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+Title:  Human Nature and Other Sermons
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+Author:  Joseph Butler
+
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+This etext was prepared from the 1887 Cassell & Co. edition by
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+
+
+HUMAN NATURE AND OTHER SERMONS
+
+by Joseph Butler
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+
+Joseph Butler was born in 1692, youngest of eight children of a
+linendraper at Wantage, in Berkshire.  His father was a
+Presbyterian, and after education at the Wantage Free Grammar School
+Joseph Butler was sent to be educated for the Presbyterian ministry
+in a training academy at Gloucester, which was afterwards removed to
+Tewkesbury.  There he had a friend and comrade, Secker, who
+afterwards became Archbishop of Canterbury.  Butler and Secker
+inquired actively, and there was foreshadowing of his future in the
+fact that in 1713, at the age of twenty-one, Butler was engaged in
+anonymous discussion with Samuel Clarke upon his book on the a
+priori demonstration of the Divine Existence and Attributes.
+
+When the time drew near for call to the ministry, Butler, like his
+friend Secker, had reasoned himself into accordance with the
+teaching of the Church of England.  Butler's father did not oppose
+his strong desire to enter the Church, and he was entered in 1714 at
+Oriel College, Oxford.  At college a strong friendship was
+established between Butler and a fellow-student, Edward Talbot,
+whose father was a Bishop, formerly of Oxford and Salisbury, then of
+Durham.  Through Talbot's influence Butler obtained in 1718 the
+office of Preacher in the Rolls Chapel, which he held for the next
+eight years.  In 1722 Talbot died, and on his death-bed urged his
+father on behalf of his friend Butler.  The Bishop accordingly
+presented Joseph Butler to the living of Houghton-le-Spring.  But it
+was found that costs of dilapidations were beyond his means at
+Houghton, and Butler had a dangerous regard for building works.  He
+was preferred two years afterwards to the living of Stanhope, which
+then became vacant, and which yielded a substantial income.  Butler
+sought nothing for himself, his simplicity of character, real worth,
+and rare intellectual power, secured him friends, and the love of
+two of them--Talbot first, and afterwards Secker, who made his own
+way in the Church, and became strong enough to put his friend as
+well as himself in the way of worldly advancement, secured for
+Butler all the patronage he had, until the Queen also became his
+active friend.
+
+Joseph Butler was seven years at Stanhope, quietly devoted to his
+parish duties, preaching, studying, and writing his "Analogy of
+Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of
+Nature."  In 1727, while still at Stanhope, he was appointed to a
+stall in Durham Cathedral.  Secker, having become chaplain to the
+Queen, encouraged her in admiration of Butler's sermons.  He told
+her that the author was not dead, but buried, and secured her active
+interest in his behalf.  From Talbot, who had become Lord
+Chancellor, Secker had no difficulty in obtaining for Butler a
+chaplaincy which exempted him from the necessity of residence at
+Stanhope.  Butler, in accepting it, stipulated for permission to
+live and work in his parish for six months in every year.  Next he
+was made chaplain to the King, and Rector of St. James's, upon which
+he gave up Stanhope.  In 1736 Queen Caroline appointed him her Clerk
+of the Closet, an office which gave Butler the duty of attendance
+upon her for two hours every evening.  In that year he published his
+"Analogy," of which the purpose was to meet, on its own ground, the
+scepticism of his day.  The Queen died in 1737, and, in accordance
+with the strong desire expressed in her last days, in 1738 Butler
+was made a Bishop.  But his Bishopric was Bristol, worth only 300 or
+400 pounds a year.  The King added the Deanery of St. Paul's, when
+that became vacant in 1740, and in 1750, towards the close of his
+life, Joseph Butler was translated to the Bishopric of Durham.  He
+died in 1752.
+
+No man could be less self-seeking.  He owed his rise in the Church
+wholly to the intellectual power and substantial worth of character
+that inspired strong friendship.  Seeing how little he sought
+worldly advancement for himself, while others were pressing and
+scrambling, Butler's friends used their opportunities of winning for
+him the advancement he deserved.  He was happiest in doing his work,
+of which a chief part was in his study, where he employed his
+philosophic mind in strengthening the foundations of religious
+faith.  Faith in God was attacked by men who claimed especially to
+be philosophers, and they were best met by the man who had, beyond
+all other divines of his day--some might not be afraid to add, of
+any day--the philosophic mind.
+
+H.M.
+
+
+
+HUMAN NATURE, AND OTHER SERMONS.
+
+
+
+SERMON I.
+UPON HUMAN NATURE.
+ROMANS xii. 4, 5.
+
+
+
+For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not
+the same office:  so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and
+every one members one of another.
+
+The Epistles in the New Testament have all of them a particular
+reference to the condition and usages of the Christian world at the
+time they were written.  Therefore as they cannot be thoroughly
+understood unless that condition and those usages are known and
+attended to, so, further, though they be known, yet if they be
+discontinued or changed, exhortations, precepts, and illustrations
+of things, which refer to such circumstances now ceased or altered,
+cannot at this time be urged in that manner and with that force
+which they were to the primitive Christians.  Thus the text now
+before us, in its first intent and design, relates to the decent
+management of those extraordinary gifts which were then in the
+Church, {1} but which are now totally ceased.  And even as to the
+allusion that "we are one body in Christ," though what the apostle
+here intends is equally true of Christians in all circumstances, and
+the consideration of it is plainly still an additional motive, over
+and above moral considerations, to the discharge of the several
+duties and offices of a Christian, yet it is manifest this allusion
+must have appeared with much greater force to those who, by the many
+difficulties they went through for the sake of their religion, were
+led to keep always in view the relation they stood in to their
+Saviour, who had undergone the same:  to those, who, from the
+idolatries of all around them, and their ill-treatment, were taught
+to consider themselves as not of the world in which they lived, but
+as a distinct society of themselves; with laws and ends, and
+principles of life and action, quite contrary to those which the
+world professed themselves at that time influenced by.  Hence the
+relation of a Christian was by them considered as nearer than that
+of affinity and blood; and they almost literally esteemed themselves
+as members one of another.
+
+It cannot, indeed, possibly be denied, that our being God's
+creatures, and virtue being the natural law we are born under, and
+the whole constitution of man being plainly adapted to it, are prior
+obligations to piety and virtue than the consideration that God sent
+his Son into the world to save it, and the motives which arise from
+the peculiar relation of Christians as members one of another under
+Christ our head.  However, though all this be allowed, as it
+expressly is by the inspired writers, yet it is manifest that
+Christians at the time of the Revelation, and immediately after,
+could not but insist mostly upon considerations of this latter kind.
+
+These observations show the original particular reference to the
+text, and the peculiar force with which the thing intended by the
+allusion in it must have been felt by the primitive Christian world.
+They likewise afford a reason for treating it at this time in a more
+general way.
+
+The relation which the several parts or members of the natural body
+have to each other and to the whole body is here compared to the
+relation which each particular person in society has to other
+particular persons and to the whole society; and the latter is
+intended to be illustrated by the former.  And if there be a
+likeness between these two relations, the consequence is obvious:
+that the latter shows us we were intended to do good to others, as
+the former shows us that the several members of the natural body
+were intended to be instruments of good to each other and to the
+whole body.  But as there is scarce any ground for a comparison
+between society and the mere material body, this without the mind
+being a dead unactive thing, much less can the comparison be carried
+to any length.  And since the apostle speaks of the several members
+as having distinct offices, which implies the mind, it cannot be
+thought an allowable liberty, instead of the BODY and ITS MEMBERS,
+to substitute the WHOLE NATURE of MAN, and ALL THE VARIETY OF
+INTERNAL PRINCIPLES WHICH BELONG TO IT.  And then the comparison
+will be between the nature of man as respecting self, and tending to
+private good, his own preservation and happiness; and the nature of
+man as having respect to society, and tending to promote public
+good, the happiness of that society.  These ends do indeed perfectly
+coincide; and to aim at public and private good are so far from
+being inconsistent that they mutually promote each other:  yet in
+the following discourse they must be considered as entirely
+distinct; otherwise the nature of man as tending to one, or as
+tending to the other, cannot be compared.  There can no comparison
+be made, without considering the things compared as distinct and
+different.
+
+From this review and comparison of the nature of man as respecting
+self and as respecting society, it will plainly appear that there
+are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that
+we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as
+that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and
+private good:  and that the same objections lie against one of these
+assertions as against the other.  For,
+
+First, there is a natural principle of BENEVOLENCE {2} in man, which
+is in some degree to SOCIETY what SELF-LOVE is to the INDIVIDUAL.
+And if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there
+be any such thing as compassion--for compassion is momentary love--
+if there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if
+there be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which
+is the good of another, this is itself benevolence, or the love of
+another.  Be it ever so short, be it in ever so low a degree, or
+ever so unhappily confined, it proves the assertion, and points out
+what we were designed for, as really as though it were in a higher
+degree and more extensive.  I must, however, remind you that though
+benevolence and self-love are different, though the former tends
+most directly to public good, and the latter to private, yet they
+are so perfectly coincident that the greatest satisfactions to
+ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and
+that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards
+society.  It may be added that their mutual coinciding, so that we
+can scarce promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we
+were made for both.
+
+Secondly, this will further appear, from observing that the SEVERAL
+PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS, which are distinct {3} both from
+benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute and lead us to
+PUBLIC GOOD as really as to PRIVATE.  It might be thought too minute
+and particular, and would carry us too great a length, to
+distinguish between and compare together the several passions or
+appetites distinct from benevolence, whose primary use and intention
+is the security and good of society, and the passions distinct from
+self-love, whose primary intention and design is the security and
+good of the individual. {4}  It is enough to the present argument
+that desire of esteem from others, contempt and esteem of them, love
+of society as distinct from affection to the good of it, indignation
+against successful vice--that these are public affections or
+passions, have an immediate respect to others, naturally lead us to
+regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of service to our
+fellow-creatures.  If any or all of these may be considered likewise
+as private affections, as tending to private good, this does not
+hinder them from being public affections too, or destroy the good
+influence of them upon society, and their tendency to public good.
+It may be added that as persons without any conviction from reason
+of the desirableness of life would yet of course preserve it merely
+from the appetite of hunger, so, by acting merely from regard
+(suppose) to reputation, without any consideration of the good of
+others, men often contribute to public good.  In both these
+instances they are plainly instruments in the hands of another, in
+the hands of Providence, to carry on ends--the preservation of the
+individual and good of society--which they themselves have not in
+their view or intention.  The sum is, men have various appetites,
+passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from self-
+love and from benevolence:  all of these have a tendency to promote
+both public and private good, and may be considered as respecting
+others and ourselves equally and in common; but some of them seem
+most immediately to respect others, or tend to public good; others
+of them most immediately to respect self, or tend to private good:
+as the former are not benevolence, so the latter are not self-love:
+neither sort are instances of our love either to ourselves or
+others, but only instances of our Maker's care and love both of the
+individual and the species, and proofs that He intended we should be
+instruments of good to each other, as well as that we should be so
+to ourselves.
+
+Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they
+distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions.  We
+are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon
+our own nature.  The mind can take a view of what passes within
+itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections as
+respecting such objects, and in such degrees; and of the several
+actions consequent thereupon.  In this survey it approves of one,
+disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither
+of these ways, but is quite indifferent.  This principle in man, by
+which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is
+conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word, though
+sometimes it is used so as to take in more.  And that this faculty
+tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and leads
+them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon.  Thus
+a parent has the affection of love to his children:  this leads him
+to take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them--the
+natural affection leads to this:  but the reflection that it is his
+proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right and
+commendable so to do--this, added to the affection, becomes a much
+more settled principle, and carries him on through more labour and
+difficulties for the sake of his children than he would undergo from
+that affection alone, if he thought it, and the cause of action it
+led to, either indifferent or criminal.  This indeed is impossible,
+to do that which is good and not to approve of it; for which reason
+they are frequently not considered as distinct, though they really
+are:  for men often approve of the action of others which they will
+not imitate, and likewise do that which they approve not.  It cannot
+possibly be denied that there is this principle of reflection or
+conscience in human nature.  Suppose a man to relieve an innocent
+person in great distress; suppose the same man afterwards, in the
+fury of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a person who had given
+no just cause of offence.  To aggravate the injury, add the
+circumstances of former friendship and obligation from the injured
+person; let the man who is supposed to have done these two different
+actions coolly reflect upon them afterwards, without regard to their
+consequences to himself:  to assert that any common man would be
+affected in the same way towards these different actions, that he
+would make no distinction between them, but approve or disapprove
+them equally, is too glaring a falsity to need being confuted.
+There is therefore this principle of reflection or conscience in
+mankind.  It is needless to compare the respect it has to private
+good with the respect it has to public; since it plainly tends as
+much to the latter as to the former, and is commonly thought to tend
+chiefly to the latter.  This faculty is now mentioned merely as
+another part in the inward frame of man, pointing out to us in some
+degree what we are intended for, and as what will naturally and of
+course have some influence.  The particular place assigned to it by
+nature, what authority it has, and how great influence it ought to
+have, shall be hereafter considered.
+
+From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of our public and
+private affections, of the courses of life they lead to, and of the
+principle of reflection or conscience as respecting each of them, it
+is as manifest that WE WERE MADE FOR SOCIETY, AND TO PROMOTE THE
+HAPPINESS OF IT, AS THAT WE WERE INTENDED to TAKE CARE OF OUR OWN
+LIFE AND HEALTH AND PRIVATE GOOD.
+
+And from this whole review must be given a different draught of
+human nature from what we are often presented with.  Mankind are by
+nature so closely united, there is such a correspondence between the
+inward sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is
+as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and
+love as much desired as any external goods; and in many particular
+cases persons are carried on to do good to others, as the end their
+affection tends to and rests in; and manifest that they find real
+satisfaction and enjoyment in this course of behaviour.  There is
+such a natural principle of attraction in man towards man that
+having trod the same tract of land, having breathed in the same
+climate, barely having been born in the same artificial district or
+division, becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances and
+familiarities many years after; for anything may serve the purpose.
+Thus relations merely nominal are sought and invented, not by
+governors, but by the lowest of the people, which are found
+sufficient to hold mankind together in little fraternities and
+copartnerships:  weak ties indeed, and what may afford fund enough
+for ridicule, if they are absurdly considered as the real principles
+of that union:  but they are in truth merely the occasions, as
+anything may be of anything, upon which our nature carries us on
+according to its own previous bent and bias; which occasions
+therefore would be nothing at all were there not this prior
+disposition and bias of nature.  Men are so much one body that in a
+peculiar manner they feel for each other shame, sudden danger,
+resentment, honour, prosperity, distress; one or another, or all of
+these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence, upon the
+occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence;
+each of these being distinct cements of society.  And therefore to
+have no restraint from, no regard to, others in our behaviour, is
+the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and
+independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to
+our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice.  And this is
+the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part, to have no
+natural respect to any other, or to the whole body.
+
+But, allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man dispositions
+and principles within which lead him to do evil to others, as well
+as to do good?  Whence come the many miseries else which men are the
+authors and instruments of to each other?"  These questions, so far
+as they relate to the foregoing discourse, may be answered by
+asking, Has not man also dispositions and principles within which
+lead him to do evil to himself, as well as good?  Whence come the
+many miseries else--sickness, pain, and death--which men are
+instruments and authors of to themselves?
+
+It may be thought more easy to answer one of these questions than
+the other, but the answer to both is really the same:  that mankind
+have ungoverned passions which they will gratify at any rate, as
+well to the injury of others as in contradiction to known private
+interest:  but that as there is no such thing as self-hatred, so
+neither is there any such thing as ill-will in one man towards
+another, emulation and resentment being away; whereas there is
+plainly benevolence or good-will:  there is no such thing as love of
+injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, but only eager
+desires after such and such external goods; which, according to a
+very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose to obtain
+by innocent means, if they were as easy and as effectual to their
+end:  that even emulation and resentment, by any one who will
+consider what these passions really are in nature, {5} will be found
+nothing to the purpose of this objection; and that the principles
+and passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self-
+love and benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to right
+behaviour with regard to others as well as himself, and only
+secondarily and accidentally to what is evil.  Thus, though men, to
+avoid the shame of one villainy, are sometimes guilty of a greater,
+yet it is easy to see that the original tendency of shame is to
+prevent the doing of shameful actions; and its leading men to
+conceal such actions when done is only in consequence of their being
+done; i.e., of the passion's not having answered its first end.
+
+If it be said that there are persons in the world who are in great
+measure without the natural affections towards their fellow-
+creatures, there are likewise instances of persons without the
+common natural affections to themselves.  But the nature of man is
+not to be judged of by either of these, but by what appears in the
+common world, in the bulk of mankind.
+
+I am afraid it would be thought very strange, if to confirm the
+truth of this account of human nature, and make out the justness of
+the foregoing comparison, it should be added that from what appears,
+men in fact as much and as often contradict that PART of their
+nature which respects SELF, and which leads them to their OWN
+PRIVATE good and happiness, as they contradict that PART of it which
+respects SOCIETY, and tends to PUBLIC good:  that there are as few
+persons who attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment which
+they might attain in the present world, as who do the greatest good
+to others which they might do; nay, that there are as few who can be
+said really and in earnest to aim at one as at the other.  Take a
+survey of mankind:  the world in general, the good and bad, almost
+without exception, equally are agreed that were religion out of the
+case, the happiness of the present life would consist in a manner
+wholly in riches, honours, sensual gratifications; insomuch that one
+scarce hears a reflection made upon prudence, life, conduct, but
+upon this supposition.  Yet, on the contrary, that persons in the
+greatest affluence of fortune are no happier than such as have only
+a competency; that the cares and disappointments of ambition for the
+most part far exceed the satisfactions of it; as also the miserable
+intervals of intemperance and excess, and the many untimely deaths
+occasioned by a dissolute course of life:  these things are all
+seen, acknowledged, by every one acknowledged; but are thought no
+objections against, though they expressly contradict, this universal
+principle--that the happiness of the present life consists in one or
+other of them.  Whence is all this absurdity and contradiction?  Is
+not the middle way obvious?  Can anything be more manifest than that
+the happiness of life consists in these possessed and enjoyed only
+to a certain degree; that to pursue them beyond this degree is
+always attended with more inconvenience than advantage to a man's
+self, and often with extreme misery and unhappiness?  Whence, then,
+I say, is all this absurdity and contradiction?  Is it really the
+result of consideration in mankind, how they may become most easy to
+themselves, most free from care, and enjoy the chief happiness
+attainable in this world?  Or is it not manifestly owing either to
+this, that they have not cool and reasonable concern enough for
+themselves to consider wherein their chief happiness in the present
+life consists; or else, if they do consider it, that they will not
+act conformably to what is the result of that consideration--i.e.,
+reasonable concern for themselves, or cool self-love, is prevailed
+over by passions and appetite?  So that from what appears there is
+no ground to assert that those principles in the nature of man,
+which most directly lead to promote the good of our fellow-
+creatures, are more generally or in a greater degree violated than
+those which most directly lead us to promote our own private good
+and happiness.
+
+The sum of the whole is plainly this:  The nature of man considered
+in his single capacity, and with respect only to the present world,
+is adapted and leads him to attain the greatest happiness he can for
+himself in the present world.  The nature of man considered in his
+public or social capacity leads him to right behaviour in society,
+to that course of life which we call virtue.  Men follow or obey
+their nature in both these capacities and respects to a certain
+degree, but not entirely:  their actions do not come up to the whole
+of what their nature leads them to in either of these capacities or
+respects:  and they often violate their nature in both; i.e., as
+they neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-creatures, to which
+their nature leads them, and are injurious, to which their nature is
+abhorrent, so there is a manifest negligence in men of their real
+happiness or interest in the present world, when that interest is
+inconsistent with a present gratification; for the sake of which
+they negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors and
+instruments of their own misery and ruin.  Thus they are as often
+unjust to themselves as to others, and for the most part are equally
+so to both by the same actions.
+
+
+
+SERMON II., III.
+UPON HUMAN NATURE.
+ROMANS ii. 14.
+
+
+
+For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the
+things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law
+unto themselves.
+
+As speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so likewise
+moral obligations may be shown by different methods.  If the real
+nature of any creature leads him and is adapted to such and such
+purposes only, or more than to any other, this is a reason to
+believe the Author of that nature intended it for those purposes.
+Thus there is no doubt the eye was intended for us to see with.  And
+the more complex any constitution is, and the greater variety of
+parts there are which thus tend to some one end, the stronger is the
+proof that such end was designed.  However, when the inward frame of
+man is considered as any guide in morals, the utmost caution must be
+used that none make peculiarities in their own temper, or anything
+which is the effect of particular customs, though observable in
+several, the standard of what is common to the species; and above
+all, that the highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that to
+which belongs the adjustment and correction of all other inward
+movements and affections; which principle will of course have some
+influence, but which being in nature supreme, as shall now be shown,
+ought to preside over and govern all the rest.  The difficulty of
+rightly observing the two former cautions; the appearance there is
+of some small diversity amongst mankind with respect to this
+faculty, with respect to their natural sense of moral good and evil;
+and the attention necessary to survey with any exactness what passes
+within, have occasioned that it is not so much agreed what is the
+standard of the internal nature of man as of his external form.
+Neither is this last exactly settled.  Yet we understand one another
+when we speak of the shape of a human body:  so likewise we do when
+we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far soever the
+standard is from being exact or precisely fixed.  There is therefore
+ground for an attempt of showing men to themselves, of showing them
+what course of life and behaviour their real nature points out and
+would lead them to.  Now obligations of virtue shown, and motives to
+the practice of it enforced, from a review of the nature of man, are
+to be considered as an appeal to each particular person's heart and
+natural conscience:  as the external senses are appealed to for the
+proof of things cognisable by them.  Since, then, our inward
+feelings, and the perceptions we receive from our external senses,
+are equally real, to argue from the former to life and conduct is as
+little liable to exception as to argue from the latter to absolute
+speculative truth.  A man can as little doubt whether his eyes were
+given him to see with as he can doubt of the truth of the science of
+optics, deduced from ocular experiments.  And allowing the inward
+feeling, shame, a man can as little doubt whether it was given him
+to prevent his doing shameful actions as he can doubt whether his
+eyes were given him to guide his steps.  And as to these inward
+feelings themselves, that they are real, that man has in his nature
+passions and affections, can no more be questioned than that he has
+external senses.  Neither can the former be wholly mistaken, though
+to a certain degree liable to greater mistakes than the latter.
+
+There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts,
+several principles in the heart of man, carry him to society, and to
+contribute to the happiness of it, in a sense and a manner in which
+no inward principle leads him to evil.  These principles,
+propensions, or instincts which lead him to do good are approved of
+by a certain faculty within, quite distinct from these propensions
+themselves.  All this hath been fully made out in the foregoing
+discourse.
+
+But it may be said, "What is all this, though true, to the purpose
+of virtue and religion? these require, not only that we do good to
+others when we are led this way, by benevolence or reflection
+happening to be stronger than other principles, passions, or
+appetites, but likewise that the WHOLE character be formed upon
+thought and reflection; that EVERY action be directed by some
+determinate rule, some other rule than the strength and prevalency
+of any principle or passion.  What sign is there in our nature (for
+the inquiry is only about what is to be collected from thence) that
+this was intended by its Author?  Or how does so various and fickle
+a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto?  It may indeed be
+absurd and unnatural for men to act without any reflection; nay,
+without regard to that particular kind of reflection which you call
+conscience, because this does belong to our nature.  For as there
+never was a man but who approved one place, prospect, building,
+before another, so it does not appear that there ever was a man who
+would not have approved an action of humanity rather than of
+cruelty; interest and passion being quite out of the case.  But
+interest and passion do come in, and are often too strong for and
+prevail over reflection and conscience.  Now as brutes have various
+instincts, by which they are carried on to the end the Author of
+their nature intended them for, is not man in the same condition--
+with this difference only, that to his instincts (i.e., appetites
+and passion) is added the principle of reflection or conscience?
+And as brutes act agreeably to their nature, in following that
+principle or particular instinct which for the present is strongest
+in them, does not man likewise act agreeably to his nature, or obey
+the law of his creation, by following that principle, be it passion
+or conscience, which for the present happens to be strongest in him?
+Thus different men are by their particular nature hurried on to
+pursue honour or riches or pleasure; there are also persons whose
+temper leads them in an uncommon degree to kindness, compassion,
+doing good to their fellow-creatures, as there are others who are
+given to suspend their judgment, to weigh and consider things, and
+to act upon thought and reflection.  Let every one, then, quietly
+follow his nature, as passion, reflection, appetite, the several
+parts of it, happen to be strongest; but let not the man of virtue
+take upon him to blame the ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute,
+since these equally with him obey and follow their nature.  Thus, as
+in some cases we follow our nature in doing the works CONTAINED IN
+THE LAW, so in other cases we follow nature in doing contrary."
+
+Now all this licentious talk entirely goes upon a supposition that
+men follow their nature in the same sense, in violating the known
+rules of justice and honesty for the sake of a present
+gratification, as they do in following those rules when they have no
+temptation to the contrary.  And if this were true, that could not
+be so which St. Paul asserts, that men are BY NATURE A LAW TO
+THEMSELVES.  If by following nature were meant only acting as we
+please, it would indeed be ridiculous to speak of nature as any
+guide in morals; nay, the very mention of deviating from nature
+would be absurd; and the mention of following it, when spoken by way
+of distinction, would absolutely have no meaning.  For did ever any
+one act otherwise than as he pleased?  And yet the ancients speak of
+deviating from nature as vice, and of following nature so much as a
+distinction, that according to them the perfection of virtue
+consists therein.  So that language itself should teach people
+another sense to the words FOLLOWING NATURE than barely acting as we
+please.  Let it, however, be observed that though the words HUMAN
+NATURE are to be explained, yet the real question of this discourse
+is not concerning the meaning of words, any other than as the
+explanation of them may be needful to make out and explain the
+assertion, that EVERY MAN IS NATURALLY A LAW to HIMSELF, that EVERY
+ONE MAY FIND WITHIN HIMSELF THE RULE OF RIGHT, AND OBLIGATIONS TO
+FOLLOW IT.  This St. Paul affirms in the words of the text, and this
+the foregoing objection really denies by seeming to allow it.  And
+the objection will be fully answered, and the text before us
+explained, by observing that NATURE is considered in different
+views, and the word used in different senses; and by showing in what
+view it is considered, and in what sense the word is used, when
+intended to express and signify that which is the guide of life,
+that by which men are a law to themselves.  I say, the explanation
+of the term will be sufficient, because from thence it will appear
+that in some senses of the word NATURE cannot be, but that in
+another sense it manifestly is, a law to us.
+
+I.  By nature is often meant no more than some principle in man,
+without regard either to the kind or degree of it.  Thus the passion
+of anger, and the affection of parents to their children, would be
+called equally NATURAL.  And as the same person hath often contrary
+principles, which at the same time draw contrary ways, he may by the
+same action both follow and contradict his nature in this sense of
+the word; he may follow one passion and contradict another.
+
+II.  NATURE is frequently spoken of as consisting in those passions
+which are strongest, and most influence the actions; which being
+vicious ones, mankind is in this sense naturally vicious, or vicious
+by nature.  Thus St. Paul says of the Gentiles, WHO WERE DEAD IN
+TRESPASSES AND SINS, AND WALKED ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT OF
+DISOBEDIENCE, THAT THEY WERE BY NATURE THE CHILDREN OF WRATH. {6}
+They could be no otherwise CHILDREN OF WRATH by nature than they
+were vicious by nature.
+
+Here, then, are two different senses of the word NATURE, in neither
+of which men can at all be said to be a law to themselves.  They are
+mentioned only to be excluded, to prevent their being confounded, as
+the latter is in the objection, with another sense of it, which is
+now to be inquired after and explained.
+
+III.  The apostle asserts that the Gentiles DO BY NATURE THE THINGS
+CONTAINED IN THE LAW.  Nature is indeed here put by way of
+distinction from revelation, but yet it is not a mere negative.  He
+intends to express more than that by which they DID NOT, that by
+which they DID, the works of the law; namely, by NATURE.  It is
+plain the meaning of the word is not the same in this passage as in
+the former, where it is spoken of as evil; for in this latter it is
+spoken of as good--as that by which they acted, or might have acted,
+virtuously.  What that is in man by which he is NATURALLY A LAW TO
+HIMSELF is explained in the following words:  Which show the work of
+the law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing
+witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing
+one another.  If there be a distinction to be made between the WORKS
+WRITTEN IN THEIR HEARTS, and the WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE, by the
+former must be meant the natural disposition to kindness and
+compassion to do what is of good report, to which this apostle often
+refers:  that part of the nature of man, treated of in the foregoing
+discourse, which with very little reflection and of course leads him
+to society, and by means of which he naturally acts a just and good
+part in it, unless other passions or interest lead him astray.  Yet
+since other passions, and regards to private interest, which lead us
+(though indirectly, yet they lead us) astray, are themselves in a
+degree equally natural, and often most prevalent, and since we have
+no method of seeing the particular degrees in which one or the other
+is placed in us by nature, it is plain the former, considered merely
+as natural, good and right as they are, can no more be a law to us
+than the latter.  But there is a superior principle of reflection or
+conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal
+principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which
+passes judgement upon himself and them, pronounces determinately
+some actions to be in themselves just, right, good, others to be in
+themselves evil, wrong, unjust:  which, without being consulted,
+without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and
+approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly:  and which,
+if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to
+anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall
+hereafter second and affirm its own.  But this part of the office of
+conscience is beyond my present design explicitly to consider.  It
+is by this faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that
+he is a law to himself, but this faculty, I say, not to be
+considered merely as a principle in his heart, which is to have some
+influence as well as others, but considered as a faculty in kind and
+in nature supreme over all others, and which bears its own authority
+of being so.
+
+This PREROGATIVE, this NATURAL SUPREMACY, of the faculty which
+surveys, approves, or disapproves the several affections of our mind
+and actions of our lives, being that by which men ARE A LAW TO
+THEMSELVES, their conformity or disobedience to which law of our
+nature renders their actions, in the highest and most proper sense,
+natural or unnatural, it is fit it be further explained to you; and
+I hope it will be so, if you will attend to the following
+reflections.
+
+Man may act according to that principle or inclination which for the
+present happens to be strongest, and yet act in a way
+disproportionate to, and violate his real proper nature.  Suppose a
+brute creature by any bait to be allured into a snare, by which he
+is destroyed.  He plainly followed the bent of his nature, leading
+him to gratify his appetite:  there is an entire correspondence
+between his whole nature and such an action:  such action therefore
+is natural.  But suppose a man, foreseeing the same danger of
+certain ruin, should rush into it for the sake of a present
+gratification; he in this instance would follow his strongest
+desire, as did the brute creature; but there would be as manifest a
+disproportion between the nature of a man and such an action as
+between the meanest work of art and the skill of the greatest master
+in that art; which disproportion arises, not from considering the
+action singly in ITSELF, or in its CONSEQUENCES, but from COMPARISON
+of it with the nature of the agent.  And since such an action is
+utterly disproportionate to the nature of man, it is in the
+strictest and most proper sense unnatural; this word expressing that
+disproportion.  Therefore, instead of the words DISPROPORTIONATE TO
+HIS NATURE, the word UNNATURAL may now be put; this being more
+familiar to us:  but let it be observed that it stands for the same
+thing precisely.
+
+Now what is it which renders such a rash action unnatural?  Is it
+that he went against the principle of reasonable and cool self-love,
+considered MERELY as a part of his nature?  No; for if he had acted
+the contrary way, he would equally have gone against a principle, or
+part of his nature--namely, passion or appetite.  But to deny a
+present appetite, from foresight that the gratification of it would
+end in immediate ruin or extreme misery, is by no means an unnatural
+action:  whereas to contradict or go against cool self-love for the
+sake of such gratification is so in the instance before us.  Such an
+action then being unnatural, and its being so not arising from a
+man's going against a principle or desire barely, nor in going
+against that principle or desire which happens for the present to be
+strongest, it necessarily follows that there must be some other
+difference or distinction to be made between these two principles,
+passion and cool self-love, than what I have yet taken notice of.
+And this difference, not being a difference in strength or degree, I
+call a difference in NATURE and in KIND.  And since, in the instance
+still before us, if passion prevails over self-love the consequent
+action is unnatural, but if self-love prevails over passion the
+action is natural, it is manifest that self-love is in human nature
+a superior principle to passion.  This may be contradicted without
+violating that nature; but the former cannot.  So that, if we will
+act conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love
+must govern.  Thus, without particular consideration of conscience,
+we may have a clear conception of the SUPERIOR NATURE of one inward
+principle to another, and see that there really is this natural
+superiority, quite distinct from degrees of strength and prevalency.
+
+Let us now take a view of the nature of man, as consisting partly of
+various appetites, passions, affections, and partly of the principle
+of reflection or conscience, leaving quite out all consideration of
+the different degrees of strength in which either of them prevails,
+and it will further appear that there is this natural superiority of
+one inward principle to another, and that it is even part of the
+idea of reflection or conscience.
+
+Passion or appetite implies a direct simple tendency towards such
+and such objects, without distinction of the means by which they are
+to be obtained.  Consequently it will often happen there will be a
+desire of particular objects, in cases where they cannot be obtained
+without manifest injury to others.  Reflection or conscience comes
+in, need disapproves the pursuit of them in these circumstances; but
+the desire remains.  Which is to be obeyed, appetite or reflection?
+Cannot this question be answered, from the economy and constitution
+of human nature merely, without saying which is strongest?  Or need
+this at all come into consideration?  Would not the question be
+INTELLIGIBLY and fully answered by saying that the principle of
+reflection or conscience being compared with the various appetites,
+passions, and affections in men, the former is manifestly superior
+and chief, without regard to strength?  And how often soever the
+latter happens to prevail, it is mere USURPATION:  the former
+remains in nature and in kind its superior; and every instance of
+such prevalence of the latter is an instance of breaking in upon and
+violation of the constitution of man.
+
+All this is no more than the distinction, which everybody is
+acquainted with, between MERE POWER and AUTHORITY:  only instead of
+being intended to express the difference between what is possible
+and what is lawful in civil government, here it has been shown
+applicable to the several principles in the mind of man.  Thus that
+principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our
+own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what
+is in its turn to have some influence--which may be said of every
+passion, of the lowest appetites--but likewise as being superior, as
+from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all
+others, insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty,
+conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency.
+This is a constituent part of the idea--that is, of the faculty
+itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and
+constitution of man, belongs to it.  Had it strength, as it had
+right; had it power, as it had manifest authority, it would
+absolutely govern the world.
+
+This gives us a further view of the nature of man; shows us what
+course of life we were made for:  not only that our real nature
+leads us to be influenced in some degree by reflection and
+conscience, but likewise in what degree we are to be influenced by
+it, if we will fall in with, and act agreeably to, the constitution
+of our nature:  that this faculty was placed within to be our proper
+governor, to direct and regulate all under principles, passions, and
+motives of action.  This is its right and office:  thus sacred is
+its authority.  And how often soever men violate and rebelliously
+refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which they cannot
+otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot
+otherwise gratify--this makes no alteration as to the NATURAL RIGHT
+and OFFICE of conscience.
+
+Let us now turn this whole matter another way, and suppose there was
+no such thing at all as this natural supremacy of conscience--that
+there was no distinction to be made between one inward principle and
+another, but only that of strength--and see what would be the
+consequence.
+
+Consider, then, what is the latitude and compass of the actions of
+man with regard to himself, his fellow-creatures, and the Supreme
+Being?  What are their bounds, besides that of our natural power?
+With respect to the two first, they are plainly no other than these:
+no man seeks misery, as such, for himself; and no one unprovoked
+does mischief to another for its own sake.  For in every degree
+within these bounds, mankind knowingly, from passion or wantonness,
+bring ruin and misery upon themselves and others.  And impiety and
+profaneness--I mean what every one would call so who believes the
+being of God--have absolutely no bounds at all.  Men blaspheme the
+Author of nature, formally and in words renounce their allegiance to
+their Creator.  Put an instance, then, with respect to any one of
+these three.  Though we should suppose profane swearing, and in
+general that kind of impiety now mentioned, to mean nothing, yet it
+implies wanton disregard and irreverence towards an infinite Being
+our Creator; and is this as suitable to the nature of man as
+reverence and dutiful submission of heart towards that Almighty
+Being?  Or suppose a man guilty of parricide, with all the
+circumstances of cruelty which such an action can admit of.  This
+action is done in consequence of its principle being for the present
+strongest; and if there be no difference between inward principles,
+but only that of strength, the strength being given you have the
+whole nature of the man given, so far as it relates to this matter.
+The action plainly corresponds to the principle, the principle being
+in that degree of strength it was:  it therefore corresponds to the
+whole nature of the man.  Upon comparing the action and the whole
+nature, there arises no disproportion, there appears no
+unsuitableness, between them.  Thus the MURDER OF A FATHER and the
+NATURE OF MAN correspond to each other, as the same nature and an
+act of filial duty.  If there be no difference between inward
+principles, but only that of strength, we can make no distinction
+between these two actions, considered as the actions of such a
+creature; but in our coolest hours must approve or disapprove them
+equally:  than which nothing can be reduced to a greater absurdity.
+
+
+
+SERMON III.
+
+
+
+The natural supremacy of reflection or conscience being thus
+established, we may from it form a distinct notion of what is meant
+by HUMAN NATURE when virtue is said to consist in following it, and
+vice in deviating from it.
+
+As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united strength,
+various subordinations under one direction--that of the supreme
+authority--the different strength of each particular member of the
+society not coming into the idea--whereas, if you leave out the
+subordination, the union, and the one direction, you destroy and
+lose it--so reason, several appetites, passions, and affections,
+prevailing in different degrees of strength, is not THAT idea or
+notion of HUMAN NATURE; but THAT NATURE consists in these several
+principles considered as having a natural respect to each other, in
+the several passions being naturally subordinate to the one superior
+principle of reflection or conscience.  Every bias, instinct,
+propension within, is a natural part of our nature, but not the
+whole:  add to these the superior faculty whose office it is to
+adjust, manage, and preside over them, and take in this its natural
+superiority, and you complete the idea of human nature.  And as in
+civil government the constitution is broken in upon and violated by
+power and strength prevailing over authority; so the constitution of
+man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties or
+principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature
+supreme over them all.  Thus, when it is said by ancient writers
+that tortures and death are not so contrary to human nature as
+injustice, by this, to be sure, is not meant that the aversion to
+the former in mankind is less strong and prevalent than their
+aversion to the latter, but that the former is only contrary to our
+nature considered in a partial view, and which takes in only the
+lowest part of it, that which we have in common with the brutes;
+whereas the latter is contrary to our nature, considered in a higher
+sense, as a system and constitution contrary to the whole economy of
+man. {7}
+
+And from all these things put together, nothing can be more evident
+than that, exclusive of revelation, man cannot be considered as a
+creature left by his Maker to act at random, and live at large up to
+the extent of his natural power, as passion, humour, wilfulness,
+happen to carry him, which is the condition brute creatures are in;
+but that FROM HIS MAKE, CONSTITUTION, OR NATURE, HE IS IN THE
+STRICTEST AND MOST PROPER SENSE A LAW TO HIMSELF.  He hath the rule
+of right within:  what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to
+it.
+
+The inquiries which have been made by men of leisure after some
+general rule, the conformity to or disagreement from which should
+denominate our actions good or evil, are in many respects of great
+service.  Yet let any plain, honest man, before he engages in any
+course of action, ask himself, Is this I am going about right, or is
+it wrong?  Is it good, or is it evil?  I do not in the least doubt
+but that this question would be answered agreeably to truth and
+virtue, by almost any fair man in almost any circumstance.  Neither
+do there appear any cases which look like exceptions to this, but
+those of superstition, and of partiality to ourselves.  Superstition
+may perhaps be somewhat of an exception; but partiality to ourselves
+is not, this being itself dishonesty.  For a man to judge that to be
+the equitable, the moderate, the right part for him to act, which he
+would see to be hard, unjust, oppressive in another, this is plain
+vice, and can proceed only from great unfairness of mind.
+
+But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right within himself, yet
+it may be asked, "What obligations are we under to attend to and
+follow it?"  I answer:  It has been proved that man by his nature is
+a law to himself, without the particular distinct consideration of
+the positive sanctions of that law:  the rewards and punishments
+which we feel, and those which from the light of reason we have
+ground to believe, are annexed to it.  The question, then, carries
+its own answer along within it.  Your obligation to obey this law is
+its being the law of your nature.  That your conscience approves of
+and attests to such a course of action is itself alone an
+obligation.  Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the
+way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority
+with it, that it is our natural guide; the guide assigned us by the
+Author of our nature:  it therefore belongs to our condition of
+being; it is our duty to walk in that path, and follow this guide,
+without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake
+them with impunity.
+
+However, let us hear what is to be said against obeying this law of
+our nature.  And the sum is no more than this:  "Why should we be
+concerned about anything out of and beyond ourselves?  If we do find
+within ourselves regards to others, and restraints of we know not
+how many different kinds, yet these being embarrassments, and
+hindering us from going the nearest way to our own good, why should
+we not endeavour to suppress and get over them?"
+
+Thus people go on with words, which when applied to human nature,
+and the condition in which it is placed in this world, have really
+no meaning.  For does not all this kind of talk go upon supposition,
+that our happiness in this world consists in somewhat quite distinct
+from regard to others, and that it is the privilege of vice to be
+without restraint or confinement?  Whereas, on the contrary, the
+enjoyments--in a manner all the common enjoyments of life, even the
+pleasures of vice--depend upon these regards of one kind or another
+to our fellow-creatures.  Throw off all regards to others, and we
+should be quite indifferent to infamy and to honour; there could be
+no such thing at all as ambition; and scarce any such thing as
+covetousness; for we should likewise be equally indifferent to the
+disgrace of poverty, the several neglects and kinds of contempt
+which accompany this state, and to the reputation of riches, the
+regard and respect they usually procure.  Neither is restraint by
+any means peculiar to one course of life; but our very nature,
+exclusive of conscience and our condition, lays us under an absolute
+necessity of it.  We cannot gain any end whatever without being
+confined to the proper means, which is often the most painful and
+uneasy confinement.  And in numberless instances a present appetite
+cannot be gratified without such apparent and immediate ruin and
+misery that the most dissolute man in the world chooses to forego
+the pleasure rather than endure the pain.
+
+Is the meaning, then, to indulge those regards to our fellow-
+creatures, and submit to those restraints which upon the whole are
+attended with more satisfaction than uneasiness, and get over only
+those which bring more uneasiness and inconvenience than
+satisfaction?  "Doubtless this was our meaning."  You have changed
+sides then.  Keep to this; be consistent with yourselves, and you
+and the men of virtue are IN GENERAL perfectly agreed.  But let us
+take care and avoid mistakes.  Let it not be taken for granted that
+the temper of envy, rage, resentment, yields greater delight than
+meekness, forgiveness, compassion, and good-will; especially when it
+is acknowledged that rage, envy, resentment, are in themselves mere
+misery; and that satisfaction arising from the indulgence of them is
+little more than relief from that misery; whereas the temper of
+compassion and benevolence is itself delightful; and the indulgence
+of it, by doing good, affords new positive delight and enjoyment.
+Let it not be taken for granted that the satisfaction arising from
+the reputation of riches and power, however obtained, and from the
+respect paid to them, is greater than the satisfaction arising from
+the reputation of justice, honesty, charity, and the esteem which is
+universally acknowledged to be their due.  And if it be doubtful
+which of these satisfactions is the greatest, as there are persons
+who think neither of them very considerable, yet there can be no
+doubt concerning ambition and covetousness, virtue and a good mind,
+considered in themselves, and as leading to different courses of
+life; there can, I say, be no doubt, which temper and which course
+is attended with most peace and tranquillity of mind, which with
+most perplexity, vexation, and inconvenience.  And both the virtues
+and vices which have been now mentioned, do in a manner equally
+imply in them regards of one kind or another to our fellow-
+creatures.  And with respect to restraint and confinement, whoever
+will consider the restraints from fear and shame, the dissimulation,
+mean arts of concealment, servile compliances, one or other of which
+belong to almost every course of vice, will soon be convinced that
+the man of virtue is by no means upon a disadvantage in this
+respect.  How many instances are there in which men feel and own and
+cry aloud under the chains of vice with which they are enthralled,
+and which yet they will not shake off!  How many instances, in which
+persons manifestly go through more pains and self-denial to gratify
+a vicious passion, than would have been necessary to the conquest of
+it!  To this is to be added, that when virtue is become habitual,
+when the temper of it is acquired, what was before confinement
+ceases to be so by becoming choice and delight.  Whatever restraint
+and guard upon ourselves may be needful to unlearn any unnatural
+distortion or odd gesture, yet in all propriety of speech, natural
+behaviour must be the most easy and unrestrained.  It is manifest
+that, in the common course of life, there is seldom any
+inconsistency between our duty and what is CALLED interest:  it is
+much seldomer that there is an inconsistency between duty and what
+is really our present interest; meaning by interest, happiness and
+satisfaction.  Self-love, then, though confined to the interest of
+the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue,
+and leads us to one and the same course of life.  But, whatever
+exceptions there are to this, which are much fewer than they are
+commonly thought, all shall be set right at the final distribution
+of things.  It is a manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing
+finally over good, under the conduct and administration of a perfect
+mined.
+
+The whole argument, which I have been now insisting upon, may be
+thus summed up, and given you in one view.  The nature of man is
+adapted to some course of action or other.  Upon comparing some
+actions with this nature, they appear suitable and correspondent to
+it:  from comparison of other actions with the same nature, there
+arises to our view some unsuitableness or disproportion.  The
+correspondence of actions to the nature of the agent renders them
+natural; their disproportion to it, unnatural.  That an action is
+correspondent to the nature of the agent does not arise from its
+being agreeable to the principle which happens to be the strongest:
+for it may be so and yet be quite disproportionate to the nature of
+the agent.  The correspondence therefore, or disproportion, arises
+from somewhat else.  This can be nothing but a difference in nature
+and kind, altogether distinct from strength, between the inward
+principles.  Some then are in nature and kind superior to others.
+And the correspondence arises from the action being conformable to
+the higher principle; and the unsuitableness from its being contrary
+to it.  Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or
+superior principles in the nature of man; because an action may be
+suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated,
+but becomes unsuitable if either of those are.  Conscience and self-
+love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same
+way.  Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part
+in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the
+future and the whole; this being implied in the notion of a good and
+perfect administration of things.  Thus they who have been so wise
+in their generation as to regard only their own supposed interest,
+at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at last find, that
+he who has given up all the advantages of the present world, rather
+than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has
+infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his owns
+interest and happiness.
+
+
+
+SERMON IV.
+UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TONGUE.
+JAMES i. 26.
+
+
+
+If any man among you seem to be religious, and bridleth not his
+tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain.
+
+The translation of this text would be more determinate by being more
+literal, thus:  If any man among you seemeth to be religious, not
+bridling his tongue, but deceiving his own heart, this man's
+religion is vain.  This determines that the words, BUT DECEIVETH HIS
+OWN HEART, are not put in opposition to SEEMETH TO BE RELIGIOUS, but
+to BRIDLETH NOT HIS TONGUE.  The certain determinate meaning of the
+text then being, that he who seemeth to be religious, and bridleth
+not his tongue, but in that particular deceiveth his own heart, this
+man's religion is vain, we may observe somewhat very forcible and
+expressive in these words of St. James.  As if the apostle had said,
+No man surely can make any pretences to religion, who does not at
+least believe that he bridleth his tongue:  if he puts on any
+appearance or face of religion, and yet does not govern his tongue,
+he must surely deceive himself in that particular, and think he
+does; and whoever is so unhappy as to deceive himself in this, to
+imagine he keeps that unruly faculty in due subjection when indeed
+he does not, whatever the other part of his life be, his religion is
+vain; the government of the tongue being a most material restraint
+which virtue lays us under:  without it no man can be truly
+religious.
+
+In treating upon this subject, I will consider,
+
+First, what is the general vice or fault here referred to; or what
+disposition in men is supposed in moral reflections and precepts
+concerning BRIDLING THE TONGUE.
+
+Secondly, when it may be said of any one, that he has a due
+government over himself in this respect.
+
+I.  Now, the fault referred to, and the disposition supposed, in
+precepts and reflections concerning the government of the tongue, is
+not evil-speaking from malice, nor lying or bearing false witness
+from indirect selfish designs.  The disposition to these, and the
+actual vices themselves, all come under other subjects.  The tongue
+may be employed about, and made to serve all the purposes of vice,
+in tempting and deceiving, in perjury and injustice.  But the thing
+here supposed and referred to, is talkativeness:  a disposition to
+be talking, abstracted from the consideration of what is to be said;
+with very little or no regard to, or thought of doing, either good
+or harm.  And let not any imagine this to be a slight matter, and
+that it deserves not to have so great weight laid upon it, till he
+has considered what evil is implied in it, and the bad effects which
+follow from it.  It is perhaps true, that they who are addicted to
+this folly would choose to confine themselves to trifles and
+indifferent subjects, and so intend only to be guilty of being
+impertinent:  but as they cannot go on for ever talking of nothing,
+as common matters will not afford a sufficient fund for perpetual
+continued discourse, where subjects of this kind are exhausted they
+will go on to defamation, scandal, divulging of secrets, their own
+secrets as well as those of others--anything rather than be silent.
+They are plainly hurried on in the heat of their talk to say quite
+different things from what they first intended, and which they
+afterwards wish unsaid:  or improper things, which they had no other
+end in saying, but only to afford employment to their tongue.  And
+if these people expect to be heard and regarded--for there are some
+content merely with talking--they will invent to engage your
+attention:  and, when they have heard the least imperfect hint of an
+affair, they will out of their own head add the circumstances of
+time and place and other matters to make out their story and give
+the appearance of probability to it:  not that they have any concern
+about being believed, otherwise than as a means of being heard.  The
+thing is, to engage your attention; to take you up wholly for the
+present time:  what reflections will be made afterwards, is in truth
+the least of their thoughts.  And further, when persons who indulge
+themselves in these liberties of the tongue are in any degree
+offended with another--as little disgusts and misunderstandings will
+be--they allow themselves to defame and revile such a one without
+any moderation or bounds; though the offence is so very slight, that
+they themselves would not do, nor perhaps wish him, an injury in any
+other way.  And in this case the scandal and revilings are chiefly
+owing to talkativeness, and not bridling their tongue, and so come
+under our present subject.  The least occasion in the world will
+make the humour break out in this particular way or in another.  It
+as like a torrent, which must and will flow; but the least thing
+imaginable will first of all give it either this or another
+direction, turn it into this or that channel:  or like a fire--the
+nature of which, when in a heap of combustible matter, is to spread
+and lay waste all around; but any one of a thousand little accidents
+will occasion it to break out first either in this or another
+particular part.
+
+The subject then before us, though it does run up into, and can
+scarce be treated as entirely distinct from all others, yet it needs
+not be so much mixed or blended with them as it often is.  Every
+faculty and power may be used as the instrument of premeditated vice
+and wickedness, merely as the most proper and effectual means of
+executing such designs.  But if a man, from deep malice and desire
+of revenge, should meditate a falsehood with a settled design to
+ruin his neighbour's reputation, and should with great coolness and
+deliberation spread it, nobody would choose to say of such a one
+that he had no government of his tongue.  A man may use the faculty
+of speech as an instrument of false witness, who yet has so entire a
+command over that faculty as never to speak but from forethought and
+cool design.  Here the crime is injustice and perjury, and, strictly
+speaking, no more belongs to the present subject than perjury and
+injustice in any other way.  But there is such a thing as a
+disposition to be talking for its own sake; from which persons often
+say anything, good or bad, of others, merely as a subject of
+discourse, according to the particular temper they themselves happen
+to be in, and to pass away the present time.  There is likewise to
+be observed in persons such a strong and eager desire of engaging
+attention to what they say, that they will speak good or evil, truth
+or otherwise, merely as one or the other seems to be most hearkened
+to:  and this though it is sometimes joined, is not the same with
+the desire of being thought important and men of consequence.  There
+is in some such a disposition to be talking, that an offence of the
+slightest kind, and such as would not raise any other resentment,
+yet raises, if I may so speak, the resentment of the tongue--puts it
+into a flame, into the most ungovernable motions.  This outrage,
+when the person it respects is present, we distinguish in the lower
+rank of people by a peculiar term:  and let it be observed, that
+though the decencies of behaviour are a little kept, the same
+outrage and virulence, indulged when he is absent, is an offence of
+the same kind.  But, not to distinguish any further in this manner,
+men race into faults and follies which cannot so properly be
+referred to any one general head as this--that they have not a due
+government over their tongue.
+
+And this unrestrained volubility and wantonness of speech is the
+occasion of numberless evils and vexations in life.  It begets
+resentment in him who is the subject of it, sows the seed of strife
+and dissension amongst others, and inflames little disgusts and
+offences which if let alone would wear away of themselves:  it is
+often of as bad effect upon the good name of others, as deep envy or
+malice:  and to say the least of it in this respect, it destroys and
+perverts a certain equity of the utmost importance to society to be
+observed--namely, that praise and dispraise, a good or bad
+character, should always be bestowed according to desert.  The
+tongue used in such a licentious manner is like a sword in the hand
+of a madman; it is employed at random, it can scarce possibly do any
+good, and for the most part does a world of mischief; and implies
+not only great folly and a trifling spirit, but great viciousness of
+mind, great indifference to truth and falsity, and to the
+reputation, welfare, and good of others.  So much reason is there
+for what St. James says of the tongue, IT IS A FIRE, A WORLD OF
+INIQUITY, IT DEFILETH THE WHOLE BODY, SETTETH ON FIRE THE COURSE OF
+NATURE, AND IS ITSELF SET ON FIRE OF HELL. {8}  This is the faculty
+or disposition which we are required to keep a guard upon:  these
+are the vices and follies it runs into when not kept under due
+restraint.
+
+II.  Wherein the due government of the tongue consists, or when it
+may be said of any one in a moral and religious sense that he
+BRIDLETH HIS TONGUE, I come now to consider.
+
+The due and proper use of any natural faculty or power is to be
+judged of by the end and design for which it was given us.  The
+chief purpose for which the faculty of speech was given to man is
+plainly that we might communicate our thoughts to each other, in
+order to carry on the affairs of the world; for business, and for
+our improvement in knowledge and learning.  But the good Author of
+our nature designed us not only necessaries, but likewise enjoyment
+and satisfaction, in that being He hath graciously given, and in
+that condition of life He hath placed us in.  There are secondary
+uses of our faculties:  they administer to delight, as well as to
+necessity; and as they are equally-adapted to both, there is no
+doubt but He intended them for our gratification as well as for the
+support and continuance of our being.  The secondary use of speech
+is to please and be entertaining to each other in conversation.
+This is in every respect allowable and right; it unites men closer
+in alliances and friendships; gives us a fellow-feeling of the
+prosperity and unhappiness of each other; and is in several respects
+servicable to virtue, and to promote good behaviour in the world.
+And provided there be not too much time spent in it, if it were
+considered only in the way of gratification and delight, men must
+have strange notion of God and of religion to think that He can be
+offended with it, or that it is any way inconsistent with the
+strictest virtue.  But the truth is, such sort of conversation,
+though it has no particular good tendency, yet it has a general good
+one; it is social and friendly, and tends to promote humanity, good-
+nature, and civility.
+
+As the end and use, so likewise the abuse of speech, relates to the
+one or other of these:  either to business or to conversation.  As
+to the former:  deceit in the management of business and affairs
+does not properly belong to the subject now before us:  though one
+may just mention that multitude, that heedless number of words with
+which business is perplexed, where a much fewer would, as it should
+seem, better serve the purpose; but this must be left to those who
+understand the matter.  The government of the tongue, considered as
+a subject of itself, relates chiefly to conversation; to that kind
+of discourse which usually fills up the time spent in friendly
+meetings and visits of civility.  And the danger is, lest persons
+entertain themselves and others at the expense of their wisdom and
+their virtue, and to the injury or offence of their neighbour.  If
+they will observe and keep clear of these, they may be as free and
+easy and unreserved as they can desire.
+
+The cautions to be given for avoiding these dangers, and to render
+conversation innocent and agreeable, fall under the following
+particulars:  silence; talking of indifferent things; and, which
+makes up too great a part of conversation, giving of characters,
+speaking well or evil of others.
+
+The Wise Man observes that "there is a time to speak, and a time to
+keep silence."  One meets with people in the world who seem never to
+have made the last of these observations.  And yet these great
+talkers do not at all speak from their having anything to say, as
+every sentence shows, but only from their inclination to be talking.
+Their conversation is merely an exercise of the tongue:  no other
+human faculty has any share in it.  It is strange these persons can
+help reflecting, that unless they have in truth a superior capacity,
+and are in an extraordinary manner furnished for conversation if
+they are entertaining, it is at their own expense.  Is it possible
+that it should never come into people's thoughts to suspect whether
+or no it be to their advantage to show so very much of themselves?
+"O that you would altogether hold your peace, and it should be your
+wisdom." {9}  Remember likewise there are persons who love fewer
+words, an inoffensive sort of people, and who deserve some regard,
+though of too still and composed tempers for you.  Of this number
+was the Son of Sirach:  for he plainly speaks from experience when
+he says, "As hills of sand are to the steps of the aged, so is one
+of many words to a quiet man."  But one would think it should be
+obvious to every one, that when they are in company with their
+superiors of any kind--in years, knowledge, and experience--when
+proper and useful subjects are discoursed of, which they cannot bear
+a part in, that these are times for silence, when they should learn
+to hear, and be attentive, at least in their turn.  It is indeed a
+very unhappy way these people are in; they in a manner cut
+themselves out from all advantage of conversation, except that of
+being entertained with their own talk:  their business in coming
+into company not being at all to be informed, to hear, to learn, but
+to display themselves, or rather to exert their faculty, and talk
+without any design at all.  And if we consider conversation as an
+entertainment, as somewhat to unbend the mind, as a diversion from
+the cares, the business, and the sorrows of life, it is of the very
+nature of it that the discourse be mutual.  This, I say, is implied
+in the very notion of what we distinguish by conversation, or being
+in company.  Attention to the continued discourse of one alone grows
+more painful, often, than the cares and business we come to be
+diverted from.  He, therefore, who imposes this upon us is guilty of
+a double offence--arbitrarily enjoining silence upon all the rest,
+and likewise obliging them to this painful attention.
+
+I am sensible these things are apt to be passed over, as too little
+to come into a serious discourse; but in reality men are obliged,
+even in point of morality and virtue, to observe all the decencies
+of behaviour.  The greatest evils in life have had their rise from
+somewhat which was thought of too little importance to be attended
+to.  And as to the matter we are now upon, it is absolutely
+necessary to be considered.  For if people will not maintain a due
+government over themselves, in regarding proper times and seasons
+for silence, but WILL be talking, they certainly, whether they
+design it or not at first, will go on to scandal and evil-speaking,
+and divulging secrets.
+
+If it were needful to say anything further to persuade men to learn
+this lesson of silence, one might put them in mind how insignificant
+they render themselves by this excessive talkativeness:  insomuch
+that, if they do chance to say anything which deserves to be
+attended to and regarded, it is lost in the variety and abundance
+which they utter of another sort.
+
+The occasions of silence then are obvious, and one would think
+should be easily distinguished by everybody:  namely, when a man has
+nothing to say; or nothing but what is better unsaid:  better,
+either in regard to the particular persons he is present with; or
+from its being an interruption to conversation itself; or to
+conversation of a more agreeable kind; or better, lastly, with
+regard to himself.  I will end this particular with two reflections
+of the Wise Man; one of which, in the strongest manner, exposes the
+ridiculous part of this licentiousness of the tongue; and the other,
+the great danger and viciousness of it.  When he that is a fool
+walketh by the way side, his wisdom faileth him, and he saith to
+every one that he is a fool. {10}  The other is, In the multitude of
+words there wanteth not sin. {11}
+
+As to the government of the tongue in respect to talking upon
+indifferent subjects:  after what has been said concerning the due
+government of it in respect to the occasions and times for silence,
+there is little more necessary than only to caution men to be fully
+satisfied that the subjects are indeed of an indifferent nature; and
+not to spend too much time in conversation of this kind.  But
+persons must be sure to take heed that the subject of their
+discourse be at least of an indifferent nature:  that it be no way
+offensive to virtue, religion, or good manners:  that it be not of a
+licentious, dissolute sort, this leaving always ill impressions upon
+the mind; that it be no way injurious or vexatious to others; and
+that too much time be not spent this way, to the neglect of those
+duties and offices of life which belong to their station and
+condition in the world.  However, though there is not any necessity
+that men should aim at being important and weighty in every sentence
+they speak:  yet since useful subjects, at least of some kinds, are
+as entertaining as others, a wise man, even when he desires to
+unbend his mind from business, would choose that the conversation
+might turn upon somewhat instructive.
+
+The last thing is, the government of the tongue as relating to
+discourse of the affairs of others, and giving of characters.  These
+are in a manner the same; and one can scarce call it an indifferent
+subject, because discourse upon it almost perpetually runs into
+somewhat criminal.
+
+And, first of all, it were very much to be wished that this did not
+take up so great a part of conversation; because it is indeed a
+subject of a dangerous nature.  Let any one consider the various
+interests, competitions, and little misunderstandings which arise
+amongst men; and he will soon see that he is not unprejudiced and
+impartial; that he is not, as I may speak, neutral enough to trust
+himself with talking of the character and concerns of his neighbour,
+in a free, careless, and unreserved manner.  There is perpetually,
+and often it is not attended to, a rivalship amongst people of one
+kind or another in respect to wit, beauty, learning, fortune, and
+that one thing will insensibly influence them to speak to the
+disadvantage of others, even where there is no formed malice or ill-
+design.  Since therefore it is so hard to enter into this subject
+without offending, the first thing to be observed is that people
+should learn to decline it; to get over that strong inclination most
+have to be talking of the concerns and behaviour of their neighbour.
+
+But since it is impossible that this subject should be wholly
+excluded conversation; and since it is necessary that the characters
+of men should be known:  the next thing is that it is a matter of
+importance what is said; and, therefore, that we should be
+religiously scrupulous and exact to say nothing, either good or bad,
+but what is true.  I put it thus, because it is in reality of as
+great importance to the good of society, that the characters of bad
+men should be known, as that the characters of good men should.
+People who are given to scandal and detraction may indeed make an
+ill-use of this observation; but truths, which are of service
+towards regulating our conduct, are not to be disowned, or even
+concealed, because a bad use may be made of them.  This however
+would be effectually prevented if these two things were attended to.
+First, That, though it is equally of bad consequence to society that
+men should have either good or ill characters which they do not
+deserve; yet, when you say somewhat good of a man which he does not
+deserve, there is no wrong done him in particular; whereas, when you
+say evil of a man which he does not deserve, here is a direct formal
+injury, a real piece of injustice done him.  This therefore makes a
+wide difference; and gives us, in point of virtue, much greater
+latitude in speaking well than ill of others.  Secondly, A good man
+is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a lover of mankind; and so
+will, upon every occasion, and often without any, say all the good
+he can of everybody; but, so far as he is a good man, will never be
+disposed to speak evil of any, unless there be some other reason for
+it, besides, barely that it is true.  If he be charged with having
+given an ill character, he will scarce think it a sufficient
+justification of himself to say it was a true one, unless he can
+also give some further account how he came to do so:  a just
+indignation against particular instances of villainy, where they are
+great and scandalous; or to prevent an innocent man from being
+deceived and betrayed, when he has great trust and confidence in one
+who does not deserve it.  Justice must be done to every part of a
+subject when we are considering it.  If there be a man, who bears a
+fair character in the world, whom yet we know to be without faith or
+honesty, to be really an ill man; it must be allowed in general that
+we shall do a piece of service to society by letting such a one's
+true character be known.  This is no more than what we have an
+instance of in our Saviour himself; {12} though He was mild and
+gentle beyond example.  However, no words can express too strongly
+the caution which should be used in such a case as this.
+
+Upon the whole matter:  If people would observe the obvious
+occasions of silence, if they would subdue the inclination to tale-
+bearing, and that eager desire to engage attention, which is an
+original disease in some minds, they would be in little danger of
+offending with their tongue; and would, in a moral and religious
+sense, have due government over it.
+
+I will conclude with some precepts and reflections of the Son of
+Sirach upon this subject.  Be swift to hear; and, if thou hast
+understanding, answer thy neighbour; if not, lay thy hand upon thy
+mouth.  Honour and shame is in talk.  A man of an ill tongue is
+dangerous in his city, and he that is rash in his talk shall be
+hated.  A wise man wilt hold his tongue till he see opportunity; but
+a babbler and a fool will regard no time.  He that useth many words
+shall be abhorred; and he that taketh to himself authority therein
+shall be hated.  A backbiting tongue hath disquieted many; strong
+cities hath it pulled down, and overthrown the houses of great men.
+The tongue of a man is his fall; but if thou love to hear, thou
+shall receive understanding.
+
+
+
+SERMON V.
+UPON COMPASSION.
+ROM. xii. 15.
+
+
+
+Rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep.
+
+Every man is to be considered in two capacities, the private and
+public; as designed to pursue his own interest, and likewise to
+contribute to the good of others.  Whoever will consider may see
+that, in general, there is no contrariety between these; but that
+from the original constitution of man, and the circumstances he is
+placed in, they perfectly coincide, and mutually carry on each
+other.  But, among the great variety of affections or principles of
+actions in our nature, some in their primary intention and design
+seem to belong to the single or private, others to the public or
+social capacity.  The affections required in the text are of the
+latter sort.  When we rejoice in the prosperity of others, and
+compassionate their distresses, we as it were substitute them for
+ourselves, their interest for our own; and have the same kind of
+pleasure in their prosperity, and sorrow in their distress, as we
+have from reflection upon our own.  Now there is nothing strange or
+unaccountable in our being thus carried out, and affected towards
+the interests of others.  For, if there be any appetite, or any
+inward principle besides self-love; why may there not be an
+affection to the good of our fellow-creatures, and delight from that
+affection's being gratified, and uneasiness from things going
+contrary to it? {13}
+
+Of these two, delight in the prosperity of others, and compassion
+for their distresses, the last is felt much more generally than the
+former.  Though men do not universally rejoice with all whom they
+see rejoice, yet, accidental obstacles removed, they naturally
+compassionate all, in some degree, whom they see in distress; so far
+as they have any real perception or sense of that distress:
+insomuch that words expressing this latter, pity, compassion,
+frequently occur:  whereas we have scarce any single one by which
+the former is distinctly expressed.  Congratulation indeed answers
+condolence:  but both these words are intended to signify certain
+forms of civility rather than any inward sensation or feeling.  This
+difference or inequality is so remarkable that we plainly consider
+compassion as itself an original, distinct, particular affection in
+human nature; whereas to rejoice in the good of others is only a
+consequence of the general affection of love and good-will to them.
+The reason and account of which matter is this:  when a man has
+obtained any particular advantage or felicity, his end is gained;
+and he does not in that particular want the assistance of another:
+there was therefore no need of a distinct affection towards that
+felicity of another already obtained; neither would such affection
+directly carry him on to do good to that person:  whereas men in
+distress want assistance; and compassion leads us directly to assist
+them.  The object of the former is the present felicity of another;
+the object of the latter is the present misery of another.  It is
+easy to see that the latter wants a particular affection for its
+relief, and that the former does not want one because it does not
+want assistance.  And upon supposition of a distinct affection in
+both cases, the one must rest in the exercise of itself, having
+nothing further to gain; the other does not rest in itself, but
+carries us on to assist the distressed.
+
+But, supposing these affections natural to the mind, particularly
+the last; "Has not each man troubles enough of his own? must he
+indulge an affection which appropriates to himself those of others?
+which leads him to contract the least desirable of all friendships,
+friendships with the unfortunate?  Must we invert the known rule of
+prudence, and choose to associate ourselves with the distressed? or,
+allowing that we ought, so far as it is in our power to relieve
+them, yet is it not better to do this from reason and duty?  Does
+not passion and affection of every kind perpetually mislead us?
+Nay, is not passion and affection itself a weakness, and what a
+perfect being must be entirely free from?"  Perhaps so, but it is
+mankind I am speaking of; imperfect creatures, and who naturally
+and, from the condition we are placed in, necessarily depend upon
+each other.  With respect to such creatures, it would be found of as
+bad consequence to eradicate all natural affections as to be
+entirely governed by them.  This would almost sink us to the
+condition of brutes; and that would leave us without a sufficient
+principle of action.  Reason alone, whatever any one may wish, is
+not in reality a sufficient motive of virtue in such a creature as
+man; but this reason joined with those affections which God has
+impressed upon his heart, and when these are allowed scope to
+exercise themselves, but under strict government and direction of
+reason, then it is we act suitably to our nature, and to the
+circumstances God has placed us in.  Neither is affection itself at
+all a weakness; nor does it argue defect, any otherwise than as our
+senses and appetites do; they belong to our condition of nature, and
+are what we cannot be without.  God Almighty is, to be sure, unmoved
+by passion or appetite, unchanged by affection; but then it is to be
+added that He neither sees nor hears nor perceives things by any
+senses like ours; but in a manner infinitely more perfect.  Now, as
+it is an absurdity almost too gross to be mentioned, for a man to
+endeavour to get rid of his senses, because the Supreme Being
+discerns things more perfectly without them; it is as real, though
+not so obvious an absurdity, to endeavour to eradicate the passions
+He has given us, because He is without them.  For, since our
+passions are as really a part of our constitution as our senses;
+since the former as really belong to our condition of nature as the
+latter; to get rid of either is equally a violation of and breaking
+in upon that nature and constitution He has given us.  Both our
+senses and our passions are a supply to the imperfection of our
+nature; thus they show that we are such sort of creatures as to
+stand in need of those helps which higher orders of creatures do
+not.  But it is not the supply, but the deficiency; as it is not a
+remedy, but a disease, which is the imperfection.  However, our
+appetites, passions, senses, no way imply disease:  nor indeed do
+they imply deficiency or imperfection of any sort; but only this,
+that the constitution of nature, according to which God has made us,
+is such as to require them.  And it is so far from being true, that
+a wise man must entirely suppress compassion, and all fellow-feeling
+for others, as a weakness; and trust to reason alone to teach and
+enforce upon him the practice of the several charities we owe to our
+kind; that, on the contrary, even the bare exercise of such
+affections would itself be for the good and happiness of the world;
+and the imperfection of the higher principles of reason and religion
+in man, the little influence they have upon our practice, and the
+strength and prevalency of contrary ones, plainly require these
+affections to be a restraint upon these latter, and a supply to the
+deficiencies of the former.
+
+First, The very exercise itself of these affections in a just and
+reasonable manner and degree would upon the whole increase the
+satisfactions and lessen the miseries of life.
+
+It is the tendency and business of virtue and religion to procure,
+as much as may be, universal good-will, trust, and friendship
+amongst mankind.  If this could be brought to obtain; and each man
+enjoyed the happiness of others, as every one does that of a friend;
+and looked upon the success and prosperity of his neighbour as every
+one does upon that of his children and family; it is too manifest to
+be insisted upon how much the enjoyments of life would be increased.
+There would be so much happiness introduced into the world, without
+any deduction or inconvenience from it, in proportion as the precept
+of REJOICING WITH THOSE WHO REJOICE was universally obeyed.  Our
+Saviour has owned this good affection as belonging to our nature in
+the parable of the LOST SHEEP, and does not think it to the
+disadvantage of a perfect state to represent its happiness as
+capable of increase from reflection upon that of others.
+
+But since in such a creature as man, compassion or sorrow for the
+distress of others seems so far necessarily connected with joy in
+their prosperity, as that whoever rejoices in one must unavoidably
+compassionate the other; there cannot be that delight or
+satisfaction, which appears to be so considerable, without the
+inconveniences, whatever they are, of compassion.
+
+However, without considering this connection, there is no doubt but
+that more good than evil, more delight than sorrow, arises from
+compassion itself; there being so many things which balance the
+sorrow of it.  There is first the relief which the distressed feel
+from this affection in others towards them.  There is likewise the
+additional misery which they would feel from the reflection that no
+one commiserated their case.  It is indeed true that any
+disposition, prevailing beyond a certain degree, becomes somewhat
+wrong; and we have ways of speaking, which, though they do not
+directly express that excess, yet always lead our thoughts to it,
+and give us the notion of it.  Thus, when mention is made of delight
+in being pitied, this always conveys to our mind the notion of
+somewhat which is really a weakness.  The manner of speaking, I say,
+implies a certain weakness and feebleness of mind, which is and
+ought to be disapproved.  But men of the greatest fortitude would in
+distress feel uneasiness from knowing that no person in the world
+had any sort of compassion or real concern for them; and in some
+cases, especially when the temper is enfeebled by sickness, or any
+long and great distress, doubtless, would feel a kind of relief even
+from the helpless goodwill and ineffectual assistances of those
+about them.  Over against the sorrow of compassion is likewise to be
+set a peculiar calm kind of satisfaction, which accompanies it,
+unless in cases where the distress of another is by some means so
+brought home to ourselves as to become in a manner our own; or when
+from weakness of mind the affection rises too high, which ought to
+be corrected.  This tranquillity, or calm satisfaction, proceeds
+partly from consciousness of a right affection and temper of mind,
+and partly from a sense of our own freedom from the misery we
+compassionate.  This last may possibly appear to some at first sight
+faulty; but it really is not so.  It is the same with that positive
+enjoyment, which sudden ease from pain for the present affords,
+arising from a real sense of misery, joined with a sense of our
+freedom from it; which in all cases must afford some degree of
+satisfaction.
+
+To these things must be added the observation which respects both
+the affections we are considering; that they who have got over all
+fellow-feeling for others have withal contracted a certain
+callousness of heart, which renders them insensible to most other
+satisfactions but those of the grossest kind.
+
+Secondly, Without the exercise of these affections men would
+certainly be much more wanting in the offices of charity they owe to
+cache other, and likewise more cruel and injurious than they are at
+present.
+
+The private interest of the individual would not be sufficiently
+provided for by reasonable and cool self-love alone; therefore the
+appetites and passions are placed within as a guard and further
+security, without which it would not be taken due care of.  It is
+manifest our life would be neglected were it not for the calls of
+hunger and thirst and weariness; notwithstanding that without them
+reason would assure us that the recruits of food and sleep are the
+necessary means of our preservation.  It is therefore absurd to
+imagine that, without affections, the same reason alone would be
+more effectual to engage us to perform the duties we owe to our
+fellow-creatures.  One of this make would be as defective, as much
+wanting, considered with respect to society, as one of the former
+make would be defective, or wanting, considered as an individual, or
+in his private capacity.  Is it possible any can in earnest think
+that a public spirit, i.e., a settled reasonable principle of
+benevolence to mankind, is so prevalent and strong in the species as
+that we may venture to throw off the under affections, which are its
+assistants, carry it forward and mark out particular courses for it;
+family, friends, neighbourhood, the distressed, our country?  The
+common joys and the common sorrows, which belong to these relations
+and circumstances, are as plainly useful to society as the pain and
+pleasure belonging to hunger, thirst, and weariness are of service
+to the individual.  In defect of that higher principle of reason,
+compassion is often the only way by which the indigent can have
+access to us:  and therefore, to eradicate this, though it is not
+indeed formally to deny them that assistance which is their due; yet
+it is to cut them off from that which is too frequently their only
+way of obtaining it.  And as for those who have shut up this door
+against the complaints of the miserable, and conquered this
+affection in themselves; even these persons will be under great
+restraints from the same affection in others.  Thus a man who has
+himself no sense of injustice, cruelty, oppression, will be kept
+from running the utmost lengths of wickedness by fear of that
+detestation, and even resentment of inhumanity, in many particular
+instances of it, which compassion for the object towards whom such
+inhumanity is exercised, excites in the bulk of mankind.  And this
+is frequently the chief danger and the chief restraint which tyrants
+and the great oppressors of the world feel.
+
+In general, experience will show that, as want of natural appetite
+to food supposes and proceeds from some bodily disease; so the
+apathy the Stoics talk of as much supposes, or is accompanied with,
+somewhat amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health
+of the mind.  Those who formerly aimed at this upon the foot of
+philosophy appear to have had better success in eradicating the
+affections of tenderness and compassion than they had with the
+passions of envy, pride, and resentment:  these latter, at best,
+were but concealed, and that imperfectly too.  How far this
+observation may be extended to such as endeavour to suppress the
+natural impulses of their affections, in order to form themselves
+for business and the world, I shall not determine.  But there does
+not appear any capacity or relation to be named, in which men ought
+to be entirely deaf to the calls of affection, unless the judicial
+one is to be excepted.
+
+And as to those who are commonly called the men of pleasure, it is
+manifest that the reason they set up for hardness of heart is to
+avoid being interrupted in their course by the ruin and misery they
+are the authors of; neither are persons of this character always the
+most free from the impotencies of envy and resentment.  What may men
+at last bring themselves to, by suppressing their passions and
+affections of one kind, and leaving those of the other in their full
+strength?  But surely it might be expected that persons who make
+pleasure their study and their business, if they understood what
+they profess, would reflect, how many of the entertainments of life,
+how many of those kind of amusements which seem peculiarly to belong
+to men of leisure and education they became insensible to by this
+acquired hardness of heart.
+
+I shall close these reflections with barely mentioning the behaviour
+of that divine Person, who was the example of all perfection in
+human nature, as represented in the Gospels mourning, and even, in a
+literal sense, weeping over the distresses of His creatures.
+
+The observation already made, that, of the two affections mentioned
+in the text, the latter exerts itself much more than the former;
+that, from the original constitution of human nature, we much more
+generally and sensibly compassionate the distressed than rejoice
+within the prosperous, requires to be particularly considered.  This
+observation, therefore, with the reflections which arise out of it,
+and which it leads our thoughts to, shall be the subject of another
+discourse.
+
+For the conclusion of this, let me just take notice of the danger of
+over-great refinements; of going beside or beyond the plain,
+obvious, first appearances of things, upon the subject of morals and
+religion.  The least observation will show how little the generality
+of men are capable of speculations.  Therefore morality and religion
+must be somewhat plan and easy to be understood:  it must appeal to
+what we call plain common sense, as distinguished from superior
+capacity and improvement; because it appeals to mankind.  Persons of
+superior capacity and improvement have often fallen into errors
+which no one of mere common understanding could.  Is it possible
+that one of this latter character could even of himself have thought
+that there was absolutely no such thing in mankind as affection to
+the good of others? suppose of parents to their children; or that
+what he felt upon seeing a friend in distress was only fear for
+himself; or, upon supposition of the affections of kindness and
+compassion, that it was the business of wisdom and virtue to set him
+about extirpating them as fast as he could?  And yet each of these
+manifest contradictions to nature has been laid down by men of
+speculation as a discovery in moral philosophy; which they, it
+seems, have found out through all the specious appearances to the
+contrary.  This reflection may be extended further.  The
+extravagances of enthusiasm and superstition do not at all lie in
+the road of common sense; and therefore, so far as they are ORIGINAL
+MISTAKES, must be owing to going beside or beyond it.  Now, since
+inquiry and examination can relate only to things so obscure and
+uncertain as to stand in need of it, and to persons who are capable
+of it; the proper advice to be given to plain honest men, to secure
+them from the extremes both of superstition and irreligion, is that
+of the Son of Sirach:  In every good work trust thy own soul; for
+this is the keeping of the commandment. {14}
+
+
+
+SERMON VI.
+UPON COMPASSION.
+PREACHED THE FIRST SUNDAY IN LENT.
+Rom. xii. 15.
+
+
+
+Rejoice with then that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep.
+
+There is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and
+moral world than we are apt to take notice of.  The inward frame of
+man does in a peculiar manner answer to the external condition and
+circumstances of life in which he is placed.  This is a particular
+instance of that general observation of the Son of Sirach:  All
+things are double one against another, and God hath made nothing
+imperfect. {15}  The several passions and affections in the heart of
+man, compared with the circumstances of life in which he is placed,
+afford, to such as will attend to them, as certain instances of
+final causes, as any whatever, which are more commonly alleged for
+such:  since those affections lead him to a certain determinate
+course of action suitable to those circumstances; as (for instance)
+compassion to relieve the distressed.  And as all observations of
+final causes, drawn from the principles of action in the heart of
+man, compared with the condition he is placed in, serve all the good
+uses which instances of final causes in the material world about us
+do; and both these are equally proofs of wisdom and design in the
+Author of nature:  so the former serve to further good purposes;
+they show us what course of life we are made for, what is our duty,
+and in a peculiar manner enforce upon us the practice of it.
+
+Suppose we are capable of happiness and of misery in degrees equally
+intense and extreme, yet, we are capable of the latter for a much
+longer time, beyond all comparison.  We see men in the tortures of
+pain for hours, days, and, excepting the short suspensions of sleep,
+for months together, without intermission, to which no enjoyments of
+life do, in degree and continuance, bear any sort of proportion.
+And such is our make and that of the world about us that any thing
+may become the instrument of pain and sorrow to us.  Thus almost any
+one man is capable of doing mischief to any other, though he may not
+be capable of doing him good; and if he be capable of doing him some
+good, he is capable of doing him more evil.  And it is, in
+numberless cases, much more in our power to lessen the miseries of
+others than to promote their positive happiness, any otherwise than
+as the former often includes the latter; ease from misery
+occasioning for some time the greatest positive enjoyment.  This
+constitution of nature, namely, that it is so munch more in our
+power to occasion and likewise to lessen misery than to promote
+positive happiness, plainly required a particular affection to
+hinder us from abusing, and to incline us to make a right use of the
+former powers, I.E., the powers both to occasion and to lessen
+misery; over and above what was necessary to induce us to make a
+right use of the latter power, that of promoting positive happiness.
+The power we have over the misery of our fellow-creatures, to
+occasion or lessen it, being a more important trust than the power
+we have of promoting their positive happiness; the former requires
+and has a further, an additional, security and guard against its
+being violated, beyond and over and above what the latter has.  The
+social nature of man, and general goodwill to his species, equally
+prevent him from doing evil, incline him to relieve the distressed,
+and to promote the positive happiness of his fellow-creatures; but
+compassion only restrains from the first, and carries him to the
+second; it hath nothing to do with the third.
+
+The final causes, then, of compassion are to prevent and to relieve
+misery.
+
+As to the former:  this affection may plainly be a restraint upon
+resentment, envy, unreasonable self-love; that is, upon all the
+principles from which men do evil to one another.  Let us instance
+only in resentment.  It seldom happens, in regulated societies, that
+men have an enemy so entirely in their power as to be able to
+satiate their resentment with safety.  But if we were to put this
+case, it is plainly supposable that a person might bring his enemy
+into such a condition, as from being the object of anger and rage,
+to become an object of compassion, even to himself, though the most
+malicious man in the world; and in this case compassion would stop
+him, if he could stop with safety, from pursuing his revenge any
+further.  But since nature has placed within us more powerful
+restraints to prevent mischief, and since the final cause of
+compassion is much more to relieve misery, let us go on to the
+consideration of it in this view.
+
+As this world was not intended to be a state of any great
+satisfaction or high enjoyment, so neither was it intended to be a
+mere scene of unhappiness and sorrow.  Mitigations and reliefs are
+provided by the merciful Author of nature for most of the
+afflictions in human life.  There is kind provision made even
+against our frailties:  as we are so constituted that time
+abundantly abates our sorrows, and begets in us that resignment of
+temper, which ought to have been produced by a better cause; a due
+sense of the authority of God, and our state of dependence.  This
+holds in respect too far the greatest part of the evils of life; I
+suppose, in some degree, as to pain and sickness.  Now this part of
+the constitution or make of man, considered as some relief to
+misery, and not as provision for positive happiness, is, if I may so
+speak, an instance of nature's compassion for us; and every natural
+remedy or relief to misery may be considered in the same view.
+
+But since in many cases it is very much in our power to alleviate
+the miseries of each other; and benevolence, though natural in man
+to man, yet is in a very low degree kept down by interest and
+competitions; and men, for the most part, are so engaged in the
+business and pleasures of the world, as to overlook and turn away
+from objects of misery; which are plainly considered as
+interruptions to them in their way, as intruders upon their
+business, their gaiety, and mirth:  compassion is an advocate within
+us in their behalf, to gain the unhappy admittance and access, to
+make their case attended to.  If it sometimes serves a contrary
+purpose, and makes men industriously turn away from the miserable,
+these are only instances of abuse and perversion:  for the end, for
+which the affection was given us, most certainly is not to make us
+avoid, but to make us attend to, the objects of it.  And if men
+would only resolve to allow thus much to it:  let it bring before
+their view, the view of their mind, the miseries of their fellow-
+creatures; let it gain for them that their case be considered; I am
+persuaded it would not fail of gaining more, and that very few real
+objects of charity would pass unrelieved.  Pain and sorrow and
+misery have a right to our assistance:  compassion puts us in mind
+of the debt, and that we owe it to ourselves as well as to the
+distressed.  For, to endeavour to get rid of the sorrow of
+compassion by turning from the wretched, when yet it is in our power
+to relieve them, is as unnatural as to endeavour to get rid of the
+pain of hunger by keeping from the sight of food.  That we can do
+one with greater success than we can the other is no proof that one
+is less a violation of nature than the other.  Compassion is a call,
+a demand of nature, to relieve the unhappy as hunger is a natural
+call for food.  This affection plainly gives the objects of it an
+additional claim to relief and mercy, over and above what our
+fellow-creatures in common have to our goodwill.  Liberality and
+bounty are exceedingly commendable; and a particular distinction in
+such a world as this, where men set themselves to contract their
+heart, and close it to all interests but their own.  It is by no
+means to be opposed to mercy, but always accompanies it:  the
+distinction between them is only that the former leads our thoughts
+to a more promiscuous and undistinguished distribution of favours;
+to those who are not, as well as those who are, necessitous; whereas
+the object of compassion is misery.  But in the comparison, and
+where there is not a possibility of both, mercy is to have the
+preference:  the affection of compassion manifestly leads us to this
+preference.  Thus, to relieve the indigent and distressed, to single
+out the unhappy, from whom can be expected no returns either of
+present entertainment or future service, for the objects of our
+favours; to esteem a man's being friendless as a recommendation;
+dejection, and incapacity of struggling through the world, as a
+motive for assisting him; in a word, to consider these circumstances
+of disadvantage, which are usually thought a sufficient reason for
+neglect and overlooking a person, as a motive for helping him
+forward:  this is the course of benevolence which compassion marks
+out and directs us to:  this is that humanity which is so peculiarly
+becoming our nature and circumstances in this world.
+
+To these considerations, drawn from the nature of man, must be added
+the reason of the thing itself we are recommending, which accords to
+and shows the same.  For since it is so much more in our power to
+lessen the misery of our fellow-creatures than to promote their
+positive happiness; in cases where there is an inconsistency, we
+shall be likely to do much more good by setting ourselves to
+mitigate the former than by endeavouring to promote the latter.  Let
+the competition be between the poor and the rich.  It is easy, you
+will say, to see which will have the preference.  True; but the
+question is, which ought to have the preference?  What proportion is
+there between the happiness produced by doing a favour to the
+indigent, and that produced by doing the same favour to one in easy
+circumstances?  It is manifest that the addition of a very large
+estate to one who before had an affluence, will in many instances
+yield him less new enjoyment or satisfaction than an ordinary
+charity would yield to a necessitous person.  So that it is not only
+true that our nature, i.e., the voice of God within us, carries us
+to the exercise of charity and benevolence in the way of compassion
+or mercy, preferably to any other way; but we also manifestly
+discern much more good done by the former; or, if you will allow me
+the expressions, more misery annihilated and happiness created.  If
+charity and benevolence, and endeavouring to do good to our fellow-
+creatures, be anything, this observation deserves to be most
+seriously considered by all who have to bestow.  And it holds with
+great exactness, when applied to the several degrees of greater and
+less indigency throughout the various ranks in human life:  the
+happiness or good produced not being in proportion to what is
+bestowed, but in proportion to this joined with the need there was
+of it.
+
+It may perhaps be expected that upon this subject notice should be
+taken of occasions, circumstances, and characters which seem at once
+to call forth affections of different sorts.  Thus vice may be
+thought the object both of pity and indignation:  folly, of pity and
+of laughter.  How far this is strictly true, I shall not inquire;
+but only observe upon the appearance, how much more humane it is to
+yield and give scope to affections, which are most directly in
+favour of, and friendly towards, our fellow-creatures; and that
+there is plainly much less danger of being led wrong by these than
+by the other.
+
+But, notwithstanding all that has been said in recommendation of
+compassion, that it is most amiable, most becoming human nature, and
+most useful to the world; yet it must be owned that every affection,
+as distinct from a principle of reason, may rise too high, and be
+beyond its just proportion.  And by means of this one carried too
+far, a man throughout his life is subject to much more uneasiness
+than belongs to his share; and in particular instances, it may be in
+such a degree as to incapacitate him from assisting the very person
+who is the object of it.  But as there are some who upon principle
+set up for suppressing this affection itself as weakness, there is
+also I know not what of fashion on this side; and, by some means or
+other, the whole world almost is run into the extremes of
+insensibility towards the distresses of their fellow-creatures:  so
+that general rules and exhortations must always be on the other
+side.
+
+And now to go on to the uses we should make of the foregoing
+reflections, the further ones they lead to, and the general temper
+they have a tendency to beget in us.  There being that distinct
+affection implanted in the nature of man, tending to lessen the
+miseries of life, that particular provision made for abating its
+sorrows, more than for increasing its positive happiness, as before
+explained; this may suggest to us what should be our general aim
+respecting ourselves, in our passage through this world:  namely, to
+endeavour chiefly to escape misery, keep free from uneasiness, pain,
+and sorrow, or to get relief and mitigation of them; to propose to
+ourselves peace and tranquillity of mind, rather than pursue after
+high enjoyments.  This is what the constitution of nature before
+explained marks out as the course we should follow, and the end we
+should aim at.  To make pleasure and mirth and jollity our business,
+and be constantly hurrying about after some gay amusement, some new
+gratification of sense or appetite, to those who will consider the
+nature of man and our condition in this world, will appear the most
+romantic scheme of life that ever entered into thought.  And yet how
+many are there who go on in this course, without learning better
+from the daily, the hourly disappointments, listlessness, and
+satiety which accompany this fashionable method of wasting away
+their days!
+
+The subject we have been insisting upon would lead us into the same
+kind of reflections by a different connection.  The miseries of life
+brought home to ourselves by compassion, viewed through this
+affection considered as the sense by which they are perceived, would
+beget in us that moderation, humility, and soberness of mind which
+has been now recommended; and which peculiarly belongs to a season
+of recollection, the only purpose of which is to bring us to a just
+sense of things, to recover us out of that forgetfulness of
+ourselves, and our true state, which it is manifest far the greatest
+part of men pass their whole life in.  Upon this account Solomon
+says that IT IS BETTER TO GO TO THE HOUSE OF MOURNING THAN TO GO TO
+THE HOUSE OF FEASTING; i.e., it is more to a man's advantage to turn
+his eyes towards objects of distress, to recall sometimes to his
+remembrance the occasions of sorrow, than to pass all his days in
+thoughtless mirth and gaiety.  And he represents the wise as
+choosing to frequent the former of these places; to be sure not for
+his own sake, but because BY THE SADNESS OF THE COUNTENANCE, THE
+HEART IS MADE BETTER.  Every one observes how temperate and
+reasonable men are when humbled and brought low by afflictions in
+comparison of what they are in high prosperity.  By this voluntary
+resort to the house of mourning, which is here recommended, we might
+learn all those useful instructions which calamities teach without
+undergoing them ourselves; and grow wiser and better at a more easy
+rate than men commonly do.  The objects themselves, which in that
+place of sorrow lie before our view, naturally give us a seriousness
+and attention, check that wantonness which is the growth of
+prosperity and ease, and head us to reflect upon the deficiencies of
+human life itself; that EVERY MAN AT HIS BEST ESTATE IS ALTOGETHER
+VANITY.  This would correct the florid and gaudy prospects and
+expectations which we are too apt to indulge, teach us to lower our
+notions of happiness and enjoyment, bring them down to the reality
+of things, to what is attainable, to what the frailty of our
+condition will admit of, which, for any continuance, is only
+tranquillity, ease, and moderate satisfactions.  Thus we might at
+once become proof against the temptations with which the whole world
+almost is carried away; since it is plain that not only what is
+called a life of pleasure, but also vicious pursuits in general, aim
+at somewhat besides and beyond these moderate satisfactions.
+
+And as to that obstinacy and wilfulness, which renders men so
+insensible to the motives of religion; this right sense of ourselves
+and of the world about us would bend the stubborn mind, soften the
+heart, and make it more apt to receive impression; and this is the
+proper temper in which to call our ways to remembrance, to review
+and set home upon ourselves the miscarriages of our past life.  In
+such a compliant state of mind, reason and conscience will have a
+fair hearing; which is the preparation for, or rather the beginning
+of, that repentance, the outward show of which we all put on at this
+season.
+
+Lastly, The various miseries of life which lie before us wherever we
+turn our eyes, the frailty of this mortal state we are passing
+through, may put us in mind that the present world is not our home;
+that we are merely strangers and travellers in it, as all our
+fathers were.  It is therefore to be considered as a foreign
+country; in which our poverty and wants, and the insufficient
+supplies of them, were designed to turn our views to that higher and
+better state we are heirs to:  a state where will be no follies to
+be overlooked, no miseries to be pitied, no wants to be relieved;
+where the affection we have been now treating of will happily be
+lost, as there will be no objects to exercise it upon:  for God
+shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no
+more death, neither sorrow, nor crying; neither shall there be any
+more pain; for the former things are passed away.
+
+
+
+SERMON VII.
+UPON THE CHARACTER OF BALAAM.
+PREACHED THE SECOND SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.
+NUMBERS xxiii. 10.
+
+
+
+Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like
+his.
+
+These words, taken alone, and without respect to him who spoke them,
+lead our thoughts immediately to the different ends of good and bad
+men.  For though the comparison is not expressed, yet it is
+manifestly implied; as is also the preference of one of these
+characters to the other in that last circumstance, death.  And,
+since dying the death of the righteous or of the wicked necessarily
+implies men's being righteous or wicked; i.e., having lived
+righteously or wickedly; a comparison of them in their lives also
+might come into consideration, from such a single view of the words
+themselves.  But my present design is to consider them with a
+particular reference or respect to him who spoke them; which
+reference, if you please to attend, you will see.  And if what shall
+be offered to your consideration at this time be thought a discourse
+upon the whole history of this man, rather than upon the particular
+words I have read, this is of no consequence:  it is sufficient if
+it afford reflection of use and service to ourselves.
+
+But, in order to avoid cavils respecting this remarkable relation in
+Scripture, either that part of it which you have heard in the first
+lesson for the day, or any other; let me just observe that as this
+is not a place for answering them, so they no way affect the
+following discourse; since the character there given is plainly a
+real one in life, and such as there are parallels to.
+
+The occasion of Balaam's coming out of his own country into the land
+of Moab, where he pronounced this solemn prayer or wish, he himself
+relates in the first parable or prophetic speech, of which it is the
+conclusion.  In which is a custom referred to, proper to be taken
+notice of:  that of devoting enemies to destruction before the
+entrance upon a war with them.  This custom appears to have
+prevailed over a great part of the world; for we find it amongst the
+most distant nations.  The Romans had public officers, to whom it
+belonged as a stated part of their office.  But there was somewhat
+more particular in the case now before us:  Balaam being looked upon
+as an extraordinary person, whose blessing or curse was thought to
+be always effectual.
+
+In order to engage the reader's attention to this passage, the
+sacred historian has enumerated the preparatory circumstances, which
+are these.  Balaam requires the king of Moab to build him seven
+altars, and to prepare him the same number of oxen and of rams.  The
+sacrifice being over, he retires alone to a solitude sacred to these
+occasions, there to wait the Divine inspiration or answer, for which
+the foregoing rites were the preparation.  AND GOD MET BALAAM, AND
+PUT A WORD IN HIS MOUTH; {16} upon receiving which, he returns back
+to the altars, where was the king, who had all this while attended
+the sacrifice, as appointed; he and all the princes of Moab
+standing, big with expectation of the Prophet's reply.  And he took
+up his parable, and said, Balak the king of Moab hath brought me
+from Aram, out of the mountains of the east, saying, Come, curse me
+Jacob, and come, defy Israel.  How shall I curse, whom God hath not
+cursed?  Or how shall I defy, whom the Lord hath not defied?  For
+from the top of the rocks I see him, and from the hills I behold
+him:  lo, the people shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned
+among the nations.  Who can count the dust of Jacob, and the number
+of the fourth part of Israel?  Let me die the death of the
+righteous, and let my last end be like his. {17}
+
+It is necessary, as you will see in the progress of this discourse,
+particularly to observe what he understood by RIGHTEOUS.  And he
+himself is introduced in the book of Micah {18} explaining it; if by
+RIGHTEOUS is meant good, as to be sure it is.  O my people, remember
+now what Balak king of Moab consulted, and what Balaam the son of
+Beor answered him from Shittim unto Gilgal.  From the mention of
+Shittim it is manifest that it is this very story which is here
+referred to, though another part of it, the account of which is not
+now extant; as there are many quotations in Scripture out of books
+which are not come down to us.  Remember what Balaam answered, that
+ye may know the righteousness of the Lord; i.e., the righteousness
+which God will accept.  Balak demands, Wherewith shall I come before
+the Lord, and bow myself before the high God?  Shall I come before
+him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old?  Will the Lord
+be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers
+of oil?  Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit
+of my body for the sin of my soul?  Balaam answers him, he hath
+showed thee, O man, what is good:  and what doth the Lord require of
+thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with
+thy God?  Here is a good man expressly characterised, as distinct
+from a dishonest and a superstitious man.  No words can more
+strongly exclude dishonesty and falseness of heart than doing
+justice and loving mercy; and both these, as well as walking humbly
+with God, are put in opposition to those ceremonial methods of
+recommendation, which Balak hoped might have served the turn.  From
+hence appears what he meant by the righteous, whose death he desires
+to die.
+
+Whether it was his own character shall now be inquired; and in order
+to determine it, we must take a view of his whole behaviour upon
+this occasion.  When the elders of Noah came to him, though he
+appears to have been much allured with the rewards offered, yet he
+had such regard to the authority of God as to keep the messengers in
+suspense until he had consulted His will.  And God said to him, Thou
+shalt not go with them; thou shalt not curse the people, for they
+are blessed. {19}  Upon this he dismisses the ambassadors, with an
+absolute refusal of accompanying them back to their king.  Thus far
+his regards to his duty prevailed, neither does there anything
+appear as yet amiss in his conduct.  His answer being reported to
+the king of Moab, a more honourable embassy is immediately
+despatched, and greater rewards proposed.  Then the iniquity of his
+heart began to disclose itself.  A thorough honest man would without
+hesitation have repeated his former answer, that he could not be
+guilty of so infamous a prostitution of the sacred character with
+which he was invested, as in the name of a prophet to curse those
+whom he knew to be blessed.  But instead of this, which was the only
+honest part in these circumstances that lay before him, he desires
+the princes of Moab to tarry that night with him also; and for the
+sake of the reward deliberates, whether by some means or other he
+might not be able to obtain leave to curse Israel; to do that, which
+had been before revealed to him to be contrary to the will of God,
+which yet he resolves not to do without that permission.  Upon
+which, as when this nation afterwards rejected God from reigning
+over them, He gave them a king in His anger; in the same way, as
+appears from other parts of the narration, He gives Balaam the
+permission he desired:  for this is the most natural sense of the
+words.  Arriving in the territories of Moab, and being received with
+particular distinction by the king, and he repeating in person the
+promise of the rewards he had before made to him by his ambassadors,
+he seeks, the text says, by SACRIFICES and ENCHANTMENTS (what these
+were is not to our purpose), to obtain leave of God to curse the
+people; keeping still his resolution, not to do it without that
+permission:  which not being able to obtain, he had such regard to
+the command of God as to keep this resolution to the last.  The
+supposition of his being under a supernatural restraint is a mere
+fiction of Philo:  he is plainly represented to be under no other
+force or restraint than the fear of God.  However, he goes on
+persevering in that endeavour, after he had declared that God had
+not beheld iniquity in Jacob, neither had he seen perverseness in
+Israel; {20} i.e., they were a people of virtue and piety, so far as
+not to have drawn down by their iniquity that curse which he was
+soliciting leave to pronounce upon them.  So that the state of
+Balaam's mind was this:  he wanted to do what he knew to be very
+wicked, and contrary to the express command of God; he had inward
+checks and restraints which he could not entirely get over; he
+therefore casts about for ways to reconcile this wickedness with his
+duty.  How great a paradox soever this may appear, as it is indeed a
+contradiction in terms, it is the very account which the Scripture
+gives us of him.
+
+But there is a more surprising piece of iniquity yet behind.  Not
+daring in his religious character, as a prophet, to assist the king
+of Moab, he considers whether there might not be found some other
+means of assisting him against that very people, whom he himself by
+the fear of God was restrained from cursing in words.  One would not
+think it possible that the weakness, even of religious self-deceit
+in its utmost excess, could have so poor a distinction, so fond an
+evasion, to serve itself of.  But so it was; and he could think of
+no other method than to betray the children of Israel to provoke His
+wrath, who was their only strength and defence.  The temptation
+which he pitched upon was that concerning which Solomon afterwards
+observed, that it had cast down many wounded; yea, many strong men
+had been slain by it:  and of which he himself was a sad example,
+when his wives turned away his heart after other gods.  This
+succeeded:  the people sin against God; and thus the Prophet's
+counsel brought on that destruction which he could by no means be
+prevailed upon to assist with the religious ceremony of execration,
+which the king of Moab thought would itself have affected it.  Their
+crime and punishment are related in Deuteronomy {21} and Numbers.
+{22}  And from the relation repeated in Numbers, {23} it appears,
+that Balaam was the contriver of the whole matter.  It is also
+ascribed to him in the Revelation, {24} where he is said to have
+taught Balak to cast a stumbling-block before the children of
+Israel.
+
+This was the man, this Balaam, I say, was the man, who desired to
+die the death of the righteous, and that his last end might be like
+his; and this was the state of his mind when he pronounced these
+words.
+
+So that the object we have now before us is the most astonishing in
+the world:  a very wicked man, under a deep sense of God and
+religion, persisting still in his wickedness, and preferring the
+wages of unrighteousness, even when he had before him a lively view
+of death, and that approaching period of his days, which should
+deprive him of all those advantages for which he was prostituting
+himself; and likewise a prospect, whether certain or uncertain, of a
+future state of retribution; all this joined with an explicit ardent
+wish that, when he was to leave this world, he might be in the
+condition of a righteous man.  Good God! what inconsistency, what
+perplexity is here!  With what different views of things, with what
+contradictory principles of action, must such a mind be torn and
+distracted!  It was not unthinking carelessness, by which he ran on
+headlong in vice and folly, without ever making a stand to ask
+himself what he was doing:  no; he acted upon the cool motives of
+interest and advantage.  Neither was he totally hard and callous to
+impressions of religion, what we call abandoned; for he absolutely
+denied to curse Israel.  When reason assumes her place, when
+convinced of his duty, when he owns and feels, and is actually under
+the influence of the divine authority; whilst he is carrying on his
+views to the grave, the end of all temporal greatness; under this
+sense of things, with the better character and more desirable state
+present--full before him--in his thoughts, in his wishes,
+voluntarily to choose the worse--what fatality is here!  Or how
+otherwise can such a character be explained?  And yet, strange as it
+may appear, it is not altogether an uncommon one:  nay, with some
+small alterations, and put a little lower, it is applicable to a
+very considerable part of the world.  For if the reasonable choice
+be seen and acknowledged, and yet men make the unreasonable one, is
+not this the same contradiction; that very inconsistency, which
+appeared so unaccountable?
+
+To give some little opening to such characters and behaviour, it is
+to be observed in general that there is no account to be given in
+the way of reason, of men's so strong attachments to the present
+world:  our hopes and fears and pursuits are in degrees beyond all
+proportion to the known value of the things they respect.  This may
+be said without taking into consideration religion and a future
+state; and when these are considered, the disproportion is
+infinitely heightened.  Now when men go against their reason, and
+contradict a more important interest at a distance, for one nearer,
+though of less consideration; if this be the whole of the case, all
+that can be said is, that strong passions, some kind of brute force
+within, prevails over the principle of rationality.  However, if
+this be with a clear, full, and distinct view of the truth of
+things, then it is doing the utmost violence to themselves, acting
+in the most palpable contradiction to their very nature.  But if
+there be any such thing in mankind as putting half-deceits upon
+themselves; which there plainly is, either by avoiding reflection,
+or (if they do reflect) by religious equivocation, subterfuges, and
+palliating matters to themselves; by these means conscience may be
+laid asleep, and they may go on in a course of wickedness with less
+disturbance.  All the various turns, doubles, and intricacies in a
+dishonest heart cannot be unfolded or laid open; but that there is
+somewhat of that kind is manifest, be it to be called self-deceit,
+or by any other name.  Balaam had before his eyes the authority of
+God, absolutely forbidding him what he, for the sake of a reward,
+had the strongest inclination to:  he was likewise in a state of
+mind sober enough to consider death and his last end:  by these
+considerations he was restrained, first from going to the king of
+Moab, and after he did go, from cursing Israel.  But notwithstanding
+this, there was great wickedness in his heart.  He could not forego
+the rewards of unrighteousness:  he therefore first seeks for
+indulgences, and when these could not be obtained, he sins against
+the whole meaning, end, and design of the prohibition, which no
+consideration in the world could prevail with him to go against the
+letter of.  And surely that impious counsel he gave to Balak against
+the children of Israel was, considered in itself, a greater piece of
+wickedness than if he had cursed them in words.
+
+If it be inquired what his situation, his hopes, and fears were, in
+respect to this his wish; the answer must be, that consciousness of
+the wickedness of his heart must necessarily have destroyed all
+settled hopes of dying the death of the righteous:  he could have no
+calm satisfaction in this view of his last end:  yet, on the other
+hand, it is possible that those partial regards to his duty, now
+mentioned, might keep him from perfect despair.
+
+Upon the whole it is manifest that Balaam had the most just and true
+notions of God and religion; as appears, partly from the original
+story itself, and more plainly from the passage in Micah; where he
+explains religion to consist in real virtue and real piety,
+expressly distinguished from superstition, and in terms which most
+strongly exclude dishonesty and falseness of heart.  Yet you see his
+behaviour:  he seeks indulgences for plain wickedness, which not
+being able to obtain he glosses over that same wickedness, dresses
+it up in a new form, in order to make it pass off more easily with
+himself.  That is, he deliberately contrives to deceive and impose
+upon himself in a matter which he knew to be of the utmost
+importance.
+
+To bring these observations home to ourselves:  it is too evident
+that many persons allow themselves in very unjustifiable courses who
+yet make great pretences to religion; not to deceive the world, none
+can be so weak as to think this will pass in our age; but from
+principles, hopes, and fears, respecting God and a future state; and
+go on thus with a sort of tranquillity and quiet of mind.  This
+cannot be upon a thorough consideration, and full resolution, that
+the pleasures and advantages they propose are to be pursued at all
+hazards, against reason, against the law of God, and though
+everlasting destruction is to be the consequence.  This would be
+doing too great violence upon themselves.  No, they are for making a
+composition with the Almighty.  These of His commands they will
+obey; but as to others--why, they will make all the atonements in
+their power; the ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute man, each in
+a way which shall not contradict his respective pursuit.
+Indulgences before, which was Balaam's first attempt, though he was
+not so successful in it as to deceive himself, or atonements
+afterwards, are all the same.  And here, perhaps, come in faint
+hopes that they may, and half-resolves that they will, one time or
+other, make a change.
+
+Besides these there are also persons, who, from a more just way of
+considering things, see the infinite absurdity of this, of
+substituting sacrifice instead of obedience; there are persons far
+enough from superstition, and not without some real sense of God and
+religion upon their minds; who yet are guilty of most unjustifiable
+practices, and go on with great coolness and command over
+themselves.  The same dishonesty and unsoundness of heart discovers
+itself in these another way.  In all common ordinary cases we see
+intuitively at first view what is our duty, what is the honest part.
+This is the ground of the observation, that the first thought is
+often the best.  In these cases doubt and deliberation is itself
+dishonesty, as it was in Balaam upon the second message.  That which
+is called considering what is our duty in a particular case is very
+often nothing but endeavouring to explain it away.  Thus those
+courses, which, if men would fairly attend to the dictates of their
+own consciences, they would see to be corruption, excess,
+oppression, uncharitableness; these are refined upon--things were so
+and so circumstantiated--great difficulties are raised about fixing
+bounds and degrees, and thus every moral obligation whatever may be
+evaded.  Here is scope, I say, for an unfair mind to explain away
+every moral obligation to itself.  Whether men reflect again upon
+this internal management and artifice, and how explicit they are
+with themselves, is another question.  There are many operations of
+the mind, many things pass within, which we never reflect upon
+again; which a bystander, from having frequent opportunities of
+observing us and our conduct, may make shrewd guesses at.
+
+That great numbers are in this way of deceiving themselves is
+certain.  There is scarce a man in the world, who has entirely got
+over all regards, hopes, and fears, concerning God and a future
+state; and these apprehensions in the generality, bad as we are,
+prevail in considerable degrees:  yet men will and can be wicked,
+with calmness and thought; we see they are.  There must therefore be
+some method of making it sit a little easy upon their minds; which,
+in the superstitious, is those indulgences and atonements before
+mentioned, and this self-deceit of another kind in persons of
+another character.  And both these proceed from a certain unfairness
+of mind, a peculiar inward dishonesty; the direct contrary to that
+simplicity which our Saviour recommends, under the notion of
+becoming little children, as a necessary qualification for our
+entering into the kingdom of heaven.
+
+But to conclude:  How much soever men differ in the course of life
+they prefer, and in their ways of palliating and excusing their
+vices to themselves; yet all agree in one thing, desiring to die the
+death of the righteous.  This is surely remarkable.  The observation
+may be extended further, and put thus:  even without determining
+what that is which we call guilt or innocence, there is no man but
+would choose, after having had the pleasure or advantage of a
+vicious action, to be free of the guilt of it, to be in the state of
+an innocent man.  This shows at least the disturbance and implicit
+dissatisfaction in vice.  If we inquire into the grounds of it, we
+shall find it proceeds partly from an immediate sense of having done
+evil, and partly from an apprehension that this inward sense shall
+one time or another be seconded by a higher judgment, upon which our
+whole being depends.  Now to suspend and drown this sense, and these
+apprehensions, be it by the hurry of business or of pleasure, or by
+superstition, or moral equivocations, this is in a manner one and
+the same, and makes no alteration at all in the nature of our case.
+Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them
+will be what they will be:  why, then, should we desire to be
+deceived?  As we are reasonable creatures, and have any regard to
+ourselves, we ought to lay these things plainly and honestly before
+our mind, and upon this, act as you please, as you think most fit:
+make that choice, and prefer that course of life, which you can
+justify to yourselves, and which sits most easy upon your own mind.
+It will immediately appear that vice cannot be the happiness, but
+must upon the whole be the misery, of such a creature as man; a
+moral, an accountable agent.  Superstitious observances, self-deceit
+though of a more refined sort, will not in reality at all mend
+matters with us.  And the result of the whole can be nothing else,
+but that with simplicity and fairness we keep innocency, and take
+heed unto the thing that is right; for this alone shall bring a man
+peace at the last.
+
+
+
+SERMON XI {24a--see footnote}
+UPON THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR.
+PREACHED ON ADVENT SUNDAY.
+ROMANS xiii. 9.
+
+
+
+And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in
+this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.
+
+It is commonly observed that there is a disposition in men to
+complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they
+live as greater than that of former ones; which is usually followed
+with this further observation, that mankind has been in that respect
+much the same in all times.  Now, not to determine whether this last
+be not contradicted by the accounts of history; thus much can scarce
+be doubted, that vice and folly takes different turns, and some
+particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in some ages than in
+others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the
+distinction of the present to profess a contracted spirit, and
+greater regards to self-interest, than appears to have been done
+formerly.  Upon this account it seems worth while to inquire whether
+private interest is likely to be promoted in proportion to the
+degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over all other
+principles; or whether the contracted affection may not possibly be
+so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own
+and private good.
+
+And since, further, there is generally thought to be some peculiar
+kind of contrariety between self-love and the love of our neighbour,
+between the pursuit of public and of private good; insomuch that
+when you are recommending one of these, you are supposed to be
+speaking against the other; and from hence arises a secret prejudice
+against, and frequently open scorn of, all talk of public spirit and
+real good-will to our fellow-creatures; it will be necessary to
+inquire what respect benevolence hath to self-love, and the pursuit
+of private interest to the pursuit of public:  or whether there be
+anything of that peculiar inconsistence and contrariety between them
+over and above what there is between self-love and other passions
+and particular affections, and their respective pursuits.
+
+These inquiries, it is hoped, may be favourably attended to; for
+there shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite
+passion, which hath so much allowed to it, and whose cause is so
+universally pleaded:  it shall be treated with the utmost tenderness
+and concern for its interests.
+
+In order to do this, as well as to determine the forementioned
+questions, it will be necessary to consider the nature, the object,
+and end of that self-love, as distinguished from other principles or
+affections in the mind, and their respective objects.
+
+Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness; and likewise a
+variety of particular affections, passions, and appetites to
+particular external objects.  The former proceeds from, or is, self-
+love; and seems inseparable from all sensible creatures, who can
+reflect upon themselves and their own interest or happiness so as to
+have that interest an object to their minds; what is to be said of
+the latter is, that they proceed from or together make up that
+particular nature, according to which man is made.  The object the
+former pursues is somewhat internal--our own happiness, enjoyment,
+satisfaction; whether we have, or have not, a distinct particular
+perception what it is, or wherein it consists:  the objects of the
+latter are this or that particular external thing, which the
+affections tend towards, and of which it hath always a particular
+idea or perception.  The principle we call self-love never seeks
+anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of
+happiness or good:  particular affections rest in the external
+things themselves.  One belongs to man as a reasonable creature
+reflecting upon his own interest or happiness.  The other, though
+quite distinct from reason, are as much a part of human nature.
+
+That all particular appetites and passions are towards EXTERNAL
+THINGS THEMSELVES, distinct from the PLEASURE ARISING FROM THEM, is
+manifested from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were
+it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the
+passion:  there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more
+than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if
+there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than
+another.
+
+Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour, is as
+really our own affection as self-love; and the pleasure arising from
+its gratification is as much my own pleasure as the pleasure self-
+love would have from knowing I myself should be happy some time
+hence would be my own pleasure.  And if, because every particular
+affection is a man's own, and the pleasure arising from its
+gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such
+particular affection must be called self-love; according to this way
+of speaking, no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from
+self-love; and every action and every affection whatever is to be
+resolved up into this one principle.  But then this is not the
+language of mankind; or if it were, we should want words to express
+the difference between the principle of an action, proceeding from
+cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage; and an
+action, suppose of revenge or of friendship, by which a man runs
+upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another.  It is manifest
+the principles of these actions are totally different, and so want
+different words to be distinguished by; all that they agree in is
+that they both proceed from, and are done to gratify, an inclination
+in a man's self.  But the principle or inclination in one case is
+self-love; in the other, hatred or love of another.  There is then a
+distinction between the cool principle of self-love, or general
+desire of our own happiness, as one part of our nature, and one
+principle of action; and the particular affections towards
+particular external objects, as another part of our nature, and
+another principle of action.  How much soever therefore is to be
+allowed to self-love, yet it cannot be allowed to be the whole of
+our inward constitution; because, you see, there are other parts or
+principles which come into it.
+
+Further, private happiness or good is all which self-love can make
+us desire, or be concerned about:  in having this consists its
+gratification:  it is an affection to ourselves; a regard to our own
+interest, happiness, and private good:  and in the proportion a man
+hath this, he is interested, or a lover of himself.  Let this be
+kept in mind; because there is commonly, as I shall presently have
+occasion to observe, another sense put upon these words.  On the
+other hand, particular affections tend towards particular external
+things:  these are their objects:  having these is their end:  in
+this consists their gratification:  no matter whether it be, or be
+not, upon the whole, our interest or happiness.  An action done from
+the former of these principles is called an interested action.  An
+action proceeding from any of the latter has its denomination of
+passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengeful, or any other, from the
+particular appetite or affection from which it proceeds.  Thus self-
+love as one part of human nature, and the several particular
+principles as the other part, are, themselves, their objects and
+ends, stated and shown.
+
+From hence it will be easy to see how far, and in what ways, each of
+these can contribute and be subservient to the private good of the
+individual.  Happiness does not consist in self-love.  The desire of
+happiness is no more the thing itself than the desire of riches is
+the possession or enjoyment of them.  People might love themselves
+with the most entire and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely
+miserable.  Neither can self-love any way help them out, but by
+setting them on work to get rid of the causes of their misery, to
+gain or make use of those objects which are by nature adapted to
+afford satisfaction.  Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the
+enjoyment of those objects which are by nature suited to our several
+particular appetites, passions, and affections.  So that if self-
+love wholly engrosses us, and leaves no room for any other
+principle, there can be absolutely no such thing at all as happiness
+or enjoyment of any kind whatever; since happiness consists in the
+gratification of particular passions, which supposes the having of
+them.  Self-love then does not constitute THIS or THAT to be our
+interest or good; but, our interest or good being constituted by
+nature and supposed, self-love only puts us upon obtaining and
+securing it.  Therefore, if it be possible that self-love may
+prevail and exert itself in a degree or manner which is not
+subservient to this end; then it will not follow that our interest
+will be promoted in proportion to the degree in which that principle
+engrosses us, and prevails over others.  Nay, further, the private
+and contracted affection, when it is not subservient to this end,
+private good may, for anything that appears, have a direct contrary
+tendency and effect.  And if we will consider the matter, we shall
+see that it often really has.  DISENGAGEMENT is absolutely necessary
+to enjoyment; and a person may have so steady and fixed an eye upon
+his own interest, whatever he places it in, as may hinder him from
+ATTENDING to many gratifications within his reach, which others have
+their minds FREE and OPEN to.  Over-fondness for a child is not
+generally thought to be for its advantage; and, if there be any
+guess to be made from appearances, surely that character we call
+selfish is not the most promising for happiness.  Such a temper may
+plainly be, and exert itself in a degree and manner which may give
+unnecessary and useless solicitude and anxiety, in a degree and
+manner which may prevent obtaining the means and materials of
+enjoyment, as well as the making use of them.  Immoderate self-love
+does very ill consult its own interest:  and, how much soever a
+paradox it may appear, it is certainly true that even from self-love
+we should endeavour to get over all inordinate regard to and
+consideration of ourselves.  Every one of our passions and
+affections hath its natural stint and bound, which may easily be
+exceeded; whereas our enjoyments can possibly be but in a
+determinate measure and degree.  Therefore such excess of the
+affection, since it cannot procure any enjoyment, must in all cases
+be useless; but is generally attended with inconveniences, and often
+is downright pain and misery.  This holds as much with regard to
+self-love as to all other affections.  The natural degree of it, so
+far as it sets us on work to gain and make use of the materials of
+satisfaction, may be to our real advantage; but beyond or besides
+this, it is in several respects an inconvenience and disadvantage.
+Thus it appears that private interest is so far from being likely to
+be promoted in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses
+us, and prevails over all other principles, that the contracted
+affection may be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even
+contradict its own and private good.
+
+"But who, except the most sordidly covetous, ever thought there was
+any rivalship between the love of greatness, honour, power, or
+between sensual appetites and self-love?  No, there is a perfect
+harmony between them.  It is by means of these particular appetites
+and affections that self-love is gratified in enjoyment, happiness,
+and satisfaction.  The competition and rivalship is between self-
+love and the love of our neighbour:  that affection which leads us
+out of ourselves, makes us regardless of our own interest, and
+substitute that of another in its stead."  Whether, then, there be
+any peculiar competition and contrariety in this case shall now be
+considered.
+
+Self-love and interestedness was stated to consist in or be an
+affection to ourselves, a regard to our own private good:  it is
+therefore distinct from benevolence, which is an affection to the
+good of our fellow-creatures.  But that benevolence is distinct
+from, that is, not the same thing with self-love, is no reason for
+its being looked upon with any peculiar suspicion; because every
+principle whatever, by means of which self-love is gratified, is
+distinct from it; and all things which are distinct from each other
+are equally so.  A man has an affection or aversion to another:
+that one of these tends to, and is gratified by, doing good, that
+the other tends to, and is gratified by, doing harm, does not in the
+least alter the respect which either one or the other of these
+inward feelings has to self-love.  We use the word PROPERTY so as to
+exclude any other persons having an interest in that of which we say
+a particular man has the property.  And we often use the word
+SELFISH so as to exclude in the same manner all regards to the good
+of others.  But the cases are not parallel:  for though that
+exclusion is really part of the idea of property; yet such positive
+exclusion, or bringing this peculiar disregard to the good of others
+into the idea of self-love, is in reality adding to the idea, or
+changing it from what it was before stated to consist in, namely, in
+an affection to ourselves. {25}  This being the whole idea of self-
+love, it can no otherwise exclude good-will or love of others, than
+merely by not including it, no otherwise, than it excludes love of
+arts or reputation, or of anything else.  Neither on the other hand
+does benevolence, any more than love of arts or of reputation
+exclude self-love.  Love of our neighbour, then, has just the same
+respect to, is no more distant from, self-love, than hatred of our
+neighbour, or than love or hatred of anything else.  Thus the
+principles, from which men rush upon certain ruin for the
+destruction of an enemy, and for the preservation of a friend, have
+the same respect to the private affection, and are equally
+interested, or equally disinterested; and it is of no avail whether
+they are said to be one or the other.  Therefore to those who are
+shocked to hear virtue spoken of as disinterested, it may be allowed
+that it is indeed absurd to speak thus of it; unless hatred, several
+particular instances of vice, and all the common affections and
+aversions in mankind, are acknowledged to be disinterested too.  Is
+there any less inconsistence between the love of inanimate things,
+or of creatures merely sensitive, and self-love, than between self-
+love and the love of our neighbour?  Is desire of and delight in the
+happiness of another any more a diminution of self-love than desire
+of and delight in the esteem of another?  They are both equally
+desire of and delight in somewhat external to ourselves; either both
+or neither are so.  The object of self-love is expressed in the term
+self; and every appetite of sense, and every particular affection of
+the heart, are equally interested or disinterested, because the
+objects of them all are equally self or somewhat else.  Whatever
+ridicule therefore the mention of a disinterested principle or
+action may be supposed to lie open to, must, upon the matter being
+thus stated, relate to ambition, and every appetite and particular
+affection as much as to benevolence.  And indeed all the ridicule,
+and all the grave perplexity, of which this subject hath had its
+full share, is merely from words.  The most intelligible way of
+speaking of it seems to be this:  that self-love and the actions
+done in consequence of it (for these will presently appear to be the
+same as to this question) are interested; that particular affections
+towards external objects, and the actions done in consequence of
+those affections are not so.  But every one is at liberty to use
+words as he pleases.  All that is here insisted upon is that
+ambition, revenge, benevolence, all particular passions whatever,
+and the actions they produce, are equally interested or
+disinterested.
+
+Thus it appears that there is no peculiar contrariety between self-
+love and benevolence; no greater competition between these than
+between any other particular affections and self-love.  This relates
+to the affections themselves.  Let us now see whether there be any
+peculiar contrariety between the respective courses of life which
+these affections lead to; whether there be any greater competition
+between the pursuit of private and of public good, than between any
+other particular pursuits and that of private good.
+
+There seems no other reason to suspect that there is any such
+peculiar contrariety, but only that the course of action which
+benevolence leads to has a more direct tendency to promote the good
+of others, than that course of action which love of reputation
+suppose, or any other particular affection leads to.  But that any
+affection tends to the happiness of another does not hinder its
+tending to one's own happiness too.  That others enjoy the benefit
+of the air and the light of the sun does not hinder but that these
+are as much one's own private advantage now as they would be if we
+had the property of them exclusive of all others.  So a pursuit
+which tends to promote the good of another, yet may have as great
+tendency to promote private interest, as a pursuit which does not
+tend to the good of another at all, or which is mischievous to him.
+All particular affections whatever, resentment, benevolence, love of
+arts, equally lead to a course of action for their own
+gratification; i.e., the gratification of ourselves; and the
+gratification of each gives delight:  so far, then, it is manifest
+they have all the same respect to private interest.  Now take into
+consideration, further, concerning these three pursuits, that the
+end of the first is the harm, of the second, the good of another, of
+the last, somewhat indifferent; and is there any necessity that
+these additional considerations should alter the respect, which we
+before saw these three pursuits had to private interest, or render
+any one of them less conducive to it, than any other?  Thus one
+man's affection is to honour as his end; in order to obtain which he
+thinks no pains too great.  Suppose another, with such a singularity
+of mind, as to have the same affection to public good as his end,
+which he endeavours with the same labour to obtain.  In case of
+success, surely the man of benevolence hath as great enjoyment as
+the man of ambition; they both equally having the end their
+affections, in the same degree, tended to; but in case of
+disappointment, the benevolent man has clearly the advantage; since
+endeavouring to do good, considered as a virtuous pursuit, is
+gratified by its own consciousness, i.e., is in a degree its own
+reward.
+
+And as to these two, or benevolence and any other particular
+passions whatever, considered in a further view, as forming a
+general temper, which more or less disposes us for enjoyment of all
+the common blessings of life, distinct from their own gratification,
+is benevolence less the temper of tranquillity and freedom than
+ambition or covetousness?  Does the benevolent man appear less easy
+with himself from his love to his neighbour?  Does he less relish
+his being?  Is there any peculiar gloom seated on his face?  Is his
+mind less open to entertainment, to any particular gratification?
+Nothing is more manifest than that being in good humour, which is
+benevolence whilst it lasts, is itself the temper of satisfaction
+and enjoyment.
+
+Suppose then, a man sitting down to consider how he might become
+most easy to himself, and attain the greatest pleasure he could, all
+that which is his real natural happiness.  This can only consist in
+the enjoyment of those objects which are by nature adapted to our
+several faculties.  These particular enjoyments make up the sum
+total of our happiness, and they are supposed to arise from riches,
+honours, and the gratification of sensual appetites.  Be it so; yet
+none profess themselves so completely happy in these enjoyments, but
+that there is room left in the mind for others, if they were
+presented to them:  nay, these, as much as they engage us, are not
+thought so high, but that human nature is capable even of greater.
+Now there have been persons in all ages who have professed that they
+found satisfaction in the exercise of charity, in the love of their
+neighbour, in endeavouring to promote the happiness of all they had
+to do with, and in the pursuit of what is just and right and good as
+the general bent of their mind and end of their life; and that doing
+an action of baseness or cruelty would be as great violence to THEIR
+self, as much breaking in upon their nature, as any external force.
+Persons of this character would add, if they might be heard, that
+they consider themselves as acting in the view of an Infinite Being,
+who is in a much higher sense the object of reverence and of love,
+than all the world besides; and therefore they could have no more
+enjoyment from a wicked action done under His eye than the persons
+to whom they are making their apology could if all mankind were the
+spectators of it; and that the satisfaction of approving themselves
+to his unerring judgment, to whom they thus refer all their actions,
+is a more continued settled satisfaction than any this world can
+afford; as also that they have, no less than others, a mind free and
+open to all the common innocent gratifications of it, such as they
+are.  And if we go no further, does there appear any absurdity in
+this?  Will any one take upon him to say that a man cannot find his
+account in this general course of life as much as in the most
+unbounded ambition, and the excesses of pleasure?  Or that such a
+person has not consulted so well for himself, for the satisfaction
+and peace of his own mind, as the ambitious or dissolute man?  And
+though the consideration that God himself will in the end justify
+their taste, and support their cause, is not formally to be insisted
+upon here, yet thus much comes in, that all enjoyments whatever are
+much more clear and unmixed from the assurance that they will end
+well.  Is it certain, then, that there is nothing in these
+pretensions to happiness? especially when there are not wanting
+persons who have supported themselves with satisfactions of this
+kind in sickness, poverty, disgrace, and in the very pangs of death;
+whereas it is manifest all other enjoyments fail in these
+circumstances.  This surely looks suspicions of having somewhat in
+it.  Self-love, methinks, should be alarmed.  May she not possibly
+pass over greater pleasures than those she is so wholly taken up
+with?
+
+The short of the matter is no more than this.  Happiness consists in
+the gratification of certain affections, appetites, passions, with
+objects which are by nature adapted to them.  Self-love may indeed
+set us on work to gratify these, but happiness or enjoyment has no
+immediate connection with self-love, but arises from such
+gratification alone.  Love of our neighbour is one of those
+affections.  This, considered as a VIRTUOUS PRINCIPLE, is gratified
+by a consciousness of ENDEAVOURING to promote the good of others,
+but considered as a natural affection, its gratification consists in
+the actual accomplishment of this endeavour.  Now indulgence or
+gratification of this affection, whether in that consciousness or
+this accomplishment, has the same respect to interest as indulgence
+of any other affection; they equally proceed from or do not proceed
+from self-love, they equally include or equally exclude this
+principle.  Thus it appears, that benevolence and the pursuit of
+public good hath at least as great respect to self-love and the
+pursuit of private good as any other particular passions, and their
+respective pursuits.
+
+Neither is covetousness, whether as a temper or pursuit, any
+exception to this.  For if by covetousness is meant the desire and
+pursuit of riches for their own sake, without any regard to, or
+consideration of, the uses of them, this hath as little to do with
+self-love as benevolence hath.  But by this word is usually meant,
+not such madness and total distraction of mind, but immoderate
+affection to and pursuit of riches as possessions in order to some
+further end, namely, satisfaction, interest, or good.  This,
+therefore, is not a particular affection or particular pursuit, but
+it is the general principle of self-love, and the general pursuit of
+our own interest, for which reason the word SELFISH is by every one
+appropriated to this temper and pursuit.  Now as it is ridiculous to
+assert that self-love and the love of our neighbour are the same, so
+neither is it asserted that following these different affections
+hath the same tendency and respect to our own interest.  The
+comparison is not between self-love and the love of our neighbour,
+between pursuit of our own interest and the interest of others, but
+between the several particular affections in human nature towards
+external objects, as one part of the comparison, and the one
+particular affection to the good of our neighbour as the other part
+of it:  and it has been shown that all these have the same respect
+to self-love and private interest.
+
+There is indeed frequently an inconsistence or interfering between
+self-love or private interest and the several particular appetites,
+passions, affections, or the pursuits they lead to.  But this
+competition or interfering is merely accidental, and happens much
+oftener between pride, revenge, sensual gratifications, and private
+interest, than between private interest and benevolence.  For
+nothing is more common than to see men give themselves up to a
+passion or an affection to their known prejudice and ruin, and in
+direct contradiction to manifest and real interest, and the loudest
+calls of self-love:  whereas the seeming competitions and
+interfering, between benevolence and private interest, relate much
+more to the materials or means of enjoyment than to enjoyment
+itself.  There is often an interfering in the former when there is
+none in the latter.  Thus as to riches:  so much money as a man
+gives away, so much less will remain in his possession.  Here is a
+real interfering.  But though a man cannot possibly give without
+lessening his fortune, yet there are multitudes might give without
+lessening their own enjoyment, because they may have more than they
+can turn to any real use or advantage to themselves.  Thus the more
+thought and time any one employs about the interests and good of
+others, he must necessarily have less to attend his own:  but he may
+have so ready and large a supply of his own wants, that such thought
+might be really useless to himself, though of great service and
+assistance to others.
+
+The general mistake, that there is some greater inconsistence
+between endeavouring to promote the good of another and self-
+interest, than between self-interest and pursuing anything else,
+seems, as hath already been hinted, to arise from our notions of
+property, and to be carried on by this property's being supposed to
+be itself our happiness or good.  People are so very much taken up
+with this one subject, that they seem from it to have formed a
+general way of thinking, which they apply to other things that they
+have nothing to do with.  Hence in a confused and slight way it
+might well be taken for granted that another's having no interest in
+an affection (i.e., his good not being the object of it) renders, as
+one may speak, the proprietor's interest in it greater; and that if
+another had an interest in it this would render his less, or
+occasion that such affection could not be so friendly to self-love,
+or conducive to private good, as an affection or pursuit which has
+not a regard to the good of another.  This, I say, might be taken
+for granted, whilst it was not attended to, that the object of every
+particular affection is equally somewhat external to ourselves, and
+whether it be the good of another person, or whether it be any other
+external thing, makes no alteration with regard to its being one's
+own affection, and the gratification of it one's own private
+enjoyment.  And so far as it is taken for granted that barely having
+the means and materials of enjoyment is what constitutes interest
+and happiness; that our interest or good consists in possessions
+themselves, in having the property of riches, houses, lands,
+gardens, not in the enjoyment of them; so far it will even more
+strongly be taken for granted, in the way already explained, that an
+affection's conducing to the good of another must even necessarily
+occasion it to conduce less to private good, if not to be positively
+detrimental to it.  For, if property and happiness are one and the
+same thing, as by increasing the property of another you lessen your
+own property, so by promoting the happiness of another you must
+lessen your own happiness.  But whatever occasioned the mistake, I
+hope it has been fully proved to be one, as it has been proved, that
+there is no peculiar rivalship or competition between self-love and
+benevolence:  that as there may be a competition between these two,
+so there many also between any particular affection whatever and
+self-love; that every particular affection, benevolence among the
+rest, is subservient to self-love by being the instrument of private
+enjoyment; and that in one respect benevolence contributes more to
+private interest, i.e., enjoyment or satisfaction, than any other of
+the particular common affections, as it is in a degree its own
+gratification.
+
+And to all these things may be added that religion, from whence
+arises our strongest obligation to benevolence, is so far from
+disowning the principle of self-love, that it often addresses itself
+to that very principle, and always to the mind in that state when
+reason presides, and there can no access be had to the
+understanding, but by convincing men that the course of life we
+would persuade them to is not contrary to their interest.  It may be
+allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion,
+that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the
+nearest and most important to us; that they will, nay, if you
+please, that they ought to prevail over those of order, and beauty,
+and harmony, and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is
+impossible there ever should be, any inconsistence between them,
+though these last, too, as expressing the fitness of actions, are
+real as truth itself.  Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral
+rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is
+right and good, as such, yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour,
+we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till
+we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not
+contrary to it.
+
+Common reason and humanity will have some influence upon mankind,
+whatever becomes of speculations; but, so far as the interests of
+virtue depend upon the theory of it being secured from open scorn,
+so far its very being in the world depends upon its appearing to
+have no contrariety to private interest and self-love.  The
+foregoing observations, therefore, it is hoped, may have gained a
+little ground in favour of the precept before us, the particular
+explanation of which shall be the subject of the next discourse.
+
+I will conclude at present with observing the peculiar obligation
+which we are under to virtue and religion, as enforced in the verses
+following the text, in the epistle for the day, from our Saviour's
+coming into the world.  THE NIGHT IS FAR SPENT, THE DAY IS AT HAND;
+LET US THEREFORE CAST OFF THE WORKS OF DARKNESS, AND LET US PUT ON
+THE ARMOUR OF LIGHT, &c.  The meaning and force of which exhortation
+is, that Christianity lays us under new obligations to a good life,
+as by it the will of God is more clearly revealed, and as it affords
+additional motives to the practice of it, over and above those which
+arise out of the nature of virtue and vice, I might add, as our
+Saviour has set us a perfect example of goodness in our own nature.
+Now love and charity is plainly the thing in which He hath placed
+His religion; in which, therefore, as we have any pretence to the
+name of Christians, we must place ours.  He hath at once enjoined it
+upon us by way of command with peculiar force, and by His example,
+as having undertaken the work of our salvation out of pure love and
+goodwill to mankind.  The endeavour to set home this example upon
+our minds is a very proper employment of this season, which is
+bringing on the festival of His birth, which as it may teach us many
+excellent lessons of humility, resignation, and obedience to the
+will of God, so there is none it recommends with greater authority,
+force, and advantage than this love and charity, since it was FOR US
+MEN, AND FOR OUR SALVATION, that HE CAME DOWN FROM HEAVEN, AND WAS
+INCARNATE, AND WAS MADE MAN, that He might teach us our duty, and
+more especially that He might enforce the practice of it, reform
+mankind, and finally bring us to that ETERNAL SALVATION, of which HE
+IS THE AUTHOR TO ALL THOSE THAT OBEY HIM.
+
+
+
+SERMON XII.
+UPON THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR.
+ROM. xiii. 9.
+
+
+
+And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in
+this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.
+
+Having already removed the prejudices against public spirit, or the
+love of our neighbour, on the side of private interest and self-
+love, I proceed to the particular explanation of the precept before
+us, by showing, Who is our neighbour:  In what sense we are required
+to love him as ourselves; The influence such love would have upon
+our behaviour in life; and lastly, How this commandment comprehends
+in it all others.
+
+I.  The objects and due extent of this affection will be understood
+by attending to the nature of it, and to the nature and
+circumstances of mankind in this world.  The love of our neighbour
+is the same with charity, benevolence, or goodwill:  it is an
+affection to the good and happiness of our fellow-creatures.  This
+implies in it a disposition to produce happiness, and this is the
+simple notion of goodness, which appears so amiable wherever we meet
+with it.  From hence it is easy to see that the perfection of
+goodness consists in love to the whole universe.  This is the
+perfection of Almighty God.
+
+But as man is so much limited in his capacity, as so small a part of
+the Creation comes under his notice and influence, and as we are not
+used to consider things in so general a way, it is not to be thought
+of that the universe should be the object of benevolence to such
+creatures as we are.  Thus in that precept of our Saviour, Be ye
+perfect, even as your Father, which is in heaven, is perfect, {26}
+the perfection of the divine goodness is proposed to our imitation
+as it is promiscuous, and extends to the evil as well as the good;
+not as it is absolutely universal, imitation of it in this respect
+being plainly beyond us.  The object is too vast.  For this reason
+moral writers also have substituted a less general object for our
+benevolence, mankind.  But this likewise is an object too general,
+and very much out of our view.  Therefore persons more practical
+have, instead of mankind, put our country, and made the principle of
+virtue, of human virtue, to consist in the entire uniform love of
+our country:  and this is what we call a public spirit, which in men
+of public stations is the character of a patriot.  But this is
+speaking to the upper part of the world.  Kingdoms and governments
+are large, and the sphere of action of far the greatest part of
+mankind is much narrower than the government they live under:  or
+however, common men do not consider their actions as affecting the
+whole community of which they are members.  There plainly is wanting
+a less general and nearer object of benevolence for the bulk of men
+than that of their country.  Therefore the Scripture, not being a
+book of theory and speculation, but a plain rule of life for
+mankind, has with the utmost possible propriety put the principle of
+virtue upon the love of our neighbour, which is that part of the
+universe, that part of mankind, that part of our country, which
+comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, and
+with which we have to do.
+
+This is plainly the true account or reason why our Saviour places
+the principle of virtue in the love of our NEIGHBOUR, and the
+account itself shows who are comprehended under that relation.
+
+II.  Let us now consider in what sense we are commanded to love our
+neighbour AS OURSELVES.
+
+This precept, in its first delivery by our Saviour, is thus
+introduced:- Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart,
+with all thy soul, and with all thy strength; and thy neighbour as
+thyself.  These very different manners of expression do not lead our
+thoughts to the same measure or degree of love, common to both
+objects, but to one peculiar to each.  Supposing, then, which is to
+be supposed, a distinct meaning and propriety in the words, AS
+THYSELF; the precept we are considering will admit of any of these
+senses:  that we bear the SAME KIND of affection to our neighbour as
+we do to ourselves, or, that the love we bear to our neighbour
+should have SOME CERTAIN PROPORTION OR OTHER to self-love:  or,
+lastly, that it should bear the particular proportion of EQUALITY,
+that IT BE IN THE SAME DEGREE.
+
+First, The precept may be understood as requiring only that we have
+the SAME KIND of affection to our fellow-creatures as to ourselves;
+that, as every man has the principle of self-love, which disposes
+him to avoid misery, and consult his own happiness, so we should
+cultivate the affection of goodwill to our neighbour, and that it
+should influence us to have the same kind of regard to him.  This at
+least must be commanded, and this will not only prevent our being
+injurious to him, but will also put us upon promoting his good.
+There are blessings in life, which we share in common with others,
+peace, plenty, freedom, healthful seasons.  But real benevolence to
+our fellow-creatures would give us the notion of a common interest
+in a stricter sense, for in the degree we love another, his
+interest, his joys and sorrows, are our own.  It is from self-love
+that we form the notion of private good, and consider it is our own:
+love of our neighbour would teach us thus to appropriate to
+ourselves his good and welfare; to consider ourselves as having a
+real share in his happiness.  Thus the principle of benevolence
+would be an advocate within our own breasts, to take care of the
+interests of our fellow-creatures in all the interfering and
+competitions which cannot but be, from the imperfection of our
+nature, and the state we are in.  It would likewise, in some
+measure, lessen that interfering, and hinder men from forming so
+strong a notion of private good, exclusive of the good of others, as
+we commonly do.  Thus, as the private affection makes us in a
+peculiar manner sensible of humanity, justice or injustice, when
+exercised towards ourselves, love of our neighbour would give us the
+same kind of sensibility in his behalf.  This would be the greatest
+security of our uniform obedience to that most equitable rule.
+WHATSOEVER YE WOULD THAT MEN SHOULD DO UNTO YOU, DO YE EVEN SO UNTO
+THEM.
+
+All this is indeed no more than that we should have a real love to
+our neighbour; but then, which is to be observed, the words AS
+THYSELF express this in the most distinct manner, and determine the
+precept to relate to the affection itself.  The advantage which this
+principle of benevolence has over other remote considerations is,
+that it is itself the temper of virtue, and likewise that it is the
+chief, nay, the only effectual security of our performing the
+several offices of kindness we owe to our fellow-creatures.  When
+from distant considerations men resolve upon any thing to which they
+have no liking, or perhaps an averseness, they are perpetually
+finding out evasions and excuses, which need never be wanting, if
+people look for them:  and they equivocate with themselves in the
+plainest cases in the world.  This may be in respect to single
+determinate acts of virtue, but it comes in much more, where the
+obligation is to a general course of behaviour, and most of all, if
+it be such as cannot be reduced to fixed determinate rules.  This
+observation may account for the diversity of the expression in that
+known passage of the prophet Micah, TO DO JUSTLY, AND TO LOVE MERCY.
+A man's heart must be formed to humanity and benevolence, he must
+LOVE MERCY, otherwise he will not act mercifully in any settled
+course of behaviour.  As consideration of the future sanctions of
+religion is our only security of preserving in our duty, in cases of
+great temptation:  so to get our heart and temper formed to a love
+and liking of what is good is absolutely necessary in order to our
+behaving rightly in the familiar and daily intercourses amongst
+mankind.
+
+Secondly, The precept before us may be understood to require that we
+love our neighbour in some certain PROPORTION or other, ACCORDING AS
+we love ourselves.  And indeed a man's character cannot be
+determined by the love he bears to his neighbour, considered
+absolutely, but the proportion which this bears to self-love,
+whether it be attended to or not, is the chief thing which forms the
+character and influences the actions.  For, as the form of the body
+is a composition of various parts, so likewise our inward structure
+is not simple or uniform, but a composition of various passions,
+appetites, affections, together with rationality, including in this
+last both the discernment of what is right, and a disposition to
+regulate ourselves by it.  There is greater variety of parts in what
+we call a character than there are features in a face, and the
+morality of that is no more determined by one part than the beauty
+or deformity of this is by one single feature:  each is to be judged
+of by all the parts or features, not taken singly, but together.  In
+the inward frame the various passions, appetites, affections, stand
+in different respects to each other.  The principles in our mind may
+be contradictory, or checks and allays only, or incentives and
+assistants to each other.  And principles, which in their nature
+have no kind of contrariety or affinity, may yet accidentally be
+each other's allays or incentives.
+
+From hence it comes to pass, that though we were able to look into
+the inward contexture of the heart, and see with the greatest
+exactness in what degree any one principle is in a particular man,
+we could not from thence determine how far that principle would go
+towards forming the character, or what influence it would have upon
+the actions, unless we could likewise discern what other principles
+prevailed in him, and see the proportion which that one bears to the
+others.  Thus, though two men should have the affection of
+compassion in the same degree exactly, yet one may have the
+principle of resentment or of ambition so strong in him as to
+prevail over that of compassion, and prevent its having any
+influence upon his actions, so that he may deserve the character of
+a hard or cruel man, whereas the other having compassion in just the
+same degree only, yet having resentment or ambition in a lower
+degree, his compassion may prevail over them, so as to influence his
+actions, and to denominate his temper compassionate.  So that, how
+strange soever it may appear to people who do not attend to the
+thing, yet it is quite manifest that, when we say one man is more
+resenting or compassionate than another, this does not necessarily
+imply that one has the principle of resentment or of compassion
+stronger than the other.  For if the proportion which resentment or
+compassion bears to other inward principles is greater in one than
+in the other, this is itself sufficient to denominate one more
+resenting or compassionate than the other.
+
+Further, the whole system, as I may speak, of affections (including
+rationality), which constitute the heart, as this word is used in
+Scripture and on moral subjects, are each and all of them stronger
+in some than in others.  Now the proportion which the two general
+affections, benevolence and self-love, bear to each other, according
+to this interpretation of the text, demonstrates men's character as
+to virtue.  Suppose, then, one man to have the principle of
+benevolence in a higher degree than another; it will not follow from
+hence that his general temper or character or actions will be more
+benevolent than the other's.  For he may have self-love in such a
+degree as quite to prevail over benevolence, so that it may have no
+influence at all upon his action, whereas benevolence in the other
+person, though in a lower degree, may yet be the strongest principle
+in his heart, and strong enough to be the guide of his actions, so
+as to denominate him a good and virtuous man.  The case is here as
+in scales:  it is not one weight considered in itself, which
+determines whether the scale shall ascend or descend, but this
+depends upon the proportion which that one weight hath to the other.
+
+It being thus manifest that the influence which benevolence has upon
+our actions, and how far it goes towards forming our character, is
+not determined by the degree itself of this principle in our mind,
+but by the proportion it has to self-love and other principles:  a
+comparison also being made in the text between self-love and the
+love of our neighbour; these joint considerations afforded
+sufficient occasion for treating here of that proportion.  It
+plainly is implied in the precept, though it should be questioned,
+whether it be the exact meaning of the words, as THYSELF.
+
+Love of our neighbour, then, must bear some proportion to self-love,
+and virtue, to be sure, consists in the due proportion.  What this
+due proportion is, whether as a principle in the mind, or as exerted
+in actions, can be judged of only from our nature and condition in
+this world.  Of the degree in which affections and the principles of
+action, considered in themselves, prevail, we have no measure:  let
+us, then, proceed to the course of behaviour, the actions they
+produce.
+
+Both our nature and condition require that each particular man
+should make particular provision for himself:  and the inquiry, what
+proportion benevolence should have to self-love, when brought down
+to practice, will be, what is a competent care and provision for
+ourselves?  And how certain soever it be that each man must
+determine this for himself, and how ridiculous soever it would be
+for any to attempt to determine it for another, yet it is to be
+observed that the proportion is real, and that a competent provision
+has a bound, and that it cannot be all which we can possibly get and
+keep within our grasp, without legal injustice.  Mankind almost
+universally bring in vanity, supplies for what is called a life of
+pleasure, covetousness, or imaginary notions of superiority over
+others, to determine this question:  but every one who desires to
+act a proper part in society would do well to consider how far any
+of them come in to determine it, in the way of moral consideration.
+All that can be said is, supposing what, as the world goes, is so
+much to be supposed that it is scarce to be mentioned, that persons
+do not neglect what they really owe to themselves; the more of their
+care and thought and of their fortune they employ in doing good to
+their fellow-creatures the nearer they come up to the law of
+perfection, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.
+
+Thirdly, if the words AS THYSELF were to be understood of an
+equality of affection, it would not be attended with those
+consequences which perhaps may be thought to follow from it.
+Suppose a person to have the same settled regard to others as to
+himself; that in every deliberate scheme or pursuit he took their
+interest into the account in the same degree as his own, so far as
+an equality of affection would produce this:  yet he would, in fact,
+and ought to be, much more taken up and employed about himself, and
+his own concerns, than about others, and their interests.  For,
+besides the one common affection toward himself and his neighbour he
+would have several other particular affections, passions, appetites,
+which he could not possibly feel in common both for himself and
+others.  Now these sensations themselves very much employ us, and
+have perhaps as great influence as self-love.  So far indeed as
+self-love, and cool reflection upon what is for our interest, would
+set us on work to gain a supply of our own several wants, so far the
+love of our neighbour would make us do the same for him:  but the
+degree in which we are put upon seeking and making use of the means
+of gratification, by the feeling of those affections, appetites, and
+passions, must necessarily be peculiar to ourselves.
+
+That there are particular passions (suppose shame, resentment) which
+men seem to have, and feel in common, both for themselves and
+others, makes no alteration in respect to those passions and
+appetites which cannot possibly be thus felt in common.  From hence
+(and perhaps more things of the like kind might be mentioned) it
+follows, that though there were an equality of affection to both,
+yet regards to ourselves would be more prevalent than attention to
+the concerns of others.
+
+And from moral considerations it ought to be so, supposing still the
+equality of affection commanded, because we are in a peculiar
+manner, as I may speak, intrusted with ourselves, and therefore care
+of our own interests, as well as of our conduct, particularly
+belongs to us.
+
+To these things must be added, that moral obligations can extend no
+further than to natural possibilities.  Now we have a perception of
+our own interests, like consciousness of our own existence, which we
+always carry about with us, and which, in its continuation, kind,
+and degree, seems impossible to be felt in respect to the interests
+of others.
+
+From all these things it fully appears that though we were to love
+our neighbour in the same degree as we love ourselves, so far as
+this is possible, yet the care of ourselves, of the individual,
+would not be neglected, the apprehended danger of which seems to be
+the only objection against understanding the precept in this strict
+sense.
+
+III.  The general temper of mind which the due love of our neighbour
+would form us to, and the influence it would have upon our behaviour
+in life, is now to be considered.
+
+The temper and behaviour of charity is explained at large in that
+known passage of St. Paul:  {27} Charity suffereth long, and is
+kind; charity envieth not, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh
+not her own, thinketh no evil, beareth all things, believeth all
+things, hopeth all things.  As to the meaning of the expressions,
+seeketh not her own, thinketh no evil, believeth all things; however
+those expressions may be explained away, this meekness, and in some
+degree easiness of temper, readiness to forego our right for the
+sake of peace, as well as in the way of compassion, freedom from
+mistrust, and disposition to believe well of our neighbour, this
+general temper, I say, accompanies, and is plainly the effect of
+love and goodwill.  And, though such is the world in which we live,
+that experience and knowledge of it not only may, but must beget, in
+as greater regard to ourselves, and doubtfulness of the characters
+of others, than is natural to mankind, yet these ought not to be
+carried further than the nature and course of things make necessary.
+It is still true, even in the present state of things, bad as it is,
+that a real good man had rather be deceived than be suspicious; had
+rather forego his known right, than run the venture of doing even a
+hard thing.  This is the general temper of that charity, of which
+the apostle asserts, that if he had it not, giving his BODY TO BE
+BURNED WOULD AVAIL HIM NOTHING; and which he says SHALL NEVER FAIL.
+
+The happy influence of this temper extends to every different
+relation and circumstance in human life.  It plainly renders a man
+better, more to be desired, as to all the respects and relations we
+can stand in to each other.  The benevolent man is disposed to make
+use of all external advantages in such a manner as shall contribute
+to the good of others, as well as to his own satisfaction.  His own
+satisfaction consists in this.  He will be easy and kind to his
+dependents, compassionate to the poor and distressed, friendly to
+all with whom he has to do.  This includes the good neighbour,
+parent, master, magistrate:  and such a behaviour would plainly make
+dependence, inferiority, and even servitude easy.  So that a good or
+charitable man of superior rank in wisdom, fortune, authority, is a
+common blessing to the place he lives in:  happiness grows under his
+influence.  This good principle in inferiors would discover itself
+in paying respect, gratitude, obedience, as due.  It were therefore,
+methinks, one just way of trying one's own character to ask
+ourselves, am I in reality a better master or servant, a better
+friend, a better neighbour, than such and such persons, whom,
+perhaps, I may think not to deserve the character of virtue and
+religion so much as myself?
+
+And as to the spirit of party, which unhappily prevails amongst
+mankind, whatever are the distinctions which serve for a supply to
+it, some or other of which have obtained in all ages and countries,
+one who is thus friendly to his kind will immediately make due
+allowances for it, as what cannot but be amongst such creatures as
+men, in such a world as this.  And as wrath and fury and overbearing
+upon these occasions proceed, as I may speak, from men's feeling
+only on their own side, so a common feeling, for others as well as
+for ourselves, would render us sensible to this truth, which it is
+strange can have so little influence, that we ourselves differ from
+others, just as much as they do from us.  I put the matter in this
+way, because it can scarce be expected that the generality of men
+should see that those things which are made the occasions of
+dissension and fomenting the party-spirit are really nothing at all:
+but it may be expected from all people, how much soever they are in
+earnest about their respective peculiarities, that humanity and
+common goodwill to their fellow-creatures should moderate and
+restrain that wretched spirit.
+
+This good temper of charity likewise would prevent strife and enmity
+arising from other occasions:  it would prevent our giving just
+cause of offence, and our taking it without cause.  And in cases of
+real injury, a good man will make all the allowances which are to be
+made, and, without any attempts of retaliation, he will only consult
+his own and other men's security for the future against injustice
+and wrong.
+
+IV.  I proceed to consider, lastly, what is affirmed of the precept
+now explained, that it comprehends in it all others, i.e., that to
+love our neighbour as ourselves includes in it all virtues.
+
+Now the way in which every maxim of conduct, or general speculative
+assertion, when it is to be explained at large should be treated,
+is, to show what are the particular truths which were designed to be
+comprehended under such a general observation, how far it is
+strictly true, and then the limitations, restrictions, and
+exceptions, if there be exceptions, with which it is to be
+understood.  But it is only the former of these, namely, how far the
+assertion in the text holds, and the ground of the pre-eminence
+assigned to the precept of it, which in strictness comes into our
+present consideration.
+
+However, in almost everything that is said, there is somewhat to be
+understood beyond what is explicitly laid down, and which we of
+course supply, somewhat, I mean, which would not be commonly called
+a restriction or limitation.  Thus, when benevolence is said to be
+the sum of virtue, it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but a
+principle in reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their
+reason, for reason and reflection comes into our notion of a moral
+agent.  And that will lead us to consider distant consequences, as
+well as the immediate tendency of an action.  It will teach us that
+the care of some persons, suppose children and families, is
+particularly committed to our charge by Nature and Providence, as
+also that there are other circumstances, suppose friendship or
+former obligations, which require that we do good to some,
+preferably to others.  Reason, considered merely as subservient to
+benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will teach
+us to have particular regard to these relations and circumstances,
+because it is plainly for the good of the world that they should be
+regarded.  And as there are numberless cases in which,
+notwithstanding appearances, we are not competent judges, whether a
+particular action will upon the whole do good or harm, reason in the
+same way will teach us to be cautious how we act in these cases of
+uncertainty.  It will suggest to our consideration which is the
+safer side; how liable we are to be led wrong by passion and private
+interest; and what regard is due to laws, and the judgment of
+mankind.  All these things must come into consideration, were it
+only in order to determine which way of acting is likely to produce
+the greatest good.  Thus, upon supposition that it were in the
+strictest sense true, without limitation, that benevolence includes
+in it all virtues, yet reason must come in as its guide and
+director, in order to attain its own end, the end of benevolence,
+the greatest public good.  Reason, then, being thus included, let us
+now consider the truth of the assertion itself.
+
+First, It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind
+or any creature but happiness.  This, then, is all which any person
+can, in strictness of speaking, be said to have a right to.  We can
+therefore OWE NO MAN ANYTHING, but only to farther and promote his
+happiness, according to our abilities.  And therefore a disposition
+and endeavour to do good to all with whom we have to do, in the
+degree and manner which the different relations we stand in to them
+require, is a discharge of all the obligations we are under to them.
+
+As human nature is not one simple uniform thing but a composition of
+various parts, body, spirit, appetites, particular passions, and
+affections, for each of which reasonable self-love would lead men to
+have due regard, and make suitable provision, so society consists of
+various parts to which we stand in different respects and relations,
+and just benevolence would as surely lead us to have due regard to
+each of these and behave as the respective relations require.
+Reasonable goodwill and right behaviour towards our fellow-creatures
+are in a manner the same, only that the former expresseth the
+principle as it is in the mind; the latter, the principle as it were
+become external, i.e., exerted in actions.
+
+And so far as temperance, sobriety, and moderation in sensual
+pleasures, and the contrary vices, have any respect to our fellow-
+creatures, any influence upon their quiet, welfare, and happiness,
+as they always have a real, and often a near influence upon it, so
+far it is manifest those virtues may be produced by the love of our
+neighbour, and that the contrary vices would be prevented by it.
+Indeed, if men's regard to themselves will not restrain them from
+excess, it may be thought little probable that their love to others
+will be sufficient:  but the reason is, that their love to others is
+not, any more than their regard to themselves, just, and in its due
+degree.  There are, however, manifest instances of persons kept
+sober and temperate from regard to their affairs, and the welfare of
+those who depend upon them.  And it is obvious to every one that
+habitual excess, a dissolute course of life, implies a general
+neglect of the duties we owe towards our friends, our families, and
+our country.
+
+From hence it is manifest that the common virtues and the common
+vices of mankind may be traced up to benevolence, or the want of it.
+And this entitles the precept, THOU SHALT LOVE THY NEIGHBOUR AS
+THYSELF, to the pre-eminence given to it, and is a justification of
+the apostle's assertion, that all other commandments are
+comprehended in it, whatever cautions and restrictions {28} there
+are, which might require to be considered, if we were to state
+particularly and at length what is virtue and right behaviour in
+mankind.  But,
+
+Secondly, It might be added, that in a higher and more general way
+of consideration, leaving out the particular nature of creatures,
+and the particular circumstances in which they are placed,
+benevolence seems in the strictest sense to include in it all that
+is good and worthy, all that is good, which we have any distinct
+particular notion of.  We have no clear conception of any position
+moral attribute in the Supreme Being, but what may be resolved up
+into goodness.  And, if we consider a reasonable creature or moral
+agent, without regard to the particular relations and circumstances
+in which he is placed, we cannot conceive anything else to come in
+towards determining whether he is to be ranked in a higher or lower
+class of virtuous beings, but the higher or lower degree in which
+that principle, and what is manifestly connected with it, prevail in
+him.
+
+That which we more strictly call piety, or the love of God, and
+which is an essential part of a right temper, some may perhaps
+imagine no way connected with benevolence:  yet surely they must be
+connected, if there be indeed in being an object infinitely good.
+Human nature is so constituted that every good affection implies the
+love of itself, i.e., becomes the object of a new affection in the
+same person.  Thus, to be righteous, implies in it the love of
+righteousness; to be benevolent, the love of benevolence; to be
+good, the love of goodness; whether this righteousness, benevolence,
+or goodness be viewed as in our own mind or another's, and the love
+of God as a being perfectly good is the love of perfect goodness
+contemplated in a being or person.  Thus morality and religion,
+virtue and piety, will at last necessarily coincide, run up into one
+and the same point, and LOVE will be in all senses THE END OF THE
+COMMANDMENT.
+
+
+O Almighty God, inspire us with this divine principle; kill in us
+all the seeds of envy and ill-will; and help us, by cultivating
+within ourselves the love of our neighbour, to improve in the love
+of Thee.  Thou hast placed us in various kindreds, friendships, and
+relations, as the school of discipline for our affections:  help us,
+by the due exercise of them, to improve to perfection; till all
+partial affection be lost in that entire universal one, and thou, O
+God, shalt be all in all.
+
+
+
+SERMON XIII., XIV.
+UPON THE LOVE OF GOD.
+MATTHEW xxii. 37.
+
+
+
+Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all
+thy soul, and with all thy mind.
+
+Everybody knows, you therefore need only just be put in mind, that
+there is such a thing as having so great horror of one extreme as to
+run insensibly and of course into the contrary; and that a
+doctrine's having been a shelter for enthusiasm, or made to serve
+the purposes of superstition, is no proof of the falsity of it:
+truth or right being somewhat real in itself, and so not to be
+judged of by its liableness to abuse, or by its supposed distance
+from or nearness to error.  It may be sufficient to have mentioned
+this in general, without taking notice of the particular
+extravagances which have been vented under the pretence or endeavour
+of explaining the love of God; or how manifestly we are got into the
+contrary extreme, under the notion of a reasonable religion; so very
+reasonable as to have nothing to do with the heart and affections,
+if these words signify anything but the faculty by which we discern
+speculative truth.
+
+By the love of God I would understand all those regards, all those
+affections of mind which are due immediately to Him from such a
+creature as man, and which rest in Him as their end.  As this does
+not include servile fear, so neither will any other regards, how
+reasonable soever, which respect anything out of or besides the
+perfection of the Divine nature, come into consideration here.  But
+all fear is not excluded, because His displeasure is itself the
+natural proper object of fear.  Reverence, ambition of His love and
+approbation, delight in the hope or consciousness of it, come
+likewise into this definition of the love of God, because He is the
+natural object of all those affections or movements of mind as
+really as He is the object of the affection, which is in the
+strictest sense called love; and all of them equally rest in Him as
+their end.  And they may all be understood to be implied in these
+words of our Saviour, without putting any force upon them:  for He
+is speaking of the love of God and our neighbour as containing the
+whole of piety and virtue.
+
+It is plain that the nature of man is so constituted as to feel
+certain affections upon the sight or contemplation of certain
+objects.  Now the very notion of affection implies resting in its
+object as an end.  And the particular affection to good characters,
+reverence and moral love of them, is natural to all those who have
+any degree of real goodness in themselves.  This will be illustrated
+by the description of a perfect character in a creature; and by
+considering the manner in which a good man in his presence would be
+affected towards such a character.  He would of course feel the
+affections of love, reverence, desire of his approbation, delight in
+the hope or consciousness of it.  And surely all this is applicable,
+and may be brought up to that Being, who is infinitely more than an
+adequate object of all those affections; whom we are commanded to
+LOVE WITH ALL OUR HEART, WITH ALL OUR SOUL, AND WITH ALL OUR MIND.
+And of these regards towards Almighty God some are more particularly
+suitable to and becoming so imperfect a creature as man, in this
+mortal state we are passing through; and some of them, and perhaps
+other exercises of the mind, will be the employment and happiness of
+good men in a state of perfection.
+
+This is a general view of what the following discourse will contain.
+And it is manifest the subject is a real one:  there is nothing in
+it enthusiastical or unreasonable.  And if it be indeed at all a
+subject, it is one of the utmost importance.
+
+As mankind have a faculty by which they discern speculative truth,
+so we have various affections towards external objects.
+Understanding and temper, reason and affection, are as distinct
+ideas as reason and hunger, and one would think could no more be
+confounded.  It is by reason that we get the ideas of several
+objects of our affections; but in these cases reason and affection
+are no more the same than sight of a particular object, and the
+pleasure or uneasiness consequent thereupon, are the same.  Now as
+reason tends to and rests in the discernment of truth, the object of
+it, so the very nature of affection consists in tending towards, and
+resting in, its objects as an end.  We do indeed often in common
+language say that things are loved, desired, esteemed, not for
+themselves, but for somewhat further, somewhat out of and beyond
+them; yet, in these cases, whoever will attend will see that these
+things are not in reality the objects of the affections, i.e. are
+not loved, desired, esteemed, but the somewhat further and beyond
+them.  If we have no affections which rest in what are called their
+objects, then what is called affection, love, desire, hope, in human
+nature, is only an uneasiness in being at rest; an unquiet
+disposition to action, progress, pursuit, without end or meaning.
+But if there be any such thing as delight in the company of one
+person, rather than of another; whether in the way of friendship, or
+mirth and entertainment, it is all one, if it be without respect to
+fortune, honour, or increasing our stores of knowledge, or anything
+beyond the present time; here is an instance of an affection
+absolutely resting in its object as its end, and being gratified in
+the same way as the appetite of hunger is satisfied with food.  Yet
+nothing is more common than to hear it asked, what advantage a man
+hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular friendships, or
+in any other; nothing, I say, is more common than to hear such a
+question put in a way which supposes no gain, advantage, or
+interest, but as a means to somewhat further:  and if so, then there
+is no such thing at all as real interest, gain, or advantage.  This
+is the same absurdity with respect to life as an infinite series of
+effects without a cause is in speculation.  The gain, advantage, or
+interest consists in the delight itself, arising from such a
+faculty's having its object:  neither is there any such thing as
+happiness or enjoyment but what arises from hence.  The pleasures of
+hope and of reflection are not exceptions:  the former being only
+this happiness anticipated; the latter the same happiness enjoyed
+over again after its time.  And even the general expectation of
+future happiness can afford satisfaction only as it is a present
+object to the principle of self-love.
+
+It was doubtless intended that life should be very much a pursuit to
+the gross of mankind.  But this is carried so much further than is
+reasonable that what gives immediate satisfaction, i.e. our present
+interest, is scarce considered as our interest at all.  It is
+inventions which have only a remote tendency towards enjoyment,
+perhaps but a remote tendency towards gaining the means only of
+enjoyment, which are chiefly spoken of as useful to the world.  And
+though this way of thinking were just with respect to the imperfect
+state we are now in, where we know so little of satisfaction without
+satiety, yet it must be guarded against when we are considering the
+happiness of a state of perfection; which happiness being enjoyment
+and not hope, must necessarily consist in this, that our affections
+have their objects, and rest in those objects as an end, i.e. be
+satisfied with them.  This will further appear in the sequel of this
+discourse.
+
+Of the several affections, or inward sensations, which particular
+objects excite in man, there are some, the having of which implies
+the love of them, when they are reflected upon. {29}  This cannot be
+said of all our affections, principles, and motives of action.  It
+were ridiculous to assert that a man upon reflection hath the same
+kind of approbation of the appetite of hunger or the passion of fear
+as he hath of goodwill to his fellow-creatures.  To be a just, a
+good, a righteous man, plainly carries with it a peculiar affection
+to or love of justice, goodness, righteousness, when these
+principles are the objects of contemplation.
+
+Now if a man approves of, or hath an affection to, any principle in
+and for itself, incidental things allowed for, it will be the same
+whether he views it in his own mind or in another; in himself or in
+his neighbour.  This is the account of our approbation of, or moral
+love and affection to good characters; which cannot but be in those
+who have any degrees of real goodness in themselves, and who discern
+and take notice of the same principle in others.
+
+From observation of what passes within ourselves, our own actions,
+and the behaviour of others, the mind may carry on its reflections
+as far as it pleases; much beyond what we experience in ourselves,
+or discern in our fellow creatures.  It may go on and consider
+goodness as become a uniform continued principle of action, as
+conducted by reason, and forming a temper and character absolutely
+good and perfect, which is in a higher sense excellent, and
+proportionably the object of love and approbation.
+
+Let us then suppose a creature perfect according to his created
+nature--let his form be human, and his capacities no more than equal
+to those of the chief of men--goodness shall be his proper
+character, with wisdom to direct it, and power within some certain
+determined sphere of action to exert it:  but goodness must be the
+simple actuating principle within him; this being the moral quality
+which is amiable, or the immediate object of love as distinct from
+other affections of approbation.  Here then is a finite object for
+our mind to tend towards, to exercise itself upon:  a creature,
+perfect according to his capacity, fixed, steady, equally unmoved by
+weak pity or more weak fury and resentment; forming the justest
+scheme of conduct; going on undisturbed in the execution of it,
+through the several methods of severity and reward, towards his end,
+namely, the general happiness of all with whom he hath to do, as in
+itself right and valuable.  This character, though uniform in
+itself, in its principle, yet exerting itself in different ways, or
+considered in different views, may by its appearing variety move
+different affections.  Thus, the severity of justice would not
+affect us in the same way as an act of mercy.  The adventitious
+qualities of wisdom and power may be considered in themselves; and
+even the strength of mind which this immovable goodness supposes may
+likewise be viewed as an object of contemplation distinct from the
+goodness itself.  Superior excellence of any kind, as well as
+superior wisdom and power, is the object of awe and reverence to all
+creatures, whatever their moral character be; but so far as
+creatures of the lowest rank were good, so far the view of this
+character, as simply good, must appear amiable to them, be the
+object of, or beget love.  Further suppose we were conscious that
+this superior person so far approved of us that we had nothing
+servilely to fear from him; that he was really our friend, and kind
+and good to us in particular, as he had occasionally intercourse
+with us:  we must be other creatures than we are, or we could not
+but feel the same kind of satisfaction and enjoyment (whatever would
+be the degree of it) from this higher acquaintance and friendship as
+we feel from common ones, the intercourse being real and the persons
+equally present in both cases.  We should have a more ardent desire
+to be approved by his better judgment, and a satisfaction in that
+approbation of the same sort with what would be felt in respect to
+common persons, or be wrought in us by their presence.
+
+Let us now raise the character, and suppose this creature, for we
+are still going on with the supposition of a creature, our proper
+guardian and governor; that we were in a progress of being towards
+somewhat further; and that his scheme of government was too vast for
+our capacities to comprehend:  remembering still that he is
+perfectly good, and our friend as well as our governor.  Wisdom,
+power, goodness, accidentally viewed anywhere, would inspire
+reverence, awe, love; and as these affections would be raised in
+higher or lower degrees in proportion as we had occasionally more or
+less intercourse with the creature endued with those qualities, so
+this further consideration and knowledge that he was our proper
+guardian and governor would much more bring these objects and
+qualities home to ourselves; teach us they had a greater respect to
+us in particular, that we had a higher interest in that wisdom and
+power and goodness.  We should, with joy, gratitude, reverence,
+love, trust, and dependence, appropriate the character, as what we
+had a right in, and make our boast in such our relation to it.  And
+the conclusion of the whole would be that we should refer ourselves
+implicitly to him, and cast ourselves entirely upon him.  As the
+whole attention of life should be to obey his commands, so the
+highest enjoyment of it must arise from the contemplation of this
+character, and our relation to it, from a consciousness of his
+favour and approbation, and from the exercise of those affections
+towards him which could not but be raised from his presence.  A
+Being who hath these attributes, who stands in this relation, and is
+thus sensibly present to the mind, must necessarily be the object of
+these affections:  there is as real a correspondence between them as
+between the lowest appetite of sense and its object.
+
+That this Being is not a creature, but the Almighty God; that He is
+of infinite power and wisdom and goodness, does not render Him less
+the object of reverence and love than He would be if He had those
+attributes only in a limited degree.  The Being who made us, and
+upon whom we entirely depend, is the object of some regards.  He
+hath given us certain affections of mind, which correspond to
+wisdom, power, goodness, i.e. which are raised upon view of those
+qualities.  If then He be really wise, powerful, good, He is the
+natural object of those affections which He hath endued us with, and
+which correspond to those attributes.  That He is infinite in power,
+perfect in wisdom and goodness, makes no alteration, but only that
+He is the object of those affections raised to the highest pitch.
+He is not, indeed, to be discerned by any of our senses.  I go
+forward, but He is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive
+Him:  on the left hand where He doth work, but I cannot behold Him:
+He hideth Himself on the right hand, that I cannot see Him, Oh that
+I knew where I might find Him! that I might come even to His seat!
+{30}  But is He then afar off? does He not fill heaven and earth
+with His presence?  The presence of our fellow-creatures affects our
+senses, and our senses give us the knowledge of their presence;
+which hath different kinds of influence upon us--love, joy, sorrow,
+restraint, encouragement, reverence.  However, this influence is not
+immediately from our senses, but from that knowledge.  Thus suppose
+a person neither to see nor hear another, not to know by any of his
+senses, but yet certainly to know, that another was with him; this
+knowledge might, and in many cases would, have one or more of the
+effects before mentioned.  It is therefore not only reasonable, but
+also natural, to be affected with a presence, though it be not the
+object of our senses; whether it be, or be not, is merely an
+accidental circumstance, which needs not come into consideration:
+it is the certainty that he is with us, and we with him, which hath
+the influence.  We consider persons then as present, not only when
+they are within reach of our senses, but also when we are assured by
+any other means that they are within such a nearness; nay, if they
+are not, we can recall them to our mind, and be moved towards them
+as present; and must He, who is so much more intimately with us,
+that IN HIM WE LIVE AND MOVE AND HAVE OUR BEING, be thought too
+distant to be the object of our affections?  We own and feel the
+force of amiable and worthy qualities in our fellow creatures; and
+can we be insensible to the contemplation of perfect goodness?  Do
+we reverence the shadows of greatness here below, are we solicitous
+about honour and esteem and the opinion of the world, and shall we
+not feel the same with respect to Him whose are wisdom and power in
+the original, who IS THE GOD OF JUDGMENT BY WHOM ACTIONS ARE
+WEIGHED?  Thus love, reverence, desire of esteem, every faculty,
+every affection, tends towards and is employed about its respective
+object in common cases:  and must the exercise of them be suspended
+with regard to Him alone who is an object, an infinitely more than
+adequate object, to our most exalted faculties; Him, OF WHOM, AND
+THROUGH WHOM, AND TO WHOM ARE ALL THINGS?
+
+As we cannot remove from this earth, or change our general business
+on it, so neither can we alter our real nature.  Therefore no
+exercise of the mind can be recommended, but only the exercise of
+those faculties you are conscious of.  Religion does not demand new
+affections, but only claims the direction of those you already have,
+those affections you daily feel; though unhappily confined to
+objects not altogether unsuitable but altogether unequal to them.
+We only represent to you the higher, the adequate objects of those
+very faculties and affections.  Let the man of ambition go on still
+to consider disgrace as the greatest evil, honour as his chief good.
+But disgrace in whose estimation?  Honour in whose judgment?  This
+is the only question.  If shame, and delight in esteem, be spoken of
+as real, as any settled ground of pain or pleasure, both these must
+be in proportion to the supposed wisdom, and worth of him by whom we
+are contemned or esteemed.  Must it then be thought enthusiastical
+to speak of a sensibility of this sort which shall have respect to
+an unerring judgment, to infinite wisdom, when we are assured this
+unerring judgment, this infinite wisdom does observe upon our
+actions?
+
+It is the same with respect to the love of God in the strictest and
+most confined sense.  We only offer and represent the highest object
+of an affection supposed already in your mind.  Some degree of
+goodness must be previously supposed; this always implies the love
+of itself, an affection to goodness:  the highest, the adequate
+object of this affection, is perfect goodness; which therefore we
+are to LOVE WITH ALL OUR HEART, WITH ALL OUR SOUL, AND WITH ALL OUR
+STRENGTH.  "Must we then, forgetting our own interest, as it were go
+out of ourselves, and love God for His own sake?"  No more forget
+your own interest, no more go out of yourselves, than when you
+prefer one place, one prospect, the conversation of one man to that
+of another.  Does not every affection necessarily imply that the
+object of it be itself loved?  If it be not it is not the object of
+the affection.  You may, and ought if you can, but it is a great
+mistake to think you can love or fear or hate anything, from
+consideration that such love or fear or hatred may be a means of
+obtaining good or avoiding evil.  But the question whether we ought
+to love God for His sake or for our own being a mere mistake in
+language, the real question which this is mistaken for will, I
+suppose, be answered by observing that the goodness of God already
+exercised towards us, our present dependence upon Him, and our
+expectation of future benefits, ought, and have a natural tendency,
+to beget in us the affection of gratitude, and greater love towards
+Him, than the same goodness exercised towards others; were it only
+for this reason, that every affection is moved in proportion to the
+sense we have of the object of it; and we cannot but have a more
+lively sense of goodness when exercised towards ourselves than when
+exercised towards others.  I added expectation of future benefits
+because the ground of that expectation is present goodness.
+
+Thus Almighty God is the natural object of the several affections,
+love, reverence, fear, desire of approbation.  For though He is
+simply one, yet we cannot but consider Him in partial and different
+views.  He is in himself one uniform Being, and for ever the same
+without VARIABLENESS OR SHADOW OF TURNING; but His infinite
+greatness, His goodness, His wisdom, are different objects to our
+mind.  To which is to be added, that from the changes in our own
+characters, together with His unchangeableness, we cannot but
+consider ourselves as more or less the objects of His approbation,
+and really be so.  For if He approves what is good, He cannot,
+merely from the unchangeableness of His nature, approve what is
+evil.  Hence must arise more various movements of mind, more
+different kinds of affections.  And this greater variety also is
+just and reasonable in such creatures as we are, though it respects
+a Being simply one, good and perfect.  As some of these actions are
+most particularly suitable to so imperfect a creature as man in this
+mortal state we are passing through, so there may be other exercises
+of mind, or some of these in higher degrees, our employment and
+happiness in a state of perfection.
+
+
+
+SERMON XIV.
+
+
+
+Consider then our ignorance, the imperfection of our nature, our
+virtue, and our condition in this world, with respect to aim
+infinitely good and just Being, our Creator and Governor, and you
+will see what religious affections of mind are most particularly
+suitable to this mortal state we are passing through.
+
+Though we are not affected with anything so strongly as what we
+discern with our senses, and though our nature and condition require
+that we be much taken up about sensible things, yet our reason
+convinces us that God is present with us, and we see and feel the
+effects of His goodness:  He is therefore the object of some
+regards.  The imperfection of our virtue, joined with the
+consideration of His absolute rectitude or holiness, will scarce
+permit that perfection of love which entirely casts out all fear:
+yet goodness is the object of love to all creatures who have any
+degree of it themselves; and consciousness of a real endeavour to
+approve ourselves to Him, joined with the consideration of His
+goodness, as it quite excludes servile dread and horror, so it is
+plainly a reasonable ground for hope of His favour.  Neither fear
+nor hope nor love then are excluded, and one or another of these
+will prevail, according to the different views we have of God, and
+ought to prevail, according to the changes we find in our own
+character.  There is a temper of mind made up of, or which follows
+from all three, fear, hope, love--namely, resignation to the Divine
+will, which is the general temper belonging to this state; which
+ought to be the habitual frame of our mind and heart, and to be
+exercised at proper seasons more distinctly, in acts of devotion.
+
+Resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety.  It includes
+in it all that is good, and is a source of the most settled quiet
+and composure of mind.  There is the general principle of submission
+in our nature.  Man is not so constituted as to desire things, and
+be uneasy in the want of them, in proportion to their known value:
+many other considerations come in to determine the degrees of
+desire; particularly whether the advantage we take a view of be
+within the sphere of our rank.  Whoever felt uneasiness upon
+observing any of the advantages brute creatures have over us?  And
+yet it is plain they have several.  It is the same with respect to
+advantages belonging to creatures of a superior order.  Thus, though
+we see a thing to be highly valuable, yet that it does not belong to
+our condition of being is sufficient to suspend our desires after
+it, to make us rest satisfied without such advantage.  Now there is
+just the same reason for quiet resignation in the want of everything
+equally unattainable and out of our reach in particular, though
+others of our species be possessed of it.  All this may be applied
+to the whole of life; to positive inconveniences as well as wants,
+not indeed to the sensations of pain and sorrow, but to all the
+uneasinesses of reflection, murmuring, and discontent.  Thus is
+human nature formed to compliance, yielding, submission of temper.
+We find the principles of it within us; and every one exercises it
+towards some objects or other, i.e. feels it with regard to some
+persons and some circumstances.  Now this is an excellent foundation
+of a reasonable and religious resignation.  Nature teaches and
+inclines as to take up with our lot; the consideration that the
+course of things is unalterable hath a tendency to quiet the mind
+under it, to beget a submission of temper to it.  But when we can
+add that this unalterable course is appointed and continued by
+infinite wisdom and goodness, how absolute should be our submission,
+how entire our trust and dependence!
+
+This would reconcile us to our condition, prevent all the
+supernumerary troubles arising from imagination, distant fears,
+impatience--all uneasiness, except that which necessarily arises
+from the calamities themselves we may be under.  How many of our
+cares should we by this means be disburdened of!  Cares not properly
+our own, how apt soever they may be to intrude upon us, and we to
+admit them; the anxieties of expectation, solicitude about success
+and disappointment, which in truth are none of our concern.  How
+open to every gratification would that mind be which was clear of
+these encumbrances!
+
+Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect when
+our will is lost and resolved up into His:  when we rest in His will
+as our end, as being itself most just and right and good.  And where
+is the impossibility of such an affection to what is just, and
+right, and good, such a loyalty of heart to the Governor of the
+universe as shall prevail over all sinister indirect desires of our
+own?  Neither is this at bottom anything more than faith and honesty
+and fairness of mind--in a more enlarged sense indeed than those
+words are commonly used.  And as, in common cases, fear and hope and
+other passions are raised in us by their respective objects, so this
+submission of heart and soul and mind, this religious resignation,
+would be as naturally produced by our having just conceptions of
+Almighty God, and a real sense of His presence with us.  In how low
+a degree soever this temper usually prevails amongst men, yet it is
+a temper right in itself:  it is what we owe to our Creator:  it is
+particularly suitable to our mortal condition, and what we should
+endeavour after for our own sakes in our passage through such a
+world as this, where is nothing upon which we can rest or depend,
+nothing but what we are liable to be deceived and disappointed in.
+Thus we might ACQUAINT OURSELVES WITH GOD, AND BE AT PEACE.  This is
+piety an religion in the strictest sense, considered as a habit of
+mind:  an habitual sense of God's presence with us; being affected
+towards Him, as present, in the manner His superior nature requires
+from such a creature as man:  this is to WALK WITH GOD.
+
+Little more need be said of devotion or religious worship than that
+it is this temper exerted into act.  The nature of it consists in
+the actual exercise of those affections towards God which are
+supposed habitual in good men.  He is always equally present with
+us:  but we are so much taken up with sensible things that, Lo, He
+goeth by us, and we see Him not:  He passeth on also, but we
+perceive Him not. {31}  Devotion is retirement from the world He has
+made to Him alone:  it is to withdraw from the avocations of sense,
+to employ our attention wholly upon Him as upon an object actually
+present, to yield ourselves up to the influence of the Divine
+presence, and to give full scope to the affections of gratitude,
+love, reverence, trust, and dependence; of which infinite power,
+wisdom, and goodness is the natural and only adequate object.  We
+may apply to the whole of devotion those words of the Son of Sirach,
+When you glorify the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for even
+yet will He far exceed:  and when you exalt Him, put forth all your
+strength, and be not weary; for you can never go far enough. {32}
+Our most raised affections of every kind cannot but fall short and
+be disproportionate when an infinite being is the object of them.
+This is the highest exercise and employment of mind that a creature
+is capable of.  As this divine service and worship is itself
+absolutely due to God, so also is it necessary in order to a further
+end, to keep alive upon our minds a sense of His authority, a sense
+that in our ordinary behaviour amongst men we act under him as our
+Governor and Judge.
+
+Thus you see the temper of mind respecting God which is particularly
+suitable to a state of imperfection, to creatures in a progress of
+being towards somewhat further.
+
+Suppose now this something further attained, that we were arrived at
+it, what a perception will it be to see and know and feel that our
+trust was not vain, our dependence not groundless?  That the issue,
+event, and consummation came out such as fully to justify and answer
+that resignation?  If the obscure view of the divine perfection
+which we have in this world ought in just consequence to beget an
+entire resignation, what will this resignation be exalted into when
+WE SHALL SEE FACE TO FACE, AND KNOW AS WE ARE KNOWN?  If we cannot
+form any distinct notion of that perfection of the love of God which
+CASTS OUT ALL FEAR, of that enjoyment of Him which will be the
+happiness of good men hereafter, the consideration of our wants and
+capacities of happiness, and that He will be adequate supply to
+them, must serve us instead of such distinct conception of the
+particular happiness itself.
+
+Let us then suppose a man entirely disengaged from business and
+pleasure, sitting down alone and at leisure, to reflect upon himself
+and his own condition of being.  He would immediately feel that he
+was by no means complete of himself, but totally insufficient for
+his own happiness.  One may venture to affirm that every man hath
+felt this, whether he hath again reflected upon it or not.  It is
+feeling this deficiency, that they are unsatisfied with themselves,
+which makes men look out for assistance from abroad, and which has
+given rise to various kinds of amusements, altogether needless any
+otherwise than as they serve to fill up the blank spaces of time,
+and so hinder their feeling this deficiency, and being uneasy with
+themselves.  Now, if these external things we take up with were
+really an adequate supply to this deficiency of human nature, if by
+their means our capacities and desires were all satisfied and filled
+up, then it might be truly said that we had found out the proper
+happiness of man, and so might sit down satisfied, and be at rest in
+the enjoyment of it.  But if it appears that the amusements which
+men usually pass their time in are so far from coming up to or
+answering our notions and desires of happiness or good that they are
+really no more than what they are commonly called, somewhat to pass
+away the time, i.e. somewhat which serves to turn us aside from, and
+prevent our attending to, this our internal poverty and want; if
+they serve only, or chiefly, to suspend instead of satisfying our
+conceptions and desires of happiness; if the want remains, and we
+have found out little more than barely the means of making it less
+sensible; then are we still to seek for somewhat to be an adequate
+supply to it.  It is plain that there is a capacity in the nature of
+man which neither riches nor honours nor sensual gratifications, nor
+anything in this world, can perfectly fill up or satisfy:  there is
+a deeper and more essential want than any of these things can be the
+supply of.  Yet surely there is a possibility of somewhat which may
+fill up all our capacities of happiness, somewhat in which our souls
+may find rest, somewhat which may be to us that satisfactory good we
+are inquiring after.  But it cannot be anything which is valuable
+only as it tends to some further end.  Those therefore who have got
+this world so much into their hearts as not to be able to consider
+happiness as consisting in anything but property and possessions--
+which are only valuable as the means to somewhat else--cannot have
+the least glimpse of the subject before us, which is the end, not
+the means; the thing itself, not somewhat in order to it.  But if
+you can lay aside that general, confused, undeterminate notion of
+happiness, as consisting in such possessions, and fix in your
+thoughts that it really can consist in nothing but in a faculty's
+having its proper object, you will clearly see that in the coolest
+way of consideration, without either the heat of fanciful enthusiasm
+or the warmth of real devotion, nothing is more certain than that an
+infinite Being may Himself be, if He pleases, the supply to all the
+capacities of our nature.  All the common enjoyments of life are
+from the faculties He hath endued us with and the objects He hath
+made suitable to them.  He may Himself be to us infinitely more than
+all these; He may be to us all that we want.  As our understanding
+can contemplate itself, and our affections be exercised upon
+themselves by reflection, so may each be employed in the same manner
+upon any other mind; and since the Supreme Mind, the Author and
+Cause of all things, is the highest possible object to Himself, He
+may be an adequate supply to all the faculties of our souls, a
+subject to our understanding, and an object to our affections.
+
+Consider then:  when we shall have put off this mortal body, when we
+shall be divested of sensual appetites, and those possessions which
+are now the means of gratification shall be of no avail, when this
+restless scene of business and vain pleasures, which now diverts us
+from ourselves, shall be all over, we, our proper self, shall still
+remain:  we shall still continue the same creatures we are, with
+wants to be supplied and capacities of happiness.  We must have
+faculties of perception, though not sensitive ones; and pleasure or
+uneasiness from our perceptions, as now we have.
+
+There are certain ideas which we express by the words order,
+harmony, proportion, beauty, the furthest removed from anything
+sensual.  Now what is there in those intellectual images, forms, or
+ideas, which begets that approbation, love, delight, and even
+rapture, which is seen in some persons' faces upon having those
+objects present to their minds?--"Mere enthusiasm!"--Be it what it
+will:  there are objects, works of nature and of art, which all
+mankind have delight from quite distinct from their affording
+gratification to sensual appetites, and from quite another view of
+them than as being for their interest and further advantage.  The
+faculties from which we are capable of these pleasures, and the
+pleasures themselves, are as natural, and as much to be accounted
+for, as any sensual appetite whatever, and the pleasure from its
+gratification.  Words to be sure are wanting upon this subject; to
+say that everything of grace and beauty throughout the whole of
+nature, everything excellent and amiable shared in differently lower
+degrees by the whole creation, meet in the Author and Cause of all
+things, this is an inadequate and perhaps improper way of speaking
+of the Divine nature; but it is manifest that absolute rectitude,
+the perfection of being, must be in all senses, and in every
+respect, the highest object to the mind.
+
+In this world it is only the effects of wisdom and power and
+greatness which we discern; it is not impossible that hereafter the
+qualities themselves in the supreme Being may be the immediate
+object of contemplation.  What amazing wonders are opened to view by
+late improvements!  What an object is the universe to a creature, if
+there be a creature who can comprehend its system!  But it must be
+an infinitely higher exercise of the understanding to view the
+scheme of it in that mind which projected it before its foundations
+were laid.  And surely we have meaning to the words when we speak of
+going further, and viewing, not only this system in His mind, but
+the wisdom and intelligence itself from whence it proceeded.  The
+same may be said of power.  But since wisdom and power are not God,
+He is a wise, a powerful Being; the divine nature may therefore be a
+further object to the understanding.  It is nothing to observe that
+our senses give us but an imperfect knowledge of things:  effects
+themselves, if we knew them thoroughly, would give us but imperfect
+notions of wisdom and power; much less of His being in whom they
+reside.  I am not speaking of any fanciful notion of seeing all
+things in God, but only representing to you how much a higher object
+to the understanding an infinite Being Himself is than the things
+which He has made; and this is no more than saying that the Creator
+is superior to the works of His hands.
+
+This may be illustrated by a low example.  Suppose a machine, the
+sight of which would raise, and discoveries in its contrivance
+gratify, our curiosity:  the real delight in this case would arise
+from its being the effect of skill and contrivance.  This skill in
+the mind of the artificer would be a higher object, if we had any
+senses or ways to discern it.  For, observe, the contemplation of
+that principle, faculty, or power which produced any effect must be
+a higher exercise of the understanding than the contemplation of the
+effect itself.  The cause must be a higher object to the mind than
+the effect.
+
+But whoever considers distinctly what the delight of knowledge is
+will see reason to be satisfied that it cannot be the chief good of
+man:  all this, as it is applicable, so it was mentioned with regard
+to the attribute of goodness.  I say goodness.  Our being and all
+our enjoyments are the effects of it:  just men bear its
+resemblance; but how little do we know of the original, of what it
+is in itself?  Recall what was before observed concerning the
+affection to moral characters--which, in how low a degree soever,
+yet is plainly natural to man, and the most excellent part of his
+nature.  Suppose this improved, as it may be improved, to any degree
+whatever, in the SPIRITS OF JUST MEN MADE PERFECT; and then suppose
+that they had a real view of that RIGHTEOUSNESS WHICH IS AN
+EVERLASTING RIGHTEOUSNESS, of the conformity of the Divine will to
+THE LAW OF TRUTH in which the moral attributes of God consist, of
+that goodness in the sovereign Mind which gave birth to the
+universe.  Add, what will be true of all good men hereafter, a
+consciousness of having an interest in what they are contemplating--
+suppose them able to say, THIS GOD IS OUR GOD FOR EVER AND EVER.
+Would they be any longer to seek for what was their chief happiness,
+their final good?  Could the utmost stretch of their capacities look
+further?  Would not infinite perfect goodness be their very end, the
+last end and object of their affections, beyond which they could
+neither have nor desire, beyond which they could not form a wish or
+thought?
+
+Consider wherein that presence of a friend consists which has often
+so strong an effect as wholly to possess the mind, and entirely
+suspend all other affections and regards, and which itself affords
+the highest satisfaction and enjoyment.  He is within reach of the
+senses.  Now as our capacities of perception improve we shall have,
+perhaps by some faculty entirely new, a perception of God's presence
+with us in a nearer and stricter way, since it is certain He is more
+intimately present with us than anything else can be.  Proof of the
+existence and presence of any being is quite different from the
+immediate perception, the consciousness of it.  What then will be
+the joy of heart which His presence and THE LIGHT OF HIS
+COUNTENANCE, who is the life of the universe, will inspire good men
+with when they shall have a sensation that He is the sustainer of
+their being, that they exist in Him; when they shall feel His
+influence to cheer and enliven and support their frame, in a manner
+of which we have now no conception?  He will be in a literal sense
+THEIR STRENGTH AND THEIR PORTION FOR EVER.
+
+When we speak of things so much above our comprehension as the
+employment and happiness of a future state, doubtless it behoves us
+to speak with all modesty and distrust of ourselves.  But the
+Scripture represents the happiness of that state under the notions
+of SEEING GOD, SEEING HIM AS HE IS, KNOWING AS WE ARE KNOWN, AND
+SEEING FACE TO FACE.  These words are not general or undetermined,
+but express a particular determinate happiness.  And I will be bold
+to say that nothing can account for or come up to these expressions
+but only this, that God Himself will be an object to our faculties,
+that He Himself will be our happiness as distinguished from the
+enjoyments of the present state, which seem to arise not immediately
+from Him but from the objects He has adapted to give us delight.
+
+To conclude:  Let us suppose a person tired with care and sorrow and
+the repetition of vain delights which fill up the round of life;
+sensible that everything here below in its best estate is altogether
+vanity.  Suppose him to feel that deficiency of human nature before
+taken notice of, and to be convinced that God alone was the adequate
+supply to it.  What could be more applicable to a good man in this
+state of mind, or better express his present wants and distant
+hopes, his passage through this world as a progress towards a state
+of perfection, than the following passages in the devotions of the
+royal prophet?  They are plainly in a higher and more proper sense
+applicable to this than they could be to anything else.  I have seen
+an end of all perfection.  Whom have I in heaven but Thee?  And
+there is none upon earth that I desire in comparison of Thee.  My
+flesh and may heart faileth:  but God is the strength of my heart
+and my portion for ever.  Like as the hart desireth the water-
+brooks, so longeth my soul after Thee, O God.  My soul is athirst
+for God, yea, even for the living God:  when shall I come to appear
+before Him?  How excellent is Thy loving-kindness, O God! and the
+children of men shall put their trust under the shadow of Thy wings.
+They shall be satisfied with the plenteousness of Thy house:  and
+Thou shalt give them drink of Thy pleasures, as out of the river.
+For with Thee is the well of life:  and in Thy light shall we see
+light.  Blessed is the man whom Thou choosest, and receivest unto
+Thee:  he shall dwell in Thy court, and shall be satisfied with the
+pleasures of Thy house, even of Thy holy temple.  Blessed is the
+people, O Lord, that can rejoice in Thee:  they shall walk in the
+light of Thy countenance.  Their delight shall be daily in Thy name,
+and in Thy righteousness shall they make their boast.  For Thou art
+the glory of their strength:  and in Thy lovingkindness they shall
+be exalted.  As for me, I will behold Thy presence in righteousness:
+and when I awake up after Thy likeness, I shall be satisfied with
+it.  Thou shalt shew me the path of life; in Thy presence is the
+fulness of joy, and at Thy right hand there is pleasure for
+evermore.
+
+
+
+Footnotes:
+
+{1}  1 Cor. xii
+
+{2}  Suppose a man of learning to be writing a grave book upon HUMAN
+NATURE, and to show in several parts of it that he had an insight
+into the subject he was considering, amongst other things, the
+following one would require to be accounted for--the appearance of
+benevolence or good-will in men towards each other in the instances
+of natural relation, and in others. {2a}  Cautions of being deceived
+with outward show, he retires within himself to see exactly what
+that is in the mind of man from whence this appearance proceeds;
+and, upon deep reflection, asserts the principle in the mind to be
+only the love of power, and delight in the exercise of it.  Would
+not everybody think here was a mistake of one word for another--that
+the philosopher was contemplating and accounting for some other
+HUMAN ACTIONS, some other behaviour of man to man?  And could any
+one be thoroughly satisfied that what is commonly called benevolence
+or good-will was really the affection meant, but only by being made
+to understand that this learned person had a general hypothesis, to
+which the appearance of good-will could no otherwise be reconciled?
+That what has this appearance is often nothing but ambition; that
+delight in superiority often (suppose always) mixes itself with
+benevolence, only makes it more specious to call it ambition than
+hunger, of the two:  but in reality that passion does no more
+account for the whole appearances of good-will than this appetite
+does.  Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that
+good to another, which he knows himself unable to procure him; and
+rejoicing in it, though bestowed by a third person?  And can love of
+power any way possibly come in to account for this desire or
+delight?  Is there not often the appearance of men's distinguishing
+between two or more persons, preferring one before another, to do
+good to, in cases where love of power cannot in the least account
+for the distinction and preference?  For this principle can no
+otherwise distinguish between objects than as it is a greater
+instance and exertion of power to do good to one rather than to
+another.  Again, suppose good-will in the mind of man to be nothing
+but delight in the exercise of power:  men might indeed be
+restrained by distant and accidental consideration; but these
+restraints being removed, they would have a disposition to, and
+delight in, mischief as an exercise and proof of power:  and this
+disposition and delight would arise from, or be the same principle
+in the mind, as a disposition to and delight in charity.  Thus
+cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment, would be exactly the
+same in the mind of man as good-will:  that one tends to the
+happiness, the other to the misery, of our fellow-creatures, is, it
+seems, merely an accidental circumstance, which the mind has not the
+least regard to.  These are the absurdities which even men of
+capacity run into when they have occasion to belie their nature, and
+will perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally
+stamped upon it, the traces of which, however faint, are plainly
+discernible upon the mind of man.
+
+If any person can in earnest doubt whether there be such a thing as
+good-will in one man towards another (for the question is not
+concerning either the degree or extensiveness of it, but concerning
+the affection itself), let it be observed that WHETHER MAN BE THUS,
+OR OTHERWISE CONSTITUTED, WHAT IS THE INWARD FRAME IN THIS
+PARTICULAR is a mere question of fact of natural history not
+provable immediately by reason.  It is therefore to be judged of and
+determined in the same way other facts or matters of natural history
+are--by appealing to the external senses, or inward perceptions
+respectively, as the matter under consideration is cognisable by one
+or the other:  by arguing from acknowledged facts and actions for a
+great number of actions in the same kind, in different
+circumstances, and respecting different objects, will prove to a
+certainty what principles they do not, and to the greatest
+probability what principles they do, proceed from:  and, lastly, by
+the testimony of mankind.  Now that there is some degree of
+benevolence amongst men may be as strongly and plainly proved in all
+these ways, as it could possibly be proved, supposing there was this
+affection in our nature.  And should any one think fit to assert
+that resentment in the mind of man was absolutely nothing but
+reasonable concern for our own safety, the falsity of this, and what
+is the real nature of that passion, could be shown in no other ways
+than those in which it may be shown that there is such a thing in
+SOME DEGREE as real good-will in man towards man.  It is sufficient
+that the seeds of it be implanted in our nature by God.  There is,
+it is owned, much left for us to do upon our own heart and temper;
+to cultivate, to improve, to call it forth, to exercise it in a
+steady, uniform manner.  This is our work:  this is virtue and
+religion.
+
+{2a}  Hobbes, "Of Human Nature," c. ix. 7.
+
+{3}  Everybody makes a distinction between self-love and the several
+particular passions, appetites, and affections; and yet they are
+often confounded again.  That they are totally different, will be
+seen by any one who will distinguish between the passions and
+appetites THEMSELVES, and ENDEAVOURING after the means of their
+gratification.  Consider the appetite of hunger, and the desire of
+esteem:  these being the occasion both of pleasure and pain, the
+coolest self-love, as well as the appetites and passions themselves,
+may put us upon making use of the PROPER METHODS OF OBTAINING that
+pleasure, and avoiding that pain; but the FEELINGS themselves, the
+pain of hunger and shame, and the delight from esteem, are no more
+self-love than they are anything in the world.  Though a man hated
+himself, he would as much feel the pain of hunger as he would that
+of the gout; and it is plainly supposable there may be creatures
+with self-love in them to the highest degree, who may be quite
+insensible and indifferent (as men in some cases are) to the
+contempt and esteem of those upon whom their happiness does not in
+some further respects depend.  And as self-love and the several
+particular passions and appetites are in themselves totally
+different, so that some actions proceed from one and some from the
+other will be manifest to any who will observe the two following
+very supposable cases.  One man rushes upon certain ruin for the
+gratification of a present desire:  nobody will call the principle
+of this action self-love.  Suppose another man to go through some
+laborious work upon promise of a great reward, without any distinct
+knowledge what the reward will be:  this course of action cannot be
+ascribed to any particular passion.  The former of these actions is
+plainly to be imputed to some particular passion or affection; the
+latter as plainly to the general affection or principle of self-
+love.  That there are some particular pursuits or actions concerning
+which we cannot determine how far they are owing to one, and how far
+to the other, proceeds from this, that the two principles are
+frequently mixed together, and run up into each other.  This
+distinction is further explained in the Eleventh Sermon.
+
+{4}  If any desire to see this distinction and comparison made in a
+particular instance, the appetite and passion now mentioned may
+serve for one.  Hunger is to be considered as a private appetite,
+because the end for which it was given us is the preservation of the
+individual.  Desire of esteem is a public passion; because the end
+for which it was given us is to regulate our behaviour towards
+society.  The respect which this has to private good is as remote as
+the respect that has to public good; and the appetite is no more
+self-love than the passion is benevolence.  The object and end of
+the former is merely food; the object and end of the latter is
+merely esteem; but the latter can no more be gratified without
+contributing to the good of society, than the former can be
+gratified without contributing to the preservation of the
+individual.
+
+{5}  Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or
+superiority over others with whom we compare ourselves.  There does
+not appear to be any other GRIEF in the natural passion, but only
+THAT WANT which is implied in desire.  However, this may be so
+strong as to be the occasion of great GRIEF.  To desire the
+attainment of this equality or superiority by the PARTICULAR MEANS
+of others being brought down to our own level, or below it, is, I
+think, the distinct notion of envy.  From whence it is easy to see
+that the real end, which the natural passion emulation, and which
+the unlawful one envy aims at, is exactly the same; namely, that
+equality or superiority:  and consequently, that to do mischief is
+not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain
+its end.  As to resentment, see the Eighth Sermon.
+
+{6}  Ephes. ii. 3.
+
+{7}  Every man in his physical nature is one individual single
+agent.  He has likewise properties and principles, each of which may
+be considered separately, and without regard to the respects which
+they have to each other.  Neither of these is the nature we are
+taking a view of.  But it is the inward frame of man considered as a
+SYSTEM or CONSTITUTION:  whose several parts are united, not by a
+physical principle of individuation, but by the respects they have
+to each other; the chief of which is the subjection which the
+appetites, passions, and particular affections have to the one
+supreme principle of reflection or conscience.  The system or
+constitution is formed by and consists in these respects and this
+subjection.  Thus the body is a SYSTEM or CONSTITUTION:  so is a
+tree:  so is every machine.  Consider all the several parts of a
+tree without the natural reselects they have to each other, and you
+have not at all the idea of a tree; but add these respects, and this
+gives you the idea.  This body may be impaired by sickness, a tree
+may decay, a machine be out of order, and yet the system and
+constitution of them not totally dissolved.  There is plainly
+somewhat which answers to all this in the moral constitution of man.
+Whoever will consider his own nature will see that the several
+appetites, passions, and particular affections have different
+respects amongst themselves.  They are restraints upon, and are in a
+proportion to, each other.  This proportion is just and perfect,
+when all those under principles are perfectly coincident with
+conscience, so far as their nature permits, and in all cases under
+its absolute and entire direction.  The least excess or defect, the
+least alteration of the due proportions amongst themselves, or of
+their coincidence with conscience, though not proceeding into
+action, is some degree of disorder in the moral constitution.  But
+perfection, though plainly intelligible and unsupportable, was never
+attained by any man.  If the higher principle of reflection
+maintains its place, and as much as it can corrects that disorder,
+and hinders it from breaking out into action, this is all that can
+be expected in such a creature as man.  And though the appetites and
+passions have not their exact due proportion to each other, though
+they often strive for mastery with judgment or reflection, yet,
+since the superiority of this principle to all others is the chief
+respect which forms the constitution, so far as this superiority is
+maintained, the character, the man, is good, worthy, virtuous.
+
+{8}  Chap. iii., ver. 6.
+
+{9}  Job xiii. 5.
+
+{10}  Eccles. x. 3.
+
+{11}  Prov. x. 19.
+
+{12}  Mark xii. 38, 40.
+
+{13}  There being manifestly this appearance of men's substituting
+others for themselves, and being carried out and affected towards
+them as towards themselves; some persons, who have a system which
+excludes every affection of this sort, have taken a pleasant method
+to solve it; and tell you it is NOT ANOTHER you are at all concerned
+about, but your SELF ONLY, when you feel the affection called
+compassion, i.e. Here is a plain matter of fact, which men cannot
+reconcile with the general account they think fit to give of things:
+they therefore, instead of that manifest fact, substitute ANOTHER,
+which is reconcilable to their own scheme.  For does not everybody
+by compassion mean an affection, the object of which is another in
+distress? instead of this, but designing to have it mistaken for
+this, they speak of an affection or passion, the object of which is
+ourselves, or danger to ourselves.  Hobbes defines PITY,
+IMAGINATION, OR FICTION OF FUTURE CALAMITY TO OURSELVES, PROCEEDING
+FROM THE SENSE (he means sight or knowledge) OF ANOTHER MAN'S
+CALAMITY.  Thus fear and compassion would be the same idea, and a
+fearful and a compassionate man the same character, which every one
+immediately sees are totally different.  Further, to those who give
+any scope to their affections, there is no perception or inward
+feeling more universal than this:  that one who has been merciful
+and compassionate throughout the course of his behaviour should
+himself be treated with kindness, if he happens to fall into
+circumstances of distress.  Is fear, then, or cowardice, so great a
+recommendation to the favour of the bulk of mankind?  Or is it not
+plain that mere fearlessness (and therefore not the contrary) is one
+of the most popular qualifications?  This shows that mankind are not
+affected towards compassion as fear, but as somewhat totally
+different.
+
+Nothing would more expose such accounts as these of the affections
+which are favourable and friendly to our fellow-creatures than to
+substitute the definitions, which this author, and others who follow
+his steps, give of such affections, instead of the words by which
+they are commonly expressed.  Hobbes, after having laid down that
+pity or compassion is only fear for ourselves, goes on to explain
+the reason why we pity our friends in distress more than others.
+Now substitute the word DEFINITION instead of the word PITY in this
+place, and the inquiry will be, why we fear our friends, &c., which
+words (since he really does not mean why we are afraid of them) make
+no question or sentence at all.  So that common language, the words
+TO COMPASSIONATE, TO PITY, cannot be accommodated to his account of
+compassion.  The very joining of the words to PITY OUR FRIENDS is a
+direct contradiction to his definition of pity:  because those
+words, so joined, necessarily express that our friends are the
+objects of the passion; whereas his definition of it asserts that
+ourselves (or danger to ourselves) are the only objects of it.  He
+might indeed have avoided this absurdity, by plainly saying what he
+is going to account for; namely, why the sight of the innocent, or
+of our friends in distress, raises greater fear for ourselves than
+the sight of other persons in distress.  But had he put the thing
+thus plainly, the fact itself would have been doubted; that THE
+SIGHT OF OUR FRIENDS IN DISTRESS RAISES IN US GREATER FEAR FOR
+OURSELVES THAN THE SIGHT OF OTHERS IN DISTRESS.  And in the next
+place it would immediately have occurred to every one that the fact
+now mentioned, which at least is doubtful whether, true or false,
+was not the same with this fact, which nobody ever doubted, that THE
+SIGHT OF OUR FRIENDS IN DISTRESS RAISES IN US GREATER COMPASSION
+THAN THE SIGHT OF OTHERS IN DISTRESS:  every one, I say, would have
+seen that these are not the same, but TWO DIFFERENT inquiries; and,
+consequently, that fear and compassion are not the same.  Suppose a
+person to be in real danger, and by some means or other to have
+forgot it; any trifling accident, any sound might alarm him, recall
+the danger to his remembrance, and renew his fear; but it is almost
+too grossly ridiculous (though it is to show an absurdity) to speak
+of that sound or accident as an object of compassion; and yet,
+according to Mr. Hobbes, our greatest friend in distress is no more
+to us, no more the object of compassion, or of any affection in our
+heart:  neither the one nor the other raises any emotion in one
+mind, but only the thoughts of our liableness to calamity, and the
+fear of it; and both equally do this.  It is fit such sort of
+accounts of human nature should be shown to be what they really are,
+because there is raised upon them a general scheme, which undermines
+the whole foundation of common justice and honesty.  See Hobbes of
+Human Nature, c. 9. section 10.
+
+There are often three distinct perceptions or inward feelings upon
+sight of persons in distress:  real sorrow and concern for the
+misery of our fellow-creatures; some degree of satisfaction from a
+consciousness of our freedom from that misery; and as the mind
+passes on from one thing to another it is not unnatural from such an
+occasion to reflect upon our own liableness to the same or other
+calamities.  The two last frequently accompany the first, but it is
+the first ONLY which is properly compassion, of which the distressed
+are the objects, and which directly carries us with calmness and
+thought to their assistance.  Any one of these, from various and
+complicated reasons, may in particular cases prevail over the other
+two; and there are, I suppose, instances, where the bare SIGHT of
+distress, without our feeling any compassion for it, may be the
+occasion of either or both of the two latter perceptions.  One might
+add that if there be really any such thing as the fiction or
+imagination of danger to ourselves from sight of the miseries of
+others, which Hobbes specks of, and which he has absurdly mistaken
+for the whole of compassion; if there be anything of this sort
+common to mankind, distinct from the reflection of reason, it would
+be a most remarkable instance of what was furthest from his
+thoughts--namely, of a mutual sympathy between each particular of
+the species, a fellow-feeling common to mankind.  It would not
+indeed be an example of our substituting others for ourselves, but
+it would be an example of user substituting ourselves for others.
+And as it would not be an instance of benevolence, so neither would
+it be any instance of self-love:  for this phantom of danger to
+ourselves, naturally rising to view upon sight of the distresses of
+others, would be no more an instance of love to ourselves than the
+pain of hunger is.
+
+{14}  Ecclus. xxxii. 28.
+
+{15}  Ecclus. xlii. 24.
+
+{16}  Ver. 4, 5.
+
+{17}  Ver. 6.
+
+{18}  Micah vi.
+
+{19}  Chap. xxii. 12.
+
+{20}  Ver. 21.
+
+{21}  Chap. iv.
+
+{22}  Chap. xxv.
+
+{23}  Chap. xxxi.
+
+{24}  Chap. ii.
+
+{24a}  In the Cassell edition the sermons jump from sermon VII to XI
+with no explanation as to where VIII, IX and X are.  I've left the
+numbering as is in case there is a good reason for it.--DP
+
+{25}  P. 137.
+
+{26}  Matt. v. 48.
+
+{27}  1 Cor. xiii.
+
+{28}  For instance as we are not competent judges, what is upon the
+whole for the good of the world, there MAY be other immediate ends
+appointed us to pursue, besides that one of doing good or producing
+happiness.  Though the good of the Creation be the only end of the
+Author of it, yet he may have laid us under particular obligations,
+which we may discern and feel ourselves under, quite distinct from a
+perception, that the observance or violation of them it for the
+happiness or misery of our fellow-creatures.  And this is in fart
+the ease, for there are certain dispositions of mind, and certain
+actions, which are in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind,
+abstracted from the consideration of their tendency to the happiness
+or misery of the world approved or disapproved by reflection, by
+that principle within, whirls is the guile of life, the judge of
+right and wrong.  Numberless instances of this kind might be
+mentioned.  There are pieces of treachery, which in themselves
+appear base and detestable to every one.  There are actions, which
+perhaps can scarce have any other general name given them than
+indecencies, which yet are odious and shocking to human nature.
+There is such a thing as meanness, a little mind, which as it is
+quite distinct from incapacity, so it raises a dislike and
+disapprobation quite different from that contempt, which men are too
+apt to have, of mere folly.  On the other hand, what we call
+greatness of mind is the object of another most of approbation, than
+superior understanding.  Fidelity, honour, strict justice, are
+themselves approved in the highest degree, abstracted from the
+consideration of their tendency.  Now, whether it be thought that
+each of these are connected with benevolence in our nature, amid so
+may he considered as the same thing with it, or whether some of them
+he thought an inferior kind of virtues and vices, somewhat like
+natural beauties and deformities, or lastly, plain exceptions to the
+general rule, thus such however is certain, that the things now
+instanced in, and numberless others, are approved or disapproved by
+mankind in general, in quite another view than as conducive to the
+happiness or misery of the world.
+
+{29}  St. Austin observes, Amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene
+amatur quod amandum sit, ut sit in nobis virtue qua vivitur bene,
+i.e. The affection which we rightly have for what is lovely must
+ordinate justly, in due manner end proportion, become the object of
+a new affection, or be itself beloved, in order to our being endued
+with that virtue which is the principle of a good life.  Civ. Dei,
+1. xv. c. 22.
+
+{30}  Job xxii.
+
+{31}  Job ix. 2.
+
+{32}  Eccius. xliii. 50.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg Human Nature & Other Sermons, by Joseph Butler
+
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