac.</i> II. ��<a href="#BkII_120">120</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_137">137</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_83"></a><a href="#NtA_83">[83]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. �33.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_84"></a><a href="#NtA_84">[84]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_121">121</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_85"></a><a href="#NtA_85">[85]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. �82,
+  <i>libas ex omnibus</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_86"></a><a href="#NtA_86">[86]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_143">143</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_87"></a><a href="#NtA_87">[87]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. �11.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_88"></a><a href="#NtA_88">[88]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_10">10</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_89"></a><a href="#NtA_89">[89]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. �12.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_90"></a><a href="#NtA_90">[90]</a> <i>Parad.</i> �2. <i>De
+  Fato</i>, �3. <i>T.D.</i> I. �7. <i>De Off.</i> I. �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_91"></a><a href="#NtA_91">[91]</a> <i>D.F.</i> IV. �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_92"></a><a href="#NtA_92">[92]</a> <i>Paradoxa</i>,
+  �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_93"></a><a href="#NtA_93">[93]</a> <i>T.D.</i> I. �55.
+  <i>De Div.</i> II. �62.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_94"></a><a href="#NtA_94">[94]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. �11.
+  <i>D.F.</i> II. ��1 and 2, etc.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_95"></a><a href="#NtA_95">[95]</a> �<a
+  href="#BkI_13">13</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_96"></a><a href="#NtA_96">[96]</a> Cf. esp. <i>N.D.</i> i.
+  �6. <i>Ac.</i> ii. ��<a href="#BkII_11">11</a> and <a
+  href="#BkII_17">17</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_97"></a><a href="#NtA_97">[97]</a> <i>De Leg.</i> I.
+  �39.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_98"></a><a href="#NtA_98">[98]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> I. ��55,
+  56.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_99"></a><a href="#NtA_99">[99]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_100"></a><a href="#NtA_100">[100]</a> <i>T.D.</i> IV.
+  �53.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_101"></a><a href="#NtA_101">[101]</a> Cf. <i>De Off.</i>
+  III. �20.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_102"></a><a href="#NtA_102">[102]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V.
+  ��21-31, esp. �23.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_103"></a><a href="#NtA_103">[103]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> V.
+  �75.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_104"></a><a href="#NtA_104">[104]</a> <i>De Off.</i> II.
+  �35.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_105"></a><a href="#NtA_105">[105]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V.
+  �34.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_106"></a><a href="#NtA_106">[106]</a> <i>Ac.</i> I. �<a
+  href="#BkI_16">16</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_107"></a><a href="#NtA_107">[107]</a> <i>Paradoxa</i>, �4.
+  <i>Ac.</i> II. ��<a href="#BkII_136">136</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_137">137</a>. <i>T.D.</i> III. �10.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_108"></a><a href="#NtA_108">[108]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_135">135</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_109"></a><a href="#NtA_109">[109]</a> See esp. <i>N.D.</i>
+  I. ��3, 4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_110"></a><a href="#NtA_110">[110]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, also
+  <i>T.D.</i> V. �83.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_111"></a><a href="#NtA_111">[111]</a> Grote's
+  <i>Aristotle</i>, vol. I. ch. 11.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_112"></a><a href="#NtA_112">[112]</a> <i>T.D.</i> IV. �9.
+  <i>D.F.</i> III. �41.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_113"></a><a href="#NtA_113">[113]</a> I. �<a
+  href="#BkI_6">6</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_114"></a><a href="#NtA_114">[114]</a> <i>T.D.</i> IV.
+  �7.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_115"></a><a href="#NtA_115">[115]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IV. �7.
+  Cf. <i>D.F.</i> II. �44, <i>populus cum illis facit</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_116"></a><a href="#NtA_116">[116]</a> <i>Ac.</i> I. �<a
+  href="#BkI_6">6</a>. <i>T.D.</i> IV. 6, 7; II. �7; III. �33. <i>D.F.</i>
+  III. �40.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_117"></a><a href="#NtA_117">[117]</a> <i>T.D.</i> IV.
+  �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_118"></a><a href="#NtA_118">[118]</a> <i>D.F.</i> I.
+  ��4-6. <i>Ac.</i> I. �<a href="#BkI_10">10</a>. <i>D.F.</i> III. �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_119"></a><a href="#NtA_119">[119]</a> <i>De Div.</i> I.
+  ��4, 5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_120"></a><a href="#NtA_120">[120]</a> <i>D.F.</i> III. �5.
+  <i>N.D.</i> I. �8. <i>T.D.</i> III. ��10, 16.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_121"></a><a href="#NtA_121">[121]</a> <i>T.D.</i> I.
+  �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_122"></a><a href="#NtA_122">[122]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II.
+  �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_123"></a><a href="#NtA_123">[123]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II.
+  �1. <i>De Off.</i> II. �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_124"></a><a href="#NtA_124">[124]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II.
+  �6. <i>De Off.</i> II. �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_125"></a><a href="#NtA_125">[125]</a> See esp. <i>De
+  Consolatione</i>, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe. <i>T.D.</i> V. �5. <i>Ac.</i> I.
+  �<a href="#BkI_11">11</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_126"></a><a href="#NtA_126">[126]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I.
+  �6.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_127"></a><a href="#NtA_127">[127]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. ��1,
+  4. <i>De Off.</i> II. �3. <i>D.F.</i> I. �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_128"></a><a href="#NtA_128">[128]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. �1.
+  <i>D.F.</i> I. ��1, 3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_129"></a><a href="#NtA_129">[129]</a> <i>D.F.</i> I. ��1,
+  11.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_130"></a><a href="#NtA_130">[130]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II.
+  �5. <i>De Off.</i> II. �2. <i>T.D.</i> IV. �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_131"></a><a href="#NtA_131">[131]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II.
+  �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_132"></a><a href="#NtA_132">[132]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. �9.
+  <i>T.D.</i> II. �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_133"></a><a href="#NtA_133">[133]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II.
+  �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_134"></a><a href="#NtA_134">[134]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XII.
+  19, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_135"></a><a href="#NtA_135">[135]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII.
+  14, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_136"></a><a href="#NtA_136">[136]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII.
+  15, 16.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_137"></a><a href="#NtA_137">[137]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII.
+  21, �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_138"></a><a href="#NtA_138">[138]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII.
+  23, �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_139"></a><a href="#NtA_139">[139]</a> <i>Ut scias me ita
+  dolere ut non iaceam.</i></p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_140"></a><a href="#NtA_140">[140]</a> <i>De Or.</i> III.
+  �109.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_141"></a><a href="#NtA_141">[141]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XII.
+  28, �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_142"></a><a href="#NtA_142">[142]</a> Cf. esp. <i>Ad
+  Att.</i> XII. 40, �2 with 38, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_143"></a><a href="#NtA_143">[143]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII.
+  40, �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_144"></a><a href="#NtA_144">[144]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII.
+  40, �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_145"></a><a href="#NtA_145">[145]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  26.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_146"></a><a href="#NtA_146">[146]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII.
+  41, �1, also 42, 43; XIII. 26.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_147"></a><a href="#NtA_147">[147]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII.
+  46.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_148"></a><a href="#NtA_148">[148]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XII.
+  45, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_149"></a><a href="#NtA_149">[149]</a> <i>�ber Cicero's
+  Akademika</i>, p. 4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_150"></a><a href="#NtA_150">[150]</a> Cf. <i>Ad Att.</i>
+  XII. 12, �2, where there is a distinct mention of the first two
+  books.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_151"></a><a href="#NtA_151">[151]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  12, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_152"></a><a href="#NtA_152">[152]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  19, �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_153"></a><a href="#NtA_153">[153]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  21, ��4, 5; 22, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_154"></a><a href="#NtA_154">[154]</a> II. �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_155"></a><a href="#NtA_155">[155]</a> <i>De Fin.</i>
+  Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_156"></a><a href="#NtA_156">[156]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  12, �3; 16, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_157"></a><a href="#NtA_157">[157]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XVI. 3,
+  �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_158"></a><a href="#NtA_158">[158]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XVI. 6,
+  �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_159"></a><a href="#NtA_159">[159]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_61">61</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_160"></a><a href="#NtA_160">[160]</a> <i>D.F.</i> I.
+  �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_161"></a><a href="#NtA_161">[161]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. �4.
+  <i>De Div.</i> II. �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_162"></a><a href="#NtA_162">[162]</a> Cf. Krische, p.
+  5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_163"></a><a href="#NtA_163">[163]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_61">61</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_164"></a><a href="#NtA_164">[164]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  5, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_165"></a><a href="#NtA_165">[165]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  32, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_166"></a><a href="#NtA_166">[166]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  33, �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_167"></a><a href="#NtA_167">[167]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII.
+  II. �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_168"></a><a href="#NtA_168">[168]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XII.
+  42.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_169"></a><a href="#NtA_169">[169]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII.
+  16, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_170"></a><a href="#NtA_170">[170]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII.
+  12, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_171"></a><a href="#NtA_171">[171]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. IV.
+  16a, �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_172"></a><a href="#NtA_172">[172]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII.
+  12, �3; also IV. 16a, �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_173"></a><a href="#NtA_173">[173]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  12, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_174"></a><a href="#NtA_174">[174]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII.
+  19, �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_175"></a><a href="#NtA_175">[175]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII.
+  12, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_176"></a><a href="#NtA_176">[176]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII.
+  19, �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_177"></a><a href="#NtA_177">[177]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII.
+  12, �3; 19, �4; 16, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_178"></a><a href="#NtA_178">[178]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII.
+  19, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_179"></a><a href="#NtA_179">[179]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  22, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_180"></a><a href="#NtA_180">[180]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  19, �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_181"></a><a href="#NtA_181">[181]</a> Cf. <i>Ibid.</i>
+  XIII. 14, �3; 16, �2; 18; 19, �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_182"></a><a href="#NtA_182">[182]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  19, �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_183"></a><a href="#NtA_183">[183]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  25, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_184"></a><a href="#NtA_184">[184]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  24.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_185"></a><a href="#NtA_185">[185]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  13, �1; 18.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_186"></a><a href="#NtA_186">[186]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  13, �1; 18; 19, �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_187"></a><a href="#NtA_187">[187]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  12, �3. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates Sch�tz assigns to
+  these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition of the
+  <i>Academica</i> in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_188"></a><a href="#NtA_188">[188]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  13, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_189"></a><a href="#NtA_189">[189]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  19, �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_190"></a><a href="#NtA_190">[190]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  19, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_191"></a><a href="#NtA_191">[191]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  25, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_192"></a><a href="#NtA_192">[192]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  25, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_193"></a><a href="#NtA_193">[193]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  21, �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_194"></a><a href="#NtA_194">[194]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  21, �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_195"></a><a href="#NtA_195">[195]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  22, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_196"></a><a href="#NtA_196">[196]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  24.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_197"></a><a href="#NtA_197">[197]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  35, 36, �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_198"></a><a href="#NtA_198">[198]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  38, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_199"></a><a href="#NtA_199">[199]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII.
+  21, ��3, 4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_200"></a><a href="#NtA_200">[200]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. �4.
+  Cf. Quintil. <i>Inst. Or.</i> III. 6, �64.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_201"></a><a href="#NtA_201">[201]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XVI.
+  6, �4. <i>N.D.</i> I. �11. <i>De Div.</i> II. �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_202"></a><a href="#NtA_202">[202]</a> <i>De Off.</i> II.
+  �8, <i>Tim�us</i>, c. 1. <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. 13, �1; 19, �5.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_203"></a><a href="#NtA_203">[203]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  12; 16; 13; 19.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_204"></a><a href="#NtA_204">[204]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XVI. 6,
+  �4. <i>T.D.</i> II. �4. <i>N.D.</i> I. �11. <i>De Div.</i> II. �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_205"></a><a href="#NtA_205">[205]</a> <i>Nat. Hist.</i>
+  XXXI. c. 2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_206"></a><a href="#NtA_206">[206]</a> <i>Inst. Or.</i>
+  III. 6, �64.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_207"></a><a href="#NtA_207">[207]</a> Plut.
+  <i>Lucullus</i>, c. 42.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_208"></a><a href="#NtA_208">[208]</a> ��<a
+  href="#BkII_12">12</a>, <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_148">148</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_209"></a><a href="#NtA_209">[209]</a> Cf. <i>Att.</i>
+  XIII. 19, �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_210"></a><a href="#NtA_210">[210]</a> <i>Lucullus</i>,
+  �12.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_211"></a><a href="#NtA_211">[211]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII.
+  16, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_212"></a><a href="#NtA_212">[212]</a> Lactant.
+  <i>Inst.</i> VI 2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_213"></a><a href="#NtA_213">[213]</a> Cf. esp. <i>De
+  Off.</i> I. �133 with <i>Brutus</i>, ��133, 134.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_214"></a><a href="#NtA_214">[214]</a> Esp. <i>Pro Lege
+  Manilia</i>, �51.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_215"></a><a href="#NtA_215">[215]</a> <i>Brutus</i>,
+  �222.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_216"></a><a href="#NtA_216">[216]</a> <i>In Verrem</i>,
+  II. 3, �210.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_217"></a><a href="#NtA_217">[217]</a> <i>Pro Lege
+  Manilia</i>, �59.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_218"></a><a href="#NtA_218">[218]</a> <i>Pro Sestio</i>,
+  �122.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_219"></a><a href="#NtA_219">[219]</a> <i>Pro Sestio</i>,
+  �101.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_220"></a><a href="#NtA_220">[220]</a> <i>Philipp.</i> II.
+  �12.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_221"></a><a href="#NtA_221">[221]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> II.
+  24, �4.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_222"></a><a href="#NtA_222">[222]</a> <i>Pis.</i> �6.
+  <i>Pro Sestio</i>, �121. <i>Pro Domo</i>, �113. <i>Post Reditum in
+  Senatu</i>, �9. <i>Philipp.</i> II. �12.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_223"></a><a href="#NtA_223">[223]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> IX.
+  15, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_224"></a><a href="#NtA_224">[224]</a> Cf. <i>Post Reditum
+  in Senatu</i>, �9. <i>Pro Domo</i>, �113.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_225"></a><a href="#NtA_225">[225]</a> <i>Pro Archia</i>,
+  ��6, 28.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_226"></a><a href="#NtA_226">[226]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II.
+  �<a href="#BkII_9">9</a> with �<a href="#BkII_80">80</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_227"></a><a href="#NtA_227">[227]</a> �<a
+  href="#BkII_62">62</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_228"></a><a href="#NtA_228">[228]</a> <i>Pro Plancio</i>,
+  �12. <i>Pro Murena</i>, �36. <i>Pro Rabirio</i>, �26. <i>Pro Cornelia</i>
+  II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_229"></a><a href="#NtA_229">[229]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. �56.
+  Cf. <i>De Or.</i> III. �9. <i>N.D.</i> III. �80.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_230"></a><a href="#NtA_230">[230]</a> Cf. esp. III.
+  �173.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_231"></a><a href="#NtA_231">[231]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II.
+  �28.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_232"></a><a href="#NtA_232">[232]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II.
+  ��13, 20, 21.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_233"></a><a href="#NtA_233">[233]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II.
+  �51.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_234"></a><a href="#NtA_234">[234]</a> Cf. <i>ibid.</i> II.
+  �74 with III. �127.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_235"></a><a href="#NtA_235">[235]</a> Cf. II. �152 with
+  III. �187.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_236"></a><a href="#NtA_236">[236]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II.
+  �154.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_237"></a><a href="#NtA_237">[237]</a> <i>Brutus</i>,
+  ��132, 133, 134, 259. <i>De Or.</i> III. �29.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_238"></a><a href="#NtA_238">[238]</a> <i>Brutus</i>,
+  �132.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_239"></a><a href="#NtA_239">[239]</a> <i>De Or.</i> II.
+  �244. <i>N.D.</i> I. �79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_240"></a><a href="#NtA_240">[240]</a> <i>De Or.</i> II.
+  �155.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_241"></a><a href="#NtA_241">[241]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> III.
+  �194.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_242"></a><a href="#NtA_242">[242]</a> Cf. <i>De Or.</i>
+  II. �68 with III. ��182, 187.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_243"></a><a href="#NtA_243">[243]</a> <i>De Or.</i> I. �82
+  sq.; II. �360.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_244"></a><a href="#NtA_244">[244]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> I. �45;
+  II. �365; III. ��68, 75.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_245"></a><a href="#NtA_245">[245]</a> �<a
+  href="#BkII_12">12</a>, <i>commemoravit a patre suo dicta
+  Philoni</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_246"></a><a href="#NtA_246">[246]</a> Cf. <i>De Or.</i>
+  III. �110.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_247"></a><a href="#NtA_247">[247]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_148">148</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_248"></a><a href="#NtA_248">[248]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II.
+  �<a href="#BkII_11">11</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_249"></a><a href="#NtA_249">[249]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_250"></a><a href="#NtA_250">[250]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> ��<a
+  href="#BkII_12">12</a>, <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>, with my notes.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_251"></a><a href="#NtA_251">[251]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_12">12</a>: <i>ista quae heri defensa sunt</i> compared with
+  the words <i>ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_252"></a><a href="#NtA_252">[252]</a> See below.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_253"></a><a href="#NtA_253">[253]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. ��<a
+  href="#BkII_33">33</a>&mdash;<a href="#BkII_36">36</a> inclusive; �<a
+  href="#BkII_54">54</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_254"></a><a href="#NtA_254">[254]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_28">28</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_255"></a><a href="#NtA_255">[255]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II.
+  ��<a href="#BkII_59">59</a>, <a href="#BkII_67">67</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_78">78</a>, <a href="#BkII_112">112</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_148">148</a>, with my notes.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_256"></a><a href="#NtA_256">[256]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_10">10</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_257"></a><a href="#NtA_257">[257]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_28">28</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_258"></a><a href="#NtA_258">[258]</a> Cf. II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_61">61</a> with the fragments of the <i>Hortensius</i>; also
+  <i>T.D.</i> II. �4; III. �6; <i>D.F.</i> I. �2.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_259"></a><a href="#NtA_259">[259]</a> Lactant. III.
+  16.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_260"></a><a href="#NtA_260">[260]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II.
+  �<a href="#BkII_10">10</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_261"></a><a href="#NtA_261">[261]</a> <i>Ib.</i> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_61">61</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_262"></a><a href="#NtA_262">[262]</a> ��<a
+  href="#BkI_44">44</a>&mdash;<a href="#BkI_46">46</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_263"></a><a href="#NtA_263">[263]</a> �<a
+  href="#BkII_13">13</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_264"></a><a href="#NtA_264">[264]</a> Cf. II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_14">14</a> with I. �<a href="#BkI_44">44</a>, and II. ��<a
+  href="#BkII_55">55</a>, <a href="#BkII_56">56</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_265"></a><a href="#NtA_265">[265]</a> II. ��<a
+  href="#BkII_17">17</a>, <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_22">22</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_266"></a><a href="#NtA_266">[266]</a> Cf. II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_31">31</a> with I. �<a href="#BkI_45">45</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_267"></a><a href="#NtA_267">[267]</a> II. ��<a
+  href="#BkII_17">17</a>, <a href="#BkII_24">24</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_26">26</a>, <a href="#BkII_27">27</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_29">29</a>, <a href="#BkII_38">38</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_54">54</a>, <a href="#BkII_59">59</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_268"></a><a href="#NtA_268">[268]</a> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_79">79</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_269"></a><a href="#NtA_269">[269]</a> Cf. the words <i>tam
+  multa</i> in II. �<a href="#BkII_79">79</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_270"></a><a href="#NtA_270">[270]</a> See II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_42">42</a>, where there is a reference to the "<i>hesternus
+  sermo</i>."</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_271"></a><a href="#NtA_271">[271]</a> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_10">10</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_272"></a><a href="#NtA_272">[272]</a> Cf. II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_10">10</a>: <i>id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut
+  tota fere quaestio tractata videatur</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_273"></a><a href="#NtA_273">[273]</a> What these were will
+  appear from my notes on the <i>Lucullus</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_274"></a><a href="#NtA_274">[274]</a> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_12">12</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_275"></a><a href="#NtA_275">[275]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> IX.
+  8.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_276"></a><a href="#NtA_276">[276]</a> Cf. <i>Ad Att.</i>
+  XIII. 25, �3: <i>Ad Brutum transeamus</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_277"></a><a href="#NtA_277">[277]</a> This is not, as
+  Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy after Hortensius' death.
+  That lay at Puteoli: see <i>Ad Att.</i> VII. 3, �9.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_278"></a><a href="#NtA_278">[278]</a> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_9">9</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_279"></a><a href="#NtA_279">[279]</a> Cf. II. �6<a
+  href="#BkII_1">1</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_280"></a><a href="#NtA_280">[280]</a> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_80">80</a>: <i>O praeclarum prospectum</i>!</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_281"></a><a href="#NtA_281">[281]</a> Cf. II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_9">9</a> with �<a href="#BkII_128">128</a> (<i>signum
+  illud</i>), also ��<a href="#BkII_80">80</a>, <a href="#BkII_81">81</a>,
+  <a href="#BkII_100">100</a>, <a href="#BkII_105">105</a>, <a
+  href="#BkII_125">125</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_282"></a><a href="#NtA_282">[282]</a> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_115">115</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_283"></a><a href="#NtA_283">[283]</a> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_63">63</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_284"></a><a href="#NtA_284">[284]</a> II. ��<a
+  href="#BkII_147">147</a>, <a href="#BkII_148">148</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_285"></a><a href="#NtA_285">[285]</a> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_135">135</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_286"></a><a href="#NtA_286">[286]</a> Cf. II. ��<a
+  href="#BkII_11">11</a>, 12 with the words <i>quae erant contra</i> <span
+  lang="el" title="akatal�psian"
+  >&#x3B1;&#x3BA;&#x3B1;&#x3C4;&#x3B1;&#x3BB;&#x3B7;&#x3C8;&#x3B9;&#x3B1;&#x3BD;</span>
+  <i>praeclare collecta ab Antiocho</i>: <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. 19, �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_287"></a><a href="#NtA_287">[287]</a> Varro, <i>De Re
+  Rust.</i> III. 17.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_288"></a><a href="#NtA_288">[288]</a> II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_11">11</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_289"></a><a href="#NtA_289">[289]</a> <i>Paradoxa</i>, �1.
+  <i>D.F.</i> III. �8. <i>Brutus</i>, �119.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_290"></a><a href="#NtA_290">[290]</a> <i>Ac.</i> I. �<a
+  href="#BkI_12">12</a>. <i>D.F.</i> V. �8.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_291"></a><a href="#NtA_291">[291]</a> Cf. II. �<a
+  href="#BkII_80">80</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_292"></a><a href="#NtA_292">[292]</a> Cf. Aug. <i>Adv.
+  Acad.</i> III. �35. Nonius, sub v. <i>exultare</i>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_293"></a><a href="#NtA_293">[293]</a> Cf. the word
+  <i>nuper</i> in �<a href="#BkI_1">1</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_294"></a><a href="#NtA_294">[294]</a> �<a
+  href="#BkI_11">11</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_295"></a><a href="#NtA_295">[295]</a> ��<a
+  href="#BkI_3">3</a>, <a href="#BkI_18">18</a>.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_296"></a><a href="#NtA_296">[296]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> IX.
+  8, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_297"></a><a href="#NtA_297">[297]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> II.
+  25, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_298"></a><a href="#NtA_298">[298]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. III. 8,
+  �3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_299"></a><a href="#NtA_299">[299]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. III.
+  15, �3; 18, �1.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_300"></a><a href="#NtA_300">[300]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> IX.
+  1&mdash;8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro preserved in
+  our collections.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_301"></a><a href="#NtA_301">[301]</a> Above, pp.
+  xxxvii&mdash;xlii.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_302"></a><a href="#NtA_302">[302]</a> <i>De Civ. Dei</i>,
+  XIX. cc. 1&mdash;3.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_303"></a><a href="#NtA_303">[303]</a> See Madvig, <i>De
+  Fin.</i> ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50. Br�ckner, <i>Leben des
+  Cicero</i>, I. p. 655, follows M�ller.</p>
+
+  <p><a name="Nt_304"></a><a href="#NtA_304">[304]</a> Cf. Krische, p.
+  58.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
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+</pre>
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+</body>
+</html>
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Academica, by Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Academica
+
+Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+Release Date: February 8, 2005 [EBook #14970]
+
+Language: Latin with English and Greek (ancient)
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team
+
+
+
+
+
+THE
+
+ACADEMICA OF CICERO.
+
+_THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED_
+
+BY
+
+JAMES S. REID,
+
+M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)
+ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
+ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.
+
+LONDON:
+MACMILLAN AND CO.
+1874
+
+[_All Rights reserved_.]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+TO
+THOSE OF HIS PUPILS
+WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM
+_THE ACADEMICA_,
+THIS EDITION
+IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED
+BY
+THE EDITOR.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+PREFACE.
+
+Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has edited
+the _Academica_. In Germany the last edition with explanatory notes is that
+of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and untrustworthiness of
+Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong evidence; while the work of
+Davies, though in every way far superior to that of Goerenz, is very
+deficient when judged by the criticism of the present time.
+
+This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures given by
+me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work in its
+present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the Universities,
+and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where the
+philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those where an
+attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient Philosophy as
+will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now required in the final
+Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford and Cambridge. My notes
+have been written throughout with a practical reference to the needs of
+junior students. During the last three or four years I have read the
+_Academica_ with a large number of intelligent pupils, and there is
+scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested by some difficulty or
+want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody in an Introduction such
+information concerning Cicero's philosophical views and the literary
+history of the _Academica_ as could not be readily got from existing books;
+next, to provide a good text; then to aid the student in obtaining a higher
+knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity, and lastly, to put it in his power to
+learn thoroughly the philosophy with which Cicero deals.
+
+My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in the
+edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the
+editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second edition
+of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that editor. I
+have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass without carefully
+weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also studied all original
+criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain access. The result is a
+text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than that of Halm. My
+obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently acknowledged in my
+notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled _Emendationes ad
+Ciceronis libros Philosophicos_, published in 1825 at Copenhagen, but
+never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in the edition of
+Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few passages I have
+introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the conjecttires of
+other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the MSS. If any
+apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the notes, questions
+of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from a conviction that
+the very excellence of the texts now in use is depriving a Classical
+training of a great deal of its old educational value. The judgment was
+better cultivated when the student had to fight his way through bad texts
+to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the Latin tongue. The
+acceptance of results without a knowledge of the processes by which they
+are obtained is worthless for the purposes of education, which is thus made
+to rest on memory alone. I have therefore done my best to place before the
+reader the arguments for and against different readings in the most
+important places where the text is doubtful.
+
+My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the students
+for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller acquaintance than they
+ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties of language which the
+best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide them to the best
+teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding editor of Cicero
+must build. His edition of the _De Finibus_ contains more valuable material
+for illustrating, not merely the language, but also the subject-matter of
+the _Academica_, than all the professed editions of the latter work in
+existence. Yet, even after Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be
+done in pointing out what is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have
+therefore added very many references from my own reading, and from other
+sources. Wherever a quotation would not have been given but for its
+appearance in some other work, I have pointed out the authority from whom
+it was taken. I need hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to
+look out all the references given. It was necessary to provide material by
+means of which the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if
+it were new to him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that
+occurred. Want of space has compelled me often to substitute a mere
+reference for an actual quotation.
+
+As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not
+touched upon somewhere in the _Academica_, it is evidently impossible for
+an editor to give information which would be complete for a reader who is
+studying that subject for the first time. I have therefore tried to enable
+readers to find easily for themselves the information they require, and
+have only dwelt in my own language upon such philosophical difficulties as
+were in some special way bound up with the _Academica_. The two books
+chiefly referred to in my notes are the English translation of Zeller's
+_Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics_ (whenever Zeller is quoted without any
+further description this book is meant), and the _Historia Philosophiae_ of
+Ritter and Preller. The _pages_, not the _sections_, of the fourth edition
+of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's _De Finibus_, all
+teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a
+philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have
+constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all
+of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.
+
+Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is
+hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as bringing
+together much scattered information illustrative of the _Academica_, which
+was before difficult of access. The present work will, I hope, prepare the
+way for an exhaustive edition either from my own or some more competent
+hand. It must be regarded as an experiment, for no English scholar of
+recent times has treated any portion of Cicero's philosophical works with
+quite the purpose which I have kept in view and have explained above.
+Should this attempt meet with favour, I propose to edit after the same plan
+some others of the less known and less edited portions of Cicero's
+writings.
+
+In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited I
+cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to
+repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than
+to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a
+great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that intellectual
+disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this University,
+and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of English
+scholarship as compared with that of Germany,
+
+I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and
+omissions from any who are interested in the subject.
+
+JAMES S. REID.
+
+CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, _December, 1873._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.
+
+Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica
+Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De
+Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. =
+Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus;
+Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = De
+Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. =
+Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; Ad
+Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., Verr. =
+In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; In Cat. =
+In Catilinam.
+
+Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia Socratis;
+Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.
+
+Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna
+Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De
+Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. =
+Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.
+
+Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. Rep. =
+De Stoicis Repugnantiis.
+
+Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. =
+Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = Pyrrhoneon
+Hypotyposeon Syntagmata.
+
+Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.
+
+Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.
+
+Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et Platonis.
+
+Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.
+
+Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos; De
+Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.
+
+Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.
+
+Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad Helvidium.
+
+Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.
+
+Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. =
+Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv. =
+Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.
+
+Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. =
+Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or
+Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.
+
+Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.
+
+Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundzuege der Griechischen Etymologie.
+
+Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.
+
+Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.
+
+Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. =
+conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. =
+emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. =
+especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. =
+Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, or
+omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. =
+subjunctive.
+
+R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium locis
+contexta.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+I. _Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of
+Letters:_ 90--45 B.C.
+
+It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his
+father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and spent
+the greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived
+that strong love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son
+throughout his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young
+Cicero to feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a
+corrective for the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2]
+
+Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the
+Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of Athens,
+whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he had assumed
+the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at once to the
+tenets of the master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life a friend
+of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable disposition
+and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, the exception
+of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any literary power.[4]
+Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius
+Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus.
+It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend
+became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the
+Epicurean school.[5]
+
+At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of
+Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively,
+the art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important to the
+orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the monopoly of
+the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days with Diodotus in
+the severest study, but he seems never to have been much attracted by the
+general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between the two lasted till
+the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion set by the Roman Stoic
+circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became an inmate of Cicero's
+house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil heir to a not
+inconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most
+accomplished men of his time, and Cicero's feelings towards him were those
+of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8]
+
+In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the
+Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled
+from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. Philo,
+like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic philosopher,
+he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice of oratory.
+Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for Epicureanism was
+swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, as he tells us, to
+the brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he
+abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the
+conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever,
+and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10]
+
+We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been brought
+into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent
+philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and
+important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become
+thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of each.
+His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his egotism has
+been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. In his later
+works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to philosophy.[11] It would
+be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection which subsisted
+between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; but there
+can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then Rhodian
+ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning the
+ethical part of Greek philosophy.
+
+During the years 88--81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly with the
+study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many ambitious
+works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him at this
+period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the Marian
+party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular course, and
+Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one philosophic orator of
+Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he was busily engaged,
+and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern Hellas. It is usually
+supposed that he came into collision with Sulla through the freedman
+Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of Roscius. The silence of
+Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which rests on no better evidence
+than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even when mentioning his speech in
+defence of Roscius, never assigns any other cause for his departure than
+his health, which was being undermined by his passionate style of
+oratory[13].
+
+The whole two years 79--77 B.C. were spent in the society of Greek
+philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at Athens, and
+were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the exception of
+Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent rhetorical teachers at that time
+resident in the city[14]. By the advice of Philo himself[15], Cicero
+attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as Diogenes calls
+him[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the Epicurean school. In Cicero's
+later works there are several references to his teaching. He was biting and
+sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in spirit, hence in striking contrast to
+Patro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to find that Zeno is numbered by
+Cicero among those pupils and admirers of Carneades whom he had known[18].
+Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along with Atticus who loved him beyond all
+other philosophers[19], Cicero spent much time in listening to his
+instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the two pupils[20]. Patro was
+probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere explicitly stated.
+Cicero must at this time have attained an almost complete familiarity with
+the Epicurean doctrines.
+
+There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school then
+at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures
+Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed Peripatetic,
+was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three notable
+Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of Naples, who
+lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is
+probable, however, from a mention of him in the De Oratore, that Cicero
+knew himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently
+named by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time
+unknown to him.
+
+The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at this
+period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a Stoicised
+Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to treat later,
+when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised over our
+author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point which was in
+controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still continued to think
+with his earlier teacher. His later works, however, make it evident that he
+set a high value on the abilities and the learning of Antiochus, especially
+in dialectic, which was taught after Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him
+as eminent among the philosophers of the time, both for talent and
+acquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a
+pointed style[25]; in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the
+philosophers of the age[26]. A considerable friendship sprang up between
+Antiochus and Cicero[27], which was strengthened by the fact that many
+friends of the latter, such as Piso, Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or
+less adhered to the views of Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at
+this time became acquainted with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in
+the Academica[28] he is mentioned in such a way as to show that he was
+unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.
+
+The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had been to learn philosophy; in
+Asia and at Rhodes he devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the
+guidance of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was his old
+friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian school[29]. Cicero, however,
+formed while at Rhodes one friendship which largely influenced his views of
+philosophy, that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, the most famous
+Stoic of the age. To him Cicero makes reference in his works oftener than
+to any other instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the
+Stoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom Pompey, in the
+midst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble[31]; as a
+minute inquirer[32]. He is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression
+of affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works more than those of
+any other author[33]. Posidonius was at a later time resident at Rome, and
+stayed in Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of Panaetius,
+may have been at Rhodes at this time. Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers
+of Panaetius, belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was well
+acquainted with the works of the former, he does not seem to have known
+either personally.
+
+From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters begins,
+Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political affairs to
+spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed much to
+philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; and we know from his
+letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style by much study
+of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. During the period
+then, about which we have little or no information, we may believe that he
+kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many Roman friends who had a
+bent towards philosophy, as well as with the Greeks who from time to time
+came to Rome and frequented the houses of the Optimates; to this he added
+such reading as his leisure would allow. The letters contained in the first
+book of those addressed to Atticus, which range over the years 68--62 B.C.,
+afford many proofs of the abiding strength of his passion for literary
+employment. In the earlier part of this time we find him entreating Atticus
+to let him have a library which was then for sale; expressing at the same
+time in the strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his
+love for books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the
+midst of his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest
+for the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan
+villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be
+taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all
+things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory
+held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed
+his intellect, but never his heart.
+
+The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to indulge his
+literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his speeches, which
+were crowded, he says, with the maxims of philosophy[35]; the history of
+his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he sent to
+Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the poem on his
+consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two later we find him
+reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and keeping up his
+acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of leisure
+seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at this
+time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he
+presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes
+to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the
+endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even
+slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find
+greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37]."
+At this period of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates
+near Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater
+emphasis on these facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero
+was a mere dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore
+paraphrases of Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for
+every kind of literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each
+department considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his
+age, with the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38]
+will give a fair picture of his life at this time. He especially studied
+the political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and
+Dicaearchus[39]. He also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of
+Theopompus[40].
+
+The years from 59--57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private cares
+overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return from
+exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring literature" with
+a marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that
+nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the
+year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla, the
+son of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us, his solace
+and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which Atticus had,
+beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of office. Towards the
+end of the year, he was busily engaged on the _De Oratore_, a work which
+clearly proves his continued familiarity with Greek philosophy[43]. In the
+following year (54) he writes that politics must cease for him, and that he
+therefore returns unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature,
+that of the student[44]. During this year he was again for the most part at
+those of his country villas where his best collections of books were. At
+this time was written the _De Republica_, a work to which I may appeal for
+evidence that his old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to
+drop[45]. Aristotle is especially mentioned as one of the authors read at
+this time[46]. In the year 52 B.C. came the _De Legibus_, written amid many
+distracting occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older
+philosophers of the Socratic schools.
+
+In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, much
+to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the house of
+Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His acquaintance
+with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the affectionate
+mention in the _Brutus_[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of Xeno, an
+Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. It was at
+this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil of the great
+Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in which Epicurus had
+lived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat disappointed with the state
+of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the only man of merit then resident
+there[49]. On the journey from Athens to his province, he made the
+acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at Athens as head of the
+Peripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at Mitylene, where
+Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the
+greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and
+indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52].
+
+The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's
+thoughts till the end of 50. Yet he yearned for Athens and philosophy. He
+wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful city, and
+anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build a [Greek:
+propylon] at the Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at
+Eleusis[53]. It seems the Athenians of the time were in the habit of
+adapting their ancient statues to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of
+placing on them fulsome inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with
+loathing. In one letter of this date he carefully discusses the errors
+Atticus had pointed out in the books _De Republica_[54]. His wishes with
+regard to Athens still kept their hold upon his mind, and on his way home
+from Cilicia he spoke of conferring on the city some signal favour[55].
+Cicero was anxious to show Rhodes, with its school of eloquence, to the two
+boys Marcus and Quintus, who accompanied him, and they probably touched
+there for a few days[56]. From thence they went to Athens, where Cicero
+again stayed with Aristus[57], and renewed his friendship with other
+philosophers, among them Xeno the friend of Atticus[58].
+
+On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical
+condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The letters
+which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times contrasts
+the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn in the _De
+Republica_[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's description of the tyrant
+is present to his mind[60]; when, he deliberates about the course he is
+himself to take, he naturally recals the example of Socrates, who refused
+to leave Athens amid the misrule of the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious
+to find Cicero, in the very midst of civil war, poring over the book of
+Demetrius the Magnesian concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in
+arguing with himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about
+tyranny[63]. Nothing could more clearly show that he was really a man of
+books; by nothing but accident a politician. In these evil days, however,
+nothing was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn
+became unpleasant[64].
+
+As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he
+returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter
+written to Varro in that year[65], he says "I assure you I had no sooner
+returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books."
+These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit
+than in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this
+time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to
+Sulpicius[67]. The _Partitiones Oratoriae_, the _Paradoxa_, the _Orator_,
+and the _Laudatio Catonis_, to which Caesar replied by his _Anticato_, were
+all finished within the year. Before the end of the year the _Hortensius_
+and the _De Finibus_ had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in
+the following year the _Academica_, the history of which I shall trace
+elsewhere, was written.
+
+I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as
+the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his
+life which preceded the writing of the _Academica_. Even the evidence I
+have produced, which does not include such indirect indications of
+philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical
+works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he
+been divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge made
+by some people on the publication of his first book of the later
+period--the _Hortensius_--that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the
+assertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts
+throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life[69]. Did the scope of
+this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in showing from a
+minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with ancient
+authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as accurate
+as it was extensive. So far as the _Academica_ is concerned, I have had in
+my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's substantial accuracy; of the
+success of the defence I must leave the reader to judge. During the
+progress of this work I shall have to expose the groundlessness of many
+feelings and judgments now current which have contributed to produce a low
+estimate of Cicero's philosophical attainments, but there is one piece of
+unfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the
+present. It is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the
+shortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise
+his political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate
+his achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too
+closely into their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance
+the illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the _De Legibus_ as "an oasis in the
+desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political partizanship,
+and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all
+students to free themselves in reading the _Academica_.
+
+II. _The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero_.
+
+In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student of
+philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed historical
+examination of the later Greek schools--the Stoic, Peripatetic, Epicurean
+and new Academic. These it would be necessary to know, not merely as they
+came from the hands of their founders, but as they existed in Cicero's age;
+Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as Posidonius and the other pupils
+of Panaetius propounded it; not merely the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but
+that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum
+by Cratippus; the new Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and
+Carneades; the medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put
+forward by Antiochus in the name of the Old Academy. A systematic attempt
+to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine held by
+these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements concerning
+any particular school are generally tested by comparing them with the
+assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier representatives of
+the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at once concluded that
+Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all probability, he is uttering
+opinions which would have been recognised as genuine by those who were at
+the head of the school in his day. The criticism of Madvig even is not free
+from this error, as will be seen from my notes on several passages of the
+_Academica_[70]. As my space forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I
+have indicated as desirable, I can but describe in rough outline the
+relation in which Cicero stands to the chief schools.
+
+The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often
+insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to
+distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical
+standard[71]. We have in the _Academica_ Cicero's view of the first
+problem: that the attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To
+go more into detail here would be to anticipate the text of the _Lucullus_
+as well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in
+this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, and
+in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine that
+absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against which
+all the other schools were combined[72]. In that which was most
+distinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.
+
+It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. Nothing
+was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he was
+accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both
+sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition with a
+conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One
+requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this
+arrogance[73]. Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most
+opposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from
+all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most
+probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart
+from his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration,
+and repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the
+diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to
+lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In
+positiveness of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and
+disgraceful, unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a
+touch of feeling thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar
+to some put forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to
+Mill, to show that the free conflict of opinion is necessary to the
+progress of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to
+maturity in Greece[77]. Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice,
+says Cicero, there philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a
+warning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often
+depicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires us to find out what can
+be said for every view. It is a positive duty to discuss all aspects of
+every question, after the example of the Old Academy and Aristotle[80].
+Those who demand a dogmatic statement of belief are mere busybodies[81].
+The Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to
+defend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their
+predecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does Cicero carry this freedom,
+that in the fifth book of the _Tusculan Disputations_, he maintains a view
+entirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the _De Finibus_,
+and when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former
+statements, on the score that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. "Modo
+hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur[84]." The Academic sips the best of
+every school[85]. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic
+dares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus[86]. The Academic is
+only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he makes it his
+sole aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and others of the mists of
+error[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus the Antiochean[88]. While
+professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero indignantly
+repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth,
+has no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true.
+
+Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their
+evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that
+eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators,
+politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the
+teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and
+Epicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic
+tenets were those with which the common sense of the world could have most
+sympathy[92]. The Academy also was the school which had the most
+respectable pedigree. Compared with its system, all other philosophies were
+plebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was
+most estimable, _ceteris paribus_, and that man was Carneades[94].
+
+In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard, we
+must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later
+philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first.
+Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of conduct (_ars vivendi_).
+All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely estimable as
+supplying a basis on which this practical art could be reared. This is
+equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the dogmatism of Zeno and
+Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were mere outworks or
+ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school was carried on. These
+were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy; in time of peace ethics
+held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a key to unlock many
+difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may instance one passage
+in the beginning of the _Academica Posteriora_[95], which has given much
+trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro with having deserted
+the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge. How is this to be
+reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he never recanted the
+doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus. Arcesilas, Carneades, and
+Philo had been too busy with their polemic against Zeno and his followers,
+maintained on logical grounds, to deal much with ethics. On the other hand,
+in the works which Cicero had written and published before the _Academica_,
+wherever he had touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The
+works themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and
+Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics
+mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase
+"Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical
+resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical difference, would
+naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus Academia," so
+long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought dialectic to the front,
+and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would naturally regard him as a
+deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This view is confirmed by the
+fact that for many years before Cicero wrote, the Academic dialectic had
+found no eminent expositor. So much was this the case, that when Cicero
+wrote the _Academica_ he was charged with constituting himself the champion
+of an exploded and discredited school[96].
+
+Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the sphere
+of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in the _De
+Legibus_ when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he begs the New
+Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, to be
+silent[97]. Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected,
+is in the _De Legibus_ spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical
+systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an
+attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the
+power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he
+calls them "great and famous philosophers[99]," and he frequently speaks
+with something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands
+of Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they
+should be the only true philosophers after all[100]. There was a kind of
+magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited to a
+superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the
+barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions,
+therefore, we often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism
+than even his teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the
+philosophers of the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The
+Stoics maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero
+agrees with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a
+life enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be
+happy, but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic
+and Peripatetic schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire)
+and to allow that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired
+even if he were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he
+admits the purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104].
+These opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but
+appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an
+ignoble craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is
+Cicero's general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt
+that he caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno,
+ever stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however,
+regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so
+regarded chiefly the dialectic. It is just in this that the difference
+between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To the former Zeno's dialectic was true
+and Socratic, while the latter treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon
+Socrates as the apostle of doubt[106]. On the whole Cicero was more in
+accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in all points, however: for
+while Antiochus accepted without reserve the Stoic paradoxes, Cicero
+hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded that they were
+Socratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic theory that all
+emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in his joys and sorrows,
+refused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some points Cicero
+was inconsistent. In the _De Finibus_ he argued that the difference between
+the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of terms; in the _Tusculan
+Disputations_ he held it to be real. The most Stoic in tone of all his
+works are the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Officiis_.
+
+With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a comparatively
+small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this branch of
+philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient theology was,
+as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical science. The
+religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very strongly to
+sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal operation of
+divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were impossible in any form,
+he thought, if the divine government of the universe were denied[109]. It
+went to Cicero's heart that Carneades should have found it necessary to
+oppose the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defends the great sceptic by
+the plea that his one aim was to arouse men to the investigation of the
+truth[110]. At the same time, while really following the Stoics in physics,
+Cicero often believed himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose
+from the actual adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines,
+which they gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious
+and the genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange
+oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111].
+Still, Cicero contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic
+physics by a study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of
+his notions about physics, the _Timaeus_ of Plato, which he knew well and
+translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that
+the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well
+aware of the fact.
+
+Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's estimate of
+the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not very powerfully
+represented during his lifetime. The philosophical descendants of the
+author of the _Organon_ were notorious for their ignorance of logic[112],
+and in ethics had approximated considerably to the Stoic teaching. While
+not much influenced by the school, Cicero generally treats it tenderly for
+the sake of its great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic
+family. With the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood
+absolutely alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they
+discarded mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing
+but loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors
+by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely
+indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.
+
+III. _The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works_.
+
+It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a philosopher,
+and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is true, but still
+absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of Cicero's purpose in
+writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek speculation. The
+conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite unwarranted. If the later
+philosophy of the Greeks is of any value, Cicero's works are of equal
+value, for it is only from them that we get any full or clear view of it.
+Any one who attempts to reconcile the contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes
+Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and other authorities, will perhaps
+feel little inclination to cry out against the confusion of Ciceros ideas.
+Such outcry, now so common, is due largely to the want, which I have
+already noticed, of any clear exposition of the variations in doctrine
+which the late Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before
+the Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This
+is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works
+(if we except the third book of the _De Officiis_), which he does not
+freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the time
+when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault rather
+than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no one had
+propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had been
+simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing tenets. It
+would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two centuries are
+therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not the substance of
+the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which ultimately exercised
+no unimportant influence on society and on the Christian religion itself.
+
+When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have been
+destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed study to
+those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the best Greek
+speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the education of
+his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at the same time
+to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism throughout Italy. The
+doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin in a shape suited to
+catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a very large Epicurean
+literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty traces is now lost. C.
+Amafinius, mentioned in the _Academica_[113], was the first to write, and
+his books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large
+number of imitators, who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in
+Cicero's strong language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115].
+Rabirius and Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of
+Horace, were two of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various
+reasons for their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean
+physics, the fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and
+the voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in
+one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It is
+exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean literature
+dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics than with the
+ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the
+Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for morality in the legal
+and social constitution of the family, and did not much feel the need of
+any speculative system; while the general decay among the educated classes
+of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied as it was by an increase of
+superstition among the masses, prepared the way for the acceptance of a
+purely mechanical explanation of the universe. But of this subject,
+interesting and important as it is in itself, and neglected though it has
+been, I can treat no farther.
+
+These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached by Cicero for their
+uncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not read
+them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious question
+arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero had for
+omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman Epicureans.
+The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible to include
+the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being unwilling to allow
+that anything good could come from the school of Epicurus, preferred to
+keep silence, which nothing compelled him to break, since Lucretius was an
+obscure man and only slowly won his way to favour with the public.
+
+In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero had a
+patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the reproach
+that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He often tries by
+the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had left its mark on
+the early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that philosophy was
+best left to the Greek language, he replies with indignation, accusing them
+of being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a glorious thing, he
+thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled to resort to
+Greeks[119]. He will not even concede that the Greek is a richer tongue
+than the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the Roman intellect
+to deal with philosophical enquiries, he will not hear of it. It is only,
+he says, because the energy of the nation has been diverted into other
+channels that so little progress has been made. The history of Roman
+oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an impulse
+were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the wane in
+Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of oratory,
+which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122].
+
+There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he
+could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political
+inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one
+service he could render[123]. He is within his right when he claims praise
+for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so many of the most
+prominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and in
+those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125].
+Philosophy took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and
+politics[126]. It is strange to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies
+as he does for devoting himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might
+set them down to egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such
+studies were merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a
+life to them seemed well enough for Greeks, but for Romans unmanly,
+unpractical and unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were
+ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh
+importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were
+received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others, like
+the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy was
+good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that
+Cicero should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging
+the pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.
+
+Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were roused
+by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. The elder
+generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the books, and
+many were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now
+extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as to
+bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were accustomed
+to treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy could not be thoroughly
+understood till the whole subject had been mastered[132]. This design then,
+which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest works which we possess,
+the _Academica_ and the _De Finibus_, required the composition of a sort of
+philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero never claimed to be more than an
+interpreter of Greek philosophy to the Romans. He never pretended to
+present new views of philosophy, or even original criticisms on its
+history. The only thing he proclaims to be his own is his style. Looked at
+in this, the true light, his work cannot be judged a failure. Those who
+contrive to pronounce this judgment must either insist upon trying the work
+by a standard to which it does not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek
+philosophy it copies, or perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed
+worthlessness of the philosophy of his age.
+
+In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his oratorical
+and political writings, all or nearly all published before the
+_Hortensius_, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only
+two works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded
+the _Academica_, were the _De Consolatione_, founded on Crantor's book,
+[Greek: peri penthous], and the _Hortensius_, which was introductory to
+philosophy, or, as it was then called, protreptic.
+
+For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of their
+composition, the student must be referred to the _Dict. of Biography_, Art.
+Cicero.
+
+IV. _History of the Academica_.
+
+On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45 B.C.,
+Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was
+pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and Circeii[134].
+Here he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book
+_De Consolatione_ was written. He found the mechanic exercise of
+composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days
+together[135]. At other times he would plunge at early morning into the
+dense woods near his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till
+nightfall[136]. Often exertion failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the
+entreaties of Atticus that he would return to the forum and the senate. A
+grief, which books and solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would
+crush him, he felt, in the busy city[137].
+
+It was amid such surroundings that the _Academica_ was written. The first
+trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a letter of Cicero
+to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks of his
+bereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus very much for
+historical and biographical details, and in the letter in question he asks
+for just the kind of information which would be needed in writing the
+_Academica_. The words with which he introduces his request imply that he
+had determined on some new work to which our _Academica_ would
+correspond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome the embassy which
+Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader of the Epicurean
+school; who were then the most noted [Greek: politikoi] at Athens. The
+meaning of the last question is made clear by a passage in the _De
+Oratore_[140], where Cicero speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic
+schools under that name. It may be with reference to the progress of the
+_Academica_ that in a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the
+advance he has made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of
+the remainder of his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively
+employed; but although he speaks of various other literary projects, we
+find no express mention in his letters to Atticus of the _Academica_[142].
+He declares that however much his detractors at Rome may reproach him with
+inaction, they could not read the numerous difficult works on which he has
+been engaged within the same space of time that he has taken to write
+them[143].
+
+In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near
+Antium[144], where he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he
+afterwards suppressed[145]. From the same place he wrote to Atticus of his
+intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome by way of Lanuvium about the
+middle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately following Tullia's
+death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she died. This he felt
+now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either abandon Tusculum
+altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even ten years would make
+the effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero wrote
+to Atticus that he had finished while at Astura _duo magna_ [Greek:
+syntagmata], words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many
+scholars, including Madvig, have understood that the first edition of the
+_Academica_, along with the _De Finibus_, is intended. Against this view
+the reasons adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the
+letters to Atticus that the _De Finibus_ was being worked out book by book
+long after the first edition of the _Academica_ had been placed in the
+hands of Atticus. The _De Finibus_ was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it
+was still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the
+_Academica_[151]. The final arrangement of the characters in the _De
+Finibus_ is announced later still[152]; and even at a later date Cicero
+complains that Balbus had managed to obtain surreptitiously a copy of the
+fifth book before it was properly corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia
+having copied the whole five books while in that state[153]. A passage in
+the _De Divinatione_[154] affords almost direct evidence that the
+_Academica_ was published before the _De Finibus_. On all these grounds I
+hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero describes as having
+been finished simultaneously at Astura.
+
+Another view of the [Greek: syntagmata] in question is that they are simply
+the two books, entitled _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, of the _Priora
+Academica_. In my opinion the word [Greek: syntagma], the use of which to
+denote a portion of a work Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains its natural
+meaning. Cicero uses the word [Greek: syntaxis] of the whole work[156],
+while [Greek: syntagma][157], and [Greek: syngramma][158], designate
+definite portions or divisions of a work. I should be quite content, then,
+to refer the words of Cicero to the _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_. Krische,
+however, without giving reasons, decides that this view is unsatisfactory,
+and prefers to hold that the _Hortensius_ (or _de Philosophia_) and the
+_Priora Academica_ are the compositions in question. If this conjecture is
+correct, we have in the disputed passage the only reference to the
+_Hortensius_ which is to be found in the letters of Cicero. We are quite
+certain that the book was written at Astura, and published before the
+_Academica_. This would be clear from the mention in the _Academica
+Posteriora_ alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the _De Finibus_[160]
+place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the _Hortensius_ had
+been published a sufficiently long time before the _De Finibus_, to have
+become known to a tolerably large circle of readers. Further, in the
+_Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Divinatione_[161] the _Hortensius_ and
+the _Academica_ are mentioned together in such a way as to show that the
+former was finished and given to the world before the latter. Nothing
+therefore stands in the way of Krische's conjecture, except the doubt I
+have expressed as to the use of the word [Greek: syntagma], which equally
+affects the old view maintained by Madvig.
+
+Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the
+_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ must have been more closely connected, in
+style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting perhaps the
+_Academica_ and the _De Finibus_. The interlocutors in the _Hortensius_
+were exactly the same as in the _Academica Priora_, for the introduction of
+Balbus into some editions of the fragments of the _Hortensius_ is an
+error[162]. The discussion in the _Academica Priora_ is carried on at
+Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the _Hortensius_ at the villa of Lucullus
+near Cumae. It is rather surprising that under these circumstances there
+should be but one direct reference to the _Hortensius_ in the
+_Lucullus_[163].
+
+While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45, Cicero
+sent Atticus the _Torquatus_, as he calls the first book of the _De
+Finibus_[164]. He had already sent the first edition of the _Academica_ to
+Rome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia had been added to the
+_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, in which the public characters from whom the
+books took their names were extolled. In all probability the extant
+prooemium of the _Lucullus_ is the one which was then affixed. Atticus, who
+visited Cicero at Tusculum, had doubtless pointed out the incongruity
+between the known attainments of Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they
+were made to take in difficult philosophical discussions. It is not
+uncharacteristic of Cicero that his first plan for healing the incongruity
+should be a deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of
+statements concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans
+which he knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I
+may note, as of some interest in connection with the _Academica_, the fact
+that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was one
+from Varro[166].
+
+On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says, to
+arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing attentions of
+Brutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it had been his intention to
+go on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still unsatisfied with his
+choice of interlocutors for the _Academica_, for the first thing he did on
+his arrival was to transfer the parts of Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and
+Brutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on the receipt of a letter
+from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work should be dedicated to
+Varro, or if not the _Academica_, the _De Finibus_[170]. Cicero had never
+been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems to have been
+chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times anxious to draw
+them more closely together. Nine years before he had pressed Cicero to find
+room in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of the works
+on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to comply with
+the request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full two years before the
+_Academica_ was written, to dedicate to Cicero his great work _De Lingua
+Latino_. In answer to the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared
+himself very much dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise.
+From this it is evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude
+of that work. His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years
+without making any progress[173], shows that there could have been little
+of anything like friendship between the two. Apart from these causes for
+grumbling, Cicero thought the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend[174]." Since
+the _De Finibus_ was already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer
+to Varro the _Academica_, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of
+noble birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they
+possess that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had
+been made in the first edition of the _Academica_ to maintain[176]. For
+them another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the
+_Academica_ would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus, and the
+fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It
+happened that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's
+stay at Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his
+_Academica_, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making
+the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position occupied by
+Atticus in the dialogue was quite an inferior one, but he was so pleased
+with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often in the future such
+minor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta should also be
+introduced was found impracticable[180].
+
+Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had
+constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He
+frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus,
+but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his plans.
+Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the work
+contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over again
+before he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for these
+solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was obliged to
+assure him that there were reasons, which he could not disclose in a
+letter[182]. The true reasons, however, did appear in some later letters.
+In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of Varro, and the more so because he
+wishes it, but you know he is
+
+  [Greek: deinos aner, tacha ken kai anaition aitiooito.]
+
+So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, it may
+be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than his; a
+charge which you will perceive to be untrue[183]." Cicero, then, feared
+Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical fastidiousness.
+Before these explanations Atticus had concluded that Cicero was afraid of
+the effect the work might produce on the public. This notion Cicero assured
+him to be wrong; the only cause for his vacillation was his doubt as to how
+Varro would receive the dedication[184]. Atticus would seem to have
+repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured Cicero that there
+was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a general assurance,
+and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the reasons from which it
+proceeded[185]. In order to stimulate his friend, Atticus affirmed that
+Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown more favour[186]. We
+find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it
+Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not
+have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to
+have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed ignorant
+of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of being
+actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently while at
+Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the _De Finibus_, but
+employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the dedication[187].
+
+Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the _Academica_
+is often given in the letters. He tells us that it extended, on the whole,
+to greater length than the first, though much had been omitted; he adds,
+"Unless human self love deceives me, the books have been so finished that
+the Greeks themselves have nothing in the same department of literature to
+approach them.... This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and
+altogether better than the last[188]." Again: "The Antiochean portion has
+all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may
+possess[189]." Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what
+success, but with a care which nothing could surpass[190]." The binding and
+adornment of the presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and
+the letter accompanying it was carefully elaborated[191]. Yet after
+everything had been done and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome,
+Cicero was still uneasy as to the reception it would meet with from Varro.
+He wrote thus to Atticus: "I tell you again and again that the presentation
+will be at your own risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to
+Brutus, who is also a follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou
+wert ever wont, flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part
+"shuddered" at the idea of taking the responsibility[192]. After the work
+had passed into his hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to
+prevent it from getting into circulation until they could meet one another
+in Rome[193]. This warning was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had
+just managed to get access to the _De Finibus_[194]. In a letter, dated
+apparently a day or two later, Cicero declared his intention to meet
+Atticus at Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable
+to do so, after a consultation[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take
+place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to
+approve any course that might be taken[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as
+soon as Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time,
+then," says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal
+step; oh dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my
+letter stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to
+hear how the matter stands[197]." Again, a little later: "You have been
+bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment upon them,
+but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books in the first
+fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work on the _Tusculan
+Disputations_[198]. A copy of the first edition had already got into
+Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which Cicero begs Atticus to
+ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of the _Academica_, at a
+time when the fate of the second edition was still undecided[199]. From
+this fact we may conclude that Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing
+the first edition. If he consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies
+of the first edition, it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of
+course assumes that Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people,
+wishes to have the "Splendidiora, breviora, meliora." Still, on every
+occasion which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised
+edition the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately
+after the _Academica Posteriora_ was completed[200], and often
+subsequently, when he most markedly mentioned the number of the books as
+four[201]. That he wished the work to bear the title _Academica_ is
+clear[202]. The expressions _Academica quaestio_, [Greek: Akademike
+syntaxis], and _Academia_, are merely descriptive[203]; so also is the
+frequent appellation _Academici libri_[204]. The title _Academicae
+Quaestiones_, found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the
+_Tusculanae Quaestiones_, which was supported by the false notion, found as
+early as Pliny[205], that Cicero had a villa called Academia, at which the
+book was written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his Tusculan villa, which he
+called his Academia, but we are certain from the letters to Atticus that
+the work was written entirely at Astura, Antium, and Arpinum.
+
+Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well[206], but the
+second edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books
+are expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the
+title _Academica_. Augustine speaks of them only as _Academici libri_, and
+his references show that he knew the second edition only. Lactantius also
+uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks of the _Academica_.
+Plutarch shows only a knowledge of the first edition[207].
+
+I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of the
+genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. That it
+was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding theories which
+old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the two editions. A
+fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of Goerenz. I now proceed
+to examine into the constitution and arrangement of the two editions.
+
+a. _The lost dialogue "Catulus."_
+
+The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the _Lucullus_ are among
+those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party whom Cicero
+so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue was named was
+son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the political career of
+father and son we shall have little to do. I merely inquire what was their
+position with respect to the philosophy of the time, and the nature of
+their connection with Cicero.
+
+Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the
+_Lucullus_[208] that he did little more than put forward opinions he had
+received from his father. Cicero would, doubtless, have preferred to
+introduce the elder man as speaking for himself, but in that case, as in
+the _De Oratore_, the author would have been compelled to exclude himself
+from the conversation[209]. The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of
+the father, just as Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does
+nothing but render literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to
+have heard[210]. For the arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be
+found in their [Greek: atripsia] with respect to philosophy[211]. This
+[Greek: atripsia] did not amount to [Greek: apaideusia], or else Cicero
+could not have made Catulus the younger the advocate of philosophy in the
+_Hortensius_[212]. Though Cicero sometimes classes the father and son
+together as men of literary culture and perfect masters of Latin style, it
+is very evident on a comparison of all the passages where the two are
+mentioned, that no very high value was placed on the learning of the
+son[213]. But however slight were the claims of Catulus the younger to be
+considered a philosopher, he was closely linked to Cicero by other ties.
+During all the most brilliant period of Cicero's life, Catulus was one of
+the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his character, life, and influence are
+often depicted in even extravagant language by the orator[214]. He is one
+of the pillars of the state[215], Cicero cries, and deserves to be classed
+with the ancient worthies of Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law,
+and asks the people on whom they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic
+power concentrated in his hands, were to die, the people answer with one
+voice "On you[217]." He alone was bold enough to rebuke the follies, on the
+one hand, of the mob, on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no storm of
+danger, no favouring breeze of fortune, could ever inspire either fear or
+hope, or cause to swerve from his own course[219]. His influence, though he
+be dead, will ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not only glorious
+in his life, but fortunate in his death[221].
+
+Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were
+special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the _viri consulares_
+who had given their unreserved approval to the measures taken for the
+suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the first to confer on
+Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title "Father of his
+country[222]." So closely did Cicero suppose himself to be allied to
+Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for the death of Tullia, by
+bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden times[223]." The statement of
+Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never been so
+unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna
+held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast between the
+zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague Antonius[224].
+Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of
+the two Catuli[225].
+
+We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first
+edition of the _Academica_ from circulation, he affixed a prooemium to each
+book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. From the
+passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit in such
+matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a portion of
+the contents of the lost prooemium to the _Catulus_. The achievements of
+the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as those of his son. The
+philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made to cast its lustre on the
+younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once more lauded, and great
+stress was laid upon the patronage it received from so famous a man as the
+younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in the fervid language which
+Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. Some allusion most likely was
+made to the connection of Archias with the Catuli, and to the poem he had
+written in Cicero's honour. Then the occasion of the dialogue, its supposed
+date, and the place where it was held, were indicated. The place was the
+Cuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned date must fall between the year 60
+B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which
+is alluded to in the _Lucullus_[227]. It is well known that in the
+arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against
+anachronisms.
+
+The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly made
+to the _Hortensius_, in which the same speakers had been engaged; and after
+more compliments had been bandied about, most of which would fall to
+Cicero's share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between
+the dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's
+views, at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy.
+Before we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from
+indications offered by the _Lucullus_, it is necessary to speak of the
+character and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.
+
+In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to mention
+his _sapientia_, which implies a certain knowledge of philosophy. He was,
+says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the wisest, the holiest of
+men[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of surpassing worth, a second
+Laelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the _De Oratore_, in which he
+appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view of his accomplishments.
+Throughout the second and third books he is treated as the lettered man,
+par excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made to him when any
+question is started which touches on Greek literature and philosophy. We
+are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance with Greek, and
+his style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the Greeks from
+the attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the Latin
+historians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek rhetorical
+teaching, while he bestows high commendation on the early sophists[234].
+The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus is most to his
+mind[235]. An account is given by him of the history of Greek speculation
+in Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin style made him seem to
+many the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written a history of his
+own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had imitated[238], and
+was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239].
+
+Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the
+_Academica_ that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In the _De
+Oratore_, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does
+not declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in
+his long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular
+teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the
+poet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded that he
+was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. Cicero
+repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator spring, and
+the whole tone of the _De Oratore_ shows that Catulus could have had no
+leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The probability is that he
+had never placed himself under the instruction of Greek teachers for any
+length of time, but had rather gained his information from books and
+especially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual
+communication with any of the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have
+failed to tell us, as he does in the case of Antonius[243], and
+Crassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any direct intercourse between
+Philo and Catulus can have taken place, although one passage in the
+_Lucullus_ seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo had a brilliant reputation
+during the later years of Catulus, and no one at all conversant with Greek
+literature or society could fail to be well acquainted with his
+opinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus
+undoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the latest development
+of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were probably not known to
+Catulus[248].
+
+I now proceed to draw out from the references in the _Lucullus_ the chief
+features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably introduced
+by a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the speech
+must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon the
+genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated with
+great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of the
+older Academics[250]. The most important part of the speech, however, must
+have consisted of a defence of Carneades and Arcesilas against the dogmatic
+schools[251]. Catulus evidently concerned himself more with the system of
+the later than with that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly
+probable that he touched only very lightly on the negative Academic
+arguments, while he developed fully that positive teaching about the
+[Greek: pithanon] which was so distinctive of Carneades. All the counter
+arguments of Lucullus which concern the destructive side of Academic
+teaching appear to be distinctly aimed at Cicero, who must have represented
+it in the discourse of the day before[252]. On the other hand, those parts
+of Lucullus' speech which deal with the constructive part of
+Academicism[253] seem to be intended for Catulus, to whom the maintenance
+of the genuine Carneadean distinction between [Greek: adela] and [Greek:
+akatalepta] would be a peculiarly congenial task. Thus the commendation
+bestowed by Lucullus on the way in which the _probabile_ had been handled
+appertains to Catulus. The exposition of the sceptical criticism would
+naturally be reserved for the most brilliant and incisive orator of the
+party--Cicero himself. These conjectures have the advantage of establishing
+an intimate connection between the prooemium, the speech of Catulus, and
+the succeeding one of Hortensius. In the prooemium the innovations of Philo
+were mentioned; Catulus then showed that the only object aimed at by them,
+a satisfactory basis for [Greek: episteme], was already attained by the
+Carneadean theory of the [Greek: pithanon]; whereupon Hortensius showed,
+after the principles of Antiochus, that such a basis was provided by the
+older philosophy, which both Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned.
+Thus Philo becomes the central point or pivot of the discussion. With this
+arrangement none of the indications in the _Lucullus_ clash. Even the
+demand made by Hortensius upon Catulus[254] need only imply such a bare
+statement on the part of the latter of the negative Arcesilaean doctrines
+as would clear the ground for the Carneadean [Greek: pithanon]. One
+important opinion maintained by Catulus after Carneades, that the wise man
+would opine[255] ([Greek: ton sophon doxasein]), seems another indication
+of the generally constructive character of his exposition. Everything
+points to the conclusion that this part of the dialogue was mainly drawn by
+Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.
+
+Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of
+Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it
+extremely probable that he gave a resume of the history of philosophy,
+corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the _Academica
+Posteriora_. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty of
+understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the speech
+could have been assigned in the first edition. In the _Academica
+Posteriora_ it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second as
+Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second edition
+of the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate
+only in the mouth of one who was answering a speech already made. On the
+view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the fact that
+Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the lost dialogue
+which bore his name he had argued against philosophy altogether[258], and
+denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a
+historical resume as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within the
+reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put forward to
+show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old
+Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant for
+stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We
+are thus relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word
+_commoveris_[261], from which Krische infers that the dialogue, entitled
+_Hortensius_, had ended in a conversion to philosophy of the orator from
+whom it was named. To any such conversion we have nowhere else any
+allusion.
+
+The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character and
+attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to have been
+as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it was possible
+for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech of Hortensius
+were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral teaching of
+Antiochus.
+
+The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of the
+preceding speech is correct, it follows that Cicero in his reply pursued
+the same course which he takes in his answer to Varro, part of which is
+preserved in the _Academica Posteriora_[262]. He justified the New Academy
+by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old, and also with
+those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, therefore,
+reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great and ancient
+names like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according to
+Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes,
+Plato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a historical
+summary. He must have dealt with the theory of [Greek: kataleptike
+phantasia] and [Greek: ennoiai] (which though really Stoic had been adopted
+by Antiochus), since he found it necessary to "manufacture" (_fabricari_)
+Latin terms to represent the Greek[265]. He probably also commented on the
+headlong rashness with which the dogmatists gave their assent to the truth
+of phenomena. To this a retort is made by Lucullus[266]. That Cicero's
+criticism of the dogmatic schools was incomplete may be seen by the fact
+that he had not had occasion to Latinize the terms [Greek: katalepsis]
+(i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the individual [Greek: kataleptike
+phantasia]), [Greek: enargeia, horme, apodeixis, dogma, oikeion, adela,
+epoche], nearly all important terms in the Stoic, and to some extent in the
+Antiochean system, all of which Lucullus is obliged to translate for
+himself[267]. The more the matter is examined the more clearly does it
+appear that the main purpose of Cicero in this speech was to justify from
+the history of philosophy the position of the New Academy, and not to
+advance sceptical arguments against experience, which were reserved for his
+answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he expressly tells us that such
+sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him in the first day's discourse
+were really out of place, and were merely introduced in order to disarm
+Lucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these arguments must have
+occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, although foreign to
+its main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary classification of the
+sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent to the truth of each
+class[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of the elaborate speech of
+Cicero in the _Lucullus_ proves that no general or minute demonstration of
+the impossibility of [Greek: episteme] in the dogmatic sense had been
+attempted in his statement of the day before. Cicero's argument in the
+_Catulus_ was allowed by Lucullus to have considerably damaged the cause of
+Antiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus, Hortensius, and Cicero had
+gone over nearly the whole ground marked out for the discussion[272], but
+only cursorily, so that there was plenty of room for a more minute
+examination in the _Lucullus_.
+
+One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the attack of
+Catulus? Krische believes that the argument of Catulus was answered point
+by point. In this opinion I cannot concur. Cicero never appears elsewhere
+as the defender of Philo's reactionary doctrines[273]. The expressions of
+Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching had been dismissed by
+all the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his letter of
+dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo (_partes mihi
+sumpsi Philonis_[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to those general
+New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly supported by the pupil
+of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief sources for Cicero's
+speech in the _Catulus_ were, doubtless, Philo himself and Clitomachus.
+
+In that intermediate form of the _Academica_, where Cato and Brutus
+appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no doubt
+that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. Consequently Cato
+must have taken the comparatively inferior part of Hortensius, while Brutus
+took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem strange that a Stoic of the
+Stoics like Cato should be chosen to represent Antiochus, however much that
+philosopher may have borrowed from Zeno. The role given to Hortensius,
+however, was in my view such as any cultivated man might sustain who had
+not definitely committed himself to sceptical principles. So eminent an
+Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been reduced to the comparatively
+secondary position assigned to Hortensius in the _Academica Priora_. He
+would naturally occupy the place given to Varro in the second edition[276].
+If this be true, Brutus would not speak at length in the first half of the
+work. Cato is not closely enough connected with the _Academica_ to render
+it necessary to treat of him farther.
+
+b. _The "Lucullus."_
+
+The day after the discussion narrated in the _Catulus_, during which
+Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the Cuman villa
+of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of Hortensius at
+Bauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind favoured, Lucullus was to leave for
+his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his at Pompeii[278]. Bauli was a little
+place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round which so many legends
+lingered[279]. The scenery in view was magnificent[280]. As the party were
+seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines of statues, the
+waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the horizon glistened and
+quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour under the freshening
+breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and Puteoli, thirty stadia
+distant[281].
+
+Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and to keep it perfectly
+free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still living, although
+when the words were written he had been dead for many years[282]. The
+surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom
+of Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private troubles
+which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept carefully
+out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of thoughts and
+plans which were actively employing the author's mind at Astura. His
+intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last section of the
+book, while in the last but one the _De Finibus_, the _De Natura Deorum_
+and other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another passage the design of
+the _Tusculan Disputations_, which was carried out immediately after the
+publication of the _Academica_ and _De Finibus_, is clearly to be
+seen[285].
+
+Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the
+conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially
+acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly
+all that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue,
+and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to have
+dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private citizen, was
+directed to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train when he went to
+Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his residence in the
+East he sought to attach learned men to his person. At Alexandria he was
+found in the company of Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius
+Rogus and the Selii, all men of philosophic tastes[288]. He is several
+times mentioned by Pliny in the _Natural History_ as the patron of Greek
+artists. Yet, as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters
+to Atticus that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like
+Catulus, by the authority of another person. All his arguments are
+explicitly stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard
+Antiochus engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a
+reply to that of Cicero in the _Catulus_. Any closer examination of its
+contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The
+same may be said of Cicero's answer.
+
+In the intermediate form of the _Academica_, the speech of Lucullus was no
+doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a slight connection
+with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much more than call
+attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close relationship in
+which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have had to deal. He
+was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife of Lucullus[289].
+Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while
+Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the
+Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero,
+during the war between Pompey and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both
+friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290].
+
+c. _The Second Edition._
+
+When Cicero dedicated the _Academica_ to Varro, very slight alterations
+were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the piece. Cicero
+had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost within sight of
+Hortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene was now
+laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date
+of the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is
+shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many
+allusions are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the
+Pompeian party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the
+_Hortensius_[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of
+the _Academica_, it can be shown that Varro, Cicero and Atticus could not
+have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore for once admits into his works
+an impossibility in fact. This impossibility would at once occur to Varro,
+and Cicero anticipates his wonder in the letter of dedication[296].
+
+For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the
+ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact
+between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his
+philosophical opinions, are alone needed here. The first mention we have of
+Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself sufficient to show his
+character and the impossibility of anything like friendship between the
+two. Varro had done the orator some service in the trying time which came
+before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had eulogised Varro; and in
+the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to send Varro the eulogy to
+read, adding "_Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti,_ [Greek: elikta kai
+ouden][297]." All the references to Varro in the letters to Atticus are in
+the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to write Varro a letter of thanks
+for supposed exertions in his behalf, during his exile[298]. Several
+passages show that Cicero refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported
+by Atticus[299]. On Cicero's return from exile, he and Varro remained in
+the same semi-friendly state. About the year 54 B.C., as we have already
+seen, Atticus in vain urged his friend to dedicate some work to the great
+polymath. After the fall of the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to
+have been drawn a little closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in
+the year before the _Academica_ was published, testify to this
+approximation[300]. Still they are all cold, forced and artificial; very
+different from the letters Cicero addressed to his real intimates, such for
+instance as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all
+show a fear of giving offence to the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility
+in presence of his vast learning which is by no means natural to Cicero.
+The negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication
+of the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this
+slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301].
+
+The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable accuracy
+from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro _De
+Philosophia_[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of Antiochus and the
+so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school from, among the 288
+philosophies which he considered possible, by an elaborate and pedantic
+process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious in Augustine. My notes on
+the _Academica Posteriora_ will show that there is no reason for accusing
+Cicero of having mistaken Varro's philosophical views. This supposition
+owes its currency to Mueller, who, from Stoic phrases in the _De Lingua
+Latina_, concluded that Varro had passed over to the Stoics before that
+work was written. All that was Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303].
+
+The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the
+subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more
+conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition
+preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the
+contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical exposition
+of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by Varro; then the
+historical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had given
+in the first edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an
+exposition by Cicero of Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same
+as that given by Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that
+foretaste of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had
+formed part of the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech
+of Varro in reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in
+ed. 1. Book IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1.
+Atticus must have been almost a [Greek: kophon prosopon].
+
+I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old
+editions the _Lucullus_ is marked throughout as _Academicorum liber IV_.
+This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of Nonius'
+quotations, which are always from the _second_ edition, and can tell us
+nothing about the constitution of the _first_. One other thing is worth
+remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the _Academica Priora_
+before the _Posteriora_. This seems to me an unnatural arrangement; the
+subject-matter of the _Varro_ is certainly prior, logically, to that of the
+_Lucullus_.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+M. TULLII CICERONIS
+
+ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM
+
+LIBER PRIMUS.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+I. 1. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a
+M. Varrone, venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset,
+continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram
+interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et
+vetustate amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus,
+paulumque cum _ab_ eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus:
+atque ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad
+suam villam reduximus. 2. Hic pauca primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis,
+ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus: Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec
+audire sine molestia possumus, quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse
+novi. Silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum
+cessare, sed celare quae scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille:
+intemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo
+opus magnum in manibus, idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum--me autem
+dicebat--quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me
+politius. 3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam, Varro, iam diu exspectans, non
+audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti
+studium--nihil enim eius modi celare possumus--non te ea intermittere, sed
+accuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante
+hoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam
+sum ingressus res eas, quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis
+philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare,
+quaero quid sit cur, cum multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim
+cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et
+studiis et artibus antecedat.
+
+II. 4. Tum ille: Rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris.
+Itaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu,
+quod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam
+viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de
+nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca
+potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis
+abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca
+intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti
+intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. 5. Vides autem--eadem enim
+ipse didicisti--non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui nulla
+arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone disputant, nihil
+definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam
+denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praeceptis
+dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri
+putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, quae
+docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem
+accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur _labor_. 6. Iam vero physica, si
+Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut
+Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris,
+de corpusculorum--ita enim appellat atomos--concursione fortuita loqui?
+Nostra tu physica nosti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia
+ea, quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam
+quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit
+adducere? _Quid_, haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis
+fugiendisque rebus? Illi enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum
+esse censent: apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas.
+7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intelligat quid
+sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab honestate seiungi:
+quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine voluptatibus sensum
+moventibus ne suspicari _quidem_. Si vero Academiam veterem persequamur,
+quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam
+argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud
+philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum
+possum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est,
+maius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. 8. Sed meos amicos, in quibus
+est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ea a
+fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae autem nemo adhuc
+docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, quantum potui--nihil
+enim magno opere meorum miror--feci ut essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim
+peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et
+tamen in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati,
+quadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa
+dicta dialectice +quae quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate
+quadam ad legendum invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum
+prooemiis +philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.
+
+III. 9. Tum, ego. Sunt, inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe
+peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum
+deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem
+patriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu
+domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium
+divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti,
+plurimumque poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis
+attulisti, atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti
+philosophiamque multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum
+parum. 10. Causam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere
+malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi
+nunc: satisne probas? Immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca
+poterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos
+Graecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat
+Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum
+expresserunt poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi
+Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem,
+Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem
+sint aut Demosthenem imitati. 11. Ego autem--dicam enim, ut res est--dum me
+ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed
+quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat,
+haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum licebat, legendo.
+Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et administratione rei
+publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii
+oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime
+aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, hoc in primis
+consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil utilius aut, si
+haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. 12. Brutus quidem
+noster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris
+persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem
+sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu, cuius
+tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi
+litterarum.
+
+IV. 13. Tum, ille. Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te
+ipso quid est, inquit, quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te
+veterem illam, inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho
+id magis licuerit, nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam
+nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et
+emendata maxime. Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu
+existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas
+Academias esse erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit,
+ut dicis: sed ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra _ea_ Philonis Antiochus
+scripserit. 14. Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum
+iam diu, renovari a te, nisi molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus,
+inquam, si videtur. Sane istud quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus.
+Sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi
+vero, ille: quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita
+recordari? et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum
+essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus [omnes].
+
+15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter
+omnis, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes
+ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam
+communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et
+malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione
+censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum
+_valere_. 16. Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum
+audierunt perscripti varie _et_ copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil
+adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque
+praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil
+scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium
+sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non
+arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea
+sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in virtute laudanda et in
+hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum
+libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi potest. 17. Platonis autem
+auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens
+duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et
+Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum
+Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset,
+duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium
+et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti
+sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis
+instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones
+habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis
+ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam
+quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus
+rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt.
+Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et
+rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut
+dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem
+Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni praestabat, ut mihi quidem
+videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum
+expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.
+
+V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non
+sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus:
+Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque
+ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid me, inquam, putas,
+qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum? Pergamus
+igitur, inquit, quoniam placet. 19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone
+philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et
+rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid
+rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac
+primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse
+dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum
+bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum
+expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et
+corpore et vita. Corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in
+partibus: valetudinem, viris pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem
+sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus
+celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam
+vocum impressionem: 20. animi autem, quae essent ad comprehendendam
+ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et mores dividebantur.
+Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant: quorum utrumque mentis
+esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi
+consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis adsiduitate, partim ratione
+formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod incohatum est neque
+absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum,
+id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum, quas in animis
+ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec animorum. 21. Vitae autem--id enim erat
+tertium--adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus
+animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et _in_ quibusdam quae non tam naturae
+quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem
+quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum
+hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono
+sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum,
+ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis
+inducitur ratio bonorum.
+
+VI. 22. Atque haec illa sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique
+Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum:
+illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios
+Peripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum
+finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese
+expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo
+atque in ipsa virtute versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia
+sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam,
+nisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad
+virtutis usum idonea. 23. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita
+et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat in conservatione earum
+rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae
+voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum
+magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, quae erant congruentes
+cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque
+aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec
+quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis, quam primam posui,
+forma atque descriptio.
+
+24. De natura autem--id enim sequebatur--ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in
+res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens,
+ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, in
+eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen utrumque:
+neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur,
+neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse
+cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam
+nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi
+faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum
+inauditis.
+
+VII. 25. Nos vero, inquit Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum
+voles, si te Latina forte deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine
+loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut
+physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam
+utitur pro Latinis. Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas [Greek: poiotetas]
+Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed
+philosophorum, atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt
+publica: suis utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut
+enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda.
+Quod si Graeci faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto
+id magis nobis concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur? 26.
+Tu vero, inquam, Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus,
+si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum.
+Audebimus ergo, inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum
+igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt
+unius modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi
+multiformes. Itaque aer--utimur enim pro Latino--et ignis et aqua et terra
+prima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae
+gignuntur e terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa
+dicuntur: e quibus aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae
+partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e
+quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, quae supra dixi,
+dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. 27. Sed subiectam putant
+omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate--faciamus enim
+tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius--materiam quandam, ex qua omnia
+expressa atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque
+modis mutari atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in nihilum, sed
+in suas partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil
+omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem moveantur,
+omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 28.
+Et cum ita moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic
+ultro citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et
+illa effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et
+continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla
+pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, quae
+insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit,
+quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat: 29.
+quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque
+perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae,
+quasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris
+ea, quae pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant,
+quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem
+et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem
+fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter
+obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.
+
+VIII. 30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in
+disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus,
+tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse
+iudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id,
+quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi
+[Greek: idean] appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem
+possumus dicere. 31. Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse
+arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo res eas, quae subiectae sensibus
+viderentur, quae essent aut ita parvae, ut sub sensum cadere non possent,
+aut ita mobiles et concitatae, ut nihil umquam unum esset constans, ne idem
+quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem
+partem rerum opinabilem appellabant. 32. Scientiam autem nusquam esse
+censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa
+definitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur,
+adhibebant. Verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa
+quaeque essent ita nominata, quam [Greek: etymologian] appellabant: post
+argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad
+concludendum id, quod explanari volebant: itaque tradebatur omnis
+dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae. Huic quasi ex
+altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis
+perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. 33. Haec erat illis disciplina a
+Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos
+vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam.
+
+IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum
+et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus species, quas paulo
+ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis
+quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et
+ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat,
+vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae:
+spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in
+ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 34. Nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam
+fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum
+maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et
+moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in
+ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi
+Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates
+unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, diligenter ea, quae a superioribus
+acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas.
+35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret
+et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. Eam quoque, si
+videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero,
+inquam, videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium.
+
+X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos virtutis
+inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una
+virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret
+honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 36. Cetera
+autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat,
+alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.
+Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione
+dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis relinquebat,
+in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. 37. Sed quae essent sumenda,
+ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea
+praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam
+rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum,
+officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in
+bonis actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem
+servata praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. 38. Cumque superiores non
+omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut
+more perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera
+virtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo
+modo fieri posse disserebat nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed
+ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse
+quin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non
+tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et
+efferri laetitia dicerent, sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent,
+hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. 39. Cumque eas
+perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque
+in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem
+adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque
+iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse
+immoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.
+
+XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum illis
+quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur,
+non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque
+gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo
+modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis,
+cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero
+aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 40.
+Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de
+sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi
+impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille [Greek: phantasian], nos visum
+appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim utendum in
+reliquo sermone saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi accepta
+sensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis positam et
+voluntariam. 41. Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae
+propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id
+autem visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile--feretis hoc? Nos
+vero, inquit. Quonam enim modo [Greek: katalepton] diceres?--Sed, cum
+acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis
+rebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo
+verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis--nova
+enim dicebat--usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum
+appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset,
+scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam
+opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. 42. Sed
+inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi,
+collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli
+credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut
+supra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis
+videbatur, non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia
+nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam
+scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis
+imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad
+rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et
+ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent
+aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat.
+Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a
+superioribus.
+
+XII. 43. Quae cum dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est,
+inquam, a te, Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse
+[autem] arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem
+veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc
+Varro: Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis
+et ea, quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa
+discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. 44. Tum
+ego: Cum Zenone, inquam, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen
+instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed
+earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant
+Socratem et iam ante Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis
+paene veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse
+dixerunt: angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut
+Democritus, in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis
+omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa
+esse dixerunt. 45. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri
+posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia
+latere censebat in occulto: neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi
+posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare
+quemquam neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu
+continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita
+res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et
+perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod
+erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam
+plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus
+momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio
+sustineretur. 46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur,
+si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil
+adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur,
+nihil certi dicitur: sed tamen illa, quam exposui_sti_, vetus, haec nova
+nominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit,
+in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae
+partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex
+Epicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter
+ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.
+
+EX LIBRO I.
+
+1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. _Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere,
+dictum a gladiis. Cicero Academicorum lib. I._: quid autem stomachatur
+Menesarchus? quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?
+
+2. Nonius s.v. _concinnare_ p. 43. _Idem in Academicis lib. I._: qui cum
+similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.
+
+EX LIBRO II.
+
+3. Nonius p. 65. _Aequor ab aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II.
+vocabulum accepisse confirmat_: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo
+etiam aequor illud poetae vocant.
+
+4. Nonius p. 69. _Adamare Cicero Academicorum lib. II._: qui enim serius
+honores adamaverunt vix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini
+possunt esse.
+
+5. Nonius p. 104. _Exponere pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis
+lib. II._: frangere avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad
+imitandum iuventuti.
+
+6. Nonius p. 121. _Hebes positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero
+Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere?
+cuius et nascentis et senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur
+cornua.
+
+7. Nonius p. 162. _Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? mare
+nonne caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem
+aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....
+
+8. Nonius p. 162. _Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_
+atqui si id crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non
+regulis.
+
+9. Nonius p. 394. _Siccum dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur
+et sobrium, non madidum ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ alius (_color_)
+adultis, alius adulescentibus, alius aegris, _alius sanis_, alius siccis,
+alius vinulentis ...
+
+10. Nonius p. 474. _Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.:_ si quando enim
+nos demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum
+cernimus.
+
+11. Nonius p. 545. _Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ quibus etiam
+alabaster plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.
+
+EX LIBRO III.
+
+Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. Sec.4. _De gloria librum ad te misi: at in eo_
+prooemium _id est, quod in Academico tertio._
+
+12. Nonius p. 65. _Digladiari ... idem tertio:_ digladiari autem semper,
+depugnare cum facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam
+stultissimum dixerit?
+
+13. Nonius p. 65. _Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib.
+III._: et ut nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus
+...
+
+14. Nonius p. 123. _Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib.
+III._: in tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas
+ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae.
+
+15. Nonius p. 419. _Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum
+lib. III._: aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.
+
+16. Lactantius Inst. div. VI. 24. _Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico
+tertio verba sunt:_ quod si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent,
+sic vitam deviam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset
+emendatio temeritatis.
+
+17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. _Varro ad Ciceronem
+tertio_ fixum _et Cicero Academicorum tertio_ (= _Lucullus_ Sec.27): +malcho
+in opera adfixa.
+
+18. Nonius p. 139. _Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic.
+Academicorum lib. III._: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus,
+abesse dicemus. = _Lucullus_ Sec.51.
+
+19. Nonius p. 117. _Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III._: qui gallinas
+alere permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae
+gallina peperisset dicere solebant. = _Lucullus_ Sec.57.
+
+EX LIBRO IIII.
+
+20. Nonius p. 69, _Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in Academicis
+lib. IIII._: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = _Lucullus_ Sec.67.
+
+21. Nonius p. 65. _Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et
+columna Maenia. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: item ille cum aestuaret,
+veterum ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = _Lucullus_
+Sec.70.
+
+22. Nonius p. 99. _Dolitum, quod dolatum usu dicitur, quod est percaesum
+vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum Academicorum lib. IIII._: non
+enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. = _Lucullus_ Sec.100.
+
+23. Nonius p. 164. _Ravum fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: quia
+nobismet ipsis tum caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole
+conlucet.... = _Lucullus_ Sec.105.
+
+24. Nonius p. 107. _Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic. Academicorum
+lib. IIII._: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi quendam laborem
+exanclatum. = _Lucullus_ Sec.108.
+
+25. Nonius p. 163. _Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic.
+Academicorum lib. IIII._: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = _Lucullus_ Sec.109.
+
+26. Nonius p. 122. _Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: at hoc
+Anaximandro infinitatem. = _Lucullus_ Sec.118.
+
+27. Nonius p. 65. _Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic. Academicorum lib.
+IIII._: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. = _Lucullus_ Sec.120.
+
+28. Nonius p. 189. _Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: nec
+ut ille qui asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse
+dicat. = _Lucullus_ Sec.121.
+
+29. Martianus Capella V. Sec.517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. _Cicero ... in
+Academicis_: latent ista omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa
+tenebris. = _Lucullus_ Sec.122.
+
+30. Nonius p. 102. _E regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum
+lib. IIII._: nec ego non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in
+contraria parte terrae qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia.
+= _Lucullus_ Sec.123.
+
+31. Nonius p. 80. _Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et
+confusione trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: plane, ut supra
+dictus, Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = _Lucullus_ Sec.135.
+
+Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.
+
+32. Lactantius Inst. div. III. 14. _Haec tua verba sunt_ (_sc. Cicero!_):
+mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua
+ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.
+
+33. August. contra Academicos II. Sec.26.: _id probabile vel veri simile
+Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent invitare_. ...
+Talia, _inquit Academicus_, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri
+similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno.
+Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus
+haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem
+decet esse sapientem. [_Proximis post hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat
+Augustinus haec ipsius esse Ciceronis verba_.]
+
+34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. Sec.15. _Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius
+causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... _
+Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes
+videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse
+sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo,
+qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.
+
+35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. Sec.43. _Ait enim Cicero_ illis (_i.e.
+Academicis_) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, nisi
+qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.
+
+36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei VI. 2. _Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T.
+Varroni) tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi
+versatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone_, homine, _inquit_,
+omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM
+
+LIBER II.
+
+I. 1. Magnum ingenium Luci Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum
+omnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus
+temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut
+enim admodum adolescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito
+paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor
+profectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit;
+deinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor--licebat enim celerius legis
+praemio--, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut
+diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad
+Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium, quae
+de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. 2. Idque eo fuit
+mirabilius, quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui
+adolescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum
+in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni
+magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter
+et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in
+rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma
+profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum,
+verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam
+verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam fuisse in
+Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt: qui
+quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum
+proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere,
+credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali
+ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles
+spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis
+mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. 3. Tantus ergo
+imperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus
+pugnis totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum
+maximus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos
+legisset, fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis
+temperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli
+institutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum
+utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque
+ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum
+victor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio
+tardius quam debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in
+urbem currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum
+in maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod
+hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito testimonio
+quam id cum mea laude communicem.
+
+II. 4. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt
+et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum
+multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim
+studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit
+quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed
+et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei
+militaris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus
+otii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur
+Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et
+post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea
+saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset.
+Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus audiebat.
+
+5. Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam
+etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras,
+plures qui philosophiam, reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum
+rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego
+autem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P.
+autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante
+censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum
+Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. 6. Restat ut iis
+respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam gravis illigari.
+Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut
+ludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro
+vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque
+amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis,
+quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis
+de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo
+operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem
+ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non
+modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis
+prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam augeri
+arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus
+notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. 7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis, qui
+in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus disputatur,
+scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam mortuis invidere.
+
+III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non probatur.
+Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret
+praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere
+quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare:
+quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla
+contentione volumus, idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim
+omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis
+rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa
+antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint,
+tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati
+relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in
+utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut
+verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. 8. Neque inter nos et eos, qui se
+scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea
+vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile,
+adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod
+integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut omnia, quae praescripta et
+quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum
+ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde
+infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius,
+quem primum audierunt, oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad
+quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad
+saxum adhaerescunt. 9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se credere ei, quem iudicent
+fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare
+potuissent--statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse
+sapientis--, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis
+etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem re semel audita atque ad
+unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare
+malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt, pugnacissime defendere quam
+sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere. Quibus de rebus et
+alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa,
+quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie
+venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus,
+quod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in
+Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in
+spatio consedimus.
+
+IV. 10. Hic Catulus: Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene
+explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea,
+quae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem,
+inquit Hortensius, feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram
+servatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in
+promptu erant, dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille:
+Non sane, inquit, Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est
+iis, qui placere volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde
+ea, quae dico, probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec
+ea, in quibus, si non fuerint, _non_ vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed
+mehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata
+est, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus
+agebat: nota enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno
+studio, eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei
+faciam quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum
+animos ereximus. 11. At ille: Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem,
+fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi
+Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat,
+homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus
+et nobilis: cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque
+leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo
+est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant:
+et homo natura lenissimus--nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius--stomachari
+tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante videram. At ille, Heracliti
+memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num
+vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis
+tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei
+familiares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa
+audivisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent
+descripsisse. 12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus
+commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin
+contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur
+et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item
+Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex
+eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque
+compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et
+Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in
+ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae contra Philonem erat,
+praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est adversarius is, qui ista, quae
+sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino dicere. Etsi enim mentitur,
+tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.
+
+V. 13. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini--me
+autem nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod
+seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt,
+quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur.
+Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit,
+commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint, cum
+consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem agrariam
+aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito
+senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium: illi
+quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero
+sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt
+Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam,
+alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium. Et de hoc
+quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum
+expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. 14. Similiter vos, cum
+perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam
+velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem,
+Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum
+inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum illorum nec
+Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti
+physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente
+incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere videatur, abstrusa
+esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse
+reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam
+quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire quam sciant. 15. Quod si illi
+tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot
+saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum
+iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut
+in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui
+constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret,
+qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e numero tollendus
+est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam,
+Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a
+quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates
+autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat
+refellere. Ita, cum aliud agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus
+est ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci [Greek: eironeian] vocant: quam ait
+etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non
+putandum, quod idem fuerit in Socrate.
+
+VI. 16. Sed fuerint illa veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est
+igitur actum, quod investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut
+putatur, obtrectans nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores
+immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est
+clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio,
+quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi,
+proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est
+quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, Lacydi
+discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit:
+nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum floruerunt: e
+quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit--declarat multitudo
+librorum--ingeni non minus in [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in
+Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus
+Metrodorus putabatur. 17. Iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos
+dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos
+facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e
+philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant: nec
+vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis, qui nihil probarent,
+Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo fuisset, reprehendebant, nec
+definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si
+verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam [Greek: katalepsin] illi vocant,
+eosque, qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi
+posset, inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius
+[Greek: enargeiai], ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si
+placet, nominemus fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi--me
+appellabat iocans--hoc licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam
+putabant illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara
+essent, definienda censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia
+quicquam priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici
+oportere putabant, ne qui fallerentur. 18. Plerique tamen et definitiones
+ipsarum etiam evidentium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua
+quaeratur, et homines dignos, quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem,
+dum nova quaedam commovet, quod ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra
+Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus
+a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod
+timebat. Cum enim ita negaret, quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset--id
+enim volumus esse [Greek: akatalepton]--, si illud esset, sicut Zeno
+definiret, tale visum--iam enim hoc pro [Greek: phantasiai] verbum satis
+hesterno sermone trivimus--visum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo, unde
+esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non esset, id nos a Zenone
+definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest quicquam comprehendi, ut
+plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod est tale, quale vel
+falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, iudicium tollit
+incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendi. Ita
+imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis oratio contra
+Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem, quam Philo
+voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse concedimus.
+
+VII. 19. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa
+sunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat
+contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius
+aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum
+est, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum,
+qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit
+et alia multa. Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et
+sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt.
+Itaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur,
+et intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum
+adspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in
+odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis
+iudicium requirat acrius. 20. Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi
+pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in
+sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos
+non videmus! quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere
+exercitati! qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut
+Andromacham, quum id nos ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu
+et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen.
+Quid de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris
+aut voluptatis? in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia
+sentiatur:--potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, et inter
+eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet non
+apertissime insaniat? 21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi
+dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed
+quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud,
+hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non
+sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde
+sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum
+comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis
+particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec
+intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. 22. Quod si essent falsae
+notitiae--[Greek: ennoias] enim notitias appellare tu videbare--, si igitur
+essent hae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis
+discerni non possent, quo tandem his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid
+cuique rei consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem
+certe, quae non modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una
+maxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse
+memoria falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et
+tenet? Ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex
+multis animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues
+artificem ab inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum
+negabimus, sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum
+non item. Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem
+cernat, aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres
+cernere ea potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt,
+aut is, qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem
+in similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo
+atque agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem
+tractabit, multa perceperit?
+
+VIII. 23. Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi
+multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non
+comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse
+censemus, itemque sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat
+constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti,
+quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui
+statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam
+aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges
+imposuerit, cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi,
+percepti, cogniti, constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam
+tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum
+supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non
+possint. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo
+modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam
+rem aut agere fidenter audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum
+vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia
+referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est,
+constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat,
+sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter
+appetitio--eam enim volumus esse [Greek: hormen]--, qua ad agendum
+impellimur, et id appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest. 25. Illud
+autem, quod movet, prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest,
+si id, quod visum erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri
+animus ad appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur
+accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit non
+occurrit animo, nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur,
+numquam movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est, necesse est id ei
+verum, quod occurrit, videri. 26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis
+tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate
+perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem,
+cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio
+cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea,
+quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi
+involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium
+quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet_ur_. Itaque
+argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece [Greek: apodeixis], ita definitur:
+'ratio, quae ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit.'
+
+IX. 27. Quod si omnia visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel
+falsa esse possent, neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo
+quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset
+conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi
+debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de
+se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant
+[Greek: dogmata], quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim
+decretum proditur, lex veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum
+proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari
+quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse
+falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla
+ratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui
+illa visa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis
+interesse. 28. Ex hoc illud est natum, quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id
+ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed
+Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse
+percipi, consentaneum esse unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia
+non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id
+consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam
+esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum
+quidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse.
+29. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id
+haberent Academici decretum,--sentitis enim iam hoc me [Greek: dogma]
+dicere--, nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in
+ceteris rebus, fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim
+esse regulam totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti
+incogniti: quam rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis_a_
+accipi oporteret et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri
+falsique iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec
+maxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse
+esse, qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut
+aut unde proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere
+dubia neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a sapientia
+plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut hoc unum
+saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia
+totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil
+approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.
+
+X. 30. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior--habet
+enim aliquantum a physicis--, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra
+dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de
+abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat
+subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal
+omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum
+primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut
+sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons
+est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea,
+quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia
+quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus
+construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum [Greek:
+ennoias], tum [Greek: prolepseis] vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio
+argumentique conclusio rerumque innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio
+eorum omnium apparet et eadem ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam
+pervenit. 31. Ad rerum igitur scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum
+sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime cognitionem, et istam [Greek:
+katalepsin], quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem
+dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat--nihil est enim ei veritatis luce
+dulcius--tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et artis
+efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat,
+ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit. Ergo ii, qui
+negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel instrumenta vel
+ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt funditus ipsumque
+animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate eorum, perinde ut causa
+postulat, dicere.
+
+32. Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid
+velint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea,
+quae disputentur, vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid
+ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo
+veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius,
+qui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque
+intersit inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur
+eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui
+omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi
+desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim--et hoc quidem vel maxime vos
+animadvertebam moveri--probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque
+se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.
+
+XI. 33. Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi,
+propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus,
+interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si
+nihil interest, nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique
+communis, ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum
+dicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem
+modo falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt
+pueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut
+si quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non
+ademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed
+propria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu
+probabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades
+volebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo
+agimus, tibi erit revertendum. 34. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum
+falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non
+potest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod
+ita mihi videatur verum, ut non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore
+versantur, cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt
+distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud
+quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque
+comprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum
+possit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo
+ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere
+inaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec
+argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. 35. Ex hoc illud
+iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur:
+'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur.
+Non enim urguent, ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque
+adseverare sine aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et
+propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique
+occurrit et primo quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo
+levius? 36. Sin ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod
+visum sit, id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis
+visis, inter quae nihil interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides:
+deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit
+diligentissimeque circumspexerit, exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile
+videatur et absit longissime a vero, ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent
+dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt.
+Ut enim confidant, notum iis esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et
+oppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam
+absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei
+signum aut argumentum et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod
+significatur, aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione
+hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam
+absentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet.
+
+XII. 37. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione
+atque approbatione, quam Graeci [Greek: synkatathesin] vocant, pauca
+dicemus, non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta.
+Nam cum vim, quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur,
+comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non
+potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod
+animal agit aliquid--nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale
+sit--, aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate
+sita, reddenda adsensio. 38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos
+neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra
+ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo
+non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam
+appareat--Graeci id [Greek: oikeion] appellant--, sic non potest obiectam
+rem perspicuam non approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est,
+vera sunt, nihil attinet de adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid
+percipit, adsentitur statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine
+adsensione posse constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum
+est, ut sit aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur,
+non erit. 39. Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime
+autem absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi
+adsensione: hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et
+firmitas ex iis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit,
+omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum
+sit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem
+actionem tollit e vita.
+
+XIII. 40. Nunc ea videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius
+potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt
+igitur primum artem quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et
+genera definiunt, in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit,
+totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant
+omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri
+possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia
+non percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi
+sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti
+conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic
+est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum est,
+id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est, ut
+eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius modi, ut
+in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint,
+alia non possint. 41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae
+autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant
+concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa sint,
+ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis
+non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint:'
+reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum:
+'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: 'omne visum,
+quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit esse.' 42. Haec duo
+proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam
+adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:
+primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni
+consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne
+ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa
+concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis,
+item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt,
+volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta esse falsa,
+quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.
+
+XIV. 43. Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed
+ab eorum causa, qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et
+partitiones et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines
+dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est
+hominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui
+clament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum
+aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam
+rem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa
+vera definitio sit? si_n_ negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera
+definitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur,
+id percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus
+partibus. 44. Si enim dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide
+perspicere nec ulla communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se
+fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui
+poterunt longius progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam
+concludi argumentum non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt,
+ita probatis, ut falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus
+comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse
+comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque
+ipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam
+quod non appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et
+ea, quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse
+quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro
+congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam falsa
+visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem, inter
+falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam
+interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.
+
+45. Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse
+videamur, quaeque ab iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis
+relinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam
+habet vim, ut ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed
+tamen, ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus
+est vel arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese,
+quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit
+subvenire erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem,
+dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil
+profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.
+
+XV. 46. Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus
+adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim
+primum, quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt,
+ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod
+fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti
+quidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet
+igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere,
+de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus
+interrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere
+constitui. 47. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam
+illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri
+esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus
+iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis, quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa
+quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea, quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis,
+auspiciis, extis declarentur--haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra
+disputant--, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere
+possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant, efficere non
+possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae
+perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae
+nihil sit omnino? 48. Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea
+declarant, quae cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel
+furiosis videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut
+non modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis
+nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se
+motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset,
+qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset
+inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae
+falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile
+internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi
+dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in
+visis distinctio appareat.
+
+XVI. 49. Ad has omnis visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat
+et erat de hac una re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum
+puto, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod
+captiosissimo genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in
+philosophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut
+demitur. Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano.
+Vitiosum sane et captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum
+obiectum est a deo dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri
+simile? cur deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne
+internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc si
+perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin ipse
+tua sponte processeris, tuum. 50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum
+posse aut ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid
+cui simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit?
+deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi canibus
+similes _sunt_, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt
+quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa:
+quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia
+quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri
+possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium generum nihil
+interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno. 51.
+Quod fieri qui potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive
+illa cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete
+sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis
+perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim,
+cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse
+commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et
+inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum
+Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba
+ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:
+
+  'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'
+
+Idemque in Epicharmo:
+
+  'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'
+
+Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus,
+ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.
+
+XVII. 52. At enim dum videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum_que_,
+quae vigilantes videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim
+dicimus, non eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium
+nec mente nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione
+faciunt qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae
+videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam
+levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes
+furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum
+relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:
+
+  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum
+  adspectu' ...
+
+53. At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro
+veris. Et alias quidem saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte
+gravitas aut tarditas aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo
+temporis brevitate excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando
+sustinere adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset,
+aut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest
+levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus
+gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis
+somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere
+quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos
+aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter vigilantium
+visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter adfecti, tum nihil
+interesse. 54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod
+nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae [Greek: adela] Graeci. Si enim res se ita
+habeant, ut nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano, cui
+possit exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non mediocris
+insaniae est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis
+impressorum pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum similitudines negat
+esse, cum eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si satis est ad tollendam
+cognitionem similia esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti,
+praesertim concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius contenditis, quod rerum
+natura non patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit tale, quale est, nec sit
+in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas? ut [sibi] sint
+et ova ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi
+vis in geminis? Conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras:
+tu autem vis eosdem plane esse, non similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest.
+55. Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in Academia irridentur, a
+quibus ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais Democritum dicere
+innumerabilis esse mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum
+similis, sed undique perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut inter eos nihil
+prorsus intersit [et eos quidem innumerabiles], itemque homines. Deinde
+postulas, ut, si mundus ita sit par alteri mundo, ut inter eos ne minimum
+quidem intersit, concedatur tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid
+alicui sic sit par, ut nihil differat, nihil intersit. Cur enim, inquies,
+ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni adfirmat, in reliquis
+mundis et in iis quidem innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non
+modo possint esse, sed etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non
+possit effici?
+
+XVIII. 56. Primum quidem me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior
+potiusque refello propter id, quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis
+singularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos
+Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam
+eosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a
+suis. An non videmus hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis
+internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti
+ne minimum quidem similes viderentur? 57. Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo:
+quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum
+ei res similes occurrant, quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum
+nec umquam ulli viso adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse
+non possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis
+possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater
+geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si
+adsueveris. Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen
+hoc accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere
+permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id gallina
+peperisset dicere solebant. 58. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis
+est ova illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc
+illud esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam,
+ut talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non
+licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri
+enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit
+quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere,
+cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones
+nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi vero non
+specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi
+nota. 59. Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re
+nulla impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non
+distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa
+necessario nata est [Greek: epoche], id est adsensionis retentio, in qua
+melius sibi constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli
+existimant. Si enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est, tollendus
+adsensus est. Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare non
+cognitum? Carneadem autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse _eo_ delabi
+interdum, ut diceret opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse sapientem. Mihi
+porro non tam certum est esse aliquid, quod comprehendi possit, de quo iam
+nimium etiam diu disputo, quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est, numquam
+adsentiri rei vel falsae vel incognitae. 60. Restat illud, quod dicunt,
+veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo
+igitur videre quid invenerint. Non solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt
+tandem ista mysteria? aut cur celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam
+vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit, ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur.
+Quid, si utroque? num peius est? Unum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse
+quod percipi possit. An in eo auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem videtur
+vel plurimum. Quis enim ista tam aperte perspicueque et perversa et falsa
+secutus esset, nisi tanta in Arcesila, multo etiam maior in Carneade et
+copia rerum et dicendi vis fuisset?
+
+XIX. 61. Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo
+etiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus.
+Sed iam confirmata causa te, hominem amicissimum--me autem appellabat--et
+aliquot annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus
+philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris, eam
+philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio,
+privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis quidem, quibus
+adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat sive eius loci, quem
+incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis uti lumine licebat,
+isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillam quidem
+ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si sequamur, iis vinculis
+simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus. 62. Sublata enim adsensione
+omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo recte
+fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam
+sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas aperueris
+in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse, quod mihi
+quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem ullam quae
+cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam atque etiam ne
+illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur auctoritas. Quae cum
+dixisset ille, finem fecit. 63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod
+quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret,
+nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius, me
+quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens--non enim satis intellegebam--, coepit
+hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli
+oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter, accurate, copiose, taceo neque te
+quo minus, si tibi ita videatur, sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud
+vero non censuerim, ut eius auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo
+monuit, inquit adridens, ut caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis,
+quorum vides quanta copia semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione
+quaereret qui tibi constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse
+reperiri, idem te comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De
+causa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno
+opere mirabor. Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia
+sensisset, simul ac visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset
+Catulus, me omnes intueri.
+
+XX. 64. Tum ego non minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius
+modi quadam oratione sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita
+movit, ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum,
+quae pro illa causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse
+diffiderem. Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses
+non minorem tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero.
+65. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad
+hanc potissimum philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed
+etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus
+pertinacia reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu
+consilioque totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum
+alios tum etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali
+disputatione id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum
+solet, iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri
+reperiendi et ea sentire, quae dicerem. 66. Qui enim possum non cupere
+verum invenire, cum gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc
+pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa
+turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui
+numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero
+ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator--non enim sum sapiens--et meas
+cogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,
+
+  'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'
+
+ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,
+
+  'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'
+
+sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore
+specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non de
+me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter mentem
+sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec percipio
+tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens; itaque visis
+cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse
+maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre. Nihil
+est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de gravitate sapientis, errore,
+levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis?
+quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te
+probatur--ut praepostere tecum agam, mox referam me ad ordinem--haec primum
+conclusio quam habeat vim considera.
+
+XXI. 67. Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam
+opinabitur: numquam autem opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc
+conclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum.
+Carneades non numquam secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita
+sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed
+illud primum, sapientem, si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse
+et Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a
+veris et quae non possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere. 68.
+Nobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo
+adsentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam
+vitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum,
+sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet, si temere
+processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa veris, eaque, quae percipi non
+possunt, _iis quae possunt_--si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus--,
+ut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem
+omnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das,
+accepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus
+omnes cohibiturum, ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum
+esse sapientem. Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse
+percipi: etenim de eo omnis est controversia.
+
+XXII. 69. Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me
+defenduntur, et didicit apud Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius
+didicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non
+acrius accusavit in senectute quam antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur
+fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim
+iste dies illuxerit quaero, qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse
+negitavisset, veri et falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae
+Stoici. Poenituit illa sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime
+ad Stoicos? eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi
+poenitebat? quid? Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum.
+Numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent
+habere. 70. Unde autem subito vetus Academia revocata est? Nominis
+dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod
+erant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii,
+qui se sequerentur, Antiochii vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non
+potuisse sustinere concursum omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt
+inter illos non nulla communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam
+reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub
+Novis solem non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum,
+sic Academicorum umbram secutus est. 71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum,
+cum ei placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille
+Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis
+oportere, illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro
+credidisset, honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea
+defensitavisset, honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum:
+qui ex illius commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis
+nostris a vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit _ut_
+quod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum
+hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.
+
+XXIII. 72. Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a
+nobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros
+viros, sed tamen popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res _non_ bonas
+tractent, similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri,
+quae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras
+nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si
+dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?--sic enim appellabantur
+ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophabantur--: maxima fuit et
+gravitatis et ingeni gloria. 73. Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo
+conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam animi? qui ita sit
+ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil excipit de quo non
+profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa? quis hunc philosophum
+non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis inferioris aetatis? qui mihi
+cum illo collati quintae classis videntur. Atque is non hoc dicit, quod
+nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus; ille verum
+plane negat esse: sensus quidem non obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic
+enim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus
+initio libri, qui est de natura: 'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne
+aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos,
+nec omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit.' 74. Furere tibi Empedocles videtur:
+at mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur, sonum fundere. Num ergo
+is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum magnam vim censet in iis esse
+ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt, iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus
+bonis quamquam versibus, sed tamen illi versibus increpant eorum
+adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire
+dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis
+certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones
+perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum
+sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, 'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius.
+Quid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non
+esset, nisi probavisset. Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla
+fuit ratio persequi.
+
+XXIV. 75. Videorne tibi, non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris
+homines, sed imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam
+molestos vobis, sed minutos, Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt
+contorta et aculeata quaedam [Greek: sophismata]; sic enim appellantur
+fallaces conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum habeam Chrysippum, qui
+fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa ille contra sensus, quam
+multa contra omnia, quae in consuetudine probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi
+quidem non videtur: sed dissolverit sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset,
+quae nos fallerent probabilitate magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile
+posse. 76. Quid Cyrenaici _tibi_ videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui
+negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere,
+quae tactu intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid
+colore aut quo sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.
+
+Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post
+illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis tantisque
+studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te ipso quidem
+iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse, sed
+verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. 77. Nemo, inquam, superiorum non
+modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec
+solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum vera
+sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone fortasse quid
+futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari
+sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset, quod percipi
+posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur visum? tum illum ita
+definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et
+effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset visum verum, quale
+vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi
+posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non
+est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum: neque
+enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si esset tale, quale vel falsum.
+Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a
+vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. 78. Haec est una
+contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse
+sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim nihil
+percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum: equidem
+Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab eo
+disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et
+perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, ut, si ostendero
+nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum esse.
+
+XXV. 79. Quid ergo est quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera
+nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle, communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere
+posses, idcirco heri non necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram.
+Tu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur?
+Nam et in remo sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris
+videri colores nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?--Manent
+illa omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.--Igitur
+semper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim rem
+demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam
+esse credendum. 80. Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et
+importune insistere! Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum
+oculum torsisset, duas ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse
+mendacium, non oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed
+hic quidem maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas
+esse, alia falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi
+nobis ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et
+integris sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?--Utinam
+quidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus,
+quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non
+cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies
+longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at
+familiarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem, non
+videmus. 81. At ille nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et
+octingenta stadia quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius.
+Responderem igitur audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse
+contentum. Dicet me acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque
+videntur a nobis et nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere
+possunt. Ergo ut illis aqua, sic nobis aer crassus offunditur. At amplius
+non desideramus. Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam
+quererer cum deo, quod parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem
+illam? Stare nobis videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa.
+Quaere rationem cur ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio
+an non possis, non tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum
+testimonium dicere ostenderis.
+
+XXVI. 82. Quid ego de nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse
+quaeris. Quid potest esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti
+partibus confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi
+quidem quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum
+quam videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum
+esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi
+igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri
+putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta incitatione
+fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem possit, tamen nobis
+stare videatur. 83. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso, quam in
+parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci,
+percipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E quibus primum
+est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id percipi, tertium,
+inter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi
+possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum verum a sensu
+profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo nihil intersit
+quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium
+omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos, quibuscum res est, id quoque
+conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est. 84. Qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum
+videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi visum, quod
+percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso: qua
+distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum Gemino consul
+fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non posset? Negas tantam
+similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum adversario
+facili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet igitur sensum, et si una
+fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit. Sublato enim iudicio illo,
+quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem videris, qui tibi videbitur,
+tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem
+modi falsa. 85. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus videri, quid
+habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non sit, quoniam
+aliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil
+esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum credibile 'nullum
+esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum.'
+Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod agitur, nihil
+interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an internosci non
+possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo tanta esse non
+potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, eadem
+temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros eiusdem
+modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres? 86. Quid? si in
+eius_dem_ modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in
+agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui,
+quoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret?
+
+XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae nos
+non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur. Quid?
+hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad quae
+pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire
+possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros
+mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura! 87. Cur non
+extimescam opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse
+aliquam vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo
+verbo utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi
+adhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur
+etiam eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de
+physicis mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo
+ante dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam,
+res iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris
+solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:--de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose
+omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem
+consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem
+fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.--88. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a
+te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et furiosorum
+visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum, sanorum. Quo
+modo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se vidisse Homerum,
+sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:
+
+  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'
+
+Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit, eum
+somnia re_ri_ et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea vera, quae
+essent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum videbantur, quo
+modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non putamus ita totum illud
+audivisse,
+
+  'O pietas animi ...',
+
+si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit illa
+visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti
+probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:
+
+  'Mater, te appello ...'
+
+nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde enim
+illa:
+
+'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur minorem
+habere visis quam vigilantes fidem?
+
+XXVIII. 89. Quid loquar de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus,
+Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is
+putabat quae videbantur? Quid ille, qui:
+
+  'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,'
+
+nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid? apud
+Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat sagittis,
+cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde movebatur
+falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi
+cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:
+
+  'unde haec flamma oritur?'
+
+et illa deinceps:
+
+  'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, _adsunt_, me expetunt:'
+
+Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat:
+
+  'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam
+      hanc vim, quae me excruciat!
+  Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant
+      cum ardentibus taedis.'
+
+Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:
+
+  'Intendit crinitus Apollo
+  arcum auratum, luna innixus:
+  Diana facem iacit a laeva.'
+
+90. Qui magis haec crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur?
+Apparet enim iam 'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur,
+ut illud efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et
+falsa ad animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa
+falsa vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non
+enim id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti
+sint, aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut
+furentium aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.
+
+91. Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse
+dicitis, veri et falsi quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et
+falsi? et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus
+iudicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia
+igitur. Sol quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut
+queat iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera
+sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? Si
+haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem pollicebatur.
+Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in philosophia multae
+atque magnae, non est satis. 92. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis,
+videte ne contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit
+elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum
+paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod
+tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.
+
+XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam
+nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus quatenus.
+Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re
+minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca,
+magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto
+certum respondeamus [non] habemus.--93. At vitiosi sunt soritae.--Frangite
+igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum
+est, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa,
+tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat
+quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur, [Greek: hesychazein]. Per me vel
+stertas licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit?
+Sequitur enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget. Quo in
+numero conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt?
+Progrediere rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim fateris, neque
+ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse. Cuius generis
+error ita manat, ut non videam quo non possit accedere. 94. Nihil me
+laedit, inquit: ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem veniam,
+equos sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi, praeceps
+erit. Sic me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose interroganti
+respondeo. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus es: si non
+habes, ne tu quidem percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed negas te usque
+ad obscura progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si id tantum modo,
+ut taceas, nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te captare volt, utrum
+tacentem irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad novem, verbi gratia,
+sine dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo insistis: etiam a certis
+et illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me in obscuris facere non
+sinis. Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adiuvat, quae nec augentis
+nec minuentis quid aut primum sit aut postremum docet. 95. Quid? quod eadem
+illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora.
+Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est,
+quidquid enuntietur--id autem appellant [Greek: axioma], quod est quasi
+effatum--, aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an falsa sunt?
+Si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris _an_ verum dicis? Haec
+scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius quam illa, quae nos
+non comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.
+
+XXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec eorum
+ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi
+est illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum sit'? Rebus
+sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias improbandas, quae sint
+in genere contrario. 96. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si
+dicis _nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem_ nunc lucere et verum
+dicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis.
+Itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum traditis. Aut quidquid
+igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars ista nulla est. Vide ergo
+hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis,
+mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui
+potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec
+Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic
+conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet
+scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius
+concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris,
+mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec
+approbare nec improbare. 97. Qui igitur magis illud? Si ars, si ratio, si
+via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in utroque. Sed hoc
+extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec inexplicabilia. Tribunum
+aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem numquam impetrabunt. Etenim
+cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et irridet, non
+impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur, 'aut vivet cras
+Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic statuant, omne, quod ita
+diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non modo verum esse, sed etiam
+necessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti tardum putant. Si enim,
+inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras
+Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis
+necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est, Antiochus et Stoici:
+totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis diiunctio--contraria
+autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa
+potest esse, nulla vera est. 98. Mecum vero quid habent litium, qui ipsorum
+disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades
+solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose, minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab
+eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec autem merces erat dialecticorum.
+Sequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo
+iudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob eam causam, quod ita didici, omne,
+quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris,
+mentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi
+hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.
+
+XXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi
+relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis sententia
+Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam, ut quisquam
+id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum
+Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde studiosus ac diligens.
+Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae
+iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo. 99. Duo placet esse Carneadi genera
+visorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi possint, alia
+quae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse probabilia; alia non
+probabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur,
+ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra posteriorem nihil dici
+oportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum esse, ut perceptio
+consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra naturam esset, si
+probabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam tu, Luculle,
+commemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur
+modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non etiam falsum nihil
+ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit specie probabile, si
+nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens
+ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis
+sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque
+percepta neque adsensa, sed similia veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita
+tollatur. 100. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num comprehensum animo
+habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui potest? Sed si iam
+ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta, probo navigio, bono
+gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur se illuc venturum esse
+salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et agendi et non agendi,
+faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam erat Anaxagoras, qui id
+non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde
+illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri quidem. 101. Et quaecumque
+res eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum,
+movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus, habet corpus,
+habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut ei multa vera videantur,
+neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam: eoque
+sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem modi exsistere falsum aliquod,
+cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui
+multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.
+
+XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur, praesto
+est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis tacentibus ex uno
+Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio tollitur. Quod est
+caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est, nihil percipi potest.'
+Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio
+ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa
+igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem
+certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus, tibi adsentior. 102. Quamquam nihil
+mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem maxime, cui erant
+ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec quivis arbitratu suo
+reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, certe levior reprehensio
+est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, non videtur hoc satis esse
+vobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere, quae a te vel maxime agitata
+sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? nihil tibi est perspicuum?'
+Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret.
+Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C.
+Lucilium scripsit poetam, cum scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum,
+eum, qui consul cum M. Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis--sunt
+enim mihi nota, propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima
+institutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur--, sed scriptum est
+ita: 103. 'Academicis placere esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut
+aliae probabiles videantur, aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia
+posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia
+sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait
+vehementer errare eos, qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus
+numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit
+disputatum, non inesse in his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et
+certi notam. 104. Quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus
+sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli
+adsentiri: altero, cum se a respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet,
+sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum
+placere, ut numquam adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem,
+ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere
+possit. +Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab
+adsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa, quibus
+ad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque partem
+respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit, dum sine
+adsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea, quae nulla re
+impedirentur. 105. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane, invidiosa
+certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos percipi
+comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri dicimus.
+
+XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem expedito,
+soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle, iacere iam
+illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens, de quo
+loquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, isdem
+sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare illud, quod
+nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, nec
+tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane
+ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et vibrat dissimileque
+est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis rationem reddere cur id
+eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod videbatur oculis, defendere.
+106. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim quaerebas. Quid? meminisse
+visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? Polyaenus, qui magnus
+mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro adsentiens totam
+geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae sciebat, oblitus est?
+Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut vobismet ipsis placet. Si
+igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque rerum est, omnia, quae quisque
+meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil
+potest, et omnia meminit Siron Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc
+omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime
+vis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si
+comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit. 107. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne,
+quae ipsae fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae
+tantum id, quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera
+et falsa diiudicent?
+
+Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum enim
+negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem
+perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum,
+ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam
+putant, vera esse haruspicum [_responsa_], auspicia, oracula, somnia,
+vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is potest facere vel de
+iis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas habuerint, cur id
+sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est aliquid, quod positum
+vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non possit? an tu in soritis
+poteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus non poterit eodem modo
+insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione ipsam veri similitudinem
+non impeditam sequi? 108. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei
+posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim videri
+oportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus
+esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli autem
+omnia, si visa tollantur.
+
+XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, sed
+brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto
+repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere,
+credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a
+Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris
+adsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea
+pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia
+sequitur, nulla re impediente? 109. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod
+statuet, ne id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque
+impediet in navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis
+procreandis plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter
+probabile.
+
+Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater, sed,
+ut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret consentaneum
+esse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum saltem dicere
+posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et sibi ipsum
+contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil comprehendi posse, si
+quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo potius putat urguendum fuisse
+Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum esse possit nisi comprehensum,
+perceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil
+posse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud
+decretum habeat et sine decretis vitam agere possit! 110. Sed ut illa habet
+probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc
+haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non
+habet, utitur probabilibus. Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur
+et incerta reddere. Non enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit,
+stellarum numerus par an impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de
+rebus, in quibus versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis
+enim nihil probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti
+nec quid faciat nec quid respondeat. 111. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti,
+Luculle, reprehensionem Antiochi--nec mirum: in primis enim est nobilis--,
+qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum. Cum enim
+sumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea differre a
+veris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse concessum, quod
+videretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli altero, quo neget
+visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id ita esset, si nos
+verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam falsa cernimus. Sed
+probandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum habemus.
+
+XXXV. 112. Ac mihi videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim
+campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in
+Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui
+id percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet
+illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum
+simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque etiam,
+si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille sapientem
+interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem huic loco
+valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum? 113. Quaero enim quid sit quod
+comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, ne
+Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale
+falsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito nimirum
+adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus Academia
+concedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet, vel quod
+amavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum et
+acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero quo
+tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam alia,
+haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae aut
+Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale, quale
+falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo. Horum
+neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque verum
+puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.
+
+XXXVI. 114. Illud ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes
+idque turpissimum esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi
+adroges, ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas,
+mores fingas, finis bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam
+vitam ingrediar definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium
+dicas te et artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia
+complectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad
+quam me deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si
+dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est. 115. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad
+suam quisque rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus
+cognationem esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam
+saepe rexisse, sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam
+inter se amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi?
+qui mecum vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo?
+qui ista Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola,
+si vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos
+impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint
+scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire.
+Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale
+est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet ipsis,
+de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec quaestio est.
+
+116. In tres igitur partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa
+sapientia est. Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita,
+videamus: at illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se
+illa scire persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura
+pendent, quae disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent
+persuadendi necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non
+persuadere, sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non
+quaero ex his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum
+progredi non possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat:
+extremitatem et quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit:
+liniamentum sine ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero,
+si adigam ius iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante
+rationes omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem
+maiorem esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem
+deum censet esse, contempserit. 117. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est
+crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille
+longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus,
+quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est:
+quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum
+esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget _et_ disciplinam? Etsi quamcumque
+eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e physicis
+potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor quaestiones
+infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia constant, videamus
+quem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio.
+
+XXXVII. 118. Princeps Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse
+primas ferunt, ex aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari
+et sodali suo, non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua
+omnia gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum aera, sed ea,
+quae ex eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex
+his omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis
+inter se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente
+divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse
+mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata
+figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur:
+Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in
+ceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem:
+Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et fore.
+Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo
+sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis proficisci
+volunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem, credo, quem
+sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo condemnatique discedent.
+119. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam
+habebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit nunc lucere, quam,
+quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quae et se
+et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum
+etiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis, terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam
+animalis intellegentia per omnia ea permanet et transeat, fore tamen
+aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore deflagret.
+
+XXXVIII. Sint ista vera--vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse veri--,
+comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste Stoicus sapiens
+syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens
+Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum,
+quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita
+esse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat motus mutationemque
+moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum exsistere, ut hic ornatus
+umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare, illud autem superius sicut
+caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem
+relinquatur. 120. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium, quanti
+libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est? Cur deus,
+omnia nostra causa cum faceret--sic enim voltis--, tantam vim natricum
+viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa _ac_ perniciosa terra marique
+disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine
+divina aliqua sollertia. Cuius quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad
+apium formicarumque perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis
+minutorum opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur. 121. Negas sine deo posse
+quicquam. Ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo
+immunitatem magni quidem muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem
+habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad
+fabricandum mundum. Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec,
+ut ille, qui asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta
+haec esse dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non
+docentis, sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens,
+quidquid aut sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet
+ponderibus et motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore.
+Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes
+divinum numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit--quod cui non
+accidit?--extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen adsentior,
+nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.
+
+XXXIX. 122. Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa
+tenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum,
+terram intrare possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium,
+quam vim quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum
+intererat ea nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici
+notiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed
+ecquid nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus,
+ut videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an
+media pendeat? 123. Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram
+multarum urbium et montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui
+dixit, iurare posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam
+dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis
+vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos [Greek: antipodas] vocatis:
+cur mihi magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis, qui, cum
+audiunt, desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait Theophrastus,
+caelum, solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare censet neque
+praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum axem se summa
+celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae, si stante terra
+caelum moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam
+arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure? loquere. Putas solem
+esse tantulum? Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos ab illo irridemini et
+ipsi illum vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali irrisione Socrates, liber
+Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat posse. 124. Sed redeo ad animum
+et corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura sit,
+quae venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an, ut
+Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis habeat, ut
+Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit? si
+simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus
+nullo corpore--quod intellegi quale sit vix potest--et, quidquid est,
+mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Horum
+aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur, nostro ne quid maxime quidem
+probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum paria
+momenta.
+
+XL. 125. Sin agis verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non
+adsentiar, sed quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem
+potissimum? quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis
+fui. Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes
+esse, cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur
+corporum cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos
+ullas, e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine
+aliqua mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus
+hic tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante
+post, alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc
+simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis
+isdem esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus,
+isdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid
+animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus
+irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus
+adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire. 126. Non ergo id
+agitur, ut aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam
+postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne probabilia
+quidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam esse
+arbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne
+exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud scio
+an ita sit.
+
+XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio? an
+Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et reliquis
+fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia
+regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis
+auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione
+sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri
+serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem--ipse enim hic radiatus me intueri
+videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui--vos ergo huius
+magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis
+architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum
+sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior? 127. Neque tamen istas quaestiones
+physicorum exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale
+quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur,
+elatiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque
+caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum
+cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero
+aliquid occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus
+voluptate. 128. Quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed
+vester, ut adsentiatur, credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere
+opinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile
+quod sit invenerit. Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum
+ante dicendum est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde
+adfirmant, earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur,
+amittere. Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam,
+cum cornix cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis
+adfirmabunt signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem
+metiri non possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam
+terram. Ex quo illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non
+potest, qui ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas
+res non percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id
+approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse percipi
+quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera percipi
+comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis minusve
+comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.
+
+XLII. 129. Sed quod coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis
+explorati? nempe fines constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum
+summa referatur: qua de re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio?
+Omitto illa, quae relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et
+scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum
+ab eo dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis
+disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo
+nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici
+philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a
+quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod esset
+unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A Menedemo
+autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in
+mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli similia, sed,
+opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius. 130. Hos si contemnimus et iam
+abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui cum
+Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum
+nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in mediis ea
+momenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum bonum est in his
+rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae [Greek: adiaphoria] ab ipso dicitur.
+Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae [Greek: apatheia]
+nominatur. Has igitur tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae
+diu multumque defensa sunt. 131. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt:
+quorum princeps Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post
+Epicurus, cuius est disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de
+ipsa voluptate consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse
+Callipho censuit: vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate
+Diodorus: ambo hi Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis,
+quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut indicant
+scripta Polemonis, quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles eiusque
+amici nunc proxime videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo
+probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui rebus iis, quas
+primas natura conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere, quod ducatur a
+conciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inventor et
+princeps Stoicorum fuit.
+
+XLIII. 132. Iam illud perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos
+exposui, malorum finis esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar:
+modo ne quis illud tam ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo
+aliquem.' Nihil potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos.
+Licetne--omitto per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope
+singularem--per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem,
+si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in
+discrimine. Nam aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae.
+Utrumque non potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota
+possessione contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni
+continetur, de qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non
+potest igitur uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed
+alter. Si Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens--nam vos quidem
+nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum--: sin vera sunt Zenonis, eadem
+in veteres Academicos _et_ Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur neutri
+adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? 133. Quid? cum ipse
+Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne
+indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia peccata
+esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat tandem mihi
+considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue aliquando
+quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in utramque
+partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim dicebas esse,
+Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito assentiar: quod
+mihi tecum est dogma commune. 134. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno
+in una virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit,
+beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti,
+homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse,
+partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam
+natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente.
+Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et
+fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat, si
+sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur, et
+tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his
+discrepant.
+
+XLIV. 135. Quid? illa, in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare
+possumus? Sapientis animum numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia
+efferri. Age, haec probabilia sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere,
+numquam dolere? Sapiensne non timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si
+deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est
+in bonis, tibi vero, Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona,
+praeter turpitudinem multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens
+necesse est et venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint _ab_ Academia
+vetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent?
+Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse
+quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu. Est enim
+non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, ad verbum
+ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant
+permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa, misericordiam
+aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse
+dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus. 136. Atrocitas quidem ista tua quo
+modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non possum, non
+quo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum,
+quae [Greek: paradoxa] nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista
+tetigit? hos enim quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis
+solos reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent,
+sapientis esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne
+quinquevirum quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum
+liberum? insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique
+scripta Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis
+quidem aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? 137. Haec tibi, Luculle,
+si es adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia:
+mihi autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.
+
+XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad senatum in
+Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M. Marcello coss.
+praetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, doctum sane
+hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem dixisse
+Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia sapiens non
+sum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico non videris.'
+Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, non dubitavisset
+quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas incoleret. Sed ille
+noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens. 138. Vos
+autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et comprobem
+incognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur saepe
+Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de finibus
+bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem esse
+finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id esse, si
+vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed in
+vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum honestate
+coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda
+adiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat probabiliter posse
+defendi. 139. Sit sane ita--quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et
+Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam habeo adhuc
+probabilius--, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas sensibus nostris
+blandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut Aristippo. Revocat virtus
+vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos motus esse dicit, hominem iungit
+deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam Aristippus, quasi animum nullum
+habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno, quasi corporis simus expertes, animum
+solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem sequar, cuius quidem sententiam
+Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur.
+Quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid
+Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et
+gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu, cum honestas in voluptate
+contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate tamquam hominem cum belua
+copulabis?
+
+XLVI. 140. Unum igitur par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum
+honestate. De quo Chrysippo fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio.
+Alteram si sequare, multa ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere,
+caritas, amicitia, iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest,
+nisi erit gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium
+impellitur, ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis.
+Audi contra illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant,
+nisi forte, quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere:
+fontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc
+praescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in
+vita sequeretur habiturum. 141. Nihil igitur me putatis, haec et alia
+innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me
+minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum interest, quod tu, cum es commotus,
+adquiescis, adsentiris, approbas, verum illud certum, comprehensum,
+perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque
+pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror, cui si
+adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam vera a falsis nullo
+discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia ista dialecticae nulla sint.
+
+142. Venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium
+Protagorae est, qui putet id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud
+Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii:
+aliud Epicuri, qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in
+voluptate constituit. Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque
+ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis
+esse voluit. 143. Num quid horum probat noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne
+maiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt
+de ratione loquendi multi et multum probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo
+profecto nihil est acutius, nihil politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.
+
+XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut cur
+cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in elementis
+dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne sit, si quid
+ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta contentio est! Aliter
+Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. Quid? cum Cleanthe
+doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet! quid? duo vel principes
+dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis
+in rebus dissentiunt? 144. Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam
+in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi
+tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud, cum artificia tolli quereris a
+nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui si undique omnes convenerint,
+facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam primum illa invidiosa, quod eos
+omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules, servos, insanos esse dicatis:
+deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos,
+qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos Zeno, negat Antiochus scire
+quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim defendimus etiam insipientem multa
+comprehendere. 145. At scire negatis quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et
+hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum
+ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum
+digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat
+pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine
+etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, [Greek: katalepsin] imposuit. Cum
+autem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque
+compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem
+esse neminem. Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi quidem solent
+dicere. Ita tu nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu, Hortensi, in tua villa
+nos esse. 146. Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen nimis
+eleganter: illa subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi posset,
+artificia concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile esset,
+satis magnam vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine
+scientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut
+Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos
+docuisset aliquis quam vim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: ne
+nobis quidem suscenserent, cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod nusquam
+esset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem maiorum etiam
+comprobat diligentia, qui primum iurare 'ex sui animi sententia' quemque
+voluerunt, deinde ita teneri 'si sciens falleret,' quod inscientia multa
+versaretur in vita, tum, qui testimonium diceret, ut 'arbitrari' se diceret
+etiam quod ipse vidisset, quaeque iurati iudices cognovissent, ea non ut
+esse facta, sed ut 'videri' pronuntiarentur.
+
+XLVIII. 147. Verum, quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius
+ipse insusurrat navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis
+multa dixi, est mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius
+de dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate
+naturae deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus
+tanto opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere
+necesse sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque
+reliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra
+se Stoici texuerunt. 148. Tum Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec
+contulisse. Saepius enim congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis
+nostris, si quae videbuntur, requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus
+sentit? quid Hortensius? Tum Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor
+sententiam, quam quidem ille Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil
+putem posse, adsensurum autem non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem
+existimem, sed ita, ut intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod
+comprehendi et percipi possit: qua re [Greek: epochen] illam omnium rerum
+non probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit,
+vehementer adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum
+aspernor. Sed tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens:
+Tollendum. Teneo te, inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia. Ita
+sermone confecto Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras descendimus.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTES.
+
+BOOK I.
+
+    Sec.Sec.1--14. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae (1). Cic.,
+    after adroitly reminding Varro that the promised dedication of the _De
+    Lingua Latina_ is too long delayed, turns the conversation towards
+    philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves this subject untouched (2,
+    3). Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful
+    purpose, and points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4--6). He
+    greatly believes in philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to
+    Greece for it, while he devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks
+    have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion, but demurs to the
+    theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. Latins may surely
+    imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and orators. He gives
+    reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and instancing the
+    success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy (9--12).
+    Varro putting the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the
+    Old Academy for the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for
+    the statement that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro
+    refers to Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a
+    proposal on the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference
+    between Antiochus and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition
+    of the principles of Antiochus (13, 14).
+
+Sec.1. _Noster_: our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus
+than of Cic., see Introd. p. 37. _Nuntiatum_: the spelling _nunciatum_ is a
+mistake, cf. Corssen, _Ausspr._ I. p. 51. _A M. Varrone_: _from M. Varro's
+house_ news came. _Audissemus_: Cic. uses the contracted forms of such
+subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms like
+_audiissemus_. _Confestim_: note how artfully Cic. uses the dramatic form
+of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for Varro. _Ab eius
+villa_: the prep is absent from the MSS., but Wesenberg (_Em. M.T. Cic.
+Epistolarum_, p. 62) shows that it must be inserted. Cic. writes _abesse
+Roma_ (_Ad Fam._ V. 15, 4), _patria_ (_T.D._ V. 106) etc., but not _abesse
+officio_ (_De Off._ I. 43, where Wes. alters it) or the like. _Satis eum
+longo intervallo_: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after Davies, reads _se
+visentum_ for _satis eum_, quoting _Ad Att._ I. 4, Madv. _tum_ for _eum_
+(Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the repetition
+of pronouns (_illum_, _eum_) is quite Ciceronian. The emphatic _ille_ is
+often repeated by the unemphatic _is_, cf. _T.D._ III. 71, and _M.D.F._ V.
+22. I may note that the separation of _satis_ from _longo_ by the word
+_eum_ is quite in Cicero's style (see my note on 25 _quanta id magis_).
+Some editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking _intervallo_ of distance
+in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly press _satis_,
+which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently." The words _satis
+longo intervallo_ simply = "after a tolerably long halt." For the clause
+_ut mos_, etc., cf. _De Or._ II. 13.
+
+Sec.2. _Hic pauca primo_: for the omission of _locuti_, cf. the very similar
+passages in _D.F._ I. 14, III. 8, also my note on 14. _Atque ea_: Halm
+brackets _ea_, quite needlessly, for its insertion is like Cic. _Ecquid
+forte Roma novi_: _Roma_ is the ablative, and some verb like _attulisset_
+is omitted. (So Turnebus.) To take it as nom., understanding _faciat_, is
+clearly wrong. _Percontari_: the spelling _percunctari_ rests on false
+derivation (Corss. I. 36). _Ecquid ipse novi_: cf. _De Or._ II. 13. The
+MSS. have _et si quid_, bad Latin altered by Manutius. _Istum_: some edd.
+_ipsum_, but Cic. often makes a speaker use _iste_ of a person who is
+present. Goer. qu. _Brut._ 125, _De Or._ II. 228. _Velit_: Walker reads
+_velis_ with St Jerome. For _quod velit_ = _quod quis velit_, cf. _De Or._
+I. 30. _In manibus_: so often, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 38. _Idque_: MSS. have in
+the place of this _quod_ with variants _que_, _quae_, _qui_, _quo_. Dav.
+gave _quia_, which was the vulgate reading down to Halm, who reads _idque_,
+after Christ. _Ad hunc enim ipsum_: MSS. have _eum_ for _enim_ (exc. Halm's
+G). Such a combination of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for
+expressions like _me illum ipsum_ (_Ad Att._ II. 1, 11) are not in point.
+Of course if _quia_ be read above, _eum_ must be ejected altogether.
+_Quaedam institui_: the _De Lingua Latina_; see _Ad. Att_ XIII. 12.
+
+Sec.3. _E Libone_: the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see Caesar _B. Civ._
+III. 5, 16, 24. _Nihil enim eius modi_ again all MSS. except Halm's G. have
+_eum_ for _enim_. Christ conj. _enim eum_; so Baiter. _Illud ...
+requirere_: i.e. the question which follows; cf. _requiris_ in 4. _Tecum
+simul_: Halm's G om. _tecum_; but cf. _De Or._ III. 330. _Mandare
+monumentis--letteris illustrare_: common phrases in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 1,
+_T.D._ I. 1, _De Div._ II. 4. _Monumentis_: this, and not _monimentis_
+(Halm) or _monementis_, is probably the right spelling; cf. Corss. II. 314.
+_Ortam a_: Cic. _always_ writes the prep. after _ortus_; cf. _M.D.F._ V.
+69. _Genus_: regularly used by Cic. as _opus_ by Quintilian to mean
+"department of literature." _Ea res_: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter
+has _ars_; on the other hand Bentley (if the _amicus_ so often quoted in
+Davies' notes be really he) reads _artibus_ for _rebus_ below. The slight
+variation, however, from _res_ to _artibus_ is such as Cic. loves.
+_Ceteris_: the spelling _caeteris_ (Klotz) is absolutely wrong, cf. Corss.
+I. 325. _Antecedat_: some MSS. give _antecellat_. a frequent variant, cf.
+_De Off._ I. 105
+
+Sec.4. _Deliberatam--agitatam_: Cic. as usual exaggerates the knowledge
+possessed by the _personae_ of the dialogue; cf. Introd. p. 38, _De Or._
+II. 1. _In promptu_: so II. 10. _Quod ista ipsa ... cogitavi_: Goer., who
+half a page back had made merry over the gloss hunters, here himself
+scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo expels the words. Yet
+they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf. _De Div._ II. 1, _Cat. Mai._ 38), and
+moreover nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and
+clauses in slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense
+desire to flatter Varro. _Si qui ... si essent_: the first _si_ has really
+no conditional force, _si qui_ like [Greek: eitines] merely means "all
+who," for a strong instance see _Ad Fam._ I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe, _si accusandi
+sunt, si qui pertimuerunt_. _Ea nolui scribere_, etc.: very similar
+expressions occur in the prologue to _D.F._ I., which should be compared
+with this prologue throughout.
+
+Sec.5. _Vides ... didicisti_: MSS. have _vides autem eadem ipse didicisti
+enim_. My reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ,
+has _vides autem ipse--didicisti enim eadem--non posse_, etc. _Similis_:
+Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write _i_ and _e_ indiscriminately
+in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write _i_ everywhere, we shall thus,
+I believe, be far nearer Cicero's real writing. Though I do not presume to
+say that his usage did not vary, he must in the vast majority of instances
+have written _i_, see Corss. I. 738--744. _Amafinii aut Rabirii_: cf.
+Introd. p. 26. _Definiunt ... partiuntur_: n. on 32. _Interrogatione_:
+Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g.
+Bentl. _argumentatione_, Ernesti _ratione_. But the word as it stands has
+exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure.
+_Interrogatio_ is merely the _conclusio_ or syllogism put as a series of
+questions. Cf. _Paradoxa_ 2, with _T.D._ II. 42 which will show that
+_interrogatiuncula_ and _conclusiuncula_ are almost convertible terms. See
+also _M.D.F._ I. 39. _Nec dicendi nec disserendi_: Cic.'s constant mode of
+denoting the Greek [Greek: rhetorike] and [Greek: dialektike]; note on 32.
+_Et oratorum etiam_: Man., Lamb. om. _etiam_, needlessly. In _Ad Fam._ IX.
+25, 3, the two words even occur without any other word to separate them.
+For _oratorum_ Pearce conj. _rhetorum_. _Rhetor_, however is not thus used
+in Cic.'s phil. works. _Utramque vim virtutem_: strange that Baiter (esp.
+after Halm's note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj. _unam_ for
+_virtutem_. Any power or faculty (vis, [Greek: dynamis]) may be called in
+Gk. [Greek: arete], in Lat _virtus_. Two passages, _D.F._ III. 72, _De Or._
+III. 65, will remove all suspicion from the text. _Verbis quoque novis_:
+MSS. have _quanquam_ which however is impossible in such a place in Cic.
+(cf. _M.D.F._ V. 68). _Ne a nobis quidem_: so all the MSS., but Orelli
+(after Ernesti) thinking the phrase "_arrogantius dictum_" places _quidem_
+after _accipient_. The text is quite right, _ne quidem_, as Halm remarks,
+implies no more than the Germ. _auch nicht_, cf. also Gk. [Greek: oude].
+_Suscipiatur labor_: MSS. om. the noun, but it is added by a later hand in
+G.
+
+Sec.6. _Epicurum, id est si Democritum_: for the charge see _D.F._ I. 17, IV.
+13, _N.D._ I. 73. _Id est_ often introduces in Cic. a clause which
+intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause, exx. in _M.D.F._
+I. 33. _Cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris_: cf. _D.F._ I. 18, the
+same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists, _Met._ A, 2. Many
+editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read _efficientis_, which would then
+govern _rerum_ (cf. _D.F._ V. 81, _De Fato_, 33, also Gk. [Greek:
+poietikos]). But the genitive is merely one of definition, the _causae_ are
+the _res efficientes_, for which cf. 24 and _Topica_, 58, _proximus locus
+est rerum efficientium, quae causae appellantur_. So Faber, though less
+fully. _Appellat_: i.e. Amafinius, who first so translated [Greek: atomos].
+_Quae cum contineantur_: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it
+must be kept, and _adhibenda etiam_ begins the _apodosis_. Madvig
+(_Emendationes ad Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos_, Hauniae, 1825, p. 108)
+tacitly reads _continentur_ without _cum_, so Orelli and Klotz. Goer.
+absurdly tries to prop up the subj. without _cum_. _Quam quibusnam_:
+Durand's em. for _quoniam quibusnam_ of the MSS., given by Halm and also
+Baiter. Madv. (_Em._ p. 108) made a forced defence of _quoniam_, as marking
+a rapid transition from one subject to another (here from physics to
+ethics) like the Gk. [Greek: epei], only one parallel instance, however,
+was adduced (_T.D._ III. 14) and the usage probably is not Latin.
+_Adducere?_: The note of interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole sentence,
+so far, explains the difficulty of setting forth the true system of
+physics. If _quoniam_ is read and no break made at _adducere_, all after
+_quoniam_ will refer to ethics, in that case there will be a strange change
+of subject in passing from _quisquam_ to _haec ipsa_, both which
+expressions will be nominatives to _poterit_, further, there will be the
+almost impossible ellipse of _ars_, _scientia_, or something of the kind
+after _haec ipsa_. On every ground the reading of Madv. is insupportable.
+_Quid, haec ipsa_: I have added _quid_ to fill up the lacuna left by Halm,
+who supposes much more to have fallen out. [The technical philosophical
+terms contained in this section will be elucidated later. For the Epicurean
+ignorance of geometry see note on II. 123] _Illi enim simpliciter_:
+"frankly," cf. _Ad Fam._ VIII. 6, 1 _Pecudis et hominis_: note on II. 139.
+
+Sec.7. _Sive sequare ... magnum est_: for the constr. cf. II. 140. _Magnum
+est_: cf. _quid est magnum_, 6. _Verum et simplex bonum_: cf. 35. _Quod
+bonum ... ne suspicari quidem_ an opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp
+_T.D._ III. 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with the Greek
+preserved by Diog. Laert. X. 6 (qu. Zeller, 451), and less accurately by
+Athenaeus, VII. 279 (qu. R. and P. 353). _Ne suspicari quidem_: for this
+MSS. give _nec suspicari_, but Madv. (_D.F._, Excursus III.) has
+conclusively shown that _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_ is post Augustan Latin.
+Christ supposes some thing like _sentire_ to have fallen out before _nec
+suspicari_; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in _D.F._ II.
+20, 30, _T.D._ III. 46, _N.D._ I. 111, where the same opinion of Epicurus
+is dealt with, we have either _ne suspicari quidem_ or _ne intellegere
+quidem_ (cf. also _In Pisonem_ 69). Further, _ne ... quidem_ is esp
+frequent with _suspicari_ (_D.F._ II. 20), and verbs of the kind
+(_cogitari_ II. 82), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end of
+sentences eg _Verr._ II. 1, 155. Notice _negat ... ne suspicari quidem_
+without _se_, which however Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous
+passages produced from Cic. by Madv. (_Em._ 111), in which not only _se_,
+but _me_, _nos_, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the
+infinitive, after verbs like _negat_. Cf. also the omission of _sibi_ in
+_Paradoxa_ 40. _Si vero_: this, following _sive enim_ above, is a departure
+from Cic.'s rule which is to write _sive--sive_ or _si--sin_, but not
+_si--sive_ or _sive--si_. This and two or three other similar passages in
+Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most important and
+exhaustive excursus to his _D.F._ (p. 785, ed. 2), and are connected with
+other instances of broken sequence. There is no need therefore to read
+_sive_ here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others. _Quam nos ... probamus_:
+cf. Introd. p. 62. _Erit explicanda_: for the separation of these words by
+other words interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see 11, 17. I am
+surprised that Halm and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical
+objection to the phrase _explicare Academiam_, and read _erunt_ against the
+MSS., making _illa_ plural. If _erunt_ is read, _erit_ must be supplied
+from it to go with _disserendum_, which is harsh. _Quam argute, quam
+obscure_: at first sight an oxymoron, but _argute_ need not only imply
+_clearness_, it means merely "acutely". _Quantum possum_: some MSS. have
+_quantam_, which is scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only
+follows _nequeo_, _volo_, _malo_, _possum_, and such verbs when an
+infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For _velle_ see a good
+instance in _D.F._ III. 68, where consult Madv. _Constantiam_: the notions
+of firmness, consistency, and clearness of mind are bound up in this word,
+cf. II. 53. _Apud Platonem_: _Timaeus_, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by
+Cic., cf. _De Leg._ I. 58, _Laelius_ 20, 47, _T.D._ I. 64.
+
+Sec.8. _Id est ... jubeo_: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss.
+But Cicero is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight
+variations in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of
+slightly varied phrases connected by _id est_ in _D.F._ I. 72, II. 6, 90. I
+therefore hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words. _Ea a_:
+Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read
+_e_ for _a_, which Halm would also prefer. _De_, _ab_, and _ex_ follow
+_haurire_ indifferently in Cic. _Rivulos consectentur_: so Wordsworth, "to
+hunt the waterfalls". The metaphor involved in _fontibus--rivulos_ is often
+applied by Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus
+in _N.D._ I. 120. _Nihil enim magno opere_: _magno opere_ should be written
+in two words, not as _magnopere_, cf. the phrases _maximo opere_, _nimio
+opere_, the same holds good of _tanto opere_, _quanto opere_. _L. Aelii_:
+MSS. _Laelii_. The person meant is L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the
+master of Varro, and the earliest systematic grammarian of Rome. See
+Quintil. _Inst. Or._ X. 1, 99, Gellius X. 21, Sueton. _Gramm._ 3.
+_Occasum_: an unusual metaphor. _Menippum_: a Cynic satirist, see _Dict.
+Biogr._ Considerable fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and
+have often been edited--most recently by Riese (published by Teubner).
+_Imitati non interpretati_: Cic. _D.F._ I. 7, gives his opinion as to the
+right use to be made of Greek models. _+Quae quo_: these words are
+evidently wrong. Halm after Faber ejects _quae_, and is followed by Baiter.
+Varro is thus made to say that he stated many things dialectically, _in
+order that_ the populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault
+lies in the word _quo_, for which I should prefer to read _cum_ (=_quom_,
+which would be written _quo_ in the MSS.) The general sense would then be
+"Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature which the
+unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the learned
+read." _Laudationibus_: [Greek: logois epitaphiois], cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 48
+where Varro's are mentioned. _+Philosophe scribere_: the MSS. all give
+_philosophie_. Klotz has _philosophiam_, which is demonstrably wrong,
+_physica_, _musica_ etc. _scribere_ may be said, but not _physicam_,
+_musicam_ etc. _scribere_. The one passage formerly quoted to justify the
+phrase _philosophiam scribere_ is now altered in the best texts (_T.D._ V.
+121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads _philosophiae scribere_; his
+explanation is, as Orelli gently says, "vix Latina." I can scarcely think
+Halm's _philosophe_ to be right, the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic.
+almost condemns it by his use of the Greek [Greek: philosophos] (_Ad Att._
+XIII. 20). In older Greek the adverb does not appear, nor is [Greek:
+philosophos] used as an adjective much, yet Cic. uses _philosophus_
+adjectivally in _T.D._ V. 121, _Cat. Mai._ 22, _N.D._ III. 23, just as he
+uses _tyrannus_ (_De Rep._ III. 45), and _anapaestus_ (_T.D._ III. 57)
+Might we not read _philosophis_, in the dative, which only requires the
+alteration of a single letter from the MSS. reading? The meaning would then
+be "to write _for_ philosophers," which would agree with my emendation
+_cum_ for _quo_ above. _Philosophice_ would be a tempting alteration, but
+that the word [Greek: philosophikos] is not Greek, nor do _philosophicus_,
+_philosophice_ occur till very late Latin times. _Si modo id consecuti
+sumus_: cf. _Brut._ 316.
+
+Sec.9. _Sunt ista_: = [Greek: esti tauta], so often, e.g. _Lael._ 6. Some edd.
+have _sint_, which is unlikely to be right. _Nos in nostra_: Augustine (_De
+Civ. Dei_ VI. 2) quotes this with the reading _reduxerunt_ for
+_deduxerunt_, which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with
+approval Durand's remark, "_deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus
+humanitatis_." The words, however, are almost convertible; see _Cat. Mai._
+63. In _Lael._ 12, _Brut._ 86, we have _reducere_, where Durand's rule
+requires _deducere_, on the other hand cf. _Ad Herennium_ IV. 64, _hospites
+domum deducere. Aetatem patriae_ etc., August. (_De Civ. Dei_ VI. 3)
+describes Varro's "_Libri Antiquitatum_" (referred to in 8), in which most
+of the subjects here mentioned were treated of. _Descriptiones temporum_:
+lists of dates, so [Greek: chronoi] is technically used for dates, Thuc. V.
+20, etc. _Tu sacerdotum_: after this Lamb. inserts _munera_ to keep the
+balance of the clauses. Cic. however is quite as fond of variety as of
+formal accuracy. _Domesticam--bellicam_: opposed like _domi bellique_, cf.
+_Brut._ 49, _De Off._ I. 74. Augustine's reading _publicam_ shows him to
+have been quoting from memory. _Sedem_: so the best MSS. of Aug., some edd.
+here give _sedium_. The argument for _sedem_ is the awkwardness of making
+the three genitives, _sedium_, _regionum_, _locorum_, dependent on the
+accusatives, _nomina_, _genera_, _officia_, _causas_. Cic. is fond of using
+_sedes_, _locus_, _regio_ together, see _Pro Murena_, 85, _Pro Cluentio_,
+171, quoted by Goer. _Omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum_: from the
+frequent references of Aug. it appears that the "_Libri Antiquitatum_" were
+divided into two parts, one treating of _res humanae_, the other of _res
+divinae_ (_De Civ. Dei_, IV. 1, 27, VI. 3). _Et litteris luminis_: for
+_luminis_, cf. _T.D._ I. 5. _Et verbis_: Manut. reads _rebus_ from 26.
+Varro's researches into the Latin tongue are meant. _Multis locis
+incohasti_: Varro's book "_De Philosophia_" had apparently not yet been
+written.
+
+Sec.10. _Causa_: = [Greek: prophasis]. _Probabilem_: = specious. _Nesciunt_:
+Halm with his one MS. G, which is the work of a clever emendator, gives
+_nescient_ to suit _malent_ above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not
+necessary to force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which
+Halm himself allows to be broken in two similar passages, II. 20, 105. _Sed
+da mihi nunc, satisne probas?_: So all MSS. except G, which has the evident
+conj. _sed ea (eam) mihi non sane probas_. This last Baiter gives, while
+Halm after Durand reads _sed eam mihi non satis probas_, which is too far
+from the MSS. to please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable,
+though _da mihi_ for _dic mihi_ is certainly poetic. _Da te mihi_ (Manut.,
+Goer., Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be supported
+by 12, _Brut._ 306, _Ad Fam._ II. 8, or such like passages. _Attius_: the
+old spelling _Accius_ is wrong. _Si qui ... imitati_: note the collocation,
+and cf. 17. Halm needlessly writes _sint_ for MSS. _sunt_. For this section
+throughout cf. the prologues to _D.F._ I., _T.D._ I. and II.
+
+Sec.11. _Procuratio_: for the proper meaning of _procurator_ and _procuratio_
+see Jordan on _Pro Caecina_ 55. _Implacatum et constrictum_: the
+conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual; cf. 17 _plenam ac
+refertam_, II. 127 _exigua et minima_, so [Greek: kai] in Greek. _Inclusa
+habebam_: cf. _T.D._ I. 1. _Obsolescerent_, used of _individual_ memory, is
+noteworthy. _Percussus volnere_: many edd. give the frequent variant
+_perculsus_. The _volnus_, which Goer. finds so mysterious, is the death of
+Tullia, cf. _N.D._ I. 9, _De Consolatione_, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe, and
+Introd. p. 32. _Aut ... aut ... aut ... aut_: This casting about for an
+excuse shows how low philosophy stood in public estimation at Rome. See
+Introd. p. 29. The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the
+exordium of _N.D._ I.
+
+Sec.12. _Brutus_: the same praise often recurs in _D.F._ and the _Brutus
+Graecia desideret_ so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has _Graeca_. Halm
+(and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger, _Graeca
+desideres_. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's _Philologus_ XXIV. 483,
+approves the reading on the curious ground that Brutus was not anxious to
+satisfy Greek requirements, but rather to render it unnecessary for Romans
+to have recourse to Greece for philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for
+Greece with Cicero is the supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if
+she is satisfied the philosophic world is tranquil. Cf. _Ad Att._ I. 20, 6,
+_D.F._ I. 8, _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 16, 5. I just note the em. of Turnebus, _a
+Graecia desideres_, and that of Dav. _Graecia desideretur_. _Eandem
+sententiam_: cf. Introd. p. 56. _Aristum_: cf. II. 11, and _M.D.F._ V. 8.
+
+Sec.13. _Sine te_: = [Greek: sou dicha]. _Relictam_: Cic. very rarely omits
+_esse_, see note on II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p.
+20. _Veterem illam_: MSS. have _iam_ for _illam_. The position of _iam_
+would be strange, in the passage which used to be compared, _Pro Cluentio_
+16, Classen and Baiter now om. the word. Further, _vetus_ and _nova_ can
+scarcely be so barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The
+reading _illam_ is from Madv. (_Em._ 115), and is supported by _illam
+veterem_ (18), _illa antiqua_ (22), _istius veteris_ (_D.F._ V. 8), and
+similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and Bait.) thinks _iam_ comprises
+the last two syllables of _Academiam_, which he reads. _Correcta et
+emendata_: a fine sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words
+often occur together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of
+expression, cf. _De Leg._ III. 30, _D.F._ IV. 21, also Tac. _Hist._ I. 37.
+_Negat_: MSS. have _negaret_, but Cic. never writes the subj. after
+_quamquam_ in _oratio recta_, as Tac. does, unless there is some
+conditional or potential force in the sentence; see _M.D.F._ III. 70.
+Nothing is commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for
+the pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and _vice versa_. _In libris_:
+see II. 11. _Duas Academias_: for the various modes of dividing the Academy
+refer to R. and P. 404. _Contra ea Philonis_: MSS. have _contra Philonis_
+merely, exc. Halm's V., which gives _Philonem_, as does the ed. Rom.
+(1471). I have added _ea_. Orelli quotes _Ad Att._ XII. 23, 2, _ex
+Apollodori_. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and _libros_ may be supplied
+from _libris_ above, so in _Ad Att._ XIII. 32, 2, _Dicaearchi_ [Greek: peri
+psyches] _utrosque_, the word _libros_ has to be supplied from the
+preceding letter, cf. a similar ellipse of _bona_ in 19, 22. Madvig's
+_Philonia_ is improbable from its non-appearance elsewhere, while the
+companion adjective _Antiochius_ is frequent. Halm inserts _sententiam_, a
+heroic remedy. To make _contra_ an adv. and construe _Philonis Antiochus_
+together, supplying _auditor_, as is done by some unknown commentators who
+probably only exist in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified by
+_D.F._ V. 13.
+
+Sec.14. _A qua absum iam diu_: MSS. have strangely _aqua absumtam diu_,
+changed by Manut. _Renovari_: the vulg. _revocari_ is a curious instance of
+oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note he
+gave _renovari_. Orelli--who speaks of Goerenz's "_praestantissima
+recensio_," and founds his own text upon it two years after Madvig's
+crushing exposure in his _Em._ often quoted by me--not only reads
+_revocari_, but quotes _renovari_ as an em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536.
+From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no independent value, took it.
+_Renovare_ in Cic. often means "to refresh the memory," e.g. 11, _Brut._
+315. _Nisi molestum est_: like _nisi alienum putas_, a variation on the
+common _si placet, si videtur_. _Adsidamus_: some MSS. have _adsideamus_,
+which would be wrong here. _Sane istud_: Halm _istuc_ from G. _Inquit_: for
+the late position of this word, which is often caused by its affinity for
+_quoniam_, _quidem_, etc., cf. _M.D.F._ III. 20 _Quae cum essent dicta, in
+conspectu consedimus (omnes)_: most edd. since Gulielmus print this without
+_essent_ as a hexameter, and suppose it a quotation. But firstly, a verse
+so commonplace, if familiar, would occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if
+not familiar, would not be given without the name of its author. Secondly,
+most MSS. have _sint_ or _essent_ before _dicta_. It is more probable
+therefore that _omnes_ was added from an involuntary desire to make up the
+hexameter rhythm. Phrases like _quae cum essent dicta consedimus_ often
+occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf. _De Div._ II. 150, and
+Augustine, the imitator of Cic., _Contra Academicos_, I. 25, also
+_consedimus_ at the end of a clause in _Brut._ 24, and _considitur_ in _De
+Or._ III. 18. _Mihi vero_: the omission of _inquit_, which is strange to
+Goer., is well illustrated in _M.D.F._ I. 9. There is an odd ellipse of
+_laudasti_ in _D.F._ V. 81.
+
+    Sec.Sec.15--42. Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. First part of
+    Varro's Exposition, 15--18. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made
+    ethics supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets, his one
+    doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of ignorance.
+    Moral exhortation was his task (16). Plato added to and enriched the
+    teaching of his master, from him sprang two schools which abandoned the
+    negative position of Socrates and adopted definite tenets, yet remained
+    in essential agreement with one another--the Peripatetic and the
+    Academic (17, 18).
+
+Sec.15. _A rebus ... involutis_: physical phenomena are often spoken of in
+these words by Cic., cf. 19, _Timaeus_ c. 1, _D.F._ I. 64, IV. 18, V. 10,
+_N.D._ I. 49. Ursinus rejected _ab_ here, but the insertion or omission of
+_ab_ after the passive verb depends on the degree to which _natura_ is
+personified, if 28 be compared with _Tim._ c. 1, this will be clear.
+_Involutis_ = veiled; cf. _involucrum_. Cic. shows his feeling of the
+metaphor by adding _quasi_ in II. 26, and often. _Avocavisse philosophiam_:
+this, the Xenophontic view of Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's
+time, cf. II. 123, _T.D._ V. 10, _D.F._ V. 87, 88, also Varro in Aug. _De
+Civ. Dei_, VIII. 3. Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were
+curiously answered in _De Rep._ I. 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug. _De Civ.
+Dei_, VIII. 4). The same view is supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the
+passages quoted by R. and P. 141. To form an opinion on this difficult
+question the student should read Schleiermacher's _Essay on the Worth of
+Socrates as a Philosopher_ (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's _Socrates
+and the Socratic Schools_, Eng. Trans., pp. 112--116 [I dissent from his
+view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's _Handbook_, so far as it
+relates to Socrates and Plato. _Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum valere_:
+_valere_ is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm, its use in 21 makes
+it more probable than _conferre_, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius
+vainly tries to justify the MSS. reading by such passages as _D.F._ I. 39,
+_T.D._ I. 70. The strangest ellipse with _nihil ad_ elsewhere in Cic. is in
+_De Leg._ I. 6.
+
+Sec.16. _Hic ... illum_: for this repetition of pronouns see _M.D.F._ IV. 43.
+_Varie et copiose_: MSS. omit _et_, but it may be doubted whether Cic.
+would let two _adverbs_ stand together without _et_, though three may (cf.
+II. 63), and though with pairs of _nouns_ and _adjectives, et_ often is
+left out, as in the passages quoted here by Manut. _Ad Att._ IV. 3, 3, _Ad
+Fam._ XIII. 24, XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg, reprinted
+in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works (1861), on
+_T.D._ III. 6. _Varie et copiose_ is also in _De Or._ II. 240. Cf. the
+omission of _que_ in 23, also II. 63. _Perscripti_: Cic. like Aristotle
+often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were authentic reports of
+Socratic conversations, cf. II. 74. _Nihil adfirmet_: so _T.D._ I. 99.
+"_Eoque praestare ceteris_" this is evidently from Plato _Apol._ p. 21, as
+to the proper understanding of which see note on II. 74. _Ab Apolline_,
+Plato _Apol._ 21 A, _Omnium_: Dav. conj. _hominum_ needlessly. _Dictum_:
+Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads _iudicatum_, it is remarkable that in four
+passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (_Cato Mai._ 78, _Lael._ 7,
+9, 13) he uses the verb _iudicare_. _Una omnis_: Lamb. _hominis_, Baiter
+also. _Omnis eius oratio tamen_: _notwithstanding_ his negative dialectic
+he gave positive teaching in morals. _Tamen_: for MSS. _tam_ or _tum_ is
+due to Gruter, Halm has _tantum_. _Tam_, _tum_ and _tamen_ are often
+confused in MSS., e.g. _In Veri_ (_Act_ II.) I. 3, 65, II. 55, 112, V. 78,
+where see Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that _tum ... et_, _tum
+... que_, _et ... tum_, correspond in Cic. like _tum ... cum_, _tum ...
+tum_. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled by _Ac._ II. 1, 43. _Ad
+virtutis studium cohortandis_: this broad assertion is distinctly untrue;
+see Zeller's _Socrates_ 88, with footnote.
+
+Sec.17. _Varius et multiplex, et copiosus_: these characteristics are named to
+account for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For
+_multiplex_ "many sided," cf. _T.D._ V. 11. _Una et consentiens_: this is
+an opinion of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in
+_D.F._ IV. 5 _De Leg._ I. 38, _De Or._ III. 67. Five ancient philosophers
+are generally included in this supposed harmonious Academico-Peripatetic
+school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo (cf.
+_D.F._ IV. 2), sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have
+been first broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in
+Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1, cf. also 34. Antiochus doubtless rested his
+theory almost entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In
+_D.F._ V. 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus, this appears, as also
+in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as though ethics were the whole
+of philosophy (cf. also _De Off._ III. 20). Antiochus probably made light
+of such dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about
+[Greek: ideai], which had long ceased. Krische _Uber Cicero's Akademika_ p.
+51, has some good remarks. _Nominibus_: the same as _vocabulis_ above. Cic.
+does not observe Varro's distinction (_De L. L._ IX. 1) which confines
+_nomen_ to proper nouns, _vocabulum_ to common nouns, though he would not
+use _vocabulum_ as Tac. does, for the name of a person (_Annals_ XII. 66,
+etc.). _Quasi heredem ... duos autem_: the conj. of Ciaconus "_ex asse
+heredem, secundos autem_" is as acute as it is absurd. _Duos_: it is
+difficult to decide whether this or _duo_ is right in Cic., he can scarcely
+have been so inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and
+Halm's ed., _Ac._ II. 11, 13 with _De Div._ I. 6). The older inscr. in the
+_Corpus_ vol. I. have _duo_, but only in _duoviros_, two near the time of
+Cic. (_C.I._ vol. I. nos. 571 and 1007) give _duos_, which Cic. probably
+wrote. _Duo_ is in old Latin poets and Virgil. _Chalcedonium_: not
+_Calchedonium_ as Klotz, cf. Gk. [Greek: Chalkedonion]. _Praestantissimos_:
+Halm wrongly, cf. _Brut._ 125. _Stagiritem_: not _Stagiritam_ as Lamb., for
+Cic., exc. in a few nouns like _Persa_, _pirata_, etc., which came down
+from antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in [Greek: -es] into Latin nouns
+in _-a_. See _M.D.F._ II. 94. _Coetus ... soliti_: cf. 10. _Platonis
+ubertate_: cf. Quintilian's "_illa Livii lactea ubertas_." _Plenum ac
+refertam_: n. on 11. _Dubitationem_: Halm with one MS., G, gives
+_dubitantem_, Baiter _dubitanter_, Why alter? _Ars quaedam philosophiae_:
+before these words all Halm's MSS., exc G, insert _disserendi_, probably
+from the line above, Lipsius keeps it and ejects _philosophiae_, while
+Lamb., Day read _philosophia_ in the nom. Varro, however, would never say
+that philosophy became entirely dialectical in the hands of the old
+Academics and Peripatetics. _Ars_ = [Greek: techne], a set of definite
+rules, so Varro in Aug. (as above) speaks of the _certa dogmata_ of this
+old school as opposed to the incertitude of the New Academy. _Descriptio_:
+so Halm here, but often _discriptio_. The _Corp. Inscr._, vol. I. nos. 198
+and 200, has thrice _discriptos_ or _discriptum_, the other spelling never.
+
+Sec.18. _Ut mihi quidem videtur_: MSS. transpose _quidem_ and _videtur_, as in
+44. _Quidem_, however nearly always comes closely after the pronoun, see
+_M.D.F._ IV. 43, cf. also I. 71, III. 28, _Opusc._ I. 406. _Expetendarum
+fugiendarumque_: [Greek: haireton kai pheukton], about which more in n. on
+36. The Platonic and Aristotelian ethics have indeed an external
+resemblance, but the ultimate bases of the two are quite different. In
+rejecting the Idea of the Good, Aristotle did away with what Plato would
+have considered most valuable in his system. The ideal theory, however, was
+practically defunct in the time of Antiochus, so that the similarity
+between the two schools seemed much greater than it was. _Non sus
+Minervam_: a Greek proverb, cf. Theocr. _Id._ V. 23, _De Or._ II. 233, _Ad
+Fam._ IX. 18, 3. Binder, in his German translation of the _Academica_, also
+quotes Plutarch _Praec. Polit._ 7. _Inepte ... docet_: elliptic for _inepte
+docet, quisquis docet_. _Nostra atque nostros_: few of the editors have
+understood this. Atticus affects everything Athenian, and speaks as though
+he were one of them; in Cic.'s letters to him the words "_tui cives_,"
+meaning the Athenians, often occur. _Quid me putas_: i.e. _velle_.
+_Exhibiturum_: Halm inserts _me_ before this from his one MS. G, evidently
+emended here by its copyist. For the omission of _me_, cf. note on 7.
+
+    Sec.Sec.19--23. Part II. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.
+    The threefold division of philosophy into [Greek: ethike, physike,
+    dialektike]. Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the
+    acquisition of natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental,
+    bodily, and external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental,
+    which fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the
+    chief of the acquired (20), then the external, which form with the
+    bodily advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The
+    ethical standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief
+    part, and is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the
+    greatest happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three
+    classes of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible
+    to give an intelligent account of action and duty (23).
+
+Sec.19. _Ratio triplex_: Plato has not this division, either consciously or
+unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's time,
+so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ VIII. 4, and by
+Diog. Laert. III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself cannot be
+traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian Peripatetics,
+to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 16. It was probably
+first brought into strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more
+sharply and decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf.
+esp. _M.D.F._ IV. 3. _Quid verum ... repugnans iudicando_: MSS. exc. G have
+_et_ before _quid falsum_, whence Klotz conj. _sit_ in order to obviate the
+awkwardness of _repugnet_ which MSS. have for _repugnans_. Krische wishes
+to read _consequens_ for _consentiens_, comparing _Orator_ 115, _T.D._ V.
+68, _De Div._ II. 150, to which add _T.D._ V. 21 On the other hand cf. II.
+22, 91. Notice the double translations of the Greek terms, _de vita et
+moribus_ for [Greek: ethike], etc. This is very characteristic of Cic., as
+we shall see later. _Ac primum_: many MSS. and edd. _primam_, cf. 23, 30.
+_A natura petebant_: how Antiochus could have found this in Plato and
+Aristotle is difficult to see; that he did so, however, is indubitable; see
+_D.F._ V. 24--27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and
+Varro in Aug. XIX. 3. The root of Plato's system is the [Greek: idea] of
+the Good, while so far is Aristotle from founding his system on the
+abstract [Greek: physis], that he scarcely appeals even incidentally to
+[Greek: physis] in his ethical works. The abstract conception of nature in
+relation to ethics is first strongly apparent in Polemo, from whom it
+passed into Stoic hands and then into those of Antiochus. _Adeptum esse
+omnia_: put rather differently in _D.F._ V. 24, 26, cf. also _D.F._ II. 33,
+34, _Ac._ II. 131. _Et animo et corpore et vita_: this is the [Greek:
+trias] or [Greek: trilogia ton agathon], which belongs in this form to late
+Peripateticism (cf. _M.D.F._ III. 43), the third division is a development
+from the [Greek: bios teleios] of Aristotle. The [Greek: trias] in this
+distinct shape is foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus,
+_Ethica_ II. 6, 4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro seems to
+merge the two last divisions into one in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX 3. This
+agrees better with _D.F._ V. 34--36, cf. also Aug. VIII. 8. On the
+Antiochean _finis_ see more in note on 22. _Corporis alia_: for ellipse of
+_bona_, see n. on 13. _Ponebant esse_: n. on 36. _In toto in partibus_: the
+same distinction is in Stob. _Eth._ II. 6, 7; cf. also _D.F._ V. 35.
+_Pulchritudinem_: Cic. _Orator_ 160, puts the spelling _pulcher_ beyond a
+doubt; it often appears in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only
+_pulcrai_, _pulcrum_, etc., occur in inscr., exc. _pulchre_, which is found
+once (_Corp. Inscr._ I. no 1019). _Sepulchrum_, however, is frequent at an
+early time. On the tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see Boscher
+in Curtius' _Studien_ II. 1, p. 145. In the case of _pulcher_ the false
+derivation from [Greek: polychroos] may have aided the corruption.
+Similarly in modern times J.C. Scaliger derived it from [Greek: poly cheir]
+(Curtius' _Grundz_ ed. 3, p. 8) For _valetudinem viris pulchritudinem_, cf.
+the [Greek: hygieia ischys kallos] of Stob. _Eth_. II. 6, 7, and _T.D._ V.
+22. _Sensus integros_ [Greek: euaisthesia] in Stob., cf. also _D.F._ V. 36
+(_in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus_). _Celeritatem_: so [Greek:
+podokeia] in Stob., _bene currere_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Claritatem in voce_:
+cf. _De Off._ I. 133. _Impressionem_: al. _expressionem_. For the former
+cf. _De Or._ III. 185, which will show the meaning to be the distinct
+marking of each sound; for the latter _De Or._ III. 41, which will disprove
+Klotz's remark "_imprimit lingua voces, non exprimit_." See also _De Off._
+I. 133. One old ed. has _pressionem_, which, though not itself Ciceronian,
+recalls _presse loqui_, and _N.D._ II. 149. Pliny, _Panegyric_, c. 64, has
+_expressit explanavitque verba_; he and Quintilian often so use
+_exprimere_.
+
+Sec.20. _Ingeniis_: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. _T.D._ III. 2, and
+_animis_ below and in _N.D._ II. 58. _In naturam et mores_: for _in ea quae
+natura et moribus fiunt_. A similar inaccuracy of expression is found in
+II. 42. The division is practically Aristotle's, who severs [Greek: aretai]
+into [Greek: dianoetikai] and [Greek: ethikai] (_Nic. Eth._ I. c. 13,
+_Magna Mor._ I. c. 5). In _D.F._ V. 38 the [Greek: dianoetikai] are called
+_non voluntariae_, the [Greek: ethikai] _voluntariae_. _Celeritatem ad
+discendum et memoriam_: cf. the [Greek: eumatheia, mneme] of Arist. (who
+adds [Greek: anchinoia sophia phronesis]), and the _docilitas, memoria_ of
+_D.F._ V. 36. _Quasi consuetudinem_: the _quasi_ marks a translation from
+the Greek, as frequently, here probably of [Greek: ethismos] (_Nic. Eth._
+II. c. 1). _Partim ratione formabant_: the relation which reason bears to
+virtue is set forth in _Nic. Eth._ VI. c. 2. _In quibus_: i.e. _in
+moribus_. All the late schools held that ethics formed the sole ultimate
+aim of philosophy. _Erat_: note the change from _oratio obliqua_ to
+_recta_, and cf. the opposite change in II. 40. _Progressio_: this, like
+the whole of the sentence in which it stands, is intensely Stoic. For the
+Stoic [Greek: prokore, prokoptein eis areten], cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 64, 66, R.
+and P. 392, sq., Zeller, _Stoics_ 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said
+to be Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised
+Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. _Perfectio naturae_:
+cf. esp. _De Leg._ I. 25. More Stoic still is the definition of virtue as
+the perfection of the _reason_, cf. II. 26, _D.F._ IV. 35, V. 38, and
+Madvig's note on _D.F._ II. 88. Faber quotes Galen _De Decr. Hipp. et
+Plat._ c. 5, [Greek: he arete teleiotes esti tes hekastou physeos]. _Una
+res optima_: the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. XIX.
+3, cf. also _D.F._ V. 36, 38.
+
+Sec.21. _Virtutis usum_: so the Stoics speak of their [Greek: adiaphora] as
+the practising ground for virtue (_D.F._ III. 50), cf. _virtutis usum_ in
+Aug. XIX. 1. _Nam virtus_: most MSS. have _iam_, which is out of place
+here. _Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam_: MSS. omit _et_
+between _cernitur_ and _in_, exc. Halm's G which has _in_ before _animi_
+and also before _corporis_. These last insertions are not necessary, as may
+be seen from _Topica_ 80, _causa certis personis locis temporibus
+actionibus negotiis cernitur aut_ in _omnibus aut_ in _plerisque_, also
+_T.D._ V. 22. In Stob. II. 6, 8, the [Greek: telos] of the Peripatetics is
+stated to be [Greek: to kat' areten zen en tois peri soma kai tois exothen
+agathois], here _quibusdam quae_ etc., denote the [Greek: exothen] or
+[Greek: ektos agatha], the third class in 19. _Hominem ... societate_: all
+this is strongly Stoic, though also attributed to the Peripatetics by Stob.
+II. 6, 7 ([Greek: koine philanthropia]), etc., doubtless the
+humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the [Greek: physei
+anthropos politikon zoon] theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf. _D.F._ III. 66,
+_De Leg._ I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293--296. The repetitions
+_hominem_, _humani_, _hominibus_, _humana_ are striking. For the last,
+Bentley (i.e. Davies' anonymous friend) proposed _mundana_ from _T.D._ V.
+108, Varro, however, has _humana societas_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Cetera autem_:
+what are these _cetera?_ They form portion of the [Greek: ektos agatha],
+and although not strictly contained within the _summum bonum_ are necessary
+to enrich it and preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob. II. 6, 8,
+13, [Greek: philia, philoi] would belong to the _quaedam_ of Cicero, while
+[Greek: ploutos arche eutychia eugeneia dynasteia] would be included in
+_cetera_. The same distinction is drawn in Aug. VIII. 8. _Tuendum_: most
+MSS. _tenendum_, but _tuendum_ corresponds best with the division of
+[Greek: agatha] into [Greek: poietika] and [Greek: phylaktika], Stob. II.
+6, 13. For the word _pertinere_ see _M.D.F._ III. 54.
+
+Sec.22. _Plerique_: Antiochus believes it also Academic. _Qui tum
+appellarentur_: MSS. _dum_, the subj. is strange, and was felt to be so by
+the writer of Halm's G, which has _appellantur_. _Videbatur_: Goer. and
+Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that it has the strong meaning of
+the Gr. [Greek: edokei], "it was their dogma," so often. _Adipisci_: cf.
+_adeptum esse_, 19. _Quae essent prima natura_: MSS. have _in natura_. For
+the various modes of denoting the [Greek: prota kata physin] in Latin see
+Madvig's _Fourth Excursus to the D.F._, which the student of Cic.'s
+philosophy ought to know by heart. The phrase _prima natura_ (abl.) could
+not stand alone, for [Greek: ta prota te physei] is one of Goerenz's
+numerous forgeries. The ablative is always conditioned by some verb, see
+Madv. A comparison of this statement of the ethical _finis_ with that in 19
+and the passages quoted in my note there, will show that Cic. drew little
+distinction between the Stoic [Greek: ta prota kata physin] and the
+Peripatetic [Greek: trilogia]. That this is historically absurd Madvig
+shows in his _Excursus_, but he does not sufficiently recognise the fact
+that Cicero has perfectly correctly reported Antiochus. At all events,
+Varro's report (Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 3) coincides with Cic.'s in every
+particular. Even the _inexplicabilis perversitas_ of which Madv. complains
+(p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus, who, as will be seen from Augustine
+XIX. 1, 3, included even _virtus_ among the _prima naturae_. A little
+reflection will show that in no other way could Antiochus have maintained
+the practical identity of the Stoic and Peripatetic views of the _finis_. I
+regret that my space does not allow me to pursue this difficult subject
+farther. For the Stoic [Greek: prota kata physin] see Zeller, chap XI.
+_Ipsa per sese expetenda_: Gk. [Greek: haireta], which is applied to all
+things contained within the _summum bonum_. As the Stoic _finis_ was
+[Greek: arete] only, that alone to them was [Greek: haireton], their
+[Greek: prota kata physin] were not [Greek: haireta], (cf. _D.F._ III. 21).
+Antiochus' _prima naturae_ were [Greek: haireta] to him, cf. Aug. XIX. 3,
+_prima illa naturae propter se ipsa existimat expetenda_ so Stob., II. 6,
+7, demonstrates each branch of the [Greek: trilogia] to be [Greek: kath'
+hauto haireton]. _Aut omnia aut maxima_: so frequently in Cic., e.g. _D.F._
+IV. 27, so Stob. II. 6, 8, [Greek: ta pleista kai kyriotata]. _Ea sunt
+maxima_: so Stob., Varro in Aug. _passim_. _Sensit_: much misunderstood by
+edd., here = _iudicavit_ not _animadvertit_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 6.
+_Reperiebatur_: for change of constr. cf. _D.F._ IV. 26 _Nec tamen
+beatissimam_: the question whether [Greek: arete] was [Greek: autarkes pros
+eudaimonian] was one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As
+to Antiochus, consult _M.D.F._ V. 67.
+
+Sec.23. _Agendi aliquid_: Gk. [Greek: praxeos], the usual translation, cf. II.
+24, 37. _Officii ipsius initium_: [Greek: tou kathekontos archen], Stob.
+II. 6, 7. This sentence is covertly aimed at the New Academics, whose
+scepticism, according to the dogmatists, cut away the ground from action
+and duty, see II. 24. _Recti honestique_: these words are redolent of the
+Stoa. _Earum rerum_: Halm thinks something like _appetitio_ has fallen out,
+_susceptio_ however, above, is quite enough for both clauses; a similar use
+of it is found in _D.F._ III. 32. _Descriptione naturae_: Halm with one MS.
+(G) gives _praescriptione_, which is in II. 140, cf. also _praescriberet_
+above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. _prima constitutio naturae_ in _D.F._
+IV. 15. _Aequitas_: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of
+[Greek: epieikeia]. _Eaeque_: so Halm for MSS. _haeque_, _haecque_. Of
+course _haecque_, like _hicque_, _sicque_, would be un-Ciceronian.
+_Voluptatibus_: a side blow at the Epicureans. _Forma_ see n. on 33.
+
+    Sec.Sec.24--29. Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus' _Physics_.
+    Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which are never
+    actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. When
+    force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed entity
+    ([Greek: poion ti] or _quale_)--(24). These formed entities are either
+    _primary_ or _secondary_. Air, fire, water, earth are primary, the two
+    first having an active, the two last a passive function. Aristotle
+    added a fifth (26). Underlying all formed entities is the formless
+    matter, matter and space are infinitely subdivisible (27). Force or
+    form acts on the formless matter and so produces the ordered universe,
+    outside which no matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes
+    it eternal. This Reason has various names--Soul of the Universe, Mind,
+    Wisdom, Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the
+    same thing (28, 29).
+
+Sec.24. _Natura_: this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a
+translation both of [Greek: physis] and [Greek: ousia]. Here it is [Greek:
+ousia] in the broadest sense, all that exists. _In res duas_: the
+distinction between Force and Matter, the active and passive agencies in
+the universe, is of course Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however
+probably apprehended the distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this
+read carefully Zeller, 135 sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of
+Aristotle's doctrine is to be got from Schwegler, _Handbook_, pp 99--105.
+R. and P. 273 sq. should be consulted for the important coincidence of
+Force with logical _genus_ ([Greek: eidos]), and of Matter ([Greek: hyle])
+with logical _differentia_ ([Greek: diaphora]). For the _duae res_, cf.
+_D.F._ I. 18. _Efficiens ... huic se praebens_: an attempt to translate
+[Greek: to poioun] and [Greek: to paschon] of the _Theaetetus_, [Greek: to
+othen] and [Greek: to dechomenon] of the _Timaeus_ (50 D). Cic. in _Tim._
+has _efficere_ and _pati_, Lucretius I. 440 _facere_ and _fungi_. _Ea
+quae_: so Gruter, Halm for MSS. _eaque._ The meaning is this; passive
+matter when worked upon by an active generative form results in an
+_aliquid_, a [Greek: tode ti] as Aristotle calls it. Passive matter [Greek:
+hyle] is only potentially [Greek: tode ti], passing into actual [Greek:
+tode ti], when affected by the form. (Cf. [Greek: tode, touto], Plato
+_Tim._ 49 E, 50 A, also Arist. _Metaph_ H, 1, R. and P. 270--274). A
+figurative description of the process is given in _Timaeus_, 50 D. _In eo
+quod efficeret ... materiam quandam_: Cic. is hampered by the _patrii
+sermonis egestas_, which compels him to render simple Greek terms by
+laboured periphrases. _Id quod efficit_ is not distinct from, but
+_equivalent_ to _vis_, _id quod efficitur_ to _materia_. _Materiam
+quandam_: it is extraordinary how edd. (esp Goer.) could have so stumbled
+over _quandam_ and _quasi_ used in this fashion. Both words (which are
+joined below) simply mark the unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its
+philosophical use, in the Greek [Greek: hyle] the strangeness had had time
+to wear off. _In utroque_: for _in eo quod ex utroque_ (sc. _vi et
+materia_) _fit_, the meaning is clearly given by the next clause, viz. that
+Force and Matter cannot actually exist apart, but only in the compound of
+the two, the formed entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the
+reff. given above. _Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur_: the
+meaning of this is clear, that nothing can _exist_ except in space
+_(alicubi)_, it is more difficult to see why it should be introduced here.
+Unless _est_ be taken of merely phenomenal existence (the only existence
+the Stoics and Antiochus would allow), the sentence does not represent the
+belief of Aristotle and Plato. The [Greek: ideai] for instance, though to
+Plato in the highest sense existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle
+explicitly says this, _Phys._ III. 4). Aristotle also recognised much as
+existent which did not exist in space, as in _Phys._ IV. 5 (qu. R. and P.
+289). Cic. perhaps translates here from _Tim._ 52 B, [Greek: phamen
+anankaion einai pou to hon hapan en tini topo]. For ancient theories about
+space the student must be referred to the histories of philosophy. A fair
+summary is given by Stob. _Phys._ [Greek: peri kenou kai topou kai choras],
+ch. XVIII. 1. _Corpus et quasi qualitatem_: note that _corpus_ is _formed_,
+as contrasted with _materia_, _unformed_ matter. _Qualitas_ is here wrongly
+used for _quale_; it ought to be used of Force only, not of the product of
+Force and Matter, cf. 28. The Greeks themselves sometimes confuse [Greek:
+poiotes] and [Greek: poion], the confusion is aided by the ambiguity of the
+phrase [Greek: to poion] in Greek, which may either denote the [Greek: tode
+ti] as [Greek: poion], or the Force which makes it [Greek: poion], hence
+Arist. calls one of his categories [Greek: to poion] and [Greek: poiotes]
+indifferently For the Stoic view of [Greek: poiotes], see Zeller, 96--103,
+with footnotes.
+
+Sec.25. _Bene facis_: _passim_ in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. _D.F._
+III. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly like this. _Rhetoricam_:
+Huelsemann conj. _ethicam_, which however is _not_ Latin. The words have no
+philosophical significance here, but are simply specimens of words once
+foreign, now naturalised. _D.F._ III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words make
+it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first declension
+nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in _en_. _Non est vulgi
+verbum_: it first appears in _Theaet._ 182 A, where it is called [Greek:
+allokoton onoma]. _Nova ... facienda_: = _imponenda_ in _D.F._ III. 5.
+_Suis utuntur_: so _D.F._ III. 4. _Transferenda_: _transferre_ = [Greek:
+metapherein], which is technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on
+metaphor, _De Or._ III. 153 sq., where _necessitas_ is assigned as one
+cause of it (159) just as here; cf. also _De Or._ III. 149. _Saecula_: the
+spelling _secula_ is wrong; Corss. I. 325, 377. The diphthong bars the old
+derivations from _secare_, and _sequi_. _Quanto id magis_: Cic. is
+exceedingly fond of separating _tam quam ita tantus quantus_, etc., from
+the words with which they are syntactically connected, by just one small
+word, e.g. _Lael._ 53 _quam id recte_, _Acad._ II. 125 _tam sit mirabilis_,
+II. 68 _tam in praecipitem_; also _D.F._ III. 5 _quanto id nobis magis est
+concedendum qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere_.
+
+Sec.26. _Non modo rerum sed verborum_: cf. 9. _Igitur_ picks up the broken
+thread of the exposition; so 35, and frequently. _Principes ... ex his
+ortae_: the Greek terms are [Greek: hapla] and [Greek: syntheta], see
+Arist. _De Coelo_, I. 2 (R. and P. 294). The distinction puzzled Plutarch
+(quoted in R. and P. 382). It was both Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics
+(Zeller, 187 sq.) followed partly Heraclitus, and cast aside many
+refinements of Aristotle which will be found in R. and P. 297. _Quasi
+multiformes_: evidently a trans. of [Greek: polyeideis], which is opposed
+to [Greek: haplous] in Plat. _Phaedr._ 238 A, and often. Plato uses also
+[Greek: monoeides] for _unius modi_; cf. Cic. _Tim._ ch. VII., a transl. of
+Plat. _Tim._ 35 A. _Prima sunt_: _primae_ (sc. _qualitates_) is the
+needless em. of Walker, followed by Halm. _Formae_ = _genera_, [Greek:
+eide]. The word is applied to the four elements themselves, _N.D._ I. 19;
+cf. also _quintum genus_ below, and _Topica_, 11--13. A good view of the
+history of the doctrine of the four elements may be gained from the section
+of Stob. _Phys._, entitled [Greek: peri archon kai stoicheion kai tou
+pantos]. It will be there seen that Cic. is wrong in making _initia_ and
+_elementa_ here and in 39 ([Greek: archai] and [Greek: stoicheia])
+convertible terms. The Greeks would call the four elements [Greek:
+stoicheia] but _not_ [Greek: archai], which term would be reserved for the
+primary Matter and Force. _Aer et ignis_: this is Stoic but _not_
+Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary properties of
+matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two former as active,
+the two latter as passive. He then assigns _two_ of these properties, _one_
+active and _one_ passive, to each of the four elements; each therefore is
+to him _both_ active and passive. The Stoics assign only _one_ property to
+each element; heat to fire, cold to air (cf. _N.D._ II. 26), moisture to
+water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows at once. Cf.
+Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq. _Accipiendi ...
+patiendi_: [Greek: dechesthai] often comes in Plat. _Tim._ _Quintum genus_:
+the note on this, referred to in Introd. p. 16, is postponed to 39.
+_Dissimile ... quoddam_: so MSS.; one would expect _quiddam_, which Orelli
+gives. _Rebatur_: an old poetical word revived by Cic. _De Or._ III. 153;
+cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ VIII. 3, 26.
+
+Sec.27. _Subiectam ... materiam_: the [Greek: hypokeimene hyle] of Aristotle,
+from which our word subject-matter is descended. _Sine ulla specie_:
+_species_ here = _forma_ above, the [Greek: eidos] or [Greek: morphe] of
+Arist. _Omnibus_ without _rebus_ is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes
+avoided by the immediate succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in 21
+in _quibusdam_, _quae_. _Expressa_: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf.
+_expressa effigies_ _De Off_. III. 69); _efficta_, moulded as by a potter
+(see II. 77); the word was given by Turnebus for MSS. _effecta_. So Matter
+is called an [Greek: ekmageion] in Plat. _Tim._ _Quae tota omnia_: these
+words have given rise to needless doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them.
+_Tota_ is feminine sing.; cf. _materiam totam ipsam_ in 28; "which matter
+throughout its whole extent can suffer all changes." For the word _omnia_
+cf. II. 118, and Plat. _Tim._ 50 B ([Greek: dechetai gar ei ta panta]), 51
+A ([Greek: eidos pandeches]). The word [Greek: pandeches] is also quoted
+from Okellus in Stob. I. 20, 3. Binder is certainly wrong in taking _tota_
+and _omnia_ both as neut.--"_alles und jedes_." Cic. knew the _Tim._ well
+and imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments on the
+passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between
+Plato's [Greek: hyle] and that of Aristotle. _Eoque interire_: so MSS.;
+Halm after Dav. _eaque_. Faber was right in supposing that Cic. has said
+loosely of the _materia_ what he ought to have said of the _qualia_. Of
+course the [Greek: prote hyle], whether Platonic or Aristotelian, is
+imperishable (cf. _Tim._ 52 A. [Greek: phthoran ou prosdechomenon]). _Non
+in nihilum_: this is aimed at the Atomists, who maintained that infinite
+subdivision logically led to the passing of things into nothing and their
+reparation out of nothing again. See Lucr. I. 215--264, and elsewhere.
+_Infinite secari_: through the authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the
+infinite subdivisibility of matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox
+one that the Atom was scouted as a silly absurdity. Cf. _D.F._ I. 20 _ne
+illud quidem physici credere esse minimum_, Arist. _Physica_, I. 1 [Greek:
+ouk estin elachiston megethos]. The history of ancient opinion on this
+subject is important, but does not lie close enough to our author for
+comment. The student should at least learn Plato's opinions from _Tim._ 35
+A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates, tripping over the old [Greek:
+antiphasis] of the One and the Many, denied [Greek: pan megethos diaireton
+einai kai meros echein] (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus followed Aristotle very
+closely (R. and P. 377, 378). _Intervallis moveri_: this is the theory of
+motion without void which Lucr. I. 370 sq. disproves, where see Munro. Cf.
+also Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 214. Aristotle denied the existence of
+void either within or without the universe, Strato allowed its possibility
+within, while denying its existence without (Stob. I. 18, 1), the Stoics
+did the exact opposite affirming its existence without, and denying it
+within the universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). _Quae intervalla ...
+possint_: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is no matter atom.
+As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed Aristotle,
+whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and especially from M.
+Saint Hilaire's explanation of the _Physica_.
+
+Sec.28. _Ultro citroque_: this is the common reading, but I doubt its
+correctness. MSS. have _ultro introque_, whence _ed. Rom._ (1471) has
+_ultro in utroque_. I think that _in utroque_, simply, was the reading, and
+that _ultro_ is a dittographia from _utro_. The meaning would be "since
+force plays this part in the compound," _utroque_ being as in 24 for _eo
+quod ex utroque fit_. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this
+motion and is ever thus on the move." _Ultro citroque_ is an odd expression
+to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with a _quasi_.
+Indeed if it is kept I suggest _quasi_ for _cum sic_. The use of _versetur_
+is also strange. _E quibus in omni natura_: most edd. since Dav. (Halm
+included) eject _in_. It is perfectly sound if _natura_ be taken as [Greek:
+ousia] = existence substance. The meaning is "out of which _qualia_,
+themselves existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf.
+_totam commutari_ above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was
+formed." For the _in_ cf. _N.D._ II. 35, _in omni natura necesse est
+absolvi aliquid_, also a similar use _ib._ II. 80, and _Ac._ II. 42. If _in
+utroque_ be read above, _in omni natura_ will form an exact contrast,
+substance as a whole being opposed to the individual _quale_. _Cohaerente
+et continuata_: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than any
+other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in _N.D._ II.
+19, 84, 119, _De Div._ II. 33, _De Leg._ fragm. 1. (at the end of Bait. and
+Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if they be got at
+second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. I. 22, 3. The _partes
+mundi_ are spoken of in most of the passages just quoted, also in _N.D._
+II. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic sources. _Effectum
+esse mundum_: Halm adds _unum_ from his favourite MS. (G). _Natura
+sentiente_: a clumsy trans. of [Greek: aisthete ousia] = substance which
+can affect the senses. The same expression is in _N.D._ II. 75. It should
+not be forgotten, however, that to the Stoics the universe was itself
+sentient, cf. _N.D._ II. 22, 47, 87. _Teneantur_: for _contineantur_; cf.
+_N.D._ II. 29 with II. 31 _In qua ratio perfecta insit_: this is thorough
+going Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are interchangeable terms
+with the Stoics. See Zeller 145--150 By an inevitable inconsistency, while
+believing that Reason _is_ the Universe, they sometimes speak of it as
+being _in_ the Universe, as here (cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 138, _N.D._ II. 34)
+In a curious passage (_N.D._ I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same
+inconsistency. For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life,
+extends through all extent". _Sempiterna_: Aristotle held this: see II. 119
+and _N.D._ II. 118, Stob. I. 21, 6. The Stoics while believing that our
+world would be destroyed by fire (Diog. Laert. VII. 141, R. and P. 378,
+Stob. I. 20, 1) regarded the destruction as merely an absorption into the
+Universal World God, who will recreate the world out of himself, since he
+is beyond the reach of harm (Diog. Laert. VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller
+159) Some Stoics however denied the [Greek: ekpyrosis]. _Nihil enim
+valentius_: this is an argument often urged, as in _N.D._ II. 31 (_quid
+potest esse mundo valentius?_), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. _A quo
+intereat_: _interire_ here replaces the passive of _perdere_ cf. [Greek:
+anastenai, ekpiptein hypo tinos].
+
+Sec.29. _Quam vim animum_: there is no need to read _animam_, as some edd. do.
+The Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the
+names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance,
+Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. VI. _passim_.
+Nearly all these names occur in _N.D._ II. The whole of this section is
+undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it
+all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics.
+_Sapientiam_: cf. _N.D._ II. 36 with III. 23, in which latter passage the
+Stoic opinion is severely criticised. _Deum_: Cic. in _N.D._ I. 30 remarks
+that Plato in his _Timaeus_ had already made the _mundus_ a God. _Quasi
+prudentium quandam_: the Greek [Greek: pronoia] is translated both by
+_prudentia_ and _providentia_ in the same passage, _N.D._ II. 58, also in
+_N.D._ II. 77--80. _Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad homines_: the World
+God is perfectly beneficent, see _Ac._ II. 120, _N.D._ I. 23, II. 160
+(where there is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq.
+_Necessitatem_: [Greek: ananken], which is [Greek: eirmos aition],
+_causarum series sempiterna_ (_De Fato_ 20, cf. _N.D._ I. 55, _De Div._ I.
+125, 127, Diog. VII. 149, and Zeller as before). This is merely the World
+God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence of cause upon cause.
+When the World God is called Fortune, all that is expressed is human
+inability to see this orderly sequence. [Greek: Tuche] therefore is defined
+as [Greek: aitia adelos anthropinoi logismoi] (Stob. I. 7, 9, where the
+same definition is ascribed to Anaxagoras--see also _Topica_, 58--66). This
+identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and excites
+his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward by
+Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob. I. 5, 15. _Nihil aliter possit_: on
+_posse_ for _posse fieri_ see _M.D.F._ IV. 48, also _Ac._ II. 121. For the
+sense of Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), [Greek: oude
+ti gignetai ergon epi chthoni sou dicha daimon]. _Inter quasi fatalem_: a
+trans. of the Gk. [Greek: katenankasmenon]. I see no reason for suspecting
+_inter_, as Halm does. _Ignorationemque causarum_: the same words in _De
+Div._ II. 49; cf. also August. _Contra Academicos_ I. 1. In addition to
+studying the reff. given above, the student might with advantage read
+Aristotle's _Physica_ II. ch. 4--6, with M. Saint Hilaire's explanation,
+for the views of Aristotle about [Greek: tyche] and [Greek: to automaton],
+also ch. 8--9 for [Greek: ananke]. Plato's doctrine of [Greek: ananke],
+which is diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics, is to be found in
+_Timaeus_ p. 47, 48, Grote's _Plato_, III. 249--59.
+
+    Sec.Sec.30--32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.
+    Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the
+    senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of truth, but the
+    mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The
+    senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of
+    such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense,
+    or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained
+    constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous
+    flux. Knowledge based _only_ on sense was therefore mere opinion (31).
+    Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they
+    _defined_ everything about which they argued, and also used verbal
+    explanations, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes
+    consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric
+    (32).
+
+Sec.30. _Quae erat_: the Platonic [Greek: en], = was, as we said. _In ratione
+et disserendo_: an instance of Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. _D.F._
+I. 22 _quaerendi ac disserendi_. _Quamquam oriretur_: the sentence is
+inexact, it is _knowledge_ which takes its rise in the senses, not the
+criterion of truth, which is the mind itself; cf. however II. 30 and n.
+_Iudicium_: the constant translation of [Greek: kriterion], a word foreign
+to the older philosophy. _Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem_: Halm with
+his pet MS. writes _esse rerum_, thus giving an almost perfect iambic,
+strongly stopped off before and after, so that there is no possibility of
+avoiding it in reading. I venture to say that no real parallel can be found
+to this in Cic., it stands in glaring contradiction to his own rules about
+admitting metre in prose, _Orator_ 194 sq., _De Or._ III. 182 sq. _Solam
+censebant ... tale quale esset_: probably from Plato's _Tim._ 35 A thus
+translated by Cic., _Tim._ c. 7 _ex ea materia quae individua est et unius
+modi_ ([Greek: aei kata tauta echouses] cf. 28 A. [Greek: to kata tauta
+echon]) _et sui simile_, cf. also _T.D._ I. 58 _id solum esse quod semper
+tale sit quale sit, quam_ [Greek: idean] _appellat ille, nos speciem_, and
+_Ac._ II. 129. _Illi_ [Greek: idean], etc.: there is more than one
+difficulty here. The words _iam a Platone ita nom_ seem to exclude Plato
+from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may be an
+oversight, but to say first that the school (_illi_, cf. _sic tractabatur
+ab utrisque_) which included Aristotle held the doctrine of [Greek: ideai],
+and next, in 33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears very
+absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's
+[Greek: ideai] and Aristotle's [Greek: ta kathalou] would naturally seem
+microscopic to Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in his
+time as those of Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid at
+Cicero's door, for Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with Plato's
+must have been driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very knowledge of Plato
+has, however, probably led him to intensify what inconsistency there was in
+Antiochus, who would have glided over Plato's opinions with a much more
+cautious step.
+
+Sec.31. _Sensus omnis hebetes_: this stands in contradiction to the whole
+Antiochean view as given in II. 12--64, cf. esp. 19 _sensibus quorum ita
+clara et certa iudicia sunt_, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his
+agreement with Plato by asserting that though sense is naturally dull,
+reason may sift out the certain from the uncertain. _Res eas ... quae
+essent aut ita_: Halm by following his pet MS. without regard to the
+meaning of Cic. has greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He
+reads _res ullas ... quod aut ita essent_; thus making Antiochus assert
+that _no_ true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall
+see in the _Lucullus_, he really divided sensations into true and false. I
+believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's
+reminiscences of the _Theaetetus_ and of Xenocrates; see below. _Nec
+percipere_: for this see _Lucullus_ passim. Christ's conj. _percipi, quod
+perceptio sit mentis non sensuum_, which Halm seems to approve, is a wanton
+corruption of the text, cf. II. 101 _neget rem ullam percipi posse
+sensibus_, so 21, 119 (just like _ratione percipi_ 91), also I. 41 _sensu
+comprehensum_. _Subiectae sensibus_: cf. II. 74 and Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._
+VIII. 9, [Greek: ta hypopiptonta te aisthesei]. _Aut ita mobiles_, etc.:
+this strongly reminds one of the _Theaetetus_, esp. 160 D sq. For
+_constans_ cf. [Greek: estekos], which so often occurs there and in the
+_Sophistes_. _Ne idem_: Manut. for MSS. _eidem_. In the _Theaetetus_,
+Heraclitus' theory of flux is carried to such an extent as to destroy the
+self-identity of things; even the word [Greek: eme] is stated to be an
+absurdity, since it implies a permanent subject, whereas the subject is
+changing from moment to moment; the expression therefore ought to be
+[Greek: tous eme]. _Continenter_: [Greek: ounechos]; cf. Simplicius quoted
+in Grote's Plato, I. p. 37, about Heraclitus, [Greek: en metabole gar
+synechei ta onta]. _Laberentur et fluerent_: cf. the phrases [Greek: rhoe,
+panta rhei, hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta], etc., which are scattered
+thickly over the _Theaet._ and the ancient texts about Heraclitus; also a
+very similar passage in _Orator_ 10. _Opinabilem_: [Greek: doxasten], so
+_opinabile_ = [Greek: doxaston] in Cic. _Tim_ ch. II. The term was largely
+used by Xenocrates (R. and P. 243--247), Arist. too distinguishes between
+the [Greek: doxaston] and the [Greek: episteton], e.g _Analyt. Post._ I. 33
+(qu. R. and P. 264).
+
+Sec.32. For this cf. _D.F._ IV. 8--10. _Notionibus_: so one MS. for
+_motionibus_ which the rest have. _Notio_ is Cicero's regular translation
+for [Greek: ennoia], which is Stoic. This statement might have been made
+both by Aristotle and Plato, though each would put a separate meaning on
+the word _notio_. [Greek: Episteme] in Plato is of the [Greek: ideai] only,
+while in Aristotle it is [Greek: ton katholou]; cf. _Anal. Post._ I. 33 (R.
+and P. 264), [Greek: lego noun archen epistemes]. _Definitiones rerum_:
+these must be carefully distinguished fiom _definitiones nominum_, see the
+distinction drawn after Aristotle in R. and P. 265, note b. The _definitio
+rei_ really involves the whole of philosophy with Plato and Aristotle (one
+might almost add, with moderns too). Its importance to Plato may be seen
+from the _Politicus_ and _Sophistes_, to Aristotle from the passages quoted
+in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes will make the subject as clear as it
+can be made to any one who has not a knowledge of the whole of Aristotle's
+philosophy. _Verborum explicatio_: this is quite a different thing from
+those _definitiones nominum_ just referred to; it is _derivation_, which
+does not necessitate definition. [Greek: etymologian]: this is almost
+entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the Classic Greek Prose, as are
+[Greek: etymos] and all its derivatives. ([Greek: Etymos] means
+"etymologically" in the _De Mundo_, which however is not Aristotle's). The
+word [Greek: etymologia] is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who
+use rather [Greek: onomaton orthotes] (Diog. Laert. VII. 83), the title of
+their books on the subject preserved by Diog. is generally "[Greek: peri
+ton etymologikon]" The systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than
+Chrysippus, when it became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and
+Cleanthes had given the first impulse (_N.D._ III. 63). Specimens of Stoic
+etymology are given in _N.D._ II. and ridiculed in _N.D._ III. (cf. esp. 62
+_in enodandis nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis_). _Post argumentis
+et quasi rerum notis ducibus_: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to
+prove something about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in
+_Topica_ 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation
+_veriloquium_ of [Greek: etymologia] and adopts _notatio_, the _rerum nota_
+(Greek [Greek: symbolon]) being the name so explained (_Top._ 35). Varro
+translated [Greek: etymologia] by _originatio_ (Quintil. I. 6, 28).
+Aristotle had already laid down rules for this rhetorical use of etymology,
+and Plato also incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be said to
+belong to the old Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer examination of
+authorities would have led Halm to retract his bad em. _notationibus_ for
+_notas ducibus_, the word _notatio_ is used for the whole science of
+etymology, and not for particular derivations, while Cic. in numerous
+passages (e.g. _D.F._ V. 74) describes _verba_ or _nomina_ as _rerum
+notae_. Berkley's _nodis_ for _notis_ has no support, (_enodatio nominum_
+in _N.D._ III. 62 is quite different). One more remark, and I conclude this
+wearisome note. The _quasi_ marks _rerum nota_ as an unfamiliar trans. of
+[Greek: symbolon]. Davies therefore ought not to have placed it before
+_ducibus_, which word, strong as the metaphor is, requires no
+qualification, see a good instance in _T.D._ I. 27. _Itaque tradebatur_: so
+Halm improves on Madvig's _ita_ for _in qua_ of the MSS., which cannot be
+defended. Orelli's reference to 30 _pars_ for an antecedent to _qua_ (_in
+ea parte in qua_) is violent, while Goerenz's resort to _partem rerum
+opinabilem_ is simply silly. Manut. conj. _in quo_, Cic. does often use the
+neut. pronoun, as in _Orator_ 3, but not quite thus. I have sometimes
+thought that Cic. wrote _haec, inquam_ (cf. _huic_ below). _Dialecticae_:
+as [Greek: logike] had not been Latinised, Cic. is obliged to use this word
+to denote [Greek: logike], of which [Greek: dialektike] is really one
+subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, [Greek: rhetorike] which is
+mentioned in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, 70.
+_Orationis ratione conclusae_: speech drawn up in a syllogistic form which
+becomes _oratio perpetua_ under the influence of [Greek: rhetorike]. _Quasi
+ex altera parte_: a trans. of Aristotle's [Greek: antistrophos] in the
+beginning of the _Rhetoric_. _Oratoria_: Halm brackets this word; cf.
+however a close parallel in _Brut._ 261 _oratorio ornamenta dicendi_. The
+construction is simply a variation of Cic.'s favourite double genitive
+(_T.D._ III. 39), _oratoria_ being put for _oratoris_. _Ad persuadendum_:
+[Greek: to pithanon] is with Arist. and all ancient authorities the one aim
+of [Greek: rhetorike].
+
+    Sec.Sec.33--42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old
+    Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the [Greek:
+    ideai] of Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato
+    abandoned ethics for physics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates,
+    Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas,
+    pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing
+    but virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name _good_
+    to nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes,
+    some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and
+    some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value, and
+    called them _preferred_ to the second a negative value and called them
+    _rejected_, to the third no value whatever--mere verbal alterations on
+    the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms _right action_ and _sin_
+    belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate
+    action (_officium_) and an inappropriate, which concerned things
+    _preferred_ and things _rejected_ (37). He made _all_ virtue reside in
+    the reason, and considered not the _practice_ but the mere _possession_
+    of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not
+    but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and
+    immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and
+    believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow
+    the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed
+    sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding
+    judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40).
+    Sensations (_visa_) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the
+    examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a
+    sensation he called it _Knowledge_, if otherwise, _Ignorance_ (41).
+    _Perception_, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor
+    wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving
+    assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them
+    of the reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect
+    wisdom (42).
+
+Sec.33. _Haec erat illis forma_: so Madv. _Em._ 118 for MSS. _prima_,
+comparing _formulam_ in 17, also _D.F._ IV. 19, V. 9, _T.D._ III. 38, to
+which add _Ac._ I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the
+MSS. reading and supply _pars_, as usual. His power of _supplying_ is
+unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the difficulties involved
+in the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here. _Immutationes_: so Dav. for
+_disputationes_, approved by Madv. _Em._ 119 who remarks that the phrase
+_disputationes philosophiae_ would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost
+certain by _mutavit_ in 40, _commutatio_ in 42, and _De Leg._ I. 38. Halm's
+odd em. _dissupationes_, so much admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's
+_Philologus_, needs support, which it certainly does not receive from the
+one passage Halm quotes, _De Or._ III. 207. _Et recte_: for the _et_ cf.
+_et merito_, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. _Auctoritas_:
+"system". _Inquit_: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the
+omission of _igitur_ after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin
+here. To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno
+opere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer.
+feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is
+copying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and
+evidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's
+resumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought
+to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded.
+_Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the
+supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact
+that he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the
+strong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi
+nisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of
+the relation in which Plato's [Greek: ideai] stand to his notion of the
+deity. _Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His
+real name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf.
+_loquendi nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf.
+_Orat._ 161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V.
+12 sq., _T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed
+very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him
+transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of
+him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in
+22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of
+[Greek: eudaimonian]. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_
+but does not elsewhere employ them.
+
+Sec.34. _Strato_: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for
+Diog. V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven ethical works, while
+Stob. II. 6, 4 quotes his definition of the [Greek: agathon]. _Diligenter
+... tuebantur_: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic,
+cf. Diog. Laert. IV. 18, _Ac._ II. 131, _D.F._ II. 34, and R. and P.
+_Congregati_: "_all_ in the Academic fold," cf. _Lael._ 69, _in nostro, ut
+ita dicam, grege_. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. _Polemonem ...
+Zeno et Arcesilas_: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many
+teachers (Diog. VII. 2, 3), while he is not mentioned by Diog. at all among
+the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is that we have a mere theory, which
+accounts for the split of Stoicism from Academicism by the rivalry of two
+fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 5, [Greek:
+symphoitontes para Polemoni ephilo timethesan]. Dates are against the
+theory, see Zeller 500.
+
+Sec.35. _Anteiret aetate_: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350,
+though the dates are uncertain. _Dissereret_: was a deep reasoner. Bentl.
+missing the meaning conj. _definiret_. _Peracute moveretur_: Bentl.
+_partiretur_; this with _definiret_ above well illustrates his licence in
+emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted the soundness of the text, the
+words refer not to the emotional, but to the intellectual side of Zeno's
+nature. The very expression occurs _Ad Fam._ XV. 21, 4, see other close
+parallels in n. on II. 37. _Nervos ... inciderit_: same metaphor in
+_Philipp._ XII. 8, cf. also _T.D._ II. 27 _nervos virtutis elidere_, III.
+83 _stirpis aegritudinis elidere_. (In both these passages Madv. _Em. Liv._
+135 reads _elegere_ for _elidere_, I cannot believe that he is right).
+Plato uses [Greek: neura ektemnein] metaphorically. Notice _inciderit_ but
+_poneret_. There is no need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the
+sequence is not uncommon in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ III. 33. _Omnia, quae_: MSS.
+_quaeque_, which edd. used to take for _quaecunque_. Cf. Goerenz's
+statement "_negari omnino nequit hac vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri_"
+with Madvig's utter refutation in the sixth Excursus to his _D.F._ _Solum
+et unum bonum_: for the Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R.
+and P. and Zeller for himself. I can only treat such points as are involved
+in the special difficulties of the _Academica_.
+
+Sec.36. _Cetera_: Stoic [Greek: adiaphora], the presence or absence of which
+cannot affect happiness. The Stoics loudly protested against their being
+called either _bona_ or _mala_, and this question was one of the great
+battle grounds of the later Greek philosophy. _Secundum naturam ...
+contraria_: Gr. [Greek: kata physin, para physin]. _His ipsis ...
+numerabat_: I see no reason for placing this sentence after the words _quae
+minoris_ below (with Christ) or for suspecting its genuineness (with Halm).
+The word _media_ is the Gk. [Greek: mesa], which word however is not
+usually applied to _things_, but to _actions_. _Sumenda_: Gk. [Greek:
+lepta]. _Aestimatione_: [Greek: axia], positive value. _Contraque
+contraria_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ III. 50 feels the need of a word to
+express [Greek: apaxia] (negative value). (Madv. in his note on that
+passage coins the word _inaestimatio._) _Ponebat esse_: cf. 19, _M.D.F._ V.
+73.
+
+Sec.37. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section
+the student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller
+and Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it
+would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general
+acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic.
+appears at first sight to have made the [Greek: apoproegmena] a subdivision
+of the [Greek: lepta] (_sumenda_), the two being utterly different. I
+admit, with Madv. (_D.F._ III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting
+the text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads
+_media_ in the place of _sumenda_, must be rejected. Nor can anything be
+said for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save
+Cicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could
+so utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of
+Stoicism, as to think even for a moment that the [Greek: apoproegmena]
+formed a branch of the [Greek: lepta]. This view of Madvig's is strongly
+opposed to the fact that Cic. in 36 had explained with perfect correctness
+the Stoic theory of the [Greek: adiaphora], nor is there anywhere in the
+numerous passages where he touches on the theory any trace of the same
+error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the intention to speak of the
+_sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his thought so as to embrace the
+whole class of [Greek: adiaphora], which he accordingly dealt with in the
+latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding sentence. (The
+remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the present.) Cic.
+therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but with careless
+writing. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae secundum locum
+obtinent_, [Greek: proegmena] _id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita
+appellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely pressed,
+the [Greek: apoproegmena] are made of a subdivision of the [Greek:
+proegmena], though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that
+intention. So if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are
+made to include both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16
+_appeterent_ includes _fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata
+vita_ is abruptly introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be
+construed together, and _ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said
+_coerceri_, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices
+which are opposite to these virtues.
+
+I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_
+Cic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to
+talk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and
+_minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the [Greek: axia] and [Greek: apaxia]
+of the Greek, _not_ different degrees of [Greek: axia] (positive value).
+That _minor aestimatio_ should mean [Greek: apaxia] need not surprise us
+when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing
+this [Greek: apaxia] or negative value in Latin, a difficulty I have
+already observed on 36; (2) on the strong negative meaning which _minor_
+bears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic. means "but if not." Even the
+Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing [Greek: apaxia]. Stobaeus, in
+a passage closely resembling ours makes [Greek: elatton axia] equivalent to
+[Greek: polle apaxia] (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly defining
+[Greek: apoproegmena] as [Greek: ta hikanen apaxian echonta] (_Adv. Math._
+XI. 62--64) again speaks of them as [Greek: ta me hikanen echonta axian]
+(_Pyrrhon. Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning.
+Now I contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong
+a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, [Greek: ta me hikanen axian
+echonta]. I therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin
+language allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the [Greek:
+adiaphora], some have [Greek: axia] while others have [Greek: apaxia]. He
+may fairly claim to have applied to his words the rule "_re intellecta in
+verborum usu faciles esse debemus_" (_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as
+good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics
+as there is for accusing Cicero. There are difficulties connected with the
+terms [Greek: hikane axia] and [Greek: hikane apaxia] which are not
+satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret
+that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student
+will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the _D.F._
+quoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_: Cic. frequently
+repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the clothes of the
+Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly belonged to the
+Stoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob. speaks II. 6, 6
+of [Greek: ta metaxy aretes kai kakias]. (This does not contradict his
+words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, [Greek: aretes de kai kakias ouden
+metaxy], which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog.
+Laert., however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R.
+and P. 393.) _Recte factum_ = [Greek: katorthoma], _peccatum_ = [Greek:
+hamartema], _officium_ = [Greek: kathekon] (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller
+238--248, 268--272). _Servata praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before
+_servata_, which all edd. since Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_
+correspond in Cic., the _que_ is always an afterthought, added in oblivion
+of the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this
+oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate
+_clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._ V. 64.
+
+Sec.38. _Sed quasdam virtutes_: see 20. This passage requires careful
+construing: after _quasdam virtutes_ not the whole phrase _in ratione esse
+dicerent_ must be repeated but _dicerent_ merely, since only the _virtutes
+natura perfectae_, the [Greek: dianoetikai aretai] of Arist., could be said
+to belong to the reason, while the _virtutes more perfectae_ are
+Aristotle's [Greek: ethikai aretai]. Trans. "but spoke of certain
+excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be) by
+habit." _Ea genera virtutum_: both Plato and Arist. roughly divided the
+nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the emotional, the
+former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and
+Arist. [Greek: to men hos logon echon, to de epipeithes logoi]); Zeno
+however asserted the nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist
+solely of Reason, to which he gave the name [Greek: hegemonikon] (Zeller
+203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller 248,
+_D.F._ III. _passim_). When the [Greek: hegemonikon] was in a perfect
+state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or
+emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a
+war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war
+carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the
+description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the
+mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word [Greek: hexis],
+a use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the
+_Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a [Greek: hexis],
+according to the Stoics, but a [Greek: diathesis] (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog.
+VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a [Greek: hexis],
+VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse
+... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 [Greek: duo gene ton anthropon einai to
+men ton spoudaion, to de ton phaulon, kai to men ton spoudaion dia pantos
+tou biou chresthai tais aretais, to de ton phaulon tais kakiais].
+_Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of
+Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of the
+_Acad._ appears, should read the plural _perturbationes_, a conj. of
+Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the abstract; _perturbationes_
+below, particular emotions. There is exactly the same transition in _T.D._
+III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while _perturbatio_ is used, in the same
+sense as here, in at least five other passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8,
+11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a trans. of Stoic [Greek: pathesi], which
+Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit carere sapientem_: emotion being a
+disturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue
+(20), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228
+sq.). All emotions are reasonless; [Greek: hedone] or _laetitia_ for
+instance is [Greek: alogos eparsis]. (_T.D._ Books III. and IV. treat
+largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the _T.D._ III.
+p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri libidine_.
+
+Sec.39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De
+Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the
+Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of
+the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general
+Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion
+arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object;
+cf. Diog. VII. 111. [Greek: ta pathe kriseis einai]. Instances of each in
+Zeller 233. For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15,
+18. _Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. [Greek: akolasia], see
+Zeller 232. _Quintam naturam_: the [Greek: pempte ousia] or [Greek: pempton
+soma] of Aristotle, who proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a
+curious and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that
+Arist. derived _mind_ from this fifth element, though the finest and
+highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a
+material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65,
+_D.F._ IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important note, but he
+fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33,
+that the Peripatetics of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind
+from [Greek: aither], which is the very name that Aristotle gives to the
+fifth element ([Greek: soma aitherion] in the _De Coelo_), and of giving
+this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error once made, no one could
+correct it, for there were a hundred influences at work to confirm it,
+while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange oblivion. I cannot
+here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but will mention a
+few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully influencing every
+other sect, and it placed [Greek: nous en aitheri] (see Plutarch, qu. R.
+and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The notion
+that [Greek: nous] or [Greek: psyche] came from [Greek: aither] was also
+fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as [Greek:
+aeikinetos] in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great
+hold on his mind One from the _Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in
+_Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._ VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only
+thing with Aristotle which is [Greek: aeikinetos] in eternal perfect
+circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion is alone perfect and
+eternal), is the [Greek: aither] or [Greek: pempton soma], that fiery
+external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with
+which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works,
+to conclude that the [Greek: aeikinetos psyche] of Plato came from the
+[Greek: aeikinetos aither] of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by
+saying that the soul as an [Greek: arche kineseos] must be [Greek:
+akinetos], but Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36).
+Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to the outer
+circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just where Arist.
+placed his [Greek: pempton soma] Any one who will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with
+the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power this had over Cicero. Further,
+Cic. would naturally link the mind in its origin with the stars which both
+Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf. _Somn. Scip._ 15) These
+considerations will be enough to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom
+Madv. considers responsible for the error, could have escaped it in any way
+not superhuman except by the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did
+not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we seem here to have a remnant of the
+distinction drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former
+being [Greek: analogon to ton astron stoicheio] (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu.
+R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made no difference, except one of
+degree, between [Greek: aither] and [Greek: pyr], see Zeller 189, 190.
+_Ipsam naturam_: [Greek: pyr] is [Greek: kat' exochen stoicheion] (Stob. I.
+10, 16), and is the first thing generated from the [Greek: apoios hyle];
+from it comes air, from air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136,
+137) The fire is [Greek: logikon], from it comes the [Greek: hegemonikon]
+of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought.
+These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics
+(Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view of sensation and thought see
+Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics probably
+misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34
+sq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The
+necessity of a connection between the perceiving mind and the things
+perceived followed from old physical principles such as that of Democritus
+([Greek: ou gar enchorein ta hetera kai diapheronta paschein hyp' allelon],
+qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7, by R. and P. 43), the same is
+affirmed loosely of all the old [Greek: physikoi], (Sextus _Adv. Math._
+VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines [Greek: gaiai men gaian
+opopamen], etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though in a
+different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of thought.
+_Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed old
+Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no ultimate
+difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see Zeller, pp.
+134, 135.
+
+Sec.40. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion
+that _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely
+agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an
+anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu
+animorum_, but having to explain [Greek: phantasia] was obliged to break
+off and resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a
+very similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis
+Ciceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44
+_e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav.
+_punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say.
+[Greek: Phantasian]: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of
+sensation is given by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus
+licet_: the same turn of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc
+verbum quidem hoc quidem_ probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_
+= [Greek: synkatathesin]. _In nobis positam_: the usual expression for
+freedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important
+passage). The actual sensation is involuntary ([Greek: akousion] Sext. Emp.
+_Adv. Math._ VIII. 397). _Tironum causa_ I note that the Stoics sometimes
+speak of the assent of the mind as _involuntary,_ while the [Greek:
+kataleptike phantasia] _compels_ assent (see II. 38). This is, however,
+only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.
+
+Sec.41. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all
+sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to
+the inner citadel of the [Greek: kataleptike phantasia]. _Declarationem_:
+[Greek: enargeian], a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on
+II. 17. _Earum rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct
+information of the _things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole
+truth lies in its own [Greek: enargeia], which requires no corroboration
+from without. _Comprehendibile_: this form has better MSS. authority than
+the vulg _comprehensibile_. Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading
+as a philological curiosity _Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes
+_inquam_. Why change? Atticus answers as in 14, 25, 33. [Greek:
+Katalepton]: strictly the _thing_ which emits the _visum_ is said to be
+[Greek: katalepton], but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_, the sensation
+and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused. _Comprehensionem_:
+this word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not
+the individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use [Greek:
+katalepsis] for [Greek: kataleptike phantasia] very often. _Quae manu
+prehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often
+made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely
+renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the
+term [Greek: aisthesis] to the [Greek: phantasia]. _Scientiam_: the word
+[Greek: episteme] is used in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number
+of coordinated or systematised perceptions ([Greek: katalepseis] or [Greek:
+kataleptikai phantasiai]) sometimes also called [Greek: techne] (cf. Sext.
+_Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 [Greek: technen de einai systema ek katalepseon
+syngegymnasmenon]); (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied
+by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. _Ut
+convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno
+all [Greek: kataleptikai phantasiai] were [Greek: asphaleis, ametaptotoi
+hypo logou]. Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not
+impervious to logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller
+88. Thus every [Greek: kataleptike phantasia], instead of carrying with it
+its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of sceptical criticism
+before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to
+giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua
+exsisteret_: I know nothing like this in the Stoic texts; [Greek: amathia]
+is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_: [Greek: doxa], see Zeller and cf.
+_Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.
+
+Sec.42. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of [Greek:
+epistemen kai doxan kai ten en methopiai touton katalepsin]. _Soli_: Halm,
+I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod
+omnia_: the meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate
+sensations and combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_.
+This will appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78
+seems to take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly
+like this in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of
+some Gk. word, [Greek: kriterion] perhaps, or [Greek: gnomon] or [Greek:
+kanon]. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic [Greek: ennoiai]; Zeller 81--84, R. and P.
+367, 368. _Quodque natura_: the omission of _eam_ is strange; Faber
+supplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms [Greek: enapesphragismene,
+enapomemagmene, entetypomene] occur constantly, but generally in relation
+to [Greek: phantasiai], not to [Greek: ennoiai]. _Non principia solum_:
+there seems to be a ref. to those [Greek: archai tes apodeixeos] of Arist.
+which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all
+proof. (See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in
+Bain's _Mental and Moral Science_, now re-published in Grote's
+_Aristotle._) Zeno's [Greek: ennoiai] were all this and more.
+_Reperiuntur_: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_
+to _recta_, which however has repeatedly taken place during Varro's
+exposition, and for which see _M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase
+_reperire viam_, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm give
+_aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant. _Aliena_: cf. _alienatos_ _D.F._
+III. 18. _A virtute sapientiaque removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur
+in iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The _firma adsensia_ is opposed to
+_imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the _sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More
+information on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes
+on the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In his constitit_: cf. II. 134.
+
+    Sec.Sec.43--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy.
+    Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory
+    in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the
+    ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet
+    held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of
+    equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of
+    phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely
+    (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were
+    carried on by Carneades (46).
+
+Sec.43. _Breviter_: MSS. _et breviter;_ see 37. _Tunc_: rare before a
+consonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in
+deference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading
+defensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_.
+Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought," etc.
+The edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_.
+This is a total mistake; cf. _ait ... putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15,
+_aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from
+Cic.
+
+Sec.44. _Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi_: for these words see n. on II.
+14. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. 76. _Obscuritate_: a
+side-blow at _declaratio_ 41. _Confessionem ignorationis_: see 16. Socrates
+was far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. 74. _Et iam
+ante Socratem_: MSS. _veluti amantes Socratem;_ Democritus (460--357 B.C.)
+was really very little older than Socrates (468--399) who died nearly sixty
+years before him. _Omnis paene veteres_: the statement is audaciously
+inexact, and is criticised II. 14. None of these were sceptics; for
+Democritus see my note on II. 73, for Empedocles on II. 74, for Anaxagoras
+on II. 72. _Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri_: the verbs are all
+equivalent; cf. _D.F._ III. 15 _equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci ...
+idem pluribus verbis exponere_. _Angustos sensus_: Cic. is thinking of the
+famous lines of Empedocles [Greek: steinopoi men gar palamai k.t.l.] R. and
+P. 107. _Brevia curricula vitae_: cf. Empedocles' [Greek: pauron de zoes
+abiou meros]. Is there an allusion in _curricula_ to Lucretius' _lampada
+vitai tradunt_, etc.? _In profundo_: Dem. [Greek: en bytho], cf. II. 32.
+The common trans. "well" is weak, "abyss" would suit better. _Institutis_:
+[Greek: nomo] of Democritus, see R. and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an
+extraordinary display of ignorance. _Deinceps omnia_: [Greek: panta
+ephexes] there is no need to read _denique_ for _deinceps_ as Bentl., Halm.
+_Circumfusa tenebris_: an allusion to the [Greek: skotie gnosis] of
+Democr., see II. 73. _Dixerunt_: Halm brackets this because of _dixerunt_
+above, parts of the verb _dicere_ are however often thus repeated by Cic.
+
+Sec.45. _Ne illud quidem_: cf. 16. _Latere censebat_ Goer. omitted _censebat_
+though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as usual. For the sense II.
+122. _Cohibereque_: Gk. [Greek: epechein], which we shall have to explain
+in the _Lucullus_. _Temeritatem ... turpius_: for these expressions, see
+II. 66, note. _Praecurrere_: as was the case with the dogmatists. _Paria
+momenta_: this is undiluted scepticism, and excludes even the possibility
+of the _probabile_ which Carneades put forward. For the doctrine cf. II.
+124, for the expression Euseb. _Praep. Evan._ XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of
+Arcesilas, [Greek: einai gar panta akatalepta kai tous eis ekatera logous
+isokrateis allelois], Sextus _Adv. Math._ IX. 207 [Greek: isostheneis
+logoi]; in the latter writer the word [Greek: isostheneia] very frequently
+occurs in the same sense, e g _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 8 (add _N.D._ I. 10,
+_rationis momenta_)
+
+Sec.46. _Platonem_: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, Sextus
+_Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 221 [Greek: ton Platona oin hoi men dogmatikon ephasan
+einai, hoi de apo etikon, hoi de kata men ti aporetikon, kata de ti
+dogmatikon]. Stobaeus II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the difficulty; [Greek:
+Platon polyphonos on, ouch hos tines oiontai polydoxos]. _Exposuisti_:
+Durand's necessary em., approved by Krische, Halm, etc. for MSS. _exposui_.
+_Zenone_: see Introd. p. 5.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.
+
+BOOK I.
+
+1. _Mnesarchus_: see II. 69, _De Or._ I. 45, and _Dict. Biogr._
+'Antipater'; cf. II. 143, _De Off._ III. 50. Evidently this fragment
+belongs to that historical justification of the New Academy with which I
+suppose Cicero to have concluded the first book.
+
+2. The word _concinere_ occurs _D.F._ IV. 60, _N.D._ I. 16, in both which
+places it is used of the Stoics, who are said _re concinere, verbis
+discrepare_ with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had
+already mentioned 43, and probably repeated in this fragment. Krische
+remarks that Augustine, _Cont. Acad._ II. 14, 15, seems to have imitated
+that part of Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic.
+must have condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order
+to excuse the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).
+
+BOOK II.
+
+3. This fragm. clearly forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments
+which Cic. in the first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius,
+see Introd. p. 55. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so level as
+the sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not level.
+
+4. On this I have nothing to remark.
+
+5. There is nothing distinctive about this which might enable us to
+determine its connection with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who
+_serius adamavit honores_.
+
+6. The changing aspects of the same thing are pointed to here as
+invalidating the evidence of the senses.
+
+7. This passage has the same aim as the last and closely resembles
+_Lucullus_ 105.
+
+8. The fact that the eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy
+the senses are. A similar argument occurs in _Luc._ 86. _Perpendiculum_ is
+a plumb line, _norma_ a mason's square, the word being probably a
+corruption of the Greek [Greek: gnomon] (Curt. _Grundz_ p. 169, ed. 3),
+_regula_, a rule.
+
+9. The different colours which the same persons show in different
+conditions, when young and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober
+and when drunken, are brought forward to prove how little of permanence
+there is even in the least fleeting of the objects of sense.
+
+10. _Urinari_ is to dive; for the derivation see Curt. _Grundz_ p. 326. A
+diver would be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in _Luc._ 81,
+which are unable to see that which lies immediately above them and so
+illustrate the narrow limits of the power of vision.
+
+11. Evidently an attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy.
+Different people pass different judgments on one and the same odour. The
+student will observe that the above extracts formed part of an argument
+intended to show the deceptive character of the senses. To these should
+probably be added fragm. 32. Fr. 19 shows that the impossibility of
+distinguishing eggs one from another, which had been brought forward in the
+_Catulus_, was allowed to stand in the second edition, other difficulties
+of the kind, such as those connected with the bent oar, the pigeon's neck,
+the twins, the impressions of seals (_Luc._ 19, 54), would also appear in
+both editions. The result of these assaults on the senses must have been
+summed up in the phrase _cuncta dubitanda esse_ which Augustine quotes from
+the _Academica Posteriora_ (see fragm. 36).
+
+BOOK III.
+
+12. This forms part of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in
+substance to Lucullus' speech in the _Academica Priora_ The drift of this
+extract was most likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the
+battle against criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we
+must cease to fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own
+way. See another view in Krische, p. 62.
+
+13. Krische believes that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show
+that the senses were trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with
+which the fishes were seen leaping from the water was brought up as
+evidence. (In _Luc._ 81, on the other hand, Cic. drew an argument hostile
+to the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The explanation seems to
+me very improbable. The words bear such a striking resemblance to those in
+_Luc._ 125 (_ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic
+innumerabilis paribus in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis_) that I am
+inclined to think that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book IV. and
+not Book III., and that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the
+Lucrine lake, also changed _Puteolosque_ into _pisciculosque exultantes_
+for the sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa
+on the Lucrine.
+
+14. The passion for knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by
+Varro as an argument in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be
+attainable. The same line is taken in _Luc._ 31, _D.F._ III. 17, and
+elsewhere.
+
+15. It is so much easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than
+in that of Lucullus in the _Academica Priora_ that I think the reference in
+Nonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than a
+dogmatist (see _Luc._ 105, 120, and Cic.'s words in 8 of the same). If my
+conjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book IV. Krische gives a
+different opinion, but very hesitatingly, p. 63.
+
+16. This may well have formed part of Varro's explanation of the [Greek:
+katalepsis], _temeritas_ being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and
+Stoics as by the Academics cf. I. 42.
+
+17. I conjecture _malleo_ (a hammer) for the corrupt _malcho_, and think
+that in the second ed. some comparison from building operations to
+illustrate the fixity of knowledge gained through the [Greek: katalepseis]
+was added to a passage which would correspond in substance with 27 of the
+_Lucullus_. I note in Vitruvius, quoted by Forc. s.v. _malleolus_, a
+similar expression (_naves malleolis confixae_) and in Pliny _Nat. Hist._
+XXXIV. 14 _navis fixa malleo_. _Adfixa_ therefore in this passage must have
+agreed with some lost noun either in the neut. plur. or fem. sing.
+
+18. This and fragm. 19 evidently hang very closely together. As Krische
+notes, the Stoic [Greek: enargeia] had evidently been translated earlier in
+the book by _perspicuitas_ as in _Luc._ 17.
+
+19. See on _Luc._ 57.
+
+BOOK IV.
+
+Further information on all these passages will be found in my notes on the
+parallel passages of the _Lucullus_.
+
+21. _Viam_ evidently a mistake for the _umbram_ of _Luc._ 70.
+
+23. The best MS. of Nonius points to _flavum_ for _ravum_ (_Luc._ 105).
+Most likely an alteration was made in the second edition, as Krische
+supposes, p. 64.
+
+28. _Corpusculis_: _Luc._ 121 has _corporibus_. Krische's opinion that this
+latter word was in the second edition changed into the former may be
+supported from I. 6, which he does not notice. The conj. is confirmed by
+Aug. _Contr. Ac._ III. 23.
+
+29. _Magnis obscurata_: in _Luc._ 122 it is _crassis occultata_, so that we
+have another alteration, see Krische, p. 64.
+
+30. Only slight differences appear in the MSS. of the _Luc._ 123, viz.
+_contraria_, for _in c._, _ad vestigia_ for _contra v._
+
+31. _Luc._ 137 has _dixi_ for _dictus_. As Cic. does not often leave out
+_est_ with the passive verb, Nonius has probably quoted wrongly. It will be
+noted that the fragments of Book III. correspond to the first half of the
+_Luc._, those of Book IV. to the second half. Cic. therefore divided the
+_Luc._ into two portions at or about 63.
+
+UNCERTAIN BOOKS.
+
+32. I have already said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary
+assault on the senses made by Cic. in the second book.
+
+33. In the Introd. p. 55 I have given my opinion that the substance of
+Catulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the _probabile_ was
+incorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To
+that part this fragment must probably be referred.
+
+34. This important fragment clearly belongs to Book II., and is a jocular
+application of the Carneadean _probabile_, as may be seen from the words
+_probabiliter posse confici_.
+
+35. Krische assigns this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book.
+With this opinion I find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the
+_Lucullus_ (60) proves to demonstration that in the first edition this
+allusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have occurred
+either in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no reason whatever
+appears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer to regard it as
+belonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of Academic doctrine in
+the second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the Academic school must not
+be supposed to have no truths to maintain, see _Luc._ 119, also 66 and
+_N.D._ I. 12. Also Aug. _Contra. Ac._ II. 29.
+
+36. It is difficult to see where this passage could have been included if
+not in that prooemium to the third book which is mentioned _Ad. Att._ XVI.
+6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me wrong in holding that the
+whole four books formed one discussion, finished within the limits of a
+single day. Why interrupt the discussion by the insertion of a prologue of
+so general a nature as to be taken from a stock which Cic. kept on hand
+ready made? (Cf. _Ad Att._ as above.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications of its
+contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled _Contra
+Academicos_, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions,
+imitated throughout the second edition of the _Academica_ of Cic. No
+writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture
+and opinions of Augustine as the _Academica_ and the lost _Hortensius_. I
+give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications of the contents of the
+former which are to be gathered from the bishop's works. In Aug. _Contr.
+Ac._ II. 14, 15, we have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of
+Book I. to the following effect. The New Academy must not be regarded as
+having revolted against the Old, all that it did was to discuss that new
+doctrine of [Greek: katalepsis] advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of [Greek:
+akatalepsia] though present to the minds of the ancients had never taken
+distinct shape, because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was
+rather enriched than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism
+under the name of the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife
+between it and the New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic.
+must have ended. From this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his
+opinion (_Contra. Ac._ II. 1) that New Academicism was excusable from the
+necessities of the age in which it appeared. Indications of Book II. in
+Aug. are scarce, but to it I refer _Contra. Ac._ I. 7 _placuit Ciceroni
+nostro beatum esse qui verum investigat etiam si ad eius inventionem non
+valeat pervenire_, also _ibid._ III. 10 _illis (Academicis) placuit esse
+posse hominem sapientem, et tamen in hominem scientiam cadere non posse_.
+These I refer to Cicero's development of the _probabile_ in Book II.,
+although I ought to say that Krische, p. 65, maintains that the substance
+of Catulus' exposition in the _Ac. Priora_ transferred to Book IV. of the
+_Ac. Posteriora_. As this would leave very meagre material for Book II.,
+nothing indeed excepting the provisional proof of the deceptiveness of the
+senses, I cannot accede to his arrangement; mine, I may remark, involves a
+much smaller departure from the first edition. Allusions in Aug. to the
+attack on the senses by Cic. in Book II. are difficult to fix, as they
+apply equally well to the later attack in Book IV. As to Books III. and
+IV., I do not think it necessary here to prove from Aug. the points of
+agreement between them and the _Lucullus_, which will find a better place
+in my notes on the latter, but merely give the divergences which appear
+from other sources. These are the translation of [Greek: sophismata] by
+_cavillationes_ in _Luc._ 75 (Seneca _Ep._ III.), and the insertion in 118
+of _essentia_ as a translation of [Greek: ousia].
+
+BOOK II.
+
+ENTITLED _LUCULLUS_.
+
+    Sec.Sec.1--12. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was
+    absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to
+    attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great
+    general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory
+    (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander
+    and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my
+    consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now
+    tell (3). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher,
+    having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself (4). Those
+    enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know
+    philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5).
+    Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of
+    the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about
+    trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public
+    duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but
+    enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who
+    hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge
+    show that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics
+    do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow--the Academic.
+    This is natural, but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to
+    inquiry (7). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools
+    are enslaved to authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the
+    authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without
+    hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus,
+    Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the
+    _Catulus_ (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of
+    Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the
+    doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before (10). He
+    spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius
+    the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, and Antiochus. At that very time
+    the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of
+    Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old
+    teacher (11 and 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes
+    between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the
+    latter against Philo (12).
+
+Sec.1. _Luculli_: see Introd. p. 58, and _Dict. Biog._ _Digna homini nobili_:
+a good deal of learning would have been considered _unworthy_ of a man like
+Lucullus, see Introd. p. 30. _Percepta_: "gained," "won;" cf. _percipere
+fruges_, "to reap," _Cat. Mai._ 24. _Caruit_: "was cut off from;" _carere_
+comes from a root _skar_ meaning to divide, see Corss. I. 403. For the
+three nouns with a singular verb see Madv. _Gram._ 213 A, who confines the
+usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common reading
+_dissensit_ in _De Or._ III. 68 is right, the restriction does not hold.
+_Admodum_: "to a degree." _Fratre_: this brother was adopted by a M.
+Terentius Varro, and was a man of distinction also; see _Dict. Biog._
+_Magna cum gloria_: a ref. to _Dict. Biog._ will show that the whole affair
+was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have gained
+greater glory by letting it drop. _Quaestor_: to Sulla, who employed him
+chiefly in the civil administration of Asia. _Continuo_: without any
+interval. _Legis praemio_: this seems to mean "by the favour of a special
+law," passed of course by Sulla, who had restored the old _lex annalis_ in
+all its rigour, and yet excepted his own officers from its operation.
+_Prooemio_, which has been proposed, would not be Latin, see _De Leg._ II.
+16. _Consulatum_: he seems to have been absent during the years 84--74, in
+the East. _Superiorum_: scarcely that of Sulla.
+
+Sec.2. _Laus_: "merit," as often, so _praemium_, Virg. _Aen._ XII. 437, means
+a deed worthy of reward. _Non admodum exspectabatur_: Cic. forgets that
+Luc. had served with distinction in the Social War and the first
+Mithridatic war. _In Asia pace_: three good MSS. have _Asiae_; Baiter
+ejects _Asia_; Guilelmus read _in Asia in pace_ (which Davies conjectures,
+though he prints _Asiae_). _Consumere_ followed by an ablative without _in_
+is excessively rare in Cic. Madv. _D.F._ V. 53 denies the use altogether.
+In addition, however, to our passage, I note _hoc loco consumitur_ in
+_T.D._ IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give no variants.
+_Pace_ here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like _tranqullo_.
+_Indocilem_: this is simply passive, = "untaught," as in Prop. I. 2, 12,
+Ov. _Fast._ III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong in making
+it active. _Factus_: = _perfectus_; cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 5, 33 _homo factus
+ad unguem_, Cic. _De Or._ III. 184, _In Verr._ IV. 126. So _effectus_ in
+silver Latin. _Rebus gestis_: military history, so often. _Divinam quandam
+memoriam_: the same phrase in _De Or._ II. 360. _Rerum, verborum_: same
+distinction in _De Or._ II. 359. _Oblivisci se malle_: the same story is
+told _D.F._ II. 104, _De Or._ II. 299. The ancient art of memory was begun
+by Simonides (who is the person denoted here by _cuidam_) and completed by
+Metrodorus of Scepsis, for whom see _De Or._ II. 360. _Consignamus_: cf.
+_consignatae in animis notiones_ in _T.D._ I. 57. _litteris_ must be an
+ablative of the instrument. _Mandare monum._: cf. I. 3. _Insculptas_: rare
+in the metaphorical use, cf. _N.D._ I. 45.
+
+Sec.3. _Genere_: "department" cf. I. 3. _Navalibus pugnis_: [Greek:
+naumachiais]. _Instrumento et adparatu_: [Greek: kataskeue kai paraskeue].
+_Rex_: Mithridates. _Quos legisset_: = _de quibus l._; cf. the use of the
+passive verb so common in Ovid, e.g. _Trist._ IV. 4, 14. I take of course
+_rex_ to be nom. to _legisset_, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is
+nom. and that _quos legisset_ = _quorum commentarios legisset_ I think
+improbable. _Hodie_: Drakenborch on Livy V. 27 wants to read _hodieque_,
+which however, is not Ciceronian. In passages like _De Or._ I. 103 and
+_Verr._ V. 64, the _que_ connects clauses and does not modify _hodie_. On
+this subject see Madv. _Opuscula_ I. 390. _Etsi_: _M.D.F._ V. 68, shows
+that in Cic. a parenthetic clause with _etsi_ always has a common verb with
+its principal clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same
+holds of _quamquam_, see n. on I. 5. _Calumnia_: properly a fraudulent use
+of litigation, [Greek: sykophantia]. The chief enemy was the infamous
+Memmius who prosecuted him. _In urbem_: until his triumph Luc. would remain
+outside the city. _Profuisset_: this ought properly to be _profuerit_, but
+the conditional _dicerem_ changes it. _Potius ... quam ... communicem_: n.
+on 23.
+
+Sec.4. _Sunt ... celebrata_: cf. I. 11, 17 for the collocation of the words.
+_Externa ... interiora_: cf. _De Div._ II. 124 _sed haec quoque in promptu,
+nunc interiora videamus_. _Pro quaestore_: for this Faber wrote _quaestor_,
+arguing that as Luc. was Sulla's _quaestor_ and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he
+could not be _pro quaestor_. But surely after the first year he would be
+_pro quaestor_. Dav. reads _quaestor_ here and 11, saying "_veterem
+lectionem iugulavit Faber_". _Ea memoria ... quam_: Bentl., Halm, Baiter
+give _qua_, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor. _Sat._ I. 6, 15. A passage like
+ours is _D.F._ I. 29, _ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis_, where one MS.
+has _qua_. Read Madvig's lucid note there. _De quibus audiebat_: Madv.
+_Em._ 121 makes this equivalent to _de eis rebus de quibus_, the necessity
+of which explanation, though approved by Halm, I fail to see. The form of
+expression is very common in Cic., and the relative always refers to an
+actually expressed antecedent, cf. e.g. _Cat. Mai._ 83. I take _quibus_ as
+simply = _libris_.
+
+Sec.5. _Ac_: strong, as often, = [Greek: kai men]. _Personarum_: public
+characters, [Greek: prosopon poleos] (_Ad. Fam._ XV. 17, 2), so _personas_
+6. _Multi ... plures_: cf. Introd. p. 30. _Reliqui_: many MSS. insert _qui_
+by _dittographia_, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains it.
+On the retention or omission of this _qui_ will depend the choice of
+_putant_ or _putent_ below. _Earum rerum disputationem_: for _disp._
+followed by genitive see n. on I. 33. _Non ita decoram_: for this feeling
+see Introd. p. 30. For _non ita_ cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae".
+_Historiae loquantur_: _hist._ means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than
+"history," which is better expressed by _res gestae_. Note that the verb
+_loqui_ not _dicere_ is used, and cf. n. on 101. _Legatione_: to the kings
+in Egypt and the East in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C.
+About the embassy see _Dict. Biogr._ art. 'Panactius'. _Auctorem_: one
+would think this simple and sound enough, Bentl. however read _fautorem_,
+Dav. _auditorem_.
+
+Sec.6. _Illigari_: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use Forc.
+qu. Liv. XXXIII. 21, Tac. _Ann._ XIII. 40. _Aut ludicros sermones_: = _aut
+clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat_. _Rerum leviorum_: a similar
+argument in _D.F._ I. 12. _Quodam in libro_: the _Hortensius_. _Gradu_: so
+the word "degree" was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the
+ballad. _De opera publica detrahamus_: the dative often follows this verb,
+as in _D.F._ III. 7 _nihil operae reipublicae detrahens_, a passage often
+wrongly taken. _Operae_ is the dat. after the verb, not the gen. after
+_nihil_, _reip._ the gen. after _operae_, like _opera publica_ here, not
+the dat. after _detrahens_. _Nisi forensem_: the early oratorical works may
+fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the _De
+Republica_ or the _De Leg._ both of which fall within the period spoken of.
+_Ut plurimis prosimus_: cf. Introd. p. 29. _Non modo non minui, sed_:
+notice _non modo ... sed_ thrice over in two sentences.
+
+Sec.7. _Sunt ... qui negent_: and truly, see Introd. p. 38. In _Cat. Mai._ Sec.3
+Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned than he really was.
+_Mortuis_: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about 57, Hortensius 50. _Contra
+omnis dicere quae videntur_: MSS. mostly insert _qui_ between _dicere_ and
+_quae_, one of the best however has _dicere quae aliis_ as a correction,
+while another has the marginal reading _qui scire sibi videntur_. The
+omission of _qui_, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal.
+2) referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense. _Verum invenire_: cf. 60.
+_Contentione_: = [Greek: philoneikia] as usual. _In ... rebus obscuritas_:
+cf. I. 44 _rerum obscuritate_. _Infirmitas_: cf. I. 44 _imbecillos animos_.
+_Antiquissimi et doctissimi_: on the other hand _recentissima quaeque sunt
+correcta et emendata maxime_ I. 13. _Diffisi_: one of the best MSS. has
+_diffissi_, which reminds one of the spelling _divisssiones_, asserted to
+be Ciceronian in Quint. _Inst. Or_. I. 7, 20. _In utramque partem_: [Greek:
+ep' amphotera], cf. I. 45. _Exprimant_: "embody," cf. n. on I. 19.
+
+Sec.8. _Probabilia_: [Greek: pithana], for which see 33. _Sequi_: "act upon,"
+cf. 99-101. _Liberiores et solutiores_: these two words frequently occur
+together in Cic. and illustrate his love for petty variations; see 105,
+also _T.D._ V. 43, _De Div._ I. 4, _De Rep._ IV. 4, _N.D._ I. 56, _Orat._
+64. _Integra_: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "_non mihi integrum est_"--"I
+have committed my self." _Et quasi_: MSS. have _et quibus et quasi_.
+_Cogimur_: for this Academic freedom see Introd. p. 18. _Amico cuidam_:
+Orelli after Lamb. _cuipiam;_ for the difference see Madv. _Gram._ 493 _b_,
+c.
+
+Sec.9. _Ut potuerint, potuerunt_: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which
+was simply _ut potuerunt_, "granting that they had the ability, they gained
+it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they _did_ decide on a
+single hearing," etc. _Iudicaverunt autem_: so Lamb. for MSS. _aut_.
+Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "_arguta hariolatio_," read _an_ for _aut_
+and put a note of interrogation at _contulerunt_. C.F. Hermann
+(Schneidewin's _Philologus_ VII. 466) introduces by conj. a sad confusion
+into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's remarks in _Em._ 125
+has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed, followed by the faithful
+Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion of _aut_ between _sed_ and
+_ut_ at the beginning; of this Madv. says "_non solum Latina non est, sed
+sanae menti repugnat_." For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf.
+_N.D._ I. 10, _De Leg._ I. 36. _Quam adamaverunt_: "which they have learned
+to love;" the _ad_ has the same force as [Greek: pro] in [Greek:
+promanthanein], which means "to learn _on and on_, to learn by degrees"
+(cf. [Greek: proumathon stergein kakois]), not, as the lexica absurdly say,
+"to learn beforehand, i.e. to learn thoroughly." _Constantissime_: "most
+consistently". _Quae est ad Baulos_: cf. Introd. p. 57. _In spatio_: this
+_xystus_ was a colonnade with one side open to the sea, called [Greek:
+xystos] from its polished floor and pillars. _Consedimus_: n. on I. 14.
+
+Sec.10. _Servatam oportuit_: a construction very characteristic of Terence,
+found, but rarely, in Cic. and Livy. _In promptu ... reconditiora_: cf. _in
+promptu ... interiora_ in _De Div._ II. 124, also _Ac._ I. 4. _Quae dico_:
+Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and wishes to read
+_dixero_. But the substitution of the pres. for the future is common enough
+in all languages cf. Iuv. IV. 130 with Mayor's copious note. _Si non
+fuerint_: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have _si vera_
+etc. In support of the text, see I. 9 (_sunt ista_) and note.
+_Labefactata_: this is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in
+_Ed. Rom._ (1471); the others have _labefacta_. Orelli's statement (note to
+his separate text of the _Academica_ 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the
+perfect _labefeci_ and the part, _labefactus_ is quite wrong. The former is
+indeed the vulg. reading in _Pro Sestio_ 101, the latter in _De Haruspicum
+Responsis_ 60, but the last of these two passages is doubtful. Cic. as a
+rule prefers long forms like _sustentatus_, which occurs with
+_labefactatus_ in _Cat. Mai._ 20. For the perfect _labefactavit_ cf. I. 33.
+_Agam igitur_: Cic. rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a
+belief in the learning of Lucullus.
+
+Sec.11. _Pro quaestore_: cf. 4. _Essem_: MSS. _issem_, whence Goer. conj.
+_Alexandriam issem_. _Heraclitus Tyrius_: scarcely known except from this
+passage. _Clitomachum_: for this philosopher see Zeller 532. _Quae nunc
+prope dimissa revocatur_: sc. _a Cicerone_. Philo's only notable pupils had
+combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the
+_Academica_ the New Academic dialectic had been without a representative
+for many years. Cf. Introd. p. 21. _Libri duo_: cf. I. 13. _Heri_ for this
+indication of the contents of the lost _Catulus_, see Introd. p. 50.
+_Implorans_: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to with
+tears," see Corss. I. 361. _Philonis_: sc. _esse_. _Scriptum agnoscebat_:
+i.e. it was an actual work of Ph. _Tetrilius_: some MSS. are said to have
+Tetrinius, and the name _Tertinius_ is found on Inscr. One good MS. has
+_Tretilius_, which may be a mistake for _Tertilius_, a name formed like
+_Pompilius_, _Quintilius_, _Sextilius_. Qy, should _Petrilius_, a
+derivative from the word for four, be read? _Petrilius_ and _Pompilius_
+would then agree like _Petronius_ and _Pomponius_, _Petreius_ and
+_Pompeius_. For the formation of these names see Corss. I. 116. _Rogus_: an
+ill omened and unknown name. _Rocus_, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on
+_denarii_ of the _gens Creperia_. _De Philone ... ab eo ipso_: note the
+change of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy." _De_ and _ex_ are
+common in Cic. after _audire_, while _ab_ is rather rarer. See _M.D.F._ I.
+39, and for _describere ab aliquo_ cf. _a te_ in _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, 3.
+
+Sec.12. _Dicta Philoni_: for this see Introd. p. 50. It cannot mean what Goer.
+makes it mean, "_coram Philone_." I think it probable that _Philoni_ is a
+marginal explanation foisted on the text. As to the statements of Catulus
+the elder, they are made clear by 18. _Academicos_: i.e. _novos_, who are
+here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the
+title. _Aristo_: see Introd. p. 11. _Aristone_: Diog. VII. 164 mentions an
+Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems
+unknown. _Negat_: see n. on 18. _Lenior_: some MSS. _levior_, as is usual
+with these two words. In 11 one of the earliest editions has _leviter_ for
+_leniter_.
+
+    Sec.Sec.13--18. Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted like a seditious
+    tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as supporters of
+    scepticism (13), Those very philosophers, with the exception of
+    Empedocles, seem to me, if anything, too dogmatic (14). Even if they
+    were often in doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made
+    during so many centuries by the investigations of so many men of
+    ability? Arcesilas was a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti.
+    Gracchus was a rebel against a good government (15). Has nothing really
+    been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty,
+    though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists think that no
+    argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument can add
+    nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however
+    do allow of discussion with sceptics. Philo in his innovations was
+    induced to state falsehoods, and incurred all the evils he wished to
+    avoid, his rejection of Zeno's definition of the [Greek: kataleptike
+    phantasia] really led him back to that utter scepticism from which he
+    was fleeing. We then must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in
+    to the sceptics (18).
+
+Sec.13. _Rursus exorsus est_: cf. _exorsus_ in 10. _Popularis_: [Greek:
+demotikous]. _Ii a_: so Dav. for MSS. _iam_. _Tum ad hos_: so MSS., Dav.
+_aut hos_. The omission of the verb _venire_ is very common in Cic.'s
+letters. _C. Flaminium_: the general at lake Trasimene. _Aliquot annis_:
+one good MS. has _annos_, cf. _T.D._ I. 4, where all the best MSS. have
+_annos_. The ablative is always used to express point of time, and indeed
+it may be doubted whether the best writers _ever_ use any accusative in
+that sense, though they do occasionally use the ablative to express
+duration (cf. Prop. I. 6, 7 and Madv. _Gram._ 235, 2). _L. Cassium_: this
+is L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot
+bill (_De Leg._ III. 35), he was the author of the _cui bono_ principle and
+so severe a judge as to be called _scopulus reorum_. Pompeium: apparently
+the man who made the disgraceful treaty with Numantia repudiated by home in
+139 B.C. _P. Africanum_: i.e. the younger, who supported the ballot bill of
+Cassius, but seems to have done nothing else for the democrats. _Fratres_:
+Lamb. _viros_, but cf. _Brut._ 98. _P. Scaevolam_: the pontifex, consul in
+the year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against
+the tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of
+Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about the
+legal effect the bills would have. _Ut videmus ... ut suspicantur_: Halm
+with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that the statement about
+Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but him. Those words need
+not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be allowed the inconsistency.
+
+Sec.14. _Similiter_: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have _simile_.
+_Xenophanem_: so Victorius for the MSS. _Xenoplatonem_. _Ed. Rom._ (1471)
+has _Cenonem_, which would point to _Zenonem_, but Cic. does not often name
+Zeno of Elea. _Saturninus_: of the question why he was an enemy of
+Lucullus, Goer. says _frustra quaeritur_. Saturninus was the persistent
+enemy of Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage.
+_Arcesilae calumnia_: this was a common charge, cf. _Academicorum calumnia_
+in _N.D._ II. 20 and _calumnia_ in 18 and 65 of this book. So August.
+_Contra Acad._ II. 1 speaks of _Academicorum vel calumnia vel pertinacia
+vel pericacia_. _Democriti verecundia_: Cic. always has a kind of
+tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on _D.F._ I. 20 remarks, cf. _De Div._
+II. 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the general _arrogantia_ of
+the _physici_. _Empedocles quidem ... videatur_: cf. 74. The exordium of
+his poem is meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of
+the text, see R. and P. 108. _Quale sit_: the emphasis is on _sit_, the
+sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. _Quasi modo
+nascentes_: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however _T.D._ II. 5 _ut
+oratorum laus ... senescat ... , philosophia nascatur_.
+
+Sec.15. _haesitaverunt_: Goer. cf. _De Or._ I. 40. _Constitutam_: so in 14.
+_Delitisceret_: this is the right spelling, not _delitesceret_, which one
+good MS. has here, see Corssen II. 285. _Negavissent_: "had denied, as they
+said." _Tollendus est_: a statement which is criticised in 74. _Nominibus
+differentis ... dissenserunt_: genuine Antiochean opinions, see the
+_Academica Posteriora_ 17, 43. _De se ipse_: very frequent in Cic. (cf.
+Madv. _Gram._ 487 _b_). _Diceret_: this is omitted by the MSS., but one has
+_agnosceret_ on the margin; see n. on 88. _Fannius_: in his "Annals." The
+same statement is quoted in _De Or._ II. 270, _Brutus_ 299. Brutus had
+written an epitome of this work of Fannius (_Ad Att._ XII. 5, 3).
+
+Sec.16. _Veteribus_: Bentley's em. of MSS. _vetera_: C.F. Hermann (Schneid
+_Philol._ VII. 457), thinking the departure from the MSS. too great, keeps
+_vetera_ and changes _incognita_ into _incondita_, comparing _De Or._ I.
+197, III. 173. A glance, however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the
+word always means merely "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here
+is not one between order and no order, but between knowledge and no
+knowledge, so that _incognita_ is far better. I am not at all certain that
+the MSS. reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us
+suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were not
+_knowledge_, but mere _opinion_." The conj. of Kayser _veri nota_ for
+_vetera_ (cf. 76) and _investigatum_ below, is fanciful and improbable.
+_Quod investigata sunt_: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again
+disturbs the text which since Madv. _Em._ 127 supported it (quoting _T.D._
+V. 15, Liv. XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that _illa_ in the former
+sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects _nihilne est
+igitur actum_ as a dittographia (!) from 15 _nihilne explicatum_, and reads
+_quot_ for _quod_ with Bentl. For the meaning cf. _T.D._ III. 69 and Arist.
+on the progress of philosophy as there quoted. _Arcesilas Zenoni ...
+obtrectans_: see n. on I. 34. These charges were brought by each school
+against the other. In Plutarch _Adv. Colotem_ p. 1121 F, want of novelty is
+charged against Arcesilas, and the charge is at once joyfully accepted by
+Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was often excused by the provocation Zeno
+gave, see Aug. _Contra Acad._ II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm. 2 and 35 of
+the _Academica Posteriora_. _Immutatione verborum_: n. on I. 33. This
+phrase has also technical meanings; it translates the Greek [Greek: tropoi]
+(_Brut._ 69) and [Greek: allegoria] in _De Or._ II. 261, where an ex. is
+given. _Definitiones_: n. on 18. _Tenebras obducere_: such expressions
+abound in Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned, cf. 30 (_lucem
+eripere_), _N.D._ I. 6 (_noctem obfundere_) Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 14
+(_quasdam nebulas obfundere_), also the joke of Aug. II. 29 _tenebrae quae
+patronae Academicorum solent esse_. _Non admodum probata_: cf. the passage
+of Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. _Lacyde_: the most important passages in
+ancient authorities concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is
+important to note that Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became
+the source of information about his teacher's doctrines. _Tenuit_: cf. the
+use of _obtinere_ in _De Or._ I. 45. _In Aeschine_: so Dav. for the
+confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher see Zeller 533. As two MSS.
+have _hac nonne_ Christ conj. _Hagnone_ which Halm, as well as Baiter
+takes; Zeller 533 seems to adopt this and at once confuses the supposed
+philosopher with one Agnon just mentioned in Quint. II. 17, 15. There is
+not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known
+at all, from these two passages only.
+
+Sec.17. _Patrocinium_: for the word cf. _N.D._ I. 6. _Non defuit_: such
+patronage _was_ wanting in the time of Arcesilas (16). _Faciendum omnino
+non putabant_: "Epictetus (Arrian, _Diss._ I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a
+sceptic by saying [Greek: ouk ago scholen pros tauta]" (Zeller 85, n.). In
+another passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a
+sceptic than with a corpse. _Ullam rationem disputare_: the same constr.
+occurs in 74 and _Pro Caecina_ 15, _Verr. Act._ I. 24. _Antipatrum_: cf.
+fragm. 1 of Book I. _Verbum e verbo_: so 31, _D.F._ III. 15, _T.D._ III. 7,
+not _verbum de verbo_, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form.
+_Comprehensio_: cf. I. 41. _Ut Graeci_: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I.
+44 _ut Democritus_. _Evidentiam_: other translations proposed by Cic. were
+_illustratio_ (Quint. VI. 2, 32) and _perspicientia_ (_De Off._ I. 15).
+_Fabricemur_: cf. 87, 119, 121. _Me appellabat_: Cic. was the great
+advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (_D.F._ III. 15). _Sed tamen_:
+this often resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Ipsa
+evidentia_: note that the verb _evidere_ is not Latin.
+
+Sec.18. _Sustinere_: cf. 70. _Pertinaciam_: the exact meaning of this may be
+seen from _D.F._ II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot
+recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an
+opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf.
+n. on 14, 66, also I. 44 and _D.F._ V. 94, _N.D._ I. 13, in the last of
+which passages the Academy is called _procax_. _Mentitur_: cf. 12. _Ita
+negaret_: this _ita_ corresponds to _si_ below,--a common sequence of
+particles in Cic., cf. 19. [Greek: Akatalepton]: the conj. of Turnebus
+[Greek: katalepton] is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in
+_negaret_. _Visum_: cf. I. 40. _Trivimus_: cf. I. 27. _Visum igitur_: the
+Greek of this definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words _impressum
+effictumque_ are equivalent to [Greek: enapesphragismene kai
+enapomemagmene] in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a
+sensation to be a real alteration ([Greek: heteroiosis]) of the material
+substance of the soul through the action of some external thing, which
+impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77
+with footnotes. _Ex eo unde esset ... unde non esset_: this translation
+corresponds closely to the definition given by Sextus in four out of the
+six passages referred to by Zeller (in _Adv. Math._ VIII. 86 _Pyrrh.
+Hypotyp._ III. 242, the definition is clipt), and in Diog. Laert. VII. 50
+(in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just
+referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of
+Orelli's reprint of his _Academica_) that Cic. omits to represent the words
+[Greek: kat' auto to hyparchon]. Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 249 considers
+them essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at
+Electra, mistook her for an Erinys. The [Greek: phantasia] therefore which
+he had although [Greek: apo hyparchontos] (proceeding from an actually
+existent thing) was not [Greek: kata to hyparchon], i.e. did not truly
+represent that existent thing. Aug. _Cont. Acad._ II. 11 quotes Cicero's
+definition and condenses it thus; _his signis verum posse comprehendi quae
+signa non potest habere quod falsum est_. _Iudicium_: [Greek: kriterion], a
+test to distinguish between the unknown and the known. _Eo, quo minime
+volt_: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a reaction towards
+dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of knowledge on a ground quite
+different from the [Greek: kataleptike phantasia], which he pronounced
+impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to suit his own.
+As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. 11, Sextus _Pyrr. Hyp._ I.
+235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans believed all things to be
+[Greek: akatalepta], Philo held them to be [Greek: katalepta], and Numenius
+in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice
+as a renegade. (2) is evident from the _Academica_ and from Sextus as
+quoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more
+difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be
+_in their own nature_ [Greek: katalepta (hoson de epi te physei ton
+pragmaton auton katal.)]. But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have
+attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that things _in
+themselves_ were incognisable, _but_ that human faculties do not avail to
+give information about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with
+words, there was nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by
+their [Greek: kataleptike phantasia] professed to be able to get at _the
+thing in itself_, in its real being, if then Philo did away with the
+[Greek: katal. phant.] and substituted no other mode of curing the defects
+alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense, he was fairly open
+to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius treats his polemic
+against the [Greek: katal. phant.] as a mere feint intended to cover his
+retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in 112 of
+this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing the views of Philo,
+and not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It would seem from that
+passage that he defined the cognisable to be "_quod impressum esset e
+vero_" ([Greek: phantasia apo hyparchontos enapomemagmene]), refusing to
+add "_quo modo imprimi non posset a falso_ ([Greek: hoia ouk an genoito apo
+me hyparchontos]), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely
+tried to show that the cognisable was equivalent to the [Greek: delon] or
+[Greek: pithanon] of Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful
+statement of the latter that the wise man would "opine," that is, would
+pronounce definite judgments on phenomena. (See 78 of this book.) The
+scarcity of references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a
+more exact view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little
+or nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book
+entitled _Academica_ (pp. 313--316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard
+to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He
+denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles
+of doubt, to be correct (12). I may add that from the mention of Philo's
+ethical works at the outset of Stobaeus' _Ethica_, he would appear to have
+afterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important
+for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the
+new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as
+genuinely Academic. _Revolvitur_: cf. _De Div._ II. 13, also 148 of this
+book. _Eam definitionem_: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the
+sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single
+sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these
+sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that _all_
+knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on
+the truth of the individual perception of sense.
+
+    Sec.Sec.19--29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give
+    perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain
+    the truth of _every_ sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which
+    impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we
+    always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated
+    senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch!
+    (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions
+    of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since
+    they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at
+    definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic
+    memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22).
+    That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would
+    act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false?
+    (23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her?
+    There must he some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence
+    must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action
+    is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end
+    to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be
+    discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should
+    be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are rendered useless, philosophy
+    too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence the
+    Academics have been urged to allow their _dogma_ that perception is
+    impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades
+    said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the
+    supposition that there can be _any_ true perception (28). Antiochus
+    declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if
+    they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).
+
+Sec.19. _Sensibus_: it is important to observe that the word _sensus_ like
+[Greek: aisthesis] means two things, (1) one of the _five_ senses, (2) an
+individual act of sensation. _Deus_: for the supposed god cf. _T.D._ II.
+67. _Non videam_: this strong statement is ridiculed in 80. _De remo
+inflexo et de collo columbae_: cf. 79, 82. The [Greek: kope enalos
+keklasmene] and [Greek: peristeras trachelos] are frequently mentioned,
+along with numerous other instances of the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext.
+Emp., e.g. _Pyrrhon. Hypot._ I. 119-121, _Adv. Math._ VII. 244, 414.
+Cicero, in his speech of the day before, had probably added other examples,
+cf. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 27. _Epicurus hoc viderit_: see 79, 80. Epic.
+held all sensation, _per se_, to be infallible. The chief authorities for
+this are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote. _Lumen mutari_:
+cf. _Brut._ 261. _Intervalla ... diducimus_: for this cf. Sext. _Pyrrh_. I.
+118 [Greek: pemptos esti logos] (i.e. the 5th sceptic [Greek: tropos] for
+showing sense to be untrustworthy) [Greek: ho para tas theseis] (_situs_)
+[Greek: kai ta diastemata] (_intervalla_) [Greek: kai tous topous].
+_Multaque facimus usque eo_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 258 [Greek: panta
+poiei mechris an tranen kai plektiken spase phantasian]. _Sui iudicii_: see
+for the gen. _M.D.F._ II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut.
+_Persa_ V. 2, 8, quoted by Goer. _Sui cuiusque_: for this use of _suus
+quisque_ as a single word see _M.D.F._ V. 46.
+
+Sec.20. _Ut oculi ... cantibus_: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on
+the other hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. _Quis est quin
+cernat_: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here (_D.F._ II.
+27). _Umbris ... eminentia_: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses _umbra_ and
+_lumen_, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. [Greek: skia] and
+[Greek: skiasma] are opposed to [Greek: lampra]; cf. also [Greek:
+skiagraphein], _adumbrare_, and Aesch. _Agam_. 1328. Cic. often applies
+metaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g. _De Or._ III. 101,
+and after him Quintilian, e.g. II. 17, 21. _Inflatu_: cf. 86 (where an
+answer is given) and [Greek: anabole]. _Antiopam_: of Pacuvius.
+_Andromacham_: of Ennius, often quoted by Cic., as _De Div._ I. 23.
+_Interiorem_: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's _Socrates and the Socratic
+Schools_, 296. _Quia sentiatur_: [Greek: aisthesis] being their only
+[Greek: kriterion]. Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages
+referred to in R. and P. and Zeller will show) conj. _cui adsentiatur_,
+comparing 39, 58; cf. also 76. _Inter eum ... et inter_: for the repetition
+of _inter_ cf. _T.D._ IV. 32 and Madv. _Gram._ 470. _Nihil interesse_: if
+the doctrine of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when
+he fancied himself in pleasure, and _vice versa_; thus the distinction
+between pleasure and pain would be obscured. _Sentiet ... insaniat_: For
+the sequence cf. _D.F._ I. 62 and Wesenberg's fine note on _T.D._ V. 102.
+
+Sec.21. _Illud est album_: these are [Greek: axiomata], judgments of the mind,
+in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq. There is a
+passage in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours;
+it is too long to quote entire: [Greek: aisthesesi men oun monais labein
+talethes] (which resides only in the [Greek: axioma]) [Greek: ou dynatai
+anthropos. ... physei gar eisin alogoi ... dei de eis phantasian achthenai
+tou toioutou pragmatos "touto leukon esti kai touto glyky estin." toi de
+toioutoi pragmati ouketi tes aistheseos ergon estin epiballein ... syneseos
+te dei kai mnemes]. _Ille deinceps_: _deinceps_ is really out of place; cf.
+24 _quomodo primum_ for _pr. quom._ _Ille equus est_: Cic. seems to
+consider that the [Greek: axioma], which affirms the existence of an
+abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the existence of a
+concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from the Greek texts.
+_Expletam comprehensionem_: full knowledge. Here we rise to a definition.
+This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. _Adv. Math._ VII. [Greek: anthropos
+esti zoon logikon thneton, nou kai epistemes dektikon]. The Stoic [Greek:
+horoi], and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II.
+208--211. _Notitiae_: this Cic. uses as a translation both of [Greek:
+prolepsis] and [Greek: ennoia], for which see Zeller 79, 89. In I. 40
+_notiones rerum_ is given. _Sine quibus_: [Greek: dia gar ton ennoion ta
+pragmata lambanetai] Diog. VII. 42.
+
+Sec.22. _Igitur_: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Consentaneum_:
+so Sextus constantly uses [Greek: akolouthon]. _Repugnaret_: cf. I. 19 and
+n. _Memoriae certe_: n. on 106. _Continet_: cf. _contineant_ in 40. _Quae
+potest esse_: Cic. nearly always writes _putat esse_, _potest esse_ and the
+like, not _esse putat_ etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a
+clause. _Memoria falsorum_: this difficulty is discussed in Plato
+_Sophist._ 238--239. _Ex multis animi perceptionibus_: the same definition
+of an art occurs in _N.D._ II. 148, _D.F._ III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II.
+17, 41, Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 [Greek: technen einai systema ek
+katalepseon syngegymnasmenon] _ib._ III. 250. _Quam_: for the change from
+plural to singular (_perceptio in universum_) cf. n. on I. 38, Madv. _D.F._
+II. 61, _Em._ 139. _Qui distingues_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 280 [Greek:
+ou dioisei tes atechnias he techne]. Sextus often comments on similar
+complaints of the Stoics. _Aliud eiusmodi genus sit_: this distinction is
+as old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence in the late
+philosophy. Cf. Sext. _Adv. Math._ XI. 197 who adds a third class of
+[Greek: technai] called [Greek: apotelesmatikai] to the usual [Greek:
+theoretikai] and [Greek: praktikai], also Quint. II. 18, 1 and 2, where
+[Greek: poietike] corresponds to the [Greek: apot.] of Sext. _Continget_:
+"will be the natural consequence." The notion that the verb _contingit_
+denotes necessarily _good_ fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer on
+_T.D._ III. 4. _Tractabit_: [Greek: mellei metacheirizesthai].
+
+Sec.23. _Cognitio_: like Germ. _lehre_, the branch of learning which concerns
+the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of [Greek:
+katalepsis] here. _In quibus_: the antecedent is not _virtutum_, as Petrus
+Valentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, but
+_multa_. This is shown by _etiam_; not _merely_ the virtues but _also_ all
+[Greek: episteme] depends on [Greek: katalepseis]; cf. I. 40, 41, with
+notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367. _Stabilem_: [Greek: bebaion kai
+ametaptotou]. _Artem vivendi_: "_tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos_"
+_M.D.F._ I. 42. Sextus constantly talks about [Greek: he oneiropoloumene
+peri ton bion techne] (_Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 250) the existence of which he
+disproves to his own satisfaction (_Adv. Math._ XI. 168 sq). _Ille vir
+bonus_: in all ancient systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness of the
+_sapiens_ must be proof against the rack; cf. esp. _D.F._ III. 29, 75,
+_T.D._ V. 73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the [Greek:
+sophos] in Plato's _Gorgias_. _Potius quam aut_: Lamb. _ut_; but I think
+C.F. Hermann is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. _never_ inserts
+_ut_ after _potius quam_ with the subj. Tischer on _T.D._ II. 52 affirms
+that _ut_ is frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. _De
+Off._ I. 86, Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12 who says the _sapiens_ of the Academy
+must be _desertor officiorum omnium_. _Comprehensi ... constituti_: cf. the
+famous _abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit_. _Iis rebus_: note the assumption
+that the _sensation_ corresponds to the _thing_ which causes it. _Adsensus
+sit ... possint_: nearly all edd. before Halm read _possunt_, but the subj.
+expresses the possibility as present to the mind of the supposed _vir
+bonus_. Cf. Madv. _Gram._ 368.
+
+Sec.24. _Primum_: out of place, see on 21. _Agere_: the dogmatist always held
+that the sceptic must, if consistent, be [Greek: anenergetos en bioi]
+(Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 23). _Extremum_: similar attempts to translate
+[Greek: telos] are made in D.F. I. 11, 29, V. 17. _Cum quid agere_: cf. I.
+23 for the phrase _Naturae accommodatum_. a purely Stoic expression,
+[Greek: homoiomenon te physei]; cf. 38 and _D.F._ V. 17, also III. 16,
+Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P. 390. _Impellimur_: [Greek: kinoumetha],
+Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 391, as often.
+
+Sec.25. _Oportet videri_: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. 39, 81 and 122
+of this book. _Videri_ at the end of this section has the weak sense, "to
+seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. I.
+262 with I. 270, and Munro's n., also _M.D.F._ II. 52, _Em. Liv._ p. 42.
+_Non poterit_: as the Academics allege. _Naturae ... alienum_: Cic. uses
+this adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by _ab_; I
+doubt whether the phrase _maiestate alienum_ (without the preposition) can
+be right in _De Div._ II. 102, where the best texts still keep it. _Non
+occurrit ... aget_: occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on 127.
+
+Sec.26. _Quid quod si_: Goer., outrageously reads _quid quod si, si_.
+_Tollitur_: the verb _tollere_ occurs as frequently in this sense as
+[Greek: anairein] does in Sextus. _Lux lumenque_: Bentl. _dux_ The
+expression _dux vitae_ is of course frequent (cf. _N.D._ I. 40, _T.D._ V. 5
+and Lucretius), but there is no need to alter. _Lux_ is properly natural
+light, _lumen_ artificial, cf. _Ad Att._ XVI. 13, 1. _lumina dimiseramus,
+nec satis lucebat_, D.F. III. 45 _solis luce ... lumen lucernae_. There is
+the same difference between [Greek: phos] and [Greek: phengos], the latter
+is used for the former ([Greek: phengos heliou]) just as _lumen_ is for
+_lux_ (_si te secundo lumine his offendere_--_Ad Att._ VII. 26, 1) but not
+often _vice versa_. Trans. "the luminary and the lamp of life," and cf.
+Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 269 where the [Greek: phantasia] is called [Greek:
+phengos]. _Finis_: so in the beginning of the _Nicom. Eth._ Aristot.
+assumes that the actual existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof
+that there is a [Greek: telos]. _Aperta_: a reminiscence of the frequently
+recurring Greek terms [Greek: ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos] etc., cf. Sextus
+_passim_, and _D.F._ I. 30. _Initium ... exitus_ = [Greek: arche ...
+telos]. _Tenetur_: MSS. _tenet_, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be
+_ratio_ above. [Greek: Apodeixis]: cf. the definition very often given by
+Sext. e.g. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II. 143 [Greek: logos di' homologoumenon lemmaton]
+(premisses) [Greek: kata synagogen epiphoran] (conclusion) [Greek:
+ekkalypton adelon], also Diog. VII. 45, [Greek: logon dia ton mallon
+katalambanomenon to hetton katalambanomenon perainonta] (if the reading be
+right).
+
+Sec.27. _Notio_: another trans. of [Greek: ennoia]. _Conclusisse_: although
+the Greeks used [Greek: symperasma] instead of [Greek: epiphora] sometimes
+for the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb [Greek:
+symperainein] which has been supposed to correspond to _concludere_. It is
+more likely to be a trans. of [Greek: synagein], and _conclusum argumentum_
+of [Greek: synaktikos logos], which terms are of frequent occurrence.
+_Rationibus progredi_: to a similar question Sextus answers, [Greek: ouk
+estin anankaion tas ekeinon] (the dogmatists) [Greek: dogmatologias
+probainein, plasmatodeis hyparchousas] (_Adv. Math._ VIII. 367).
+_Sapientiae ... futurum est_: for the dat. with _facio_ and _fio_ see Madv.
+_Gram._ 241, obs. 5, _Opusc._ I. 370, _D.F._ II. 79, and cf. 96 of this
+book. _Lex veri rectique_: cf. 29; the _constitutio veri_ and the
+determination of what is _rectum_ in morals are the two main tasks of
+philosophy. _Sapientique satis non sit_: so Manut. for the _sapientisque
+sit_ of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads _sapientis, neque satis sit_, which
+I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run
+_neque dubitari potest quin satis sit_, which gives the exact opposite of
+the sense required. _Ratum_: cf. 141.
+
+Sec.28. _Perceptum_: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are very
+frequent in Sextus, e.g. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues
+that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to
+show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be _provable_. Cf. 109 of
+this book. _Postulanti_: making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. _De
+Leg._ I. 21. _Consentaneum esse_: [Greek: akolouthon einai]. _Ut alia_:
+_although_ others. _Tantum abest ut--ut_: cf. Madv. _Gram._ 440 a.
+
+Sec.29. _Pressius_: cf. _De Fato_ 31, 33, _N.D._ II. 20, _T.D._ IV. 14,
+_Hortensius_ fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in 109. _Decretum_: of
+course the Academics would say they did not hold this [Greek: dogma] as
+_stabile fixum ratum_ but only as _probabile_. Sextus however _Pyrrh. Hyp._
+I. 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words
+they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. _Sentitis enim_: cf. _sentis_
+in _D.F._ III. 26. _Fluctuare_: "to be at sea," Halm _fluctuari_, but the
+deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. _Summa_: cf. _summa
+philosophiae_ _D.F._ II. 86. _Veri falsi_: cf. n. on 92. _Quae visa_: so
+Halm for MSS. _quaevis_, which edd. had changed to _quae a quovis_.
+_Repudiari_: the selection depended on the _probabile_ of course, with the
+Academics. _Veri falsique_: these words were used in different senses by
+the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them "the undestructibly
+true and false." This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense
+arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. says, [Greek: psile phasei
+ison pheretai psile phasis] (_A.M._ VII. 315), [Greek: phasei men phasis
+epischethesetai] (_ib._ 337). _Cognoscendi initium_: cf. 26, "This I have,"
+the Academic would reply, "in my _probabile_." _Extremum expetendi_: a
+rather unusual phrase for the ethical _finis_. _Ut moveri non possint_: so
+[Greek: kineisthai] is perpetually used in Sext. _Est ut opinor_: so Halm
+after Ernesti for _sit_ of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS.
+reading is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the
+Greek [Greek: hikanos eioestho] and the like. The subj. is supported by
+_D.F._ III. 20, _De Off._ I. 8, _Ad Att._ XIII. 14, 3, where _ut opinor_ is
+thrown in as here, and by _Ac._ II. 17, _D.F._ III. 21, 24, _N.D._ I. 109,
+where _si placet_ is appended in a similar way.
+
+    Sec.Sec.30--36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we might urge that
+    nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed
+    for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses
+    the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection
+    of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained
+    through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some
+    sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others distinguish between the
+    absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence.
+    Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on
+    the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the
+    other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between
+    true and false is possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be
+    known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing.
+    How can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility
+    remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be
+    "evident" at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is
+    no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.
+    Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they
+    only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we
+    reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36).
+
+Sec.30. _Physicis_: neuter not masc.; cf. I. 6. _Libertatem et licentiam_:
+_et_ = "and even." _Libertas_ = [Greek: parresia] as often in Tacitus.
+_Abditis rebus et obscuris_: cf. n. on I. 15, and the word [Greek:
+syneskiasmenos] Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 26. _Lucem eripere_: like _tollere_
+(n. on 26), cf. 38, 103 and _N.D._ I. 6. For the sense see n. on 16, also
+61. _Artificio_: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to _ars_ in all
+its senses, cf. 114 and _De Or._ II. 83. _Fabricata esset_: the expression
+is sneered at in 87. _Quem ad modum primum_: so Halm rightly for MSS.
+_prima_ or _primo_, which latter is not often followed by _deinde_ in
+Cicero. _Primum_ is out of position, as in 24. _Appetitio pulsa_: = _mota_,
+set in motion. For [Greek: horme] see 24. _Intenderemus_: as in the exx.
+given in 20. _Fons_: "reservoir," rather than "source" here. It will be
+noted that [Greek: synkatathesis] must take place before the [Greek: horme]
+is roused. _Ipse sensus est_: an approach to this theory is made in Plat.
+_Theaet._ 185, 191. Cf. especially Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 350 [Greek: kai
+hoi men diapherein auten ton aistheseon, hos hoi pleious, hoi de auten
+einai tas aistheseis ... hes staseos erxe Straton]. All powers of sensation
+with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included in the
+[Greek: hegemonikon], cf. n. on I. 38. _Alia quasi_: so Faber for _aliqua_.
+"_In vera et aperta partitione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis--alius
+dixit, multo minus alius--aliquis_," _M.D.F._ III. 63. Goer. on the other
+hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he forbears however, to
+produce them. _Recondit_: so the [Greek: ennoiai] are called [Greek:
+apokeimenai noeseis] (Plut. _De Sto. Repug._ p. 1057 a). In Sext. _Adv.
+Math._ VII. 373 [Greek: mneme] is called [Greek: thesaurismos phantasion].
+_Similitudinibus_: [Greek: kath' homoiosin] Sext. _Pyrr. Hyp._ II. 75. Cic.
+uses this word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know
+things not immediately perceived by sense. In _D.F._ III. 33 it receives
+its proper meaning, for which see Madv. there, and the passages he quotes,
+"analogies" will here best translate the word, which, is used in the same
+wide sense in _N.D._ II. 22 38. _Construit_: so MSS. Orelli gave
+_constituit_. _Notitiae_: cf. 22. Cic. fails to distinguish between the
+[Greek: physikai ennoiai] or [Greek: koinai] which are the [Greek:
+prolepseis], and those [Greek: ennoiai] which are the conscious product of
+the reason, in the Stoic system. Cf. _M.D.F._ III. 21, V. 60, for this and
+other inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also Zeller 79.
+_Rerumque_: "facts". _Perfecta_: _sapientia_, _virtus_, _perfecta ratio_,
+are almost convertible terms in the expositions of Antiocheanism found in
+Cic. Cf. I. 20.
+
+Sec.31. _Vitaeque constantiam_: which philosophy brings, see 23.
+_Cognitionem_: [Greek: epistemen]. _Cognitio_ is used to translate [Greek:
+katalepsis] in _D.F._ II. 16, III. 17, cf. n. on I. 41. _Ut dixi ...
+dicemus_: For the repetition cf. 135, 146, and _M.D.F._ I. 41. The future
+tense is odd and unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote _dicimus_, I would rather read
+_dicamus_; cf. n. on 29. _Per se_: [Greek: kath' auten], there is no need
+to read _propter_, as Lamb. _Ut virtutem efficiat_: note that virtue is
+throughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the
+_reason_. _Evertunt_: cf. _eversio_ in 99. _Animal ... animo_: Cic. allows
+_animus_ to all animals, not merely _anima_; see Madv. _D.F._ V. 38. The
+rule given by Forc. s.v. _animans_ is therefore wrong. _Temeritate_:
+[Greek: propeteia], which occurs _passim_ in Sext. The word, which is
+constantly hurled at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of
+retort. So in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 260, the sceptic is called [Greek:
+embrontetos] for rejecting the [Greek: kataleptike phantasia].
+
+Sec.32. _Incerta_: [Greek: adela]. _Democritus_: cf. I. 44. _Quae ...
+abstruserit_: "_because_ she has hidden." _Alii autem_: note the ellipse of
+the verb, and cf. I. 2. _Etiam queruntur_: "actually complain;" "go so far
+as to complain." _Inter incertum_: cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 7,
+12, [Greek: diaphoran einai adelou kai akataleptou, kai panta men einai
+akatalepta ou panta de adela] (quoted as from Carneades), also 54 of this
+book. _Docere_: "to prove," cf. n. on 121. _Qui haec distinguunt_: the
+followers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on I. 45.
+_Stellarum numerus_: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in
+Sext. e.g. _P.H_. II. 90, 98, _A.M_. VII. 243, VIII. 147, 317; where it is
+reckoned among things [Greek: aionion echonta agnosian]. So in the Psalms,
+God only "telleth the number of the stars;" cf. 110. _Aliquos_:
+contemptuous; [Greek: aponenoemenous tinas]. Cf. _Parad._ 33 _agrestis
+aliquos_. _Moveri_: this probably refers to the speech of Catulus; see
+Introd. p. 51. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 15 refers to this passage, which must
+have been preserved in the second edition.
+
+Sec.33. _Veri et falsi_: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first
+clause, and Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and
+appropriate. "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and
+the false while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether."
+The discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use
+the term "true" to denote the _probably true_, the Academics are not open
+to the criticism here attempted; cf. 111 _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_.
+_Ut inter rectum et pravum_: the sceptic would no more allow the absolute
+certainty of this distinction than of the other. _Communis_: the [Greek:
+aparallaktos] of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf.
+[Greek: koine phantasia alethous kai pseudous] Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R.
+and P. 410), also 175. _Notam_: the [Greek: semeion] of Sextus; cf. esp.
+_P.H_. II. 97 sq. _Eodem modo falsum_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P.
+410) [Greek: oudemia estin alethes phantasia hoia ouk an genoito pseudes].
+_Ut si quis_: Madv. in an important n. on _D.F._ IV. 30 explains this thus;
+_ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, possit dicere_. I do not think our
+passage at all analogous to those he quotes, and still prefer to construe
+_quem_ as a strong relative, making a pause between _quis_ and _quem_.
+_Visionem_: Simply another trans. of [Greek: phantasia]. _Ut Carneades_:
+see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 166 [Greek: ten te pithanen phantasian kai ten
+pithanen hama kai aperispaston kai diexodeumenen] (R. and P. 411). As the
+trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 "probable undisputed and tested"
+is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own explanation. The merely [Greek:
+pithane] is that sensation which at first sight, without any further
+inquiry, seems probably true (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 167--175). Now no sensation
+is perceived _alone_; the percipient subject has always other synchronous
+sensations which are able to turn him aside ([Greek: perispan, perielkein])
+from the one which is the immediate object of his attention. This last is
+only called [Greek: aperispastos] when examination has shown all the
+concomitant sensations to be in harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175--181.)
+The word "undisputed," therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The
+[Greek: diexodeumene] ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere
+apparent agreement of the concomitant sensations with the principal one.
+Circumstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined;
+the time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition
+of the space within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between
+the person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the
+person's mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext.
+181--189).
+
+Sec.34. _Communitas_: [Greek: aparallaxia] or [Greek: epimixia ton
+phantasion]; Sext. _A.M._ VII. 403, _P.H._ I. 127. _Proprium_: so Sext.
+often uses [Greek: idioma], e.g. _A. M._ IX. 410. _Signo notari_: _signo_
+for _nota_, merely from love of variety. The _in_ before _communi_, though
+bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly sound; it means "within
+the limits of," and is so used after _notare_ in _De Or._, III. 186.
+_Convicio_: so Madv. _Em._ 143 corrected the corrupt MSS. readings,
+comparing _Orator_ 160, _Ad Fam._ XV. 18. A.W. Zumpt on _Pro Murena_ 13
+rightly defines the Ciceronian use of the word, "_Non unum maledictum
+appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio_." He is wrong
+however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word _once_ in the plural (_Ad
+Att._ II. 18, 1), for it occurs _N.D._ II. 20, and elsewhere. _Perspicua_:
+[Greek: enarge], a term used with varying signification by all the later
+Greek schools. _Verum illud quidem_: "which is indeed what _they_ call
+'true'." _Impressum_: n. on 18. _Percipi atque comprehendi_: Halm retains
+the barbarous _ac_ of the MSS. before the guttural. It is quite impossible
+that Cic. could have written it. The two verbs are both trans. of [Greek:
+katalambanesthai]; Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described
+in _D.F._ III. 14 _erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem
+declarantibus_. _Subtiliter_: Cic.'s constant trans. of [Greek: akribos] or
+[Greek: kat' akribeian] (_passim_ in Sext. e.g. _P.H._ II. 123).
+_Inaniterne moveatur_: MSS. agree in _ve_ for _ne_, on which see _M.D.F._
+IV. 76. _Inaniter_ = [Greek: kenos] = [Greek: pseudos]. Cf. n. on I. 35,
+also II. 47, _D.F._ V. 3 (_inaniter moveri_), _T.D._ IV. 13, _De Div._ II.
+120, 126, 140 (_per se moveri_), Greek [Greek: kenopathein] (Sext. _P.H._
+II. 49), [Greek: kenopatheia] (= _inanis motus_, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 184),
+[Greek: kenopathemata kai anaplasmata tes dianoias] (_ib._ VIII. 354),
+[Greek: diakenos helkysmos] (_ib._ VII. 241), [Greek: diakenos phantasia]
+(_ib._ VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase [Greek: kinema tes dianoias]. For
+the meaning see n. on 47. _Relinquitur_: so in Sext. [Greek: apoleipein] is
+constantly used as the opposite of [Greek: anairein] (_tollere_).
+
+Sec.35. _Neminem_ etc.: they are content to make strong statements without any
+mark of certainty. _Primo quasi adspectu_: the _merely_ [Greek: pithane
+phantasia] is here meant; see 33.
+
+Sec.36. _Ex circumspectione_, etc.: the [Greek: diexodeumene]; see n. on 33.
+_Primum quia ... deinde_: for the slight anacoluthia, cf. _M.D.F_ ed. II.
+p. 796. _Iis visis_, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of _things_, emitting
+a number of _appearances_, and you cannot be sure of uniting each
+_appearance_ to the _thing_ from which it proceeds, then you can have no
+faith in any _appearance_ even if you have gone through the process
+required by Carneades' rules. _Ad verum ipsum_: cf. 40. _Quam proxime_: cf.
+47, and also 7. _Insigne_: [Greek: semeion], the same as _nota_ and
+_signum_ above. _Quo obscurato_: so Lamb. for MSS. _obscuro_ which Halm
+keeps. Cf. _quam obscurari volunt_ in 42 and _quo sublato_ in 33.
+_Argumentum_: Cic. seems to be thinking of the word [Greek: tekmerion],
+which, however, the Stoics hardly use. _Id quod significatur_: [Greek: to
+semeionton] in Sext.
+
+    Sec.Sec.37--40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to act. You must
+    either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to
+    phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a
+    firm assent to be given to some phenomena, he therefore who does away
+    with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39).
+
+Sec.37. _Explicabamus_: 19--21 and 30 (_quae vis esset in sensibus_).
+_Inanimum_: not _inanimatum_, cf. _M.D.F_. IV. 36. _Agit aliquid_: I. 23.
+_Quae est in nostra_: Walker's insertion of _non_ before _est_ is needless,
+cf. n. on I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the
+assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 397 [Greek: to
+men gar phantasiothenai abouleton en]). For _in potestate_ cf. _De Fato_ 9,
+_N.D._ I. 69
+
+Sec.38. _Eripitur_: cf. 30. _Neque sentire_: Christ om. _neque_; but the
+sceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. _Cedere_:
+cf. [Greek: eikein, eixis] in Sext. _P.H._ I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51,
+[Greek: ton de aisthetikon meta eixeos kai synkatatheseos ginontai [hai
+phantasia]]; also 66 of this book. [Greek: Oikeion]: cf. 34. _Adsentitur
+statim_: this really contradicts a good deal that has gone before, esp. 20.
+_Memoriam_: cf. 22. _In nostra potestate_: this may throw light on fragm.
+15 of the _Ac. Post._, which see.
+
+Sec.39. _Virtus_: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral
+action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. _Ante videri
+aliquid_ for the doctrine cf. 25, for the passive use of _videri_, n. on
+25. _Adsentiatur_: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. _Em._ 131, the
+change of construction from infin. to subj. after _necesse est_ on _D.F._
+V. 25. _Tollit e vita_: so _De Fato_ 29.
+
+    Sec.Sec.40--42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give
+    a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different
+    classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong
+    arguments, (1) _things_ which produce _sensations_ such as might have
+    been produced in the same form by other _things_, cannot be partly
+    capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) _sensations_ must
+    be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to
+    distinguish between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly
+    true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real _perceptions_,
+    while the true are always of a form which the false _may_ assume. Now
+    sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly
+    perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also
+    a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1)
+    false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are
+    indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not.
+    The following two assertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are
+    partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a
+    reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an
+    unreality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions
+    into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from
+    sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either
+    class (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a certainly known
+    sensation."]
+
+Sec.40. _Quasi fundamenta_: a trans. probably of [Greek: themelios] or the
+like; cf. [Greek: hosper themelios] in Sext. _A.M._ V. 50. _Artem_: method,
+like [Greek: techne], cf. _M.D.F._ III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. _Vim_:
+the general character which attaches to all [Greek: phantasiai]; _genera_
+the different classes of [Greek: phantasiai]. _Totidem verbis_: of course
+with a view to showing that nothing really corresponded to the definition.
+Carneades largely used the _reductio ad absurdum_ method. _Contineant ...
+quaestionem_: cf. 22 and _T.D._ IV. 65 _una res videtur causam continere_.
+_Quae ita_: it is essential throughout this passage to distinguish clearly
+the _sensation_ (_visum_) from the _thing_ which causes it. Here the
+_things_ are meant; two _things_ are supposed to cause two _sensations_ so
+similar that the person who has one of the _sensations_ cannot tell from
+which of the two _things_ it comes. Under these circumstances the sceptics
+urge that it is absurd to divide _things_ into those which can be perceived
+(known with certainty) and those which cannot. _Nihil interesse autem_: the
+sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity of the two
+sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is enough if he
+can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to discern whatever
+difference may exist, cf. 85. _Alia vera sunt_: Numenius in Euseb. _Pr.
+Ev._ XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and falsehood (or reality
+and unreality) could be affirmed of _things_, though not of _sensations_.
+If we could only pierce _through_ a sensation and arrive at its source, we
+should be able to tell whether to believe the sensation or not. As we
+cannot do this, it is wrong to assume that _sensation_ and _thing_
+correspond. Cf. Sext. _P.H._ I. 22 [Greek: peri men tou phaisthai toion e
+toion to hypokeimenon] (i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds)
+[Greek: oudeis isos amphisbetei, peri de tou ei toiouton estin hopoion
+phainetai zeteitai]. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some
+modern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause
+sensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the
+things, our sensations do not give us correct information about them.
+_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 33 _eodem modo_. _Non posse accidere_: this is a very
+remarkable, and, as Madv. (_D.F._ I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from
+_recta oratio to obliqua_. Halm with Manut. reads _potest_. Cf. 101.
+
+Sec.41. _Neque enim_: a remark of Lucullus' merely. _Quod sit a vero_: cf.
+Munio on Lucr. II. 51 _fulgor ab auro_. _Possit_: for the om. of _esse_ cf.
+n. on I. 29.
+
+Sec.42. _Proposita_: cf. [Greek: protaseis] _passim_ in Sext. _In sensus_: =
+_in ea, quae ad sensus pertinent_ cf. I. 20. _Omni consuetudine_: "general
+experience" [Greek: empeiria], cf. _N.D._ I. 83. _Quam obscurari volunt_:
+cf. I. 33. _quod explanari volebant_; the em. of Dav. _obscurare_ is
+against Cic.'s usage, that of Christ _quam observari nolunt_ is wanton
+without being ingenious. _De reliquis_: i.e. _iis quae a sensibus
+ducuntur_. _In singulisque rebus_: the word _rebus_ must mean _subjects_,
+not _things_, to which the words _in minima dispertiunt_ would hardly
+apply. _Adiuncta_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) [Greek: pasei te
+dokousei alethei kathestanai eurisketai tis aparallaktos pseudes], also
+VII. 438, etc.
+
+    Sec.Sec.43--45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to _define_, for (1) a
+    definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition
+    is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being
+    thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes
+    of reasoning their _probabile_ is not enough. Reasoning can only
+    proceed upon _certain_ premisses. Again to say that there are false
+    sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge
+    therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is
+    none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of
+    _visa_, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).
+
+Sec.43. _Horum_: Lamb. _harum_; the text however is quite right, cf. Madv.
+_Gram._ 214 b. _Luminibus_: cf. 101. _Nihilo magis_: = [Greek: ouden
+mallon], which was constantly in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext.
+_P.H._ I. 14. _Num illa definitio ... transferri_: I need hardly point out
+that the [Greek: horos] of the Academics was merely founded on probability,
+just as their "truth" was (cf. n. on 29). An Academic would say in reply to
+the question, "probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it." _Vel illa
+vera_: these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack
+them. _Vel_ = "even" i.e. if _even_ the definition is firmly known, the
+thing, which is more important, must also be known. In _illa vera_ we have
+a pointed mocking repetition like that of _veri et falsi_ in 33. _In
+falsum_: note that _falsum_ = _aliam rem_ above. For the sense cf. Sext.
+_P.H._ II. 209 [Greek: mochtherous horous einai tous periechontas ti ton me
+prosonton tois horistois], and the schoolmen's maxim _definitio non debet
+latior esse definito suo_. _Minime volunt_: cf. 18. _Partibus_: Orelli
+after Goer. ejected this, but _omnibus_ hardly ever stands for _omn.
+rebus_, therefore C.F. Hermann reads _pariter rebus_ for _partibus_. A
+little closer attention to the subject matter would have shown emendation
+to be unnecessary, cf. 42 _dividunt in partis_, _T.D._ III. 24, where
+_genus_ = division, _pars_ = subdivision.
+
+Sec.44. _Impediri ... fatebuntur_: essentially the same argument as in 33 at
+the end. _Occurretur_: not an imitation of [Greek: enantiousthai] as Goer.
+says, but of [Greek: apantan], which occurs very frequently in Sext.
+_Sumpta_: the two premisses are in Gk. called together [Greek: lemmata],
+separately [Greek: lemma] and [Greek: proslepsis] (_sumptio et adsumptio_
+_De Div_ II. 108). _Orationis_: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes
+use this word like _ratio_ ([Greek: syllogismos]), cf. _De Leg._ I. 48
+_conclusa oratio_. Fab. refers to Gell. XV. 26. _Profiteatur_: so [Greek:
+hypischneisthai] is often used by Sext. e.g. _A.M._ VIII. 283.
+_Patefacturum_: n. on 26, [Greek: ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos, delotikos]
+(the last in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 277) often recur in Greek. _Primum esse ...
+nihil interesse_: there is no inconsistency. Carneades allowed that _visa_,
+_in themselves_, might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties
+were incapable of distinguishing those _visa_ which proceed from real
+things and give a correct representation of the things, from those which
+either are mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly
+represent it. Lucullus confuses _essential_ with _apparent_ difference.
+_Non iungitur_: a supposed case of [Greek: diartesis], which is opposed to
+[Greek: synartesis] and explained in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 430.
+
+Sec.45. _Assentati_: here simply = _assensi_. _Praeteritis_: here used in the
+strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed over," cf. _in
+remissis_ _Orat._ 59. _Primum igitur ... sed tamen_: for the slight
+anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Iis qui videntur_: Goer. _is qui
+videtur_, which is severely criticised by Madv. _Em._ 150. For Epicurus'
+view of sensation see n. on 79, 80.
+
+    Sec.Sec.46--48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to the innate
+    clearness of some phenomena ([Greek: enargeia]) is due to two causes,
+    (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which
+    these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic
+    paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom
+    sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is
+    easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be
+    mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom
+    sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The
+    dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom sensations _do_ command
+    assent. Why should they not admit that they command assent when they so
+    closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48)
+
+Sec.46. _Circumfusa sint_: Goer. retains the MSS. _sunt_ on the ground that
+the clause _quanta sint_ is inserted [Greek: parenthetikos]! Orelli
+actually follows him. For the phrase cf. 122 _circumfusa tenebris_.
+_Interrogationibus_: cf. I. 5 where I showed that the words _interrogatio_
+and _conclusio_ are convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure syllogisms
+are very frequently called [Greek: eroteseis], and that he often introduces
+a new argument by [Greek: erotatai kai touto], when there is nothing
+interrogatory about the argument at all. _Dissolvere_: [Greek: apolyesthai]
+in Sext. _Occurrere_: cf. 44.
+
+Sec.47. _Confuse loqui_: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus
+in _D.F._ II. 27. _Nulla sunt_: on the use of _nullus_ for _non_ in Cic.
+cf. Madv. _Gram._ 455 obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very
+common in Plaut. and Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the
+Letters. _Inaniter_: cf. 34. There are two ways in which a sensation may be
+false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be supposed by
+the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different thing, (2) it
+may be a mere [Greek: phantasma] or [Greek: anaplasma tes dianoias], a
+phantom behind which there is no reality at all. _Quae in somnis
+videantur_: for the support given by Stoics to all forms of divination see
+Zeller 166, _De Div._ I. 7, etc. _Quaerunt_: a slight anacoluthon from
+_dicatis_ above. _Quonam modo ... nihil sit omnino_: this difficult passage
+can only be properly explained in connection with 50 and with the general
+plan of the Academics expounded in 41. After long consideration I elucidate
+it as follows. The whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced
+in 41 and 42 viz. _omnibus veris visis adiuncta esse falsa_. The criticism
+in 50 shows that the argument is meant to be based on the assumption known
+to be Stoic, _omnia deum posse_. If the god can manufacture (_efficere_)
+sensations which are false, but probable (as the Stoics say he does in
+dreams), why can he not manufacture false sensations which are so probable
+as to closely resemble true ones, or to be only with difficulty
+distinguishable from the true, or finally to be utterly indistinguishable
+from the true (this meaning of _inter quae nihil sit omnino_ is fixed by
+40, where see n.)? _Probabilia_, then, denotes false sensations such as
+have only a slight degree of resemblance to the true, by the three
+succeeding stages the resemblance is made complete. The word _probabilia_
+is a sort of tertiary predicate after _efficere_ ("to manufacture so as to
+be probable"). It _must not be repeated_ after the second _efficere_, or
+the whole sense will be inverted and this section placed out of harmony
+with 50. _Plane proxime_: = _quam proxime_ of 36.
+
+Sec.48. _Ipsa per sese_: simply = _inaniter_ as in 34, 47, i.e. without the
+approach of any external object. _Cogitatione_: the only word in Latin, as
+[Greek: dianoia] is in Greek, to express our "imagination." _Non numquam_:
+so Madv. for MSS. _non inquam_. Goer. after Manut. wrote _non inquiunt_
+with an interrogation at _omnino_. _Veri simile est_: so Madv. _D.F._ III.
+58 for _sit_. The argument has the same purpose as that in the last
+section, viz to show that phantom sensations may produce the same effect on
+the mind as those which proceed from realities. _Ut si qui_: the _ut_ here
+is merely "as," "for instance," cf. n. on 33. _Nihil ut esset_: the _ut_
+here is a repetition of the _ut_ used several times in the early part of
+the sentence, all of them alike depend on _sic_. Lamb. expunged _ut_ before
+_esset_ and before _quicquam_. _Intestinum et oblatum_: cf. Sext. _A.M._
+VII. 241 [Greek: etoi ton ektos e ton en hemin pathon], and the two classes
+of _falsa visa_ mentioned in n. on 47. _Sin autem sunt_, etc.: if there
+_are_ false sensations which are probable (as the Stoics allow), why should
+there not be false sensations so probable as to be with difficulty
+distinguishable from the true? The rest exactly as in 47.
+
+    Sec.Sec.49--53. Antiochus attacked these arguments as _soritae_, and
+    therefore faulty (49). The admission of a certain amount of similarity
+    between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the
+    impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50). We
+    contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we
+    require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we
+    make light of the sensations we had while in it (51). But, say our
+    opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our
+    waking ones. This we deny (52). "But," say they, "you allow that the
+    wise man in madness withholds his assent." This proves nothing, for he
+    will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about
+    dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention (53).
+
+Sec.49. _Antiochus_: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and
+similar subjects. _Ipsa capita_: [Greek: auta ta kephalaia].
+_Interrogationis_: the _sorites_ was always in the form of a series of
+questions, cf. _De Div._ II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already
+naturalised, so that his proposed trans. _acervalis_ is unnecessary),
+_Hortens._ fragm. 47, and n. on 92. _Hoc vocant_: i.e. _hoc genus_, cf.
+_D.F._ III. 70 _ex eo genere, quae prosunt_. _Vitiosum_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 50
+_ille sorites, quo nihil putatis_ (Stoici) _vitiosius_. Most edd. read
+_hos_, which indeed in 136 is a necessary em. for MSS. _hoc_. _Tale visum_:
+i.e. _falsum_. _Dormienti_: sc. [Greek: tini]. _Ut probabile sit_, etc.:
+cf. 47, 48 and notes. _Primum quidque_: not _quodque_ as Klotz; cf.
+_M.D.F._ II. 105, to whose exx. add _De Div._ II. 112, and an instance of
+_proximus quisque_ in _De Off._ II. 75. _Vitium_: cf. _vitiosum_ above.
+
+Sec.50. _Omnia deum posse_: this was a principle generally admitted among
+Stoics at least, see _De Div._ II. 86. For the line of argument here cf.
+_De Div._ II. 106 _fac dare deos, quod absurdum est_. _Eadem_: this does
+not mean that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when
+one of them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n.
+on 40. _Similes_: after this _sunt_ was added by Madv. _In suo genere
+essent_: substitute _esse viderentur_ for _essent_, and you get the real
+view of the Academic, who would allow that _things in their essence_ are
+divisible into sharply-defined _genera_, but would deny that the
+_sensations_ which proceed from or are caused by the _things_, are so
+divisible.
+
+Sec.51. _Una depulsio_: cf. 128 (_omnium rerum una est definitio
+comprehendendi_), _De Div._ II. 136 (_omnium somniorum una ratio est_). _In
+quiete_: = _in somno_, a rather poetical usage. _Narravit_: Goer., Orelli,
+Klotz alter into _narrat_, most wantonly. _Visus Homerus_, etc.: this
+famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his _Annals_, is referred to by Lucr.
+I. 124, Cic. _De Rep._ VI. 10 (_Somn. Scip._ c. 1), Hor. _Epist._ II. 1,
+50. _Simul ut_: rare in Cic., see Madv. _D.F._ II. 33, who, however, unduly
+restricts the usage. In three out of the five passages where he allows it
+to stand, the _ut_ precedes a vowel; Cic. therefore used it to avoid
+writing _ac_ before a vowel, so that in _D.F._ II. 33 _ut_ should probably
+be written (with Manut. and others) for _et_ which Madv. ejects.
+
+Sec.52. _Eorumque_: MSS. om. _que_. Dav. wrote _ac_ before _eorum_, this
+however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a guttural condemned in n.
+on 34. For the argument see n. on 80 _quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non
+quid videatur_. _Primum interest_: for om. of _deinde_ cf. 45, 46.
+_Imbecillius_: cf. I. 41. _Edormiverunt_: "have slept _off_ the effects,"
+cf. [Greek: apobrizein] in Homer. _Relaxentur_: cf. [Greek: anienai tes
+orges] Aristoph. _Ran._ 700, _relaxare_ is used in the neut. sense in
+_D.F._ II. 94. _Alcmaeonis_: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is often quoted by
+Cic., e.g. _D.F._ IV. 62.
+
+Sec.53. _Sustinet_: [Greek: epechei]; see on 94. _Aliquando sustinere_: the
+point of the Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness
+the [Greek: epoche] of the _sapiens_ becomes _habitual_; he gives up the
+attempt to distinguish between true and false _visa_. Lucullus answers
+that, did no distinction exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it,
+even in the sane condition. _Confundere_: so 58, 110, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 56
+([Greek: syncheousi ta pragmata]), _ib._ VIII. 157 ([Greek: syncheomen ton
+bion]), VIII. 372 ([Greek: holen syncheei ten philosophon zetesin]), Plut.
+_De Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos_ p. 1077 ([Greek: hos panta pragmata
+syncheousi]). _Utimur_: "we have to put up with," so [Greek: chresthai] is
+used in Gk. _Ebriosorum_: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than
+_vinolenti_ above. _Illud attendimus_: Goer., and Orelli write _num illud_,
+but the emphatic _ille_ is often thus introduced by itself in questions, a
+good ex. occurs in 136. _Proferremus_: this must apparently be added to the
+exx. qu. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 of the subj. used to denote "_non id
+quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri debuerit_." As such passages are
+often misunderstood, I note that they can be most rationally explained as
+elliptic constructions in which a _condition_ is expressed without its
+_consequence_. We have an exact parallel in English, e.g. "_tu dictis
+Albane maneres_" may fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy
+word, Alban!" Here the condition "_if_ thou hadst kept, etc." stands
+without the consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the
+kind. Such a condition may be expressed without _si_, just as in Eng.
+without "_if_," cf. Iuv. III. 78 and Mayor's n. The use of the Greek
+optative to express a wish (with [Greek: ei gar], etc., and even without
+[Greek: ei]) is susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has
+many such points of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most
+of the functions of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 seems
+to imply that he prefers the hypothesis of a suppressed protasis, but as in
+his _Gram._ 351 _b_, obs. 4 he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be
+certain.]
+
+    Sec.Sec.54--63. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such doctrines do
+    away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and seals is
+    childish (54). They press into their service the old physical
+    philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much ridiculed by them
+    (55). Democritus may say that innumerable worlds exist in every
+    particular similar to ours, but I appeal to more cultivated physicists,
+    who maintain that each thing has its own peculiar marks (55, 56). The
+    Servilii were distinguished from one another by their friends, and
+    Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the appearance of an egg which
+    hen had laid it (56, 57). We however, do not much care whether we are
+    able to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that
+    they say is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between
+    individual sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58).
+    Equally absurd are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they
+    profess to follow. The doctrine that true and false sensations are
+    indistinguishable logically leads to the unqualified [Greek: epoche] of
+    Arcesilas (59). What nonsense they talk about inquiring after the
+    truth, and about the bad influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero,
+    the panegyrist of philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian
+    darkness? (61) By holding that knowledge is impossible you weaken the
+    force of your famous oath that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus
+    ended Lucullus, amid the continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then
+    Catulus said that he should not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus
+    were to induce me to change my view (63).
+
+Sec.54. _Ne hoc quidem_: the common trans. "not even" for "_ne quidem_" is
+often inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this _either_," cf. n. on
+I. 5. _Habeant_: the slight alteration _habeat_ introduced by Goer. and
+Orelli quite destroys the point of the sentence. _Quod nolunt_: cf. 44. _An
+sano_: Lamb. _an ut sano_, which Halm approves, and Baiter reads.
+_Similitudines_: cf. 84--86. The impossibility of distinguishing between
+twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was a favourite theme with the
+sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no two things were absolutely
+alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the Stoic view, was practically
+refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who took two twins, and made one
+deposit money with Aristo, while the other after a time asked for the money
+back and received it. On this subject cf. Sextus _A.M._ VII. 408--410.
+_Negat esse_: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places _esse_ second,
+especially at the end of a clause. _Cur eo non estis contenti_: Lucullus
+here ignores the question at issue, which concerned the _amount_ of
+similarity. The dogmatists maintained that the similarity between two
+phenomena could never be great enough to render it impossible to guard
+against mistaking the one for the other, the sceptics argued that it could.
+_Quod rerum natura non patitur_: again Lucullus confounds _essential_ with
+_phenomenal_ difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on 50. _Nulla re
+differens_: cf. the _nihil differens_ of 99, the substitution of which here
+would perhaps make the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the
+common Gk. term [Greek: aparallaktos] (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 252, etc.). _Ulla
+communitas_: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of
+Lamb. _nulla_ after the fine note of Madv. (_Em._ 154), approved by Halm
+and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the Stoics may be stated
+thus _suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec est in duobus aut
+pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas_ ([Greek: oude hyparchei
+epimige aparallaktos]). This opinion is negatived by _non patitur ut_ and
+it will be evident at a glance that the only change required is to put the
+two verbs (_est_) into the subjunctive. The change of _ulla_ into _nulla_
+is in no way needed. _Ut_ [_sibi_] _sint_: _sibi_ is clearly wrong here.
+Madv., in a note communicated privately to Halm and printed by the latter
+on p. 854 of Bait. and Halm's ed of the philosophical works, proposed to
+read _nulla re differens communitas visi? Sint et ova_ etc. omitting _ulla_
+and _ut_ and changing _visi_ into _sibi_ (cf. Faber's em. _novas_ for
+_bonas_ in 72). This ingenious but, as I think, improbable conj. Madv. has
+just repeated in the second vol. of his _Adversaria_. Lamb. reads _at tibi
+sint_, Dav. _at si vis, sint_, Christ _ut tibi sint_, Bait. _ut si sint_
+after C.F.W. Muller, I should prefer _sui_ for _sibi_ (SVI for SIBI). B is
+very frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip in.
+_Eosdem_: once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps intentional
+misconception of the sceptic position; see n. on 50. Before leaving this
+section, I may point out that the [Greek: epimige] or [Greek: epimixia ton
+phantasion] supplies Sext. with one of the sceptic [Greek: tropoi], see
+_Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 124.
+
+Sec.55. _Irridentur_: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the
+constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. _A.M._ IX. 1. _Absolute ita
+paris_: Halm as well as Bait. after Christ, brackets _ita_; if any change
+be needed, it would be better to place it before _undique_. For this
+opinion of Democr. see R. and P. 45. _Et eo quidem innumerabilis_: this is
+the quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has
+yet been proposed, cf. 125. _Nihil differat, nihil intersit_: these two
+verbs often appear together in Cic., e.g._D.F._ III. 25.
+
+Sec.56. _Potiusque_: this adversative use of _que_ is common with _potius_,
+e.g._D.F._ I. 51. Cf. _T.D._ II. 55 _ingemescere nonnum quam viro concessum
+est, idque raro_, also _ac potius_, _Ad Att._ I. 10, etc. _Proprietates_:
+the [Greek: idiotetes] or [Greek: idiomata] of Sextus, the doctrine of
+course involves the whole question at issue between dogmatism and
+scepticism. _Cognoscebantur_: Dav. _dignoscebantur_, Walker
+_internoscebantur_. The MSS. reading is right, cf. 86. _Consuetudine_: cf.
+42, "experience". _Minimum_: an adverb like _summum_.
+
+Sec.57. _Dinotatas_: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not
+recognise the word. Most edd. change it into _denotatas_. _Artem_: [Greek:
+technen], a set of rules. _In proverbio_: so _venire in proverbium_, _in
+proverbii usum venire_, _proverbii locum obtinere_, _proverbii loco dici_
+are all used. _Salvis rebus_: not an uncommon phrase, e.g. _Ad Fam._ IV. 1.
+_Gallinas_: cf. fragm. 19 of the _Acad. Post._ The similarity of eggs was
+discussed _ad nauseam_ by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras the Stoic
+actually wrote a book entitled, [Greek: oi skopia] (egg investigation)
+[Greek: e peri sophisteias pros Akademaikous], mentioned by Suidas.
+
+Sec.58. _Contra nos_: the sense requires _nos_, but all Halm's MSS. except one
+read _vos_. _Non internoscere_: this is the reading of all the MSS., and is
+correct, though Orelli omits _non_. The sense is, "we are quite content not
+to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we shall not on that account be
+led into a mistake for our rule will prevent us from making any positive
+assertion about the eggs." _Adsentiri_: for the passive use of this verb
+cf. 39. _Par est_: so Dav. for _per_, which most MSS. have. The older edd.
+and Orelli have _potest_, with one MS. _Quasi_: the em. of Madv. for the
+_quam si_ of the MSS. _Transversum digitum_: cf. 116. _Ne confundam omnia_:
+cf. 53, 110. _Natura tolletur_: this of course the sceptics would deny.
+They refused to discuss the nature of _things in themselves_, and kept to
+_phenomena_. _Intersit_: i.e. _inter visa_. _In animos_: Orelli with one
+MS. reads _animis_; if the MSS. are correct the assertion of Krebs and
+Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) "_imprimere_ wird klas sisch verbunden _in
+aliqua re_, nicht _in aliquam rem_," will require modification. _Species et
+quasdam formas_: [Greek: eide kai gene], _quasdam_ marks the fact that
+_formas_ is a trans. I have met with no other passage where any such
+doctrine is assigned to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine is
+absurd, for surely it must always be easier to distinguish between two
+_genera_ than between two individuals. If the _non_ before _vos_ were
+removed a better sense would be given. It has often been inserted by
+copyists when _sed_, _tamen_, or some such word, comes in the following
+clause, as in the famous passage of Cic _Ad Quintum Fratrem_, II. 11,
+discussed by Munro, Lucr. p. 313, ed. 3.
+
+Sec.59. _Illud vero perabsurdum_: note the omission of _est_, which often
+takes place after the emphatic pronoun. _Impediamini_: cf. n. on 33. _A
+veris_: if _visis_ be supplied the statement corresponds tolerably with the
+Academic belief, if _rebus_ be meant, it is wide of the mark. _Id est ...
+retentio_: supposed to be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on I. 6,
+8. _Constitit_: from _consto_, not from _consisto_ cf. 63 _qui tibi
+constares_. _Si vera sunt_: cf. 67, 78, 112, 148. The _nonnulli_ are Philo
+and Metrodorus, see 78. _Tollendus est adsensus_: i.e. even that qualified
+assent which the Academics gave to probable phenomena. _Adprobare_: this
+word is ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n.
+on 104. _Id est peccaturum_: "which is equivalent to sinning," cf. I. 42.
+_Iam nimium etiam_: note _iam_ and _etiam_ in the same clause.
+
+Sec.60. _Pro omnibus_: note _omnibus_ for _omnibus rebus_. _Ista mysteria_:
+Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 37, 38 speaks of various doctrines, which were
+_servata et pro mysteriis custodita_ by the New Academics. The notion that
+the Academic scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while
+they had an esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the
+reactionary period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and
+may perhaps from a passage of Augustine, _C. Ac._ III. 41 (whose authority
+must have been Cicero), be attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller
+534, n.). The idea is ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p.
+279), and all succeeding inquirers. _Auctoritate_: cf. 8, 9. _Utroque_:
+this neuter, referring to two fem. nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv.
+_Gram._ 214 c.
+
+Sec.61. _Amicissimum_: "_because_ you are my dear friend". _Commoveris_: a
+military term, cf. _De Div._ II. 26 and Forc., also Introd. p. 53.
+_Sequere_: either this is future, as in 109, or _sequeris_, the constant
+form in Cic. of the pres., must be read. _Approbatione omni_: the word
+_omni_ is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified assent, cf.
+59. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 74, and _D.F._ I. 64, where Madv. is wrong in
+reproving Torquatus for using the phrase _sensus tolli_, on the ground that
+the Academics swept away not _sensus_ but _iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis_.
+Goer. qu. Plin. _N.H._ III. 5, Sil. Ital. XII. 131, Festus, s.v.
+_Cimmerii_, to show that the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to
+Bauli, and probably induced this mention of the legendary people. _Deus
+aliquis_: so the best edd. without comment, although they write _deus
+aliqui_ in 19. It is difficult to distinguish between _aliquis_ and
+_aliqui_, _nescio quis_ and _nescio qui_, _si quis_ and _si qui_ (for the
+latter see n. on 81). As _aliquis_ is substantival, _aliqui_ adjectival,
+_aliquis_ must not be written with impersonal nouns like _terror_ (_T.D._
+IV. 35, V. 62), _dolor_ (_T.D._ I. 82, _Ad Fam._ VII. 1, 1), _casus_ (_De
+Off._ III. 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd. vary, e.g.
+_deus aliqui_ (_T.D._ I. 23, IV. 35), _deus aliquis_ (_Lael._ 87, _Ad Fam._
+XIV. 7, 1), _anularius aliqui_ (86 of this book), _magistratus aliquis_
+(_In Verr._ IV. 146). With a proper name belonging to a real person
+_aliquis_ ought to be written (_Myrmecides_ in 120, see my n.).
+_Dispiciendum_: not _despiciendum_, cf. _M.D.F._ II. 97, IV. 64, also _De
+Div._ II. 81, _verum dispicere_. _Iis vinculis_, etc. this may throw light
+on fragm. 15 of the _Acad. Post._, which see.
+
+Sec.62. _Motum animorum_: n. on 34. _Actio rerum_: here _actio_ is a pure
+verbal noun like [Greek: praxis], cf. _De Off._ I. 83, and expressions like
+_actio vitae_ (_N.D._ I. 2), _actio ullius rei_ (108 of this book), and the
+similar use of _actus_ in Quintilian (_Inst. Or._ X. 1, 31, with Mayor's
+n.) _Iuratusque_: Bait. possibly by a mere misprint reads _iratus_.
+_Comperisse_: this expression of Cic., used in the senate in reference to
+Catiline's conspiracy, had become a cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic.
+was often taunted. See _Ad Fam._ V. 5, 2, _Ad Att._ I. 14, 5. _Licebat_:
+this is the reading of the best MSS., not _liquebat_, which Goer., Kl., Or.
+have. For the support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy
+see 3, and the passages quoted in Introd. p. 46 with respect to Catulus, in
+most of which Lucullus is also mentioned.
+
+Sec.63. _Quod ... fecerat, ut_: different from the constr. treated by Madv.
+_Gram._ 481 b. _Quod_ refers simply to the fact of Lucullus' admiration,
+which the clause introduced by _ut_ defines, "which admiration he had shown
+... to such an extent that, etc." _Iocansne an_: this use of _ne ... an_
+implies, Madv. says (on _D.F._ V. 87), more doubt than the use of _ne_
+alone as in _vero falsone_. _Memoriter_: nearly all edd. before Madv. make
+this mean _e memoria_ as opposed to _de scripto_; he says, "_laudem habet
+bonae et copiosae memoriae_" (on _D.F._ I. 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in
+the _Antibarbarus_, ed. 4. _Censuerim_: more modest than _censeo_, see
+Madv. _Gram._ 380. _Tantum enim non te modo monuit_: edd. before Madv.,
+seeing no way of taking _modo_ exc. with _non_, ejected it. Madv. (_Em._
+160) retains it, making it mean _paulo ante_. On the other hand, Halm after
+Christ asserts that _tantum non_ = [Greek: monon ou] occurs nowhere else in
+Cic. Bait. therefore ejects _non_, taking _tantum_ as _hoc tantum, nihil
+praeterea_. Livy certainly has the suspected use of _tantum non_.
+_Tribunus_: a retort comes in 97, 144. _Antiochum_: cf. I. 13.
+_Destitisse_: on the difference between _memini_ followed by the pres. and
+by the perf. inf. consult Madv. _Gram._ 408 _b_, obs. 2.
+
+    Sec.Sec.64--71. Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The strength of
+    Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it can be
+    answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my
+    character (64). I protest my entire sincerity in all that I say, and
+    would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (65). I am a passionate
+    inquirer after truth, and on that very account hold it disgraceful to
+    assent to what is false. I do not deny that I make slips, but we must
+    deal with the _sapiens_, whose characteristic it is never to err in
+    giving his assent (66). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the _sapiens_ ever
+    gives his assent he will be obliged to _opine_, but he never will
+    _opine_ therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and
+    Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is
+    possible to distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so
+    the mere habit of assenting is full of peril. Still, our whole argument
+    must tend to show that _perception_ in the Stoic sense is impossible
+    (68). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When he was converted,
+    what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long denied? (69) Some
+    think he wished to found a school called by his own name. It is more
+    probable that he could no longer bear the opposition of all other
+    schools to the Academy (70). His conversion gave a splendid opening for
+    an _argumentum ad hominem_ (71).
+
+Sec.64. _Quadam oratione_: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not
+_quandam orationem_ as Lamb., Orelli. _De ipsa re_: cf. _de causa ipsa_
+above. _Respondere posse_: for the om. of _me_ before the infin, which has
+wrongly caused many edd. either to read _respondere_ (as Dav., Bait.) or to
+insert _me_ (as Lamb.), see n. on I. 7.
+
+Sec.65. _Studio certandi_: = [Greek: philoneikia]. _Pertinacia ... calumnia_:
+n. on 14. _Iurarem_: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of
+his consulship.
+
+Sec.66. _Turpissimum_: cf. I. 45, _N.D._ I. 1. _Opiner_: _opinio_ or [Greek:
+doxa] is judgment based on insufficient grounds. _Sed quaerimus de
+sapiente_: cf. 115, _T.D._ IV. 55, 59 also _De Or._ III. 75 _non quid ego
+sed quid orator_. _Magnus ... opinator_: Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 31 qu.
+this passage wrongly as from the _Hortensius_. He imitates it, _ibid._ I.
+15 _magnus definitor_. _Qua fidunt_, etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s
+_Aratea_, and are quoted in _N.D._ II. 105, 106. _Phoenices_: the same fact
+is mentioned by Ovid, _Fasti_ III. 107, _Tristia_ IV. 3, 1. _Sed Helicen_:
+the best MSS. om. _ad_, which Orelli places before _Helicen_. _Elimatas_:
+the MSS. are divided between this and _limatas_. _Elimare_, though a very
+rare word occurs _Ad Att._ XVI. 7, 3. _Visis cedo_: cf. n. on 38. _Vim
+maximam_: so _summum munus_ is applied to the same course of action in
+_D.F._ III. 31. _Cogitatione_: "idea". _Temeritate_: cf. I. 42, _De Div._
+I. 7, and the charge of [Greek: propeteia] constantly brought against the
+dogmatists by Sext. _Praepostere_: in a disorderly fashion, taking the
+wrong thing first.
+
+Sec.67. _Aliquando ... opinabitur_: this of course is only true if you grant
+the Academic doctrine, _nihil posse percipi_. _Secundum illud ... etiam
+opinari_: it seems at first sight as though _adsentiri_ and _opinari_ ought
+to change places in this passage, as Manut. proposes. The difficulty lies
+in the words _secundum illud_, which, it has been supposed, must refer back
+to the second premiss of Arcesilas' argument. But if the passage be
+translated thus, "Carneades sometimes granted _as a second premiss_ the
+following statement, that the wise man sometimes does opine" the difficulty
+vanishes. The argument of Carneades would then run thus, (1) _Si ulli rei_,
+etc. as above, (2) _adsentietur autem aliquando_, (3) _opinabitur igitur_.
+
+Sec.68. _Adsentiri quicquam_: only with neuter pronouns like this could
+_adsentiri_ be followed by an accusative case. _Sustinenda est_: [Greek:
+ephekteon]. _Iis quae possunt_: these words MSS. om. _Tam in praecipiti_:
+for the position of _in_ cf. n. on I. 25. The best MSS. have here _tamen
+in_. Madv. altered _tamen_ to _tam_ in n. on _D.F._ V. 26. The two words
+are often confused, as in _T.D._ IV. 7, cf. also n. on I. 16. _Sin autem_,
+etc.: cf. the passage of Lactantius _De Falsa Sapientia_ III. 3, qu. by P.
+Valentia (p. 278 of Orelli's reprint) _si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut
+Socrates docuit, neque opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata
+est_. _Nitamur ... percipi_: "let us struggle to prove the proposition,
+etc." The construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect _hoc_,
+or some such word, to have fallen out between _igitur_ and _nihil_.
+
+Sec.69. _Non acrius_: one of the early editions omits _non_ while Goer. reads
+_acutius_ and puts a note of interrogation at _defensitaverat_. M. _Em._
+161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the old arguments of
+Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his new arguments
+against it. _Quis enim_: so Lamb. for MSS. _quisquam enim_. _Excogitavit_:
+on interrogations not introduced by a particle of any kind see Madv.
+_Gram._ 450. _Eadem dicit_: on the subject in hand, of course. Taken
+without this limitation the proposition is not strictly true, see n. on
+132. _Sensisse_: = _iudicasse_, n. on I. 22. _Mnesarchi ... Dardani_: see
+_Dict. Biogr._
+
+Sec.70. _Revocata est_: Manut. here wished to read _renovata_, cf. n. on I.
+14. _Nominis dignitatem_, etc.: hence Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 41 calls him
+_foeneus ille Platonicus Antiochus_ (that _tulchan_ Platonist). _Gloriae
+causa_: cf. Aug. _ibid._ II. 15 _Antiochus gloriae cupidior quam
+veritatis_. _Facere dicerent_: so Camerarius for the MSS. _facerent_.
+_Sustinere_: cf. 115 _sustinuero Epicureos_. _Sub Novis_: Faber's brilliant
+em. for the MSS. _sub nubes_. The _Novae Tabernae_ were in the forum, and
+are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy. In _De Or._ II. 266 a story is told
+of Caesar, who, while speaking _sub Veteribus_, points to a "_tabula_"
+which hangs _sub Novis_. The excellence of Faber's em. may be felt by
+comparing that of Manut. _sub nube_, and that of Lamb. _nisi sub nube_. I
+have before remarked that _b_ is frequently written in MSS. for _v_.
+_Maenianorum_: projecting eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were
+probably named from their inventor like _Vitelliana_, _Vatinia_ etc.
+
+Sec.71. _Quoque ... argumento_: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread
+is picked up by _quod argumentum_ near the end. _Utrum_: the neuter
+pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are marked by
+_ne_ and _an_. The same usage is found in _D.F._ II. 60, _T.D._ IV. 9, and
+must be carefully distinguished from the use of _utrum ... ne ... an_,
+which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g _De Invent._ II. 115 _utrum
+copiane sit agri an penuria consideratur_. On this point cf. M. _Em._ 163,
+_Gram._ 452, obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic. _Verr._ IV. 73. _Honesti inane nomen
+esse_: a modern would be inclined to write _honestum_, in apposition to
+_nomen_, cf. _D.F._ V. 18 _voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum_.
+_Voluptatem_ etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called [Greek: ho
+metathemenos]) from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf. _T.D._ II. 60, Diog.
+Laert. VII. 166--7. _A vero_: "coming from a reality," cf. 41, n. _Is
+curavit_: Goer. reads _his_, "_solet V. D. in hoc pronomen saevire_," says
+Madv. The scribes often prefix _h_ to parts of the pronoun _is_, and Goer.
+generally patronises their vulgar error.
+
+    Sec.Sec.72--78. Summary. You accuse me of appealing to ancient names like a
+    revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, philosophers
+    of the highest position, protest against the truth of sense knowledge,
+    and deny the possibility of knowledge altogether (72, 73). Empedocles,
+    Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense knowledge. You
+    said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with these. Why?
+    Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while Plato
+    pursued the same theme in all his works (74). Now do you see that I do
+    not merely name, but take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus
+    stated many difficulties concerning the senses and general experience.
+    You say he solved them, even if he did, which I do not believe, he
+    admitted that it was not easy to escape being ensnared by them (75).
+    The Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to
+    themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (76). Zeno held
+    strongly that the wise man ought to keep clear from _opinion_.
+    Arcesilas agreed but this without _knowledge_ was impossible.
+    _Knowledge_ consists of _perceptions_. Arcesilas therefore demanded a
+    definition of _perception_. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is
+    the controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with _opinion_
+    and _perception_, and the [Greek: epoche] of Arcesilas follows at once
+    (77, 78).
+
+Sec.72. _De antiquis philosophis_: on account of the somewhat awkward constr.
+Lamb. read _antiquos philosophos_. _Popularis_: cf. 13. _Res non bonas_:
+MSS. om. _non_, which Or. added with two very early editions. Faber
+ingeniously supposed the true reading to be _novas_, which would be written
+_nobas_, and then pass into _bonas_. _Nivem nigram_: this deliverance of
+Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In _P.H._ I. 33 he quotes
+it as an instance of the refutation of [Greek: phainomena] by means of
+[Greek: nooumena], "[Greek: Anaxagoras toi leuken einai ten chiona,
+anetithei hoti chion estin hydor pepegos to de hydor esti melan kai he
+chion ara melaina]." There is an obscure joke on this in _Ad Qu. Fratrem_
+II. 13, 1 _risi nivem atram ... teque hilari animo esse et prompto ad
+iocandum valde me iuvat_. _Sophistes_: here treated as the demagogue of
+philosophy. _Ostentationis_: = [Greek: epideixeos].
+
+Sec.73. _Democrito_: Cic., as Madv. remarks on _D.F._ I. 20, always
+exaggerates the merits of Democr. in order to depreciate the Epicureans,
+cf. _T.D._ I. 22, _De Div._ I. 5, II. 139, _N.D._ I. 120, _De Or._ I. 42.
+_Quintae classis_: a metaphor from the Roman military order. _Qui veri esse
+aliquid_, etc.: cf. _N.D._ I. 12 _non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse
+videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus_. _Non
+obscuros sed tenebricosos_: "not merely dim but darkened." There is a
+reference here to the [Greek: skotie gnosis] of Democr., by which he meant
+that knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things as
+shown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also held a
+[Greek: gnesie gnosis], dealing with the realities of material existence,
+the atoms and the void, which exist [Greek: eteei] and not merely [Greek:
+nomoi] as appearances do. See R. and P. 51.
+
+Sec.74. _Furere_: cf. 14. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 61, and for the belief of
+Empedocles about the possibility of [Greek: episteme] see the remarks of
+Sextus _A.M._ VII. 123--4 qu. R. and P. 107, who say "_patet errare eos qui
+scepticis adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant_." _Sonum fundere_: similar
+expressions occur in _T.D._ III. 42, V. 73, _D.F._ II. 48. _Parmenides,
+Xenophanes_: these are the last men who ought to be charged with
+scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against sense-knowledge, but
+held that real knowledge was attainable by the reason. Cf. Grote, _Plato_
+I. 54, Zeller 501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. _Minus bonis_:
+Dav. qu. Plut. _De Audit._ 45 A, [Greek: mempsaito d' an tis Parmenidou ten
+stichopoiian]. _Quamquam_: on the proper use of _quamquam_ in clauses where
+the verb is not expressed see _M.D.F._ V. 68 and cf. I. 5. _Quasi irati_:
+for the use of _quasi_ = almost cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 22, _Orat._ 41.
+_Aiebas removendum_: for om. of _esse_ see n. on I. 43. _Perscripti sunt_:
+cf. n. on I. 16. _Scire se nihil se scire_: cf. I. 16, 44. The words
+referred to are in Plat. _Apol._ 21 [Greek: eoika goun toutou smikroi tini
+autoi toutoi sophoteros einai, hoti a me oida oude oiomai eidenai], a very
+different statement from the _nihil sciri posse_ by which Cic. interprets
+it (cf. R. and P. 148). That [Greek: episteme] in the strict sense is
+impossible, is a doctrine which Socrates would have left to the Sophists.
+_De Platone_: the doctrine above mentioned is an absurd one to foist upon
+Plato. The dialogues of search as they are called, while exposing sham
+knowledge, all assume that the real [Greek: episteme] is attainable.
+_Ironiam_: the word was given in its Greek form in 15. _Nulla fuit ratio
+persequi_: n. on 17.
+
+Sec.75. _Videorne_: = _nonne videor_, as _videsne_ = _nonne vides_. _Imitari
+numquam nisi_: a strange expression for which Manut. conj. _imitari? num
+quem_, etc., Halm _nullum unquam_ in place of _numquam_. Bait. prints the
+reading of Man., which I think harsher than that of the MSS. _Minutos_: for
+the word cf. _Orat._ 94, also _De Div._ I. 62 _minuti philosophi_, _Brut._
+256 _minuti imperatores_. _Stilponem_, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P.
+177--182. [Greek: sophismata]: Cic. in the second edition probably
+introduced here the translation _cavillationes_, to which Seneca _Ep._ 116
+refers, cf. Krische, p. 65. _Fulcire porticum_: "to be the pillar of the
+Stoic porch". Cf. the anonymous line [Greek: ei me gar en Chrysippos, ouk
+an en Stoa]. _Quae in consuetudine probantur_: n. on 87. _Nisi videret_:
+for the tense of the verb, see Madv. _Gram._ 347 _b_, obs. 2.
+
+Sec.76. _Quid ... philosophi_: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv.
+and followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this
+reading, which only requires the alteration of _Cyrenaei_ into _Cyrenaici_
+(now made by all edd. on the ground that _Cyrenaeus_ is a citizen of
+Cyreno, _Cyrenaicus_ a follower of Aristippus) and the insertion of _tibi_.
+I see no difficulty in the _qui_ before _negant_, at which so many edd.
+take offence. _Tactu intimo_: the word [Greek: haphe] I believe does not
+occur in ancient authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great
+word was [Greek: pathos]. From 143 (_permotiones intimas_) it might appear
+that Cic. is translating either [Greek: pathos] or [Greek: kinesis]. For a
+clear account of the school see Zeller's _Socrates_, for the illustration
+of the present passage pp 293--300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R. and P.
+162 sq. _Quo quid colore_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 191 (qu. Zeller _Socrates_
+297, R. and P. 165). _Adfici se_: = [Greek: paschein]. _Quaesieras_: note
+the plup. where Eng. idiom requires the perfect or aorist. _Tot saeculis_:
+cf. the same words in 15. _Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis_: cf. _summis
+ingeniis, maximis studiis_ in 15. _Obtrectandi_: this invidious word had
+been used by Lucullus in 16; cf. also I. 44.
+
+Sec.77. _Expresserat_: "had put into distinct shape". Cf. 7 and I. 19.
+_Exprimere_ and _dicere_ are always sharply distinguished by Cic., the
+latter merely implying the mechanic exercise of utterance, the former the
+moulding and shaping of the utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp. _Orat._
+3, 69, and _Ad Att._ VIII. 11, 1; also _De Or._ I. 32, _De Div._ I. 79, qu.
+by Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav. _exposuerat_ is therefore
+needless. _Fortasse_: "we may suppose". _Nec percipere_, etc.: cf. 68, n.
+_Tum illum_: a change from _ille, credo_ (sc. _respondit_), the _credo_
+being now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after _ita
+definisse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 13 (who quotes exx.); also the construction
+with _ita iudico_ in 113. _Ex eo, quod esset_: cf. 18, n. _Effictum_: so
+Manut. for MSS. _effectum_, cf. 18. _Ab eo, quod non est_: the words _non
+est_ include the two meanings "is non existent," and "is different from
+what it seems to be"--the two meanings of _falsum_ indeed, see n. on 47.
+_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 40, 84. MSS. have _eius modi_, altered by Dav. _Recte
+... additum_: the semicolon at _Arcesilas_ was added by Manutius, who is
+followed by all edd. This involves taking _additum_ = _additum est_, an
+ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv. _Opusc._ I. 448, _D.F._ I.
+43, _Gram._ 479 a. I think it quite possible that _recte consensit additum_
+should be construed together, "agreed that the addition had been rightly
+made." For the omission of _esse_ in that case cf. Madv. _Gram._ 406, and
+such expressions as _dicere solebat perturbatum_ in 111, also _ita
+scribenti exanclatum_ in 108. _Recte_, which with the ordinary stopping
+expresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain in
+point. Qy, should _concessit_ be read, as in 118 _concessisse_ is now read
+for MSS. _consensisse_? _A vero_: cf. 41.
+
+Sec.78. _Quae adhuc permanserit_: note the subj., "which is of such a nature
+as to have lasted". _Nam illud ... pertinebat_: by _illud_ is meant the
+argument in defence of [Greek: epoche] given in 67; by _nihil ...
+pertinebat_ nothing more is intended than that there was no _immediate_ or
+_close_ connection. Cf. the use of _pertinere_ in _D.F._ III. 55.
+_Clitomacho_: cf. n. on 59.
+
+    Sec.Sec.79--90. Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding your cause in
+    spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are thus acting
+    like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the sensation
+    can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80). I wish the god of whom
+    you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound
+    senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our
+    vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you,
+    _we_ desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires not
+    the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the god
+    because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (80, 81). If you
+    want something greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the
+    sun? Still he seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a
+    little broader or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed,
+    too, he appears to us to stand still (82). The whole question lies in a
+    nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is
+    disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a
+    false one indistinguishable from it (83). A man who has mistaken P. for
+    Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising Cotta. You say
+    that no such indistinguishable resemblances _exist_. Never mind, they
+    _seem_ to exist and that is enough. One mistaken sensation will throw
+    all the others into uncertainty (84). You say everything belongs to its
+    own _genus_ this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that
+    two sensations _are_ absolutely similar, it is enough that human
+    faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of
+    signet rings? (85) Can you find a ring merchant to rival your chicken
+    rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So we cannot see or
+    hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea this gives us of
+    the art with which nature has constructed the senses! (86) But about
+    physics I will speak afterwards. I am going now to advance against the
+    senses arguments drawn from Chrysippus himself (87). You said that the
+    sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of
+    the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his
+    Alcmaeon, of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides
+    disprove your point (88, 89). In their case at least 'mind and eyes
+    agreed. It is no good to talk about the saner moments of such people;
+    the question is, what was the nature of their sensations at the time
+    they were affected? (90)
+
+Sec.79. _Communi loco_: [Greek: topo], that of blinking facts which cannot be
+disproved, see 19. _Quod ne_ [_id_]: I have bracketed _id_ with most edd.
+since Manut. If, however, _quod_ be taken as the conjunction, and not as
+the pronoun, _id_ is not altogether insupportable. _Heri_: cf. Introd. 55.
+_Infracto remo_: n. on 19. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his "Higher
+Pantheism"--"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool".
+_Manent illa omnia, iacet_: this is my correction of the reading of most
+MSS. _maneant ... lacerat_. Madv. _Em._ 176 in combating the conj. of Goer.
+_si maneant ... laceratis istam causam_, approves _maneant ... iaceat_, a
+reading with some MSS. support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole
+confusion of the passage arises from the mania of the copyists for turning
+indicatives into subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx.
+occur every few pages. If _iacet_ were by error turned into _iaceret_ the
+reading _lacerat_ would arise at once. The nom. to _dicit_ is, I may
+observe, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans. "all my
+arguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his senses are
+true quotha!" (For this use of _dicit_ cf. _inquit_ in 101, 109, 115).
+Hermann approves the odd reading of the ed. Cratandriana of 1528 _latrat_.
+Dav. conjectured comically _blaterat iste tamen et_, Halm _lacera est ista
+causa_. _Habes_: as two good MSS. have _habes et eum_, Madv. _Em._ 176
+conj. _habet_. The change of person, however, (from _dicit_ to _habes_)
+occurs also in 101. _Epicurus_: n. on 19.
+
+Sec.80. _Hoc est verum esse_: Madv. _Em._ 177 took _verum_ as meaning fair,
+candid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical
+epistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed _virum esse_, a very
+strange em. Halm's conj. _certum esse_ is weak and improbable. _Importune_:
+this is in one good MS. but the rest have _importata_, a good em. is
+needed, as _importune_ does not suit the sense of the passage. _Negat ...
+torsisset_: for the tenses cf. 104 _exposuisset, adiungit_. _Cum oculum
+torsisset_: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing upwards
+or sideways. Cf. Aristot. _Eth. Eud._ VII. 13 (qu. by Dav.) [Greek:
+ophthalmous diastrepsanta hoste duo to hen phanenai]. Faber qu. Arist.
+_Problemata_ XVII. 31 [Greek: dia ti eis to plagion kinousi ton ophthalmon
+ou (?) phainetai duo to hen]. Also _ib._ XXXI. 3 inquiring the reason why
+drunkards see double he says [Greek: tauto touto gignetai kai ean tis
+katothen piese ton ophthalmon]. Sextus refers to the same thing _P.H._ I.
+47, _A.M._ VII. 192 ([Greek: ho parapiesas ton ophthalmon]) so Cic. _De
+Div._ II. 120. Lucretius gives the same answer as Timagoras, _propter
+opinatus animi_ (IV. 465), as does Sext. _A.M._ VII. 210 on behalf of
+Epicurus. _Sed hic_: Bait. _sit hic_. _Maiorum_: cf. 143. _Quasi
+quaeratur_: Carneades refused to discuss about things in themselves but
+merely dealt with the appearances they present, [Greek: to gar alethes kai
+to pseudes en tois pragmasi synechorei] (Numen in Euseb. _Pr. Eu._ XIV. 8).
+Cf. also Sext. _P.H._ I. 78, 87, 144, II. 75. _Domi nascuntur_: a proverb
+used like [Greek: glauk' es' Athenas] and "coals to Newcastle," see Lorenz
+on Plaut. _Miles_ II. 2, 38, and cf. _Ad Att._ X. 14, 2, _Ad Fam._ IX. 3.
+_Deus_: cf. 19. _Audiret ... ageret_: MSS. have _audies ... agerent_. As
+the insertion of _n_ in the imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read _ageret_
+and alter _audies_ to suit it. Halm has _audiret ... ageretur_ with Dav.,
+Bait. _audiet, egerit_. _Ex hoc loco video ... cerno_: MSS. have _loco
+cerno regionem video Pompeianum non cerno_ whence Lipsius conj. _ex hoc
+loco e regione video_. Halm ejects the words _regionem video_, I prefer to
+eject _cerno regionem_. We are thus left with the slight change from
+_video_ to _cerno_, which is very often found in Cic., e.g. _Orat._ 18.
+Cic. sometimes however joins the two verbs as in _De Or._ III. 161. _O
+praeclarum prospectum_: the view was a favourite one with Cic., see _Ad
+Att._ I. 13, 5.
+
+Sec.81. _Nescio qui_: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that _nescio quis_
+implies contempt, while _nescio qui_ does not, cf. _Div. in qu. Caec._ 47,
+where _nescio qui_ would contradict his rule. It is as difficult to define
+the uses of the two expressions as to define those of _aliquis_ and
+_aliqui_, on which see 61 n. In _Paradoxa_ 12 the best MSS. have _si qui_
+and _si quis_ almost in the same line with identically the same meaning
+Dav. quotes Solinus and Plin. _N.H._ VII. 21, to show that the man
+mentioned here was called Strabo--a misnomer surely. _Octingenta_: so the
+best MSS., not _octoginta_, which however agrees better with Pliny. _Quod
+abesset_: "_whatever_ might be 1800 stadia distant," _aberat_ would have
+implied that Cic. had some _particular_ thing in mind, cf. Madv. _Gram._
+364, obs. 1. _Acrius_: [Greek: oxyteron], Lamb. without need read _acutius_
+as Goer. did in 69. _Illos pisces_: so some MSS., but the best have
+_ullos_, whence Klotz conj. _multos_, Orelli _multos illos_, omitting
+_pisces_. For the allusion to the fish, cf. _Acad. Post._ fragm. 13.
+_Videntur_: n. on 25. _Amplius_: cf. 19 _non video cur quaerat amplius_.
+_Desideramus_: Halm, failing to understand the passage, follows Christ in
+reading _desiderant_ (i.e. _pisces_). To paraphrase the sense is this "But
+say my opponents, the Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses
+than we have." Well you are like the mole, which does not yearn for the
+light because it does not know what light is. Of course all the ancients
+thought the mole blind. A glance will show the insipidity of the sense
+given by Halm's reading. _Quererer cum deo_: would enter into an
+altercation with the god. The phrase, like [Greek: loidoresthai tini] as
+opposed to [Greek: loidorein tina] implies mutual recrimination, cf. _Pro
+Deiotaro_ 9 _querellae cum Deiotaro_. The reading _tam quererer_ for the
+_tamen quaereretur_ of the MSS. is due to Manut. _Navem_: Sextus often uses
+the same illustration, as in _P.H._ I. 107, _A.M._ VII. 414. _Non tu verum
+testem_, etc.: cf. 105. For the om. of _te_ before _habere_, which has
+strangely troubled edd. and induced them to alter the text, see n. on I. 6.
+
+Sec.82. _Quid ego_: Bait. has _sed quid_ after Ernesti. _Nave_: so the best
+MSS., not _navi_, cf. Madv. _Gram._ 42. _Duodeviginti_: so in 128. Goer.
+and Roeper qu. by Halm wished to read _duodetriginta_. The reff. of Goer.
+at least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the
+sun at 28 times the size of the earth. _Quasi pedalis_: cf. _D.F._ I. 20
+_pedalis fortasse_. For _quasi_ = _circiter_ cf. note on 74. Madv. on
+_D.F._ I. 20 quotes Diog. Laert. X. 91, who preserves the very words of
+Epicurus, in which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr. V. 590,
+who copies Epicurus, and Seneca _Quaest. Nat._ I. 3, 10 (_solem sapientes
+viri pedalem esse contenderunt_). Madv. points out from Plut. _De Plac.
+Phil._ II. 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus asserted the sun to be a foot
+wide, he does not however quote Stob. _Phys._ I. 24, 1 [Greek: helion
+megethos echein euros podos anthropeiou], which is affirmed to be the
+opinion of Heraclitus and Hecataeus. _Ne maiorem quidem_: so the MSS., but
+Goer. and Orelli read _nec_ for _ne_, incurring the reprehension of Madv.
+_D.F._ p. 814, ed 2. _Nihil aut non multum_: so in _D.F._ V. 59, the
+correction of Orelli, therefore, _aut non multum mentiantur aut nihil_, is
+rash. _Semel_: see 79. _Qui ne nunc quidem_: sc. _mentiri sensus putat_.
+Halm prints _quin_, and is followed by Baiter, neither has observed that
+_quin ne ... quidem_ is bad Latin (see _M.D.F._ V. 56). Nor can _quin ne_
+go together even without _quidem_, cf. Krebs and Allgayer, _Antibarbarus_
+ed. 4 on _quin_.
+
+Sec.83. _In parvo lis sit_: Durand's em. for the _in parvulis sitis_ of the
+MSS., which Goer. alone defends. _Quattuor capita_: these were given in 40
+by Lucullus, cf. also 77. _Epicurus_: as above in 19, 79 etc.
+
+Sec.84. _Geminum_: cf. 56. _Nota_: cf. 58 and the speech of Lucullus _passim_.
+_Ne sit ... potest_: cf. 80 _quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur.
+Si ipse erit_ for _ipse_ apparently = _is ipse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 93.
+
+Sec.85. _Quod non est_: = _qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur_. _Sui generis_: cf.
+50, 54, 56. _Nullum esse pilum_, etc.: a strong expression of this belief
+is found in Seneca _Ep._. 113, 13, qu. R. and P. 380. Note the word
+_Stoicum_; Lucullus is of course not Stoic, but Antiochean. _Nihil
+interest_: the same opinion is expressed in 40, where see my note. _Visa
+res_: Halm writes _res a re_, it is not necessary, however, either in Gk.
+or Lat. to express _both_ of two related things when a word is inserted
+like _differat_ here, which shows that they _are_ related. Cf. the elliptic
+constructions in Gk. with [Greek: homoion, metaxy, mesos], and such words.
+_Eodem caelo atque_: a difficult passage. MSS. have _aqua_, an error easy,
+as Halm notes, to a scribe who understood _caelum_ to be the heaven, and
+not [Greek: glypheion], a graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the
+MSS. reading, adducing passages to show that sky and water were important
+in the making of statues. For _aqua_ Orelli conj. _acu_ = _schraffirnadel_,
+C.F. Hermann _caelatura_, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian word.
+Halm's _aeque_ introduces a construction with _ceteris omnibus_ which is
+not only not Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I read _atque_, taking
+_ceteris omnibus_ to be the abl. neut. "all the other implements." Formerly
+I conj. _ascra_, or _atque in_, which last leading would make _omnibus_ =
+_om. statuis_. _Alexandros_: Lysippus alone was privileged to make statues
+of Alexander, as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the conqueror, cf. _Ad
+Fam._ V. 12, 7.
+
+Sec.86. _Anulo_: cf. 54. _Aliqui_: n. on 61. _Gallinarium_: cf. 57. _Adhibes
+artem_: cf. 20 _adhibita arte_. _Pictor ... tibicen_: so in 20. _Simul
+inflavit_: note _simul_ for _simul atque_, cf. _T.D._ IV. 12. _Nostri
+quidem_: i.e. _Romani_. _Admodum_: i.e. _adm. pauci_ cf. _De Leg._ III. 32
+_pauci enim atque admodum pauci_. _Praeclara_: evidently a fem. adj.
+agreeing with _natura_. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and
+understanding _sunt_ interpreted "these arguments I am going to urge are
+grand, viz. _quanto art_. etc."
+
+Sec.87. _Scilicet_: Germ. "nat�rlich." _Fabricata sit_: cf. 30, 119, 121 and
+N.D. I. 19. _Ne modo_: for _modo ne_, a noticeable use. _Physicis_:
+probably neut. _Contra sensus_: he wrote both for and against [Greek:
+synetheia]; cf. R. and P. 360 and 368. _Carneadem_: Plut. _Sto. Rep_. 1036
+B relates that Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the
+senses, quoted the address of Andromache to Hector: [Greek: daimonie
+phthisei se to son menos]. From Diog. IV. 62 we learn that he thus parodied
+the line qu. in n. on 75, [Greek: ei me gar en Chrysippos ouk an en ego].
+
+Sec.88. _Diligentissime_: in 48--53. _Dicebas_: in 52 _imbecillius
+adsentiuntur_. _Siccorum_: cf. Cic. _Contra Rullum_ I. 1 _consilia
+siccorum_. _Madere_ is common with the meaning "to be drunk," as in Plaut.
+_Mostellaria_ I. 4, 6. _Non diceret_: Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit
+the verb, with one MS., cf. 15 and I. 13. The omission of a verb in the
+subjunctive is, Madv. says on _D.F._ I. 9, impossible; for other ellipses
+of the verb see _M.D.F._ V. 63. _Alcmaeo autem_: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon;
+cf. 52. _Somnia reri_: the best MSS. have _somniare_. Goer. reads _somnia_,
+supplying _non fuisse vera_. I have already remarked on his extraordinary
+power of _supplying_. Halm conj. _somnia reprobare_, forgetting that the
+verb _reprobare_ belongs to third century Latinity, also _sua visa putare_,
+which Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from the MSS., I
+read _reri_, which verb occurred in I. 26, 39. Possibly _putare_, a little
+farther on, has got misplaced. _Non id agitur_: these difficulties supply
+Sextus with one of his [Greek: tropoi], i.e. [Greek: ho peri tas
+peristaseis]; cf. _P.H._ I. 100, also for the treatment of dreams, _ib._ I.
+104. _Si modo_, etc.: "if only he dreamed it," i.e. "merely because he
+dreamed it." _Aeque ac vigilanti_: = _aeque ac si vigilaret_. Dav. missing
+the sense, and pointing out that _when awake_ Ennius did not assent to his
+sensations at all, conj. _vigilantis_. Two participles used in very
+different ways not unfrequently occur together, see Madv. _Em. Liv._ p.
+442. _Ita credit_: MSS. have _illa_, which Dav. altered. Halm would prefer
+_credidit_. _Itera dum_, etc.: from the _Iliona_ of Pacuvius; a favourite
+quotation with Cic.; see _Ad Att._ XIV. 14, and _T.D._ II. 44.
+
+Sec.89. _Quisquam_: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences cf.
+Virg. _Aen._ I. 48 with the Notes of Wagner and Conington. _Tam
+certa putat_: so Sextus _A.M._ VII. 61 points out that Protagoras must in
+accordance with his doctrine [Greek: panton metron anthropos] hold that the
+[Greek: memenos] is the [Greek: kriterion ton en maniai phainomenon].
+_Video, video te_: evidently from a tragedy whose subject was [Greek: Aias
+mainomenos], see Ribbeck _Trag. Lat. rel._ p. 205. Cic. in _De Or._ III.
+162 thus continues the quotation, "_oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape_."
+So in Soph. _Aiax_ 100 the hero, after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae,
+keeps Odysseus alive awhile in order to torture him. _Hercules_: cf. Eur.
+_Herc. Fur._ 921--1015. The mad visions of this hero, like those of
+Orestes, are often referred to for a similar purpose by Sext., e.g. _A.M._
+VII. 405 [Greek: ho goun Herakles maneis kai labon phantasian apo ton idion
+paidon hos Eurystheos, ten akolouthon praxin tautei te phantasiai synepsen.
+akolouthon de en to tous tou echthrou paidas anelein, hoper kai epoiesen.]
+Cf. also _A.M._ VII. 249. _Moveretur_: imperf. for plup. as in 90. _Alcmaeo
+tuus_: cf. 52. _Incitato furore_: Dav. reads _incitatus_. Halm qu. from
+Wesenberg _Observ. Crit. ad Or. p. Sestio_ p. 51 this explanation, "_cum
+furor eius initio remissior paulatim incitatior et vehementior factus
+esset_," he also refers to Wopkens _Lect. Tull._ p. 55 ed. Hand. _Incedunt_
+etc.: the MSS. have _incede_, which Lamb. corrected. The subject of the
+verb is evidently _Furiae_. _Adsunt_: is only given once by MSS., while
+Ribbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have written it twice.
+_Caerulea ... angui_: _anguis_ fem is not uncommon in the old poetry. MSS.
+here have _igni_. _Crinitus_: [Greek: akersekomes], "never shorn," as
+Milton translates it. _Luna innixus_: the separate mention in the next line
+of _Diana_, usually identified with the moon, has led edd. to emend this
+line. Some old edd. have _lunat_, while Lamb. reads _genu_ for _luna_, cf.
+Ov. _Am._ I. 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.) _lunavitque genu sinuosum fortiter
+arcum_. Wakefield on Lucr. III. 1013 puts a stop at _auratum_, and goes on
+with _Luna innixans_. Taber strangely explains _luna_ as = _arcu ipso
+lunato_, Dav. says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it
+is the utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should
+not regard _luna_ and _Diana_ as distinct.
+
+Sec.90. _Illa falsa_: sc. _visa_, which governs the two genitives. Goer.
+perversely insists on taking _somniantium recordatione ipsorum_ closely
+together. _Non enim id quaeritur_: cf. 80 n. Sext. very often uses very
+similar language, as in _P.H._ I. 22, qu. in n. on 40. _Tum cum
+movebantur_: so Halm for MSS. _tum commovebantur_, the em. is supported by
+88.
+
+    Sec.Sec.91--98. Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable knowledge, its
+    processes are not applicable to a large number of philosophical
+    questions (91). You value the art, but remember that it gave rise to
+    fallacies like the _sorites_, which you say is faulty (92). If it is
+    so, refute it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will
+    avail you nothing (93). If you refrain because you _cannot_ answer,
+    your knowledge fails you, if you _can_ answer and yet refrain, you are
+    unfair (94). The art you admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did
+    her web, witness the _Mentiens_, (95). You assent to arguments which
+    are identical in form with the _Mentiens_, and yet refuse to assent to
+    it Why so? (96) You demand that these sophisms should be made
+    exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go to a tribune for that
+    exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would not allow the very
+    first postulate of your Dialectic (97). In my opinion, and I learned
+    Dialectic from Antiochus, the _Mentiens_ and the arguments identical
+    with it in form must stand or fall together (98).
+
+Sec.91. _Inventam esse_: cf. 26, 27. _In geometriane_: with this inquiry into
+the special function of Dialectic cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato
+_Gorg._ 453 D, 454 C. _Sol quantus sit_: this of course is a problem for
+[Greek: physike], not for [Greek: dialektike]. _Quod sit summum bonum_: not
+[Greek: dialektike] but [Greek: ethike] must decide this. _Quae
+coniunctio_: etc. so Sext. often opposes [Greek: symploke] or [Greek:
+synemmenon] to [Greek: diezeugmenon], cf. esp _P.H._ II. 201, and Zeller
+109 sq. with footnotes. An instance of a _coniunctio_ (hypothetical
+judgment) is "_si lucet, lucet_" below, of a _disiunctio_ (disjunctive
+judgment) "_aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet_". _Ambigue dictum_:
+[Greek: amphibolon], on which see _P.H._ II. 256, Diog VII. 62. _Quid
+sequatur_: [Greek: to akolouthon], cf. I. 19 n. _Quid repugnet_: cf. I. 19,
+n. _De se ipsa_: the _ipsa_, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom. and not
+abl. Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an art is not
+to be condemned as useless merely because it is unable to solve every
+problem presented to it. He quotes Plato's remarks (in _Rep._ II.) that the
+Expert is the man who knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot.
+Very similar arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp. _P.H._ II.
+175 and the words [Greek: eautou estai ekkalyptikon]. For the mode in which
+Carneades dealt with Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511. The true ground of
+attack is that Logic always _assumes_ the truth of phenomena, and cannot
+_prove_ it. This was clearly seen by Aristotle alone of the ancients; see
+Grote's essay on the Origin of Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol II. of his
+_Aristotle_.
+
+Sec.92. _Nata sit_: cf. 28, 59. _Loquendi_: the Stoic [Greek: logike], it must
+be remembered, included [Greek: rhetorike]. _Concludendi_: [Greek: tou
+symperainein] or [Greek: syllogizesthai]. _Locum_: [Greek: topon] in the
+philosophical sense. _Vitiosum_: 49, n. _Num nostra culpa est_: cf. 32.
+_Finium_: absolute limits; the fallacy of the _sorites_ and other such
+sophisms lies entirely in the treatment of purely _relative_ terms as
+though they were _absolute_. _Quatenus_: the same ellipse occurs in
+_Orator_ 73. _In acervo tritici_: this is the false _sorites_, which may be
+briefly described thus: A asks B whether one grain makes a heap, B answers
+"No." A goes on asking whether two, three, four, etc. grains make a heap. B
+cannot always reply "No." When he begins to answer "Yes," there will be a
+difference of one grain between heap and no heap. One grain therefore
+_does_ make a heap. The true _sorites_ or chain inference is still treated
+in books on logic, cf. Thomson's _Laws of Thought_, pp 201--203, ed 8.
+_Minutatim_: cf. Heindorf's note on [Greek: kata smikron] in _Sophistes_
+217 D. _Interrogati_: cf. 104. In 94 we have _interroganti_, which some
+edd. read here. _Dives pauper_, etc.: it will be easily seen that the
+process of questioning above described can be applied to any relative term
+such as these are. For the omission of any connecting particle between the
+members of each pair, cf. 29, 125, _T.D._ I. 64, V. 73, 114, Zumpt _Gram._
+782. _Quanto addito aut dempto_: after this there is a strange ellipse of
+some such words as _id efficiatur, quod interrogatur_. [_Non_] _habemus_: I
+bracket _non_ in deference to Halm, Madv. however (_Opusc._ I. 508) treats
+it as a superabundance of negation arising from a sort of anacoluthon,
+comparing _In Vatin._ 3, _Ad Fam._ XII. 24. The scribes insert and omit
+negatives very recklessly, so that the point may remain doubtful.
+
+Sec.93. _Frangite_: in later Gk. generally [Greek: apolyein]. _Erunt ...
+cavetis_: this form of the conditional sentence is illustrated in Madv.
+_D.F._ III. 70, _Em. Liv._ p. 422, _Gram._ 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence
+_Heaut._ V. 1, 59 _quot incommoda tibi in hac re capies nisi caves_, cf.
+also 127, 140 of this book. The present is of course required by the
+instantaneous nature of the action. _Chrysippo_: he spent so much time in
+trying to solve the sophism that it is called peculiarly his by Persius VI.
+80. _inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi_. The titles of numerous
+distinct works of his on the _Sorites_ and _Mentiens_ are given by Diog.
+_Tria pauca sint_: cf. the instances in Sext. _A.M._ VII. 418 [Greek: ta
+pentekonta oliga estin, ta myria oliga estin], also Diog. VII. 82 [Greek:
+hesychazein] the advice is quoted in Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 ([Greek: dein
+histasthai kai epechein]), _A.M._ VII. 416 ([Greek: ho sophos stesetai kai
+hesychasei]). The same terms seem to have been used by the Cynics, see
+Sext. _P.H._ II. 244, III. 66. _Stertas_: imitated by Aug. _Contra Ac._
+III. 25 _ter terna novem esse ... vel genere humano stertente verum sit_,
+also _ib._ III. 22. _Proficit_: Dav. _proficis_, but Madv. rightly
+understands [Greek: to hesychazein] (_Em._ 184), cf. _N.D._ II. 58.
+_Ultimum ... respondere_: "to put in as your answer" cf. the use of
+_defendere_ with an accus. "to put in as a plea". Kayser suggests _paucorum
+quid sit_.
+
+Sec.94. _Ut agitator_: see the amusing letter to Atticus XIII. 21, in which
+Cic. discusses different translations for the word [Greek: epechein], and
+quotes a line of Lucilius _sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator
+equosque_, adding _semperque Carneades_ [Greek: probolen] _pugilis et
+retentionem aurigae similem facit_ [Greek: epoche]. Aug. _Contra Ac._
+trans. [Greek: epoche] by _refrenatio_ cf. also _Lael._ 63. _Superbus es_:
+I have thus corrected the MSS. _responde superbe_; Halm writes _facis
+superbe_, Orelli _superbis_, which verb is hardly found in prose. The
+phrase _superbe resistere_ in Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 14 may be a
+reminiscence. _Illustribus_: Bait. with some probability adds _in_,
+comparing _in decimo_ below, and 107, cf. however Munro on Lucr. I. 420.
+_Irretiat_: parallel expressions occur in _T.D._ V. 76, _De Or._ I. 43, _De
+Fato_ 7. _Facere non sinis_: Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 points the moral in the
+same way. _Augentis nec minuentis_: so Halm for MSS. _augendi nec
+minuendi_, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase _primum
+augendi_ to be Latin.
+
+Sec.95. _Tollit ... superiora_: cf. _Hortensius_ fragm. 19 (Orelli) _sed ad
+extremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit
+dialecticorum ratio_. _Vestra an nostra_: Bait. after Christ needlessly
+writes _nostra an vestra_. [Greek: axioma]: "a judgment expressed in
+language"; cf. Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this subject.
+_Effatum_: Halm gives the spelling _ecfatum_. It is probable that this
+spelling was antique in Cic.'s time and only used in connection with
+religious and legal formulae as in _De Div._ I. 81, _De Leg._ II. 20, see
+Corss. _Ausspr._ I. 155 For the word cf. Sen. _Ep._ 117 _enuntiativum
+quiddam de corpore quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii
+edictum_, in _T.D._ I. 14 _pronuntiatum_ is found, in _De Fato_ 26
+_pronuntiatio_, in Gellius XVI. 8 (from Varro) _prologium_. _Aut verum esse
+aut falsum_: the constant Stoic definition of [Greek: axioma], see Diog.
+VII. 65 and other passages in Zeller 107. _Mentiris an verum dicis_: the
+_an_ was added by Schutz on a comparison of Gellius XVIII. 10 _cum mentior
+et mentiri me dico, mentior an verum dico?_ The sophism is given in a more
+formally complete shape in _De Div._ II. 11 where the following words are
+added, _dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur_. The
+fallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli), _quis unquam
+dixit "ego mentior" quum hoc ipsum pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare?_
+_Inexplicabilia_: [Greek: apora] in the Greek writers. _Odiosius_: this
+adj. has not the strong meaning of the Eng. "hateful," but simply means
+"tiresome," "annoying." _Non comprehensa_: as in 99, the opposite of
+_comprehendibilia_ III. 1, 41. The past partic. in Cic. often has the same
+meaning as an adj. in _-bilis_. Faber points out that in the _Timaeus_ Cic.
+translates [Greek: alytos] by _indissolutus_ and _indissolubilis_
+indifferently. _Imperceptus_, which one would expect, is found in Ovid.
+
+Sec.96. _Si dicis_: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by
+Manut. with the exception of _nunc_ which was added by Dav. The idea of
+Orelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the
+comic writers is untenable. _In docendo_: _docere_ is not to _expound_ but
+to _prove_, cf. n. on 121. _Primum ... modum_: the word _modus_ is
+technical in this sense cf. _Top._ 57. The [Greek: protos logos
+anapodeiktos] of the Stoic logic ran thus [Greek: ei hemera esti, phos
+estin ... alla men hemera estin phos ara estin] (Sext. _P.H._ II. 157, and
+other passages qu. Zeller 114). This bears a semblance of inference and is
+not so utterly tautological as Cic.'s translation, which merges [Greek:
+phos] and [Greek: hemera] into one word, or that of Zeller (114, note).
+These arguments are called [Greek: monolemmatoi] (involving only one
+premise) in Sext. _P.H._ I. 152, 159, II. 167. _Si dicis te mentiri_, etc.:
+it is absurd to assume, as this sophism does, that when a man _truly_
+states that he _has_ told a lie, he establishes against himself not merely
+that he _has_ told a lie, but also that he _is_ telling a lie at the moment
+when he makes the _true_ statement. The root of the sophism lies in the
+confusion of past and present time in the one infinitive _mentiri_.
+_Eiusdem generis_: the phrase _te mentiri_ had been substituted for _nunc
+lucere_. _Chrysippea_: n. on 93. _Conclusioni_: on _facere_ with the dat.
+see n. on 27. _Cederet_: some edd. _crederet_, but the word is a trans. of
+Gk. [Greek: eikein]; n. on 66. _Conexi_: = [Greek: synemmenon], cf. Zeller
+109. This was the proper term for the hypothetical judgment. _Superius_:
+the [Greek: synemmenon] consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and
+the affirmative--called in Greek [Greek: hegoumenon] and [Greek: legon]; if
+one is admitted the other follows of course.
+
+Sec.97. _Excipiantur_: the legal _formula_ of the Romans generally directed
+the _iudex_ to condemn the defendant if certain facts were proved, unless
+certain other facts were proved; the latter portion went by the name of
+_exceptio_. See _Dict. Ant_. _Tribunum ... adeant_: a retort upon Lucullus;
+cf. 13. The MSS. have _videant_ or _adeant_; Halm conj. _adhibeant_,
+comparing 86 and _Pro Rabirio_ 20. _Contemnit_: the usual trans. "to
+despise" for _contemnere_ is too strong; it means, like [Greek: oligorein],
+merely to neglect or pass by. _Effabimur_; cf. _effatum_ above.
+_Hermarchus_: not _Hermachus_, as most edd.; see _M.D.F._ II. 96.
+_Diiunctum_: [Greek: diezeugmenon], for which see Zeller 112.
+_Necessarium_: the reason why Epicurus refused to admit this is given in
+_De Fato_ 21 _Epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato
+fieri quaecumque fiant_. The context of that passage should be carefully
+read, along with _N.D._ I. 69, 70. Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 29 lays great
+stress on the necessary truth of disjunctive propositions. _Catus_: so
+Lamb. for MSS. _cautus_. _Tardum_: _De Div._ II. 103 _Epicurum quem hebetem
+et rudem dicere solent Stoici_; cf. also _ib._ II. 116, and the frequent
+use of [Greek: bradys] in Sext., e.g. _A.M._ VII. 325. _Cum hoc igitur_:
+the word _igitur_, as usual, picks up the broken thread of the sentence.
+_Id est_: n. on I. 8. _Evertit_: for the Epicurean view of Dialectic see R.
+and P. 343. Zeller 399 sq., _M.D.F._ I. 22. _E contrariis diiunctio_: =
+[Greek: diezeugmenon ex enantion].
+
+Sec.98. _Sequor_: as in 95, 96, where the _Dialectici_ refused to allow the
+consequences of their own principles, according to Cic. _Ludere_: this
+reminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for which
+see Cope in the old _Journal of Philology_. No. 7. _Iudicem ... non
+iudicem_: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by [Greek: men]
+and [Greek: de], has been a great crux of edd.; Dav. here wished to insert
+_cum_ before _iudicem_, but is conclusively refuted by Madv. _Em._ 31. The
+same construction occurs in 103. _Esse conexum_: with great probability
+Christ supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the copyists.
+
+    Sec.Sec.98--105. Summary. In order to overthrow at once the case of
+    Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of
+    Carneades' system (98). Carneades laid down two divisions of _visa_,
+    one into those capable of being perceived and those not so capable, the
+    other into probable and improbable. Arguments aimed at the senses
+    concern the first division only; the sapiens will follow probability,
+    as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly does (99, 100). Our
+    sapiens is not made of stone; many things _seem_ to him true; yet he
+    always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The
+    Stoics themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this
+    admission together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes
+    impossible (101). It is strange that our _Probables_ do not seem
+    sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (102). He
+    condemns those who say that sensation is swept away by the Academy;
+    nothing is swept away but its _necessary_ certainty (103). There are
+    two modes of withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and
+    withholding it merely so far as to deny the _certainty_ of phenomena.
+    The latter mode leaves all that is required for ordinary life (104).
+
+Sec.98. _Tortuosum_: similar expressions are in _T.D._ II. 42, III. 22, _D.F._
+IV. 7. _Ut Poenus_: "as might be expected from a Carthaginian;" cf. _D.F._
+IV. 56, _tuus ille Poenulus, homo acutus_. A different meaning is given by
+the _ut_ in passages like _De Div._ II. 30 _Democritus non inscite nugatur,
+ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius_; "for a physical philosopher."
+
+Sec.99. _Genera_: here = classifications of, modes of dividing _visa_. This
+way of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong censure of
+Madv. (Pref. to _D.F._ p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted of ignorance, for
+representing Carneades as dividing _visa_ into those which can be perceived
+and those which cannot. Is it possible that any one should read the
+_Academica_ up to this point, and still believe that Cic. is capable of
+supposing, even for a moment, that Carneades in any way upheld [Greek:
+katalepsis]? _Dicantur_: i.e. _ab Academicis_. _Si probabile_: the _si_ is
+not in MSS. Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading _est, probabile
+nihil esse_. _Commemorabas_: in 53, 58. _Eversio_: cf. _D.F._ III. 50 (the
+same words), Plat. _Gorg_. 481 C [Greek: hemon ho bios anatetrammenos an
+eie], Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 157 [Greek: syncheomen ton bion]. _Et sensibus_:
+no second _et_ corresponds to this; _sic_ below replaces it. See Madv.
+_D.F._ p. 790, ed. 2. _Quicquam tale_ etc.: cf. 40, 41. _Nihil ab eo
+differens_: n. on 54. _Non comprehensa_: n. on 96.
+
+Sec.100. _Si iam_: "if, for example;" so _iam_ is often used in Lucretius.
+_Probo ... bono_: it would have seemed more natural to transpose these
+epithets. _Facilior ... ut probet_: the usual construction is with _ad_ and
+the gerund; cf. _De Div._ II. 107, _Brut_. 180. _Anaxagoras_: he made no
+[Greek: homoiomereiai] of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and
+deep, is dark in colour. _Concreta_: so Manut. for MSS. _congregata_. In
+121 the MSS. give _concreta_ without variation, as in _N.D._ II. 101, _De
+Div._ I. 130, _T.D._ I. 66, 71.
+
+Sec.101. _Impeditum_: cf. 33, n. _Movebitur_: cf. _moveri_ in 24. _Non enim
+est_: Cic. in the vast majority of cases writes _est enim_, the two words
+falling under one accent like _sed enim, et enim_ (cf. Corss. _Ausspr._ II.
+851); Beier on _De Off._ I. p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read
+_est enim_, but the MSS. both of the _Lucullus_ and of Nonius agree in the
+other form, which Madv. allows to stand in _D.F._ I. 43, and many other
+places (see his note). Cf. fragm. 22 of the _Acad. Post_. _E robore_: so
+Nonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here _ebore_. _Dolatus_: an evident
+imitation of Hom. _Od._ T 163 [Greek: ou gar apo drios essi palaiphatou
+oud' apo petres]. _Neque tamen habere_: i.e. _se putat_. For the sudden
+change from _oratio recta_ to _obliqua_ cf. 40 with n. _Percipiendi notam_:
+= [Greek: charaktera tes synktatheseos] in Sext. _P.H._ I. 191. For the use
+of the gerund cf. n. on 26, with Madv. _Gram._ 418, Munro on Lucr. I. 313;
+for _propriam_ 34. _Exsistere_. cf. 36. _Qui neget_: see 79. _Caput_: a
+legal term. _Conclusio loquitur_: cf. _historiae loquantur_ (5),
+_consuetudo loquitur_ (_D.F._ II. 48), _hominis institutio si loqueretur_
+(_ib._ IV. 41), _vites si loqui possint_ (_ib._ V. 39), _patria loquitur_
+(_In Cat._ I. 18, 27); the last use Cic. condemns himself in _Orat._ 85.
+_Inquit_: "quotha," indefinitely, as in 109, 115; cf. also _dicit_ in 79.
+
+Sec.102. _Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis_: Bait. follows Madv. in
+placing a comma after _est_, and a full stop at _probabilia_. _Tamen_ ought
+in that case to follow _dicimus_, and it is noteworthy that in his
+communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait., and Hahn's ed. of the
+philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word _tamen_ altogether, nor
+does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice the omission. _Ista diceret_:
+"stated the opinions you asked for." _Poetam_: this both Halm and Bait.
+treat as a gloss.
+
+Sec.103. For this section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext. _P.H._ I.
+227 sq. _Academia ... quibus_: a number of exx. of this change from sing.
+to plural are given by Madv. on _D.F._ V. 16. _Nullum_: on the favourite
+Ciceronian use of _nullus_ for _non_ see 47, 141, and Madv. _Gram._ 455,
+obs. 5. _Illud sit disputatum_: for the construction cf. 98; _autem_ is
+omitted with the same constr. in _D.F._ V. 79, 80. _Nusquam alibi_: cf. 50.
+
+Sec.104. _Exposuisset adiungit_: Madv. on _D.F._ III. 67 notices a certain
+looseness in the use of tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the
+opinions of philosophers, but no ex. so strong as this is produced. _Ut aut
+approbet quid aut improbet_: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent
+editors of Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced
+by _ut_. Halm brackets a similar clause in 20, and is followed in both
+instances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the most extensive _bracketer_ of
+modern times, rejects very many clauses of the kind in the Oratorical
+works. In our passage, the difficulty vanishes when we reflect that
+_approbare_ and _improbare_ may mean either to render an _absolute_
+approval or disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely
+based on _probability_. For example, in 29 the words have the first
+meaning, in 66 the second. The same is the case with _nego_ and _aio_. I
+trace the whole difficulty of the passage to the absence of terms to
+express distinctly the difference between the two kinds of assent. The
+general sense will be as follows. "There are two kinds of [Greek: epoche],
+one which prevents a man from expressing any assent or disagreement (in
+either of the two senses above noticed), another which does not prevent him
+from giving an answer to questions, provided his answer be not taken to
+imply absolute approval or absolute disapproval; the result of which will
+be that he will neither absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but
+will merely give a qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability." My
+defence of the clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann
+in the _Philologus_ (vol. VII.), which I had not read when this note was
+first written. _Alterum placere ... alterum tenere_: "the one is his formal
+dogma, the other is his actual practice." For the force of this see my note
+on _non probans_ in 148, which passage is very similar to this. _Neget ...
+aiat_: cf. 97. _Nec ut placeat_: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the
+wrong sense, for Clitomachus _did_ allow such _visa_ to stand as were
+sufficient to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's _neu cui_ labours
+under the same defect. Various emendations are _nam cum_ (Lamb., accepted
+by Zeller 522), _hic ut_ (Manut.), _et cum_ (Dav. followed by Bait.), _sed
+cum_ (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me that of Manut. I should
+prefer _sic ut_, taking _ut_ in the sense of "although." _Respondere_: "to
+put in as an answer," as in 93 and often. _Approbari_: sc. _putavit_. Such
+changes of construction are common in Cic., and I cannot follow Halm in
+altering the reading to _approbavit_.
+
+Sec.105. _Lucem eripimus_: cf. 30.
+
+    Sec.Sec.105--111. Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this time, that your
+    defence of dogmatism is overthrown (105). You asked how memory was
+    possible on my principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of
+    Epicurus? If nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true,
+    then these will be true (106). Probability is quite sufficient basis
+    for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us to
+    _assent_. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas, and you
+    yourself refuse assent to the _sorites_, why then should not the
+    Academic doubt about other things? (107) Your other strong point is
+    that without assent action is impossible (108). But surely many actions
+    of the dogmatist proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the
+    use of the hackneyed argument of Antiochus (109). Where probability is,
+    there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (110). The argument
+    of Antiochus that the Academics first admit that there are true and
+    false _visa_ and then contradict themselves by denying that there is
+    any difference between true and false, is absurd. We do not deny that
+    the difference _exists_; we do deny that human faculties are capable of
+    perceiving the difference (111).
+
+Sec.105. _Inducto ... prob._: so Aug. _Cont Ac._ II. 12 _Soluto, libero_: cf.
+n. on 8. _Implicato_: = _impedito_ cf. 101. _Iacere_: cf. 79. _Isdem
+oculis_: an answer to the question _nihil cernis?_ in 102. _Purpureum_: cf.
+fragm. 7 of the _Acad. Post_. _Modo caeruleum ... sole_: Nonius (cf. fragm.
+23) quotes _tum caeruleum tum lavum_ (the MSS. in our passage have
+_flavum_) _videtur, quodque nunc a sole_. C.F. Hermann would place _mane
+ravum_ after _quodque_ and take _quod_ as a proper relative pronoun, not as
+= "because." This transposition certainly gives increased clearness.
+Hermann further wishes to remove _a_, quoting exx. of _collucere_ without
+the prep., which are not at all parallel, i.e. _Verr._ I. 58, IV. 71.
+_Vibrat_: with the [Greek: anerithmon gelasma] of Aeschylus.
+_Dissimileque_: Halm, followed by Bait., om. _que_. _Proximo et_: MSS. have
+_ei_, rightly altered by Lamb., cf. e.g. _De Fato_ 44. _Non possis ...
+defendere_: a similar line is taken in 81.
+
+Sec.106. _Memoria_: cf. 22. _Polyaenus_: named _D.F._ I. 20, Diog. X. 18, as
+one of the chief friends of Epicurus. _Falsum quod est_: Greek and Latin do
+not distinguish accurately between the _true_ and the _existent_, the
+_false_ and the _non existent_, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the
+confusion is frequent, notably in the _Sophistes_ and _Theaetetus_. _Si
+igitur_: "if then recollection is recollection only of things perceived and
+known." The dogmatist theory of [Greek: mneme] and [Greek: noesis] is dealt
+with in exactly the same way by Sext. _P.H._ II. 5, 10 and elsewhere, cf.
+also Plat _Theaet._ 191 sq. _Siron_: thus Madv. on _D.F._ II. 119 writes
+the name, not _Sciron_, as Halm. _Fateare_: the em. of Dav. for _facile_,
+_facere_, _facias_ of MSS. Christ defends _facere_, thinking that the
+constr. is varied from the subj. to the inf. after _oportet_, as after
+_necesse est_ in 39. For _facere_ followed by an inf. cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 8.
+_Nulla_: for _non_, cf. 47, 103.
+
+Sec.107. _Fiet artibus_: n. on 27 for the constr., for the matter see 22.
+_Lumina_: "strong points." Bentl. boldly read _columina_, while Dav.
+proposed _vimina_ or _vincula_. That an em. is not needed may be seen from
+_D.F._ II. 70. _negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum lumen est)_ _N.D._ I. 79,
+and 43 of this book. _Responsa_: added by Ernesti. Faber supplies
+_haruspicia_, Orelli after Ern. _haruspicinam_, but, as Halm says, some
+noun in the plur. is needed. _Quod is non potest_: this is the MSS.
+reading, but most edd. read _si is_, to cure a wrong punctuation, by which
+a colon is placed at _perspicuum est_ above, and a full stop at
+_sustineat_. Halm restored the passage. _Habuerint_: the subj. seems due to
+the attraction exercised by _sustineat_. Bait. after Kayser has
+_habuerunt_. _Positum_: "when laid down" or "assumed."
+
+Sec.108. _Alterum est quod_: this is substituted for _deinde_, which ought to
+correspond to _primum_ above. _Actio ullius rei_: n. on _actio rerum_ in
+62, cf. also 148. _Adsensu comprobet_: almost the same phrase often occurs
+in Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc. _Sit etiam_: the _etiam_ is a little
+strange and was thought spurious by Ernesti. It seems to have the force of
+Eng. "indeed", "in what indeed assent consists." _Sensus ipsos adsensus_:
+so in I. 41 _sensus_ is defined to be _id quod est sensu comprehensum_,
+i.e. [Greek: katalepsis], cf. also Stobaeus I. 41, 25 [Greek: aisthetike
+gar phantasia synkatathesis esti]. _Appetitio_: for all this cf. 30. _Et
+dicta ... multa_: Manut. ejected these words as a gloss, after _multa_ the
+MSS. curiously add _vide superiora_. _Lubricos sustinere_: cf. 68 and 94.
+_Ita scribenti ... exanclatum_: for the om. of _esse_ cf. 77, 113 with
+notes. _Herculi_: for this form of the gen. cf. Madv. on _D.F._ I. 14, who
+doubts whether Cic. ever wrote _-is_ in the gen. of the Greek names in
+_-es_. When we consider how difficult it was for copyists _not_ to change
+the rarer form into the commoner, also that even Priscian (see _M.D.F._ V.
+12) made gross blunders about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost
+irresistible. _Temeritatem_: [Greek: propeteian, eikaioteta].
+
+Sec.109. _In navigando_: cf. 100. _In conserendo_: Guretus interprets "[Greek:
+en to phytyesthai ton agron]," and is followed by most commentators, though
+it seems at least possible that _manum_ is to be understood. For the
+suppressed accus. _agrum_ cf. n. on _tollendum_ in 148. _Sequere_: the fut.
+not the pres. ind., cf. 61. _Pressius_: cf. 28. _Reprehensum_: sc.
+_narrasti_. _Id ipsum_: = _nihil posse comprehendi_. _Saltem_: so in 29.
+_Pingue_: cf. _Pro Archia_ 10. _Sibi ipsum_: note that Cic. does not
+generally make _ipse_ agree in case with the reflexive, but writes _se
+ipse_, etc. _Convenienter_: "consistently". _Esse possit_: Bait. _posset_
+on the suggestion of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one,
+not throwing it back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of
+Ant. _Ut hoc ipsum_: the _ut_ follows on _illo modo urguendum_ above.
+_Decretum quod_: Halm followed by Bait. gives _quo_, referring to _altero
+quo neget_ in 111, which however does not justify the reading. The best
+MSS. have _qui_. _Et sine decretis_: Lamb. gave _nec_ for _et_, but Dav.
+correctly explains, "_multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta
+sed tantum probabilia._"
+
+Sec.110. _Ut illa_: i.e. the _decreta_ implied in the last sentence. Some MSS.
+have _ille_, while Dav. without necessity gives _alia_. _Sic hoc ipsum_:
+Sext. then is wrong is saying (_P.H._ I. 226) that the Academics [Greek:
+diabebaiountai ta pragmata einai akatalepta], i.e. state the doctrine
+dogmatically, while the sceptics do not. _Cognitionis notam_: like _nota
+percipiendi_, _veri et falsi_, etc. which we have already had. _Ne
+confundere omnia_: a mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf. 58.
+_Incerta reddere_: cf. 54. _Stellarum numerus_: another echo of Lucullus;
+see 32. _Quem ad modum ... item_: see Madv. on _D.F._ III. 48, who quotes
+an exact parallel from _Topica_ 46, and _sicut ... item_ from _N.D._ I. 3,
+noting at the same time that in such exx. neither _ita_ nor _idem_, which
+MSS. sometimes give for _item_, is correct.
+
+Sec.111. _Dicere ... perturbatum_: for om. of _esse_ cf. 108, etc.
+_Antiochus_: this Bait. brackets. _Unum ... alterum_: cf. 44. _Esse quaedam
+in visis_: it was not the _esse_ but the _videri_, not the actual existence
+of a difference, but the possibility of that difference being infallibly
+perceived by human sense, that the Academic denied. _Cernimus_: i.e. the
+_probably_ true and false. _Probandi species_: a phenomenal appearance
+which belongs to, or properly leads to qualified approval.
+
+    Sec.Sec.112--115. Summary. If I had to deal with a Peripatetic, whose
+    definitions are not so exacting, my course would be easier; I should
+    not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise man sometimes
+    _opines_ (112). The definitions of the real Old Academy are more
+    reasonable than those of Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does,
+    can he profess to belong to the Old Academy? (113) I cannot tolerate
+    your assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic
+    system like yours free from mistakes (114). You wish me to join your
+    school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who thinks
+    so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I, but
+    the _sapiens_ is to adopt (115).
+
+Sec.112. _Campis ... exsultare ... oratio_: expressions like this are common
+in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 54, _De Off._ I. 61, _Orat._ 26; cf. also Aug.
+_Cont. Ac._ III. 5 _ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret oratio_. _Cum
+Peripatetico_: nothing that Cic. states here is at discord with what is
+known of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf. esp. Sext. _A.M._ VII.
+216--226. All that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic
+formula, putting upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic
+would have wondered how a sceptic _could_ accept his formulae; but the
+spectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the
+same formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at
+Cicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on 18) that we have here
+a trace of Philo's teaching, as distinct from that of Carneades. I see
+absolutely no reason for the very severe remarks of Madvig on _D.F._ V. 76,
+a passage which very closely resembles ours. _Dumeta_: same use in _N.D._
+I. 68, Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 6; the _spinae_ of the Stoics are often
+mentioned, e.g. _D.F._ IV. 6. _E vero ... a falso_: note the change of
+prep. _Adhiberet_: the MSS. are confused here, and go Halm reads _adderet_,
+and Bait. follows, while Kayser proposes _adhaereret_, which is indeed
+nearer the MSS.; cf. however I. 39 _adhiberet_. _Accessionem_: for this cf.
+18 and 77. _Simpliciter_: the opposite of _subtiliter_; cf.
+_simpliciter--subtilitas_ in I. 6. _Ne Carneade quidem_: cf. 59, 67, 78,
+148.
+
+Sec.113. _Sed qui his minor est_: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for
+MSS. _sed mihi minores_. Guietus gave _sed his minores_, Durand _sed
+minutior_, while Halm suggests _sed minutiores_. I conj. _nimio minares_,
+which would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr. I. 734 _inferiores partibus
+egregie multis multoque minores_. _Tale verum_: _visum_ omitted as in
+_D.F._ V. 76. _Incognito_: cf. 133. _Amavi hominem_: cf. Introd. p. 6. _Ita
+iudico, politissimum_; it is a mistake to suppose this sentence incomplete,
+like Halm, who wishes to add _eum esse_, or like Bait., who with Kayser
+prints _esse_ after _politissimum_. Cf. 108 _ita scribenti, exanclatum_,
+and the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 13. _Horum
+neutrum_: cf. 77 _nemo_. _Utrumque verum_: Cic. of course only accepts the
+propositions as Arcesilas did; see 77.
+
+Sec.114. _Illud ferre_: cf. 136. _Constituas_: this verb is often used in
+connection with the ethical _finis_; cf. 129 and I. 19. _Idemque etiam_:
+Krebs and Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) deny that the expression _idem
+etiam_ is Latin. One good MS. here has _atque etiam_, which Dav. reads; cf.
+however _Orat._ 117. _Artificium_: = _ars_, as in 30. _Nusquam labar_: cf.
+138 _ne labar_. _Subadroganter_: cf. 126.
+
+Sec.115. _Qui sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse_: so Cic. vary often speaks of
+the Peripatetics, as in _D.F._ IV. 5, V. 7. _Sustinuero_: cf. 70. _Tam
+bonos_: Cic. often speaks of them and of Epicurus in this patronising way;
+see e.g. _T.D._ II. 44, III. 50, _D.F._ I. 25, II. 81. For the Epicurean
+friendships cf. esp. _D.F._ I. 65. _Diodoto_: cf. Introd. p. 2. _Nolumus_:
+Halm and Bait., give _nolimus_; so fine a line divides the subjunctive from
+the indicative in clauses like these that the choice often depends on mere
+individual taste. _De sapiente loquamur_: n. on 66.
+
+    Sec.Sec.116--128. Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy take Physics
+    first. Would your _sapiens_ swear to the truth of any geometrical
+    result whatever? (116) Let us see which one of actual physical systems
+    the _sapiens_ we are seeking will select (117). He must choose _one_
+    teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander,
+    Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles,
+    Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers,
+    great men though they be, he must reject (118). Whatever system he
+    selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must believe as
+    strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If he holds
+    this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus, must
+    defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not
+    allow me even to doubt (119). How much better to be free, as I am and
+    not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles of the universe!
+    (120) Nothing can exist, say you, apart from the deity. Strato,
+    however, says he does not need the deity to construct the universe. His
+    mode of construction again differs from that of Democritus. I see some
+    good in Strato, yet I will not assent absolutely either to his system
+    or to yours (121). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We know
+    nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the
+    advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the
+    earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (122).
+    Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell strange things of the
+    heavenly bodies. How much better to side with Socrates and Aristo, who
+    hold that nothing can be known about them! (123) Who knows the nature
+    of mind? Numberless opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato
+    and Xenocrates. Our _sapiens_ will be unable to decide (124). If you
+    say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose
+    Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous
+    falsehoods (125). The Stoics differ among themselves about physical
+    subjects, why will they not allow me to differ from them? (126) Not
+    that I deprecate the study of Physics, for moral good results from it
+    (127). Our _sapiens_ will be delighted if he attains to anything which
+    seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your
+    weakness in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be
+    prepared to asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times
+    as large as the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you
+    admit that all things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than
+    the size of the sun, I am almost content (128).
+
+Sec.116. _Tres partes_: cf. I. 19. _Et a vobismet_: "and especially by you".
+The threefold division was peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools,
+cf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 13 (on the same subject) [Greek: hoi Stoikoi kai alloi
+tines]. For other modes of dividing philosophy see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 2. _At
+illud ante_: this is my em. for the MSS. _velut illud ante_, which probably
+arose from a marginal variant "_vel ut_" taking the place of _at_; cf. a
+similar break in 40 _sed prius_, also in 128 _at paulum ante_. Such breaks
+often occur in Cic., as in _Orator_ 87 _sed nunc aliud_, also _T.D._ IV. 47
+_repenam fortasse, sed illud ante._ For _velut_ Halm writes _vel_ (which
+Bait. takes), Dav. _verum_. _Inflatus tumore_: cf. _De Off._ I. 91 _inflati
+opinionibus._ Bentl. read _errore_. _Cogere_: this word like [Greek:
+anankazein] and [Greek: biazesthai] often means simply to argue
+irresistibly. _Initia_: as in 118, bases of proof, themselves naturally
+incapable of proof, so [Greek: archai] in Gk. _Digitum_: cf. 58, 143.
+_Punctum esse_ etc.: [Greek: semeion estin ou meros outhen] (Sext. _P.H._
+III. 39), [Greek: stigme] = [Greek: to ameres] (_A.M._ IX. 283, 377).
+_Extremitatem_: = [Greek: epiphaneian]. _Libramentum_: so this word is used
+by Pliny (see Forc.) for the slope of a hill. _Nulla crassitudo_: in Sext.
+the [Greek: epiphaneia] is usually described not negatively as here, but
+positively as [Greek: mekos meta platous] (_P.H._ III. 39), [Greek: peras]
+(_extremitas_) [Greek: somatos duo echon diastaseis, mekos kai platos]
+(_A.M._ III. 77). _Liniamentum ... carentem_: a difficult passage. Note (1)
+that the line is defined in Greek as [Greek: mekos aplates]. (Sext. as
+above), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the point and surface
+negatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against the introduction of
+_longitudinem_ which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and others propose by
+conjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would rather add _et
+crassitudine_ before _carentem_, comparing I. 27 _sine ulla specie et
+carentem omni illa qualitate_. I have merely bracketed _carentem_, though I
+feel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in this clause as in the other
+two, he suggests _quod sit sine_. Hermann takes _esse_ after _punctum_ as
+strongly predicative ("there _is_ a point," etc.), then adds _similiter_
+after _liniamentum_ and ejects _sine ulla_. Observe the awkwardness of
+having the _line_ treated of after the _superficies_, which has induced
+some edd. to transpose. For _liniamentum_ = _lineam_ cf. _De Or._ I. 187.
+_Si adigam_: the fine em. of Manut. for _si adiiciamus_ of MSS. The
+construction _adigere aliquem ius iurandum_ will be found in Caes. _Bell.
+Civ._ I. 76, II. 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg. _Aen._ III. 56 _quid non
+mortalia pectora cogis auri sacra fames?_ _Sapientem nec prius_: this is
+the "_egregia lectio_" of three of Halm's MSS. Before Halm _sapientemne_
+was read, thus was destroyed the whole point of the sentence, which is
+_not_ that the _sapiens_ will swear to the size of the sun after he has
+seen Archimedes go through his calculations, _but_ that the _sapiens_,
+however true he admits the bases of proof to be which Archimedes uses, will
+_not_ swear to the truth of the elaborate conclusions which that geometer
+rears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in 128 against the absurdity of
+attaching one and the same degree of certainty to the simplest and the most
+complex truths, and tries to condemn the Stoic _sapiens_ out of his own
+mouth, cf. esp. _nec ille iurare posset_ in 123. _Multis partibus_: for
+this expression see Munro on Lucr. I. 734, for the sense cf. 82, 123, 126,
+128. _Deum_: see 126.
+
+Sec.117. _Vim_: = [Greek: ananken], cf. _cogere_ in 116. _Ne ille_: this
+asseverative _ne_ is thus always closely joined with pronouns in Cic.
+_Sententiam eliget et_: MSS. have (by _dittographia_ of _m_, _eli_) added
+_melius_ after _sententiam_, and have also dropped _et_. Dav. wished to
+read _elegerit_, comparing the beginning of 119. _Insipiens eliget_: cf.
+115 _quale est a non sapiente explicari sapientiam?_ and 9 _statuere qui
+sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis_. _Infinitae quaestiones_:
+[Greek: theseis], general propositions, opposed to _finitae quaestiones_,
+limited propositions, Gk. [Greek: hypotheseis]. Quintal III. 5, 5 gives as
+an ex. of the former _An uxor ducenda_, of the latter _An Catoni ducenda_.
+These _quaestiones_ are very often alluded to by Cic. as in _D.F._ I. 12,
+IV. 6, _De Or._ I. 138, II. 65--67, _Topica_ 79, _Orat._ 46, cf. also
+Quint. X. 5, II. _E quibus omnia constant_: this sounds like Lucretius,
+_omnia_ = [Greek: to pan].
+
+Sec.118. For these _physici_ the student must in general be referred to R. and
+P., Schwegler, and Grote's _Plato_ Vol. I. A more complete enumeration of
+schools will be found in Sext. _P.H._ III. 30 sq. Our passage is imitated
+by Aug _De Civ. Dei_ XVIII. 37. _Concessisse primas_: Cic. always considers
+Thales to be _sapientissimus e septem_ (_De Leg._ II. 26). Hence Markland
+on Cic. _Ad Brutum_ II. 15, 3 argued that that letter cannot be genuine,
+since in it the supremacy among the seven is assigned to Solon.
+_Infinitatem naturae_: [Greek: to apeiron], _naturae_ here = [Greek:
+ousias]. _Definita_: this is opposed to _infinita_ in _Topica_ 79, so
+_definire_ is used for _finire_ in _Orat._ 65, where Jahn qu. _Verr._ IV.
+115. _Similis inter se_: an attempt to translate [Greek: homoiomereias].
+_Eas primum_, etc.: cf. the exordium of Anaxagoras given from Diog. II. 6
+in R. and P. 29 [Greek: panta chremata en homou eita nous elthon auta
+diekosmese]. _Xenophanes ... deum_: Eleaticism was in the hands of Xenoph.
+mainly theological. _Neque natum unquam_: cf. _neque ortum unquam_ in 119.
+_Parmenides ignem_: cf. Arist. _Met. A._ 5 qu. R. and P. 94. He only
+hypothetically allowed the existence of the phenomenal world, after which
+he made two [Greek: archai, thermon kai psychron touton de to men kata men
+to hon thermon tattei, thateron de kata to me on]. _Heraclitus_: n. on I.
+39. _Melissus_: see Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp. [Greek: to eon
+aiei ara en te kai estai]. _Plato_: n. on I. 27. _Discedent_: a word often
+used of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 7, 17.
+
+Sec.119. _Sic animo ... sensibus_: knowledge according to the Stoics was
+homogeneous throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than
+another. _Nunc lucere_: cf. 98, also 128 _non enim magis adsentiuntur_,
+etc. _Mundum sapientem_: for this Stoic doctrine see _N.D._ I. 84, II. 32,
+etc. _Fabricata sit_: see 87 n. _Solem_: 126. _Animalis intellegentia_:
+reason is the essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138--9,
+also 28, 29 of Book I. _Permanet_: the deity is to the Stoic [Greek: pneuma
+endiekon di holou tou kosmou] (Plut. _De Plac. Phil._ I. 7 qu. R. and P.
+375), _spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus._
+(Seneca, _Consol. ad Helvid._ 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147). _Deflagret_: the Stoics
+considered the [Greek: kosmos phthartos], cf. Diog. VII. 141, Zeller
+156--7. _Fateri_: cf. _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_ in 111. _Flumen
+aureum_: Plut. _Vita Cic._ 24 alludes to this ([Greek: hoti chrysiou
+potamos eie reontos]). This is the constant judgment of Cic. about
+Aristotle's style. Grote, _Aristot._ Vol I. p. 43, quotes _Topica_ 3, _De
+Or._ I. 49, _Brut._ 121, _N.D._ II. 93, _De Inv._ II. 6, _D.F._ I. 14, _Ad
+Att._ II. 1, and discusses the difficulty of applying this criticism to the
+works of Aristotle which we possess. _Nulla vis_: cf. I. 28. _Exsistere_:
+Walker conj. _efficere_, "_recte ut videtur_" says Halm. Bait. adopts it.
+_Ornatus_: = [Greek: kosmos].
+
+Sec.120. _Libertas ... non esse_: a remarkable construction. For the Academic
+liberty see Introd. p. 18. _Quod tibi est_: after these words Halm puts
+merely a comma, and inserting _respondere_ makes _cur deus_, etc. part of
+the same sentence. Bait. follows. _Nostra causa_: Cic. always writes _mea,
+tua, vestra, nostra causa_, not _mei, tui, nostri, vestri_, just as he
+writes _sua sponte_, but not _sponte alicuius_. For the Stoic opinion that
+men are the chief care of Providence, see _N.D._ I. 23, II. 37, _D.F._ III.
+67, _Ac._ I. 29 etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding the opinion
+are treated of in Zeller 175, _N.D._ II. 91--127. They supply in Sext.
+_P.H._ I. 32, III. 9--12 an example of the refutation of [Greek: nooumena]
+by means of [Greek: nooumena]. _Tam multa ac_: MSS. om. _ac_, which I
+insert. Lactantius qu. the passage without _perniciosa_. _Myrmecides_: an
+actual Athenian artist, famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for
+a chariot which a fly covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of
+a bee concealed. See Plin. _Nat. Hist._ VII. 21, XXXVI. 5.
+
+Sec.121. _Posse_: n. on I. 29. _Strato_: R. and P. 331. _Sed cum_: _sed_ often
+marks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read _et_, as Halm.
+_Asperis ... corporibus_: cf. fragm. 28 of the _Ac. Post._, also _N.D._ I.
+66. _Somnia_: so _N.D._ I. 18 _miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed
+somniantium_, _ib._ I. 42 _non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium
+somnia_, also _ib._ I. 66 _flagitia Democriti_. _Docentis_: giving _proof_.
+_Optantis_: Guietus humorously conj. _potantis,_ Durand _oscitantis_ (cf.
+_N.D._ I. 72), others _opinantis_. That the text is sound however may be
+seen from _T.D._ II. 30 _optare hoc quidem est non docere_, _De Fato_ 46,
+_N.D._ I. 19 _optata magis quam inventa_, _ib._ III. 12 _doceas oportet nec
+proferas_; cf. also _Orat._ 59 _vocis bonitas optanda est, non est enim in
+nobis_, i.e. a good voice is a thing to be prayed for, and not to be got by
+exertion. There is a similar Greek proverb, [Greek: euche mallon e
+aletheia], in Sext. _P.H._ VIII. 353. _Magno opere_: Hermann wishes to read
+_onere_. The phrase _magnum onus_ is indeed common (cf. _De Or._ I. 116),
+but _magnum opus_, in the sense of "a great task," is equally so, cf.
+_T.D._ III. 79, 84, _Orat._ 75. _Modo hoc modo illud_: 134.
+
+Sec.122. _Latent ista_: see n. on fragm. 29 of the _Ac. Post._; for _latent_
+cf. I. 45. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12, III. 1 imitates this passage.
+_Circumfusa_: cf. I. 44, and 46 of this book. _Medici_: cf. _T.D._ I. 46
+_Viderentur_: a genuine passive, cf. 25, 39, 81. _Empirici_: a school of
+physicians so called. _Ut ... mutentur_: exactly the same answer was made
+recently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he was said to have
+assumed that the living protoplasm would have the same properties as the
+dead. _Media pendeat_: cf. _N.D._ II. 98, _De Or._ III. 178.
+
+Sec.123. _Habitari ait_: for this edd. qu. Lactant. _Inst._ III. 23, 12.
+_Portenta_: "monstrosities these," cf. _D.F._ IV. 70. _Iurare_: cf. 116.
+_Neque ego_, etc.: see fragm. 30 of _Ac. Post._ [Greek: Antipodas]: this
+doctrine appears in Philolaus (see Plut. _Plac. Phil._ III. 11 qu. R. and
+P. 75), who give the name of [Greek: antichthon] to the opposite side of
+the world. Diog. VIII. 26 (with which passage cf. Stob. _Phys._ XV. 7)
+mentions the theory as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says
+that Plato first invented the name. The word [Greek: antipous] seems to
+occur first in Plat. _Tim._ 63 A. The existence of [Greek: antipodes]; was
+of course bound up with the doctrine that the universe or the world is a
+globe (which is held by Plat. in the _Tim._ and by the Stoics, see Stob.
+_Phys._ XV. 6, Diog. VII. 140), hence the early Christian writers attack
+the two ideas together as unscriptural. Cf. esp Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XVI. 9.
+_Hicetas_: he was followed by Heraclides Ponticus and some Pythagoreans.
+Sext. _A.M._ X. 174 speaks of the followers of Aristarchus the
+mathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems also to be found in
+Philolaus, see R. and P. 75. _Theophrastus_: who wrote much on the history
+of philosophy, see R. and P. 328. _Platonem_: the words of Plato (_Tim._ 40
+B) are [Greek: gen de trophon men hemeteran, eillomenen de peri ton dia
+pantos polon tetamenon]. _Quid tu, Epicure_: the connection is that Cic.,
+having given the crotchets of other philosophers about [Greek: physike],
+proceeds to give the peculiar crotchet of Epic. _Putas solem ... tantum_: a
+hard passage. _Egone? ne bis_ is the em. of Lamb. for MSS. _egone vobis_,
+and is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (_Em._ 185) "_cum
+interrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem 82) solem esse putaret,
+Epic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat quantus videretur vel
+paulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius circumscribit, ne bis quidem
+tantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem et bipedalem_". (_D.F._ I. 20)
+This explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given.
+Epicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the
+outside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's
+size, i.e. twice the apparent size. _Ne ... quidem_ may possibly appear
+strange, cf. however _ne maiorem quidem_ in 82. _Aristo Chius_: for this
+doctrine of his see R. and P. 358.
+
+Sec.124. _Quid sit animus_: an enumeration of the different ancient theories
+is given in _T.D._ I. 18--22, and by Sext. _A.M._ VII. 113, who also speaks
+in _P.H._ II. 31 of the [Greek: polle kai anenytos mache] concerning the
+soul. In _P.H._ II. 57 he says [Greek: Gorgias oude dianoian einai phesi].
+_Dicaearcho_: _T.D._ I. 21. _Tres partis_: in Plato's _Republic_. _Ignis_:
+Zeno's opinion, _T.D._ I. 19. _Animam_: _ib._ I. 19. _Sanguis_: Empodocles,
+as in _T.D._ I. 19 where his famous line [Greek: haima gar anthropois
+perikardion esti noema] is translated, see R. and P. 124. _Ut Xenocrates_:
+some edd. read _Xenocrati_, but cf. I. 44, _D.F._ II. 18, _T.D._ III. 76.
+_Numerus_: so Bentl. for _mens_ of MSS., cf. I. 39, _T.D._ I. 20, 41. An
+explanation of this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and
+P. 244. _Quod intellegi_ etc.: so in _T.D._ I. 41 _quod subtiliter magis
+quam dilucide dicitur_. _Momenta_ n. on I. 45.
+
+Sec.125. _Verecundius_: cf. 114 _subadroganter_. _Vincam animum_: a common
+phrase in Cic., cf. _Philipp._ XII. 21. _Queru potissimum? quem?_: In
+repeated questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of
+_quisnam_, not _quis_, in the second question, as in _Verr._ IV. 5. The
+mutation of Augustine _Contra Ac._ III. 33 makes it probable that _quemnam_
+was the original reading here. Zumpt on _Verr._ qu. Quint. IX. 2, 61, Plin.
+_Epist._ I. 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud it for its
+likeness to impromptu. _Nobilitatis_: this is to be explained by referring
+to 73--75 (_imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem_), where Cic.
+protests against being compared to a demagogue, and claims to follow the
+aristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the commentators to show that
+Democr. was literally an aristocrat have failed. _Convicio_: cf. 34.
+_Completa et conferta_: n. on I. 27. _Quod movebitur ... cedat_: this is
+the theory of motion disproved by Lucr. I. 370 sq., cf. also _N.D._ II. 83.
+Halm writes _quo quid_ for _quod_ (with Christ), and inserts _corpus_
+before _cedat_, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. "whatever
+body is pushed, gives way." _Tam sit mirabilis_: n. on I. 25.
+_Innumerabilis_: 55. _Supra infra_: n. on 92. _Ut nos nunc simus_, etc.: n.
+on fragm. 13 of _Ac. Post._ _Disputantis_: 55. _Animo videre_: cf. 22.
+_Imagines_: [Greek: eidola], which Catius translated (_Ad Fam._ XV. 16) by
+_spectra_, Zeller 432. _Tu vero_: etc. this is all part of the personal
+_convicium_ supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by the Antiocheans,
+and beginning at _Tune aut inane_ above. _Commenticiis_: a favourite word
+of Cic., cf. _De Div._ II. 113.
+
+Sec.126. _Quae tu_: elliptic for _ut comprobem quae tu comprobas_ cf. 125.
+_Impudenter_: 115. _Atque haud scio_: _atque_ here = [Greek: kaitoi], "and
+yet," n. on 5 _ac vereor_. _Invidiam_: cf. 144. _Cum his_: i.e. _aliis cum
+his_. _Summus deus_: "the highest form of the deity" who was of course one
+in the Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and [Greek: pyr technikon]
+is one of the definitions of the Stoic deity, cf. I. 29, Zeller 161 sq.
+_Solem_: as of course being the chief seat of fire. _Solis autem ... nego
+credere_: Faber first gave _ac monet_ for MSS. _admonens_, which Halm
+retains, Manut. then restored to its place _permensi refertis_, which MSS.
+have after _nego_. _Hic_, which MSS. have after _decempeda_, Madv. turns
+into _hunc_, while _hoc_, which stands immediately after _nego_, he ejects
+(_Em._ 187). _Ergo_ after _vos_ is of course analeptic. Halm departs
+somewhat from this arrangement. _Leniter_: Halm and Hermann _leviter_; the
+former reads _inverecundior_ after Morgenstern, for what reason it is
+difficult to see.
+
+Sec.127. _Pabulum_: similar language in _D.F._ II. 46. _Consideratio
+contemplatioque_: Cic. is fond of this combination, as _De Off._ I. 153;
+cf. Wesenberg on _T.D._ V. 9, who qu. similar combinations from _D.F._ V.
+11, 58. _Elatiores_: MSS. mostly have _latiores_. Halm with Lamb. reads
+_altiores_, in support of which reading Dav. qu. _D.F._ II. 51, Val.
+Flaccus _Argon._ II. 547, add Virg. _Aen._ VI. 49, Cic. _Orat._ 119.
+_Exigua et minima_: [Greek: smikra kai elachista]. Madv. on _D.F._ V. 78
+notes that except here Cic. always writes _exigua et paene minima_ or
+something of the kind. _Occultissimarum_: n. on I. 15. _Occurit ...
+completur_: MSS. have _occuret_ mostly, if that is retained _complebitur_
+must be read. Madv. _Opusc._ II. 282 takes _occurit_, explaining it as a
+perfect, and giving numerous exx. of this sequence of tenses, cf. also
+Wesenb. on _T.D._ IV. 35.
+
+Sec.128. _Agi secum_: cf. _nobiscum ageret_ in 80. _Simile veri_: cf. 66.
+_Notionem_: = _cognitionem_, [Greek: epistemen]. _At paulum_: MSS. _et_
+Halm _sed._; cf. _at illud ante_ in 116. _Si quae_: Halm and many edd. have
+_se, quae_. But the _se_ comes in very awkwardly, and is not needed before
+the infinitive. Madv. indeed (_Em._ 114), after producing many exx. of the
+reflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts about this passage because
+_considero_ does not belong to the class of verbs with which this usage is
+found, but he produces many instances with _puto_, which surely stands on
+the same level. _Non magis_: so in 119 _nec magis approbabit nunc lucere_,
+etc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely cognisable
+phenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to absolute
+knowledge by refusing [Greek: ton helion homologein einai katalepton]
+(Galen _De Opt. Gen. Dicendi_ 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.). _Cornix_:
+for the Stoic belief in divination see Zeller 349--358. _Signum illud_: the
+_xystus_ (9) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XXXIV.
+8. _Duodeviginti_: 82, I just note that _octodecim_ is not used by Cic.
+_Sol quantus sit_: 91. _Omnium rerum ... comprehendendi_: not a case of a
+plural noun with a singular gerund like _spe rerum potiendi_, etc., but of
+two genitives depending in different ways on the same word (_definitio_).
+M. _Em._ 197 qu. Plat. _Leg._ 648 E [Greek: ten panton hettan phoboumenos
+anthropon toi pomatos], _Brut._ 163 _Scaevolae dicendi elegantia_, _De Or._
+III. 156. Other exx. in _M.D.F._ I. 14. For the turn of expression cf.
+_T.D._ IV. 62 _omnium philosophorum una est ratio medendi_, _Lael._ 78
+_omnium horum vitiorum una cautio est_, also 51 of this book.
+
+    Sec.Sec.129--141. Summary. What contention is there among philosophers about
+    the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems like that of
+    Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes, Parmenides,
+    Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho, Aristippus,
+    Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus, Carneades
+    (129-131). If I desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow
+    me, while if I follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (132). I must be
+    careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both
+    you, Lucullus, and myself (133). Zeno thinks virtue gives happiness.
+    "Yes," says Antiochus, "but not the greatest possible." How am I to
+    choose among such conflicting theories? (134) Nor can I accept those
+    points in which Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard
+    emotion as harmful, which the ancients thought natural and useful
+    (135). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! (136) Albinus joking said to
+    Carneades "You do not think me a praetor because I am not a _sapiens_."
+    "That," said Carneades, "is Diogenes' view, not mine" (137). Chrysippus
+    thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be defended
+    (138). I gravitate then towards one of them, that of pleasure. Virtue
+    calls me back, nor will she even allow me to join pleasure to herself
+    (139). When I hear the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I
+    cannot avoid being moved by both, and so I find it impossible to choose
+    (141, 142).
+
+Sec.129. _Quod coeperam_: in 128 at _veniamus nunc ad boni maique notionem_.
+_Constituendi_: n. on 114. _Bonorum summa_: cf. _D.F._ V. 21 and Madv. _Est
+igitur_: so in _De Div._ II. 8, _igitur_ comes fourth word in the clause;
+this is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius. _Omitto_: MSS. _et omitto_,
+but cf. Madv. _Em._ 201 _certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro
+simplici 'omitto,' in initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae
+exempla subiciuntur per figuram omissionis_. _Relicta_: cf. 130 _abiectos_.
+Cic. generally classes Herillus (or Erillus as Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35
+spells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded
+systems, cf. _D.F._ II. 43, _De Off._ I. 6, _T.D._ V. 85. _Ut Herillum_.
+MSS. have either _Erillum_ or _et illum_, one would expect _ut Herilli_.
+_Cognitione et scientia_: double translation of [Greek: episteme]. For the
+_finis_ of Herillus see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 43. _Megaricorum_:
+_Xenophanes_. Cic considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so
+closely related as to have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a
+continuous history. The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development
+of Eleatic doctrine. Zeller, _Socrates_ 211. _Unum et simile_: for this see
+Zell. _Socr._ 222 sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq. _Simile_ ought
+perhaps to be _sui simile_ as in _Tim._ c. 7, already quoted on I. 30, see
+my note there and cf. I. 35. _Menedemo_: see Zeller _Socr._ 238, R. and P.
+182. The _Erctrian_ school was closely connected with the Megarian. _Fuit_:
+= _natus est_, as often. _Herilli_: so Madv. for _ulli_ of MSS.
+
+Sec.130. _Aristonem_: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a
+Peripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines of
+Aristo the Chian _ib._ 358, Zeller 58 sq. _In mediis_: cf. I. 36, 37.
+_Momenta_ = _aestimationes_, [Greek: axiai] in 36, where _momenti_ is used
+in a different way. _Pyrrho autem_: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav.
+conj., but in 124 there is just the same change from _Pyrrhoni_ to
+_Xenocrates_. [Greek: Apatheia]: Diog. IX. 108 affirms this as well as
+[Greek: praiotes] to be a name for the sceptic [Greek: telos], but the name
+scarcely occurs if at all in Sext. who generally uses [Greek: ataraxia],
+but occasionally [Greek: metriopatheia]; cf. Zeller 496, R. and P. 338.
+[Greek: Apatheia] was also a Stoic term. _Diu multumque_: n. on I. 4.
+
+Sec.131. _Nec tamen consentiens_: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences
+between the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448.
+_Callipho_: as the genitive is _Calliphontis_, Cic. ought according to rule
+to write _Calliphon_ in the nom; for this see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 19, who
+also gives the chief authorities concerning this philosopher. _Hieronymus_:
+mentioned _D.F._ II. 19, 35, 41, V. 14, in which last place Cic. says of
+him _quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio_. _Diodorus_: see Madv. on
+_D.F._ II. 19. _Honeste vivere_, etc.: in _D.F._ IV. 14 the _finis_ of
+Polemo is stated to be _secundum naturam vivere_, and three Stoic
+interpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present
+passage--_omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint fruentem
+vivere_. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him it is
+attributed to the _vetus Academia_ in I. 22, where the words _aut omnia aut
+maxima_, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf. Clemens Alex. qu.
+by Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 15. See n. below on Carneades. _Antiochus probat_:
+the germs of many Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in
+Polemo; see I. 34, n. _Eiusque amici_: Bentl. _aemuli_, but Halm refers to
+_D.F._ II. 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree Stoicised.
+_Nunc_: Halm _huc_ after Jo. Scala. _Carneades_: this _finis_ is given in
+_D.F._ II. 35 (_frui principiis naturalibus_), II. 42 (_Carneadeum illud
+quod is non tam ut probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum
+gerebat opponeret_), V. 20 (_fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum
+naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor sed defensor
+disserendi causa fuit_), _T.D._ V. 84 (_naturae primus aut omnibus aut
+maximis frui, ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat_). The _finis_
+therefore, thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is
+clear that Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include
+_virtus_ in it (see _D.F._ II. 38, 42, V. 22) while Polemo did (I. 22). See
+more on 139. _Zeno_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 15 _Inventor et princeps_: same
+expression in _T.D._ I. 48, _De Or._ I. 91, _De Inv._ II. 6; _inv._ =
+[Greek: oikistes].
+
+Sec.132. _Quemlibet_: cf. 125, 126. _Prope singularem_: cf. _T.D._ I. 22
+_Aristoteles longe omnibus--Platonem semper excipio--praestans_; also
+_D.F._ V. 7, _De Leg._ I. 15. _Per ipsum Antiochum_: a similar line of
+argument is taken in Sext. _P.H._ I. 88, II. 32, etc. _Terminis ...
+possessione_: there is a similar play on the legal words _finis terminus
+possessio_ in _De Leg._ I. 55, 56, a noteworthy passage. _Omnis ratio_
+etc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf. Aug.
+_De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1 _neque enim existimat_ (Varro) _ullam philosophiae
+sectam esse dicendam, quae non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat
+fines bonorum et malorum_, etc. _Si Polemoneus_: i.e. _sapiens fuerit_.
+_Peccat_: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see I. 37. _Academicos et_:
+MSS. om. _et_ as in I. 16, and _que_ in 52 of this book. _Dicenda_: for the
+omission of the verb with the gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic
+clauses) cf. I. 7, and Madv. on _D.F._ I. 43, who how ever unduly limits
+the usage. _Hic igitur ... prudentior_: MSS. generally have _assentiens_,
+but one good one (Halm's E) has _assentientes_. I venture to read
+_adsentietur_, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt, as in
+26 (_tenetur_) and that then _adsentiet_, under the attraction of the _s_
+following, passed into _adsentiens_, as in 147 _intellegat se_ passed into
+_intelligentes_. _N_, I may remark, is frequently inserted in MSS. (as in
+I. 7 _appellant_, 16 _disputant_, 24 _efficerentur_), and all the changes
+involved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read _sin, inquam_
+(_sc. adsentietur_) for _si numquam_ of MSS. The question _uter est
+prudentior_ is intended to press home the dilemma in which Cicero has
+placed the supposed _sapiens_. All the other emendations I have seen are
+too unsatisfactory to be enumerated.
+
+Sec.133. _Non posse ... esse_: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads
+_non esse illa probanda sap._ after Lamb., who also conj. _non posse illa
+probata esse_. _Paria_: _D.F._ III. 48, _Paradoxa_ 20 sq., Zeller 250.
+_Praecide_: [Greek: syntomos] or [Greek: synelon eipe], cf. _Cat. Mai._ 57,
+_Ad Att._ VIII. 4, X. 16. _Inquit_: n. on 79. _Quid quod quae_: so Guietus
+with the approval of Madv. (_Em._ 203) reads for MSS. _quid quae_ or _quid
+quaeque_, Halm and Bait., follow Moser in writing _Quid? si quae_ removing
+the stop at _paria_, and make _in utramque partem_ follow _dicantur_, on
+Orelli's suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS.
+often omit one. _Dicebas_: in 27. _Incognito_: 133.
+
+Sec.134. _Etiam_: = "yes," Madv. _Gram._ 454. _Non beatissimam_: I. 22, n.
+_Deus ille_: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's [Greek: e theos e
+therion]), if he can do without other advantages. For the omission of _est_
+after the emphatic _ille_ cf. 59, n. _Theophrasto_, etc.: n. on I. 33, 35.
+_Dicente_: before this Halm after Lamb., followed by Bait., inserts
+_contra_, the need for which I fail to see. _Et hic_: i.e. Antiochus. _Ne
+sibi constet_: Cic. argues in _T.D._ V. that there cannot be degrees in
+happiness. _Tum hoc ... tum illud_: cf. 121. _Iacere_: 79. _In his
+discrepant_: I. 42 _in his constitit_.
+
+Sec.135. _Moveri_: [Greek: kineisthai], 29. _Laetitia efferri_: I. 38.
+_Probabilia_: the removal of passion and delight is easier than that of
+fear and pain. _Sapiensne ... deleta sit_: see Madv. _D.F._ p. 806, ed. 2,
+who is severe upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz), _non
+timeat? nec si patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit?_ which
+involves the use of _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_. I have followed the reading
+of Madv. in his _Em._, not the one he gives (after Davies) in _D.F._ _ne
+patria deleatur_, which Halm takes, as does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer
+the MSS. _Decreta_: some MSS. _durata_; Halm conj. _dictata_.
+_Mediocritates_: [Greek: mesopetes], as in Aristotle; cf. _T.D._ III. 11,
+22, 74. _Permotione_: [Greek: kinesei]. _Naturalem ... modum_: so _T.D._
+III. 74. _Crantoris_: sc. _librum_, for the omission of which see n. on I.
+13; add Quint. IX. 4, 18, where Spalding wished to read _in Herodoti_,
+supplying _libro_. _Aureolus ... libellus_: it is not often that two
+diminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is rather colloquial; cf.
+_T.D._ III. 2, _N.D._ III. 43, also for _aureolus_ 119 _flumen aureum_.
+_Panaetius_: he had addressed to Tubero a work _de dolore_; see _D.F._ IV.
+23. _Cotem_: _T.D._ IV. 43, 48, Seneca _De Ira_ III. 3, where the saying is
+attributed to Aristotle (_iram calcar esse virtutis_). _Dicebant_: for the
+repetition of this word cf. 146, I. 33.
+
+Sec.136. _Sunt enim Socratica_: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is
+affirmed in _Parad._ 4, _T.D._ III. 10. _Mirabilia_: Cic. generally
+translates [Greek: paradoxa] by _admirabilia_ as in _D.F._ IV. 74, or
+_admiranda_, under which title he seems to have published a work different
+from the _Paradoxa_, which we possess: see Bait., and Halm's ed. of the
+Phil. works (1861), p. 994. _Quasi_: = almost, [Greek: hos epos eipein].
+_Voltis_: cf. the Antiochean opinion in I. 18, 22. _Solos reges_: for all
+this see Zeller 253 sq. _Solos divites_: [Greek: hoti monos ho sophos
+plousios], _Parad._ VI. _Liberum_: _Parad._ V. [Greek: hoti monos ho sophos
+eleutheros kai pas aphron doulos]. _Furiosus_: _Parad._ IV. [Greek: hoti
+pas aphron mainetai].
+
+Sec.137. _Tam sunt defendenda_: cf. 8, 120. _Bono modo_: a colloquial and
+Plautine expression; see Forc. _Ad senatum starent_: "were in waiting on
+the senate;" cf. such phrases as _stare ad cyathum_, etc. _Carneade_: the
+vocative is _Carneades_ in _De Div._ I. 23. _Huic Stoico_: i.e. _Diogeni_;
+cf. _D.F._ II. 24. Halm brackets _Stoico_, and after him Bait. _Sequi
+volebat_: "professed to follow;" cf. _D.F._ V. 13 _Strato physicum se
+voluit_ "gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:" also Madv. on
+_D.F._ II. 102. _Ille noster_: Dav. _vester_, as in 143 _noster Antiochus_.
+But in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf. 113.
+_Balbutiens_: "giving an uncertain sound;" cf. _De Div._ I. 5, _T.D._ V.
+75.
+
+Sec.138. _Mihi veremini_: cf. Caes. _Bell. Gall_. V. 9 _veritus navibus_. Halm
+and Bait. follow Christ's conj. _verenti_, removing the stop at _voltis_.
+_Opinationem_: the [Greek: oiesin] of Sext., e.g. _P.H._ III. 280. _Quod
+minime voltis_: cf. I. 18. _De finibus_: not "concerning," but "from among"
+the different _fines_; otherwise _fine_ would have been written. Cf. I. 4
+_si qui de nostris._ _Circumcidit et amputat_: these two verbs often come
+together, as in _D.F._ I. 44; cf. also _D.F._ III. 31. _Si vacemus omni
+molestia_: which Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure. _Cum honestate_:
+Callipho in 131. _Prima naturae commoda_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ IV. 59, V.
+58 confuses the Stoic [Greek: prota kata physin] with [Greek: ta tou
+somatos agatha kai ta ektos] of the Peripatetics, for which see I. 19. More
+on the subject in Madvig's fourth Excursus to the _D.F._ _Relinquit_:
+Orelli _relinqui_ against the MSS.
+
+Sec.139. _Polemonis ... finibus_: all these were composite _fines_. _Adhuc_: I
+need scarcely point out that this goes with _habeo_ and not with
+_probabilius_; _adhuc_ for _etiam_ with the comparative does not occur till
+the silver writers. _Labor eo_: cf. Horace's _nunc in Aristippi furtim
+praecepta relabor_, also _D.F._ V. 6 _rapior illuc: revocat autem
+Antiochus_. _Reprehendit manu_: _M.D.F._ II. 3. _Pecudum_: I. 6, _Parad._
+14 _voluptatem esse summum bonum, quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non
+hominum_; similar expressions occur with a reference to Epicurus in _De
+Off._ I. 105, _Lael._ 20, 32. _T.D._ V. 73, _D.F._ II. 18; cf. also
+Aristoph. _Plut._ 922 [Greek: probatiou bion legeis] and [Greek: boskematon
+bios] in Aristotle. The meaning of _pecus_ is well shown in _T.D._ I. 69.
+_Iungit deo_: Zeller 176 sq. _Animum solum_: the same criticism is applied
+to Zeno's _finis_ in _D.F._ IV. 17, 25. _Ut ... sequar_: for the repeated
+_ut_ see _D.F._ V. 10, Madv. _Gram._ 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second
+_ut_ with Lamb. _Carneades ... defensitabat_: this is quite a different
+view from that in 131; yet another of Carneades is given in _T.D._ V. 83.
+_Istum finem_: MSS. _ipsum_; the two words are often confused, as in I. 2.
+_Ipsa veritas_: MSS. _severitas_, a frequent error; cf. _In Verr. Act._ I.
+3, III. 162, _De Leg._ I. 4, also Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 55. _Obversetur_:
+Halm takes the conj. of Lamb., _adversetur_. The MSS. reading gives
+excellent sense; cf. _T.D._ II. 52 _obversentur honestae species viro_.
+Bait. follows Halm. _Tu ... copulabis_: this is the feigned expostulation
+of _veritas_ (cf. 34 _convicio veritatis_), for which style see 125.
+
+Sec.140. _Voluptas cum honestate_: this whole expression is in apposition to
+_par_, so that _cum_ must not be taken closely with _depugnet_; cf. Hor.
+_Sat._ I. 7, 19 _Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius_ (sc.
+_par_) _cum Bitho Bacchius_. _Si sequare, ruunt_: for constr. cf. I. 7.
+_Communitas_: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297. _Nulla potest nisi
+erit_: Madv. _D.F._ III. 70 "_in hac coniunctione--hoc fieri non potest
+nisi--fere semper coniunctivus subicitur praesentis--futuri et perfecti
+indicativus ponitur_." _Gratuita_: "disinterested." _Ne intellegi quidem_:
+n. on I. 7, cf. also _T.D._ V. 73, 119. _Gloriosum in vulgus_: cf. _D.F._
+II. 44 _populus cum illis facit_ (i.e. _Epicureis_). _Normam ... regulam_:
+n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 8. _Praescriptionem_: I. 23, n.
+
+Sec.141. _Adquiescis_: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads _adsciscis_,
+comparing 138. Add _D.F._ I. 23 (_sciscat et probet_), III. 17
+(_adsciscendas esse_), III. 70 (_adscisci et probari_) Bait. follows Halm.
+_Ratum ... fixum_: cf. 27 and n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 17. _Falso_: like
+_incognito_ in 133. _Nullo discrimine_: for this see the explanation of
+_nihil interesse_ in 40, n. _Iudicia_: [Greek: kriteria] as usual.
+
+    Sec.Sec.142--146. Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how Protagoras, the
+    Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (142). Does Antiochus follow
+    any of these? Why, he never even follows the _vetus Academia_, and
+    never stirs a step from Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot
+    agree about the very elements of their art (143). Why then, Lucullus,
+    do you rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling
+    them I do away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd
+    together, I will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them
+    are slaves, exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being
+    _sapiens_, know nothing whatever (144). This last point Zeno used to
+    illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any actual
+    _sapiens_ (145). Now as there is no knowledge there can be no art. How
+    would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this conclusion? They would prefer
+    mine, to which our ancestors bear testimony.
+
+Sec.142. _Venio iam_: Dialectic had been already dealt with in 91--98 here it
+is merely considered with a view to the choice of the supposed _sapiens_,
+as was Ethical Science in 129--141 and Physics in 116--128. With the
+enumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus gives
+in _A.M._ VII. 48 sq. _Protagorae_: R. and P. 132 sq. _Qui putet_: so MSS.,
+Halm and Bait. _putat_ after Lamb. Trans. "inasmuch as he thinks".
+_Permotiones intimas_: cf. 20 _tactus interior_, also 76. _Epicuri_: nn. on
+19, 79, 80. _Iudicium_: [Greek: kriterion] as usual. _Rerum notitiis_:
+[Greek: prolepsesi], Zeller 403 sq. _Constituit_: note the constr. with
+_in_, like _ponere in_. _Cogitationis_: cf. I. 30. Several MSS. have
+_cognitionis_, the two words are frequently confused. See Wesenberg _Fm._
+to _T.D._ III. p. 17, who says, _multo tamen saepius "cogitatio" pro
+"cognitio" substituitur quam contra_, also _M.D.F_ III. 21.
+
+Sec.143. _Ne maiorum quidem suorum_: sc. _aliquid probat_. For _maiorum_ cf.
+80. Here Plato is almost excluded from the so-called _vetus Academia_, cf.
+I. 33. _Libri_: titles of some are preserved in Diog. Laert. IV. 11--14.
+_Nihil politius_: cf. 119, n. _Pedem nusquam_: for the ellipse cf. 58, 116,
+_Pro Deiot._ 42 and _pedem latum_ in Plaut. _Abutimur_: this verb in the
+rhetorical writers means to use words in metaphorical or unnatural senses,
+see Quint. X. 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; "do we use the name
+Academic in a non natural fashion?" _Si dies est lucet_: a better trans of
+[Greek: ei phos estin, hemera estin] than was given in 96, where see n.
+_Aliter Philoni_: not Philo of Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of
+Diodorus the Megarian, mentioned also in 75. The dispute between Diodorus
+and Philo is mentioned in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 115--117 with the same purpose
+as here, see also Zeller 39. _Antipater_: the Stoic of Tarsus, who
+succeeded Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school. _Archidemus_:
+several times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as VII. 68, 84.
+_Opiniosissimi_: so the MSS. I cannot think that the word is wrong, though
+all edd. condemn it. Halm is certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory
+epithet such as _ingeniosissimi_ is necessary. I believe that the word
+_opiniosissimi_ (an adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was manufactured on
+the spur of the moment, in order to ridicule these two philosophers, who
+are playfully described as men full of _opinio_ or [Greek: doxa]--just the
+imputation which, as Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's
+_spinosissimi_ is ingenious, and if an em. were needed, would not be so
+utterly improbable as Halm thinks.
+
+Sec.144. _In contionem vocas_: a retort, having reference to 14, cf. also 63,
+72. For these _contiones_ see Lange, _Romische Alterthumer_ II. 663, ed 2.
+They were called by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of
+whom had the right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under
+fewer restrictions than the right of the others. _Occludi tabernas_ in
+order of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this see
+Liv. III. 27, IV. 31, IX. 7, and compare the cry "to your tents, O Israel"
+in the Bible. _Artificia_: n. on 30. _Tolli_: n. on 26. _Ut opifices
+concitentur_: cf. _Pro Flacc._ 18 _opifices et tabernarios quid neqoti est
+concitare?_ _Expromam_: Cic. was probably thinking of the use to which he
+himself had put these Stoic paradoxes in _Pro Murena_ 61, a use of which he
+half confesses himself ashamed in _D.F._ IV. 74. _Exsules_ etc.: 136.
+
+Sec.145. _Scire negatis_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 153, who says that even
+[Greek: katalepsis] when it arises in the mind of a [Greek: phaulos] is
+mere [Greek: doxa] and not [Greek: episteme]; also _P.H._ II. 83, where it
+is said that the [Greek: phaulos] is capable of [Greek: to alethes] but not
+of [Greek: aletheia], which the [Greek: sophos] alone has. _Visum ...
+adsensus_: the Stoics as we saw (II. 38, etc.) analysed sensations into two
+parts; with the Academic and other schools each sensation was an ultimate
+unanalysable unit, a [Greek: psilon pathos]. For this symbolic action of
+Zeno cf. _D.F._ II. 18, _Orat._ 113, Sextus _A.M._ II. 7, Quint. II. 20, 7,
+Zeller 84. _Contraxerat_: so Halm who qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XI. 26, 94
+_digitum contrahens aut remittens_; Orelli _construxerat_; MSS. mostly
+_contexerat_. _Quod ante non fuerat_: [Greek: katalambanein] however is
+frequent in Plato in the sense "to seize firmly with the mind."
+_Adverterat_: the best MSS. give merely _adverat_, but on the margin
+_admoverat_ which Halm takes, and after him Bait.; one good MS. has
+_adverterat_. _Ne ipsi quidem_: even Socrates, Antisthenes and Diogenes
+were not [Greek: sophoi] according to the Stoics, but merely were [Greek:
+en prokopei]; see Diog. VII. 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut. _Sto. Rep._ 1056
+(qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli) [Greek: esti de outos] (i.e. [Greek:
+ho sophos]) [Greek: oudamou ges oude gegone]. _Nec tu_: sc. _scis_; Goer.
+has a strange note here.
+
+Sec.146. _Illa_: cf. _illa invidiosa_ above (144). _Dicebas_: in 22. _Refero_:
+"retort," as in Ovid. _Metam._ I. 758 _pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici
+potuisse et non potuisse referri_; cf. also _par pari referre dicto_. _Ne
+nobis quidem_: "_nor_ would they be angry;" cf. n. on. I. 5. _Arbitrari_:
+the original meaning of this was "to be a bystander," or "to be an
+eye-witness," see Corssen I. 238. _Ea non ut_: MSS. have _ut ea non aut_.
+Halm reads _ut ea non_ merely, but I prefer the reading I have given
+because of Cicero's fondness for making the _ut_ follow closely on the
+negative: for this see Madv. _Gram._ 465 _b_, obs.
+
+Sec.147. _Obscuritate_: cf. I. 44, n. on I. 15. _Plus uno_: 115. _Iacere_: cf.
+79. _Plagas_: cf. n. on 112.
+
+Sec.148. _Ad patris revolvor sententiam_: for this see Introd. 50, and for the
+expression 18. _Opinaturum_: see 59, 67, 78, 112. _Intellegat se_: MSS.
+_intellegentes_, cf. n. on 132. _Qua re_: so Manut. for _per_ of MSS.
+[Greek: Epochen] _illam omnium rerum_: an odd expression; cf. _actio rerum_
+in 62. _Non probans_: so Madv. _Em._ 204 for MSS. _comprobans_. Dav. conj.
+_improbans_ and is followed by Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is
+wrong. The difficulty is essentially the same as that involved in 104,
+which should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a theoretical
+dogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that _assent_ (meaning absolute
+assent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma Catulus might well
+describe himself as formally approving (_comprobans_). The _practice_ is to
+give assent (meaning modified assent). There is the same contrast in 104
+between _placere_ and _tenere_. I may note that the word _alteri_ (cf.
+_altero_ in 104) need not imply that the dogma and the practice are
+irreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably confirmed
+edd. in their introduction of the negative. _Nec eam admodum_: cf. _non
+repugnarem_ in 112. _Tollendum_: many edd. have gone far astray in
+interpreting this passage. The word is used with a double reference to
+_adsensus_ and _ancora_; in the first way we have had _tollere_ used a
+score of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes.
+_Bell. Gall._ IV. 23, _Bell. Civ._ I. 31, where _tollere_ is used of
+weighing anchor, and Varro _De Re Rust._ III. 17, 1, where it occurs in the
+sense "to get on," "to proceed," without any reference to the sea. (The
+exx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe and this alone is referred to
+in _Ad Att._ XIII. 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried at first
+to manage a joke by using the word _inhibendum_, which had also a nautical
+signification, but finding that he had mistaken the meaning of the word,
+substituted _tollendum_.
+
+[1] _De Leg._ II. Sec.3.
+
+[2] Cf. _De Or._ II. Sec.1 with II. Sec.5.
+
+[3] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut
+philosophus probabatur.
+
+[4] _N.D._ I. Sec.93, Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius.
+
+[5] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1.
+
+[6] _Brutus_, Sec.309.
+
+[7] _Ad Att._ II. 20, Sec.6.
+
+[8] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 16. _T.D._ V. Sec.113. _Acad._ II. Sec.115.
+
+[9] _Brutus_, Sec.306.
+
+[10] _Ibid._
+
+[11] _Rep._ I. Sec.7. _T.D._ V. Sec.5. _De Off._ II. Sec.Sec.3,4. _De Fato_, Sec.2.
+
+[12] Cf. _Brutus_, Sec.Sec.312, 322.
+
+[13] Cf. _Brutus_, Sec.Sec.312, 314, 316.
+
+[14] _Brutus_, Sec.315.
+
+[15] _N.D._ I. Sec.59.
+
+[16] VII. I. Sec.35.
+
+[17] Cf. _N.D._ I. Sec.93 with _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, Sec.1.
+
+[18] _Ac._ I. Sec.46.
+
+[19] _D.F._ V. Sec.3.
+
+[20] _D.F._ I. Sec.16.
+
+[21] _D.F._ V. Sec.6, etc.
+
+[22] _D.F._ V. Sec.8.
+
+[23] _Ac._ II. Sec.4.
+
+[24] _Ib._ Sec.69.
+
+[25] _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, Sec.5.
+
+[26] _Ac._ II. Sec.113.
+
+[27] _Ac._ II. Sec.113. _De Leg._ I. Sec.54.
+
+[28] II. Sec.12.
+
+[29] _Brutus_, Sec.316.
+
+[30] _Hortensius_, fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe.
+
+[31] _T.D._ II. Sec.61.
+
+[32] _De Div._ I. Sec.130.
+
+[33] _D.F._ I. Sec.6.
+
+[34] _Ad Att._ I. 10 and 11.
+
+[35] _Ibid._ II. 1, Sec.3. _N.D._ I. Sec.6.
+
+[36] _Ad Att._ II. 2.
+
+[37] _Ibid._ I. 20. Cf. II. 1, Sec.12.
+
+[38] II. 6.
+
+[39] _Ad Att._ II. 7 and 16.
+
+[40] _Ibid._ II. 6, Sec.2.
+
+[41] Cf. _Ad Att._ IV. 11 with IV. 8 a.
+
+[42] _Ibid._ IV. 10.
+
+[43] _Ibid._ IV. 16, Sec.2.
+
+[44] _Ibid._ IV. 16 c, Sec.10, ed. Nobbe.
+
+[45] _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 14.
+
+[46] _Ad Qu. Fr._ III. 5 and 6.
+
+[47] Sec.332.
+
+[48] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1. _Ad Att._ V. 11, Sec.6.
+
+[49] _Ad Att._ V. 10, Sec.5.
+
+[50] _De Off._ I. Sec.1.
+
+[51] _Tim._ c. 1.
+
+[52] Cf. _Tim._ c. 1 with _De Div._ I. Sec.5. _Brutus_, Sec.250.
+
+[53] _Ad Att._ VI. 1, Sec.26.
+
+[54] _Ibid._ VI. 2, Sec.3.
+
+[55] _Ibid._ VI. 6, Sec.2.
+
+[56] _Ibid._ VI. 7, Sec.2. _Ad Fam._ II. 17, Sec.1.
+
+[57] _T.D._ V. Sec.22.
+
+[58] _Ad Att._ VII. 1, Sec.1.
+
+[59] _Ibid._ VII. 3, VIII. 11.
+
+[60] _Ad Att._ X. 8, Sec.6.
+
+[61] _Ibid._ VIII. 2, Sec.4.
+
+[62] [Greek: peri homonoias], _Ad Att._ IX. 9, Sec.2, etc.
+
+[63] _Ibid._ IX. 4, Sec.2; 9, Sec.1.
+
+[64] _Ibid._ IX. 10, Sec.2.
+
+[65] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1.
+
+[66] _Ibid._ IX. 3.
+
+[67] _Ibid._ IV. 3 and 4.
+
+[68] _De Rep._ I. Sec.7. _T.D._ V. Sec.5, etc.
+
+[69] Cf. _N.D._ I. Sec.6.
+
+[70] Esp. I. Sec.Sec.26, 37.
+
+[71] Cf. _Ac._ II. Sec.29.
+
+[72] _Ac._ II. Sec.70.
+
+[73] _De Div._ II. Sec.1. _Ac._ I. Sec.45, etc.
+
+[74] _N.D._ I. Sec.1.
+
+[75] Cf. esp. _N.D._ I. Sec.5. _T.D._ II. Sec.5.
+
+[76] _De Div._ II. Sec.1. _N.D._ I. Sec.7, etc.
+
+[77] _T.D._ II. Sec.4.
+
+[78] _N.D._ I. Sec.10.
+
+[79] Cf. _Ac._ II. Sec.8. _N.D._ I. Sec.Sec.10, 66.
+
+[80] _T.D._ II. Sec.9.
+
+[81] _N.D._ I. Sec.10.
+
+[82] _Ibid._ I. Sec.17. _Ac._ II. Sec.Sec.120, 137.
+
+[83] _T.D._ V. Sec.33.
+
+[84] _Ac._ II. Sec.121.
+
+[85] _T.D._ V. Sec.82, _libas ex omnibus_.
+
+[86] _Ac._ II. Sec.143.
+
+[87] _T.D._ V. Sec.11.
+
+[88] _Ac._ II. Sec.10.
+
+[89] _N.D._ I. Sec.12.
+
+[90] _Parad._ Sec.2. _De Fato_, Sec.3. _T.D._ I. Sec.7. _De Off._ I. Sec.3.
+
+[91] _D.F._ IV. Sec.5.
+
+[92] _Paradoxa_, Sec.2.
+
+[93] _T.D._ I. Sec.55. _De Div._ II. Sec.62.
+
+[94] _T.D._ V. Sec.11. _D.F._ II. Sec.Sec.1 and 2, etc.
+
+[95] Sec.13.
+
+[96] Cf. esp. _N.D._ i. Sec.6. _Ac._ ii. Sec.Sec.11 and 17.
+
+[97] _De Leg._ I. Sec.39.
+
+[98] _Ibid._ I. Sec.Sec.55, 56.
+
+[99] _N.D._ I. Sec.4.
+
+[100] _T.D._ IV. Sec.53.
+
+[101] Cf. _De Off._ III. Sec.20.
+
+[102] _T.D._ V. Sec.Sec.21-31, esp. Sec.23.
+
+[103] _Ibid._ V. Sec.75.
+
+[104] _De Off._ II. Sec.35.
+
+[105] _T.D._ V. Sec.34.
+
+[106] _Ac._ I. Sec.16.
+
+[107] _Paradoxa_, Sec.4. _Ac._ II. Sec.Sec.136, 137. _T.D._ III. Sec.10.
+
+[108] _Ac._ II. Sec.135.
+
+[109] See esp. _N.D._ I. Sec.Sec.3, 4.
+
+[110] _Ibid._, also _T.D._ V. Sec.83.
+
+[111] Grote's _Aristotle_, vol. I. ch. 11.
+
+[112] _T.D._ IV. Sec.9. _D.F._ III. Sec.41.
+
+[113] I. Sec.6.
+
+[114] _T.D._ IV. Sec.7.
+
+[115] _Ibid._ IV. Sec.7. Cf. _D.F._ II. Sec.44, _populus cum illis facit_.
+
+[116] _Ac._ I. Sec.6. _T.D._ IV. 6, 7; II. Sec.7; III. Sec.33. _D.F._ III. Sec.40.
+
+[117] _T.D._ IV. Sec.3.
+
+[118] _D.F._ I. Sec.Sec.4-6. _Ac._ I. Sec.10. _D.F._ III. Sec.5.
+
+[119] _De Div._ I. Sec.Sec.4, 5.
+
+[120] _D.F._ III. Sec.5. _N.D._ I. Sec.8. _T.D._ III. Sec.Sec.10, 16.
+
+[121] _T.D._ I. Sec.5.
+
+[122] _T.D._ II. Sec.5.
+
+[123] _De Div._ II. Sec.1. _De Off._ II. Sec.4.
+
+[124] _De Div._ II. Sec.6. _De Off._ II. Sec.2.
+
+[125] See esp. _De Consolatione_, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe. _T.D._ V. Sec.5. _Ac._
+I. Sec.11.
+
+[126] _N.D._ I. Sec.6.
+
+[127] _T.D._ II. Sec.Sec.1, 4. _De Off._ II. Sec.3. _D.F._ I. Sec.1.
+
+[128] _T.D._ II. Sec.1. _D.F._ I. Sec.Sec.1, 3.
+
+[129] _D.F._ I. Sec.Sec.1, 11.
+
+[130] _De Div._ II. Sec.5. _De Off._ II. Sec.2. _T.D._ IV. Sec.1.
+
+[131] _De Div._ II. Sec.4.
+
+[132] _N.D._ I. Sec.9. _T.D._ II. Sec.1.
+
+[133] _De Div._ II. Sec.4.
+
+[134] _Ad Att._ XII. 19, Sec.1.
+
+[135] _Ibid._ XII. 14, Sec.3.
+
+[136] _Ibid._ XII. 15, 16.
+
+[137] _Ibid._ XII. 21, Sec.5.
+
+[138] _Ibid._ XII. 23, Sec.2.
+
+[139] _Ut scias me ita dolere ut non iaceam._
+
+[140] _De Or._ III. Sec.109.
+
+[141] _Ad Att._ XII. 28, Sec.2.
+
+[142] Cf. esp. _Ad Att._ XII. 40, Sec.2 with 38, Sec.3.
+
+[143] _Ibid._ XII. 40, Sec.2.
+
+[144] _Ibid._ XII. 40, Sec.5.
+
+[145] _Ibid._ XIII. 26.
+
+[146] _Ibid._ XII. 41, Sec.1, also 42, 43; XIII. 26.
+
+[147] _Ibid._ XII. 46.
+
+[148] _Ad Att._ XII. 45, Sec.1.
+
+[149] _Ueber Cicero's Akademika_, p. 4.
+
+[150] Cf. _Ad Att._ XII. 12, Sec.2, where there is a distinct mention of the
+first two books.
+
+[151] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, Sec.3.
+
+[152] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, Sec.4.
+
+[153] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, Sec.Sec.4, 5; 22, Sec.3.
+
+[154] II. Sec.2.
+
+[155] _De Fin._ Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2.
+
+[156] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, Sec.3; 16, Sec.1.
+
+[157] _Ibid._ XVI. 3, Sec.1.
+
+[158] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, Sec.4.
+
+[159] _Ac._ II. Sec.61.
+
+[160] _D.F._ I. Sec.2.
+
+[161] _T.D._ II. Sec.4. _De Div._ II. Sec.1.
+
+[162] Cf. Krische, p. 5.
+
+[163] _Ac._ II. Sec.61.
+
+[164] _Ad Att._ XIII. 5, Sec.1.
+
+[165] _Ibid._ XIII. 32, Sec.3.
+
+[166] _Ad Att._ XIII. 33, Sec.4.
+
+[167] _Ibid_. XIII. II. Sec.1.
+
+[168] _Ibid_. XII. 42.
+
+[169] _Ibid_. XIII. 16, Sec.1.
+
+[170] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, Sec.3.
+
+[171] _Ibid_. IV. 16a, Sec.2.
+
+[172] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, Sec.3; also IV. 16a, Sec.2.
+
+[173] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, Sec.3.
+
+[174] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, Sec.4.
+
+[175] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, Sec.3.
+
+[176] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, Sec.4.
+
+[177] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, Sec.3; 19, Sec.4; 16, Sec.1.
+
+[178] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, Sec.3.
+
+[179] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, Sec.1.
+
+[180] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, Sec.5.
+
+[181] Cf. _Ibid._ XIII. 14, Sec.3; 16, Sec.2; 18; 19, Sec.5.
+
+[182] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, Sec.5.
+
+[183] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, Sec.3.
+
+[184] _Ad Att._ XIII. 24.
+
+[185] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, Sec.1; 18.
+
+[186] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, Sec.1; 18; 19, Sec.4.
+
+[187] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, Sec.3. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates
+Schuetz assigns to these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition
+of the _Academica_ in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13.
+
+[188] _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, Sec.1.
+
+[189] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, Sec.5.
+
+[190] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, Sec.3.
+
+[191] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, Sec.3.
+
+[192] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, Sec.3.
+
+[193] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, Sec.4.
+
+[194] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, Sec.5.
+
+[195] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, Sec.3.
+
+[196] _Ibid._ XIII. 24.
+
+[197] _Ibid._ XIII. 35, 36, Sec.2.
+
+[198] _Ibid._ XIII. 38, Sec.1.
+
+[199] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, Sec.Sec.3, 4.
+
+[200] _T.D._ II. Sec.4. Cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ III. 6, Sec.64.
+
+[201] _Ad Att._ XVI. 6, Sec.4. _N.D._ I. Sec.11. _De Div._ II. Sec.1.
+
+[202] _De Off._ II. Sec.8, _Timaeus_, c. 1. _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, Sec.1; 19, Sec.5.
+
+[203] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12; 16; 13; 19.
+
+[204] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, Sec.4. _T.D._ II. Sec.4. _N.D._ I. Sec.11. _De Div._ II. Sec.1.
+
+[205] _Nat. Hist._ XXXI. c. 2.
+
+[206] _Inst. Or._ III. 6, Sec.64.
+
+[207] Plut. _Lucullus_, c. 42.
+
+[208] Sec.Sec.12, 18, 148.
+
+[209] Cf. _Att._ XIII. 19, Sec.4.
+
+[210] _Lucullus_, Sec.12.
+
+[211] _Ad Att._ XIII. 16, Sec.1.
+
+[212] Lactant. _Inst._ VI 2.
+
+[213] Cf. esp. _De Off._ I. Sec.133 with _Brutus_, Sec.Sec.133, 134.
+
+[214] Esp. _Pro Lege Manilia_, Sec.51.
+
+[215] _Brutus_, Sec.222.
+
+[216] _In Verrem_, II. 3, Sec.210.
+
+[217] _Pro Lege Manilia_, Sec.59.
+
+[218] _Pro Sestio_, Sec.122.
+
+[219] _Pro Sestio_, Sec.101.
+
+[220] _Philipp._ II. Sec.12.
+
+[221] _Ad Att._ II. 24, Sec.4.
+
+[222] _Pis._ Sec.6. _Pro Sestio_, Sec.121. _Pro Domo_, Sec.113. _Post Reditum in
+Senatu_, Sec.9. _Philipp._ II. Sec.12.
+
+[223] _Ad Fam._ IX. 15, Sec.3.
+
+[224] Cf. _Post Reditum in Senatu_, Sec.9. _Pro Domo_, Sec.113.
+
+[225] _Pro Archia_, Sec.Sec.6, 28.
+
+[226] Cf. _Ac._ II. Sec.9 with Sec.80.
+
+[227] Sec.62.
+
+[228] _Pro Plancio_, Sec.12. _Pro Murena_, Sec.36. _Pro Rabirio_, Sec.26. _Pro
+Cornelia_ II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe.
+
+[229] _T.D._ V. Sec.56. Cf. _De Or._ III. Sec.9. _N.D._ III. Sec.80.
+
+[230] Cf. esp. III. Sec.173.
+
+[231] _Ibid._ II. Sec.28.
+
+[232] _Ibid._ II. Sec.Sec.13, 20, 21.
+
+[233] _Ibid._ II. Sec.51.
+
+[234] Cf. _ibid._ II. Sec.74 with III. Sec.127.
+
+[235] Cf. II. Sec.152 with III. Sec.187.
+
+[236] _Ibid._ II. Sec.154.
+
+[237] _Brutus_, Sec.Sec.132, 133, 134, 259. _De Or._ III. Sec.29.
+
+[238] _Brutus_, Sec.132.
+
+[239] _De Or._ II. Sec.244. _N.D._ I. Sec.79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.
+
+[240] _De Or._ II. Sec.155.
+
+[241] _Ibid._ III. Sec.194.
+
+[242] Cf. _De Or._ II. Sec.68 with III. Sec.Sec.182, 187.
+
+[243] _De Or._ I. Sec.82 sq.; II. Sec.360.
+
+[244] _Ibid._ I. Sec.45; II. Sec.365; III. Sec.Sec.68, 75.
+
+[245] Sec.12, _commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni_.
+
+[246] Cf. _De Or._ III. Sec.110.
+
+[247] _Ac._ II. Sec.148.
+
+[248] Cf. _Ac._ II. Sec.11.
+
+[249] _Ibid._
+
+[250] _Ibid._ Sec.Sec.12, 18, with my notes.
+
+[251] _Ac._ II. Sec.12: _ista quae heri defensa sunt_ compared with the words
+_ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus_.
+
+[252] See below.
+
+[253] _Ac._ II. Sec.Sec.33--36 inclusive; Sec.54.
+
+[254] _Ac._ II. Sec.28.
+
+[255] Cf. _Ac._ II. Sec.Sec.59, 67, 78, 112, 148, with my notes.
+
+[256] _Ibid._ II. Sec.10.
+
+[257] _Ibid._ II. Sec.28.
+
+[258] Cf. II. Sec.61 with the fragments of the _Hortensius_; also _T.D._ II.
+Sec.4; III. Sec.6; _D.F._ I. Sec.2.
+
+[259] Lactant. III. 16.
+
+[260] Cf. _Ac._ II. Sec.10.
+
+[261] _Ib._ II. Sec.61.
+
+[262] Sec.Sec.44--46.
+
+[263] Sec.13.
+
+[264] Cf. II. Sec.14 with I. Sec.44, and II. Sec.Sec.55, 56.
+
+[265] II. Sec.Sec.17, 18, 22.
+
+[266] Cf. II. Sec.31 with I. Sec.45.
+
+[267] II. Sec.Sec.17, 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 54, 59.
+
+[268] II. Sec.79.
+
+[269] Cf. the words _tam multa_ in II. Sec.79.
+
+[270] See II. Sec.42, where there is a reference to the "_hesternus sermo_."
+
+[271] II. Sec.10.
+
+[272] Cf. II. Sec.10: _id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut tota fere
+quaestio tractata videatur_.
+
+[273] What these were will appear from my notes on the _Lucullus_.
+
+[274] II. Sec.12.
+
+[275] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8.
+
+[276] Cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 25, Sec.3: _Ad Brutum transeamus_.
+
+[277] This is not, as Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy
+after Hortensius' death. That lay at Puteoli: see _Ad Att._ VII. 3, Sec.9.
+
+[278] II. Sec.9.
+
+[279] Cf. II. Sec.61.
+
+[280] II. Sec.80: _O praeclarum prospectum_!
+
+[281] Cf. II. Sec.9 with Sec.128 (_signum illud_), also Sec.Sec.80, 81, 100, 105, 125.
+
+[282] II. Sec.115.
+
+[283] II. Sec.63.
+
+[284] II. Sec.Sec.147, 148.
+
+[285] II. Sec.135.
+
+[286] Cf. II. Sec.Sec.11, 12 with the words _quae erant contra_ [Greek:
+akatalepsian] _praeclare collecta ab Antiocho_: _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, Sec.3.
+
+[287] Varro, _De Re Rust._ III. 17.
+
+[288] II. Sec.11.
+
+[289] _Paradoxa_, Sec.1. _D.F._ III. Sec.8. _Brutus_, Sec.119.
+
+[290] _Ac._ I. Sec.12. _D.F._ V. Sec.8.
+
+[291] Cf. II. Sec.80.
+
+[292] Cf. Aug. _Adv. Acad._ III. Sec.35. Nonius, sub v. _exultare_.
+
+[293] Cf. the word _nuper_ in Sec.1.
+
+[294] Sec.11.
+
+[295] Sec.Sec.3, 18.
+
+[296] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8, Sec.1.
+
+[297] _Ad Att._ II. 25, Sec.1.
+
+[298] _Ibid_. III. 8, Sec.3.
+
+[299] _Ibid_. III. 15, Sec.3; 18, Sec.1.
+
+[300] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1--8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro
+preserved in our collections.
+
+[301] Above, pp. xxxvii--xlii.
+
+[302] _De Civ. Dei_, XIX. cc. 1--3.
+
+[303] See Madvig, _De Fin._ ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50.
+Brueckner, _Leben des Cicero_, I. p. 655, follows Mueller.
+
+[304] Cf. Krische, p. 58.
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #14970 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/14970)