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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.07.00*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared from the 1887 Cassell & Co. edition by +David Price, email ccx074@coventry.ac.uk. + + + + + +HUMAN NATURE AND OTHER SERMONS + +by Joseph Butler + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + + +Joseph Butler was born in 1692, youngest of eight children of a +linendraper at Wantage, in Berkshire. His father was a +Presbyterian, and after education at the Wantage Free Grammar School +Joseph Butler was sent to be educated for the Presbyterian ministry +in a training academy at Gloucester, which was afterwards removed to +Tewkesbury. There he had a friend and comrade, Secker, who +afterwards became Archbishop of Canterbury. Butler and Secker +inquired actively, and there was foreshadowing of his future in the +fact that in 1713, at the age of twenty-one, Butler was engaged in +anonymous discussion with Samuel Clarke upon his book on the a +priori demonstration of the Divine Existence and Attributes. + +When the time drew near for call to the ministry, Butler, like his +friend Secker, had reasoned himself into accordance with the +teaching of the Church of England. Butler's father did not oppose +his strong desire to enter the Church, and he was entered in 1714 at +Oriel College, Oxford. At college a strong friendship was +established between Butler and a fellow-student, Edward Talbot, +whose father was a Bishop, formerly of Oxford and Salisbury, then of +Durham. Through Talbot's influence Butler obtained in 1718 the +office of Preacher in the Rolls Chapel, which he held for the next +eight years. In 1722 Talbot died, and on his death-bed urged his +father on behalf of his friend Butler. The Bishop accordingly +presented Joseph Butler to the living of Houghton-le-Spring. But it +was found that costs of dilapidations were beyond his means at +Houghton, and Butler had a dangerous regard for building works. He +was preferred two years afterwards to the living of Stanhope, which +then became vacant, and which yielded a substantial income. Butler +sought nothing for himself, his simplicity of character, real worth, +and rare intellectual power, secured him friends, and the love of +two of them--Talbot first, and afterwards Secker, who made his own +way in the Church, and became strong enough to put his friend as +well as himself in the way of worldly advancement, secured for +Butler all the patronage he had, until the Queen also became his +active friend. + +Joseph Butler was seven years at Stanhope, quietly devoted to his +parish duties, preaching, studying, and writing his "Analogy of +Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of +Nature." In 1727, while still at Stanhope, he was appointed to a +stall in Durham Cathedral. Secker, having become chaplain to the +Queen, encouraged her in admiration of Butler's sermons. He told +her that the author was not dead, but buried, and secured her active +interest in his behalf. From Talbot, who had become Lord +Chancellor, Secker had no difficulty in obtaining for Butler a +chaplaincy which exempted him from the necessity of residence at +Stanhope. Butler, in accepting it, stipulated for permission to +live and work in his parish for six months in every year. Next he +was made chaplain to the King, and Rector of St. James's, upon which +he gave up Stanhope. In 1736 Queen Caroline appointed him her Clerk +of the Closet, an office which gave Butler the duty of attendance +upon her for two hours every evening. In that year he published his +"Analogy," of which the purpose was to meet, on its own ground, the +scepticism of his day. The Queen died in 1737, and, in accordance +with the strong desire expressed in her last days, in 1738 Butler +was made a Bishop. But his Bishopric was Bristol, worth only 300 or +400 pounds a year. The King added the Deanery of St. Paul's, when +that became vacant in 1740, and in 1750, towards the close of his +life, Joseph Butler was translated to the Bishopric of Durham. He +died in 1752. + +No man could be less self-seeking. He owed his rise in the Church +wholly to the intellectual power and substantial worth of character +that inspired strong friendship. Seeing how little he sought +worldly advancement for himself, while others were pressing and +scrambling, Butler's friends used their opportunities of winning for +him the advancement he deserved. He was happiest in doing his work, +of which a chief part was in his study, where he employed his +philosophic mind in strengthening the foundations of religious +faith. Faith in God was attacked by men who claimed especially to +be philosophers, and they were best met by the man who had, beyond +all other divines of his day--some might not be afraid to add, of +any day--the philosophic mind. + +H.M. + + + +HUMAN NATURE, AND OTHER SERMONS. + + + +SERMON I. +UPON HUMAN NATURE. +ROMANS xii. 4, 5. + + + +For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not +the same office: so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and +every one members one of another. + +The Epistles in the New Testament have all of them a particular +reference to the condition and usages of the Christian world at the +time they were written. Therefore as they cannot be thoroughly +understood unless that condition and those usages are known and +attended to, so, further, though they be known, yet if they be +discontinued or changed, exhortations, precepts, and illustrations +of things, which refer to such circumstances now ceased or altered, +cannot at this time be urged in that manner and with that force +which they were to the primitive Christians. Thus the text now +before us, in its first intent and design, relates to the decent +management of those extraordinary gifts which were then in the +Church, {1} but which are now totally ceased. And even as to the +allusion that "we are one body in Christ," though what the apostle +here intends is equally true of Christians in all circumstances, and +the consideration of it is plainly still an additional motive, over +and above moral considerations, to the discharge of the several +duties and offices of a Christian, yet it is manifest this allusion +must have appeared with much greater force to those who, by the many +difficulties they went through for the sake of their religion, were +led to keep always in view the relation they stood in to their +Saviour, who had undergone the same: to those, who, from the +idolatries of all around them, and their ill-treatment, were taught +to consider themselves as not of the world in which they lived, but +as a distinct society of themselves; with laws and ends, and +principles of life and action, quite contrary to those which the +world professed themselves at that time influenced by. Hence the +relation of a Christian was by them considered as nearer than that +of affinity and blood; and they almost literally esteemed themselves +as members one of another. + +It cannot, indeed, possibly be denied, that our being God's +creatures, and virtue being the natural law we are born under, and +the whole constitution of man being plainly adapted to it, are prior +obligations to piety and virtue than the consideration that God sent +his Son into the world to save it, and the motives which arise from +the peculiar relation of Christians as members one of another under +Christ our head. However, though all this be allowed, as it +expressly is by the inspired writers, yet it is manifest that +Christians at the time of the Revelation, and immediately after, +could not but insist mostly upon considerations of this latter kind. + +These observations show the original particular reference to the +text, and the peculiar force with which the thing intended by the +allusion in it must have been felt by the primitive Christian world. +They likewise afford a reason for treating it at this time in a more +general way. + +The relation which the several parts or members of the natural body +have to each other and to the whole body is here compared to the +relation which each particular person in society has to other +particular persons and to the whole society; and the latter is +intended to be illustrated by the former. And if there be a +likeness between these two relations, the consequence is obvious: +that the latter shows us we were intended to do good to others, as +the former shows us that the several members of the natural body +were intended to be instruments of good to each other and to the +whole body. But as there is scarce any ground for a comparison +between society and the mere material body, this without the mind +being a dead unactive thing, much less can the comparison be carried +to any length. And since the apostle speaks of the several members +as having distinct offices, which implies the mind, it cannot be +thought an allowable liberty, instead of the BODY and ITS MEMBERS, +to substitute the WHOLE NATURE of MAN, and ALL THE VARIETY OF +INTERNAL PRINCIPLES WHICH BELONG TO IT. And then the comparison +will be between the nature of man as respecting self, and tending to +private good, his own preservation and happiness; and the nature of +man as having respect to society, and tending to promote public +good, the happiness of that society. These ends do indeed perfectly +coincide; and to aim at public and private good are so far from +being inconsistent that they mutually promote each other: yet in +the following discourse they must be considered as entirely +distinct; otherwise the nature of man as tending to one, or as +tending to the other, cannot be compared. There can no comparison +be made, without considering the things compared as distinct and +different. + +From this review and comparison of the nature of man as respecting +self and as respecting society, it will plainly appear that there +are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that +we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as +that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and +private good: and that the same objections lie against one of these +assertions as against the other. For, + +First, there is a natural principle of BENEVOLENCE {2} in man, which +is in some degree to SOCIETY what SELF-LOVE is to the INDIVIDUAL. +And if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there +be any such thing as compassion--for compassion is momentary love-- +if there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if +there be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which +is the good of another, this is itself benevolence, or the love of +another. Be it ever so short, be it in ever so low a degree, or +ever so unhappily confined, it proves the assertion, and points out +what we were designed for, as really as though it were in a higher +degree and more extensive. I must, however, remind you that though +benevolence and self-love are different, though the former tends +most directly to public good, and the latter to private, yet they +are so perfectly coincident that the greatest satisfactions to +ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and +that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards +society. It may be added that their mutual coinciding, so that we +can scarce promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we +were made for both. + +Secondly, this will further appear, from observing that the SEVERAL +PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS, which are distinct {3} both from +benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute and lead us to +PUBLIC GOOD as really as to PRIVATE. It might be thought too minute +and particular, and would carry us too great a length, to +distinguish between and compare together the several passions or +appetites distinct from benevolence, whose primary use and intention +is the security and good of society, and the passions distinct from +self-love, whose primary intention and design is the security and +good of the individual. {4} It is enough to the present argument +that desire of esteem from others, contempt and esteem of them, love +of society as distinct from affection to the good of it, indignation +against successful vice--that these are public affections or +passions, have an immediate respect to others, naturally lead us to +regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of service to our +fellow-creatures. If any or all of these may be considered likewise +as private affections, as tending to private good, this does not +hinder them from being public affections too, or destroy the good +influence of them upon society, and their tendency to public good. +It may be added that as persons without any conviction from reason +of the desirableness of life would yet of course preserve it merely +from the appetite of hunger, so, by acting merely from regard +(suppose) to reputation, without any consideration of the good of +others, men often contribute to public good. In both these +instances they are plainly instruments in the hands of another, in +the hands of Providence, to carry on ends--the preservation of the +individual and good of society--which they themselves have not in +their view or intention. The sum is, men have various appetites, +passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from self- +love and from benevolence: all of these have a tendency to promote +both public and private good, and may be considered as respecting +others and ourselves equally and in common; but some of them seem +most immediately to respect others, or tend to public good; others +of them most immediately to respect self, or tend to private good: +as the former are not benevolence, so the latter are not self-love: +neither sort are instances of our love either to ourselves or +others, but only instances of our Maker's care and love both of the +individual and the species, and proofs that He intended we should be +instruments of good to each other, as well as that we should be so +to ourselves. + +Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they +distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. We +are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon +our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within +itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections as +respecting such objects, and in such degrees; and of the several +actions consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one, +disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither +of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by +which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is +conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word, though +sometimes it is used so as to take in more. And that this faculty +tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and leads +them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon. Thus +a parent has the affection of love to his children: this leads him +to take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them--the +natural affection leads to this: but the reflection that it is his +proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right and +commendable so to do--this, added to the affection, becomes a much +more settled principle, and carries him on through more labour and +difficulties for the sake of his children than he would undergo from +that affection alone, if he thought it, and the cause of action it +led to, either indifferent or criminal. This indeed is impossible, +to do that which is good and not to approve of it; for which reason +they are frequently not considered as distinct, though they really +are: for men often approve of the action of others which they will +not imitate, and likewise do that which they approve not. It cannot +possibly be denied that there is this principle of reflection or +conscience in human nature. Suppose a man to relieve an innocent +person in great distress; suppose the same man afterwards, in the +fury of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a person who had given +no just cause of offence. To aggravate the injury, add the +circumstances of former friendship and obligation from the injured +person; let the man who is supposed to have done these two different +actions coolly reflect upon them afterwards, without regard to their +consequences to himself: to assert that any common man would be +affected in the same way towards these different actions, that he +would make no distinction between them, but approve or disapprove +them equally, is too glaring a falsity to need being confuted. +There is therefore this principle of reflection or conscience in +mankind. It is needless to compare the respect it has to private +good with the respect it has to public; since it plainly tends as +much to the latter as to the former, and is commonly thought to tend +chiefly to the latter. This faculty is now mentioned merely as +another part in the inward frame of man, pointing out to us in some +degree what we are intended for, and as what will naturally and of +course have some influence. The particular place assigned to it by +nature, what authority it has, and how great influence it ought to +have, shall be hereafter considered. + +From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of our public and +private affections, of the courses of life they lead to, and of the +principle of reflection or conscience as respecting each of them, it +is as manifest that WE WERE MADE FOR SOCIETY, AND TO PROMOTE THE +HAPPINESS OF IT, AS THAT WE WERE INTENDED to TAKE CARE OF OUR OWN +LIFE AND HEALTH AND PRIVATE GOOD. + +And from this whole review must be given a different draught of +human nature from what we are often presented with. Mankind are by +nature so closely united, there is such a correspondence between the +inward sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is +as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and +love as much desired as any external goods; and in many particular +cases persons are carried on to do good to others, as the end their +affection tends to and rests in; and manifest that they find real +satisfaction and enjoyment in this course of behaviour. There is +such a natural principle of attraction in man towards man that +having trod the same tract of land, having breathed in the same +climate, barely having been born in the same artificial district or +division, becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances and +familiarities many years after; for anything may serve the purpose. +Thus relations merely nominal are sought and invented, not by +governors, but by the lowest of the people, which are found +sufficient to hold mankind together in little fraternities and +copartnerships: weak ties indeed, and what may afford fund enough +for ridicule, if they are absurdly considered as the real principles +of that union: but they are in truth merely the occasions, as +anything may be of anything, upon which our nature carries us on +according to its own previous bent and bias; which occasions +therefore would be nothing at all were there not this prior +disposition and bias of nature. Men are so much one body that in a +peculiar manner they feel for each other shame, sudden danger, +resentment, honour, prosperity, distress; one or another, or all of +these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence, upon the +occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence; +each of these being distinct cements of society. And therefore to +have no restraint from, no regard to, others in our behaviour, is +the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and +independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to +our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice. And this is +the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part, to have no +natural respect to any other, or to the whole body. + +But, allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man dispositions +and principles within which lead him to do evil to others, as well +as to do good? Whence come the many miseries else which men are the +authors and instruments of to each other?" These questions, so far +as they relate to the foregoing discourse, may be answered by +asking, Has not man also dispositions and principles within which +lead him to do evil to himself, as well as good? Whence come the +many miseries else--sickness, pain, and death--which men are +instruments and authors of to themselves? + +It may be thought more easy to answer one of these questions than +the other, but the answer to both is really the same: that mankind +have ungoverned passions which they will gratify at any rate, as +well to the injury of others as in contradiction to known private +interest: but that as there is no such thing as self-hatred, so +neither is there any such thing as ill-will in one man towards +another, emulation and resentment being away; whereas there is +plainly benevolence or good-will: there is no such thing as love of +injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, but only eager +desires after such and such external goods; which, according to a +very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose to obtain +by innocent means, if they were as easy and as effectual to their +end: that even emulation and resentment, by any one who will +consider what these passions really are in nature, {5} will be found +nothing to the purpose of this objection; and that the principles +and passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self- +love and benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to right +behaviour with regard to others as well as himself, and only +secondarily and accidentally to what is evil. Thus, though men, to +avoid the shame of one villainy, are sometimes guilty of a greater, +yet it is easy to see that the original tendency of shame is to +prevent the doing of shameful actions; and its leading men to +conceal such actions when done is only in consequence of their being +done; i.e., of the passion's not having answered its first end. + +If it be said that there are persons in the world who are in great +measure without the natural affections towards their fellow- +creatures, there are likewise instances of persons without the +common natural affections to themselves. But the nature of man is +not to be judged of by either of these, but by what appears in the +common world, in the bulk of mankind. + +I am afraid it would be thought very strange, if to confirm the +truth of this account of human nature, and make out the justness of +the foregoing comparison, it should be added that from what appears, +men in fact as much and as often contradict that PART of their +nature which respects SELF, and which leads them to their OWN +PRIVATE good and happiness, as they contradict that PART of it which +respects SOCIETY, and tends to PUBLIC good: that there are as few +persons who attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment which +they might attain in the present world, as who do the greatest good +to others which they might do; nay, that there are as few who can be +said really and in earnest to aim at one as at the other. Take a +survey of mankind: the world in general, the good and bad, almost +without exception, equally are agreed that were religion out of the +case, the happiness of the present life would consist in a manner +wholly in riches, honours, sensual gratifications; insomuch that one +scarce hears a reflection made upon prudence, life, conduct, but +upon this supposition. Yet, on the contrary, that persons in the +greatest affluence of fortune are no happier than such as have only +a competency; that the cares and disappointments of ambition for the +most part far exceed the satisfactions of it; as also the miserable +intervals of intemperance and excess, and the many untimely deaths +occasioned by a dissolute course of life: these things are all +seen, acknowledged, by every one acknowledged; but are thought no +objections against, though they expressly contradict, this universal +principle--that the happiness of the present life consists in one or +other of them. Whence is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is +not the middle way obvious? Can anything be more manifest than that +the happiness of life consists in these possessed and enjoyed only +to a certain degree; that to pursue them beyond this degree is +always attended with more inconvenience than advantage to a man's +self, and often with extreme misery and unhappiness? Whence, then, +I say, is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is it really the +result of consideration in mankind, how they may become most easy to +themselves, most free from care, and enjoy the chief happiness +attainable in this world? Or is it not manifestly owing either to +this, that they have not cool and reasonable concern enough for +themselves to consider wherein their chief happiness in the present +life consists; or else, if they do consider it, that they will not +act conformably to what is the result of that consideration--i.e., +reasonable concern for themselves, or cool self-love, is prevailed +over by passions and appetite? So that from what appears there is +no ground to assert that those principles in the nature of man, +which most directly lead to promote the good of our fellow- +creatures, are more generally or in a greater degree violated than +those which most directly lead us to promote our own private good +and happiness. + +The sum of the whole is plainly this: The nature of man considered +in his single capacity, and with respect only to the present world, +is adapted and leads him to attain the greatest happiness he can for +himself in the present world. The nature of man considered in his +public or social capacity leads him to right behaviour in society, +to that course of life which we call virtue. Men follow or obey +their nature in both these capacities and respects to a certain +degree, but not entirely: their actions do not come up to the whole +of what their nature leads them to in either of these capacities or +respects: and they often violate their nature in both; i.e., as +they neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-creatures, to which +their nature leads them, and are injurious, to which their nature is +abhorrent, so there is a manifest negligence in men of their real +happiness or interest in the present world, when that interest is +inconsistent with a present gratification; for the sake of which +they negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors and +instruments of their own misery and ruin. Thus they are as often +unjust to themselves as to others, and for the most part are equally +so to both by the same actions. + + + +SERMON II., III. +UPON HUMAN NATURE. +ROMANS ii. 14. + + + +For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the +things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law +unto themselves. + +As speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so likewise +moral obligations may be shown by different methods. If the real +nature of any creature leads him and is adapted to such and such +purposes only, or more than to any other, this is a reason to +believe the Author of that nature intended it for those purposes. +Thus there is no doubt the eye was intended for us to see with. And +the more complex any constitution is, and the greater variety of +parts there are which thus tend to some one end, the stronger is the +proof that such end was designed. However, when the inward frame of +man is considered as any guide in morals, the utmost caution must be +used that none make peculiarities in their own temper, or anything +which is the effect of particular customs, though observable in +several, the standard of what is common to the species; and above +all, that the highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that to +which belongs the adjustment and correction of all other inward +movements and affections; which principle will of course have some +influence, but which being in nature supreme, as shall now be shown, +ought to preside over and govern all the rest. The difficulty of +rightly observing the two former cautions; the appearance there is +of some small diversity amongst mankind with respect to this +faculty, with respect to their natural sense of moral good and evil; +and the attention necessary to survey with any exactness what passes +within, have occasioned that it is not so much agreed what is the +standard of the internal nature of man as of his external form. +Neither is this last exactly settled. Yet we understand one another +when we speak of the shape of a human body: so likewise we do when +we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far soever the +standard is from being exact or precisely fixed. There is therefore +ground for an attempt of showing men to themselves, of showing them +what course of life and behaviour their real nature points out and +would lead them to. Now obligations of virtue shown, and motives to +the practice of it enforced, from a review of the nature of man, are +to be considered as an appeal to each particular person's heart and +natural conscience: as the external senses are appealed to for the +proof of things cognisable by them. Since, then, our inward +feelings, and the perceptions we receive from our external senses, +are equally real, to argue from the former to life and conduct is as +little liable to exception as to argue from the latter to absolute +speculative truth. A man can as little doubt whether his eyes were +given him to see with as he can doubt of the truth of the science of +optics, deduced from ocular experiments. And allowing the inward +feeling, shame, a man can as little doubt whether it was given him +to prevent his doing shameful actions as he can doubt whether his +eyes were given him to guide his steps. And as to these inward +feelings themselves, that they are real, that man has in his nature +passions and affections, can no more be questioned than that he has +external senses. Neither can the former be wholly mistaken, though +to a certain degree liable to greater mistakes than the latter. + +There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts, +several principles in the heart of man, carry him to society, and to +contribute to the happiness of it, in a sense and a manner in which +no inward principle leads him to evil. These principles, +propensions, or instincts which lead him to do good are approved of +by a certain faculty within, quite distinct from these propensions +themselves. All this hath been fully made out in the foregoing +discourse. + +But it may be said, "What is all this, though true, to the purpose +of virtue and religion? these require, not only that we do good to +others when we are led this way, by benevolence or reflection +happening to be stronger than other principles, passions, or +appetites, but likewise that the WHOLE character be formed upon +thought and reflection; that EVERY action be directed by some +determinate rule, some other rule than the strength and prevalency +of any principle or passion. What sign is there in our nature (for +the inquiry is only about what is to be collected from thence) that +this was intended by its Author? Or how does so various and fickle +a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? It may indeed be +absurd and unnatural for men to act without any reflection; nay, +without regard to that particular kind of reflection which you call +conscience, because this does belong to our nature. For as there +never was a man but who approved one place, prospect, building, +before another, so it does not appear that there ever was a man who +would not have approved an action of humanity rather than of +cruelty; interest and passion being quite out of the case. But +interest and passion do come in, and are often too strong for and +prevail over reflection and conscience. Now as brutes have various +instincts, by which they are carried on to the end the Author of +their nature intended them for, is not man in the same condition-- +with this difference only, that to his instincts (i.e., appetites +and passion) is added the principle of reflection or conscience? +And as brutes act agreeably to their nature, in following that +principle or particular instinct which for the present is strongest +in them, does not man likewise act agreeably to his nature, or obey +the law of his creation, by following that principle, be it passion +or conscience, which for the present happens to be strongest in him? +Thus different men are by their particular nature hurried on to +pursue honour or riches or pleasure; there are also persons whose +temper leads them in an uncommon degree to kindness, compassion, +doing good to their fellow-creatures, as there are others who are +given to suspend their judgment, to weigh and consider things, and +to act upon thought and reflection. Let every one, then, quietly +follow his nature, as passion, reflection, appetite, the several +parts of it, happen to be strongest; but let not the man of virtue +take upon him to blame the ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute, +since these equally with him obey and follow their nature. Thus, as +in some cases we follow our nature in doing the works CONTAINED IN +THE LAW, so in other cases we follow nature in doing contrary." + +Now all this licentious talk entirely goes upon a supposition that +men follow their nature in the same sense, in violating the known +rules of justice and honesty for the sake of a present +gratification, as they do in following those rules when they have no +temptation to the contrary. And if this were true, that could not +be so which St. Paul asserts, that men are BY NATURE A LAW TO +THEMSELVES. If by following nature were meant only acting as we +please, it would indeed be ridiculous to speak of nature as any +guide in morals; nay, the very mention of deviating from nature +would be absurd; and the mention of following it, when spoken by way +of distinction, would absolutely have no meaning. For did ever any +one act otherwise than as he pleased? And yet the ancients speak of +deviating from nature as vice, and of following nature so much as a +distinction, that according to them the perfection of virtue +consists therein. So that language itself should teach people +another sense to the words FOLLOWING NATURE than barely acting as we +please. Let it, however, be observed that though the words HUMAN +NATURE are to be explained, yet the real question of this discourse +is not concerning the meaning of words, any other than as the +explanation of them may be needful to make out and explain the +assertion, that EVERY MAN IS NATURALLY A LAW to HIMSELF, that EVERY +ONE MAY FIND WITHIN HIMSELF THE RULE OF RIGHT, AND OBLIGATIONS TO +FOLLOW IT. This St. Paul affirms in the words of the text, and this +the foregoing objection really denies by seeming to allow it. And +the objection will be fully answered, and the text before us +explained, by observing that NATURE is considered in different +views, and the word used in different senses; and by showing in what +view it is considered, and in what sense the word is used, when +intended to express and signify that which is the guide of life, +that by which men are a law to themselves. I say, the explanation +of the term will be sufficient, because from thence it will appear +that in some senses of the word NATURE cannot be, but that in +another sense it manifestly is, a law to us. + +I. By nature is often meant no more than some principle in man, +without regard either to the kind or degree of it. Thus the passion +of anger, and the affection of parents to their children, would be +called equally NATURAL. And as the same person hath often contrary +principles, which at the same time draw contrary ways, he may by the +same action both follow and contradict his nature in this sense of +the word; he may follow one passion and contradict another. + +II. NATURE is frequently spoken of as consisting in those passions +which are strongest, and most influence the actions; which being +vicious ones, mankind is in this sense naturally vicious, or vicious +by nature. Thus St. Paul says of the Gentiles, WHO WERE DEAD IN +TRESPASSES AND SINS, AND WALKED ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT OF +DISOBEDIENCE, THAT THEY WERE BY NATURE THE CHILDREN OF WRATH. {6} +They could be no otherwise CHILDREN OF WRATH by nature than they +were vicious by nature. + +Here, then, are two different senses of the word NATURE, in neither +of which men can at all be said to be a law to themselves. They are +mentioned only to be excluded, to prevent their being confounded, as +the latter is in the objection, with another sense of it, which is +now to be inquired after and explained. + +III. The apostle asserts that the Gentiles DO BY NATURE THE THINGS +CONTAINED IN THE LAW. Nature is indeed here put by way of +distinction from revelation, but yet it is not a mere negative. He +intends to express more than that by which they DID NOT, that by +which they DID, the works of the law; namely, by NATURE. It is +plain the meaning of the word is not the same in this passage as in +the former, where it is spoken of as evil; for in this latter it is +spoken of as good--as that by which they acted, or might have acted, +virtuously. What that is in man by which he is NATURALLY A LAW TO +HIMSELF is explained in the following words: Which show the work of +the law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing +witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing +one another. If there be a distinction to be made between the WORKS +WRITTEN IN THEIR HEARTS, and the WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE, by the +former must be meant the natural disposition to kindness and +compassion to do what is of good report, to which this apostle often +refers: that part of the nature of man, treated of in the foregoing +discourse, which with very little reflection and of course leads him +to society, and by means of which he naturally acts a just and good +part in it, unless other passions or interest lead him astray. Yet +since other passions, and regards to private interest, which lead us +(though indirectly, yet they lead us) astray, are themselves in a +degree equally natural, and often most prevalent, and since we have +no method of seeing the particular degrees in which one or the other +is placed in us by nature, it is plain the former, considered merely +as natural, good and right as they are, can no more be a law to us +than the latter. But there is a superior principle of reflection or +conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal +principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which +passes judgement upon himself and them, pronounces determinately +some actions to be in themselves just, right, good, others to be in +themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without being consulted, +without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and +approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly: and which, +if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to +anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall +hereafter second and affirm its own. But this part of the office of +conscience is beyond my present design explicitly to consider. It +is by this faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that +he is a law to himself, but this faculty, I say, not to be +considered merely as a principle in his heart, which is to have some +influence as well as others, but considered as a faculty in kind and +in nature supreme over all others, and which bears its own authority +of being so. + +This PREROGATIVE, this NATURAL SUPREMACY, of the faculty which +surveys, approves, or disapproves the several affections of our mind +and actions of our lives, being that by which men ARE A LAW TO +THEMSELVES, their conformity or disobedience to which law of our +nature renders their actions, in the highest and most proper sense, +natural or unnatural, it is fit it be further explained to you; and +I hope it will be so, if you will attend to the following +reflections. + +Man may act according to that principle or inclination which for the +present happens to be strongest, and yet act in a way +disproportionate to, and violate his real proper nature. Suppose a +brute creature by any bait to be allured into a snare, by which he +is destroyed. He plainly followed the bent of his nature, leading +him to gratify his appetite: there is an entire correspondence +between his whole nature and such an action: such action therefore +is natural. But suppose a man, foreseeing the same danger of +certain ruin, should rush into it for the sake of a present +gratification; he in this instance would follow his strongest +desire, as did the brute creature; but there would be as manifest a +disproportion between the nature of a man and such an action as +between the meanest work of art and the skill of the greatest master +in that art; which disproportion arises, not from considering the +action singly in ITSELF, or in its CONSEQUENCES, but from COMPARISON +of it with the nature of the agent. And since such an action is +utterly disproportionate to the nature of man, it is in the +strictest and most proper sense unnatural; this word expressing that +disproportion. Therefore, instead of the words DISPROPORTIONATE TO +HIS NATURE, the word UNNATURAL may now be put; this being more +familiar to us: but let it be observed that it stands for the same +thing precisely. + +Now what is it which renders such a rash action unnatural? Is it +that he went against the principle of reasonable and cool self-love, +considered MERELY as a part of his nature? No; for if he had acted +the contrary way, he would equally have gone against a principle, or +part of his nature--namely, passion or appetite. But to deny a +present appetite, from foresight that the gratification of it would +end in immediate ruin or extreme misery, is by no means an unnatural +action: whereas to contradict or go against cool self-love for the +sake of such gratification is so in the instance before us. Such an +action then being unnatural, and its being so not arising from a +man's going against a principle or desire barely, nor in going +against that principle or desire which happens for the present to be +strongest, it necessarily follows that there must be some other +difference or distinction to be made between these two principles, +passion and cool self-love, than what I have yet taken notice of. +And this difference, not being a difference in strength or degree, I +call a difference in NATURE and in KIND. And since, in the instance +still before us, if passion prevails over self-love the consequent +action is unnatural, but if self-love prevails over passion the +action is natural, it is manifest that self-love is in human nature +a superior principle to passion. This may be contradicted without +violating that nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will +act conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love +must govern. Thus, without particular consideration of conscience, +we may have a clear conception of the SUPERIOR NATURE of one inward +principle to another, and see that there really is this natural +superiority, quite distinct from degrees of strength and prevalency. + +Let us now take a view of the nature of man, as consisting partly of +various appetites, passions, affections, and partly of the principle +of reflection or conscience, leaving quite out all consideration of +the different degrees of strength in which either of them prevails, +and it will further appear that there is this natural superiority of +one inward principle to another, and that it is even part of the +idea of reflection or conscience. + +Passion or appetite implies a direct simple tendency towards such +and such objects, without distinction of the means by which they are +to be obtained. Consequently it will often happen there will be a +desire of particular objects, in cases where they cannot be obtained +without manifest injury to others. Reflection or conscience comes +in, need disapproves the pursuit of them in these circumstances; but +the desire remains. Which is to be obeyed, appetite or reflection? +Cannot this question be answered, from the economy and constitution +of human nature merely, without saying which is strongest? Or need +this at all come into consideration? Would not the question be +INTELLIGIBLY and fully answered by saying that the principle of +reflection or conscience being compared with the various appetites, +passions, and affections in men, the former is manifestly superior +and chief, without regard to strength? And how often soever the +latter happens to prevail, it is mere USURPATION: the former +remains in nature and in kind its superior; and every instance of +such prevalence of the latter is an instance of breaking in upon and +violation of the constitution of man. + +All this is no more than the distinction, which everybody is +acquainted with, between MERE POWER and AUTHORITY: only instead of +being intended to express the difference between what is possible +and what is lawful in civil government, here it has been shown +applicable to the several principles in the mind of man. Thus that +principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our +own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what +is in its turn to have some influence--which may be said of every +passion, of the lowest appetites--but likewise as being superior, as +from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all +others, insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, +conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. +This is a constituent part of the idea--that is, of the faculty +itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and +constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it had +right; had it power, as it had manifest authority, it would +absolutely govern the world. + +This gives us a further view of the nature of man; shows us what +course of life we were made for: not only that our real nature +leads us to be influenced in some degree by reflection and +conscience, but likewise in what degree we are to be influenced by +it, if we will fall in with, and act agreeably to, the constitution +of our nature: that this faculty was placed within to be our proper +governor, to direct and regulate all under principles, passions, and +motives of action. This is its right and office: thus sacred is +its authority. And how often soever men violate and rebelliously +refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which they cannot +otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot +otherwise gratify--this makes no alteration as to the NATURAL RIGHT +and OFFICE of conscience. + +Let us now turn this whole matter another way, and suppose there was +no such thing at all as this natural supremacy of conscience--that +there was no distinction to be made between one inward principle and +another, but only that of strength--and see what would be the +consequence. + +Consider, then, what is the latitude and compass of the actions of +man with regard to himself, his fellow-creatures, and the Supreme +Being? What are their bounds, besides that of our natural power? +With respect to the two first, they are plainly no other than these: +no man seeks misery, as such, for himself; and no one unprovoked +does mischief to another for its own sake. For in every degree +within these bounds, mankind knowingly, from passion or wantonness, +bring ruin and misery upon themselves and others. And impiety and +profaneness--I mean what every one would call so who believes the +being of God--have absolutely no bounds at all. Men blaspheme the +Author of nature, formally and in words renounce their allegiance to +their Creator. Put an instance, then, with respect to any one of +these three. Though we should suppose profane swearing, and in +general that kind of impiety now mentioned, to mean nothing, yet it +implies wanton disregard and irreverence towards an infinite Being +our Creator; and is this as suitable to the nature of man as +reverence and dutiful submission of heart towards that Almighty +Being? Or suppose a man guilty of parricide, with all the +circumstances of cruelty which such an action can admit of. This +action is done in consequence of its principle being for the present +strongest; and if there be no difference between inward principles, +but only that of strength, the strength being given you have the +whole nature of the man given, so far as it relates to this matter. +The action plainly corresponds to the principle, the principle being +in that degree of strength it was: it therefore corresponds to the +whole nature of the man. Upon comparing the action and the whole +nature, there arises no disproportion, there appears no +unsuitableness, between them. Thus the MURDER OF A FATHER and the +NATURE OF MAN correspond to each other, as the same nature and an +act of filial duty. If there be no difference between inward +principles, but only that of strength, we can make no distinction +between these two actions, considered as the actions of such a +creature; but in our coolest hours must approve or disapprove them +equally: than which nothing can be reduced to a greater absurdity. + + + +SERMON III. + + + +The natural supremacy of reflection or conscience being thus +established, we may from it form a distinct notion of what is meant +by HUMAN NATURE when virtue is said to consist in following it, and +vice in deviating from it. + +As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united strength, +various subordinations under one direction--that of the supreme +authority--the different strength of each particular member of the +society not coming into the idea--whereas, if you leave out the +subordination, the union, and the one direction, you destroy and +lose it--so reason, several appetites, passions, and affections, +prevailing in different degrees of strength, is not THAT idea or +notion of HUMAN NATURE; but THAT NATURE consists in these several +principles considered as having a natural respect to each other, in +the several passions being naturally subordinate to the one superior +principle of reflection or conscience. Every bias, instinct, +propension within, is a natural part of our nature, but not the +whole: add to these the superior faculty whose office it is to +adjust, manage, and preside over them, and take in this its natural +superiority, and you complete the idea of human nature. And as in +civil government the constitution is broken in upon and violated by +power and strength prevailing over authority; so the constitution of +man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties or +principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature +supreme over them all. Thus, when it is said by ancient writers +that tortures and death are not so contrary to human nature as +injustice, by this, to be sure, is not meant that the aversion to +the former in mankind is less strong and prevalent than their +aversion to the latter, but that the former is only contrary to our +nature considered in a partial view, and which takes in only the +lowest part of it, that which we have in common with the brutes; +whereas the latter is contrary to our nature, considered in a higher +sense, as a system and constitution contrary to the whole economy of +man. {7} + +And from all these things put together, nothing can be more evident +than that, exclusive of revelation, man cannot be considered as a +creature left by his Maker to act at random, and live at large up to +the extent of his natural power, as passion, humour, wilfulness, +happen to carry him, which is the condition brute creatures are in; +but that FROM HIS MAKE, CONSTITUTION, OR NATURE, HE IS IN THE +STRICTEST AND MOST PROPER SENSE A LAW TO HIMSELF. He hath the rule +of right within: what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to +it. + +The inquiries which have been made by men of leisure after some +general rule, the conformity to or disagreement from which should +denominate our actions good or evil, are in many respects of great +service. Yet let any plain, honest man, before he engages in any +course of action, ask himself, Is this I am going about right, or is +it wrong? Is it good, or is it evil? I do not in the least doubt +but that this question would be answered agreeably to truth and +virtue, by almost any fair man in almost any circumstance. Neither +do there appear any cases which look like exceptions to this, but +those of superstition, and of partiality to ourselves. Superstition +may perhaps be somewhat of an exception; but partiality to ourselves +is not, this being itself dishonesty. For a man to judge that to be +the equitable, the moderate, the right part for him to act, which he +would see to be hard, unjust, oppressive in another, this is plain +vice, and can proceed only from great unfairness of mind. + +But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right within himself, yet +it may be asked, "What obligations are we under to attend to and +follow it?" I answer: It has been proved that man by his nature is +a law to himself, without the particular distinct consideration of +the positive sanctions of that law: the rewards and punishments +which we feel, and those which from the light of reason we have +ground to believe, are annexed to it. The question, then, carries +its own answer along within it. Your obligation to obey this law is +its being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves of +and attests to such a course of action is itself alone an +obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the +way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority +with it, that it is our natural guide; the guide assigned us by the +Author of our nature: it therefore belongs to our condition of +being; it is our duty to walk in that path, and follow this guide, +without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake +them with impunity. + +However, let us hear what is to be said against obeying this law of +our nature. And the sum is no more than this: "Why should we be +concerned about anything out of and beyond ourselves? If we do find +within ourselves regards to others, and restraints of we know not +how many different kinds, yet these being embarrassments, and +hindering us from going the nearest way to our own good, why should +we not endeavour to suppress and get over them?" + +Thus people go on with words, which when applied to human nature, +and the condition in which it is placed in this world, have really +no meaning. For does not all this kind of talk go upon supposition, +that our happiness in this world consists in somewhat quite distinct +from regard to others, and that it is the privilege of vice to be +without restraint or confinement? Whereas, on the contrary, the +enjoyments--in a manner all the common enjoyments of life, even the +pleasures of vice--depend upon these regards of one kind or another +to our fellow-creatures. Throw off all regards to others, and we +should be quite indifferent to infamy and to honour; there could be +no such thing at all as ambition; and scarce any such thing as +covetousness; for we should likewise be equally indifferent to the +disgrace of poverty, the several neglects and kinds of contempt +which accompany this state, and to the reputation of riches, the +regard and respect they usually procure. Neither is restraint by +any means peculiar to one course of life; but our very nature, +exclusive of conscience and our condition, lays us under an absolute +necessity of it. We cannot gain any end whatever without being +confined to the proper means, which is often the most painful and +uneasy confinement. And in numberless instances a present appetite +cannot be gratified without such apparent and immediate ruin and +misery that the most dissolute man in the world chooses to forego +the pleasure rather than endure the pain. + +Is the meaning, then, to indulge those regards to our fellow- +creatures, and submit to those restraints which upon the whole are +attended with more satisfaction than uneasiness, and get over only +those which bring more uneasiness and inconvenience than +satisfaction? "Doubtless this was our meaning." You have changed +sides then. Keep to this; be consistent with yourselves, and you +and the men of virtue are IN GENERAL perfectly agreed. But let us +take care and avoid mistakes. Let it not be taken for granted that +the temper of envy, rage, resentment, yields greater delight than +meekness, forgiveness, compassion, and good-will; especially when it +is acknowledged that rage, envy, resentment, are in themselves mere +misery; and that satisfaction arising from the indulgence of them is +little more than relief from that misery; whereas the temper of +compassion and benevolence is itself delightful; and the indulgence +of it, by doing good, affords new positive delight and enjoyment. +Let it not be taken for granted that the satisfaction arising from +the reputation of riches and power, however obtained, and from the +respect paid to them, is greater than the satisfaction arising from +the reputation of justice, honesty, charity, and the esteem which is +universally acknowledged to be their due. And if it be doubtful +which of these satisfactions is the greatest, as there are persons +who think neither of them very considerable, yet there can be no +doubt concerning ambition and covetousness, virtue and a good mind, +considered in themselves, and as leading to different courses of +life; there can, I say, be no doubt, which temper and which course +is attended with most peace and tranquillity of mind, which with +most perplexity, vexation, and inconvenience. And both the virtues +and vices which have been now mentioned, do in a manner equally +imply in them regards of one kind or another to our fellow- +creatures. And with respect to restraint and confinement, whoever +will consider the restraints from fear and shame, the dissimulation, +mean arts of concealment, servile compliances, one or other of which +belong to almost every course of vice, will soon be convinced that +the man of virtue is by no means upon a disadvantage in this +respect. How many instances are there in which men feel and own and +cry aloud under the chains of vice with which they are enthralled, +and which yet they will not shake off! How many instances, in which +persons manifestly go through more pains and self-denial to gratify +a vicious passion, than would have been necessary to the conquest of +it! To this is to be added, that when virtue is become habitual, +when the temper of it is acquired, what was before confinement +ceases to be so by becoming choice and delight. Whatever restraint +and guard upon ourselves may be needful to unlearn any unnatural +distortion or odd gesture, yet in all propriety of speech, natural +behaviour must be the most easy and unrestrained. It is manifest +that, in the common course of life, there is seldom any +inconsistency between our duty and what is CALLED interest: it is +much seldomer that there is an inconsistency between duty and what +is really our present interest; meaning by interest, happiness and +satisfaction. Self-love, then, though confined to the interest of +the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue, +and leads us to one and the same course of life. But, whatever +exceptions there are to this, which are much fewer than they are +commonly thought, all shall be set right at the final distribution +of things. It is a manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing +finally over good, under the conduct and administration of a perfect +mined. + +The whole argument, which I have been now insisting upon, may be +thus summed up, and given you in one view. The nature of man is +adapted to some course of action or other. Upon comparing some +actions with this nature, they appear suitable and correspondent to +it: from comparison of other actions with the same nature, there +arises to our view some unsuitableness or disproportion. The +correspondence of actions to the nature of the agent renders them +natural; their disproportion to it, unnatural. That an action is +correspondent to the nature of the agent does not arise from its +being agreeable to the principle which happens to be the strongest: +for it may be so and yet be quite disproportionate to the nature of +the agent. The correspondence therefore, or disproportion, arises +from somewhat else. This can be nothing but a difference in nature +and kind, altogether distinct from strength, between the inward +principles. Some then are in nature and kind superior to others. +And the correspondence arises from the action being conformable to +the higher principle; and the unsuitableness from its being contrary +to it. Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or +superior principles in the nature of man; because an action may be +suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated, +but becomes unsuitable if either of those are. Conscience and self- +love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same +way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part +in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the +future and the whole; this being implied in the notion of a good and +perfect administration of things. Thus they who have been so wise +in their generation as to regard only their own supposed interest, +at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at last find, that +he who has given up all the advantages of the present world, rather +than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has +infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his owns +interest and happiness. + + + +SERMON IV. +UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TONGUE. +JAMES i. 26. + + + +If any man among you seem to be religious, and bridleth not his +tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain. + +The translation of this text would be more determinate by being more +literal, thus: If any man among you seemeth to be religious, not +bridling his tongue, but deceiving his own heart, this man's +religion is vain. This determines that the words, BUT DECEIVETH HIS +OWN HEART, are not put in opposition to SEEMETH TO BE RELIGIOUS, but +to BRIDLETH NOT HIS TONGUE. The certain determinate meaning of the +text then being, that he who seemeth to be religious, and bridleth +not his tongue, but in that particular deceiveth his own heart, this +man's religion is vain, we may observe somewhat very forcible and +expressive in these words of St. James. As if the apostle had said, +No man surely can make any pretences to religion, who does not at +least believe that he bridleth his tongue: if he puts on any +appearance or face of religion, and yet does not govern his tongue, +he must surely deceive himself in that particular, and think he +does; and whoever is so unhappy as to deceive himself in this, to +imagine he keeps that unruly faculty in due subjection when indeed +he does not, whatever the other part of his life be, his religion is +vain; the government of the tongue being a most material restraint +which virtue lays us under: without it no man can be truly +religious. + +In treating upon this subject, I will consider, + +First, what is the general vice or fault here referred to; or what +disposition in men is supposed in moral reflections and precepts +concerning BRIDLING THE TONGUE. + +Secondly, when it may be said of any one, that he has a due +government over himself in this respect. + +I. Now, the fault referred to, and the disposition supposed, in +precepts and reflections concerning the government of the tongue, is +not evil-speaking from malice, nor lying or bearing false witness +from indirect selfish designs. The disposition to these, and the +actual vices themselves, all come under other subjects. The tongue +may be employed about, and made to serve all the purposes of vice, +in tempting and deceiving, in perjury and injustice. But the thing +here supposed and referred to, is talkativeness: a disposition to +be talking, abstracted from the consideration of what is to be said; +with very little or no regard to, or thought of doing, either good +or harm. And let not any imagine this to be a slight matter, and +that it deserves not to have so great weight laid upon it, till he +has considered what evil is implied in it, and the bad effects which +follow from it. It is perhaps true, that they who are addicted to +this folly would choose to confine themselves to trifles and +indifferent subjects, and so intend only to be guilty of being +impertinent: but as they cannot go on for ever talking of nothing, +as common matters will not afford a sufficient fund for perpetual +continued discourse, where subjects of this kind are exhausted they +will go on to defamation, scandal, divulging of secrets, their own +secrets as well as those of others--anything rather than be silent. +They are plainly hurried on in the heat of their talk to say quite +different things from what they first intended, and which they +afterwards wish unsaid: or improper things, which they had no other +end in saying, but only to afford employment to their tongue. And +if these people expect to be heard and regarded--for there are some +content merely with talking--they will invent to engage your +attention: and, when they have heard the least imperfect hint of an +affair, they will out of their own head add the circumstances of +time and place and other matters to make out their story and give +the appearance of probability to it: not that they have any concern +about being believed, otherwise than as a means of being heard. The +thing is, to engage your attention; to take you up wholly for the +present time: what reflections will be made afterwards, is in truth +the least of their thoughts. And further, when persons who indulge +themselves in these liberties of the tongue are in any degree +offended with another--as little disgusts and misunderstandings will +be--they allow themselves to defame and revile such a one without +any moderation or bounds; though the offence is so very slight, that +they themselves would not do, nor perhaps wish him, an injury in any +other way. And in this case the scandal and revilings are chiefly +owing to talkativeness, and not bridling their tongue, and so come +under our present subject. The least occasion in the world will +make the humour break out in this particular way or in another. It +as like a torrent, which must and will flow; but the least thing +imaginable will first of all give it either this or another +direction, turn it into this or that channel: or like a fire--the +nature of which, when in a heap of combustible matter, is to spread +and lay waste all around; but any one of a thousand little accidents +will occasion it to break out first either in this or another +particular part. + +The subject then before us, though it does run up into, and can +scarce be treated as entirely distinct from all others, yet it needs +not be so much mixed or blended with them as it often is. Every +faculty and power may be used as the instrument of premeditated vice +and wickedness, merely as the most proper and effectual means of +executing such designs. But if a man, from deep malice and desire +of revenge, should meditate a falsehood with a settled design to +ruin his neighbour's reputation, and should with great coolness and +deliberation spread it, nobody would choose to say of such a one +that he had no government of his tongue. A man may use the faculty +of speech as an instrument of false witness, who yet has so entire a +command over that faculty as never to speak but from forethought and +cool design. Here the crime is injustice and perjury, and, strictly +speaking, no more belongs to the present subject than perjury and +injustice in any other way. But there is such a thing as a +disposition to be talking for its own sake; from which persons often +say anything, good or bad, of others, merely as a subject of +discourse, according to the particular temper they themselves happen +to be in, and to pass away the present time. There is likewise to +be observed in persons such a strong and eager desire of engaging +attention to what they say, that they will speak good or evil, truth +or otherwise, merely as one or the other seems to be most hearkened +to: and this though it is sometimes joined, is not the same with +the desire of being thought important and men of consequence. There +is in some such a disposition to be talking, that an offence of the +slightest kind, and such as would not raise any other resentment, +yet raises, if I may so speak, the resentment of the tongue--puts it +into a flame, into the most ungovernable motions. This outrage, +when the person it respects is present, we distinguish in the lower +rank of people by a peculiar term: and let it be observed, that +though the decencies of behaviour are a little kept, the same +outrage and virulence, indulged when he is absent, is an offence of +the same kind. But, not to distinguish any further in this manner, +men race into faults and follies which cannot so properly be +referred to any one general head as this--that they have not a due +government over their tongue. + +And this unrestrained volubility and wantonness of speech is the +occasion of numberless evils and vexations in life. It begets +resentment in him who is the subject of it, sows the seed of strife +and dissension amongst others, and inflames little disgusts and +offences which if let alone would wear away of themselves: it is +often of as bad effect upon the good name of others, as deep envy or +malice: and to say the least of it in this respect, it destroys and +perverts a certain equity of the utmost importance to society to be +observed--namely, that praise and dispraise, a good or bad +character, should always be bestowed according to desert. The +tongue used in such a licentious manner is like a sword in the hand +of a madman; it is employed at random, it can scarce possibly do any +good, and for the most part does a world of mischief; and implies +not only great folly and a trifling spirit, but great viciousness of +mind, great indifference to truth and falsity, and to the +reputation, welfare, and good of others. So much reason is there +for what St. James says of the tongue, IT IS A FIRE, A WORLD OF +INIQUITY, IT DEFILETH THE WHOLE BODY, SETTETH ON FIRE THE COURSE OF +NATURE, AND IS ITSELF SET ON FIRE OF HELL. {8} This is the faculty +or disposition which we are required to keep a guard upon: these +are the vices and follies it runs into when not kept under due +restraint. + +II. Wherein the due government of the tongue consists, or when it +may be said of any one in a moral and religious sense that he +BRIDLETH HIS TONGUE, I come now to consider. + +The due and proper use of any natural faculty or power is to be +judged of by the end and design for which it was given us. The +chief purpose for which the faculty of speech was given to man is +plainly that we might communicate our thoughts to each other, in +order to carry on the affairs of the world; for business, and for +our improvement in knowledge and learning. But the good Author of +our nature designed us not only necessaries, but likewise enjoyment +and satisfaction, in that being He hath graciously given, and in +that condition of life He hath placed us in. There are secondary +uses of our faculties: they administer to delight, as well as to +necessity; and as they are equally-adapted to both, there is no +doubt but He intended them for our gratification as well as for the +support and continuance of our being. The secondary use of speech +is to please and be entertaining to each other in conversation. +This is in every respect allowable and right; it unites men closer +in alliances and friendships; gives us a fellow-feeling of the +prosperity and unhappiness of each other; and is in several respects +servicable to virtue, and to promote good behaviour in the world. +And provided there be not too much time spent in it, if it were +considered only in the way of gratification and delight, men must +have strange notion of God and of religion to think that He can be +offended with it, or that it is any way inconsistent with the +strictest virtue. But the truth is, such sort of conversation, +though it has no particular good tendency, yet it has a general good +one; it is social and friendly, and tends to promote humanity, good- +nature, and civility. + +As the end and use, so likewise the abuse of speech, relates to the +one or other of these: either to business or to conversation. As +to the former: deceit in the management of business and affairs +does not properly belong to the subject now before us: though one +may just mention that multitude, that heedless number of words with +which business is perplexed, where a much fewer would, as it should +seem, better serve the purpose; but this must be left to those who +understand the matter. The government of the tongue, considered as +a subject of itself, relates chiefly to conversation; to that kind +of discourse which usually fills up the time spent in friendly +meetings and visits of civility. And the danger is, lest persons +entertain themselves and others at the expense of their wisdom and +their virtue, and to the injury or offence of their neighbour. If +they will observe and keep clear of these, they may be as free and +easy and unreserved as they can desire. + +The cautions to be given for avoiding these dangers, and to render +conversation innocent and agreeable, fall under the following +particulars: silence; talking of indifferent things; and, which +makes up too great a part of conversation, giving of characters, +speaking well or evil of others. + +The Wise Man observes that "there is a time to speak, and a time to +keep silence." One meets with people in the world who seem never to +have made the last of these observations. And yet these great +talkers do not at all speak from their having anything to say, as +every sentence shows, but only from their inclination to be talking. +Their conversation is merely an exercise of the tongue: no other +human faculty has any share in it. It is strange these persons can +help reflecting, that unless they have in truth a superior capacity, +and are in an extraordinary manner furnished for conversation if +they are entertaining, it is at their own expense. Is it possible +that it should never come into people's thoughts to suspect whether +or no it be to their advantage to show so very much of themselves? +"O that you would altogether hold your peace, and it should be your +wisdom." {9} Remember likewise there are persons who love fewer +words, an inoffensive sort of people, and who deserve some regard, +though of too still and composed tempers for you. Of this number +was the Son of Sirach: for he plainly speaks from experience when +he says, "As hills of sand are to the steps of the aged, so is one +of many words to a quiet man." But one would think it should be +obvious to every one, that when they are in company with their +superiors of any kind--in years, knowledge, and experience--when +proper and useful subjects are discoursed of, which they cannot bear +a part in, that these are times for silence, when they should learn +to hear, and be attentive, at least in their turn. It is indeed a +very unhappy way these people are in; they in a manner cut +themselves out from all advantage of conversation, except that of +being entertained with their own talk: their business in coming +into company not being at all to be informed, to hear, to learn, but +to display themselves, or rather to exert their faculty, and talk +without any design at all. And if we consider conversation as an +entertainment, as somewhat to unbend the mind, as a diversion from +the cares, the business, and the sorrows of life, it is of the very +nature of it that the discourse be mutual. This, I say, is implied +in the very notion of what we distinguish by conversation, or being +in company. Attention to the continued discourse of one alone grows +more painful, often, than the cares and business we come to be +diverted from. He, therefore, who imposes this upon us is guilty of +a double offence--arbitrarily enjoining silence upon all the rest, +and likewise obliging them to this painful attention. + +I am sensible these things are apt to be passed over, as too little +to come into a serious discourse; but in reality men are obliged, +even in point of morality and virtue, to observe all the decencies +of behaviour. The greatest evils in life have had their rise from +somewhat which was thought of too little importance to be attended +to. And as to the matter we are now upon, it is absolutely +necessary to be considered. For if people will not maintain a due +government over themselves, in regarding proper times and seasons +for silence, but WILL be talking, they certainly, whether they +design it or not at first, will go on to scandal and evil-speaking, +and divulging secrets. + +If it were needful to say anything further to persuade men to learn +this lesson of silence, one might put them in mind how insignificant +they render themselves by this excessive talkativeness: insomuch +that, if they do chance to say anything which deserves to be +attended to and regarded, it is lost in the variety and abundance +which they utter of another sort. + +The occasions of silence then are obvious, and one would think +should be easily distinguished by everybody: namely, when a man has +nothing to say; or nothing but what is better unsaid: better, +either in regard to the particular persons he is present with; or +from its being an interruption to conversation itself; or to +conversation of a more agreeable kind; or better, lastly, with +regard to himself. I will end this particular with two reflections +of the Wise Man; one of which, in the strongest manner, exposes the +ridiculous part of this licentiousness of the tongue; and the other, +the great danger and viciousness of it. When he that is a fool +walketh by the way side, his wisdom faileth him, and he saith to +every one that he is a fool. {10} The other is, In the multitude of +words there wanteth not sin. {11} + +As to the government of the tongue in respect to talking upon +indifferent subjects: after what has been said concerning the due +government of it in respect to the occasions and times for silence, +there is little more necessary than only to caution men to be fully +satisfied that the subjects are indeed of an indifferent nature; and +not to spend too much time in conversation of this kind. But +persons must be sure to take heed that the subject of their +discourse be at least of an indifferent nature: that it be no way +offensive to virtue, religion, or good manners: that it be not of a +licentious, dissolute sort, this leaving always ill impressions upon +the mind; that it be no way injurious or vexatious to others; and +that too much time be not spent this way, to the neglect of those +duties and offices of life which belong to their station and +condition in the world. However, though there is not any necessity +that men should aim at being important and weighty in every sentence +they speak: yet since useful subjects, at least of some kinds, are +as entertaining as others, a wise man, even when he desires to +unbend his mind from business, would choose that the conversation +might turn upon somewhat instructive. + +The last thing is, the government of the tongue as relating to +discourse of the affairs of others, and giving of characters. These +are in a manner the same; and one can scarce call it an indifferent +subject, because discourse upon it almost perpetually runs into +somewhat criminal. + +And, first of all, it were very much to be wished that this did not +take up so great a part of conversation; because it is indeed a +subject of a dangerous nature. Let any one consider the various +interests, competitions, and little misunderstandings which arise +amongst men; and he will soon see that he is not unprejudiced and +impartial; that he is not, as I may speak, neutral enough to trust +himself with talking of the character and concerns of his neighbour, +in a free, careless, and unreserved manner. There is perpetually, +and often it is not attended to, a rivalship amongst people of one +kind or another in respect to wit, beauty, learning, fortune, and +that one thing will insensibly influence them to speak to the +disadvantage of others, even where there is no formed malice or ill- +design. Since therefore it is so hard to enter into this subject +without offending, the first thing to be observed is that people +should learn to decline it; to get over that strong inclination most +have to be talking of the concerns and behaviour of their neighbour. + +But since it is impossible that this subject should be wholly +excluded conversation; and since it is necessary that the characters +of men should be known: the next thing is that it is a matter of +importance what is said; and, therefore, that we should be +religiously scrupulous and exact to say nothing, either good or bad, +but what is true. I put it thus, because it is in reality of as +great importance to the good of society, that the characters of bad +men should be known, as that the characters of good men should. +People who are given to scandal and detraction may indeed make an +ill-use of this observation; but truths, which are of service +towards regulating our conduct, are not to be disowned, or even +concealed, because a bad use may be made of them. This however +would be effectually prevented if these two things were attended to. +First, That, though it is equally of bad consequence to society that +men should have either good or ill characters which they do not +deserve; yet, when you say somewhat good of a man which he does not +deserve, there is no wrong done him in particular; whereas, when you +say evil of a man which he does not deserve, here is a direct formal +injury, a real piece of injustice done him. This therefore makes a +wide difference; and gives us, in point of virtue, much greater +latitude in speaking well than ill of others. Secondly, A good man +is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a lover of mankind; and so +will, upon every occasion, and often without any, say all the good +he can of everybody; but, so far as he is a good man, will never be +disposed to speak evil of any, unless there be some other reason for +it, besides, barely that it is true. If he be charged with having +given an ill character, he will scarce think it a sufficient +justification of himself to say it was a true one, unless he can +also give some further account how he came to do so: a just +indignation against particular instances of villainy, where they are +great and scandalous; or to prevent an innocent man from being +deceived and betrayed, when he has great trust and confidence in one +who does not deserve it. Justice must be done to every part of a +subject when we are considering it. If there be a man, who bears a +fair character in the world, whom yet we know to be without faith or +honesty, to be really an ill man; it must be allowed in general that +we shall do a piece of service to society by letting such a one's +true character be known. This is no more than what we have an +instance of in our Saviour himself; {12} though He was mild and +gentle beyond example. However, no words can express too strongly +the caution which should be used in such a case as this. + +Upon the whole matter: If people would observe the obvious +occasions of silence, if they would subdue the inclination to tale- +bearing, and that eager desire to engage attention, which is an +original disease in some minds, they would be in little danger of +offending with their tongue; and would, in a moral and religious +sense, have due government over it. + +I will conclude with some precepts and reflections of the Son of +Sirach upon this subject. Be swift to hear; and, if thou hast +understanding, answer thy neighbour; if not, lay thy hand upon thy +mouth. Honour and shame is in talk. A man of an ill tongue is +dangerous in his city, and he that is rash in his talk shall be +hated. A wise man wilt hold his tongue till he see opportunity; but +a babbler and a fool will regard no time. He that useth many words +shall be abhorred; and he that taketh to himself authority therein +shall be hated. A backbiting tongue hath disquieted many; strong +cities hath it pulled down, and overthrown the houses of great men. +The tongue of a man is his fall; but if thou love to hear, thou +shall receive understanding. + + + +SERMON V. +UPON COMPASSION. +ROM. xii. 15. + + + +Rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep. + +Every man is to be considered in two capacities, the private and +public; as designed to pursue his own interest, and likewise to +contribute to the good of others. Whoever will consider may see +that, in general, there is no contrariety between these; but that +from the original constitution of man, and the circumstances he is +placed in, they perfectly coincide, and mutually carry on each +other. But, among the great variety of affections or principles of +actions in our nature, some in their primary intention and design +seem to belong to the single or private, others to the public or +social capacity. The affections required in the text are of the +latter sort. When we rejoice in the prosperity of others, and +compassionate their distresses, we as it were substitute them for +ourselves, their interest for our own; and have the same kind of +pleasure in their prosperity, and sorrow in their distress, as we +have from reflection upon our own. Now there is nothing strange or +unaccountable in our being thus carried out, and affected towards +the interests of others. For, if there be any appetite, or any +inward principle besides self-love; why may there not be an +affection to the good of our fellow-creatures, and delight from that +affection's being gratified, and uneasiness from things going +contrary to it? {13} + +Of these two, delight in the prosperity of others, and compassion +for their distresses, the last is felt much more generally than the +former. Though men do not universally rejoice with all whom they +see rejoice, yet, accidental obstacles removed, they naturally +compassionate all, in some degree, whom they see in distress; so far +as they have any real perception or sense of that distress: +insomuch that words expressing this latter, pity, compassion, +frequently occur: whereas we have scarce any single one by which +the former is distinctly expressed. Congratulation indeed answers +condolence: but both these words are intended to signify certain +forms of civility rather than any inward sensation or feeling. This +difference or inequality is so remarkable that we plainly consider +compassion as itself an original, distinct, particular affection in +human nature; whereas to rejoice in the good of others is only a +consequence of the general affection of love and good-will to them. +The reason and account of which matter is this: when a man has +obtained any particular advantage or felicity, his end is gained; +and he does not in that particular want the assistance of another: +there was therefore no need of a distinct affection towards that +felicity of another already obtained; neither would such affection +directly carry him on to do good to that person: whereas men in +distress want assistance; and compassion leads us directly to assist +them. The object of the former is the present felicity of another; +the object of the latter is the present misery of another. It is +easy to see that the latter wants a particular affection for its +relief, and that the former does not want one because it does not +want assistance. And upon supposition of a distinct affection in +both cases, the one must rest in the exercise of itself, having +nothing further to gain; the other does not rest in itself, but +carries us on to assist the distressed. + +But, supposing these affections natural to the mind, particularly +the last; "Has not each man troubles enough of his own? must he +indulge an affection which appropriates to himself those of others? +which leads him to contract the least desirable of all friendships, +friendships with the unfortunate? Must we invert the known rule of +prudence, and choose to associate ourselves with the distressed? or, +allowing that we ought, so far as it is in our power to relieve +them, yet is it not better to do this from reason and duty? Does +not passion and affection of every kind perpetually mislead us? +Nay, is not passion and affection itself a weakness, and what a +perfect being must be entirely free from?" Perhaps so, but it is +mankind I am speaking of; imperfect creatures, and who naturally +and, from the condition we are placed in, necessarily depend upon +each other. With respect to such creatures, it would be found of as +bad consequence to eradicate all natural affections as to be +entirely governed by them. This would almost sink us to the +condition of brutes; and that would leave us without a sufficient +principle of action. Reason alone, whatever any one may wish, is +not in reality a sufficient motive of virtue in such a creature as +man; but this reason joined with those affections which God has +impressed upon his heart, and when these are allowed scope to +exercise themselves, but under strict government and direction of +reason, then it is we act suitably to our nature, and to the +circumstances God has placed us in. Neither is affection itself at +all a weakness; nor does it argue defect, any otherwise than as our +senses and appetites do; they belong to our condition of nature, and +are what we cannot be without. God Almighty is, to be sure, unmoved +by passion or appetite, unchanged by affection; but then it is to be +added that He neither sees nor hears nor perceives things by any +senses like ours; but in a manner infinitely more perfect. Now, as +it is an absurdity almost too gross to be mentioned, for a man to +endeavour to get rid of his senses, because the Supreme Being +discerns things more perfectly without them; it is as real, though +not so obvious an absurdity, to endeavour to eradicate the passions +He has given us, because He is without them. For, since our +passions are as really a part of our constitution as our senses; +since the former as really belong to our condition of nature as the +latter; to get rid of either is equally a violation of and breaking +in upon that nature and constitution He has given us. Both our +senses and our passions are a supply to the imperfection of our +nature; thus they show that we are such sort of creatures as to +stand in need of those helps which higher orders of creatures do +not. But it is not the supply, but the deficiency; as it is not a +remedy, but a disease, which is the imperfection. However, our +appetites, passions, senses, no way imply disease: nor indeed do +they imply deficiency or imperfection of any sort; but only this, +that the constitution of nature, according to which God has made us, +is such as to require them. And it is so far from being true, that +a wise man must entirely suppress compassion, and all fellow-feeling +for others, as a weakness; and trust to reason alone to teach and +enforce upon him the practice of the several charities we owe to our +kind; that, on the contrary, even the bare exercise of such +affections would itself be for the good and happiness of the world; +and the imperfection of the higher principles of reason and religion +in man, the little influence they have upon our practice, and the +strength and prevalency of contrary ones, plainly require these +affections to be a restraint upon these latter, and a supply to the +deficiencies of the former. + +First, The very exercise itself of these affections in a just and +reasonable manner and degree would upon the whole increase the +satisfactions and lessen the miseries of life. + +It is the tendency and business of virtue and religion to procure, +as much as may be, universal good-will, trust, and friendship +amongst mankind. If this could be brought to obtain; and each man +enjoyed the happiness of others, as every one does that of a friend; +and looked upon the success and prosperity of his neighbour as every +one does upon that of his children and family; it is too manifest to +be insisted upon how much the enjoyments of life would be increased. +There would be so much happiness introduced into the world, without +any deduction or inconvenience from it, in proportion as the precept +of REJOICING WITH THOSE WHO REJOICE was universally obeyed. Our +Saviour has owned this good affection as belonging to our nature in +the parable of the LOST SHEEP, and does not think it to the +disadvantage of a perfect state to represent its happiness as +capable of increase from reflection upon that of others. + +But since in such a creature as man, compassion or sorrow for the +distress of others seems so far necessarily connected with joy in +their prosperity, as that whoever rejoices in one must unavoidably +compassionate the other; there cannot be that delight or +satisfaction, which appears to be so considerable, without the +inconveniences, whatever they are, of compassion. + +However, without considering this connection, there is no doubt but +that more good than evil, more delight than sorrow, arises from +compassion itself; there being so many things which balance the +sorrow of it. There is first the relief which the distressed feel +from this affection in others towards them. There is likewise the +additional misery which they would feel from the reflection that no +one commiserated their case. It is indeed true that any +disposition, prevailing beyond a certain degree, becomes somewhat +wrong; and we have ways of speaking, which, though they do not +directly express that excess, yet always lead our thoughts to it, +and give us the notion of it. Thus, when mention is made of delight +in being pitied, this always conveys to our mind the notion of +somewhat which is really a weakness. The manner of speaking, I say, +implies a certain weakness and feebleness of mind, which is and +ought to be disapproved. But men of the greatest fortitude would in +distress feel uneasiness from knowing that no person in the world +had any sort of compassion or real concern for them; and in some +cases, especially when the temper is enfeebled by sickness, or any +long and great distress, doubtless, would feel a kind of relief even +from the helpless goodwill and ineffectual assistances of those +about them. Over against the sorrow of compassion is likewise to be +set a peculiar calm kind of satisfaction, which accompanies it, +unless in cases where the distress of another is by some means so +brought home to ourselves as to become in a manner our own; or when +from weakness of mind the affection rises too high, which ought to +be corrected. This tranquillity, or calm satisfaction, proceeds +partly from consciousness of a right affection and temper of mind, +and partly from a sense of our own freedom from the misery we +compassionate. This last may possibly appear to some at first sight +faulty; but it really is not so. It is the same with that positive +enjoyment, which sudden ease from pain for the present affords, +arising from a real sense of misery, joined with a sense of our +freedom from it; which in all cases must afford some degree of +satisfaction. + +To these things must be added the observation which respects both +the affections we are considering; that they who have got over all +fellow-feeling for others have withal contracted a certain +callousness of heart, which renders them insensible to most other +satisfactions but those of the grossest kind. + +Secondly, Without the exercise of these affections men would +certainly be much more wanting in the offices of charity they owe to +cache other, and likewise more cruel and injurious than they are at +present. + +The private interest of the individual would not be sufficiently +provided for by reasonable and cool self-love alone; therefore the +appetites and passions are placed within as a guard and further +security, without which it would not be taken due care of. It is +manifest our life would be neglected were it not for the calls of +hunger and thirst and weariness; notwithstanding that without them +reason would assure us that the recruits of food and sleep are the +necessary means of our preservation. It is therefore absurd to +imagine that, without affections, the same reason alone would be +more effectual to engage us to perform the duties we owe to our +fellow-creatures. One of this make would be as defective, as much +wanting, considered with respect to society, as one of the former +make would be defective, or wanting, considered as an individual, or +in his private capacity. Is it possible any can in earnest think +that a public spirit, i.e., a settled reasonable principle of +benevolence to mankind, is so prevalent and strong in the species as +that we may venture to throw off the under affections, which are its +assistants, carry it forward and mark out particular courses for it; +family, friends, neighbourhood, the distressed, our country? The +common joys and the common sorrows, which belong to these relations +and circumstances, are as plainly useful to society as the pain and +pleasure belonging to hunger, thirst, and weariness are of service +to the individual. In defect of that higher principle of reason, +compassion is often the only way by which the indigent can have +access to us: and therefore, to eradicate this, though it is not +indeed formally to deny them that assistance which is their due; yet +it is to cut them off from that which is too frequently their only +way of obtaining it. And as for those who have shut up this door +against the complaints of the miserable, and conquered this +affection in themselves; even these persons will be under great +restraints from the same affection in others. Thus a man who has +himself no sense of injustice, cruelty, oppression, will be kept +from running the utmost lengths of wickedness by fear of that +detestation, and even resentment of inhumanity, in many particular +instances of it, which compassion for the object towards whom such +inhumanity is exercised, excites in the bulk of mankind. And this +is frequently the chief danger and the chief restraint which tyrants +and the great oppressors of the world feel. + +In general, experience will show that, as want of natural appetite +to food supposes and proceeds from some bodily disease; so the +apathy the Stoics talk of as much supposes, or is accompanied with, +somewhat amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health +of the mind. Those who formerly aimed at this upon the foot of +philosophy appear to have had better success in eradicating the +affections of tenderness and compassion than they had with the +passions of envy, pride, and resentment: these latter, at best, +were but concealed, and that imperfectly too. How far this +observation may be extended to such as endeavour to suppress the +natural impulses of their affections, in order to form themselves +for business and the world, I shall not determine. But there does +not appear any capacity or relation to be named, in which men ought +to be entirely deaf to the calls of affection, unless the judicial +one is to be excepted. + +And as to those who are commonly called the men of pleasure, it is +manifest that the reason they set up for hardness of heart is to +avoid being interrupted in their course by the ruin and misery they +are the authors of; neither are persons of this character always the +most free from the impotencies of envy and resentment. What may men +at last bring themselves to, by suppressing their passions and +affections of one kind, and leaving those of the other in their full +strength? But surely it might be expected that persons who make +pleasure their study and their business, if they understood what +they profess, would reflect, how many of the entertainments of life, +how many of those kind of amusements which seem peculiarly to belong +to men of leisure and education they became insensible to by this +acquired hardness of heart. + +I shall close these reflections with barely mentioning the behaviour +of that divine Person, who was the example of all perfection in +human nature, as represented in the Gospels mourning, and even, in a +literal sense, weeping over the distresses of His creatures. + +The observation already made, that, of the two affections mentioned +in the text, the latter exerts itself much more than the former; +that, from the original constitution of human nature, we much more +generally and sensibly compassionate the distressed than rejoice +within the prosperous, requires to be particularly considered. This +observation, therefore, with the reflections which arise out of it, +and which it leads our thoughts to, shall be the subject of another +discourse. + +For the conclusion of this, let me just take notice of the danger of +over-great refinements; of going beside or beyond the plain, +obvious, first appearances of things, upon the subject of morals and +religion. The least observation will show how little the generality +of men are capable of speculations. Therefore morality and religion +must be somewhat plan and easy to be understood: it must appeal to +what we call plain common sense, as distinguished from superior +capacity and improvement; because it appeals to mankind. Persons of +superior capacity and improvement have often fallen into errors +which no one of mere common understanding could. Is it possible +that one of this latter character could even of himself have thought +that there was absolutely no such thing in mankind as affection to +the good of others? suppose of parents to their children; or that +what he felt upon seeing a friend in distress was only fear for +himself; or, upon supposition of the affections of kindness and +compassion, that it was the business of wisdom and virtue to set him +about extirpating them as fast as he could? And yet each of these +manifest contradictions to nature has been laid down by men of +speculation as a discovery in moral philosophy; which they, it +seems, have found out through all the specious appearances to the +contrary. This reflection may be extended further. The +extravagances of enthusiasm and superstition do not at all lie in +the road of common sense; and therefore, so far as they are ORIGINAL +MISTAKES, must be owing to going beside or beyond it. Now, since +inquiry and examination can relate only to things so obscure and +uncertain as to stand in need of it, and to persons who are capable +of it; the proper advice to be given to plain honest men, to secure +them from the extremes both of superstition and irreligion, is that +of the Son of Sirach: In every good work trust thy own soul; for +this is the keeping of the commandment. {14} + + + +SERMON VI. +UPON COMPASSION. +PREACHED THE FIRST SUNDAY IN LENT. +Rom. xii. 15. + + + +Rejoice with then that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep. + +There is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and +moral world than we are apt to take notice of. The inward frame of +man does in a peculiar manner answer to the external condition and +circumstances of life in which he is placed. This is a particular +instance of that general observation of the Son of Sirach: All +things are double one against another, and God hath made nothing +imperfect. {15} The several passions and affections in the heart of +man, compared with the circumstances of life in which he is placed, +afford, to such as will attend to them, as certain instances of +final causes, as any whatever, which are more commonly alleged for +such: since those affections lead him to a certain determinate +course of action suitable to those circumstances; as (for instance) +compassion to relieve the distressed. And as all observations of +final causes, drawn from the principles of action in the heart of +man, compared with the condition he is placed in, serve all the good +uses which instances of final causes in the material world about us +do; and both these are equally proofs of wisdom and design in the +Author of nature: so the former serve to further good purposes; +they show us what course of life we are made for, what is our duty, +and in a peculiar manner enforce upon us the practice of it. + +Suppose we are capable of happiness and of misery in degrees equally +intense and extreme, yet, we are capable of the latter for a much +longer time, beyond all comparison. We see men in the tortures of +pain for hours, days, and, excepting the short suspensions of sleep, +for months together, without intermission, to which no enjoyments of +life do, in degree and continuance, bear any sort of proportion. +And such is our make and that of the world about us that any thing +may become the instrument of pain and sorrow to us. Thus almost any +one man is capable of doing mischief to any other, though he may not +be capable of doing him good; and if he be capable of doing him some +good, he is capable of doing him more evil. And it is, in +numberless cases, much more in our power to lessen the miseries of +others than to promote their positive happiness, any otherwise than +as the former often includes the latter; ease from misery +occasioning for some time the greatest positive enjoyment. This +constitution of nature, namely, that it is so munch more in our +power to occasion and likewise to lessen misery than to promote +positive happiness, plainly required a particular affection to +hinder us from abusing, and to incline us to make a right use of the +former powers, I.E., the powers both to occasion and to lessen +misery; over and above what was necessary to induce us to make a +right use of the latter power, that of promoting positive happiness. +The power we have over the misery of our fellow-creatures, to +occasion or lessen it, being a more important trust than the power +we have of promoting their positive happiness; the former requires +and has a further, an additional, security and guard against its +being violated, beyond and over and above what the latter has. The +social nature of man, and general goodwill to his species, equally +prevent him from doing evil, incline him to relieve the distressed, +and to promote the positive happiness of his fellow-creatures; but +compassion only restrains from the first, and carries him to the +second; it hath nothing to do with the third. + +The final causes, then, of compassion are to prevent and to relieve +misery. + +As to the former: this affection may plainly be a restraint upon +resentment, envy, unreasonable self-love; that is, upon all the +principles from which men do evil to one another. Let us instance +only in resentment. It seldom happens, in regulated societies, that +men have an enemy so entirely in their power as to be able to +satiate their resentment with safety. But if we were to put this +case, it is plainly supposable that a person might bring his enemy +into such a condition, as from being the object of anger and rage, +to become an object of compassion, even to himself, though the most +malicious man in the world; and in this case compassion would stop +him, if he could stop with safety, from pursuing his revenge any +further. But since nature has placed within us more powerful +restraints to prevent mischief, and since the final cause of +compassion is much more to relieve misery, let us go on to the +consideration of it in this view. + +As this world was not intended to be a state of any great +satisfaction or high enjoyment, so neither was it intended to be a +mere scene of unhappiness and sorrow. Mitigations and reliefs are +provided by the merciful Author of nature for most of the +afflictions in human life. There is kind provision made even +against our frailties: as we are so constituted that time +abundantly abates our sorrows, and begets in us that resignment of +temper, which ought to have been produced by a better cause; a due +sense of the authority of God, and our state of dependence. This +holds in respect too far the greatest part of the evils of life; I +suppose, in some degree, as to pain and sickness. Now this part of +the constitution or make of man, considered as some relief to +misery, and not as provision for positive happiness, is, if I may so +speak, an instance of nature's compassion for us; and every natural +remedy or relief to misery may be considered in the same view. + +But since in many cases it is very much in our power to alleviate +the miseries of each other; and benevolence, though natural in man +to man, yet is in a very low degree kept down by interest and +competitions; and men, for the most part, are so engaged in the +business and pleasures of the world, as to overlook and turn away +from objects of misery; which are plainly considered as +interruptions to them in their way, as intruders upon their +business, their gaiety, and mirth: compassion is an advocate within +us in their behalf, to gain the unhappy admittance and access, to +make their case attended to. If it sometimes serves a contrary +purpose, and makes men industriously turn away from the miserable, +these are only instances of abuse and perversion: for the end, for +which the affection was given us, most certainly is not to make us +avoid, but to make us attend to, the objects of it. And if men +would only resolve to allow thus much to it: let it bring before +their view, the view of their mind, the miseries of their fellow- +creatures; let it gain for them that their case be considered; I am +persuaded it would not fail of gaining more, and that very few real +objects of charity would pass unrelieved. Pain and sorrow and +misery have a right to our assistance: compassion puts us in mind +of the debt, and that we owe it to ourselves as well as to the +distressed. For, to endeavour to get rid of the sorrow of +compassion by turning from the wretched, when yet it is in our power +to relieve them, is as unnatural as to endeavour to get rid of the +pain of hunger by keeping from the sight of food. That we can do +one with greater success than we can the other is no proof that one +is less a violation of nature than the other. Compassion is a call, +a demand of nature, to relieve the unhappy as hunger is a natural +call for food. This affection plainly gives the objects of it an +additional claim to relief and mercy, over and above what our +fellow-creatures in common have to our goodwill. Liberality and +bounty are exceedingly commendable; and a particular distinction in +such a world as this, where men set themselves to contract their +heart, and close it to all interests but their own. It is by no +means to be opposed to mercy, but always accompanies it: the +distinction between them is only that the former leads our thoughts +to a more promiscuous and undistinguished distribution of favours; +to those who are not, as well as those who are, necessitous; whereas +the object of compassion is misery. But in the comparison, and +where there is not a possibility of both, mercy is to have the +preference: the affection of compassion manifestly leads us to this +preference. Thus, to relieve the indigent and distressed, to single +out the unhappy, from whom can be expected no returns either of +present entertainment or future service, for the objects of our +favours; to esteem a man's being friendless as a recommendation; +dejection, and incapacity of struggling through the world, as a +motive for assisting him; in a word, to consider these circumstances +of disadvantage, which are usually thought a sufficient reason for +neglect and overlooking a person, as a motive for helping him +forward: this is the course of benevolence which compassion marks +out and directs us to: this is that humanity which is so peculiarly +becoming our nature and circumstances in this world. + +To these considerations, drawn from the nature of man, must be added +the reason of the thing itself we are recommending, which accords to +and shows the same. For since it is so much more in our power to +lessen the misery of our fellow-creatures than to promote their +positive happiness; in cases where there is an inconsistency, we +shall be likely to do much more good by setting ourselves to +mitigate the former than by endeavouring to promote the latter. Let +the competition be between the poor and the rich. It is easy, you +will say, to see which will have the preference. True; but the +question is, which ought to have the preference? What proportion is +there between the happiness produced by doing a favour to the +indigent, and that produced by doing the same favour to one in easy +circumstances? It is manifest that the addition of a very large +estate to one who before had an affluence, will in many instances +yield him less new enjoyment or satisfaction than an ordinary +charity would yield to a necessitous person. So that it is not only +true that our nature, i.e., the voice of God within us, carries us +to the exercise of charity and benevolence in the way of compassion +or mercy, preferably to any other way; but we also manifestly +discern much more good done by the former; or, if you will allow me +the expressions, more misery annihilated and happiness created. If +charity and benevolence, and endeavouring to do good to our fellow- +creatures, be anything, this observation deserves to be most +seriously considered by all who have to bestow. And it holds with +great exactness, when applied to the several degrees of greater and +less indigency throughout the various ranks in human life: the +happiness or good produced not being in proportion to what is +bestowed, but in proportion to this joined with the need there was +of it. + +It may perhaps be expected that upon this subject notice should be +taken of occasions, circumstances, and characters which seem at once +to call forth affections of different sorts. Thus vice may be +thought the object both of pity and indignation: folly, of pity and +of laughter. How far this is strictly true, I shall not inquire; +but only observe upon the appearance, how much more humane it is to +yield and give scope to affections, which are most directly in +favour of, and friendly towards, our fellow-creatures; and that +there is plainly much less danger of being led wrong by these than +by the other. + +But, notwithstanding all that has been said in recommendation of +compassion, that it is most amiable, most becoming human nature, and +most useful to the world; yet it must be owned that every affection, +as distinct from a principle of reason, may rise too high, and be +beyond its just proportion. And by means of this one carried too +far, a man throughout his life is subject to much more uneasiness +than belongs to his share; and in particular instances, it may be in +such a degree as to incapacitate him from assisting the very person +who is the object of it. But as there are some who upon principle +set up for suppressing this affection itself as weakness, there is +also I know not what of fashion on this side; and, by some means or +other, the whole world almost is run into the extremes of +insensibility towards the distresses of their fellow-creatures: so +that general rules and exhortations must always be on the other +side. + +And now to go on to the uses we should make of the foregoing +reflections, the further ones they lead to, and the general temper +they have a tendency to beget in us. There being that distinct +affection implanted in the nature of man, tending to lessen the +miseries of life, that particular provision made for abating its +sorrows, more than for increasing its positive happiness, as before +explained; this may suggest to us what should be our general aim +respecting ourselves, in our passage through this world: namely, to +endeavour chiefly to escape misery, keep free from uneasiness, pain, +and sorrow, or to get relief and mitigation of them; to propose to +ourselves peace and tranquillity of mind, rather than pursue after +high enjoyments. This is what the constitution of nature before +explained marks out as the course we should follow, and the end we +should aim at. To make pleasure and mirth and jollity our business, +and be constantly hurrying about after some gay amusement, some new +gratification of sense or appetite, to those who will consider the +nature of man and our condition in this world, will appear the most +romantic scheme of life that ever entered into thought. And yet how +many are there who go on in this course, without learning better +from the daily, the hourly disappointments, listlessness, and +satiety which accompany this fashionable method of wasting away +their days! + +The subject we have been insisting upon would lead us into the same +kind of reflections by a different connection. The miseries of life +brought home to ourselves by compassion, viewed through this +affection considered as the sense by which they are perceived, would +beget in us that moderation, humility, and soberness of mind which +has been now recommended; and which peculiarly belongs to a season +of recollection, the only purpose of which is to bring us to a just +sense of things, to recover us out of that forgetfulness of +ourselves, and our true state, which it is manifest far the greatest +part of men pass their whole life in. Upon this account Solomon +says that IT IS BETTER TO GO TO THE HOUSE OF MOURNING THAN TO GO TO +THE HOUSE OF FEASTING; i.e., it is more to a man's advantage to turn +his eyes towards objects of distress, to recall sometimes to his +remembrance the occasions of sorrow, than to pass all his days in +thoughtless mirth and gaiety. And he represents the wise as +choosing to frequent the former of these places; to be sure not for +his own sake, but because BY THE SADNESS OF THE COUNTENANCE, THE +HEART IS MADE BETTER. Every one observes how temperate and +reasonable men are when humbled and brought low by afflictions in +comparison of what they are in high prosperity. By this voluntary +resort to the house of mourning, which is here recommended, we might +learn all those useful instructions which calamities teach without +undergoing them ourselves; and grow wiser and better at a more easy +rate than men commonly do. The objects themselves, which in that +place of sorrow lie before our view, naturally give us a seriousness +and attention, check that wantonness which is the growth of +prosperity and ease, and head us to reflect upon the deficiencies of +human life itself; that EVERY MAN AT HIS BEST ESTATE IS ALTOGETHER +VANITY. This would correct the florid and gaudy prospects and +expectations which we are too apt to indulge, teach us to lower our +notions of happiness and enjoyment, bring them down to the reality +of things, to what is attainable, to what the frailty of our +condition will admit of, which, for any continuance, is only +tranquillity, ease, and moderate satisfactions. Thus we might at +once become proof against the temptations with which the whole world +almost is carried away; since it is plain that not only what is +called a life of pleasure, but also vicious pursuits in general, aim +at somewhat besides and beyond these moderate satisfactions. + +And as to that obstinacy and wilfulness, which renders men so +insensible to the motives of religion; this right sense of ourselves +and of the world about us would bend the stubborn mind, soften the +heart, and make it more apt to receive impression; and this is the +proper temper in which to call our ways to remembrance, to review +and set home upon ourselves the miscarriages of our past life. In +such a compliant state of mind, reason and conscience will have a +fair hearing; which is the preparation for, or rather the beginning +of, that repentance, the outward show of which we all put on at this +season. + +Lastly, The various miseries of life which lie before us wherever we +turn our eyes, the frailty of this mortal state we are passing +through, may put us in mind that the present world is not our home; +that we are merely strangers and travellers in it, as all our +fathers were. It is therefore to be considered as a foreign +country; in which our poverty and wants, and the insufficient +supplies of them, were designed to turn our views to that higher and +better state we are heirs to: a state where will be no follies to +be overlooked, no miseries to be pitied, no wants to be relieved; +where the affection we have been now treating of will happily be +lost, as there will be no objects to exercise it upon: for God +shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no +more death, neither sorrow, nor crying; neither shall there be any +more pain; for the former things are passed away. + + + +SERMON VII. +UPON THE CHARACTER OF BALAAM. +PREACHED THE SECOND SUNDAY AFTER EASTER. +NUMBERS xxiii. 10. + + + +Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like +his. + +These words, taken alone, and without respect to him who spoke them, +lead our thoughts immediately to the different ends of good and bad +men. For though the comparison is not expressed, yet it is +manifestly implied; as is also the preference of one of these +characters to the other in that last circumstance, death. And, +since dying the death of the righteous or of the wicked necessarily +implies men's being righteous or wicked; i.e., having lived +righteously or wickedly; a comparison of them in their lives also +might come into consideration, from such a single view of the words +themselves. But my present design is to consider them with a +particular reference or respect to him who spoke them; which +reference, if you please to attend, you will see. And if what shall +be offered to your consideration at this time be thought a discourse +upon the whole history of this man, rather than upon the particular +words I have read, this is of no consequence: it is sufficient if +it afford reflection of use and service to ourselves. + +But, in order to avoid cavils respecting this remarkable relation in +Scripture, either that part of it which you have heard in the first +lesson for the day, or any other; let me just observe that as this +is not a place for answering them, so they no way affect the +following discourse; since the character there given is plainly a +real one in life, and such as there are parallels to. + +The occasion of Balaam's coming out of his own country into the land +of Moab, where he pronounced this solemn prayer or wish, he himself +relates in the first parable or prophetic speech, of which it is the +conclusion. In which is a custom referred to, proper to be taken +notice of: that of devoting enemies to destruction before the +entrance upon a war with them. This custom appears to have +prevailed over a great part of the world; for we find it amongst the +most distant nations. The Romans had public officers, to whom it +belonged as a stated part of their office. But there was somewhat +more particular in the case now before us: Balaam being looked upon +as an extraordinary person, whose blessing or curse was thought to +be always effectual. + +In order to engage the reader's attention to this passage, the +sacred historian has enumerated the preparatory circumstances, which +are these. Balaam requires the king of Moab to build him seven +altars, and to prepare him the same number of oxen and of rams. The +sacrifice being over, he retires alone to a solitude sacred to these +occasions, there to wait the Divine inspiration or answer, for which +the foregoing rites were the preparation. AND GOD MET BALAAM, AND +PUT A WORD IN HIS MOUTH; {16} upon receiving which, he returns back +to the altars, where was the king, who had all this while attended +the sacrifice, as appointed; he and all the princes of Moab +standing, big with expectation of the Prophet's reply. And he took +up his parable, and said, Balak the king of Moab hath brought me +from Aram, out of the mountains of the east, saying, Come, curse me +Jacob, and come, defy Israel. How shall I curse, whom God hath not +cursed? Or how shall I defy, whom the Lord hath not defied? For +from the top of the rocks I see him, and from the hills I behold +him: lo, the people shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned +among the nations. Who can count the dust of Jacob, and the number +of the fourth part of Israel? Let me die the death of the +righteous, and let my last end be like his. {17} + +It is necessary, as you will see in the progress of this discourse, +particularly to observe what he understood by RIGHTEOUS. And he +himself is introduced in the book of Micah {18} explaining it; if by +RIGHTEOUS is meant good, as to be sure it is. O my people, remember +now what Balak king of Moab consulted, and what Balaam the son of +Beor answered him from Shittim unto Gilgal. From the mention of +Shittim it is manifest that it is this very story which is here +referred to, though another part of it, the account of which is not +now extant; as there are many quotations in Scripture out of books +which are not come down to us. Remember what Balaam answered, that +ye may know the righteousness of the Lord; i.e., the righteousness +which God will accept. Balak demands, Wherewith shall I come before +the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before +him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord +be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers +of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit +of my body for the sin of my soul? Balaam answers him, he hath +showed thee, O man, what is good: and what doth the Lord require of +thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with +thy God? Here is a good man expressly characterised, as distinct +from a dishonest and a superstitious man. No words can more +strongly exclude dishonesty and falseness of heart than doing +justice and loving mercy; and both these, as well as walking humbly +with God, are put in opposition to those ceremonial methods of +recommendation, which Balak hoped might have served the turn. From +hence appears what he meant by the righteous, whose death he desires +to die. + +Whether it was his own character shall now be inquired; and in order +to determine it, we must take a view of his whole behaviour upon +this occasion. When the elders of Noah came to him, though he +appears to have been much allured with the rewards offered, yet he +had such regard to the authority of God as to keep the messengers in +suspense until he had consulted His will. And God said to him, Thou +shalt not go with them; thou shalt not curse the people, for they +are blessed. {19} Upon this he dismisses the ambassadors, with an +absolute refusal of accompanying them back to their king. Thus far +his regards to his duty prevailed, neither does there anything +appear as yet amiss in his conduct. His answer being reported to +the king of Moab, a more honourable embassy is immediately +despatched, and greater rewards proposed. Then the iniquity of his +heart began to disclose itself. A thorough honest man would without +hesitation have repeated his former answer, that he could not be +guilty of so infamous a prostitution of the sacred character with +which he was invested, as in the name of a prophet to curse those +whom he knew to be blessed. But instead of this, which was the only +honest part in these circumstances that lay before him, he desires +the princes of Moab to tarry that night with him also; and for the +sake of the reward deliberates, whether by some means or other he +might not be able to obtain leave to curse Israel; to do that, which +had been before revealed to him to be contrary to the will of God, +which yet he resolves not to do without that permission. Upon +which, as when this nation afterwards rejected God from reigning +over them, He gave them a king in His anger; in the same way, as +appears from other parts of the narration, He gives Balaam the +permission he desired: for this is the most natural sense of the +words. Arriving in the territories of Moab, and being received with +particular distinction by the king, and he repeating in person the +promise of the rewards he had before made to him by his ambassadors, +he seeks, the text says, by SACRIFICES and ENCHANTMENTS (what these +were is not to our purpose), to obtain leave of God to curse the +people; keeping still his resolution, not to do it without that +permission: which not being able to obtain, he had such regard to +the command of God as to keep this resolution to the last. The +supposition of his being under a supernatural restraint is a mere +fiction of Philo: he is plainly represented to be under no other +force or restraint than the fear of God. However, he goes on +persevering in that endeavour, after he had declared that God had +not beheld iniquity in Jacob, neither had he seen perverseness in +Israel; {20} i.e., they were a people of virtue and piety, so far as +not to have drawn down by their iniquity that curse which he was +soliciting leave to pronounce upon them. So that the state of +Balaam's mind was this: he wanted to do what he knew to be very +wicked, and contrary to the express command of God; he had inward +checks and restraints which he could not entirely get over; he +therefore casts about for ways to reconcile this wickedness with his +duty. How great a paradox soever this may appear, as it is indeed a +contradiction in terms, it is the very account which the Scripture +gives us of him. + +But there is a more surprising piece of iniquity yet behind. Not +daring in his religious character, as a prophet, to assist the king +of Moab, he considers whether there might not be found some other +means of assisting him against that very people, whom he himself by +the fear of God was restrained from cursing in words. One would not +think it possible that the weakness, even of religious self-deceit +in its utmost excess, could have so poor a distinction, so fond an +evasion, to serve itself of. But so it was; and he could think of +no other method than to betray the children of Israel to provoke His +wrath, who was their only strength and defence. The temptation +which he pitched upon was that concerning which Solomon afterwards +observed, that it had cast down many wounded; yea, many strong men +had been slain by it: and of which he himself was a sad example, +when his wives turned away his heart after other gods. This +succeeded: the people sin against God; and thus the Prophet's +counsel brought on that destruction which he could by no means be +prevailed upon to assist with the religious ceremony of execration, +which the king of Moab thought would itself have affected it. Their +crime and punishment are related in Deuteronomy {21} and Numbers. +{22} And from the relation repeated in Numbers, {23} it appears, +that Balaam was the contriver of the whole matter. It is also +ascribed to him in the Revelation, {24} where he is said to have +taught Balak to cast a stumbling-block before the children of +Israel. + +This was the man, this Balaam, I say, was the man, who desired to +die the death of the righteous, and that his last end might be like +his; and this was the state of his mind when he pronounced these +words. + +So that the object we have now before us is the most astonishing in +the world: a very wicked man, under a deep sense of God and +religion, persisting still in his wickedness, and preferring the +wages of unrighteousness, even when he had before him a lively view +of death, and that approaching period of his days, which should +deprive him of all those advantages for which he was prostituting +himself; and likewise a prospect, whether certain or uncertain, of a +future state of retribution; all this joined with an explicit ardent +wish that, when he was to leave this world, he might be in the +condition of a righteous man. Good God! what inconsistency, what +perplexity is here! With what different views of things, with what +contradictory principles of action, must such a mind be torn and +distracted! It was not unthinking carelessness, by which he ran on +headlong in vice and folly, without ever making a stand to ask +himself what he was doing: no; he acted upon the cool motives of +interest and advantage. Neither was he totally hard and callous to +impressions of religion, what we call abandoned; for he absolutely +denied to curse Israel. When reason assumes her place, when +convinced of his duty, when he owns and feels, and is actually under +the influence of the divine authority; whilst he is carrying on his +views to the grave, the end of all temporal greatness; under this +sense of things, with the better character and more desirable state +present--full before him--in his thoughts, in his wishes, +voluntarily to choose the worse--what fatality is here! Or how +otherwise can such a character be explained? And yet, strange as it +may appear, it is not altogether an uncommon one: nay, with some +small alterations, and put a little lower, it is applicable to a +very considerable part of the world. For if the reasonable choice +be seen and acknowledged, and yet men make the unreasonable one, is +not this the same contradiction; that very inconsistency, which +appeared so unaccountable? + +To give some little opening to such characters and behaviour, it is +to be observed in general that there is no account to be given in +the way of reason, of men's so strong attachments to the present +world: our hopes and fears and pursuits are in degrees beyond all +proportion to the known value of the things they respect. This may +be said without taking into consideration religion and a future +state; and when these are considered, the disproportion is +infinitely heightened. Now when men go against their reason, and +contradict a more important interest at a distance, for one nearer, +though of less consideration; if this be the whole of the case, all +that can be said is, that strong passions, some kind of brute force +within, prevails over the principle of rationality. However, if +this be with a clear, full, and distinct view of the truth of +things, then it is doing the utmost violence to themselves, acting +in the most palpable contradiction to their very nature. But if +there be any such thing in mankind as putting half-deceits upon +themselves; which there plainly is, either by avoiding reflection, +or (if they do reflect) by religious equivocation, subterfuges, and +palliating matters to themselves; by these means conscience may be +laid asleep, and they may go on in a course of wickedness with less +disturbance. All the various turns, doubles, and intricacies in a +dishonest heart cannot be unfolded or laid open; but that there is +somewhat of that kind is manifest, be it to be called self-deceit, +or by any other name. Balaam had before his eyes the authority of +God, absolutely forbidding him what he, for the sake of a reward, +had the strongest inclination to: he was likewise in a state of +mind sober enough to consider death and his last end: by these +considerations he was restrained, first from going to the king of +Moab, and after he did go, from cursing Israel. But notwithstanding +this, there was great wickedness in his heart. He could not forego +the rewards of unrighteousness: he therefore first seeks for +indulgences, and when these could not be obtained, he sins against +the whole meaning, end, and design of the prohibition, which no +consideration in the world could prevail with him to go against the +letter of. And surely that impious counsel he gave to Balak against +the children of Israel was, considered in itself, a greater piece of +wickedness than if he had cursed them in words. + +If it be inquired what his situation, his hopes, and fears were, in +respect to this his wish; the answer must be, that consciousness of +the wickedness of his heart must necessarily have destroyed all +settled hopes of dying the death of the righteous: he could have no +calm satisfaction in this view of his last end: yet, on the other +hand, it is possible that those partial regards to his duty, now +mentioned, might keep him from perfect despair. + +Upon the whole it is manifest that Balaam had the most just and true +notions of God and religion; as appears, partly from the original +story itself, and more plainly from the passage in Micah; where he +explains religion to consist in real virtue and real piety, +expressly distinguished from superstition, and in terms which most +strongly exclude dishonesty and falseness of heart. Yet you see his +behaviour: he seeks indulgences for plain wickedness, which not +being able to obtain he glosses over that same wickedness, dresses +it up in a new form, in order to make it pass off more easily with +himself. That is, he deliberately contrives to deceive and impose +upon himself in a matter which he knew to be of the utmost +importance. + +To bring these observations home to ourselves: it is too evident +that many persons allow themselves in very unjustifiable courses who +yet make great pretences to religion; not to deceive the world, none +can be so weak as to think this will pass in our age; but from +principles, hopes, and fears, respecting God and a future state; and +go on thus with a sort of tranquillity and quiet of mind. This +cannot be upon a thorough consideration, and full resolution, that +the pleasures and advantages they propose are to be pursued at all +hazards, against reason, against the law of God, and though +everlasting destruction is to be the consequence. This would be +doing too great violence upon themselves. No, they are for making a +composition with the Almighty. These of His commands they will +obey; but as to others--why, they will make all the atonements in +their power; the ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute man, each in +a way which shall not contradict his respective pursuit. +Indulgences before, which was Balaam's first attempt, though he was +not so successful in it as to deceive himself, or atonements +afterwards, are all the same. And here, perhaps, come in faint +hopes that they may, and half-resolves that they will, one time or +other, make a change. + +Besides these there are also persons, who, from a more just way of +considering things, see the infinite absurdity of this, of +substituting sacrifice instead of obedience; there are persons far +enough from superstition, and not without some real sense of God and +religion upon their minds; who yet are guilty of most unjustifiable +practices, and go on with great coolness and command over +themselves. The same dishonesty and unsoundness of heart discovers +itself in these another way. In all common ordinary cases we see +intuitively at first view what is our duty, what is the honest part. +This is the ground of the observation, that the first thought is +often the best. In these cases doubt and deliberation is itself +dishonesty, as it was in Balaam upon the second message. That which +is called considering what is our duty in a particular case is very +often nothing but endeavouring to explain it away. Thus those +courses, which, if men would fairly attend to the dictates of their +own consciences, they would see to be corruption, excess, +oppression, uncharitableness; these are refined upon--things were so +and so circumstantiated--great difficulties are raised about fixing +bounds and degrees, and thus every moral obligation whatever may be +evaded. Here is scope, I say, for an unfair mind to explain away +every moral obligation to itself. Whether men reflect again upon +this internal management and artifice, and how explicit they are +with themselves, is another question. There are many operations of +the mind, many things pass within, which we never reflect upon +again; which a bystander, from having frequent opportunities of +observing us and our conduct, may make shrewd guesses at. + +That great numbers are in this way of deceiving themselves is +certain. There is scarce a man in the world, who has entirely got +over all regards, hopes, and fears, concerning God and a future +state; and these apprehensions in the generality, bad as we are, +prevail in considerable degrees: yet men will and can be wicked, +with calmness and thought; we see they are. There must therefore be +some method of making it sit a little easy upon their minds; which, +in the superstitious, is those indulgences and atonements before +mentioned, and this self-deceit of another kind in persons of +another character. And both these proceed from a certain unfairness +of mind, a peculiar inward dishonesty; the direct contrary to that +simplicity which our Saviour recommends, under the notion of +becoming little children, as a necessary qualification for our +entering into the kingdom of heaven. + +But to conclude: How much soever men differ in the course of life +they prefer, and in their ways of palliating and excusing their +vices to themselves; yet all agree in one thing, desiring to die the +death of the righteous. This is surely remarkable. The observation +may be extended further, and put thus: even without determining +what that is which we call guilt or innocence, there is no man but +would choose, after having had the pleasure or advantage of a +vicious action, to be free of the guilt of it, to be in the state of +an innocent man. This shows at least the disturbance and implicit +dissatisfaction in vice. If we inquire into the grounds of it, we +shall find it proceeds partly from an immediate sense of having done +evil, and partly from an apprehension that this inward sense shall +one time or another be seconded by a higher judgment, upon which our +whole being depends. Now to suspend and drown this sense, and these +apprehensions, be it by the hurry of business or of pleasure, or by +superstition, or moral equivocations, this is in a manner one and +the same, and makes no alteration at all in the nature of our case. +Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them +will be what they will be: why, then, should we desire to be +deceived? As we are reasonable creatures, and have any regard to +ourselves, we ought to lay these things plainly and honestly before +our mind, and upon this, act as you please, as you think most fit: +make that choice, and prefer that course of life, which you can +justify to yourselves, and which sits most easy upon your own mind. +It will immediately appear that vice cannot be the happiness, but +must upon the whole be the misery, of such a creature as man; a +moral, an accountable agent. Superstitious observances, self-deceit +though of a more refined sort, will not in reality at all mend +matters with us. And the result of the whole can be nothing else, +but that with simplicity and fairness we keep innocency, and take +heed unto the thing that is right; for this alone shall bring a man +peace at the last. + + + +SERMON XI {24a--see footnote} +UPON THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. +PREACHED ON ADVENT SUNDAY. +ROMANS xiii. 9. + + + +And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in +this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. + +It is commonly observed that there is a disposition in men to +complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they +live as greater than that of former ones; which is usually followed +with this further observation, that mankind has been in that respect +much the same in all times. Now, not to determine whether this last +be not contradicted by the accounts of history; thus much can scarce +be doubted, that vice and folly takes different turns, and some +particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in some ages than in +others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the +distinction of the present to profess a contracted spirit, and +greater regards to self-interest, than appears to have been done +formerly. Upon this account it seems worth while to inquire whether +private interest is likely to be promoted in proportion to the +degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over all other +principles; or whether the contracted affection may not possibly be +so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own +and private good. + +And since, further, there is generally thought to be some peculiar +kind of contrariety between self-love and the love of our neighbour, +between the pursuit of public and of private good; insomuch that +when you are recommending one of these, you are supposed to be +speaking against the other; and from hence arises a secret prejudice +against, and frequently open scorn of, all talk of public spirit and +real good-will to our fellow-creatures; it will be necessary to +inquire what respect benevolence hath to self-love, and the pursuit +of private interest to the pursuit of public: or whether there be +anything of that peculiar inconsistence and contrariety between them +over and above what there is between self-love and other passions +and particular affections, and their respective pursuits. + +These inquiries, it is hoped, may be favourably attended to; for +there shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite +passion, which hath so much allowed to it, and whose cause is so +universally pleaded: it shall be treated with the utmost tenderness +and concern for its interests. + +In order to do this, as well as to determine the forementioned +questions, it will be necessary to consider the nature, the object, +and end of that self-love, as distinguished from other principles or +affections in the mind, and their respective objects. + +Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness; and likewise a +variety of particular affections, passions, and appetites to +particular external objects. The former proceeds from, or is, self- +love; and seems inseparable from all sensible creatures, who can +reflect upon themselves and their own interest or happiness so as to +have that interest an object to their minds; what is to be said of +the latter is, that they proceed from or together make up that +particular nature, according to which man is made. The object the +former pursues is somewhat internal--our own happiness, enjoyment, +satisfaction; whether we have, or have not, a distinct particular +perception what it is, or wherein it consists: the objects of the +latter are this or that particular external thing, which the +affections tend towards, and of which it hath always a particular +idea or perception. The principle we call self-love never seeks +anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of +happiness or good: particular affections rest in the external +things themselves. One belongs to man as a reasonable creature +reflecting upon his own interest or happiness. The other, though +quite distinct from reason, are as much a part of human nature. + +That all particular appetites and passions are towards EXTERNAL +THINGS THEMSELVES, distinct from the PLEASURE ARISING FROM THEM, is +manifested from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were +it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the +passion: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more +than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if +there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than +another. + +Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour, is as +really our own affection as self-love; and the pleasure arising from +its gratification is as much my own pleasure as the pleasure self- +love would have from knowing I myself should be happy some time +hence would be my own pleasure. And if, because every particular +affection is a man's own, and the pleasure arising from its +gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such +particular affection must be called self-love; according to this way +of speaking, no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from +self-love; and every action and every affection whatever is to be +resolved up into this one principle. But then this is not the +language of mankind; or if it were, we should want words to express +the difference between the principle of an action, proceeding from +cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage; and an +action, suppose of revenge or of friendship, by which a man runs +upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another. It is manifest +the principles of these actions are totally different, and so want +different words to be distinguished by; all that they agree in is +that they both proceed from, and are done to gratify, an inclination +in a man's self. But the principle or inclination in one case is +self-love; in the other, hatred or love of another. There is then a +distinction between the cool principle of self-love, or general +desire of our own happiness, as one part of our nature, and one +principle of action; and the particular affections towards +particular external objects, as another part of our nature, and +another principle of action. How much soever therefore is to be +allowed to self-love, yet it cannot be allowed to be the whole of +our inward constitution; because, you see, there are other parts or +principles which come into it. + +Further, private happiness or good is all which self-love can make +us desire, or be concerned about: in having this consists its +gratification: it is an affection to ourselves; a regard to our own +interest, happiness, and private good: and in the proportion a man +hath this, he is interested, or a lover of himself. Let this be +kept in mind; because there is commonly, as I shall presently have +occasion to observe, another sense put upon these words. On the +other hand, particular affections tend towards particular external +things: these are their objects: having these is their end: in +this consists their gratification: no matter whether it be, or be +not, upon the whole, our interest or happiness. An action done from +the former of these principles is called an interested action. An +action proceeding from any of the latter has its denomination of +passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengeful, or any other, from the +particular appetite or affection from which it proceeds. Thus self- +love as one part of human nature, and the several particular +principles as the other part, are, themselves, their objects and +ends, stated and shown. + +From hence it will be easy to see how far, and in what ways, each of +these can contribute and be subservient to the private good of the +individual. Happiness does not consist in self-love. The desire of +happiness is no more the thing itself than the desire of riches is +the possession or enjoyment of them. People might love themselves +with the most entire and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely +miserable. Neither can self-love any way help them out, but by +setting them on work to get rid of the causes of their misery, to +gain or make use of those objects which are by nature adapted to +afford satisfaction. Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the +enjoyment of those objects which are by nature suited to our several +particular appetites, passions, and affections. So that if self- +love wholly engrosses us, and leaves no room for any other +principle, there can be absolutely no such thing at all as happiness +or enjoyment of any kind whatever; since happiness consists in the +gratification of particular passions, which supposes the having of +them. Self-love then does not constitute THIS or THAT to be our +interest or good; but, our interest or good being constituted by +nature and supposed, self-love only puts us upon obtaining and +securing it. Therefore, if it be possible that self-love may +prevail and exert itself in a degree or manner which is not +subservient to this end; then it will not follow that our interest +will be promoted in proportion to the degree in which that principle +engrosses us, and prevails over others. Nay, further, the private +and contracted affection, when it is not subservient to this end, +private good may, for anything that appears, have a direct contrary +tendency and effect. And if we will consider the matter, we shall +see that it often really has. DISENGAGEMENT is absolutely necessary +to enjoyment; and a person may have so steady and fixed an eye upon +his own interest, whatever he places it in, as may hinder him from +ATTENDING to many gratifications within his reach, which others have +their minds FREE and OPEN to. Over-fondness for a child is not +generally thought to be for its advantage; and, if there be any +guess to be made from appearances, surely that character we call +selfish is not the most promising for happiness. Such a temper may +plainly be, and exert itself in a degree and manner which may give +unnecessary and useless solicitude and anxiety, in a degree and +manner which may prevent obtaining the means and materials of +enjoyment, as well as the making use of them. Immoderate self-love +does very ill consult its own interest: and, how much soever a +paradox it may appear, it is certainly true that even from self-love +we should endeavour to get over all inordinate regard to and +consideration of ourselves. Every one of our passions and +affections hath its natural stint and bound, which may easily be +exceeded; whereas our enjoyments can possibly be but in a +determinate measure and degree. Therefore such excess of the +affection, since it cannot procure any enjoyment, must in all cases +be useless; but is generally attended with inconveniences, and often +is downright pain and misery. This holds as much with regard to +self-love as to all other affections. The natural degree of it, so +far as it sets us on work to gain and make use of the materials of +satisfaction, may be to our real advantage; but beyond or besides +this, it is in several respects an inconvenience and disadvantage. +Thus it appears that private interest is so far from being likely to +be promoted in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses +us, and prevails over all other principles, that the contracted +affection may be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even +contradict its own and private good. + +"But who, except the most sordidly covetous, ever thought there was +any rivalship between the love of greatness, honour, power, or +between sensual appetites and self-love? No, there is a perfect +harmony between them. It is by means of these particular appetites +and affections that self-love is gratified in enjoyment, happiness, +and satisfaction. The competition and rivalship is between self- +love and the love of our neighbour: that affection which leads us +out of ourselves, makes us regardless of our own interest, and +substitute that of another in its stead." Whether, then, there be +any peculiar competition and contrariety in this case shall now be +considered. + +Self-love and interestedness was stated to consist in or be an +affection to ourselves, a regard to our own private good: it is +therefore distinct from benevolence, which is an affection to the +good of our fellow-creatures. But that benevolence is distinct +from, that is, not the same thing with self-love, is no reason for +its being looked upon with any peculiar suspicion; because every +principle whatever, by means of which self-love is gratified, is +distinct from it; and all things which are distinct from each other +are equally so. A man has an affection or aversion to another: +that one of these tends to, and is gratified by, doing good, that +the other tends to, and is gratified by, doing harm, does not in the +least alter the respect which either one or the other of these +inward feelings has to self-love. We use the word PROPERTY so as to +exclude any other persons having an interest in that of which we say +a particular man has the property. And we often use the word +SELFISH so as to exclude in the same manner all regards to the good +of others. But the cases are not parallel: for though that +exclusion is really part of the idea of property; yet such positive +exclusion, or bringing this peculiar disregard to the good of others +into the idea of self-love, is in reality adding to the idea, or +changing it from what it was before stated to consist in, namely, in +an affection to ourselves. {25} This being the whole idea of self- +love, it can no otherwise exclude good-will or love of others, than +merely by not including it, no otherwise, than it excludes love of +arts or reputation, or of anything else. Neither on the other hand +does benevolence, any more than love of arts or of reputation +exclude self-love. Love of our neighbour, then, has just the same +respect to, is no more distant from, self-love, than hatred of our +neighbour, or than love or hatred of anything else. Thus the +principles, from which men rush upon certain ruin for the +destruction of an enemy, and for the preservation of a friend, have +the same respect to the private affection, and are equally +interested, or equally disinterested; and it is of no avail whether +they are said to be one or the other. Therefore to those who are +shocked to hear virtue spoken of as disinterested, it may be allowed +that it is indeed absurd to speak thus of it; unless hatred, several +particular instances of vice, and all the common affections and +aversions in mankind, are acknowledged to be disinterested too. Is +there any less inconsistence between the love of inanimate things, +or of creatures merely sensitive, and self-love, than between self- +love and the love of our neighbour? Is desire of and delight in the +happiness of another any more a diminution of self-love than desire +of and delight in the esteem of another? They are both equally +desire of and delight in somewhat external to ourselves; either both +or neither are so. The object of self-love is expressed in the term +self; and every appetite of sense, and every particular affection of +the heart, are equally interested or disinterested, because the +objects of them all are equally self or somewhat else. Whatever +ridicule therefore the mention of a disinterested principle or +action may be supposed to lie open to, must, upon the matter being +thus stated, relate to ambition, and every appetite and particular +affection as much as to benevolence. And indeed all the ridicule, +and all the grave perplexity, of which this subject hath had its +full share, is merely from words. The most intelligible way of +speaking of it seems to be this: that self-love and the actions +done in consequence of it (for these will presently appear to be the +same as to this question) are interested; that particular affections +towards external objects, and the actions done in consequence of +those affections are not so. But every one is at liberty to use +words as he pleases. All that is here insisted upon is that +ambition, revenge, benevolence, all particular passions whatever, +and the actions they produce, are equally interested or +disinterested. + +Thus it appears that there is no peculiar contrariety between self- +love and benevolence; no greater competition between these than +between any other particular affections and self-love. This relates +to the affections themselves. Let us now see whether there be any +peculiar contrariety between the respective courses of life which +these affections lead to; whether there be any greater competition +between the pursuit of private and of public good, than between any +other particular pursuits and that of private good. + +There seems no other reason to suspect that there is any such +peculiar contrariety, but only that the course of action which +benevolence leads to has a more direct tendency to promote the good +of others, than that course of action which love of reputation +suppose, or any other particular affection leads to. But that any +affection tends to the happiness of another does not hinder its +tending to one's own happiness too. That others enjoy the benefit +of the air and the light of the sun does not hinder but that these +are as much one's own private advantage now as they would be if we +had the property of them exclusive of all others. So a pursuit +which tends to promote the good of another, yet may have as great +tendency to promote private interest, as a pursuit which does not +tend to the good of another at all, or which is mischievous to him. +All particular affections whatever, resentment, benevolence, love of +arts, equally lead to a course of action for their own +gratification; i.e., the gratification of ourselves; and the +gratification of each gives delight: so far, then, it is manifest +they have all the same respect to private interest. Now take into +consideration, further, concerning these three pursuits, that the +end of the first is the harm, of the second, the good of another, of +the last, somewhat indifferent; and is there any necessity that +these additional considerations should alter the respect, which we +before saw these three pursuits had to private interest, or render +any one of them less conducive to it, than any other? Thus one +man's affection is to honour as his end; in order to obtain which he +thinks no pains too great. Suppose another, with such a singularity +of mind, as to have the same affection to public good as his end, +which he endeavours with the same labour to obtain. In case of +success, surely the man of benevolence hath as great enjoyment as +the man of ambition; they both equally having the end their +affections, in the same degree, tended to; but in case of +disappointment, the benevolent man has clearly the advantage; since +endeavouring to do good, considered as a virtuous pursuit, is +gratified by its own consciousness, i.e., is in a degree its own +reward. + +And as to these two, or benevolence and any other particular +passions whatever, considered in a further view, as forming a +general temper, which more or less disposes us for enjoyment of all +the common blessings of life, distinct from their own gratification, +is benevolence less the temper of tranquillity and freedom than +ambition or covetousness? Does the benevolent man appear less easy +with himself from his love to his neighbour? Does he less relish +his being? Is there any peculiar gloom seated on his face? Is his +mind less open to entertainment, to any particular gratification? +Nothing is more manifest than that being in good humour, which is +benevolence whilst it lasts, is itself the temper of satisfaction +and enjoyment. + +Suppose then, a man sitting down to consider how he might become +most easy to himself, and attain the greatest pleasure he could, all +that which is his real natural happiness. This can only consist in +the enjoyment of those objects which are by nature adapted to our +several faculties. These particular enjoyments make up the sum +total of our happiness, and they are supposed to arise from riches, +honours, and the gratification of sensual appetites. Be it so; yet +none profess themselves so completely happy in these enjoyments, but +that there is room left in the mind for others, if they were +presented to them: nay, these, as much as they engage us, are not +thought so high, but that human nature is capable even of greater. +Now there have been persons in all ages who have professed that they +found satisfaction in the exercise of charity, in the love of their +neighbour, in endeavouring to promote the happiness of all they had +to do with, and in the pursuit of what is just and right and good as +the general bent of their mind and end of their life; and that doing +an action of baseness or cruelty would be as great violence to THEIR +self, as much breaking in upon their nature, as any external force. +Persons of this character would add, if they might be heard, that +they consider themselves as acting in the view of an Infinite Being, +who is in a much higher sense the object of reverence and of love, +than all the world besides; and therefore they could have no more +enjoyment from a wicked action done under His eye than the persons +to whom they are making their apology could if all mankind were the +spectators of it; and that the satisfaction of approving themselves +to his unerring judgment, to whom they thus refer all their actions, +is a more continued settled satisfaction than any this world can +afford; as also that they have, no less than others, a mind free and +open to all the common innocent gratifications of it, such as they +are. And if we go no further, does there appear any absurdity in +this? Will any one take upon him to say that a man cannot find his +account in this general course of life as much as in the most +unbounded ambition, and the excesses of pleasure? Or that such a +person has not consulted so well for himself, for the satisfaction +and peace of his own mind, as the ambitious or dissolute man? And +though the consideration that God himself will in the end justify +their taste, and support their cause, is not formally to be insisted +upon here, yet thus much comes in, that all enjoyments whatever are +much more clear and unmixed from the assurance that they will end +well. Is it certain, then, that there is nothing in these +pretensions to happiness? especially when there are not wanting +persons who have supported themselves with satisfactions of this +kind in sickness, poverty, disgrace, and in the very pangs of death; +whereas it is manifest all other enjoyments fail in these +circumstances. This surely looks suspicions of having somewhat in +it. Self-love, methinks, should be alarmed. May she not possibly +pass over greater pleasures than those she is so wholly taken up +with? + +The short of the matter is no more than this. Happiness consists in +the gratification of certain affections, appetites, passions, with +objects which are by nature adapted to them. Self-love may indeed +set us on work to gratify these, but happiness or enjoyment has no +immediate connection with self-love, but arises from such +gratification alone. Love of our neighbour is one of those +affections. This, considered as a VIRTUOUS PRINCIPLE, is gratified +by a consciousness of ENDEAVOURING to promote the good of others, +but considered as a natural affection, its gratification consists in +the actual accomplishment of this endeavour. Now indulgence or +gratification of this affection, whether in that consciousness or +this accomplishment, has the same respect to interest as indulgence +of any other affection; they equally proceed from or do not proceed +from self-love, they equally include or equally exclude this +principle. Thus it appears, that benevolence and the pursuit of +public good hath at least as great respect to self-love and the +pursuit of private good as any other particular passions, and their +respective pursuits. + +Neither is covetousness, whether as a temper or pursuit, any +exception to this. For if by covetousness is meant the desire and +pursuit of riches for their own sake, without any regard to, or +consideration of, the uses of them, this hath as little to do with +self-love as benevolence hath. But by this word is usually meant, +not such madness and total distraction of mind, but immoderate +affection to and pursuit of riches as possessions in order to some +further end, namely, satisfaction, interest, or good. This, +therefore, is not a particular affection or particular pursuit, but +it is the general principle of self-love, and the general pursuit of +our own interest, for which reason the word SELFISH is by every one +appropriated to this temper and pursuit. Now as it is ridiculous to +assert that self-love and the love of our neighbour are the same, so +neither is it asserted that following these different affections +hath the same tendency and respect to our own interest. The +comparison is not between self-love and the love of our neighbour, +between pursuit of our own interest and the interest of others, but +between the several particular affections in human nature towards +external objects, as one part of the comparison, and the one +particular affection to the good of our neighbour as the other part +of it: and it has been shown that all these have the same respect +to self-love and private interest. + +There is indeed frequently an inconsistence or interfering between +self-love or private interest and the several particular appetites, +passions, affections, or the pursuits they lead to. But this +competition or interfering is merely accidental, and happens much +oftener between pride, revenge, sensual gratifications, and private +interest, than between private interest and benevolence. For +nothing is more common than to see men give themselves up to a +passion or an affection to their known prejudice and ruin, and in +direct contradiction to manifest and real interest, and the loudest +calls of self-love: whereas the seeming competitions and +interfering, between benevolence and private interest, relate much +more to the materials or means of enjoyment than to enjoyment +itself. There is often an interfering in the former when there is +none in the latter. Thus as to riches: so much money as a man +gives away, so much less will remain in his possession. Here is a +real interfering. But though a man cannot possibly give without +lessening his fortune, yet there are multitudes might give without +lessening their own enjoyment, because they may have more than they +can turn to any real use or advantage to themselves. Thus the more +thought and time any one employs about the interests and good of +others, he must necessarily have less to attend his own: but he may +have so ready and large a supply of his own wants, that such thought +might be really useless to himself, though of great service and +assistance to others. + +The general mistake, that there is some greater inconsistence +between endeavouring to promote the good of another and self- +interest, than between self-interest and pursuing anything else, +seems, as hath already been hinted, to arise from our notions of +property, and to be carried on by this property's being supposed to +be itself our happiness or good. People are so very much taken up +with this one subject, that they seem from it to have formed a +general way of thinking, which they apply to other things that they +have nothing to do with. Hence in a confused and slight way it +might well be taken for granted that another's having no interest in +an affection (i.e., his good not being the object of it) renders, as +one may speak, the proprietor's interest in it greater; and that if +another had an interest in it this would render his less, or +occasion that such affection could not be so friendly to self-love, +or conducive to private good, as an affection or pursuit which has +not a regard to the good of another. This, I say, might be taken +for granted, whilst it was not attended to, that the object of every +particular affection is equally somewhat external to ourselves, and +whether it be the good of another person, or whether it be any other +external thing, makes no alteration with regard to its being one's +own affection, and the gratification of it one's own private +enjoyment. And so far as it is taken for granted that barely having +the means and materials of enjoyment is what constitutes interest +and happiness; that our interest or good consists in possessions +themselves, in having the property of riches, houses, lands, +gardens, not in the enjoyment of them; so far it will even more +strongly be taken for granted, in the way already explained, that an +affection's conducing to the good of another must even necessarily +occasion it to conduce less to private good, if not to be positively +detrimental to it. For, if property and happiness are one and the +same thing, as by increasing the property of another you lessen your +own property, so by promoting the happiness of another you must +lessen your own happiness. But whatever occasioned the mistake, I +hope it has been fully proved to be one, as it has been proved, that +there is no peculiar rivalship or competition between self-love and +benevolence: that as there may be a competition between these two, +so there many also between any particular affection whatever and +self-love; that every particular affection, benevolence among the +rest, is subservient to self-love by being the instrument of private +enjoyment; and that in one respect benevolence contributes more to +private interest, i.e., enjoyment or satisfaction, than any other of +the particular common affections, as it is in a degree its own +gratification. + +And to all these things may be added that religion, from whence +arises our strongest obligation to benevolence, is so far from +disowning the principle of self-love, that it often addresses itself +to that very principle, and always to the mind in that state when +reason presides, and there can no access be had to the +understanding, but by convincing men that the course of life we +would persuade them to is not contrary to their interest. It may be +allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, +that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the +nearest and most important to us; that they will, nay, if you +please, that they ought to prevail over those of order, and beauty, +and harmony, and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is +impossible there ever should be, any inconsistence between them, +though these last, too, as expressing the fitness of actions, are +real as truth itself. Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral +rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is +right and good, as such, yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, +we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till +we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not +contrary to it. + +Common reason and humanity will have some influence upon mankind, +whatever becomes of speculations; but, so far as the interests of +virtue depend upon the theory of it being secured from open scorn, +so far its very being in the world depends upon its appearing to +have no contrariety to private interest and self-love. The +foregoing observations, therefore, it is hoped, may have gained a +little ground in favour of the precept before us, the particular +explanation of which shall be the subject of the next discourse. + +I will conclude at present with observing the peculiar obligation +which we are under to virtue and religion, as enforced in the verses +following the text, in the epistle for the day, from our Saviour's +coming into the world. THE NIGHT IS FAR SPENT, THE DAY IS AT HAND; +LET US THEREFORE CAST OFF THE WORKS OF DARKNESS, AND LET US PUT ON +THE ARMOUR OF LIGHT, &c. The meaning and force of which exhortation +is, that Christianity lays us under new obligations to a good life, +as by it the will of God is more clearly revealed, and as it affords +additional motives to the practice of it, over and above those which +arise out of the nature of virtue and vice, I might add, as our +Saviour has set us a perfect example of goodness in our own nature. +Now love and charity is plainly the thing in which He hath placed +His religion; in which, therefore, as we have any pretence to the +name of Christians, we must place ours. He hath at once enjoined it +upon us by way of command with peculiar force, and by His example, +as having undertaken the work of our salvation out of pure love and +goodwill to mankind. The endeavour to set home this example upon +our minds is a very proper employment of this season, which is +bringing on the festival of His birth, which as it may teach us many +excellent lessons of humility, resignation, and obedience to the +will of God, so there is none it recommends with greater authority, +force, and advantage than this love and charity, since it was FOR US +MEN, AND FOR OUR SALVATION, that HE CAME DOWN FROM HEAVEN, AND WAS +INCARNATE, AND WAS MADE MAN, that He might teach us our duty, and +more especially that He might enforce the practice of it, reform +mankind, and finally bring us to that ETERNAL SALVATION, of which HE +IS THE AUTHOR TO ALL THOSE THAT OBEY HIM. + + + +SERMON XII. +UPON THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. +ROM. xiii. 9. + + + +And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in +this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. + +Having already removed the prejudices against public spirit, or the +love of our neighbour, on the side of private interest and self- +love, I proceed to the particular explanation of the precept before +us, by showing, Who is our neighbour: In what sense we are required +to love him as ourselves; The influence such love would have upon +our behaviour in life; and lastly, How this commandment comprehends +in it all others. + +I. The objects and due extent of this affection will be understood +by attending to the nature of it, and to the nature and +circumstances of mankind in this world. The love of our neighbour +is the same with charity, benevolence, or goodwill: it is an +affection to the good and happiness of our fellow-creatures. This +implies in it a disposition to produce happiness, and this is the +simple notion of goodness, which appears so amiable wherever we meet +with it. From hence it is easy to see that the perfection of +goodness consists in love to the whole universe. This is the +perfection of Almighty God. + +But as man is so much limited in his capacity, as so small a part of +the Creation comes under his notice and influence, and as we are not +used to consider things in so general a way, it is not to be thought +of that the universe should be the object of benevolence to such +creatures as we are. Thus in that precept of our Saviour, Be ye +perfect, even as your Father, which is in heaven, is perfect, {26} +the perfection of the divine goodness is proposed to our imitation +as it is promiscuous, and extends to the evil as well as the good; +not as it is absolutely universal, imitation of it in this respect +being plainly beyond us. The object is too vast. For this reason +moral writers also have substituted a less general object for our +benevolence, mankind. But this likewise is an object too general, +and very much out of our view. Therefore persons more practical +have, instead of mankind, put our country, and made the principle of +virtue, of human virtue, to consist in the entire uniform love of +our country: and this is what we call a public spirit, which in men +of public stations is the character of a patriot. But this is +speaking to the upper part of the world. Kingdoms and governments +are large, and the sphere of action of far the greatest part of +mankind is much narrower than the government they live under: or +however, common men do not consider their actions as affecting the +whole community of which they are members. There plainly is wanting +a less general and nearer object of benevolence for the bulk of men +than that of their country. Therefore the Scripture, not being a +book of theory and speculation, but a plain rule of life for +mankind, has with the utmost possible propriety put the principle of +virtue upon the love of our neighbour, which is that part of the +universe, that part of mankind, that part of our country, which +comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, and +with which we have to do. + +This is plainly the true account or reason why our Saviour places +the principle of virtue in the love of our NEIGHBOUR, and the +account itself shows who are comprehended under that relation. + +II. Let us now consider in what sense we are commanded to love our +neighbour AS OURSELVES. + +This precept, in its first delivery by our Saviour, is thus +introduced:- Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, +with all thy soul, and with all thy strength; and thy neighbour as +thyself. These very different manners of expression do not lead our +thoughts to the same measure or degree of love, common to both +objects, but to one peculiar to each. Supposing, then, which is to +be supposed, a distinct meaning and propriety in the words, AS +THYSELF; the precept we are considering will admit of any of these +senses: that we bear the SAME KIND of affection to our neighbour as +we do to ourselves, or, that the love we bear to our neighbour +should have SOME CERTAIN PROPORTION OR OTHER to self-love: or, +lastly, that it should bear the particular proportion of EQUALITY, +that IT BE IN THE SAME DEGREE. + +First, The precept may be understood as requiring only that we have +the SAME KIND of affection to our fellow-creatures as to ourselves; +that, as every man has the principle of self-love, which disposes +him to avoid misery, and consult his own happiness, so we should +cultivate the affection of goodwill to our neighbour, and that it +should influence us to have the same kind of regard to him. This at +least must be commanded, and this will not only prevent our being +injurious to him, but will also put us upon promoting his good. +There are blessings in life, which we share in common with others, +peace, plenty, freedom, healthful seasons. But real benevolence to +our fellow-creatures would give us the notion of a common interest +in a stricter sense, for in the degree we love another, his +interest, his joys and sorrows, are our own. It is from self-love +that we form the notion of private good, and consider it is our own: +love of our neighbour would teach us thus to appropriate to +ourselves his good and welfare; to consider ourselves as having a +real share in his happiness. Thus the principle of benevolence +would be an advocate within our own breasts, to take care of the +interests of our fellow-creatures in all the interfering and +competitions which cannot but be, from the imperfection of our +nature, and the state we are in. It would likewise, in some +measure, lessen that interfering, and hinder men from forming so +strong a notion of private good, exclusive of the good of others, as +we commonly do. Thus, as the private affection makes us in a +peculiar manner sensible of humanity, justice or injustice, when +exercised towards ourselves, love of our neighbour would give us the +same kind of sensibility in his behalf. This would be the greatest +security of our uniform obedience to that most equitable rule. +WHATSOEVER YE WOULD THAT MEN SHOULD DO UNTO YOU, DO YE EVEN SO UNTO +THEM. + +All this is indeed no more than that we should have a real love to +our neighbour; but then, which is to be observed, the words AS +THYSELF express this in the most distinct manner, and determine the +precept to relate to the affection itself. The advantage which this +principle of benevolence has over other remote considerations is, +that it is itself the temper of virtue, and likewise that it is the +chief, nay, the only effectual security of our performing the +several offices of kindness we owe to our fellow-creatures. When +from distant considerations men resolve upon any thing to which they +have no liking, or perhaps an averseness, they are perpetually +finding out evasions and excuses, which need never be wanting, if +people look for them: and they equivocate with themselves in the +plainest cases in the world. This may be in respect to single +determinate acts of virtue, but it comes in much more, where the +obligation is to a general course of behaviour, and most of all, if +it be such as cannot be reduced to fixed determinate rules. This +observation may account for the diversity of the expression in that +known passage of the prophet Micah, TO DO JUSTLY, AND TO LOVE MERCY. +A man's heart must be formed to humanity and benevolence, he must +LOVE MERCY, otherwise he will not act mercifully in any settled +course of behaviour. As consideration of the future sanctions of +religion is our only security of preserving in our duty, in cases of +great temptation: so to get our heart and temper formed to a love +and liking of what is good is absolutely necessary in order to our +behaving rightly in the familiar and daily intercourses amongst +mankind. + +Secondly, The precept before us may be understood to require that we +love our neighbour in some certain PROPORTION or other, ACCORDING AS +we love ourselves. And indeed a man's character cannot be +determined by the love he bears to his neighbour, considered +absolutely, but the proportion which this bears to self-love, +whether it be attended to or not, is the chief thing which forms the +character and influences the actions. For, as the form of the body +is a composition of various parts, so likewise our inward structure +is not simple or uniform, but a composition of various passions, +appetites, affections, together with rationality, including in this +last both the discernment of what is right, and a disposition to +regulate ourselves by it. There is greater variety of parts in what +we call a character than there are features in a face, and the +morality of that is no more determined by one part than the beauty +or deformity of this is by one single feature: each is to be judged +of by all the parts or features, not taken singly, but together. In +the inward frame the various passions, appetites, affections, stand +in different respects to each other. The principles in our mind may +be contradictory, or checks and allays only, or incentives and +assistants to each other. And principles, which in their nature +have no kind of contrariety or affinity, may yet accidentally be +each other's allays or incentives. + +From hence it comes to pass, that though we were able to look into +the inward contexture of the heart, and see with the greatest +exactness in what degree any one principle is in a particular man, +we could not from thence determine how far that principle would go +towards forming the character, or what influence it would have upon +the actions, unless we could likewise discern what other principles +prevailed in him, and see the proportion which that one bears to the +others. Thus, though two men should have the affection of +compassion in the same degree exactly, yet one may have the +principle of resentment or of ambition so strong in him as to +prevail over that of compassion, and prevent its having any +influence upon his actions, so that he may deserve the character of +a hard or cruel man, whereas the other having compassion in just the +same degree only, yet having resentment or ambition in a lower +degree, his compassion may prevail over them, so as to influence his +actions, and to denominate his temper compassionate. So that, how +strange soever it may appear to people who do not attend to the +thing, yet it is quite manifest that, when we say one man is more +resenting or compassionate than another, this does not necessarily +imply that one has the principle of resentment or of compassion +stronger than the other. For if the proportion which resentment or +compassion bears to other inward principles is greater in one than +in the other, this is itself sufficient to denominate one more +resenting or compassionate than the other. + +Further, the whole system, as I may speak, of affections (including +rationality), which constitute the heart, as this word is used in +Scripture and on moral subjects, are each and all of them stronger +in some than in others. Now the proportion which the two general +affections, benevolence and self-love, bear to each other, according +to this interpretation of the text, demonstrates men's character as +to virtue. Suppose, then, one man to have the principle of +benevolence in a higher degree than another; it will not follow from +hence that his general temper or character or actions will be more +benevolent than the other's. For he may have self-love in such a +degree as quite to prevail over benevolence, so that it may have no +influence at all upon his action, whereas benevolence in the other +person, though in a lower degree, may yet be the strongest principle +in his heart, and strong enough to be the guide of his actions, so +as to denominate him a good and virtuous man. The case is here as +in scales: it is not one weight considered in itself, which +determines whether the scale shall ascend or descend, but this +depends upon the proportion which that one weight hath to the other. + +It being thus manifest that the influence which benevolence has upon +our actions, and how far it goes towards forming our character, is +not determined by the degree itself of this principle in our mind, +but by the proportion it has to self-love and other principles: a +comparison also being made in the text between self-love and the +love of our neighbour; these joint considerations afforded +sufficient occasion for treating here of that proportion. It +plainly is implied in the precept, though it should be questioned, +whether it be the exact meaning of the words, as THYSELF. + +Love of our neighbour, then, must bear some proportion to self-love, +and virtue, to be sure, consists in the due proportion. What this +due proportion is, whether as a principle in the mind, or as exerted +in actions, can be judged of only from our nature and condition in +this world. Of the degree in which affections and the principles of +action, considered in themselves, prevail, we have no measure: let +us, then, proceed to the course of behaviour, the actions they +produce. + +Both our nature and condition require that each particular man +should make particular provision for himself: and the inquiry, what +proportion benevolence should have to self-love, when brought down +to practice, will be, what is a competent care and provision for +ourselves? And how certain soever it be that each man must +determine this for himself, and how ridiculous soever it would be +for any to attempt to determine it for another, yet it is to be +observed that the proportion is real, and that a competent provision +has a bound, and that it cannot be all which we can possibly get and +keep within our grasp, without legal injustice. Mankind almost +universally bring in vanity, supplies for what is called a life of +pleasure, covetousness, or imaginary notions of superiority over +others, to determine this question: but every one who desires to +act a proper part in society would do well to consider how far any +of them come in to determine it, in the way of moral consideration. +All that can be said is, supposing what, as the world goes, is so +much to be supposed that it is scarce to be mentioned, that persons +do not neglect what they really owe to themselves; the more of their +care and thought and of their fortune they employ in doing good to +their fellow-creatures the nearer they come up to the law of +perfection, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. + +Thirdly, if the words AS THYSELF were to be understood of an +equality of affection, it would not be attended with those +consequences which perhaps may be thought to follow from it. +Suppose a person to have the same settled regard to others as to +himself; that in every deliberate scheme or pursuit he took their +interest into the account in the same degree as his own, so far as +an equality of affection would produce this: yet he would, in fact, +and ought to be, much more taken up and employed about himself, and +his own concerns, than about others, and their interests. For, +besides the one common affection toward himself and his neighbour he +would have several other particular affections, passions, appetites, +which he could not possibly feel in common both for himself and +others. Now these sensations themselves very much employ us, and +have perhaps as great influence as self-love. So far indeed as +self-love, and cool reflection upon what is for our interest, would +set us on work to gain a supply of our own several wants, so far the +love of our neighbour would make us do the same for him: but the +degree in which we are put upon seeking and making use of the means +of gratification, by the feeling of those affections, appetites, and +passions, must necessarily be peculiar to ourselves. + +That there are particular passions (suppose shame, resentment) which +men seem to have, and feel in common, both for themselves and +others, makes no alteration in respect to those passions and +appetites which cannot possibly be thus felt in common. From hence +(and perhaps more things of the like kind might be mentioned) it +follows, that though there were an equality of affection to both, +yet regards to ourselves would be more prevalent than attention to +the concerns of others. + +And from moral considerations it ought to be so, supposing still the +equality of affection commanded, because we are in a peculiar +manner, as I may speak, intrusted with ourselves, and therefore care +of our own interests, as well as of our conduct, particularly +belongs to us. + +To these things must be added, that moral obligations can extend no +further than to natural possibilities. Now we have a perception of +our own interests, like consciousness of our own existence, which we +always carry about with us, and which, in its continuation, kind, +and degree, seems impossible to be felt in respect to the interests +of others. + +From all these things it fully appears that though we were to love +our neighbour in the same degree as we love ourselves, so far as +this is possible, yet the care of ourselves, of the individual, +would not be neglected, the apprehended danger of which seems to be +the only objection against understanding the precept in this strict +sense. + +III. The general temper of mind which the due love of our neighbour +would form us to, and the influence it would have upon our behaviour +in life, is now to be considered. + +The temper and behaviour of charity is explained at large in that +known passage of St. Paul: {27} Charity suffereth long, and is +kind; charity envieth not, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh +not her own, thinketh no evil, beareth all things, believeth all +things, hopeth all things. As to the meaning of the expressions, +seeketh not her own, thinketh no evil, believeth all things; however +those expressions may be explained away, this meekness, and in some +degree easiness of temper, readiness to forego our right for the +sake of peace, as well as in the way of compassion, freedom from +mistrust, and disposition to believe well of our neighbour, this +general temper, I say, accompanies, and is plainly the effect of +love and goodwill. And, though such is the world in which we live, +that experience and knowledge of it not only may, but must beget, in +as greater regard to ourselves, and doubtfulness of the characters +of others, than is natural to mankind, yet these ought not to be +carried further than the nature and course of things make necessary. +It is still true, even in the present state of things, bad as it is, +that a real good man had rather be deceived than be suspicious; had +rather forego his known right, than run the venture of doing even a +hard thing. This is the general temper of that charity, of which +the apostle asserts, that if he had it not, giving his BODY TO BE +BURNED WOULD AVAIL HIM NOTHING; and which he says SHALL NEVER FAIL. + +The happy influence of this temper extends to every different +relation and circumstance in human life. It plainly renders a man +better, more to be desired, as to all the respects and relations we +can stand in to each other. The benevolent man is disposed to make +use of all external advantages in such a manner as shall contribute +to the good of others, as well as to his own satisfaction. His own +satisfaction consists in this. He will be easy and kind to his +dependents, compassionate to the poor and distressed, friendly to +all with whom he has to do. This includes the good neighbour, +parent, master, magistrate: and such a behaviour would plainly make +dependence, inferiority, and even servitude easy. So that a good or +charitable man of superior rank in wisdom, fortune, authority, is a +common blessing to the place he lives in: happiness grows under his +influence. This good principle in inferiors would discover itself +in paying respect, gratitude, obedience, as due. It were therefore, +methinks, one just way of trying one's own character to ask +ourselves, am I in reality a better master or servant, a better +friend, a better neighbour, than such and such persons, whom, +perhaps, I may think not to deserve the character of virtue and +religion so much as myself? + +And as to the spirit of party, which unhappily prevails amongst +mankind, whatever are the distinctions which serve for a supply to +it, some or other of which have obtained in all ages and countries, +one who is thus friendly to his kind will immediately make due +allowances for it, as what cannot but be amongst such creatures as +men, in such a world as this. And as wrath and fury and overbearing +upon these occasions proceed, as I may speak, from men's feeling +only on their own side, so a common feeling, for others as well as +for ourselves, would render us sensible to this truth, which it is +strange can have so little influence, that we ourselves differ from +others, just as much as they do from us. I put the matter in this +way, because it can scarce be expected that the generality of men +should see that those things which are made the occasions of +dissension and fomenting the party-spirit are really nothing at all: +but it may be expected from all people, how much soever they are in +earnest about their respective peculiarities, that humanity and +common goodwill to their fellow-creatures should moderate and +restrain that wretched spirit. + +This good temper of charity likewise would prevent strife and enmity +arising from other occasions: it would prevent our giving just +cause of offence, and our taking it without cause. And in cases of +real injury, a good man will make all the allowances which are to be +made, and, without any attempts of retaliation, he will only consult +his own and other men's security for the future against injustice +and wrong. + +IV. I proceed to consider, lastly, what is affirmed of the precept +now explained, that it comprehends in it all others, i.e., that to +love our neighbour as ourselves includes in it all virtues. + +Now the way in which every maxim of conduct, or general speculative +assertion, when it is to be explained at large should be treated, +is, to show what are the particular truths which were designed to be +comprehended under such a general observation, how far it is +strictly true, and then the limitations, restrictions, and +exceptions, if there be exceptions, with which it is to be +understood. But it is only the former of these, namely, how far the +assertion in the text holds, and the ground of the pre-eminence +assigned to the precept of it, which in strictness comes into our +present consideration. + +However, in almost everything that is said, there is somewhat to be +understood beyond what is explicitly laid down, and which we of +course supply, somewhat, I mean, which would not be commonly called +a restriction or limitation. Thus, when benevolence is said to be +the sum of virtue, it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but a +principle in reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their +reason, for reason and reflection comes into our notion of a moral +agent. And that will lead us to consider distant consequences, as +well as the immediate tendency of an action. It will teach us that +the care of some persons, suppose children and families, is +particularly committed to our charge by Nature and Providence, as +also that there are other circumstances, suppose friendship or +former obligations, which require that we do good to some, +preferably to others. Reason, considered merely as subservient to +benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will teach +us to have particular regard to these relations and circumstances, +because it is plainly for the good of the world that they should be +regarded. And as there are numberless cases in which, +notwithstanding appearances, we are not competent judges, whether a +particular action will upon the whole do good or harm, reason in the +same way will teach us to be cautious how we act in these cases of +uncertainty. It will suggest to our consideration which is the +safer side; how liable we are to be led wrong by passion and private +interest; and what regard is due to laws, and the judgment of +mankind. All these things must come into consideration, were it +only in order to determine which way of acting is likely to produce +the greatest good. Thus, upon supposition that it were in the +strictest sense true, without limitation, that benevolence includes +in it all virtues, yet reason must come in as its guide and +director, in order to attain its own end, the end of benevolence, +the greatest public good. Reason, then, being thus included, let us +now consider the truth of the assertion itself. + +First, It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind +or any creature but happiness. This, then, is all which any person +can, in strictness of speaking, be said to have a right to. We can +therefore OWE NO MAN ANYTHING, but only to farther and promote his +happiness, according to our abilities. And therefore a disposition +and endeavour to do good to all with whom we have to do, in the +degree and manner which the different relations we stand in to them +require, is a discharge of all the obligations we are under to them. + +As human nature is not one simple uniform thing but a composition of +various parts, body, spirit, appetites, particular passions, and +affections, for each of which reasonable self-love would lead men to +have due regard, and make suitable provision, so society consists of +various parts to which we stand in different respects and relations, +and just benevolence would as surely lead us to have due regard to +each of these and behave as the respective relations require. +Reasonable goodwill and right behaviour towards our fellow-creatures +are in a manner the same, only that the former expresseth the +principle as it is in the mind; the latter, the principle as it were +become external, i.e., exerted in actions. + +And so far as temperance, sobriety, and moderation in sensual +pleasures, and the contrary vices, have any respect to our fellow- +creatures, any influence upon their quiet, welfare, and happiness, +as they always have a real, and often a near influence upon it, so +far it is manifest those virtues may be produced by the love of our +neighbour, and that the contrary vices would be prevented by it. +Indeed, if men's regard to themselves will not restrain them from +excess, it may be thought little probable that their love to others +will be sufficient: but the reason is, that their love to others is +not, any more than their regard to themselves, just, and in its due +degree. There are, however, manifest instances of persons kept +sober and temperate from regard to their affairs, and the welfare of +those who depend upon them. And it is obvious to every one that +habitual excess, a dissolute course of life, implies a general +neglect of the duties we owe towards our friends, our families, and +our country. + +From hence it is manifest that the common virtues and the common +vices of mankind may be traced up to benevolence, or the want of it. +And this entitles the precept, THOU SHALT LOVE THY NEIGHBOUR AS +THYSELF, to the pre-eminence given to it, and is a justification of +the apostle's assertion, that all other commandments are +comprehended in it, whatever cautions and restrictions {28} there +are, which might require to be considered, if we were to state +particularly and at length what is virtue and right behaviour in +mankind. But, + +Secondly, It might be added, that in a higher and more general way +of consideration, leaving out the particular nature of creatures, +and the particular circumstances in which they are placed, +benevolence seems in the strictest sense to include in it all that +is good and worthy, all that is good, which we have any distinct +particular notion of. We have no clear conception of any position +moral attribute in the Supreme Being, but what may be resolved up +into goodness. And, if we consider a reasonable creature or moral +agent, without regard to the particular relations and circumstances +in which he is placed, we cannot conceive anything else to come in +towards determining whether he is to be ranked in a higher or lower +class of virtuous beings, but the higher or lower degree in which +that principle, and what is manifestly connected with it, prevail in +him. + +That which we more strictly call piety, or the love of God, and +which is an essential part of a right temper, some may perhaps +imagine no way connected with benevolence: yet surely they must be +connected, if there be indeed in being an object infinitely good. +Human nature is so constituted that every good affection implies the +love of itself, i.e., becomes the object of a new affection in the +same person. Thus, to be righteous, implies in it the love of +righteousness; to be benevolent, the love of benevolence; to be +good, the love of goodness; whether this righteousness, benevolence, +or goodness be viewed as in our own mind or another's, and the love +of God as a being perfectly good is the love of perfect goodness +contemplated in a being or person. Thus morality and religion, +virtue and piety, will at last necessarily coincide, run up into one +and the same point, and LOVE will be in all senses THE END OF THE +COMMANDMENT. + + +O Almighty God, inspire us with this divine principle; kill in us +all the seeds of envy and ill-will; and help us, by cultivating +within ourselves the love of our neighbour, to improve in the love +of Thee. Thou hast placed us in various kindreds, friendships, and +relations, as the school of discipline for our affections: help us, +by the due exercise of them, to improve to perfection; till all +partial affection be lost in that entire universal one, and thou, O +God, shalt be all in all. + + + +SERMON XIII., XIV. +UPON THE LOVE OF GOD. +MATTHEW xxii. 37. + + + +Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all +thy soul, and with all thy mind. + +Everybody knows, you therefore need only just be put in mind, that +there is such a thing as having so great horror of one extreme as to +run insensibly and of course into the contrary; and that a +doctrine's having been a shelter for enthusiasm, or made to serve +the purposes of superstition, is no proof of the falsity of it: +truth or right being somewhat real in itself, and so not to be +judged of by its liableness to abuse, or by its supposed distance +from or nearness to error. It may be sufficient to have mentioned +this in general, without taking notice of the particular +extravagances which have been vented under the pretence or endeavour +of explaining the love of God; or how manifestly we are got into the +contrary extreme, under the notion of a reasonable religion; so very +reasonable as to have nothing to do with the heart and affections, +if these words signify anything but the faculty by which we discern +speculative truth. + +By the love of God I would understand all those regards, all those +affections of mind which are due immediately to Him from such a +creature as man, and which rest in Him as their end. As this does +not include servile fear, so neither will any other regards, how +reasonable soever, which respect anything out of or besides the +perfection of the Divine nature, come into consideration here. But +all fear is not excluded, because His displeasure is itself the +natural proper object of fear. Reverence, ambition of His love and +approbation, delight in the hope or consciousness of it, come +likewise into this definition of the love of God, because He is the +natural object of all those affections or movements of mind as +really as He is the object of the affection, which is in the +strictest sense called love; and all of them equally rest in Him as +their end. And they may all be understood to be implied in these +words of our Saviour, without putting any force upon them: for He +is speaking of the love of God and our neighbour as containing the +whole of piety and virtue. + +It is plain that the nature of man is so constituted as to feel +certain affections upon the sight or contemplation of certain +objects. Now the very notion of affection implies resting in its +object as an end. And the particular affection to good characters, +reverence and moral love of them, is natural to all those who have +any degree of real goodness in themselves. This will be illustrated +by the description of a perfect character in a creature; and by +considering the manner in which a good man in his presence would be +affected towards such a character. He would of course feel the +affections of love, reverence, desire of his approbation, delight in +the hope or consciousness of it. And surely all this is applicable, +and may be brought up to that Being, who is infinitely more than an +adequate object of all those affections; whom we are commanded to +LOVE WITH ALL OUR HEART, WITH ALL OUR SOUL, AND WITH ALL OUR MIND. +And of these regards towards Almighty God some are more particularly +suitable to and becoming so imperfect a creature as man, in this +mortal state we are passing through; and some of them, and perhaps +other exercises of the mind, will be the employment and happiness of +good men in a state of perfection. + +This is a general view of what the following discourse will contain. +And it is manifest the subject is a real one: there is nothing in +it enthusiastical or unreasonable. And if it be indeed at all a +subject, it is one of the utmost importance. + +As mankind have a faculty by which they discern speculative truth, +so we have various affections towards external objects. +Understanding and temper, reason and affection, are as distinct +ideas as reason and hunger, and one would think could no more be +confounded. It is by reason that we get the ideas of several +objects of our affections; but in these cases reason and affection +are no more the same than sight of a particular object, and the +pleasure or uneasiness consequent thereupon, are the same. Now as +reason tends to and rests in the discernment of truth, the object of +it, so the very nature of affection consists in tending towards, and +resting in, its objects as an end. We do indeed often in common +language say that things are loved, desired, esteemed, not for +themselves, but for somewhat further, somewhat out of and beyond +them; yet, in these cases, whoever will attend will see that these +things are not in reality the objects of the affections, i.e. are +not loved, desired, esteemed, but the somewhat further and beyond +them. If we have no affections which rest in what are called their +objects, then what is called affection, love, desire, hope, in human +nature, is only an uneasiness in being at rest; an unquiet +disposition to action, progress, pursuit, without end or meaning. +But if there be any such thing as delight in the company of one +person, rather than of another; whether in the way of friendship, or +mirth and entertainment, it is all one, if it be without respect to +fortune, honour, or increasing our stores of knowledge, or anything +beyond the present time; here is an instance of an affection +absolutely resting in its object as its end, and being gratified in +the same way as the appetite of hunger is satisfied with food. Yet +nothing is more common than to hear it asked, what advantage a man +hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular friendships, or +in any other; nothing, I say, is more common than to hear such a +question put in a way which supposes no gain, advantage, or +interest, but as a means to somewhat further: and if so, then there +is no such thing at all as real interest, gain, or advantage. This +is the same absurdity with respect to life as an infinite series of +effects without a cause is in speculation. The gain, advantage, or +interest consists in the delight itself, arising from such a +faculty's having its object: neither is there any such thing as +happiness or enjoyment but what arises from hence. The pleasures of +hope and of reflection are not exceptions: the former being only +this happiness anticipated; the latter the same happiness enjoyed +over again after its time. And even the general expectation of +future happiness can afford satisfaction only as it is a present +object to the principle of self-love. + +It was doubtless intended that life should be very much a pursuit to +the gross of mankind. But this is carried so much further than is +reasonable that what gives immediate satisfaction, i.e. our present +interest, is scarce considered as our interest at all. It is +inventions which have only a remote tendency towards enjoyment, +perhaps but a remote tendency towards gaining the means only of +enjoyment, which are chiefly spoken of as useful to the world. And +though this way of thinking were just with respect to the imperfect +state we are now in, where we know so little of satisfaction without +satiety, yet it must be guarded against when we are considering the +happiness of a state of perfection; which happiness being enjoyment +and not hope, must necessarily consist in this, that our affections +have their objects, and rest in those objects as an end, i.e. be +satisfied with them. This will further appear in the sequel of this +discourse. + +Of the several affections, or inward sensations, which particular +objects excite in man, there are some, the having of which implies +the love of them, when they are reflected upon. {29} This cannot be +said of all our affections, principles, and motives of action. It +were ridiculous to assert that a man upon reflection hath the same +kind of approbation of the appetite of hunger or the passion of fear +as he hath of goodwill to his fellow-creatures. To be a just, a +good, a righteous man, plainly carries with it a peculiar affection +to or love of justice, goodness, righteousness, when these +principles are the objects of contemplation. + +Now if a man approves of, or hath an affection to, any principle in +and for itself, incidental things allowed for, it will be the same +whether he views it in his own mind or in another; in himself or in +his neighbour. This is the account of our approbation of, or moral +love and affection to good characters; which cannot but be in those +who have any degrees of real goodness in themselves, and who discern +and take notice of the same principle in others. + +From observation of what passes within ourselves, our own actions, +and the behaviour of others, the mind may carry on its reflections +as far as it pleases; much beyond what we experience in ourselves, +or discern in our fellow creatures. It may go on and consider +goodness as become a uniform continued principle of action, as +conducted by reason, and forming a temper and character absolutely +good and perfect, which is in a higher sense excellent, and +proportionably the object of love and approbation. + +Let us then suppose a creature perfect according to his created +nature--let his form be human, and his capacities no more than equal +to those of the chief of men--goodness shall be his proper +character, with wisdom to direct it, and power within some certain +determined sphere of action to exert it: but goodness must be the +simple actuating principle within him; this being the moral quality +which is amiable, or the immediate object of love as distinct from +other affections of approbation. Here then is a finite object for +our mind to tend towards, to exercise itself upon: a creature, +perfect according to his capacity, fixed, steady, equally unmoved by +weak pity or more weak fury and resentment; forming the justest +scheme of conduct; going on undisturbed in the execution of it, +through the several methods of severity and reward, towards his end, +namely, the general happiness of all with whom he hath to do, as in +itself right and valuable. This character, though uniform in +itself, in its principle, yet exerting itself in different ways, or +considered in different views, may by its appearing variety move +different affections. Thus, the severity of justice would not +affect us in the same way as an act of mercy. The adventitious +qualities of wisdom and power may be considered in themselves; and +even the strength of mind which this immovable goodness supposes may +likewise be viewed as an object of contemplation distinct from the +goodness itself. Superior excellence of any kind, as well as +superior wisdom and power, is the object of awe and reverence to all +creatures, whatever their moral character be; but so far as +creatures of the lowest rank were good, so far the view of this +character, as simply good, must appear amiable to them, be the +object of, or beget love. Further suppose we were conscious that +this superior person so far approved of us that we had nothing +servilely to fear from him; that he was really our friend, and kind +and good to us in particular, as he had occasionally intercourse +with us: we must be other creatures than we are, or we could not +but feel the same kind of satisfaction and enjoyment (whatever would +be the degree of it) from this higher acquaintance and friendship as +we feel from common ones, the intercourse being real and the persons +equally present in both cases. We should have a more ardent desire +to be approved by his better judgment, and a satisfaction in that +approbation of the same sort with what would be felt in respect to +common persons, or be wrought in us by their presence. + +Let us now raise the character, and suppose this creature, for we +are still going on with the supposition of a creature, our proper +guardian and governor; that we were in a progress of being towards +somewhat further; and that his scheme of government was too vast for +our capacities to comprehend: remembering still that he is +perfectly good, and our friend as well as our governor. Wisdom, +power, goodness, accidentally viewed anywhere, would inspire +reverence, awe, love; and as these affections would be raised in +higher or lower degrees in proportion as we had occasionally more or +less intercourse with the creature endued with those qualities, so +this further consideration and knowledge that he was our proper +guardian and governor would much more bring these objects and +qualities home to ourselves; teach us they had a greater respect to +us in particular, that we had a higher interest in that wisdom and +power and goodness. We should, with joy, gratitude, reverence, +love, trust, and dependence, appropriate the character, as what we +had a right in, and make our boast in such our relation to it. And +the conclusion of the whole would be that we should refer ourselves +implicitly to him, and cast ourselves entirely upon him. As the +whole attention of life should be to obey his commands, so the +highest enjoyment of it must arise from the contemplation of this +character, and our relation to it, from a consciousness of his +favour and approbation, and from the exercise of those affections +towards him which could not but be raised from his presence. A +Being who hath these attributes, who stands in this relation, and is +thus sensibly present to the mind, must necessarily be the object of +these affections: there is as real a correspondence between them as +between the lowest appetite of sense and its object. + +That this Being is not a creature, but the Almighty God; that He is +of infinite power and wisdom and goodness, does not render Him less +the object of reverence and love than He would be if He had those +attributes only in a limited degree. The Being who made us, and +upon whom we entirely depend, is the object of some regards. He +hath given us certain affections of mind, which correspond to +wisdom, power, goodness, i.e. which are raised upon view of those +qualities. If then He be really wise, powerful, good, He is the +natural object of those affections which He hath endued us with, and +which correspond to those attributes. That He is infinite in power, +perfect in wisdom and goodness, makes no alteration, but only that +He is the object of those affections raised to the highest pitch. +He is not, indeed, to be discerned by any of our senses. I go +forward, but He is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive +Him: on the left hand where He doth work, but I cannot behold Him: +He hideth Himself on the right hand, that I cannot see Him, Oh that +I knew where I might find Him! that I might come even to His seat! +{30} But is He then afar off? does He not fill heaven and earth +with His presence? The presence of our fellow-creatures affects our +senses, and our senses give us the knowledge of their presence; +which hath different kinds of influence upon us--love, joy, sorrow, +restraint, encouragement, reverence. However, this influence is not +immediately from our senses, but from that knowledge. Thus suppose +a person neither to see nor hear another, not to know by any of his +senses, but yet certainly to know, that another was with him; this +knowledge might, and in many cases would, have one or more of the +effects before mentioned. It is therefore not only reasonable, but +also natural, to be affected with a presence, though it be not the +object of our senses; whether it be, or be not, is merely an +accidental circumstance, which needs not come into consideration: +it is the certainty that he is with us, and we with him, which hath +the influence. We consider persons then as present, not only when +they are within reach of our senses, but also when we are assured by +any other means that they are within such a nearness; nay, if they +are not, we can recall them to our mind, and be moved towards them +as present; and must He, who is so much more intimately with us, +that IN HIM WE LIVE AND MOVE AND HAVE OUR BEING, be thought too +distant to be the object of our affections? We own and feel the +force of amiable and worthy qualities in our fellow creatures; and +can we be insensible to the contemplation of perfect goodness? Do +we reverence the shadows of greatness here below, are we solicitous +about honour and esteem and the opinion of the world, and shall we +not feel the same with respect to Him whose are wisdom and power in +the original, who IS THE GOD OF JUDGMENT BY WHOM ACTIONS ARE +WEIGHED? Thus love, reverence, desire of esteem, every faculty, +every affection, tends towards and is employed about its respective +object in common cases: and must the exercise of them be suspended +with regard to Him alone who is an object, an infinitely more than +adequate object, to our most exalted faculties; Him, OF WHOM, AND +THROUGH WHOM, AND TO WHOM ARE ALL THINGS? + +As we cannot remove from this earth, or change our general business +on it, so neither can we alter our real nature. Therefore no +exercise of the mind can be recommended, but only the exercise of +those faculties you are conscious of. Religion does not demand new +affections, but only claims the direction of those you already have, +those affections you daily feel; though unhappily confined to +objects not altogether unsuitable but altogether unequal to them. +We only represent to you the higher, the adequate objects of those +very faculties and affections. Let the man of ambition go on still +to consider disgrace as the greatest evil, honour as his chief good. +But disgrace in whose estimation? Honour in whose judgment? This +is the only question. If shame, and delight in esteem, be spoken of +as real, as any settled ground of pain or pleasure, both these must +be in proportion to the supposed wisdom, and worth of him by whom we +are contemned or esteemed. Must it then be thought enthusiastical +to speak of a sensibility of this sort which shall have respect to +an unerring judgment, to infinite wisdom, when we are assured this +unerring judgment, this infinite wisdom does observe upon our +actions? + +It is the same with respect to the love of God in the strictest and +most confined sense. We only offer and represent the highest object +of an affection supposed already in your mind. Some degree of +goodness must be previously supposed; this always implies the love +of itself, an affection to goodness: the highest, the adequate +object of this affection, is perfect goodness; which therefore we +are to LOVE WITH ALL OUR HEART, WITH ALL OUR SOUL, AND WITH ALL OUR +STRENGTH. "Must we then, forgetting our own interest, as it were go +out of ourselves, and love God for His own sake?" No more forget +your own interest, no more go out of yourselves, than when you +prefer one place, one prospect, the conversation of one man to that +of another. Does not every affection necessarily imply that the +object of it be itself loved? If it be not it is not the object of +the affection. You may, and ought if you can, but it is a great +mistake to think you can love or fear or hate anything, from +consideration that such love or fear or hatred may be a means of +obtaining good or avoiding evil. But the question whether we ought +to love God for His sake or for our own being a mere mistake in +language, the real question which this is mistaken for will, I +suppose, be answered by observing that the goodness of God already +exercised towards us, our present dependence upon Him, and our +expectation of future benefits, ought, and have a natural tendency, +to beget in us the affection of gratitude, and greater love towards +Him, than the same goodness exercised towards others; were it only +for this reason, that every affection is moved in proportion to the +sense we have of the object of it; and we cannot but have a more +lively sense of goodness when exercised towards ourselves than when +exercised towards others. I added expectation of future benefits +because the ground of that expectation is present goodness. + +Thus Almighty God is the natural object of the several affections, +love, reverence, fear, desire of approbation. For though He is +simply one, yet we cannot but consider Him in partial and different +views. He is in himself one uniform Being, and for ever the same +without VARIABLENESS OR SHADOW OF TURNING; but His infinite +greatness, His goodness, His wisdom, are different objects to our +mind. To which is to be added, that from the changes in our own +characters, together with His unchangeableness, we cannot but +consider ourselves as more or less the objects of His approbation, +and really be so. For if He approves what is good, He cannot, +merely from the unchangeableness of His nature, approve what is +evil. Hence must arise more various movements of mind, more +different kinds of affections. And this greater variety also is +just and reasonable in such creatures as we are, though it respects +a Being simply one, good and perfect. As some of these actions are +most particularly suitable to so imperfect a creature as man in this +mortal state we are passing through, so there may be other exercises +of mind, or some of these in higher degrees, our employment and +happiness in a state of perfection. + + + +SERMON XIV. + + + +Consider then our ignorance, the imperfection of our nature, our +virtue, and our condition in this world, with respect to aim +infinitely good and just Being, our Creator and Governor, and you +will see what religious affections of mind are most particularly +suitable to this mortal state we are passing through. + +Though we are not affected with anything so strongly as what we +discern with our senses, and though our nature and condition require +that we be much taken up about sensible things, yet our reason +convinces us that God is present with us, and we see and feel the +effects of His goodness: He is therefore the object of some +regards. The imperfection of our virtue, joined with the +consideration of His absolute rectitude or holiness, will scarce +permit that perfection of love which entirely casts out all fear: +yet goodness is the object of love to all creatures who have any +degree of it themselves; and consciousness of a real endeavour to +approve ourselves to Him, joined with the consideration of His +goodness, as it quite excludes servile dread and horror, so it is +plainly a reasonable ground for hope of His favour. Neither fear +nor hope nor love then are excluded, and one or another of these +will prevail, according to the different views we have of God, and +ought to prevail, according to the changes we find in our own +character. There is a temper of mind made up of, or which follows +from all three, fear, hope, love--namely, resignation to the Divine +will, which is the general temper belonging to this state; which +ought to be the habitual frame of our mind and heart, and to be +exercised at proper seasons more distinctly, in acts of devotion. + +Resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety. It includes +in it all that is good, and is a source of the most settled quiet +and composure of mind. There is the general principle of submission +in our nature. Man is not so constituted as to desire things, and +be uneasy in the want of them, in proportion to their known value: +many other considerations come in to determine the degrees of +desire; particularly whether the advantage we take a view of be +within the sphere of our rank. Whoever felt uneasiness upon +observing any of the advantages brute creatures have over us? And +yet it is plain they have several. It is the same with respect to +advantages belonging to creatures of a superior order. Thus, though +we see a thing to be highly valuable, yet that it does not belong to +our condition of being is sufficient to suspend our desires after +it, to make us rest satisfied without such advantage. Now there is +just the same reason for quiet resignation in the want of everything +equally unattainable and out of our reach in particular, though +others of our species be possessed of it. All this may be applied +to the whole of life; to positive inconveniences as well as wants, +not indeed to the sensations of pain and sorrow, but to all the +uneasinesses of reflection, murmuring, and discontent. Thus is +human nature formed to compliance, yielding, submission of temper. +We find the principles of it within us; and every one exercises it +towards some objects or other, i.e. feels it with regard to some +persons and some circumstances. Now this is an excellent foundation +of a reasonable and religious resignation. Nature teaches and +inclines as to take up with our lot; the consideration that the +course of things is unalterable hath a tendency to quiet the mind +under it, to beget a submission of temper to it. But when we can +add that this unalterable course is appointed and continued by +infinite wisdom and goodness, how absolute should be our submission, +how entire our trust and dependence! + +This would reconcile us to our condition, prevent all the +supernumerary troubles arising from imagination, distant fears, +impatience--all uneasiness, except that which necessarily arises +from the calamities themselves we may be under. How many of our +cares should we by this means be disburdened of! Cares not properly +our own, how apt soever they may be to intrude upon us, and we to +admit them; the anxieties of expectation, solicitude about success +and disappointment, which in truth are none of our concern. How +open to every gratification would that mind be which was clear of +these encumbrances! + +Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect when +our will is lost and resolved up into His: when we rest in His will +as our end, as being itself most just and right and good. And where +is the impossibility of such an affection to what is just, and +right, and good, such a loyalty of heart to the Governor of the +universe as shall prevail over all sinister indirect desires of our +own? Neither is this at bottom anything more than faith and honesty +and fairness of mind--in a more enlarged sense indeed than those +words are commonly used. And as, in common cases, fear and hope and +other passions are raised in us by their respective objects, so this +submission of heart and soul and mind, this religious resignation, +would be as naturally produced by our having just conceptions of +Almighty God, and a real sense of His presence with us. In how low +a degree soever this temper usually prevails amongst men, yet it is +a temper right in itself: it is what we owe to our Creator: it is +particularly suitable to our mortal condition, and what we should +endeavour after for our own sakes in our passage through such a +world as this, where is nothing upon which we can rest or depend, +nothing but what we are liable to be deceived and disappointed in. +Thus we might ACQUAINT OURSELVES WITH GOD, AND BE AT PEACE. This is +piety an religion in the strictest sense, considered as a habit of +mind: an habitual sense of God's presence with us; being affected +towards Him, as present, in the manner His superior nature requires +from such a creature as man: this is to WALK WITH GOD. + +Little more need be said of devotion or religious worship than that +it is this temper exerted into act. The nature of it consists in +the actual exercise of those affections towards God which are +supposed habitual in good men. He is always equally present with +us: but we are so much taken up with sensible things that, Lo, He +goeth by us, and we see Him not: He passeth on also, but we +perceive Him not. {31} Devotion is retirement from the world He has +made to Him alone: it is to withdraw from the avocations of sense, +to employ our attention wholly upon Him as upon an object actually +present, to yield ourselves up to the influence of the Divine +presence, and to give full scope to the affections of gratitude, +love, reverence, trust, and dependence; of which infinite power, +wisdom, and goodness is the natural and only adequate object. We +may apply to the whole of devotion those words of the Son of Sirach, +When you glorify the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for even +yet will He far exceed: and when you exalt Him, put forth all your +strength, and be not weary; for you can never go far enough. {32} +Our most raised affections of every kind cannot but fall short and +be disproportionate when an infinite being is the object of them. +This is the highest exercise and employment of mind that a creature +is capable of. As this divine service and worship is itself +absolutely due to God, so also is it necessary in order to a further +end, to keep alive upon our minds a sense of His authority, a sense +that in our ordinary behaviour amongst men we act under him as our +Governor and Judge. + +Thus you see the temper of mind respecting God which is particularly +suitable to a state of imperfection, to creatures in a progress of +being towards somewhat further. + +Suppose now this something further attained, that we were arrived at +it, what a perception will it be to see and know and feel that our +trust was not vain, our dependence not groundless? That the issue, +event, and consummation came out such as fully to justify and answer +that resignation? If the obscure view of the divine perfection +which we have in this world ought in just consequence to beget an +entire resignation, what will this resignation be exalted into when +WE SHALL SEE FACE TO FACE, AND KNOW AS WE ARE KNOWN? If we cannot +form any distinct notion of that perfection of the love of God which +CASTS OUT ALL FEAR, of that enjoyment of Him which will be the +happiness of good men hereafter, the consideration of our wants and +capacities of happiness, and that He will be adequate supply to +them, must serve us instead of such distinct conception of the +particular happiness itself. + +Let us then suppose a man entirely disengaged from business and +pleasure, sitting down alone and at leisure, to reflect upon himself +and his own condition of being. He would immediately feel that he +was by no means complete of himself, but totally insufficient for +his own happiness. One may venture to affirm that every man hath +felt this, whether he hath again reflected upon it or not. It is +feeling this deficiency, that they are unsatisfied with themselves, +which makes men look out for assistance from abroad, and which has +given rise to various kinds of amusements, altogether needless any +otherwise than as they serve to fill up the blank spaces of time, +and so hinder their feeling this deficiency, and being uneasy with +themselves. Now, if these external things we take up with were +really an adequate supply to this deficiency of human nature, if by +their means our capacities and desires were all satisfied and filled +up, then it might be truly said that we had found out the proper +happiness of man, and so might sit down satisfied, and be at rest in +the enjoyment of it. But if it appears that the amusements which +men usually pass their time in are so far from coming up to or +answering our notions and desires of happiness or good that they are +really no more than what they are commonly called, somewhat to pass +away the time, i.e. somewhat which serves to turn us aside from, and +prevent our attending to, this our internal poverty and want; if +they serve only, or chiefly, to suspend instead of satisfying our +conceptions and desires of happiness; if the want remains, and we +have found out little more than barely the means of making it less +sensible; then are we still to seek for somewhat to be an adequate +supply to it. It is plain that there is a capacity in the nature of +man which neither riches nor honours nor sensual gratifications, nor +anything in this world, can perfectly fill up or satisfy: there is +a deeper and more essential want than any of these things can be the +supply of. Yet surely there is a possibility of somewhat which may +fill up all our capacities of happiness, somewhat in which our souls +may find rest, somewhat which may be to us that satisfactory good we +are inquiring after. But it cannot be anything which is valuable +only as it tends to some further end. Those therefore who have got +this world so much into their hearts as not to be able to consider +happiness as consisting in anything but property and possessions-- +which are only valuable as the means to somewhat else--cannot have +the least glimpse of the subject before us, which is the end, not +the means; the thing itself, not somewhat in order to it. But if +you can lay aside that general, confused, undeterminate notion of +happiness, as consisting in such possessions, and fix in your +thoughts that it really can consist in nothing but in a faculty's +having its proper object, you will clearly see that in the coolest +way of consideration, without either the heat of fanciful enthusiasm +or the warmth of real devotion, nothing is more certain than that an +infinite Being may Himself be, if He pleases, the supply to all the +capacities of our nature. All the common enjoyments of life are +from the faculties He hath endued us with and the objects He hath +made suitable to them. He may Himself be to us infinitely more than +all these; He may be to us all that we want. As our understanding +can contemplate itself, and our affections be exercised upon +themselves by reflection, so may each be employed in the same manner +upon any other mind; and since the Supreme Mind, the Author and +Cause of all things, is the highest possible object to Himself, He +may be an adequate supply to all the faculties of our souls, a +subject to our understanding, and an object to our affections. + +Consider then: when we shall have put off this mortal body, when we +shall be divested of sensual appetites, and those possessions which +are now the means of gratification shall be of no avail, when this +restless scene of business and vain pleasures, which now diverts us +from ourselves, shall be all over, we, our proper self, shall still +remain: we shall still continue the same creatures we are, with +wants to be supplied and capacities of happiness. We must have +faculties of perception, though not sensitive ones; and pleasure or +uneasiness from our perceptions, as now we have. + +There are certain ideas which we express by the words order, +harmony, proportion, beauty, the furthest removed from anything +sensual. Now what is there in those intellectual images, forms, or +ideas, which begets that approbation, love, delight, and even +rapture, which is seen in some persons' faces upon having those +objects present to their minds?--"Mere enthusiasm!"--Be it what it +will: there are objects, works of nature and of art, which all +mankind have delight from quite distinct from their affording +gratification to sensual appetites, and from quite another view of +them than as being for their interest and further advantage. The +faculties from which we are capable of these pleasures, and the +pleasures themselves, are as natural, and as much to be accounted +for, as any sensual appetite whatever, and the pleasure from its +gratification. Words to be sure are wanting upon this subject; to +say that everything of grace and beauty throughout the whole of +nature, everything excellent and amiable shared in differently lower +degrees by the whole creation, meet in the Author and Cause of all +things, this is an inadequate and perhaps improper way of speaking +of the Divine nature; but it is manifest that absolute rectitude, +the perfection of being, must be in all senses, and in every +respect, the highest object to the mind. + +In this world it is only the effects of wisdom and power and +greatness which we discern; it is not impossible that hereafter the +qualities themselves in the supreme Being may be the immediate +object of contemplation. What amazing wonders are opened to view by +late improvements! What an object is the universe to a creature, if +there be a creature who can comprehend its system! But it must be +an infinitely higher exercise of the understanding to view the +scheme of it in that mind which projected it before its foundations +were laid. And surely we have meaning to the words when we speak of +going further, and viewing, not only this system in His mind, but +the wisdom and intelligence itself from whence it proceeded. The +same may be said of power. But since wisdom and power are not God, +He is a wise, a powerful Being; the divine nature may therefore be a +further object to the understanding. It is nothing to observe that +our senses give us but an imperfect knowledge of things: effects +themselves, if we knew them thoroughly, would give us but imperfect +notions of wisdom and power; much less of His being in whom they +reside. I am not speaking of any fanciful notion of seeing all +things in God, but only representing to you how much a higher object +to the understanding an infinite Being Himself is than the things +which He has made; and this is no more than saying that the Creator +is superior to the works of His hands. + +This may be illustrated by a low example. Suppose a machine, the +sight of which would raise, and discoveries in its contrivance +gratify, our curiosity: the real delight in this case would arise +from its being the effect of skill and contrivance. This skill in +the mind of the artificer would be a higher object, if we had any +senses or ways to discern it. For, observe, the contemplation of +that principle, faculty, or power which produced any effect must be +a higher exercise of the understanding than the contemplation of the +effect itself. The cause must be a higher object to the mind than +the effect. + +But whoever considers distinctly what the delight of knowledge is +will see reason to be satisfied that it cannot be the chief good of +man: all this, as it is applicable, so it was mentioned with regard +to the attribute of goodness. I say goodness. Our being and all +our enjoyments are the effects of it: just men bear its +resemblance; but how little do we know of the original, of what it +is in itself? Recall what was before observed concerning the +affection to moral characters--which, in how low a degree soever, +yet is plainly natural to man, and the most excellent part of his +nature. Suppose this improved, as it may be improved, to any degree +whatever, in the SPIRITS OF JUST MEN MADE PERFECT; and then suppose +that they had a real view of that RIGHTEOUSNESS WHICH IS AN +EVERLASTING RIGHTEOUSNESS, of the conformity of the Divine will to +THE LAW OF TRUTH in which the moral attributes of God consist, of +that goodness in the sovereign Mind which gave birth to the +universe. Add, what will be true of all good men hereafter, a +consciousness of having an interest in what they are contemplating-- +suppose them able to say, THIS GOD IS OUR GOD FOR EVER AND EVER. +Would they be any longer to seek for what was their chief happiness, +their final good? Could the utmost stretch of their capacities look +further? Would not infinite perfect goodness be their very end, the +last end and object of their affections, beyond which they could +neither have nor desire, beyond which they could not form a wish or +thought? + +Consider wherein that presence of a friend consists which has often +so strong an effect as wholly to possess the mind, and entirely +suspend all other affections and regards, and which itself affords +the highest satisfaction and enjoyment. He is within reach of the +senses. Now as our capacities of perception improve we shall have, +perhaps by some faculty entirely new, a perception of God's presence +with us in a nearer and stricter way, since it is certain He is more +intimately present with us than anything else can be. Proof of the +existence and presence of any being is quite different from the +immediate perception, the consciousness of it. What then will be +the joy of heart which His presence and THE LIGHT OF HIS +COUNTENANCE, who is the life of the universe, will inspire good men +with when they shall have a sensation that He is the sustainer of +their being, that they exist in Him; when they shall feel His +influence to cheer and enliven and support their frame, in a manner +of which we have now no conception? He will be in a literal sense +THEIR STRENGTH AND THEIR PORTION FOR EVER. + +When we speak of things so much above our comprehension as the +employment and happiness of a future state, doubtless it behoves us +to speak with all modesty and distrust of ourselves. But the +Scripture represents the happiness of that state under the notions +of SEEING GOD, SEEING HIM AS HE IS, KNOWING AS WE ARE KNOWN, AND +SEEING FACE TO FACE. These words are not general or undetermined, +but express a particular determinate happiness. And I will be bold +to say that nothing can account for or come up to these expressions +but only this, that God Himself will be an object to our faculties, +that He Himself will be our happiness as distinguished from the +enjoyments of the present state, which seem to arise not immediately +from Him but from the objects He has adapted to give us delight. + +To conclude: Let us suppose a person tired with care and sorrow and +the repetition of vain delights which fill up the round of life; +sensible that everything here below in its best estate is altogether +vanity. Suppose him to feel that deficiency of human nature before +taken notice of, and to be convinced that God alone was the adequate +supply to it. What could be more applicable to a good man in this +state of mind, or better express his present wants and distant +hopes, his passage through this world as a progress towards a state +of perfection, than the following passages in the devotions of the +royal prophet? They are plainly in a higher and more proper sense +applicable to this than they could be to anything else. I have seen +an end of all perfection. Whom have I in heaven but Thee? And +there is none upon earth that I desire in comparison of Thee. My +flesh and may heart faileth: but God is the strength of my heart +and my portion for ever. Like as the hart desireth the water- +brooks, so longeth my soul after Thee, O God. My soul is athirst +for God, yea, even for the living God: when shall I come to appear +before Him? How excellent is Thy loving-kindness, O God! and the +children of men shall put their trust under the shadow of Thy wings. +They shall be satisfied with the plenteousness of Thy house: and +Thou shalt give them drink of Thy pleasures, as out of the river. +For with Thee is the well of life: and in Thy light shall we see +light. Blessed is the man whom Thou choosest, and receivest unto +Thee: he shall dwell in Thy court, and shall be satisfied with the +pleasures of Thy house, even of Thy holy temple. Blessed is the +people, O Lord, that can rejoice in Thee: they shall walk in the +light of Thy countenance. Their delight shall be daily in Thy name, +and in Thy righteousness shall they make their boast. For Thou art +the glory of their strength: and in Thy lovingkindness they shall +be exalted. As for me, I will behold Thy presence in righteousness: +and when I awake up after Thy likeness, I shall be satisfied with +it. Thou shalt shew me the path of life; in Thy presence is the +fulness of joy, and at Thy right hand there is pleasure for +evermore. + + + +Footnotes: + +{1} 1 Cor. xii + +{2} Suppose a man of learning to be writing a grave book upon HUMAN +NATURE, and to show in several parts of it that he had an insight +into the subject he was considering, amongst other things, the +following one would require to be accounted for--the appearance of +benevolence or good-will in men towards each other in the instances +of natural relation, and in others. {2a} Cautions of being deceived +with outward show, he retires within himself to see exactly what +that is in the mind of man from whence this appearance proceeds; +and, upon deep reflection, asserts the principle in the mind to be +only the love of power, and delight in the exercise of it. Would +not everybody think here was a mistake of one word for another--that +the philosopher was contemplating and accounting for some other +HUMAN ACTIONS, some other behaviour of man to man? And could any +one be thoroughly satisfied that what is commonly called benevolence +or good-will was really the affection meant, but only by being made +to understand that this learned person had a general hypothesis, to +which the appearance of good-will could no otherwise be reconciled? +That what has this appearance is often nothing but ambition; that +delight in superiority often (suppose always) mixes itself with +benevolence, only makes it more specious to call it ambition than +hunger, of the two: but in reality that passion does no more +account for the whole appearances of good-will than this appetite +does. Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that +good to another, which he knows himself unable to procure him; and +rejoicing in it, though bestowed by a third person? And can love of +power any way possibly come in to account for this desire or +delight? Is there not often the appearance of men's distinguishing +between two or more persons, preferring one before another, to do +good to, in cases where love of power cannot in the least account +for the distinction and preference? For this principle can no +otherwise distinguish between objects than as it is a greater +instance and exertion of power to do good to one rather than to +another. Again, suppose good-will in the mind of man to be nothing +but delight in the exercise of power: men might indeed be +restrained by distant and accidental consideration; but these +restraints being removed, they would have a disposition to, and +delight in, mischief as an exercise and proof of power: and this +disposition and delight would arise from, or be the same principle +in the mind, as a disposition to and delight in charity. Thus +cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment, would be exactly the +same in the mind of man as good-will: that one tends to the +happiness, the other to the misery, of our fellow-creatures, is, it +seems, merely an accidental circumstance, which the mind has not the +least regard to. These are the absurdities which even men of +capacity run into when they have occasion to belie their nature, and +will perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally +stamped upon it, the traces of which, however faint, are plainly +discernible upon the mind of man. + +If any person can in earnest doubt whether there be such a thing as +good-will in one man towards another (for the question is not +concerning either the degree or extensiveness of it, but concerning +the affection itself), let it be observed that WHETHER MAN BE THUS, +OR OTHERWISE CONSTITUTED, WHAT IS THE INWARD FRAME IN THIS +PARTICULAR is a mere question of fact of natural history not +provable immediately by reason. It is therefore to be judged of and +determined in the same way other facts or matters of natural history +are--by appealing to the external senses, or inward perceptions +respectively, as the matter under consideration is cognisable by one +or the other: by arguing from acknowledged facts and actions for a +great number of actions in the same kind, in different +circumstances, and respecting different objects, will prove to a +certainty what principles they do not, and to the greatest +probability what principles they do, proceed from: and, lastly, by +the testimony of mankind. Now that there is some degree of +benevolence amongst men may be as strongly and plainly proved in all +these ways, as it could possibly be proved, supposing there was this +affection in our nature. And should any one think fit to assert +that resentment in the mind of man was absolutely nothing but +reasonable concern for our own safety, the falsity of this, and what +is the real nature of that passion, could be shown in no other ways +than those in which it may be shown that there is such a thing in +SOME DEGREE as real good-will in man towards man. It is sufficient +that the seeds of it be implanted in our nature by God. There is, +it is owned, much left for us to do upon our own heart and temper; +to cultivate, to improve, to call it forth, to exercise it in a +steady, uniform manner. This is our work: this is virtue and +religion. + +{2a} Hobbes, "Of Human Nature," c. ix. 7. + +{3} Everybody makes a distinction between self-love and the several +particular passions, appetites, and affections; and yet they are +often confounded again. That they are totally different, will be +seen by any one who will distinguish between the passions and +appetites THEMSELVES, and ENDEAVOURING after the means of their +gratification. Consider the appetite of hunger, and the desire of +esteem: these being the occasion both of pleasure and pain, the +coolest self-love, as well as the appetites and passions themselves, +may put us upon making use of the PROPER METHODS OF OBTAINING that +pleasure, and avoiding that pain; but the FEELINGS themselves, the +pain of hunger and shame, and the delight from esteem, are no more +self-love than they are anything in the world. Though a man hated +himself, he would as much feel the pain of hunger as he would that +of the gout; and it is plainly supposable there may be creatures +with self-love in them to the highest degree, who may be quite +insensible and indifferent (as men in some cases are) to the +contempt and esteem of those upon whom their happiness does not in +some further respects depend. And as self-love and the several +particular passions and appetites are in themselves totally +different, so that some actions proceed from one and some from the +other will be manifest to any who will observe the two following +very supposable cases. One man rushes upon certain ruin for the +gratification of a present desire: nobody will call the principle +of this action self-love. Suppose another man to go through some +laborious work upon promise of a great reward, without any distinct +knowledge what the reward will be: this course of action cannot be +ascribed to any particular passion. The former of these actions is +plainly to be imputed to some particular passion or affection; the +latter as plainly to the general affection or principle of self- +love. That there are some particular pursuits or actions concerning +which we cannot determine how far they are owing to one, and how far +to the other, proceeds from this, that the two principles are +frequently mixed together, and run up into each other. This +distinction is further explained in the Eleventh Sermon. + +{4} If any desire to see this distinction and comparison made in a +particular instance, the appetite and passion now mentioned may +serve for one. Hunger is to be considered as a private appetite, +because the end for which it was given us is the preservation of the +individual. Desire of esteem is a public passion; because the end +for which it was given us is to regulate our behaviour towards +society. The respect which this has to private good is as remote as +the respect that has to public good; and the appetite is no more +self-love than the passion is benevolence. The object and end of +the former is merely food; the object and end of the latter is +merely esteem; but the latter can no more be gratified without +contributing to the good of society, than the former can be +gratified without contributing to the preservation of the +individual. + +{5} Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or +superiority over others with whom we compare ourselves. There does +not appear to be any other GRIEF in the natural passion, but only +THAT WANT which is implied in desire. However, this may be so +strong as to be the occasion of great GRIEF. To desire the +attainment of this equality or superiority by the PARTICULAR MEANS +of others being brought down to our own level, or below it, is, I +think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see +that the real end, which the natural passion emulation, and which +the unlawful one envy aims at, is exactly the same; namely, that +equality or superiority: and consequently, that to do mischief is +not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain +its end. As to resentment, see the Eighth Sermon. + +{6} Ephes. ii. 3. + +{7} Every man in his physical nature is one individual single +agent. He has likewise properties and principles, each of which may +be considered separately, and without regard to the respects which +they have to each other. Neither of these is the nature we are +taking a view of. But it is the inward frame of man considered as a +SYSTEM or CONSTITUTION: whose several parts are united, not by a +physical principle of individuation, but by the respects they have +to each other; the chief of which is the subjection which the +appetites, passions, and particular affections have to the one +supreme principle of reflection or conscience. The system or +constitution is formed by and consists in these respects and this +subjection. Thus the body is a SYSTEM or CONSTITUTION: so is a +tree: so is every machine. Consider all the several parts of a +tree without the natural reselects they have to each other, and you +have not at all the idea of a tree; but add these respects, and this +gives you the idea. This body may be impaired by sickness, a tree +may decay, a machine be out of order, and yet the system and +constitution of them not totally dissolved. There is plainly +somewhat which answers to all this in the moral constitution of man. +Whoever will consider his own nature will see that the several +appetites, passions, and particular affections have different +respects amongst themselves. They are restraints upon, and are in a +proportion to, each other. This proportion is just and perfect, +when all those under principles are perfectly coincident with +conscience, so far as their nature permits, and in all cases under +its absolute and entire direction. The least excess or defect, the +least alteration of the due proportions amongst themselves, or of +their coincidence with conscience, though not proceeding into +action, is some degree of disorder in the moral constitution. But +perfection, though plainly intelligible and unsupportable, was never +attained by any man. If the higher principle of reflection +maintains its place, and as much as it can corrects that disorder, +and hinders it from breaking out into action, this is all that can +be expected in such a creature as man. And though the appetites and +passions have not their exact due proportion to each other, though +they often strive for mastery with judgment or reflection, yet, +since the superiority of this principle to all others is the chief +respect which forms the constitution, so far as this superiority is +maintained, the character, the man, is good, worthy, virtuous. + +{8} Chap. iii., ver. 6. + +{9} Job xiii. 5. + +{10} Eccles. x. 3. + +{11} Prov. x. 19. + +{12} Mark xii. 38, 40. + +{13} There being manifestly this appearance of men's substituting +others for themselves, and being carried out and affected towards +them as towards themselves; some persons, who have a system which +excludes every affection of this sort, have taken a pleasant method +to solve it; and tell you it is NOT ANOTHER you are at all concerned +about, but your SELF ONLY, when you feel the affection called +compassion, i.e. Here is a plain matter of fact, which men cannot +reconcile with the general account they think fit to give of things: +they therefore, instead of that manifest fact, substitute ANOTHER, +which is reconcilable to their own scheme. For does not everybody +by compassion mean an affection, the object of which is another in +distress? instead of this, but designing to have it mistaken for +this, they speak of an affection or passion, the object of which is +ourselves, or danger to ourselves. Hobbes defines PITY, +IMAGINATION, OR FICTION OF FUTURE CALAMITY TO OURSELVES, PROCEEDING +FROM THE SENSE (he means sight or knowledge) OF ANOTHER MAN'S +CALAMITY. Thus fear and compassion would be the same idea, and a +fearful and a compassionate man the same character, which every one +immediately sees are totally different. Further, to those who give +any scope to their affections, there is no perception or inward +feeling more universal than this: that one who has been merciful +and compassionate throughout the course of his behaviour should +himself be treated with kindness, if he happens to fall into +circumstances of distress. Is fear, then, or cowardice, so great a +recommendation to the favour of the bulk of mankind? Or is it not +plain that mere fearlessness (and therefore not the contrary) is one +of the most popular qualifications? This shows that mankind are not +affected towards compassion as fear, but as somewhat totally +different. + +Nothing would more expose such accounts as these of the affections +which are favourable and friendly to our fellow-creatures than to +substitute the definitions, which this author, and others who follow +his steps, give of such affections, instead of the words by which +they are commonly expressed. Hobbes, after having laid down that +pity or compassion is only fear for ourselves, goes on to explain +the reason why we pity our friends in distress more than others. +Now substitute the word DEFINITION instead of the word PITY in this +place, and the inquiry will be, why we fear our friends, &c., which +words (since he really does not mean why we are afraid of them) make +no question or sentence at all. So that common language, the words +TO COMPASSIONATE, TO PITY, cannot be accommodated to his account of +compassion. The very joining of the words to PITY OUR FRIENDS is a +direct contradiction to his definition of pity: because those +words, so joined, necessarily express that our friends are the +objects of the passion; whereas his definition of it asserts that +ourselves (or danger to ourselves) are the only objects of it. He +might indeed have avoided this absurdity, by plainly saying what he +is going to account for; namely, why the sight of the innocent, or +of our friends in distress, raises greater fear for ourselves than +the sight of other persons in distress. But had he put the thing +thus plainly, the fact itself would have been doubted; that THE +SIGHT OF OUR FRIENDS IN DISTRESS RAISES IN US GREATER FEAR FOR +OURSELVES THAN THE SIGHT OF OTHERS IN DISTRESS. And in the next +place it would immediately have occurred to every one that the fact +now mentioned, which at least is doubtful whether, true or false, +was not the same with this fact, which nobody ever doubted, that THE +SIGHT OF OUR FRIENDS IN DISTRESS RAISES IN US GREATER COMPASSION +THAN THE SIGHT OF OTHERS IN DISTRESS: every one, I say, would have +seen that these are not the same, but TWO DIFFERENT inquiries; and, +consequently, that fear and compassion are not the same. Suppose a +person to be in real danger, and by some means or other to have +forgot it; any trifling accident, any sound might alarm him, recall +the danger to his remembrance, and renew his fear; but it is almost +too grossly ridiculous (though it is to show an absurdity) to speak +of that sound or accident as an object of compassion; and yet, +according to Mr. Hobbes, our greatest friend in distress is no more +to us, no more the object of compassion, or of any affection in our +heart: neither the one nor the other raises any emotion in one +mind, but only the thoughts of our liableness to calamity, and the +fear of it; and both equally do this. It is fit such sort of +accounts of human nature should be shown to be what they really are, +because there is raised upon them a general scheme, which undermines +the whole foundation of common justice and honesty. See Hobbes of +Human Nature, c. 9. section 10. + +There are often three distinct perceptions or inward feelings upon +sight of persons in distress: real sorrow and concern for the +misery of our fellow-creatures; some degree of satisfaction from a +consciousness of our freedom from that misery; and as the mind +passes on from one thing to another it is not unnatural from such an +occasion to reflect upon our own liableness to the same or other +calamities. The two last frequently accompany the first, but it is +the first ONLY which is properly compassion, of which the distressed +are the objects, and which directly carries us with calmness and +thought to their assistance. Any one of these, from various and +complicated reasons, may in particular cases prevail over the other +two; and there are, I suppose, instances, where the bare SIGHT of +distress, without our feeling any compassion for it, may be the +occasion of either or both of the two latter perceptions. One might +add that if there be really any such thing as the fiction or +imagination of danger to ourselves from sight of the miseries of +others, which Hobbes specks of, and which he has absurdly mistaken +for the whole of compassion; if there be anything of this sort +common to mankind, distinct from the reflection of reason, it would +be a most remarkable instance of what was furthest from his +thoughts--namely, of a mutual sympathy between each particular of +the species, a fellow-feeling common to mankind. It would not +indeed be an example of our substituting others for ourselves, but +it would be an example of user substituting ourselves for others. +And as it would not be an instance of benevolence, so neither would +it be any instance of self-love: for this phantom of danger to +ourselves, naturally rising to view upon sight of the distresses of +others, would be no more an instance of love to ourselves than the +pain of hunger is. + +{14} Ecclus. xxxii. 28. + +{15} Ecclus. xlii. 24. + +{16} Ver. 4, 5. + +{17} Ver. 6. + +{18} Micah vi. + +{19} Chap. xxii. 12. + +{20} Ver. 21. + +{21} Chap. iv. + +{22} Chap. xxv. + +{23} Chap. xxxi. + +{24} Chap. ii. + +{24a} In the Cassell edition the sermons jump from sermon VII to XI +with no explanation as to where VIII, IX and X are. I've left the +numbering as is in case there is a good reason for it.--DP + +{25} P. 137. + +{26} Matt. v. 48. + +{27} 1 Cor. xiii. + +{28} For instance as we are not competent judges, what is upon the +whole for the good of the world, there MAY be other immediate ends +appointed us to pursue, besides that one of doing good or producing +happiness. Though the good of the Creation be the only end of the +Author of it, yet he may have laid us under particular obligations, +which we may discern and feel ourselves under, quite distinct from a +perception, that the observance or violation of them it for the +happiness or misery of our fellow-creatures. And this is in fart +the ease, for there are certain dispositions of mind, and certain +actions, which are in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind, +abstracted from the consideration of their tendency to the happiness +or misery of the world approved or disapproved by reflection, by +that principle within, whirls is the guile of life, the judge of +right and wrong. Numberless instances of this kind might be +mentioned. There are pieces of treachery, which in themselves +appear base and detestable to every one. There are actions, which +perhaps can scarce have any other general name given them than +indecencies, which yet are odious and shocking to human nature. +There is such a thing as meanness, a little mind, which as it is +quite distinct from incapacity, so it raises a dislike and +disapprobation quite different from that contempt, which men are too +apt to have, of mere folly. On the other hand, what we call +greatness of mind is the object of another most of approbation, than +superior understanding. Fidelity, honour, strict justice, are +themselves approved in the highest degree, abstracted from the +consideration of their tendency. Now, whether it be thought that +each of these are connected with benevolence in our nature, amid so +may he considered as the same thing with it, or whether some of them +he thought an inferior kind of virtues and vices, somewhat like +natural beauties and deformities, or lastly, plain exceptions to the +general rule, thus such however is certain, that the things now +instanced in, and numberless others, are approved or disapproved by +mankind in general, in quite another view than as conducive to the +happiness or misery of the world. + +{29} St. Austin observes, Amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene +amatur quod amandum sit, ut sit in nobis virtue qua vivitur bene, +i.e. The affection which we rightly have for what is lovely must +ordinate justly, in due manner end proportion, become the object of +a new affection, or be itself beloved, in order to our being endued +with that virtue which is the principle of a good life. Civ. Dei, +1. xv. c. 22. + +{30} Job xxii. + +{31} Job ix. 2. + +{32} Eccius. xliii. 50. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg Human Nature & Other Sermons, by Joseph Butler + diff --git a/old/hmntr10.zip b/old/hmntr10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f35bac9 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/hmntr10.zip |